

Course 4-3. Philosophical rhetoric.

Location

4. Courses from 1984 to 1987

4.1. Introduction to Logic, 1984-1985, (L1-L95, 169p.)

4.2. Introduction to Hiero-analysis, 1984-1985 (HA1- HA122, 141p.)

4.3. Philosophical Rhetoric, 1985-1986 (WR1-WR305, 328p.)

4.4. Questionnaires from Contemporary Ontology, 1986-1987, (HO1-HO368, 416p.)

Note: *This course has been spaced larger than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current pagination of 'Word'. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'WR'. They stand for Philosophical Rhetoric (in Dutch : 'Wijsgerige Retoriek') and are derived from the old page number.*

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WR1

Bibliographic sample.

It is simply unthinkable to cite the countless books and articles on rhetoric.

Here are a few titles.

(i) *Henri Morier, Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique* , Paris, 1961-1; 1981-3;

(ii) *Robert Ralph Bolger, Rhetoric* , in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* , Chicago, 1967, 19:257/260;

Marc Sangnier (1873/1950; founder of Sillon (1902), the Christian Democratic movement), *Aux sources de l' éloquence (Commented Lectures)*, Paris, 1908;

These two works outline the history of rhetoric;

(iii) *C. Rehdantz, Demosthenes: Acht philippische Reden* , Hft, 1, Leipzig, 1865-2, 13/16 (*Kurze Geschichte der Redekunst*);

-- *JW Hey Atkins, Greek Rhetoric* , in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* , Oxford; 1949-1; 1950-2, 766/767;

-- *Ed . von Tunk, Kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Literatur* , Einsiedeln/Köln, 1942, 40/51 (*Die Redekunst*);

-- *R. Stock, Eloquence* , in: *Helicon* (Anthology of Greek and Latin writers), Antwerp, sd, 243/306;

-- *HI Merrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité* , Paris, 1948, 91/98 (*Les Sophistes*); 268/282 (*L'enseignement supérieur: la rhétorique*);

These five works deal with ancient Greek rhetoric, which remains, ever, the great introduction, to the present day;

(iii) *M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, Modern Eloquence (Handbook for Oral Language Proficiency)*, Amsterdam / Brussels, 1968-3;

-- *Paul C. Jagot, L' éducation de la parole (Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire et assurée)*, 45800 St. Jean de Braye, 1975;

-- *George T. Vardaman, Effective Communication of Ideas* , New York, 1970;

These three works move more in the practical realm: the actual influencing of fellow man.

(iv) *Fauconnier, General Communication Theory (An overview of the scientific theories of communication)*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1981, especially 19/27 (*From rhetoric to general communication theory*);

-- *Chaim Perelman, Rhetoric and Argumentation* , Baarn, 1979;

-- *Samuel IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy (What happens when people*

Speak?), Bilthoven, 1975;

-- Lionel Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985;-- works that discuss an aspect.

WR2

Preface

First, a few descriptions ('definitions' or 'determinations of essence', if you will).

(i) Pierre Larousse (1817/1875; in 1852 co-founder of *La Librairie Larousse*), *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle*, 15 vol., 1866/1876; 2 suppl., 1878, 1890, -- t. 13, 1143, writes that “La rhétorique est la théorie de l'éloquence; l'éloquence étant l'art de persuader.

In other words, rhetoric is the doctrine of eloquence; -- where 'eloquence' is understood as “the art of persuasion”: Steller - Géruzez - adds that the theory of persuasion

(a) indicates the principles – it is therefore a prescriptive or normative discipline,

(b) but based on rhetorical masterpieces from our cultural history - it is, immediately, an inductive-historical discipline.

(ii) Bolger, oc, 257, says otherwise, but that does not mean he is contrary to Larousse.-- “Rhetoric is the name that, in keeping with tradition, is given to

(i) language usage

(ii) as an art (skill) supported by a body of ordered knowledge”.

In other words: **(i)** a set of techniques regarding language use (compare with the principles above), **(ii)** based on a series of relevant insights.

At the end of his exposition (ac, 25, the author explicitly refers to “the 1930s, when logical positivism (190, Carnap) drew attention to the importance of the analysis of language use”. ((56. Procl. v. Konst.; 176).

It should be noted that logical positivism connects with David Hume (1711/1776), the leading figure of the English Enlightenment (Enlightened Rationalism), and with Auguste Comte (1798/1857), the founder of French Positivism. (73: Burnet, Gompertz: 90 Renan; 97; 142 (Huismans)).

'Positivism' takes the modern scientific method (239: Protagoras) (mathematical physics, especially) as a model for all thought, including philosophical (scientistics). 'Neopositivism' (= logical positive thinking) is that positivism which places language, especially the exact scientific language, at

the center.

It is immediately clear that rhetoric, insofar as it grasps language use (it is more than that), was intended to sustain the interest of the language positivists. Reference is also made to *I.A. Richards*, **Philosophy of Rhetoric** (1941), who, in the USA, advocates a rhetoric aimed at school and university instruction.

WR3

Bolger (ac, 257) adds, for the sake of safety, that “in its original form (note -- that is, in its ancient Greek form), rhetoric was the systematic (= methodical) analysis of eloquence”. -- Which corresponds with Gêruzez (= Larousse).

Introduction

The title of this academic year is 'philosophical rhetoric': this entails that we will deal with rhetoric as it is, but according to its 'foundations' (238), (axioms,-- expressed in Platonically: 'lemmas': presuppositions). 'fundamental rhetoric' would be just as good.

In order to expose these presuppositions, we will, in a first section, situate rhetoric within early ancient Greek philosophy. - This implies that the student learns to think genetically (297) (genetic method). (31: theory of ideas; 32, axis 32, Gr. WB; 39 musical), 56: linguistic analysis; 83: religious -132 Pyth. ; 136)

(i) Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), in his **Politics** 1:2, says: “If one can follow things in their becoming, from the beginning, then this is the best method.” Thus, for example, he speaks of the (city-)state: in doing so, he starts from primitive societies—the family and the village—in order to arrive, in this way, at the Greek city-state of that time. He called this method 'gennetikè' (literally: 'gennetic'; though it is customary to write 'genetic').

(ii) GFW Hegel (1770/1831), as a dialectician, likewise follows the genetic style of thinking. The mere fact that two thinkers of such stature apply this method proves part of its soundness.

As *O. Willmann* (1839/1920), *Abriss der Philosophie* (*Philosophische Propädeutik*), Vienna, 1959 (1912/1914-1), 51, states, this method springs from an organic view (31/31: theory of ideas; 12: total understanding, 136, 110, 127, 177): a plant, an animal, a human body (biological), a poem (from its first draft to its completion), a world empire (such as that of Rome, for example) (culturological) (cultuurhist. Meth. 31; 91; 46: thaletic)

(i) arise,

(ii) develop (grow),

(iii) usually, decay (perish),-- therein, as it were, a regularity following

inherent to 'organisms' (44: inter-, multi-, disc.) ('systems' is now said). It is now also sometimes said 'organismic'.

In a second part, we will expose rhetoric in its general essence ('structure,' as they now like to say), as it has maintained itself throughout its long evolution.

WR4

Indeed: just as philosophy—first as wisdom, then as developed philosophy—has one long, uninterrupted lifespan, so too does rhetoric have the appearance of a 'rhetorica perennis' ('eternal rhetoric'). (13: theol. Perennis).

1. *Augustinus Steuchus Eugubinus* (died the Augustinian canon Agostino Steuco of Gubio, +1550), in his work *De perenni philosophia*, Lyon, 1540-1, Basel 1542-2, develops the idea that, from the beginning of the world, humanity has possessed a single heritage of ideas, of which fragments and traces can be found scattered across cultures and peoples. G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716), the pioneer of the German Enlightenment, appropriates the expression 'perennis philosophia' (52; 75; 116; 132; 162; (Orf. Dual); 254: circumstances.) and presents them as a need. (107: algorithmic Method, 145; 169; 181; 199 (indirect proof); 229 criteria)

2. Open a book such as *A. Heymer, Vocabulaire éthologique* (Allemand/ Anglais / Français), Berlin/ Hamburg / Paris, 1977, 191/192: behavioral biology establishes, in both animals and humans, (6; 17 (signif.; 20, 24 (erot.) means of understanding: tactile (personal grooming, for example), chemical (smells, for example), optical (movement, mimicry, for example), acoustic (sounds, for example), and even electrical (in some fish) means of communication build an intersubjective and social life.

Indeed: from the primitives onwards, we see humanity engaging in influencing itself and its fellow man. Viewed against that background, rhetoric is a single heritage that has endured since the beginning of the world.

We say “since the beginning of the world”: since *Donald C. Johanson / Maitlend A. Edey, Lucy (The Beginnings of Mankind)*, New York, 1981, one can say, with some scholarly justification, that that 'beginning of the world' is situated around three and a half million years before us.

The Afar Triangle (in northern Ethiopia), specifically the village of Hadar, is the site where Lucy was found, the oldest, most complete, and best-preserved skeleton of an upright human ancestor, *Homo afarensis*.

Since then there has existed a rhetorica perennis, a teaching of eloquence, which has endured for centuries and centuries, until it becomes, in Hellas, an elaborated theory of the means of understanding.

WR5

Textualology of Rhetoric .

1. *P. Larousse*, oc,1143, through G ruez, (179) cited in *A. Langlois, Le style: la chose et la mani re* (Du

(1) inventio (discovery of the data which, together, constitute both the subject (theme) and everything related to it),

(2) dispositio (arrangement of the text parts, the layout first) and

(3) be called elocutio (formation or elaboration of the text). (29 =/ actio)

2. Thus G ruez: "all intellectual work comes into being on the basis of invention, arrangement, and shaping. Although these three processes are distinct, they are nevertheless not separate."

(a) Indeed: as soon as our mind (30) has carefully gathered all the elements that make up an integral part of the center or, in Latin terms, 'corpus' of the text,-- as soon as our mind has determined, on the basis of a thorough investigation, their role ('function') in the text as a whole (...),

(b) from that moment on, on the basis of their connections rooted in their own essence, the aforementioned text components will join together; moreover: they will, starting from their own nature, find their natural order (11; 17) (...).

(c) Our intellect, as the faculty for mastering the textual materials, will articulate them with an expressiveness and a colorfulness that are the 'projection' (expression) of its own clear insights and animate them with its own vital warmth.

One recognizes under **(a)** invention, under **(b)** arrangement and under **(c)** design.

3. The threefoldness outlined by G ruez represents the textual rhetoric:

(a) the process of discovery, called 'heuresis' by the ancient Greeks (hence 'heuristic rhetoric');

(b) the settlement process ('diataxis' or 'taxis');

(c) the process of expression or shaping ('lexis') (WR 276: stylistics). These are the moments of the text process in which a piece of life takes on textual (textuological) form.

4. From the perspective of ideas (in the Platonic sense), one can formulate what G ruez states from the perspective of textual theory as follows.

WR6

Whatever type of subject one 'develops' (17) ('aux sis' (*Arist., Rhet.* 3:12, 4), amplificatio) or whatever manner of 'developing' one sets out, textual elaboration) one performs, the groundwork of our mind will always be:

1. Collect ideas, 2. Arrange ideas (order, classification), 3. Express ideas convincingly, 'significantly' (WR 20).

Decision:

So much for the textual (textuological), three-part rhetorical structure.

Mnemonic technique of rhetoric.

Bibliographic Sample

JP Vernant, *Mythe et pens e chez les Grecs* (*Etudes de psychologie historique*), I, Paris, 1971, 80/ 123 (fl. 106s, (*Mn motechnie d'Hippias*)).

Hippias of Elis (-470/-400), one of the Protosophists, apparently had a phenomenal memory and introduced 'memoria' (mnemosun ) (38/39), memorization - an old heritage of the poets, incidentally - into rhetoric.

Vernant, however, sees in it merely (38/39, 125) the secularization of the (goddess) mnemosune, which, within a sacred framework, inspired the memory work of the poet, orator, or whoever. (Cfr . J.-P. Dumont, *Les Sophistes* (*Fragments et t moignages*), Paris, 1969, 145s.)

Indeed: one can memorize aloud; one can practice silently—either alone or with others (e.g., summarizing what one is about to say in a group). One can 'learn by heart' verbatim or partially.

Crucial, meanwhile, is that one runs over the text (inwardly) more than once, programming it. It is also crucial that one subsequently takes samples from that programmed text delivery, more than one, as if one were already speaking (situationally).

Significa (signific) or actio (agog ) of rhetoric.

(18; 20; 28; 29; - 654 (Thales), 173: agogie(k)). The delivery itself is called action in antiquity (to act, to influence): it is the essence of rhetoric. Textuology and mnemonic technology are merely preparatory operations. Nothing more. True rhetoric has always been the science of action. We refer to WR 20 (significance); 4 (behavioral biology). 'Action' is more than diction, with or without gesture (gestural skill), with or without overall appearance (clothing can be eloquent!), with or without infrastructure (evidence (in court, for

example), blackboard, tables, computer screen images, etc.). Speaking is, after all, a speech act.

In summary: Two preparatory sub-ideas (text and memorization) and one decisive sub-idea (delivery); behold the total idea of 'rhetoric'. Anything more is more than rhetoric; anything less is less than rhetoric. Behold the lemma (analysis program) of this course!

WR7

1. Historical introduction to philosophical rhetoric.

1.1. The first cultural-historical framework (7/8)

Archaeology, with its auxiliary sciences, teaches us, broadly speaking, the following prehistoric line of development.

Bibliographic sample:

- J. Hawkes, *Archaeological Panorama (What happened at the same time as what, in the world from -35,000 to +500?)*, Amerongen, 1977;
- RE Leaky/ R. Lewis, *New insights into the origins and development of man* , Utr./ Antw., 1978;
- RE Leaky, *On the Trail of Man* , Utr./Antw., 1981 (Fri. 198/217: A New Way of Life);
- HRH Prince Claus of the Netherlands et al., *The Evolution of Man (The Search for the Missing Link)*, Maastricht/Brussels, 1981.

1.1. A nomadic existence

For at least three and a half million years, hominids and prehistoric humans—and, even today, increasingly rare witness remains thereof—led a nomadic existence, based on gathering, as well as hunting and fishing.

1.2. The agricultural revolution .

Library Sample:

J. Northon Leonard, *Les premiers cultivateurs* , Life-Time International (Netherlands), 1977-3.

Around 28,000 BC, the first traces of the agricultural revolution appear at various points on the globe: arable farming and/or livestock farming emerge here and there.

2.1. The lead of pre-Asia.

Bib. sample : *Galleries nationales du Grand Palais* (07.05.82/09.08.82), *Naissance de l'écriture (Cunéiformes et hieroglyphes)*, Paris, 1982, 19/27 (Pierre Amiet, *Introduction historique*).

In fact, Near Asia, of which Sumer (or Sumer, the land of Lower Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and Euphrates) was the intellectual center for a long time, possessed an initially clear lead.

On the one hand, Egypt is, at that moment, still in prehistory. On the other hand, between the highlands of Iran and the Mediterranean Sea, we can follow the development brought about by 'civilization' (*Note*: As we imagined it now).

(i) From the end of the tenth millennium (around -9000), the hunters, called Natufians and settled from Palestine to the Euphrates, as well as their neighbors on the hills of Kurdistan, changed the basis of their existence.

WR 8

They cease to exploit resources like their Paleolithic ancestors. In regions drenched by abundant rains, man gradually learned to select a number of 'weeds'—meaning wild grasses such as corn (a rare wheat species, *Triticum monococcum*). He also learned to keep goats and sheep within an enclosed space, to hunt them all the more easily—before he tamed them into domestic animals.

(ii) In the 8th millennium (-8,000/-7,000), farmers became residents in the great village of Jericho (*Note* - Today this is Ariha, in Jordan, 23 km northeast of Jerusalem; the city was conquered by Israel under the leadership of Joshua between -1410 and -1350), as well as in Ganj Dareh (*Note* - In western Iran). They gradually discovered the art of firing and hardening clay, while further refining their utensils made of bone and flint.

2.2. Urbanization.

Around 7000 BC, a whole series of agricultural villages arose in the Fertile Crescent (the Fertile Half-Moon, stretching from the Persian Gulf, through the Taurus Mountains (southern Turkey) and Palestine to the Nile Delta). Urban civilization emerged in this center (Jericho is considered the oldest city).

3. Egypt.

Ancient Egypt, which was still isolated around 4000 BC, developed, in turn, the agricultural revolution.

4. The script.

Around -3300, the pictographic script was invented in Lower Mesopotamia (Uruk IVb). Around -3100, the hieroglyphic script emerged in Egypt. Around -2800/-2600, the Sumerian script (in Lower Mesopotamia) became cuneiform.

Around 2300 BC, the peoples of the Indus Valley (Mohenjo-Daro; Harappa), in present-day Pakistan and north of Karachi, developed their own script, which remains undeciphered to this day. Around 1500 BC, ideographic writing appears on bronze vases and oracle bones in China.

Around 1100, the first inscriptions of the linear alphabet of the Phoenicians appear. Around 800, the Greeks invent the modern alphabet with vowels. Immediately, the written sources of history emerge.

Note: Rhetoric in Sumer and Egypt. One should not think that the Hellenes had no Near Eastern predecessors in terms of rhetoric.

WR9

1.1.1. The first tenzones (*redé twistgedichten*) in Sumer (9/15)

Library sample: *Samuel Noah Kramer, l'histoire commence à Sumer*, Paris, 1975, 153/159 (*Logomachie: les premières tensons*).

'Tenzone' comes from the Latin 'tensio', to exert oneself, debate.

1. Kramer states that the Sumerians, who called themselves 'Kengir', settled in Mesopotamia in the 4th millennium (-4000/-3000). Their principal cities were Ur, Lagash, Uruk, and Eridu. They established their own agriculture and metalworking, as well as city-state legislation. They possessed ziggurat architecture (a stepped tower, temple, and observatory) and their own sculpture, comparable to ancient Egyptian.

2. The Sumerians thought in systems (pairs of opposites), one type of comparative method: thus read the titles of the debate poems 'Summer and Winter', 'Grain and Cattle', 'Bird and Fish', 'Tree and Reed', 'Copper and Silver', 'Pickaxe and Plow': One sees the culture of that time shimmering through the titles.

3. In the tenzones, the elements or objects were personified in such a way that they became the acting persons of a kind of reasoning duel, in which one glorified oneself—largely as a game—and brought down the opponent.

Summer and Winter

Kramer, op. cit., 154/156, analyzes this debate poem'.

(a) *Mythical introduction*

Enlil, the god of the sky, decides to make all kinds of trees and plants grow so that abundance reigns in Sumeria.

(b) *Cast*

To this end he creates ('causes' (281); see Hiero-analysis course 103/106 (Die Urheber by N. Söderblom)) two 'founders of culture' (heroes of culture), the brothers Emesh (summer) and Ents (winter); as 'function deities' (H. Usener (1834/1905)) they each have their own function (field of activity)

Grafting causes the sheep to give birth to the lamb, the goat to give birth

to the kid, the cow and calf to multiply, and the cream and milk to be abundant. (...). Emesh causes the existence of trees and fields, the expansion of stables and sheepfolds. (...)”.

WR10

Now, do not think that nature alone is the 'function' of the deities, for further it reads: “Emesh causes the founding of cities and dwellings, the building of houses in the land, the raising of the temples on the mountain heights”.

(c) *The twist.*

Once their mission is fulfilled, the two brothers proceed to Nippur to offer sacrifices to their 'father' (cause) Enlil. Emesh provides all kinds of wild and tame animals, birds, and plants. Enten brings precious stones and rare metals, trees, and fish.

However, having arrived before the House of Life (the name of the sanctuary), Enten, out of envy, provokes a quarrel with Emesh.

(d) *The heated discussion.*

Every god sets out the situation before Enlil. Enten says: “Father Enlil, you gave me the guarding of the canals as a 'function'. I have provided the water of abundance. I have caused farm to fall into disrepair; I have fulfilled my 'function': the granaries are bursting. (...)”

Well then, Emesh, the ..., who understands nothing of fields, has bumped my arm ...”. (*Note* -- The text is sometimes illegible in the original). -- Whereupon Emesh presents his version, starting with flattery.

(e) *The judgment* .

After having listened attentively to both their pleas, Enlil answers: “the waters that give rise to life, in all lands, -- Enten has the 'function' of guarding them. As farmer of the deities, he causes everything. -- Emesh, my son, how can you equate yourself with your brother Enten?”

(f) *Reconciliation.*

The god Enlil pronounces the verdict, irrevocable: both brothers, respectfully obeying, reconcile with each other.

“The holy words of Enlil, which have a deep meaning, whose decision is unchangeable, -- who would dare dishonor them? Emesh kneels before Enten, offers him a prayer. In his house he brings nectar (mead, divine drink), wine and beer. Both drink, to their satiety, the nectar, which gladdens the heart, the wine and the beer. Emesh has given his brother gold, silver, and lapis lazuli as gifts; as brothers and as friends they pour out drink offerings. (...)”.

(g) Conclusion -- “In the dispute between Emesh and Enten, Enten, the faithful farmer of the gods, has shown himself victorious. (...). Father Enlil, be glorified!”

WR11

Hermeneutical remarks.

'Hermneutiek' (176 pp.; 164; 11) is 'textual interpretation'.

1.-- Rhetorically it is clear that the debate is structured: the arrangement (WR5: classification) proves that a rhetorical culture existed. Also the agonistic - to put it in Greek terms - that is, influencing one another with means of persuasion as a form of power struggle, indeed, of will to power (27) and assertiveness, proves the existence of rhetoric, -- even if it is not Greek, of course.

2.-- From a religious-historical perspective ('hiero-analytical'), this text is typical of the demonistic religion, see Hiero-analysis 93; 95; 98; 100; 106ff.;

The defining characteristic of 'demonism' is the harmony of opposites within the deities themselves. We are faced here with an ancient polytheism, in which two layers are discernible:

(i) primitive polydemonism, with its local worship of nature spirits ('naturism'; see Hiero-analysis 91/92); for the idea 'polydemonism' see *Salomon Reinach* (1858/1932), *Cultes, mythes et religions*, III, Paris, 1913- 2, 364/433, especially 429/433; 'polydemonism' as a term dates from **(i)** Johann Mosheim (1733/1773),

(ii) A. Milchhöfer, who meant the religion of the Eastern Pelasgians);

(ii) Later heroism (80; 79) (hero worship in connection with deities); we refer to *Hector Munro Chadwick* (1870/1947), *The Heroic Age* (1912); id., *The Growth of Literature*, 3 vol., 1932/1940: there is a heroic period in Sumeria (-2,750+), Hellas (-1,200+), India (-1,100+), Germania (+300+).

Well, both primitive polydemonism and later heroism (which goes hand in hand with invading peoples) exhibit a type of deities and humans that, alongside good, simultaneously displays evil characteristics and leaves a barbaric impression.

The opposites – good and evil, rise and fall, etc. – merge ('harmony').

J. W. Goethe (1749/1832), in his *Faust* (1808/1832), says, through the

mouth of Mephistopheles: "I am the spirit that constantly denies! And rightly so! For everything that comes into being is worthy of destruction. It would be better, therefore, if nothing came into being! -- Thus, everything that you know as sin, ruin, in short, as evil, is my peculiar element".

WR12

With this statement, Goethe, who once belonged to the Sturm und Drang group (1771/1785), characterizes the downward movement in demonism (representing physical evil (injury, illness, death, natural disaster) and ethical evil (sin)). In contrast, that same demonism simultaneously represents the upward line (physical good (invulnerability, health, survival) and ethical good (virtue, conscientious conduct)).

The ancients sometimes called both sides together death and life (where 'death' denotes both physical and ethical evil). This totality, called death and life, forms the essence of the polytheistic deities, who thus establish the cycle in which death and life continually follow one another.

Bibl. sample:

-- WB Kristensen, *Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions*, Amsterdam, 1947 (fri. 231/290: *Cycle and Totality*, -- a brilliant study);

-- P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité*, II (*La symbolique du mal*), Paris, 1960 (199/217 : *Le dieu méchant et la vision 'tragique' de l'existence*);

-- Kurt Leese, **Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion **, *Zürich*, 1954, writes: "Extra- and intra-human natural events are never, in an unambiguous (...) sense, a revelation of God (*note*, -- 'God' is understood here in a Biblical sense, as Supreme Being, standing above demonism).

Such a natural event is not necessarily holy (*note* : 'Holy', here, again in the sublime Biblical sense of 'standing outside physical and ethical evil'). It can be holy. The Christian faith sharpens the gaze for the demonic aspects in that natural event, that is, for that which is not divinely-creating in it, but anti-godly-destructive, indeed, satanic." (oc, 295f.). In other words: the Bible clearly saw the demonization that is at work in polytheism.

That our conception of 'demonism' ('demonization') also applies to Sumerian religion is evident from Kramer oc, 124: "Although the Sumerians thought that the great deities (especially the goddess Nanshe) behaved ethically well, they nevertheless believed that, at the founding (cause) of human culture, those same deities had also introduced evil (lies, violence, oppression).

The list of the 'ME', of the 'principles', invented by the deities to ensure the smooth functioning of the cosmos (the universe, nature), encompassed not only truth, peace, goodness, and justice, but also falsehood, discord (strife), lament, and holy anguish.

Why had the deities deemed it necessary to establish (cause) and favor evil, sin, suffering, and miscalculation? (...) Did the sages of Sumer not think that the will of the deities and their motives, or drives, were unfathomable?

Kramer, apparently not a historian of religion or a theologian, forgets to mention that the impeccable Nansje, for example, collaborated intimately with the evil deities within a single, coherent system of deities—which entails her complicity! Therefore, we prefer Kristensen, where he places the duality in the very essence of the deities.

Theologia perennis.

Above (WR4) we discussed the 'eternal philosophy or rhetoric', which, in other words, has defied the ages since time immemorial. His Holiness Pope John Paul II spoke, in our Antwerp cathedral, on Friday, May 17, 1985, about the commitment ('engagement') of the laity in the church. The following words appear therein: "According to the words of C. Houtman: "In the Bible, nature is depicted as a power with a Janus head (*note*-- Turned in two directions):

- (i) she can be kind to man, -- give him food;
- (ii) but she can also threaten him, -- and take his life. (...).

It is well known that the biblical belief in creation has contributed to

(i) both the disenchantment

(ii) as the valorization of nature. This means that the world is neither divine (*note*: in the Biblical sense of 'elevated above physical and ethical evil') nor diabolical, and that the distance between creator and creature is and remains insurmountable.

(i) Worship of natural forces or cult of the dead is forbidden,

(ii) On the other hand, the Bible emphatically affirms the fundamental goodness of creation.

One sees that, perhaps three or four millennia after the Sumerian theologians, our current Pope is also still grappling with the problem of the demonization of nature (= the universe). And not only him! However, the language in which that demonization is spoken of has partially shifted.

The religious projection theory.

1. In psychology, an idea is circulating that is referred to as 'religious projection'. The psychic subject (I, the unconscious layer within us)

(i) possesses, within itself, certain attributes (characteristics, desires, states of mind, etc.);

(ii) it attributes them to the deity ("The subject 'projects what is in him, **a/** outside him, **b/** yes, above him, into the deity").

In this psychological idea, one sees one of the possible applications of Etienne Bonnot, Abbé de Condillac (1714/1780), and the Sensualists, with their 'projection'.

2. The question arises, at least in Enlightened -Rational circles (or, as it is called, the 'classical' tradition), whether the Sumerians, here, are not engaging in religious projection. Specifically: whether they are not projecting the demonic reality within themselves outside, indeed above them, into the deities.

More simply put: anthropomorphism. Imagining the deities as humans. The Greek thinker who first did this is Xenophanes of Colophon (-560/-490), the pioneer of the religious-critical Greek Enlightenment.

a. The answer to that is clear: Only a mentality alienating from, or already alienated from, archaic (and ancient, in particular) religion can assume something like mere projection in this regard.

b. Let a single testimony be cited here. *H. Limet, Religion de Sumer*, in: *P. Poupard et al., Dictionnaire des religions*, Paris, 1984, 1620/1629, says: "One of the fundamental ideas of Sumerian religion is designated by the term 'ME'.

This idea is expressed only in the plural. It concerns all human activities: worship, kingship, crafts, intellect and what man knows, social life (fights, law, prostitution), music.

The ME cause a person, an object, or a function (role) to correspond to an imaginary model (...). Thus, a king is merely an individual among many others, as long as the ME of kingship have not been granted to him.

Thus, a city that rejoices in its ME corresponds to the idea of what a city ought to be. (...). Without being divine beings, the ME nevertheless belong to the world of the deities, who are its principal possessors and distributors."

Decision:

Nature and, even more so, culture are rooted in the originators (gods, goddesses, nature beings) and, at the same time, in the pre-existing imaginary models (called 'Me' in Sumer).

a. From a purely theological perspective, there can be no doubt: The 'myths' (of which the tenzone, above, is one example) are anything but 'projections'. They are—as explained in the Logic course (1984/1985), 109/110—insights into essence, expressed in narrative form, belonging to the sacred.

b. -- However, theological language (WR2) is not the only one: for instance, one can recite the above tenzone in an amusing manner to a Sumerian children's audience or allow it to be freely interpreted and processed as narrative material in a debate exercise—as, apparently, according to Kramer, occurred in some cultural circles at the time. That genuine projection is taking place there, within the already given sacred framework, is more than normal. However, this places one in non-theological language.

Conclusion: the answer as to whether or not the above text contains projection depends on the types of language use within the Sumerian culture of that time.

Bib. sample

Among a mass of 'mythanalytic' scholarly literature, just one work is recommended: *P. Schebesta, ed., *Oorsprong van de religie* (Results of Prehistoric and Ethnological Research)*, Tielt/The Hague, 1962, especially 95/102 (*Myth: Fairy Tale or History*), where it becomes clear that, even today, primitives, for example, possess more than one usage regarding 'mythical stories'—including playful, artistic, and strictly sacred forms of language.

Literature typology.

The concept of 'literary genre' (literary type) is familiar. It is immediately clear that the three types of language use—playful, artistic, and sacred—represent just as many 'literary genres'. Situation and intention play a decisive role in this.

Traditional rhetoric has always been, also, a literary theory, concerned with the correct understanding of the literary genre. With the above-mentioned hermeneutics (text interpretation), we are fully immersed in classical rhetoric!

1.1.2. Two very old Egyptian wisdom writers (16/18)

Bibl. sample :

-- G. Fauconnier, op. cit., 19 ("Other sources (intended is - R. Scherer, *Structure et fondement de la communication* , Paris, 1955 ;

-- id., *Philosophies de la communication* , Paris, 1971) would, even, go back to ancient Egypt, where 'rhetors' are mentioned such as Kagemni and Ptahhotep".

-- Miriam Lichtheim, *Ancient Egyptian Literature (A book of Readings)*, Vol. I (*The Old and Middle Kingdoms*), Univ. of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1973-1; 1975-2,

1. Kagemni.

Lichtheim, op. cit., 58/61, situates ' *The Instruction Addressed to Kagemni* ' (Lesson addressed to Kagemni) in the didactic or doctrinal genre, with the subtype 'LES' (WR 15).

The full title reads: "The Instruction Addressed to Kagemni by a sage." (... on behalf of a 'sage'). With this, however, Lichtheim situates the text within Sapiential or wisdom literature (or, in the Eastern sense, Sophiology). 'Instruction' means, besides 'teaching' (in Greek 'didachè', doctrine), also, occasionally, a teaching aid, and even, sometimes, punishment (apparently as a means to 'learn' 'to learn more').

The literary form (genre) in which that doctrine (lesson) is cast varies from establishing principles of life and/or rules of conduct to dialogues and stories intended to be didactic.

Incidentally: the genre 'instruction' also occurs in Sumer. As well as elsewhere in the ancient Near East (Babylonian-Assyrian, Canaanite-Phoenician, Biblical literature). We know, after all, that in ancient Israel, besides priests, prophets, and apocalypticists, 'wise men' also wrote.

The text appears on the Papyrus Priss (Bib. Nat.) and dates from the Fifth Dynasty (-2450/-2300). It reads as follows: "The reverent person knows prosperity. Praised is the modest one. The tent opens for the silent one. The seat of the quiet person is spacious".

Linguistic-logical hermeneutics.

It is clear that the four little sentences are, actually, conditional sentences: "Man, if he is respectful, knows prosperity; man, if he is modest, is praised; the tent opens for man, if he is silent. The seat of man, if he is quiet, is spacious."

Without that conditional, every little sentence loses its meaning.

Miriam Lichtheim notes that the expression “to have a spacious seat” means “to be well received” in such a way that one is “comfortable”.

Meaning-making hermeneutics.

How should one, now, understand that text?

(i) Lichtheim says that exactly one idea is expressed in four sentences: the quiet, modest person is appreciated and is successful.

(ii) However, we have the impression that this is not entirely correct. Would the following meaning not be more appropriate?

a. The respectful, reverent person goes along best;

b. for, by virtue of his reverence, he is a modest, a quiet figure, a taciturn one, -- three sub-ideas of the total idea 'reverence for one's fellow man', -- three characteristics that make him sought after.

Without further contextual data, this is not verifiable, of course.

2. *Ptahhotep.*

M. Lichtheim, oc; 61/80 (*The Instruction of Ptahhotep*), -- Also belongs to the Papyrus Priss om and dates from the Sixth Dynasty (-2.300/-2.150).

The settlement.

(WR5)

a. introduction.

b . corpus (center): 37 maxims, where each maxim is developed (WR 6) as a unit of at least four and rarely more than twelve sentences and clauses. The 'units', here, are text units, of course -

c . lock. (Abc: 103 (three); 231; 296).

Compassion as an ethical mandate.

(1) Some data and themes (topics) are repeated several times, -- which indicates their importance within the author's scale of values.

(2) The text offers neither a complete ethics nor an exposition of ethics that is strictly logically suited. However, it does offer

(a) the most important aspects of human understanding (WR 4) and

(b) the basic virtues. Lichtheim lists: self-control, temperance, kindness, generosity, justice, sense of truth, modesty.

Overall impression.

No warlike 'virtues' are mentioned; the ideal man is the 'man of peace', the peaceful man.

Behold the image of man or the idea of man, which resonates through the

text, as it were. Indeed, also a 'homo perennis' (an 'eternal' image of man)!

WR18

A section of text.

Christiane Ziegler, Deux feuillets de 'l'enseignement de Ptahotep ', in: Naissance de l'écriture , 305/306.

On a papyrus, the text of which dates from the Old Kingdom (around 2400), but the copy from the Middle Kingdom (around 2000). Always the *Papyrus Prisse* .

The writer says: “Such wisdom dates back to the Pyramid Age. From generation to generation, the name of their author is passed down. They constitute one of the foundations of education: students learn to do them from their tender old age.”

The content of Egyptian wisdom reached a high ethical standard at the beginning of the first millennium BC (-1000). The Bible adopts some of these sayings. For, as a Lebanese prince who lived around -1000 openly stated: “Wisdom came out of Egypt and reached the land in which I dwell.”

1.-- “Do not boast of your knowledge. (On the contrary) ask advice from both the ignorant (and) the 'wise' (the one who knows). (For) the limits of skill have not (yet) been reached and no sketchy (knowledge) is perfect.

The good (*note* -- Understand: sound) word (*note* -- Understand: insight) is just as hidden as the green stone. Yet it can be found with the maids who grind the grain.

One remark: within the very strictly authoritarian Egyptian society, it is striking that the author (Ptahotep, Ptah - Hotep, Ptahhotep) understands the truth (42; 67: Greek mod.) independently of social class, for both the ignorant (= uncultured) and the ordinary maid can be truth-bearing fellow human beings.

2.-- “Suppose you encounter an opponent in full action, -- a mighty man who is your superior, - in that case: bend your arm, bow your back! Taking up arms against him will not bring him into (good) understanding with you.”

—

Do not pay too much attention to his angry language! On the contrary: by not opposing him in his actions, (you will achieve that) people will say of him: “He is an ignorant man.” -- Your self-control will prevail over his abundance of words.” (...).

3.-- “Suppose that you, in the midst of the guests, sit at the table of a fellow man who is of a higher rank than you, in that case: take what he gives you and as it stands before you. Look straight ahead (at the one sitting directly opposite you), but do not stare at him.”

WR19

1.1.3. Sides (19/30)

(1) Two Sumerian proverbs (dating from the end of the third millennium (-2000)).

a. S. Freud (1856/1939), the psychoanalyst, drew the attention of the modern West to a psychological system, the opposing pair 'pleasure principle/reality principle'. Listen now to the following Sumerian saying: “For the sake of pleasure; marry. After deep reflection: divorce”.

b. In our time of austerity policies, coupled with increased taxes, the tax collector takes on a very special significance. Listen, now, to what the sighing Sumerian from four thousand years ago—* *Das un behagen in der kultur* * (a work by the same *Freud*)—explains: “You may have a master, you may even have a king! But the man you must truly fear is the tax collector.”

This implies that, in the midst of an authoritarian-despotic state, one would still prefer the prince or the lord to the treasurer—whom we, in the midst of our democratic system, have retained for all certainty.

(2) An Egyptian love poem

('love song') from the New (= Second) Kingdom (-1612/-1064; in -1463 Moses leaves Egypt with the Hebrews).

a. My sweetheart's love is on the other bank. A river arm lies between us both and the crocodile stands ready on a sandbank.

b. Yet I step into the water and dive beneath the currents. My heart is mighty, elevated above the waves: like steadfast earth, beneath my feet is the water. It is the feeling of love for her that makes me so strong, so much so that I ward off the dangers of the current.

c. She is a unique mistress; there is no second like her. Look: she is like the star that rises at the beginning of a successful year. She is luminous and flawless; her complexion is radiant. She is seductive by the look in her eyes. Her words and her lips are her magic. Her neck is tall and her bosom sparkling. She possesses hair like lapis lazuli, with a blue sheen. Her arm: it surpasses gold. Her fingers are reminiscent of lotus flowers. She wears the belt close around her waist. The beauty of her legs surpasses her other beauties. Her posture is like that of a noble lady when she walks.

That is as far as translation goes—the beautiful text.

Bib. st. : Naiss. d, l'écriture, 291; 320.

WR20

Comparative hermeneutics .

1. Rhetoric is the study of human understanding (164; 293: pathos) from the perspective of influence ((WR 4; 17; 28). Now, the magic that a woman radiates is a form of rhetorical action (WR 6; 20).

Library sample:

-- C. Tindemans, *Eloquent silence (Non-verbal communication)*, in: *Streven* , vol. 52 (1985): 11 (Aug.-Sept.), 950/ 957;

-- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion* , Paris, 1985 (especially 72/02: *La logique de la séduction*).

2. Significant (significa).

Because people, consciously or unconsciously, limit traditional rhetoric to textual and ideas rhetoric (the latter in the verbal sense).

WR 6 (textual and performance aspect) -- and, in addition, forgetting the memoria and, above all, the actio (action), it never dawns on rhetoric critics, time and again, that full-fledged rhetoric (28) also includes the unconditional (non-verbal) moments.

Bib, steekpr .:

G. Mannoury, *Significa en moderne begripskritiek* , in: B. Stokvis, *Psychologie der autosuggestie en der ambience (A signific-psychological exposition for psychologists and doctors)*, Lochem, 1947, 11/14.

Mannoury refers to *Lady Victoria Welby* , an Englishwoman, who was once a lady-in-waiting under Queen Victoria (1819/1901). She is known for her *What is Meaning ?* (1903) and was, among others, with CCS Peirce (1839/1914), the founder of semiotics, in correspondence (Cfr *Elisabeth Walther, Hrsg., Ch.S. Peirce, Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und Andere Schriften* , Baden-Baden, 1965 (oc,143/167: *Ueber Zeichen, aus Briefen an Lady Victoria Welby*).

Lady Welby is considered the founder of *significa*, which studies “significance, in all its forms, and thus ... working in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose”.

With that broad meaning of 'significance', Lady Welby joins the true Platonic idea (which encompasses every content of knowledge and thought,

including the non-verbal). Significance studies the relationship from the perspective of influence, in whatever form. One also speaks of the theory of the speech act (whereby the speech act also includes non-verbal communication).

Here, briefly, reference is made to two thinkers.

(1) Jacob L. Moreno (189/1974), the man of psychodrama. In his *Gruppenpsychologie, therapy and psychodrama* (initiation in theory and praxis), Stuttgart, 1937-2, 3/4, Steller discusses non-linguistic communication in more detail

WR21

The therapeutic group is (...) not only

(i) a branch of medicine and

(ii) a form of society,

(iii) but also the first step into the cosmos. The question arises immediately: "does a cosmic type of understanding exist?"

Moreno explains:

(i) there is the purely 'dialogical' (conversational) method in its 'groups' whose main instrument of understanding is language.

(ii) "However important language may be in the development of the individual and the group, it is, always, merely the primarily logical (...) form of understanding". Especially in the experiential world of the baby and the child, non-linguistic realities play a leading role. "Language represents only a part of the entire psyche". In the 'groups', therefore, communicating more than verbally is the appropriate method.

Conclusion: 'cosmic' means, here,

(a) the fact that man belongs not only in society, but also in the entire universe,

(b) the fact that, situated therein, he establishes extra-linguistic communication (156 Dionys. mainades).

(2) Charles Bally (1865/1947),

Le langage et la vie, Geneva/Lille, 1952-3,-- frl. oc, 150/153; 157/159.-- Bally, a pupil of the renowned Ferd. de Saussure (1857/1913), the semiologist, takes a stand against de Saussure's one-sided rational and intellectualist conception of language. He does this on the basis of his analysis of natural language, as it is revealed by non-literary speech spoken in real life.

In it comes

(i) the speaking subject, the individual,

- (ii) the entire situation in which the language is spoken,
 - (iii) expressed in more than merely a logical manner.
- All aspects that Saussure puts in parentheses.

It is evident that both Moreno and Bally (the one as a physician-therapist, the other as a linguist) exhibit significant scope.

It is precisely from a significant perspective that we engage in comparative hermeneutics.

L. Bellenger, oc, 79ss., discusses seduction as a form of influencing understanding. In doing so, he distinguishes mainly two types:

- (1) passive seduction ("I am being seduced") and
- (2) active seduction ("I seduce").

WR22

Biblical wisdom concerning adultery.

Proverbs 7 gives us a sample regarding Biblical interpretation

- (i) adultery and
- (ii) prostitution in general.

a. *The Book of Proverbs* dates from the Persian occupation (which does not exclude the possibility that the wisdom expressed therein goes back to the time of King Solomon (+ in - 970)).

The main content connects with the core problem of religion (WR11/12: harmony (124) of life and death). This is masterfully expressed in Jesus Sirach (= Ecclesiastikus) 15:11/17, where it is said: "For man lie life and death: on the basis of his own choice, one of the two possibilities is given to him". One sees the Biblical shift: thanks to the intervention of the Lord ('Yahweh'), human freedom is established to a degree which the peoples (the 'pagan religions') had never suspected; the emphasis lies on the free choice of man.

b. The 'parakuptousa', the one who looks sideways while bending.

A. Introduction.

My son, apply my words; keep my precepts within your inner being. If you carry out my precepts, then you shall 'live' (WR12; understood as: and, immediately, be freed from the cycle of death (evil) and life (good)). (...). Say to wisdom: 'You are my sister'; designate insight ('understanding' as 'having understanding of') as 'a relative!' This, to shield yourself against a strange woman, against an unknown lady who speaks seductive words.

B. Middle ('corpus').

One day, I was sitting at the window in my home, looking through the

bars. And I saw the scene of youthful delusional wise men: I noticed—in the midst of law one should still be called 'children'—a young man without insight.

He creeps through the alley, close to the corner where she stands: he turns in the direction of her house, -- in the twilight, when the day was drawing to a close, in the heart of the night and the darkness.

Look, a woman is coming to meet him! She is dressed up like a maiden and her heart is deceitful. She is one who is enterprising and defiant. Truly: her feet cannot stand it in her house! At one moment she is to be seen in the streets, then again in the squares. She stands guard on every conceivable corner.

WR23

Look: there she holds him and is already embracing him! Shamelessly she addresses him: 'I still had to make a sacrifice, to fulfill my vows. With that I came to meet you and, searching, I found you. I have covered my couch with blankets, with embroidered fabrics, with Egyptian cloth. Where I lie, I have sprinkled myrrh, aloe and cinnamon oil. Come on down: let us live love-drunk until morning! Just enjoy yourself, in lust! For a husband is not to be found in my house: 'he' is away, away for a long journey. 'He' has, after all, taken the bag of coins with him. 'He' will, therefore, only come home again with the full moon!'

Turning point

By persuasion with power she seduces him, and with the sweet magic of her lips she enthrones him. Without hesitation he follows her—like an ox heading to the slaughter—like a madman who, shackled in leg irons, heads toward his torture chamber—until an arrow pierces his liver. Or like a little bird flying into a net—without realizing that his 'life' (WR12) is at stake.

C. Slot.

And now: listen to me, son! Pay attention to the words of my mouth! -- May your heart not be led astray in the direction of the ways of such women, do not go astray on the paths of such a thing, -- for numerous are those whom she has struck down with death (WR 12) and she has beheaded the strongest men. -- Her dwelling is the way to Sheol (underworld, hell), the ramp that leads to the realm of the dead.

Note: For the idea of 'underworld', 'realm of the dead' (125: chthonic) pan, satyrs, hermes); 150: Dionysus), we refer to Hiero-analysis 19 (cosmic axis); 37 (sheol).

In short: the maiden's house is the realm of the dead extending just above the earth (159, 166: Orf. light); whoever 'lives' there with the maiden is already,

anticipatively, (160: Orpheus) in the realm of 'death' (always in the archaic-ancient, truly religious sense).

Just as the one who actually lives Biblical wisdom is, anticipatively, in the realm of 'life' (again in the religious sense).

In other words: whoever reduces the wisdom books to mere 'ethical' works misunderstands their full, religious scope. Hermeneutically (in order to understand their true meaning), this is decisive.

Two types of 'seduction'.

Reread, now, WR 19, love song "This is a description of 'the seductive' (passive) in the pretty one. (81: witches; 161 Dionusoskind); 156 158, 145 (Dion): 247: marketing).

WR24

The woman herself—insofar as the love song reveals—is not knowingly and willingly enchanting. The loving man, however, is seduced because he finds in his fellow man that which seduces him.

a. Whether, as *Jean Baudrillard* (1929/2007), *De la séduction*, Paris, 1979, all seduction (28) is narcissistic, we leave open: according to that theory, the enchanted man would, here, merely, find his own essence, insofar as it is seductive. Freudian psychoanalysis has indeed led to an inflation (attributing an excessive role to) of narcissism. Reread the text, and try in vain to find the poet's self-projection (28) in it.

b. In contrast, the axiology of *Max Scheler* 1874/1928), *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1913/1916); (246 Plat.; 288: 'rhetoric') id., *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, Frankf.aM, 1948-5, op.

There exists—according to Scheler—a feeling that is original (derivable from nothing else) and true to reality ('objective'), the feeling of value. That feeling is, furthermore, like all consciousness, intentional: it is I (subject), directed at (= intentio) an object (given), who 'feel'! What is felt in the beautiful girl, for example? Her erotic and eroticizing value.

It is not because the poet-writing man is already eroticized or in love that the erotic value of the girl on the other side arises before his consciousness. No, the girl—with her erotic value—must first be given before the man, focusing on her, feels seduced, addressed, or moved by her.

Conclusion: the man is, indeed, seduced by the seductive (= value) in the other, the girl. But whether he recognizes his self-satisfied doppelganger in

her, as Baudrillard and the Freudians claim, is, for the time being, nowhere evident. We refer here to WR14 (projection theory).

c. Within axiology the significant elements (27) acquire their value (WR4: means of understanding, especially the optical, as well as the acoustic):

a. the partial impressions: (6: partial idea) (complexion, gaze, neck, bosom, hair, arm, fingers, belt, legs, words);

b , the overall impression (6: total idea, 31): unique,-- luminous, flawless, noble posture.

Through these elements and their totality she appeals to the man: this means that she constitutes a value for him—the erotic one, that is. That is her 'significance' (WR 20), her significance.

WR25

d. L. Bellenger, oc, 78, attributes the idea of 'apatè' to Gorgias of Leontinoi (-487/-190)—which means deceit, cunning, pastime, but in the sense that the success of that deceit, that cunning, that pastime, would be due to or attributable to the fact that “a being, which is not without feeling, allows itself to be caught by the pleasure” of being seduced.

In other words, the one being seduced—in our case, the poet—is actually waiting to be seduced by the seductive in the girl.

The desire to be seduced.

a. It is true that this interpretation of the word 'apatè' (to be deceived, to deceive) fits into the worldview of the great rhetorician and (proto)sophist that Gorgias was.

b. The question arises, however, whether here, in our Egyptian love song, one should speak of cunning, deceit, or trickery. Nowhere is this immediately apparent. What is true, however, is that the sense (of erotic beauty) entails susceptibility to the seductive, appealing effect (influence, persuasion: WR4, 116: Pyth.). Yet this does not necessarily mean that one should speak here of 'complicity' or, even, of 'weakness'. 'Susceptibility' simply means that one possesses a sense of value (here: of feminine beauty) and, therefore, is not lacking in character. Nothing more.

And 'seductive' means, here, for the time being, only 'strongly appealing': it does not yet imply succumbing to the power of feminine beauty—which, indeed, would imply weakness or complicity in succumbing to it.

Conclusion : some researchers easily confuse a number of related terms.
– Even the continuous use of the word 'desire' – so characteristic of psychoanalysts – is misleading: a desire (in the Freudian sense or not) only acquires meaning if, beforehand (consciously or unconsciously), value and

sense for value (in the Schelerian sense) are present.

The basic language is axiology. In other words, not all feelings of value are already 'desire'; 'desire' is one type of feeling of value. Nothing more.

Reread, now, WR 22/23 (parakuptousa). – This is the keen-sighted description of 'the seduction' (active) in the maiden. She is – unlike the Egyptian beauty on the riverbank – knowingly and willingly enchanting, And the young man allows himself to be enchanted, consciously.

WR26

L. Bellenger, oc,78, mentions two theories about seduction:

a.-- The theological idea of 'temptation', whereby the theologian regards temptation (in the active sense) as the act (deed, action) of diabolical pride;-- as 'hubris', overestimation of oneself;

b . The libertine idea of 'seduction', whereby the libertine denotes the same active seduction as the act of Promethean (self-assured) sense of freedom and, at the same time, of human cunning.

'Libertine' has, primarily, two meanings:

(i) the seventeenth century, philosophical - ethical meaning, which refers to thinkers such as P. Gassendi (1592/1655), who focused on the Epicurean pleasure value, - Saint-Evremond, François La Moth's Le Vayer (1588/1672), the skeptic ("Des choses les plus sûres la plus sûre est de douter"), - even Jean - Baptiste Poquelin, dit Molière (1622/1673), who followed Gassendi's lessons;

'Libertine', here, means freethinker, 'esprit fort' (emancipated), one who has freed himself from the 'grip' (pressure) of religion, prevailing opinions, and prevailing rules of conduct; H. Berr, in **Du scepticisme de Gassendi** (oc, 14s.), expresses this 'discomfort in the (prevailing) culture' as follows: "To begin with, to let oneself go, in pleasure; then, simply articulating principles of life—that is what it means to be a libertine".

A. Adam, *Les libertins au XVIIe siècle* , 1964, 7, says: "There is

(i) the freethinking, which is offensive, of the some,
(ii) the learned freethinking of the others,
(iii) the imperceptible and secret free-spiritedness, which, without appearing to, carried out a true revolution in moral values throughout the century.

(ii) There is the modern meaning: licentiousness, debauchery, such that

'libertine' refers to a dissolute person.

According to *Mario Pernolia, Logique de le séduction*, in; *Traverses*, 18 (1980: février), cited by Bellenger, the theological and the libertarian idea of 'seduction' share one common characteristic: "The dictate of a subjective will such that deception is used as a detour".

In other words: someone's 'desire' (will) imposes its dominion by means of deceptive influence (WR4, 118). understanding, yes, but by deception, tricking.

WR27

Ludwig Binswanger (1881/1266), the only one with whom Freud maintained friendly relations, notwithstanding the fact that Binswanger, as a psychiatrist starting from Heidegger's **Daseinsanalyse** (analysis of concrete human existence), held entirely different views, has left us a system that is relevant here: there is the taking of something, someone as (what it, he/she is) and there is the taking of something, especially of someone, to (what belongs to him/her).

"One takes someone by their word, by their gesture, "bei der schwachen Stelle" (at their weak spot) (179: mysteries) (their inclinations, their passions). In this general formulation, therefore, the act of "taking (that) person by something" in the encounter (with someone) becomes a universal human relationship (...).

It is the experience of being caught, as excellently described by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980), the great French existentialist, in his example of someone looking through a keyhole. The moment he is tapped on the shoulder and looked at, he feels 'caught' (*FJJ Buytendijk* (1087/1974; the existential physiologist and behavioral psychologist), ** De vrouw** (** Her nature, appearance and existence **), Utr./Bruss., 1951, 320ff.).

Well, for the power-hungry person (11) (cf. Ed. Spranger (1882/1963), *Lebensformen*, Halle, 1921, where that type is clarified, for example in politics) 'die schwache stelle', someone's weak spot, is seductive: "Nous séduisons, parce que notre vulnérabilité apparaît à l'autre" ("We seduce, because our vulnerability is clear to the other"),-- thus Bellenger, oc 79.

What 'temptation' does the 'seducer'/'seductress' undergo in that case? The temptation to hit us by our weak spot.

Conclusion: the variants of meaning constantly intertwine in seducing and being seduced! The seducer is, through our seductiveness, seduced into seducing us! The active meaning partially merges with the passive meaning.

Let one now go through the parakuptousa: one will see all those meanings, as it were, dramatized at work.

1. Note ...

Note once again the significant means of understanding (WR4; 20; 24): the optical (dressed up, enterprising, visible), the acoustic (she speaks to him, sweet lips), especially the chemical (myrrh, aloe, cinnamon oil), also the tactile (she holds him tight, blankets, fabrics).

She takes him by his 'lustprinzip' (Freud), his sense of lust and a life drunken into the night. The ardor, the passion, is that within him by which she takes him and ... holds him.

WR28

The second thing in him—which is also in her—through which she grasps him, is the unease with the (norms of) culture: her husband is gone and, thus, the freedom to indulge repressed desire is now there—for her and... for him, who, with her, escapes the pressure of a strict society... “until morning”; afterwards, he (and she) walk once again in the armor of culture. But that is 'for later'.

Well then, the optical, acoustic, chemical, tactile significant means speculate on that duality, that system of 'passion / cultural pressure', in him, - in her.

Note -- That archaic and ancient cultures already grasped this system is evident from WR 19: “For the sake of pleasure.../ after deep reflection”. Freud formulated something universal—human, materialistic-hedonistic. Perennis homo, the 'eternal' man.

Note: In that sense, both night lovers recognize themselves in each other; yet whether that is narcissism is another matter; after all, they do recognize their own need for lust and breaking boundaries in the other, but, for that reason alone, not their own self-absorption and conceit, so typical of narcissism (WR24); moreover: the one does not even have to project both tendencies onto the other, for they are within them, in both, without (useless) projection (WR24; 14). They are simply in solidarity in the same thing. And discover it. Nothing more.

2. One notices

Note the verbal (253, 288) rhetoric at work here: “She addresses him shamelessly.”

Bellenger, oc, 7, says “One should not confuse every influencing of one's fellow man with persuasion (i.e., influencing with words);

That is most certainly correct. That is why we have already, in WR 6, made a distinction between text-based and performance rhetoric (cf. WR 20: full-fledged rhetoric).

But look what Bellenger, out of necessity, immediately adds: “Admittedly, persuasion is difficult to separate: the reason is that persuasion is “a 'psychosocial fact'. (155: reflexive).

Marcel Mauss (1872/1951), *Sociologie et Anthropologie* , Paris, 1950), an expression that was adopted by D. Huisman (1929/...), in 1993.

WR29

Persuasion is situated within influence techniques that are willed and calculated, while they occur in conjunction with compulsive acts and with acts in which spontaneous and involuntary influence is at work (such as magic ('charm'), charisma (*note* - special giftedness, attributed to deities in archaic times, now to the 'unconscious'), prestige (status), seduction, etc.

We shall, moreover, see that persuasion

(i) can be more or less open ('manifest'), such as in evidentiary value, seeking out 'proofs' of pathos (appealing to the emotions), etc., or

(ii) more or less stealthily ('subreptic') and cleverly, as in various 'manipulations' (tricks), stratagems, etc.”.

Thus, always, Bellenger, who—curiously enough—limits rhetoric (oc, 8) to persuasion which, openly, acts upon the emotional life. As if traditional rhetoric did not rather exaggerate in the rational-intellectual direction! We leave this limited view of rhetoric to him, of course.

Applied here to the Parakuptousa: how can one separate (even distinguish) the words of the unfaithful, virtuous wife from her overall significant manner of appearance and action? Make a distinction, separate, and... her words lose virtually all 'significance' (WR 20; 24), as well as all 'rhetoric', understood as actio, speech act (WR 6; 20).

Rhetoric is, ultimately, an analysis of the actio (not least of the final aspect of text formation, the elocutio, which must not be confused with the actio, acting by means of speaking; WR 5). Why would the rhetoricians, at the time, have introduced the term 'actio'? Unless to express the more than verbal.

When the parakuptousa says “seeking, I have found you”, what rhetorical

value (action, effect) would these words have, without the unverbale effect of the singular-personal, which refers to him, the bedmate? What 'action' would emanate from "I have covered my couch with blankets" or from "where I lie, I have sprinkled myrrh" without the significant, unverbale effect of the couch-with-blankets and of the bed-with-incense?

It would be zero: speaking is - as Heidegger (1889/1976) says (253) - 'a.letheia', revelation, drawing bare of what is. It is that which is, that 'works', 'speaks', through the spoken - and, at the same time, rhetorical - word, that possesses expressive power in the force of being (that which is and is discussed).

WR30

1.2. The second cultural-historical framework (30/36)

O. Willmann (1839/1920), *History d. Id.*, III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit* - Brunschweig, 1907-4, 1034, says that 'idealism' (the theory of ideas) is an organic explanation of the world. Ideas work, are 'actio', just like principles of life. As living organisms (WR 5). (106: Puth.) 117: theory of thought, 104-106: light metaf., 121, 126: choreia, 102: Pyth. Number, 107, 109).

In this, Willmann is faithful to Platonism: just as the ever-changing world around us, the world of our senses, reveals a multitude of 'zoa', 'thremmate' (di Living beings, 132, 133, 176), likewise, but on a rational intellectual level, the ideal world around us, indeed, in our mind (WR5), reveals a collection of 'noëta zoa' animalia intelligibilia, living beings with knowledge and thought content, which Platon calls 'ideas'. (45: hylisch, 55: genotk., 104: theosoph.). Cfr O. Willmann, oc, 431/432. We interpret this peculiar expression, which derives from Platon, the older one at that.

1 -- As 'noëta', intellegibilia, contents of knowledge and thought, (speculative: 41, 107; 112; 198; 204) the ideas are suprasensory, falling outside the realm of sensory experience. Yet, accessible to us as intellectual beings: our 'spirit' (as faculty of ideas) 'sees' the ideas, with its 'spiritual'. In this it is striking that, for example, when seeing a fellow human being through the senses, our spirit sees 'the human being in itself', 'the human being as human being—simply—nothing more', 'the human being as such', -- as the prototype or archetype that can be found in all concrete people around us.

As 'zoa', animalia, (110: Pyth.) living beings, the ideas are alive and the source of life (= principles of life): that which we see around us with our senses, e.g. to stay with Platon's examples: humans and horses, all of which lives thanks to the idea, present within it and acting within it: "The ideas give the sensually perceptible data a share in its ideal life and establish the living within them" (oc, 432).

This gives rise to the abstract-general concept, which we derive from those data through experience and analysis. For example, 'anthropotès', humanitas, being human (humanity, mankind). Or 'hippotès', 'horseness' (being-horse). The general man, the universal.

Note -- In terms of knowledge and thought content, Platon calls the idea 'idea' (essence, being); as a living being, he calls it 'eidos', form of thought and knowledge, concept (in our intellect, but also in the things themselves).

As can be seen, very incorrect views regarding the idea and the theory of ideas are in circulation.

WR31

Note-- *H. Limet, Religion de Sumer*, in; *Dict.d.relig*. (WR14), speaking of the Me of the Sumerians, the exemplary models of everything, agrees with Castellino, where he says that the Me of the Sumerians are very comparable to the ideas of Plato (oc,1627).-- It is, moreover, established that Plato deliberately drew upon ancient ('archaic') traditions on the subject.

The Platonically conceived idea manifests itself, therefore, as an organism: both organic or—as is now said—organic, and genetic thinking (WR 3, 110) are one of the aspects of the theory of forms.

Thus, human culture, as a factually and historically observable phenomenon, is in its essential core the living idea 'culture' that expresses itself within it. We know, now, that from an archaeological perspective, human culture

(i) had an initial start,
(ii) has developed,
(iii) until it 'generated' (brought forth) the agricultural revolution, primarily in Asia Minor (WR7v.).

We now know that that same culture developed urbanization and, consequently, writing (WR8). - Phenomena such as agriculture, urban culture, and writing culture are partial ideas -of a developing total idea of 'culture'. (91; WR 3); 93; 176).

Regarding the overall and partial idea, see WR 6 (ret. overall and partial idea); 24 (partial and overall impression)).

The Platonically understood idea is, after all, being itself (WR 29), insofar as it is ideal, knowable, and conceivable (ontological truth). Here: the very being of culture and its components, together with its evolution (syn- and

diachronic idea). The idea 'culture' is – put differently – the existing culture, insofar as our mind (= ideal faculty within us) 'sees', 'understands', 'perceives' it, in its deeper essence, culture itself. Culture (165) is a living being with knowledge and thought content, because it is an idea.-- Let us now consider the next phase.

The ash-time idea of Karl Jaspers , (1883/1969).

In his **Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte **, Zurich, 1969, this existential thinker-psychiatrist develops an idea consisting of two sub-ideas:

(i) an axis or turning point is a period in cultural history characterized by a major shift in leading cultural ideas;

(ii) such a transitional period is followed by the formation of extensive political systems (e.g. great world empires).

WR32

Such an axis of rotation was the time between -700 and -500, approximately. In India lived Buddha (= Buddha: -600/-500), in Media (Iran) Zoroaster (= Zoroaster, the founder of Parsis; between -700 and -580), in Israel Daniel, the apocalypticist (around -608), Jeremiah(s) (who appeared from -598 to -587 (the fall of Jerusalem)), Ezekiel (who appeared from -598 to -587 and thereafter, in the exile). - This axis rotation is already palpable around -800, reaching its peak around -600 (WR3: genetic aspect).

In its wake, great empires arose—especially in Near Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean (one need only think of the Persian Empire, for example).

This re-establishment of culture, thanks to the material conditions and the favorable environment created by the preceding phase, forms the basis of the following 2,500 years of teaching—up to the present day.

Library sample: *J.Tyciak, Untergang und Verheissung (Aus der Welt der Propheten Jeremias, Ezechiel und Daniel)*, Düsseldorf, 1957, left. 163ff.

Against this background we situate Greek philosophy: it begins with Thales of Miletus (Milete) (-624/-545) and is subsequently grown and re-established by Socrates of Athens (-469/-399), within the material conditions and the favorable environment, only to die out around +600 (WR 3: genetic view; 12 (totality of opposites in an organic reality 124).

It is as if the idea 'Greek philosophy'

(i) commences,

(ii) rises and

(iii) dies out,--

therein the 'rise/fall' schema so typical of the demonistic theory of reality (ontology), making true, in the facts themselves. Therein living beings equal (organic aspect of the theory of ideas).

Cultural-historical data

Regarding Hellas, please note the following.

(1) The oldest known civilization, based on archaeological finds, dates from about 40,000 (at Kokkinopilos, where traces of human occupation were discovered).

(2) The oldest, somewhat known culture on Hellenic soil is the Pelasgian (the Pelasgians),

(3).1. Around -2100 (the early Bronze Age), the Indo-Europeans ('Aryans'), having descended from the North and the East (Ukraine?), invaded the Pelasgian region. They were called Achaeans; they destroyed the Pelasgian civilization, at least partially, especially in Argolis (eastern Peloponnese).

WR33

However, the Achaean culture sets in immediately. Later, other Indo-Europeans follow, the Ionians and the Aeolians.

(3).2. Note -- *Jacquetta Hawkes, *Dawn of the Gods **, London, 1968, primarily a work of the history of religion, sets out how

(a) The (Cycladic culture (115 BC - think of the *Kukledes*, Cyclades, the islands in the Aegean Sea, such as Andros, Delos, Paros, Naxos, etc.), from -3.200,

(b) moreover, the Cretan (= Minoan) culture, (100: Pyth., 149: Dionusos) flourishing immediately after the Cycladic, together can be called the cradle culture of European culture.

Now, around 1700, the Cretans (of the Minoan culture type) set foot in Argolis (on the Peloponnese, between Sparta and Corinth), at Asine: the fusion of the already existing Achaean culture with the Cretan-Minoan is called the Mukenean (Mycenaean) culture. (66, 68: Agamemnon, 155 Orestes). It is, after all, most striking at Mukenai (Mycenae), the capital of Argolis.

The Trojan War is part of the Mycenaean expansion (territorial expansion, land hunger). (200: Menelaus, 280; 66: 68, 87: Priam (= prince))). Troy – also

called Ilion or Pergamon – let this Pergamon (or, also, Pergamos, the citadel of Ilion) not be confused with the famous city of Pergamon, in Mysia – is situated at Hissarlik (Central Asia): its magnificent culture (Pre-Hellenic) was destroyed by the Achaeans, either in the 14th or the 12th century BC.

This episode later became the theme of *Homer* (34; 38), the Blind Singer, the greatest poet of Hellas, in his *Iliad* and his *Odyssey*. He is thought to have been an Ionian and to have been born after 900 or 800.

(3).3. Between -1200 and -1100, the rough Dorians invaded as the last Indo-Europeans: they destroyed the culture of the Mycenaeans. With this, the Dark Ages began, from -1200 to -800. It is in this period that Homer (Homerus), (179: Sparta) mentioned above, apparently situated himself.

Note-- The major dialects are:

(i) Ionic-Attic, (96: Maxime) spoken in Attica, Euboea, the Cyclades, Ionia);

(ii) the Aeolian (Aeolian), in Thessaly, Boeotia, Aiolis (Aeolia);

(iii) Doric, in the Peloponnese, Crete, Southern Italy (Greater Greece), Sicily). From -830 these dialects predominate (writing is invented around -800; WR8).

WR34

Bible sample: Except *J. Hawkes, Moses I, Finley, Les premiers temps de la Grèce (L' âge du bronze et l' époque archaïque),* Paris, 1980-2.

The structure of Greek history.

Bible Sample: except *Finley, oc, 109/172 (l' époque archaïque (-800/-500)); P. Lévêque, L'aventure grecque ,* Paris, 1964-3.

The Dark Ages.

Finley, oc,89/108, says that the later Hellenes had virtually no awareness of the break with the Minoan-Mycenaean period. Two characteristics:

a. Economic:

general poverty; artistic: mediocrity of the artworks.

(1)a. The 'archaic' period (-800/-500).

Two features stand out, according to Finley.

a. The origin and slow development of the 'polis', (65) the city (state).

O. Brunner, Bürger und Bourgeois , in: Wort und Wahrheit VIII (1953): June; 419/426, points out that mainly three types of cities emerged in the course of

history:

1. the Eastern city,
2. the ancient city (including the Greek 'polis'),
3. The Medieval Modern City. (WR 8).

b . The vast expansion of Hellas.

Finley, oc. 109, says that, in about two centuries' time, Hellas extended from the Black Sea to the Atlantic Ocean.

Indeed: two waves of colonization take place:

(i) -775/-675: Chaldice and Southern Italy and Sicily (Sikelia) are invaded by starving Hellenes seeking agricultural regions;

(ii) -675/-550: besides Southern Italy and Sicily, Gaul is visited (Massalia (Marseille) is founded in -599 by inhabitants of Phocaea, in Ionia (Asia Minor):

P. Scolerdi, Marseille la Grecque , 1974), Iberia (Spain), in the West; -- in the East: the Black Sea coasts (including Propontis, Maiotis; Buzantion (Byzantium) is founded in 660), Egypt (Naukratis is founded in 650). Cf. Levêque, oc, 197s.

This period signifies the Greek revival (Hawkes, oc,243ff.):

- a.** the Olympic Games begin in -776;
- b.** two poets, Homer (WR 33, 39; 284, 125) and Hesiod of Askra (in Boeotia, Boeotia), appeared a little later than Homer (perhaps around -800) days later;
- c.** philosophy arises: Thales of Militos (-624/-545) (49) founds philosophical thought, in the Milesian group; Puthagoras of Samos (Pythagoras; - 580/-500) founds the Paleo-Pythagorean school (-550/-300);

WR35

Parmeninides of Elea (-540/...) ((37; 77; 131) founds the Eleatic style of thought (-520/-400); -- Xenophanes of Colophon (-580/-490) is the first enlightened mind; (78; 82; 84; 86: type 1 =/ 64 (protosophist.): 65) -- somewhat later: Heraclitus of Ephesus (174) founds the first form of dialectics;

(1)b . The 'classical' period (-500/-338). (102: Socr.)

Here is situated the century of Pericles, the golden age of Athens, the center. Pericles of Athens (-495/-429) had an impeccable character, pursued a sensible policy, and was an impressive orator; he was friends with artists and philosophers (Anaxagores of Klazomenai (-499/-428; (52; 49; 117) the founder of empirical natural science).

(2) The Hellenistic period (-338 and later).

The term 'Hellenism' was, (28) in 1836, coined by J.G. Droysen

(1808/1884), the Prussian historian and politician. The idea 'Hellenism' comprises two sub-ideas:

a. demographic: the mixing of the Macedonian-Greek population with the indigenous populations in Anatolia (Asia Minor), Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc. (in Egypt, for example, the ratio is estimated to be one million Greeks to eight million Egyptians);

b. cultural: the blending of the widely spreading Greek culture with the indigenous – especially the Eastern – cultures (especially their religions).

(2)a. *The Macedonian period* (-338/-146).

In 338, Philip of Macedonia (382/336), (281) together with his son Alexander the Great (365/323), (177: Samothr. Myst - Arist.) defeated the Athenians and the Boeotians at Chaironeia, whereby all of Hellas came under Macedonian rule (the Macedonians were northern Greeks).

But the conquests of Alexander the Great extended as far as the Indus (-325; WR8). Within his empire, Greek culture spread into Egypt and Mesopotamia.

Alexander was a pupil of the greatest thinker of antiquity, Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322).

Description of mentality.

P. Lévêque, op. cit., 390; 483, 226 writes: "This century, which is the century of Aristotle, is also the century in which the longing for the divine emerges, for the first time, with such force."

In other words: notwithstanding the secularization (the orientation towards this world) established by the Greek Enlightenment (cf. Xenophanes, above), the yearning for the sacred breaks through powerfully.

WR36

Hellenism will further reinforce this tendency: "The Greek of Egypt, if he is ill, will turn, first, to a Greek physician. The latter will apply a method of diagnosis, a treatment, a handbook of prescriptions—all of an almost purely Greek nature."

But, if he doubts that he will regain his health in this way, then he will gladly ascend into the mountains above Thebes (an Egyptian city) to the tombs, to beg for the healing of Amenhotep, the son of Hapoe (Hapou), "a very good god" as almost all graffiti written in Greek express it. (*Note* : Amenhotep, son of Hapoe, the architect of Pharaoh Amenophis III (-1432/-1395), of the 18th dynasty, is meant: a considerable time later he was 'deified' as a healing

god (his 'sanatorium' was located in a sanctuary at Deir el-Behari):

In other words: a kind of syncretism (114) (merging of seemingly incompatible facts) of secularism and sacralism prevailed, gradually, from classical times onwards. Which one can see, just as well, in a number of contemporaries today.

(2)b. The Roman period (-146 and later).

Meanwhile, an empire is growing, the Roman one: in 168 BC and, even more so, in 146 BC, Macedonia (with Greece) becomes a Roman province. However, militarily defeated, Hellas has conquered Rome and the empire culturally.

Note- V.L. Ehrenberg, *Hellenistic Age* in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 1967, 11: 322/334, says: "Droysen forgot Rome (when he limited 'Hellenism' to the Macedonian period). This in two ways:

a. around -200 the pressure of the Roman conquests begins to weigh on the Hellenistic world, -- until its absorption in -31 (at Aktion (Actium), Octavius and Agrippa defeated their opponent Antony in a naval battle);

b . (...) Hellenism, as a culture, (...) continues to grow, so that one can speak of a second Hellenism under Roman rule."

In 476, the Western Roman Empire came to an end (with the deposition of Augustulus by Odoaker). The Eastern Roman Empire continued. It also bears the name Byzantine Empire (395/1453). In 1453, the Ottoman Turks captured Constantinople. This was an endpoint, because, starting from 632, the first caliphs of Islam gradually conquered parts of the Eastern Roman Empire.

However, precisely during those days of the West, Greek culture resumed a renewed influence (humanism and the Renaissance).

WR37

The relationship between philosophy and rhetoric:

Just as for Eastern cultures, so we will now, for Greek philosophy, analyze a few samples that shed light on what the early Greek philosophers either did regarding or thought about rhetoric.

We say 'samples' because, true to the method of traditional rhetoricians (WR 2: inductive-historical method), we orient ourselves towards factual models—in order to build up a normative science, or philosophy, of rhetorical

action (WR6). After all, no one can represent history exhaustively (down to the last detail). Only samples ('samples', say the Vlengels speakers!) are appropriate.

1.2.1. First sample: Thales of Miletus (39/91)

(-625/-525). (37/97)

Bib. Sample :

-- G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *Thalès de Milet* , in: D . Huisman, director *Dict.d.philosophes* , Paris, 1984; II, 2489/2492;

-- text editions:

H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (*Griechisch und Deutsch*), I, Berlin, 1922, 1/13;

-- CJ De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* , I (*Thales to Plato*), Leiden, 1950, 4/5;

-- renderings: W. Röd, *Geschichte der Philosophie* , I, 1(*Von Thales bis Demokrit*), Munich, 1976, 30/36;

-- shared ideas:

J. Zafropulo, *Empédocle d'Agrigente* , Paris, 1953, 34/63 (Le milieu, l'appartenance; fl. 37, 103);

W. Jaeger, *A la naissance de la Théologie (Essai sur les Présocratiques)* , Paris, 1966, 25/44 (*Les Milésiens ou la théologie des philosophes de la nature*);

-- Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft* , I (*Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen*), Freiburg, 1971, 76/91 (*Thales*);

-- in Dutch: A. Vloemans, *De Voorsocratica* , The Hague, 1961 (earlier title: *De Profetische gestalten der wijsbegeerte*), 23/34 (*Thales*).

This shows that, regarding a thinker of whom we know very little directly, a multitude of viewpoints (perspectives), together with a multitude of interpretations, is possible. This compels us to the sampling nature of our analysis.

1. The Paleomilesians (= Elder Milesians).

Miletus was one of the Ionian cities on the coast of Asia Minor, -- incidentally, a very old city. -- They are called 'fusio.logoi', (102: Pyth., 99. Pyth. Stad.) 'fusikoi', natural philosophers. This is because they conceived of nature ('fusus', natura) as reality.

WR38

What, since Parmenides (WR 35, 77) has been called 'being', they call 'fusus'; although it is not yet Parmenides' concept of being (of which more

later), it nevertheless moves strongly in that direction. Indeed, Ionian natural philosophy (81; 83; 122; 130) is a 'musical' philosophy, -- a way of thinking that is inspired (70; 79) by 'the mousai', muses, and, through those muses, by mnemosune, memoria, 'remembering' (mindfulness, mindfulness), (169; 125 anamnesis, omniscient, all-knowing) -- where our modern word 'memory' (WR6) merely refers to the remembering of the past. The goddess Mnemosune, Remembrance, i.e., provides either the poet or the thinker (the natural philosopher, for example) with an immediate insight (66: goddesses of law) (immediatism) into the data he is discussing.

1.-- Thus says Homer (183: verses = healing (Pyth.) 33: 84 Scheffer), *Iliad*: 70, of Calches, the son of Thestor, the best among the orangists ('orangizing' is one type of 'seeing' (41) (as an eyewitness, as it were)), that he possesses insight into “ta t'eonta (the present beings,-- what is now), ta t'essomena (the future beings,-- what will be), pro t'eonta (the past beings,-- what was formerly):

Thus says Hesiod of Askra (Boeotia), (183: verses are healing (Pyth.) 34; 125; 139), who met the Muses (177) and the goddess Remembrance associated with them near Mount Helikon, that they had instructed him to speak about “ta t'essomana (126; 131; 138; 227) (future beings), pro t'eonta (past beings) (Theogonia): The Muses (with Mnemosune) - thus Theogonia 38 - communicate “te t'eonta (present beings), ta t'essomene (future beings); pro t'eonta (former beings); Cfr Krafft, I: 67; Jaeger, 212.

Conclusion: it is evident that, from Homeric times, the ancient Greeks learned to think in that all-encompassing perspective (43: transcendental), on a musical basis (42: emancipation phil. 124: new 'music'; 142). For this all-encompassing view is expressly attributed to muses and remembrance.

In *Iliad* 2:434 *Homer says* : “Proclaim to me, Muses, (82; - 123 (Hom.) 119) who are at home in the Olympian dwellings, for you are goddesses, present at all (43; 79; 85) and in possession of insight into (86; 42; 78; 85) all things, while we mortals hear only a rumor, but have no eyewitness insight (40)”.

2 .-- The same artistic 'philosophy' (way of thinking) emphasizes, time and again, that whoever (like the poet and, later, the philosopher, specialist, rhetorician) wishes to gain insight ought to think 'ex archès', a principio, from the origin (beginning) (principle). The 'arche', (43; 46: cybern., 160: Orf.) principium; a term meaning both beginning (start) and principle (origin) - is, for Homer, (66, 173) *Il.* 14:246, okeanos, the Ocean.

WR39

Okeanos, the waters that surround the earth disc (59), is 'genesis (92:

Anaxim.) pantessi', the origin of all beings. To begin with, he is the origin of all waters (45: induction): his floods give rise to "all streams, the whole sea, all springs and the deep pits". But, as a god (47), he is, with his consort, Tethys (Tethys) - II. 14: 201; 302; *Hesiod, Theogonia* 136; 337 - also the origin of all deities.

Maw the primordial water, Okeanos, (205:// Parm.) is both a primordial force, a primordial component, and a deity, a nature deity.

Cf. *E. Mireaux, Zo levenden de Grieken ten tijde van Homerus*, Baarn, 1979-3, 15; Jaeger, oc, 26; 212.--

For Hesiod, (34) the arche (50), the primordial beginning, which he calls 'chaos' (Theog. 116; 173; 185; 228) - This is an immeasurable and lightless space, which came into existence first. As Krafft, I, 69, notes, chaos, (100: Orf.) is a divine reality, yet also a given of nature, not the founding force but, itself, the first of the arising beings. "For Hesiod, Chaos (...), initially, is alone: Chaos represents, as it were, the first generation". (Ibid.).

The second generation of beings, according to Hesiod, consists of:

(i)a Gaia, (66; 69: Themis) the earth (naturally given and deity of a feminine nature),

(i)b Eros, (161; 177; 102 (Orf./ pyth./ theos./ 167 (orf.); 198 (Parm.)) the procreative drive ('love'), again both naturally given and a god of a male nature, - a theme to which Aristotle of Stageira (-364/-322), with his 'genesis' (58; 131) way of thinking, will return),--, besides this primordial couple,

(ii) Tartara, the underworld, a nebulous space (a neutral principle), which will later become the prison of the enemies of Zeus (II. 8/13; Hes., Theog. 807).

Behold what the goddess of knowledge and thought, Mnemosune, with her Muses, communicates concerning genesis, the beginning and origin of past, present, and future beings. That is the oldest museological mode of representation. That method is transcendental (all-encompassing) and genetic (WR 3). Even genetic.

'Fusis', Natura, Nature

(59 (=)); 50 (=); 158 (orf.); 175; 45) The Paleo-miliesians are naturalists. - 110: organism (pyth.); 129; 139; 176; 183, - 243: proto-soph.) W. Jaeger, Oc, 27, describes this further. "Fusis is one of those abstract word forms, ending in -is, which become frequent at the time of the last epic poets.

(1) Apparently this word denotes the act of 'funai', the process of origin and growth; consequently, the Greeks followed the word with a genitive ('of...');

for example, 'fisis ton onton', the origin and growth of the beings surrounding us.

WR40

(2) But that same word 'fisis' also means the very origin, from which beings came forth, indeed, continually come forth.

In other words: the reality which serves as the foundation for observable beings. -- We find this double meaning, again, in the word 'genesis', a synonym of 'fisis' which is just as old and, perhaps, even older. Here is another - literal - aspect of the artistic way of thinking; process thinking. (104) - genetic and, even, genetic (66; 68; 175; 177; 171) (think of Oceanus and Tethus, of Gala (66) and Eros, as primordial couples who create reality generatively or 'genesis'; which shows how the erotic-sexual reality was central). This type of thinking will continue to dominate the entire Greek philosophy.

2. *Thales' view.*

Aristotle, metaph. A3: 983b 27, notes that there is a difference between (Homer and) Hesiod and the Milesians; both types of thought, 'sofizontai', proclaim wisdom, sound knowledge, but both poets proceed 'muthikos', mythically (telling sacred stories) and are 'theologians', whereas the Milesians apply a rigorous method of proof.

This points to a new type of musical (63; 139: positive) thinking. To begin with, the philosophers no longer essentially depart from traditions, such as myths, but from ta onta, the beings of their own perception itself. Which does not necessarily exclude the role of deities, for example.

2.bis. "We know a great deal about Thales, namely, thanks to Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-425), the father of historiography, who adopted what he knew from Hecataeus of Miletus (-560/-480), while the latter, in turn, connected it to Anaximandus of Miletus (-610/-547), the immediate successor of Thales." (Krafft, I: 83). This implies that we are dealing with both authentic data and an image ('imago'), both of which can be valuable.

Now, with the Milesians a new artistic style of thought begins, which is denoted by an ancient Greek word, 'history' (= historia) 57, 70; 88: Thales - monster; 103: Hipp. ; 154, 173; 180 (Alkm.); 182: ideol. Sceps;), inquisitio, investigation (based on personal observation or eyewitness accounts; wr.38).

With the understanding that the Milesians applied that historia to the fisis as a whole: historia fusike. (209=/ parm. 230; 226: Xenof. 196: orf.)

WR41

This 'historia naturalis' (histoire naturelle or natural history), (73: theol. Nat.; 144: pyth) this study of nature, exhibits a twofold aspect:

(i) on the one hand, it is empeiria, experientia, testing, observation, experience, and

(ii) on the other hand, it is logismos, ratiocinatio, reasoning, calculation.

Indeed, the ancient world made a strict distinction between, on the one hand, Phanera, visibilia, the visible data, accessible to empeiria, perception, and on the other hand, Adela, invisibilia, the invisible realities, accessible, except to mantic seeing (WR 38: Kalchas, the 'seer' or 'mantis'), to logismos, reasoning.

Cf. *JP Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, II, Paris, 1971, 55, ad 28, where this double system is discussed.

Or, as Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428), the founder of experimental natural science, would later say: "Opsis ton adelon to fainomena" (the visible data (phenomena, phenomena) represent the seeing of the invisible).

Milesian historia, natural research, encompasses, in the process of observation and reasoning, theoria, speculatio, contemplation.

Indeed: the speculative spirit of natural philosophers causes them to pause at the beings of their perception, in order to fathom its invisible 'grounds'.

The expression 'theoria', from which our modern word 'theorie' derives, is translated as contemplative understanding while observing. - The term is attributed to Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500).

He is said to have called himself 'thatès', a speculator, an observer of the truth. Later, Platon of Athens (-427/-347), following in the footsteps of the Paleopythagoreans, would describe the idea of 'science' (episteme), sciëntia, as 'theorètikè tou ontos' (the contemplation, 'theory', of being).

Later still, Aristotle, Plato's pupil, will compare the theoretical life with the practical life.

The Romans translated 'theatès' as 'speculator', which actually means fathom (peeper, spy). 'Specula' is 'lookout post'. They translated 'theorein', to fathom, as 'speculari'.

In connection with this, O. Willmann writes , **Die wichtigsten*

philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung *, Kempten/München, 1909, 20f.*: “We call 'speculation' the actual philosophical consideration, i.e.

WR42

- (1) examine, analyze,
- (2) based on the 'empirical' interest (in beings)
- (3) so that the connections hidden behind the empiricism are revealed.

a. Note: nowadays, in everyday language or among intellectuals, the word 'speculation' or 'speculative' is used pejoratively to stigmatize a purely precarious knowledge not supported by observation. Which, of course, deviates from the ancient meaning.

b. As the word 'theory' is now often used to denote a rational construction, whether or not supported by observation. Which, likewise, deviates from ancient usage: *theoria* was to fathom, by observation (preferably as an eyewitness), the invisible, non-phenomenal implications (backgrounds),

Note -- As we shall see later, Alkmaion of Croton (a Peleopythagorean who lived around -500) and Xenophanes of Colophon (-580/-490), the first religious Enlightened mind, will conceive of the duality of 'perception' (*empeiria*) / 'reasoning' (*logismos*), the two components of fathoming (*theoria*), as an interpretation (in their hermeneutics or theory of interpretation). This is because perception is usually too uncertain, too ambiguous, and requires an interpretation, whereas, in contrast, another interpretation sometimes has just as much right.

It is evident that, compared to Manticism, the art of clairvoyance, the natural philosophy of the Milesians implies an emancipation from the Mnemosune and her Muses: the natural philosophers have learned to think independently and autonomously. This does not prevent the Muse (Mnemosune) from continuing to play a fundamental role as a guide: she treats her interpreter, the thinker, as a mature being and thus works alongside him in an inspiring way.

In that sense, natural philosophy remains artistic; the emancipation process at work in philosophy, specialized science, and rhetoric was no obstacle for ancient Greek artistic religion.

This explains why the Paleo-Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle organized their philosophical schools as sacred societies (*thiasos*), within which the Muses received genuine worship. Musical religion is not a damper on personal thought, in a philosophical, academic, or rhetorical sense. In that sense,

something mantic, something mystical, remains within the entire great ancient -Greek intellectual tradition.

WR43

Application to Thales:

a. It is part of the visual impression (imago) of Thales that he engages in *theoria*—looking, observing, reasoning, reflecting ('speculari'), 'contemplating'—and tells an anecdote that, one day, he is standing looking at the firmament and, moving forward, falls into a spring; his maid, a Thracian, laughs at him: "Meteorologika, celestial phenomena—he sees that well, but not the water lying at his feet."

Whatever truth there may be in that anecdote, with Thales the 'probing man' ('ho theorêtikos') was born—with the occasional absent-mindedness inherent in it. The entire history of Greek philosophy is strewn with such 'mousikoi', intellectuals inspired by a Muse and her Mnemosune.

Library sample:

W. Jaeger, *Paideia (Die Formung des griechischen Menschen)*, 3 Bde, Berlin, 1934/1936-1; 1936/1947-2, i, 211.

b. Apart from that visual impression of 'fathoming', we are left with a few isolated statements—rather aphoristic heritage—of the first philosopher, only very few of which are not disputed by one scholar or another. Nevertheless, we can outline the entirety of the traditions—whether disputed or not, they form a whole—as follows. We immediately obtain a first structure of Thaletic wisdom.

2. A.-- *Transcendental Wisdom.*

'Transcendental' means 'all-encompassing', the 'universe', understood as the collection and system of all beings, containing within itself.

1. We know (WR38) that Mnemosune, with the Muses, held such a transcendental view (the former, present, and future beings; 'panta' says Homer, II, 2: 484, know, by direct knowledge, the goddesses, -- 'panta' means 'all things')

2. We also know that artistic wisdom was 'theoria', fathoming, in its own way: it penetrated, through visible beings, to the archè, the 'ground' or beginning of all beings (WR 38v.). Now, it is precisely this twofold dimension that we find in Thales.

What later developed into theology, philosophy, specialized science (and rhetoric) as separate disciplines is, originally, a unity.

Later, too, these separate subjects distinguish themselves, among the Greeks only by a distinct accent.” (Krafft, oc,59).

WR44

In other words: what we now call a multi- or interdisciplinary method was practiced in antiquity in a naive manner, as it were. 'Discipline' means 'skill'; expertise, professional scholarship, 'science': 'multi-' (many) and 'inter-' (between) are the prefixes that indicate communication and interaction.

Due to the transcendental scope of the object, all that is being, the ancient Greek education characteristic of the philosophy of that time lends itself excellently to an interdisciplinary approach. After all, it proceeds from the premise that everything exhibits a connection with everything else, somewhere. Cf. WR3.

2.A.1.-- *The transcendental primordial substance or 'prote hule' (first substance).*

Aristotle, Metaph . A3: 98 3b 18 (Thales A12), says: “Most of those who started philosophical thought were convinced that the 'archai', the foundations (origins, principles), of all beings were merely material ('hyl') in nature”. He adds, to this that Thales

(1) was the founder of that hylic type of thinking and

(2) regarded the water ('hudor') as 'arche', primordial ground of all beings.

—

Cfr. Krafft, oc, 82.

a. Romeyer-Dherby, ac,2490, says: “What exactly is this water? Water is the malleable element par excellence. Since it is form-free, it can assume all forms: it assumes those forms and releases them again and again. Thus, the suppleness ('flexibility') of water, that fluid element ('fluid'), makes it possible that

(1) based on a single reality - here the water -

(2) an unlimited, infinite, indeterminate variety ('multiplicity') is conceivable, --

“ce qui, pour Thales, est la definition même de la nature” (which, for Thales, is the very definition (essence determination) of the 'fusus').

The author specifies: “Indeed: the formula of the Milesian establishes a principle, that is, an origin, from which all the rest emerges. Now, this principle is 'water', which is the primordial component, present in 'hapanta ta onta', all beings (Ar., Met. I: 3/983b 8)”.

Whether Thales himself used the word 'archè', principle, can no longer be deduced from any of his sayings. But Aristotle stood entirely within the Milesian scientific tradition and must, therefore, have interpreted it correctly—even if he does so from his own perspective.

WR45

Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), in his * *Birth of Tragedy* * (1872), says of Thales's water primordial substance: “The mediocre, incoherent, and merely 'empirical' (in the sense of not guided by a strict hypothesis) observations that Thales had made regarding the presence and the transformations (metamorphoses) of water or—more precisely—of moisture, would by no means have allowed or, even, suggested this enormous generalization (induction).

What drove him to this is a philosophical axiom (presupposition, guiding idea, abduction). (...). This (axiom) read “everything is one”; -

What Nietzsche means to say here is that, in Thales' case, it is not a matter of ordinary scientific induction (“If water everywhere, then water here and there and yonder. Well, water here and there and yonder. Therefore water everywhere”). This scientific induction can—mentioned in passing—be suggested by Homer's text (WR39: all waters): “all streams, the whole sea, all springs and the deep wells”.

But it concerns what Platon would later call a luminous idea (WR 30v.): by placing water first, Thales casts a light (see light metaphysics, in: Course on the Theory of Thought 104/106) on the beings in and around him. The leading idea, according to Nietzsche, supported by meager indications, precedes experimental observation. Peirce would say: abduction precedes induction.

Bb The idea 'arche', beginning, from a philosophical perspective.

If we survey the collection of meanings (semasiological) inherent in the Greek word 'archè', the following aspects stand out.

(i) Naturally, the meaning 'origin', 'beginning' is present. The beginning of a course or process is brought about by the commencement.

(ii)a . Harmological .

The idea 'archè' is, as Nietzsche clearly states, an idea of order: the many (i.e. the elements, thought apart from one another) becomes a thought (i.e. ordered into a collection), whereby the many (elements) are visible and the one (collection) invisible (WR41). The common property ('characteristic') is 'water'.

Moreover: the disjointed occurrence of many (elements, forms) is clearly

conceived as a coherent unit (thus forming a system, structure, ordered), with water as a binding agent, medium.

WR46

Note well: once again, the looseness of the 'forms' (WR44), which the water primordial substance assumes, is visible, while the formless cohesion (the binding agent) is invisible. Only 'theoria' (WR41), fathoming supported by reasoning (logismos; WR 41), sees through—through the visible, the elements (forms),—the invisible order (formless primordial substance), which makes those elements into a collection and system.

(II)B. Steering (cybernetic).

The arche is, amidst the many changes (movement: 'kinesis', motus), which, as we shall see shortly, encompass origination, growth, but also decay (WR3: organismic thinking), directing, guiding, goal-directing: there is a teleology in the tangle of becoming and decay, of rise and fall (WR11: harmony of opposites).

Incidentally, in everyday language, 'archè' means authority, leadership of subjects, -- indeed, even the territory (the collection of subjects) over which command is exercised. -- 'Steering-related' means that,

(1) in case of deviation,

(2) a correction (corrective), from the predetermined goal (idea), is brought about by the archè.

This cybernetic component is certainly present in Thales's idea of the water primordial substance. Moreover: it is conformal (M. Scheler (1874/1928: the conformity system, which asserts that philosophies coming later usually faithfully reinterpret preceding religious ideas and are thus conformal (in agreement) with those religious ideas), -- namely with the artistic way of thinking, which it realizes in a new form (WR38: everything, from the origin).

This implies that formless water nevertheless represents a form-creating force, for it directs, guides—purposeful.

c. The cathartic background.

Bibl. sample:

--Dr . *Stock, Greek drama and Western man* , Desclée De Brouwer, 1959;

-- *K. Popma, Knowledge of ancient culture* , in: *Tijdschr.v.Phil.* , 22 (1960): 3 (441/476);

Both quotations emphasize that Greek philosophy is not understandable without knowledge of ancient religion (which answers Scheler's idea of conformity);

-- WB Kristensen, *Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions*, A'm, 1947 (questions 238/242: Lustratio, 'purification').

-- As Th. Ballauf states in **Vom Ursprung (Interpretationen zu Thales' und Anaximanders Philosophie **, in: ** Tijdschr. v. Phil. **, 15 (1953): 1 (18/70), there is the mythological, Homeric background (WR, 39: Okeanos + Tethus, the primordial couple as origin), from which Thales could derive the idea of water primordial matter.

WR47

Once again proof of conformity with religion (the Homeric-mythical).

But there is a second, religious-sacred model, which is made clear by Kristensen. "The Romans called the cycle (of life and death; WR 12: totality) 'lustratio', purification (with water). The entire rite, following the conclusion of the 'census' (population census, wealth assessment), is called 'lustrum', i.e., 'means of purification'. This word was also used to indicate the period of 'five years' between two such acts." (Kristensen, oc, 238).

Kristensen explains, in response, that the 'classical' (understand: Enlightened-rational) conception of 'purification' (lustratio) is: a rite that removes demonic and other impure influences. That is correct, but merely negative and very one-sided. Ancient peoples call 'pure' whatever possesses (divine) life. 'Purification' is something positive, namely the communication of (divine) life—a process that entails, among other things, the removal of impurity, ungodliness, 'death', but is not limited to that.

"For the ancient consciousness, ritual cleansing was, first and foremost, a sacred act, by which a divine attribute, the attribute of the cleansing agent, was imparted to the person or the object. It had a positive effect." (Oc,239). The historical data—according to Kristensen—from which this is evident are so rich that the prevailing simplistic theory loses all value in comparison.

Kristensen cites models.

Ancient Egyptian depictions of the purification of the ruler are numerous. The purifying agent is water. This type of water, however, is usually drawn as a jet over the king. In many cases, that type of water is not depicted as ordinary water, but as a series of hieroglyphs (ankh symbol) signifying life. These characters form a curved jet over the ruler.

The caption reads: "You are cleansed, as one who lives and prospers. You renew yourself, just as your Father Re (the sun god) renews himself. You celebrate periodic feasts ('cycle'), just like your Father Tum (a sun god)".

WR48

Kristensen's commentary: "It cannot be expressed more clearly that purification is a communication of the life present in the cleansing agent. The 'water' possesses—according to the generally accepted ancient view—a creative and renewing power which can be transferred to others by ritual sprinkling (which in Rome was called 'lustratio'). (...). It is more than the absence of impurity; it is splendor, glory, divine life." (Oc,240).

Thales, who, in his Ionian manner, experienced nature, especially in its summery 'splendor', 'glory', spontaneously thought, as an ancient man, of divine life that resided in and behind that nature, as the origin (cause) of that splendor and glory (a form of 'theoria' (WR 41v.: fathoming, here still purely sacred)).

This also applies where not water but, for example, incense (divine smoke) is used as a symbol to invoke and transmit divine life: "The scent of incense is described as divine life—a notion that was widespread in antiquity." (Oc, 240). The cleansing agent is the divine bearer and giver of 'life' (WR 12, where the correct, ancient meaning of life is described), whatever that cleansing agent may be—water, incense, etc.

Kristensen refers to the ancient Christian conception of baptism (*Rom 6:3* ; to be baptized is to acquire divine (here: Trinitarian) life through the cleansing agent, water, -- immediately, to be cleansed of original sin and other impurities).

He refers to the 'holy' (understand: power-laden, mana) water of the Ganges in India; to the sprinkling with the 'water from Eridu' (i.e., water of creation) in Babylonia; to the purification with the 'holy' blood of the bull in the religion of Cybele in Phrygia, -- a form of worship that the Romans introduced in Rome in - 204. Behold what the Greeks called 'catharsis'.

Cf. Hiero-analysis: 70ff. (manaism); 91ff.: the ondine in the water as a source of power; -- 88: types of power-bearing elements from nature). Now, in the rites, 'water' (as mana, as power, subtle matter) is the origin of life. Thus Thales may—and probably did—view water—as the primordial substance in everything.

WR49

d. The 'subtle' (ethereal or fine matter, fluid) nature of Thales's water primordial substance.

This aspect is included in the cathartic aspect. Cfr. Hieroanalysis 44 (soul matter; hylozoism); 71; fri. 73/75 (hylic pluralism).

Bibl. sample :

- JJ Poortman, *Ochêma* , Assen, 1954;
- id., *Vehicles of Consciousness (The Concept of Hyllic Pluralism : Ochêma)*, Utrecht, 1978, 4 vols. (an excellent work on the subject);
- J. Prieur, *L' aura et le corps immortel* , Paris, 1979.

For the hylistic pluralist, the idea of 'body' or 'substance' (matter) is not limited to the ordinary concept of 'substance' in circulation in our modern physics, chemistry, and/or biology. The hylistic pluralist labels this type of body or substance as gross material.

In addition, he distinguishes a fine or ethereal (subtle, fluid) type of body, respectively.

For the ancient Greek philosophers, Poortman, oc, II, 28/55 (*Ancient Greece and Rome*), thematizes this hylistic pluralism. This idea of 'subtle substance (body)' is designated by the Greek thinkers with words intended to indicate its subtlety: the Milesians Anaximenes of Miletus (-585/-525) and his pupil, Diogenes of Apollonia, designate this type of substance with the term 'aer' (air).

The Paleophythagoreans (-550/-300) said that the soul was a part of the 'either' (the fine, clear substance situated above our firmament).

Xenophanes of Colophon (-580/-490) taught that the soul was 'pneuma' (spiritus, 'spirit', something in the nature of thin air).

Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428) - see WR35v. above - said that the soul and the world spirit were 'Nous' Intellectus, 'leptotaton', finest matter.

Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/-465) said that the soul, at least that of the sage (sophos), was 'laugè xèrè' (light that is dry), -- which brings to mind the idea of 'fire' (something luminous).

In other words: only the theoria (WR 41v.) allows us to see, through air, either, pneuma, finest matter, luminous (fire),-- the background idea, subtle matter. Just as, for Thales, through the coarse material water, the fine or primordial 'water' shines through.

Whether this early Greek idea originated from the Egyptians can be discussed in reference to A. Volten, *Der Begriff der maat in den AEgyptischen Weisheitstexten* (WR16/18), in: *Colloque de Strasbourg, Les sagesses du Proche-Orient* , Paris, 1963, 73/101;

Frisian 94ff., where it is written, literally: “In any case, it is clear: the so-called hylozoism, characteristic of pre-Socratic philosophy, is, as Antiquity itself had already seen, Egyptian-inspired.

The main problem of pre-Socratic philosophy is: “What is the raw material (basic substance) of which the soul consists?-- Well, as with the Egyptians, the soul is in its essence equal to God, who governs the world.” (Acts 94).

We shall see shortly how and to what extent the soul, or the soul-substance (i.e., the primordial or finer substance of which the soul consists), dominates the interpretation of nature of the Milesians and their immediate successors.

'Hylozoism' is understood to mean the doctrine that

- (1) all matter (hulè), whether coarse or fine,
- (2) is alive (zoë) in one way or another.

This technical-philosophical term was first recorded by Ralph Cudworth (1617/1688), the English Renaissance Platonist. For this true Platonist, the term in question means something in which he himself still believes, albeit in a purified manner.

Well, all Milesians and their immediate successors are, to a greater or lesser extent, hylozoists: these thinkers apparently do not know 'dead' matter, as modern natural science believes it must presuppose.

The idea of 'life' (with its counterpart 'death' (wr12)) is the central idea of their thinking. The primordial substance is only discussed because, along with the idea of 'life', they consider the idea of 'primordial or subtle matter'. Or more accurately: 'life' and 'subtle, omnipresent matter' are the two partial ideas of the total idea around which their thinking revolves.

Note :-- Volten, ac, 92, writes, literally: “All that lives has its origin (WR 39v. (musical type 1); 44v. (musical type 2)) in a divine fluid, which permeates everything—both the celestial deities and the people, the animals, and the plants.”

The entire universe is governed (WR46) by this fluid. Now, this fluid, in its highest form, manifests itself in the celestial bodies. It governs the universe according to eternal, immutable laws.”

Volten says that Mesopotamia, known for its astral way of thinking, thought in the same way, just like Egypt. So that we are faced here with a widespread idea, which we will find again, for example, in Plato.

(277, 253; 246; Plato, Herakl. 233: Protosophy;istics 240 Protagoras, 71, 85, 118, 207: Parm. 224 Zenon, 227, 25: operation, 26ff., 116, 122, didactics,

142 inspiration groups, 145: archit. 148: pomo ind. 152 Dion. 156, 162, (Dion. Zagr. , 118, 135, 136, 154, 155, refl. 181 Alkm. 192 Xen.) (108: Pythagorean 115ff: generative model). (68, 79 (daimon) 81, 123, 137, 148 (Dionusos); 153 (Dion); 168 (Pyth.) 99: Orpheus, Pyth. 179, 191, (Xenof.) 194, 229 (Herakl.):” (20: cf. H.) (296; 144; 215: Zenonist model; 231 Sicilian m.; 24) 80: nymphs; 86: outer;/mortal; 150 Dionusos Omadios). (22 proverbs, Ecclesiasticus (Is. Sirach), 46: Milesian; 156; 150)

WR51

Note-- *L. Levy-Bruhl* (1857/1939), the French ethnologist-philosopher, in his * *La mythologie primitive** (**Le monde mythique des Australiens et des Papous* *), Paris, 1963, 35/38; 42s.; 74; 96; 200; 211; 226; 229; 230; 269; 314* (La fluidité du monde mythique), discusses the great extent to which the world (the universe), like the myths, not only of the Australian and Papuan natives, but of all archaic cultures, exhibits 'fluidity' (suppleness: WR 44: 46).

1. Romeyer-Dherby, ac, portrays Thales's primordial substance-water as the quintessential malleable element: it effortlessly assumes all possible forms and, just as effortlessly, casts these forms away again. Precisely because of this, Thales—according to the author—can discover within it the One, as it is present in a boundless multiplicity.

2. On page 48 supra we saw that Kristensen established that the cleansing agent, in the cathartic rites (which we would now designate with the word 'exorcism'), as a carrier of divine life, or primordial substance (WR 50: total idea), can assume all forms, such as water, but also incense (smoke is a malleable element), blood, etc. In these many forms, a cleansing agent (divine-living primordial substance) is present and at work.

In other words: the philosophical problem 'one/many' (order/material of order) draws its roots from pre-philosophical ideas.

Now, at a very primitive level, one also encounters the problem of the one (eg a single acting being, in a myth or, even, a fairy tale) and the many (eg the different guises that a single being assumes in the course of the myth or the fairy tale respectively): consiste (...) en ceci que les formes spécifiques des plantes et des animaux y sont être peu stables que les lois des phénomènes. pouvoir, soit sous l'action d'un Dema. “Tout dépend des forces mystiques (WR42) en jeu et ne dépend que d'elles”.

Translated: "This characteristic property of the mythical world has been given the name 'fluidity'. (...). Its fluidity consists (...) in the fact that the specific forms of plants and animals are as unstable as the laws of phenomena. At any moment anything can happen. Likewise, every living being

can assume a new form at any moment, either by the action of its own power or under the action of a Dema. Everything depends on the mystical forces (WR42) at work and depends only on them.

Here we immediately have one of the characteristics of the fairy tale, to which we hope to return later. -- We are also faced here with the condition of possibility of the wonder (miracle), to which we refer to M. Meslin, *Le merveilleux (L'imaginaire et les croyances en Occident)*, Paris, 1984.

WR52

Over a period of 2,500 years, the book examines in all art forms “one of the enduring expressions of the human spirit; namely, the imagined (l'imaginaire)”.

Olv Meslin, Professor of Comparative Religious Studies at Paris-Sorbonne, offers the book what his collaborators encounter in terms of imaginative work (art historians, historians of ideas, depth psychologists, folklorists).

Main theme: the metamorphic, that which is susceptible to change of form, – the pliable, in other words, this idea of 'pliability' is one of the principal ideas of all art. – The idea of 'primordial substance' is its condition of possibility. In this sense, Thales founded a philosophia perennis (WR 4).

a. Pre-Socratic 'materialism'.

Bibl. sample:

-- G. Verbeke, *The development of philosophical spiritualism* , in: *Tijdschr.v.Phil.* , 8 (1946): 1 (Feb), 3/26;

-- DG Gershenson/ DA Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Scientific Method* , New York, 1964 (at 33).

Both writings address the problem of whether the idea of 'pure spirit' (immaterial reality) is discussed, either by Parmenides of Elea (WR 35; 37) or by Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (WR 35; 49). For example, someone like Parmenides is labeled a spiritualist by the classical tradition (which is Platonizing), while a scholar like J. Burnet labels him the father of materialism.

From Anaxagoras we saw (WR49) that he knows 'leptotaton' (the finest), but, in terms of spiritualization, reaches no further.

Unfortunately: the aforementioned authors bring up, not even in the least, hylistic pluralism (which posits a plurality of types of matter)!!! Which may well be called striking.

In short: it was only Platon of Athens (-427/-347), the founder of the Academy, with his theory of Forms in the strict sense (of immaterial realities), who founded strict spiritualism. All Pre-Platonic thinkers still conflate immaterial spirit, or idea, with subtle reality (primordial matter): they do not make the strict distinction.

'Materialism' among the Pre-Platonicists is therefore not yet a modern, gross materialism: for that, the soul, the substance of the soul (WR50), is already too central.

WR53

Decision.

The transcendental or 'first' primordial substance is **(a)** malleable, **(b)** origin (ordering; guiding), **(c)** purifying life, **(d)** subtle soul substance. It is the one (collection, system) in the many (elements).

2.A.2.-- Transcendental ethics, or politics

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 239/254 (*Hervorgang der Weisheitslehre und Ethik aus der politischen Theologie*), outlines how

(1)a . not with Socrates of Athens (-469/-399), the founder of Classical Attic philosophy,

(1)b . nor with the Paleophythagoreans (-550/-300), who had a real ethics (and, in connection with that, a real politics),

(2) but already with the seven wise men (statesmen and poets) a real ethics came into being.

1. Seven Sages

Among those Seven Sages, mention is made of Solon of Athens (-640/-558); thus older than Thales (-624/-545), Thales himself, and even Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500). These build upon the pre-existing ethics of the (Apollonian) religion and of the mystery religion(s). Which implies conformity (WR 46) with the sacred thinkers.

2. The main ideas are :

(1) "Know thyself" **(2)** so that you **(2)a**. "exercise moderation" and **(2)b**. "do not exceed the limit" (O.Willmann, oc, 251).

An application of this is "act at the right moment ('kairos')"

In other words: ethics (and, in a community context, politics or social behavior) is a physical ethics (politics). The great framework in which man at that time situated himself was nature (as all past, present, and future beings). Within this, each individual—singular or particular being—had his place. Or, as people said then, 'his measure', that which is allotted to each being by fate.

3. Spells bear Thales' name .

(1) “Proceed with measure”, from which it appears that the 'metron', mensura, measure (what has been allotted to you), is the rule of conduct. Indeed: the archaic religions assume that the deities help determine that measure, but also that your soul, with its soul substance, helps determine the dose of life (WR50: life, primordial substance). This, within the transcendental framework of nature as total primordial substance (life -and action substance).

(2) “Try to be the object of envy rather than pity”, - from which the victory over the deadly terror of all archaic thinkers is evident regarding envy (jealousy), which was identified with the evil eye, which is 'evil' because the envious fellow man literally destroys your 'measure' regarding happiness (favorable share of fate). Cf. S. Seligmann, *Die Zauberkraft des Auges and des Berufen (Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte des Aberglaubens)*, The Hague (reprint of the 1921 edition), in which a very large number of models are discussed scientifically.

WR54

From Thales's economic conduct (the usurious profits, which we will discuss shortly) we can deduce that he possessed a reckless streak. How he reconciled this with the ethics, or rather the politics, of the measure of fate is not so clear—unless he exercised 'moderation' even when crossing the line.

(3) Evil things

“Keep evil things within your own home” seems like everyday wisdom: whoever is too talkative with neighbors and friends about domestic matters will soon find that this creates new problems. One does not exceed the domestic limit! (For the texts: *CJ De Vogel, Greek Philosophy , I (Thales to Plato)*, Leiden, 1950, 3).

Decision.

As Willmann notes, one cannot directly deduce from any surviving statement of Thales that he established a strict logical connection between his physicality and his ethics. This was indeed the case with the Paleophythaogoreans: their doctrine concerning measure, expressed in numbers, is clear on that point.

2.B.-- Non-transcendental wisdom.

Werner Jaeger emphasized that the Milesians fathomed nature as a whole, and that only then did nature come into question in its parts (geographical, medical, etc.).

However, this is not so simple. With Thales—according to the image attributed to him by the ancients—profane and sacred specialized sciences do indeed come through. Which is what we are now examining. See WR43.

2.B.1.-- *The Secular (Profane) Wisdom.*

This is *theoria*, which, in and through observation (*empeiria*), by means of reasoning (*logismos*) - WR 41v. -, explains the visible data (*phanera*) on their invisible (*afanes*) grounds.

a. *Mathematical or Geometric wisdom.* (54/56)

In ancient Greek art history, there is a geometric period in ceramics: around 1050 BC, the Protogeometric period arises in Athens, which develops into the Geometric period around 900 BC; the latter ends around 700 BC. People (soldiers, women, etc.) and animals are depicted in a strictly geometric (one might say 'Cubist') manner, instead of figuratively (flowing).

WR55

It should be noted that, besides Near Eastern mathematics (geometry), the Milesians also possessed their own tradition on the subject—which we will see at work, especially in the Paleo-Pythagoreans. The historiography of mathematics attributes a number of insights to Thales.

1. For example, the statement that


(1) for all angles inside a halved circle, the following applies

(2) that they are right-angled.

Note-- Cf. Logic (First year): 116/118 (*AN Whitehead* (1861/1947), *Mathematics (Basis of exact thinking)*, Utr./Antw., 1965), says that mathematics, as a specialized science, arose when someone, “probably a Greek” (according to Whitehead), first attempted to prove theorems (= judgments, statements, sentences) about (1) all things, (2) not-all things ('things' = mathematical data), without further specification regarding singular data.

Well, Thales' insight is of that formal (later formalized) type of theorems. Since he, at least as far as we know, provided no proof of this (which later Euclidean geometry will do), it remains merely insight (which shines the light of the general idea upon all singular models; WR 30; 45).

2. W. Röd, oc,30, describes, purely ideally-intuitively (one would better say: theoretically (WR41)), the scope of Thales' ideal intuition: “to see the correctness of this thesis (statement), it suffices to know that one can draw a circle around right angles”. (cf. Logica 104: the third introduction to the idea (in the 'image', i.e. in its drawn form.)



The intersection of the diagonals forms the center of the circle in question. Let us now consider just one of the triangles (singular model) that is formed when the diagonal bisects the rectangle. For example, in the accompanying drawing, ACD. Röd, oc,30, adds: “This method is applicable to any (= all) right angles; consequently, also to any right-angled triangles”—which supports Whitehead's assertion.

WR56

3. - From an epistemological (= theoretical) perspective: the visible (phanera, singular: faneron) - here: the drawn figure once observed (empeiria), leads to the invisible (afanes; plural: afanè) - here: the theorem concerning all angles within the halved circle (Whitehead's assertion; logismos, reasoning, is the method).

In other words: the dyadic (twofold) structure of the ancient Greek theoria (WR 42).

Note –

1. Fr. Krafft, oc, 86f., cites Proclm of Constantinople, nicknamed 'diadochos' (di successor of Plato, as leader of the school) (+412/+485), Commentaries on the First Book of *Euclid's Elements* .

Proclm, the Neo-Platonist of the Athenian School, who is called 'the scholastic' of Antiquity (because of his 'scholastic' way of thinking, as it flourished in Middle-Century Ecclesiastical Scholasticism), writes:

“The ancient Thales (...) is said to have been the first to realize and say that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal ('goniai isai'). However, according to archaic usage, he called these equal (isai) angles 'similar' (homoiai) angles”.

It is clear here that this pioneer of the scholastic method did indeed possess linguistic analytical awareness (WR2): he draws attention to language evolution, regarding geometric language usage. -- Which leads us, once again, to the gene(n)etic method (WR3).

2. Proclm continues: “This theorem – found in Euclid of Alexandria (- 323/-283; the founder of the School of Alexandria, author of the famous '

Elements of Geometry ') – is accompanied by the proof that, when two straight lines intersect, the angles situated at the vertex are equal.

This theorem was – as Eudemos of Rhodes (c. 300; pupil of Aristotle; he wrote *The History(ies) of Astronomy and Geometry*) relates – first discovered by Thales. The author of *The Elements* (= Euclid) considered this theorem worthy of scientific proof.

It is evident that the scholastic of antiquity, in addition to insight into the evolution of language, also possessed insight into the evolution of proof (WR 3: genetic method).

b. Applied mathematical wisdom .

The same Proclus writes: “Eudemus, *History of Geometry*, traces the (following) theorem back to Thales. Thales, after all, needed this theorem for his method, with which he found the distance of ships at sea”.

WR57

This reads as follows: “For all triangles, it holds that they are determined by one side and both adjacent angles”

Again: Whitehead's formal insight. - Krafft, op. 88; says that Thales, in doing so, took a calculation rule found by the ancient Egyptians as a starting point. But Thales certainly did not yet proceed axiomatically-deductively: this method only gets off the ground in the second half of the fifth century BC. Thales lived between 624 and 545; that second half is 450 and later. Ideas need time, di historie (= historia), rovingwerk (WR40).

Gaius Plinius (Caecilius) Secundus (+62/+114), in his *Naturalis historia* (WR 41), 36: 82, informs us that Thales supposedly found a method to measure the height of the Egyptian pyramids. This demonstrates that the modern idea of measurement (not, for example, its Cartesian elaboration) was already at work in Thales' mind. We can, in Whiteheadian terms, characterize the method as follows:

(ACD = antecedent): “For all vertical objects, it holds that precisely when (tz = moment of the sun's position) the sun's position, for all measured measuring models (e.g. the shadow staff used by Thales) is such that the shadow cast by it (lh = horizontal length) is equal in length (lh = lv) to its (vertical) height (lv), it holds that (tz) the sun's position, for all objects to be measured (e.g. an Egyptian pyramid), likewise, the shadow cast by it (lh) is equal in length (lh = lv) to its height to be measured (lv);

(CSQ = consequent): so that, precisely then (tz), one only needs to measure

the shadow cast on the ground floor to know the desired height”

The model method consists in starting from a known object, called a 'model' (here: measurement model), in order to know (to measure) an unknown object (here: the height of a pyramid) (which, here, is twofold: both the shadow staff and the shadow cast on the ground). Krafft, op. cit., 89, says that Thales, here, simply applied “the method, long known in Egypt”.

Which suggests that the (mere) model idea certainly goes back to the (above WR 16/29) ancient Egyptian culture.

WR58

Note-- Technological wisdom.

Romeyer-Dherby, op. cit. 2489, states that, for Thales, the *theoria* (WR43), although at first glance merely 'theoretical' (in our 'modern' sense of the word), was always aimed at problem-solving praxis. This is already evident from both preceding application models (distance measurement, height measurement). But *Herodotus, Hist. 1.1* :74ff., tells us that, to prevent the army of Croesus (Croesus, -- the last prince of Lydia; (-560/-546); he has the image impression of being “rich and happy”) from building a bridge, Thales diverted the course of a river. Which points to very practical tasks indeed for this 'theoretikos', this fathom.

c. Astronomical wisdom. (58/59)

R. Flacelière, Devins et oracles Grecs , Paris, 1965-2, 8, states that Thales—not divining (di non-mantic; wr 41) like the star-diviners (astrologers)—merely calculating, predicted a solar eclipse. This took place on May 28-585, during the Battle of the Halys (Halys, in Asia Minor). This phenomenon, so typical of *fusis*, the wondrous nature (WR 51ff.), helped end the war between the Lydians and the Medes.

From the Mesopotamian Magi (*magoi*, a type of 'priests' among the Medes) or, which amounts to the same thing in part, astrologers, Thales could have known that a solar eclipse was cyclical (WR 50: regularities). From this, by deduction (not mantic), he could have anticipated both its possibility and its approximate dating, and perhaps even calculated it exactly.

Thus, alongside the semi-mantic, semi-scientific study of the stars of the Easterners, a purely specialized astronomy emerged.

JP Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs , I, 172/173, says that the existing Mesopotamian astronomy:

(1) was practiced by the royal scribes,

(2) was 'astral' (better: 'astro(theo)logical') and, at the same time, arithmetic (not geometric). As astrologers ('magicians'), they calculated the connection (understand: model character) (WR 57) that exists, according to them at least, between the celestial bodies, together with their movements, in the firmament, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, some earthly persons and their life course. This connection is called, well, 'life parallel' (parallel course, in an analogous (not completely identical) manner, of the celestial bodily movements (actual stars, such as the sun or the other 'fixed' stars; planets; comets etc.), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 'movements' (the course) specific to a human being, or group of people, living on earth). Especially the lives of persons in authority were considered for this in Mesopotamia.

WR59

d. Geographical wisdom. (59/63)

Aristotle, De coelo , B 13: 294a, 28/31, says: "Others say that the earth lies on the water. This is the theory handed down to us, which is the oldest. It is said that Thales of Miletus formulated it: since the earth behaves like a piece of wood or something of that nature, it floats (on the water). (WR59 (earth disc); 45 (water everywhere)).

Ionia, in which Miletus, the commercial metropolis and cultural center, is situated, was at the time the most developed region of Hellas. As a major port city, it maintained trade relations with the west (e.g., Southern Italy), the north (e.g., the Black Sea), and the south (egypt). Merchants are, by nature, interested in countries and peoples.

Well, Homer is usually situated in Ionia. His 'earth disc' was surrounded by

- (1)** the Atlantic Ocean,
- (2)** the Baltic Sea,
- (3)** the Caspian Sea,
- (4)** the North Indian Ocean,
- (5)** the southern Arabian coast.

Thales' view of the world—or, rather, of the earth—must certainly have been as extensive as the Homeric.

Krafft, oc, 122f., says that, for both Hesiod and Thales, the earth, as a whole, as a pedestal, was not subject to coming into being and passing away (WR11: Mephistopheles).

What was subject to arising and passing away are:

- (1) a** . the plants,
- (1) b** . the animals,

(1) c. the people and

(2) Meteora, the regions above the inhabited earth (a part of the firmament).

Which, after the foregoing (especially WR39), seems somewhat of a 'wonder' to us. Yet not: WR 50 (hylozoism) teaches us that, especially (though not exclusively), living (so-called 'biological') nature attracted attention. Somewhat later, Anaximenes of Miletus (WR 49) (-588/-524) will view both the entire earth and all that lives on it, as well as the atmospheric regions above it (ta meteora), as subject to one and the same law of origin and decay (Krafft, oc,122f.).

WR60

The causal explanation.

1. We start from CSS Peirce (1839/1914), insofar as he developed his own theory regarding the scientific explanation. Schematically, this reads as follows.

(1) An astonishing fact F occurs (such as the annual flooding of the Nile in Egypt, preceded by the equally annual north winds (trade winds)).

(2) The 'abductive' reasoning (logismos: WR 41), following previous 'empeiria' (WR41), is compelling:

If the annual north winds (= ACD) were the cause (= CSQ) of the equally annual flooding, then the surprising fact F would be 'evident; 'natural', no longer surprising;

In other words, F would have a collectively sufficient number of separately necessary conditions; put another way: F would have found its explanation—specifically a causal explanation. F becomes 'intelligible' as a result of a cause.

2. After this abductive phase, there is the inductive one. For this, we turn to Jan Lukasiewicz (1878/1956), the Polish logician of the Lwow School.

The syllogistic wording reads as follows (WR45):

If all Nile floods are the result of the northern trade winds, then those of previous years and of the current year are also.

Well, in previous years and, also, this year, the same sequence repeats itself '(omen:) trade winds/ (continuation:) Nile flooding'

So all Nile floods are caused by the North trade winds.

One sees that one, in the inductive 'logismos' (WR .41),

(a) of some cases (application models)

(b) penetration (theoria; WR41) to the - not so visible' - 'grounds' (ACD) of all cases (regulatory model).

Bibl. sample:

(1) Abductive reasoning : WR45 (leading idea);

-- J. Dewey, *Le développement du pragmatisme américain* , in: *Revue de Metaph. et de Mor.* , 29 (1922): 4 (Oct. - Dec.): 411/430;

-- WB Gallie, *Peirce and Pragmatism* , New York, 1966 (frl. oc, 98);

(2) Inductive reasoning :

-- I .M. Bochenski (1902/1995), *Philosophical methods in modern science* , Utr./Antw., 1961 (Fri. oc, 94);

-- Ch. Lahr, *Cours de philosophie* , I (*Psychologie, Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 591/598 (L'induction).

WR61

Röd, oc,31, says: “Methodically speaking, Thales is no different from the specialist scientists of later times. He had observations at his disposal (Northern Winds/Nile flooding) and formulated a hypothesis (in Peircian terms: abduction): there is a connection—and indeed a causal connection—between the two phenomena. Thales indicated that connection—according to Röd—as follows:

(1) The north winds push the Nile water back upstream;

(2) as a result the Nile overflows.

The hypothesis (...) presupposes a direct connection between the trade winds and the flooding,

The critique of thaletic abduction.

Heliodoros of Emesa , a locality in Syria, wrote a novel , **Aithiopika** , sometime after 220 AD—thus centuries after Thales—with Theagenes and Charikleia as the main characters, who experience a whole series of adventures (adventure novel), including their very beautiful, somewhat Platonic-sounding love.

In a 'philosophical' conversation (2:28 (1/5)), which is inserted, the cause of the Nile floods is discussed. The text reads: “I explained how Neilos, the Nile, originates in the mountains of Aithiophaiia (in the language of that time – WR56 (language evolution) – this means: Africa south of Egypt) (...), where the south begins. The stream rises in the summer. This, not, as some (including Thales, of course) imagine, because the Northwesterly winds push back its waters, but as a result of a phenomenon attributable to those same winds. The clouds, around the solstice, are driven and whipped up from the North to the South, to accumulate in the scorched zone. There their drift is broken by the exceptional heat of the region. The humidity, gradually accumulated and condensed, evaporates—resulting in abundant rains that cause the Nile to overflow.”

Schematic: Thaletic: trade winds -- Nile flooding (direct connection);
Heliodoros: trade winds -- precipitation in the source region -- flooding
(indirect connection: there is an intermediate term, the rains in the South).

Note-- Falsifiability .

Karl Popper (1902/1994), the epistemologist, emphasized the fact that a 'theory' (here: the explanation of the Nile flood) does not necessarily have to be verifiable (verification is 'to find true'), but, at the very least, falsifiable: it must be refutable and, therefore, capable of being found false. This minimalist characteristic of any theory was, indeed, present in Thales's abductive reasoning.

Proof: already in antiquity, people improved their hypothesis thanks to more accurate observation (empeiria).

WR62

(1) It was, however, refuted as a direct explanation (no intermediate term between trade winds and flooding).

(2) It was, however, confirmed as an indirect explanation (precipitation in the South as the nearest cause of the flooding), while the trade winds, as a distant cause, were retained. -- So that, in Popperian perspective, we are faced with both falsification (no intermediate term) and verification (intermediate term).

The revolutionary scope of the thaletic causal explanation.

A twofold aspect means that – as far as we know – Thales acts as a pioneer here,

(1)a. Instead of (wanting to) explain total nature (by the transcendental archè; WR 44: all beings), Thales limits the phenomenon to be explained to a single, singular phenomenon, within total fisis (WR 54: nature in its parts).

Which proves, loud and clear, that the concept of—what W. Jaeger calls—'partial physics' was started not after Thales, but already from Thales himself.

(1)b. This means, immediately, that instead of philosophy (ontology, metaphysics), which covers the transcendental, Thales began with positive science. This is also evident, moreover, from his mathematical, astronomical activities, etc. One of the constitutive characteristics of the positive sciences is that, as an object, they do not analyze total reality, but a part of it (a partial physical).

(2)a. A second characteristic is noted by Fr. Krafft. oc,76: partial phenomena, within the total framework of fisis, Thales explains, not starting

from the total archè (the primordial substance-water), but starting from partial phenomena.

Applied: the flooding of the Nile Valley (sub-phenomenon 1) is explained by the southern precipitation (sub-phenomenon 2) and the trade winds (sub-phenomenon 3). -- Which further reinforces the positive character.

(2)b. Moreover, the explanatory partial phenomenon remains within beings, insofar as these are reachable by direct empeiria. Thales thus explains the visible by means of the visible, rather than the invisible (WR41).

WR63

1. Thereby he distances himself both from manticism (which, 'seeing', refers to the invisible) and from metaphysics (which, 'reasoning', attempts to expose the invisible; one need only think of the primordial substance, which, although omnipresent, nevertheless escapes ordinary empeiria (precisely for this reason we have, WR46/52, attempted to sketch the poor empeiria, in the purification rites (cathartic) and in the hylistic pluralism, -- phenomena which one perceives only mantically).

2. Immediately, however, Thales, by his positive method, exposed a new type of invisibility, namely the causal connection; --this is, after all, by no means always visible; quite the contrary. But

- 1.** It takes place between partial physical phenomena and
- 2.** concerns data observable by empiricism.

This implies that, immediately, a new type of theoria (WR 41) is brought to light, the theoria or phenomenon-understanding characteristic of positive or specialized science.

Empiricism, the observation of visible facts, plays a much greater role in the positive approach than in the mantic (musical) or even the metaphysical (total physical) one.

Yet this theory, too, from an ancient Greek perspective, is a musical activity; the Muses, with mnèmosune, remain the inspiring entities, also of the positive method.

Cf. WR 42: was the emancipation process of a metaphysical-philosophical nature not an obstacle to artistic inspiration, the positive turning towards

- 1.** the partial physical phenomenon and
- 2.** the visible phenomena as causes were not that either.

The mystical element (WR 42) was preserved, as was the conformity (WR 46) with (musical) religion. Ancient Greek positive science is – in turn – a new

type of musical thought (WR40).

2.B.2.-- Secular, human-scientific wisdom.

W. Jaeger, at the time, relied on the premise that the physical, as a total description and explanation of 'nature', also encompassed human nature.

Nevertheless, for the thinkers of that time, however philosophical their views may have been, it must have been clear that man—distinguished from plants, animals, and, most certainly, from the landscape around him—possessed an essence of his own. Even though they did not yet possess an appropriate language and method to define that difference precisely. Therefore, we isolate the following subphysics.

WR64

Let one piece of evidence be cited in this regard.

F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes, I (*Altertum and Frühmittelalter*), Zürich, 1954, 9f., where the author quotes Hesiodos, *Erga* 274/285.

1. “Perses (= the brother of Hesiod), let this one thing be said to you: lend your ear to justice ('dike'); do not lend yourselves to violence. -- As Kronion (= Zeus, the son of Kronos) has commanded the people.

2. The animals that are wild— -the fish and the birds—they may devour one another: among them there is no law (rule).

3. But to the people (Zeus) gave dike (right), -- truly the best among what fell to us.” This language is crystal clear:

(1) Dike, the law established by Zeus, is immediately sacred law: the deities stand behind it. -- Although it remains true what is said in WR 12v. (demonism): those deities were, in time, themselves the founders of injustice. - By respecting justice and causing it to be respected, man, as man, enters into a relationship with the Supreme God;

(2) Dike, the right of Zeus, distinguishes man from the non-human order of life. -- This will later appear even paradoxically from what some Protosophists (-450/-350) say, especially a certain Polos and also one Trasummachos (“Do we call 'right' that which yields result for the strongest”); or also Callicles (“Do we call 'right' the power which, in principle, every man possesses to satisfy his desires, by any means whatsoever”). In reasoning in this way, they appeal to animals! -- Now, the Protosophists represented a crisis in the Hellenic, over-civilized spirit.

a . Economic wisdom .

Krafft, oc,78; Romeyer-Dherby, ac, 2489.

The anecdote—or true story—comes down to this. *Aristotle, Polit . 1: 1259a*, relates.

1.-- The 'astronomical' (WR58) 'theoria' allows Thales, at a certain moment, to foresee a rich olive harvest for the following year.

2. Thereupon he borrows all the oil presses (in Miletos).

3 .-- Then, later, when the pressing season arrived and oil presses were urgently needed, he lent them out at the (usurious) price he imposed.

Another version says that, long before the olives ripen—Thales comes off better here—he buys up the entire olive harvest of his hometown, in order to determine the price himself later.

WR65

Be that as it may, Thales proved, according to some, that he was a capitalist merchant who became rich by applying his knowledge (his physical abilities?). Whether this occurrence took place more than once—which would characterize him as Spranger's economic type, whose 'structure' consists of living to enrich himself—is unknown.

It is usually said in books on the history of philosophy that only the aforementioned Protosophists (WR 64), including the non-immoralist ones, allowed themselves to be paid for their wisdom.

One thing is certain: Thales has, to a certain extent, shown them the way. -- Whether what was said (WR 53) regarding Thales' statement “to be more of an object of envy” was applied here is not clear. The most favorable interpretation is this: did he not wish to enrich himself, once and for all, in order to be able to devote himself to theoria?

Note: Scarce data are ambiguous: they allow for more than one interpretation because the context (situation) is missing.

b. Political wisdom.

'Polis' means city, or city-state (WR 34). 'Politisch' means that which is consistent with or goes hand in hand with polis.

An anecdote (true history) tells the following. Lydia, under the leadership of Croesus (WR58), at a certain moment threatens the twelve Ionian cities on the coast of Asia Minor. Thales advises them to form an alliance.

This explicitly points to rhetorical activity (WR6: ACTIO).

However, Miletus chose a separate alliance with Croesus, while the other cities, to begin with, thwarted the Lydian plans.

That Thales acted in political matters is normal. The city-state practiced direct democracy: in the agora, the popular assembly, on the basis of isonomia (equality), every citizen (at least the non-slave) freely discussed 'ta koina' (res publicae), the matters that were public, concerning the entire community.

However, we do not know very well which political ideas Thales espoused.

(1) Herodotus (1:170) mentions that he was an 'engineer' in the army of Croesus, at least at some point.

(2) *G. Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, II (*The First Philosophers*), London, 1955, points out that Thales comes from a family of priest-kings (Thomson is a Marxist). But a political stance has more necessary (and sufficient) reasons than those two facts. Cf. WR 60.

So much for the 'human-scientific' physics.

WR66

Note-- (i) Historical note . -- In the cited text (WR 64), 'dike' is mentioned repeatedly. -- In fact, two sacred legal systems occurred in Hellas.

a. The oldest layer—predating the religion of Zeus—was called 'Themis'. This right applied to the family, the clan—the home, hospitality—the worship of the dead (F. Flückiger, oc, 20). This right is inspired and guided by the goddess Themis, who belongs to the mother goddesses—indeed, is sometimes identified with the earth mother, Gaia (WR38). “Sacred to her, the Mother Goddess, are the domains of life (WR50: hylozoism; the idea 'life') and fertility (WR40: genetic; Gaia). Also the domain of the earth and the subterranean. Likewise the night.” (oc, 29).

One is called Themis, therefore, both law itself and the goddess of law. There is an immanent and a transcendent side to it.

b . The younger layer is the Olympian (Uranian) Zeus religion: it is called dikè. Its domain is the polis and the law (legislation) regarding the citizen.

Again: Dike is both law itself and the goddess of law. -- One may safely compare the role of these goddesses of law with the role of the Muses (WR38).-
- The standard saying in Hellas was, therefore, “it is Themis and Dike”.

(2) Note regarding Homeric antecedents.

1. "Homer (WR39) has often been regarded as the founder of rhetoric. *Ernst Curtius* (1814/1896; known for his *History of Greece* (1857/1861)) rightly noted that almost half of the Iliad and more than two-thirds of the Odyssey consist of speeches by actors, often of considerable length. The 'cunning Odysseus' (...) in particular is a masterful orator." (*M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, Moderne welsprekendheid* , A'm / Bssl, 1968, 38).

2. In Homeric culture, the agora (WR65), then the assembly of the people or army (WR56 (language evolution)), which, as was normal at the time, was of sacred law, occupies central position.

The army assembly is, after all, a edification of the deities. Thus, for example, Agamemnon, the prince of Mukenai (Mycenae; WR33), commander of the Greek army, receives the command to gather the people (the warriors) for Troy (WR33) - the Achaeans (WR33) - in a god-given dream (Il. 2: 1ff.).

WR67

Not that the will of the deity ought to be enforced authoritatively at all times: for instance, Telemachus, Odysseus' son (Od. 1:289ff.), receives the inspiration, from Pallas Athena (= the goddess Athena), who appears to him in the guise of Mentos, to convene the agora, the assembly of the people. This is to denounce the shameless suitors who are devouring the house of his mother, the queen Penelope, who awaits Odysseus' return. The agora disperses without reaching a decision: it learns merely that if those suitors continue in their blindness, fate will strike them. It is a God-given warning. Nothing more.

The order of the assembly is likewise sacred; the one authorized to speak receives the scepter of Zeus: he stands under the protection of the supreme deity; is immediately inviolable ('holy'; 'taboo'), even if he turns against the army commander.

For example, Diomedes, who, in the midst of a full army assembly, turns against Agamemnon, saying: "Atrides (= Atreides, son of Atreus), against you, first of all, I ought to take a stand, in your lack of insight, -- just as it is for Themis (WR66), Lord, in the agora (the assembly is a sacred area, even in the midst of wartime. Even then, freedom of speech and decision prevails, under the protection of Zeus. "This is the cradle of later democracy" (thus F. Flückiger, oc,14).

In other words: if a Vernant claims that democratic freedom of speech and decision only became possible later, in the desacralized polis, he contradicts the Homeric texts.

We saw, incidentally, that Mnemosune and the Muses also integrated the

process of emancipation (WR42), which took place in (Milesian) philosophy. Within Egyptian wisdom, too, the socially inferior (e.g. a 'common maid' (WR 18)) were granted a right to speak.

Admittedly, after Homer, with the rise of the polis, the agora evolves: the people (the free men) of the city-state acquire, in turn, an agora, a popular assembly. There, the same right to speak freely prevails.

*J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs **, I, 177, attributes this to “a process of desecration and rationalization of social life” (as he puts it). In fact, the desecrated and more rational polisagora is merely the further elaboration of the law of themis.

WR68

(3) The divine messenger.

Bibl. sample: *WB Kristensen, Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religion*, Am, 1947, 125/148 (*The Divine Herald and the Word of God*).

The chapter is a short treatise on sacred eloquence (kerygmatics) as known in archaic culture in antiquity.

a. The god Hermes

The god Hermes (also: Hermeias), the son of Zeus and Maia, is the mediator between the other world and this world. Not as an ordinary messenger, only

1. He is a psuchopompos, soul guide, in two directions: he guides the souls to the underworld and also guides them out of it, towards this world.

2. In that function (WR9), he shows that he is more than that: he is the mediator of 'life' (WR 12; 22; 23; 32; 48; 50), the 'life' inherent in the deities originating from the 'other' world—this between this and that other world: he mediates this 'life' towards our earthly world. In that broad function, he leads the Charites, the goddesses of favor, the bringers of blessing, out of the 'cave' (i.e., the symbol as well as the representation of the underworld), to bring the blessing (i.e., 'life' in its successful form) among the people.

In that same function, for example, he is called 'fut.almios', generative (WR40: genetic) god (cause of 'life'), who begets plant life.

Behold two functions (sub-functions), with that of psuchopompos, soul guide, three, specific to the angelos, the messenger (herald).

3. In that broad, essential function, Hermes is also 'logios', eloquent, articulate, -- immediately also, reasoning, skillful.

In *Homer*, II.2:370, we have an appliqué model of this. Agamemnon (WR 66) calls out to Nestor, the prince of Pulos, after his speech (not to give up the fight): “Yes, indeed! Once again you are conquering the sons of the Achaeans by your eloquence ('agorei'). If only I possessed ten such counselors ('sumfradmones') as you, then the city of Prince Priam (= Troy; WR 33) would surely bow its head quickly (...).”

What exactly does 'eloquence' mean – here (WR 58: language evolution) –? “Eloquence is

(1) good advice, in the ancient sense,

(2) counsel, which forces itself upon the listeners and reveals itself as a new strength.” (Kristensen, oc,142).

WR69

In other words: it is catharsis, purification, the communication of God-given life and, immediately, of this purification (here: of discouragement, before the walls of Troy) (WR47). The means of cleansing is, here, the spoken word, including the expressed idea. Kristensen correctly points out: “The eloquence of ten such counselors as Nestor would give the Achaeans tenfold strength (*note* 'mana') and, for example, ensure the fall of Troy”. (Oc, 142).

Well, Hermes possessed the 'gift' of this type of maxim ('magic word'). Hesiod, *Theog.*, 938, calls him 'the messenger of the deities'. He was generally seen as the prototype (idea, to speak in Platonic terms) of human messengers. Thus, of speakers.

b. The staff of messengers (speakers).

Ancient Greek eloquence had an emblem that appears in the epic and in the visual arts: the scepter, the messenger's staff. According to the epic (WR 67: the Scepter of Zeus), every speaker—including the king when he addresses the assembly of the people—is given the herald's scepter. The judge, during the administration of justice, also receives the same scepter.

In the images, now, Hermes invariably carries the same scepter.

(1) The ancient Greeks knew three terms: *kèruk(e)ion*, the staff that ends in two branches bent together or interwoven; *rhabdos*, the short tree branch; *skèptron*, the ordinary staff. Hermes is the typical bearer of all three.

(2) According to the epic, the staff, the messenger's staff, is the attribute of princes, judges: all received it from Hermes. Cf. Kristensen, oc, 143.

c. The people's assembly .

Kings, judges, and heralds speak in the agora while carrying staffs. Their eloquence, purifying (cathartic), was edifying and creative: they proclaim (kerugma) and, immediately, realize the God-given laws and institutions.

This is what 'Themis', 'themiston', 'themiton' (Lat.: fas, distinguished from ius or lex, which were purely human works, -- just as, in Greek, 'nomos' (human law, custom) is. This law was derived from Themis, the earth goddess (WR 39: Gaia; 66), even more than from the (later) Zeus. Cf. WR 66: two layers in the law).

The scepter and 'themistes' (Homer, II, 9: 99) belong together, in the agora, the assembly of the people.

WR70

Note:

(1) that the ancient Greeks were aware of the demonic character, also of the spoken word in the sacred sense (WR12; 68);

(2) that the Bible also has this type of consecrated or sacred word; cf. A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten Testaments* , Tübingen, 1932, 1/9 (Dynamistisches); -- thus Psalm 33:9 says: "(Yahweh) spoke and it came to pass; He commanded and it was." The New Testament continues this idea.

It should also be noted that Herodotus, *Hist.*, 8:11, speaks of a goddess Peitho, the eloquent one, as of the goddess of eloquence. This resembles the Muses (WR38: inspiration), Themis and Dike (WR 66): they too inspire, guide, purify, and give life.

So much for the religious tradition in which Thales stood and which forms his background.

d. Rhetorical wisdom.

(1) Thales has not left us any partial physics called 'rhetoric' (WR 43 (subjects); 54 (parts of physics); 62). But he has practiced 'eloquence'. This is contained in his economic (WR64) and political (WR65) wisdom.

(2) We have come to know Thales as a true thinker. A fusikos, a natural philosopher. We now put ourselves in his shoes (identical or comprehensive method), based on what we now know of him. In this way, we answer the question: which part of physics and, at the same time, which theory of his own is contained in Thales' eloquence, without it, therefore, being explicitly stated?

In this way, we further develop the idea of 'theoria' (WR41v.: general idea;

46: general - physical idea (transcendental); 55v. mathematical idea; 60: causal idea (ab- and inductive); 63: positive idea), once again.

Theory, fathoming, is, through observable data (empeiria), the visible, penetrating to the invisible by means of reasoning (logismos).

The question arises as to which data, in eloquence, represent the visible and which invisible 'archai', elements of thought, constitute the goal.

(A) *Economic rhetoric*

Thales borrows all the oil presses and lends them on, later, at the price he imposed. He had to persuade their owners to reach an understanding with them, in the form of lending on their part.

WR 71

Or: he buys up the entire olive harvest in his hometown. He had to persuade the olive growers so that he reached an agreement with them regarding the price.

a. The invisible, for both parties, is the intersection where both simultaneously 'see' their own advantage (price). This is expressed in the initially invisible price, regarding which agreement (understanding) must be reached.

This entails negotiation until the point is reached where both can be 'satisfied'; at that moment, what was sought from the outset becomes visible.

In ancient Greek, this negotiation is called 'historia', inquiry (WR40), which, here, takes place jointly. Reasoning (logismos) is involved: each party attempts to fathom the true intention of the other.

b.1. What stands out here, in comparison with earlier forms of fathoming—think of the cause (archè) of the Nile flood or the 'cause' (archè) of the total (transcendental) fisis (the primordial substance-water), etc.; or the measurement model in the measurement of height or the height to be measured (found), is that the sought-after (invisible) is strongly present in one's fellow man.

The theory here is to fathom the invisible within the fellow man (his intentions or possibilities for selling or lending; his desired price; his need) through the visible data of his fellow man (what he says, what presses or olives he possesses and displays, etc.): and indeed in such a way that he meets Thales's wishes. His persuasiveness, whether easy or not, for example, is by no means visible from the outset; quite the contrary.

b.2. Moreover: that fellow human being is situated within the phenomenon of the 'market', specifically the free market. Now, to 'see through' (fathom) the market is to notice something strongly invisible, through a number of visible data, as an observer of that market. After all, the entire economic system operates, right down to those individual decisions.

Conclusion: At least two sub-physics—the fellow man as an economic partner, the market itself, in which economic transactions are situated, are the object itself—together with the relationship regarding those two components—together constitute economic rhetoric. The fellow man, the market,—the relationship,—behold two, three pieces of fusion, nature. And viewed positively (WR63: positive method).

WR72

(B) Political rhetoric

Again: Thales advises the Twelve Ionian Cities to form an alliance amidst a situation in which Croesus, the Lydian prince, threatens them. This entails that he had to persuade a number of fellow men so that he could reach an understanding with them regarding international politics.

1. One sees the clear analogy with economic transactions of understanding.

(1) Fellow man,

(2) relationship, -- yes, but, now, instead of the free market economy, the political situation, within the Twelve Cities and outside of them, especially regarding Lydia. The political situation is a part of nature. The analysis of it leads to a new partial physics. The twelve city-states are a part of nature, object of a partial physics.

In other words: The specific object differs from the partial physics encountered above (and from that of the total or transcendental physics). The investigation is co-determined by the object.

2.a. The theory, which, by reasoning through the visible data (= the rumor threatening Croesus; the conversations, the proceedings in the agora (popular assembly); perhaps the military preparations of Croesus, etc.), attempts to penetrate to the invisible data (the true intention of Croesus, the true institution of the Twelve Cities, -- the influences acting on both instances, etc.), is therefore not entirely the same as in the previous cases. Although there is a strong analogy.

2.b. It is especially 'ta koina' (WR 65), the general, public, or open nature that distinguishes this political sub-physical from all others mentioned above.

Just as private welfare (expressible in the lending or selling price) played a leading role in economic transactions, so too does public welfare play a decisive role in political affairs. For everyone, in their own way, seeks welfare, whether private or public. That welfare is a very distinct part of nature, the object of its own sub-physical.

Conclusion: Fellow man, in a politik and international context, aimed at the common good, -- together with the understanding that is sought, -- behold the two or three components of fusion, the object of political rhetoric. And indeed elaborated positively (WR63: positive method).

Decision.

- (1) Economics and politics are sub-physics in which man is at the center.
- (2) The rhetoric interwoven into it places him even more at the center: it is a human science in the second degree.

WR73

2.B.3.-- Sacred wisdom.

Bibl. sample: W. Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology* , Marquette Un. Pr., 1943 (Fr.: *Humanisme et théologie* , Paris, 1950).

The idea of 'theology'.

M. Terentius Varro, *Rerum humanarum et divinarum antiquitates* , 2, gives us a threefold idea of "theology" or theology. Marcus Terentius Varro (-116/-27) is an encyclopedic writer, quoted by S. Augustine of Tagaste (+354/ +430), *De civitate Dei* , 4: 27; 6:5.

a. Mythical theology describes the deity by means of myths; poets, in particular, practice this type.

b. Political (WR 65) theology depicts the deity as the public, official religion, with its institutions and worship, shows it. The people primarily practice this.

c. Physical theology represents the deity insofar as nature (hence *theologia naturalis* (cf. WR 41 (*historia naturalis*; 57)) has the deity as a part.

In other words: natural theology is a partial physical (WR 43; 54; 62). Cf. W. Jaeger, *oc*, 8s.; 206.

The Christians, to put it in the words of St. Augustine, will supplement this threefoldness with the *theologia supernaturalis*, the supernatural theology, as it emerges from Biblical revelation.

Incidentally: the term 'theologia' was only introduced by Plato of Athens, *Rep*, 2: 379a.

The pre-Socratics (concerning the Milesians): natural philosophers or natural theologians?

The 19th-century historians of philosophy are divided on the matter according to their own presuppositions.

(1) Ed. Zeller, a Hegelian, and his school adhere to the tradition of Plato and Aristotle: the history of ideas interests them first and foremost; for example, they place the Milesians among the natural philosophers, but pay attention to the transcendental and even theological aspects of it.

(2) John Burnet and Theodor Gomperz, both scientistically oriented (positivist (WR2)), avoid anything 'metaphysical' (accessible through non-experimental means) and see in, for example, the Milesians the aspect of positive specialized science (WR62), indeed, the aspect of secularization (WR54: secular w.), with the banishment of the transcendental and the theological, which is dismissed as 'metaphysics' (in the pejorative sense of 'flimsy theory of ideas').

WR 74

They see in them the first 'specialist scientists' in the positivist-modern sense of the explanation of the phenomena of the (gross) material world, this by means of 'rational' systematization of causality (WR 62ff.). Something that is correct, but incomplete.

W. Jaeger, *oc*, 78ss., states that the 'physical' arche (WR 44/46) – in Thales, for example – the primordial substance-water, was indeed a 'physical reality', but, at the same time, divine both in terms of the requirements of essential nature ('nature', essence) and in terms of rank.

We see this from the fact that the primordial substance-water, as the ground of beings,

(1) harmological, order-establishing, and

(2) is steering-oriented, goal-directing, just like the deities: did not Zeus—with his many deities—appeal as the founder of order and as the ruler (goal-director) of all beings? Examine, for example, where he intervenes in matters of law: WR74 (Hesiodic idea of law); 67 (Homeric: Athena's actions); 68/70 (Homeric: Hermes' actions and 'function'). Even clearer: WR 39: the primordial couple as a model of the later foundation of all beings (WR46: conform)! Burnet and Gomperz cannot deny this—at least from a cultural-historical perspective.

It is, then, also natural that *St. Augustine*, in **De civ. Dei**, 8:2, situates the physical philosophers—following Thales—"at the head of the Greek philosophical theologians." With the proof:

(1) The physicalists attribute to their ground of all beings the following predicates: infinite, eternally provident with respect to all beings, omnipresent; now, these are precisely the characteristics that later theologians, including the supernatural or Biblically Christian ones, attribute to God, the immaterial;

(2) The criticism of mythical theology, especially regarding its demonism (WR12; 68; 70), by the physical theologians was adopted by later theologians, especially the supernatural-Biblical ones.

Conclusion : they are – also, not only – specialist scientists and theologians – at the same time.

The physicists' own rhetoric.

J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée, II* , 121, states that they differ from the shamans (magical healers; iatromanteis) and the strictly religious figures by three characteristics:

- a. they publish sacred secrets;
- b. a privilege of a sacred nature, they extend to an open group (instead of a closed one);
- c. proclamation of insights to the general public, - insights that were previously (e.g. in the mystery religions) strictly reserved for initiates.

In other words: relationship with public opinion, through open discussion.

WR75

Note: That supernatural, Biblically inspired theology has integrated the nature of physicals into its system is evident primarily from the Eastern Christian mentality:

The (Incarnation) mystery, (which) was foreseen from the beginning, is revealed today. The Son of God (the Father) becomes the child of a man. This, in order to communicate His glory to us, while He shares in our wretchedness.

Adam was once deceived: although he desired it, he did not become a 'god'. God (the Son), however, becomes man so that He may make 'Adam' (the human race) into a 'god'.

Creation must rejoice with joy; nature ought to dance in chorus, since the archangel (Gabriel), in deep reverence, appears to the Virgin (Mary) and addresses her with the 'Hail Mary,' which lifts up sorrow (since the Fall). -- You, who, out of deep compassion, have appeared to our God in human garb, to You be glory." (K.Kirchhoff, *Ueber dich freut sich der Erdkreis (Marienhymnen der byzantinischen Kirche)* , Münster (Wf.), 1940, 163f.).

Or again: “Our sick (human) nature, Lord, You have healed: in the Virgin You have imparted to her, as the most effective means of healing, Your spotless Divinity.” (Oc,55).

Aesthetic: “You have shown natural beauty in even greater beauty, by allowing wretched humanity, in which the Divinity clothed Himself, to radiate. We praise, much-praised Virgin, Your Child and exalt It throughout all ages.” (o.c., 57).

It is evident: either total nature (= creation) or human (partial) nature, or human-female beauty, as a natural phenomenon, are involved in the supernatural order. The physicists have bestowed upon us a lasting inheritance (WR 4; 52 (Perennis philosophia)).

The tripartite nature 'natural/ extranatural/ supernatural!'

Bibl. sample: J. Rivière, *Surnaturel* , in: *Dict. prat.d. conn. relig .*, Paris, 1928, 6: 506/510.

This Scholastic-Ecclesiastical usage can be understood as follows.

(1) 'Naturally' is all that corresponds to the capabilities of a being; consequently, as soon as it exists, it is endowed (by the Creator) with all that is 'natural'.

(2) 'Supernatural' is anything that, by divine intervention, directly surpasses the natural: this entails,

a/ something that has been added by virtue of divine generosity;

b/ something that is higher and both cleanses nature (WR 46/48; question 48: baptism) and, according to its level, elevates it: the classical word for this is grace.

WR76

The theological adage regarding this is clear: *gratia supponit, sanat et perficit naturam* (grace presupposes, purifies, and elevates nature). One could just as well say: the supernatural presupposes, purifies, and elevates nature. 'Grace' expresses divine generosity; 'supernatural' expresses purification, or raising of the standard, respectively.

The supernatural (the outside nature).

In the Latin-Ecclesiastical language it sounds like 'praeternaturale', -- strictly distinguished from, although factual, frequently, interwoven with the supernatural. The extranatural remains within the boundaries of nature, but points to the paranormal (that which is neither abnormal nor normal).

The ancient peoples—the Greeks, especially—usually call the

supernatural the 'divine': that which, although remaining within the possibilities of nature (fisis), is nevertheless unusual, of a higher level, compared to the average functioning of nature, is called 'divine'.

J. Rivière, ac, 507, gives two applicative models thereof.

(a) As regards human nature, immortality is a desired object, but unattainable (for the time being) within the normal limits of nature, but, in principle, attainable in paranormal circumstances.

One remembers how all the ancients

(1) to label man, on earth, as 'mortal', -- one might say 'label' (for the word indicates misery),

(2) worship the real deities - gods, goddesses - as 'immortal deities'.

(b) “Miracles – thus, literally, J. Rivière – belong “pour la plupart” (mostly) to the order of the supernatural”. In other words: most miracles – what 'people' perceive as such – are, therefore, within nature, albeit paranormal nature, completely understandable.

It is also for this reason that whoever denies the paranormal (the external nature -- in Scholastic-ecclesiastical language) — like the enlightened rationalists (outside or inside the Church) — immediately also denies the miracles — e.g., labeled as 'parables' or 'mythical superstition'.

One then speaks, following the Protestant Liberal theologian Rudolf Bultmann (1884/1976), the man behind the *Formgeschichte* regarding Biblical interpretation (hermeneutics), of 'demythologization'.

WR77

For example, Bultmann 'demythologizes' (desacralizes) both the virgin birth of Jesus and his miracles and his glorification in the resurrection and ascension, as well as in the sending of the Spirit on Pentecost: although interpreted partly extra-partly supernaturally by a centuries-long Church tradition, these facts of salvation are, for the Enlightened-rational Bultmann, contrary to our current 'mentality' ('consciousness', 'self-understanding') determined by positive scientific discipline.

The supernatural in the thaletic 'nature'

Bibl. sample:

-- J. Zafiropulo, *Empedocle d'Agrigente*, Paris, 1953, left. 35/63 (*Le milieu, l'appartenance*);

-- J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée*, II: 7 (oc,95/124: *Du mythe à la raison*);

-- id., *Divination et rationalité*, Paris, 1974, fl. oc, 199/263 (the Greek thinkers).

Vernant, *Mythe et p .*, 105, believes he can schematize the development of early Greek philosophy as follows: “Among the Ionians— *note*: from Thales onwards—the new positive-scientific (WR62) starting point was suddenly extended to its 'absolute' limit, in the idea of 'fusus.'"

In Parmenides (WR 35; 37; -- more detailed later), the new intellectual-rational starting point is extended to its 'absolute' limit in the idea of 'being, which is immutable and identical with itself'. The — *note*: what Vernant calls — 'rational thinking' is immediately torn apart by these two contradictory starting points, which simultaneously mark a decisive break with the myth.”

We shall see that Vernant, with this bold statement, does violence to historical reality, at least partially.

1.-- 'Animism' or belief in the soul in Thales.

The antecedents, in Homer.

Erwin Rohde, Psyche (Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen), Tübingen, 1925–10, frl. 14ff. (Where the author discusses the worship of the soul of the deceased).

According to Rohde, an older religion is still very much alive in Homer: it concerns the honor and sympathy granted to the souls of the deceased. By pouring out flowing blood, by pouring out wine, by burning the corpses of animals and humans, the 'psuche', the soul, of someone who has just died is 'erquicket, ihr Groll besänftigt' (refreshed, its resentment calmed). “In any case, that soul is hereby conceived as still accessible to human prayer, indeed, as still lingering in the proximity of the sacrifices” (Oc,17).

WR78

1. Zafiropulo, oc, 40, elaborates precisely on that ancient custom. In *Odyssey*, 11:74; 12:13, for example—as Zafiropulo notes—the soul of the deceased Elpenor instructs Odysseus to burn his armor along with his body. In *the Iliad*, 6:48, Homer relates how Achilles honors the enemy he has killed by burning his armor on the pyre, along with his body.

2. Rohde, oc, 24, gives, as an explanation of this peculiar custom, the belief that the soul can make use of the burned (corpse, weapons) afterwards, after the burning. It is as if all the possessions of the deceased still remain his property.

Zafiropulo concurs with this explanation and even elaborates: “The belief was that by burning beloved objects, one freed 'the souls' from them: those 'souls' are a kind of semi-material cloud ('une espèce de nuage semi-matériel'),

which is trapped within them. These 'souls' sought out the soul of their former master in the afterlife, to serve him there, still. (...)

That is the reason why Odysseus, when he descends into hell, promises the dead to burn their possessions on the pyre.” (Oc,40; Zafiropulo refers, regarding the latter, to Rohde, oc,49ff. (*Hadesfahrt des Odysseus*)).

Zafiropulo forgets to add that the ancients—to put it more clearly—also spoke of soul matter, rather than merely 'soul'. In any case, they conceived of 'soul' both as subtle being and as subtle matter (WR 49/52: subtle matter).

Incidentally, this usage of language is also found among many other peoples (see Hiero-analysis course:

- (1) descent into hell HA 39/ 42;
- (2) substance of the soul: HA 43/44; 56; 71; 73; 75). We immediately see how important the idea of 'hylistic pluralism' is for the proper cultural-historical understanding of what is being discussed here.

Zafiropulo, 40s., adds that even the classical Greeks, of later times, held fast to that belief in soul and soul-substance present in all objects around them, except for the Protosophists (WR64: crisis) (Cfr also oc, 36; 39). Nostalgically, Zafiropulo adds: “But the Protosophists defiled nature by denying its soul, -- immediately, by taking life from it.”

WR79

“Immediately, once nature had been disfigured, the enthusiasm ('enthousiasmos', i.e., being inspired by a deity (theos), from within; WR 38; 70: musical type of enthousiasmos), which had supported the preceding epoch in its run-up, collapsed. By denying 'the soul of beings' ('l' âme des choses'), the mortal (man) cast his deities far away from himself, into a distant heaven, so inaccessible. Behold with what rhetorical words the Enlightened-rational spirit, which Zafiropulo himself is, describes the enlightened-rational disfigurement of nature, as extra-nature.”

“Thales was of the opinion that 'pan', the totality of nature, is both 'empsuchon', animated, and full of daimones”.

Thus Aetios of Amida (Mesopotamia; between 500 and 600; a physician). Zafiropulo explains: “Everything in nature is alive and possesses a kind of psyche, soul (substance).”

Note : 'Psuchè' means, first of all, breath; subsequently: breath of life and, immediately, principle of life, soul.

'Daimon' means deity, with emphasis on the impersonal power and

'function' (WR 9; 68: Hermes' function or 'domain'). After Homer, especially, 'daimon' means - also - one type of supernatural beings, situated between the actual deities and the heroes.

Note 1. To vividly grasp Thales' statement—'existential'—one would need to be familiar with ancient Greek religion.

Bibl. sample:

-- MP Nilsson, *La religion populaire dans la Grèce antique* , Paris, 1954;
-- L. Gernet / A. Boulanger, *Le génie grec dans la religion* , Paris, 1932;
-- especially Th. Zielinski, *La religion de la Grèce antique* , Paris, 1926 (fl. 12/30: *La divinisation de la nature*).

“Perhaps the most profound basis for the religious sensibility of the ancient Greek was the idea of the mysterious life in the nature surrounding him – and not only the life of that nature, but also the life of its spiritualization and deification.” (Th. Zielinski, oc, 12).

Zielinski continues: “In the mind of an (ancient) Greek, there was no 'dead' nature: nature was wholly and all life, wholly and all soul, wholly and all divinity; that nature was deified not only in its meadows and forests, in its springs and its rivers, but also in (...) its seas and (...) its mountain deserts”(ibid.).

WR80

MP Nilsson, *Les croyances de la Grèce antique* , Paris, 1955, 212, says: “The original Greek religion was one that arose from nature, whose deities controlled the various natural phenomena, while other deities had human activities or instincts as their domain”.

In his **La religion populaire **, 20th century, Nilsson provides an applicative model of this. “Like the peoples of Northern Europe, the Greeks ‘saw’ in nature, besides male beings—centaurs, sileni, satyrs, for example—also female spirits—such as the nymphs. The Greek word ‘numfè’, nymph, simply means ‘young woman’.”

In contrast to the male daimones, the nymphs are always depicted in purely human form. They are beautiful. They love to dance. They are benevolent, but they can also be agitated and threatening (WR11: demonism). Thus, if someone goes insane, it is said that he is 'numfo lèptos', possessed by the nymphs. (...).

Nymphs are often the mothers of mythical heroes (WR 11; 79). Nymphs are found almost everywhere. They live in the mountains, in cool caves, in

groves, in meadows, and in the vicinity of springs. There are also sea nymphs—Nèreids—and tree nymphs—dendrodes, druads.

The worship of the nymphs took place in many locations, especially near springs and caves. Evidence of this has been found in some caves (...). The worship in question is connected with nature daimones and with animals. Nevertheless, it was, first and foremost, a worship of women. (...).

The worship of nymphs was very popular. Beautiful and kind as they were, they personified almost all pleasant and benevolent aspects of nature (...). A great goddess, very similar to the nymphs who are her company, is Artemis, 'the Lady of Wild Things'. She haunts the mountains and meadows. She is associated with the worship of trees and with the veneration of springs and rivers. She protects women giving birth and watches over the babies."

With Artemis (Diana) and her nymphs we have a sacred figure that has a lasting effect: *S. Reinach, Cultes, mythes et religions*, I, Paris, 1922-3, 272/278 (*La religion des Galates*), says: "From the fourth to the fifteenth century (AD), the opinion was held that Diana, equated with or associated with Herodias (-7/-39), is the queen of the (witches') sabbath.

WR81

From +314 onwards, in the canons (minutes) of an Ecclesiastical Council held at Ankura (Ancyra, the present-day Ankara), one finds the following: "(...) Some criminal women, who previously converted to Satan, seduced as they are (WR 23/28) by deceit and apparitions ('phantasmatibus'), believe and confess that they, at night, in the company of Diana, the goddess of the pagans, or of Herodias, as well as of an innumerable multitude of women (*note* -- 'nymphs'), ride on horseback on certain animals (WR80: animals) (...), obey Diana as her queen ('dominae'), and, during the course of certain nights, are called to her service".

We cite this cultural phenomenon to point out how thoroughly, down to the subconscious, ancient religion—especially in this form—intervenes and has a lasting effect deep into our Biblical-Ecclesiastical era. From this, we can sense how profoundly nature, in its supernatural sphere, must have impressed us at the time, in the days of the Milesians. Only against this background does Thales's sentence become fully understandable. Cf. Th. Zielinski, oc,12/30 (on the deification of nature).

Note 2. But there is, as Nilsson said, more: human activities and drives—they too are animated by daimones.

An applicative model; - *Th. Zielinski* , oc, 31/48 (*La consecration du*

travail), says that all labor was animated by daimones, inspiring deities, who found in it its function, domain (WR 79 (9; 68)): hunting, agriculture and livestock farming, viticulture, -- trade and industry (crafts),-- all that was sacralized by 'enthusiasm' (WR79), sustained by daimones.

So too with intellectual labor. - Cf. Zielinski, oc. 45/48. "The goddesses of intellectual labor are (...) the daughters of the mountains, the nymphs (...). as inspirers of the poets, they had preserved her old name 'mousai' muses, -- a word related to the Latin word for 'mountain', 'mons', (*note* -- One need think of 'montsa', which became 'moussa'). (...). The Muses influenced all human intellectual labor. To such an extent, in fact, that anyone incapable of intellectual labor was labeled as 'a.mousos' (foreign to the Muse, devoid of culture, coarse). "May it never befall me as fate to live among 'amoussio', foreign to the Muses," reads a prayer by Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406).

WR82

It was, in any case, the Muses—the daughters of Mnemosune (Remembrance)—who accompanied the child's first, hesitant steps in the lessons of reading and writing. In the classroom, an image of the Muse was mandatory: with her scroll, she was, in the eyes of the school-going child, the symbol of the difficult skill being taught. It is, therefore, not surprising that the child dedicated his first school results to the Muse. Nor is it surprising that he began his studies with the inflection of her sacred name: Mouse, Mousas (gen.), Mousai (dat.), Mousan (acc.), in Greek; in Latin: Musa, Musae (gen.), Musae (dat.), Musam (acc.); this word served as a model for all words of the first inflection. (...).

In the Christian era, this honor, bestowed upon a pagan goddess, seemed naturally unacceptable: 'Musa, Mousa' had to make way for 'mensa' (table). (...). Meanwhile, as the child grew older and occupied himself more with intellectual work, the Muses remained, all the more, his companions. (...) The poets directed their prayers, with care, to the Muses (WR 38: Homer's model). Admittedly, in later times, the term 'Muse', formerly alive, became a 'classical remnant of witness' (WR64; 78ff.: Protosophistic crisis).-

Other radiant deities were accompanied by the Muses: Apollo, Hermes (WR 68/70), Pallas Athena (WR 67;74) – the latter the Romans identified with Minerva. Nevertheless, the Muses always occupied the foremost place.

Furthermore: not only poetry, but also music (*mousikè*) inherited the name of the Muses. Music, poetry, and dance (WR 80) together constitute the three musical arts (*note*: 'choreia'). These musical skills—called 'musical' in the stricter sense—were distinguished from the visual ('plastic') arts, which originated from the crafts." – So far Zielinski.

Incidentally: the Charites, the luminous-benevolent goddesses of favor (WR68), who created joy, shared, with the Muses, the fondness for the round dance and the accompanying music.

That the Musical religion, outlined above, was taken seriously is evident from the fact that Ptolemy Soter (= Lagos) (-367/ -281; general of Alexander the Great; ruler of Egypt -305/-285) founded the first academy for literature and specialized sciences in Alexandria and named it 'mouseion', museum, Muse's dwelling.

WR83

Note - 3. Zielinski, oc, 49/70 (**Revelation of God in Beauty**), explains how, especially for the Greek, the deity reveals itself in beauty (oc, 50). This is—he says, oc, 57s.—the true meaning of, for example, Greek statues of deities.

“To such an extent, in fact, that the serious and thoughtful Aristotle states: “If, by chance, we should one day encounter a man of the type in which sculptors depict the deities, then it is indisputable that we would all be prepared to bow before him and render him a service, as if he were a higher being”: (oc, 57s.).

Note - 4. Zielinski, oc, 71/94 (*La consécration du milieu social*), elaborates on the animation (enthusiasm, inspiration) by deities (daimones) of all social forms, starting with the family. -- So much for what the cultural-historical context (here: regarding religion) teaches us about the sentence of Thales, which the physician Aëtios has preserved for us. --

Reread, III now, WR38 (*mnemosune and the muses*): 38v. (origin or gene(n)etic thinking of the Muses: WR3): 42 (emancipation process and the Muses) (WR67); 43 (transcendental scope of musical thought).

Note - 5. W. Den Boer, *De religie van de Grieken*, The Hague, 1965, 56/62 (Delphi and the Law), discusses the enormous influence of the Delphic oracle, which was universally consulted, even by 'intellectuals':

“Greek tradition knows, in Pindar of Kunos Kefalai (literally: dog-heads, - hills in Boeotia) (-518/-438), the great lyric poet, a group of seven sages (WR 53 (the ethicists)), who possess knowledge bestowed by a god.” (Oc,57). Now, among those seven sages, our physical Thales is mentioned.

Moreover: “The famous seven sages, according to Plato of Athena (-427/-347), dedicate their wisdom to Apollo (WR 82) (*note*: Apollo is the musical god

of Delphi, in Phocis, -- present day: Kastri), even though their knowledge originates from man himself and receives divine sanction by being affixed to the temple". (Ibid.).

In other words: just as for Mnemosune with her Muses, so too for Apollo (and Puthia, Pythia, the serpent woman, who was his interpreter), one's own autonomous intellectual work is an obstacle. Quite the contrary.

WR84

Note Kurt Leese, **Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion **, *Zürich*, 1954, 305, says: "to have rediscovered nature as the mediator of divine revelation is (...) the religious charisma (note: special gift) of Romanticism—which was judged so hostilely by theologians (note: of enlightened-rationalist mentality, of course) of all people."

Without comment, except for this: WR78ff., we have chosen Zafiropulo's judgment on the degradation of nature, as external nature, in its entirety. After what we have learned about human nature, as a reality influenced by precisely that external nature, we can measure its degradation by Enlightened Rationalism, to some extent. Let one reread, once again, WR64, where (regarding the 'right' stripped of its external nature (if one may still designate that animalistic ethics by the name 'ethics')), it is discussed very briefly.

Two applicative thaletic models.

(1) Aristotle, *De anima* A2: 405a/19, says that Thales is said to have claimed that the magnet stone carried a 'psyche' within it. To which Zafiropulo adds: "As for inorganic matter, Thales derived the magnet stone soul – according to Aristotle – from the fact that the stone was made of magnesia (this is a natural magnet, consisting of Fe₃O₄ (iron oxide) and amber (which in Greek means 'electronic'). This 'animistic' theory would be adopted by Plato (*Robert Baccou, Histoire de la science grecque*, Paris, 1951, 55). -- The primitiveness of the initial Greek natural science is measured by this applicative model:

(2) Zafiropulo, oc, 37, further says: "As for plants: "ta futa empsucha zoa" (Plants are living beings, which are animated), thus Thales. He derived this either from the fact that, if one changes the direction of the stem, the plants spontaneously (of their own accord) resume it (WR46: directional structure: direction/ deviation/ recovery).

Once again: the primitiveness of the natural science of that time, which explains steering with soul (substance) and/or with divinity (daimon). Meanwhile, it appears that Thales still lives in the religiously saturated Greek-ancient sphere of life.

Note:-- Perhaps Romeyer-Dherby, ac, 2491, correctly indicates where he interprets the omnipresence of 'soul (matter)' as 'a sympathy of all beings, which react to one another and correspond with one another (...). The same soul circulates through the multiplicity'.

WR85

Meanwhile, the author touches upon one of the main characteristics of animism. -- By way of proof.

(1) *Alain Daniélou, Shiva et Dionysos (La religion de la nature et de l' éros)*, Paris, 1979, com. 17. Steller distinguishes two rather thoroughly distinct types of religion: “The one is bound to the lifeworld of nature; the other to the ordering of group life in the city.” (Oc, 17). The first—according to Steller, the oldest—type bears as its fundamental characteristic the following: “The inorganic world, the plant world, the animal and human world, as well as the subtle ('subtil') world of spirits and deities exist thanks to one another and for one another.” (Oc, 15). In other words: coexistence!

(2) *Karl Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie (Neue Untersuchungen über Posei-donios (note: of Apameia (-135/-51))*, Munich, 1926, frl. 111ff., explains how, among a number of Greeks, as well as, for example, Cicero (-106/-43), the great orator, what was then called the 'sumpatheia' (WR 56: linguistic evolution), in Latin: distantium rerum cognatio (cohesion, even kinship, of things existing at a distance from one another), was a fundamental idea regarding the conception of the cosmos.

One of the applications reads: thanks to this 'pneumatic' (WR49: air; pneuma (breath), di subtle matter) coherence, for example, the 'air souls' (= daimones) understand

- (1) each other and
- (2) the souls of earthly people (oc 114f.).

In other words: a theory of understanding (wr4 (ethological means of understanding); 71v. (Thaletic understanding) is enclosed in that transcendental or, rather, cosmic subtle matter ('pneuma'), also translated as 'spirit' in Dutch (oc,114f.). We will return to this later in connection with Pythagoreanism.

2.-- Belief in Thales.

Aristotle, De anima A5: 411a/7, says that Thales would be of the opinion that “panta plèrè theon einai” (that 'everything' (WR38 (goddesses, present at everything and possessing insight into everything); 43 (panta: Homeric); 79 (pan)) is filled with deities).

Bibl. sample:

- MP Nilsson, *Les croyances rel. dl Gr. ant* , 71/78;
- W. Jaeger, *A la naiss. dltheol.*, fl. 7/16 (*Le concept de 'théologie naturelle'*).

See, now, first WR 73/74 (the idea 'theology', natural philosophy or natural theology; frl. 75/77 (the triad 'nature/ extra-nature/ supernatural', as a Christian position.

WR86

MP Nilsson, Les cr. rel ., 71ss., says, in summary, the following.

(1) There is a Homeric era regarding the idea of God.

(a) The poet, as a particularly inspired one, “knows” (WR38 (insight into everything)), precisely which individual deity intervenes in the fate of this earth and its life.

(b) In contrast, ordinary 'mortals' (who are, precisely, mortals, because they lack the supernatural element of the inspired) do not 'know' (demonistic ignorance, which amounts to 'keeping them ignorant'; WR11ff.) which individual deity precisely determines their (fate) fate—or rather: co-determines it; WR53. Consequently, there are two types of language (WR56: language-analytical consciousness) regarding theology.

Consequence: when *J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée* , II, 79/94 (*La personne dans la religion*), writes: “Les dieux helléniques sont des Puissances, non des personnes” (The Hellenic deities are (merely) (impersonal) Powers, not (individual) persons), he is saying something that does not concern the deities themselves, but only what the 'mortal' (not the inspired (= supernaturally gifted)) 'knows' about them.

(2) After the Homeric period,

After the Homeric era, there is a schism between the tradition-faithful folk religion (which our catechists and theologians have recently been rediscovering) and the 'enlightened-rational religion' of the 'intelligentsia' (= the intellectuals). With two extremes on the one hand: the type of a Xenophanes of Colophon (WR35), about which more later; on the other hand, the type of the Protosophists (WR 64; 65; 78; 82; 84). Both embody the demonism inherent even to the enlightened-rational type of man (double-edgedness). So that, even with the light of the step, one does not escape the vicious circle of demonism (WR11).

Indeed: where a Xenophanes purifies the idea of God, elevates it to a

standard (WR 46ff.: catharsis; 76: Biblical), a type of Protosophist degrades the already demonic concept of God. It is this latter

(a) already demonistic and

(b) moreover, the 'enlightened-rational' idea of God that is usually in circulation among our current critics of the concept of God (among whom atheists are the frontrunners).

W. Jager, oc, therefore notes that, generally speaking, “all philosophical systems—except the skeptical—culminate in a 'theology'. We can assert this of the Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, Neo-Pythagorean, and Neoplatonic 'theologies'”. (oc, 11).

WR87

In that duality, the demonistic duality of 'reason' manifests itself, at least in part.

3.-- The belief in miracles in Thales.

Bibl. sample:

-- ER Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zurich/Munich, 1977, 188/239 (*Paranormale Phänomene in der klassischen Antike*);

-- R. Flacelière, *Devins at oracles grecs*, Paris, 1965 (fl. 103/118: *Divination et philosophie*);

-- R. Bloch, *Les prodiges dans l'antiquité classique* (*Grèce, Etrurie et Rome*), Paris, 1963;

-- Ph. Vandenberg, *The Oracles*, A'm/ Bssl, 1980;

-- H. Klees, *Die Eigenart des griechischen Glaubens an Orakel und Seher*, Stuttgart, sd;

-- H. De Jong, *Magic among the Greeks and the Romans*, Haarlem, 1948-2.

(1) R. Bloch, oc, 36, notes the Homeric antecedents. The figures ('heroes') of Homer show a duality with regard to the supernatural phenomenon par excellence, the utterance or oracle.

(a) Most people interpret the oracle as a blessing or, at least, as valid regarding insight into fate (WR86).

(b) Some, however, among whom Hector, the son of Priam (WR33; 68), haughtily ridicules his countryman Poludamas regarding bird-mantics in the Iliad, 12:230ff., already display an Enlightened-rational way of thinking. “You demand of me (Hector) that I obey birds that spread their wings! I do not worry whether they fly on my right side, towards the sunrise, or on my left side, towards the endless darkness. The best omen lies in the fact that one fights for one’s homeland.”

(2). Flacelière, oc,103, mentions that Ploetarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125; a later Platonicist), in his *Feast of the Seven Sages*, relates that Thales showed evidence of Enlightenment-rational interpretation.

It is about a monster, which a young shepherd claimed was born of a mare.

(1) The upper body, up to the neck and arms, was human;

(2) The rest of the body was that of a horse. A bit like the Centaurs of mythology.

(a) The mantis, the seer, Diocles saw in it 'a great wonder',

(b) But Thales did nothing but laugh, disbelieving as he reacted to it.

WR88

Analysis. -- Bibl. sample: R. Barber/A. Riches, *A Dictionary of fabulous Beasts*, London, 1971 (fl. 37: Centaurs).

Thales apparently understands the shepherd's tale in the gross material sense. But even then, it cannot be ruled out that a 'monster' (veterinarians, for example, sometimes identify them) was actually born. If—we say: if—this were the case, then—but only then—Thales makes an error against his own method of investigation or *historia* (WR 40ff.).

For according to the theory (WR 41), which was admittedly only formulated by Puthagoras of Samos, Thales ought, first and foremost, to practice 'empeiria' (observation, here in the sense of verification or falsification (WR60 (first Abduction, then Induction); 61: falsifiability)). Which he—at least according to Ploetarchos' account—did not do.

Theory seeks, after all, the invisible, which, here, in the untested assertion of the young shepherd, becomes briefly visible, but not sufficiently visible. Cf. WR41v.

Husserlian-phenomenological: the pure phenomenon must first be purified from all the rest. The pure phenomenon was here, in principle, the gross material monster. That Thales did not even go to 'examine' (*speculari*, *spy*).

Diocles, as mantis, as seer, perhaps also indicates correctly. For both disturbed 'seeres' (those suffering from hallucinations, for example) and the paranormally gifted (WR76: normal, abnormal, paranormal) assert, emphatically and vehemently (so that one would be compelled, as it were, to develop either the abnormal or the paranormal capacity oneself, if—if—one wishes to test, verify, or falsify oneself) that such monsters are indeed observable somewhere.

We say: 'perceptible somewhere'. For, apparently, if it exists, then this concerns a distinct, irreducible type of perception, which has been designated by the name 'sensitivity' since Carl von Reichenbach (1788/1869).

We know it: both hallucinations and 'faces' (visions (WR 81; phantasmata)) are the subject of contradictory assertions, which can only be settled if one (whether naive believers or enlightened rationalists) can repeat the process oneself by means of verifying or falsifying observation (inductive observation; WR60). With this, the list of both partial physics and types of theory (WR 70) can be supplemented with one type, namely the theory of the supernatural (soul, substance of the soul: daimon; deity).

WR89

Indeed, after Thales come thinkers ('theoretikoi') who, using subtle means, wish to 'explain' one type of perception—or, perhaps, even all types of perception.

(1) The first is Alkmaion of Kroton (-500/-450), a Pythagorean physician, who speaks of an atmospheric substance which plays a role in perception, especially that of the eye. Cf. WR49; 85.

(2) The second is the 'first materialist', in the strict sense' (WR52) - if one includes hylistic pluralism, namely Democritus of Abdera (-460/-370). The 'eidola' - theory, that is, of this Atomist - states that, besides ordinary 'atoma', indivisible particles, there also exist "smooth and easily movable" atoms, which, in themselves, are not observable, but are present in all observable beings. This kind of atoms constitutes the substance that characterizes the soul (WR78; -- 49/52). According to Democritus, they also constitute fire. This soul substance is the ground (WR44;41), i.e., the necessary and sufficient reason, of **(a)** bodily movement, **(b)** life (WR50) and **(c)** even thought. Cf. W. Röd, I, 188f.

But this is not all. Röd, op.cit., 193f., says that Democritus thereby also 'explains' supernatural phenomena, which we would now call paranormal phenomena. Thus the appearances (phantasmata) of deities, daimones, which are frequently (so says Röd) perceived by—apparently sensitive—people. Likewise the dreams, the mantic appearances. Likewise the gift of poetry.

This theory was later adopted by the materialistically inclined Epicurus of Samos (-341/-271).

See also: J. Brun, *Les Présocratiques*, Paris, 1982-3, 120s.; C. De Vogel, *Gr. Philos.*, I, 74 (explanation of telepathic phenomena; the gods explained as eidola; explanation of the evil eye (WR53: the evil eye), also called 'baskania' (cast of fate) in Greek.

Note -- J. Tyciak, *MorgenLändsche Mystik*, Düsseldorf, 1949, on page 41f, states that quite a few 19th- and 20th-century Russian writers (poets, novelists), not without the influence of (especially German) Romanticism (WR 84), depict the supernatural in the landscape.

-- Sh. Ostrander/L. Schroeder, *Parapsychological Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain*, Haarlem, 1972,

-- H. Gris/ W. Dick, **New Parapsychological Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain **, Haarlem, 1979, show us something analogous, in Soviet style. Indeed, the ancient 'miracle' still lives on.

WR90

Note - Contrary to this belief in miracles, so typical of archaic culture, is what the so-called 'demythologization' of archaic culture asserts.

One applicative model thereof. E. Renan (1823/1892); *Vie de Jésus*, Paris, 1863-1, 1879-16, vi". (...). The miracles recounted in the Gospel were never a reality; the Gospels were not written with the participation of the Deity. In our case, these two negations are not the result of exegesis (biblical interpretation); they precede exegesis. They are, namely, the fruit of an experience that was never falsified: miracles are those things that never occur. Only gullible people imagine that they see them. One cannot cite a single miracle that occurred in the presence of witnesses capable of verifying it. No special intervention of the Deity—whether in the composition of a book or in the course of an event—has ever been proven.

(Moreover): merely by the mere fact that one accepts the 'surnaturel' (*note*: as a man who lost his faith in the course of his priestly studies, under the influence of primarily the then-current German Enlightened interpretation of the Bible, Renan, the skeptic, no longer even distinguishes between 'extra- and supernatural'), one finds oneself outside 'la science' (*note*: Renan, consistently, calls 'science' that type of analysis of facts which intentionally and a priori excludes every extra- or supernatural reality—even as a pure hypothesis; which is characteristic of all the Enlightenment in its non-religious form).

In all this, Renan is honest: he, personally, has never experienced inspiration (WR81: 'inspirantes') or wonder (miracle) up close; he generalizes that singular absence to a mere impossibility.

In syllogism form: "I, Renan, have never experienced a single extra- or supernatural phenomenon; -- well then, whatever I have not experienced

myself does not exist without further ado; -- thus, for all extra- and supernatural data, it holds that they do not exist without further ado”.

This type of reasoned disbelief is evident, from the days of Homer (WR 87: Hector), through those of Thales (ibid.), to the present day (WR 76: Bultmann, who, in existential terms, says what Renan, in the previous century, stated in positivist (WR 2; 73) terms), Cfr. WR 79 (degradation of nature by Protosophistics).

WR 91

Meanwhile, the Enlightened-rational world itself is divided regarding the correct relationship between religion (in the archaic sense) and science. For example, *J.R. Vernant, *Divination et rationalité*, *Paris*, 1974*, asserts that “divination (= manticism), having the guise of being opposed to 'positive' thinking (WR 62 (/73; 77)) and nascent science, is, on the contrary, an essential prelude to it.” (cf. oc, 199/263 (Greek thinkers))

General decision regarding thaletic natural philosophy.

We have now not only examined the oldest known philosophy in its rare textual remains; we have also interpreted it in two ways:

- (i) as the beginning of current thinking (genetic method: WR 3) and
- (ii) as situated in its own cultural context (cultural-historical method: WR 31), This dual interpretation itself has a foundation, namely organic thinking (WR 3). -- Can we, now, apply certain 'defining' (expressing the essential characteristics) terms to the Thaletic style of thinking? -- Yes!

(1) It contains an (otherwise ancient) dialectal core:

The multiplicity of (possibly opposing) natural components (which are discussed in partial physics) is unified in the one essential ground, the flowing (= fluid, pliable).

(2)a. This dialectical core becomes a true ontology (WR 38 (musical foundation); 43ff. (transcendental wisdom)), because it is interpreted from the beings, -- the former, the present, the future.

(2)b. This ontology is, in essence, a metaphysics, in that it fathoms the dialectics of nature in the ontology by means of theoria (WR 41v.), making it 'insightful', namely on its invisible grounds.

The 'hetareia' in Miletus.

(1) Thales had a 'hetairos', a companion (life partner, friend, comrade), namely Anaximandros of Miletus, who was somewhat younger than he (-610/-547). Just like his teacher-friend, Thales, who wrote a piece of prose (probably

a 'periplous' in French - still, 'périple' (circumnavigation (description)), *Anaximandros* left us a book ' *Peri fuseos* ', De natura, on nature, of which exactly one fragment remains - the oldest philosophical document that we possess.-- It is of twofold extraordinary importance. But first the Dutch translation.

WR92

Simplikios; Phys . 24:13, says concerning this that Anaximandros, the 'diadochos' (successor) and 'mathêtês' (disciple) of Thales, asserted that the principle ('archê') and constituent ('stoicheion') of beings ('ton onton') is 'to apeiron', the pliable. (Cfr WR 44; 51).

1. We immediately have the first extremely far-reaching component. *M. Müller/A. Helder, Herders kleines philosophisches wörterbuch* , Basel/Freiburg/Wien, 1959, 16, explains this. Not only mathematically (the unbounded, such as the idea of an expanding universe or the infinitesimal idea), but ontologically (as the name for that which is the origin of all beings), the idea of 'malleability' is fundamental in the entire ancient Greek philosophy. "It concerns an 'unboundedness', in all senses of that term. For nature (WR 44) contains the principle of all possible forms of being, – understand: all finite forms". (*M. Conche, Anaximandre, in: D. Huisman, dir., Dict.d.Phil. , Paris. 1984, 61.*).

In other words: the pliable is the formless, for it is formable, present in all possible forms which, collectively, constitute nature.

Here we see that Anaximandus was the 'hetairos', the intellectual companion, of Thales: his teacher took the 'water' (the flowing) into all beings, as the formless, yet malleable, present, as a conceptual model. Anaximandus does the same, but finds a more accurate name for it. Why more accurate? Because the 'pliable', now, precisely denotes neither quality nor quantity, but merely that which can become both quality and quantity.

2. Furthermore, Anaximendros attributes analogous divine characteristics to his 'pliable': it is uncreated, imperishable, -- it encompasses all beings and directs them (WR 46; 74).

In other words, as W. Jaeger rightly asserted: the intellectual companion Anaximandros is also a physical theologian—not merely a positivist specialist. After Anaximandros, the (Paleo)Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Aristotelians, and, following in their footsteps, for example the late antique Theosophists, will repeatedly incorporate malleability as a fundamental component of their worldview.

Second very interesting component of Anaximandraic thought.

Simplikios further says: “That from which beings derive their origin ('genesis'; WR 39) becomes their downfall, as is necessary. For they establish justice ('dikè'; WR 66) and atonement before one another for injustice ('adikia'). This according to the (legal) order of time.”

WR93

Hermeneutically, this fragment is a difficult matter: we lack the context that Anaximandros gave it. But there is the cultural-historical context (WR 31: 91).

(i) For example, one of the Seven Sages (WR 53; 83), Solon of Athens (-640/-558), considerably older than Thales and certainly than Anaximandros, designates time as a judge. In other words: this imagery and, even more so, hypostasis (i.e., the elevation, to a higher level, of an earthly given; WR 76; 86) expresses the fact that—even without human intervention—the course of events itself (= time), 'in time' reveals injustice and replaces it with justice.

(ii) *W. Jaeger, à la naiss.*, 42, says: it is a representation of what happens in court. When two accused parties dispute each other's assertion, the one who—whether by force or by dishonesty—appropriated more than he is entitled to must “establish justice and atonement” towards the wronged party. The reason is 'pleonexia', the fact that he possesses more than the other. Cf. WR 53 (transgression).

“For the (ancient) Greeks, for whom justice is identical with 'equality', (each exactly the same amount) this 'pleonexia' (...) is the very essence of injustice”. (*W. Jaeger, oc*, 42).

So much for the purely legal (WR 66) – But there is a generalization at work in Anaximandros' philosophical text: he speaks of 'beings'.

In other words: analogy occurs here. In terms of inter-civil ('legal') life, he speaks of the relations between beings: there, too, *dikè*, legal order, prevails, just as within the polis, between its citizens. This form of legal order decides the origin and demise of beings. “The (ancient) Greek language uses the words 'eu.nomia' ('good distribution') and 'kosmos' (order(ing)) to define the realm (of justice in political life. But the life of nature is also a 'kosmos'. Precisely this 'cosmic' (*note* : understand: judicial) view regarding the universe begins with Anaximandros' statement! (*W. Jaeger, oc*, 43).

In other words: for Anaximandros, the natural phenomena are

(i) sensible (*di*, understandable; WR 60: intelligible) and

(ii), moreover, legally sound, i.e. subject to a strict legal rule.

-- Hans Kelsen (1881/1973; the 'normativist' on law, of the Viennese School), *Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzes aus dem Vergeltungsprinzip*, in: *Erkenntnis* 8 (1939);

-- WB Kristensen, et al., *Ancient and Modern Cosmology*, Arnhem, 1941;

-- EW Beth, *Natural Philosophy*, Gorinchem, 1948, frl., 35ff,

They point out that the oldest Greek philosophy

(1) first of all, sees man as a social, or rather, 'political' (belonging to a polis or city-state) being,

(2) nature, likewise, designs according to that political model: it is one great society (polis), in which both the 'inanimate' and the living (comprising plants, animals, and humans) beings, 'beings', have their rightful place.

Consequence: 'legal' concepts are applied to natural phenomena. This interpretation of nature has been called 'sociomorphic' natural philosophy or cosmology.

Beth hits the nail on the head when he writes: "This sociomorphic cosmology is connected with the ancient view according to which an animated force is present everywhere in material nature (hylozoism; WR 44; 49; frl. 50; 66)". (Oc, 315ff.).

This omnipresent force ('dunamis'), life force established by the Deity, contains an ordering regulation or rule of law such that, when one of the beings takes too much of the primordial substance for itself, it will settle this in time, through the course of things and processes.

The ancient ethics of the Seven Sages (WR 53ff.: expresses this, ethically:

(1) know yourself so that

(2) if you keep moderation and

(2)b not exceed the limit, In other words: know that you are but one 'form' among the many 'forms' which, collectively, live from the one, omnipresent, malleability (formless, but malleable primordial substance), so that you do not exceed your measure (concerning malleability, primordial substance), causing harm to the other fellow forms within nature. This is the rule for the normal, justifiable behavior of beings.

But Beth, following Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803/1882; the co-founder, in the USA, of the famous Transcendentalist Club), says that there is also a rule built into nature which, for every deviation (transgression, 'hubris'), provides for a restoration (corrective, feedback). This takes place in the settlement (establishment of right (dikè) and atonement, - says Anaximandros).

In other words: we have here the oldest cybernetics (WR 48; 84), or the law of immanent sanction.

WR95

This means that the oldest philosophical text can be read as follows, true to cultural history: “Beings necessarily derive their downfall from the things (plural) from which they derive their origin. (When one observes this process, know then that) they establish justice and atonement, among themselves, for (committed) injustice, according to the legal order of the time”.

One might also say that a topological structure is at work within the sphere of the malleable: 'malleable' is, after all, that which is deformable, yet identical in terms of 'substance' (primordial matter). It is as if the oldest thinkers conceived of nature as a single encompassing lump of 'primordial matter', which is deformable, 'malleable', both inward (the many forms, including each of us, for example) and outward (the totality of the many worlds of which Anaximandrus speaks). Precisely when those forms take shape, it is possible that they commit 'pleon.exia', a transgression of the boundary regarding primordial matter ('adikia', committing injustice). To this, in time, an immanent sanction (inner, built-in rectification) responds.

Note- One application model.

G. Daniëls, *Religious-historical study on Herodotus*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946, 93ff., says that according to Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-464/-425: the founder of historiography)

- (1) in the plant kingdom (the plants that displace others),
- (2) in the animal kingdom (the carnivores, which devour the other).
- (3) in mankind (the land-hungry states, which swallow up the others) transgression takes place, but, in time, also 'leveling' (settlement).

Consider—just for a moment—what our people say: “One man’s death is another man’s bread!” Consider Thales’ practice: he borrows all the olive presses the moment he anticipates a rich olive harvest, or buys up the entire olive harvest—to determine the price later, alone; he displaces, devours, absorbs, viewed from the standpoint of the fellow citizen ('co-form' within nature). Wherever there is scarcity, one sees that law at work.

And we do not know whether Thales, in time, did not suffer the same in retaliation, even if only because of competitors.

With that idea, Anaximandros also insinuates a continuous struggle for existence (for the formation of one's own form from the malleable, nature). One sees: he is more dialectical (WR 91).

(2) Anaximandros seems to have had a fellow thinker and pupil, Anaximenes of Miletus (-583/-524). Unlike his friend Anaximandros, who wrote poetic prose, he wrote a book in simple and austere Ionic (WR 33), of which two or three fragments remain. In -494 Miletus was destroyed, so that the Milesian school had to survive elsewhere. There it was Anaximenes' philosophy that was passed on.

He influenced Puthogoras of Samos (-580/-500), the founder of Paleopythagoreanism, Melissus of Samos (+/- 444), the pupil of Parmenides, the founder of the Eleatic school, Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428), the founder of experimental science, Leukippos of Miletus (-490/...) and Democritus of Abdera (-460/-370), the atomists.

Just like Anaximandros, he designates fysis, nature, as a suppleness ('apeiron'). Yet he attempts to define it, i.e., to state strictly verbatim 'ti esti' (what that suppleness is). Now, according to him, nature, understood as primordial substance, is pneuma (breath) and aër (air) (WR 49; 59).

This primordial air or breath is present in the visible nature surrounding us, but also in man and even the deities, who are, likewise, primordial air. That primordial air is virtually invisible ('opsei adèlos') and incorporeal. In constant motion. Condensing and thinning.

What is precisely the fluidity is Anaximenes' concern with definition. To state this more clearly, there is one fragment that introduces the ideas of microcosm and macrocosm. "Just as our soul, primordial substance of air as it is, holds us together, so breath and air encompass the entire cosmos."

"There exists, therefore, as with the Pythagoreans, a close parallelism between the microcosm and the macrocosm." (*J. Brun, Les présocratiques* , Paris, 1982-3, 24).

The effect of malleability is coherence ('holding together', 'encompassing').

However, according to *W. Jaeger, *A la naiss .*, 43p.*, there is more: "By defining the suppleness of Anaximandros as 'soul', Anaximenes proves that he is apparently thinking of mental (spiritual) phenomena (...). He clearly feels that nature, which is divine, encompasses the intellect, necessary for governing (WR.46) everything". Indeed, according to Jaeger, 'psyche' ('psuchè'), soul, means – in the Homeric sense – the phantom of the deceased in Hades (the underworld), – which is subtle.

Note: However controversial, this statement (definition by analogy) by Anaximenes is the prelude to the idea of 'world - or universe (soul matter),' (WR 50: hylozoism).

This does not entail pantheism: it is merely asserted that the universe is 'alive' in one way or another, by means of soul matter. One can certainly interpret this pantheistically.

General decision regarding the Milesian philosophy.

In WR 37, we initiated the analysis (genetic, cultural-historical). It has become one long in-depth exploration. After all, here we have the pedestal of the Western intellectual processing of reality. Although the Milesian style of thinking is much more than what we currently understand by 'nature,' there is nevertheless an idea circulating that it is merely natural philosophy.

To conclude this aspect of it, a brief bibliographic sample.

(i) *M. Ambacher, Les philosophies de la nature , Paris, 1974 ,* shows us what natural philosophy can be in the course of Western thought. At one time, 'natural philosophy' is more of a summarizing interpretation of the whole of reality as it emerges from the collection of positive sciences (among physicists, for example, and among the positivists (WR 2; 73; 90)). It is then better called 'scientistics'. At another time, it is true philosophy, which attempts to characterize what we call nature and situate it within the totality of being ('ontological' natural philosophy).

(ii) 'Nature' -- since (German) Romanticism -- can also mean all that, in man, especially, but also in all that lives (plants, animals),

(1) is not intellectual - rational (mind, -- instinct, life drive, -- intuitive feeling, -- sensory - bodily perception, -- biological and psychological side of 'Life' and 'history'),

(2) in such a way, however, that the nature surrounding us is understood as the mediator of a God-given revelation, which appeals to precisely that non-intellectual and non-rational side within us.

Cfr K. Leese, Recht und Grenze der natuerlichen Religion , Zurich, 1954, a wonderful introduction to this.

(iii) *B. Valette, La nature , Paris, 1978; -- Rol. de Miller, Les noces avec la terra , L'isle sur la Sorgue , 1982,* lead to the sense of nature strongly influenced by the ecologies ('green philosophies'), as it exists among a growing number of contemporaries.

1.2.2. Second sample: Paleopythagorethism (98/177)

(-550/-350).

Bibl. sample:

-- J.-Fr. Mattei, *Pythagore*, in D. Huisman, dir., *Dict.d.philosophes* , II, 2160/2168;

-- O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus* , I, 266/350 (*Der vorplatonne Idealismus: Pythagoras* usw);

-- I. Gobry, *Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie* , Paris, 1973;

-- M. Ghyka, *Philosophie et mystique du nombre* , Paris, 1878;

-- O. Becker, *Die Aktualität des Pythaoreischen Gedankens* , in: O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., *Hermeneutische Philosophies* Munich, 1972, 177/200.

Pythagoras,

The Paleopythagoreans and the Neopythagoreans (98/102).

1.2.2.a. Puthagoras of Samos (98/100)

(in Latin: Pythagoras) (-580/-500).

Pythagoras is said to have received the instruction of Anaximadros of Miletus (WR 91ff.). Around 530 BC, he founded the famous 'hetaireia' society in the southern Italian city of Kroton (present-day Crotone) (WR 91; 96).

Broad-minded as he was, he refused neither foreigners (abolition of 'xenophobia' or hatred of foreigners) nor women (abolition of 'misogyny' or hatred of women). The society recognized at least three levels of membership:

(i) the 'akousmatikoi' or listeners;

(ii) the 'mathêmatikoi' or teachers (scholars);

(iii) 'fusikoi' (WR 37) or nature thinkers.

Note: Besides 'excellence' (the desire to be noticed) and effort (an ascetic moment), the Paleo-Pythagoreans cultivated friendship above all. 'Filia', 'filotès', amicitia, friendship, was 'sacred' to all Hellenes, but, in Pythagoras' 'hom.akoeion' (hall where one listens together), it was the daily experience of harmony, that is, being beautifully joined together, which constitutes the main idea of Pythagoreanism.

One famous example.

Fintias, the friend of Damon of Surakousai (= Syracuse (Sicily)), was sentenced to death by the 'turannos' (tyrant) of Syracuse, Dionusios (I or II). However, he was granted a stay of execution. Damon, out of a friendly duty, replaced him in prison as bail, allowing him to settle all his affairs. Fintias returned just in time, to be executed immediately. One might call this 'charity' avant la lettre.

Pythagoras' main characteristics.

W. Röd, *Die Phil. d. Antike*, 1,53, says that Pythagoras was “deeply rooted in religious traditions,” in order to in Asian shamanism (through, probably, the Skutian and Thracian North).

WR99

The core idea of this religious worldview was the lemma (premise) that a soul separable from the body exists; and this threefold:

- (i) in states of ecstasy ('trancezustände'),
- (ii) in the dream,
- (iii) in death.

The individuality of that separable soul remains preserved, independent of its embodiment in some body or other.” (Oc,53).

Immediately thereafter, Röd says something that reflects the fundamental structure of Pythagoreanism: “Pythagoras elevated (WR 76) these ideas to the level of a philosophical doctrine. This had, as its central belief, the proposition that the soul constitutes the true essence of man (WR 63: human-scientific wisdom).

Consistent with this was the idea that, precisely through embodiment, the soul sees its purity compromised. The body—later, matter as such (*note*: and not merely the body) will be interpreted in this way—appeared as a brake on the freedom of the spirit, as a cause of clouding; of that same spirit,—furthermore, as the root of evil (...), as something that had to be overcome. From this sprang a doctrine of purification (...).”

Although not accepted by all experts, it nevertheless appears, upon thorough examination, that shamanism, if it truly helped found Pythagoreanism, explains a great deal. Now, it is the scope of the explained facts that clarifies (makes understandable) an entry (here: shamanism as a co-cause of Pythagoreanism), which proves its correctness.

Bible St.: -- M. Hermanns, *Schamanen, Pseudo-schamanen, Erlöser und Heilbringer*, 3 Tle., Wiesbaden, 1970;

-- M. Eliade, *Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l' extase* , Paris, 1951, Eliade (1907/1986), the great phenomenologist of religion, says: “the shaman is the great specialist of the human soul. Only he 'sees' (WR 88: 'mantis, seer') the soul”. (Oc, therefore, if shamanism, which essentially belongs in Siberia, penetrated into Northern Hellas (Thrace), then it is clear that both Orpheus and Pythagoras are both called 'iatromantis' (healer-seer). And rightly so. Now, this twofold Hellenic word represents the twofold

'function' (WR 9) of both Orpheus and Pythagoras.

As Eliade and all experts say: 'seeing' and 'healing by seeing' is the leading role of the shaman.

WR100

This twofold function—'seeing' and 'healing'—explains both the emphasis on the *theoria* (WR 41), the 'seeing through' of sensually given beings, and the '*psuchagogia*', the guidance of the soul, which, in Pythagoreanism, even becomes the goal of the '*filosofia*' (a term introduced by Pythagoras).

Note - According to the Platonist Xenocrates of Chalcidion (a pupil of Plato of Athens (-427/-347) and, himself, leader of the Platonic Academy (-339/-314), Pythagoras called the soul (here, in the broadest sense, understood as the intellectual-rational principle (WR 45)) "a moving number".

With this, the second basic idea falls, alongside the shamanistic 'soul', namely 'arithmos', strictly speaking 'incorporation'. If we translate this as 'number', it is due to the fact that, indeed, the Pythagoreans consistently analyzed the *harmonia* (= incorporation) of beings by means of a number. But more on that later.

1.2.2.b. The Paleopythagoreans (100/101)

(-525/-350) After a time, they were divided regarding the authority of 'the master' (= Pythagoras).

(i) The conservatives, called 'acoustics' (but, now, in the sense of a faction), adhered to the '*Autos efa*' (He himself has said it); they were, *avant la lettre*, 'authoritarians',

(ii) Hippasos of Metapontion (-430/-350) introduced a two-part innovation:

a. he interpreted the master's teachings more personally;

b. He improved the aristocratic political thought of Pythagoras in a democratizing sense. Therefore, he became the leader of the 'mathematics' (experts), who, moreover, opened up the secret knowledge of Pythagoras to the general public (WR 74). They participated in the rhetorical turnaround ushered in by the Milesians.

It is, above all, the 'mathematicians' who have elaborated the Pythagorean doctrine. Kleinias of Taranton (-470/-400) divided it into two pairs of subjects:

a. '*arithmêtikê*'; arithmetic (number mathematics), and '*geometria*', *geometria* (space mathematics), which, together, analyze '*ta menonta*', the unchangeable things;

b. 'harmonikè', harmonica, harmony, (music theory), and 'astronomia', astronomia, science of the celestial bodies, which, together, study 'ta ekkinèthenta', the moving things.

Together, these four subjects will later be called the 'quadrivium' (the four-part subject). In due course, they will be connected with the contribution of the later Protosophistics (-450/-350), the 'trivium'.

WR101

It is claimed, especially in modern circles, influenced by the progressivism of the Enlightenment rationalists and evolutionism, that the ancients—and the Pythagoreans in particular—had no concept of motion, 'kinesis', motus, change (in the very broad sense). The fact that a Paleo-Pythagorean consciously divides subjects according to the 'su.stoichia', duality (systechi), 'immutable/movable', proves the opposite. But what is true is that the ancients never cherished the idea of progress typical of our era—time-bound as they were... just like us, incidentally.

1.2.2.c. The Neopythagoreans (101/182))

(-100/+200).

These 'theosophists' called Pythagoreans are only understandable within the late antique framework of what we, with *W. Brugger, SJ, ed., Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Freiburg, 1961-8, 418/422, call 'theosophy'.

In Greek mythology, a figure is exemplary: Hermes (WR 68/70). Specifically as 'psucho.pompos', guide of souls, acting as an intermediary figure between this earth of the living and the other world (here, especially, the underworld).

Incidentally, one of the main influences of late antique Theosophy, that strongly occultist-oriented philosophy, is called Hermeticism (in which Hermes, not without identification with an Egyptian analogue, is called Hermes Trismegistus, the threefold highest). This, between -50 and +250.

We will return to this theosophical thought later. For now, just this. In 'theosophy', philosophy focuses on intermediate beings, namely between the thinking-knowing human being on the one hand, and, on the other, 'beings' belonging to either the Underworld or the Olympian-Ouranic world (deities, souls of deceased persons (preferably famous or marked by misfortunes) ('spiritualist theosophy'), nature spirits).

A second characteristic was mentioned by W. Röd, WR 99): the gap between matter (whether as a body (which the Orphists and the Paleo-Pythagoreans already assumed), or as sexual life ('purity cult' in the form of

'virginity'), or as female existence ('masculinity cult'), or generally (as contempt for the 'impure' ('miasmatic') substance inherent to this earth) – between matter, thus, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, what was called 'God' (whether monotheistic (a single Supreme Being), pantheistic (God coinciding with his own creation), or polytheistic (multiplicity of deities)).

WR102

A third characteristic is the fact that

(i) the Pythagorean 'numbers' ('a -rithmoi') be identified with the Platonic ideas (WH 30) and

(ii) these two, once identified with God's ideas, are identified as models of those to be created or, ordinarily, to be ordered. This takes place in two stages.

(1) The aging Plato and, after him, the 'Older' Academy (-347/-265 (with Arkesilaus of Pitane (-314/-240) the septic Academy begins)) re-establish Paleo-Pythagoreanism, by conceiving Pythagoras' 'number' (arithmos) as the idea separated from material things (and thus incorporating it into Platonism).

(2) Albinos, a Platonist of the Eclectic persuasion, around +/- 175, posits that ideas, or numbers, actually exist, first and foremost, in God.

Note: The most sensational figure of Neopythagoreanism is Apollonius of Tyana, in Cappadocia (a contemporary of Jesus Christ). However, as a whole, Neopythagoreanism merged into Neoplatonic Theosophy (+250/+600), in which it remained, stealthily, an active factor.

This brief historical overview proves that Pythagoreanism is a phenomenon spanning eleven centuries. It is worth pausing to consider.

Note: After pagan philosophy, Patristics (+33/+800), medieval Scholasticism (800/1450), and subsequently the Renaissance (1450/1640) would incorporate very strong Pythagorean influences. All the more reason to briefly touch upon this.

1.2. Bible sample: -- A. Nygren, *Erôs et Agapè (La notion chrétienne de l' amour et ses transformations)*, Paris, 1944, I: 42/46 (L'Eros céleste); 172/222 (L'Eros).

If there is anything that formed a single persistent theme throughout Greek philosophy, from Orphism (to be discussed briefly shortly) to around +600, it is the pagan 'eros' (WR 39), love passion.

(i) The Dionysian religion (more on that later) placed 'eros' alongside

'bloodlust' (aggression) at the center, but in a rather degrading sense.

(ii) From the Orphists, however, up to and including Plato, a cathartic process (WR 76) takes place: from the common eros (love passion) one extracts, especially Platon, the idealistic sense for the higher (the ideas, for example). Nygren labels this higher-directing eros as 'heavenly' eros. In Paleo-Pythagoreanism, this is already active.

WR103

Pythagoras . -- 2. The Pythagorean number .

To help the reader more easily grasp the 'psychology' (according to the 'verstehende' (comprehensive) method (Dilthey, Spranger)) of the 'number' (arithmos), we begin with an applicative model.

1. It is claimed that Pythagoras 'venerated' the number 'three'! He saw in it the archetype (the very first example and origin) of the fact that so many processes (WR 100: moving beings) can be represented (= model-building) in beginning, middle, and end (WR 17: introduction, middle, conclusion). Cf. O. Willmann, oc,276; 541 (where Aristotle still holds that idea, albeit reinterpreted).

2 . The 'peri.odos', periodus, circulation, -- also period.

The ancients (Greeks, Romans, etc.) knew a sacred act called a 'period': by walking around something in a closed circle, one performed either an ordinary sacred act or, preferably immediately, one strictly magically intended. This had a cleansing effect (WR 46/48); thus they

- (i) presupposes a problematic (a worrying) thing - e.g. a newborn child
- (ii) purifies it out (the strict 'cleansing') and
- (iii) raises it to a higher level.

Cf. WR 76. It would not be the ancients if they did not see that— analogously (model: WR 57)—for example, a celestial body, the sun, performs a daily 'peri.odos' (from sunset to sunrise (nightly) and from sunrise to sunset (day)). This was sufficient reason for the ancients to conceive of the orbit with the newborn infant as identical (i.e., as if one considered oneself the sun and, as the sun, completed the orbit with that child) in relation to the solar orbit. This is the celestial aspect which, moreover, we find in all archaic cultures.

Applied: by executing the circuit around the birthplace, identical with the sun, one does two things, 'points' (= 'two'), simultaneously.

- (i) One performs a model action (= similarity).
- (ii) One participates in the 'energy' (subtle fluidity; WR 49/52) of the sun-in-motion (= coherence; indeed, understanding - WR 85 (sumpatheia)).

Well, these two combined are the
(i) assuming,
(ii) purifying,
(iii) elevating power (= force; WR 68v.), which acts upon the baby (confronted with life).

So much for the unanalyzed application model. We are now going to analyze it Pythagoreanically.

WR104

2.1.-- The unit and the 'number'

“Arithmos (...) to ek monadon sunkeimenon plèthos” (The number is the set insofar as it consists of units).

Thus reads, taken from *the Stoicheia, Elementa, Elementen*, by *Euclid of Alexandria* (-323/-283) - books 7 to 9 (Arithmetica) - the definition (WR 96) of both the unit (micro-unit) and the number. Cf. *Fr. Krafft, Gesch.d. Naturwissenschaft*, I, 319.

Consequence.-- The Platonist Theon of Smurna (-115/-40) explains the deductions thereof.

(i) The 'unit' - in the realm of visible data - e.g. an apple - is, as a gross material body, divided into 'units' (subunits or micro-units), which are smaller than the body (the macro-unit, -- here e.g. the apple), so e.g. an apple, cut in half.

(ii) The 'unity' - as an invisible number - is, however, enlarged in the sense that from the 'unity' (in the pure, intellectual-rational sense) a multiplicity ('plèthos', collection) is begotten (generated). Cf. *Fr. Krafft*, oc, 320.

In other words: the invisible, 'pure' unity, in our imagination and our intellect, becomes, in a peculiar way, a micro-unity of itself! -- The unity, as a purely intellectual reality, is 'arithmos noëros', numerus intellegibilis, number of thought content.

It is, as such, an 'archè' principle in the sense of origin, which 'generates' (begets, produces, brings forth). We call this, for convenience, the generative conception of unity. Cf. WR 40: process thinking = gen(n)etic - genetic, indeed, genealogical.

Note-- Modeling theorem

WR 57; 103. -- “The signatures (i.e., drawn models or graphic representations) of, for example, the two (as a conceptual number) or the three (idem) are, therefore, not:



The regulation ('law') of the formation (begetting) of the two is dichotomy (bipartition) and that of the three is trichotomy” (O. Willmann, oc, 292).

Up to that point—what the logicians of Middle-Age Scholasticism (WR 102) called—the conceptual content of 'unity' and 'number' (in the purely intellectual sense).

Note -- As regards the scope of the concept: the things to which the pure idea applies constitute the 'scope' of the 'content'. “Anything that is twofold or threefold—that which, for example, has two or three 'parts'; two or three kinds; two or three 'characteristics', etc.—shows the signature (outlined form) of 'the two' or 'the three'.

WR105

This structure, 'the two', 'the three', is immediately an intellectual (= ideal) framework of that to which 'the two' or 'the three' applies.

'The two', 'the three' can just as well pass for the germ, the sperm cell, the egg cell, of that to which they apply. After all, the number, as a branching reality, carries within itself a principle of motion'; O. Willmann, oc, 292).

If one wishes to use a current biological model, one can speak of cell division, to which 'the one' (in Greek: 'monas', monad) is subject as soon as a person begins to analyze. Indeed, it is as if, while someone describes (represents) something, he or she 'creates' point by point.

Returning to our 'amphi.dromia' baby procession: on the fifth day after birth, a celebration of the newborns was held, during which the baby was carried—in a circle around the hearth—while walking.

An analysis (and specifically a praxeological one, in which one describes a 'praxis'; action) shows in no time. Indeed:

- (i) the carrier begins (= point one);
- (ii) somewhere halfway, it is said that he is “in the middle section” (= point two), namely of the distance covered;
- (iii) when he reaches his starting point, as in a 'kuklos', cycle, loop, then one says: “He/she has reached his/her end point (= point three).

Instinctively, the one who analyzes is arithmological, in the style of the Pythagoreans! He summarizes, in terms of 'pontos' (= monads, subunits, micro-units) and calls them by their name—one, two, three.

Note: If one views the same procedure logically, one sees that a summative induction takes place here simultaneously (cf. Logic Course (First Year), 22/32). The rule (= regulative model) was then: “If all individually, then all collectively”.

Applied here: of all traversed strips (of the 'amphi.dromia')—beginning, middle strip, end—it can be said that they are a part (micro-monad) of the entire traversed path. In this respect, they are 'similar' (interchangeable) and thus subject to the distributive structure,

Cf. $a.(1+2+3) = a1+a2+a3$) as a mathematical application model of distributivity. Here “sub-strip (beginning, middle strip, end)”.

WR106

Second application model.

Odyssey, 10: 304ff., says: “(The remedy) – which Hermes (WR 68) gives to Odysseus to protect himself against the enchantment by the most beautiful sorceress Circe – was, according to the root, 'black'. But its flower was 'milky white'. It is called 'molu' molu (= moly)”.

Analysis.

A. The generative-transformational grammar of *Noam Chomsky* (1928/...) is well known. In 1957 he published his 'revolutionary' *Syntactic Structures*, The Hague, 1957-1; 1962-2.

We will consider the 'generative' model of syntax.

1. Suppose we want to describe a language (*note* : WR 105: analyze), in which all sentences (= Z) consist of at least one a followed by at least one b. Or a multiple thereof.

The signature (graphic drawing) comes down to: Z = ab; Z = aabb; Z = aaabbb etc.

2. The analysis ('description') of such an 'ab' language can be done algorithmically.

a. To this end, we are introducing two rules ('instructions'):

(i) the initial symbol (signature 1) is “Z = ab”,

(ii) the continuation symbols (signature 2) have the 'form' (= signature): Z = aZb.

'Rules' like these teach us that whatever stands to the left of '=' may be replaced by whatever stands to the right of '='. One could say that “=” means “is rewritten by”.

Thus “ $Z = ab$ ”, b comes down to “ Z is rewritable by ab ”. Yet, unnoticed, we have, contained in the rules of rewriting, 'defined' the elements ('points', micro-monads) of that language (WR 96), namely a and b . They are the binary 'alphabet' of the ab language.

So much for the macro-monads ($= Z = ab$; $Z = aZb$) and the micro-monads (a, b), which, together, make up the 'arithmos' (= harmonia, combination, -- let us say, from now on, 'structure') of the ab language.

b. -- Now that we know the rules of the 'procreation' (generative construction; WR 104) of this language, let us 'work'!

(A) Given: z ;

(B) Wanted : a generation of Z .

(i) Application of signature 1: Z becomes (once rewritten) ab . -- Once we have ab , no signature can be applied: ab is therefore called, in language generation, 'end product' (and, indeed, the shortest sentence possible).

(ii) Application of signature 2: ab becomes (once rewritten) aZb . -- Unlike (final product) ab , one can apply the two signatures to this – once again.

WR107

S-1: ab , once rewritten, is $aabb$; S-2: aZb , once rewritten, becomes $aaZbb$.

Again: $aabb$ is 'end product' (= not susceptible to S-1 or S-2), whereas $aaZbb$ is susceptible to S-1 and S-2.

(iii) We are already used to it: $aaabbbb$, $aaaZbbbb$; etc.

Note-- Bibl. sample : A. Kraak/ W. Klooster, *Syntaxis* , Antwerp, 1968, frl. 17ff.

“A method, as described above, by which one can form (*note*: Willmannian: initial signature) sequences of elements (*note*: harmonies of monads)—e.g. ab , $aabb$, $aaabbbb$; aZb , $aaZbb$, $aaaZbbbb$, $aaaZbbbb$, generate) from a set (or 'alphabet') of elements (*note*: micro-monads), *by applying* substitution rules (*note*: rewriting rules), is an algorithm”. (Oc,18).

This means that Pythagoreanism, from start to finish, worked algorithmically. Philosophia perennis (WR 4).

Application to an 'empirical' language.

As the structuralists would say: we have now, purely theoretically ('speculatively'; WR 41), first and foremost, 'generated' the possibilities as a lemma.

(A) Given : this purely speculative structure ('arithmos', 'harmonia');
(B) Requested (sought): an empirical verification (if necessary: falsification) thereof.

Let us return to Homer's characterization of the magic plant 'molu', but no longer, poetically, yet structurally.

(i) It is clear that the poet, unconcerned with the 'underlying' (meaning: not readily visible) structures of language (i of ideas expressed in language, -- total idea with its partial ideas; WR 30; 5v.), expresses himself paratactically; i.e.: he uses coordinate clauses.

(ii) But the syntactician, concerned with the hidden ideal structure ('arithmos', 'harmonia'), will, therefore, use the hypotactic forms of expression. E.g. as follows: "The remedy - whose root is black and whose flower is milky white - bears the name 'molu'". But now look through what I have just written (WR 41: theoria):


(i) The life-saving device is called 'molu'.

(ii) The remedy—of which (...)—bears the name 'molu'. Do you see ('theoria'), through the visible (what I write in (i) and (ii)), the invisible ('theoria'), namely what the Pythagoreans would call 'number' (harmonia), namely $ab = (i)$; $aZb = (ii)$?

By introducing a subordinate structure, it becomes (better) clear what Chomsky meant: a main clause, within which a subordinate clause!

WR108

One can also use the 'tree diagram (branching model)' as a signature:



$$\begin{array}{l}
 1 = \bigcirc \\
 1+ = \frac{\bullet}{\bullet} \quad 2+ = \frac{\bullet}{\bullet} \bullet \quad 3+ = \frac{\bullet\bullet}{\bullet\bullet} \\
 4+ = \frac{\bullet\bullet}{\bullet\bullet} \bullet \quad 5+ = \frac{\bullet\bullet\bullet}{\bullet\bullet\bullet} \quad 6+ = \frac{\bullet\bullet\bullet}{\bullet\bullet\bullet} \bullet
 \end{array}$$

Note -- Every complete sentence (total sentence) consisting of clauses) is thus 'generated'. Every text (WR 5ff.) - a child's essay; a scientific treatise - is thus 'generated'. The first sentence of a text and its last sentence 'develop' (WR 6) a theme (given, subject), according to a 'requested' (= 'sought', instruction), - i.e. according to the well-known problem structure ('problem solving' as they say in Anglo-Saxon).-- The Paleo-Pythagoreans are, in that sense, the first textualists.

In summary.

(1) Generatively there is a duality ('systechi'): unity/number (for the 'one' is, for the ancient Greeks, not a 'number', which is always more than 'one' or at least 'two'). This means that henology (= monadology) is the root and that arithmology (= numerology) is the elaboration.

Therefore, we titled 2.1 'the unit and the number'.

(2) Inductively, there is also a pair of opposites: 'elementation' ('stoicheiosis', elementatio) / 'summering' ('harmonia').

Indeed: when we analyze (dissect something composed), we split a totality (whole) into constituents, elements. But there is more: we sum, by which we mean the whole, 'summa' (Lat. = sum, total).

It is here that the arithmetic aspect is exposed. Take the sentence: "The remedy, whose root is black and whose flower is milky white, is called molu". When we 'read' (and not -- like someone who cannot yet read -- simply look at letters, words, one after another), then **(1)** we begin the sentence, **(2)** continue it, **(3)** complete it.

WR109

In the meantime, we have counted the total number of words (with or without punctuation marks), unconsciously—intuitively—determining the number that—upon conscious and rational analysis—is expressed as a number (= a number converted into a sign). Summative induction is always numerical, arithmetic induction.

The sum, after all, is always a quantity (and thus, implicitly) a number. In

this way, arithmetic spontaneously entered Pythagoreanism.

(3) From an intellectual and cultural-historical perspective, we did not intend to prove that the Paleo-Pythagoreans already knew Chomsky's generative syntax. Rather, we intended to prove that they knew the same structure which was fundamental in their philosophy (a/ number or a/ many) and which has one of its infinitely many applications in Chomsky's algorithmic method. So that a Paleo-Pythagorean, when confronted with Chomsky, will immediately feel at home. He will see in it the confirmation of his basic idea.

That this is indeed the case can be clarified as follows.

J. Piaget (1896/1980), **Structuralism **, Paris, 1968-2, defines 'structure' as follows. It comprises three characteristics: **a** . totality **b** . transformations, ('transformations'), **c**. self-regulation.

It is: **(a)** a system (totality)

(b) of transformations (metamorphic aspect; transformative moment)

(c) such that the system, as a system, exhibits regularities ('self-regulation', rules), with the result that every transformation either preserves (maintains, sustains) or enriches the system.

Well then, the unity of the Paleophythagoreans is such a structure:

(a) it is, generatively, a totality (system)

(b) of transformations (it becomes two, three, four, etc., -- in other words, it becomes number, multitude)

(c) however such that the unit exhibits self-regulation.

It works with itself (by addition and addition of addition (= multiplication) of the unity) - by subtraction, again, of the unity), with the result that it enriches or sustains itself (e.g. in subtraction one returns to its basis)), pursuant to arithmetic laws.

The algorithmic structure is one of the many applications (applicative models) of Piaget's general structural idea. They are found both among the Paleo-Pythagoreans and Chomsky.

(4) Mathematical application.

Among the ancient Greeks, a fraction (number) is not conceived of as, for example, $1/3$, as is the case with us. No! The 'one' is never divided (it is 'monas atomos', an indivisible unit). It is merely increased in number. 'Dividing' the one by three generates a proportionality: not $1/3$, but 1:3 or; B (1,3) (read: the ratio of one to three). The 'one' in its relationship to the 'number' (set) 'three'. This entails a theory of proportionality: $1/3$ of this apple resembles (analogy) the ratio of the one to the multiplicity three.

In other words: a third (of this apple, of this essay, etc.) relates to three thirds, just as one relates to three. It is the analogy of proportionality: the identical element in the two ratios is the ratio 1:3. One also speaks of 'proportional' analogy, from 'tautotès' (identity) into 'heterotès' (differentia), -- a system which the Paleophythagoreans must have known (O. Willmann, oc, 273).

(5) Terminological moment.

The idea of 'one(ness)' is not entirely unambiguous in Pythagorean usage. "The one, as an element, a micro-unit, is a constituent of all numbers (starting from two).

But, in the sense of 'henosis', unio, unification, it is the connection that makes every number a number. The number (from two) is itself one, the unity of a multiplicity". (O. Willmann, oc, 272).

In other words: One is analogous, partially identical, partially non-identical.

All this is only understandable, of course, if one starts from the organicism (WR 3; 31) of the earliest thinkers. This entails a genetic structure. In that sense, Pythagoras is the direct successor of the Milesians: WR 39ff. taught us that 'fusion' and 'genesis' denoted the process of origin and growth of all beings. Now, just as the Milesians situated that process (WR 100; 103) in matter (primordial substance, malleability), so Pythagoras situates it in the oneness. In other words: he connects with his predecessors but actualizes their idea. He immediately re-establishes philosophy. It is precisely because of this that this idea reveals itself as generative: it gives rise to a new interpretation (WR 42: interpretation).

(6) Paleophythagorean pre-idealism.

O. Willmann, oc, 266, speaks of 'pre-Platonic idealism'. Thus, a theory of ideas avant la lettre.

Indeed: the one, whether in itself or as a number (from two), is the transcendent model, epitome, 'construction principle' (according to Willmann) of beings. In that sense they (the one and the number) are simultaneously:

- (i) pre-existing (preexistent) - they exist before things - and
- (ii) immanent, present in the things themselves, as the wisdom, the comprehensibility (WR 60 intelligi(e)bel), thereof.

Conversely: the things are 'mimēmata', imitationes, mimicries, images, representations of the one and the number. Through the things the one and the number: 'seeing' (theoria; WR 41) is understanding them on their

'ground(s)' (structure, which casts light).

WR111

2.2.-- The unit and the number, configurative.

Calculation and construction always went hand in hand. The Pythagoreans did not merely 'calculate' with numbers (*note*: starting from the one). They also 'saw' them as spatial configurations.

Conversely: a construction, called 'gramma' or 'drawing', was, for them, in turn, an 'arithmetic' problem". (O. Willmann, pc, 288).

a. Let us return to our first applicative model, the amphidromia (WR 103; 105). There we analyzed, as arithmologists, according to the distributive structure (present in the summative induction).

b. The example of the cycle (baby cycle) also contains a collective structure. This defines the idea of 'system'.

The beginning **(1)** forms the first spatial mathematical line segment; the middle

(2) is the second geometric line segment; the end

(3) is the third line segment extended into space.

If one collects them, then one 'creates' (generates) a geometric figure.

1. But here the elements (line segments) are not 'identical' (interchangeable): line segment (1) comes, chronologically, before line segments (2) and (3). That is already one difference. But, in themselves, they are different.

The first line segment is located, for example, west of the hearth and the end segment east of it. That is a second difference. A geometric, spatial-mathematical figure or configuration is a 'harmonia', a joining, a merging, and thus a summering (WR 105; 108), of dissimilar elements.

2. They are, however, similar (by reason of the distributive structure inherent in them) calculated from a single perspective, namely the fact that they, jointly (= collectively), constitute the totality (summarization) of the cycle. In mutually different ways, they collectively make up the whole. That is 'collective structure'. Although not similar, they are nevertheless, from a single perspective, similar, namely as components of a totality. That totality is called a system.

Configuration or placement system.

Bibl. sample: C. Berge *Principes de combinatoire* , Paris, 1968.-- This book says the following.

(i) Applicative models.

Noah (= Noe):

(a) given: all animals;

(b) asked: to build an ark such that they can all be placed in it, in pairs.


Or, conversely: An receives a beautiful cupboard from her aunt as a gift (given); with what will she 'fill' it (asked, sought)? A cupboard is, combinatorially, configurationally, a set of places.

WR112

Applicative Pythagorean models.


Below is an example of the combinatorial method.

 = stamp (WR 171)



The system of triangular numbers

The system of square numbers



Note-- C. Berge, oc 12, defines the idea

'configuration' (= geometric positional signature) as follows.

Given : a speculative (WR 41; 107) set, consisting of a limited ('finite') number of elements and provided with a 'structure' (WR 109); requested (sought): a mapping (representation; -- here: placement) therein of a set (= second set) of empirical (perceptible by the senses) elements. -- One sees the structural:

One thinks in terms of **(1)** sets or systems, **(2)** structures specific to those sets or systems, **(3)** which vary (WR 103: processes; 105: motion; 109: transformation);


(a) one designs them, first, speculatively (one 'sees' (theoria) first in the mind, or in the imagination);

(b) one confronts (comparative method) empirical, sensorially ascertainable data with it.

Well then, the following signatures (drawings of an idea) show, as it were in person, that the Paleophythagoreans proceeded in this way to prove the following seemingly purely arithmetic (numerical) sequences, as it were visually and mnemonic-technically easily.

Note: this concerns, of course, an 'intuitive' 'proof'!

1 4 9 16 25 36 49 64 81 100 (de reeks der kwadraatgetallen)
 ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↗
 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 (de reeks der onpare getallen)




Note: One sees, after careful 'theoria' (comprehending view) of the 'gramma' (WR 111) or graphical representation, that it suffices—starting from the 'one(ness)'—to sum any square number together with exactly one of the odd numbers, in order, to 'beget' ('generate' to use Chomsky's term) the next square number.

WR113

Here too, spatially mathematically—or better, configuratively combinatorially—the applicability of the basic algorithm (one/number) of the Pythagoreans becomes apparent.

That the generative method 'pays off' is also evident from the visual – combinatorial – manner in which the world-famous Pythagorean theorem is, as it were, 'proven' (becoming a lemma that becomes susceptible to genuine analytical proof).



Note -- 'Theorema', proposition, is, literally translated: "that which is susceptible to theory". Given: the triangle ABC (with one right angle); asked (sought): to show that the square numbers exhibit the following structure: $AB^2 + BC^2 = AC^2$. Apply the practice of the counting Paleopythagoreans: fill in the square boxes with a dot (WR 105: dot by dot), i.e. the image (specifically the configurative image) of the 'oneness'; as you fill in with dots, you generate the sum (25, 16, 6, -- obtained thanks to the application of the previous generation method).

-- Even in the twentieth century, there is still no real reason to dismiss the 'numerology' of the Paleopythagoreans as 'outdated'. Provided one understands its 'spirit'. That 'spirit' – here at least – is 'algorithmic generation'

Note-- WR 57 (103; 104) taught us an 'intuitive' measurement model. - It is also evident from the foregoing that the Paleo-Pythagoreans were familiar with this: after all, they divided the sides of the triangle ABC into equal lengths, whereby they became comparable via the same measurement model ('measure') - and indeed accurately comparable. The Greeks called this type of accuracy *akribeia*. It is the precursor of the modern exact *akribeia*, which combines both experimental and measuring - numerical methods.

Its structure is clear.

(1) Bibl. sample: *K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, Logica en model*, Bussum, 1970. -
- L. Apostel (1925/1995) defines (WR 96) the idea 'model' as follows. --

a. Given: a known system B and an unknown system O.

Wanted (sought): a model of O.

If B provides us with information about O, then B is a model of O.

b. Application of the previous speculative (WR 41; 107; 112) conceptual scheme (= *arithmos*): map 1/3 of the line AB into AB (three times), BC (four times), and CA (five times), then 1/3 of the line AB provides information about the initially unknown AB, BC, and CA. By dividing AB into three equal parts, for example, one designs (generates) a measurement model.

WR114

(2) Besides the measurement model, the Paleopythagorean generation of a configuration also contains a theoretical model. WR 55 (Thaletic universal model is theoretical (in the current sense), because it says: "for all (understood: applicative models) holds") taught us the structural formula: "For all, not-all, none (understood: applicative models) holds that (...)".

W. Röd, Die Phil.d.Ant.., 1:67, states that numerical ratios, according to Pythagorean ontology (the study of being), represent the character of general (= universal) essences ('essences') or 'forms' (in the later Aristotelian sense). According to Aristotle, for example, the same numerical ratios were depicted both in the world of sound ('harmonies') and in the distances of celestial bodies, as well as in other applicative models.

Indeed: 'examine' ('*theoria*') the drawing, on WR 113 (Pythagorean theorem): provided that the configuration structure of triangle ABC (as a right-angled triangle) remains preserved (= invariant), then the lengths of the sides may vary (WR 109: transformations),-- in all variants (= transformations, transformations) the universal structure ' $ab^2 + bc^2 = ac^2$ ' remains invariant (= identical, unchanged).

This structural (because structure-transforming) generative activity

therefore exhibits, in the modern sense, a 'theoretical model character' (i.e., it generates according to a universal structure).

'Gestalt' or mode of appearance of totality.


S. Rombouts, **Psychologie voor opvoeders**, Tilburg, -- ** Algemeen psychologie**, 1957-2, 243/250 (Gestalt psychology), defines 'Gestalt' (gestalte, outward appearance), in the sense of Gestalt psychology, with Kurt Koffka (1886/1941; with Köhler and Wertheimer, the co-founder of Gestaltism), as “a combination of phenomena such that each member possesses its own nature only through and with the rest”. (Oc, 245).

One sees the dichotomy or complementing 'member/rest'. This corresponds to the collective structure (WR 111). In other words: a Gestalt or appearance ('form': is a type of system (structure).

French-speaking Gestaltists, such as Claparède (Geneva) or Decroly (Brussels), speak of schematism, globalization (also: syncretism, -- but that term is, from a cultural-historical perspective (WR 36), more than ambiguous). -- The three characteristics—system (delimitation from the rest), self-regulation (articulament; the actual structure, in the strict sense), transformation ('transposability')—are typical of the Gestalt.

WR115

Cycladic art (Vers. NP Goulandris): funerary art



white marble female figurine
(-2800/-2300)



female figurine (-2800/-2300)
vrouwenbeeldje
(-2800/-2300)



white marble, brown and grey
veined female figurine (-2800/-
2300)

WR 116

A fine example of art that adopted a Gestaltist approach is Cycladic art. The Kuklades (Cyclades) are the islands in the Aegean Sea, between Attica (Greek mainland), Crete, and Ionia (present-day southern Turkey), situated in a circular pattern around the island of Delos.

Note: The very name 'kuklades' (nèsoi), circular islands, is already an expression of Gestalt perception: it is clear that the islands, such as Andros, Naxos, Pros, etc., are not placed strictly precisely in a circle around the (imaginary) center point, Delos, known for its Temple of Apollo (which entails configuration). Yet they are called 'circular' islands! The name reflects the gestalt (schematism, globalization).

The so-called 'Cycladic culture' (WR 33) is the pinnacle of Aegean culture (in the third millennium BC). It is known for

- (i) violin-shaped schematic figures and
- (ii) stylized, expressing the essence, figurines of tall women.

According to experts in comparative art analysis, they are reminiscent of

- (i) the Amratian art of predynastic (to be situated before -5619) Egypt
- (ii) African art and,
- (iii) curiously enough, to a part of modern art (think of Cubism).

View, now, with the idea of 'gestalt' in your mind, the photocopies, WR 115. The artists have apparently perceived reality (Gestalt psychology is, first and foremost, a psychology of perception (WR 41: *empeiria*, part of *theoria*)), but gestaltist.


Through the visible (WR 41), which never reveals geometrically exact modes of appearance, the artist 'sees' (*theoria*) the invisible, the geometric configuration, ... and this has gestalt properties! Namely, it makes the essential (for the artist) appear and, with that in mind, schematizes (thus neglecting the boundless complexity of) the concrete-singular data (the empirical things; WR 107; 112), as pure transformations (transformations, 'transpositions') of the essential (for him (her) so that something stylized emerges.

Now, this gestaltistic schematization was, for Pythagoras, already clear and discernible in the works of Hecataeus of Miletus (in -500/-494 he was already involved in the Ionian Revolt) and, before him, in the thought of Anaximandus of Miletus (-610/-547) (WR 91; it is claimed that Pythagoras, like Hecataeus, was his pupil).

WR117

Thus Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-425) criticizes Hecataeus's map: "If our opinion is correct—so writes the founder of the description of the land and people (W. Jaeger) —then the Ionians— *note* : Miletus was an Ionian city situated on the southwest coast of present-day Turkey—are of a wrong opinion regarding Egypt.

But if, on the contrary, the Ionians are of the right opinion, then I can prove that the Hellenes, like the Ionians, cannot count. For they claim that the whole earth (WR 59) falls into three 'parts': Europe, Asia, and Libya. One should, after all, count the Egyptian Delta as a fourth continent ('earth'): for it is, after all, neither a part of Asia nor a part of Libya (*Fr. Krafft, Gesch.d. Naturwissenschaft* , 1:170).



Indeed: Hecataeus divides the earth—stylized schematically—as follows:

- (i)** it is a circle;
- (ii)a** the Northern half is Europe;
- (ii)b** The southern half is divided in half by the Nile, which flows from the Mediterranean Sea to the Ocean, such that Libya lies in the west and Asia in the east. (oc, ibid.).

However, Herodotus is Milesian in his approach, which is more empirical than, for example, the Paleo-Pythagoreans: he recognizes the arbitrariness (from an absolutely 'realistic' standpoint, of course). Against this 'merely speculative' (WR 113) method, he undertakes “with great effort” in Egypt itself, as far as possible, a history, research-with-his-own-eyes (WR 60; 88). And, in doing so, he establishes that the actual 'configurations' of the regions absolutely do not correspond to that schematism ('gestalt')!

Milesian empiricism! Although, as with Thales, also still very gestaltistic at times! We have not yet reached Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (WR 35) or Thukudides of Athens (-465/-401/395; the historian of the Peloponnesian War). Akribeia, empirical understanding, takes time (WR 113). So strong is the natural tendency, especially of archaic cultures, to both perceive and think in terms of forms,

WR118

Decision.

1. A 'gestalt'

The one, or the 'number' (multiple of one), insofar as it is immanent, present in the (material) beings themselves (WR 110: immanent idealism), takes on the meaning of what we, since Gestaltism, call a total outlook, a form of totality ('gestalt'). In that sense, a Gestaltism is unmistakably present in Paleophythagoreanism.

That explains why the Paleophythagoreans repeatedly sought harmony and symmetry (= numerical harmony) in nature, in things themselves. Cf. Fr. Krafft, oc, 200ff.. Things, the whole of nature—they are 'mimèma', imitatio, model, image, of the one and its multiples.

2. Valuation.

(I) In matters of art and beauty, aesthetics and the artistic essence, the Pythagorean one, multiple of a ('number'), as mutual arrangement (coordination, subordination), di configuration, is a very valuable instrument of 'theoria', of understanding beauty and art.

(II) “As regards thinking, the solving of a problem (WR 112; 113; given/asked) (...) always takes place with the aid of a thought scheme, an anticipated solution complex.

So here too, 'Gestaltung':

(i) first the whole, the schematic plan, becomes conscious;

(ii) Next comes differentiation, i.e., the more precise understanding of the whole in its parts, - whereby, finally, the solution is given. - That (...) Bühler called 'Aha-Erlebnis'". (S. Rombouts, oc, 247).

In other words: the 'gestalt' (immanent unity, multiplicity of units) is a lemma (WR 113) that is differentiated thanks to analysis. Cf. WR 108 (problem structure).

(III) Rhetorically, the configuration, as a 'gestalt', is extremely fruitful: in order to make oneself understood (understanding: WR 4), one usually does well to start with a sketch (= Gestalt), which, as in the problem-solving scheme above, is gradually refined. Its simplification makes the sketch more accessible to someone who is not knowledgeable. All elementary instruction, for example, starts from such simplified, schematic insights, which are clarified by analysis.

Imagine you have to learn the map of France: start with the law that the French themselves are called 'l'hexane' (the hexagon). Indeed: schematically, gestaltically, France is a hexagon, just as Italy is a 'boot'.

WR119

2.3.-- Unity and the 'number', musically.

Introduction . -- WB Kristensen, *Introduction to the History of Religion* , Haarlem, 1980-3, 54ff. Discusses the *Third Homeric Hymn* (a poem of 580 lines, in Homeric style, but of a later date (between -700/-500)).

The opening reads as follows: “Sing, Muse (WR 38), Hermes, the son of Zeus and Maia (*note*: a cave nymph on Mount Kullène, in Achaia and Arcadia; WR 80), the prosperity-bringing messenger of the deities (WR 68, 101), (...)”.

A striking feature of Hermes, as a divine 'angel' (proclaimer), is that he is very musical. The Hymn elaborates at length on the stringed instruments and the singing. With the shell of a tortoise, he crafted the 'first' seven-stringed zither. By 'first,' one means the origin and the prototype (WR 38: archè, principle) of all zithers.

In the presence of Apollo—the god whom Pythagoras particularly revered (so much so that he was called a second Apollo)—Hermes sang the song about

the origin of the universe. Thus about how every deity, within the harmony of the universe, was assigned her own 'time', honor, or office of honor (WR 9: type of causation or 'function').

The main motif reads: “everything according to the eternal order” established by the divine governance of the universe. -- Apollo, the god of eternal order, is delighted: “Thus, until now, no one, neither deity nor man, has sung and played music!” Thereupon Apollo receives the lyre from Hermes and Hermes receives the staff from Apollo (WR 69).

It is remarkable that the god of (sacred) eloquence is also a music-loving deity. The idea of 'power' is connected to this.

Music.

Bibl. sample: A. Gastoué, *Musique*, in: J. Bricout, dir., *Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses*, Paris, 1926, -- iv: 1209/ 1228.

The most concise definition (WR 96) – perhaps the most accurate – of 'music' was formulated by Saint Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest Church Father (Patristics) of the West) as a summary of the entire ancient doctrine on the subject:

'Music is the skill of moving (sounds and rhythms) in the right way' (in Latin: *ars bene movendi*). Until the Modern Era (after 1450), people did nothing but either repeat or explain this definition. (Ac, 1210). We note that the idea of 'movement' – in the broad sense of 'changing' – is central.

WR120

The question arises: what did St. Augustine understand by 'bene' (in a good manner)? Let us listen further to the musicologist Gastoué, ac,1210.

Philosophers have at all times attempted to analyze **(i)** the essence, **(ii)** the effect and the role (function) of music.

a. The ancient and medieval thinkers saw the epitome of music in the order of the universe itself, through the divine musician.”

Note -- This was the reason why we cited the mythical theology (WR 73) concerning Hermes and Apollo as an introduction: the 'eternal order', since and on the basis of the creation of the world, is discussed in music and song.

In other words: the cosmic in music carries weight.

b. “Ancient and Medieval thinkers,” Gastoué continues, “liked to emphasize the relationships between the proportions of the planets and the proportions of the sounds of a musical scale.”

Note -- We shall see that this is one of the basic aspects of Pythagorean musicology. The cosmic or universal (Lt.: 'universum' = universe) character of ancient-medieval music proves that music and celestial bodies interact. A subject that resonates with contemporary musicians as well.

For a number of ancient and medieval thinkers, it was the case that a sound generated by the human voice emits a genuine radiation by means of vibrations, which penetrated through the 'aither' (WR 49: upper atmosphere matter) to the corresponding (WR 85: *sumpatheia*, *correspondentia*, resonance) celestial body.

Consequently, it is not merely poetic imagery when the psalmist says, “The heavens sing out the glory of God.” On the contrary: this sentence is the expression of the highest philosophy of former times.

This 'saw' - in the *mundiale* (di *universistische*) music of the celestial bodies

- (i) The origin and
- (ii) the prototype of human artists' music.”

So much for this Scholaprof in Paris, in a purely Ecclesiastical Dictionary.

Note -- The author notes that some of the antiphons of our Vespers (the old ones, of course), based on their melodies, or as remnants in paradises of the funeral liturgy—rare—are witnesses to the pagan hymns (= religious songs) of the Greeks, of which we still possess the musical notations (hymns to Apollo, the Muse; the First Pythian Hymn, etc.).

WR121

Note: G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716), one of the leading figures of the German Enlightenment (= Enlightened rational thought; WR 35; 86), in search of the 'essence' (in the Enlightened rational sense) of music, discovered that it was “a hidden exercise in arithmetic, -- but specific to a soul (type) that does not (yet) know how to count”.

By this he means that music, admittedly, possesses 'rationality' (an exercise in arithmetic), but is still in a childlike stage—at least viewed from the 'maturity' regarding 'rational thinking' that the Enlightened minds believed themselves to possess.

Incidentally : GFW Hegel (1770/1831) harbors an analogous view regarding art as a whole.

Dionysian and Apollonian music.

To properly understand Pythagorean musicology, it is necessary to distinguish two types of music.

A-- *Dionysian music.*

Th. Zielinski, *La religion dl Grèce antique* , Paris, 1926, 116, says: “When the Dionysian worship came upon the soil of “Greece, characterized by its sound laws”, (...) as a characteristic of these new mysteries (*note*: initiatory religions), it emerged solely and exclusively of 'ecstasy' (*note*: rapture, possibly up to and including frenzy).

This was obtained:

(1) by means of the deafening music of the high, narrow drums, the cymbals and the flutes and,

(2) especially, by means of orgiastic (*note*: sacral-ecstatic) dance, which was intoxicating. Not least the women were subject to this magic of intoxication!

H. Jeanmaire, **Dionysos* (Histoire du culte de Bacchus *)*, Paris, 1978, 275, cites a Homeric Hymn (WR 119) in which the endless wandering of Dionysos through mountain and valley, accompanied by his retinue of women (WR 80: Artemis/Diana, the 'Lady of Wild Things'), is hymnically interpreted.

“Let us begin our song with Dionysus, with his ivy hair, the very loud one. -- He is the glorious son of Zeus and the lovely Semele. The nymphs (WR 80; 119), with her beautiful hair, received him, as an infant, from the Lord, his Father (*note*: Zeus), into their circle. They cherished him with every possible care in the valleys of the Nusa (*note*: a mountain range). Thanks to the favor of his Father, he grew up in a cave full of pleasant scents, taken into the company of the immortals (WR 76).

WR122

When the Goddesses had completed the upbringing of the one who would so often be sung of, he began to haunt the woods, adorned with ivy and laurel. In his retinue appeared the nymphs, whose guidance he led. A murmur hung in the immense forest.

Such a text inevitably brings to mind WR 81 (witches' sabbath). Which Jeanmaire, oc, 268ss. (*Le thiase et l'origine du théâtre*), confirms.

Dionusos-Zagreus (best translated as 'Dionusos, night hunter'), just like

Artemis/Diana, is surrounded by spectres (of the deceased), by 'spirits', like a wild band of 'animalistic' creatures going on a 'fantastic hunt'—like an army of madmen. The whole noisy group—'thiasos'—descends endlessly, especially in desolate regions, such as the 'endless forest' of the archaic Homeric Hymn.

This idea—according to Jeanmaire—gave rise to tradition-bound exodus at night of masked youths, who surrendered themselves to insane 'ecstasy', apparently with the invisible beings. This, especially on certain occasions.

In ancient Greek, these night revelers were called 'nuktipoloi'. This term is applied to such night spectacles by Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/-465).

Even though people called Dionusos 'gunai(ko)manès', the one who drives women mad, he was nevertheless, in his wild 'thiasos', always accompanied by Saturoi, male Satyrs. They were also called Silenoi, Sileni. They too danced and played music.

Note: The name of the women who wildly accompanied Dionusos-Zagreus was 'Mainas, Mainades, Menade(n), those women who experience 'mania; ecstasy, up to and including frenzy;-- Bacchante(s).

B -- Apollonian music.

Plutarch of Chaironeia (+45u/+125; an Eclectic-Platonic scholar), *De Py.* or., 6, cites Pindar (WR 83):

“Cademus (*note:* the mythical founder of the city of Thebes) heard, because of the deity, a strict music ('orthèn', literally: 'right'), -- not caressing, not effeminate, not contrived” To which Plutarch adds: “For the pure and the chaste are not aimed at the experience of lust.”

Unfortunately: the vast majority of musical art, with Ate (*note:* the Goddess who bestows both sinister inspirations and calamities), the Goddess of Fate, has degenerated toward the earth and hammers together the sonic noise that we are forced to hear!

WR123

If the 'epiphanies' (in ancient Greek, 'epifaneia' means royal entry, the response of a deity to the summoning by his followers, e.g., by the boisterous frenzy of a Dionysian Thiasos) of Dionysus are essentially—cf. WR 85—bound to nature, those of Apollo, as Jeanmaire, *oc*,273, says, are city-bound: he delivers oracles (divine pronouncements) (WR 81 (*inspirantes*); 85) in the renowned sanctuaries at Delphi (present-day Kastri), Klaros (near Zille, Ionia), and Kurene (in North Africa: Cyrene).

They are clearly ouranic (heaven-bound) or, moreover, Olympian (WR 66: the younger Zeus religion), whereas that of Dionysus (although it is, in itself, neither ouranic nor chthonic), by reason of the spirits of the deceased and, also, by reason of its nocturnal character (without mentioning the 'hellish noise'), is clearly chthonic (earth-bound,-- even 'infernal' or 'hellish') (WR 66: Earth Mother - Themis), -- or, as is best said, underworldly.

Update

Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) – along with K. Marx (1818/1883) and S. Freud (1856/1939), one of the three notorious critical materialists – in his work **Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik ** (1872), made the 'Dionysian/Apollinian' duality a living reality. Nietzsche calls 'Apollinian' (he never says 'Apollonian') everything aimed at clarity, good fitting together ('harmony'), orderliness, – at the reasoned subjugation of the world, – especially in his eyes at least, at the immutability of all structures.

One need only reread WR 119 (the Homeric Hymn to Hermes and Apollo) to establish that Nietzsche is right.

The situation is different with his interpretation of the Dionysian.

“The term 'Dionysian' expresses (...) a jubilant affirmation of the fundamental characteristic of life, (note: as Nietzsche conceives it): life—through all change—remains the same. It preserves the same 'power' and the same bliss, 'the great joy' and 'the great lived sympathy'; -- qualities which even the most terrifying and controversial aspects of life approve of (...). (Life) as the case of the necessary conjunction of the necessity of founding and that of destroying.” (H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande* , Paris, 1910, 36).

In other words: for Nietzsche, the Apollonian (founding) is one aspect (or, to put it 'dialectically', one moment) of life, which, for Nietzsche and contemporary libertarians, is essentially nocturnally destructive. Cf. WR 11/13 (demonism or harmony of opposites).

WR124

Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322) once analyzed the connection between Dionysian and Apocalypse: he showed that both spring from the same root. In any case: Nietzsche, with our libertarians, reverses the relationships. The celebrants of Dionysus returned, as it were purified after the intoxication (WR 76 (46)), to ordinary, colourless, 'passionless' life, whereas Nietzsche – in the tradition of Sturm und Drang (1770/1775; a pre-Romantic irrationalism to which J.W. Goethe (1749/1832) belonged), in the tradition, also, of the dark side of (German) Romanticism – elevates life, with its “abysses of dark experience and of dark forces and impulses” (as a counterpart to a clear and plain 'philosophy'), to an 'ideal' that not only calls into question or criticizes

our entire culture and its foundation, our whole cultural tradition, but dismisses and glorifies it as a kind of senseless repetition of the same 'senseless' founding and destruction.

That demonistic contradiction is typical of the Nietzschean interpretation of Dionysian life (and death). --- What an idiosyncratic interpretation it is.

Bibl. sample: D. Huisman, *L' esthétique* , Paris, 1983-9, 43/45 (*L' esthétique de Nietzsche*) 61/64 (*Les esthétiques libertaires*).

“Nietzsche is preparing a true cultural revolution. By undermining the foundations of philosophy regarding (the distinction between) good and evil, true and false, Nietzsche opens up the perspective, containing many possibilities, of a world that one experiences as a pure game of intense sensations.” (oc, 44s.).

In other words: a nihilism, which reduces the higher gravity of life to 'nihil', nothing.

Cfr also: H. Arvon, *Le gauchisme* , Paris, 1977-2, in which, in particular, the Marxist and Freudian inspirations are discussed.

'Musical' music.

WR 38/39; 42 (emancipation); 81/82 (82: Apollo; Hermes) (83: Apollo, the musical god of Delphi).-- Hesiod's *Theogonia*, 38; 66, says: “The Muses sing out the laws and the righteous morals and proclaim the present beings, the future and the past. They make this resound with their voices and, effortlessly, their lustful sound flows from their mouths”.

WR125

O. Willmann, oc, 24, comments: “They do not sing about the law of the universe, therefore, but this law of the universe itself—the event in the universe—plays out in its melodies.”

But note: in this Musical 'music' ('mousike techne', ars musica, comes from Muse art) it is not about the 'choreia' (music, dance, song; WR 82), in the ordinary sense, but about 'something great, -- of a divine, glorious, daimonic nature' (WR 83) as Aristotle, the rather dry specialist scientist, says.

Maximus of Turus (-125/-85), a Patronizing Sophist, notes that Hesiod (WR 34; 38), where he speaks of the song of the Muses, means the same thing as Pythagoras thought regarding heavenly music. - Cfr O. Willmann, oc, 24.

Well then, Pythagoras, who was called a second Apollo, sees in Musical

Music what 'orthos' is, respecting the laws of the high, Olympian deities.

O. Willmann, op. cit., 23, 27, 29 outlines this as follows.

(i) There is, first of all, the cosmos, the universe, which – especially in the celestial bodies and their movements – bears witness to 'eu.nomia' (= 'cosmos'; WR 93), a good legal order ('laws'). So much for the universal (= cosmic) aspect.

(ii) In accordance with this (WR 85 (sumpatheia); 103; 120ff.) is the Human - social ('political'; WR 64; 66) legal order, which contains the guidelines ('norms') of the deities - especially the Ouranic-Olympian (WR 123 - which govern the ethical (= moral deontic, moral, conscientious) behavior of people.

(iii) At the root (WR 45: 'archè', as an order-establishing (harmological) and deviation-correcting (cybernetic) power) lies cosmic music, 'sung' by the Muses under the guidance of mnemosune (WR 38). We now understand better, WR 120, where the musicologist emphasizes the universal nature of music, even that founded by humans, in Ancient-Medieval music theory. This is a purely musical musicology! It has the transcendental scope (WR 43) of equally musical philosophy.

The idea of 'sociomorphic philosophy of nature' (WR 93/94; as well as an Eastern analogue: WR 58 (course of life)).

Note-- *Psalm 75* (74), om, expresses an analogous idea: "God (= Yahweh) is, at the same time, the lord of the order in the physical universe and in human ethics. He establishes its immutability (*1 Sam. 2: 8; Ps. 93: 1ff.; Ps 96: 10*).

WR126

Or, if necessary, he disturbs them (*Job 26:11; Ps. 18:8*). In any case: not a single deviation escapes his will (*Ps 46:3; Ps 60:4*). He alone determines the moment of (God's) judgment (*Habakkuk 2: 3*). Thus *R. Tournay et al., Les Psaumes* , Paris, 1955, 292s.

This entails that the Bible **(i)** presupposes , **(ii)** purifies (strictly cathartic moment) and **(iii)** elevates to a level what the 'nations' (= the so-called heathens) already saw, as lemmas, preconceptions, of life (WR 76),

Consequence

In line with the Delphic cycle of faith (WR 123), two subjects of study are introduced to interpret the cosmos:

(i) *arithmology*

The discipline that generates ('konstruiert', says Willmann), with number and measure (*note*: another word for a component of configuration), namely arithmology ('Arithmetik'), and

(ii) *music theory*.

The world is 'connected' by an 'arithmetic' (as well as, understood, a 'configurative') connection (O. Willmann, oc,308).

Or again: "The primary role of (unity and) numbers means, now, that the universe is not purely a work of construction (generation), but, at the same time, a musical work of art."

The celestial bodies, namely – cf. WR 119ff. – from the earth to the heaven of fixed stars – constitute the cosmic octave (*note*: the pitch interval of a multitude of scale degrees). For they are positioned (WR 111: configuration) in such a way that their intermediate distances ('intervals') correspond (WR 85: *sumpatheia*) to the intermediate distances inherent in sounds. Precisely because of this, the universe is a 'harmonia' (di, here, in the sense of 'octave'). In the cosmic movements (WR 100), a 'homo.meleia', a (world) symphony, corresponds (WR 85: *sumpatheia*) to this. (O. Willmann, oc, 309f.).

Unity and its 'multiples' ('numbers') as music-founding.

The Pythagoreans did not merely 'calculate' with (the unity and) the numbers (= unit multiples). They also 'saw' them as spatial configurations. (...).

Moreover: they (calculated with the one and the 'numbers' and) saw them (as figures), while they 'heard' them. They were, after all, accustomed to interpreting tones as numerical and length ratios." (O. Willmann, oc, 288).

1. Thus, a tradition relates that Pythagoras himself sometimes attempted, during a quiet, peaceful night, to immerse himself in the 'theoria' (WR 41; 100; 107; 110) of the celestial spheres, - specifically in 'the chorus of the totality of the celestial bodies' (Cfr J.Fr. Mattei, Pythagora, 2165).

WR127

Note-- As before, so here too: the Paleophythagorean 'theoria' is, always, a form of 'akribeia' (WR 113; 117).

(a) Perception, for the Paleophythagoreans, is not something like the increasingly more or less mechanistic model that is in circulation in our theory of perception.

(b) On the contrary: it is 'empeiria', the determination of factual, material data; it is – even more – 'logismos', reasoning, regarding the logical connections ('grounds') specific to what is observed.

It is—furthermore—true 'theoria' (although of a supernatural nature; WR 88/89;—see also WR 52 (art) and 49 (subtle matter)), which 'see' (fathom) through the 'chorus' of celestial bodies, in such a way, however, that one simultaneously attunes the 'inner ear' (WR 85: sum.patheia) to what that 'chorus' (actually: dance choir) produces in terms of sound play.

1. Contemporary 'psychologists' will say: “Such is an 'association' (that is, something that arises in a person spontaneously, without firm ground in reality, in response to (not: as an exact representation of) an 'observation' of an 'ordinary' nature)!”

Or again: “To 'hear' something like the 'harmony' (i.e., the sonorous, inwardly audible 'world symphony' (WR 127), the 'homomeleia') of the celestial bodies is, just as 'commonplace', a 'hallucination' (WR 88: a false perception, however intensely felt 'hallucinatory' perceptions may be) or, even 'more commonplace', a pure 'imagination’”. -- Later Protosophistics (-450/-350) begins with this.

2. Unfortunately for these Enlightened-rational (WR 14: 'projection theory'; 24; 28; --WR. 64; 78; 84 (Enlightened form of rational thinking) ways of thinking, not a single true Pythagorean—there are still some today—will recognize himself in them.

His perception may, of course, contain elements resembling 'associations', 'imaginings', etc. But it is never totally reducible to such data.

By the way: question real composers or real music lovers! It won't be long before they describe 'things' that point in that Paleo-pytho-theogorean direction. Except, of course, when they have allowed themselves to be influenced by Enlightenment-rational ideology (but, in that case, their description does not correspond to what they actually experience).

Note that tradition says that Pythagoras himself 'tried' to 'hear'. It remains a difficult matter.

WR128

Now, do not think for a moment that the Paleophythagoreans 'lost' themselves in the 'supernatural' ('miraculous') form of hearing the One and her numbers!

The same tradition relates that Pythagoras, one day, listened to blacksmiths hammering on their anvils. He recognized the intervals of the fourth, the fifth, and the octave. Later, he was given the insight that these distinct sounds (akribeia!) corresponded to the distinct weights (meaning: masses) of the hammers.

To test this (WR 60 (inductive phase); 117 (Herodotus)) – cf. Course in Logic: peirastic reduction – he was given a second lemma: he would try out these harmonic (perfectly 'consonant', i.e., melodious) ratios on the monochord or monochordium. This is an old, single-stringed musical instrument with a movable bridge, as well as with variable string tension, such that it begins to resemble a sonometer, with which one can test, or possibly measure, the transverse vibrations of the strings. (Cf. WR 57: measuring model). This lies, moreover, in Pythagorean configuration theory (WR 113).

Note -- This is, incidentally, in line with what we called Paleophythagorean Gestaltism (WR 114/118).

There is something that, among our modern Gestaltists, resembles what is attributed to Pythagoras: they analyzed the melody, insofar as it can be 'generated' independently of specific **(i)** tones and **(ii)** pitches.

Cf. *HJ Duijker et al., Codex psychologicus*, A'm/ Bssl, 1981, 18 (Gestalt psychology). Pythagoras 'heard':

(i) a (system or) 'assembly' (coherent whole), namely the mutually cohesive sounds, as proportions;

(ii) a so-called 'self-regulation' (structure, in the strict sense), namely moved ('transformed') from the hammers-on-anvils to the monochord, the union remains identical;

(iii) let the 'rule' or 'structure' (here of a musical nature) vary (transformative aspect). In other words: he 'heard' - not individual sounds (WR 108: 'read'; 109: Piaget's own idea of 'structure' (112: the structural) but - a coherent whole in the sensory perceived data themselves (WR 116: perceptual psychology).

Which amounts to a distinct type of 'theoria'—resembling (through the purely musical aspect) the 'listening', by Pythagoras, of 'astral' music—different (through the gross material aspect) from that same listening.

WR129

The oneness and its multiples ('numbers') as quantification of

qualities.

(1) W. Röd oc,58, specifies the experiment of Pythagoras, with the hammers-on-anvils and the monochord, i.e. what the Gestaltists call 'transposition' (of the same system of sounds),

a. When he halved the string ($1/2$), it produced, as a sound, the ratio of the fundamental tone and the octave; -- which gives $1/2$ as a mathematical expression ('model').

For the so-called fifth he found $2/3$, and for the so-called fourth $3/4$.

These intermediate distances ('intervals') are labeled as 'perfect' because they—and this is one of the numerous peculiarities of early Pythagoreanism—can be represented in ratios (WR 109: proportions) of the one(ness) and the first three 'numbers' (1,-- 2,3,4).

b. W. Röd, *ibid.*, states, in addition, that the scope of this discovery in the physicality of the time (WR 37; 39ff.) lies in the fact that “qualitative distinctions are expressed in quantitative form”. In other words: qualities become measurable (WR 57; 113: akribeia). The akribeia, accuracy in representation, of the Paleopythagoreans thereby reaches a new form.

She illustrates the relationship between **(i)** physical process and **(ii)** psychic experience. Which – viewed from the standpoint of the understanding method (W. Dilthey; E. Spranger) – is a step forward and, what is more, a reconciliation ('harmonia') between scientifics (i.e. natural science—with a preference for mathematical precision) and hermeneutics (i.e. human science—with a preference for understanding experience).

(2) O. Willmann, oc,27f., specifies, in yet another sense.

The ancient Greek word 'nomos', lex, law (regularity), derives from legal language (WR 93: eu.nomia); over time, it became applicable not only to ethical but also to physical and—surprisingly enough, for us moderns—to musical data.

Cfr WR. 125. O. Willmann,, *Die wichtigstent philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung*, Kempten/Munich, 1909, 25, says: “The connection between the ideas of “moral law, law, natural law and ... song” extends - far beyond Pythagoras - back to the myths (WR 73) of the Apollonian worship. (WR 123).

Now, a fragment attributed to Aristotle says: “Apollon revealed to men, on the lyre, the laws ('nomoi'), according to which they ought to live. He tamed, in doing so, by melody, the initial wildness (WR 122: wild thiasos).

He created—through the magic of the 'rhuthmos' (*note* : 'rhythm', but figuratively movement provided with a 'rule' (WR 109: self-regulation = structuring) and a measure (WR 113: measurement model))—access (*note* : in the heart of the initially 'savages') to the commandment (*note*: i.e. the law).

a. Hence derives the term 'kitharoidische nomoi' (*note*: the playing and singing (and, occasionally, dancing) tunes specific to singing (and dancing), insofar as accompanied by the 'kithara' the zither (WR 119)).

b. Hence, too, stems the fact that the musical 'tunes' ('tropoi', think of our 'singing a tune'), according to which we sing, are titled with an elevated term ('semno.logikos'): 'nomoi'.

So much for this text attributed to Aristotle. He articulates a musical-Apollonian idea that is both Pythagorean and Platonic: the idea that music, originally 'art of the Muses', is, in the thoroughest sense of the word, 'philosophy itself'.

Cf. O. Willmann, oc. 301. Indeed, the initial philosophy, as we came to know it—previously (WR 93/95; 125ff., where the Bible, broadly speaking, also supports this position)—can be summarized as

- (i) physical (with its own laws),
- (ii) ethics (politics with its own laws), -- founded by music (with its own 'nomoi', melodies, 'ways of singing, dancing and making music').

With this, we have arrived at the core of Palepythagoreanism.

We began, WR 124, with the Muses. Here, WR 130, we end with her. Or rather: WR 38, we began with her (Thales' thinking is musical in background).

Note-- GMA Hanfmann, *Muses* , in: M. Cary et al., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* , Oxford, 1950-2, 583, says that “the Pythagoreans, Plato and Aristotle organized their societies (WR 91; 96; 98) – their 'hetaireiai' within which friendship (WR 98) – also among the Platonists and the Aristotelians – played such a great and decisive role – as 'thiasoi' of Muse worship”. (WR 122: the Dionysian model, which

- (i) supposed,
- (ii) purified (catharsis) and
- (iii) was raised to a higher level (WR 75).

Thus, music played a fundamental role (with song and dance, if necessary in 'thiasos', i.e., in a more or less 'lively' religious gathering).

That is, perhaps, what keeps them furthest removed from all kinds of our current enlightened-rational 'philosophies'. Indeed: who among us imagines

'philosophizing' as the Art of the Muses?

WR131

Pyth.-- 3. Pythagorean animism.

WR 77/85 (Thaletic animism); 96 (Anaximenes' animism); 98/100 (shamanistic-Pythagorean animism).

We are going to review this animism, among the Pythagoreans, **(i)** theologically, **(ii)** generally and **(iii)** specifically - humanly.

3.1.-- Animism, theological.

"The basic idea that underpins Pythagorean physics also forms the basis of its ethics. -- It finds its simplest expression in the maxim 'one(ness)/two(ness): The meaning of which is:

(a) The deity, as (transcendent) one(ness), is simultaneously the origin (WR 38: archè; 119: first) and the ultimate goal of both physical and ethical activity ('movement'; WR 100; 103; 110; 126ff.);

(b) the physical and ethical activities ('types of movement') move in an atmosphere ('in einem elemente') of imperfection, -- of division, 'dilemma' (*note*: expressed in the 'number' two(ness)). These ought to be 'overcome'". (O. Willmann, oc, 320).

The question arises: what exactly did the Paleo-Pythagoreans understand by the fact that God can be characterized (defined; WR 110) as 'one(ness)' and that what proceeds from the Deity must be characterized as 'two(ness)'? The answer is contained—WR 110—: there is encompassing and there is encompassed unity. God is, because he condenses all perfection within himself, as it were (he stands above temporal and spatial dispersion), one; what proceeds from him, because it exists spread out, apart, in time (past, present, future; WR 38), as well as because it is situated spread out, apart, in space (here, there, yonder) (WR 111ff.: configurative mode of being), is, thereby, two(ness), that one(ness), but never pure one(ness). And thus always at least two(ness).

It is evident that, thanks to the analogy of oneness and multiplicity (at least duality), the Pythagoreans established a terminology that, while debatable, is nevertheless strongly unified, and which still lives on in Scholasticism.

Cf. WR 108, where the generative number scheme shows that one can generate all numbers (at least two(ness)) either with the one(ness) or with the two(ness). For God, because he, suddenly, 'is' everything (and, because everything exists exactly once), is 'calculable' (i.e., reproducible) in precisely

an affirmation: he is the 'all-encompassing' and all 'two-nesses' generating 'one(ness):

WR132

3.2.-- General animism.

The Platonist Xenocrates of Chalkedon (leader of the later Platonic Academy (-339/-314)) says that, according to Pythagoras, the soul is "a self-moving 'number'".

'Number' is structure (WR 100; 111) and 'moving oneself' is a characteristic of life, in the organic sense, inherent to plants, animals, and humans. The soul can, therefore, Pythagoreanically, indeed be conceived as a moving structure. Cf. WR 100: the moving things.

The world or universe soul (matter).

WR 50 taught us the Thaletian idea of omnipresent subtle, 'fine' or 'ethereal' matter, the primordial substance. WR 97 taught us the prelude to the idea of 'world- or universe-soul-(e-substance)'.

Well, Pythagoras, just like almost all the Pre-Socratics, shared that idea. Yet it was more than a widespread, diffuse given; it was harmological and cybernetic (WR 45), which establishes order and restoration of order (after deviation from that order).

Furthermore: among the Pythagoreans, the world soul (matter) is the primordial material background of a sociomorphic cosmology (WR 94).

Note-- (i) This is reminiscent of what the Bible calls 'the Spirit of Yahweh', insofar as it is present and active, spread throughout the universe created by Yahweh.

The universe soul (substance) is, once again, **(i)** presumed, **(ii)** purified and **(iii)** elevated on a Yahweh-believing (supernatural) plane (WR 76).

(ii) The Romantic depth psychologist *Carl Gustav Carus* (1789/1869), in his **Vom unbewussten Leben der Seele ** (1846) - long before Freud, therefore, and without the aggressive atheistic materialism - says that, in assuming God's presence by means of (not merely 'in') a universe (soul matter), neither atheism (denial of God) nor pantheism (evaporation of God into everything) is assumed, but rather en.theysm, God's presence in and through the world (soul matter).

This must have been, more or less, the view among a number of Paleophythagoreans.

The singularized or singular, individual souls or soul substances.

According to J. Zafiropulo, *Empédocle d' Agrigente* , Paris, 1953, 45, Pythagoras is the heir of archaic animism.

(i) Besides the belief, or the perception (mantic; WR 88v.) of the universe soul (substance),

(ii) this idea includes the following.

a. All beings from the natural environment exhibit two planes.

WR133

a.1. The visible

(WR 41; 116: Gestalt as ideal structure)), that everyone can perceive with the eyes, the ears, the sense of touch—sensorially, therefore;

a.2. The invisible ,

in, behind, yes, above the visible (WR 41: perception through 'empeiria', penetrating to e.g. the 'Gestalt' (in, under, above) or by means of manticism, of course), both together constitute the being-in-nature.

Well then, given the Pre-Socratic 'materialism' (better: hyl dualism; WR 52), the 'arithmos' (structure) is always either gross or subtle. That invisible-subtle moment of something was easily called its soul (sometimes, simply, in the sense of 'soul substance' (WR 78: the Homeric example of the 'semi-material, understand: subtle, soul substance or 'cloud')). See Thales: WR 84 (magnet stone, plant), for Pythagoras.

b . The invisible and the visible

The relationship between the invisible and the visible is interpreted in two ways by the Pythagoreans.

b.1. As Zafiropulo says: the visible is the materialization (= coarsening) ('matérialisation') of the (subtle) invisible.

In other words: what we see, touch, and hear is the coarsened 'soul (substance)', in, behind, above the seen, the touched, the heard (WR 49/52; 88/89; 103: archetype; 104: visible/invisible; 126ff. (invisible); 128 (visible)).

b.2 . The invisible, in Pythagoras, is the precursor of the later Platonic idea (WR 102). That is: the one and the number are before (pre-existing) and yet within the gross material given—structured according to him—(O. Willmann, oc, 293: "Things are images, 'mimēmata', of (one and) numbers"; WR 110: pre-idealisms).

Moreover: it is the gestalt, the ideal or even idealized 'form' (= structure, configuration) of Cfr. WR 114/118; 128. Thus it is understood that the regular

could be conceived as the tonal and exemplary, and that the irregular (such as the 'whimsical' forms in a landscape, in a body) could be regarded as merely an image—and at that an imperfect one (O. Willmann, oc, 294).

What Platon will assert about the visible data: they are 'caricatures' of the ideal idea!

That all this is so is further evident from the fact that Platon calls his ideas living beings (WR 30), which – in archaic language – are visible, in, behind, indeed, above visible things, present and active, – just like the one(ness) and the 'number'.

WR134

Decision.

“The Pythagorean doctrine designates the individual beings as existing independently, but it also designates them as interconnected: the community of being extends from the deities to the animals (*note* : and, even, to inorganic matter). One breath (WR 85; 96) traverses the entire cosmos and connects us with all beings.” (O. Willmann, oc, 315).

If we connect the world soul (matter) and singular souls, we see that the world soul forms the background in which, against which, the individual souls stand out as figures.

The ranking of the singularized souls respectively. soul substances.

It is quite clear that the idea of 'soul' (soul substance) is a common 'measure' (= encompassing property; O. Willmann, oc, 283: “‘Metrein’, to measure, mensurare (= Lt), is to indicate a common property”) within which species and, especially, levels (measuring) are defined.

(i) Inorganic things have a 'soul', i.e. a 'number' (= structure), which structures them (orders, adjusts; WR 45v.); but this soul is not organically alive.

(ii)a. The plant is a 'zoön, animal', a living being, but not like an animal.

(ii)b. The animal **(i)** presupposes, **(ii)** purifies, and **(iii)** raises to a higher level (WR 76) that which the plant owes to its type of 'soul': thus it purifies the root-boundness that becomes the ability to walk. The animal possesses, indeed, a 'logikè psuchè', a soul endowed with 'understanding', but, because

(a) the unfavorable structure of his body and

(b) due to the lack of language ability, the animal behavior does not exhibit a truly 'intellectual' character (O. Willmann, oc, 315).

(iii). The human soul - related to the deities ('sungeneia pros Theous')
(i) presupposes, **(ii)** purifies, and **(iii)** raises to a level what the plant and animal soul generates. Moreover: "Man unites all higher and lower cosmic 'forces' (levels of being): he is the universe in miniature.

According to a tradition, Pythagoras is said to have used the term 'microcosm'. (O. Willmann, oc, 316). There are even texts that say that man:

a. through his 'logikon', intellect, or 'fronimon', intellect, is in understanding (WR 85: sumpatheia) with the deities,

b . through his 'thumikon', animating power, with the universe soul (substance),

c. by his 'epithumètikon' that governs and regulates physical life (= libido, zest for life), with the pliability (WR 51).

WR135

We hereby refer briefly to WR 102 ('eros').

The Paleophythagorean theory of understanding.

WR 85 (sum.patheia); 103 (circulation); 120; 121; 125; 126; 127).-- There is a 'pneumatic' (subtle or fluid) coherence - the universe (substance) is its substrate or infrastructure - which not only objectively connects all beings to one another, but establishes a genuine understanding (WR 4).

1. We have already seen it, WR 103: by imitating the sun in its movement ('mimèsis', imitatio, not to be confused with 'slavish' imitation, as so often happens in Enlightened-rational circles: 'accurate' (WR 113; 117 (akribeia)) is not the same as 'slavish'), one establishes, by means of the pneumatic or subtle bond that always exists, a type of understanding upon which the sacred act rests.

2. *Sextos Empeirikos* (= Sextus Empiricus (the systematic Skeptic, who lived around +150)), *Adversus mathematicos* , 7: 92, says: "The Pythagoreans teach that the intellect, if it is schooled in 'mathèmata' (Pythagorean doctrines, subjects of study), is the criterion of beings. They teach, namely—through Philolaos of Croton (-470/-400)—that, in the process of theoria, the fathoming, the nature of the universe shows a certain kinship with the theoria, since, naturally, like is known by means of like ("hupo tou homoiou to homoion")."

Note: the Latin formula reads: 'similia similibus' (O. Willmann, oc, 282). Naturally, for the Paleo-Pythagorean Philolaos, this is (the one and) the number, which functions as an intermediate term between the known object and the knowing subject. "(the one and) the number, namely, makes all beings

knowable by adapting them to the soul, as soon as they are perceived.

By its very nature, 'number (structure, as a means of knowledge) aligns beings with one another (...). You can establish the nature and power of number not only in the world of deities and spirits, but also in all products and thoughts of men, -- such as, for example, in technical operations and in the art of music." Thus Philolaos himself (O. Willmann, oc, 282).

It is evident: all beings, by betraying something like a soul (substance), a soul-material structure, are by the very fact "attuned to the soul (mind)".

General animism forms the background of the theory of understanding.

WR136

It is clear: if I eat an apple, I digest it in a gross material way. But if I touch it, look at it, admire it, then 'something' of that apple, which represents the whole apple, penetrates me—its 'arithmos', its number (structure). This is 'soul-material' (subtle): like the 'soul' itself, which absorbs it without destroying it, which does happen when eating. The Pythagoreans saw this, of course, too. Their idea of the soul and their idea of the number ultimately merge.

The theory of influence.

The Paleo-Pythagoreans excelled in their comparative definitions. For example: "What is strongest? The 'gnome', the thought (the insight)". This maximum (one type of configuration: WR 111 (placement, positioning, mutual)) covers a theory of influence.

Zafiropulo, oc, 41, explains this. Since the soul of man—ancient shamanism prepared the ground for this idea—possesses the same nature as the souls situated within people and the things outside of us, precisely because of this, "our ideas (*note*: Pythagorean: our structures) can directly ('directement') influence these subtle ('spirituelles,' says Zafiropulo, but he means this word animistically-fluidly) entities in all that is perceptible through the senses."

In other words: by means of the similar—the structure of the 'sumpatheia'—man influences the rest of being. Through the fluid (and the form, 'arithmos'—one also says 'thought-form'—of it) within our soul, one influences the fluid outside the soul.

The medium is, of course, the pliable substance of the world-soul. Through the subtle structure within our soul, we have a—albeit purely subtle—grip on the subtle structure outside our soul. This is, as Zafiropulo emphasizes, the

basis of all magic (which acts (WR 6: actio) by means of mere thought, by the mere utterance of words (WR 68/70: Hermes' power of influence by means of the word; WR 4)). Whether this magic is exercised consciously or unconsciously: it remains actio, influence.

The Paleophythagoreans, with their number structure as a means, are the first to have founded a rhetoric in a philosophical sense. We do not say 'established'. They did, however, lay its foundations by establishing a theory of communication and interaction. It stands or falls with their animism, elaborated arithmologically.

WR137

3.3.-- Human animism.

"Pythagoras was considered someone who remembered his former lives. The 'anamnesis', or memory, of which he was capable, allowed him to have in his current consciousness all that he had learned in previous lives." (*J. Brun, Les présocratiques*, Paris, 1982-3, 41).

Brun adds to this what Platonism owes to this: at the center of Platonism stands, indeed, 'anamnesis' – which one should translate not so much as 'remembrance, memory', but as 'expanded consciousness'.

Bibl. sample:

- *Erwin Rohde, Psyche (Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen)*, Tübingen, 1925-10, II: 417/ 421 (*Vorgeburten des Pythagoras; seine Hadesfahrt*);
- *ER Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational* , Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1966, 135/178 (*The Greek Shamans and the Origin of Puritanism*);
- *J.-P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* , 1971,-- I: 80/123 (*Aspects mythiques de la mémoire et du temps*).

Furthermore, regarding 'palingenesia' (re- or reincarnation), 'met.en.somatosis' (repeated embodiment), 'met.em.psychosis' (metempsychosis, soul exchange):

- *Kenneth K. Inada, Buddhist Naturalism and the Myth of Rebirth* , in: *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion* , I: 1 (Spring 1970), 46/53;
- *Reincarnation* , in: *W .F. Albright et al., Zeitschrift fur Religions(geschichte) und Geistesgeschichte*, Jrg. 9:2 (1957), including 'reincarnation';
- *Lucien Roure, Réincarnation* , in: *J. Bricout et al., Dict.prat.d.conn. relig .*, Paris, 1927,v:1061/ 1064; vi: 446.

Roure, who is certainly not reincarnistically inclined, and is theologically trained as a Catholic, admits that the doctrine claiming that the soul is embodied multiple times is widespread. One encounters it "already among the

Celtic Druids and the Middle Ages Druze”. “It holds true among the Zulus and the Greenlanders, the North American Indians and the Dayaks of Borneo, the Karaeans of Burma and the natives of Guinea, -- who, in this, join the countless adherents of the Brahmanistic and Buddhist religions”. (Ac,v: 1061s.).

This is to say that Pythagoras absolutely need not be considered a madman or an imaginary (which Enlightened rationalists like to do), in our eyes, because he is a reincarnator.

Very serious journals such as *Journal en Zeitschrift* , mentioned above, believe they must even devote equally serious articles to it.

WR138

' Mnemosune', to remember , (WR 38), *reincarnistic*.

We just said that Plato's 'anamnesis' is better translated as 'expanded consciousness'. The same is true of the term 'Mnemosune': did we not see that Remembering 'remembers' both past and present and future beings? Cf. WR 38.

Ontology—even in that so-called archaic form—is an expanded awareness of what 'is'. In Homer's and Hesiod's days, this was a characteristic of both poets ('aoidoi', aedes (Iliad 24:721)) and seers: both the poet and the seer 'sees' (WR 88ff.).

“Remembering, knowing, 'seeing'”, these are all terms that amount to the same thing (...). Immediate presence at what happened in the past, immediate revelation, divine giftedness, -- all these characteristics (...) define inspiration by the Muses”. (J.41. Vernant, oc, 83).

We have already seen that, differing from the 'ordinary' man in this respect, the gifted one is the one 'who knows' (WR 86) – this already in the Homeric era. But the same law also prevails in Hades (the Underworld): *Odyssey 10* :490/495 teaches us this abundantly clear. To the plea of Odysseus and his companions to be allowed to return to their homeland at last, the stunningly beautiful Circe (WR 106) replies that this will happen, but only after a journey to Hades (a descent into the underworld) has been completed.

For that 'knowledge' (expanded consciousness), which can provide information about this, rests with the now deceased 'seer' Teiresias. He is “the blind seer ('mantis'), whose intellectual faculties are 'empedoi', firmly established in the earth, di, rock-solid.

Persephoneia, the Goddess of the Underworld, gave him—even now that he is dead—'noön', the use of his intellect. He alone possesses the gift of clairvoyance ('pepnusthai'), while the (other) shades ('skiai') 'aissousin', blow back and forth. In other words: even in the other world, here: the Underworld, Teiresias, the 'blind seer', remains the one who knows, thanks to expanded consciousness.

With this, the Mother of the Muses, Mnemosune, appears to us in one of her many aspects, namely a continuous awareness of what was, is, and will be (WR 38: ontology), including regarding the (own) life of the soul, whether in this world or in the world to come. Pythagoras must have had that exemplary model in mind. Cf. Vernant, oc, 87.

In other words: one must absolutely not resort to foreign ('Eastern') sources of consciousness expansion to find a prelude to Pythagoras' 'reincarnistically' expanded awareness.

WR139

“With Pherekud of Suros (c. 550 BC), who was regarded as the teacher of Pythagoras, as the one who first upheld the immortality of the soul and who, likewise, was the first to articulate the doctrine concerning the reincarnation of the soul, time ('Chronos', WR 93; 95) is immediately conceived as a deity and placed at the very origin (WR 39; 45) of the cosmos. (...).

Chronos, (primeval) time, is encountered again in the Orphic theogonies (*note*: descriptions of the origin of deities), in which he plays an analogous role. There he appears as a multifaceted monster that begets the cosmic egg (world egg, primordial egg). When this cosmic Primordial Egg (*note*: archè, from which, as from an 'egg', all life arises) undergoes duality (WR 104; 105: germ, -- seed and egg cell), it begets heaven and earth.

"Immediately the firstborn of the deities, 'phanes', a hermaphroditic (*note*: exhibiting both male and female traits) deity, emerges, in which the 'male/female' opposition is resolved." (J.-P. Vernant, oc, 98).

Note: Myths (WR 15) have a language of their own: they interpret (model: WR 57), via known realities (e.g. the idea 'time' (but 'sublime' on a mythical-theological level; WR 73; 129), the idea 'memory' or, rather, 'remembrance', etc.), unknown (invisible; WR 41) – preferably 'divine' or, at least, realities accessible only to 'seers'.

Applied here: the past, present, and future beings (WR 38), which Mnemosune, the Mother of the Muses, gives to 'see' (= know), are situated, inevitably, in the series 'beginning, now, future' (WR 103), the trinity which is

suddenly called time, but as an encompassing 'archè' (WR 45: harmological/cybernetic).

Myths 'tell', but are thought-stories that gradually prepare overly unformed minds, like the contemporaries of the archaic seers, for rigorous thinking (science) (WR 40: new type of Musical thinking; 63: positive type).

Translated into 'abstract' language: the initial chaotic reality (early times) sees itself forming (division of the universe)—both the heavens (the firmament) and the earth (on which we live); within that twofold whole, heaven and earth, situate the primordial deity (phanes), and, immediately, all male and female beings (hermaphrodite), who find in him both origin and model. --- Behold, strictly logical, the content.

WR140

Conclusion. -- The human soul is only truly fully definable (WR 96) if one defines it as an expanded consciousness that encompasses 'time' (as the totality of all possible (WR 55; 57; 114) moments). The Orphic myth, which the Paleopythagoreans adopted (though not without modification), expresses this by way of 'models' (which appear familiar).

Mnèmosunè, because of the inspiring daimon.

WR 81 (inspirantes); 85 (inspiration based on sumpatheia) taught us the phenomenon of the 'inspiring daimon'.

Well, *E. Dodds, The Greeks*, 143s., claims that the so-called 'reincarnation' can also be explained differently. "Both Pythagoras and Epimenides of Knossos, who acted before him, could have heard that there was a belief prevalent in the North of Hellas that the soul or, indeed, 'the guardian spirit' of a former shaman (WR 99) could 'take up residence' in a still living shaman, -- this, to strengthen his ability and knowledge (...)

(i) Epimenides, the Cretan (Knossos is a city on Crete), does not, in tradition, exhibit reincarnation: he claimed, merely, that he had lived "before" and was identical with Aiakos (Iliad 21: 189), who was known as an archaic man of God.

(ii) By analogy, Pythagoras appears as appealing to the fact that he is identical with the former shaman Hermotimos of Klazomenai (*Herodotus* 8:103).

"But it appears that Pythagoras expanded on reincarnation, in that very narrow sense (of being inspired by the grasping, the inhabitation, of a former shaman). Perhaps that was his personal contribution." Thus Dodds.

Note: This prompts us to exercise extreme caution with 'reincarnistic' claims; in other words, a strict distinction must be made between guidance by means of the entry of a former figure, on the one hand, and, on the other, true reincarnation of one and the same soul in more than one body.

The one guided by an inspirer can, after all, gain the impression that he himself (and not merely his inspirer) has experienced the facts which he believes himself to remember. In this sense, his expanded consciousness is the coexistence of his own, the earthly (and narrower), and that of the inspirer. Nothing more.

WR141

Mnemosune, by means of out-of-body experience.

E. Dodds, oc, 140, notes yet another form of expanded consciousness. "Excerpts from Pindar (WR 83; 122) and Xenophon of Athens (-427/-355), a Socratic, (...) suggest that one possible source of the Puritan contradiction (*note:* referring to the proposition that the body is unclean and that the soul, naturally, as divine in origin, is also pure, but 'stained' by a sin from previous lives) lies in the ascertainable fact that so-called soul activities (*note:* preferably of a paranormal, supernatural nature; WR 76)) are inversely proportional to bodily (*note:* preferably conceived as grossly material) activities.

The 'psuchè' soul is most active when the body
(i) is in a state of sleep or
(ii) as Aristotle added, is about to die (...).

Well, a belief of that type is an essential component of shamanistic culture (WR 99), which still exists in Siberia and which has left behind remnants of its past, spread over a very vast area, namely (...) from Scandinavia, across the Eurasian landmass, to Indonesia. This vast expanse demonstrates its great antiquity. (...).

A shaman (...) – in a state of 'mental dissociation' – so it is believed – is not like the Puthia (Lt.: Pythia) – *note:* the female aunt at Delphi (WR 123; 126; 129), who, in Apollo's service, uttered divine pronouncements in a state of ecstasy – or like a modern 'medium' (*note:* a person, whether or not ecstatic, who 'mediates' (Lt.: 'medius' = intermediary being)), who are assumed to be either seized or possessed by a spirit distinct from their own (deeper) soul. No: the shaman/shamaness – so it is believed – leaves his body with his own soul and 'travels' elsewhere (most of all, into the world of 'spirits').

It is understood that a shaman can be seen simultaneously (*note:* with

the eyes of the physical body) in different places. In other words: he/she possesses the gift of 'bilocation' (being visible in more than one place at the same time).

From such experiences, which he/she recounts off the cuff and sings out loud, he/she derives the giftedness regarding

(i) supernatural counsel ('divination'),

(ii) religious poetry and

(iii) magical healing method,

who make him/her a, socially speaking, first-rate figure". (ER Dodds, oc, 140).

WR142

Conclusion. -- The 'soul' that leaves the body—which enters a 'cataleptic' (fainted) state—is a 'free' or, indeed, an 'external' soul. The shamanistic experiences described by Dodds prove that expanded consciousness ('mnemosune') also arises through out-of-body experience.

Note: Now we understand better the Dionysian religion (WR 121ff.), with its cult of 'ecstatic ecstasy' or (sometimes frenzied form of) out-of-body experience. "In the 'ecstasy' of the Dionysian dance, the soul literally stepped outside the boundaries of bodily life. Immediately it changed form, enjoyed the bliss of an out-of-body state, -- immersed as it was in the totality ('l' ensemble') of things and nature". (*Th. Zielinski, La rel.dl Gr. ant .*, 116s.).

Conclusion. -- Before we can understand the typically Orphic doctrine regarding the soul, as Pythagoras and the Paleo-Pythagoreans processed it, we ought to briefly touch upon primordial shamanism, which is still alive today, especially in Siberia.

Expansion of consciousness—a theme that is currently attracting attention even in scientific circles—is possible in multiple ways. Reincarnating (the same soul goes through more than one life), inspired (a soul guided by an inspiring daimon), or astral (the soul traveling through the universe)—these are three types of supernatural expansion of consciousness that, moreover, are very often present in one and the same person.

Musical Mnemosune, or also called anamnesis, by the ancient Greeks. WR 38; 40; 42; 119; -- 81; 124/130; -- all those passages from this course give us the essential components of—what one repeatedly seeks to construct today—a musical philosophy. In it, the expansion of consciousness plays an essential role. Immediately: the belief in the typically higher-gifted 'soul'—a theme that was only introduced into the physique of the Milesians by the Orphists and the Paleo-Pythagoreans.

It has influenced ancient philosophy for more than eleven hundred years. One need only think of WR 120 (*Gastoue's musicology*).

Library sample:

-- J. Pearce-Higgins et al., *Life, Death and Psychical Research* , London, 1973 (an excellent introduction, Ecclesiastical, but also expert);

-- *Parapsychology: appearance or reality* , in: *Cultuurleven* , vol. 45, 1978): 10 (December), 866/920 (a naturally Flemish view on the matter).-- Here too, Paleophythagoreanism is still topical.

WR143

3.4. -- Orphic animism.

Bibl. sample: A. Provoost, ed., *Orpheus (Origin, growth and aftermath of an ancient myth in literature, visual arts, music and film)*, Leuven, 1974;

“Since Russian scholars (WR 89) have demonstrated, in a—positively scientific—verifiable manner, that phenomena such as parapsychology, psycho- or telekinesis, and reincarnation indeed exist, other events from Orpheus' life no longer elicit a specific smile either.” (Thus A. Provoost, at an Orpheus weekend for classicists, in Kortenbergh).

The Orphic myth.

WR 139 gave us, in a greatly abbreviated form, the first part of it. We therefore assume that the first part is known.

At the great turning point (in ancient Greek 'kairos', the rightly chosen measure, especially regarding time (the rightly chosen moment)), a descendant of Phanes, who is also called Eros (Love Passion; WR 102), namely Zeus, nicknamed 'Aithèr' (WR 49; 120), the deity of the high heavens, 'devours' the firmament (= Ouranic, Olympian, or Luminous deities: WR 123)), Phanes - Eros, the first shaper of the universe. This, along with all that Phanes - Eros created.

Thus Zeus-Aithèr, the God of Light, establishes a new 'Aion', i.e., a new epoch of deities, immediately a new epoch of the universe. The 'epoch of the universe' is also called an 'age' (from the Latin 'aevum' or, furthermore, 'saeculum').

Instead of Phanes - Eros, the 'first' and 'universe-founding' son of God (who, by means of his life force - just like Hermes (WR 68/70) - represents the re-founding Zeus-Aithèr), Zeus-Aithèr creates a Dionysus, who

(i) assumes,

(ii) purifies and

(iii) on a higher plane, the figure of Dionysus rises (typical of the Phanes-Eros period, namely hellish - wild (WR 121ff.)) whom we have encountered in connection with the infernal - wild and frenzied dance, music and song.

In other words: what Christianity does in a later mythical phase (suppose, purify, and elevate), Orphism already does (WR 76). But it places strong emphasis on the second, the purifying or cathartic aspect. Hence the name 'Puritanism'.

What comes through, symbolized in that mythical model (WR 139), is the following. The primordial monster time (i.e., the total initial reality), itself still typically 'hellish' and 'wild - frenzied', establishes a cosmic order that is a reflection of itself. Yet, within that primordial disorder lies a higher 'eros' (lust for life, active especially in amorous passion).

WR144

Note: Here we have the core of the archaic-ancient belief in progress, which, in contrast to the contemporary view, emphasizes inner development towards higher realms, rather than external, technological perfection. Progress lies, first and foremost, in the soul.

The idea of progress is, first of all, noological: it refers to the higher in the soul, -- which Platon, later, calls the noble soul. Secondly, it is anagogical (instead of catagogical): it directs upwards, instead of deteriorating downwards, - Cfr WR 122: wild thiasos: ---124ff.: Musical thiasos.

Note: We learn from the Orphic myth the manner in which Zeus, the so-called God of Light, 'destroys' the older cosmic and divine order (WR 123ff: the Nietzschean interpretation). He destroys by devouring. This is an expression that refers to **(i) the animal world and (ii)** indeed to the predatory world (WR 64).

Note -- In this context, it is remarkable how the prophet-apocalypticist Daniel (in the Old Testament, in the 7th century BC) characterizes the pagan kingdoms as 'animals', against which man (the Son of Man) is set. Here, too, the idea of sublimation is at work (WR 76).

This predatory type of behavior (which points to a lower 'soul') is best seen at work in archaic magic. Besides the so-called 'sexual' (understand: sacred - erotic) magic, which works with the power of eros and the eros fluid (WR 102: pagan, especially wild-hellish eros), there is, often very strongly developed, blood magic which works with the power and the fluid, the so-called 'blood-soul (substance)', of which the Old Testament speaks (in the so-called bloody sacrifices).

It is precisely this blood magic that is depicted in the myth: Zeus 'devours' the old order by "eating up" its power and fluid (vampirism). For this reason, it is not surprising that in antiquity (Aristotle, for example), both the Dionysian and the Apollonian (= Zeus-religious) religions were conceived as having sprung from one and the same – demonistic (WR 12) – one.

Note: A third aspect of the Orphic myth is expressed by *Th. Zielinski, *La rel.d.1.Gr.**, 69. There he discusses agonisticism (WR 11): mutual rivalry was commonplace in ancient Greek life, -- even in the choreia etc. This is never without some connection to violence (WR 64; -- a theme already emphasized by Hesiod). But, already earlier, in **Odyssey* 9* (comment 9: 112ff., 215, 275), Homer mentions a mythical type, the Capuchin, the primeval giant endowed with a pivotal eye.

WR145

The Cykloop (Latinized pronunciation) has wild morals. Thus, the Kuklops Polufèmos is "a savage, who knows neither commandments nor divine teachings (inspirations)" (*Od.*, 9: 215).

The Kukliopeia (= *Od.*, 9) shows us someone who kills the guest (who was 'sacred', in Zeus law), -- who eats human flesh, -- who breaks his word, -- who, above all, mocks the new deities of the Zeus regime. (*F. Flückiger, Gesch.d. Naturrechtes*, I, *Die Gesch.d. europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*, Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 10).

Update

Violence, in the broad sense, occurs in the modern sense, e.g. in evolutionism (*Ch. Darwin* (1809/1882), *Origin of Species*),—specifically in the idea of 'natural selection'.

Violence, in the human sciences this time (WR 63ff.), was clearly denounced in *R. Girard, *La violence et le sacré**, *Paris*, 1972 (where 'violence' is interpreted mimetically: in the agonistic rivalry for too few objects (the stakes), for too many contenders ('desiring'; WR 102: Dionysian 'eros'), one imitates the other, who, precisely because of this, becomes his competitor ('rival')). In that sense, the ancient Greek myths cover a **philosophia perennis** (WR 4).

The Orphic myth, from an anthropological perspective.

We assume knowledge of the two previous myth-pericopes. -- the Dionysus Passion. -- *Jeanmeire, Dionysus*, 384, summarizes as follows.

(i) Dionysus, the Son of God, representative of Zeus-Aithèr within the new

divine order, is killed as a child.

(ii) This killing process takes place as follows.

(ii)a . The child of Dionysus is seduced (WR 23), -- and indeed by the Titans.

Note-- Ho Titan, hoi Titanes (the Titan, the Titans) are primordial beings, belonging, like the Cyclopes, to the wild-hellish order; their image is that of giants (giants) sometimes tens of meters tall, primal hostile towards all that is Zeus.

(ii)b. Dionysus is tempted by typical toys (ball, cone, spinning top, gaming wheel, die, Hesperides apple (*note* : all rather geometric, - or rather: configurative (WR 111), objects), -- mirror).

WR146

This toy—according to Jeanmaire—appears in some mysteries (regarding the Dionysian mysteries) as the 'sumbola', the symbols, the visual objects of a sacred nature, which the initiate was given to 'see'.

Note-- 'Mysteries' are

(i) usually, limited communities,

(ii) who 'invokes' a deity - often a chthonic (WR 123), but then - at least at first glance - 'benevolent' (WR 12: demonism) deity, called 'Savior', 'Redeemer' (WR 123),

(iii) who, thereupon, answers with an epiphany, a joyful entry befitting a prince,

(iv) this, to solve problems among members of the community.

(ii)c. All versions of the Passion of Dionysus agree: the child was torn apart, yet in such a way that the pieces of raw flesh were then glued back together and, thus joined together, cooked in a witches' cauldron (according to some of the documents: by the same Titans).

This refers to blood magic (WR 144: the eaters of the cooked meat appropriate the life force of the god) (Cfr Jeanmaire, oc, 384). - The meat, once cooked, was devoured by the titans.

Digression.-- The author believes that devouring (after cooking) is not essential.

1. It is established that at least some of the celebrants (WR 122) – at the peak of their evidently frenzied ecstasy – seized an animal (or, according to some indications, even a child), tore it apart, and devoured the bloody morsels of meat raw. Which, in ancient Greek, is called omophagia, eating raw meat.

NP Nilsson/ HJ Rose, *Dionysos*, in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1950-2, 288f., says: "This so-called omophagy is a 'sacramental' (WR 76: supernatural) meal. By consuming the body parts—namely, of the sacrificial animal—the menads absorb the deity into themselves, as well as its power." In other words: pure blood magic.

2. The myth surrounding Orpheus, the perhaps historical, in any case 'mythical' founder of Orphism, says that, after the failed attempt to retrieve his wife Eurudike (Euridice) from Hades, he scorned the lust of the Thracian Dionysian Osmenads, -- with the result that a group of them tore the poet to pieces.

These details seem to indicate, viewed within the archaic framework, that the devouring was not so unreal.

WR147

Digression.

Up to that point, a perhaps purely mythical premise. But there is more.

-- M. Hermanns, *Schamanen, Pseudoschamanen, Erlöser und Heilbringer*, 3 Vol., Wiesbaden, 1970, -- 1,5, gives an additional reason why the tearing apart, or the devouring, is perhaps not as unreal as Jeanmaire suggests.

(a) More developed hunter-gatherer peoples, especially in North Asia, have a ritual regarding game preservation. When they have killed a piece of game—a reindeer, for example—the meat is removed from the bones with great care, so that the bones remain unharmed. (*Note:* Compare this with the 'thinking heart' of the child Dionysus—a heart that, as the rest of the myth tells, remains unharmed).

"To symbolically revive the felled game, the bones, in the form of a skeleton, are laid on the laid-out hide and, subsequently, wrapped in that skin." Thus says Hermanns, who is a connoisseur of shamanism.

Note: This bone magic ritual relies on what is called, there, the bone-soul (substance). Again: magic.

(b) *Note:* Analogy is one of the essential characteristics of archaic-magical thought. We see this at work here. The apprentice shaman is treated symbolically (= analogously) following the model of the wild-preservation rite. "Precisely the same rite is experienced by the apprentice shaman in a state of ecstasy (WR 99; 140: out-of-body experience)."

“His soul, during that ecstasy, dwells outside the body and she 'beholds' the process of passion within her own body. In doing so, the skeleton wrapped in the skin comes to life again.” -- Thus Hermanns literally. Precisely because of this—she then states—the shaman differs from the ordinary magician—to be found all over the world.

Note: It is as if *Ezekiel 37:1/14*, where the prophet 'sees' how the 'dead bones' (of the people of God), thanks to Yahweh's spirit (= life force (WR 132)), became 'alive again', also had an analogous conceptual model before his eyes. Cf. WR 76 (sublimation process, but Biblical).

Conclusion of both digressions.

The devouring, followed by a revival, does not seem so unreal.

(ii)d. The conclusion of the anthropological myth.

(i)a. The Titans are struck down by Zeus' lightning (fire, beam of light, -- either), such that they end up in the prison dungeon (ta Tartara, hoTartaros, --- the deepest part of the underworld).

WR148

(i)b. Dionysus - Zagreus (WR 122) - is revived thanks to the feminine radiance (= fluid) or energy of, besides Athena, also the goddesses Rhea and Demeter. The goddess Athena, in particular, has 'noërèn kradièn' the thinking heart, saved.

Note - An analogy with the wildlife conservation rite emerges here.

(i) The hunters 'preserve' the game, after they have ritually returned it to the Lord/Mistress of the forest, the taiga, who establishes new life from the life force (= energy, fluid) left within it.

(ii) The goddesses, especially Athena, 'preserve' the 'game' hunted by the Titans, the child of Dionysus, by isolating the 'living' heart, which thinks it is, from the devouring ritual told in the myth.

(ii) Mankind, through Zeus' intervention, arises from the ashes of the Titans.

To this the Orphists, or the Paleopythagoreans respectively, attach the idea that the soul of man—insofar as it is titanic, i.e., hellish—wild in its depths, is both guilty of the devouring tritus of the child of Dionysus sent by Zeus, and divine, thanks to that same devouring tritus, for the child of Dionysus was a bearer of Zeus's power.

This twofold human science is regularly called anthropological dualism—

a term that is often used purely pejoratively and—what is more—says virtually nothing without the mythical content.

Decision.

(1) This ancient Greek myth is not without analogy with what follows.

Hermanns, *oc*, 1, 17f., refers to

-- *AE Jensen, Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur* , Stuttgart, 1949-2;

-- *id.*, *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölkern* , Wiesbaden, 1951.

Some planter peoples, characterized by man-hunting, cannibalism, and human sacrifice, know—what Jensen calls—a Dema (a kind of deity). This entity lived in the beginning (WR 45: *archè*), what he calls 'die mythische Urzeit' (the mythical primeval time (WR 93; 139)), before humans existed.

A portion of the Demas became human. At a certain moment in history, they killed a non-human Dema, who has resided in the underworld ever since.

“From the remains of the slain deity arises some plant essential for life (*note*: they are planter peoples). Eating the plant is, immediately, eating the deity (deemed to be present therein).’ (*AE Jensen, Mythos* , 203).

But listen carefully to what Jensen, or Hermanns respectively, says: this vital Dema can also be found on earth in animal or human form and, therefore, immediately, susceptible to killing, devouring, 'sacrifice'.

WR149

Conclusion. -- Even there, in those arch-primitive cultures, on New Guinea, lives the idea “by eating something, one appropriates, supernaturally, the life force, a fluid component of the soul, making the body alive”.

What *Nilsson/Rose, in the Oxford Dictionary* —for a Catholic, in the figurative sense, of course—calls 'sacramental'. Cf. WR 146. No: the devouring, by the Titans, viewed against the background of an idea of subtle matter (WR 49; 134), which, while not identical with the idea of the soul, is nevertheless always connected to it (the soul always has a soul-body or subtle substrate),—that devouring, understood ritually, is essential.

(2) It is evident that the Catholic Eucharistic celebration, in which the bloody sacrifice of Jesus, as the basis of a ritual meal, exhibits the same basic structure, -- although it is true that (WR 76) Catholicism, at least before the demythologization (WR 15; 73; 86; 90ff.), that basic structure

(i) assumes,

(ii) purifies and

(iii) raises to standard.

“Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood, ...”. All this, of course, against the background of demonism, a reality which, although it offers good, nevertheless, somewhere, brings evil and ... conversely (WR 12).

Note: It should be noted, in passing, that occultists who are somewhat knowledgeable in their field are familiar with this state of affairs.

Bibl. sample:

-- R. Ambelain, *Le vampirisme (De la légende au réel)*, Paris, 1977 (a work that deals, above all, with fluid vampirism, i.e., the fact that the ones 'suck the others dry', especially in the blood-soul (substance));

-- R. Delorme, *Les vampires humains*, Paris, 1979 (work that discusses legal vampires, -- among whom Vlad Tepez (' *Dracula* ') is a prototype that became world-famous since the novel by *Bram Stoker* (1891)).

Orphic Anthropology.

Bibl. sample : P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté*, II (*Finitude et culpabilité*), 2 (*La symbolique du mal*), Paris, 1960, 197 (*Les Orphiques*); 261/283 (*Le myth de l'âme exilée et le salut par la connaissance*).

Ricoeur, oc, 264ss. summarizes.

(i) According to Plato, *Kratulos*, 400c, it is mainly the Orphists who have labeled the body (in the gross material sense) as 'sèma', -- as the sign that someone is 'buried' (dead) within it.

WR150

The reason why: the Orphists were convinced that the soul, apparently as “buried in the body”, atones for the sins for which it is punished. The Greek term for body used by the Orphists is 'soma', that gross material shell, which is reminiscent of a 'prison' or 'dungeon', which lasts until the soul has atoned for its guilt.

1. Ricoeur, oc, 265, notes that Plato, in his account, does not label the body as the origin of evil. No: the soul, before it is (re)embodied in the body—tombstone and prison—is already sinful. The body, in which it atones, once 'buried' within it, like a prisoner, is, on the contrary, useful as a means of atonement.

2. Admittedly, the Orficer identifies himself with his soul, -- not with his body, which he tolerates as a place of exile, on account of a fault situated in his soul.

3. The body—as a penal colony—is also a place of temptation and

contamination. Cf. WR 101 (miasma, impurity).

Conclusion. The series of reincarnations (WR 137ff.) amounts to the fact that time and again the soul, in order to atone for a debt and thus incur debt again, becomes imprisoned in the body, as in a tombstone. That is the 'kuklos geneseos', the cycle of (re)becoming, (re)incarnation,

(ii) The Orfiekers differ

(i) of the Homeric idea that the great culprits are punished, while the 'small' culprits are not spoken of, since they attempt to make all people aware of the impending threat of punishment in the afterlife;

(ii) of the Demeter worshippers (WR 148; Demeter (Lt.: Ceres) was the goddess of agriculture (fertility), who was worshipped in mysteries (WR 146), especially at Eleusis (now: Levsina), who, when it comes to the afterlife, do speak of bliss - for the pure and the blessed - but without mentioning punishment, -- which is precisely what the Orphists emphasize.

Immediately, the fear of the Underworld, as a dungeon (but now otherworldly), takes root in the hearts of the followers.

(iii) For the Orphists, soma (body) and hades (underworld) are the same: the body is the Underworld insofar as it extends above the earth's surface, and the Underworld is the same place of punishment as the body, but underground. A typical 'harmony' of opposites (WR 11) leads the Orphists to say: 'life is death'

WR151

Conclusion. -- It is not coarse matter and the earthly body per se against which Orphism is directed. Rather: the senseless and purposeless, tangible in the eternal return of the same underworld 'life' (which is more dead than alive), now on earth, in the body, then again in the Underworld, disembodied.

(iii) Puritanism

ER Dodds, The Greeks, 149, outlines this as follows.

a. "I will (...) use the term 'Puritan doctrine of souls' to represent both the early Orphic and the early Pythagorean belief regarding the soul". This includes the following sub-ideas (WR 5).

(1) The body is the tombstone of the soul.

(2) The soul, although unclean ('stained') by sin, can be cleansed (cf. 'catharsis'; WR 46ff.), thanks to rites (*note*: 'Ritus' is a supernatural act) and also, thanks to avoiding eating meat (WR 144 (devouring); 146 (being devoured

by Titans)), -- which entails vegetarianism.

(3) This purification - which, besides rites and vegetarianism, also entails an ethically good life - applies both in this life and in the underworld life. Cf. Ricoeur, *oc*, 268s.

b. Both Dodds and Ricoeur give the profound reason for Puritanism, namely the concern for purity and the cathartic lifestyle. The soul, although Titanic—that is, an Underworld being—is actually at home in the dungeon. But it partakes in the Titan's feast: the Son of God, Dionysus, by virtue of that meal, is within man. Consequently, there is a luminous, immortal-divine component within man. Cf. WR 76; 121.

Consequently, Orphism and Paleopythagoreism shift the emphasis to the deity, who is immortal, within man. The dull and shadowy existence in the Underworld is not necessary. - Cf. WR 138: Teiresias as escaping the dull-shadowy existence, in the Underworld itself. Cf. WR 86 (the one who 'knows'): the poet, as mantically gifted. These Homeric exemplars are actualized in Orphism and Paleopythagoreism.

c. Reincarnation, as the 'cycle of 're-becoming'', ought to be broken. One wishes to escape it through a process of deification whereby the long process of upbringing, which encompasses many lives, is transcended and culminates in a life that is not Underworldly, but in an Ouranic-Olympian, immortal (WR 76) life. Cf. Dodds, *oc*, 151. -- Later, Plato will discuss the noble soul.

WR152

3.5. -- *The Pythagorean psychagogy.*

The term 'agogie(k)' (WR 6: *agogè*) derives, in its current usage, from J.F. Herbart (1776/1841), who introduced the term 'andragogie' (raising the standard of the lower classes).

Today, that term is interpreted—often, in a leftist, libertarian sense—as the practice and theory of assistance and educational guidance, such that anti-authoritarian 'emancipated' individuals and non-elitist 'democrats' are formed from those who are subservient to the authoritarian and those with an elitist disposition. In this sense, they can be compared, to some extent, with the 'mathematicians', since Hippasos of Metapontion (WR 100).

Agogy is the praxis, agogics is the theory (the doctrinal models), agology is the theory regarding agogics (metatheory).

The Paleopythagorean philosophy as agogy, agogic, agology.

The entire philosophy of the Pythagoreans did not merely possess an

agogy(c), it *was*—essentially—agogy. After all, promoting well-being is the core of agogy(c). Now, 'eu.daimonia', well-being, understood as the possession of a good 'daimon' (determination of destiny), is, in Pythagorean eyes, the highest value.

Heraclitus of Pontus (-390/-310), a Platonist, attributes the following statement to Pythagoras: "The 'eudaimonia', the good lot (on, if necessary, a supernatural basis) inherent to the soul, is the science of (the perfection of) numbers".

We know what 'number' (WR 104ff.) means:

- (i) structure, consisting of 'units' (elements),
- (ii) such that, preferably, the ideal structure (WR 114/118 (Gestalt); 133 (idealized 'form' or structure) is meant.

Well, for the Pythagoreans, it was not about the mere 'theory' (in the modern sense of a 'rationally coherent system of statements'). No: well-being was the goal. A 'theory' that was not well-being-promoting, not 'agogical', was banished. The term 'harmonia', the structure such that all elements fit together in a way that promotes well-being, expresses this.

The Pythagorean agogy(k) as psychagogy(k).

Diogenes Laërtius (200/250) 8:32, states, as Pythagorean doctrine: "Man possesses eudaimonia, well-being, if he comes to acquire a good soul ('psuche')."

However, we must now briefly explain the term eudaimonia. It is one of the terms of the system 'eu.daimonia / kako.daimonia'.

WR153

(A) Is 'eu.daimon', endowed with a natural and supernatural favorable fate factor, the one who possesses both a good soul ('agathe psuche'), i.e. a 'daimon' (deep soul) of his/her own, and a good guardian spirit, i.e. a 'daimon' accompanying him/her, on account of good, conscientious conduct, which overcomes the Titaness (bloodlust and amorous passion).

(B) Is 'kako.daimon', afflicted with a natural and supernatural adverse fate factor, the one who possesses both a bad (deep) soul and a bad accompanying daimon, due to bad behavior that displaces or suppresses the good soul, the divinely luminous soul, within itself, in order to allow the Titaness, which manifests itself primarily in bloodlust and misguided amorous passion, to come to full fruition.

Note-- lot analysis.

A theory concerning fate is, naturally, embedded in this Pythagorean doctrine.

Even the already strongly secularizing Aristotle of Stageira, the Stagirite (-384/-322), will write that 'kala prattein', a morally responsible life, leads to 'kalos prattein', well-being.

There is, incidentally, a fragment attributed to him which states that he ascribed to himself a Pythian daimon, a guide, who drove him toward philosophy. In other words: much like Socrates had one. Cf. O. Willmann, oc, 472f.

Note -- What follows amounts to the core of a paleopythagorean depth psychology. It is, admittedly, unlike the Freudian, not materialistic and atheistic from the outset, but noological and anagogical (thus emphasizing the higher in the soul and its upward orientation).

“(i) Orphism is a spontaneous and secret religion; hence its great emphasis on Dionysus-Zagreus.

(ii) The Pythagorean religion is a religion guided by reason; hence Apollon's first-rate role.

Yet Pythagoreanism, faithful to the principle of general harmony, which manifests itself primarily in the world of deities, does not set Apollo against Dionysus: it unites them (...), according to a principle of subordination, which subjects the irrational to the rational.” (*I. Gobry, Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie* , Paris, 1973, 41).

In other words: what Orphism started, Pythagoreanism develops further.

WR154

Paleopythagorean rhetoric and psychagogy.

Now revisit WR 135/136, briefly:

(i) understanding **(ii)** such that beneficial, welfare-founding influence is exerted (WR 4; 118; 135ff.), -- behold the psychagogical core.

Both the acousticians and—especially—the mathematicians (WR 100: psuch.agogia) aimed at well-being, the former rather authoritatively, the others rather democratically. -- Which is, for example, fully actualizable for teachers, -- even today.

Paleopythagorean anthology.

The agogie(k), respectively. The psychagogy(k) of the Paleopythagoreans stands or falls with their view of man. We now give a brief but substantial

sketch of this. Cfr. O. Willmann, Oc, 274/276.

a. -- Man is a duality of a higher and a lower part. The sustoichia, systechia (opposite pair) 'lower/higher' governs the conception of man, just as in Orphism, which, likewise, reasoned from lower (Titanic) to higher (divine). This -- evidently -- in the cathartic belief in progress (WR 76; 151)

Man is, in his essence, naturally, 'fronimon', soul, as faculty of reflection, -- soul, as immortal being. -- on earth, however, that essence, enveloped in a 'skanos' (= 'skènos', literally: 'sheath'), is the body, which is mortal.

1.-- The somatic part

The somatic part is equal to the beings around us: it consists of the same matter. However, in contrast to Orphism, Paleopythagoreism values (WR 99, where Röd says that the body was interpreted 'as the ground of evil').

Röd confuses Neo-Pythagorean pessimism with Paleo-Pythagorean interpretation of the body) the body: the body bears witness to a very good creator, who took himself as an example when establishing the 'arithmos', the structure, of that body.

2.-- The noological section;

The Paleopythagoreans call the faculty of reflection 'Thurathen', not of 'here': it is—in this one senses a parallel with Orphism—a gift of 'Zeus' (the supreme deity). Yes, it is an 'apospasm', a part detached from the Supreme Deity. It is, therefore, immaterial, like the immortal deities.

WR155

Note-- Mythological remark.

'Myths' are stories of thought.

(1) "As the ancient theologians (WR 73; 129; 139; 149) and seers (WR 88) attest" - thus reads the language of that time (which points to a modernization of traditions) - the soul, or rather the intellect that is its own, suffers from the ailment of the series of reincarnations (WR 138), - this, because of the original guilt (WR 150) and the period of atonement associated with it. Which is both Orphic and Paleo-pythagorean.

(2) Yet, just like the Orphists, the Paleopythagoreans do not resign themselves to this reality of fate: imitation of God, likeness to God, deification, -- behold the goal, the destiny of man, as a higher being. Being human is directed toward regions of light, not toward the underworld.

b. -- Man is a duality of freedom.

"The greatest quality of man lies in his ability to direct the soul towards

both good and evil,” reads a proverb attributed to Pythagoras. 'To direct', in ancient Greek, is 'peisai', literally: 'to persuade'. This amounts to self-influence. (WR. 4). With this, we have a new branch of rhetoric, which is usually understood transitively, building understanding in such a way that one person influences another.

Self-influence – think of the autosuggestive form of significant (WR 20) – is then Reflexive (loop-shaped) rhetoric.

1. As is well known, modern psychology has touched upon this (for example, in a Freudian context) when it speaks of 'rationalization'. When someone—against better judgment—'convinces' (that is the colloquial, but very apt term) that he or she is allowed to allow themselves something, then he or she formulates this in 'rational' (understand: 'reasoning', 'arguing'; 'argumentative') language, internally. This continues until the self-influence appears 'satisfaction-giving'. Compare this 'process' with transitive persuasion (WR 28).

2. Self-determination was overemphasized in, for example, existentialist philosophies. J.P. Sartre (1905/1980), the great French existentialist, emphasizes—according to the structuralists, in an exaggerated manner—'la liberté' (freedom). And in such a way that one gets the impression, at least at certain moments, that neither rule of conduct nor social structure poses any problem whatsoever.

For Sartre, however, self-influence was a very conscious process.

WR156

A second saying, attributed to Pythagoras, reads: “The soul is the storehouse (arsenal) of good, if man is good, of evil, if he is evil.”

The approach, this time, is the reverse of the previous saying. In the previous perspective, what man himself decides in the (deep) soul is reflected in the behavior; in this one, what the (deep) soul holds in reserve (the unconscious directions) is reflected in the behavior.

In other words: his behavior betrays, at the bottom of his 'soul' (here: depth), what influences him/her.

This is, of course, a direct depth-psychic observation.

Note -- This plays right into the hands of the signfici (WR 20), who point to unspoken, possibly unconscious aspects of influence.

Note -- If the harmony of opposites has its application anywhere, it is here:

good and evil spring from one and the same freedom (WR 11).

c. -- *Man is a duality of destiny* .

Indeed: fate is twofold (WR 153).

(i) At death, the pure (understand: ethically responsible) soul is guided by Hermes (WR 68), the 'tamias psuchèn', the steward of souls (from the point of view of sanctioning), to the highest realm (understand: the astral, celestial world). Thus, in the Pythagorean 'catechism', the following reads: "Which are the 'Elusia pedia', the Elysian fields? -- Sun and Moon". One sees: in no case the Underworld! (*Note*: 'Elysian' means: relating to happiness (bliss)').

(ii) At the transition, the impure soul becomes the prey of the Erinues (Erinyes), the frenzied Goddesses of Vengeance. -- immediately it falls into the (senseless; WR 151) 'kuklos anankes' (cycle of fate), the series of reincarnations. Here we see a parallel with Orphism.

d. -- *Man is twofold 'daimonic'* .

WR 79 (76) taught us that 'daimonios', in ancient Greek, means:

(i) extra-natural (WR 76)

(ii) such that this supernatural aspect is fate-determining (WR 79; 153).

First type.

The mind (understand: intellect, faculty of reflection and memory; better yet: expanded consciousness (WR 142)) is, according to 'Golden Words' (a basic Pythagorean text), 'daimon', supernaturally gifted. (Verse 62).

Is 'daimon' (WR 153) what programs fate.

WR157

Note-- In connection with WR 154 (high body rating), the following.

The 'body/soul' relationship is called 'harmonia' (WR 100), merging.-- Here, the Paleopythagoreans proceed from an analogy.

(i) Just as God, the Ruler of the Universe, governs the universe from within, so too does our own daimon, or deep soul, govern the body from within.

Note-- Compare this with WR 96 (Anaximenes' world soul).

(ii) Just as the universe is a 'theion', divinum, 'something divine', thanks to the immanence (= inner presence) of God, so too, by reason of the immanence of the soul-daimon, the body is 'daimonion', something supernatural.

In that analogy, one recognizes the 'macrocosm/microcosm' thought

pattern, but this time applied to the body. One sees that the so-called 'body/soul' dualism by no means necessarily leads to contempt for the body or, even, escapism from the world. Which is, nevertheless, often either explicitly asserted or insinuated.

Second type.

God (named 'Zeus') allows the embodied soul to be guided on earth by a daimon, a guardian spirit. According to the Golden Words mentioned above, this 'daimon' guides the life of man and delivers it from much evil.

Pindar of Kunoskefalai (WR 83; 122; 141), the great lyric poet, in his *Pyth.*, 5: 122, expresses this—Christianly speaking—'faith in guardian angels' as follows: "The spirit of Zeus, the Great, guides the daimon of beloved men". Much later, notwithstanding the Protosophist crisis of faith and morals (WR 64; 121), the comedian Menander of Athens (-342/-290) will say: "As soon as he is born, every man is given a daimon as a guide, as a good 'must.agogos', guide of souls".

The relationship between the two types.

O. Willmann, oc, 274f., describes them as follows.

a. The accompanying daimon is the guardian spirit.

b.1. He is the pre-existing embodiment of the soul, which he guides.

b.2. He is the higher 'self' of it, i.e., he is so one, so fused, with the 'I', that he is, as it were, identical with it. -- All this determines the unconscious (or subconscious) of the guided person.

WR158

The Pythaprean agogy(k) is more than mere psychagogy(k).

The one-sidedness would violate the ideal of harmony that governs the 'body/soul' relationship.

1. Pythagorean agogy(ics) also includes typically bodily aspects. For example

(i) austerity (compared to the wealth that was already emerging at the time);

(ii) healthy diet (with vegetarianism, as already mentioned);

(iii) healthy balance between work and rest, between waking and sleeping.

These were heavily ingrained in the hetaireia, the society (WR 98).

2. Thus it is not surprising that the Pythagoreans conceived of their philosophy as a method of healing (medical art, medicine), insofar as it purified ailments of a physical or spiritual nature. For that too—healing—is 'catharsis', purification. Cf. WR 151 (Orphic model).

O. Willmann, oc, 321, summarizes agogy(k): “philosophy insofar as it is the pursuit of wisdom, is

- (a) the purification and completion of life,
- (b) the highest art of the Muses (WR 81),
- (c) the purest form of consecration.

(*Note:* the Paleo-Pythagoreans (and even more so, but more obscurely, the Neo-Pythagoreans), like Platon later, regarded philosophical formation as structured according to the idea of 'mystery (religion)' (WR 146; 150),

(d) The true method of healing. For just as medicine is worthless if it does not remove diseases from the body, so too is philosophy worthless if it does not banish evil from the soul.

This fourth characterization expresses an analogy: as if, so too. But it is more than that: it concerns a merging ('harmonia'). After all, the archaic idea of 'wisdom' (general education) encompassed a primitive health science.

A Paleo-Pythagorean question-and-answer sentence reveals this further: “What is, among the things inherent to man, the wisest? -- The ability to heal”.

Pythagoras is known as the one who first founded philosophy as a closed system: since he actualized traditional wisdom (WR 155), he could not help but conceive of philosophy as more than merely abstract, life-alien 'rational' thinking, -- although the latter was also part of it.

Herein lies, perhaps, the enormous difference between our strongly Enlightenment-rational 'philosophies' (including their 'crises', present day) and the Paleo-Pythagorean conception of 'philosophizing'! Did Marx not say that “until then, philosophers had merely interpreted the world, but not changed it”? Regarding the Pythagoreans, he was sorely mistaken. For them, 'philosophy' is life that is supposed, purified, and elevated.

WR159

Pyth. -- 4. The Pythagorean concept of beauty.

We interpret this last Pythagorean particle as an example of text generation (essay, treatise). Cf. WR 105 (number-in-motion); 106 (Chomsky's generative model).-- Cfr. WR 5ff. (textuology).-- Therefore, we first provide the schema (WR 105: conceptual framework).

I -- The general universal idea of 'beauty'.

(a) Datum :

(i) the method (**1.** the Milesian 'theoria' (WR 70: list; 88: supplement); **2.** the text WR 98/158 (Pythagoreanism); **3.** possibly: new Pythagorean texts);

(ii) the theme, namely beauty.

(b) Requested (sought):

a description (approximate definition; WR 96).

II.-- the particular (particular) idea 'choreia' beauty.

(a) Given :

(i) the method (see above; -- but applied to choreia); the tradition-hermeneutic method (namely (i) the tradition (shamanistic choreia and Orphic choreia); (ii) actualization, in the Pythagorean way);

(ii) the theme, namely beauty, inherent in the choreia.

(b). Asked (sought):


A description.

Note: This schema ('content-based framework' or 'arithmos', expressed in Pythagorean terms) is applicable without limits, since virtually every theme can be split into universal and particular (indeed, singular) approaches.

Note: Textually (textuologically) and linguistically generatively, one can say that the text that will now follow has 'beauty' as its subject and a finite collection of sentences as predicates, in which—directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly—'beauty-(ness)' (understood Pythagoreantly) is the subject—a subject that is, as the Dutch like to say, expressed in a plurality of predicates (in the various clauses of the text as a whole).

Since these sentences are countable, for they are finite in number, the text will be a genuine application (a verifying application, at that) of the Pythagorean conception that the text is generated as a multiple of one(ness), namely, from one idea (understood Pythagoreically) 'beauty'.

Note-- As 'gramma' (WR 111; configuration), the text can be drawn, grosso modo, as follows.



Note: This is a primal traditional Pythagorean scheme: splitting.

WR160

4.1.-- The general idea 'beauty'

(a) Datum .

WR 70; 88.-

1. 'Theoria', a Paleo-Pythagorean idea that we have clarified following Thales' philosophical statements or traditions, means that one penetrates, through sensory data—e.g., the columns of the Parthenon in Athens, which, according to a study by Georgiadès (*J. Brun, Les Présocratiques*, Paris, 1982-3, 35), were built according to the Pythagorean staff (WR 129)—through an 'empeiria', sensory observation, to an invisible fact—here the structure of the Pythagorean 'octave' (staff interpretation), by means of 'logismos', reasoning, which reveals that invisible fact. In other words, we extend the earlier idea of 'theoria' to the perception of what the Pythagoreans call 'beautiful'.

2. Theoria, fathoming, in this number, can proceed in the form of 'sumpatheia' (WR 85), i.e., the sensing, from subject (the beauty-enjoyer) to object (the enjoyed beauty), of what beauty(ness) is. This sensing has the structure 'the like (the beauty in the 'object') by means of the like (the beauty in the subject, -- which the Platonists, later, will call the idea 'beauty(ness)'). Paleo-Pythagorean: the (objective) number (in the beauty) by means of the (subjective) number (in the idea, number-idea, 'the beauty', in our mind).

Plato speaks here of the noble yoke (understand: the union, the mutual dependence, of object and subject). Cf. O. Willmann, oc. 439.-- Cf. WR 133 (two planes).

(b) Requested.

A description, in Pythagorean terms, of the essence (WR 96: definition) of the beautiful.

The elaboration. -- This addresses the question asked. We divide (= splitting; WR 159) - methodologically - into two parts.

(a) the lemma, i.e. the universal idea (as Gestalt; WR 118);

(b) the applications, i.e. the verifications (peirastic reduction).

(a) the lemma (hypothesis). - Starting from the main idea 'harmony', one can 'guess' that 'beautiful' is the same as harmonious, which fits together. However, starting from the second main idea 'eudaimonia' (WR 152ff.), we 'guess' that harmony ought to be both beneficial to well-being in order to be called 'beautiful', -- in the Pythagorean sense, at least.

WR161

(b) The deductive reduction

After the lemmatic reduction comes the derivation: if the previous conjecture (the Gestalt 'well-being-founding merging') is correct, then we ought to be able to find statements or other applications that are model-identical to the conjecture.

(c) *The Peirastic, verifiative reduction.*

There is, indeed, a preserved 'akousma', a maxim, which reads as follows: "what is the most beautiful? -- harmony". This expresses, in the form of a maximum, that beauty and harmony go together. Cf. O. Willmann, *oc*, 283.

The further elaboration.

Let us break this down further. -- Starting from the idea that harmony is always numerical (WR 111ff.), we can surmise that a Pythagorean—if at all possible—will emphasize the numerical and the configurative (that belongs with it) in the beautiful.

Indeed: Sextos Empeirikos ($\pm$ +150/200), where he speaks of the Pythagoreans—as a skeptic, mind you—says: "No art has come into being without proportionality (WR 109; 129). Now, proportionality consists in a number. Consequence: every art comes into being through a number (...).

Consequence: there is a proportionality in plastic art (sculpture, apparently), likewise in painting, -- this, in order to achieve likeness and the absence of distortion." (*Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Aesthetik* , I (*Die Aesthetik der Antike*), 112).

Here, the proportionality is meant between the object depicted in the image or painting and the image or painting. -- But we know that proportionality, in the form of a (possibly idealized) form (WR 114ff.), was already deemed to be present in the object, that which was to be depicted in the image or painting.

There is more: Ioannès Stobeus (Stobaeus) (between +400 and +500) says: "Order and proportionality are beautiful and useful. Disorder and disproportionality are ugly and useless".

Iamblichus (+250/ +333) speaks in the same vein in his *Life of Pythagoras*, 203.

Conclusion. -- 'summetria', proportionality, -- the mutual relationship of the parts ('points') of a whole (= harmony), as a quantity expressible in numbers, is an essential component of beauty, at least where it is measurable (WR 129). Where measure is involved. It is the mathematical moment (part, aspect) of harmony.

WR162

Summary.

The first elaboration related to the beneficial, welfare-founding character of harmony; the second ('further') to the mathematical aspect of that harmony. This twofold definition (harmony, symmetry) is confirmed by Tatarkiewicz, *oc*,

107. -- Twice we have used the reductive method (lemma, deduction, testing).

The typological (= specific, similar) elaboration.

We now have a universal concept of 'clean'. But can we verify it regarding the types (kinds) of 'clean'?

(i) The pair 'natural beauty/artificial beauty'.

Bibl. sample:

- J. Segond, *Traite d'esthétique*, Paris, 1947;
- P. Fierens, *Les grandes étapes de l'esthétique*, Bruxelles/Paris, 1945;
- D. Huisman, *L'esthétique*, Paris, 1983-9;
- Cl. Khodoss, ed., *Hegel, Esthétique*, Paris, 1954.

D. Huisman, oc. 119, touches upon the idea of Prof. *Edgar De Bruyne* (in his **Esquisse d'une philosophie de l'art**), who distinguishes between natural beauty and artistic beauty. Huisman calls such a definition 'infiniment trop vaste' (boundlessly exceeding measure). But what does Huisman do with an art photograph, which depicts a 'beautiful' landscape? Or with a painting (a work of art), which depicts natural beauty? If only because the two are not absolutely separable, we must hold on to De Bruyne's idea.

(i)a. 'Aesthetics' is the theory, the fathoming, of beauty, whether it be natural or artificial beauty. The foundation, as experience, is the encounter (sumpatheia).

(i)b.1 . The Pythagoreans knew 'natural beauty'. WR 124ff. (the (musical) teaches us: there is order, harmony, even mathematical harmony (= symmetry) in the universe. Read, now, WR 126ff. (Pythagoras' theory of the starry sky).

Read, also, WR 128 (Pythagoras recognized the octave (= harmony) in the resounding hammers of the blacksmith). Fusion, nature, covers harmony, symmetry, which is pleasant to hear and which has a beneficial effect, establishing 'eudaimonia'. Note well: the blacksmiths are not musicians! Their hammering, not intended to be musical, contains sonority.

(i)b.2 . The Pythagoreans knew 'artificial beauty', of course. We are now splitting that up.

(ii)a. the cultural landscape. -- Hippodamos of Miletus, a Pythagorean urban planner, rebuilt the previously destroyed city of Miletus in 479.

WR163

In 446 BC, he rebuilt the Athenian port city of Peiraieus (Pireils); after 450 BC, he rebuilt Priènè (present-day Samsun - Kalesi; in Ionia).

The fundamental structure, 'arithmos', of those cities is the chessboard. Rectangular street intersections, orientation of the streets according to the cardinal directions, mathematical regularity (symmetry)—these are the characteristics.

As the accompanying sketch (very rough) by Priènè shows, 'Forms' (WR 114ff.), characterized by proportions and regularity, were implanted in the fisis, nature, as it were, imposed upon nature.



Fr. Krafft, *Gessh. d. Naturwissenschaft*, I, 230ff., speaks of 'hyperrationalism'. Whether that is the correct word is not so certain.

It would be better to speak of 'musicalism' (the sonority of the ground plan was decisive).

Alongside: The 'gramma' (drawn plan) of Hippodamos' ground structure of Prènè, with the natural contour lines

(ii)b. The building.

As stated (WR 160), according to an analysis by Geogiades, numerical values were found in the spaces (intervals) between the columns of the Parthenon that were exactly (WR 113: akribeia) proportional to the Pythagorean staff. Cf. WR 129. This architectural harmony—think also of hexagons, rose windows, etc.—was established by *Marcus Vitruvius Pollio* (between -100 and 0) in his * *De architectura* *, and, from there, passed on to the architects of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Cf. WR 119 (musicological aftermath).

(ii)c. The statue and the painting.

Cf. WR 161.

Decision.

We are standing, here, before (what would be called Piaget; WR 109; 112; 114; 128; 130) a structure.

(i) A system (entirety of city plans, buildings, sculptures, paintings)

(ii) exhibits self-regulation (i.e. the same idea of beauty 'harmony', or if

necessary symmetry, which comes across as beneficial (musically); the 'structure' in the strict sense)

(iii) and this through the transformations (from cultural landscape to building, from building to sculpture, from sculpture to painting).

WR164

“The artistic conception of the Pythagoreans was adopted everywhere in Greece—albeit in a slightly milder sense: beauty stands or falls with order, that is, regularity in the mutual arrangement of the parts of a whole (*note*: that whole is city plan, building, statue, painting). (...) In the narrower sense, however, namely that beauty stands or falls with measurability ('measure' and countability ('number')), this interpretation remained the idea of only a few art movements and art theories.” (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, *oc*, 107). This signifies the enormous scope of Paleopythagorean aesthetics.

Note: To return, briefly, to the structural idea of 'structure' (WR 109): harmony (possibly conceived mathematically), as promoting well-being, is the measure ('metron') by which the beauty of a cultural landscape, a building, a sculpture, or a painting is measured. Or: harmony (conceived in this way) is the structure by which the beauty of those things is structured; one can see how close arithmological Pythagoreanism stands to some basic aspects of structuralism.

4.2.-- The special idea 'beauty of choreia'

(a) **Given :** (164/166) the choreia (WR 82; --125ff.), i.e. the unity of the 'trinity' (WR 104: trichotomia) music, dance, song (poem); although existing in themselves, they were often practiced together; --- given, secondly, the tradition-hermeneutic method (WR 11 (hermeneutics as textual interpretation); 15 (literary doctrine); 17 (hermeneutics of meaning); 20 (comparative hermeneutics)).

Digression.

We interrupt the schema to definitively sharpen the idea of 'hermeneutics'.

H. Arvon, La philosophie allemande , Paris, 1970, 116/120 (*L'herméneutique*), provides an overview.

1. The classical-traditional meaning is “the skill, or discipline, that makes possible the interpretation (interpreting, explaining, 'understanding', 'comprehending') of transmitted texts (such as a Code of Laws (judicial remembrance); the Bible (Biblical remembrance)). It is an auxiliary discipline of, for example, literary studies. See above, for example: WR 11, etc., as examples.

2.1. F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861), founder of the Historical School, gave a new emphasis: 'hermeneutics' is, above all, accurate 're-pristination' (empathizing, down to the details, with the past through the interpretation of historical documents: "How did people think and live in the past?". WR 3 (cultural-historical method, -- elaborated for Thales: WR 31/91)). This is a method valid for historical analysis.

WR165

2.2.a. *FD Schleiermacher* (1768/1834), in his *Dialektik* (1839), re-establishes hermeneutics: it becomes a science of interpretation, with transmitted texts as its object—that of the Bible, yet in such a way that the meaning of the Bible is understood by experiencing it (existentially); only the one who attempts to make the text real in his personal life understands ('Verstehen') the meaning of the Bible (cf. WR 17): hermeneutics of meaning-making, referring to an interpretation that extends beyond the textual data; this is still 'repristinating': one seeks to 'understand' the meaning of the text as it was understood at the time;

Schleiermacher would add a second degree to that first degree of meaning-making: I, personally, attempt to make the ideal of 'the reverent human being' 'real' in my own life; in other words: I 'actualize' the text (and its 'meaning').

2.2.b. W. Dilthey (1833/1911), founder of the humanistic method, re-establishes hermeneutics as a science of interpretation, with human behavior as its object (formerly, based on documents), such that the life of the soul is 'understood' ('verstehen'), this not without a minimum of personal, 'existential' experience of it (axiom of essential equality).

Decision.

In all four variants, the same structure is exposed.

(i) one cannot understand without repristination (empathizing with what the transmitted material meant in its time).

(ii) But one cannot understand without minimal actualization ('to realize,' say the Anglo-Saxons, who immerse themselves in what has been handed down, as if one were, somewhat, personally involved in it, now, in one's own time). Schleiermacher goes furthest in this actualization.

Between the time when tradition originated and the time in which it is interpreted, now, lies a cultural-historical interval: elements of the situation have changed. This change in the situation is called 'historicity': we have history and we make history.

Traditional hermeneutics therefore means the fact that people interpret the past (tradition) within the context of current circumstances. They actualize the transmission. Traditional hermeneutics also means the science of that actualization.

WR166

As an application model thereof, we refer to WR 103/130 (the Pythagorean number): we have, therein, insofar as this introductory course makes this possible,

(i) Reconstituting, attempted to 'understand' the then-current sense (meaning) of the one and its multiples (numbers) (first type of interpretation),

(ii) Actualizing, attempting to translate the meaning of the time into current ideas (e.g. Chomskyan algorithm; Gestalt; Piagetian 'structure'),-- this, in order to give it a current, present meaning -- which is still useful, notwithstanding the enormous cultural-historical interval that separates us from the Paleo-Pythagoreans. That is the point.

(b) *asked (sought)*

A description of the manner in which the Paleophythagoreans 'understood' ('interpreted', 'interpreted') the transmitted choreia and established an actualized choreia. In other words: how they re-established the choreia.

4.2.A .-- *The transmitted choreia* .

This one was threefold.

(a) *The shamanic chorea* .

WR 99; 140v.-- M. Hermanns, *Schamanen* , 4, says “Thus the activity of the shaman/shamaness is, to an entirely essential part, artistic:

- (i)** portray, act out;
- (ii)** sing, dance; or
- (iii)** painting”.

Or again: “The girl mentioned in the poem *Gau tang* , who appears to the king in his dream and initiates him into the erotic art, becomes a shaman, then a maiden of the deities, finally a shaman goddess.”

She was venerated on the centrally situated mountain of worship for the pa-people, on which music resounded on the occasion of the famous folk festival on the full moon night of the eighth month. (...).

As components of the shamanistic whole, (a connoisseur) W. Eberhard

lists: “Worship of a shaman goddess, - shaman dances, shaman songs, general melancholic mood of the songs - god of shaman dances (...)”. (M. Hermanns, oc,16).

Conclusion: if, as Dodds supposes, Pythagoras was a shaman, then the central significance of choreia in total Pythagorean philosophy becomes 'understandable' (WR 161).

(b) The Orphic Choreia .

Wl. Tatarkiewicz, oc, 108, says: “The theorem of the Pythagoreans—that music represents a power—had its root

- (i) not only in the art of the Greeks,
- (ii) but also in the religion of the Greeks, -- more specifically in the ideas of the Orphists.”

WR167

The essence of those ideas comes down to this:

- a. The soul is like a prisoner in the body, -- this, due to an incurred debt;
- b. She shall be liberated as soon as she cleanses herself of that guilt: her cleansing and liberation is the highest goal of man.
- c. The mysteries (WR 146; 150; 158) of the Orfiekers contributed to that goal.
- d. Dances and music also played a role in this.” Cf. WR 139; 143/151 (Orphic animism).

Loukianos of Samosata (a Syrian city) (+125/+192), On the dance, says the following.

(1) Orpheus and Mousaios (a mythical, perhaps historical singer (Herod., 7: 6), who is closely associated with Orpheus) were the most perfect dancers of their time. They founded 'mysteries'.

Well then, - according to Lucian - an archaic initiation (WR 158: consecration service), which has no 'orchestral' accompaniment, is nowhere to be found. 'Orchestikos' means 'that which has to do with dance'. Orpheus and Mousaios, too, have, in the very structure of their mysteries,

- (i) 'rhuthmos' (i the movement, insofar as provided with regulation (wr 109: self-regulation (= structuring)) and measure), 'rhythm', and
- (ii) dance introduced.

(2) The genealogy (origin story) of dance.

The most reliable 'genealogists' (origin storytellers) - according to Lucian - say

(i) that dance is as old as the 'cosmogonic (= standing at the origin of the cosmos) 'eros', love passion (both a force and a personal being)

Cfr. WR 39 (Hesiodic); 40 (Original couple); 102 (Dionysian and Orphic - Pythagorean Eros); 143 (Fanès - Eros) 145 (Desire) --; that this Eros gave all beings their order.

(ii) that the chorus of celestial bodies - planets, fixed stars - characterized by

a. their harmonious relationship (WR 85: *sumpatheia*),

b . their magnificent performance with music, dance, and song (WR 120: cosmic music); 125 (Muses' song / heavenly music)), the prototype and the models were performed by 'mortals' for the 'first', the dance of origin. Compare with WR 103 (the orbit, in 'understanding' (*sumpatheia*) with the sun ('identitive method')).

Bibl. sample:

-- L. Séchan, *La danse grecque* , Paris, 1930, -- 35s., 37, 39.,

-- O. Willmann , oc, 632 ("Just as the Kouretes (Hes., Fr. 198: the protectors of Zeus, as babies, on Crete, by means of their dance) and the Korubantes (the Cubist -eunuchs, who, in Phrygia, performed 'wild' dances and songs), so the Sali, the dancers, seem to represent the moving celestial bodies").

WR168

Indeed: 'salire', in Latin, means 'to dance'. The Sali belonged to a sacred society found in many cities of Italy—usually as worshippers of war—for example in Rome, Lavinium, Tusculum, Aricia, Anagnia,—especially at Tibur (where they were associated with Hercules).

Note-- L. Séchan, *La danse grecque* , 38, emphasizes, in addition to the universal (= cosmic) character, the divinely inspired character.

(1) "When Lucius Apuleius Theseus (+125/+180; a Roman thinker) wishes to characterize the true nature of the Greek deities, he says, quite rightly: "Graeca numina plerumque choreis gaudent" (The Greek deities usually go on tightrope walks) (...). Gods such as Dionysus, Apollo, and Ares were often called 'dancers'; -- together with Pan, whom Pindar (WR 83) proclaims to be the most skillful dancer among the 'immortals' (WR 76)".

(2) "Pan (a son of Hermes (WR 68), at home, among the shepherds, in the Arcadian mountains, on the Peloponnese) is the brilliant dancer on lonely mountain heights, while (,..) the oreiades, the mountain nymphs (WR 80), like invisible musical artists, are singing, deep in the caves, weaving fine fabrics

that no mortal would ever get to see. (...)

As soon as dawn rises, the Muses (WR 81; 124) form their dance choruses on Mount Helikon (nowadays: Zagora), in the vicinity of inspirational springs(...)."

Note -- Lucian -- just mentioned -- says that Rhea (*note* -- The mother of Zeus, the Supreme God), was the first to teach dancing to the (mentioned above) Kouretes (Crete) and Korubantes (Phrygia). To such an extent, choreia was considered inspired by the ancient Greeks. Cf. WR 81 (inspirantes); 85 (sumpatheia).

Decision.

For both shamanism and orphism, choreia is regarded as a religious phenomenon that is both inspired and cosmic-universal.

When one forgets this dual aspect, one understands virtually nothing of the high reverence with which the ancients approached them—the Paleophythagoreans not excepted.

Note: We recall—briefly—the Dionysian choreia (WR 121ff), which was rejected as inferior music by both the Orphists and the Pythagoreans.

WR169

Admittedly not without retaining the essence of it, on a higher level, namely the animistic side: "From the states of intoxication which (the Pythagoreans) established in Bakchian (= Dionysian) music, they drew the conclusion that the soul, under the influence of such music, frees itself (WR 140 (out-of-body experience); 147) and, for a while, leaves the body". (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, oc,108).-- This was, incidentally, also typically Orphic,

4.2.B.-- The re-established choreia.

Let us now see what the Pythagoreans founded, starting from the tradition.

(I) Given

(1) The method .

This is the anciently understood 'comprehending' method:

a. in the object, the 'soul' (WR 133), i.e. the 'number' (WR. 105 (the conceptual framework)); in the subject, the image (the likeness of the soul/ the number of the object); both, together, Platon's noble yoke, which, fluidly, is called 'sumpatheia' (sensation) (WR 160);

b. behold the type of 'theoria' that the Pythagoreans practiced.

That this theory can be called a truly understanding method is evident from the fact that the rhythms were called the 'homoiomata', reflections ('projections' (WR 14)) of the soul (W1. Tatarkiewicz, oc,109). The soul expresses itself in music, dance, and song. This is its expressive essence.

Now, Dilthey, Spranger, and others, who apply the *verstehende* method, engage in behavioral analysis in such a way that, through observable external behavior (history), the soul and its 'life' are, as it were, directly perceived. This is called—but within an ancient Greek framework—'theoria', that is, 'seeing' the invisible through the visible (WR 41).

A major difference: the fluid penetration into the object, in the *sumpatheia*, is lacking in the Dilthean-conceived method, which, here, speaks of the axiom of essential similarity.

In other words: here too, the theory is groundbreaking and still relevant to us (WR 4: *philosophia perennis*).

It is the case that the Paleopythagoreans noted two moments, which are, admittedly, somewhat exaggerated by Tatarkiewicz:

- (i) the reflexive moment (WR 155), i.e. the effect of the music on the one who himself dances, plays music, sings, and
- (ii) the transitive moment, i.e. its effect on the mere spectator.

WR170

(2) *The theme:*

We just mentioned it, namely the twofold, reflexive or loop-shaped and transitive or transitional action.

(II) *asked*

A description, based on the main ideas (number, soul) of Pythagoreanism.

(III).a. *The lemma* (= abductive (WR 60) reduction).

WR 110 taught us that Pythagorean idealism discovered at least two aspects in all beings:

- a.** the pre-existing and
- b.** the immanent. Here, too, that will be the case.

The rhythms (music, dance, song) are inspired by the deities (first type of pre-existence) and they are enclosed within the fusion itself (second type of pre-existence). That fusion, nature, is twofold:

- i.** it is nature, around us (e.g. the celestial bodies, in constant motion; the

blows of blacksmiths' hammers);

ii. but she is also something that is present, as innate, in one's own daimon (WR 156: depth-psychological) or deep soul.

It is the case that one understands the following witness text: "One sees the nature and the power of numbers

(i) not only in divine and daimonic things,

ii) but also in human words and deeds, everywhere, in all musical (*note*: intellectual) activities and, immediately, also in music. The numbers and the harmony (WR 161) tolerate no deceit". Thus Philolaos of Croton (-470/-400).

Furthermore, this Platonic text (*Platon* , via Damon of Athens, was, regarding music, largely a Pythagorean, so that his statement, indirectly, provides the proof we seek): the deities (WR 168) have given the sense of measure and harmony—as a gift—to mankind, as a sign of their human dignity. Dance developed thanks to the inspiration of those same deities." (*Laws* , 2: 654a).

Hippodamus of Miletus (WR 162ff.) says: "Harmony is the 'virtue' (*note* : that which constitutes soundness: soundness) of the universe. Eunomia (WR 93; 125; 129), i.e., virtuous regularity, is the 'virtue' of the polis (society). Health and strength (WR 157) is the 'virtue' of the body.

In all these things every part is fixed in function of the whole and of the totality. O. Willmann, oc, 327; cf. WR 114: Gestalt).

Conclusion. -- These testimonies confirm ('verify') the lemma: for and simultaneously within the actual music, dance, and song, welfare-promoting harmony is, possibly numerically, active.

WR171

In other words: before people actually play music, dance, or sing, there is already a 'seal' which – in the ancient Greek language – is a fundamental chord (O. Willmann, oc,27f. ('sfragis', as a diminutive: 'sfragidion' (little seal), which coincides with the center of the universe (as world soul (substance) (WR 97; 134))).

This fundamental chord or seal is considered, by Philolaos of Croton (WR 170), to be situated in (what he calls) 'the center of the universe's fire' ('hestia', in Latin: Vesta, the goddess of the hearth). WR 104 (division signatures); 108 (branching model); -- 112 (configurative branching or generation model);-- all these places, above, show the (numerical or configurative) one(ness), calculated as 'sfragidion', little universe seal.

Another name, among the Paleopythagoreans, for that cosmic hearth—center point—is 'archidion' (O. Willmann, oc, 308), di arche-in-the-miniature (WR 45).—micro-arche, if you will.—Not only all multiples of the one(ness) or all configurations thereof, but also all music—at least, in the insights of a Philolaos et al.—are generated, 'begotten'; WR 40), calculated, by the power of that 'archidion' or 'sfragidion', that micro-principle or micro-seal, which is always noticed and/or felt by the 'seers' (WR 88ff.), in the midst of a small hearth or, even, simply, a flame.

Note-- Bibl. sample: except for O. Willmann, oc,308f., where the text is mentioned with the original (but too difficult) Greek terms, attributed to Philolaos, already in the 1907-2 edition, reference is made to Mattei, ac, 2165.

Mattei calls this the pyrocentric view of the universe: the celestial bodies—sun, moon, planets, stars—revolve, according to such views, around a (mind you) cosmic hearth, expressly labeled as invisible by Mattei. One of the names Mattei cites—as originating from Philolaos—is 'the hestia of the universe' or, as he describes it: 'foyer du monde' (world hearth).

Heraclitus of Ephesus (whom we came to know in the First Year of the Course (Theory of Thought) as the oldest known representative of modern dialectical thought (Hegel, Marx – the 'scientific dialecticians')) also speaks, in some of his fragments, of the ever-living (cosmic) fire. This proves that we are faced here with a fundamental concept that is more than merely Paleo-Pythagorean.

WR172

Note-- WR 102 taught us, with the idea of 'eros', the driving force ('drive') in what man does, in making music, dancing, singing. WR 134, with the capacity for inspiration and zest for life, taught us two forms, generated (WR 106: procreation) by Eros, which, strictly speaking, is the capacity for procreation. -- It is that moving (WR 100: moving things) force which, emanating from the little seal, little cradle, little beginning, is active and establishes creativity, a constantly new actualization of what precedes.

As A. Nygren, *Erôs et Agapè*, 1: 176/180, says: Eros (conceived as higher, anagogical) arose from religion, -- more specifically in the midst of the mysteries (WR 146), and indeed the Orphic ones, which attribute to the principle of the universe the fact that it "awakens a noble goal in mortals" (O. Willmann, oc,27: literally, from an Orphic hymn).

This 'noble goal' arises, according to the Orphists, from the divine side ('Dionysus side'; WR 151), in man, since the Titan's meal.

(1) The Pythagoreans incorporated this, in their concept of 'fronimon', capacity for reflection, into their own view of man (WR 154ff.). For them, 'Eros' focuses on the unity multiples (number structures) and the soul(s).

(2) In Plato, later, 'Eros' will focus on the ideas (which he conceived as seals of visible things) and, in his pupil Aristotle, on the 'forms', i.e. the germs (seeds; WR 105: biological model), active in the visible things themselves. - But - in contrast to the Freudian Eros - also anagogically directed towards the higher, towards elevation (based on purification; WR 46: cathartic; 76: raising of the standard). The lower Eros, zest for life,

(i) is assumed,

(ii) is purified and

(iii) raised on a higher plane.

That the Paleophythagoreans, in particular, harbored no illusions regarding the lower nature of man on this point is evident from an akousma, a saying: "Insofar as you do not know yourself, think that you are not your own master" (in Greek: 'mainesthai': to be mad).

In that sense, they actualize the ancient Apollonian ethics, which we came to know in WV53ff. (the know-thy-self ethics), with a particular application of transgression, namely mania, the lack of self-control, to the point of frenzy—as is easily expressed in music, dance, and song (WR 81: witches' sabbath; 122: Dionysian music).

WR173

(III).B. *Deduction and testing* (= deductive and peirastic ed.).

Wl. Tatarkiewicz, oc 107, says that, for the Paleophythagoreans, music "is a power that touches the soul".

Do they

(i) derived from this (deductive reduction) that they could work this out practically and

(ii) did they, by attempting it (testing or Peirastic reduction), try to obtain a definitive answer regarding this? Which would be merely the historia, the inquiry (WR 40), which they adopted from the Milesians (and extended to the unity multiples and the souls). -- Apparently so.

a. Aristoxenus of Taranton (-370/...), an Aristotle, who wrote a theory and historical overview of music, but who took lessons from a Pythagorean, says that

(i) the Pythagoreans exercised catharsis (WR 172; -- 158: purifying character of philosophy)

(ii) on the body (WR 158) by means of medical methods and on the soul by means of music.

b. *Iamblichus of Chalkis* (c. 250/c. 333), one of the leading figures of Neoplatonic theosophy (WR 101), wrote a *Life of Pythagoras*. In it he says: “It is claimed that (the Pythagoreans) made use of magic songs (WR 136: rhetoric) in the treatment of some diseases. Their premise was: music, too, if applied correctly, contributes much to healing.”

They also engaged in the reading of verses, namely those of Homer and Hesiod (WR 39). But they selected those verses with a view to the recovery of the mentally ill.”

a. Let us not forget that poetry originally coincided either with song or, at least, coincided much more with choreia (dance, music) than it does now.

b. Note that not just any music or verses, but specifically applied music and selected poetry were employed. This is the Puritan (anagogic, striving for elevation) principle of fastidiousness or 'selectivity'.

Note -- (i) The Paleophythagoreans were, apparently, not proponents of 'art for art's sake' (“L'art pour l'art”).

Note-- *Théophile Gautier* (1811/1872), in his * *Albertus* * (1832—a horror story with a preface), proclaimed aestheticism, that is, the proposition that art and the creation of beauty have nothing to do with ethics; one practices art for art's sake. For him, this was a kind of 'consolation' for the hopelessness from which he suffered due to his disbelief.

WR174

(ii) Nor were the Paleophythagoreans 'libertarians' (WR 124). Our current libertarians, following in Nietzsche's footsteps, place desire ('le Désir', *D. Huisman, L'esthétique*, 61) at the center. “Art has an increasing tendency to 'contest' ('contest') itself, insofar as it has become a fixed institution: the 'happening', the celebration ('la fête'), 'gestural' art (the art of 'the gesture'), lyrical abstraction, Pop Concerts, Body Art, -- all these 'activities' are utopian.

'Utopian' in the sense that those who practice or participate in libertarian art harbor no fixed ideas.

In other words:

(i) The self-indulgence of desire

(ii) so that all established ideas, ideals and values are called into question. This is called libertarian 'creativity'.

It is clear that Pythagoreanism, for reasons of

(a) Harmony will never value aesthetic pleasure in itself, but always within the context of the whole of life, which, for him, is essentially ethically substantiated (WR 153: determination of destiny, also based on ethical conduct); in other words: even amidst the most intense or the finest aesthetic experience, man has a conscience; -- for reasons also of

(b) the welfare foundation, which is responsible for all activities (WR 152: agogy). WR 160 approved only aesthetics if its welfare foundation.

The two: ethics such that well-being arises and well-being such that ethical behavior arises, cause the Pythagorean to reject both aestheticism (which cultivates one-sidedness) and libertarianism (which cultivates one-sidedness, but in a second way).

Those in antiquity who advocated, approximately, an aestheticist and libertarian experience of beauty were the Protosophists (WR 64; 78: 82; 84:--121).

The definition of 'beautiful' reads: "Beautiful is that which is pleasing to the ear and to the sight." Thus *Plato, Hipp. mai.* 298 a.; which Aristotle confirms (Top., 146a, 21). It should be noted that 'hearing', here, is merely (gross) material hearing (WR 126ff.: the 'hearing' of the unified multiples), whereas 'seeing', here, likewise, is merely (gross) material seeing.

"Such a definition was the aesthetic expression of sensualism and hedonism, of which they were adherents." (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, oc, 122).

'Sensualism' means assuming merely the (gross) material form of perception as a subjective experience.

WR175

Note: We write (gross) matter. Why? Because some Protosophists, such as their leading figure, apparently also assumed subtle matter (we will return to this later). But they did not do this (anymore) in order to penetrate either the soul or the unity and its multiplicity (or the Platonic ideas and/or the Aristotelian 'forms'), as a form of *theoria* (WR 41). Even in their 'belief' in subtle matter, the Protosophists remained attached to the gross matter.

'Hedonism' means the fact that, as the meaning of life, one prioritizes enjoyment, pleasure, in all forms (from the more refined to, in more than one case, very base forms). -- It is clear that both general idealism (WR 110; 133;-172 (anagogic idealism)) and anagogic idealism prevented the Pythagoreans from both mere sensualism (philosophy of the senses) and mere hedonism

(philosophy of enjoyment).

c. Aristeides Kouintilianos (between +200 and +400), a Neoplatonic (WR 101) theosophist who wrote *On Music*, in the tradition of Aristoxenos (WR 173), writes: “Since the Paleopythagoreans established (the influence of music) from childhood, they compelled schoolchildren to practice music.

In doing so, they employed only keyed melodies and rhythms as melodies and rhythms. By legislation, they regulated—both for private parties and for public worship of deities—the performance of widely known melodies. They called these 'laws' (nomoi; WR 129).

They did this to achieve permanence in the organization of religious celebrations. By the very name 'laws', they proclaimed aloud that it ought to remain unchanged.

Note-- WR 100 introduced us to the conservative characteristic of at least a portion of the Paleophythagoreans.

We believe that Aristeides offers us an application of this. This should certainly not be generalized. -- However, it does reveal insight into the possible educational 'value' that rejects the purely hedonistic (pleasure-seeking) or the purely Dionysian (indulgent) approach. Note, once again (WR 173), the principle of selectivity.

d. Platon, a thinker who became increasingly Pythagorean as he grew older, says: “It is necessary that our young people
(i) not just dance well
(ii) but also dance 'the good'.

“A truly educated person ought to be able to dance and sing well.” Such statements confirm what the Paleophythagoreans already said. -- Cf. L. Sechan, oc, 45.

WR176

Note: Wl. Tatarkiewicz, oc, 109f., points to a politicization of music, which was advocated by Damon of Athens (c. 450), a rather conservative Pythagorean, and by the Plato mentioned just above.

Damon was a member of the Areopagus (an administrative institution). At a certain point, he sent a circular to its fellow members. In it, he identified innovations in music. In this, he saw a danger to the city-state.

His argument sounded as follows.

(1) *The interaction*

The interaction between soul and rhythm (WR 169) is such that the—what Damon calls—'correct' rhythm is the 'homoionia', the expression, of the 'eu.nomia', the sound regularity (WR 170), and vice versa.

(2) *Application.*

Singing and making music instill in youth not only courage or a sense of measure, but even a sense of justice.

Consequence -- A change in music will inevitably bring about a change in the political system.

Plato shared this politicization. It is clear that here, once again, the conservative, indeed, aristocratizing nature of some Pythagoreans (WR 100: authoritarian tendency) is at work. As has been said: this wing was not the only one.

Note: State systems exist even today—one need only think of the communist state guidelines for artistic practice, which politicize what is in itself certainly not inherently political. Anyone familiar with actual state authorities can suspect the naivety of Damon and Platon, who believe that music, dance, and song must, once again, be subjected to legislation and—what accompanies it—state control.

e. Theon of Smurna (1151+140), a Platonic scholar, Math.,1, says: “The Pythagoreans—Platon is, from another point of view, their follower—called music the harmony of opposites, the combination of dissimilar things, the reconciliation of the irreconcilable. (Cfr WR 11).

(1) Music is, first of all, the harmonization of rhythms and melodies.

(2) She is more than that: she is the harmonization of the entire universe.

The reason: the meaning of music lies in uniting and joining.

Moreover, God (WR 131) is also the one who unites the contradictory: that precisely, both in music and in medicine, is his greatest work, namely, to turn what is hostile into friendship (WR 98; 130).

WR177

The Pythagoreans mentioned assert that the harmony of beings lies in music, indeed, even the 'aristokratia', the governance of the best, of the universe. This 'aristokratia', the governance under the best, is called, in the cosmos, harmony, -- in politics, a good constitution, -- in private life, prudence

(WR 154).

Universal harmony or aristocracy constitutes the unity and mutual adjustment of the multiplicity of phenomena.

Conclusion. -- The elaboration and application of this insight extends to four areas of human life:

(1) in the soul and in the body (W7 154; 158),

(2) in private and public life.

These four domains apparently require merging and ordering so that they exhibit interlocking.

We believe that we can find no better climax than this late antique Platonic text. It is remarkable in the fact that it—we would almost say 'finally'—also brings up the type of friendship of harmony (WR 98), which receives so much emphasis among the Paleopythagoreans.

F. Strabon of Amaseia (-64/+21), the famous geographer and historian, first an Aristotelian, later a Stoic, once left behind a text which, perhaps, offers the key to all that preceded.

“The Pythagoreans and, after them, Plato called philosophy a muse skill (WR 130). They further assert that the cosmos is put together on the basis of harmony.

They consider everything 'musical' to be the work of deities. Moreover: the Muses are also goddesses, and Apollo (WR 122) is the leader of the Muses. All of poetry, too, is one hymn to the gods.” We began with the Muses, under the guidance of Mnemosune (WR 38). We end—with Strabon—likewise with expanded consciousness (for that is what 'mnemosune' is (WR 137), when that word is translated faithfully to its essence), expanded consciousness which the Muses, under the guidance of Mnemosune, impart.

Brief overview.

(1) 98/ 102: Pythagoras, the Paleopythagoreans and the Neopythagoreans.

(2) 103/ 130: the Pythagorean number (i.e. the unit and its multiples, -- numerical, spatial and musicological).

(3) 131/ 158: Pythagorean animism.

(4) 159/ 177: the Pythagorean idea of beauty.

Note: This last section is a verification, in the form of a short treatise, of the first three chapters.

Third sample: Alkmaion of Kroton (-520/-450).

Bibl. Sample:

-- A. Kremer-Marieth, *Alcméon de Crotone* , in: D. Huisman, *Dict. d. Phil .* , 43;

-- J. Zafropulo, *Empédocle d'Agrigente* , Paris, 1953, 99ss. (" *Alcméon, le grand médecin de la secte de Crotone, dont la renommée était, alors (note: Empedocles of Akragas (-463/-423), éclatante (oc, 99);*

-- W. Röd, *Die Phil. d. Antike* , 1:71/73.

Alkmaion, or also Alkmeon of Kroton (WR 98), the city where Pythagoras ended up, was both a physician and a Pythagorean, within the framework of the School of Kroton.

But what interests us now is his theory of interpretation (= hermeneutics; WR 42;-- 164ff. (the fundamental structure of the 19th-century German 'Hermeneutische Philosophie').-- Alkmaion enriched the theory of interpretation with a theory of signs (semeiology, tekmeriology).

A -- The observation.

We learned—WR 89—that Alkmaion accounted for ethereal matter in perception. According to Röd, oc, 72, he could trace this back to Pythagoras himself, who taught that, in perception (especially visual perception), an air-like substance plays a role in the eyes and brain.

In other words: just as Democritus of Abdera (WR 89) will assert later, Alkmaion asserts that something like a fine-material stimulus (image) penetrates and 'works' in the eye and, immediately, in the brain, so that man 'sees'. That is 'aisthanesthai' ('aisthêsis'), perceiving. -- Man shares this type of knowing with animals.

Note: Röd, *ibid.*, states that this view, under the name 'doctrine of animal spirits' (*spiritus animales*), will live on in the thought of Francis Bacon or Verulam (1561/1626), the founder of the inductive method of causality (WR 63), and René Descartes (= Cartesius; 1596/1650), the founder of modern 'intellectualist' (geometrizing) philosophy.

But—what Röd either conceals or does not know—she lives on, in a much finer way, in current occultism and/or paranormology (WR 89).-- Talk about 'philosophia perennis' (WR 4)!

B - The interpretation .

'Xun.ienai', literally: to bring together in thought, to 'interpret', to interpret. -- That is what characterizes man, as a human being.

According to Alkmaion (who, in doing so, espouses Pythagoras), the

human soul (WR 100: moving number; 134: sungeneia) is something divine, just like, for example, the ever-moving celestial bodies: it moves of its own accord. It also has the capacity 'tekmèria' to grasp symptoms, literally: to hold them together in thought.

WR179

(1) *Alkmaion was a physician.*

This entails that, professionally, he was confronted with what is still called today 'semeiology' (the study of symptoms).

Indeed: suppose a woman—let us call her Nausikaä (like the daughter of King Alkinoos, the prince of the Phaeacians on the island of Scheria), who, according to *Homer's Odyssey*, 6:1, possessed “the grace of the Charites (WR 68; 82)” —; she played ball with her companions (Od 6:100) and ... injured her leg.

Upon arriving at the doctor, Alkmaion, she complains that her ankle hurts. After examining her carefully, the doctor, Alkmaion, considers the possible causes and injuries together: does she have a common sprain? Or is something broken inside? What he sees—the 'tekmerion', the symptom being that it is blue and swollen.

Through the visible (the symptom) he attempts to 'see' the invisible, the actual full state of affairs (theoria; WR 41).

After all

(i) the story of the girl and

(ii) the swollen ankle is only a part of the total phenomenon, respectively the total physical given. To interpret becomes the 'tekmèrion' to interpret.

(2) Alkmaion, as an ancient Greek and Paleopythagorean, knew the oracles (divine pronouncements) and the art of interpretation associated with them. Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-425) relates, for example, that after the legislation of Lukourgos (-900/-800; WR 33), the Spartans became a powerful people, but fell into 'pleonexia' (WR 93): out of a hunger for land ('imperialism'), they wanted to conquer all of Arcadia. The Puthia, consulted by them at Delfoi, answers: “I will grant you that you 'orchestassthai'...”.

The word 'orchèstasthai', however, has two meanings:

a . dancing and

b. performing work in the garden. In their transgression (WR 53), they believe they may 'translate' the text (WR 5) of the Delphic seer by “dancing (with joy)”.

However, after the lost campaign, they experience the true meaning (the outcome): they “labor (as prisoners of war) in the gardens (of the Arcadians)”.

In other words: through the visible (the mere uninterpreted text) of the oracle, they attempted, by projection (WR 14), to literally 'interpret' their own uncritical opinion into the text, but they were confronted with the invisible in the text.

Behold the two types of interpretation that Alkmaion, certainly, knew.

WR180

Biblical sample : regarding oracle interpretation, see *G. Daniels, Religious-historical study on Herodotus* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946 (p. 71).

Note-- The configuration of the interpretation .

WR 111 (configuration); -- 104 (signature); 108 (tree diagram);-- 172 (seal).
-- We first give the 'gramma' (drawing):

Exactly one piece of data (observation; aisthesis) ---- more than one interpretation (symptom; tekmonion; oracle text)

// visible

// invisible

This is, apparently, a generative schema: it is as if the given (the visible) possesses the earth of the seal. The given, after all, is 'archidion', little principle, origin, of more than one interpretation. Or again: from the one(ness) the soul generates the unified multiplicity (= number) of interpretations. -- Expressed in modern language: the sign (blue - swollen ankle of Nausikaä; 'orchèsaisthai', in the text of the Puthia) is ambiguous.

Note: One can also view all this based on the idea of causality (WR 60: causal explanation). After all, one can, for example, interpret the injury as caused by the ailment (sprain, fracture, common bruise). Even the cryptic text of the seer can be considered as caused by the true outcome.

C.-- The wisdom .

According to Alkmaion, the deity 'sees' (theoria):

(i) directly, i without symptom, sign, as an intermediate term between the full state of affairs and the knowing, inquiring person, and

(ii) absolutely certain, i.e. not seeking, investigating (WR 40: historia).

1. This is purely Pythagorean. A tradition says that Pythagoras introduced the word 'philosophy' to characterize the human inadequacy of all knowledge. He was convinced that only deities (e.g. Mnemosune and the Muses) possessed 'sophy', (full) wisdom. Man was merely 'wisdom-minded'; -- nothing more.

2. Charles SS Peirce (1839/1914) is the founder of semiotics, or the study of signs. According to him, all human knowledge was merely sign interpretation. Thus, he called man 'an interpretant'. The idea was a thought sign; the spoken word was a speech sign; the written word (the 'text', in the strict sense) was a writing sign.

Peirce also underscored that signs were essentially ambiguous and, immediately, that erring was always inherent in signification (fallibilism, doctrine of fallibility).

WR181

Bibl. sample :

-- WB Gallie, *Peirce and Pragmatism* , New York, 1966, 109/ 137 (*The Doctrine of Thought-Signs*);

-- Umberto Eco, *La structure absente* (*Introduction à la recherche sémiotique*), Paris, 1972.

Note-- Rhetorical inferences .

1. It is clear that understanding such that influence follows (WR 4), that rhetoric as 'agogè', actio, ('interaction' via communication), once the fellow man is recognized as a co-interpreter, takes on a new color. The 'sumpatheia' (WR 135), however direct, passes through (WR. 169) 'homoiomata', reflections, of the soul (inner life).

Whoever, therefore, attempts to bring a fellow man into understanding, let not forget that he merely places 'teskmeria', signs, signs of understanding, at his/her disposal.-- For example, when Nausikaä, returning from playing with her companions by the water, complains about her 'sore' ankle and describes how it happened, she is giving her doctor, Alkmaion, merely language, these signs.

When she allows him to examine her ankle, he 'sees' (in the sense of empiricism, not in the sense of theory) only symptoms. The process of understanding is always a process of interpretation. That is the achievement, rhetorically speaking, of Alkmaion's brilliant 'tekmeriology'.

2. This implies that Alkmaion, as a Pythagorean, not only believed in philosophy (rather than in full wisdom), but that, within the hetaireia (thinking society; WR 98), he belonged to the 'open' (= mathematicians, in later Pythagorean language) Pythagoreans.

a. This theme—the community of interpreters—was strongly emphasized both by Peirce himself and by Josiah Royce (1855/1916; an idealistic thinker),

whom he influenced. Royce spoke of an 'interpreting community'. People are, at least in principle, a community of interpreters. They ought, in principle, to reach agreement regarding signs.

b. This same theme was addressed by the founder of (linguistic) sociology, Ferd. de Saussure (1857/1913), *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1916-1, expressed as follows: "Semiology is a science that studies the life of signs within the context of social life." (Oc,33). In other words: there is, always, an intersubjective and social aspect of understanding inherent in all sign language.

Conclusion. -- Alkmaion founded a piece of perpetual philosophy (WR 4).

WR182

1.2.3. Third sample: xenophanean and eleatic rationalism (182/185)
(-550/-421).

Library sample: G. - G. Granger, *Rational Thinking*, Meppel, 1971.

'Rationalism' already appears in ancient Greece, -- according to Granger, oc, 10/13:

- a.** correct thinking (different from, for example, mere opinion),
 - b.** intuitive and discursive type of 'reason' or 'understanding' (WR 188),
 - c.** reasoned behavior,
- Behold the three characteristics.

But by 'rationalism' we mean something more: inheriting the so-called 'enlightened' type. We highlight two main characteristics, skepticism and 'autonomous' thinking.

1.2.3.a. First characteristic: skepticism (182/185)

Bibl. sample:

- V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1887-1; 1969-3;
- R. Jolivet, *Les sources de l'idéalisme*, Paris, 1936 (fl. 7/15; 198; 206);
- A. Lalande, *Voc. technique et critique dl phil.*, Paris, 1968, 949s.

1. The term 'skepticism' is used in more than one sense. Here, we mean by this a type of interpretation regarding

(a) universal, generally valid propositions ('truths'; WR 55: mathematical type) and/or

(b) extra- and supernatural propositions ('truths', 'dogmas', WR 75), namely insofar as one asserts that our limited knowledge cannot express itself on them, except in contrary, indeed, contradictory judgments.

The denial by Protagoras (WR 239), the 'first humanist', of purely geometric structures is one example of 'theoretical' skepticism (which denies general statements); the denial by Renan (WR 90), the 'religious' skeptic, is one type of 'sacral' skepticism (which denies sacred statements; see also WR 87: Hector's 'skepticism').

Note -- we mean, first of all, methodical skepticism. 'Methodical doubt' dates from Arkesilaus of Pitana (314/240; leader of the Platonic Academy). The Church Fathers Gregory of Nyssa (335/394) and Augustine of Hippo (354/430) continued it. R. Descartes (1596/1650) updated it in a modern way. 'Methodical' doubting is weighing both the pros and cons on purely rational grounds.

Ideological doubt, as advocated by Sextus Empiricus, the 'systematic' skeptic (+/- +150), surpasses methodological doubt in that it makes more than a mere method, which makes a 'theory' of it that replaces pure inquiry (WR 40) with apriority propositions.

WR183

From the 'theoria' to the 'theory',

1. W. R 41 taught us what 'theoria', fathoming, is. The German classicist Eduard Zeller (1814/1908), in his * *The Philosophy of the Greeks* *, demonstrates how, in the theoria characteristic of the Pre-Socratics and the Pre-Pythagoreans, the human mind (= intellect and reason) directs itself directly ('immediatism') towards (the analysis of) reality, 'nature' ('fysis') – without analyzing the subject-bound activity, which is the 'theoria' itself.

In other words: the thinker does not doubt for a moment that he, however limited and uncertain (WR 87/91; 180 (philosophy), 'knows' nature itself.

Whether this theory, as with Thales and most Pre-Pythagoreans, is the fathoming of the visible toward the invisible, or whether it, as with Alcmaeon (WR 178ff.), fathoms not only the visible but also signs of the invisible (hermeneutics/semeiology), it is and remains certain (without doubt) regarding the core of knowledge, -- even though it underscores the fallibility of purely earthly-human knowledge.

2. V. Brochard, op. cit., underscores that only the Pre-Socratics and the Pre-Pythagoreans are never mentioned as precursors of skepticism. This is consistent with Zeller's assertion. Indeed: the theoria changes, in Xenophanes, in Parmenides and Zenon of Elea, into a method of reasoning, indeed, into a real theory, i.e., a set of logically coherent judgments;

a . Instead of intuitive reason (= understanding, intellectus), discursive reason (= 'reason', 'linguistic reason', - 'ratio', 'discursus') comes to the fore, above all. Reasoning and counter-reasoning take precedence.

b. Moreover: skepticism, both sacred and also, though less so among the Eleatics, 'theoretical', fully enters with the critique of knowledge.

c. Finally: mediatism, i.e. the view that we do not grasp ('know') reality (e.g. the fusion) directly (= immediatism of theoria), but only indirectly, begins.

Decision.

As Brochard says: the 'true' skeptic adheres to the phenomena (the 'visible'). This entails either phenomenalism (man knows only phenomena, that which is immediately given in consciousness) or phenomenism even (man knows only purely subjective impressions, stripped of all objective value). What reality is in itself remains virtually unattainable.

WR184

History of skepticism.

(A).-- Diogenes Laertios (184/185)
(+200/+250)

He says: Some skeptics identify Homer (WR 33; 38) as a precursor to their view, because he, more than anyone else, interprets the same subjects in different opinions (WR 180). This, without ever determining or expressly confirming anything.

Later, apart from Xenophanes and the Eleatics (Parmenides, Zenon), a certain Protagoras, the first Sophist, will say the same thing in a philosophical sense. One need only think of Protagoras' Antilogiai.

(B).-- The pre-Socratic pre-skeptics .

V. Brochard, oc, 3, 10s. says that, except for the Paleomilesians and the Paleophythagoreans, all pre-Esocratics prepared for full skepticism, in any case.

a. The Eleatics, in the footsteps of Xenophanes, and the Heracliteans

a1. - Xenophanes says: "There never was and there never will be a man, regarding the truth, who knows this truth with certainty, concerning all that I say about the deities and the universe. For even if he expressed himself, by chance, in the most perfect way, he would still not know certainty. For only 'dokos', the pure impression, is destined (for) us all." (Fr. 34).

Later, 'dokos', also 'doxa', will be used as a technical term for 'opinion' (pure impression).

It is known that the second great Sophist, Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375), explicitly relies on the Eleatics.

a2.-- The 'dialecticist' (cf. First Year Course) Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/-465), who—instead of Eleatic monotheism—introduced polytheism regarding nature (opposite, indeed, contradictory 'views' (opinions) are equally valid), evolved into Cratylus (Platon's first philosophy teacher), who dared not pronounce a single judgment ('radical 'epoch' or suspension of judgment'), and into the humanist Protagoras of Abdera (WR 225/227), who advocated opposing opinions on every theme.

b.-- The Neomilesian thinkers,

Empedocles of Akragas (= Agrigentum; -483/-423),-- Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428; the founder of the experimental method),-- especially the two atomists, Leucippus of Miletus and Democritus of Abdera (-460/-370; WR 89),-- they all, each in his own way, arrive at some form of skepticism. Thus, for example, Metrodetros of Chios asserts, following Democritus' line, that we do not even know whether we know anything.

WR185

1.2.3.b. Second characteristic: the self-legal 'T' (185/224)

Bibl. sample: O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.* I: 135.

Willmann distinguishes two types of tradition hermeneutics (WR 159; 164ff.).

(I) *Philosophia (theologia, rhetorica) perennis* (WR 3v.)

Continuity, i.e. the will to continue the tradition, notwithstanding

(i) purification and **(ii)** raising of standards (WR 76) characterize the tradition-faithful type of thinking. After all, one starts from the idea of 'hereditary wisdom', that system of truth sprung from a primordial revelation, spread across the varying traditions of families, tribes, and peoples of all kinds.

(II) *Lighting* (e.g. WR 86).

Discontinuity, i.e. the will to determine the rules of thought and action oneself, free from the 'bonds' ('taboos') of tradition, is decisive here.

(i) *Hesiod* (WR 39) already says that "the poets lie". This, while he himself, a poet, considers his own 'truth' regarding the deities to be superior (Fr. Krafft, oc, 42).

(ii) a. Hecataeus of Miletus (-560/-480), although a Milesian, says: “(...) What follows I write down, just as it appears to me as truth ('dokeēi', opinion). Indeed, the stories of the Hellenes are both numerous and ridiculous, as they appear to me ('fainonta', phenomenon)”. (W. Jaeger, *Paideia* , I: 212).

The 'self-lawful' autonomous self, detached from all tradition, places itself first as the source of 'truth' (even though this truth is characterized as 'opinion', supported by a 'phenomenon'). The self judges the other 'mortals' by its own authority.

(ii)b. Xenophanes of Colophon (WR 184) speaks a similar language.

(ii)c . Parmenides of Elea , considering himself superior, says: “I warn against the (second) way (= method) of inquiry, upon which mortals knowing nothing form imaginings, like two-headed beings. Inability to think leads the wavering mind ('noön') into their innermost being. They drift around, like the speechless and the blind, knocked off balance, like a mass without judgment ('akrita'). For such people, 'being' and 'non-being' (WR 197ff.) are both the same and not the same. For every given fact, there is, for them, an opposite ('palintropos') way out”. (Fr. 6).

Which seems to point to Heraclitus's harmony of opposites -- one's own reasoning power, whether or not supported by empirical data (WR 189ff.), not without a touch of self-conceit (Enlightenment narcissism) and a need for self-assertion, becomes very decisive.

WR186

First sample. -- the xenophanous enlightened rationalism

Bibl. sample:

-- W. Jaeger, *Paideia* , I: 230ff.; 373ff.;

-- id., *A la naiss.* , 45/62 (*Xénophane ou la doctrine du Dieu unique*);

-- W. Röd, *Die Phil. d. Ans.* , 1:75/82;

-- J. Salem, *Xénophane*, in: D. Huisman, *Dict.d.Phil.* ,2685s..

The exact place of Xenophanes of Colonus (whom J. Salem, in his own way, places between 570 and 480) in the school of Elea, a city in southern Italy, is partially disputed. According to Aristotle (*Metaph.*, A5 986b 18s), he would

(i) have founded the school and

(ii) may have been the teacher of Parmenides. Plato, however, places him as merely one of the Eleatics (Sophist., 242cd). Salem says: it is most certain to place him as the forerunner of Parmenides.

A.-- General impression.

W. Jaeger, *Paid.*, I:370ff., states that Xenophanes—half a century before Protosophistics—introduced enlightened pride ('der xenophaneische Geistesstolz'). The esteem for reason and knowledge—this as the 'rationalization of the whole of life' ('die Rationalisierung des gesamten Lebens'),—as of the 18th century, figures such as John Locke (1632/1704), the founder of the modern Enlightenment, F.M. Voltaire (1694/1759), the typical representative of La philosophie des Lumières, and Christian Wolff (1679/1754), the leading figure of the Aufklärung, will actualize this; -- this high regard for the intellectual ('das Intellektuelle') led to what would now be called: an intelligentsia (a class of 'progressive' 'critical' bearers of culture).

B.1.-- Cultural.

In *Xenophanes*—according to Jaeger, *Paid.*, I: 249—a sharp conflict arises between, on the one hand, his personal actualization of the Milesian physique and, on the other hand,

- (i) the popular religion and
- (ii) the ideal of militant masculinity of the Greek nobility.

Instead of 'virtue'; in Greek 'aretè' (Lt.: virtus), Xenophanes was the first to propose rational knowledge, which he designated by the name 'sophia', reasoning faculty (WR 43: 'wisdom', Thaletian, is something else).

That means two aspects.

(a) Xenophanes founded culturology (cultural theory, cultural science), which the Protosophists, half a century later, would begin to develop as a true human science.

(b) Immediately he engages in cultural criticism (in the Enlightened sense).

WR187

B.2.-- Epistemological.

1. 'Epistemology' or philosophy of knowledge, possibly: philosophy of science, is the analysis of knowing. -- We have already encountered whole sections of epistemology in the past.

(i) WR 40/42 (wisdom as theoria (a. empeiria, observation; logismos, reasoning; b . historia, investigation (= lemmatic - analyt. meth.)); WR 43/54; esp. WR 53ff.): transcendental form; -- WR 54/57: mathematical form; -- WR 59/63: geographical form; --- WR 70/72; 135ff. (Pyth. model): rhetorical form; -- WR 87/ 89 (46/48: cathartic model; 77/79: hylistic - pluralistic model): theological - sacred type.

(ii)- WR 79/84: Musical model (WR 79/84: religious-historical basis; --WR 37/39; 42: emancipated type; 63; 66/70: positive-scientific and political type);

-- WR 124/130: Paleophythic model.

(iii) WR 104/110: arithmological type; -- WR 111/118: configurative model.

Behold the principal types of actual, strictly defined theoria, which is very closely related to the mantic form of 'theoria'.

(iv) WR 178/181: the theological type of theoria.-- What the following pages add regarding epistemology was, of course, actualized by the Milesian and Paleopythagorean schools, but as much as possible within each of these two styles of thought.

2. - It is W. Röd, oc, 80, who attributes 'metatheoretical insight' to Xenophanes. -- let us pause here for a moment. --

(i) *The distinction between 'theoria' and 'theorie'.*

We assume, after all that precedes, that what theoria is is known. But 'theory' is yet to be defined more precisely (WR 96). Let us call 'theory', in the rational or reasonable sense, a system of statements, mutually logically strictly connected, proceeding from premises ('foundations', 'presuppositions', 'axioms', 'postulates', 'lemmas'), whose unity stands or falls with the object about which those statements ('judgments') refer.

We will set aside, for the time being, the existence of types of 'theory formation'.

The most striking distinction between theory and theoria is that the latter is a method, namely, a state of mind, whereas theory is always an objectified method, i.e., projected into sentences (statements). This does not prevent theoria, too, from strictly adhering to statements. But these are not its essence.

WR188

Note: Especially since Scholasticism (800/1450), a distinction is made regarding knowledge and thought between

(i) The intuitive mind, which engages in theoria, the direct or immediate grasping or contemplating, fathoming, 'seeing' of the data, and

(ii) The discursive mind (= 'reason' in the strict sense), which strings together ideas, judgments, and reasoning into series that are generated (WR 105ff.). It is the discursive mind that is at work in 'theory'.

Bibl. sample: Ch. Lahr, *Psychology*, Paris, 1933-27, 199s. (*L'intelligence et la raison*).

(ii) *The distinction between 'theory' and 'metatheory' .*

This distinction runs parallel to that between 'language' and 'metalanguage'. In direct 'speech' (understand: linguistic speech) I say: "Kirke is exceptionally beautiful". In lateral speech (linguistic speech) I say: "The sentence 'Kirke is exceptionally beautiful' is a simple sentence, but the sentence 'Kirkè, who is an ancient Greek goddess, is exceptionally beautiful' is a compound sentence".

In other words: in that tangential discourse on direct speech (language about language or metalanguage), I speak only indirectly about Circe, her position in mythology, and her feminine form, but I speak directly about my linguistic speech (= utterance, direct speech) regarding those three facts. Well, metatheory is theory about theory (formation). It is in this sense that Röd's statement regarding Xenophenes ought to be understood.

1.-- "Not from the beginning (of the start) have deities shown all (beings) to Mortals (people). On the contrary: in the course of time, thanks to tireless research ('zetountes'), they find better (solutions)". (Fr. 18).

(i) This text apparently allows the deities to play a role in the growth of culture (WR 81ff.). Xenophenes is, indeed, religious. This will become even more apparent later.

(2) He has an eye for progress. -- We said just now that he was a culturalist: this is clearly evident here. He even has an eye for historicity, (WR 165) or the development of all civilization over time ('history').

Cf. WR 56: Proclus' eye for language development. -- Not only does he have an eye for change and development, but he is a meliorist: evolution moves in the direction of the 'ameinon', melius, the better.

Such a thing is indeed a belief in progress, analogous to the progress ideology of the 18th-century enlightened rationalists (WR 186).

WR189

Note: It may be noted that Xenophanes' cultural optimism, the general formulation of which we analyzed above ("for all/ some better (things) it holds that, thanks to tireless research, they are discovered by mortals in the course of time", WR 55), must have relied on applicative models, which he generalized.

It has been pointed out that he was familiar with the Lydian invention of the coin. He also admired the astronomical activity of Thales. (WR 58).

It has further been pointed out that, as a traveling poet, he was a well-traveled man such that he could practice comparative culture (which could reveal the difference between backward, respectively primitive and developed). -- Rationally minded as he was, the difference lay, above all, in knowledge and thought.

2.-- Röd relies on the distinction, in the Greek language, between 'eidenai', by observation, to know with certainty (Fr. 34), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 'dokos' (Fr. 34; WR 184), opinion, cf. also Fr. 35: 'dedoxastho', 'eoikota tois etumoisi' (probably)).

That is the first step in his reasoning regarding Xenophanes. It is indisputable linguistically.

But Röd now transfers this distinction to the (specialized) science of the time, physical science, which Xenophanes knew and popularized.

a. Röd thinks that Xenophanes' 'eidenai', knowing with certainty by observation, referred to a part of the assertions of the physicists, namely, the statements that articulate observed facts.

b. Röd thinks that Xenophanes meant 'dokos' (and related terms), pure impression, opinion, of a second part of the physical assertions, namely those statements in which assumptions, lemmas, 'hypotheses' were formulated.

It is certain that the theories of which we have spoken so often above indeed entail transcending the immediately given. However, where the Paleopythagorean, for example, will speak of a 'seeing' or 'fathoming' (even when it concerns signs (WR 179: Alkmeion)), the more skeptically inclined Xenophanes speaks only of 'conjectures', 'impressions', and opinions.

Also: the Paleopythagoreans were never invoked as precursors of skepticism, whereas Xenophanes was sometimes invoked as such (thus V. Brochard; WR 184). Nowadays one would say: he was more critically minded than the Paleomilean or the Paleopythagoreans.

WR190

Note -- The factual basis(es) of Röd's assertion.

a. Besides the structure of the theoria (seeing the invisible through the visible, by transcending), discussed just now, there is Alkmaion's theorem, which likewise distinguishes between 'aisthanesthai', perception, and 'xuniena', interpretation (WR 178ff.). The later Crotonians expressed something analogous in their own linguistic play.

b. Both thinkers, Xenophanes and Alcmaion, point to the immediacy of perception and the mediatism of opinion, respectively, of interpretation. However, as a consistent Pythagorean, Alcmaion had to assume a minimum of immediacy in interpretation (as *theoria*) as well, whereas, as a consistent Enlightenment thinker ('critically minded'), Xenophanes could see mediatism in opinion only.

Note -- 'Immediatism' means the fact that one assumes direct contact of a knowing nature (the so-called intuition or direct observation); 'mediatism' means the fact that one only indirectly 'contact' between our cognitive faculty (better: discursive, reasoning faculty, felt within consciousness as an interior), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the known, suspected object (WR 188: intuitive/discursive).

Update: --

a: Read above what we said about Xenophanes' opinion regarding progress:

(i) WR 189 gives the observed facts (invention of coinage; Thaletic astronomy; compared cultural distinctions); -- this corresponds to 'eidenai' by observation, with certainty, knowing;

(ii) WR 188 gives the generalized thesis, in which those applicative models find their universal or, at least, particular model (all/ some (more than exactly one)), -- this corresponds to 'dokos', opinion.

In other words: in Xenophanes' own theory, based on his own usage of language, two layers are distinguished: judgments of perception and judgments of generalization.

Note: the universal and/or the particular, as such, is not (sensory) perceptible! Only the singular is (sensory) perceptible.

b: Rudolf Carnap (1891/1970), in his * *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* * (1928), examines – in a logical-positivist sense (WR 2) – the structure of scientific theory.

In this, he distinguishes two 'languages', namely a language of perception (Tw), in which predicates indicate directly observable realities (regarding relations), and a theoretical language (Tt), in which unobservable contents of knowledge are discussed, such as regularities (universal statements).

WR191

Let us take the model by Jan Lukasiewicz (1878/1956).

(1) If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water also boil at 100° C. -- Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C.. -- So all water boils at 100° C.

(2)a. “This water and that water boils at 100° C” is a statement belonging to Tw (observational language), because it is the twofold statement of a fact that anyone, in principle, can repeat.

(2)b. But “All water boils at 100° C”. is a different type of sentence: it is a generalization (induction), which is not immediately apparent in observation. Such language is rightly called Carnap, Tt (theoretical language).

It can be seen that reductive reasoning (here in its inductive form) contains the two language types. They are indeed inseparable (collective structure), but they are distinct (distributive structure): if Tt, then Tw; indeed Tw; therefore Tt.

Applied to Xenophanes' model: the 'eidenai' (by observation, certain, knowing) gives rise to Tw (sentences expressing observation) and the 'dokos' gives, in the language of Xenophanes, sentences belonging to Tt (theoretical language). It is merely that, regarding the Tt, he emphasizes that it is a guess, opinion, impression; nothing more. -- *Philosophia perennis!*

General decision

Xenophanes did not develop an actual metatheory. He did, however, possess a metatheoretical insight (cf. WR 55: the mere insight, in Thales).

Bibl. sample:

-- L. Vax, *L'empirisme logique* , Paris, 1970, 49ss.;
-- IM Bochenski, *Philosophical methods in modern science* , Utr./Antw., 1961, 126 (deductive and reductive reasoning).

Note-- Relativity of perception .

That, as V. Brochard clearly states, Xenophanes was on his way to skepticism without ever being a skeptic himself, proves his 'relativism' regarding perception.

Fr. 38. -- “If (a) deity had not produced ('causes'; WR 9) the 'light yellow' honey, then people would have perceived the figs as much sweeter”.

In other words: a separate perception, in principle, does not exist; it is always, consciously or unconsciously, incorporated into the total framework ('Gestalt'; WR 114) or – in Paleopythagorean terms – into the total configuration (= background) of all possible perceptions. 'Skepticism' is, here, a sense of the totality of separate acts.

B.3.-- Theological

WR 73 taught us that physical theology was an offshoot of natural philosophy. -- WR 131 taught us, in the Paleo-Pythagorean sense, that divinity and oneness go together. -- We shall see that Xenophanes emphasizes the unity of the highest god going together. -- **criticism of gypsy.**

From at least three viewpoints, Xenophanes criticized the transmitted religion.

Criticism of fortune-telling.

WR 88ff. (Manticism): 179 (oracle hermeneutics).

Manticism, after the physical arose, became subject to criticism of a new type (unlike before: WR 87 (the unbelieving Hector)). Xenophanes is truly Presophistic in this respect: "As alone among the oldest thinkers ('antiqui'), Xenophanes completely rejected manticism ('divinatio')". (Thus *Marcus Tullius Cicero* (-106/-43), in his *De divinatione* (On Manticism))

R. Flacelière, Devins et oracles grecs, Paris, 1961-1, 1965-2, 103s., says the following regarding this.

1. An extremely hostile attitude emerges with Xenophanes: he not only rejected folk mythology and anthropomorphism, but also the belief in the 'providence' of the deities, which is the foundation of oracle belief.

Incidentally: one can safely compare this with the critique of 'superstition' (and obscurantism) provided by the modern Enlightenment thinkers. One need only think of a Renan (WR 90). 2. Naturally: one need only reread WR 87/89 (the analysis of this disbelief).

Critique of Anthropomorphism.

P. Fournier, Paganisme : l'anthropomorphisme, in: *J. Bricout, Dict. prat.d. conn. relig.*, Paris, 1927, V: 196s., defines 'anthropomorphism' as follows: "The attribution to the deity of human characteristics, -- human body, -- ways of thinking, feelings and drives, intentions, -- (physical and ethical) evil (such as murder, adultery, incest)".

It is evident that—from a religious-historical perspective—the 'humanization' of the deity is typical of polytheism, especially in its demonic nature (WR 12)—something that the polytheists themselves generally realized very well.

Fr. 14 says: "But mortals think ('dokeousi'; WR 189) that deities are born

and have their own clothes, voice, and appearance”.

Fr. 15: “But if the oxen (and the horses) and the lions possessed hands, could paint with their hands and make objects as men do, then the horses would paint deities resembling horses, the oxen forms resembling oxen, and produce such bodies resembling the kind that makes them.”

Fr.: “The Ethiopians (claim that their deities) are dark-skinned and blunt-nosed, the Thracians that theirs have blue eyes and red hair”.

WR193

Note: It is clear that we are criticizing projection here. WR 14 already taught us this idea.

For the analysis of that criticism itself, reference should be made to WR 14ff.: the enlightened-rational man is, anthropologically, structured differently: he no longer 'sees' mantically, like the archaic man; consequence: he mistakes the modes of appearance, which are fluid, for 'interpretations', 'inventions', 'imaginings', etc.; -- add to this the self-conceit syndrome, characteristic of many an Enlightened mind (WR 185), who, by reason of his intellectual superiority, feels himself greatly elevated above the 'primitive', indeed, 'infantile' man. Consequence: no understanding, unless a bad one (misunderstandings of all kinds).

Critique of demonism.

Fr. 11: “Homer and Hesiod attributed to the deities everything that is shameful and reviled among men: stealing, committing adultery, and deceiving one another.”

Fr. 12: “As they recounted many unlawful deeds of the deities: stealing, committing adultery, mutual deceit”.

Here we have ethical anthropomorphism, -- better: demonism (WR 12ff.: among the Sumerians, already, the double-hearted ethical system (double standards) was clearly common theologically, yet they did not view this, simply, as religious projection, but as the true essence of the supernatural beings. Which our Biblical demonology continues).

Note: the latter, demonism, is sometimes called 'anthropopathism' (the passions of the deities are the same as those of humans).

(2) - The transcendent god .

In contrast, Xenophanes posits his higher type of deity. -- In his *Peri fuseos* (On Nature), he depicts the highest god as follows.

Fr. 23: “One God, among deities and, the greatest of men, like mortals neither in appearance nor in thought”.

Here we see that Xenophanes seems to adopt second-rate deities (WR 188: culture-founding role), as the Bible does, for example (*Ps 82 (81); Ps 58 (57); - Ps 8:6; Exod 4:16; 7:1; 1 Sam 28:13* ; etc.).

WR194

Although Fr. 32 gives a somewhat different impression: “What 'they' call Iris, that too is, by its nature, merely a cloud, -- purple and bright red and yellow-green at first sight”.

'Iris' is the rainbow (goddess), also known as the radiance around, for example, the moon or something similar. As a rainbow goddess, Iris had the 'function' (WR 9) of being the divine messenger between deities and humans and, also, between humans themselves (WR 68ff.: Hermes). One might say that this is smoothed over here.

The leading idea behind the critique of religion and behind Xenophanes' own image of God is apparently, as Rod, oc, 78, says: God's perfection.

God is therefore

(i) unchangeable, exalted above arising and passing away (WR 11), which – both – are the harmony of opposites, so typical of all that is 'demonistic'; he is

(ii) mover of the universe (“Without effort He moves the universe, thanks to His intellect” (Fr. 25)).

Yet Xenophanes does not escape Pre-Platonic materialism (WR 52): “He remains, always, in the same place, nowhere in motion; it does not suit him to move, now here, then there.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this 'transcendent' (= sublime) image of God is what Fr. 24 says: "God is wholly seeing ('eye'), wholly thinking ('noei'), wholly hearing." Thus, his consciousness is not, as with humans, bound to sensory organs or anything of that nature. (Thus *W. Jaeger, A la naiss.dlthéol .*, 51).

“Moreover: the God of Xenophanes is, without doubt, a being that possesses consciousness and personality” (ibid).

Even more remarkable seems to us the assertion of Fr. Krafft, oc, 45; 75, that “this highest God, already in Homer's Iliad, is the deity of the 'spirit', i.e.

of the thinking reasoning faculty: Xenophanes

(i) assumes,

(ii) purifies from and

(iii) raises to the level of the physicality of the time (WR 76) what Homer, whom he so criticized, already knew: the highest God is more than the second-rate deities, thanks to 'spiritual power', intellectuality.

A supreme being that seems somewhat Biblical. This is because God lacks demonistic characteristics. Morally elevated. "One cannot doubt," according to Jaeger, "Xenophanes prayed to his only God (oc, 52). Among other things, his feast elegy (of which we now provide a translation) testifies to his high religious sentiment."

WR195

1.1 . Now, for the hardened floor—together with the hands and cups of all (present)—is clean. Someone places woven wreaths around our heads. A second offers fragrant self in a bowl.

The mixing jug stands there, full of cheerfulness, and, too, other wine is ready. It seems never to be lacking, treacherously, -- giving off a honey-sweet floral scent in jugs.

1.2. In the central part (of the dwelling), incense sends sacred fragrance upwards. Cool water, sweet in taste and pure, is available. Beside it lie blonde wheat loaves, and the table of holy abundance buckles under the weight of the cheese and the fragrant honey. In the center stands the sublime altar (in honor of the Olympian deities), decorated with flowers all around.

1.3. Song, accompanied by dance, and festivities hold the house in their grip everywhere.

2.1 . The first formality for people who are well-disposed and willing is to sing hymns to the glory of God, in which salvific myths and pure words resound.

Follow the sacrificial offering and the prayer, -- this, to acquire the strength to put righteousness into deeds. Which is self-evident.

2.2 . Only then is it, indeed, not a transgression ('hubris') to drink to such an extent that someone who is not too elderly returns home without a helper leading the way.

Among men is he who, although addicted to drink, gives proof of sound things -- how his memory and his vocal cords hold masculinity to its principal value.

3. Not the singing, in epic verses, of battles of Titans (WR 145) and Giants,

nor of Centaurs (*note*: monsters half man, half horse - all inventions of earlier generations - or of violent civil strife - there is no salvation to be found in that -; but, always giving precedence to the honoring of deities is good.

Note:--

(1) Xenophanes does not demythologize here; however, he does demand morally upright myths.

(2) WR 171 (the center of the universe) pointed to the belief that there exists, at least in subtle matter, a central point ('seal'), which is present at the center of the house.

WR196

Second sample. -- The eleatic logic of being or non-being.

Bibl. sample:

- L. Jerphagnon, *Parménide* , in: D. Huisman, *Dict. d. Phil.*, 2000/2003;
- Cl. Ramnoux, *Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats* , Monaco, 1979, fl. 99/148;
- J. Beaufret, *Le poème de Parménide* , Paris, 1955, vrl, 76/93 (Fragments);
- WW Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Permenidos to Bolzano* , Antw./ Nijmegen, 1944, 11/28 (*The Pre-Socratics*);
- Fr. Krafft , oc,235/242 (*Parmenides von Elea*);
- W. Rödl, oc, 108/125 (*Parmenides*);
- W. Jaeger, *A la naiss .*, 99/117 (*Parménide ou la mystère de l'être*).

Parmenides of Elea lived from +/- -540 to at least -475.

General location

1. "The critique of religion—meaning popular religion—of Xenophanes (WR 186/195) and the revival of theogonic reflections (*note*: Jaeger means Orphism (WR 143/151)) showed us the profound influence that Ionian natural philosophy exerted on the religious movement of the 6th century (-600/-500).

Until now, philosophical thought was of the physical type (WR 40):

(i) she analyzed the process of coming into being and passing away (WR 11;92),

(ii) on its enduring origin ('archè', WR 39v.; 45v.), which it attempted to trace a first principle, the so-called 'arche' (principium)". (W. Jaeger, oc, 99).

We may safely add Paleopythagoreanism (running parallel to Orphism), which likewise saw its starting point in the one (unity) as the origin of number (multiples of units; WR 103ff.; 111ff.; 119ff.; especially 171 (archidion)).

2. “With the Parmenidian doctrine concerning being ('un') begins a new, original phase of philosophical thought.” (W. Jaeger, *ibid.*).

Indeed: the modernization that Parmenides carried out on the transmitted (WR 159) philosophy seems, for the most part, to be a break (WR 185: discontinuous).

The after-effect

Through Parmenides' pupils, through Plato of Athens and (Neo-)Platonism (WR 102) - it lasts 'un bon millénaire' (a good thousand years),-- according to L. Jerphagnon, *ac*, 2000. A reason to spend a few minutes on it.

General characterization.

(1) The 'mythical' characterization.

The poem (*note*: by Parmenides) begins on a solemn note. -- “The mares that carry me have led me as far as my desire ('thumos') wished.

WR197

They have, after all, led me onto the famous road of the goddess ('daimonos', feminine). She, alone, through all the cities, carries the man who 'knows' (...). And 'kourai', young girls, showed, in doing so, the 'way'”.

a. This preface has exemplary models: Homer (WR 38), Hesiod (*ibid.*), -- as well as Xenophanes. The Orphic model also plays a role (L. Jerphagnon, *oc*, 2000). Jerphagnon speaks of 'le voyage d'un initié' (the 'journey' of an initiate; WR 146: mystery religion), outside the ways of the common-sense man. -- Let us no longer say—once again—with Enlightenment-rational historiography that Greek philosophy originated laicistically, secularistally, religiously free! For the umpteenth time, the historically verifiable state of affairs proves... otherwise.

b. “Remarkable, once again, is the fact that female figures – the 'demone' (goddess) and the girls – play a role. Comparable to the Muses (WR 42; 130).

(2) The philosophical characterization.

Let us, then, listen to what 'thea', the goddess, says (1:22).

1. “Well: I am going to speak then—you, listen to my words and remember them. I am going to tell you which only two ways of inquiry are conceivable.

(i) The first road:

How (being) is and how it is impossible that it is not. This is the way, which is trustworthy, for it adheres to the truth ('alêtheiai').

(ii) The second way :

How (being) is not and how it necessarily is not. I tell you that this way is merely a (dead-end) path, for this path contains nothing reliable.” “Possibly Parmenides (...) simply wanted to articulate, in an abstract way, a complete disjunction of opinions regarding being(the) (...)”. (W. Röd, oc, 111).

Thus, in any case, Parmenides' text was interpreted, and one cannot escape this interpretation, even though others are possible (inclusive interpretation, rather than exclusive interpretation). Here, one has what is now called: 'model' (being is) and 'counter-model' (being is not; which is absurd, absurd; nonsensical).

a. A 'disjunctive' is understood to mean a sentence such that it attributes opposites to the subject as predicates, using the terms 'and/or'. For example: “In *Homer's Odyssey*, 5:190ff., it says: ‘I carry, in my heart, not a heart of iron but of a tender nature’ Thus spoke the high goddess Calupso”.

WR198

Note the opposites 'heart of iron' / 'tendered heart'. They are incorporated ('generated': WR 108ff.) into a 'not/ but' formula. “not a heart of iron, but a tendered heart”.

In the depths of this lies “Either I, Kalupso, have a heart of iron or a heart of tenderness”. That is the speculative (WR 107) formulation: the possibilities. The empirical formulation reads: “I do not have a heart of iron, but a heart of tenderness”.

Indeed, the goddess in love with Odysseus (Od., 5: 155), under pressure from Zeus, lets him go (Od., 5/161), ensures that he can build a raft and provides him with food and clothing... so that he can return to his homeland, Ithakè, Ithaca (present-day: Theaki, Tiaki, -- an Ionian island). These are the empirical data that turn an 'either/or' possibility into a 'not/but' factual reality.

b. 'Complete disjunction' is understood to mean an either/or sentence that tolerates no third possibility. For example, it is impossible for something to simultaneously 'be' and 'not be'. Nor can it be simultaneously 'so' (e.g., of iron) and 'not so' (e.g., tendered).

2. “With this—says 'Thea', the goddess (8:50)—I conclude, for you, my exposition, which is reliable, and my reasoning ('noèma') of the truth.

Acknowledge, from these words, by listening, the opinion 'doxa'; WR 189 (dokos), inherent to mortals, and, at the same time, the 'kosmos apatelos' (the deceptive order) of my exposition. (...).

- (i)** On the one hand, the ethereal fire of the flame (...).
- (ii)** On the other hand, (...) the lightless night (...)."

So much for Parmenides' poem. Then follows a kind of origin description (cosmogony) of the cosmos, -- which is reminiscent of the physical. The originator of this mixture of flame and night, two balanced 'forces', is the god Eros (which is borrowed from *Hesiod's Theogonia* ; WR 39; --102; 167). One senses that Parmenides, with this, intends a kind of critique of the physicals (the Paleo-Millesian and the Paleopythagorean).

W. Röd, oc. 111, states here that it concerns an indirect proof in favor of his own complete disjunct. If only either 'being is' or 'non-being is', on the one hand, and 'both being is and non-being is' on the other, are the only prepositions (starting points of the reasoning), and if, furthermore, the first preposition 'being is' is valid, whereas the other two prepositions 'non-being is' and, even, 'both being and non-being is' are not valid, then only Parmenides' thesis 'being is' remains (as the only valid one).

WR199

Indeed: the structure of indirect evidence is as follows: "either 1... or 2... or 3..."; well, either 2... or 3... are invalid; therefore either 1 ...".

This is – as stated – natural, but valid as strictly logical reasoning if they are truly complete disjunctions that allow for no other statement.

If, now, with 'being is', Parmenides expresses his own new philosophical intuition and, with 'being is not', as well as with 'both the flame (/ / being) is and the night (/ / non-being) is', articulates the propositions of either the Paleomileseians, the Paleopythagoreans, or Heraclitus (as is also thought), then he has attempted, in the form of a strictly logically closed argument,

- (i)** to substantiate itself and
- (ii)** to undermine (refute) the others.

In any case: indirect proof (substantiating the model by the explanation of the contradiction—with proof of the counter-model) has since become a fixed philosophical achievement. Cf. WR 4 (*philosophia perennis*).

The structure is: "either model or counter-model; well, not the counter-model; therefore model" (Either M or TM; well, not TM; therefore M; or also: Either M or TM1 or TM2; well, neither TM1 nor TM2; therefore M).

Or again: "Only M or TM1 or TM2 sensible, possibly; well, in fact, TM1 and TM2 nonsensical; therefore M sensible". – One sees that the reasoning begins with the speculative (what might be), to end with the empirical (what is

factual). One sees the structure of the theories (WR 41): through the empirical application one 'sees' the speculative idea (namely 'complete disjunction').

Identity typology.

We call 'identitive' anything that corresponds with or relates to 'identity'. Now, Parmenides is simultaneously the founder of ontology (the study of being) and of ontologically founded, identitive logic (the study of thought).

Identitive 1.

-- G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtsschreibung*, Stuttgart, 1962, 9/20 (*Das Skelett der Logik*),-

WR200

(i) defines traditional logic as the doctrine of identity and negation;

(ii) immediately adds to this that it is either full, total, complete identity of something with itself (= loop-shaped, reflexive identity) or partial, partial identity of something with something else (analogical, partial-identical identity).

Applicative model:

(i) Kalupso's tenderness is fully identical only with itself;

(ii) but tenderness is partly identical with its concrete manifestations (the provision of infrastructure), as well as with everything that is either connected with or resembles tenderness.

Identitief 2.

Scholasticism (800/1450) introduced a system—which is still in use today—namely “material object/formal object”.

(i) Kalupso, materially considered, is Kalupso fully identical (di as distinct, resp. independent from the rest of being).

(ii) Kalupso, formally viewed, is the fully identical kalupso, but interpreted as partially identical; -- e.g.

(a) Kalupso, in mythological terms, is a goddess;

(b) Kalupso, ethically interpreted, is kind-hearted;

(c) Calupso, from an erotic point of view, is in love with Odysseus, etc.

“Omne individuum inafabile,” the Scholastics already said: every fully identical ('individually concrete') given is inexpressible (the series of statements about such a subject is infinite). What CSS Peirce called the endless series of interpretations.

Note-- The schema is stated in WR 160: een-veelduidig, grondschemata der

hermeneutiek.

Identiteif 3.

The Microsocratics:

1. The Megarians (School of Megara: Euclides of Megara (+ /- -400); his pupil Euboulides of Miletus));

2. The Elish-Eretrian School (Phaedo of Elis (+/- -375); Mendemos of Eretria (-319/ -265);

3 . The Paleocynists (Palaeicynici: Antisthenes of Athens (-440/-365); the infamous Diogenes of Sinope (-400/-325; the 'cynic'))),-- these three Kleinsocratic schools eleatized.

The identity judgment structure.

What Platon would later call 'to onoma' (the nominal component, 'subject') and 'to rhèma' (the verbal component), within a sentence of judgment, has – logically – a distinct, though closely connected structure:

(i) the noun (= subject) designates the reality to which the judgment relates with complete identity;

(ii) the verb (= predicate) indicates part-identical, -

WR 201

Judgment is, as Aristotle will later say in the title of his booklet on judgment, 'hermeneia', interpretatio, interpretation (WR 164ff.; 178/181).

But the elevating microsocratics misinterpret this. For instance, they will claim that the phrase “Calypso is in love with Odysseus” is an untrue judgment and substantiate this value judgment with the assertion that “the contents of knowledge and thought (ideas) 'Calypso' and 'in love with Odysseus' are supposedly 'non-identical'. They commit two logical fallacies:

(1) the idea expressed in the subject is meant materially (= fully identical) and the second idea expressed in the predicate is asserted formally, partially identically to the subject;

(2) Like Parmenides, their great predecessor, they seem never to have distinguished between totally and partially identical. They seem never to have discovered the analogy in the practical use of the idea 'being'.

To put it wittily: 'Calypso is in love with Odysseus' does not mean that “Calypso is nothing other than, in itself (reflexively), 'in love with Odysseus', but rather that one of the (otherwise merely fleeting) characteristics of Calypso is that she is 'in love with Odysseus'. Nothing more. There 'is' more and different – in her – than that!

Decision.

W. Jaeger, *A la nais* s., 112, notes: since Homer, *noein* has always meant; to reasoningly respond to, 'to identify'.

(i) to become aware of a given fact

(ii) such that this awareness (WR 137: expanded consciousness) addresses “that which it indeed is” (thus Jaeger), i.e. its identity (identity). Immediately we have the basic idea of eleatism.

The 'absolute' nature of 'being'.

Verse VIII: 29, tells us that it is “*kath'heauto te keitai*”, it (is) there in itself.

Bibl. Sample: Silvio Senn, *An sich (Skizze zu einer Begriffsgeschichte)*, in: *Philosophica Gandensia, New Series*, 10 (1972): 80/96, notes that the expression 'in itself', 'taken in itself', 'objective', 'absolute' (or other words expressing the same thing) dominates the entire ontology, but is first found in Parmenides.

Senn emphasizes the fact that this term, being an ontological term par excellence, is a problem in itself: how to know being(the) in itself, independent of the knowing subject (= *noësis*, *intellectio*, *insight*)? The reason seems to be that we, humans at least, possess only formal, partially identical insights ('interpretations') and, thus, never grasp the total identity of 'being(the)'. That is, undeniably, correct.

WR202

But Senn himself: how does he know that we grasp only the subjective (WR 189: opinion), if he himself has grasped absolutely nothing of the objective being? Senn can only maintain his assertion if he, himself, has already previously perceived (WR 203: identify) (i) that and (ii) what “is being”!

Note : Last year, in **Theory of Thought**, we saw that 'being' always encompasses both factuality (even if that 'existence' ('*existentia*') was true only in the imagination) and the mode of being ('*essentia*'). In other words, everything that is in any case not-nothing is 'something' (and that is 'being'). We designate the totality of all that is not-nothing with Parmenides' term 'to on' (being).

In other words: who does not grasp the idea of 'not-nothing'? Even a child understands—intuitively, admittedly. Well, Parmenides' being is nothing more—speaks purely logically—than the collection of all that is not-nothing. However vague, in its final details, everyone understands this. Well, that is the starting point for situating the absolute character of 'being':

(i) all that is an actual mode of being (= not-nothing)

(ii) is situated in its totality.

1. Parmenides asserts no more with 'kath' heauto', in itself. For: note how that which is non-nothing confronts us with our inability, in our honest inner consciousness, to ignore it! Conscience has such as (incidentally: its only) foundation. The conscientious person never denies that is non-nothing: "kath' heauto te keitai", it is there in itself, absolutely.

2. That is, even, so true that the absurd (absurd), e.g. "kath'heauto te keitai" (there, in itself, imposes itself (on consciousness)).

a. Did we not see that:

(i) Parmenides himself wrote down the phrase "being is not" (which is pure nonsense, 'absurdum', rubbish) (WR 197) in his didactic poem (= didactic text type) and

(ii) that our mathematicians continuously prove their (nevertheless very sensible) theorems by means of the detour of the absurd? (WR 198ff.: the indirect proof).

b. Did we not see how often the (purely) speculative – by the structuralists – is used as a starting point? (WR 41; 112; 198).

c. Did we not see how the pliable warp and weft of (religious) works of art is? (WR 52).

Would Senn dare to claim that:

(a) the absurdity (of mathematicians),

(b) the purely conceived possibilities (of the structuralists),

(c) The fantasies of the artists

Would EDM be 'absolute nothing'? Then he would erase a huge part of our culture!

WR203

3. -- The Paleophythagoreans, through Philolaos of Croton (WR 170ff.), have (like so many other ideas originating from other schools) adopted the idea 'in itself': "To no one would ever be knowable even a single being

(i) either in itself ('kath' hauta')

(ii) either in its relations ('allo pot' allo') if the (unity and its) multiples did not exist (...)" (O. Willmann, oc, 282).

This demonstrates the argumentative force of Parmenides' second basic idea 'in itself' (as distinguished from 'with regard to').

The 'onto.theo.logica', eleatic.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* ; I, 237, says that Parmenides apparently deliberately

connects to Anaximandros of Miletos (WR 92v.).

1. Nature is, according to Anaximandros, arising and passing away (WR 196). Yet this becoming and passing away is not capricious: it is the expression of a deeper *ananke*, *dike*, *moira* (three names for the same natural law that establishes justice).

The highest goal of human wisdom ('knowledge') is precisely to 'see through' (*theoria*) that basic justice.

2. As stated, Parmenides rejects the (demonistic) structure 'becoming/perishing' as the norm and law of being.

On the contrary—according to Jaeger—basic justice (*dike*) is the steering power (WR 46) that directs 'being' in a steady manner such that that being can neither arise nor perish. In other words: in the Parmenidean idea of being lies the necessity that it is elevated above arising and perishing.

Better said: above every multiplicity, be it diachronic (such as arising and passing away) or synchronic (such as a multiplicity that would 'condemn' being, for example, to its opposite, non-being, or to an 'inner contradiction', like the flame/night contradiction of some physicists (Heraclitus, for example) (WR 198ff.)), -- above every dispersion ('multiplicity'), is being, interpreted eleatically, exalted, indeed, deified.

That is the theological aspect (which was already present among the Milesians and the Paleopythagoreans: WR 39: Okeanos; Gaia and Eros; WR 131; 171: Pythag. divine unity).

This theological aspect is the very core of Parmenides' ontology. We express this, with M. Heidegger, in the term 'onto-theology'. But, as we saw with Röd, WR 198ff.: Parmenides established "a strictly logical whole" (W. Jaeger, *Paideia* , I: 236f.). Consequently, once again with Heidegger, we say: 'onto-theological logic'. Thus the threefold structure of Eleatism is formulated.

WR204

When, in his didactic poem (I: 26ff.), Parmenides, as a young man 'in love' with the truth regarding the physical, is received by the goddess, she says: "Surely, absolutely no fate has set you on this path—this path is, after all, not that of the common man, no; Themis and Dike (WR 66), the oldest law and the younger law of Zeus, represented in the goddesses Themis and Dike, (have led you upon it)".

Furthermore, in VIII: 12ff., Parmenides explicitly states what Jaeger asserted. "Nor will the steadfast conviction ever again admit that anything at all—however—arises from being that exists 'alongside' (outside) that being.

For this very reason, Dike (Zealous justice) has not allowed—thanks to strict control—being to arise or perish. Being endures. The judgment ('crisis', verdict, decision), from that perspective, concerns the fundamental choice: either being is or being is not. (...). For, assuming that being arose, then it is not. Nor, assuming that being should ever arise, in the future, is it.

Conclusion: the analysis (of being) is in no case about its origin or decay.” -- One sees that, as the foundation (necessary and sufficient reason or ground; WR 60: abduction) of the steadfast, immutable order, of which the thoroughly logically ordered being bears witness, Parmenides, as an archaizing Greek, sees nothing other than a pair of goddesses, Themis and Dike, establishing a legal order. cf. WR 46 (conform); 197: initiate. Cf. also Parmenides' didactic poem VIII: 37 (Moirai).

Conclusion.-- As his pupils, Zenon and Melissos in particular, though not unanimously, will explain, for Parmenides, multiplicity is the splitting of the one, sole being. But, as a dispersion of that one and sole being, multiplicity is the assumption of being and non-being; well, the latter is impossible.

Consequence: purely logically there is no multiplicity, (meaning, by Parmenides) multiplicity of being, that more than one total being, -- which, for him, would be being and non-being (that inner contradiction).

WR205

The 'stalt' of being.

WR 114/118 (Paleopythagorean Gestalt). - We saw that the Paleopythagoreans consistently used schemata, grammata, and configurations to perform mental operations.

We also know that the psychology of non-perceptible consciousness, since Oswalt Külpe (1862/1915)—spread across the Würzburg, Cologne, Mannheim, and Amsterdam schools—has revealed, thanks to retrospective thought experiments, that two fundamental levels of consciousness exist simultaneously, though not always equally clearly and strongly. These are:

(i) the sensory given singular given ('representation' (e.g., that photo there of Brigitte Simonetta, the meteorologist from Antenna 2)),

(ii) the abstract idea (e.g. a female meteorologist). This is, however, a kind of interval or space: it has been observed that, as thought matures, schematic, less singular representations exist. For example (to remain in the same order): with the idea 'female meteorologist', the 'figure' of a woman appears in the imagination (with a vague twilight of 'scholarship', for example).

This two- or three-part structure (for the schema, grammar, blurred – generalized representation, is not an idea) comes from the Cologne School (under the direction of Lindworsky).

Bibl. sample:

-- *Bigot et al., Textbook of Psychology* , Groningen/Djakarta, 1954-5, 376ff.. -- We shall now see how correct this is.

-- *J. Brun, Les présocratiques* , Paris, 1982-3, 72, summarizes the series of characteristics that Parmenides attributes to being.

-- As *E. des Places* , SJ, *La religion grecque* , Paris, 1969, 185/187; 314s., says, Parmenides wrote a hymn (religious song, in hexameters) in which the accumulation/enumeration of sublime qualities stands out.

We can divide them into two collections.

(a) unoriginated, imperishable, -- eternal, which was not and which will not be, but is (in an eternal 'now'); these characteristics are evident from what preceded (ontotheologica);

(b) one, continuous (= continuum), without dispersion or gathering, indivisible, always whole and complete, -- fixed motionless in the same place, radiating from the center in all directions at once, neither here nor there, neither diminished nor increased, finished everywhere so that it resembles a sphere (spherical shape), which is beautifully round.

It is clear that here - in (b) - not an abstract idea, but a 'gramma', a 'visualisation', a configuration formed in the imagination of Parmenides, is expressed.

WR206

Parmenides' 'being' immediately exhibits two fundamentally different levels of consciousness, to use Lindworsky's terminology: WR 197ff. teaches us a strictly logical 'being'; WR 207 teaches us a 'being' 'represented' in configurative imagination.

WR 52 brought us to the fact that Parmenides was labeled the 'father of materialism' by J. Burnet. If Burnet could find even one ground for proof of his thesis, it is the schematizing level of consciousness (which essentially resides in the imagination; WR 49, 133: the malleable is not purely gross material), with which Parmenides makes his 'being'—which he nevertheless conceives of strictly logically (on an abstract, unschematic, and, certainly, non-singular-gross material plane)—as it were sensory, or rather phantasmatic-perceptible (cf. WR 31).

Parmenides does it the Greek-Paleopythagorean way (WR 114: schematism)

Bibl. sample :

-- G. Verbeke, *The Genesis of Philosophical Spiritualism* , in: *Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (1946): 1 (Feb.), 3/26;

-- Fr. Krafft, Oc,237ff.-- Krafft, *ibid.*, says: "It is being or, better, the being is, for Parmenides,

(1) something situated above and beyond all ordinary visibility ('visualization') and sensory perception. In this sense it is 'non-present',

(2) But Parmenides' being is not yet in any way 'incorporeal'. Reason: the system of 'corporeal/incorporeal' was not yet conceivable at that time. A being presupposes, automatically, a bodily-being.

The sharp distinction only sets in with Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (WR 52). But it is only with Plato of Athens that the opposition 'corporeal/incorporeal', 'material/immaterial', finds its – virtually immediate – highest formulation.

Noological aspect.

WR 142 (higher gifted soul); 152 (good soul); 153v. (noological) taught us—albeit Paleopythagorean (Orphic)—what noology is: it is that part of psychology which reveals the higher in the human soul.

Parmenides' didactic poem, VIII: 34, says: 'Noein (WR 203), to identify ('identify'), and that which the act of identification is directed towards ('noëma'), are 'tauton', idem, the same'.

WR 135 already taught us the basic idea, which is applied here for the umpteenth time: by means of the similar (the model), for example, to know the similar; --here: by means of the idea of being (for, apparently, Parmenides has gone this far) to attain being.

WR207

Parmenides is, truly, the founder of idealism and spiritualism, *stricto sensu*: he sees, the first, that

(i) absolutely nothing stands opposite 'his(the)' (WR 198v.),

(ii) in man the 'noein', the identifying knowing and thinking, which attains being, by means of 'the same', i.e., an idea of being. The idea of being transcends, boundlessly, the 'Gestalt' (WR 207v.) of that being in the imagination;

1. That transcending entails idealism, i.e., proceeding from a 'something'

in the spirit ('nous', - Homeric “voös” (e.g. Odyssey 1:66)), which stands above and outside every sensually perceptible reality, namely the idea (as, some time later, Platon will say; WR 30), which corresponds to being. -- WR 110; 133; 170; 172; 175, (= Paleophythagor. ideal.).

2. That transcending entails, secondly, spiritualism, that is, the proceeding from the fact that the being (man), which is suited to an idea transcending the sensually perceptible, simultaneously, in his deeper essential core, transcends the sensory.

In other words: it must itself, in its 'soul', be 'spiritual'. -- Idealism and spiritualism are interconnected. -- We summarize this in the term 'noology'.

Rhetorical aspect.

J.-P. Vernant, *Les origines de la philosophie*, in: Chr. Delacampaign/ R. Maggiori, dir., *Philosopher (Les interrogations contemporaines / Matériaux pour un enseignement)*, Paris, 1980, 468, says:

“Opposed to the full 'positivity' ('definite' or way of thinking linking to observable facts) of the Ionian physicists (WR 40), the ideal of a complete and elaborated rationality ('intelligibilité') arises. (...).

It is the formal rigor of the evidence (...) and not its apparent correspondence with the 'natural evidences' (...). The effort to generate series of statements which are so joined together that each one contains all the others (...).” (Oc, 468s.).

That is how Vernant characterizes Parmenides' contribution. We will see this more clearly in Zenon's applications of that strictly logical method of understanding in such a way that one 'influences' the fellow reasoning person (WR 4).

WR208

Third sample. -- The Zenoniic critique of foundationalism.

Bibl. sample:

- J. Salem, *Zenon d' Elée*, in: D. Huisman, *Dict.d.phil.*, 2098;
- Cl. Ramnoux, *Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats*, Monaco, 1979, 151/166;
- W. Röd, *Die Phil.d.Antike*, 1, 126/139 (*Zeno*);
- Fr. Krafft, *Gesch.d.Naturwissenschaft*, 1, 240/242; 295ff.;
- P. Foulquié, *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949, 12/14 (Zénon d' Elée);
- EW Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 15/28 (*Zeno of Elea*);

These works provide background information regarding Parmenides' most famous pupil/fellow thinker (WR 91) Zenon of Elea (-500/...).

Introduction.

Bibl. sample:

- F. van Eemeren/ R. Grootendorst/ T. Kruiger, *Argumentation Theory* , Utr./ Antw., 1981-2, 17/20 (*A basic model of argumentation*);
- T. van Dijk, *Textual Studies (An Interdisciplinary Introduction)*, Utr./Antw., 1978, 71/74 (*What is pragmatics ?*);
- IM Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science* , Utr./Antw., 1961, 48/50 (*The Three Dimensions of the Sign*);
- Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication (A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism)*, Cambridge/ Massachussetts/ London, 1966-2, 219/ 257 (*On the Logic of Communication (Syntectics/ Semantics/ Pragmatics)*);
- CW Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* , in: *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science Series* , I, Na. 2, Chicago, 1938 (*note: Morris is the founder of semiotics, fossilized as significative (Lady Welby, Significks* , in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* , London, 1911-11; WR 6; 20).

This concise bibliography demonstrates—once searched—that a three-part structure can serve as a fundamental insight. We will now explain this.

1.-- Applicative model.

Let us take—to remain in the atmosphere of ancient Greece—an excerpt from the Odyssey (1:19b/ 95: The Council of the Gods). We translate, quickly, what the goddess Athena says: “Our Father, Son of Kronos (WR 139: Chronos; 143: Zeus), the Highest among the rulers, (...) the misery of the wise hero Odysseus weighs heavily on me (= Athena).

For so long already, far removed from his loved ones, he endures many forms of misery, -- and indeed on the island surrounded by tidal waves, the navel of the sea (WR 171: archidion; 195: center). (*note: this refers to the island of Ogugia, the ancient - venerable (island), where Odysseus, washed ashore as a castaway, was saved by the goddess Calypso (WR 197ff.)). (...).*”

WR209

The island is, admittedly, rich in (beautiful) forests. But a goddess, the daughter of the all-seeing Atlas (*note: in Greek myth, the deity of the celestial realm as a steadfast system*) - Calypso - inhabits her cave there. (...) . But Odysseus dies of homesickness for - even if only - seeing (from afar) smoke rising (from the chimneys) above his homeland and, then, to die.

Does not your heart, Olympian (WR 123), within your innermost being, turn, moved by compassion for Odysseus? (...). – So much for the reasoned

plea.

2. -- First analysis.

a. Hermeneutics (WR 164), as text analysis, distinguishes, first of all, two dimensions ('aspects', partial identities) in a text.

a. There is the actual, strict 'textual' message. For example

(i) the words themselves, which Homer quotes as Athena's plea; and

(ii) the words cited in this course from the Odyssey (context of Athena's plea/ text of her plea).

b. What is called the purport by F. van Eemeren et al., *Argumentatietheorie*, 17. Thus, in this applicative model:

(i) the purport of Athena's plea is to bring Odiseus back to his homeland by order of the supreme ruler, Zeus;

(ii) the purport – by citing the entire text – of the author of this course, namely to provide an application model, following a text analysis.

b. Hermeneutics, as text analysis, can also make use of T. van Dijk, *Textwetenschap*, 71, to -indicate exactly the same thing—business-wise.

a.-- In a text, Steller first distinguishes the linguistic utterance (the object that is 'expressed', i.e. the strict message (see above)).

b.-- Subsequently, in the same text, he distinguishes the speech act (WR 6; 20) or speech action, i.e. the purport (see, also above).

We take a step further in the pragmatics of text (analysis): 'pragmatics' is called, by van Dijk, "the science that deals with the study of speech acts" (oc, *ibid.*).

3.-- Second analysis.

With Charles Morris (1901/1979), both Colin Wilson and Bochenski distinguish two sub-aspects within the strict message (linguistic expression).

a. The syntactics.

The system of words, as an interpretation of ideas (WR 5), has an 'interconnectedness'. The analysis of these mutual relations is called Morris 'syntactics'.

WR210

b. -- Semantics.

The system of words that make up the textual communication has meaning: the spoken sentences refer to the subject, the given. -- Let us now

apply this two-part scheme.

Ad. a. – Syntactic

Let us take the sentence “The misery of the wise hero Odysseus weighs heavily on me”! Subject: 'the misery' (whereby the adverbial modifier of 'possession' (assignment), namely) 'of the wise hero Odysseus'; predicate: 'weighs' (whereby the specification or modifier of the direct object (the assignment of the 'weighing')), 'me' (and the adverbial modifier of wise, namely) 'heavily'.

A. It is clear that:

(1) the interpretation structure 'subject' (fully identical)/ 'predicate' (partially identical subject) ,

(2) 'further specified' (specified) by 'determinations' (in both interpretative components), governing the syntax, the mutual relations, of the words (WR 180: one/ ambiguous', -- 159: one subject/ plural of predicates; 200: nominal and verbal main part).

B. The duality of interpretation with its provisions

is a structure, in the structural sense. WR 109 taught us that self-regulation (= structure, in the stricter sense) governs a series of transformations (= keeps it within its confines) such that the series forms a system (coherent whole).

Let us rearrange the preceding sentence by replacing the subject and predicate (with modifiers). “For so long already, he has endured many forms of misery, far removed from his loved ones, - and indeed on the island surrounded by tidal waves, the navel of the sea”.

Syntactic analysis (parsing) shows, once again, the self-regulation (identical structure) inherent in every sentence (however diverse the subjects and predicates may be).

Subject; 'he', (with adjective) 'removed' (with adverbial phrase) 'from his loved ones';

Predicate : 'endures' (with direct object) 'many forms of misery' (with adverbial phrase of place), 'and indeed on the island surrounded by tidal waves' (with adjective phrase), 'the navel of the sea'. All individual words of this last sentence are different from those of the previous one (= transformation); yet the structure (= self-regulation) is identical.

Consequence: both sentences belong to the same system of transformations, governed by the interpretative structure. Thus, one can transform the structure, in its elements, by analyzing the following sentences

in the same way.

WR211

Ad b.-- Semantically.

The same sentences are now analyzed differently. - The words, in an interpretive structure, mean something, namely **(i)** Odysseus' misery(ies); **(ii)** Athena's attitude towards it, etc.

In other words: the meaning, within the language community, becomes the content of a communication through singular-concrete language use.

Note a . In linguistics, semantics deals with the meaning of words ('lexigraphy'), word groups, and sentences.

In philosophy (or logic), this is presupposed, and emphasis is placed on the argument, which is expressed in words, word groups, and sentences. One then speaks of 'interpretation' (interpretation in singular and concrete terms) of what the syntax offers.

Especially when that philosophy proceeds in a formalized manner. - Cf. WR 108: $Z = ab$ (= subject/predicate).

b. An application.

(1) Syntactically : o (= subject) + $b_1(o)$, $b_2(o)$, $b_3(o)$, ... $b_{nn}(o)$ + g (= predicate) + $b_1(g)$, $b_2(g)$, $b_3(g)$, $b_n(g)$ (*note* : the signs $b(o)$ and $b(g)$ stand for the modifiers of subject and predicate). The sequence of signs is a structure (self-regulation). As written above, it is purely syntactic, -- 'uninterpreted' (i.e., an empty schema, to be filled in by meanings).

(2) Semantically : "The misery (= O) of the wise hero Odysseus (= $B(O)$) weighs (= G) heavily (= BG) on me.

In other words: by filling in the abstract-synthetic signs, which merely represent the structure (self-regulation), and interpreting them semantically (assigning meanings to them), one establishes an applicative model (= semantic model, application of the regulative model, which is hidden in the syntax).

In other words: the syntactic structure presents a set of relations (of 'empty shells'); semantics 'interprets' those abstract signs by means of meanings formulated in words.

Note: This can be compared to WR 114/118 (gestalt): through the semantics one 'sees' the syntactic gestalt. So much for the introduction, with its three-part semiotics.

Critique of Foundationalism . --As early as 1925, a remarkable representative of the Anglo-Saxon type of language analysis, Georg Edward Moore (1873/1958), criticized foundationalism in his **A Defence of Common Sense**, in: J. Muirhead, **Contemporary British Philosophy**, London.

Karl Popper (1902/1994) (WR 61), in his *Logik der Forschung* (1941), does it in turn.

WR212

Fundamentalism

'Fundamentalism' is the view that all knowledge must be well-founded. By 'foundation' ('reason'), necessary and sufficient reasons, one understands conclusive proof in the first place. A 'justification' such that what one asserts can be considered proven is an absolute necessity in the eyes of the foundationalist.

Foundationalism is a characteristic of one type of rationalism. The foundational rationalist

(i) believes, with René Descartes (1596/1650), that a knowledge, an insight, a theorem is well-founded, justified and, therefore, 'rational' if it is based on (preferably mathematically) rigorously proving reason;

(ii) believes, with John Locke (1632/1704), that knowledge is well-founded if it is based on sensory perception and is, therefore, 'rationally justified'.

The intellectualist rationalist (Descartes type) trusts in (mathematical) reason as the solid foundation; the empiricist rationalist (Locke type) trusts in (sensory) perception as the solid foundation.

Both variants of rationalism still believe in the infallible authority, the one of the intellect, the other of perception.

Decision.

'Fundamentalism' is

(i) the opinion that knowledge must be well-founded and

(ii) that, for that well-founded knowledge, a ground can actually be found (either intellectual reason or empirical reason).

criticism of Foundationalism

Critique of Foundationalism is – therefore – the questioning, on 'rational' grounds, of

(i) the necessity that all assertions must be completely proven and

(ii) the possibility, for that purpose, of a ground of proof. —

Critique of Foundationalism therefore emerges independently.

(i) the obsession with proof and

(ii) the naive belief in the authority of evidence, reasoning and observation.

K. Popper, **Logik der Forschung**, *Wien*, 1934, 10f.*, says the following

regarding the reason for the need for 'grounds', absolute foundations: “We suspect that scientific research – psychologically speaking – is simply not possible at all without a scientifically indisputable belief – if one will: a 'metaphysical belief' – in theoretical ideas that are often extremely unclear.”

In other words: well-founded starting points and presuppositions that are guaranteed to be true cannot, humanly speaking, be dispensed with—not even in academic scientific work and research. To such an extent, even the scientist needs 'foundations'.

WR213

For example, Popper himself states that “what is specialized science” is not itself 'scientifically decidable' (i.e., devisable)—that the idea of 'specialized science' is itself a philosophical extra-scientific starting point. Popper says—just now—that even the specialized scientist cannot get by without 'metaphysical faith' (e.g., the so-called metaphysical faith in specialized science itself) and that this faith is psychologically necessary. That must—because of the sharp-thinking Popper—be a mistake: he must have meant that such a faith is metatheoretical (WR 188). This implies that, purely methodologically, a sharp idea—itsself unprovable by specialized science: it cannot begin without that faith, a sharp idea of 'specialized science'—determines the language (and immediately the viewpoint) of the specialized scientist.

Rhetoric of specialized science.

G.-G. Granger (1920/2016), a well-known rationalist, commits an analogous fallacy. In his * *Pensée formelle et sciences de l'homme**, Paris, 1967, 21/24 (**Rhétorique et contenus* *), Granger attempts to substantiate two claims:

(1) 'Rhetoric' (which he interprets very poorly, making it all the easier - let us say - to ridicule it) confines itself to the purely 'verbal' (word-hassle). Thus oc, 21 (“L' usage rhétorique du langage se distingue radicalement de son usage scientifique en ce qu' il s' enferme dans un univers verbal”).

(2) 'Rhetoric' - Granger says further on - uses language as a means of influence between more than one subject (if only for the purely 'aesthetic' enjoyment that the speaking and listening or reading subject derives from it; oc, 22).

(3) Specialized science, on the other hand, -- according to Granger, always -- uses language

(a) not merely as a means of understanding between the subjects engaged in specialized science (= the specialized scientists),

(b) but also as a means of interpretation between those same subjects and the perceived world, such that the objects from that perceived world become 'maniables' (manageable). (Oc, 231s))

In the words of *Thomas S. Kuhn* (1922/1996), * *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* *, Meppel, 1976-2, 135: "If we survey the extensive experimental literature (...), the suspicion arises that something like a paradigm also underlies observation."

WR214

What a person 'sees' (WR 41: *theoria*) depends **(i)** both on the object he looks at, **(ii)** and on what he has learned to 'see' through his earlier visual-conceptual experiences. In the absence of such training (= practice), there exists only - in the words of William James (1842/1910) - 'a blossoming buzzing confusion'.

Note: 'Visual-conceptual' practically means the paradigm (in Platonic terms: *idea*) that arises from the observed facts through practice within a group understanding.

Kuhn gives an application model oc,36: "At some time, between 1740 and 1780, the electricity theorists (WR 190v.: observational language/theoretical language), for the first time, were able to accept the foundations (WR 212) of their field, without further ado.

1. From that moment on, they threw themselves into more concrete and hidden problems and reported their results increasingly in articles addressed to other electricity theorists, rather than in books addressed to the developed world in general.

- 2.** As a group, they achieved some
- (i)** the astronomers, in antiquity,
 - (ii)** the movement researchers in the Middle Ages,
 - (iii)** the physical opticians late 17th century,
 - (iv)** reached the historical geologists in the early 19th century.

That is to say: they had produced a paradigm that proved capable of guiding the research of the entire group.

Except with the aid of hindsight, it is difficult to find another means of knowing ('criterion') that so clearly proclaims a field of study to be a (specialized) science.

Decision.

- (1)** As also the orator (the so-called 'rhetor')

- a. addresses other subjects (Granger's first dimension)
- b. to influence them to a different (preferably his own) view ('theoria'), or reinterpretation, of the objects from their perception,

(2) so too the specialist scientist:

- a. he usually finds, by chance, a new 'perspective' (in Kuhn's language game: paradigm) on the objects of an observation;
- b. he shares that view with other subjects,
 - b.1. The educated reader (vulgarizing rhetoric of specialist scientists),
 - b.2. The 'specialist' ('high' vulgarization), such that both their 'view' (= interpretation) of the observable world ('objects' within it) is influenced (preferably in the sense of the influencing specialist scientist himself).

WR215

General decision

1. WR 43 taught us that, from the earliest 'philosophy', theology, philosophy, specialized science, and rhetoric formed a coherent whole.

2. It is clear that, following what Popper and Kuhn said, this is still the case today—except as regards theology. Metatheory of scientific theory (WR 188ff.) necessarily encompasses both philosophy (WR 213) and rhetoric (just mentioned).

In other words: if the specialist scientist wishes to attain full awareness (WR 137) of what he is doing (= specialist scientific work), then he ought to do so metatheoretically. If he wishes to do so metatheoretically, then he must involve both philosophy and rhetoric: these belong intrinsically to the (specialist) science situated within the machinery of the specialist science itself, having attained full self-awareness.

Note: Regarding the crisis of enlightened rationalism, in view of its crisis of foundations (caused by the critique of foundationalism), see: *W.W. Bartley, *Flucht ins Engagement* (* Versuch einer Theorie des offenen Geistes *),* Munich (Szczesny Verlag), 1964. We will return to this—in part—later.

The Zenonic (logical) syntax.

*Clemente Ramnoux, *Parmenide**, 158ff, summarizes the logical syntax (WR 210ff.), founded by Zenon of Elea, as follows. Ramnoux calls this 'formalization' ('formalisation'), the reduction of a text (the full text, semantically-pragmatically) to its strict logical framework (= the syntax).

a.-- Zenon, according to Ramnoux, starts with the opponent's starting basis ('foundation') (which entails agonistics; WR 11; 144).

Phraseologically (with regard to the formulation of the 'phrasis' - sentence formation), an 'if' introduces the sentence.

Applicative model :

If (as my opponent claims) there exists a multiplicity of 'beings' ...”.

Applicative model:

If there is movement (= multitude of traversed places), ...”.

Note: One sees that the eristic (dispute-giver; WR 9: the Sumerian tenzones) Zenon is so cunning as to articulate the thesis of his opponent (perhaps either the Paleo-Pythagorean (multiplicity) or Heraclitus (movement)) in the language practiced (WR 214: training) by his teacher (which simultaneously contains the interpretation). Which is—logically—dishonest. Why? Because he introduces a usage of language alien to the closed linguistic system (of the Pythagoreans or Heraclitus).

WR216

Reread the pages on Pythagoreanism (WR 98/181) or the ultra-brief overview (as well as what was said about dialectics, First Year Course) regarding Heraclitus' philosophy that is yet to be developed: there is at least as much logical syntax (cohesion) in it as in Zenon's system. It would have been more appropriate for Zenon to choose that of his opponent rather than the Parmenidean starting point. Only then would he have displayed a full sense of system.

b. -- Ramnoux summarizes the further steps in the reasoning as follows.

b.1. To derive conclusions from the lemma (basic position) – by means of argumentation (discourse, proof) – which are mutually (syntactically) contradictory (contradictory).

b.2 To deduce from such contradictions that the basic position is impossible (understand: illogical, absurd). -- Cf. WR 198ff. (Parmenides' method).

Note: Ramnoux, oc. 158, states that as a metatheoretical lemma Zenon presupposes (without stating it) that, in order to be valid, a starting point must not lead to contradictory derivations. Which is the method of proof by contradiction (i.e., of the countermodel). Parmenides laid the foundation of proof thereof by ontologically clarifying the absolute contradiction of his and not his.

See – therefore – above for that. Meanwhile, it appears that philosophy, in

its ontology, is one of the philosophical (and not disciplinary) presuppositions of the discipline. (WR 213). In other words, the discipline merges with philosophy. “Put more simply: one must not contradict oneself” (Cl. Ramnoux, oc, 158).

Simply formalized:

If—as lemmas—acd1, acd2..., acdn are posited, such that—in the analysis—the derivations csq1, csq2 ...csqn, which necessarily follow from them according to logical syntax, are mutually contradictory (in the form 'either csqx or csqy or csqz'), then that lemma contains an absurdity and, immediately, some alternative lemma is logically valid.

Behold the logical syntax of Zenon's argument.

Compare with WR 211: there it concerned the logical coherence of the judgment; here it concerns the logical coherence of a series of judgments, which can be called an 'argument'.

WR217

The Zenoniic critique of foundationalism.

a. We now know that Zenon is the – as far as we know – founder of (applied) logical syntax (sense of systematic derivational coherence).

b. But is he, immediately, in that manner (the analysis of logical syntax), also the founder of the (applied) critique of foundationalism? Yes, if Aristotle—as EW Beth, oc, 19, says—is telling the truth: “The four paradoxes of motion mentioned by Aristotle (*note*: logically incoherent reasonings; 'antinomies') are all variations on the same theme.

They all lead to the same conclusion: (the hypothesis of multiplicity) provides no more a starting point for the rational explanation (of the phenomena of motion) than (the Eleatic theory of unity).

Consequence: neither position has anything to reproach the other for. This implies that Zenon himself was convinced of the absurdity of Parmenides' premise. He merely wanted—if Aristotle is telling the truth—to prove that his opponents held equally absurd positions.

If, therefore, Aristotle interprets correctly, then Zenon is unmistakably the founder of

(1) of the realization that every reasoning requires starting points (Platonic: lemmas; in modern language axioms, presuppositions or whatever),

(2) of the realization that both types of reasoning, regarding multiplicity (synchronic multiplicity or diachronic multiplicity (motion)), were equally

absurd.

We call this, following the above-mentioned *W. Bartley*, **Flucht ins Engagement**, at 97, 'the too-you argument' or, furthermore, 'the you-neither-as-I-argument'.

Update

WR 165. -- Bartley, as a rabid rationalist, attempts, but with little result (logically speaking), to refute the Protestant theologians — Karl Barth (1886/1968), Paul Tillich (1886/1968), Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, who represent the new Protestant thought.

These theologians proceed from the logical limitedness of reason. They justify this limitedness—rationally—as follows.

No matter what line of reasoning one presents, one can always ask two little questions.

- (1) "How do you know that?" (The epistemological question) and
- (2) "Lay your last 'grounds' (axiomata, lemmata) bare".

Unfortunately, these two little questions cannot be repeated endlessly after every answer to them.

WR218

If, therefore, the endless questions, epistemological and syntactic (How do you know that? Prove to me, again, what you assert!), must ever become finite in number, then there is—as the aforementioned Protestant theologians say—only one way out: to halt somewhere. Which amounts—according to the same theologians time and again—to accepting on authority ('faith,' Popper would say; WR 212) of, for example, a first presupposition (lemma)—which could then be, for instance, a standard (criterion), an end goal, etc.

With CSS Peirce, this constitutes 'authority' or tenacity or a priori (i.e., orthodoxy (what others predict or repeat), willfulness (what I believe is correct), liberalism (I do debate, but only based on my freely chosen premise)). To speak likewise with Peirce: consequently, there is absolutely no question of 'scientific method' ('external permanency') (See Logic Course, First Year).

In other words: such a line of reasoning is anything but 'scientific'. Behold the rational proof of the irrationality of every, absolutely every, premise of logical syntax (rigor of reasoning). Such that the analysis of logical syntax, if pushed far enough, causes rational thinking to turn into some form of 'irrationality'.

In other words: in principle, at least, every irrationalism is rationally justifiable. Talk about a paradox!

First religious application. -- Since all opinions—ultimately (logically—syntactically)—are irrational, let us seek the way in a religious faith.

*J. Daniélou, *Origène*, Paris, 1948, 32, cites the apologetics (rational foundation of faith) of Origen of Alexandria (.../+254), with St. Augustine of Tagaste (+354/+430), “the greatest genius of Christian antiquity” (oc,7). Origen urged thinking Christians to analyze all opinions (with a certain reservation for the 'atheistic' Epicureans (Epicurus of Samos (-341/-271))). The result resembled that of the current Neo-Protestants: “They never listen to those who think differently from themselves.”*

Consequence: not a single thinker among the 'Ancients' (*note:* predecessors) has succeeded in persuading even one follower of the 'New' (*note:* later) to adopt his own system. Daniélou describes Origen's final conclusion: 'akritos tuchè' (blind chance) – not reason – decides the actual opinion that someone holds.

WR219

a. Incidentally: in his exposition on the processes of opinion formation, Peirce also emphasizes their contingency.

'A.kritos' means 'that which is not (yet) categorized, ordered'. That which is in the unclear (concerning itself). Blind (in the first place, regarding itself).

b. Immanuel Kant (1724/1804), the leading figure of the German Enlightenment, says it even worse: “Folly and reason have such unknowably defined boundaries that it is difficult to continue for a long time in one area without taking a detour into the other.” (*I. Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* , Leipzig, 1880 (First edition: Königsberg, 1766), 48).

Put more clearly: the boundaries between reason and folly are so unknowable that one can easily, while lingering in the realm of reason, find oneself in the sphere of folly. This implies that, in moments of clarity, this arch-rationalist harbored no illusions regarding the work of reason. Thus, Origen stands far from alone regarding the actual use of the intellect, or rather, reason.

Second religious application.

a. Origen resolves the foundational crisis of ancient Greek philosophies by saying: “Adhere to no philosopher (after having analyzed them all). Adhere,

however, to God and his prophets.” (Thus J. Daniélou, oc, 33).-- As if, with this, everything was clarified!

b . Analogous is the 'thou too' argument of the Neo-Protestants.

(i) For reasons of well-defined logical arguments, (Enlightened) reason is so limited that no one escapes an 'engagement' situated outside of reason ('commitment', 'engagement': 'involvement'), which, to a 'critical' person, appears 'dogmatic'.

(ii) Result:

a . The Christian has the right to make a choice (commitment), according to his free decision;

b. This is a right which no one can hold against him, at least on purely rational grounds. Cf. W. Bartley, oc, 100. -- As if that clarified everything!

Note-- As already explained in Course Theory of Thought (First Year):

(i) the presuppositions ought to be understood as lemmas, hypotheses, which, initially, suffer from the limitations of reason;

(ii) can clarify the analysis (axiomatic-deductive or reductive).

WR220

Applicative model of Zenonian argument.

(1) Simplicios, a Neoplatonist (between +500 and +600), left us an account.

(2) For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that, in the days of Zenon, two anthologies were in circulation, each containing a theory of matter (conception of what constitutes a gross or subtle body) and a mathematics. The reason is that the pure idea and the Gestalt associated with it in the imagination were too rarely kept apart (WR 205ff.).

EW Beth, De wijsb. d.wisk ., 18ff., outlines both anthologies.

A.-- The theory of multiplicity.

This amounts to an atomic ontology. It can be attributed to the Paleophythagoreans. The atomistic/atomic theory of matter states that a body (anything that has extension, 'size') consists of extension such that these units ('points', micromonads; WR 104; 111) **a/** are finite in number and **b/** comprise indivisible (final units). 'Point configuration' seems to be the summarizing term for this.

B. -- The doctrine of unity.

This amounts to an infinitesimal ontology.

It can be attributed to Zenon. The infinitesimal theory of matter states that a body consists of extension such that it comprises contiguous parts, which

a/ are divisible and indeed **b/** infinitely divisible (infinitesimal divisibility: in the small there is no smallest, but always something smaller, -- which **a/** are enlargeable and indeed **b/** infinitely enlargeable (infinitesimal enlargeability: in the large there is no greatest, but always something larger).

Note -- One could also say that the theory of multiplicity teaches discontinuous units and that the theory of unity teaches continuous material coherence. The theory that teaches continuity is also called synechism ('sun.eches', connected, continuous). So that Zenon's view can be called 'infinitesimal synechism'.

Note -- One sees that, in synechistic ontology, the idea of 'boundary value' (limit) is at work: one approaches, indeed continuously, but never reaches the intended limit. -- In infinitesimal arithmetic, this finds application and actualization later on.

So that Zenon's critique (eristics, 'dialectics', 'agonistics') is directed against the following ontology(ies):

- a.** being possession of extent ('size'),
- b.1.** being consists of a finite number of indivisible units,
- b.2.** being actually moves (shows multiplicity of places).

WR221

Let us now read the appliqué model, as Cl. Ramnoux, oc, 159ff., formulates it (relying on the texts).

1. The thesis. A 'thesis' is the assertion one wishes to defend. It is divided into two parts.

1.1. Given. The prior positioning (of the opponent): "If there is a multitude of beings".

1.2. Asked (sought). The contradictory derivations from that premise: "Then those beings are, at the same time, large and small, -- and indeed large to the infinitely large and small to the infinitely small".

2. The proving (argumentation, discourse). 'Proof' is called the series of judgments which, according to a logical syntax (WR 210 (judgment); 216 reasoning)), make the proposition 'true'. -- Remnoux sees two or three components.

2.1. Argument a. "A being (that corresponds to the aforementioned characteristics, namely being simultaneously infinitely small and infinitely large), if it is added to another (being), does not thereby increase the latter.

Reason: if an extension, which is nothing, is added to another, then it cannot increase the latter in terms of extension.

Consequence : consequently, the added value would be zero in that case.

Simplikios notes here that Zenon wants to demonstrate that something that exhibits neither extension, nor diameter ('thickness'), nor mass is simply – expressed in ontological terms – 'nothing'.

2.2.a. Argument b. “If, however, the 'being' in question is (something), then this necessarily implies that an arbitrary part thereof exhibits a certain extent (size), a certain diameter (thickness), a certain distance from other parts”.

2.2.b.(i) Argument b.1 .

Regressive evidence

The same reasoning, however, applies to any part preceding that just discussed: that too will, in turn, possess extensiveness.

2.2.b.(ii) Argument b.2.

Infinitesimal - regressive proof.

A third (arbitrarily chosen) part will lie before the (second) one just mentioned. -- It amounts to the same thing whether one asserts this once or an infinite number of times: after all, no part will be the last, and no part will not be related to another.

WR222

3. Decision (value judgment, evaluation).

The comparison between what is asked and the proof is called a 'conclusion', such that one sees the answer to what is asked in the latter.

Here is how Zenon phrases this: -- “If, therefore, there is a multiplicity of beings, then those beings are simultaneously great and small, -- great to the infinitely great, -- small to the infinitely small.” Behold Fr. 1, from *Zenon* 's * *On Nature* *. It is a model of argument (thesis/proof/conclusion).

“Because of the logical clarity that characterizes Zenon’s argument, Aristotle regarded him as the founder of logic, in the stricter sense.” (W. Röd, oc, 137). At least according to logical syntax.

Note 1. It is evident that Zenon enjoys the endless repetition of a (partial) reasoning (WR 106: algorithm). It is as if the discovery of the boundary value (limit increasingly approached, yet never reached) has fascinated him.

As an update, reference is made to WR 217ff.: the endless questioning back regarding the proof of the series of assertions (as a means of proving the boundedness of reason). However, among Neo-Protestant theologians, this endless questioning serves to support the argument that this is unfeasible (in other words: a summative induction, which concerns an infinite set, is unfeasible unless one finds another way).

2. We will not lose ourselves here in the multitude of interpretations provoked by Zenon's text, which is not very clear. We are concerned with two things:

(i) the merging - with all the unpleasant consequences thereof - of ontology, matter theory and mathematics.

(ii) the sense of logical syntax that Zenon displays and which still holds true.

Note: We do, however, cite here the interpretation of W. Röd, oc, 128.

(A) Zenon's basic idea.

If things are conceived (multiplicity theory) as aggregates (configurations) of indivisible parts, then these parts must be **(i)** inextensive and **(ii)** extended. Or at least be conceived as such.

Ad (i).-- If they are inextensive, these mathematical 'points', then every aggregate thereof would likewise be inextensive.

Ad (ii).-- If they are extensive, then they must first be bounded by nearby parts, -- which, in turn, are also of such a state, -- which -continues without limits.

WR223

In other words: relationalism characterizes Zenon's conception of matter and being: once bounded (= related to a nearby example), they are subject to re-questioning (regressive) and this endlessly (infinitesimal). Which is impossible as summative induction (first all individually, then all collectively).

Being – according to Röd – would, in that case, as the sum of infinitely many extended parts, inevitably be conceived as infinitely extended.” (Ibid.).

Conclusion. -- Being can be thought of simultaneously as unextended and as extended. Consequence: given this nonsense (contradiction), the counter-model, the doctrine of unity, must be assumed to be possibly true. The dilemma refers to syntax.

(B) Zenon's additional idea.

In addition to his reasoning, Zenon argues against the presupposition of indefinite parts. After all, the addition of indefinite parts to something does not make the latter more extensive. Nor does its removal. Something that is such that neither its addition nor its removal enlarges nor diminishes anything else is nothing.

So much for Röd's interpretation. We know too little about the context in which Zenon argued to see it fully clearly.

Second applicative model of Zenonian argument.

Swift-footed Achilles ('podas okus Achilleus').

Aristotle is now our main source.

1. The thesis, – Zenon now directs himself against the diachronic multiplicity situated in the movement (displacement, change).

Given. -- Swift-footed Achilles chases the tortoise, the slowest animal.

Requested. -- Proof that he, no matter how quick-footed, never catches up with them.

2.1.-- The argument 1.

That which moves must, inevitably, reach half of the lag (space, interval) before it reaches the stated goal. (infinitesimal - regressive).

Before the moving object reaches the goal, it has already traversed half of half of the intermediate space. This proceeds in this way into infinity.

This is called the argument of dichotomia, dichotomy (WR 104).

2.2.-- The argument 2.

The swiftest will never overtake the slowest while running. Indeed: inevitably, the one overtaking must reach the point from which the one being overtaken departed.

Consequence : the slowest will, inevitably, always maintain a lead over the fastest.

So much for Aristotle's account.

WR224

3. The decision.

“In the two cases—dichotomia, swift-footed Achilles—one proves the impossibility of reaching the boundary (value) (limit) by dividing the space to be traversed in a specific manner. But in the second argument, one dramatizes by means of the failure of the figure of the swift-footed hero in his pursuit of the slowest.” (Thus Aristotle, Phys., 6: 9, 239b).

Note: 'Dramatizing' is a well-known form of rhetoric: by means of vivid

representations, one establishes rapport in such a way that an abstract idea is understood much faster and more clearly, thanks to singular – concrete interpretation (WR 211: semantic interpretation).

Here: the moving (abstract model) is replaced by the pursuing Achilles (singular model). As Aristotle noted. The logician Zenon, indeed, also knew rhetoric!

Note: The criticism of Zenon's argument.

(1) Aristotle says: “To claim that - in the case of Achilles and the tortoise - the one who leads is not overtaken is false.

a. It is true, however, that the tortoise is not overtaken as long as it has a lead.

b. But, if one assumes that the distance to be covered is a finite distance, it will still be overtaken.” (Ibid.).

But oh, for Zenon, wasn't the problem there:

(i) he also knew, of course, that in the physical reality that common sense sees, Achilles overtakes the tortoise;

(ii) he apparently wanted to persuade purely by reasoning, contrary to all physical reality, -- because he did not want to combat physical reality, but the axioms, lemmas of the opponents, not by experimental-physical falsification, but by purely logical-syntactic (WR 210 + 215v.) reasoning, which was falsification.

It is not without reason that he is, in Aristotle's eyes, the father of logic. He founded strict logical rhetoric. It deals with the manner in which someone

(i) establishes understanding

(ii) such that he influences by strictly logical reasoning (WR 4; 207: Parmenides' model).

(2) Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, 701, notes that Zenon confuses two types of division: the equal division (two halves, four quarters, etc.) and the proportional division (two halves, two halves of both halves, etc.)

WR225

1.2.4. Fourth sample: Protagoras of Abdera (225/247)

(- 480/-410).

Bibl. sample:

-- G.Romeyer-Dherbey, *Les sophistes*, Paris, 1985 (7/32: Protagoras; according to him, probably born in -492);

-- J.-P. Dumont, *Protagoras*, in: D. Huisman, *Dict.d.phil.*, 2138/2142;

--id., *Les sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1969 (24/53: Protagoras).

We situate Protagoras, first, within the entire Protosophistic. This distinguishes itself from Deuterosophistic (= Second Sophistic, which was a distinct movement under the 'Good Emperors' (+96/+180)).

I. - General visual impression of Protosophistics (-450/-3501).

Five characteristics will suffice.

IA . -- The emergence of the 'classical' man the 'humanistic' man.

E.R. Dodds, **Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike**, * Zürich/München*, 1977 (originally *Eng.*: ** The Ancient Concept of Progress **, Oxford, 1973), 124f., characterizes it as follows: “(Protosophistics) exhibits the same characteristics as the liberal thought of the 18th and 19th centuries. These are:

- (1) individualism,
- (2) 'humanity' (note: humanism, which we will discuss later),
- (3) worldliness (note: secularization),
- (4) criticism of tradition based on 'reason',
- (5) great confidence in applied 'reason' as the key to continuous progress”.

One cannot better characterize the transition from the 'archaic' man to the 'classical' ('humanistic') man.

Indeed: until now, all thinkers—Paleomileans, Paleophythagoreans, Eleatics, Heraclitians—were archaic in their deepest essence. The epitome of their thinking was—notwithstanding their thoroughly rational behavior—deeply rooted in religion. It is precisely that—that sacred root—that will be eradicated thanks to desacralization. The Protosophists are the perpetrators of this, perhaps unknowingly, at least the best among them. We will now demonstrate this by means of two examples.

First example.

Protagoras was Heraclitating. By way of reminder: Heraclitus of Ephesus (whether 535/465 or 567/480) is the founder of what has been called 'dialectics' since the German Idealistic Romanticism (cf. Theory of Thought, First Year). Now, two main characteristics of the dialectic of fate (that is still the best name) are

- (i) 'panta rhei' (everything flows) and
- (ii) harmony of opposites. We will see how Protagoras, as a typical 'classical' (humanistic) man, actualized them.

WR226

The archaic interpretation of 'panta rhei', all beings are 'fluid', is twofold.

- (a) Plato, in the dialogue Cratylus, interprets 'rhein', 'to flow', as a verb in

which (Mother) Earth (WR 65: Gaia), called Rhee or Rhea, the Mother of Zeus, as the wife of Kronos/Chronos (WR 93 (time); 139), is incorporated. In this sense, 'panta rhei', everything flows, is the same as 'being of the essential nature of Rhea, the Chthonic primordial goddess'. (WR 123). Everything is seen as flowing in the nature of Rhea, the central female figure of the oldest religious stratum in Hellas.

(b) *Cl. Ramnoux*, a scholar of Heraclitus, states that 'rhein', being fluid, should be understood as choreic (WR 82). In other words: all beings move (= movement, change) according to a 'rhuthmos', rhythm (WR 129).

'Rhuthmizein' means arranging something at regular intervals within the framework of a sequence (e.g., a round dance) and, in doing so, providing it with a measure and rhythm of movement. Choreically ordering, if you will. "In panta rhei, one would prefer, as an interpretation, to think of (...) 'une ronde' (a dance circle)—rather than to think of the image of a flowing stream." (*Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite* , in: *D. Huisman, Dict.d.phil* . 1184).

Note: Like the first thinkers, so too Heraclitus: he somehow became acquainted with a mystery religion (WR 158: consecration service; 167). It is likely the Orphic one (WR 143ff.; 188). Heraclitus, if to be understood as Orphic, becomes thoroughly understandable. For him, the movement (WR 223) is not like that of a Zenon of Elea, of course.

But Protagoras, as a classical-humanist thinker, actualized the movement—why else, otherwise: 'dialectically' too, but now as back-and-forth arguing (here the name fits: dialectics of discussion). The interpretation becomes logical-rhetorical. There, too, everything flows: one asserts this now, that then; the other, once again, 'creatively' brings forward a new 'equally fluid' (understand: uncertain, open to criticism, and therefore changeable) opinion (WR 184; 189). Opinions, in Protagoras's little world, are fluid. Behold the desacralized interpretation. Dialectics of opinion.

Second example.

Heraclitus, as a dialectician of fate, emphasizes the harmony of opposites; WR 11 (the Sumerian model) taught us that the deities, in Sumerian reality itself, had 'caused' ('begotten') opposites, which turned that reality into a demonic system.

WR227

Well, Heraclitus stands on that same sacred ground. WB Kristensen, * *Verz. bijdr. tot kennis der Antieke religieen* *, *A'm*, 1947, 288ff., points this out.

(a) Fr. reads as follows: “Nature, too, is directed toward 'enantia' contraria, opposites; from opposites—and not from similar things—it produces the harmonious. (...). This is precisely expressed in what Heraclitus the Obscure says: “harmonious things are what is whole and what is not whole, harmony and discord, harmonious and disharmonious. From all beings comes the One, and from the One all beings.” (*Aristotle, De mundo* , 5: 1176a.7).

(b) Fr. 54: “The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible one”. --“In a truly ancient spirit, Heraclitus considered the mystery of totality (WR 12) more important than the 'rational' relations of existence”. (Oc, 289).

However, what the desacralized way of thinking will later consider most important—the 'rational' structure of reality—is precisely what Heraclitus finds less 'strong', influential, or decisive. After all, an invisible power is active within the fusion itself in such a way that opposites are, as it were, simultaneously present within it.

But Protagoras, as a classical humanist, interprets this as follows: “He was the first to assert that on every subject there exist two arguments opposed to one another. He was, immediately, the first to introduce this principle of 'dialectical argumentation' into practice.” (*Diogenes Laërtios, Levens* , 9: 50).

Furthermore, Diogenes Laërtios says: “He was also the first to demonstrate how one could undertake the refutation of an opposing opinion.”

Decision.

'Dialectics of opinion'. This becomes the common ground of the entire Protosophist movement.

IB -- The founding of the classical-humanist 'paideia'

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* , I: 379f., characterizes Protagoras' educational idea as “ausgesprochen humanismus” (pronounced humanism; oc, 380). He outlines it as follows.

A.-- Two culture stages are distinguished.

(a) The first stage in human development is the Prometheus gift. In Hellenic mythology, Prometheus is the offspring of a Titan (WR 145), who, by stealing fire from 'heaven', became a 'savior' (founder of culture). The name 'Prometheus gift' comes from the tragedian Aeschylus of Eleusis (-525/-456). In Protagoras' actualization, it refers to skilled, 'technical' civilization.

WR228

Note: We must, here, correct Dodds' opinion that Protosophism mirrors the 8th-century Enlightenment: in contrast to Protosophism, the

Encyclopedists, for example, highly valued industrialization driven by technology.

(b) The second phase is somewhat later, and will be called humanist culture. -- “Notwithstanding the mastery of fire, humans (equipped, since Prometheus, with the Prometheus gift) would have been doomed to a pitiable doom: they destroyed one another in terrifying battles. But Zeus - thus the myth of the origin of culture - granted them the gift of justice so that, thereby, they were able to found community and state.” Thus W. Jaeger. He raises the question whether this myth comes from Hesiod, *Erga*, 276 (WR 39; 64) or originates from Aeschylus.

Note: One sees, once again, the two layers in ancient cultures, the titanically destructive and the Olympically constructive (WR 66).

B.-- *The Protagoreic Actualization.*

(a) While the gift of Prometheus, technology, is given only to craftsmen ('des Spezialistentum' (oc,380)), Zeus has implanted the sense of justice and law in all people. Otherwise, the state cannot exist.

(b) However, there is an even higher level of insight into the foundations of the state and law.

It is learned in the *techne politike*, the political science, of the Protosophists. For Protagoras, the '*techne politike*', the knowledge or skill such that one can lead life in the polis, is the true humanist *paideia*.

Decision.

(1) Jaeger calls 'humanism' the priority given to the formation of man, as a human being, over the entire field of technological formation.

(2) “The basis for the understanding and the clarity of the technical knowledge and knowledge and the proper perception has become the basis for humanism.” (Oc,380: this thorough and clear separation of technical skills and knowledge and the actual (human) education has become the foundation of humanism).

B. bis . -- Protagoras held such a high view of the profession of sophist, teacher of civic 'wisdom'. The average sophist has contented himself with selling his knowledge.

WR229

One sees, once again, how the archaic-sacred dichotomy 'chthonic/Olympic' (WR 123) is reinterpreted into a secular-culturological 'technology'/'humanism'. In this way, the entire culture is desacralized.

B. ter. -- *Protagorean political elitism.*

'Elitism' is the fact that, culturally speaking, one grants a certain 'elite' a choice, preference, indeed, leadership.

(a) *the fundamental question of democracy* .

Classical humanity, through its emancipation from the ancient sacred sphere, acquires a new major problem: if it wishes to maintain its democratic society, it needs leaders.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I: 368, even says: “das Problem der Probleme für die Demokratie” (the problem par excellence in democracy). - The century of Pericles is known, in Athens at least, for its democracy. But Pericles of Athens (-492/-429), the leader of the democratic party, became the sole ruler of Athens in -444: Jaeger says, in this regard, that his 'democratic' government was “eine kaum verhülte Tyrannis” (a barely concealed autocracy)! (oc, 368).

This gives rise to a new tension between “the strong, cultural personality, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, society” (oc, ibid.). All thinkers on society, in its democratic form, have concerned themselves with this, 'ohne damit fertig zu werden' (without coming to terms with it; oc, ibid.).

(b) *The leadership formation of Sophistics.* –

Not general popular education, but leader formation was the goal of the educational movement that the Sophists sought to bring about. “es war, im Grunde, nur das alte Problem des adels in neuer Form” (It was, in essence, merely the old problem of the nobility in a new form; oc, ibid.).

(b).1. However, everyone – even the ordinary citizen in Athens – could acquire a basic education.

(b).2. However, from the very beginning, the Sophists addressed themselves only to an elite: “only those who **(1)** wish to become a politician and **(2)** wish to lead his 'polis' (city) will come to them”. (W. Jaeger, ibid.).

'Justice' was twofold: **(1)** observing the laws, **(2)** leading the polis itself by introducing laws. However, to this end, insight was needed into **(a)** the praxis of politics and **(b)** the theory of man.

WR230

1c-- *The foundation of protosophist rhetoric.*

1. Hesuchios of Alexandria (+/- +400/+500), *Life of Protagoras* (Suidaslexikon), says: “Protagoras was a porter, but, after he had met Democritus of Abdera (*note*: the atomist), he engaged in philosophy and

became absorbed in rhetoric. He was the first to invent eristic (WR 9 (tenzone); 215 (Zenon)) orations and received from his disciples one hundred mnai (note: a mna (mine) is one hundred drachmas, in silver or gold) as payment.

He was, therefore, given the nickname 'the orator'. Isocrates of Athens (-436/-338) (note: the great 'rhetor' and antithesis of Plato), as well as Prodicos of Ceos (c. 500/-400) (note: renowned sophist and rhetorician) were his pupils.

2. - Plato, in the dialogue *Protagoras*, 317b, has Protagoras say: “(...) I claim the title 'sophist' and my profession is to teach people culture (...)

(a) The others -- they corrupt the young: (...) they bring them back - against their will - to the specialized subjects (...). - calculations, astronomy, geometry, music (WR 126v.). (...).

(b) But, if a young man comes to me (Protagoras), he learns only what he likes to learn. The subject matter I teach is 'eu.boulia', sound deliberation (note: what we would now call 'know-how' regarding private and public action, 'sense of (private and state) affairs'). Namely:

(i) in private matters: the manner in which one manages one's property excellently;

(ii) in state affairs: the manner in which one acts and speaks in the polis with maximum efficiency (result). (Cfr *J.-P. Dumont, Les sophistes* , 29s.).

Note: Compare with WR 70/73 (rhetoric). Al Thales of Miletus, businessman and politically involved, pointed the way, ... albeit within the framework of the older 'theoria'.

Note-- the power of money

(1) Sacred wisdom was extremely suspicious regarding possessions (goods, money). WR 78 taught us how, even inheritances, after death, were perceived animistically (meaning: subtle). WR 53ff. taught us how transgression, regarding possessions, was thought and perceived as subject to immanent sanction (the punishment built into the transgression itself (WR 93/94)).

(2) The desacralization of property (goods, money) leads to the classical, 'humanist' conception of property.

WR231

We see this at work in Protagoras' behavior.

“(...) **(i)** After the lesson given, if one agrees, one pays (immediately) the

sum that I set as a condition.

(ii) If one does not agree, then one enters a sanctuary, where one declares under oath what value (correctly) one attaches to what one has learned: then one pays that sum to me.” (Platon, Protagoras, 326b).

Note: One sees here how the old sacred interpretation of money still lives on.

a. -- Sicilian word agonistics (= rhetoric).

WR 11 (Sumerian model); 144 (Mythical-Orphic model); 215 (Zenonian model) already taught us the core idea of 'agonistics' (rivalry). We will now determine how that ancient idea is introduced into vocabulary.

The Sicilian Koraks of Surakousai (c. 500/400) (Syracuse), after demokratia, or popular government, gained a foothold in Akragas (= Agrigentum) around 460, became involved in many lawsuits. Based on these legal experiences, Koraks developed an early form of rhetoric. For example, he distinguished three parts in judicial ('forensic') speech (WR 17; 103).

- a.** to pro.oimion, ex.ordium, preface/introduction;
- b.** hoi agones (sing.: ho agon), controveriae, debates;
- c.** ho epi.logos, per.oratio, end(word).

It is evident that the name 'agon' (pl.: agones) already betrays the rivalry, indeed, the fighting spirit of classical man, once it concerns **(i)** possessions and **(ii)** political power. Demokratia, government of the people, always entails more or less – what Heraclitus of Ephesus (WR 225) calls – 'polemos' (lat.: bellum), fight, war, and this desacralized, i.e., as the fighting out of earthly people, without a sacred background.

How far the protosophist 'agonistics' is removed from the Zenonian by becomes apparent from what follows.

As the logical foundation (WR 215ff.) of the debates, Korak saw 'to eikos', probable, the probable (that which, while not certain (true), possesses at least the semblance of truth). What a lawyer puts forward in court is not necessarily logically true. It is—usually—rhetorically expedient. Nothing more. WR 209 taught us that, in the analysis of the (spoken) word, pragmatics is one of the 'formal' (WR 200) objects. Here it takes precedence!

WR232

Note: The process of desacralization is established if one compares WR 65/70 (archaic-sacred eloquence); 154 (Paleop. rhet.); 155 (refl. rh.) with the Protagorean-Sophistic doctrine of eloquence. Or with the doctrine and

especially the practice of Koraks.

b.-- The master/apprentice relationship.

Koraks had one Teisias from Surakousai as a 'student'.

(1) This 'disciple' also had 'disciples', in turn. And not just any disciples! First, Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375) - who, along with Protagoras, is considered the second greatest Protosophist; - then - who has just been mentioned - Isocrates of Athens (-436/-338; WR 23); - as well as Lusias of Athens (-440/-380). Very great and resounding names, therefore, in the history of classical paideia (= culture).

(2) Let us examine the “teacher (rhetor)/student” relationship.

(i).1 -- Koraks teaches Teisias the skill “of always winning in the agon”. The condition – as with Protagoras – is to be called money, 'fee'. To be paid if Teisias wins his first plea, this as proof of the effectiveness (WR 230), usefulness, – expressed more scholarly: pragmatics – of Koraks' teaching.

(i).2. But Teisias does not plead. He becomes, in particular, himself, immediately a 'rhetor' (teacher of eloquence), like his master, Koraks. Indeed, Teisias does it even more brilliantly than his master, and ... naturally, does not pay!

(ii).1. -- It comes to a dispute.

Teisias, with or without Eleatic reasoning (logic: WR 222/216), presents his 'teacher' with a dilemma—what we still call a 'dilemma' (Latinized). The structure (logical syntax (WR 215ff.)) comes down to this:

Position.-- Your claim for payment is unfounded (WR 212).

Argument .

(1) Model : either I, Teisias, provide convincing proof that I owe you nothing. In that case, you, Koraks, rightly waive your claim.

(2) counter-model : either I do not provide you, Koraks, with convincing proof: but, then, it is my first plea that fails, -- which proves that your teaching is of no use. Then, too, you, Koraks, rightly withdraw your claim, as agreed, regarding my first plea.

(ii).2. Koraks, not without tricks, says what follows.

Position . -- My claim for payment is, indeed, well-founded.

Argument.

(1) Model : either you, Teisias, do not provide convincing proof of your refusal to pay. Then you must, of course, pay.

(2) counter-model : either you, Teisias, provide convincing proof; -- in that case your first plea is indeed effective and our agreement applies. Even then you must pay.

Note: The hetaireia, or intellectual society, among the Paleophythagoreans, would never have dared, even to think, such a thing. Moreover, indeed: we find ourselves among the desacralized.

c. The origin of the 'trivium'.

The paideia, the system of formation, of Protosophistics comprised three basic subjects, 'technai', disciplinae, (specialized) sciences.

(1) grammatike techne, grammar, speech theory, which sharpened the word and the language,

(2) dialectiktike techne, dialectica, redeneerleer, die het redeneren en het redetwisten aanleerde,

(3) rhetorike techne, rhetoric, eloquence, which is the teaching of

(a) the relationship was,

(b) so that one influences, by all possible means (pragmatic moment), one's fellow man - the public, in the agora, popular assembly, - the judges and the listeners, in court, - the audience, in the hall or, rather, in the open air, by 'epideictic' or ostentatious speech (WR 4), behold the threefold nominalist or purely verbal 'rhetoric'.

Note: 'Nominalism' is understood to mean the view that denies any content of knowledge and thought that is not (sensory) perceptible (WR 205: O. Külpe et al.), so that only perceptible contents of thought and mere words ('nomina', singular: nomen, namen, naam) remain. The Socratic 'concept', the Platonic 'idea' (WR 30), indeed, the Paleo-Pythagorean unity and its multiples (WR 110) and, even, the Aristotelian 'morphe' (forma, form, the idea immanent in things)—all of this seems non-existent to the nominalist, indeed, fiction.

However, note that precisely this nominalist paideia—later called 'trivium', three-part method—forms the basis of—what W. Jaeger calls—the 'formal' (understand: word-bound) formation of the West (Paideia, I: 397ff.).

With the contribution of the Paleopythagoreans (WR 100) or the quadrivium, the nominalist subjects form 'the seven artes liberales' (liberal arts).

The Greek system of higher education, as the Protosophists constructed this education, dominates the entire civilized world today.

Jaeger, Paideia , I: 400). -- Reason why we dwelled on it so extensively—in

both contributions.

WR234

Indeed, in Alexandria, the 'enkuklios paideia', General Education, arises.

(1)a . The philological part (grammar, dialectics, rhetoric) taught how to discern the (reading, writing, and speaking) sign.-

(1)b. The practical part (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) taught the understanding of the ideal in sensory data.

(2)a. Philosophy built upon this twofold basis (which was itself hermeneutical (commentary on texts; philological) and systematic (insight into beings themselves; objective)).

(2)b. Among the thinking Christians (especially since St. Clement of Alexandria (+/- +175/+225)) this was followed by theology (WR 73: supernatural theology), which was, in turn, both philological (in Scripture exegesis, hermeneutical) and systematic (factual).

Library sample:

-- O. Willmann, *Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke* , Kempten/Munich, 1909, 48;

-- id., *Gesch.d.Id.*, I: 351/356 (*Der Nominalismus der Sophisten*); II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker*), 328f. (Die Scholastic: Scholastic also adopted this formation scheme from the enkuklios paideia, but updated it).

ID -- *The utilitarianism ('pragmatism') of sophistry.*

1 . G. Romeyer -Dherbey, *Les Sophistes*, 19 and 30, underscores the fact that, for Protagoras, the given (the 'thing' or 'being') is not designated by the term 'pragma' (= thing), but by the word 'chrèma', useful given. Protagoras aims, therefore, at the pragmatic or useful, at the utility value in the data.

2. The 'truth' concerning the given is likewise defined by the usefulness of that truth, which lies in the phenomena.

Trasummachos of Chalkedon, a pupil of Plato and of Isocrates (WR 232), a well-known Protosophist, says: "I declare that what is just is nothing other than what is useful to the strongest." (*Platon, Republ.* , 1: 338c). -- Which is also endorsed by another sophist, Polos (WR 64). -- That utility value is the basis of law.

Kallikles, another sophist, asserts that, in politics, first and foremost, power relations are at work. 'Rhetoric', the power of the word, is, in this context, but one factor of power. -- Everyone possesses the right to give effect to his desire for power, by any means whatsoever (WR WR4).

WR235

Bibl. sample: S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy*, Bilthoven, 1975, 14 (concerning Polos and Callicles, in *Plato's* dialogue *Gorgias* (subtitle: *On rhetoric*)).

Updates.

1. E. Grassi, *Die Macht der Phantasie* (*Zur Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens*), Königstein/Ts., 1979.

The book discusses the relationship of Renaissance humanists to science and philosophy. Steller emphasizes that the Humanists started from the needs of man, both material and spiritual, to measure the value of truth. The self-development of 'life' (the humanist) is the measure of the 'value' (usefulness) of a given and the truth concerning it. Hence—says Grassi—the impression on rhetoric.

2. Romeyer-Dherbey, *Les sophistes*, 30/32, explains how Fr. Nietzsche (WR 123ff.: libertarianism) apparently thinks Protagoreically.

The 'Übermensch' 'assesses' all beings according to their 'value', their usefulness in the service of the self-development of life, the Dionysian-libertarian life. "Arranging Nietzsche and Protagoras together is not based on arbitrariness, for it seems that Nietzsche himself suggests this." (Oc, 31).

Critique of pragatism.

(1) G. Romeyer - Dherbey, oc,16, says that Protagoras's number one enemy was eleatic ontology. WR 201/203, indeed, taught us that Parmenides is the first to think of the given, the being, in itself, objectively, absolutely. This implies that it is approached independently of the subject (and for its needs, its desire(s), its self-development or whatever). Accepting a given that holds in itself is, of course, a curse for the pragmatist or utilitarian (thinker of utility).

a. - The 'truth' concerning the given is valuable in itself, and our mind submits to it.

b. For the utilitarian, truth is valuable only insofar as it is useful. Fundamentally, one subjects truth to the subject (his needs, his desires, his self-development, etc.).

(2) S. IJsseling, oc,14, points out that Socrates (= Plato) - against Polos

and Callicles - argues that, admittedly, power relations do in fact play a role in politics, but that this is a regrettable fact,-- that the moral good should prevail.

WR236

Power, indeed violence, is not in accordance with conscience and, therefore, never establishes what is morally good and just. The deeper purpose of the state and politics is to make conscientious living—for everyone—possible and to safeguard it. -- It should be noted that Socrates, just like Parmenides (and the Paleophythagoreans), takes the objective rule of conduct, binding on conscience, as his foundation.

Note - 1.-- We recall *WB Kristensen, Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religion*, 273: “The supreme deities: Zeus, Fortuna (Rome), Varuna (India), Ahura Yazda (Iran)) were not just – in the ordinary sense of the word. By their conduct they denied the laws which they had established for mankind. And the Ancients were aware of this contradiction (WR 11 (harmony of opposites); 226ff.) in the divine essence.”

In other words: the ancient theologians were absolutely not subject to the rose-red naivety from which more than one Enlightened mind or Catholic theologian suffers. Nor was Heraclitus of Ephesus.

Well then, the same ethical contradiction that constitutes the essence of demonic polytheism is discernible in the pragmatism (utilitarianism) of Protosophism: the 'laws' (of which the Sophists spoke so much; WR 229 taught us that they liked to make them themselves) were—for the majority (though not all) of the Sophists—primarily useful, before being binding in conscience. That is the demonic nature of Sophism, the enlightenment of ancient Hellas.

In other words: most Sophists were no better—ethically speaking—than the deities they, sometimes so rabidly, opposed; they were their 'humanistic' actualization. Nothing more. And, moreover, they served as a model for all Western democracies.

Note-- 2.-- *Fr. Nietzsche* is perhaps one of the rare thinkers who was aware of the internal contradiction, especially in the ethical realm, of humanist culture inherent in the West since Protosophy.

In his **Zur Genealogie der Moral ** (1887), 12, he discusses the physical, which seeks the cause (*archè* (WR 45)), with pragmatics, which seeks utility. In 12, it concerns the origin and utility ('*Zweck*') of punishment. Nietzsche emphasizes that “the cause, which explains the origin, and the ultimate utility of a thing, i.e. its actual application, within the framework of a system of

objectives, lie vastly apart.”

WR237

He specifies: “Something that is given—that has come into being—is, time and again, interpreted by a power reaching above it, with a view to new intentions, reclaimed, transformed and redirected into new utility value. (...). All uses are merely the sign of the fact that a will to power ('wille zur Macht') has seized something less powerful and has, from its own perspective ('von sich aus'), 'attached' the meaning of a usefulness ('Funktion') to it.”

Expressed differently—more simply: the physicalist, who seeks the cause (origin), is bound to something objective, independent of himself; the pragmatist, however, takes—in the first instance—only his own perspective into account.

It is, therefore, not surprising that G. Romeyer-Dherbey (WR 233) sees a clear intellectual kinship between Protagoras and Nietzsche.

Bibl. sample: *J. de Gaultier, De Kant à Nietzsche* , Paris, 1905 (an old book, but one that, at least, does not 'romanticize' Nietzsche).

IE -- The hedonistic aesthetics of the sophists.

Wl. Tatarkiewicz, *Gesch. d. Aesthetik* , I (*Die Aesthetik der Antike*), Basel/Stuttgart, 1979, 120/127 (*Die Aesthetik der Sophisten*), emphasizes

1. the definite (= positive) method, regarding beauty and art,
2. the culturalological perspective,
3. The hedonistic explanation.

It is not surprising that, unlike, for example, the Paleopythagoreans (WR 139ff.), the Protosophists—according to Alkidamas of Elaia (ll. of Gorgias)—saw in the works of art “images of real life, which, when viewed, provide pleasure, but no usefulness for practical life”.

According to Tatarkiewicz, *oc.*, 122, the 'useful/pleasant' system predominated in this regard. Not only the work of art, but also beauty, in stark contrast, for example, to the Paleo-Pythagoreans, is interpreted hedonistically (in terms of pleasure): "beautiful is that which is pleasant to the ear and the sight." (*Platon, Hipp. mai.* , 299a).

In other words: everything is tested for its utility. Yet the pleasant is also 'useful'. Pragmatism and hedonism are much closer to each other than, merely literally, would seem.

WR238

II.-- Protagoras' Criteriology.

The term 'criteriology' means the analysis of the grounds (of evidence) (WR 212ff.). Another, equally recent term is epistemology (WR 187). One can also say 'foundational research' (WR 3).

II.A. Sextos Empeirikos (Sextus Empiricus, *Hypotyposis*, 1: 216) says: "Protagoras maintains that man is the criterion of all beings—specifically of the existence of those beings that actually exist, and of the non-existence of those beings that are, in fact, non-existent. The term 'metron', mensura, 'measure' (WR 53, where the archaic-sacred meaning is still found)—thus consistently Sextos—means the kriterion, criterion, (literally) sifting model. (...).

Consequence: Protagoras merely posits the existence of 'phainomena', phenomena (better: the visible data (WR 41))". (*JP Dumont, Les sophistes* , 34).

A late-antique author, *Hermias* , in his **Critique of Pagan Thinkers **, 9 (Dumont, op.cit., 35), expresses it using a different criteriological term, namely: 'man is the determination of essence (definition; WR 96) and judge (i.e., the one who establishes the type of reality, as it were, in a verdict) of beings'.

With this, we have the criteria or foundational research unique to Protagoras. It is sometimes referred to by the Latin term 'the homo mensura theorem'.

HJ Blackham, Humanism , Harmondsworth (Eng.), 1968, 105, who, as an aggressive atheist humanist (WR 225), naturally dedicates his book to both the materialist-atomist Democritus of Abdera (WR 89) and the atheist-humanist Protagoras, says:

It seems established that Protagoras:

- (1) an agnostic (*note* : one who claims not to be able to decide),
- (2) a positivist (WR 2; 190 (Carnap)),
- (3) was a relativist (WR 235: 'relativist' is the one who accepts nothing 'absolute').

Furthermore, a keen analytical intelligence with strong practical interests (WR 230: formation of possessions; formation of political power), and also, finally, the man who first proclaimed the 'regnum hominis' (= the realm of man), was". One cannot paint a more sharply defined picture of Protagoras's criteria. At least, if one understands the term 'agnostic' correctly: the 'agnostic' states that he cannot express an opinion on the actual existence or non-existence of two types of data.

A.-- “Protagoras (...) writes somewhere: Concerning the deities, I am unable to say neither whether they exist nor of what nature they are. Indeed, numerous are the obstacles that I encounter.” (*Sextos Empeirikos, Contra Phys.* , 1: 55).-- This means that all manticism ceases to exist as a source of knowledge or 'criterion' (WR 87/91: belief in miracles).

B.-- “It is not at one point that the circle (*note*: the sensory-perceptible circle) touches the straight (line)”. (Arist., *Metaph.*, 3, 997b32).-- Aristotle attributes this opinion to Protagoras.

The full performance of Protagoras is:

(i). a purely ideal reality, as theoretical geometry claims it can treat, is nowhere perceived by the senses nor perceptible in the imagination - in the form of a vague, generalized phantasm ('Gestalt'; WR 205);

(ii). Consequence: only visually perceptible circles, for example, are actually perceptible, which always touch a straight line at more than one visually perceptible point. In other words: Protagoras does acknowledge 'geometric' figures, but only in their visually perceptible and 'perceptible' models.

Decision.

Anything that is not immediately perceptible by the senses (internally, e.g., in the imagination; externally, e.g., with the organs of perception) and, thus, is (sensory) visual, such as mantically perceived realities (deities, for example) or ideal realities (perceived in sensory non-visual consciousness) (geometric data, for example), is, in Protagoras' eyes, undecidable, indeterminable, without criterion.-- Therein lies the precisely defined agnostic position of Protagoras.

In other words: the sentence “man is the 'metron', the means of sifting or delimiting all beings, regarding whether or not they exist or whether or not they are so (mode of being)” must be rewritten as “the agnostic man is the measure of all beings”. That is, after what precedes, abundantly clear.

II.B -- The theory-free man, therefore, is the norm. Cf. WR 41 (reaching the invisible through the visible). -- But the question arises: the individual or the group? -- “Protagoras said, while declaring that man is the measure of all beings: “As beings appear to me (show themselves), so they are, to me. As they appear to you (show themselves), so they are, to you.” (Platon, *Cratylus*, 385e).

In other words: the individual is decisive.

G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *Les sophistes*, 22/28 (*Le discours fort*), attempts to demonstrate that Protagoras, notwithstanding this individualistic criteriology, nevertheless means something universal (not in the object, but in the perceiving subject) when he says “man is the measure of all beings”.

However, to that end, Romeyer-Dherbey must resort to the system of 'weak assertion/strong assertion' ('logos hêtton/ logos kreitton'),-- and indeed in a political-democratic context.

1. We saw in WR 228 that all people, thanks to Zeus, possess the gift (= sense) of law, in contrast to—one might put it in an almost modernized way—the 'specialist'. Well then,—according to Romeyer-Dherbey—in the democratic form of government (WR 231), only the common and equal sense of law comes into play.

2. Because precisely an individual, by means of understanding and influence (WR 4; 233), and by means of protosophist rhetoric, succeeds in making the singular opinion, which is initially his own, shared by more than one other, -- thereby a kind of 'universalization' (generalization - WR 60: the inductive idea of 'generalization', fundamentally different from the 'democratic-rhetorical') takes place. In Protagorean language: from weak (merely individual) the opinion becomes strong (more than individual).

Decision

(1) The agnostic man, first individual, then, preferably, politically-rhetorically 'universal'. -- Behold 'man' as the measure of all beings. Behold the theory-less critique.

(2) It is therefore understandable that Romeyer-Dherbey, oc,16, emphasizes that the Parmenidean ontology, which objectively puts 'being' (WR 201) first (= lemma), is enemy number one of Protagorean 'thinking'.

Note: An analogous interpretation of 'rhetoric' can also be found, for example, in Ch. Perelman, **Retorica en argumentatie **, Baarn, 1979, 149: “While rhetoric aims to make certain opinions prevail ('validate') over others that compete with it, philosophy, which originally also encompassed the particular sciences (WR 54), seeks impersonal truths”.

'Impersonal' – here – in the sense of objective, absolute, independent of (the whims of) the subject. Not in the sense that philosophy and specialized sciences would not concern us deeply (and, in that sense, would 'personally' touch us).

Note-- The push-through rhetoric

Clement of Alexandria (WR 234), the Church Father, in his **Miscellanea**, 6:65, says: “The Greeks say that Protagoras was the first who, against every argument, set a counter-argument. (WR 227).

The Stoic *Seneca of Cordoba* (Spain; +1/+55), *Letters to Lucilius*, 88:43, says: “Protagoras says that, in every matter, one can bring forward the for and the against by presenting an equivalent argument”.

Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2: 24/1402a 23, says: “To forge the strongest out of the weakest argument—of two arguments—that is it. It was precisely because of this that people became furious—quite rightly—at Protagoras’ appeal. For the phenomenon (that which reveals itself (to sensory perception); WR 239) is deceptive, not (necessarily) true, and merely an illusion. No other discipline uses it, except rhetoric and eristic.” Aristotle apparently means (Proto)sophistic rhetoric.

Stefanos of Buzantion, Geographical Dictionary, Abdera, says: “Protagoras, of whom Eudoxos mentions that he forged the strongest out of the weakest argument and that he taught his pupils to both praise and condemn the same fact”.

In other words: one of the most appropriate means of turning a weak opinion into a strong one (making it shared, socializing it, as sociologists now say) is to undermine the 'competing' – 'obstructive' – opinion by means of 'dialectical' ('rhetorical', eristic) counter-arguments. The agonistic (WR 11; 144; 215; -- 231), the mentality of power-testing at work here, necessitates coercive techniques ... in order to socialize. -- In this, Protagoras is currently being actualized by all practitioners of coercive methods.

II.C. -- The agnostic person, -- preferably socialized.

Behold the norm. -- The question arises: is it the quantified (socialized) or the qualified human being?

A. “In democratic equality, one does not weigh votes, one counts them.” (G. Romeyer-Dherbey, oc, 25). After all, everyone possesses an equal 'voice', an expression of opinion. It then becomes a matter of majority versus minority to push through. Which G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *ibid.*, admits.

B. However, Protagoras does not advocate an absolute equivalence of all opinions and a complete identity of wisdom among all people.

The 'best' people, after all, know how to speak in such a way that this speaking elicits agreement from their fellow men. Thus, the speech of precisely a single individual becomes 'strong' speech (...)" (G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *oc*, 27).

In other words: as WR 240 already taught us: a political leader, for example (or a shrewd lawyer), 'polarizes' (it is Romeyer-Dherbey's terminology) around himself as many supporters as possible.

Quantity is, after all, very decisive. The quality of 'reason' is its 'strength'. Its strength is its quantity (of agreeers).

Decision.

(1) Quantity plays a very large role.

(2) Finally, quality is shown above all in quantity (in terms of agreeers).

Could Jaeger, who (WR 229) spoke of elitism (select figures), be proven right after all? Moreover: to win over as many supporters as possible ('strong reason'), even expertise (WR 228: specialists; 240) is very 'useful'. WR 234 taught us Protagoras' pragmatism (utilitarianism).

Indeed: not expertise in itself, but its usefulness in the process of forming a strong assertion—that is what Protagoras values. All studies, the entire *paideia*, on which he holds such high regard, is 'chrèma', a useful thing.

Incidentally, in his defense speech, Romeyer-Dherbey conceals the correct, the Protosophist, meaning of the term 'best' (people). "Yes, yes, young man, (...) the day on which you have had relations with me (= Protagoras), he will come home as someone who has become 'beltion', more cunning (note: Romeyer-Dherbey translates as 'better'). The days thereafter, it will proceed likewise. Day by day you will—uninterruptedly—make progress towards cunning." (*Platon, Protagoras* 318a).

J.-P. Dumont, Les sophistes , 30; 249, explains therein, much more honestly than Romeyer-Dherbey, exactly what 'beltion' means in the protosophist language game (WR 56): "Better, -- in the sense of more skillful, more powerful, more cunning". Romeyer-Dherbey should have added that, for the sake of honesty.

Note –

(1) *W. Jaeger, Paideia* , I: 405, notes: "Only when the time of the great Attics (*note*: he means Platon, Isocrates) has passed, does Ionian (*note*: Milesian; WR 54ff.) science—in Alexandria—experience its resurrection." The Attic mentality—strongly influenced by Protophysics, with its emphasis on the formation of possessions and the consolidation of political power—

emphasizes, according to Jaeger, the trivium (WR 233), in such a way that the eloquent, rational, and eloquent 'man' is "durch und durch tätig und politisch" (through and through active and political) (ibid.), even when he engages in theoria, theory, conceived in the power of the word that wins consent.

WR243

In contrast stands Milesian scientificity, which possessed a 'Geist der reinen Theorie' (a mentality aimed at pure theories, or theory) and which manifested itself primarily in the quadrivium of the Paleophythagoreans and the physique of the Milesians.

(2) *J.-P. Vernant* also emphasizes this 'Attic' - understand: Protosophist - aspect. There he speaks of Aristotle's mechanics: "Its theory is not 'applied science'. (...). Its thought is not 'technical'. From the point of view of form, vocabulary, and conceptual framework, the theory presented by Aristotle's *Mechanics* is strangely close to (proto)sophistics.

The 'mechanè', device, is described there as something related to cunning, usefulness, namely insofar as a clever invention allows you to extricate yourself from a difficult situation, in an 'aporia', a tightrope situation; -- insofar as a device allows you to gain an advantage over a force of nature that is both hostile to you and superior.

This battle between 'techne' (note: here, mechanical expertise) and 'fysis' (WR 39), and the tricks by which mechanical expertise secures victory over nature (force), are interpreted according to the model of verbal combat, in which the (Proto)sophist rightly proves a difficult-to-argue cause against his opponent.

In other words: being cunningly assertive thanks to expertise.

Decision.

The agnostic 'man' (= human type), -- surrounded by as many supporters as possible, -- thanks to assertive cunning. Behold the *homo mensura* thesis, the essential core of classical humanism.

II.D.-- Classical Man and the 'Antilogia'

"The 'god' ('theos') is 'day/night', 'winter/summer', 'war/peace', 'abundance/famine' (...): he turns into the opposite, -- just like fire, which, when mixed with incense, is given a name according to the scent it emits, depending on the kind of incense." (Fr. 67). —

'God' stands for the universe. Heraclitus of Ephesus (WR 225; 231), the inspirator of Protagoras, speaks in this way. But, as mentioned, there is a great difference between predecessor and follower.

(a) For Heraclitus, for example, winter and summer belong to one and the same god (understand: fisis, nature), objectively. In other words: the very being of, for example, the natural landscape (= fisis) is such that it is winter at one time and summer at another. Cf. WR 201/203 (the absolute nature).

The difference between Heraclitus and Parmenides lies in the fact that the former views contradictory characteristics as present simultaneously (i.e., in potential) within the same given, whereas the latter, Parmenides, who thinks in strictly logical terms, rejects this way of speaking. In other words: potentially, winter and summer are simultaneously, as it were, confined within the same landscape; actually, they alternate in the 'flow' (WR 226: *panta rhei*) of the seasonal changes.

(b) For Protagoras, first and foremost, it is subjective experience that matters. "Does it not happen that the same gust of wind gives one among us a cold shiver and not the other? Does it not happen that the same gust of wind is perceived by one among us as a 'gentle breeze', while the other perceives 'something tremendous' in it? (...).

What are we going to assert, after such observations, concerning that gust of wind in itself? Is it, now, in itself, cold or not cold? Or are we going to concede to Protagoras that the same gust of wind, insofar as it is cold, exists in the perception of the one who shivers with cold because of it, and, insofar as it is not cold, exists in the perception of the one who does not shiver with cold because of it?" (*Platon, Theaetetus* , 151e).

Well, in Protagorean language, that is antilogia, contradictory speech. One says: 'That gust of wind is cold'. The other says, of the same gust of wind: 'That gust of wind is not cold'. The Ancients called that 'dialectics'.

Decision.

- (1)** Parmenides, ontologist, thinks strictly unilaterally;
- (2)** Heraclitus, a dialectician of nature (dialectician of fate), apparently thinks 'contradictorily' (contradictively);
- (3)** Protagoras, a dialectician of words, also thinks seemingly 'contradictory'.

WR 160: interpretation scheme; 199/201: identical judgment structure, taught us that there exists a third (neither singular nor contradictory (multi-sense)) mode of speech, the analogical one: 'The gust of wind (= fully identical) 'is' (partially identical) now cold, then not cold!

II.E.-- *The classical man as phenomenalist.*

'Phenomenism' means the doctrine that asserts that—as a knowing being—man attains only phenomena (WR 243: subjective experience), never beings themselves.

a.-- Both Plato and Theophrastus of Eresas (Lesbos; -372/-288), Aristotle's successor, claim that Protagoras adhered to the following theory of perception.

Structural analysis.

I see a white thing.

(i) In itself (WR 201), that 'object' is not white. However, it can create a 'fainomenon', a phenomenon, which I perceive and label, for example, as 'white'. Reason: the object 'radiates' (WR 89, where Democritus of Abdere, who holds the same opinion, is briefly sketched).

(ii) The eye – I, therefore, as a seeing being – also 'radiates', namely the 'light' of the gaze. –

(iii) If both emanations meet each other in the interval (the air of the space between), only then does this meeting of both—object and subject—establish the 'fainomenon', the phenomenon that shows itself to the eye (and the self). This 'phenomenon' works, therefore, in both directions:

- (i)** it creates the white color as if it emanated from the object;
- (ii)** it establishes the perception of the same white color in the eye.

b. Aristotle draws the sensualist-actualist conclusion from this doctrine.

Outside of actual perception (the convergence of at least two emanations), there is neither object property nor subject experience. This is called 'actualism'.

This is all the more correct, since, for Heraclitus (WR 226: *panta rhei*) and for Protagoras, there are only moving, 'flowing' (not fixed, unchangeable) phenomena.

(ii) Outside of sensory (WR 233: nominalism; 239) intuition (= perception), there is neither object property (that something is, for example, in itself, neither white nor black nor colored) nor subjective experience. This is called 'sensualism' (WR 14). -- Aristotle says: "Neither warm nor cold, nor sweet, nor - generally - the sensually perceptible (= perceived) exist outside of (actual) sensory experience. (...).

Moreover: no being possesses sensory perception, except at the moment of perceiving itself, in the very act of intuition." (*Ar., Metaph .*, H: 3/1046b 29). -- actualism sensualism, -- phenomenism. Behold the theory of

knowledge (epistemology; WR 187) of the first humanist.

WR246

III.-- *The value judgment of Isocrates and Plato.*

Protosophistics remained, at first glance, a minority. But a minority with far-reaching influence. -- Consequently, the reactions were not long in coming.

III. A.-- *Isocrates of Athens* (-436/-338)

(i) Eloquence is, for these authentic 'sophistès', in the ancient sense of 'teacher of wisdom' (= educator),

1. no belles-lettres (word and literary art practiced solely for its aesthetic value),

2. no reflection detached from reality (philosophy that has drifted into pure speculation,

3. no 'eristics' (WR 9 (reasoning duel); 215 (agonistics),

4. no forensic or purely political art of persuasion. If necessary, it contains one or more of these ingredients.

(ii) In this way Isocrates sets himself apart from both Protosophistics and Platon. 'Philosophy' is, for him, general education. Therefore, he takes philosophy seriously. But it is merely an auxiliary science. Isocrates' ideal is the respectable Athenian citizen, eloquent, with as broad an information background as possible ('philosophy'), who 'knows how to 'manage' himself, both privately and publicly (pragmatism, but of a higher standard).

Conclusion .--A Refounded, Improved Sophistry.

III.B. -- *Platon of Athens* (-427/-347)

(i) Platon of the dialogue *Gorgias* is very critical of Proto-Sphist rhetoric: it is based merely on 'doxa', mere opinion (WR 184).

(ii) In the dialogue *Phaedrus* he establishes his conception of rhetoric. 'Episteme' scientific knowledge (based on truth) is the battle.

A. Goedeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 57/62 (*Rhetorik*) outlines them as follows:

a. eloquence is use of language,

b1. carried by 'eros' (enthusiasm, zest for life; WR 102), directed towards the ideas, as ideals,

b2. supported by 'akribeia' (WR 113), philosophical precision (which manifests itself in the general 'eidos' (WR 30) and in the classification),

c1. so that the soul of the conversation partners is influenced,

c2. preferably by higher values (WR 24).

Therefore, philosophizing in a group setting (WR 20: Psychodrama) was, for Platon, 'true' (= conscientiously ideal) rhetoric. To this end, in -387/-386, he bought a piece of land on which he built the akademeia, his school of philosophy. Without this infrastructure, there would have been no question of 'true rhetoric' (understand: influencing one another for the better, through understanding, as 'hetairoi' (fellow thinkers; WR 91; 96; 98), friends-fellow thinkers (WR 4)).

WR247

IV.-- Market analysis ('marketing') as an actualization of sophistry.

Bibl. sample:

- R. Laufer/ C. Paradeise, *Le prince bureaucrate* , Paris, 1982;
- L. Bellinger, *La persuasion* , Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et sophistique*);
- R.-G. Schwarzenberg, *L'état-spectacle* , Paris, 1977;
- M. Le Seach,, *L'état marketing* , Paris, 1981.

(I) 'Marketing' (market analysis) is the methodical analysis of the sales opportunities of a product (so that the terms of sale are optimized or, at least, maintained), -- in which publicity, 'public relations' (maintaining contact), and forward-looking business management play a role.

(II) a. We saw that the businessmen of 5th-century Greece allowed themselves to be instructed in the art of persuasion by the Protosophists.

b. The leading figures and politicians of the 20th century entrust their expertise and training to market analysts. -- Thus Bellenger. -- Just as the Socratics (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, -- the macrosocratics) rejected Sophistication, so too do a number of contemporary thinkers complain of 'marketing -practices' regarding leading circles.

Essential, for the market analyst, is the appearance (of the product) – its visual impression ('image'). As the aforementioned authors state: the 'marketing man' – just like the Sophist – is a technician of seduction (WR 23/29). He starts from appearances.

Concerned about sales, he is—methodically or even ideologically—out for profit (WR 70: economic rhetoric; 230: power of money): ethical values (conscience) are minimized or even eliminated (economism).

The language use exhibits manipulation of the truth: through omission (concealment of disadvantages), through inversion (presenting what is a disadvantage as an advantage), and through shifting (the disadvantage is briefly touched upon, but the advantage is emphasized).

The language used is 'rhetorical' by means of commonplaces: slogans, invariable sayings (Whoever buys that, buys that again), euphemisms, etc.

In other words: not the truth, not conscience, but dominance in the market is decisive. Arousing attention, stimulating interest, stirring up desire, eliciting consent—behold the four-phase rhetoric of Protagoras. It is also the fundamental principle of the market, analyst. And of all who apply his method!

WR248

2. Introduction to Systematic Rhetoric (248/285).

Introduction .

Positioning of rhetoric within 'general education' (*enkuklios paideia*).

1. O. Wilmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus, II (Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastic)*, Braunschweig, 907-2, 328ff., explains how ancient 'general education' ('*enkuklios paideia*' of Antiquity), Scholastically speaking, is a true hermeneutic (WR 11; 164).

(A) Observation (theme and problem).

The sensory experience ('phenomenon') is the starting point, the given. It is requested to interpret it.

(B) Interpretation.

1. The trivium, which comprises grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics (reasoning), is, first of all, 'Verstehen', the understanding of written and spoken (word) signs (WR 178). This interpretation of signs proceeds grammatically, rhetorically, and rationally.

2. The quadrivium, which encompasses arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, is, first of all, the 'Verstehen', the grasping of 'die Sachen', as Willmann literally says, the things themselves (and no longer the signs that refer to them). And indeed the things themselves, beheld, fathomed (WR 41: *theoria*), according to their idea (the essence of knowledge and thought). -- Only then was the young Scholastic confronted with philosophy or theology.

2. The young Scholastic apparently had to first undergo an intellectual and ethical catharsis, a purification (WR 46ff.; 76), consisting in that general education, before he could handle the learning process that philosophy (and, if necessary, theology) represents. Cf. O. Wilmann, *Gesch.d . Id.*, I: 303f.: catharsis (regarding music) as a condition for all learning processes.

Everywhere nowadays, one increasingly hears complaints arising

concerning language proficiency.

Anne Vallée, **Expression écrite: zéro! **, in: ** Sélection du Reader's Digest** (Zürich), 39 (1986): April, 5/14, says: “ In secondary school, a third of French youth no longer master their own language. According to a report by the General Inspectorate, four out of ten pupils can be said to be 'illiterate' when they enter the sixth grade. Since they are unable to read or write with understanding a simple and concise exposition of facts related to their daily lives, they do not possess the necessary skills to integrate into our society at a minimum level.”

Such voices are also being heard in Germany and here.

WR249

The neglect of grammatical, dialectal (= logical), and rhetorical formation, which constituted the core of traditional language proficiency, is, to say the least, attributable to the Sturm und Drang aspect of Romanticism (with its veneration of pleasure and individualism), to Positivism (with its aversion to linguistic aspects), and also to what one might call 'the Californian revolution,' namely the Hippie phenomenon and the New Left, with their counterculture and far-left tendencies.

The way out is an updating of the ancient-medieval trivium. -- This is all the more so since the computer science of the rising youth will require an accuracy (WR 113: akribeia) of the most exact type possible. One need think, in our country, of Sidel (computer firm), which bought the elan programming language.

Elan is

(i) a language to enable the computer to perform routine work and
(ii) a logically structured way of thinking. Sloppiness in language won't get you very far here.

2.1. Pre-rhetoric (pre-rhetoric) (249/285).

H.I. Marrou, **Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité **, Paris, 1948, 239, mentions that Deuterosophism (WR 225) included so-called pro.gumnasmata, preliminary exercises, or an elementary rhetoric. Let us simply say 'pre-rhetoric'. We will outline this briefly.

(1) The first thing a child or young person of that time learned was a task hermeneutics or task identification.

For example, the learning program began with:

(i) a muthos, fabula, myth, en

(ii) a diegema, narratio, story.

A text was, namely, told by the teacher (= the given). The student had to give a summary report of it (= what was asked).

It is evident that what, for example, the mathematicians of that time also did—namely, setting the assignment, split into given (theme) and requested (problem), as a guideline or norm—was also done by language proficiency teachers. A primary requirement of language proficiency (just as of mathematical-scientific or musical thinking (quadrivium)) is the precise grasping and interpretation (assignment hermeneutics) of the given and the requested (= assignment, task). Otherwise, one falls under the adage of St. Augustine of Tagaste (WR 119) 'Bene currunt, sed extra viam' (They run excellently, but off the track).

WR250

Note: Two otherwise interconnected themes and methods of that ancient medieval tradition live on:

(i) P. Brunel/ C1. Pichois/ AM Rousseau, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature comparée ?*, Paris, 1983, 115/ 134 (*Thématique et thématologie*);

(ii) PR Bize/ P. Goguelin/ R. Carpentier, *Le penser efficace* ,

1. (*Le fonctionnement mental* ,- in which ' les stapes opératoires de la problimation '),

2. (*La problématique*), Paris, 1982.

We will still need this 'thematology/problematology' pairing badly.

Note: One should reread WR 199/201 (identical method). The given, the object of thematology, is the fully identical subject of, for example, a problem. The requested item is the partially identical aspect that is examined (object of the problematology). One can also say, with the Middle Century Scholastics: the material object (theme) and the formal object (problem, aspect under which the theme is viewed).

This is reflected in Aristotle's distinction between:

(i) essence, 'substance' (autonomy), the fully identical given (theme), and,

(ii) incidentals ('accidents', partial viewpoints) "the part-identical question asked (e.g. the relation(s), the property(ies)). Together, Aristotle calls both the categories (praedicamenta), predicaments (in Scholastic Latin).

(2) The second thing that a Late Antique pupil was taught was a literatology (= study of texts).

(a). This textual science was twofold: it provided the maxims together with the exercise models (les préceptes du genre et les modèles d'exercices).

Without maxims, an exercise is blind (for it does not know the structure of what it does). Without applicative -and, in particular, exemplary models, a maxim is empty. Let one reread, now, WR 209/211: semiotics, -- syntactics is, without semantic interpretation, empty; semantics is, without syntactic structure, blind.

The maxims provide the syntactics (empty); the models of elaboration (feminine the imaginary) provide the semantics (blind). What is a student with the word 'fable' without ever having heard one? (Empty word). What is he/she without an explanation of the word 'fable' (what the fable is)? (Blind listening to a fable).

(b). Ancient medieval textual scholarship corresponds, within its cultural framework, to our textual scholarship.

WR251

The reason for this emphasis on text types and their requirements lies in knowledge itself, but, at least as much, in concern for a good relationship between teacher and student. "People do not come to misunderstanding or conflict unless they have defined either not at all or poorly." (*J. Fr. Marmontel* (1723/1799, *Eléments de littérature* (1787)).

By knowing accurately (akribeia) what myth, story, -- later: chreia (chrie), gnomè (sententia, saying, proverb), kataskeuè (confirmatio, proof) and anaskeuè (refutatio, refutation of a proof), koinos topos (locus communis, commonplace, means of exposition), are, the teacher could accurately indicate what kind of text elaboration he/she meant and the pupil could accurately understand exactly what he/she had to compose.

Our current education system, by neglecting definitions and leaving the corresponding models 'free', creates a series of misunderstandings.

Besides the seven text types mentioned above (concerning secondary education), Deuterosophical studies (for higher education) included: enkomion (laudatio, praise (oration) regarding someone's deeds; sometimes negative: psogos (vituperatio, reproach (= criticism)), sunkrisis (comparatio, comparison (parallel)), prosopopoiia (prosopopoeia, description of appearance) and ethopoiia (ethopoeia, description of the inner character of someone (sometimes of an animal)), ekfrasis (descriptio, description), thesis (propositum, proposition, position that one defends), nomos (lex, discussion of law)).

The connection between problem-solving hermeneutics and textual analysis is clear: the text (its type) is the answer to what is asked and its

elaboration, as the problem specified as a task. – Talk about language proficiency.

AI -- Bibliographic sample.

This late antique tradition has continued, evolving historically. For example, Noël Delaplace, *Leçons Françaises de littérature et de morale (avec préceptes du genre et des modèles d'exercices)*, Bruxelles, 1844 “552pp.-- The book is divided into two parts.

I. -- Prose: stories, tableaux, descriptions, definitions, fables, allegories; - religious morality, lay morality (Philosophie pratique); -- letters; -- speeches and oratorical fragments, introductions to speeches, conclusions to speeches (closing remarks); -- philosophical or purely literary dialogues; character sketches and portraits, parallels (political, literary, ethical).

WR252

II. Poetry: the same list, except for letters, but added to it: lyrical fragments. -- It is claimed that rhetoric has not evolved, but the objective comparison of the late antique and the 19th-century list is nevertheless clear: taste evolves with cultural development.

If we look at Ch.-M. des Granges/ Mlle Magueloner, *La composition Française (Livre du maître)*, Paris, 1930, we observe, once again, fidelity to tradition and evolution: stories, descriptions, portraits, letters, 'moral' (ethical essays), literary analysis, and criticism. The persuasive ('oratorical') texts have been omitted.-

A different perspective is offered by J. Gob, *Précis de littérature Française*, Brussels, 1947:

(i) introductory concepts (scientific and philosophical texts/aesthetic texts);

(ii) language proficiency:

a. invention, arrangement, design (stylization);

b. poetry;

c. writing exercises (description, story, treatise);

(iii) text types (literary genres): the essentially 'literary' (understand: aesthetic 'type' (descriptive, narrative; lyrical; dramatic); the incidentally 'literary' types (letter; didactic text; scientific and philosophical text; historical text; criticism; didactic poetry; eloquent text); a remark on satire and pers.-- Again tradition and evolution, at the same time.

Around +/- 1950, a turning point occurs: T.A. Van Dijk, **Moderne*

literatuurtheorie (*Een proef inleiding* *), Amsterdam, 1971, is proof of this. J. Kristeva, R. Barthes, J. Derrida, Ph. Sollers, N. Chomsky, Max Bense, A.J. Greimas, R. Jakobson, C.S. Peirce, T. Todorov, and others, who examined language and text using new approaches, establish a new theory of language proficiency (or 'rhetoric'). 'Text,' 'literarity,' 'style,' 'metaphor,' and 'metonymy,' narratology (narrative theory), etc., suddenly become relevant in a new way. Text and literary studies emerge in the present sense.

Consider R. Wellek/A. Warren, *Theory of Literature* , New York, 1942-1 (Fr. transl.: *Latheorie littéraire* , Paris, 1971).

What was set out by rhetoric for centuries and centuries—in a relatively simple manner—now becomes the prey of (often hyper-specialized, indeed, formalized) theories (WR 103; 187/ 191).

WR253

A.II.-- Four pre-rhetorical text types.

We will briefly (and in the traditional style) consider report, description, story, and treatise: for they are, in every speech, presupposed to be known. Whoever wishes to arrive at an understanding that influences (WR 4; 28ff.) by means of the word (text), must, possibly, be able to **(1)** report, **(2)** describe, **(3)** narrate, **(4)** treatise.

(1).-- The report

'Hupotuposis', a short sketch, was an ancient medieval exercise in text formation. Let us take, *Marrou, Hist.d.l'ed .*, 239s., as a model.

Paraphrasis, here in the sense of a 'summarizing report' of what was heard or read immediately beforehand, namely a *muyhos*, fable, or myth. The Papyrus Fayoum has preserved for us a small pupil's work.

Given: a myth in verse form;

Requested: 'paraphrasis', 'hupotuposis' (clearer term).

That concludes the task.

Now the text.

"A son, who had murdered his father and 'who feared the legislation regarding parricide, fled into the desert' (= verse from what was read aloud).

As he traveled through the mountains, he was pursued by a lion. With the lion on his heels, he climbed into a tree. He then saw a snake ('dragon') rushing towards that tree and possibly climbing into it (...). While fleeing from that snake, he fell.

(Gnomè, sententia, saying:) The villain does not escape the god: 'The deity will bring the villain to justice'. This last sentence is, once again, a verse memorized by the pupil, -- specifically by Menander of Athens (-342/-291), a famous comedic playwright. We would now call it a 'moral lesson'.

This is the summarizing idea or structure of the muthos. This saying (saying, proverb) is, after all, the regulative model (syntactic structure), of which the story is the applicative model (semantic interpretation; WR 209/211; 250).

Note: This concerns the judgment of God (WR 53: transgression; 93: Dikè), well known to the ancients.

Without the 'saying' (proverb = structure), the story is blind (a pure anecdote, without meaning for life). Without the little story, the 'moral lesson' (better: structure) is empty.

That a myth can still have philosophical significance is evident from *M. Heidegger* (WR 29), *Sein und Zeit*, I, Tübingen, 1927; 1949-6, 191/196 (*The Cura- or Care Fable*),

WR254.1

Second example of a report.

Bible st.: -- *J. Broeckaert, Le guide*, 82s. (Les Circonstances);
-- *O. Willmann,.- Abriss*, 9 (*Merksprüche der Rhetoriker*).

(1) Ambiguity.

'Manifest' is that which obeys the rule 'one-manifest' (WR 180; 199/201; 250). The full identity (= material object, theme) is one; the partial identity (= analogy, -- formal object, viewpoint, what is requested) is many. --

(2) Ambiguity schemes.

It is up to the author to make the idea of ambiguity usable in text formation. -- With regard to an event (a diachronic given), there are two variants of an interpretative scheme in circulation.

A. J. Broeckaert, oc, 82, teaches us the schema of circumstances. -- The Latin verse summarizes: Quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), per quos (with the help of which persons), quoties (how many times), cur (by what means/why), quomodo (how), quando (when).

O. Willmann, oc, 9, gives a variant: Quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), suibus auxiliis (with which aids), cur (by what/why), quomodo (how), quando (when).

Ordered:

(i) actor(s), acting persons (beings) and action (what, praxis);

(ii) how/ with - which - aids/ with - cooperation - of - whom are the specifications of (i);

(iii) where/when (how many times) is the positioning in time and space;

(iv) by what/why is the explanation (necessary and sufficient reasons to make the event, the action, understandable).

Decision:

(a) theme (material object) is the praxis (action, event);

(b) requested (formal objects) are the aspects, 'commonplaces', perspectives specific to the theme, called 'circumstances'.

B. L. Rademaker/ H. Bergman, *Sociological movements*, Spectr./ Intermed., 1977, 148; 149. "The situation, the parties involved, their actions, and their behavioral alternatives are placed in a specific framework by the report ('account')! -- "To recognize a particular instance (= application model) of 'telling the code' (using and immediately exposing a secret system of agreements) as such, you must know who said it, when, where, to whom, - under what circumstances, etc.".

In other words: adapted to current sociological research, the commonplaces of circumstances—updated (WR 165)—recur time and again. Their 'eternal value' (WR 4: philos. perennis) is abundantly clear. We will now see how the ancient Greeks established the schema.

WR254.2

Second example of a report.

Marrou, oc, 240. -- **The diegema, the story.**

After the muthos follows a more difficult exercise in summarizing and defeating.

(1) The task.

(a) **Given** : the teacher reads a poem, a play excerpt, or a simple story aloud.

(b) **Requested** : write down a representation in about ten lines (note the quantification), which

(i) as accurately (akribeia; WR 251), objectively (WR 201) as possible ,

(ii) as clear as possible,

(iii) and flawless (according to grammatical standards) is,-- this, according to the following model:

a1. time,

a2 . place;

b1. agent (acting being),

b2 . action (praxis),

b3. course ('manner in which the action takes place'),

b4. explanation ('cause'). It is evident that what we now call praxeology, the description of an event or an action, was practiced here at an elementary level.

Note: The subject could be mythical, poetic, or historical.

We cite a poetic model, namely *Odyssey*, 10: 348/373. Odysseus finds himself in the dwelling of Circe (WR 106; 138). He relates: “Meanwhile, Circe’s four helpers were busy in her dwelling. (...). They were the daughters of the springs, the forests, and the sacred streams flowing into the sea (WR 80). One covered the high seats with beautifully colored blankets—purple ones on top, linen blankets underneath. In front of the seats, the second placed the magnificent silver tables and set the golden baskets upon them. Into a silver jug, the third poured the delicious, honey-sweet wine and immediately set the golden cups ready.

The fourth of the helpers, however, brought water. Under a massive tripod, she stoked a strong fire. One saw the water becoming hot. After it had reached the boiling point inside the gleaming metal, she had me take my place in the bath. With the water from the mighty tripod, she prepared a pleasant mixture and poured it over my head and shoulders until she had driven the debilitating exhaustion from my body. She bathed me and anointed me with oil, upon which she threw a beautiful cloak over my undergarments. Then she led me to the beautiful, artfully silver-trimmed chair. She placed the footstool under my feet.

In a beautiful golden jug, one of the helpers brought water: over a silver basin, she sprinkled my hands while washing them. She set the polished wooden table before me. The senior housekeeper came and placed bread on the table, which she replenished with many dishes: she distributed from the supplies without calculation. Thereupon she invited me to the meal (...).”

WR255

(2) The report,

(i) Introduction.

In this text from the epic, the *Odyssey*, Homer (c. 800) gives voice to Odysseus.

(ii) Middle -- (time and place)

During Odysseus' stay in the home of the sorceress Circe, (action) nymphs, as helpers and as housekeeper, prepare a regular reception for Odysseus. (Mode/course) The poet dwells at length on the words of the hero Odysseus. One nymph prepares the seats, another the tables, with the baskets on them, the third the wine. The fourth provides the hero with a restorative bath, after

which she assigns him the place of honor. One of the nymphs washes his hands. The distinguished housekeeper sets the table. The meal can begin.

(iii) Conclusion.

All this happens because Kirke and her followers wish to fulfill the high duties of hospitality (explanation/cause).

Decision.

One sees that, describing the structure (in six viewpoints of praxeology), one can make an accurate account of the Homeric epic text on about ten lines.

Note: Remove one of the six integrating elements, and there is a void that violates the totality (the Gestalt; WR 114). Pay attention to how time and place situate the event and how the four other 'commonplaces' characterize it. Without the six viewpoints, the story (structure) is blind. Without the story, the structure is empty.

Update

Bibl. sample:

-- Y. Stalloni, *Méthodes de contraction et de synthèse de textes (Concours d'entrée des grandes écoles)*, Paris, 1983, 2;

-- J. Moreau, *La contraction en la synthèse de textes*, Paris, 1977;

--Ed . *Marketing, Contraction et synthèse de textes à l'entrée des grandes écoles (Epreuves intégrales des concours)*. Paris, 1983.

The 'contraction' (literally: contraction, summary) is, according to Moreau, "the 'résumé' (summary) of a text, which is nothing other than the reduction of the source text to a third, a fourth, a fifth, etc., of its length.

The 'synthesis' is an ambiguous 'contraction': summarizing more than one basic texts, which deal with either identical or related subjects, or various subjects, according to their unity (in terms of content, arrangement (= classification, plan), and design (= stylization)).

WR256

De Editions Marketing, oc, 5/8, give, the following specimen.

HEC 79 (Polytechnique).-- Duration: 3 hours.

Roger Caillois (1913/1978), *L' esprit des sectes*) in four hundred words .

In doing so, highlight the main ideas and the train of thought ('articulation de la pensée') of the author.

Indicate the number of words used at the end of your copy.

Note -- It is apparent that the quantification has been taken very far.

Another example.-- ESCA 79.-- Duration: 3 hours.

Summarize the following text in four hundred words.

On their manuscript, candidates must write fifty lines (*note*: i.e., all fifty lines), stating the number of words used in the margin, directly opposite the line corresponding to that number. The total is stated at the end of the manuscript.

An overshoot of ten percent is permitted. Above 440 words, however, one point will be deducted for every ten-word increment. -- The correctors will take the execution into account. (Oc, 109/113).

Y. Stalloni, oc,7, specifies: usually the point deduction is one point (out of a total of twenty) for every section (= text segment) of ten words above the tolerance threshold. If 400 words are required, the margin is 40 (up to 360 or 440 words). From 359 or 441 words the candidate loses one point; from 349 or 451 two points,

Conclusion.-- The entrance exams for higher institutions in France are subject to strict requirements. -- Stalloni recommends:

all at once, suddenly, to read the entire text (30 to 40 minutes for 4,000 words),

a2. subsequently, to summarize its components (arrangement, plan, diagram),

b1 . then, to summarize the paragraphs (text parts with a single idea) each time, after reading,

b2 . to summarize the line of thought, after each paragraph reading

Perhaps our language proficiency education would do well to reinforce the model of the ancient summary as early as possible. Later, the pupils will then be ready to handle this modern form of (single or multiple) contraction. “Es übt sich früh, was ein Meister werden will”.

WR257

Small-scale model of multiple text contraction ('synthesis').

Library st.: Gilbert's *Niquet, Structurer sa pensée/ Structurer sa phrase* , Paris, 1978, 10/12. Niquet presents a series of texts on TV; we select a number of them.

(A)1 . The TV runs late in the evenings: it is often partly responsible for our morning fatigue.

(A)2. Not a fin is moved anymore! Moving around to experience something

else or to meet fellow human beings is out of the question! People sit, nailed to the TV screen, gaping (...).

(A)3. Man, as a television viewer, is engaged in a merely passive introduction to the universe: he/she receives information via the TV, but does not actively inform himself/herself.

(A)4. The TV images swirl across the screen like gusts of wind (...). The world becomes a whirlwind, a vortex. Like falling leaves, the news reports, once passed on, are swept along.

(A)5 . The purely imagined merges with the real: Stendhal (= Henri Bayle, this Stendhal (1783/1842), French novelist) alongside George Pompidou (1911/1974; French president 1969/1974); (...) Don Juan (legendary figure; perhaps once a Spanish nobleman, Don Juan Tenerio, who lived in Seville during the 16th century) falls in love with Sylvie Vartan (current French actress) (...). Culturally speaking, it is full-on 'Flemish Fair'.

(A)6 . Tell me how you spend your free time, and I will tell you to what type of culture you belong (thus a sociologist). Applied to the public's processing of television, this phrase shows us that Sunday television programs offer a possible measure of the dissemination of television culture. They range from the Western in the afternoon to the tearjerker performance in the evening. What disappointing mediocrity, spread across wretched scenarios, scripts, intentions, and images on the TV screen! Everything reduces to killing time. Result: precisely when viewership is particularly high, one encounters a massively distributed, tasteless mediocrity.

(A)7. A TV report ('reportage') never appears on the TV screen in its entirety and without explanation ('commentary'). The TV reporter limits his/her footage to a narrow selection and adds his/her own interpretation.

It is, therefore, crystal clear: television imposes its viewpoint and value judgment regarding the events on us.

WR258

(B)1. Sometimes people think that TV images are received directly and processed passively. The reality is different: one member of a family wants a sports broadcast, another wants a film, yet another wants technology or theatre. The media enthusiast is, at the same time, a media interpreter, indeed, a media critic. Far from constantly compartmentalizing them within their own perspectives, TV can, therefore, compel family members to discuss among themselves.

(B)2. The popularity of broadcasts about medicine should come as no

surprise: they address a need among viewers -- the need to be informed about medicine. (...).

(B)3. Television makes world literature available to the viewing public. Something that, without television, would never have reached beyond a small circle of interested parties.

(B)4. I am a teacher of French literature. One day my students surprise me: they were engaged in a dispute about *Le Rouge et le Noir* (a novel by *Stendhal*, published in 1831). I was curious (...): they had, lo and behold, seen a film.

The evening before – based on the novel in question. My bookseller told me that, besides young people, others had done this as well. What's more: sales of the book had risen significantly since then. The same phenomenon occurred after *Germinal* (from the series *Les Rougon-Macquart* (1885), about the life of miners, by the naturalist *Emile Zola* (1840/1902).(...).

Requested.

(1) Reading (Stalloni method; WR 256). The global reading may provide you with a concise title that summarizes (A) and (B).

(2)1. Give a summary (that reflects the line of thought).

(2)2 . Similar to, (A)3 and (A)7; (A)3 and (B)1; (A)4 and (A)5; (B)1 and (B)2,3,4.

(2)3. Are WR 180 (interpretation scheme), WR 227 (dialectical argument), even WR 215 (eristics) applicable?

(2)4. After careful reading, is TV susceptible to 'marketing' (WR 247) in your opinion?

(2)5. Can the texts be called 'rhetorical'? That is, do they attempt to influence you in one direction or another by means of understanding?

(2)6. Is the 'regulatory and application model' pair applicable to (A) 6? (Cf. WR 253).

(2)7. Is the praxeological scheme (WR 254) applicable anywhere?

WR259

(2).1. --The 'ekfrasis' (descriptio), description.

If the report was a text type that shortens (to the point of quantified abbreviation), the literature types that follow are (rather) lengthening,

expanding, and developing.

The first type that we outline is the description.

Library st.:

- J. Broeckaert, SJ, *Le guide du jeune littéraire*, I (*Eléments généraux et compositions secondaires*), Bruxelles/Paris/Bois-le-Duc, 1849 - 1; 1872-2, 179/219;--
- C. Lefèvre, SJ, *La composition littéraire*, Bruxelles, 1936-3, 300/322 (*La description*);
- J. Gob, *Précis d. litt. fr.* BXL. 1947, 151/154 (*La description*);
- E. Zola (WR 258), *De la description*, in: *Le roman expérimental* (1880), in: *Oeuvres compl.* x, Cercle du livre précieux, 1968;
- Alain Robbe-Grillet (1922/2008), *Temps et description, dans le récit d'aujourd'hui*, in: *Pour un nouveau roman*, in: *Idées* (Paris), No. 45;
- Ph. Hamon, *Qu'est-ce qu'une description ?*, in: *Poétique*, No. 12;
- J. Ricardou, *L'ordre des choses ou une expérience de la description méthodique*, in: *Pratiques* (Metz), No. special, 75/84.

Definition.

"Description is the verbatim, (...), detailed representation of a fact perceptible through the senses" (C. Lefèvre, oc. 300) "The purpose of a description is to enable the fellow man (listener, reader) to perceive, by means of the power of the word, a spectacle ('spectacle'), which the author has observed or imagined." Gob, oc. 151).

It is evident that sensory perception must either actually precede or be possible ('perceptible'). Furthermore: that the describer, by chance, recalls that perception in the fellow man.

Ch.-M. Des Granges/ Mlle Maignelone, *La composition . fr.*, Paris, 1930, 799ss., says: "One attempts, by means of words, to suggest the impression that a personal, direct observation or a landscape painting would give! Here the suggestive (WR 135v.) is emphasized, that is, the evoking (or generating) of one's own perception in one's fellow man, although this is, first and foremost, directed towards the perceived itself.

Phenomenological (cf. E. Husserl): the 'I' - by means of its language - causes the 'you' (fellow man) to participate in its own attentive orientation ('intentionality', on the perceived, **(1)** I, you **(2)** intentional orientation that is communicated, **(3)** in a verbal manner, -- these are three structural aspects.

WR260

Unambiguous character.

The human aspect (possibly in its suggestive degree) is merely second-rate. To describe is, first and foremost, to render what is (WR 201/20-3: in itself).

C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d' élocution* , Dour, 1910, 61, indicates two aspects of that object-boundness:

(a) The 'gestalt' (WR 114/119) is represented “by subordinating the choice of details to the overall impression”; in other words, according to Ansotte, the totality of what is perceived gives the description its unity;

(b) The variation in detail reflects the richness and diversity of what is perceived: the partial impressions (preferably original and new) “powerfully paint what is perceived, characterize it, make it seen”. That is the multiplicity aspect inherent in the objectivity of the representation.

Typology.

J. Broeckaert, oc,180, distinguishes two types.

(1) The description of a course of events ('une action successive'; oc,180/190), -- what the author calls a story;

(2) The description of a simultaneous subject ('un tableau simultané', a tableau. -- oc, 211/219), -- which he calls actual description. -- Within actual description, Broeckaert distinguishes subtypes: “Landscapes, buildings, -- portraits, customs, -- everything can be described.

Hence terms such as topography (landscape description, concerning natural and cultural landscapes), prosopopoiy, view description (portrait, stricto sensu), and character description, ethopoiia (character image) (WR 251), also called 'ethopee'. These last two types are actualized in the behaviorist and the humanistic ('verstehende') description.

Applicative models.

We will briefly discuss some types.

App. Mod. 1.-- The simile or two-part description.

Library st.:

-- H. Morier, *Dict d. poet. et de rhétor.* , Paris, 1981-3, 989/1005 (Similé).

-- Homer, *Iliad* , 4:141ff., gives us a model.

Menelaus, the prince of Sparta, is wounded by an arrow (WR 33: Trojan War). -- “Just as a Meonian or Carian girl dyes purple the ivory that will serve as an ornament for the bridle (= bit) of the horses; -- meanwhile, the ornament lies in her bedroom; many riders would gladly take it with them, but it lies there as an adornment for a prince, both an ornament for the steed and a showpiece for the rider.

Thus, Menelaus, your well-formed thighs, your legs, and your beautiful ankles beneath them were stained with blood! -- One sees that Homer introduces a simile to describe the fact of war: "as ..., so ..." Just as a (...) girl stains ivory purple, (...) So (...) were (...) stained with blood." One sees: purple --- blood; ivory ---- thighs, legs, ankles. But the epic poet has lingered on the scene in peacetime: "The ornament lies, meanwhile, in her bedroom (...)." This is an interjection. But it describes.

The simile type of text lies in what Morier calls the bijection between purple and blood and between ivory and thighs, legs, and ankles. The war scene is depicted within a peace scene, point by point ('bijection' or 'addition'). This does not apply to the interjection, which, painted in itself, does not correspond to the war scene in a bijective manner ('not added'). The simile or bijectively elaborated comparison is, in other words, not fully developed.

Except for the prefix, the description is twofold:

- (i) it is direct (the war scene);
- (ii) it is indirect (the peace scene, at least partially, as a representation of the direct description).

App. Mod. 2.-- The characteristic.

Library St.: O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie* (*Philosophische Propädeutik*), Wien, 1959, 34; 153f..

'Characterize' means

- (i) describe the essence of a given
- (ii) so that the unreal is omitted. One can also introduce the Greek word 'tupos' 'to characterize' (WR 255). We refer to the term 'hupo.tuposis' (WR 253), hypotypose, sketch (here: of the essential).

With the characteristic we approach, strongly but undeveloped, the phenomenological description of the being ('eidetic' phenomenology: the eidos (WR 30; 246)).

Strict sensory perception (WR 259) is hereby preserved as 'empeiria' (WR 41: the visible), but it is simultaneously transcended, as 'theoria', fathoming, insight (WR 41: the invisible).

Willmann, oc,153f., describes the structure of the characteristic or essence sketch of, for example, a human being.

(1)1. What does someone look like (appearance description, prosopopoiia)?

(1)2. What is his position in society?

In other words: the profession, the social standing (according to Willmann). Which is, in turn, *prosopopoiia*, a description of outlook (but understood socially).

Note: This twofold external aspect refers to scientificity as actualization: the natural scientist examines the appearance, the visible and the tangible, and describes it.

(2) Who, what kind of 'person' (character, soul) is someone? Willmann emphasizes, here, intellect, will, and disposition.

Note: This aspect, which represents the *ethopoiia*, the description of character or soul, refers to the inner self, behind the outward appearance. It is actualized in the spiritual science (hermeneutics as a human science) which, through the externally observable, describes the soul, the inner being, -- this, according to the understanding ('*verstehende*') method.

Willmann points out that the typical, the characteristic, can be interpreted in two ways.

1. The idealization.

Thus says Aristotle, in his *Poetics*, 15 "The 'good' painters render the characteristic of the themes treated (*note* : the realistic, unambiguous aspect). Yet, in all faithful representation, they depict it more beautifully. So too, the writer, if he depicts people who are quick-tempered, frivolous, or exhibit other character defects, ought to ennoble his figures".

2. Naturalism.

There is a 'realism' that depicts 'reality' in a raw, indeed, degraded manner, because it regards idealization as, in a way, an escape from the harsh reality. The typical aspect, then, is what constitutes misery (*miserabilism*, for example).

Appl. Mod. 1. -- The summary report.

(a) If, when analyzing a *muthos* (WR 253), a student recognizes the structure (reg. mod.) in what we now call 'moral lesson', then he/she represents the characteristic, the essential sketch.

(b) If, when summarizing an event, someone briefly describes its six-part structure, then he describes its typical, its characteristic.

To describe the structure concisely—that is characterizing.

App. Mod. 2 .-- The behavioral description .

Take, for example, *Homer, Odyssey* 10: 210/219. The epic poet wishes to describe, concisely, what the behavior of the wild animals looks like, as manipulated by the 'witch' (WR 80v.; 106; 254) Circe, as Lady of the Beasts (= a magical title).

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In the valley, between the mountains, they found Circe's dwelling: it consisted of polished stones. The spot was visible from afar.

In the vicinity were mountain wolves and lions, whom Circe had magically influenced by administering black magic potions. Consequently, the animals did not attack the men wildly. On the contrary: they rose up and, with their long tails, caressed them as they passed by. -- just as the dogs of the house wag their tails around their lord whenever he returns from a feast, for he always has tasty morsels with him then, -- so too did the wolves and lions walk around them, with their heavy claws, wagging their tails."

1. The appearance, the external behavior, is described here concisely, with a trait (the wagging-tail flattering), but at the same time, the inner life of the animals shines through—precisely through the external behavior. Here, we have prosopopoeia and ethopoeia combined!

2. Again (WR 260v.):

(i) the actual event is directly depicted (one - unambiguously described) in the behavior of wild animals;

(ii) This is, in turn, depicted in comparison with the dogs—domestic animals—which points to indirect representation. The simile process is a powerful descriptive tool.

App. Mod. 3.-- The characterization of. The landscape.

Library st.:

-- *Lewis Mumfordr Technics and Civilization* , New York, 1934;

-- *Jeremy Rifkin, Ted Howard, Entropy (A New World View)* , New York, 1980.-- It is about the medieval world.

(1) The natural landscape was mainly (predominant feature, main impression), forests, in which people lived.

(2) The cultural landscape was correspondingly so: wood was, before the introduction of coal and the steam engine, the predominant industrial resource ('energy type'). This, **(i)** as raw material, **(ii)a.** as fuel, **(ii)b.** as finished product (utility objects, hand tools, appliances (ships, oil and wine presses, printing presses, etc.) were all made of wood).-- forest and wood, - behold the characteristic of the medieval way of life. In popular terms: "It was all wood

and forest that dominated the scene". One sees, once again, the summarizing ('inductive') character. Indeed: summative induction is the foundation of the essential sketch.

App. Mod. 4.-- The characterization of a human type.

The term 'fan' is known from the pop world. The word comes from 'fanatic', enthusiastic.

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(1) The fan's view.

Library st.: Joepie (Deurne), 392 (20.06.1981): 4/5.

Speaking is Angela, one of the girls from the six-member Dolly Dots, who garnered overwhelming acclaim in Japan.

a. "In one of Tokyo's largest nightclubs, there are about two thousand 'fans'. We enter: they are all singing along to our record at the top of their lungs. We sit at a table for a while: I assume that almost all the 'fans' have looked at us from closer up, with the peculiar habit of briefly touching you—only to walk away smiling afterwards.

b. “ (i) Here (in the West) the 'fans' ask for an autograph.

(ii) There, in Japan, they touch you briefly and seem - with that - to be overjoyed."

One sees: the little pop star describes the phenomenon, viewed from the outside, 'behavioristically' (one might say). Propopée!

(2). The soul of the fan.

Library st.: Joepie (Deurne), 409 (17.01.1982): 76/77.

Speaking is Beedee, a member of the four-piece group Ramones.

(i) "I think it is wonderful to have a hero. A 'hero' is someone in whom one believes, but with whom one should not interact directly (*note*: distant veneration)".

(ii) “John Lennon, the Beatle, was my last hero. Although I do not entirely agree with his 'philosophy' (*note*: *worldview and philosophy of life*), *I still appreciate the genuine in him: he was* **a.** a man with honest opinions, **b.** with a 'heart' - **c.** someone who wanted to achieve something!

Here, being a fan is described from the inside, by someone who lives it firsthand. The journalist who reports the words participates in that experience.

In corroboration: Joepie (Deurne), 398 (01.11.1981), 66v., quotes the singer Feerkal Sharkey, from the five-member Northern Irish pop group The

Undertones: “I think it lies in the nature of man to always want to put someone – a politician, a singer – on a pedestal”.

This statement **(i)** confirms the essential trait, 'characteristic', of the 'fan' (hero worship from a distance), **(ii)** but explains (WR 254: cause) him. Which is no longer a description, for explaining transcends the given (the visible phenomenon). Ethopee! Who does not think of idealization here, (WR 262)

App. Mod. 5.-- The 'enkomion', laudatio, praise (speech).

Library st.: *HI Marrou, Hist. d. l' ed ., 273/275.*

Given: a personality, living or deceased, mythical or historical.

Requested: laudatory characterization,

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The eulogy is a description, but intended to substantiate a value judgment.
-- Here is the ancient, Deuterosophist schema.

(A) - The view description.

This is divided into two parts.

(A)1 . The external values .

a. The 'eugeneia' (noble lineage). **b.** The center: **i.** birthplace, **ii.** people, **iii.** political regime (e.g. democracy), **iv.** parents, family. **c.** The personality: **i.** education received, **ii.** circle of friends, **iii.** acquired fame ('glory'), **iv.** public offices, **v.** possessions, **vi.** children (number, beauty), **vii.** leuthanasia; peaceful death.

(A)2. The physical-external values.

a. health, **b.** physical strength, **c.** beauty, **d.** 'euaisthèsia' sensitivity.

(B) The soul description (character sketch).

Two main aspects.

(B)1. Attitudes toward life.

a. wisdom (= general education), **b.** self-control, **c.** courage, **d.** sense of justice, **e.** religious devotion, **f.** nobility of soul, **g.** magnanimity (which does not get bogged down in trifles).

(B)2. The behaviors arising from it .

a. Its purposefulness:

i. altruistic, selfless activities,

ii. activities geared towards the objective good (and not towards the usable (WR 236) or enjoyment (WR 237)),

iii. activities geared towards public welfare, **iv.** activities undertaken notwithstanding risks and dangers.

b. *Its situatedness* (the circumstances in which):

i. sense of the opportune moment, **ii.** Precedents (acts performed for the first time), **iii.** Activities performed alone. **iv.** Activities surpassing others, **v.** Activities carried out with few collaborators, **vi.** Activities unusual for his age, **vii.** Achievements performed against all hope, **viii.** Achievements not performed without effort and suffering, **ix.** Activities performed quickly and yet well.

Behold, more than thirty 'kefalaia', viewpoints, perspectives on a person's essence. One sees that prosopopoeia and ethopee – once again – go together. One sees that the soul values, however highly regarded, are not examined without the analysis of intentions (analysis of goal-directedness) and, above all, not without the situation, that is, the totality of circumstances. A remarkable sense of the totality in which man situates himself. Cf. WR 255 (situating, in time and space).

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App. Mod. 3.-- The painting hypotypose;

Bible sample : H. Morier, Dict. d. poet. de rhet ., 520/531.

'Hypotuposis', sketch, can also mean a dramatizing sketch. Morier says: *The hypotypose is a figure of speech (*note:* manner of speaking), in which one describes. The scene is rendered and perceived so vividly, 'energetically', that it offers the appearance of the actual presence, the relief and the colors of the described reality." (oc, 520).

The Latin word is *om evidentia*, to place one's eyes -- to situate oneself in the midst of it. A famous model is *M. Tullius Cicero* (-106/-43), in his *Fourth Catalinare* .

It seems to me: I see this capital (Rome), the light of the inhabited world and the fortress of all peoples, suddenly collapsing in one great fire. I perceive, in the midst of the graveyard of our fatherland, heaps of citizens in a miserable and unburied state. Before my eyes rises the scene of Cethegus and, immediately, someone who is indulging himself as he slaughters you!

Cicero sees the danger posed by Catilina and his political faction, which is steering toward a reversal, indeed, the destruction of Rome. To emphasize the impact (the consequences), to make them clear ('evidentia'), he acts as if he is already the contemporary of the future. In this, he imitates—or rather, the seers—who also—albeit 'mantic' (under inspiration; WR 88)—display such a 'style'. Not from a distance; no: right in the midst of the subject itself.

An updated version that has become world-famous is the famous “I have a dream” by Martin Luther King (1929/1968).

More banally, yet still 'hypotypotically', the common man says: “I can already see myself in that situation.” Or even: “I can already see you failing.” Laying oneself before one’s eyes is a common sense trait. The immediate presence at the described object stands out. The strictly rhetorical character stands out.

The dramatizing sketch or hypotypose can be very brief. *Le Lutrin* is a rustic epic by *Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux* (1636/1711). He sketches the atmosphere of the 'lazy kings' as follows: “Four oxen, sluggish and slow, with a tranquil and slow pace // Walked in Paris, the indolent monarch”. Even the oxen become lazy.

However, in a novel, the dramatizing hypotypose can be sustained for three or four pages. Yet the reader is constantly situated right in the midst of it.

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(2).2. -- The 'diegesis' (diegema, muthos), narratio, story .

The second explanatory text type is the story.

Library st.:

- *J. Broeckart, Le guide du J.litt ., I, 180/190* (Description d' une action successive);
- *C. Ansotte, Traité prat., 48/59* (De la narration);
- *G.- A. Gasquy, La narration française , Marseille, 1905;*
- *Ch.-M. Des Granges/ Melle Magualonne, La comp. fr ., 794/799* (Un récit: *Gil Blas et le fripier*);
- *R. Fayolle, La critique , Paris, 1978, 213/216* (*L'analyse du récit*);
- *Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif , in: Communications , 4* (*Recherches sémiologiques*), Paris, 1964, 4/32;
- *J.-M. Adam, Le récit , Paris, 1984;*
- *Mieke Bal, Narratological , Paris, 1977;*
- *Rimmon-Kenan (Sholomith), Narrative Fictiony , London / New York” 1933;*
- *J.-M. Adam, Le texte narratif , Paris, 1984;*
- *P. Ricoeur, La narrativité , Paris, 1980;*
- *G. Genette, Nouveau discours du récit , Paris, 1983.*

'Narratology', the study of story, is the new term for an old concept: *Aristotle* , in his **Poetics **, 1450a 2/3 and onwards, speaks of the core of drama (play), namely the muthos, the story (WR 253). Deuterosophism has its doctrine of the story, both muthos and dègèma (WR 254). Narratology has

gained momentum, particularly since *Vladimir Propp*, **Morfologija Skazki** (*Morphology of the Fairy Tale*), **Leningrad**, 1928. It is highly formalizing.

Definition.

“The muthos, the story, is the 'mimèsis', the representation of a 'praxis', an action.” (*Aristotle, Poet.*, 1450a 2/3). The story is 'sunthesis', a closed representation, of 'ta pragmata', the facts: thus Aristotle likewise describes it in his *Poet.*, *ibidem*. *Poet.*, 1450b 23, calling the story a 'sustasis', a structural representation, of the facts such that they constitute a complete and coherent action (event). That action ought to have a certain scope ('megethos'). In other words: a sentence or two does not constitute an actual story!

This is how we understand *J. Gob, Précis d. litt. Fr.* , 154/160 (*La narration*): “A story is the representation of a series of events that are so interconnected that they form a whole, i.e., a single and complete action (event)”. (oc, 154). This definition of essence sounds Aristotelian.

C. Ansotte, Traité pr., 49, says: “The story is the exposition of a fact that actually happened or is an imagined event, with all the interesting circumstances belonging to it, from its origin to its overall conclusion”.

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We note the term 'circumstances' insofar as they are 'interesting': not all details belong, sensibly, to a story; only those circumstances that sustain interest. The suspense that sustains interest seems to coincide with what Ansotte, oc, 49, says: “Nothing should allow one to foresee what is to happen.” In other words: precisely the fact that the reader or listener does not know what is to follow 'fascinates' him.

*TA van Dijk, *Tekstwetenschap** , 150/155 (** Narrative Structures **), points out that the object is a 'action' in the broad sense. The acting beings can be people, animals, plants, or inanimate things: an earthquake or a storm, for example, which originate from the earth's crust or the layers of the atmosphere as 'acting' subjects, are an 'action'—an event. States, objects (insofar as they are not action-inducing)—according to van Dijk—do not belong to the narrative object, except indirectly. The author introduces the term 'non-redundant' (not superfluous, not contradictory, because 'old news') to indicate that what follows must be unknown, new, or at least appear new, in order to maintain attention.

Ch.-M, des Granges, oc 795, says: “The story is the direct exposition of an action of which the narrator was the witness and, sometimes, the hero (acting subject)”. This definition essentially applies to stories in the first person (and then an 'I' that claims or pretends to have experienced the event oneself). This

does not seem essential to us for every story.

Structure.

(1) The structure of the story was already discussed in WR 253 (the duality of the 'regulatory' and 'application' narrative model) and WR 254 (the praxeological six-part representation). -- These two approaches naturally remain valid from a narratological perspective. However, they should be described more precisely.

(2) two clarifications.

The pair 'omen' (= past tense, adverbial) / 'continuation' (= present tense, concluding paragraph) and the pair 'knot/resolution' constitute the structure of the action, the narrative events.

(A) The pair 'omen/continuation'

Let us take an example from Vl. Propp: "A prince gives an eagle to a hero. That eagle carries the hero away to another principality." The omen (vt = antecedent (= acd)) is

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"A prince gives an eagle to a hero." The continuation (vv = consequent, qonsequent (= csq)) is "That eagle carries the hero (...) away." In an analogous Russian fairy tale, Propp discovers the following sequence: "An old man gives a horse to Sushenko. This horse carries Sushenko away to another principality." In yet another analogous fairy tale: "A princess gives a ring to Ivan. Young people spring from that ring, who carry Ivan away to another principality."

Propp, by paying attention to the order, past tense/past tense, and by comparing more than one fairy tale as a story structure, discovers analogy.

(1) The names of the actors/actresses (prince, old man, princess; eagle, horse, ring; hero, Sushenko, Ivan; etc.) are not identical, nor are their characteristics.

(2) identical are the actions (events), which he calls 'functions'.

In other words:

(1). Incidental is by whom the action is performed (human, animal, supernatural beings, objects), -- What means the agents (acting beings) employ in the action (persuasion, deceit, violence, magic, etc.),-- With what intention (damage, service, pastime, etc.) they act in the event;

(2). Essential is what a character does -- what role (function) the agent plays. (*Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif*, 6).

Decision.

1. The 'past tense/past tense' relationship is essentially a relationship of actions that fulfill a role (function). We denote this relationship by the 'omen/continuation' pair; the 'omen' is whatever is a necessary and, if need be, sufficient condition for the 'continuation' that flows from it in one way or another.

2. We go a step further than Propp: it is not even important (= not essential) what role an agent plays, or what happens: what is essential is that a role is played, that something happens. In other words: the pure 'past tense/past tense' connection is essential.

The exact connection between the past tense and the past participle is incidental. In a suspenseful story, however, that connection is such that the past tense stimulates interest (through the surprising aspect of the past tense). If, for example, in a fairy tale, a princess suddenly turns into a gemstone or simply vanishes into nothingness, that is sufficient: the past tense surprises, viewed from the perspective of the past tense. Nothing more is needed.

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3. Another improvement we make to Propp's narrative theory is that, once the pure pastime story (such as most fairy tales) is transcended, the past tense/past tense connection becomes qualitatively important: someone who reads a novel about a love triangle and, for example, as a Biblically devout believer, takes marriage seriously, does attach value to the quality of the past tense/past tense connection:

"Miet was married (= past tense). She falls in love with a man, with her work (= vice versa)." For the Biblically believer, that vice versa (relating to past tense) is the beginning of 'sin', whereas, for the uprooted, for whom marriage has been secularized, this vice versa is merely called 'refreshing of partners'. For both types of reader, it is important what happens, what role (function) is played by the agent (to use Propp's terms).

In other words:

(1) the 'VT/VV' symbol is a syntactic phenomenon;

(2) By situating it in real life ('sitz im leben'), that syntactic sign is semantically interpreted (WR 209; 250; 253). Value judgments, for example, emerge in semantics.

(B) The 'knot/unraveling' pairing.

C. Ansotte, *Traité* pr., 49, mentions a second structure.

(1) The knot.

This lapses, strictly speaking, in two times.

(1)a. The 'ekthesis', expositio, introduction (prefix) sets **a.** time and place (WR 254), di situating,

b. characters, agents (WR 254: acting beings),

c. initial circumstances (starting situation) of the action, apart (J. Broekaert, oc,189).

Ansotte, oc, 50, says: the introduction provides the local color ('la couleur locale'), as well as the singular-concrete data (time/place, characters, initial conditions).

(1)b. Note: The introduction is, thus, the preliminary or initial node, in the sense that the global sign (vt) is present in it. Once the initial situation is known, one has the first vt at one's disposal; the first vv (continuation) can begin.

(2) The actual knot, -- 'desis' (binding) or 'plokè' complication (intrigue, in Flemish English: 'plot'), is called by Broeckaert, oc,184, 'une complication d'incidents' (a complication consisting of incidents (unforeseen occurrences)).

Aristotle calls a 'knot' that part of the story, from the beginning to the final part, from which the turning point for better or worse springs.

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(2) The resolution.

'Lusis' denouement, Aristotle calls the story from the turning point (perirpe.pateia or metabasis) for better or worse up to and including the conclusion. Ansotte speaks of the outcome or the result of the event

Application.

This abstract (syntactic) scheme, above, comes to life thanks to the (semantic) interpretation. Let us take a ballad by *Joseph von Eichendorff* (1788/1857), from the Jüngere Romantische Schule der Heidelberger. This very balanced Romantic was, at one time, together with Ludwig Uhland (1787/1862), exceptionally popular with the German public.

The title reads: **Die Lorelei**. 'Die (also: der) Lei' is 'rock' and 'die Lure' is a nymph (female nature spirit, elf). Such nymphs, who appear as treacherously beautiful women, are considered full textors of 'a judgment of God' (WR 253).

A.-- Introduction. -- (Foreknot)

"It's clean spit. It's clean.

It's already late. It's already chilly.

B.-- Knot.

reitest Du einsam durch den Wald? Waarom rijdt Gij eenzaam door het woud ?

Du bist allein. Het woud is lang.

Gij zijt alleen.

Du, schöne Braut, Ich führ' Dich heim!"
you home.

You, beautiful bride, I lead

-- " Great is the deceit and trickery of men.

Vor Schmerz mein Herz gebrochen ist.
smart gebroken.

Mijn hart is door de

Wohl irrt des Waldhorn, here and hin.
wanders back and forth.

The forest horn

O flieh: Du weizt nicht wer ich bin".
ik ben.

Vlucht toch: Gij west niet wie

"So reich geschmückt ist Rosz und Weib.
vrouw.

Zo rijk uitgedost is paard en

So wunderschöm der junge Leib.
lichaam.

Zo wondermooi het jonge

C. - Denouement.

Jetzt kenn 'ich dich: Gott !steh' mir bei!
me!

Now I know you: God help

"You are the witch

Lorelei !"

"Du kennst mich wohl: von hohem Stein Gij kent mij wel: van de hoge rots
Schaut still meim Schlosz, tief, in den Rhein. Kijkt still mijn, slot, diep, in
de Rijn.

Es ist schon spät. Es ist schon calt.
chilly.

It's already late. It's already

nimmermehr aus dieser Wald". Gij raakt nooit meer uit dit woud.

Note . -- F. Buytendijk, *Zur Phänomenologie Der Begegnung*, in: O. FRöbe-Kapteyn , ed., *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, 1950 (*Mensch u. Ritus*), Zurich, 1951, 431/486, offers us an existential-phenomenological description of what is called—in a technical sense—an 'encounter' (Begegnung, rencontre, encounter), which, through the view (WR 261ff.), makes acquaintance with one's fellow man on a deeper level, from soul to soul.

Here: the man imagines, with pity, that he ought to save that beautiful, seemingly defenseless woman, -- until (turning point), suddenly, it turns out, through what Aristotle calls 'anagnorisis' (recognition of true identity), that he himself stands right before his downfall, brought about by her. The prospect, *prosopon*, is a beautiful girl; the truth is a Lorelei, a woman who carries out fate.

Application.

1. There are, of course, many types of story. We select one type by way of sample: the anecdote. There is more than one definition. In all cases, however, it is a little story that characterizes something as 'singular-concrete'. There is also something in it that transcends the merely singular-concrete.

2. An applicative model that, once again, literally recounts a real encounter, an acquaintance on a deeper level, below the 'view'.

Michaela Denis, *Un léopard sur les genoux* , Paris, 1956, 35s., tells how she, as an actress within a Hollywood crew, experienced the filming of *The Mines of King Solomon* (in Kenya).

A. Front knot (ecthesis, expositio).

I had hired a nine-year-old boy to carry my makeup kit. The tips I gave him placed him in a wage bracket higher than his father's. I suspect he was very attached to me.

B. Knoop (desis).

About a year later, when we were about to leave Nairobi (...), he came to see me. I looked at him: I suspected that he wanted to say something. I thought that he was in financial trouble and, therefore, wanted to give him some money. He refused. With his head bowed, he stood before me, with a mist of tears before his little dark eyes. -- "Explain," I said. -- "You must adopt me as your child." -- "But your father and your mother," I said, "would be very angry if they lost their son." -- The little black boy gave no answer.

C. Unraveling (luisis).

I took him by the chin and said: "I will be your aunt, your mother's sister."

-- His little face brightened. Cheerful, he said: "Goodbye." I saw him walk away singing.

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(2).3. -- 'Thesis', proposition, treatise.

The 'thesis' in the time of Deuterosophy is the systematic development of an abstract subject.

Related to it, at that time, were:

1. the chreia (chrie), about which later, and the gnome, sententia, statement;
2. the kataskeue, confirmatio, justification (argument, proof) and its opposite, the anaskeue, refutatio, refutation;
3. the enkomion, lauditio, eulogy (WR 264v.) and its opposite, the psogos, vituperatio, reproach;
4. the sunkrisis, comparatio, comparison (parallel);
5. the prosopopoiia, the description of the view, and the ethopoiia, the description of the soul (WR. 261ff. and
6. de nomos, lex, legislation (discussion).

The koinos topos, locus communis commonplace (development of viewpoint) deserves separate mention, as this is a component of virtually all texts without further ado.

Apart from the abstract inherent in the theme and the subject matter, the treatise is the foundational text, present in all preceding text types and, in particular, in those just listed.

Bibl. sample:

- O. Willmann, *Abriss d.Phil .*, 9/13 (*die material der logic, von der aufsatzlehre aus gesehen*); 47/48 (Chrie);
- OP Spandl, *Methodik und Praxis der geistigeri Arbeit* , Munich, 166;
- E. Fleerackers, L. Geijsels, SJ, *De verhandeling* , Antwerp, 1965-12;
- G. Niquet, *Structurer sa pensée / Structurer sa phrase (Techniques d'expression oral et écrite)* , Paris, 1978;
- SP Moss, *Composition by Logic* , Belmont (Calif.), 1966;
- O. Pecqueur, *Manuel pratique de dissertation française* , Namur, 1922-2;
- J. Bojin/M. Dunand, *Documents et exposés efficaces (Messages, structure du raisonne-ment, illustrations graphiques)* , Paris, 1982;
- H. De Boer, ed., *Written Reporting (A practical guide to compiling reports, notes, memoranda, theses, dissertations, business correspondence and the like)* , Utrecht/Antwerp, 1961;
- G. Beville, *L'expression écrite, image de l' entreprise (Structure, style, présentation)* , Paris, 1979;
- U. Eco, *How do I write a thesis* , Amsterdam/Deurne, 1985 (a work by

the semiotician).

Definition.

The treatise is the reasoned development of a theme (*E. Fleerackers, De verhandeling* , Antw., 1944-5, 13). Father Fleerackers says that the whole spirit (intellect, feeling) is at work in it.

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Types of treatise are to, according to Fleerackers,

(i) The reflection, i.e. a treatise, in which the imagination (with its abductive power) predominates;

(ii) Musing, in which the emotions are strongly expressed, while (iii) reasoning centers on persuading to a decision.

The 1965-12 edition, for example, defines: "The treatise is the beautiful representation of reflection on reality." (Oc,7). If one considers the term 'beautiful' essential, then one is dealing with only one type (kind) of treatise, namely the belletristic ('literary') treatise.

The term 'reflection' stands for the didactic text type, which differs from epic (predominantly narrative), lyric (predominantly and decisively, even, an expression of emotion), and dramatics (theatrical performance).

Typology.

Besides those already mentioned, one can use O. Pecqueur, oc,

(1) distinguish informal (oc, 356/385: dissertations badines) treatises: self-love, sorrow and joy, for example, are then the themes; most school exercises in treatises give informal treatises, i.e. unpretentious, pre-scientific expositions.

(2) The scientific (oc,319/355), the ethical-political (oc,13/166), and the literary (oc, 167/318) treatises claim formal text formation, i.e., a manner of treating the theme that is as logically closed as possible.

A.-- Task hermeneutics.

Cfr WR 249v., -- *O. Willmann, Abriss* , 10, gives us the fundamental insight into the matter.

The Scholastics (800/1450) distinguished 'quaestiones simplices de uno vocabulo' (simple queries about exactly one term) and 'quaestiones coniunctae de propositione aliqua' (compound queries concerning one or the other statement). This distinction remains, to this day, very decisive.

A.1. -- One-term problems.

For example, 'Labor' and 'The proverb' are terms consisting of a single word. Anyone presented with such a task of treatise is immediately faced with the extremely broad range of possible interpretations and their justifications.

But, as Willmann says, in all those cases the first task (sub-requested) is the definition. WR 96; -- 104 (scope and content of the concept); 238 (Protagorean definition) already gave us, in a sketchy form, an insight into what defining actually is. WR 251 (Marmontel's warning) taught us its very great importance.

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Anaximenes of Miletos (-588/-524) taught us that determining essence is "saying what something 'is'". The Paleo-Pythagorean Archytas of Taras (= Archytas of Tarentum; -445/-395) left us examples:

"Calm is **(i)** the air mass **(ii)** at rest";

"The Silent Sea is **(i)** the wave motion **(ii)** that came to a standstill".

Socrates of Athens (-470/-399) systematically introduced the 'horismos' (definitio, 'demarcation' description). Platon of Athens (-427/-347) introduced the typology (diairesis, divisio, division).

Applicative models.

(1) Labour is effort insofar as it creates economic value. The proverb is a saying that succinctly summarizes situations that can be established time and again in a statement.

(2) Platonic typology (classification of concepts): there is physical and there is mental work (= two types); there are proverbs that state facts (Like father, like son) and there are those that express value judgments (Safety first: safety comes first) (= two types).

For antepredicative (predicate-less) monoterme themes, as Willmann rightly states, the definition is the primary viewpoint (first commonplace). The other viewpoints (applicative models (= examples), explanations, contextualizations, etc.) are secondary commonplaces. See further.

A.2. -- Polynomial problems.

E.g. 'Work and leisure', 'Work, liberty and play'. -- 'Proverbs as folk wisdom'. 'Proverb and life situations'-- all these assignments consist of more than one term. The hermeneutics of this second antepredicative type pays attention to the conjunctions 'as', 'and', 'if'.

For example, what is requested regarding 'Labor and leisure' is not two consecutive treatises, but the relationship between the two data. Similarly,

what is requested regarding 'Proverbs as folk wisdom' is not two treatises on each of the two terms, but the proverbs interpreted from the perspective of folk wisdom (viewpoint; WR 200: formal obj.).

B.1. -- One-sentence exercises.

A sentence contains a predicate. With this, we find ourselves in predicative exercises. For example: 'Labor, although effort, is nevertheless a source of health'. 'The proverb often contains figurative language'.

Here, what is requested is no more than a single treatise (on the subject and other parts of the sentence), but the subject insofar as it is raised (= indicated) in the predicate and the other parts of the sentence. Thus, for example, one defines labor, effort, and source of health, after which one indicates the relationship.

WR276

Note -- We hereby refer to WR 200v. (soil structure).

B.2. -- Multi-sentence exercises

The predicative theme can be **(i)** a complete sentence (= antecedent and consequent clause, 'protasis' and 'apodosis') or **(ii)** a multitude of sentences (a text). -- We refer to WR 11 (textual interpretation); 20 (comparative history); 164ff. (general, especially: tradition herm.).

Applicable model

G. Gezelle (1830/1899) is given as the theme. -- "O beautiful rose -- which, beyond all limits -- of loveliness and enchanting glances, laughs. -- Yet you are fragile -- and, will soon wither.-- Come, stand and remain in my thoughts. -- There you shall, free -- of duration and unspoiled, -- reflected in memory, henceforth, -- delight me, -- may -- your stem, already, dead and the wind plays, swirling, in your leaves, (April 1878?).

We refer to the foundation of all textual hermeneutics, WR 253/258 (the report). He who cannot summarize (summative induction) cannot characterize (WR 261/265).

Gezelle's poem can be characterized as follows:

(i) a contrast between the exceptional aesthetic splendor of a rose encountered by chance (WR 272) (with the impression of eternity emanating from it), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the impending death of the plant in question. Cf. WR 11(harmony of opposites);

(ii) Gezelle's reaction to that fading splendor: come, stand and remain in my thoughts' (where things, even the accidental ones, never fade, that is in human memory, part of the human mind (WR 137ff.: expanded

consciousness) 153ff. (noological aspect))). Only after one has carried this summarizing characteristic through as the first commonplace (= basic viewpoint), can one handle the full demand (which encompasses the rest of the viewpoints).

Stylistic remark.

Stylistics is design, with a rhetorical purpose (WR 5: 'lexis').

O. Willmann, *Abriss*, 106f., points out that treatise themes can contain figures of speech.

1 For example, the oxymoron: 'Mysticism contains an aspect that can be characterized by the terms 'asofos sofia', insaniens sapientia, unwise wisdom.

2. Also, for example, the paradox: 'Shared joy is doubled joy' or 'Once is not enough'. Upon analysis, it quickly becomes apparent that these two figures of speech, the oxymoron and the paradox, are very sensible expressions. Try to 'translate' them yourself into a type of text not laden with figures of speech.

WR277

Logical remark.

Predicative themes are subject to (what Scholasticism called) the logical or range square, which is the old name for order structure (= distributive st.).

Bibl. sample: G. Booij *et al.*, *Lexicon of Linguistics*, Utr./Antw., 1980 - 2,38 (scope).

1. Applicable model

'Like father, like son' (/ / The apple doesn't fall far from the tree). The whole question is not whether that phrase is true, but rather whether it is always true. For example, there is a French proverb that says "A père avare, fils prodigue": the stinginess of parents often provokes extravagance in the children. In other words: one proverb corrects it differently, because both only express a partial truth.

2. Logically translated:

(i) the quantifiers (quant(ifikation)oren) derive from the logical square: all/ some yes/ some no/ none (= all no);

(ii) Recently, one speaks of universal quantifier (all), of 'existential (better: singular) quantifier (just one), of particular quantifier (some), the most frequent in human affairs.

The latter is applicable here: 'For some father/son relationships (parents/children), the son adopts the father's behavioral style' (understood

as 'not for others (some)'). Cf. WR 55: 57: 140 (all possible); 189. The logical scope (the realities to which the sentence refers) or the range is of decisive importance for an accurate treatise (WR 249: akribeia). The correct range in the assignment is very important.

B.-- trading commonplaces

'Commonplace' is a recurring point of view (perspective, angle of interpretation).

M. Roustan, La dissertation littéraire, Paris, sd, one of the rare works on treatises that attaches decisive importance to the hermeneutics of the assignment (oc, 5/42; notes, regarding the problem (of what is requested), that a treatise can mean

(i) defeat (report),
(ii) declare (indicate the necessary and fully sufficient conditions),
(iii) defend and/or refute. But Roustan does not go into this much further. There is more than what he says. One who devotes much more care to this is *SP Moss, Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California, USA), 1966. We proceed from that work.

The subject matter (and thus the expository structure) could be approached from the ontological duality of 'actual mode of being' (Scholastic 'existence' actual existence, and 'essentia' (essence)).

WR278

Moss, oc 27/38, discusses 'what topics'. The examples make it clear that with the interrogative pronoun 'which? / what (for)?', everything and nothing is specified.

(i) What fact was established in Geneva in 1553 that shocked public opinion? In 1553, Jean Calvin (1509/1564) had Michel Servetus (1511/1553), a Spanish physician and theologian, condemned to the stake. The factual is the scope of the interrogative relative.

(ii) What proof did Calvin provide for the fact that he had the right, in the name of 'God', to have M. Servet burned? (The essence of the proof is asked).

What is the distinction between the stake ordered by Calvin and the pyres to which witches were subjected for centuries? (the comparison is the point of view)

To what did Calvin attribute the perseverance of the 'saints' (the elect)? (the explanation (cause) is requested). -- In other words: Moss considers the 'what' topic as a separate question. This topic (commonplace) can be traced

back to many others. The accompanying noun determines its nature.

B I. - *Commonplaces of factuality*

Moss, oc, 97/105 (fact statements) discusses what is known in scientific circles as protocol statements. He also understands quantitative, statistical findings by this. This definite or 'positive' aspect of the given encompasses the accurate representation of a fact observable by the senses. E.g., a chemical process (take the Chernobyl nuclear cloud in Ukraine, late April 1986) or a historical fact (take the rise of pop music). The representation—according to Moss (and all others)—must be **(i)** true to reality ('objective') and **(ii)** accurate.

It is clear that, with this, we arrive at the description (WR 259/266), especially regarding its unambiguousness (WR. 260).

Conclusion: What is required of a treatise can simply be a description. But the reasoned form thereof, of course. -- Describing a diachronic event is narrating (WR 267/272). Narrating in a treatise is formal narrating (WR 274; not 'informal'), -- reasoned.

The definite aspect also comes through in the where and/or when question. Situating can be the main subject of the inquiry (WR 254; 270 (ekthesis)). E.g. 'Where exactly/when exactly is M. Servet killed at the stake?' -- The emphasis is on situating, but immediately, the factual nature is thematized. These go hand in hand.

WR279

Certainty is also discussed in what Moss, oc,144/148 (example statement), deals with: exemplification (providing an example).

One clarifies an idea (concept) or definition (WR 274) by means of an applicative model (= example). This is illustrative exemplification: one 'illustrates' what one asserts (i.e., if the illustration seems familiar to the reader/listener).

One constructs a general assertion by means of established facts that all point to the same model. That is inductive exemplification.

Well-known example: the pragmatic historiography of Polubios of the megalopolis (-200/-125) 'pragmatic', in his usage, means 'what the 'praxeis' represents the facts (especially, in his case, of a political nature)'. (Note the difference with WR 209; 236, where usability is meant).

The emphasis on factuality (did something happen?) is also found.

(i) among the Romantics, at least the German ones (one need only think

of the 'positive philosophy' of FW Schelling (1775/1854), and
(ii) among the French positivists (e.g. A. Comte (1798/1857)).

B.II. Commonplaces of Essence.

It should be noted that one cannot represent the definite or factual side without a minimum essential insight into what is factual. Definiteness and essence are complementary.

First type of description of essence.

(1) Moss, oc, 137/143 (definition statements) discusses the essence determination (WR 274v.; 261: characteristic).

For example, there is R. Kuehnl, *Faschismus* (*Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung*), in: *Blätter für deutsche und international Politik* , xiii (1968): the treatise is a definition of concepts, but formal (reasoned).

(2) Moss, oc, 39/46 (how topics), raises the question 'how?'. This can be regarded as a description of essence, of a more precise nature: 'How did Louis Pasteur (1822/1895), the founder of microbiology, discover the principle of vaccination? -- This concerns an event (WR 251; 276ff. (story). Not infrequently, the 'how?' refers to a process. The treatise is then a reasoned description of the course of events.

Second type of description of essence.

(1) Application of the distributive structure. -- Moss, oc, 57/70 (*contrast topics*), 71/81 (*comparison topics*) and 82/92 (*compare and contrast topics*), introduces the distributive comparison: by comparing one discovers (i) similarities and (ii) differences (contrasts). One learns to see them both together.

WR280

The basis for this is, of course, analogy (WR 200). Specifically, proportional or metaphorical analogy.

(2) Application of the collective structure.

Moss, oc, 7/26 (why topics), discusses the explanation: 'why/ how is Karl Marx open to criticism?' The question asked is the connection, the coherence, between the openness to criticism and the necessary (separate) and, possibly, sufficient (collective) reasons for it. That is purely logical.

Or, realistically: see WR 254ff.: the cause of the hospitable behavior: the connection (cohesion) between hospitable behavior and the reason for it. -- The basis here is analogy, but now the attributive or metonymic: between, for example, the hospitality shown and the high value revealed in the guest, there exists a partial identity: the one is caused (motivated) by the other. The

connection (e.g., causal connection) is discovered by comparing both terms (from the perspective of relational cohesion); collective comparison.

Applicative model.

Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375), the second greatest Protosophist, is known for his * *Enkomion Helenès**, *Praise of Helen*. Helen, in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (WR 33), is the wife of Menelaus (WR 260), but she is abducted by Paris (= Alexandros), the son of Priam, prince of Troy (WR 33), where she is his lawful wife.

Gorgias, who wishes to prove that anything can be justified, proceeds from the necessary (and sufficient) reasons for this. He introduces a polylemma (plural of lemmas): either Troy's fate was already programmed by fate and the deities, and, then, the blame lies with those powers of fate; or Helen was violently abducted, and, then, she is Paris' victim (who bears the blame); or she was seduced by Paris' words (WR 21/29; frl. 25), and, then, "Athenians, realize that nothing in this world works as powerfully as the word ('the blame lies, once again, with Paris').

Conclusion: Helen is innocent regarding the war conflict between the Greeks (Achaeans) and the Trojans.

The entire treatise relates to the connection between the cause of Helena's behavior and her (in)nocence—her degree of responsibility. The Factors that determined her behavior excuse her (immediately a beautiful example of ancient analysis of fate (WR 153)).—Cf. WR 273 (enkomion).

WR281

Applicative Model . -- ***Library st.***: *P. van Schilfgaarde, Aristotle* , The Hague, 1965, 10/12 (*The Mysteries of Samothrace*).

On the island of Samothrace, mysteries existed since time immemorial (WR 146), of which the Kabeiroi, Cabiri, the Kabi(e)ren, were the deities. They were referred to as two (or three) male (Axiokersos and his son Kadmilos et al.) and two (or three) female (Axiokersa on Axiëros et al.).

Philip II (-382/-336), King of Macedonia, and his wife, Olympias (-375/-316), the parents of Alexander the Great (WR 35), were initiates. "On the boundary stones built like an altar (in -325), on the banks of the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indus, which formed the eastern border of the empire, Alexander had, among other things, chiseled: 'To Heracles and the Samothracian Caeiroi!' (Oc, 11). The Mysteries of Samothrace gained very large following in the Hellenistic-Roman period (WR 35): for example, the Egyptian Ptolemies and the Romans favored these mysteries.

Now, pay attention to van Schilfgaarde's reasoning:

(1) traditionally the Kabyles were the cause(WR 9) of

a. fertility, b1. maritime traffic and b2. asylum law.

(2) Alexander and his teacher Aristotle - according to van Schilfgaarde -

a. each create, in his own domain, a new world (fertility),

b1. with new forms of traffic, on an international scale, -- economic, political, scientific (traffic).

b2 . That new world offers ample asylum (refuge) for countless ethical, religious, and philosophical currents, in which ancient wisdom continuously fertilizes new forms (ad a). Cf. oc, 11/12.

One sees how an entire culture, the Hellenistic-Roman one, is characterized (WR 263: Middle Ages) on the basis of (distributive) comparison: the analogy between the Kabyle religion, on the one hand, and, on the other, the world as the makers, Alexander and Aristotle, created it, is, here, the commonplace (viewpoint). The distributive comparison!

B.III.-- Commonplace of ambiguity.

The ambiguity (WR 180; 227) is discussed by Moss, oc, 47/56 (combining: double thesis organization; triple thesis sentence organization) as a task of discourse. One can, indeed, illuminate the light sides (the pro or the pro) alone or the shadow sides (the contra or against) alone. One can also analyze both sequentially (twofold view). One can analyze both sequentially and adopt a higher standpoint from which one 'reconciles' them (dialectics).

WR282

The applicable model is located in WR 257v.: advantages and disadvantages of the TV. At least regarding the dual model, without a 'reconciliation' of the two viewpoints.

What Moss does not seem to see is that ambiguity does not necessarily have to take the form of light and shadow (advantage and disadvantage). He sees only the axiological (value-theory) ambiguity. -- There is, however, also general or positional ambiguity. An example of this can be found in WR 200 (Calypso, mythological, ethical, erotic, etc. interpreted). See also, in connection with this, WR 210.

A. The dialogue.

Library st: C. Ansotter *Traité prat.*, 101/103 (*Du dialogue*). The following definition may apply: dialogue is the fact that at least one subject ('theme') is interpreted by at least two conversational partners, in the form of a conversation ('interview'), in such a way that the viewpoints ('opinions, positions') regarding the subject are given their due.

Existentialist thinkers—such as Gabriel Marcel (1889/1973) or Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980)—have used the stage to present 'positions' in the form of (what Peirce would call) interpreters, 'interpretants', in a dramatized form (WR 224).—The dialogues of Plato of Athens (-427/-347) are immortal examples of encounters with interpretants (WR 272). They are treatises in dramatized form.

Applicable model

That theater reasoning, the reasoned development of a theme (WR 273: definition of narrative), can be, is proven by the following excerpt from *Antigone* (-441) by Sophocles of Colonus (-496/-406).

1. 'Ekthesis' (introductory commentary; WR 270).

Antigone, Oedipus' daughter, defied the prohibition of Creon, the ruler of Thebes, provided her brother Poluneikes with a funeral liturgy (in order to thereby dedicate him to the deities of the underworld (Hades; WR 66: Themisrecht)).

2. Dialogue.

Creon: "You there, with your eyes turned toward the earth, do you confess or deny having committed the crime of which You accuse You?"

Antigone: "Yes, I did it. I admit it. I deny absolutely nothing."

Creon: "Answer me, without beating around the bush and in brief words: did you know of the prohibition that I had issued?"

Antigone: "I was aware of it. How could I not have known, since your prohibition was public."

WR283

Creon: "Nevertheless, have you defied the law?"

Antigone: "Indeed! After all, it was not Zeus who issued this prohibition. Nor Dike (WR 64; 66), the goddess who belongs to the underworld deities—deities who imposed the right of the dead on mankind."

Your 'commandments' are, for me, not powerful enough to cause a mortal to violate the unwritten, indelible laws of the deities—not of today,—nor of yesterday,—no: those laws apply always! No one knows, therefore, since when they have been in force.

Consequently: I did not want—out of mere fear of a man's opinion—to incur punishment from the deities."

Decision.

(1) First the factual nature (WR. 278) is discussed (the fact of the liturgy

for the dead; the fact of knowledge of the law).

(2) Then the reasoning (the contrast between purely human - earthly 'laws' and purely divine (though chthonic) laws dominates the reasoning; cf. with 280 (the necessary and sufficient reasons)), two positions (types of interpretation) dominate the dialogue.

Note -- The dialectical method of Protosophistics (WR 227), -- indeed, even more so: the eristic method of Zenon of Elea (WR 215; --9); -- the scholastic method of 'het sic (yes) et non (no), which is merely the elevation to a higher plane (WR 76), of both preceding methods - it dates from Peter Abelard (1079/1142) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274); -- the 'dialectical' 'method' of GfW Hegel (1770/1831) and K. Marx (1818/1883; see First Year course: Logic), -- all these methods are merely variants of the commonplace of ambiguity.

Note-- The methodological treatise.

Take a book like Ch. Bühler, M. Klein, **Inleiding tot de humanistische psychologie**, Bilthoven, after 1972, which discusses three methodological approaches to the psyche (the behaviorist, the depth psychological, and the 'humanistic-existential'): it stands or falls with the idea of ambiguity.

Or take L. Rademaker/ H. Bergman, ed., **Sociologische stromingen**, *Spectrum/ Intermediair*, 1977*: you encounter positivist, functional-analytical, conflictuological, phenomenological, symbolic-interactionist, ethnomethodological systems-theory-based, exchange-theoretical, Marxist, and 'Critical-Rationalist' methods. Once again: a commonplace of ambiguity!

WR284

B. The 'chreia' (chrie).

Library st.:

- HI Marrou, *Hist.d.l' ed. ant.*, 241;
- O. Pecqueur, *Man: prat.*, 12 (*La Chrie*);
- O. Willmann, *Abriss*, 9 (*Chrie*).

The 'chreia' (literally: usable schema) concerns an anecdote (WR 272), attributed to a famous character. This anecdote can be a deed or a saying. Or both. The text length, in ancient secondary education, amounted to 'a small page'. The structure of that text to be developed was eight-part. The paragraphs were called 'kefalaia', capita, di main viewpoints or 'commonplaces'. These were, apparently, points of ambiguity.

According to the text of RI Marrou, oc, 241, the elaboration took place as follows.

Given. -- “Isocrates of Athens (-436/-338; WR 246) once said: 'The roots of upbringing come across as bitter, but its fruits have a pleasant taste'.”

Requested . -- Text formation according to the eight-part chreia.

Elaboration .

IA Characteristic of Isocrates (WR 261: structure),--this, as 'enkomion' (1 speech; WR 264v.: elaborated model).

1.B. Characteristic of the predicate (WR 276).

1.B.1. Paraphrase (WR 253) of the aphorism (= short, contextless statement). This, in three lines.

IB2.a. Kataskeuè (justification; argument; WR 251) of the paraphrase (which, apparently, represents the opinion or position of the leadership).

IB2.b. Anaskeuè (refutation; WR 251), as a contrast (WR 279), to the counter-model (WR 197), i.e. the opinion that contradicts Isocrates' saying.

IB3.a. Sunkrisis (comparison „-- better: illustrative comparison; WR 251).

IB3.b. Anecdote (WR 272), ie an illustrative example (WR 279)

Marrou mentions here Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322), who—according to an anecdote—fought with a weak voice and an equally weak delivery; in order to become a great orator nonetheless, he learned to speak with stones in his mouth and against the surging sea, on the coast. He became the most famous Greek orator.

Note -- Note the analogy (WR 2821: bitter, roots -- Demosthenic practice; pleasant fruits -- famous eloquence.

II. Arguments from authority, derived from the 'ancients' (e.g. Hesiod of Askra (WR 34; 39)). Here the speaker relies on what others besides he or she said or did regarding the matter.

Note-- The gnome (sententia, saying, proverb; WR 251) has the same structure as the chreia, but without the character (See WR 275: proverb).

WR285

The version of Aphthonios of Antiocheia (+ 270/ ...).

This late antique rhetorician proceeds as follows.

A. *Introduction.*

Praise for the anecdote (deed/saying).

B. *Middle.*

B.1. Paraphrase (characterization of the anecdote).

B.2.a. Cause, explanation (WR 254; 264; 280 (a cause) - which corresponds to the justification of the opinion advocated.

B.2.b. Contrary (a contrario), the refutation of the counter-model.

B.2.c. Similarity (a simili) - apparently illustrating comparatively.

B.2.d. Example (ab exemplo), - the applicative model.

B.2.e. Testimony (= argument from authority: a testimonial).

C. *Slot* .

“Behold the sound idea of Isocrates of Athens intake education” is an example of this (a brevi epilogos).

A mnemonic version reads as follows :

A. *Introduction* . -- Quis? (= quis egit / dixit? who acted / spoke thus?).

B. *middle* .

B.1. Quid? (= what? What did he/she do/say? -- paraphrase).

B.2.a. Cur? (cur res ita se habet? How/ Why is it so?;-- explanation).

B.2.b. Contra (= counter-model).

B.2.c. Simile (= similarity; WR 260v.; 263).

B.2.d. Paradigms (= examples).

B.2.e. Testes (= witnesses; i.e. 'dicta et scripta', spoken and/or written arguments from authority) .

C. Closing -- Adhortatio (= incentive)

Marmontel (WR 251) states that the chreia was the interpretation of a statement or a remarkable fact. Note the 'interpretation'. Since a section of the Romantics misinterpreted the chreia as 'bondage' (i.e., of 'wild' freedom), many believe that the chreia should be dismissed. And yet! One need look closely: the eight 'kefalaia', viewpoints, are types of interpretation. Behind this schema lies the ambiguity of a fact or a saying.

1. This is evident, first of all, from the counter-model, i.e., the opposing interpretation, which is invariably provided for in the treatise schema (WR 283: eristic, 'dialectical-Protosophist'. Scholastic, Hegelian-Marxist schema (method)). For and against, light side and shadow side, more than one partisanship—they are expressly provided for in the Chreia.

2 This is evident, secondly, from the purely methodological ambiguity (WR. 283: methodical approach), which is also explicitly provided for in the schema:

(i) the argument from authority (through which one learns to listen to others besides oneself);

(ii) the characterization, illustrated by **a.** the explanation, **b.** the similarity, **c.** the paradigm (example) and the other viewpoints, prove this perfectly clearly.

WR286

2.2. Rhetoric, eloquence (286/304)

Introduction . -- The first to write a 'rhetoric' appears to have been the early Protosophist *Anaximenes of Lampsakos* (-380/-320), with his *Peri rhètorikès* , -- something before Aristotle's rhetoric (which is situated around -362/-361).

Bibl. sample: besides the works cited in WR 1, the following may also be mentioned:

- Umberto Eco, *La structure absente (Introduction à la sémiotique)*, Paris, 1972, 19 (*Rhétorique*); 154/166 (*Le message persuasif: la rhétorique*);
- O. Reboul, *La rhétorique* , Paris, 1984;
- H. Elentsen, *Moderne Rhetorik (Rede und Gespräch in der Wirtschaft und im öffentlichen Leben)*, Heidelberg, 1963-2;
- H. Lausberg, *Elements der literarischen Rhetorik* , Munich, 1967-3;
- G. Klaus, *Die Macht des Wortes (Ein erkenntnistheoretisch-pragmatisches Traktat)*, Berlin, 1969-4;
- Kopperschmidt, *Allgemeine Rhetorik (Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation)*, Stuttgart, 1973.

The general schema (commonplaces) of traditional rhetoric was given in WR 5/6, -- as the lemma, the working hypothesis, of this course. We will now elaborate on this schema somewhat further.

BI -- Textual rhetoric

We have just learned, in pre-rhetoric, what it means to form a text. All the text types—report, description, narrative, treatise—recur in the influencing text type, which is speech (or discourse). Rhetorically, text theory looked as follows.

BIA . The theory of invention (heuristics).

The rhetoric of invention traditionally comprises five rubrics.

Bia1. The theory of proof.

Isocrates of Athens (WR 246) assigned the task of the persuasive text type.

(i) “to speak in such a way as to provide (logically strict) proof” or, failing that,

(ii) “to speak in such a way as to make one’s argument credible”.

In other words: all those who, today, restrict rhetoric to the second type, namely the conveying of a proposition (opinion, thesis; WR 273) by all kinds of 'persuasive' means, mutilate full, genuine rhetoric. This not only contradicts the great rhetorician Isocrates. It also contradicts actual persuasive speaking: no argument will neglect rigorous logical proof. Cf. WR 213/215 (specialist academics also proceed 'rhetorically'),

WR287

Three types of reasoning.

Aristotle (and, with him, Eco, for example) distinguishes

(1) *The apodictic reasoning*

Characteristic of expert, or philosophical, usage of language.

a. the preconditions are

a1. the first (onto)logical principles (WR 197/199): **(i)** what is (so), is (so); **(ii)** what is not (so), is not (so); **(iii)** something cannot at the same time be (so) and not be (so);

a.2. the preconditions (premises) that are absolutely certain, proven, or provable. Cf. Aristotle's logic.

b. the derivations (= concluding clauses), which always have the basic form of the syllogism, in one form or another thereof, yield, as a result of reasoning, apodictic (absolutely certain, indisputable) conclusions.

According to Aristotle, the community of experts ('philosophers'; 'specialists') is the social group in which such certainties are in circulation. Thus, they come to mutual understanding and influence one another. Which is a first type of rhetoric (WR 213/215 as proof),

(2) *The dialectical reasoning*

(discussed in Aristotle's topics).

a. the prepositions are **a.1** . the first principles; **a.2** . the preconditions are probable, 'plausible', 'reasonable' preconditions, such as established opinions (e.g. 'It is a duty to defend one's fatherland').

b. The derivations, by deductive reasoning, in various forms, are, possibly, mutually contradictory or opposed. One attempts to 'demonstrate' the most 'plausible' conclusion by reasoning—as Isocrates said: “to make it credible”.

The community of experts works with such 'hypothetical' premises and thus arrives at a second type of mutual understanding and mutual influence ('rhetoric').

(3) *The rhetorical reasoning*

(discussed in Aristotle's Rhetoric).

a. the prepositions are **a.1.** the first principles; **a.2.** the premises are, just as in dialectical reasoning, 'plausible', 'credible' prepositions (e.g. 'The value of the animal kingdom, for man, is indisputable').

b. the derivations, via syllogism (such as the enthymeme or implicit syllogism), yield 'credible' conclusions. (such as 'Animal protection is a meaningful thing').

WR288

The process of understanding, with its mutual influence, here exhibits, besides strictly logical (apodictic and 'dialectical') reasoning, also non-strictly

logical reasoning—such as the appeal to the value-feeling side in man (WR 24: axiology), like, for example, the influence of authority, the influence of 'charisma' (a strongly radiating personality), desire (WR 28ff.), etc.

1. According to Aristotle, this is typical of common sense (as displayed by the 'ordinary' people).

2. But Protosophistics (WR 230ff) developed this in a technically refined ('sophisticated') way. Cf. *L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, 12/17 (*Les premiers professionnels de la persuasion: les Sophistes*). This emerged from Sicilian democracy (WR 231).

This gives, then, **(i)** the narrower concept of 'rhetoric' (which Aristotle employs) and **(ii)** the pejorative idea of 'rhetoric' (WR 246: Isocrates; Plato), up to the present day (WR 247: marketing).

Update

"Nowadays we tend to attribute the characteristic 'apodictic' only to some logical systems that can be derived from indisputably presupposed axioms" (U. Eco, oc, 155).

We cannot endorse this skeptical (WR 182) assertion by Eco. That only some (WR 277) semiotic systems (e.g. logistics and axiomatized mathematics) offer absolute certainties is simply untrue. Would, for example, Umberto Eco, at the University of Bologna, where he teaches semiotics, doubt that a nuclear disaster occurred at Chernobyl, in the Soviet Union, on the night of April 25 to 26, 1986? And yet he arrives at that absolute certainty by means other than the sign-theoretical (logistic-mathematical) method!

As early as *Cl. Buffier, SJ*, a precursor of commonsensism (the Scottish Philosophy of Common Reason), in his *Traité des vérités premières* (1717), pointed out that the pre-expert reason possesses fundamental certainties.

A. Farges, La crise de la certitude (*Etude des bases de la connaissance et de la croyance*), Paris, 1907, 22/27, gives the Scholastic position on the matter

(a) there are certain facts (WR 278 (definite certainty), certain presuppositions (WR 201: absolute nature); 198), certain derivations (WR 216;198v.)

(b) there are certain testimonies (WR 284ff.: argument from authority). -- Every critique that is not skeptical accepts this.

Bla2. The closing argument (syllogistics),

We refer to the logic (First Year Course).

F. van Eemeren/ R. Grootendorst/ T. Kruiger, Argumentatietheorie , Utr./Antw., 1981-2, 9/16 (What is argumentation ?), states that 'argumentation' is the defense of positions" (WR 281ff.: ambiguous). - The deductive reasoning serves as the prototype of this 'argumentative language use'.

This is an argumentative text, which can be presented as a reasoning with **(1)** two premises (prefaces; prep1, prep2) i.e. the 'arguments' and **(2)** one conclusion (conclusion; nz), i.e. one 'opinion', (oc, 27).-- That is Aristotelian heritage, of course, in a new guise.

Theorists distinguish two arrangements:

(1) the forward-pointing one, which **a. develops** the preceding clauses (arguments, premises) and **b.**, only then, the subsequent clause (= thesis, opinion), and

(2) the backward-referring one, which **a. elaborates on** the subsequent clause (= conclusion, proposition, opinion) and **b.**, only then, the preceding clauses ('proofs') (oc,32).

The three-part scheme of CSS Peirce (1839/1914).

Bible st.: K .-O. Appl, Einl., Charles Sanders Peirce, Schriften , I (Zur Entstehung des Pragmatismus), Frankf. a .M., 1967, 373/394 (Deduktion, Induktion und Hypothese).

Given . -- I enter a room and see a series of bags standing there, containing beans. On a table lies a handful of beans. They are, upon analysis, 3/4 white.
--

Requested -- The syllogistic reasoning of that finding, if one knows that exactly one bag has been opened.

I.-- Abduction (= hypothesis; regressive reduction).

Intuitively, I deduce (decide) that the handle comes from that one specific pocket.

-- Rg. (= Rule, regulatory model).-- All (WR 277) beans in this bag are 3/4 white.

-- Rs. (= Result, conclusion).-- (Well then) these (WR 277) beans, here and now, are 3/4 white.

-- Tp. (=Application, application model).-- (So) these (WR 277) beans, here and now, come from that (one opened) bag.

Note-- Comparative methods

II.-- Deduction (= progressive reduction).

I assume that all beans in the bag in question are $\frac{3}{4}$ white.
 -- Rg.-- regulatory model. -- All beans in this bag are $\frac{3}{4}$ white.
 -- Tp.-- application model. -- Well, these beans, here and now, come from this bag.
 -- Rs.-- result (= decision). -- So these beans are $\frac{3}{4}$ white.

WR290

Note: The abductive, 'guessing', 'suggesting' syllogism is not certain: the on the The handle lying on the table could have been brought there by someone who brought it from outside the space of the pockets (WR 107: speculative possibilities). In other words, it is not apodictic proof.

Note --Normally the deductive syllogism is apodictic here, namely, is the part (particular set: the handle) as the whole (universal set: the empty bag).-- Naturally, since this involves statistical reasoning, it is only the limit (boundary value) of the handles from the entire bag that provides apodictic certainty.

III.-- Induction (= *peirastic, testing, experimental reduction*).

The central idea of a possible experiment lies in the deduction just elaborated: if I randomly (randomization; 'at random' = random) and repeatedly draw a handle from the same bag, I obtain the experimental (experimental) testing (verification / falsification) of the assumption. This is the sampling method.

Tp (= application models). -- These beans come from this (one opened) bag (= random, repeatable sample).

Rs (= conclusion of deduction). -- Well, these beans are $\frac{3}{4}$ white.

Rg (= regulative model). -- So all beans from this bag are $\frac{3}{4}$ white.

Note: There are two types of induction (sample reasoning).

The amplificative, 'extrapolating', expandable induction lasts until all samples have been repeated. The certainty is provisional and not apodictic. Reason: there is a dichotomy (complementation). There are the beans that have already been examined (analyzed). But there is the rest, the beans that have not yet been examined; it is therefore always (speculatively) possible that these do not conform to the provisionally established sampling model.

The summative, exhaustive, definitive (also known as 'Aristotelian') induction is a fact when the final sample has been taken. If all beans have been tested for the percentage of 'white', then there is apodictic certainty.

Cf. WR 263: essence sketch; -- 253/258: report (to induce is to defeat (from some to all; from all individually to all collectively)) -276 (characterization). -- Summative induction is the limit of amplificative induction.

Typology of syllogisms.

The enthymema.

'Enthymèma' is what one has in one's mind; -- that which is implicit, unexpressed.

Appl. model: "I am human. Therefore fallible (WR 180)". Explicit: "All People are fallible. Well, I am a human. Therefore, I am fallible."

WR291

"Is fecit, cui prodest"

He/she has performed the deed that benefits from performing it. Seneca of Cordoba (+1/+65), Nero's wisdom teacher, wrote a Medea in which that abduction occurs.

It is a declaration of guilt that is very often made by the judicial police (think of police films, in which Maigret et al.). It is the antithematic form of the following syllogism:

The one who profits from the crime is guilty of it.
(Well then, you brought advantage to that who did wrong).

So you are guilty of it.

It is, of course, not an apodictic reasoning. -- "Cogito; ergo sum" (I experience a conscious activity, 'think'; therefore I exist). This famous reasoning by the founder of modern philosophy, René Descartes (1596/1650), is an enthymeme:

(All beings that are conscious ('think') must first exist)
Well then, I, Descartes, am conscious ('think').

So I exist.

Note-- Aristotle calls 'enthymeme' not only the syllogism, of which a part is concealed, but also that syllogism, which rests on credible presuppositions (WR 287), -- thus not - is apodictic.

The epiceirema.

This is a closing argument, in which every prefix is immediately followed by its verification.

Thus MT Cicero 's reasoning in his *Pro Milone* :

All those who attack unlawfully may, in conscience, be killed (lawful self-defense). -- This is derived from both natural law and positive (man-made) law (WR 282v.).

Well, Clodius was the unlawful attacker of Milo. -- This is concluded from **i.** his previous life (antecedents), **ii.** the escort (armed companions) that accompanied him.

Thus Milo was permitted to kill Clodius, in legitimate self-defense and in conscience.

Bla3. The theory of sophisms, or the theory of paralogisms

A paralogism is an unintentionally executed invalid argument; a sophism is a deliberate fallacy. -- Aristotle, in his *Sophistic Refutations*, treats the spurious refutations that the Protosophists were so fond of committing as invalid or spurious arguments.

Applicative model. -- 'Cum hoc; ergo propter hoc': continuation follows sign together; thus the omen is the cause of the continuation (WR 268/270).

In homosexual circles, one encounters AIDS with striking effect. Therefore, homosexuality is the cause of AIDS. -- Which is certainly not an apodictic argument.

WR292

Note-- The distinction between jointly sufficient and separately Necessary conditions ('omens') are not established here: homosexuality is necessary, but not sufficient for the causation.

Applicative model.-- Ideological language use.

An ideology, such as liberalism or communism, consists of **1.** apodictic, **2.** 'dialectical' (and thus open to contradiction and dispute), extra-rational (what Aristotle calls 'rhetorical'), and also, **3.** paralogical or even sophismatic statements, while the totality thereof is presented as a rationally justified worldview and philosophy of life.

Listen to the following reasoning.

Defending the 'free' world is a duty. Well, that 'free' world is threatened by Libya. Therefore, a counter-action is a duty.

Fraternal aid to 'socialist' countries ('allies') is a duty. Well, our 'socialist' ally, Afghanistan, is threatened. Therefore, fraternal aid to Afghanistan is a duty.

Rhetoric is hereby transformed into a critique of ideology: it examines the fallacious arguments of the ideologists.

Library st.:

S. Breton, Théorie des idéologies , Paris, 1976;

M. Amiot et al., Les idéologies dans le monde actuel , Paris, 1971;

L. J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination , Chicago, 1972;

KO Apel et al., Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik , Frankf.aM 1971,

BI a.4. *The doctrine of topics or commonplaces* .

“The ancients attached great importance to this heuristic aspect. (...). They had a whole arsenal at their disposal”:

1 . *The definition* (WR 279; -- 274v.; with the genus (= universal collection) and the kind (= type; particular collection: WR 275 (typology)) and the enumeration (WR 255: struct-tuurbeschrijving; the 'enumeration' is the listing of the integrating components of a whole (collective structure);

The similarity and the contrast (WR 279ff.).

The circumstances (WR 254.1v.; 284v.: chreia);

The omen and the continuation (WR 268/270; -- 254.2 (cause); 264; 280 (why topics)). -- Thus A. Langlois, *Le style* , 57.

One can also deviate from this scheme, at least seemingly. Here is how S. Freud, *das Unbehagen in der Kultur* , Wien, 1929, performs an enumeration, He develops the idea of the 'pleasure principle'.

In this context, he lists the sources (causes, 'omens') as well as the types of suffering: 'Suffering threatens us from three sides: in our own body, which, doomed to decay and disintegration, cannot cope without the alarm signals, which are pain and fear; from the outside world, which possesses invincible and inexorable forces to cast itself upon us and destroy us; the third threat, finally, comes from our relations with other human beings: the suffering that springs from this perhaps comes across as even more painful than all other forms of suffering (...)!

This tripartite structure 'body/ fellow man/ outside world' evidently aims to provide a kind of overview of the major dimensions of suffering. -Compare with e.g. 263 above: characterization of the landscape (nature: culture as major dimensions). Or cf. WR 103: beginning/ middle/ end as integrating components of a totality.

BI a. 5 . *The theory of drives (pathics).*

Thrasymachos of Chalkèdon (-450/ -380) (WR 64), Protosophist and rhetorician, taught how to manipulate the emotions (of, for example, judges) (through shaping (= stylization) and 'action' (= performance). Since then, the theory of drives (the theory of passions) and a theory of emotions have remained a lasting aspect of rhetoric (WR 288: value-feeling aspect).

Bibl. st.: Besides the strictly rhetorical theory of the mind (WR 20ff.), reference is made, for example, to Unpleasant

Th. Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments , Paris, 1917-10 (which still remains educational);

H. Albrecht, Ueber das Gemüt , Stuttgart, 1961;

S. Strasser, Das Gemüt (Grundgedanken zu einer Phänomenologischen Philosophie und Theorie des menschlichen Gefühlslebens), Utr./Antw./Freiburg, 1956;

Furthermore: *J. Broeckaert, Le guide* , I, 258/282 (*Sentiment*);

C. Lefevre La comp. litt., 80/83 (*Les passions*).

J. Broeckaert, 260, describes, lists: "Admiration piles up gleaming exaggerations, flattering comparisons. Biting irony, bitter reproach, ruthless threats are favorite expressions of hatred and vengefulness. Envy, which wishes to avenge its disappointment but is ashamed to do so openly, conceals

its dislike with praise. Pride is defiant; fear begs for mercy. Gratitude honors. A wavering gait, broken speech, straying from the train of thought, despondency shimmering through in speech, mark sorrow. Zest for life skips, bubbles, bursts forth, concerns itself neither with obstacles nor with the future, cares neither with rules of the game nor with timekeeping, indulges in humor, avoids profound matters, appeals to the emotions.”

94

WR294

Less conspicuous and yet touching the soul, less unexpected and yet more expressive is quiet, hearty joy. Somber and anxious melancholy revels in experiencing ominous thoughts, mournful memories, dark premonitions. Firm hope reveals itself genuinely in steadfast expectations, in wishes that flare up again and again: it looks up to the heavens with full confidence. Despair—which, incidentally, cannot be justified by anything—shrouds itself in sinister silence, interrupted only to hurl its curses against nature: in its frenzy it perishes with regret, it calls upon nothingness (Cérutti).

After this enumeration, typical of rhetoricians, it comes as no surprise to us that pathetic effects are the dwindle of rhetoric. “Since persuasive language aims to strike the heart, the persuader, when preparing the text, seeks in the audience which chord, preferably, ought to be struck: admiration or indignation, enthusiasm or hatred, disdain or laughter, fear or hope” (A. Langlois, *Le style* , 57).

Axiological commonplaces.

According to Aristotle, persuasive language belongs
based on general 'topoi', loci, topics (commonplaces)

finding ideas and the articulation thereof.

Suppose: a politician wants to push through a measure in the ekklesia (WR 65: agora). To this end, he must advocate what is 'good' (the 'good' measure). Well, being happy is one type of 'good'. But so too is a sense of justice, a sense of moderation, magnanimity, etc., one type of 'good'.

Conclusion: the general theme 'good' sets the way to finding ideas (and their formulations) (successful justice, measure, magnanimity).

Other commonplaces of a pathetic nature are: the public interest (political rhetoric), justice and law (legal rhetoric), honor (eulogy).

One sees that a theory of values is present in these commonplaces.

One need only consider—outside those classical domains—how sellers in a market 'push the wares' by speculating on intuition.

WR295

Applicative model.

Bible st.: *M. Starace, De l'intuition à la voyance*, Périgueux, 1981, 19s..
The writer is visiting with her mentor in insurance rhetoric. She gives

the conversation (WR 282v.) again:

the already insured spouses take the position that further discussion is superfluous;

The officer takes the position that they benefit from it.

1. "May I ask with which company you have taken out insurance?" The agent standing, meanwhile, already in the kitchen. -- "By La Séquanaise, Sir!" "Well done!" said the agent. "That's a very reputable company" -- "Oh! Really!" the stunned husband blurted out. "That's the first time a competitor has told me something like that." -- "People are so malicious and envious. All those companies are reputable: they operate under a state guarantee, after all. So your insurance is good." The couple looked at each other in dismay (...).

Try to characterize (WR 276) on which feeling (and, at the same time, on which value) the agent 'speculates'

"May I take a look at your agreement?" the inspector pressed. The obliging woman hurried to the sideboard drawer. A large envelope, containing the contract, appeared. She handed it to the inspector. He unfolded it and read "Five hundred thousand FF". (It is 1961: the new French currency did not yet exist.)

"Look, sir. If you deposit the amount, you will save the sum of five hundred thousand francs. What's more: should you make a miscalculation, due to a road accident—he hastily added: 'Should such a thing never happen to you!'—well, then the widow will receive an immediate deposit of one and a half million."

"But you, sir, are surely worth much more than that, surely!" He uttered this neatly with great emphasis. Our good husband remembered above all

that he was worth more than one and a half million (of that time). Flattered as he was, he asked: “Could I perhaps increase that?”—“But that goes without saying, sir.”

But there is more, now that we have come this far: besides La Sêquanaise, you can also get insured with us. Then you will benefit from two contracts instead of one.” At that, the inspector sat down on the corner of the table between the two children and began to write the man’s name on the pink registration sheet. “Profession?” he said (...). Needless to say, the people accepted.

Try to characterize the commonplaces (value, feeling) that are being acted upon.

WR296

BIb *The theory of arrangement (harmological rhetoric)*

Persuasive language reveals, after the 'heuresis' (inventio, invention), at whose disposal it possesses proofs (and the form in which they are cast), what values it can assert. The 'diataxis' (= 'taxis', dispositio, arrangement, mutual ordering) draws up the plan.

Bible st.: *J.-P. Dumont, Les Sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1961, 26; 40s., gives us a schema of Protagoras of Abdera (oc, 26) and another schema, which we note:

Proöimion (exordium, introduction),

middle: **2.a.** diegèsis (narratio., story; WR 267), **2.b.1** , teknières (indicia, oratorical grounds; WR. 179), **2.b.2.** eikè (probabilia, plausible grounds; WR 287),

epilogos (conclusio, peroratio, conclusion).

The main arrangement.

WR 17 (Ptahhotep); 103 (Paleopythagorean 'arithmos', (= structure)); 231 (Korak's schema) taught us the basic structure of all arrangements (WR 109: structural arrangement): all variants of texts show, somewhere, this basic arrangement. It is a 'commonplace'.

The Isocrate model.

Isocrates of Athens (WR 246) structured it as follows.

A. prooimion (exordium).

B. middle. -- **a.** Diegèsis (narratio). **b.1.** Pistosis (persuasion based on 'peitho', plausible arguments). **b.2.** Agon (persuasion by means of apodictic grounds; WR 11; 144; 215; 231). **c.** Anakefalaiosis (recapitulatio, summary)

C. Epilogos (pathètikon meros, pathetic part).

The classic model.

Symmetry (mutual balance) governs the arrangement, in the Paleopythagorean spirit. The exposition, the middle section, is introduced and concluded, before and after, by three sections,

introduction.

B.1. . prothesis, proposition, theorem; WR 273; -- in which the given and the requested (WR 249: assignment) be mentioned, --- together with diairesis, divisio, classification ('plan').

B.2. diegesis, narratio, the story in which the facts are told.

C. ekthesis, expositio, exposition (WR 270, where the term narrative is used) the actual treatise or argument, presentation of proof.

D.1. elenchos, refutatio, refutation (WR 291: the refutation of the counter-model), cf. WR 199 (Parmenidean model).

D.2. . Anakephalaeosis, recapitulation, summary (retrospective classification).

E. slot.

Note: For all rhetoricians, this is merely an ideal practice model that is adapted.

WR297

The theorem. -- S. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, 121/136 (opinion statement), 121, says: "A preconceived opinion (...) is the thesis (thesis, proposition) that we wish to realize throughout the entire text".

In persuasive language, this is, of course, just as true as elsewhere. Precisely that thesis is—in the introduction, touched upon (drawing attention,

creating a benevolent mood);—articulated in the 'thesis';—outlined in the structure (list 1) according to the main features;—told from the factual side in the narrative;—the argument proven or made plausible;—indirectly proven in the refutation of its counter-model;—re-outlined in the summary (list 2);—possibly, situated, or treated emotionally in the closing argument.

Formal and statement-faithful arrangement.

Bible St.: A. Barilari, *Méthode pratique de dissertation* , 1, Paris, 1980, 68/127 (*La mise en ordre: le plan*).

Barilari distinguishes two types of arrangement: the formal, which is commonplace (and pre-given) (oc,69/75; 105/109), under which he targets two subtypes; the chronological (genetic) scheme, which outlines development (WR 3); and the dialectical scheme (WR 283), which reconciles opposing opinions at a higher level; and the fundamental (better: faithful to the given statement), which adapts directly to the given statement without taking commonplaces into account (oc,75).

Sometimes—so says Barilari (oc, 110)—the arrangement is imposed by the jury that presents the task. For example, when the theme and problem sound as follows: “The qualification of life”.

“What content do you give to this concept?” (WR 274; 279; 292: definition)
-- “Can one pursue a politics of the qualified life? (WR 275: polynomial statement ('politics of the qualified life'); 275ff.: single-sentence statement)

“Which, in your opinion, would be the main aspects of such a policy?” (WR 292: enumeration).

It is clear that, if the assignment is stated in such a way, the text creator reads the arrangement from it. But, very quickly indeed, if he is sufficiently familiar with rhetoric, he will recognize the commonplaces precisely in that assignment. But it is clear, as Quintilian says, that rules that are too uniform and too general (commonplaces) must, occasionally, be broken, although they remain, of course, usable (*Institutio oratoria* (+/- +95), a summary on education and language proficiency). A totally 'free' arrangement does not exist, fundamentally.

WR 298

BIc The theory of design (stylistics).

Pragmatic (influential) language use focuses on a third aspect of the text, namely the 'lexis' (elocutio, phrasing) or, alternatively, 'hermeneia' (interpretatio, interpretation).

Bibl. sample:

H. Suhamy, *Les figures de style*, Paris, 1983-2 (the figures of speech are one, very prominent stylization phenomenon);

P. Barucco, *Eléments de stylistique*, Paris, 1979 (overview of the current, sometimes sophisticated theories);

A. Langlois, *Le style (La chose et la manière, du xvii au xx siècle)*, Frameries/ Brussels, 1925 (large collection of quotations, a kind of anthology);

J. Broeckaert, *Jeune litt.*, 1, 115/150 (Du style);

C. Lefèvre, *La comp. litt.*, 161/290 (Le style);

H. Triebel, *Vom Stil des Rechts (Beitrag zu einer Aesthetik des Rechts)*, Heidelberg, 1947.

Definition.

“Style (form) is the manner in which one expresses a thought by means of language” (J. Broeckaert, *oc*, 114).

Current stylistics draws inspiration from Bally (WR 21), Bruneau, Leo Spitzer. Suhamy, *oc*, 12, defines it as follows: “Stylistics is the systematic description of the means and objectives of 'expression' (design)! These abstract definitions will be brought to life by the application models.

Applicative models.

We have already met there:

WR 260: simile (263); **(ii)** WR 266: picturesque hypotypose; **(iii)** WR 286: oxumoron; paradox; **(iv)** WR 282: dramatization by means of dialogue.

Anything that deviates from the 'dry', merely summarizing statement acquires, in principle, stylizing value. The pragmatic, significant (WR 20) value increases through the design.

Two models. -- **Bibl. st.:** R. Bruzina, *Eidos : Universality in the Image or in the Concept?* In: R. Bruzina/B. Wilshire, *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague/Boston, 1978.

Here are two manifestations of the same idea (which makes it understandable that 'hermeneia' (interpretation) can mean 'style').

The high priest informs one of his sons that it is necessary to send him to the church (in West Africa). -- “I desire that one of my sons accompany these people, to be my eyes there. If there is nothing in it, come back. But if

there is something, bring me my share home. -- The world is like a mask that dances.

WR 299

If you wish to see that world, do not remain standing in one and the same place. My spirit tells me that those who are not friends of the white man will say today or tomorrow, "If only we had known."

(Now follows the same idea in different wording ('style').

"I send you as my representative among these people, -- precisely to be safe, should this new religion arise and take hold. One ought to move with the times; otherwise, one remains lagging behind. I have a vague suspicion that those who, today, do not come to an understanding with the whites, will, in time, bitterly lament their lack of prospects." From: *Chinua Achebe* (Nigerian writer), *English and the African Writer*, in: *Transition*, 4 (1965), No. 18, 18/19, -- text, which deals with two styles in English, insofar as it is written/spoken by Negro-Africans).

It is clear that both speaker/writer and listener/reader differ in the first and second styles: archaic, Negro-Afrikaans, modern Western, Negro-Afrikaans. The same idea conveyed in different languages (WR 180: interpretative configuration; 200: material/formal object). Hermeneutics is the key to stylistics.

Literary typology.

The literary genres are distinguishable, precisely from the point of view of style. WR 15 (playful, artistic, sacred type of 'style'), -- 196ff. (mythical and philosophical style) already taught us this.

WR 254.2 (Kirkè's hospitality), 260 (Menelaus' wound); 262 (Kirkè's animals) offers us epic style. WR 271 (Die Lorelei), 276 (O beautiful rose) offers us lyrical style. WR 282 (Antigone's fragment) offers dramatic style. -- Thus there is descriptive, descriptive, narrative, expository, oratorical (rhetorical, persuasive). Thus, within the persuasive style, there is a sub-style: political, legal, academic style.

Translation

Traduttore traditore (To translate is to betray - so goes an Italian proverb.

H. De Vos, Einl./Erl., Ernst Jünger (1895/1998). Lob der Vokale und Sizilischer Brief an dem Mann im Mond, Brüssel, sd, 19f., gives us a striking

example. It Latin verse “Nulla unda, tam profunda quam vis amoris furibunda”. (No water is so deep as the power of love (love) is crazy). There is a rhymed German translation: “Keine Quelle/ So tief und schnelle/ Als der Liebe/ Reissende Welle”.

WR 300

The stylistic difference can be expressed by saying that Latin evokes the deep, dark, resting water in the Roman cistern, and German the clear, flowing ripples of a well in the Germanic landscape. Here the water is reflected in a bright, turbulent, transparent form; there it reveals its dark, unfathomable nature.

The figures of speech.

“There are idioms and turns of phrase that give form to ideas, as it were a 'schema', figura, configuration, whereby they acquire a beauty and a power, by which one distinguishes them from colorless expression.” (J. Broeckaert, oc, 90). Boeckaert situates the figures of speech 'auxèsis', amplificatio, reinforced form (oc, 76).

There are countless figures of speech. There has been an enormous amount of debate about them. Up to the present day. Besides the simile, the picturesque hypotypose, the oxumoron, the paradox, and dramatization, we will briefly consider the tropes (tropology).

Library st.:

A. Mussche, *Dutch Poetics* , Brussels, 1948, 34/75 (The Image);

H. Morier, *Dict. d. poet. et de rhét .*, 670/742 (Métaphore); 743/793 (Métonymie); 1102/ 1119 (Synecdoque).

Starting point.

Reinforced wording by replacing a less reinforcing expression with a more reinforcing one—behold, it seems, the core idea. 'Tropos', in Greek, means 'turn'—in textual theory, idiom. The tropes are metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche.

Applicative model.

Mussche, oc, 414 cites C. Stutterheim, Jr., **Het bewust 'metafoor* ;* Amsterdam, 1941*. Note the replacement of the colorless expression by a—colorful and, even, a still more colorful idiom, this on an identitious basis (WB

199/201).

a. Colonel A. fought, in Aceh, as brave as a lion. Colonel A. was so brave like a lion. Comparison (distributive type, WR 279v.)

b. Colonel A. fought like a lion. Colonel A. was like a lion. comparison = partial identity

c. Colonel A. was a lion. Colonel A., the lion of Aceh. Metaphor. This lion.

It is evident that model theory (WR 57) is at work here: one speaks in terms of a known object (the lion) regarding an unknown object (Colonel A., about whom information is provided in the text).

WR 301

It was the same with the simile, for example (WR 260): Homer speaks, in terms of girls coloring ivory with purple (model = known fact), of Menelaus' blood coloring body parts (unknown fact, about which the model provides information). The provision of information is the basis for reinforcement.

Applicative model: metonymy. -- Examine the intensification.

a . Eating apples contributes to health. Apples cause, partly, health. (Comparison: collective type, WR 260). (partial identity)

b. Eating apples, -- that is health, is healthy. Apples are health, healthy. Metonymy

The healthy food. The healthy apples. Metonymy.

The model theory works, here, not by similarity (= metaphor), but on the basis of coherence (sign/ continuation; WR 268ff.),

Here, causal connection. The caused (consequence, consequence), health, is considered partially identical (identified) with the causative (omen, cause). This partial identity allows one to speak of the omen (cause) in terms of the consequence (consequence).

Moreover: "The eating of apples" can be replaced (identified) by "Apples". Why? Because the apples are the direct object of the eating. This coherence (collective or system structure) allows one to speak, in terms of the direct object, about the action of that direct object (eating).

Conclusion: there are two metonymies here.

Applicative model : the synecdoche.

They investigate the	
reinforcement:	Comparison =
Apples are healthy.	
	partial identity
An apple is healthy.	
The healthy apples.	(quantitative
	comparison)
A healthy apple.	

Model theory operates here through quantitative comparison: one apple is a sample (WR 290: induction), one instance, one singular element, from the set of apples. This allows us to speak of all instances (universal set) in terms of a single instance.

In other words: the metaphor concerned the common property of the elements of a set. The synecdoche concerns the scope (the quantitative relationship) (WR 277): one can speak of all in terms of exactly one or some (and vice versa).

In this way, one can also speak of the whole (human being) in terms of the part ('a good soul').

WR302

B.II. -- Mnemonic rhetoric (302)

Bibl. St.: Except for WR6, they referred to *HI Marrou, Hist. d. l'éd ., 275, (la mnemonic)*.

Marrou states that, among the Deuterosophists, memorization was usually based on the association of visual images. Yet, in principle, improvisation was “the pinnacle of oratorical skill”.

Indeed: already Alkidamas of Elaia, a pupil of Gorgias (WR 25; 280), established the following sequence: if someone possesses broad background information (omen), then he possesses the power of improvisation (continuation).

As stated (WR 6), Hippias of Elis placed the work of memorization at the center, in a secularizing sense (WR 225ff.: desacralization).

Besides these three moments—visual association, background information, and memory strength—the archaic-sacred rhetoricians knew the goddess Mnemosune and the Muses.

See, in this regard, WR 79/84 (religious-hist. basis); 37/39; 42 (emancipation; ontolog. type); 63 (positive-scientific type); 66/74 (political type); 124/130 (Paleopyth. model); 196ff. (Parmenidean type). All intellectual labor, like all other forms of work, was conceived as accompanied by and inspired by artistic entities. The same applies to rhetorical work, especially

memorization.

The artistic memory work.

J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée* I, 80/107, outlines, as a historical psychologist, some aspects of it.

'Enthousiasmos', 'enthousiasis', 'geestdrift' – whether in the ecstatic or the sober sense: one should not confuse geestdrift, being driven or inspired by a 'spirit', with rapture ('trance') – was the psychologically conscious experience, the lived realization, of a provision of information emerging from the depths, of which the beneficiary (poet, specialist, speaker) was the interpreter (WR 68/70: all archaic-sacred interpreters were conceived according to the hermetic or 'prophetic' (mantic) model).

But there were two complementary aspects:

a. The basic repertoire, which comprised the tasks (data/questions), together with the commonplaces that had arisen through tradition;

b. The rigorous schooling, under the guidance of the artistic entities, together with an earthly teacher

Some believe that 'inspiration' by muses is a passive affair. What a mistake: the archaics knew better!

WR303

B.III. The significative or speech act rhetoric (303/)

We refer to WR 6; 20ff. (significance, the theory concerning (human) means of expression); 4 (behavioral biology: 24; 27ff.). Naturally, also to WR 208/211 (semiotics: syntactics, semantics, especially pragmatics). That is regarding foundational research.

G. Fauconnier, *General Communication Theory*, Utr./Antw., 1981, offers us a New perspective: one can, indeed, interpret the influencing relationship (the core of all rhetoric) from the viewpoint of the communication process. Nature as a whole teems with message transmission: mechanical (think of the TV or the telephone), plant-based (the sunflower reacts to light, which acts as a 'message' (a portion of information)), animal-based (the house cat reacts to

the message (information, idea) contained in the kitchen smells), and above all, human.

a. Since Cl. Shannon/ W. Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, Urbana (Illinois), 1959, e.g. we have a technological theory of messaging (source/sender; receiver/destination encoding/decoding, etc. are the basic terms).

b. M. van Schoor, *Bestaanskommunikasie*, Bloemfontein, 1977, provides a humane, intersubjective theory of message exchange (communicator; medium (code, signs); receiver; -- communication, message, interpretation, -- are the basic terms in which mutual information is discussed).

Conclusion: this two-layered theory regarding message transmission can be used as background information applies to updated rhetoric. Cf. WR 165.

The twofold aspect.

Thrasummachos of Chalkedon (WR 64; 293) learned the basic features of recitation (declamation), which he derived from acting skill (technè hupokritikè, the art of acting).

HI Marrou, *Hist.d.l' éd .*, 275, notes that the agoge, actio, the speech act (acts of influence) concerned the presentation, the speaking speed, the voice control (WR Demosthenes), especially the supporting of the word by facial expressions (gestural skill).

But there is the soul side (WR 261ff.; 263ff.) the acting skill was a 'meeting' (WR 272) of soul to soul. The Prosopopoeia (outlook) covers an ethopeia (influence of the soul; WR 135v. offers us a Paleopythagorean interpretation of this; cf. P.-C. Jagot, *L' éducation de la parole (Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire et insurée ?)*, St Jean de Braye (Fr.), 1975).

WR304

Note-- Ethical persuasion .

“The ancients wanted the persuader to always use his own personality, his own moral nature, as a guarantee for the truthfulness of his words.” (A. Langlois, *Le style*, 57). In other words: the one who persuades is himself an

'argument' in favor of what he presents.

We refer, first of all, to WR 246ff.: Langlois says 'the ancients' but the scope (WR 277) is wrong. Indeed, the expression suggests 'all' ancients, -- which is incorrect, for a number of Sophists had virtually no conscience. That conscientiousness was, precisely, emphasized by the Grand Socratics (Platon, Aristotle), as well as by Quintilian. "Aristotle already notes that **(1)** the correctness of the statements of the language user and **(2)** his honesty are two good arguments". (*L. Bellenger, La persuasion* , 18).

The influence of the ethical nature of one's fellow man

This is evident from I. Kant (1724/1804), the central figure of the German Enlightenment, where he interprets the 'return to nature' thesis of J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778) (WR polynomial depiction; 284: chreia). The text is, immediately, an example of the figure of speech, 'schème kat 'arsin kai thesin' (... not ... but).

Fundamentally, Rousseau did not want man to return to the state of nature, but rather that he look back upon it from the level of culture at which he now stands. His premise was that man is good by nature (as that 'nature' is inherited), albeit in a negative way. Specifically: man is not, of his own accord and intentionally, malicious; but he does run the risk of being infected and corrupted by malicious or clumsy leaders and exemplary figures.

Since, however, this again requires good people, who, in turn, must themselves be educated, and there is hardly a single one among them who does not carry within himself (innate or acquired) depravity, the problem of the education of the conscience remains unresolved.

Reason: the malicious inclination innate in our race is indeed disapproved of by general human reason, — possibly even curbed, but thereby not eradicated." (*J. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., Kant-Brevier* , Hamburg, sd, 339 (No. 788)).

Kant is, apparently, much less of an optimist than Rousseau! See also WR 261ff. (characteristic); 263ff, (Ethopea); 285 (soul description).

WR305

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Deo trino Mariaeque gratias.