

C. 7-4. Elements of philosophical rhetoric

Location:

7.1. Elements of Ontology, 1993-1994, (EO1-EO27, 309p.)

7.2. Harmology 1993-1994 (HA1-HA33, 109p.)

7.3. Elements of Philosophy of Religion 1994-1995, (ER1-ER440, 514p.)

7.4. Elements of Philosophical Rhetoric, 1994-1995, (EWR1-EWR31, 37p.)

7.5. Elements of Philosophy of Culture, 1994-1995 (CF1-CF75, 212p.)

7.6. Elements of contemporary philosophy, 1995-1996 (HF1-HF7, 77p.)

Note: *This course has been spaced larger than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current pagination of 'Word'. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'EWR'. They stand for Elements of philosophical rhetoric (In Dutch: 'Elementen Wijsgerige Retoriek'), and are derived from the old page number.*

Introduction: *As a provisional definition of rhetoric, one can use the terms 'language proficiency' or 'theory of understanding'. In ancient Greece, rhetoric answered a need: educating people to become virtuous citizens. Those who could speak well could assert themselves. For some, however, 'rhetoric' became synonymous with asserting oneself through thick and thin, even to the point of unscrupulousness. Jurisprudence is sometimes reduced to what the legal text says, even though, according to some, this does not always align with conscientiousness. Around the turn of the century, many professors complained that their students at universities were no longer able to draft texts. This is a concern that has certainly not diminished in our digital world today; on the contrary. This course aims to examine, in 11 samples, 'the elements' that contribute to the more correct composition of a text.*

C. 7-4. Elements of philosophical rhetoric

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EWR1

Introduction

Ever since ancient Greek Protosophism, a philosophical movement between 450 and 350 BC, incorporated rhetoric, in its then-current form, into philosophy, a course on 'Rhetoric' within the framework of philosophy has been 'normal'. Yet, contemporary rhetoric is a very recent phenomenon. Why? Because, under the influence of a certain form of modern rationalism as well as due to the failure to modernize traditional rhetoric, the subject of 'rhetoric' disappeared, particularly in the last century.

The lemma.

'Lemma' means "provisional definition". The term 'language proficiency' can serve as a lemma for rhetoric. The expression "to be articulate" is well known.

One can also introduce the term 'understanding'. Just as 'rhetoric' means 'theory of language skills' or 'theory of understanding'.

The 'elements'.

'Element' means both 'part' or 'member' and 'preposition' (in this latter sense, it coincides with 'preposition'). "Elements of rhetoric" therefore means "the parts or instances that must be placed first, if one wishes to understand the term 'rhetoric'".

This implies that one would have to discuss **a.** the entire rhetoric, **b.** all rhetorics, and **c.** the totality of all rhetorics in order to be encyclopedically complete. Which no one can do. Which, moreover, is not necessary for our purpose here.

Therefore, the chapters shall bear the name 'sample', the 'grasp' in the whole of rhetoric, in the totality of all rhetoric and in the whole of all rhetoric.

Incidentally: this is one application of the inductive (= generalizing or generalizing) method.

Philosophical is ontological.

The essential distinction between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge on the one hand, and philosophical knowledge on the other, lies in the ontological character of all true philosophizing. 'Ontology' means 'the study of reality'. It brings reality into question as reality. In ancient Greek, it brings into question "being as being".

This can be done in two ways.

- a.** Reality is given (phenomenon, all that reveals itself).
- b.** 'Actual' is also anything that corresponds to the requirements contained by the data.

EWR2

Hegel, the German thinker, introduced this second meaning of 'reality' very clearly. It corresponds to the dichotomy already common among ancient mathematicians: "task (= given + problem) / solution". The solution is truly (understand: true to reality) that which corresponds to both the given and the question or problem.

Applied.

a. Rhetoric is, at least since the ancient Sophists, a given and thus 'real' in the phenomenal sense.

b. Even among the ancient Sophists, rhetoric corresponded to a need (= problem): it was regarded as an element of education for 'virtuous' citizenship. Whoever was "articulate" could "assert" themselves in the 'agora', the popular assembly, or in court, or simply in any discussion whatsoever. Among some Sophists, who were already uprooted, 'rhetoric' became synonymous with "asserting oneself through thick and thin, even to the point of being unscrupulous but 'expert'".

Nowadays, more and more marketing specialists (sales experts) are discovering the true value of ancient rhetoric: even in antiquity, it had the character of "selling the truth" (primarily in the sense of "convincing one's fellow man", "persuading one's fellow man").

The current 'illiteracy'.

To illustrate the current utility of rhetorical training, consider the following.

1.-- M. Tores (Washington), *90 millions d'Américains à demi illettrés*, in: *Journal de Genève/Gazette de Lausanne* 13.09.1993.

The alarming report has resonated throughout the American press: nearly half of adults in the USA—about 90 million— read and write so poorly that it constitutes a real handicap for their work .

Congress ordered an investigation into the matter in 1988. “Adult Literacy in the USA” cost \$14,000,000. 26,000 adults were screened as a sample.

The results confirm the fears expressed many times by teachers and recruiters: 90,000,000 adults can barely fill out a social security form. They cannot write a letter to notify the bank of an error on an invoice. They cannot calculate the price difference between two products. They cannot calculate the difference between the regular price and the sale price.

EWR3

They cannot decipher train departure tables. Forty million adults cannot locate an intersection on a city map. Only 20% of them can use a press article to calculate the average cost of raising a child. – So much for some facts.

Incidentally: despite all the educational reforms here, many educators have the impression that things won't look much better over time!

2.-- *F. Mansour, Ces universités qui ne savent pas écrire* , in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 05.09.1994.

The Faculty of Arts is introducing a hitherto unprecedented certificate in Switzerland: “ *Techniques de communication écrite* ”. Goal: to fill the gaps in “qualified sectors”!

Emilio Manzotti, Professor of Italian Linguistics, speaks: “To believe that schools (in Switzerland), including higher education, currently impart language proficiency as is required today is unrealistic.” “Generally speaking, students have enormous difficulty organizing the paragraphs of a text and constructing a text.”

Author of the article. -- “Is a university degree sufficient to demonstrate language proficiency (in French)? The answer is clear: no!

a. A number of professors: “Most students struggle with enormous problems to get a thesis written.”

b . Too many people are unable to master the techniques of text reading and writing—required by their profession. To address this, the new certificate

has been introduced. It is issued to anyone who, as a professional or as a licensed professional, learns to write a text: a bulletin, a fact sheet, an announcement, an article, or a dossier.

So much for two samples. Now for the explanations.

1.-- *Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism* (1978), which we will not discuss further here, dissects one factor, namely narcissism or self-conceit.

2.-- The more recent 'irrationalism'.-- What one might call “anti-intellectualism” (the aversion to anything that proceeds rationally) began as early as the Sturm und Drang and a part of Romanticism (1790+).

EW4

The cult of genius, individualism, and the primacy of feelings (within the Sturm und Drang this led to a kind of premature nihilism (the dismantling of traditional and especially modern-rational values)) gave rise to a sort of underestimation, indeed, contempt for everything rational.

3.-- The older positivism, led by A. Comte (1798/1857), is characterized by an underestimation of all things language, -- also in scientific work.

4. The 'Counterculture' (Anti-culture), since the Beatniks (1950+) and the Hippies and Yippies (1962+), in the USA and also in our country, was thoroughly anti-intellectualist: 'reason' and 'rationality' were considered the deadly factors within the established, 'rationalist' society.

If we add to this, the textbooks, instead of 'updating' the age-old rhetoric—adapting it to evolving current events—remained stuck in outdated representations. So much so that the term “empty rhetoric” became commonplace.

So much for a few elements at work in the decline of traditional rhetoric.

The revival.

A work such as S. IJsselinck/ G. Vervaecke, **Renaissance of Rhetoric**, *Leuven University Press*, 1994, outlines the recent resurgence. The importance of rhetoric for modern man, rhetoric in visual communication, sign theory (de Saussure) in ancient rhetoric, tropology (metaphor/metonymy/synecdoche) in rhetorical language, etc., are discussed. This multifaceted thematic scope demonstrates the many components or aspects of the single rhetoric.

Among the factors, mention should be made of what *Brigitte Hernandez*, **Voyage en librairies **, in: **Le Point ** 1167 (28/01/1995), teaches us. -- During 1993, the book market in France, in terms of publication and distribution through bookstores, amounted to 22 billion French francs (+- x 6.25 BFr). Some 40,000 titles (17,000 new books, reprints) were published. 9.6 million copies were sold. -- In other words, people are reading! Much more than ever before.

Other elements.

Working as *Ch. Perelman/L. Olbrechts-Tyteca*, *Traité de l' argumentation* (1958) or *St. Toulmin*, *The Uses of Argumentation* (1958) almost initiate a real refoundation, or at least an actualization of ancient rhetoric.

EW5

After all, one can also define 'rhetoric' as “the skill of delivering a speech”. Hence, every textbook on rhetoric contains a theory of argumentation.

A certain Neo-Sophistic, especially since Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), places rhetoric to such an extent that even scientific texts are examined for their linguistic proficiency, and philosophy is simply reduced to a form of 'literature' and 'rhetoric'.

Thinkers such as J. Derrida (1930/2004) take this to the point of a 'déconstruction' of the claims of the sciences, and especially philosophy, to objective, universally valid truth. Rhetoric thus becomes the all-encompassing insight.

More recent criticism of science also contributes to the disillusionment with the claims of science. One need only read, for example, A. Chalmers, **What Is Science Called ?** (*On the Nature and Status of Science and Its Methods **), Boom/Amsterdam, 1981-1; 1984-3 (// *What is This Thing Called Science ?*, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1976). Induction is central.

Popper's falsificationism (what is falsifiable can contain objective truth), Lakatos' research programs, Kuhn's 'paradigms' (i.e., valid models of scientific work—valid in the eyes of... evolving research communities), Feyerabend's anarchism regarding knowledge of truth are all criticisms that 'dismantle' the high claims of “science”! So that one gets the impression that even scientific discourse is merely rhetoric and actually not strictly objective knowledge: the argumentation is more than the objective facts.

This does not, however, prevent “science” from undergoing a stormy development in the meantime: “In 1959 *JT Thykouner* published an *alphabetical catalogue* of all the sciences then existing: he had found 1,150. But now there are certainly several dozen more.” (*I. Gérardin, Bionica (Link between biologist and engineer)*, World Academy (// *La bionique* (1968)), 7). The active scientists—researchers especially—seem to have their own 'arguments' for 'believing' in the sense of science after all!

Conclusion: What was abolished last century is rising from its ashes! Rhetoric is flourishing as never before.

EW6

11 samples will now follow

1. The thesis of a text. (06/08)

We set sail “amidst texts”! Soon there will be time and place for theory.

Let us first read a text for its 'premise' or 'thesis' (Lat.: *propositio*), that is, the judgment that can faithfully summarize the entire text. But first the text.

A -- Bibl. st.: *H. Bierhoff/ SJ Prais, Schooling as Preparation for Life and Work in Switzerland and Britain* , National Institute of Economic and Social Research , 1995.

Here is how *L. Lema, A quoi est due la réussite des écoliers helvétiques ?* in: *Journal de Genève/Gazette de Lausanne* 07.03.1995, summarized.

1.-- The fact

As part of an international trial, about 75 mathematical questions were presented to thirteen-year-old pupils (11n.).

Result: the Swiss students achieved an average that only the best British students reached. Incidentally: all other countries scored lower than the Swiss children.

For example: to the question “Which natural number corresponds to $5/8$?” 56/100 Swiss students answered correctly, while only 13/100 of the British students succeeded. Which naturally raises a question.

2.-- The statement (elements).

British researchers investigated. Here are some factors.

(1) The British encountered the Swiss educational tradition.

J.J. Rousseau (1712/1178; *Emile* (1762)) and J.H. Pestalozzi (1746/1827), in whose footsteps J. Piaget (1896/1980)—the latter known for his works on the measure and development of the child's abilities—dominated the school system.

Although all of Europe, indeed the entire planet, was influenced by the aforementioned educators, Switzerland is nevertheless undeniably the country where their tenets were developed under the best conditions.

(2) Further details.

These are the next ones.

(2)a1 .-- *The educational atmosphere.*

The school handbook stands out. The teacher adheres to it. It can be taken home, where it is also available for parents to inspect.

The handbook provides structure to the children's schoolwork.

In contrast: in Great Britain, there is a “doctrinaire opposition” to anything that even remotely smacks of a method from which the teacher does not deviate.

EW7

(2) a2 . -- *The leadership* . -- In Switzerland there is no tension between inspectors, principals and teachers. This creates a better common climate. This favors the learning process.

(2)b .-- *The foundations* . -- The basic model.

(2)b1. -- *Basic skills.*

The Swiss model places basic skills at the center, which form the foundation. The students must acquire them collectively. Indeed, greater emphasis is placed on elementary skills: only when these have been acquired by all students does the entire class move on. Everyone must be able to keep up.

In Great Britain, however, students are more “left to their own devices”: the strictly individual development of each student is placed at the center. This works out well for a portion of the students. But in classes of twenty or thirty students, such an individual upbringing is very difficult if it is to take into account the skills and inability of each student.

(2)b2. -- *Group work in a horseshoe shape* .

Swiss classrooms work in groups. Nevertheless, the desks are usually arranged in a horseshoe shape, centered around the teacher, who thereby remains physically central. -- And both the individual and the group come into their own.

British primary schools place group work at the center. To this end, desks are arranged so that a good half of the students sit with their backs to the teacher! The teacher spends the day moving from one group to another, leaving too little time to keep up with each student individually.

(3). -- Tradition. -- In Switzerland, lessons are more traditional. They aim for progress, but collectively, -- with all students who need to keep up. Immediately, they smooth out the differences in standards between 'good' and 'less good' students.

So much for the Swiss report. -- What is a report? It is one type of text. It presents the main points as faithfully as possible (it is therefore a description), if it is a summary report. It goes into detail, if it is a detailed report. The ability to 'defeat' is a skill of a rhetorical nature.

EW8

Report and thesis.

A good report summarizes, whether it is a detailed or concise report. That summary stands or falls on the inclusion of the thesis statement. Why? Because the thesis statement or thesis itself is already the summary of the text!

Note how two types of texts are present in the report.

1.- A story .

What is a story? A story is a description or representation of an event. Here, that is the fact (the international trial with the surprising result).

Incidentally: a story consists of at least two basic elements, namely the omen and the continuation. Indicated by past tense and present tense.

For example: "When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired." The fact that Daisy arrives is already a piece of the story in itself. One expresses that piece by saying: "Daisy arrives." But such a thing is merely the introduction (antelude) of a real story. The real story begins with, for example: "When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired." Where the antecedent (A) is the omen and

the consequent (NS) is the continuation. Only then does one have a (core of a) real story.

2.-- A line of reasoning.

That reasoning is contained in what we referred to above as “the explanation”.

A line of reasoning is always the continuation of a fact or given (GG) or phenomenon, i.e., something that presents itself. However, it is done in such a way that the fact (GG, phenomenon) raises a question. That question is called “the question asked” (GV).

Well, a line of reasoning answers what is asked (one also says “what is sought”), insofar as that question or problem calls for an explanation, clarification, elaboration, etc.

So that the Swiss account comprises both story (description) and reasoning.

As a result, the report is a treatise. A treatise is a text in which more than descriptions, more than stories, and more than reports occur.

Descriptions, respectively stories and reports, form subordinate elements. A treatise argues, it attempts to persuade. Of what does it attempt to persuade? Of a thesis or proposition.

In the above case, the thesis is: due to their own model (tradition, atmosphere, leadership, basic skills, horseshoe shape, etc.), the Swiss schools achieve better results than, for example, the British.

Pay attention to how tradition, atmosphere (school textbook), leadership, basic skills, horseshoe shape, etc., are presented descriptively, respectively, narratively, and descriptively.

EW9

2. The essence of description. (09/10)

Let's start with a mini-example.

“As the gateway to the region on the globe experiencing the strongest economic growth, Hong Kong finds itself at the heart of the economic vortex that will transform not only China but Asia and the entire economy of the planet—even if that role as a gateway entails an exorbitant price in terms of rents and commercial leases.” Thus states the economic magazine *Fortune*. (*Journal de Genève/Gazette de Lausanne* 29. 10. 1994).

This is a description and not, for example, a story, even though a future expectation is mentioned in it (which describes the opinion of a number of observers). It can be called somewhat of a report, although this is not the express intention. After all, the description can take the form of a report. Here in the sense that the representation 'defeats' facts!

From the definition (essential determination) to the description.

Ch. Lahr, SJ, *Logique*, in: *Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 497, states that an essence determination or definition is the representation of the whole and solely of the entire phenomenon or given.

In other words: there is a one-to-one relationship between (the properties or essential characteristics of) the data and its representation.

This means that the (good) definition is actually a description, i.e., the correct (unambiguous) representation of (the essential characteristics of) the entire given and only of the entire given. It concerns a description of the essential form kept as brief as possible (understand: that which makes the given distinguishable from the entire rest of reality).

Incidentally: ontologically, being is both the form and existence (how real is the given?) and the essence (how is the given real?) of the given.

What is therefore called 'describing' amounts to an extended or amplifying definition. -- This means that one literally fills the form of being with circumstances.

C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d'élocution*, Dour, 1910, 61, sees two aspects or 'elements':

a. the totality of the given (understand: not a distorted form of the phenomenon) and

b. Depicted in detail. That is what a description is.

EW10

The (essential) characteristics.

Note: we use the term 'property' in the Platonic sense. -- As GJ Warnock, *Qualities*, in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1967, 18, 914/916, states: the term

'poiotès', Lat.: qualitas, property or characteristic, means anything that makes something distinguishable from the rest of reality.

Consequently:

a. relations are 'properties' (which current logistcs, for example, will not say);

b. value traits are 'properties'.

For example: “Hong Kong is situated in the vortex” expresses a relationship (to the rest of Asia and the planet). However, since that relationship is a characteristic (essential trait) or 'property' of Hong Kong, it serves as a descriptive element. For example: “An exorbitant price” indicates a value judgment, in which a characteristic typical of Hong Kong is articulated. Which fits within a (essential) description.

Incidentally : how can a value judgment be tolerated in a description? After all, a pure description suspends all value judgments of its own. It is clear—here—that the article merely describes the value judgment of others without passing a value judgment on it itself. Such that the element of valuation is tolerable in a pure description.

Description is not an explanation.

This is where what E. Husserl (1959/1938; founder of intentional phenomenology) calls “phenomenological reduction” comes in handy.

For in the description, the given (GG) is what is asked for or what is sought (GV)! What is asked for is to represent the given in a pure, unadulterated, true-to-essence, 'objective' manner.

To grasp the theme (subject of the description) purely in its objective sense is called 'sense comprehension', to be distinguished from 'sense edification'.

This is done by eliminating everything that is not purely given or a phenomenon. To reduce the representation ('reduction') to the pure phenomenon, that is 'phenomenological reduction'.

This amounts to pure observation. Without explanations or value judgments, which are constructions of meaning, for they introduce something that is not present in the pure given. In this way, a theory concerning the theme, a tradition surrounding the given, can be eliminated. The descriptive self, with its subjective reactions, is also banished in pure description. Even the question of whether the given exists outside the consciousness of the describer can be banished.

3. *The essence of stories. (11/12)*

We start with a model again.

A McLaren driver indulged in the luxury of wrecking one of the most expensive in the world—on its way to an exhibition. His McLaren F-1, which costs the modest sum of 634,000 pounds sterling, skidded inside a roundabout—just like an ordinary cattle truck—and ended the journey against a pole.

“There may have been a bit of heating oil on the road,” explained a spokesperson for the car manufacturer. “The driver is somewhat shaken and embarrassed, but he is not injured. He will receive a reprimand, but he will not be fired.”

The repairs will take a week and should cost around 10,000 pounds sterling. The price of a car – a decent car – that the average man drives. -- The McLaren F-1 reached 372 km/h during the test drives (...). Only three hundred copies will be put into circulation.” (*Reuters*)”. *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 20.10.1994).

This can be considered a type of story, namely the anecdote (from the ancient Greek 'an.ek.doton', unpublished). This is the short but spirited, sharp, sometimes witty (as here), -- in any case engaging form of storytelling.

Note: Elsewhere we discussed what has been called for several years now: narratology, narrative, narrative, -- diegetics, -- Dutch: story studies. -- Just one remark in this regard.

C.A. van Peursen, **Verhaal en werkelijkheid (Een deictische ontologie *)*, Kampen/Kapellen, 1992, characterizes ('describes', 'defines', 'typifies') the most settled question of current narrative studies as follows:

a. an event is only an 'event' – understand: a coherent whole for thinking beings with the structure “omen (VT)/ continuation (VV)” – when it is told;

b. A story only acquires a 'structure'—understand: a single, unambiguous reference to what it tells—by depicting an event somewhere.

Some exaggerating narrativists claim in this regard that the reality of an event, before it is 'structured' in a story—which is assigned the essential form of an event—is merely one great chaos or disorder, without structure (certainly

not the structure that the narrator imposes upon it as a form of sentence construction).

EWR12

The story.

First of all: storytelling is describing. This implies that what we said about description also applies to the story. It is a one-to-one representation of a given (phenomenon) such that the subject (GV) is in turn the given (GG).

B. Vouilloux, Le tableau, in: *Poétique* 65, 11s., states that every theme (given, phenomenon) is susceptible to two perspectives:

- a.** it is represented in its synchronic essence;
- b.** it is represented in its diachronic essential form. The first is a mere description; the second a story. So that we can define: the story is the representation of the diachronic essential form of a phenomenon.

We have already seen it: the primal pair “omen (PV)/continuation (VP)” is the basic structure of all events. Even when the narrator reverses the sentence structure: “When Daisy arrived, the lady became very tired” means—according to the order in the objective event itself—exactly the same as “The lady became very tired, when Daisy arrived”. Only as a figure of speech (as an idiom) do the meanings of the two differ.

This means that—what thinkers have called “time” since ancient times—plays a decisive role both in the objective phenomenon and in the faithful representation. Hence the term 'dia' (through the course of) in the term 'diachrony'.

Narrative commonplaces.

A 'commonplace' is a viewpoint (perspective) that recurs time and again and thereby proves its usefulness.

Application.

The quintessential narrative commonplace is the answer to the question “what happened?”. The term 'what' points to the essence. The term 'is' points to existence. How was what happened really? Essence. How real was what happened? Existence. -- Always that ontological fundamental system (system = couple).

Second-rate clichés refine the basic couple. For example: “Where did it happen?” (Place). Likewise: “When did it happen?” (Time). And especially: “How exactly did it happen?” (Circumstantial essence).

Note: The 'chain': 'fore-knot' (Gr.: ekthesis; Lat.: expositio), -- knot (Gr.: desis), i.e., beginning of tension, -- wrap (Gr.: peripeteia) or peripeteia, unraveling (Gr.: lysis), remains a compound commonplace.

EWR13

4. The court story. (13/14)

Stories reflect 'reality'. But – not in the colloquial but in the ontological sense of the word 'reality' – reality is multifaceted:

a . truly pure;

b . imagined reality. A dream event, a utopian event: in the strictly ontological sense, they are 'realities': for they are not nothing!

This is how the historical story is distinguished from the imagined or fictional story. With the 'mixed' story in the middle (think of a historical novel that 'represents' the past partly in an imagined manner).

Some narrativists claim that all so-called 'historical' stories are in fact 'mixed' stories. This is precisely because every narrator of the past brings forth only samples from that past and never the whole in its absolute integrity.

This can also be called the 'subjective' element. This is because the samples reflect the mentality (presuppositions, 'axioms') of the narrative.

In other words: a historical narrative is never radically 'objective'. However, the honest storyteller does attempt to be as objective as possible.

Library st.: *H. Crombag/ P. Van Koppen/ W. Wagenaar, Dubious Cases (The Psychology of Criminal Evidence)*, Amsterdam/ Antwerp, 1992.

W. Wagenaar, “Where logic fails and stories convince (A reflection on criminal evidence)”, in: *Onze Alma Mater* 45 (1991): 3 (August), 258/278.

The first work examines 35 contestable criminal cases (in the Netherlands). Judges too easily assume that a story is simultaneously evidence! After all, every court case begins with a story that tells where and when someone (the subject) committed a criminal offense. The psychologists criticize the judges for interpreting the evidence based on a pre-existing,

untested (or at least insufficiently tested) story, instead of working in reverse: namely, constructing a story from the evidence. Police investigations, interrogation methods, expert and suspect testimonies, and identifications are treated too uncritically.

The 'convincing' essence of any story outweighs the naked facts, tested and interpreted as accurately as possible.

Which brings us amidst the mixed narratives in which those involved defend a position: their story becomes a plea!

EW14

An application model.

Wagenaar, ac, 258ff. -- The story goes as follows.

Ms. A. has been living with her 'boyfriend' since she was twenty-one. At a certain point, she confesses that she was "assaulted by her father" six years ago. Whereupon the boyfriend persuades her to file a complaint.

Incidentally: this is a striking example of what historians call "History from below" (*histoire anecdotique*, *Alltagsgeschichte*, everyday history).

Two types of evidence.

a. The strictly logical proof: from the preliminary clauses (VZ), which state the facts insofar as they are known, necessarily follow the subsequent clauses (NZ), which prove guilt or innocence.

b. The logically probable proof: the subsequent clauses do not necessarily follow from the preceding clauses, but only probably.

The problem of proof.

The judges, confronted with Miss A.'s story, are faced with a problem:

a. the father denies (naturally);

b. naturally there is only one witness, A.

Wagenaar situates the case in the Netherlands.

A.-- "The statement (= story) of exactly one witness is not sufficient evidence" (legal rule in the Netherlands).

B. -- Dutch case law does add "additional evidence" to this.

B.1.-- The statement (= story) of the appointed doctor who, after a medical examination, determines that A "is no longer a virgin".

Which is natural, given that she lives with her boyfriend. However, that fact is consistent with the claim that her father assaulted her. The latter speaks in her favor, but very weakly, of course.

B.2.-- Her father's statement (= story): he admits that he was once alone in the house with the fifteen-year-old girl (which speaks in A.'s favor), but only gave her “a good beating.” Which prompts Wagenaar to remark: “Not very nice, but a beating is not rape.” (ac, 259).

In other words: logically not sufficiently conclusive for A.'s claim (that she was assaulted by her father).

Experience proves that those involved each turn their 'story', presented in a 'statement' before the court, into a (Subjective) plea ... in order to 'persuade' the judges (which is pure rhetoric).

EW15

5. The essence of a report. (15/16)

Van Dale states: “Verslag is the same as 'rapport': i.e., a (usually written) statement concerning (the circumstances of) an event or of a state of something”. Such a 'definition' is indeed telling for the average person consulting the dictionary, but too anecdotal; i.e., provides samples instead of the general essence.

What is 'reporting': that is, as a reporter, rendering or explaining something? Let us reread *E.WR. 07v* .: there we see that the journalistic report comprises both a story, or a description in general, and reasoning (explanation, clarification, etc.). Which makes that report a concise treatise.

But let it be stated clearly: what is requested (GV) in a report can only be the given (GG) and thus be limited to mere description. Without taking a position.

An application model.

Let us take the book *G. Fain, trad., Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie* , Paris, 1951-1; 1984-2.

On the cover is a 'report' (one of many types).

Joseph Aloys Schumpeter was born in Austria in 1883 and died in the USA in 1950. He is considered one of the best economists of our time. He was the

undisputed leader of the Vienna School. Later, he became a professor at Harvard University. He quickly gained international acclaim.

His famous work – *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* , London, 1942 – is considered one of the foundational works on modern economics. It offers an unparalleled analysis of economic phenomena as we experience them.

Can capitalism survive? Can socialism succeed? The author answers both questions. Meanwhile, he offers a foreshadowing of the development of our economy in the world of tomorrow.

So much for the 'enkomion', the text of praise, on the cover.

The clichés.

Let us reread.

1. Schumpeter is situated in space and time (*E.WR. 12*).
2. His specialty and the degree of expertise therein.
3. His famous work. 2 and 3 constitute the “circumstantial essence” of both himself and his main work.

In other words: the cover report here amounts to a story (with the necessary descriptions). But that story is also a plea (*E.WR. 14*).

EWR16

Typology (study of species).

There is the concise or brief report (for example, regarding the characteristics of something) and the detailed or comprehensive report. With regard to the object in question, a distinction is made between the factual report (the phenomenon without text) and the textual report (the phenomenon is a text).

The report

(The pure report or the explanatory report) is one type of report that appears around 1880 (as a report in a daily newspaper).

Incidentally: on TV and in magazines, text and image reports appear very frequently—especially lately—which, under the guise of representation, are in fact arguments. This is called “one form of expressing opinion” (influencing public opinion). Which is actually not fair.

The Digest from Emperor Augustus (-63/+14) to Emperor Justinian (482/565) – the most famous judicial decisions were collected under the title 'digesta' – is either an extract or a text reduced to a smaller size.

The periodical that publishes such is also called a 'digest' (think of Reader's Digest).

A presentation is either a talk to introduce a meeting or discussion, or a summary of a talk. The term can also simply mean 'report'.

Typical of the referent in the latter sense are

- a.** the concise summary of an article,
- b.** with all source references.

The text contraction.

Especially in France, a new type of report is occurring (for entrance exams):

- a.** Contraction (text contraction);
- b.** Synthesis (multiple text contraction).

An application model.

Duration: three hours. -- GG. Ropger Callois, *L'esprit des sectes* .

GV: summary in four hundred words, -- with an explanation of the main idea and the line of thought, -- with an indication at the end of the manuscript of the number of words used. -- Sometimes the word counts are indicated per line in the margin of the manuscript.

Penalty: an overshoot of 10% is permitted. Above 440, points are deducted for every 10 words too many.

When more than one text is presented instead of exactly one, this is called 'synthèse' (multiple text contraction) in France.

Apparently, this method of questioning harbors the will to nip a useless flow of words in the bud.

EWR17

6. The essence of the treatise. (17)

The 'being' or also the 'form of being' (existence + essence) of something is that by which that something becomes distinguishable from the rest of reality.

What, then, is the essence of 'trading': after we briefly considered the description, or narrative, and the report as basic elements of trading?

1.-- E. Fleerackers, SJ, **De verhandeling**, Antwerp, 1944-13, defines: "The treatise is the reasoned development (amplification) of an (abstract) theme". Why do we put the term 'abstract' in parentheses? Because a treatise can just as well tackle a non-abstract theme!

2.-- S. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California), 1966, 121/136 (*Opinion Statement*), specifies the artery of the treatise, namely the proposition or thesis (E. WR. 08) : "The opinion advocated (...) is the proposition that we wish to substantiate throughout the entire text" (oc, 121).

The arrangement (= ordering).

The arrangement (line of thought, plan, sequence) reflects the unity in the multiplicity of the parts of a good treatise.

1. The thesis (Lat.: *propositio*) is touched upon in the introduction (drawing attention, creating a favorable atmosphere, for example), defined in the strict statement of position (the thesis is explicitly stated), and divided into the (main parts) in the structure (listing of the main headings of the text).

2. The thesis is substantiated with information in descriptions, stories, and reports, respectively; in the argument (argumentation, proof) it is either logically rigorously proven or made logically probable (E.WR. 14); in the eventual refutation by the dismantling or deconstruction of any counter-model (the opposing thesis) it is indirectly proven; and clarified in the comparison with other propositions.

3. The thesis is rephrased in the summary and briefly highlighted once more in the conclusion (e.g., value judgment, anecdote, appeal).

Note: One can, of course, rearrange all those parts, but they are the commonplaces that help define a treatise as its 'elements', the essential components that constitute its presuppositions.

EWR18

7. Brief typology of the treatise. (18)

Many layouts are possible. Here are a few.

1.-- Fleerackers, oc, 13.

Reflection . -- This term is the Old Dutch translation of the Greek 'theoria', Latin: *speculatio*, literally: fathoming. A 'theorêtikos', Latin: *speculator*, is an

observer. The ancient Romans called a spy or a soldier on guard a 'speculator'. 'Reflection' meant "to examine something thoroughly with observation".

Incidentally : Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500) called 'philosophy' (general development) 'theoria'. Plato of Athens called his philosophy (with scientific claims) "theorètikè to ontos", the perceptive fathoming of all that is. -- Fleerackers mentions two other types.

The reverie . -- This is a reflection, but charged with emotion and a sense of value.

The plea . -- That is also reflection, but with the intention of getting fellow man(ren) to agree with the proposed proposition. We saw examples above.

2.-- O. Pecqueur, Manuel pratique de dissertation française , Namur, 1922-2, distinguishes other types.

2. a . -- Informal treatise.

"Dissertation badine". -- Addressing a theme unpretentiously and without observing the formal requirements of an essay is 'informal' essay writing. Many essays in secondary education amount to this.

2.b.-- Formal treatise .

Here, the strict trading regulations are consciously respected. -- Pecqueur distinguishes:

a. Literary (" *La Fontaine is the Homer of the French language* " (H. Taine), e.g., as a theme);

b . Scientific (" *Science, industry and poetry* " (*M. Ducamp*) e.g. as a subject),

c. Ethical-political (" *People ought to help one another* " (Lamennais); "Self-love" (La Rochefoucauld) are such themes – actually to be called spiritual or anthropological.

3.-- Platonic

is the distinction between pre-educational and philosophical treatises. -- AR Henderickx, *Justice in The State of Plato* , in: Tijdschr. v. Philos. 7(1945): 1/2.

Virtue (in the ancient sense of "overall soundness") is first vaguely described in a philosophical 'sketch' ('hupografè'), -- only to be subsequently expounded upon very thoroughly philosophically.

8. The ancient 'chreia' (determination of essence). (19/22)

We saw that the essential form (that by which something is distinguishable from the rest of reality) can be clarified in the opposing pair or system of “existence (the existence or non-existence of something) / essence (the inherent mode of being of that same something)” and in the circumstances. These form the basic structure of all treatises.

The ancient chreia or essential definition (*J. Fr. Marmontel* (1723/1799), *Eléments de littérature* (1787), defines the chreia in this way) applies to either a fact or a statement.

The eight-part chreia (also Dutchified to 'chrie') amounted to “a small page” in ancient secondary education (*HI Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* , Paris, 1948, 241). It highlights the ambiguity of the theme and its approach; for the given (GG) is examined from eight different angles (perspectives, samples) in the requested (GV).

Application model.-- Here is a brief example.

A.1 .-- Given . -- “Isocrates of Athens (-436/-338; renowned rhetorician or teacher of rhetoric; opponent of Plato) once said: “The roots of education come across as bitter. The fruits, however, taste pleasant”.

Note in passing the tropes 'roots' / 'fruits' which stand for 'formation' / 'result'. Such themes must first be stripped of their tropological character and translated into non-metaphorical or non-metonymic language.

A.2 .-- Requested . -- Development according to the eight rubrics of the chreia,

So much for the task. Now for the development.

B.1.-- Characteristic of Isocrates .

Incidentally: 'characteristic' or a brief description of someone or something traditionally encompasses three aspects: inwardness/ outward appearance/ social influence.

Isocrates was a rhetorician. He was the leader of a rhetorical-philosophical school that rivaled Plato's strict philosophical school (Academy) and advocated more general education (philosophy 1) than strict scientific education (philosophy 2). His influence was very great.

Note: In antiquity, a characteristic was easily either 'enkomioo', praise (*E.WR. 15*) or 'psogos', reproach, branding, 'criticism', which turns a pure 'reflection', or a musing, or a plea, into allowing some value judgment to weigh in.

EW20

Note: A chreia can also relate to a fact. The characterization must then be adapted to the fact, of course. See one model *E.WR. 14* : the legal narrative that briefly outlines the fact.

E.WR. 11 also provides a characterization or (brief) sketch in the first part of the story.

B. II.-- The rest of the chreia .-- All following capita or sections deal with aspects.

II.a.-- Paraphrase (description).

The ancient 'paraphrasis' frequently amounts to a shortened statement. In any case, it is a kind of interpretation in other words, without betraying the full meaning (what the statement primarily intends) through any construction of the sentence.

Here, for example:

(1) Isocrates - in a metaphor - compares upbringing to the structure of a plant whose roots seem bitter but whose fruits, on the contrary, turn out pleasant.

(2) By this he means that the practice ("sensitivity training") inherent in upbringing is strict and causes stress, but with the effect that one experiences, either in theory or in practice, how useful that practice actually is.

In Hegelian-dialectical terms: the foundation of education is difficult; the superstructure is a delight.

Note: The description when it concerns a fact is different: it can introduce further information so that the fact – captured in its sense (sense conception) – is clarified.

Take *E.WR. 06* as an example , where "the fact" (the better performance of the Swiss students) is further described in terms of the elements (tradition/ atmosphere/ leadership understanding/ basic skills/ group work/ horseshoe arrangement, etc.).

But here the description of the fact merges with the statement. Immediately, it turned out to be long.

II.b .-- *Argument* (argumentation).

This lapses in several aspects.

II.b.1. -- *positive argument* ('verification').

In ancient Greek, 'kataskeuè'. The proposition “hangs in the air” (is debatable) as long as it is not 'proven'. In other terms: before proof is provided, a claim is 'unreal' or at least “not made real”, not 'truth'. The anecdote, furthermore, can serve as a form of inductive proof or, to speak in the language of Karl Popper, as 'verification' (literally: making true).

EWR21

II.b.2 . -- *Negative argument* ('falsification').

That is the refutation of the counter-model. Here: the assertion that what Isocrates said is untrue. -- In ancient Greek 'anaskeuè'. -- Here, for example, there is room for describing, recounting, and reasoning about failed upbringings (e.g., the opinion that going to school is a pleasure). -- The term 'falsification' comes from K. Popper: it literally means 'making false' (not: forgery).

Note: One sees that the chreia compares with the opposite (and in that context conducts opinion polls). In ancient Greek democracy, this was “a sacred rule” (one need only think of the discussions in the agora, the popular assembly).

That the chreia compares, confronts with other data (one should not confuse 'compare' with 'equate'), is also evident from the immediately following commonplace.

The first part of the argumentation revolves around the thesis. The second part focuses more on the information gathered.

II.cl-- ' *Comparison* '.

In ancient Greek: 'sunkrisis', the gathering of similar things. In other words: one type of comparison. Citing the like or the similar.

A parallel fits here, for example: the actress practices extremely hard, but as a result, she acts beautifully. Or: the fruit grower tends to the trees for months, but he brings delicious fruit to market. -- Something like that strengthens the argument.

II.c.2 . -- *Story* (anecdote).

This is the place for an 'exemplification' (citing an example).

Thus, one can 'illustrate' the proposition (by citing a sample) as follows: "Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322; most famous orator in Hellas) initially suffered from a weak voice (in a culture without our loudspeakers), indeed, had little dramatic aptitude (as an actor). But he harbored a vision of strength ("idée-force" (A. Fouillée)), namely, to become a great orator. He learned to deliver speeches—with stones in his mouth (he stuttered) and, on the shores of the sea, against the crashing waves.

It was precisely this harsh method of (self-)education that had as a "pleasant result" the fact that he became a "very famous orator."

That is an application of the inductive method that generalizes from at least one instance to all instances.

EW22

II.c.3 . -- *Testimony* (argument from authority).

An argument from authority stands or falls with the (sometimes very limited) expertise of the person whose opinion is cited. -- Here: in late antiquity, "the ancients" (who were regarded as closer to the deities), such as Homer and Hesiod, were regarded as sources of 'testimony' or arguments from authority. Regarding educational requirements.

Note: Behold the schema—which is not immutable in its order, of course—of 'usefulness' ('chreia' means first and foremost "that which is useful"). This persists to this day!

Afterword. -- The Romans adopted the Greek scheme.

1.-- Aphthonios of Antiocheia (270/ ...), deuterosophist orator.

A. Introduction . -- The fact or assertion receives praise.

B . Middle . -

a. Paraphrase. Rewriting in other words.

b.1. Explanation ("a causa", from the cause).

b.2. Explanation ("a contrario", based on the counter-model).

c.1. Comparison by means of what resembles it ("a simili", from the similar: parallel).

c.2. Story (example, inductive sampling). "Ab exemplo",

c.3. Testimony (argument from authority). "A testimonio",

C . Conclusion . -- “A brevi epilogo”, from a short afterword.

The ancient rhetoricians had their students memorize the schema in those terms. -- One easily recognizes the schema that we briefly outlined above.

2.-- Mnemonic formula.

a . Introduction

Who? (Who acted or spoke like that?)

b. Middle

a. Quid? (What? Paraphrase).

b.1. Cur? (By what? Why?).

b.2. Contra (Counter-model).

c.1. Simile (Identical model; analogous model).

c.2. Paradigms (examples).

c.3. Testes (Testimonies), which consisted of both 'scripta', written texts, and 'facta', facts.

c. Conclusion

For example, an encouragement or something like that. -- One immediately recognizes the previous pattern.

A treatise according to the chreia is called by Marmontel an “extensive definition,” whether of a saying or of a fact. Whoever practices the ancient schema well, provided it is modernized of course, will see that arduous labor crowned by a pleasant result, as Isocrates said.

EWR23

9. The essence of reasoning. (23/25)

Herodotus of Halicarnassus already distinguished between the immediately given ("the visible") and that demonstrated by reasoning ("the invisible"). Observation ('empeiria', from which we derive 'empirie'), i.e., paying attention to and recording what reveals itself, and reasoning ('logismos'), i.e., pushing through to what is demonstrated, are the two domains of our knowledge. Or, if you will, the "phenomenal/transphenomenal" pair.

In ancient rhetoric, this pairing appears as follows: -- The starting point is what the audience one addresses already presupposes as a kind of 'given'.

A.-- Direct evidence.

“Pisteis a.technai”. -- When a conversational partner is already convinced of, for example, legislation known to everyone, of testimony given by

someone—which is, in principle, perceptible to everyone—or of the terms (text) of a written agreement, this is called “proof without any reasoning” (= a.technos). It plays a role that resembles the direct observation of a phenomenon. In other words: one does not have to prove self-evident truths again!

B.-- Indirect evidence.

“Pisteis en.technai” (Lat.: probationes). -- When it is not evident to a conversation partner or an audience and is not clearly stated beforehand, one must demonstrate it, -- if necessary based on the presuppositions ('evidenties') of the conversation partner or the audience.

Bible st. : R. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique* , Paris, 1985, 126/136.

Which is rhetorically evident.

Let us now turn to “direct rhetorical proof”. -- The ancient Greeks have left us a list on the subject.

1.-- 'Eikos', which seems 'evident'.

For example, what comes across to the entire community as 'natural', as “traditionally established.” Like this: children begin by honoring their parents.

This is comparable to the “commons sense” (the common sense; -- not to be confused with common sense) of C.L. Buffier, *Traité des premières vérités* (1717), and the Scottish commonsensists. Do things such as “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”, “red is not blue”, “the existence of my own consciousness”, “that which is clearly perceived or remembered really exists”, “other people, as beings who betray their inner life through their outwardly observable behavior, exist” etc. belong to the common sense

EWR24

Note: Although the common sense, which accepts everything a group assumes as a group—common, i.e., shared—as evident, differs from the sound sense, which is not disturbed by psychiatric disorders (such as neurosis, psychosis), they nevertheless partially overlap. Hence the conceptual confusion between the two.

2.-- 'Tekmerion'; the apparent sign.

A pregnant girl gives “the obvious sign” that she has had sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. The connection between cause and effect requires no rhetorical reasoning.

3.-- 'Semeion'; the descriptive sign, “the designation”.

Let us take the pregnant girl again: whether it was natural sexual intercourse or artificial insemination is indeed 'indicated' by her condition, visible to everyone, but it remains merely an indication—not self-evident. Further investigation and thus strict proof (indirect proof) will be necessary if one wishes to 'convince' the interlocutor or the public of either sexual intercourse or artificial insemination, as these are not 'evident'.

Scientific reasoning.

The Scottish thinkers, following in Claude Buffier's footsteps, were mistaken: they used in strict philosophy what is only valid in rhetoric.-- The principal forms of reasoning, since Plato, are the following.

A.-- Deduction ('sunthesis').

According to the notation of Jevons-Lukasiewicz: “If A, then B. Well, A, therefore B”. -- If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water. Well, all water boils at 100° C.. So also this water and that water”. -- Logically necessary connection between antecedents (A) and consequents (NS).

B.-- Reduction ('analysis').

“If X, then B. Well, B. Therefore X.” -- 'X' is the lemma, the hypothesis, which is presumed to be at work in the given 'B'. As long as it is not thoroughly certain that, for example, all water boils at 100° C., then it reads: “If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water. Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C.. Therefore all water boils at 100° C.”

What induction is: from a finite number of samples (“this water and that water”), it decides on 'all' samples—without actually having carried them out. This is, incidentally, one form of amplifying or knowledge-expanding induction or generalization.

EWR25

Note-- A. Since Plato, there has been one remarkable form of deduction, namely proof by contradiction or the 'absurd'. The mathematicians of Platon's time used this continuously. From a theorem, one deduces, with the introduction of information, the radical opposite of that theorem.

In rhetoric, this occurs in the form of an “argumentum ad hominem”. Proof against the claimant: “if you assert that, then it follows from that what you refute”.

B. Since Plato, there has been one very frequent form of reduction, namely the (lemmatic)-analytical proof.

One stands there with a hypothesis, a lemma. What does one do to continue the research? One acts as if the lemma, the requested item (GV), is already given (GG) and works with that.

Mathematical model: $20 = y \cdot 40 + 10$. -- Divide both sides by 40: $10/40 = y \cdot 40/40$. That gives: $10/40 = Y$. -- Where is the lemma or 'hypothesis'—in mathematical language, 'unknown'? In y , which is embedded in a sum.

That is the lemmatic-analytical method, based on entering the query in the form of the given (the unknown $10/40$ is given the known symbol y , with which one works as if it were a (known) given).

The sciences and philosophy, as well as rhetoric, work with such lemmas that take the provisional form of the known (given).

The eristics.

Zenon of Elea (-540/ ...) applied Parmenides' ontological logic. And indeed in the form expressed by Aristotle: “neither you nor I prove what you maintain”.

'Thou' stands for the one whose argumentation is tested rhetorically or scientifically. In doing so, it is established that his thesis is somewhat probable based on arguments. However, these are not radically probative. But 'I' stands for the one who criticizes and who also cannot present radically convincing arguments.

Which is very common.

EWR26

10. Pathos. (26/28)

To proceed rhetorically, if it is to be genuine, does not persuade merely with arguments (logical aspect). It also persuades with emotional and sentimental arguments (pathetic aspect). -- Let us briefly examine this.

Reread *E.WR. 06/07 (the elements that govern the Swiss school model)*. -
- Pathetic are:

a. the good understanding – the goal of rhetoric – between the inspectorate, management, and teachers,

b. the children's attention focused on the textbook, as “very important” (which implies a value judgment), and on the teacher, the center of the horseshoe shape, as “very important” (again: which covers a value judgment)

The value judgments concerning a good (= valuable) relationship, textbook, and teacher run like a common thread through the entire school system.

The logical content of the transfer of learning from textbook and teacher to children is permeated by that multifaceted pathetic element. The 'spirit' of teacher and children is more than mere thinking; it encompasses a sense of values.

That little example makes it clear why the ancient rhetoricians summarized the task of rhetoric in “logos, pathos”.

Let us now briefly turn to that 'pathos'—the word is often not even translated from Greek.

The ontological foundation.

The great tradition is expressed in *K. Lee, A New Basis for Moral Philosophy*, London, 1985.

The thesis of the book states: “if to be, then value”. That entails:

a. anything that is in any way 'being', that is something (reality), is susceptible to subjective valuations;

b. anything that has even the slightest sense of value is directed, whether willed or unwillingly, towards 'something', that reality (even if that 'reality' is a fiction, a utopia for example).

It is precisely that sense of value that is activated in rhetoric when it attempts to persuade.

The rhetorical axiology.

All rhetoricians have sensed and pondered that value-theory element. For example: *Ingrid Craemer-Rügenberg, ed., Pathos, Affekt, Gefühl*, Munich, 1981 (with the fourteen papers on pathos from Aristotle to the present).

Typology of valuations.

It comes down to a fan (differential).

1. Refusal: “no rating whatsoever” (which is another form of rating) -
2. Swap solution: “no appreciation for this; but for that”.
3. Variety: “appreciation now for this, then for that”.
4. Preference: “rather this than that”.
5. Merging: “appreciation for both this and that”.

The list could perhaps be expanded!

Bettermann's typology.

AD Bettermann, *Psychologie und Psychopathologie des Wertens* , Meisenheim am-Glan, 1949.

Bettermann divides the 'werten', to appreciate, into healthy and sick(ly) value-estimating.

1.-- The naive appreciation .

Very widespread. Children, in particular, value in this way. Without making distinctions, without asking questions, and very self-assured, naive appreciation focuses on what it considers valuable. Hereditary values, in particular, are highly regarded.

2.-- The emphatic appreciation.

This is the emotionally emphatic or emotionally charged valuation. Irrational in the eyes of rationally minded fellow human beings. It expresses the deeper soul of the appraiser, independent of the environment. Occasionally, it goes so far that the highly valued value is 'deified', placed on a throne, perceived as inviolable (taboo).

Bettermann: All true love, all true religion tends to this type.

3.-- The appraising valuation.

Here the valuation shifts from the obvious object to something else for the reason that object is valued. Thus, one assesses one's fellow man on the basis of his social standing, on the basis of the profit one can derive from him. Not for him or herself! -- The non-spontaneous stands out. On the contrary: the deliberate stands out. The calculating intellect weighs here.

A parallel. -- The same painting is worshipped “in boundless admiration” by the emphatically appreciative art lover and is 'calculated' by the profit-seeking art dealer (“It will probably fetch a lot”).-- Bettermann: a certain bourgeois culture is typified by this.

4.-- *The alienation of value valuation.*

'Valuation alienation'. The one appraising in this way is and remains detached—distant from every value-in-itself. 'Being' becomes 'nothing'. Nothing, namely, to truly appreciate. Nothing to truly immerse oneself in. Cool—yes, cold—she estimates.-- Bettermann already sees this appreciation at work to some extent in the appraising valuation.

EWR28

Bettermann presents three models of this latter, value-alienated type.

A -- *Aestheticism.*

That which is beautiful or appears to be beautiful is no longer enjoyed—appreciated—because it is beautiful or appears beautiful in itself, but for reasons of the reflective-analytical experience of it. In other words, the center of gravity lies in the enjoying subject, not in the enjoyed object. And even then, only insofar as the analyzing intellect—reason—predominates.

B.-- *Criticism*

The term 'criticism' has been in common use especially since the Enlightened thinker *I. Kant* (1724/1804; a number of his works are titled '*Critique*'). Today, it is used to denote rational-detached analysis conducted from a purely earthly (secular, worldly) standpoint. It was already at work in Aestheticism.

This attitude towards life radically undermines the basis of any surrender—think of the naive or emphatic forms of such surrender—to value in itself. The critical person abhors every form of “being naive,” of “beamingly absorbed in.” -- This fundamental attitude is also found in the following type.

C. -- *Humorous.*

Note -- Bettermann speaks of “humorous appreciation”.

We believe that he uses 'humor' in a sense that is not very common. In particular.

a. 'Humor' is usually regarded as the innocent, good-natured act of exposing something in its laughter-provoking nature. As a person, the humorist can be very good-natured and forgiving.

b. 1. 'Irony' is different, though still gentle. It is the scornful 'appreciation' of something one genuinely disapproves of, but with a detached smile. Often not without bitterness (which is lacking in humor).

b.2. 'Sarcasm': from the Greek 'sarkasmos', literally: to bite into the flesh, is the biting form of irony. 'Sardonic' laughter is the grinning-mocking form of this.

By 'humor', Bettermann means the last two forms: the critically minded person, laughing and inviting laughter, distances himself from value. So that the term 'cynicism' would be more appropriate here.

Note: Bettermann notes that value-alienated valuation is only complete in psychosis (mental illness). Who does not know the alienating laugh of psychiatric caregivers?

Conclusion. -- It is evident that a text must take into account the four outlined types of appreciation among the conversation partner or the audience.

EW29

11. Theory of Radiation. (29/31)

The theme, though ancient, is 'in': *E. Van Elsacker/ M. Wijnants, Dossier: Tinkering with your personal radiance*, in: *Elga* 56 (1992): April, 30/44, attempts to provide "practical tips" to update what the ancients called with the term 'èthos'. What exactly is 'èthos'?

Logos/ pathos/ èthos.

This threefold structure characterized the goal of rhetoric. Note:

a. 'ethos' (not with 'è' but with 'e') means 'custom', 'practice', 'morality' in ancient Greek;

b. 'èthos', however, means "innate disposition, temperament and character", insofar as that disposition radiates.

In rhetoric, it is the 'nature' of the one who attempts to make a message take root in the soul of a conversation partner or an audience.

In occultism (which is essentially a form of animism (belief in soul and soul matter)), the emanation of the inner self is called 'aura', i.e. the soul, or soul matter, insofar as it extends beyond the biological body.

Note: What the ancient Greek 'ethos' might be may become clear when one reads the small masterpiece by the Russian writer Nikolai Gogol (1809/1852), * *The Portrait* *. A painted portrait hangs in a home: whoever is confronted

with it (and is sensitive (clair-sensitive) in doing so) experiences bizarre sensations in body and soul.

A similar experience is depicted in Henri Beyle (nicknamed 'Stendhal'; 1783/1842), in his *Rome, Naples et Florence* (1817-1; 1826-2). Stendhal travels through Italy, following in Sterne's footsteps. He notes on January 22, 1817: "Florence. (...). I was already in a kind of ecstasy at the thought that I was in Florence and in the company of famous men. (...). Upon leaving Santa Croce I developed palpitations – in Berlin they call that 'nerves'. Life had drained out of me: I could march on but with the fear of falling down."

Stendhal syndrome.

Library st. : Grazielle Magherini, *Le syndrome de Stendhal (Ou voyage dans les villes d'art)*, Sogedin (Ed. Usher), 1990.

The author cites Stendhal (oc, 31). -- She adds:

a . S. Freud (1856/1938; founder of psychoanalysis), who visits the Acropolis (Athens) and experiences "bizarre unease" there;

b. Henry James (1843/1916; brother of William James) visiting Venice and experiencing "a bizarre nausea".

EWR30

According to Magherini, Laurence Sterne (1713/1768; a follower of the enlightened rationalism of John Locke), * *A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy**, an account of a journey in 1765 (published in 1768), is the prototype of a text that portrays travel as an existential experience.

Magherini: the term 'sentimental' entails

a. possibly strong experiences and

b . sometimes surprising physical reactions.

This applies to people who travel and experience all kinds of sights and wonders when they become absorbed in works of art.

In ancient terms: a work of art—such as the Acropolis for Freud—possesses an 'innate nature' that radiates and acts upon soul and body. A phenomenon that is very well known in occult circles—New Age included—and emanates from living fellow human beings.

Applicative model.

Magherini, oc, 67.-- Isabelle. -- A young French woman, an art teacher, visiting Florence with her students. -- "truly present". - Paintings, portraits of

celebrities, or self-portraits by artists: people who have long been dead strike her, when admiring them together with her students, as “truly present”.

Unease.

Suddenly, she is seized. Some paintings disgust her. Even more: she wants to destroy them! This urge is so strong that she is appalled by herself. Later manifestation: a persistent intense agitation and depression. As well as a phobia (fear).

Note: When reading Magherini, it is striking that the profound experience often

- a. 'manic' (excitement) and
- b . than is 'depressed' (melancholy, exhaustion).

The reverberation of a star.

Bibl. st .: Joepie 379 (21.06.1981). -

The actress Charlene Tilton (Lucy Ewing in the Dallas series): “I have always admired Marilyn Monroe (Norma Jean Baker (1926/1962)) immensely. For a long time, I even wanted to change my first name: I wanted to be called Norma Jean at all costs. I have read everything that was ever written about Marilyn Monroe—a whole library. Or rather: devoured it. The first time I saw a film in which she acted, I was beside myself: I felt that there was something that connected us. (...)”.

This shows that living people display an 'ethos' and, for example, encourage emulation. They “radiate”.

EWR31

Charismatic authority.

C. Rogers (1902/1986) described “charismatic authority” as follows:

1. Averse to any 'authoritarian' (imposed from the outside and from above) form of authority,
2. “The new man” (we leave it to Rogers to determine exactly what that is) trusts thoroughly in his own individual experiences—to such an extent, in fact, that he draws others along precisely because of this. Rogers speaks of “inspirers” upon whom other, less strong, or even weak personalities draw themselves.

One sees that Rogers actually depicts a “strong character with charisma.” -- It is remarkable that “the new people,” however anti-authoritarian they may be, establish “a new obedience,” which ... sometimes takes forms that the

traditional upbringing system, dismissed as 'authoritarian,' recoils from. A naive, indeed, emphatic obedience (*E.WR.27*) is then visible.

Note -- Magherini's examples frequently involve a (strongly) erotic moment. The "new obedience" involves this as well: who, in our country, is not familiar with the "butterflies in the stomach" of numerous young girls upon hearing a singer's voice, seeing his photograph, or having direct contact at his performances? On closer inspection, it becomes abundantly clear that the singer's 'ethos' has a strongly eroticizing effect and 'seduces' into naive-emphatic fan and freak obedience.

Rhetoric is the study of introducing ideas, valuations, and 'emanations' -- logos, pathos, ethos. When studying a text, and when composing a text oneself, one must therefore take into account that threefold aspect of spirit - within - a text.

I. Kant.-- "Rousseau fundamentally did not want man to return to the state of nature, but rather that he, from the level of culture at which he now stands, should look back upon it."

Rousseau's premise was "Man is good by nature." Here, 'nature' is understood as "inherited nature," albeit in a negative sense. For man is, of his own accord and intentionally, not malicious. However, he does run the risk of being infected and corrupted by malicious or clumsy leaders and exemplary figures. Kant was convinced of "das radikal Böse" (radical evil) in culture. Rhetorically, his opinion is not entirely reprehensible.