

Course 7-5. Elements of Philosophy of Culture.

Location

7. Courses from 1993 to 1996

7.1. Elements of Ontology, 1993-1994, (EO1-EO27, 309 p.)

7.2. Harmology 1993-1994 (HA1-HA33, 109p.)

7.3. Elements of Philosophy of Religion 1994-1995, (ER1-ER440, 514p.)

7.4. Elements of philosophical rhetoric, 1994-1995, (EWR1-EWR31, 37p.)

7.5. Elements of Philosophy of Culture, 1994-1995 (CF1-CF75, 212p.)

7.6. Elements of contemporary philosophy, 1995-1996 (HF1-HF7, 77p.)

Note: *This course has been spaced larger than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current 'Word' pagination. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'CF'. They stand for 'Culture-Philosophy' (In Dutch: Cultuur-Filosofie), and are derived from the old page number.*

Introduction:

In this course, we ask ourselves what culture is. We do so from the perspective of various disciplines. Through approximately 16 samples, we arrive at a better understanding of the essence of culture via generalization and generalisation. The term generalisation here refers to the general or common aspects that manifest themselves in the various samples. Generalisation—not really a Dutch word—nevertheless indicates that we thereby gain a view of culture as a whole. Once we see through the logical coherence, a number of loosely connected samples follow in the 'capita selecta'. They complement what was said in the first part and, above all, presuppose that first part.

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Course 7-5. Elements of Philosophy of Culture.

CF1

1. Foreword.

The material from the first year

Ontology or metaphysics brought into question “all that is, insofar as it is (something, 'reality')”. This in two ways.

1. As Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), following in Plato's footsteps, already said: ontology, the core subject of all philosophy, raises the question of “being as being,” -- that reality as reality (insofar as something is something).

2. As G.W.F. Hegel (1770/1831) said: to philosophize is to examine whether and how beings, 'existing beings', can 'really' handle and solve tasks (data with the sought or asked ones associated with them). -- That was the subject matter of the first year.

The second year

It covered everything that calls itself 'religion'—from the most archaic ('primitive', 'traditional') to the most secularized ('enlightened', 'rationalist'). Particular attention was paid to the New Age, in which the ancient sacred ways of thinking and living are either actualized or even radically re-established.

This cultural movement, which begins to distinguish itself from the dominant rationalist Enlightenment (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung) starting from Romanticism ($\pm$ 1790), preserves the ancient religious heritage without rejecting the essential achievements of rational thought and life.

Our philosophy of religion was thoroughly ontological:

- 1.** Does religion grasp reality (being)?
- 2.** Does religion 'really' solve tasks (data with the associated problems)?

This third year

This third year is titled “Elements of Philosophy of Culture”. -- 'Elements' means “axioms, presuppositions that define something”.

We define 'culture' as the way in which reality (being) is grasped (Aristotle) and as the way in which tasks are tackled and solved amidst that reality. Tasks point to a reality that is unfinished, not (sufficiently) elaborated, and that awaits completion, further elaboration.

Culture refers to the ways in which such unfinished realities are tackled. -- Behold a first, approximate (lemmatic) definition.

CF2

1. 'Culture'. Is a concept. (02/05)

'To define', to give a definition, means 'to identify'. The identity or individuality of something is that by which it is distinguishable from the rest of “being” (reality). Defining therefore means 'identifying' something with itself in such a way that it becomes distinguishable from all other data. The identity of something is always accompanied by difference (distinction/separation).

Speaking of 'culture' entails identifying 'culture' and providing a definition of it that distinguishes 'culture' from the rest. -- Moreover, culture—as we shall see later—begins with defining a given—as correctly as possible, at least—together with what is sought or requested (the task). Thus, we have a twofold reason to address, first and foremost, what exactly defines.

A theory of concepts.

In the course of this treatise, therefore, we are discussing the concept of 'culture'. -- Let us therefore first define what a concept (a thought idea) is.

In doing so, we rely on a work true to tradition: *Ch. Lahr, SJ, Cours de philosophie*, I (*Psychologie / logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 491/500 (*L'idée et le terme*).

Concept.

Lahr, in a modern interpretation that emerged only after the Middle Ages, uses the term 'idée' to denote 'concept'. One can do this provided one is well aware that 'idea' is not used here in the ancient medieval sense dating from Plato.

A concept is a given (being, reality) insofar as it is present in the human mind. A term is one or more words or signs (a diagram, for example) that represent a concept.

Note-- Summative induction . 'Induction' is:

- a.** from one or more instances ('elements') to all conclusions (generalization; metaphorical induction);
- b.** to conclude that one or more parts ('elements') constitute the whole (all parts) (generalization; metonymic induction).

The summarizing or 'summative' induction relates all individual instances or parts to all instances or parts collectively.

A teacher has corrected all the copies (separate treatment). At the end, she adds them up and records that sum as a number, e.g., 32. She 'summarizes'.

CF3

Or: a clockmaker who wants to assemble an alarm clock—a complete alarm clock—first counts to know whether he has all the parts of the whole clock before him. When he has gone through them all individually and summarizes the quantity into a number, he 'summarizes'.

It can be seen that summarizing or summative induction differs from ordinary, amplifying (information-expanding) induction.

Lahr, oc, 499/500 (*La division*) and 550/556 (*La méthode générale: l'analyse et la synthèse*), deals with what we call summative induction. -- The division of a totality into its specimens or groups of specimens or into its parts or groups of parts relies on summative induction.

In this regard, one method, the comparative method, proves to be the instrument. 'Comparing' here means “seeing more than exactly one given together, that is, simultaneously”.

Note: Do not confuse 'compare' with one of its meanings, namely 'to equate'!

Comparing breaks down into two forms.

Lahr, relying on *R. Descartes* (1596/1650; founder of modern philosophy), in his *Discours de la méthode* (1637), II, expresses it as follows.

1. -- To divide every difficult-to-identify piece of data ('difficulté') into the smallest possible parts or specimens. Descartes calls this, in his own terminology, 'analyse', di opdeling.

2. -- From there, summarize the specimens or parts until the totality (class (set)/system) is reached again. That is called Descartes' 'synthèse', reconstruction.

The ancient Greek thinkers

They call that double operation 'stoicheiosis' (Latin: elementatio), ordering.

Incidentally: *EW Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 30; 35, discusses stoicheiosis at length.

*T. van Dorp, in *Aristotle on Two Functions of Memory : Platonic Reminiscences **, in: **Tijdschr.v.filosofie* (Leuven) 54 (1992): 3 (Sept.), 457/491*, also discusses 'anamnèsis' (Latin: reminscientia), the ability to orderly perceive totalities (stoicheiosis), -- distinct from “mnème, Latin: memoria” (the vague summarizing remembering).

In other words: what Descartes called “analysis/synthesis”, the ancient thinkers called “stoicheiosis based on anamnesis”.

That concludes this digression.

CF4

Content/ scope

With all the logicians of the great tradition, Lahr distinguishes between conceptual content and conceptual scope.

a. -- **Content** (lat.: comprehensio).

These are the characteristics of the given in our mind which collectively (system) constitute the essence, i.e. the identity, of the given referred to in the concept.

b.-- Extent (Latin: extensio).

This constitutes the things (data) to which the content refers (which the content can be stated).

In a diagram: all that is = extent; a beautiful girl = volume

Together: all that - a beautiful girl - is

All/entirely.

All who have read Plato carefully know that these two concepts play a primary role in his 'dialectics' (thinking).

In that tradition, Lahr distinguishes

a. distributive concepts (thus: all people; class (set)) and

b . collective concepts (thus: the whole of man; the whole of humanity; system). -- In medieval, scholastic Latin: omnis homo (omnes homines); totus homo; tota humanitas.

The medieval scholastics (800/1450) thus distinguished a “totum logicum” (a class) and a “totum physicum” (a system or constitution).

It can be seen that in the “all/whole” pairing, summative induction and conceptual scope play a role.

Scope of concepts

1. -- There are transcendental or all-encompassing concepts. Such as: 'something', 'being', 'being', reality (in the strictly ontological sense), 'given'. They can be stated of radically everything and of everything of everything. They are the object of ontology.

2.-- There are non-transcendental concepts.

Thus: **a.** Singular (“this person here and now”) (also: individual, idiographic);

b. Particular (“these people here and now”) (also: similar, specific);

c. Universal (“all people here and now”) (also: general, judicial, generic).

Inverse proportionality.

“This flower here and now”, “this kind of flowers”, “all flowers” demonstrate that as the content increases in terms of properties (characteristics), the scope decreases. For instance, there are far fewer beautiful flowers than flowers! The adjective (word of quality) 'beautiful' increases the content but decreases the 'domain' (the scope)!

CF5

3. There are also collective non-transcendental concepts.

The classic books on logic usually mention only the distributive concepts “singular/ particular/ universal”.

But regarding scope, there are also:

a. single-part (“this part here and now”),

b. multi-part (“these parts here and now”) and

c. total (“all parts here and now”) concepts.

Simplified: some concepts refer to one or more parts, or (arbitrary) sections; others to the whole.

Take, for example, *Thassilo von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen **, Cologne, 1955. The book clearly refers to “the culture” of the ancient Greeks.

a. There are diachronic scopes: the Cretan, the Mycenaean, the early Hellenic cultures.

b. There are synchronous scopes: state life, religion, art, philosophy, science. -- Whoever studies a partial culture comes to know the whole culture... but from one 'perspective' or 'sample' (and is therefore very limited). For example: whoever studies the early stages of Greek culture becomes familiar with the later ones in the sense that precursors, omens , etc. of the later ones can be found in the early ones.

For example: whoever examines the life of the polis (state life) more closely soon encounters, for instance, religion or philosophy (and thus the entire culture). -- These are examples of generalization, which, through perspectives or samples concerning parts, conclude that the culture is the whole.

Similarity/ coherence.

Anyone considering the foregoing will conclude that 'ordering' ('harmology' or 'order theory' is the name) relies on the comparative method on relationships. These are twofold: **a**. similarities and **b**. connections.

Thus, the class (set) relies on at least one common property (which is a similarity): all instances of a class resemble one another!

Thus, the system rests on at least one common property (which is a similarity), namely the fact that all parts belong to exactly the same whole. As a result, they exhibit coherence!

That is precisely what allows us to summatively induce that many separate data are combined into a single totality.

Conclusion . -- “All cultures,” “the whole of the culture,” “the totality of cultures” are terms that define the object of this course.

CF5.1.

2.1.-- Definition of the singular. (05.06)

Ch. Lahr, SJ, Cours de philosophie , I (Psychologie Logique), Paris, 1933-27, 537, says: “Non datur scientia de individuo”, there is no science available about the singular (individual). Because “omne individuum ineffabile”, everything that is singular, is not amenable to general formulas. Thus Scholasticism (800/1450).

The boundless diversity (synchronic) and the equally boundless change (diachronic) of the data in the real world around us prevent one from building a universally valid 'science' concerning the varied and changeable.

Sciences, such as geography and history, limit themselves to a kind of network of generally valid statements.

They are – to use a recent term – 'nomothetic' ('nomos' = general law; 'thesis' = essay), meaning they formulate 'regularities' that apply to a plurality of, for example, landscapes (geography) or events (history).

Romanticism and its “individual understanding”.

Romanticism (c. 1790), which opposed the abstract-generalist rationalism of modern times, breaks with tradition, and for “idiographic sciences” the 'essence' (i.e., that by which something—in this case: something individual—

differs from the rest of being or reality) is, for Romanticism, first and foremost a singular essence, which can be represented in a singular concept, which in turn is susceptible to a singular definition. 'Idios', in ancient Greek, means 'singular'; 'grafia' means 'representation'; consequently: idiography is the representation of the individual.

Incidentally: what is called a 'monograph', i.e. a study concerning something singular, is essentially idiographic.

The definition of the singular.

Library st. : H. Pinard de la Boullaye, SJ, *L'étude comparée des religions*, II (*Ses méthodes*), Paris, 1929-3, 509/554 (*La démonstration par convergence d'indices probables*).

This text is one of the very rare texts about our subject.

1. The rule of definition is also here: **a.** the entire data; **b.** only the entire data (defined against the rest).

2. In the absence of axioms (general definitions), one falls back on individual characteristics, but in such a way that they are accumulated (cumulative method) until one is certain that the essence of the individual given, and only its essence, is represented.

CF5.2.

The rule of definition of the conimbricenses.

The *Jesuits of Coimbra* (in: *In universam dialecticam Aristotelis*, Coimbra, 1606) drew up a formula, in the Latin of those days. -- "Forma, -- figura, locus, stirps, nomen, patria, tempus -- unum perpetua lege reddere solent". - We explain this distichon or two-line verse.

1.-- 'Unum', literally: the one; that is, the only thing that exists exactly once, is the definable or original.

2.-- cumulatively, i.e., thanks to enumeration, one characterizes the unique. -- The name seems to us the first thing that imposes itself ('nomen'). -- Around the name - e.g. Roxanne - one can 'singularize' or 'individualize' by means of enumeration.

3.-- Furthermore, the following present themselves first : 'locus', place, residence, e.g. (Roxanne lives) in Antwerp; 'tempus', time, e.g. date of birth (Roxanne was) born on 02.02.1994.

Thus, Roxanne is situated synchronically and diachronically. After all, a singular definition is 'concrete' ('concretum', in Latin, means 'fused', 'interwoven', 'merging' with the rest). It defines, identifies, including the rest.

4.-- Additional features – instead of axioms, unless these features are designated as “singular axioms” – are:

a. 'forma', essential form, in Roxanne's case: woman;

b. 'figura', appearance, existence, in this case e.g. tall.

These characteristics pertain to the person themselves.

5.-- Additional characteristics are further (specifically, in the surroundings:

a. 'stirps', descent (lineage), in Roxanne's case: from a wealthy family;

b. 'patria', fatherland, e.g. the Netherlands, from where she came to live in Antwerp. The conimbricenses define the only thing, unum: “id cuius omnes simul proprietates alteri convenire non possunt”, that which whole (system) of characteristics cannot belong to anything else.

Convergence (coincidence).

The definition of the singular proceeds like in a treasure hunt: feature after feature piles up (= cumulative method), and thus our attention converges in the direction of that single thing that can be defined. -- Romanticism is right!

CF6

2. 'Culture' as a concept to be defined. (07/08)

The whole of culture, present in all cultures and in the whole of cultures: that is the subject of this course. Articulating the whole of culture means “defining culture”.

-- **Library st.:** Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de phil .*, I, 496/498 (*La définition*).

To represent a given in its 'essence' (understand: the identity by which it differs from the rest of reality) in signs (words, graphs, numbers, diagrams, etc.) is to give it an essence determination or definition.

Thus, a description, if it refers to one's own identity, can be a definition—a detailed one, that is.

A story can also define: consider the courts of appeal, where stories can represent a decisive (legal) definition. A (short or detailed) report can define.

A treatise can do that too: think of the phenomenological treatises of a Husserl or a Scheler, which render a phenomenon—something that reveals itself to the observing consciousness—in its essence (identity) accurately—as accurately as possible.

A set of axioms—think of Peano's axioms which, a century ago, 'defined' the positive integer—can articulate a very exact definition. -- Provided that its own identity is accurately represented.

Lahr, oc, says, following in the footsteps of the scholastics:

a. the entire given (“Omne definitum”) and

b. only display the entire data!

One recognizes the concepts of “all/whole” and “identity” (expressed as 'single').

Verbatim and factual definition.

a. One can define 'nominally' (Latin: nomen, name). By citing from a linguistic system those terms that accurately represent the given in its essence. Thus, for example, the term 'culture' can be clarified, indeed, defined, by means of terms from our language. By synonyms ... such as 'civilization' or 'civilizedness', for example, or by a set of other terms that form a sentence.

b. One can define 'real' (Latin: res, the thing itself). By tracing and recording, into a concept, the necessary and sufficient elements that make a culture or multiple cultures what they are (identity) “in the field” ('fieldwork').

CF7

However, one should note that defining in a real or factual manner simultaneously involves defining nominally or verbatim: whoever, for example, records the culture of the Zaireans “on the spot,” makes use of the terms the Zaireans use *and* their translation into, for example, Dutch. -- The linguistic system is the conceptual framework in which the definition takes root!

Note-- The definable and only the definable! Yes, which, however, does not prevent comparisons with what lies outside of it from casting a harsh light on the definable. 'Culture' and “lack of culture” illuminate each other. Precisely through their opposition. Through their difference.

The brief definition.

Usually, when we use the term 'definition', we think of a short sentence or at least a complete sentence. *Ch. Lahr, Cours de phil.*, 501/509 (*Le jugement et le proposition*), explains what a judgment is, expressed in a 'proposition' or statement (sentence).

Lahr quotes Aristotle: “to say something about something” (“katègorèin ti tinòs”) is to pronounce a judgment.

Indeed: to speak “in terms of” the predicate, which in model-theoretical language is called the original (that about which one seeks information), of the subject which, in model-theoretical language, is called the model (that which provides information), is to judge.

Well, in a judgment that defines, the model is totally identical with the original. In other words: one may replace the predicate with the subject. After all, they coincide. For the predicate expresses the entire subject and only the entire subject.

For example: “a human being is a biological being that possesses spirit.” Since “biological being endowed with spirit” can only be said of man, such a term is a definition that immediately characterizes the whole human being.

Thus, A. Toynbee characterizes (defines) culture as “giving an answer to a challenge”. If, in his sense, one knows what is meant by 'challenge' and 'answer', then this can be one of the possible definitions of 'culture'.

That description is analogous to “solving the problem (correctly)”. -- We immediately have at our disposal (what is called Platon) a lemma, which is a general and provisional concept that can serve as a working hypothesis (heuristic concept) in the following pages.

CF8

3. 'Lematic-analytical' definition. (09/10)

By way of introduction . -- “Of Plato of Athens (-427/-347; founder of the Academy) it is reported: ”He was the first to put the investigation by means of analysis into the hands of the Thasian Leodamas”. (*Diogenes Laërtios* , III: 24).

This consisted of presupposing that which is sought (= requested) as already given, and examining that sought thing in terms of its relationships.

The main characteristic of that method is the presupposition of what one seeks as already known. Fundamentally, it would be better to use the term 'prolepsis' (trans.: presumption) or “lemmatic method” than the term 'analysis', since analyzing the network of relations in which the sought is interwoven is only the second step made possible by presupposing the requested item as already given.” (*O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus* , III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 48).

Willmann, op. cit., 49, mentions that François Viète (Lat.: Vieta (1540/1603)) introduced this lemmatic-analytical method into mathematics by using letters instead of numbers. Let us consider a formula like " $x = 2 + 3y$ ": in algebraic arithmetic, one can perform calculations perfectly without knowing exactly what 'x' and 'y' mean. This is because one treats the unknown (x, y) as if one already knew it (assuming that what is sought or requested is already given).

Viète titled his book "*In artem analyticam isagoge*" (literally: Introduction to Analysis). Hence the name "analytical method".

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 137, adds: "Analysis that begins with 'Suppose that the problem was solved' is of a similar nature."

The entirety of algebra rests on this method. (...). Higher mathematical analysis and analytical geometry are called 'analysis' or 'analytical' because they examine quantities as lemmas in relation to their relations.

This is just to demonstrate how fruitful Platonic 'analysis' (reductive reasoning) that makes use of a lemma can be.

The definition of 'essence' ('essence'). (08/09)

Ontology operates no differently.

O. Willmann gives an example of this in *Abriss*, 366. We will consider it now because it is of crucial importance for the rest of the course.

CF9

The 'essence' of gold.

Thinkers who misinterpreted ancient ontology sometimes mocked the ontologists' (metaphysicians') concern for the "essence" of things.

(1) . John Locke (1632/1704; founder of the Enlightenment)

He said, as a nominalist (i.e., as someone who posits only nominal definitions and no real ones (grasping the essence itself)), that "a goldsmith knows much better what (the essence or nature of) gold is than the ontologist with all his reflections on essences." The reason in Locke's view is clear: a goldsmith deals with actual gold (of which he does not know "the essence" but does know the various properties in his practice). He tests it ("so many carats," for example). He forges it into a beautiful jewel, etc.

In this way, he arrives at a practical but very businesslike or realistic definition that relies on samples.

From this, Locke boldly concludes that “metaphysical speculations (= tentative insights)” regarding the essence of gold are 'empty'.

(2). O. Willmann (1838/1920; Catholic thinker and pedagogue), as a realist (i.e., as someone who prioritizes not only nominal but also real definitions regarding the essence of things), answers.

To assert that, for example, gold exhibits both existence (actual being) and essence (way of being), that it displays a 'nature' of its own, means, from an ontological perspective, that a number of characteristics or properties (of which, for example, a goldsmith or a jewel-loving lady experiences a part) cause gold to differ from the rest of the entire reality.

Note: It is invariably that dichotomy (complementation) “essence/rest of reality” that is decisive.

Willmann emphasizes that the number of characteristics in question did not come together by chance, but constitute a “totum physicum,” a system or coherent whole. This is clarified, for example, in the chemistry of gold.

But Willmann adds something else to that.-- Before samples (induction) have been applied to gold to probe what gold is, the “metaphysical essence” is “ein X, eine qualitas occulta” (“an X, a hidden property”).

In other words: an entry!

CF10

The 'essence' of culture.

We will now focus on just one definition of essence, namely that of *Arnold Toynbee* (1889/1975), a British cultural historian known for his twelve-volume *Study of History* (1934/1961).

A.-- Existential definition.

In ontology, 'existence' means “actual existence,” inherent in all that is something. -- Since Søren Kierkegaard (1813/1855; founder of existential thought), however, 'to exist' means “to exist as actually existing; to live as a human being in the world.” So that neither God nor, for example, an animal, a plant, or a stone 'exist'. Only man exists.

Structure ('essence') of existing.

Assignment.

Given: A human situation (e.g. a sick child; e.g. a flood).

Requested: A way out or solution to the problem that answers both the given and the requested.

Real solution.

In Hegelian terms, the solution is only 'wirklich', real, that problem-solving, if, for example, someone—a doctor or a healer—actually cures the child—or if the government, with the help of, for example, the army, actually puts an end to the flood disaster.

Thrown into existential language (task) a situation with the given and the requested, one attempts (real solution) to “realize” a design (of a way out).

B.-- Toynbee's definition.

This is twofold.

a. -- Existential.

A 'challenge'—Toynbee's name for 'task' —calls for an 'answer'—Toynbee's name for “real solution”. What, then, is culture? It is the answer to a challenge.
-- One sees that Toynbee's definition is an essentially existential definition.

b.-- Elite.

Time and again, in difficult, indeed seemingly impossible situations ('challenges'), it is observed that not the masses but rather a select few, a choice or 'elite', find the 'answer'. This resourceful and saving elite has been observed since the times of archaic cultures. They are then called 'saviors'.

As Herder's **lexikon Ethnologie** , Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 1981, 85 (Kulturheroen), states, they are also called 'culture heroes'. They are often half-animal, half-human beings who found useful plants, animals, or institutions and are often revered as “mythical ancestors.”

CF 11

4. A 'metaphysical' definition of 'culture' (11)

When one opens A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* , Paris, 1968–10, 615, one encounters one of the several definitions of 'metaphysical'.

Instead of coinciding with ontology or general metaphysics, 'metaphysics', in the terminology of *Alfred Fouillée*, for example in **Avenir de la métaphysique ** (1889), becomes “defining something in such a way that a concept of all that is reality is incorporated into it”.

In other words, one posits some concept of total reality—such as a materialistic concept of being (in which all that exists can be merely material being or reality)—after which one 'explains' something—e.g. the human mind, e.g. culture—from that materialistic concept of being.

In that (materialistic) case, things like 'human spirit' or 'culture' are in their essence material things. -- Which then amounts to a kind of special metaphysics that exposes “the essence” of things within the totality of all that is.

One can also call this a “view of life and the world” governed by an interpretation of all that is reality.

As Fouillée states: every human being has a – understood in this way – 'metaphysics'. We add to this: every culture is a metaphysics understood in this way. Thus it appears from *Pl. Tempels*, **Bantu-filosofie **, Antwerp, 1946, that the Bantus have an “own all-encompassing philosophy”, governed by the concept of 'life force' ('power'), such that every being is defined as some form of life force. Even the 'God' of the missionaries is interpreted by the Bantus as a “giver of life force” and thus as the ultimate source of magic.

Aristotle provided that ambiguity to the concept of 'being'.

“One arrives at no definition of anything that would indicate how that something is distinguishable from all other things by calling that something “a being.” For if one says of something that it is 'un' (being), then this applies to an empty term ('pilon'). (...). (*Peri hermèneias* 3, *in fine*).

Like this: when I define a girl as 'something', I am merely saying what can be said of all that is something. But a girl is indeed 'something' that is “a young woman”.

In other words: 'being' is the most general lemma -- a void that can be filled by everything that is something. Not a panacea by which one “knows everything”!

5. An axiomatic definition. (12 /14)

'Axiom', in ancient Greek, is anything so valuable that it must be put forward, whether practically or theoretically.

Our definitions of 'culture'—giving a (correct, real) answer to a challenge (Toynbee); a type of metaphysics—come down to axioms, valuable things to be put forward. -- But let us first define the phenomenon of the “integer positive number” 'axiomatically' so that we clearly see what defining is.

EW Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 63ff., gives us the Aristotelian concept of “axiomatic definition”.

Note: we say 'definition', because the axioms or presupposed sentences describe a scope or domain, in this case the positive integer, and only that domain. Which is typical of defining.

1. A specific domain (scope) is represented in sentences (statements, axioms). Nothing is represented outside that domain.

2. All statements concerning that domain are 'true' (in the ancient sense of 'evidentity'), in such a way that they are only 'true' (evident) as a system. That is to say: the terms and the statements must not contradict each other.

Behold the two principal characteristics of axiomatic definition. A domain is represented in mutually coherent terms and nothing outside of it.

Application . (12/13)

C.-I. Lewis, **La logique et la méthode mathématique** , in: ** Revue de métaphysique et de morale** 29 (1922): 4 (dec.), 455/474, gives the axioms formulated by G. Peano (1858/1932; one of the founders of mathematical logic) regarding the domain of the positive integer. We present them in colloquial form.

Logical terms.

'Class' (concept, set), “if, then” (encompassion, implication), “be a member (instance, element) of”.

Numerical terms.

'Number' (a class), 0 (zero), a, b (numbers).

This formulates the following statements (axioms) that represent the phenomenon (what presents itself) 'number' (positive, whole) as a domain.

CF13

A.-- Numbers

1. The successor of a number.

If a is a number, then $a+$ (the successor of a) is also a number. -- For example: $0+ = 1$; $1+ = 2$.

2. Different numbers.

If a and b are numbers and if the successor of a ($a+$) is the same as the successor of b ($b+$), then a is equal to b .

In other words, two different numbers also have different successors.

3. -- The mathematical 'induction'.

If s is a class of which 0 is a member and if every member of s has a successor within the class s , then every number is a member of s .

In other words: if a characteristic is specific to 0 (and every other number), then it is also specific to all other numbers. -- One extends the information regarding one number to all others. Amplificative induction.

4. -- The (whole) positive number.

If a is a number, then the successor of a is not 0 . -- In other words: every number is either 0 or another positive number. After all, if a number had 0 as a successor, then this would be $-1+$ (the successor of -1).

Here it becomes clear that the entire domain of positive numbers, and only that entire domain, is described in 'true' (representing the essence of the positive integer) sentences (axioms). Thus, Peano clarifies the phenomenon of the "positive integer" in a phenomenological description—'true' (alèthès), evidently. It is an eidetic phenomenology, for it defines all possible positive integers.

B.-- Edits.

We mention these in passing.

1. Sum.

If a is a number, then $a + 0 = a$. If a and b are numbers, then $a + b + = (a + b) +$ (then the sum of $a +$ the successor of b is equal to the successor of $a + b$).

2. Multiplication.

If a is a number, then $a \times 0 = 0$. -- If a and b are numbers, then $a \times (b + 1)$ is equal to $(a \times b) + a$.

Note: As is evident from *Th. L. Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics**, New York, 1963, the positive integer can also be defined differently. The ancient Greeks placed the 'monas' (the unit) first as an entity in itself. The concept of number only began with the combination of the unit with at least one other unit: thus, according to the ancient Greek definition, the number two was the smallest number! Did Thales not say that the number was "monadon sustèma", a combination of units?

CF14

'Essence' of the (positive integer) number.

A number (set) expressed in numbers has a reality. The number or sign in which the number is 'represented' is itself also "a reality".

1.-- Content and scope (domain) of the concept of 'reality' ('being').

M. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Tübingen, 1953, 138, says: "(In the language of Plato) 'ousia' (essence) can mean two things.

1. 'Presence' ('Anwesen') of something that is present (*note*: given).
2. This presence in the 'what' ('was') of his essential form".

P. Fürstenau, Heidegger (Das Gefüge seines Denkens), Francf. a. M., 1958, adds: "Here lies the origin of the distinction between existentia, Dasein, and essentia, Wassein". -- Note well that the two constituents of the being, actual existence (existence) and mode of being (essence), determine each other.

In other words: something has the existence of its essence and vice versa.

A nightmare is something. A wishful dream, a utopia, a science fiction are something. The absurd is absolutely nothing. For the absurd or the absurd has no mode of being of its own and therefore no existence of its own. But dreams, utopias, and science fictions have a mode of being of their own and therefore an existence of their own. Namely, in the minds of those who dream, pursue utopias, write and read science fiction. What 'exists' in the mind and only in the mind, exists truly and is not-nothing! But it does not have the existence of something outside the mind. What exists outside the mind has a kind of existence of its own that differs from that within the mind.

Therefore, of all that exists, one can ask whether it exists (existence) and what it is (essence). Or again: “How real is it (existence)?” And: “How is it really (essence)?” Whereby both aspects merge.

2.-- Content and extent (domain) of the (positive integer).

The number is something. One calculates with it. Science, exact science especially, works with it constantly. The number has a being, an existence of its own and, at the same time, an essence of its own. It exists in the mind but not like dreams, for example, because in the data, numerical ratios are ascertainable outside the mind!

Two apples are twice an apple existing outside the mind. Although '2' exists only in our mind. - The number is immediately an enormous cultural asset: it solves many problems. If only when we pay a shopkeeper!

CF15

6. Identitive culture. (15/16)

In *CF. 11* we saw, with Fouillée, that 'metaphysics' (in a narrower sense) is defining something in the light of an all-encompassing concept.

Do we possess all-encompassing concepts? Yes, for in *CF 04* we saw that the terms 'something' (= not-nothing), 'being', 'reality' represent transcendental or all-encompassing concepts.

But the concept of 'number' also covers such a transcendental concept: of all that exists, it can be said whether it exists in one instance or in more than one.

In other words: one can speak about it in terms of numbers. That means that numbers are 'models' (information providers) regarding everything.

That is the fundamental reason—besides the calculation with numbers mentioned above—why the number is such an enormous cultural phenomenon.

We will now consider the basis of this fact. That foundation is identity reality. None other than Hegel once said that identity is “ *die einfache Grundbestimmung der traditionellen Logik* ” (the basic characteristic of traditional logic).

Hegel judged this incorrectly. For he challenged that basis. Because he confused identity with “immutable substance” or “atom.” He rightly rejected any “substantialism” or “atomism” that knows no change and no relations.

The identical fan (differential).

Fully or totally identical -- partially identical (analogous) -- totally non-identical.

Behold the differential that dominates traditional (ontological) thought. -- Indeed: something is merely totally identical with itself, but it can be partially identical (analogous) with something else; indeed, it can be totally non-identical (different, removed) with something else.

Because Hegel saw not that differential but only one of the terms of that differential, he felt he had to ironize traditional logic.

The logic square.

All/ entirely	some/ partially
Some/ partially not	all/ entirely not

It can be seen that this is a double differential into which the previous one is mapped. -- Reread *CF 02 (induction)*; *04 (all/whole)*.

CF16

Henology (theory of unity).

One – partially one – non-one. Behold another differential in which the identical is mapped.

“To hen” in ancient Greek means “the one”. Henology is therefore the bringing up of “the one”. Ancient thinkers spoke of “the one” from the Paleophythagoreans (Pythagoras of Samos (-580/-500)) and the Eleatics (Parmenides of Elea (-540/-475)) onwards.

But—once again—they spoke of “the one” including “the many”! In other words: they thought in terms of systems (pairs of opposites) and differentials (fans). These encompassed all that exists. They are all-encompassing concepts.

Note how a multiplicity (a collection or a system consisting of a multitude of instances or parts) is brought into unity on the basis of similarity or coherence (*CF 05*), or relations or connections.

Which immediately places the comparative method at the center as the method par excellence. For comparing is always thinking of something including something else—seeing something in relation to something else.

Incidentally : it is not surprising that the Aristotelian list of categories (basic concepts) features the opposing pair “something/relation” (usually: “substance/relation”) as its core.

Where does strict identity lie amidst multiplicity (non-identity)? All instances of a class (“totum logicum”) exhibit one identical common property and thus belong to the same class: from that point of view, they are identical.

All parts of a system (e.g. a crystal, a plant, an animal, a human, a landscape, an axiomatics, etc.) – “totum physicum” – exhibit one identical common property and thus belong to the same system: from that point of view, they are identical.

Decision.

Identity and its variations are the pedestal of ontology and logic. But precisely that helps solve countless problems. Identity and its variants are therefore an enormous cultural asset.

Thanks to that identity and its array, we organize the sometimes very confused data (anamnesis/stoicheiosis (*CF 03*)); indeed, we can proceed in an orderly manner. Otherwise, we perish in a churning ocean of disorder.

CF17

7. Tropological culture 17/21

Let us now consider a linguistic phenomenon, the trope. 'Tropos', in ancient Greek, means reference. A reference, or, to use Derrida's words, a 'trace', entails encountering something including something else. In this context, the auxiliary verb 'to be' reveals itself as a linguistic device expressing references.

1.-- The metaphor.

It is a simile that expresses a concise, observed similarity. -- “That woman is a reed.” Upon noticing that woman, her pliability and capriciousness emerge, encompassing something that is pliable and capricious in its own way: the reed-in-the-wind. Not the reed in itself ('substantial') but in connection ('relationship').

Aristotle's two main categories—something/relationship—are clearly at play here. -- There is a 'trail' (reference) from that woman to the reed in the wind. That is how we think of them together, and suddenly.

Ontological

We do indeed say, and linguistically correctly: “That woman is a reed.” Not that she is totally identical to a reed in the wind. Rather, partially identical or analogous. After all, 'analogy' means “being partly identical and partly non-identical.” From one viewpoint, sample, or perspective, the woman is identical to a reed in the wind.

2.-- *Metonymy.*

It is the comparison that succinctly expresses an observed connection.

“Apples are healthy” (Aristotle’s example). -- Eating apples causes (cohesion) to some extent health. Hence: “Eating apples, if well considered, is healthy”. That experience brings the concept of 'apples' into inclusion with 'health'. That causal connection is expressed in short: “Apples are healthy”.

Ontological

'Apples' and 'health' are two separate things. But understood within the causal relationship, they are parts of the same whole or system (the dynamic system of health development). From that single viewpoint (sample, perspective), they are identical.

Note: Logistics replaces the flexible verb 'to be' with 'to imply' (which is just as ambiguous as 'to be'): “That woman embodies the pliability and capriciousness of the reed”; “Apples embody health”.

CF18

Decision.

Tropes are the shortened wording of something including what resembles it or is related to it.

Note -- It can also be expressed semiotically. -- “To sêmeion” is ancient Greek for “the sign”. In the language of Galen of Pergamon (131/200; Greek physician with centuries of influence), “technè sêmeiōtikè” meant the physician’s diagnosis through symptoms (semeiotics).

Ch. S. Peirce (1839/1914; American pragmatician) developed the foundations of a contemporary, widely practiced theory of signs.

Signs are data that refer to something else. This is because they resemble it (metaphorical signs) or are associated with it (metonymic signs).

A metaphorical or 'iconizing' sign is, for example, a map that resembles the landscape depicted on it. An 'indicative' or metonymic sign is, for example, a signpost that relates to the landscape.

Especially since Ch. Morris, three aspects are distinguished:

a. Syntactic (the sign among other signs: for example, the words of a language among the rest of the words);

b. Semantic (the sign as a reference to something else: for example, the term 'donkey' which means the domain of all possible donkeys);

c. Pragmatic (the sign as an instrument: for example, I use a nod of the head as a signal for another person). Within this latter aspect, the sign is situated as a means of communication between people (which is the object of Lady Welby's signification).

It is evident that the tropes express sign value in abbreviated form. Semantically. - Signs are realities that acquire an equivalent value (referential value) if they are conceived in conjunction with other data.

Thus, reeds in the wind are a 'sign' of a pliable, changeable woman. Thus, apples are a 'sign' of health. -- So smoke is a "sign of" fire and gives rise to the saying "Where there is smoke, there is fire".

Thus, the symbols of mathematics or logistics are 'signs' that stand for data within a mathematical or logistical context: when one thinks of them without the inclusion of mathematical or logistic axioms, they are merely blackened paper.

CF19

The synecdoche

'Sun.ek.dochè', in ancient Greek, means "to grasp something simultaneously with something else". It can be translated as 'co-significance'.

While similarity and coherence are central to metaphor and metonymy, the relationship between “collection/specimen” and “whole/part” is central to metaphorical and metonymic synecdoche.

1.-- *The metaphorical synecdoche.*

“A soldier stays at his post,” says the captain to all the soldiers before him. He says “exactly one” (specimen), but means 'all' (class).

“Teachers do not arrive late,” says the inspector to one teacher entering: he does say 'teachers' (plural), but he primarily means one teacher (singular).

2.-- *The metonymic synecdoche.*

“The beard is there,” people say. They mention the part (that stands out, characterizes, yes, brands) but mean the whole. -- “The congregation numbers two thousand souls”: one states the part (souls) but means the whole people!

Conclusion. -- With class (all/not all) and system (whole/partial) as a presupposition, the synecdoche states one thing but means something else within those concepts. The instance or part is conceived including the class or the system, and vice versa.

Note -- Reread CF 02 .

Generalization conceives of one or more instances including the totality (all instances). Like the metaphorical synecdoche.

Generalization conceives of one or more parts (parts) including the totality (all parts; the whole). Like the metonymic synecdoche.

In other words: the same insight is at work in the synecdoche and in the induction.

a. -- *Metaphorical induction.*

It relies on similarity. -- This water and that water boil at 100°C.. That similarity invites the inclusion of the rest of all water: we generalize and say: “Therefore, all water boils at 100°C.”.

b.-- *Metonymic induction.*

It relies on cohesion. -- This city district (the Meir, for example) and that city district (the harbor district, for example) exhibit a very diverse economic life. Viewed including the entire city (generalization), we conclude: the entire

city has a varied economic life that can differ significantly from district to district.

CF20

The cultural value of the tropics.

Money—coins, papers—is a metonymy for goods with economic value. For by convention, money represents valuable things: food and drink, land and homes, workshops and factories, books and television sets, etc.

The connection between money and commodities allows us to 'trade' goods metonymically. What a simplification! Can you imagine us exchanging a sack of wheat for a beautiful book? The tropics are a great cultural asset.

But let us confine ourselves to language. -- When we introduce figures of speech, for example by saying “You smarty pants” when someone commits a stupid act (we think of the stupid act including its opposite), we break the monotonous use of language and introduce playful elements.

Poetry is fundamentally nothing else. Enrichment: the problem of linguistic poverty is thus solved, and thus culture is founded. Tropes are figures of speech.

Associative psychology. (20/21)

Figures of speech such as metaphor, metonymy, or synecdoche are the prepositioning of associations.

We 'associate' (connect things) based on similarity or coherence. The association or thought connection follows the formula: “If a is thought including b such that one thinks of b when considering a, then b is an association of a”.

Library st.: *Théodule Ribot* (1839/1916) was both an experimental psychologist and a thinker. We cite his * *La psychologie des sentiments* *, Paris, 1917/10. Oc, 171/182 (*Les sentiments et l'association des idées*). Ribot demonstrates how our mind, as a faculty of value, involves, or associates.

1.-- Similarity (metaphor).

For a young man, if he resembles her son, is the same age and so on, a mother might spontaneously feel a sense of sympathy arise.

There is a 'trace' or reference from the young man to her son who is absent but appears in her mind.

For instance, there are fear reactions that are called 'thoughtless'. One has once suffered an insult from someone. Another similar incident spontaneously elicits the same reaction.

One sees the partial identifications at work. Based on similarities that turn something into a metaphor.

CF21

2.-- Cohesion (metonymy).

Ribot uses the term 'boundary' or 'paling'. -- Thus, the feeling that an enamored lover originally experienced for the person of his mistress herself, he transfers to what is associated with her: her clothes, her furniture, her home. --

Envy and hatred vent their anger or disappointment on the inanimate objects associated with the hated or envied person. -- Thus, the Iranians vented their anger on the American flag to strike at the USA. Or they damaged the American embassy. -- Metonymic behavior! So much for the established phenomena.

Now for the interpretation. -- Ribot: "It is known that the association of thought contents has been reduced to two basic laws, the law of resemblance and the law of contiguity." Ribot calls this by a psychological term that became very well known, 'transfert' (transfer), - transfert par ressemblance, transfert par contiguïté.

He labels such tropological behavior as "something in hiding," but—he adds—it concerns an "influence souvent latente mais efficace" (an influence that often remains hidden but achieves its goal).

Conclusion. -- The psychological applications of the tropics demonstrate that our mind, especially as a mood and faculty of values, can operate tropologically in its depths. - With or without valid reason. For an association can be irresponsible and therefore unreal.

Let's take an example. Someone once had an unpleasant experience with a teacher. Since then, a trauma, a wound, has remained. Since then, whenever he hears mention of that teacher—or rather, whenever he hears mention of

any teacher—he reacts venomously. Since then, he thinks of the rest of the behavior of that one teacher and the rest of the teachers, including that disappointing experience.

This is a generalization or induction that is usually unfounded. -- The ancient Romans captured this in a proverb: “Ab uno disce omnes” (Based on that one case, expect the same in all cases).

In other words, the similarity means that the rest becomes a metaphor for the one case.

We have the impression that such behavior is much more frequent than many are willing to admit. What problems metaphors and metonymies can cause!

CF22

8. The structural cultural element. (22/25)

Building on the previous chapter, we now consider what structuralism has to offer us.

Library st.:

--- *Ferdinand de Saussure* (1857/1913) had three pupils who recorded his ideas on linguistics after his death *Ch. Bally/ A. Sèchéhayé/ A. Riedlinger, Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1916.

-- Further: *B. Touasaint, Qu'est-ce que la semiologie ?* Toulouse, 1978 ;

--- *D. Ducrot et al., Qu'est-ce que le structurali*1978 ; 1978 ; Paris, 1968 ;

-- *JM Broekman, Structuralism* (Moscow/ Prague/ Paris), Amsterdam, 1973

Moscow, Prague, and Paris were once the centers of structuralism, which grew in phases and began in 1915. Originally rooted in linguistics and literature, it expanded to include, for example, anthropology (ethnology), mathematics (Bourbaki), and philosophy.

Language—and later every phenomenon—is dissected ('analysis') as a “totum physicum” (a system) of mutually different but axiomatically connected parts.

CF 03 (stoicheiosis). -- One immediately seeks the structure: accidental data—e.g., the sounds within a language—are analyzed as elements that exhibit an order. Thus, one encounters, for example, rules that characterize a

language as a language. They remain unchanged throughout the variations. -
- The terms 'system' and 'structure' are immediately fundamental terms.

Semiology.

CF 18 we saw something about Peirce's semiotics.

De Saussure has his own theory regarding the sign: he characterizes them as “representing the signs (linguistic signs in the first place) within life in a society as structured system components”. In this context, De Saussure speaks primarily of spoken language use, for, for him, the written word is merely an image, an ancillary aid (something for which he is criticized by J. Derrida, the deconstructionist, who prioritizes the 'written' (in the minds of people)).

The language phenomenon.

Basic terms in Saussure's semiology are 'langage' (the linguistic phenomenon as a whole), subdivisible into 'langue' (language; the linguistic system) and 'parole' (language usage; the spoken word). -- Language is, in principle, identical in every speaking individual, while language usage is such that every individual is distinguishable from all other language users.

CF23

The linguistic sign.

Note that, in Saussure's view, language use occurs when one speaks and writes, but also when one thinks or reflects in complete silence. For—Platon already noted this—when we reflect, we inwardly murmur 'words', as with an inner voice.

The sign as 'signifiant' (Sa) / signifié (Sé).

Every 'signe', or sign, consists of a sound and a meaning. -- The sound, le signifiant, the signifier, is the object of phonology (do not confuse with traditional phonetics), which studies le signifié, the signified, its meaning, 'analyzes!'.
le signifiant

Applicative model.

The word 'donkey' is, in our Dutch language system:

- a.** a valid sound ('donkey' when pronounced internally or externally),
- b.** but also that which is meant by that sound, namely the thought 'donkey' or the donkey existing outside our mind. The meaning, le signifié, can also be something purely imagined.

The sign system. (23/25)

This is the systems-theoretical aspect. -- Every valid sound within a language is valid only insofar as it possesses an essence of its own and thus forms part of the system. Something by which it differs—is distinguishable, 'discriminable'—from the rest of the signs. -- Again the dichotomy or complementation “part/rest”.

The system, synchronous or diachronic.

Medieval Dutch differs quite a bit from modern Dutch: whoever studies our Dutch language system in its evolution—a practice that the Romantic movement (1790+), strongly aligned with historical development, gladly engaged in—is practicing diachronic linguistics.

De Saussure initially stuck to synchronic linguistics. -- We will now briefly consider that.

The *Cours de linguistique générale*, 170/175, synchronically distinguishes “des rapports syntagmatiques et des rapports associatifs”.

The syntagmatic connection (let us just say: syntactic) makes the currently present (“in praesentia”) signs into one, while the associative (paradigmatic) connection makes terms that are absent (“in absentia”)—the complement (the rest of the linguistic signs)—one.

CF24

1.-- Syntagmatic relationships.

These are the relationships exhibited by the algorithm (the ordered sequence of characters).

Let us consider terms such as “rereading, to all, the life of man, God is good, if the weather is good, we set out”. All the words or word sequences (bearing in mind that a word is a sequence of letters) are simple or compound 'signifiers' that make up the sequence of signs unfolding in time.

Despite all their difference, they still belong together. It is precisely this that Saussure calls 'syntagma', arrangement, coordination.

2.-- Associative relationships.

Based on similarity/difference and coherence/gap, whether in terms of sound (Sa) or meaning (Sé), classes (sets) or systems arise as follows:

a.-- teach/ point out; education/ ice; -- education/ shelter; -- let us go / let us protest;

b.-- to teach/ shape/ educate; education/ culture/ civility.

Despite all the difference, these terms nevertheless belong together by virtue of association: with one term, one thinks—thanks to inclusion—of the others that differ from it but, in linguistic memory, belong with it. Although absent, they are nevertheless co-present somewhere in the background.

It is evident that similarity and coherence (the latter syntagmatic or associative) are decisive. Reread *CF 05; 16* .

Note-- *EW Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde* , Antw./ Nijmegen, 1944, 36v., cites *Platon, Filèbos* 18b/d:

“When someone—whether a god or a divine man (according to an Egyptian story it was Theuth (= Thoth; *CF 10* (cultural hero)))—observed that everything that is sound is infinitely different from one another, he was the first to realize:

1. that the vowels amidst that infinity of differences were not one but many, and again

2. that there were other sounds which, although not vowels, nevertheless possessed a certain sound value and that there was also a certain number of these and

3. Then he divided the consonants until he distinguished each one individually, -- in the same way the vowels and the semi-vowels. Until he also knew the number of those. -- He called each of them and all of them together 'letters'.

CF25

Let us note that among the ancient Egyptians, Thoth was regarded as the mythical inventor and introducer of a great Egyptian cultural asset: the hieroglyphs.

Let us further note that summative induction (*CF 02*) plays the leading role here (“each of them (individually)/ all together”). As a harmonological or ordering element amidst the chaos of sounds.

Plato's text continues: "But he saw that none of us could learn one of them separately without all the others. He perceived that this was a connection that made them all one. He also assigned to them one science which he called 'grammar'".

Here it becomes clear that Platon's phonetics prioritized the concept of 'system' (all/ whole) as a norm, as an illuminating light. This is evident in two pairs: "each separately/ all together" and "one separately/ all the others" (class and dichotomy). -- What we have encountered so often!

One immediately sees that what Platon does phonetically, Saussure does phonologically: analyzing the systemic character and the structures inherent to it. What is called, in ancient terms, 'stoicheiosis' (based on anamnesis). (CF 03)

Note: The structuralists made a 'metaphysical' (CF 11) axiom of this basic scheme : they defined all sorts of things in such a way that the system and structure of language were incorporated into them. The concept of 'system' ('structure') replaced the age-old concept of 'being'.

Some have called this 'linguisticism', which transfers what applies to language to non-linguistic data. Language and its structured system thus become the all-explanatory axiom.

Thus, culture has been conceived as a sign system, --as *JM Broekman, Structuralisme* , 122/129 (*Structural Anthropology and Theory of Knowledge*) explains. Claude Lévi-Strauss used the linguistic, particularly the phonological method, to 'ground' the scientific nature of his conceptions of culture.

For linguistics has a far-reaching object, namely orderly language. Without that language, no human life worthy of the name exists. Moreover: science, even where it defines objectively (CF 06/07), always incorporates a linguistic system, because a (scientific) name is attached to every given piece of data. The linguistic system is the syntagmatic and associative system without which 'culture' is non-existent.

CF26

9. Judging. (26/28)

According to Platon, even inner thought is a speech, and that speech is invariably a judgment. According to him, this judgment breaks down into two

parts: the 'onome', Latin: nomen, the subject (grammatically: subject) and the 'rhèma', Latin: verbum, the predicate (grammatically: predicate).

Which recurs in a formalized form in the transformational-generative grammar of *Noam Chomsky* (1928/ ...; Cartesianizing literary scholar). Cf. his *Syntactic Structures*, The Hague, 1957 (*A. Kraak/ W. Klooster, Syntaxi s*, Antwerp, 1968).

“The boy throws the ball” indeed breaks down into a nominal component (The boy) and a verbal component (throws the ball). In indirect speech, this recurs: “I saw your brother perform”:

- a.** “I saw” (nominal and verbal component),
- b.** “acting out your brother” (that your brother (nominally) acted out (verbally)), as Kraak/ Klooster, op. cit., 90/92, say.

It is in that grammatical way that one “expresses something (verbally) of something (nominally)”, as Aristotle says.

Model-theoretical.

By thinking of the subject including the predicate, it becomes apparent that the predicate contains information about the subject. Or: the original (unknown, subject), when compared with the model (known, predicate), comprises (or does not, in the countermodel) the model.

Library st.: *K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, Introduction to the Model Concept*, Bussum, 1969, 28.

Linguistic

The subject, if conceived including the predicate, which is a part of the living whole of language, is such that one can speak of it in terms of the predicate as part of the entire linguistic system. By means of association, we see 'traces' that refer from the predicate to the subject within the linguistic whole.

Language use, the main component of culture, takes the form of judgments. The correct understanding of 'judgments' is fundamental to a cultural theory.

Imelda walks.

Text and context regarding judgment. -- We will now examine an example in more detail.

- 1.--** “Imelda walks”. -- This statement can mean two things:

- a . “Imelda is a runner” and
- b. “Imelda is (currently) walking”.

CF27

The ambiguity or multiplicity of the expression “Imelda walks” proves that the context provides the inclusion for correct understanding: one understands the text only with the inclusion of the context which, although (often) absent, still counts and is indirectly 'present'. -- This refers to the unspoken and to what was (consciously) concealed.

2.1.-- “Imelda is a runner”.

Based on the connection (similarity, a form of identity (CF 15)) between 'Imelda' and 'runner', one can speak of 'Imelda' in terms of “being a runner”. After all, she is one instance from the “totum logicum” (class) of runners. For one is actually saying “Imelda is a runner”. -- When one sees her in action, a 'trace' points to “being a runner”.

2.2.-- Imelda is walking.

Based on the connection (cohesion, a form of identity (CF 15)) between 'Imelda' and “walking (being)”, one can—indeed, if one actually sees her walking, one must—speak of 'Imelda' in terms of “being walking”. The part “actually walking” belongs to the “totum physicum” (whole, system) of Imelda, with which she does not coincide 'total' but partially.

In both cases, there is partial identity or analogy—metaphorical (class analogy) or metonymic (system analogy). This is how traditional ontology and logic think (the latter being the ontology insofar as there are “if-then-relations” in all that exists).

Criticism from the logistics experts. (27/28)

Library st.: G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung*, Stuttgart, 1962 (especially oc, 53/64).

The criticisms in question are based on a confusion between thinking as traditional philosophy with its own 'akribeia', precision, and thinking as calculating with its own akribeia or 'exactness'.

A. Announcement of positions.

One might hear it said that, without the “logic of relations” (the analogy of Stoicism), traditional logic cannot articulate a relationship as it should.

An application model.

That church is larger than/ smaller than/ the same size as all the surrounding buildings.

In logistical circles, people forget that traditional logic does not think in words but in terms—which, if necessary, comprise more than one word.

CF28

Thus, Peano's set of axioms (*CF 12v* .) is actually a single term, but expressed in a plurality of sentences and symbols. The symbols of logistics and mathematics also belong to the terms of traditional logic. This can be known by the fact that, in lessons on logistics and mathematics, the symbols and calculations with them are explained in colloquial language!

B.-- Stating a measurement model.

Logisticians repeatedly claim that quantitative statements are 'exact' only in mathematical, formalized language.

An application model.

“That church is one hundred and fifty meters high.” -- As in the previous case, that expression is a meaningful one.

Incidentally: as Aristotle notes, judgment is based on explicit or implicit comparison. Which is clearly evident here. When we compare “that church” (think including) “a meter”, one of the many models of measurement, then we must multiply that one meter until the number of multiplied meters is identical to the church as height. That church, as height, is 'partially identical' or analogous to “one hundred and fifty meters”.

We therefore do not say, in traditional speech, “That church is one hundred and fifty meters” but rather “That church is one hundred and fifty meters high”. The first sentence can, however, be considered a trope (*CF 17*), which expresses similarity in meters, indeed, in a number of meters and thus in numbers. Numbers belong to the words or symbols that make up the one logical term “... meters high”.

Decision

People speak of “that church” in terms of “larger than/ smaller than/ equal to” or “(one hundred and fifty meters high)”. Those terms and the words contained within them are meaningful, very precise statements.

Let one therefore not say too easily that one cannot speak with accuracy without an artificial language.

In this connection, reference should be made to *Chaim Perelman* (1912/1984), the founder of contemporary 'rhetoric'. Exact scientists, including positivists, ban natural languages and value judgments from precise speech as forms of 'irrationality'!

Perelman has demonstrated quite well that this twofold prejudice is wrong. Cf. *Ch. Perelman/ L. Olbrechts, Rhétorique et philosophie*, Paris, 1952 ; -- id., *Traité de l'argumentation*, Paris, 1958.

CF29

10. Interpretation. (29/31)

This is a chapter on 'hermeneutics'.

'Hermèneuein', in ancient Greek, means "to express, articulate, interpret, explain what one thinks". "Hermèneutikè technè" (thus *Plato, Politeia 260d*) is skill in interpreting, explaining.

Man is a meaning-maker.

If anyone has emphasized this, it is Ch.SS Peirce (1839/1914; pragmatist). For him, every relationship in itself—between inorganic data, between plant, animal, and human realities—is already a form of interpretation.

When one stone crushes another, the crushed one designates the crushing one! This is: he takes it for what it is, as something transmitting, something effecting.

Man is merely a giver of meaning or an interpreter on a higher plane. Let us reflect on this as a cultural element.

Our proposition will be: meaning-making is twofold. It is the conception of meaning, i.e., grasping (the meaning or essence of what is given). It is also the establishment of meaning, di 'hinein interpretieren', placing a meaning within the given that is not present in it.

Note-- *P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'hermeneutique)*, Paris, 1969, 8, says: "The connection between textual interpretation ("exégèse textuelle") and the understanding of signs ("intelligence des signes") is

facilitated by one of the traditional meanings of the term 'hermeneutics' itself. Aristotle's little book on judgment is called “ *Peri hermèneias* ” (Latin: de interpretatione), On interpretation.

This entails: Aristotle's remarkable use of the terminology regarding 'hermeneia', which means allegorizing interpretation but also, very generally, “sensible judgment”. Moreover: responsible judgment is 'hermeneia', interpretation, as “saying something about something”. -- Cf. CF 26 . -- So that this chapter is the direct continuation of the previous one.

Judgements.

Apparently, for Aristotelian ontology and logic, the person who judges is an interpretant.

But there is meaning-grabbing judgment and meaning-creating judgment. Both are forms of meaning-making, but very different. For one 'identifies'—while judging—something with something, whereby that second something can be very different from the first something. In the defining judgment, the second something is simply the first without further ado (CF 07: The model is totally identical with the original).

CF30

In all other judgments, whether meaning-making or (certainly) meaning-creating, the second is somewhat different from the first (partially identical, totally non-identical) (Cfr CF 27).

1.-- *Conception of meaning.*

This concerns the given “according to itself,” that as given, in itself. When we attempt to grasp (the meaning or essence of) something—an event, a phrase, a landscape—correctly, we focus on that something itself, in itself.

Note: Parmenides of Elea (-540/ ...), the founder of Eleatic philosophy, has left us an expression: “being according to itself” (“Kath'heautou”).

This is: what is given (and asked) according to the given (and the asked) itself, and not according to us. In other words, in modern terms: the object decides, not the interpreting subject.

In Aristotle's formula for “ontology/metaphysics”, this returns as follows: “being as being” (“to on èi on”).

2.-- Zinstichting.

This concerns both the given (and what is sought) and, above all, what that given (with what is requested) provokes in the person confronted with it.

In other words: expressed in modern terms: both the object and, above all, the subject as an interpretive being independent of the object.

Note-- W. Leibbrand/A. Wettley, **Der Wahnsinn (Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie *)*, Freiburg/München, 1961, 60, cites a text by **Platon **, **Sofistès** (*Sof.* 228) which deals with 'para.frosunè', thinking apart from reality. The one who thinks apart from reality to an excessive degree is in a state of delusion, of delusional ideas—is insane, 'parafron'. Let us note in this regard that the counter-model is called “so.frosunè”, thinking reality itself.

The sharpest case of sophosune, 'real' thinking (realistic, objective thinking), is what the phenomenologist does, for example: he focuses on what is directly given and on nothing else. He focuses on the phenomenon, that which presents itself as a phenomenon, insofar as the phenomenon exists.

The sharpest case of parafrasune is complete madness, in which the madman says of something something that lies completely outside the first something, which, in that case, is not the object but yet another cause for claiming whatever else is said about the object.

CF31

Let us note that thinking apart from reality, as just defined, creates problems, whereas thinking according to reality solves problems. Which indicates that the latter is culture. Cf. *CF. 10* (“Actual solution”).

An example . The concept of ' **responsibility** '.

1.-- Conception of meaning.

'Responsibility' in itself can be defined as handling—or interpreting—a task (given + requested) in such a way that, in handling it, one's conscience is given due consideration. -- Expressed colloquially: “letting” both the given and the requested matter come to one's conscience!

Like this: my child is sick. In conscience, I cannot abandon him to his fate. 'Conscience' is the common word for “ethical commitment.” Because one realizes that there are situations involving rights and duties, and even ideals.

Analytical

Given: my child is sick.

Requested: to take action to save it from that wretched state.

Solution: either I can handle it myself, for example, or I call a doctor.

Such conduct is, in Hegelian terms, 'wirklich' (*CF 01*), true to reality, because one allows what is given and what is asked to be done justice, to come into their own.

2.-- Foundation of the Sense.

Given: my child is sick.

Requested: take action to save it.

A solution that is unethical and unscrupulous is “I don’t let it bother me”.

The given and the requested, which are always one, are not given their due.

Here, the creation of meaning is literally introduced. Established in the strict sense of the word. It does not derive from the given and the requested, but from a—cynical, pathological—subject.

The Latin tradition calls this “peccatum omissionis”, the sin of omission. It is as if, in the event of omission, the given and the requested did not even exist. To such an extent, in that harsh case, one thinks outside or beside reality.

Incidentally: according to *Paul Diel* (1893/1972; Austrian-French psychologist), in his ** Psychologie curative et médecine**, **Neuchatel**, 1968*, such cynical behavior is just as mentally ill as neurosis—indeed, worse, sicker, more morbid, but with the semblance of cold reason and thus seemingly mentally 'normal'. That explains why Plato speaks of **para.frosunè**, alongside the task of thinking.

CF32

11. Representation and interpretation of the phenomenon. (32/37)

Let us return to the duality of the previous short chapter.

But now, based on what we very generally call 'phenomenon representation'. In phenomenon representation—in the form of a description or a story—the given coincides with the requested subject in a certain sense,

in that the requested subject is to represent the given subject as accurately as possible. One sees that this is 'sense-taking', that is, grasping the given subject (in its essence) and putting it into words or interpreting it into signs.

Hegel's phenomenology, which represents a single main given in its cultural-historical forms or modes of appearance—that of Husserl, which represents the general essence ('eidos'; eidetic phenomenology)—and the phenomenology of Teilhard de Chardin, which represents the evolution of life forms, are three types of a—sometimes theoretically very complex, indeed, over-complex—representation of phenomena.

We begin with a sketch by E. Husserl himself. 32/34.

Library st.: W. Biemel, Hrsg./Einl.,. E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Fünf Vorlesungen)*, The Hague, 1950, 31

In that passage, Husserl wants to demonstrate that absolute doubt (“I doubt everything”) is an impossibility (following, incidentally, R. Descartes). Reason: the very experience of doubting 'everything' is unquestionable! It concerns the experience as an unquestionable 'given' and thus a completely or 'absolutely' certain starting point.

Here is the text.

Given. -- I am experiencing something, e.g. a disappointment or frustration.

Requested. -- The absolute certainty of demonstrating the lived experience or sensation as lived experience.

Husserl. -- “Every experience accomplished by the spirit, and even every experience merely as such, can, at the moment it becomes a fact, be made the object of attention and grasping.”

Immediately, in this very act of observing it, she is something that is absolutely there (is given). She is a given insofar as she is something that 'is' ('Seiendes'), as something that is “this there”. To question its being is pointless.

So much for the pure representation of the phenomenon. But interpretation is also possible.

Husserl. -- “Admittedly, I can examine what type of 'being' that experience is and how this mode of 'being' is comparable to other modes of being.

I can further examine what, in this case, 'givenness' (*note*: the fact that something is given) means. Thinking further, I can focus on the fact that I am focusing on the experience itself. (...)”.

In other words: although inherent to the conscious experience itself insofar as one pays attention to it, the examination of types of being, of what is given to be, is nevertheless already an interpretation, that is, the processing by the one who lives through, of what is perceived.

The absolute certainty.

Husserl. -- “In any case, I stand here constantly on completely certain ground. Such observation, after all, is and remains—as long as it lasts—something absolutely certain, -- a ‘this there’, -- something which, taken in itself, is what it is”.

Husserl falls into the opposing pair “existence/essence” (which was already noted by Plato; CF 14). Immediately he stands in full ontology. This is evident from what he says now.

Husserl. -- “Something by which I can measure—it concerns an indisputable measure—what 'being' and 'being given' can mean and, in this case, must mean. Naturally, regarding the kind of 'being' and 'being given' of which 'this there' (*note*: the experience) is one sample.”

Husserl is searching for “a measure,” a norm by which he can measure reality (“How real something is and how it really is”). But that is, besides a representation of phenomena, already nascent ontology or the study of being.

In other words: what presents itself—a phenomenon—is something that exists.

Note: We are keeping it simple here. But anyone who wants to know more about this and acquire 'scholarship' on the subject is referred to, for example:

-- R. Bakker, *The History of Phenomenological Thought* , Utrecht/Antwerp, 1964 (prehistory: -- Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty);

-- Alpha. de Waelhens, *Existence et signification* , Louvain/Paris, 1958 (phenomenological problems of all kinds);

-- R. Bruzina/Br. Wilshire, ed., *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology* , The Hague/Boston, 1978 (phenomenological problems).

-- Regarding hermeneutics or theory of interpretation: *O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., Hermeneutische Philosophie*, Munich, 1972 (Dilthey, Heidegger, Bollnow, Gadamer, Ritter, Becker, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur);

-- *P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'herméneutique)*, Paris, 1969 (*hermeneutics and structuralism* (CF 22); *hermeneutics and Freudian psychoanalysis; hermeneutics and phenomenology* and others).

That concludes the introduction.

CF34

We now demonstrate concretely—based on an experience of frustration and aggression—what interpreting or explaining can be. Immediately, this is a piece of practical hermeneutics.

A.-- Frustration/aggression.

Naturally, much has been written about that (causal) connection. -- whoever is disappointed tends towards an aggressive disposition, indeed, becomes aggressive. Behold the lived experience. -- Let us now examine how that can be interpreted.

B.-- Interpretations . (34/37)

We select a few interpretations by random sampling.

a. The Yale School.

Library st.: *R. Denker, Aggression (Kant/ Darwin/ Freud/ Lorenz)*, Amsterdam, 1967 (// *Aufklärung über Agression*, Stuttgart, 1966), 76/78 (Frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Yale School). -

(1). S. Freud (1856/1939; founder of psychoanalysis)

He asserted in a number of claims that if pleasure-seeking or pain-fleeing behavior is inhibited (meets opposition or resistance), then disappointment ('frustration') follows, with an aggressiveness ('aggression') in its wake.

In short: omen (disappointment) -- continuation (aggressiveness)).

(2). The Yale School.

Like Freud, this tendency characterizes the attack as a 'reactive' (responsoric) phenomenon, i.e., as a follow-up to an omen.

1937.-- John Dollard, in a study of a group in the southern USA, established as an axiom that is formulated in 1939 in *J. Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1939.

a. Aggression is always, by law, the consequence of a frustration as a harbinger.

b. Frustration always, by law, leads to aggression. Whereby 'frustration' is interpreted as an obstacle in the pursuit of a stated goal.

(3). The Yale School.

Following criticisms showing that the term 'always' is (lawfully) untenable, N. Miller et al. formulate it differently in **The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis**, in: *Psychol. Review* 1941:48, 337/342.

a. Frustration can also be processed differently, -- without an attack.

b. Frustration is indeed always (by law) a harbinger of attack tendencies, but not of attacks that will carry themselves out.

CF35

Incidentally. A. Plack et al., *Der Mythos vom Agressionstrieb*, Munich, 1974, responds against the interpretations regarding attack and aggression by S. Freud, K. Lorenz (1903/1984), Nico Tinbergen (1903/1994), and A. Mitscherlich, and states upfront that:

(1) aggression is not innate ('active') but reactive and

(2) not universal. The authors mentioned rely on an impure induction, which does not take random samples and is too limited in number.

Great apes, for example, are rather 'friendly' than aggressive, and primitives display a compassion such that they survive in their circumstances.

Note: She may briefly mention the famous book by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, **Lessons for the Living** (** Conversations with the Dying**, Bilthoven, 1970 (// ** On Death and Dying**, New York, 1969).

In it, oc, 48/140, it is argued on the basis of factual material that an attack does not always follow the omen of miscalculation—in this case: dying:

1. denial ("That can't be right. Not me!"), anger ("Why me already? I won't accept that!"), things ("I'm behaving myself. Who knows, maybe I won't get away with it this way!"), despondency ("I've had miscalculations all my life"),

2. Acceptance ("It is everyone's fate") comprises the entire series of phases or reaction types. Anger, typical of attack and aggressiveness, is merely one reaction type.

b . The ABC theory.

Library st.:

--- A. Ellis, *The Theory and Practice of Rational-Emotive Psychotherapy* , New York, 1961;

-- A. Ellis/ E. Sagarin, *Nymphomania* , Amsterdam, 1965 (// *Nymphomania* , New York, 1964).

Oc, 137ff. -- The ABC theory regarding a person's personality has a very curious hermeneutics.

A is the disappointing fact (e.g., the nymphomaniac who goes from bed to bed and considers herself a disappointing case; e.g., the doctor who says that one is incurable).

C is the (ultimate) reaction or interpretation of such a frustrating fact. The characteristic of ABC theory is that it situates the personal axioms (B) between the stimulus (A) and the reaction (C) such that C is the result of both A and those presuppositions.

Common sense . -- B, acting as common sense, reasons in such a way that the frustration is rationalized and explained as calmly as possible. Does not dramatize. "It is much harder than I expected. I can't handle it yet. But I will get through it."

CF36

The neurosis (the neurotic mind).

Here, it is not the conception of meaning that predominates, but the construction of the sentence.

"I am disappointing. It is disappointing. It is unbearable!" B. i.e. "what one deludes oneself" (oc, 138), causes in the first place (with the frustrating situation in the background) C, i.e., the overstrain, the despondency, or whatever else.

Stellers: "I cannot bear what happened at point A! It is terrible! Horrible! Disastrous! It makes me a completely worthless individual" (Oc, 138). -- As stated in Oc, 139: the neurotic reaction or interpretation is not so much due to the failure (A) but to the attitude, the 'sense', toward the failure (B).

Sentences. -- The judgment of the sound and the neurotic mind expresses itself in judgments that are typical.

Those judgments cited, oc, 191v., are each genuine axioms, definitions put forward regarding failure.

For example: “It is inevitable that one is completely thrown off balance by the problems and disturbances of others.” “Man’s happiness depends on external factors and he himself has little power over his worries and troubles.” “One must be thoroughly competent, well-adjusted, and successful in all possible respects in order to be able to consider oneself a full human being.”

When a miscalculation passes through such axioms (= lens), it is inevitable, unless one regains control, that negative reactions (denial, things, despondency, -- anger) predominate.

Peculiar: the inner voice of such people formulates the axioms (*CF 26 : Inner thinking*). From which it appears that the judgment is disturbed.

c. The sublimity hypothesis of W. James (1842/1910; pragmatist).

This interpretation appears in his *Varianten van religie ervaren* (*Een onderzoek naar de mensen aard*), Zeist/ Arnhem/ Antwerpen, 1963 (// *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902)), 27/34.

“For religion, serving ‘The Highest’ is never a yoke. Dull submission has been left far behind, and a willingness—which can assume every shade between joyful serenity and spirited delight—has taken its place.” (Oc, 27).

That is precisely what enables the truly religious person to handle the frustrations (“This earth is more a valley of tears than an earthly paradise”) perfectly.

CF37

Not with the dull acceptance of the Stoic, who haughtily looks down on those who cannot bear the disappointments. Not with the flight of the Epicurean who retreats into his 'little garden' to escape the frustrating world and seek a melancholic, pleasure-seeking life there. But with the sense of the sublime, which, according to James, is characteristic of the truly religious person.

Christianity—according to James—surpasses Stoicism, which is based merely on moralizing: “While the merely 'rational' exhortation (*note*: characteristic of the Stoic) requires an effort of the will, Christian conduct is the result of inspiration by a higher-earth emotion (*note*: the sense of the sublime) which is present without effort of the will.”

James even defines every true religion as that sense of the sublime. --
“There is a state of mind—known to religious people but to no others—in which the urge for self-preservation is replaced by a willingness to ‘keep our mouths shut’ and to be ‘nothing’ in the ‘flood’, the ‘deluges’ of God.

In such a state of mind, what we feared most has become the source of our security. The hour of death of our 'moral' (*note*: merely moralizing) attitude has turned into our spiritual birthday.” (Oc, 31).

“We find this happiness in ‘the Absolute and Eternal’ nowhere except in religion. It distinguishes itself from every 'natural' happiness, every joy in the present, solely by that element of sublimity to which I have already pointed out so often.” (Oc, 32). -- “A sublime sorrow (*note*: frustration) is a sorrow with which we inwardly agree.” (Ibid.).

This manifests itself in the sacrifice: “Being happy in a religious way outwardly accepts evil as a form of sacrifice, but inwardly knows that evil has been overcome for good.” (Oc,33)

James summarizes: “Religious consciousness is this intricate willingness to sacrifice in which a lower unhappiness is kept in check by a higher sense of happiness.” (Ibid.).

“Religion thus makes what is in any case necessary into something easy and happy.” (Oc, 34).

Conclusion . -- Properly processing frustrations is a high form of culture, because it solves a major problem of life.

CF38

12. The identity axiom: meaning-making and interpretation. (38/41)

We return to our previous topic: conception of meaning/foundation of meaning. But now applied not to an experience (as Husserlian phenomenologists like to discuss), but to what one finds in all textbooks of ontology, traditional and formalized logic: the principle of identity.

Existence/ essence captured. (38/39)

Let us reread CF 14 (' Reality ').

We heard Husserl say: “This – there (*note* : it was about an inner experience), – something which, taken in itself, is what it is” (*CF* 33).

Classically worded, the basic axiom that governs all being and all linear thinking of being reads:

“What is, is” (emphasizes existence);

“What is, is” (essence emphasized).

To 'prove' such a thing, to derive it from prepositions, is impossible, because to 'prove' those prepositions one requires the postulate of identity entirely or absolutely! This amounts to what traditional logicians call a “*circulus vitiosus*,” a 'vicious' (unjustifiable) circular argument.

The only form of proof: evidentiary or manifestness. That is: if one is confronted with a healthy (not, for example, neurotic or otherwise biased) mind or 'reason' with something that exists or something that is so, then there is exactly one reaction: to say that the something exists or that the something is so.

Note: In mathematics and logistics, this is expressed 'tautologically': “a is a” (which is precisely one application of the principle or axiom of traditional logic (which uses mathematical and logistic terms as terms in addition to words of natural languages (*CF* 27v .)). The same applies to the equality (quantitatively) “a = a”, one type of mathematical equation.

Modalities of the principle.

'Modality' here means 'variant'.

Library st. : *Ch. Lahr, SJ, Cours de philosophie , I (Psychologie Logique), Paris, 1933-27, 502/506 (La proposition).*

Traditional logic speaks of 'quantity' and 'quality' of judgments.

Quantity .

This applies to the scopes (*CF* 04) of the subject:

a. singular/ private/ universal;

b. transcendental.

CF39

Quality.

This time it is more the saying.

That wall is white' (affirmative sentence).

“That wall is white in a certain sense” (sentence expressing a restrictive or reservation).

“That wall is not white” (negative sentence).

Reread *CF 15* (identical fan). Note that the restrictive sentence can also read “That wall is, in a certain sense, not white.” That is precisely what the common man expresses with a figure of speech: “That wall is white and not white” (which does not contradict the principle of contradiction, because it is a restrictive sentence).

Note: Two other formulations of the axiom of identity are in circulation.

a. In terms of contradiction: “Something cannot simultaneously and from the same point of view be (so) and not be (so)”.

b. In terms of excluded third: “Except for (being) like this and not (being) like this, there is no third (type of reality)”.

This is speaking in terms of a dilemma (two and only two possibilities are available).

Note well: these two formulations are nothing new! Using other, explanatory words, they say exactly the same thing as the mere axiom of identity. For outside of absolute or all-encompassing being, there is absolutely nothing (one then says, using a figure of speech: “absolute or total nothing”—which is absolutely nothing (one should not be fooled by the figure of speech)).

Note: The principle of identity is universally applicable.

If that wall is white, in a certain sense is white, is not white, then that wall is white, in a certain sense white, not white.

That repetition is the expression of the being (existence/essence) of that wall, -- the articulation of what it is (is total, is partial, is not).

Always that identity fan. So much for the conception of meaning.

And now the sentence structure . (39/44)

The conception of meaning is a matter of evidence, apparentness. In ancient language 'a.lètheia' (Latin: veritas), 'truth' (understand: that which presents itself as being (so)).

In the terms of Parmenides of Elea: “Being according to itself, as it is in itself, in itself”. Cf. *CF 30* .--

Hence “What is true, is true”. “What reveals itself as already being (so), reveals itself as being (so)”.

Immediately we have the transcendental 'truth' or 'evidentity' as a basic concept, alongside the concepts of 'being' and 'unity' (*CF 15: comprehensive concepts*).

CF40

The conscience.

'Conscience' is all that is known as being (as such).

Which is not yet the same as everything that has been acknowledged as being (so). For between the pure knowing that something is or is so, and the affirmative responding to it and acknowledging that it is (so), sometimes lies an abyss. The abyss of the conscious lie or of unconscious and subconscious repression.

Let us reread *CF 30: para.frosunè and so.frosunè*, thinking alongside reality and thinking reality. -- Or, in Hegelian terms, real thinking and unreal thinking.

The introspective method.

A number of psychologists rely on the introspective method.

Thus *Paul Diel, Psychologie curative et médecine* , Neuchatel, 1968.

This consists in observing, examining, and analyzing oneself. Diel sees this as the only true method providing insight into human nature, without which even the most rabid behaviorist can understand nothing of what goes on within a person. For what, for instance, would envy mean to the behaviorist if he or she had never experienced something like envy within themselves, thanks to self-observation? It would simply be a blind spot.

But – Diel adds – our self-knowledge is disturbed by falsehoods about ourselves. Our vanities, in particular, disturb our self-perceptions. 'Vanity' means:

- a. 'emptiness' ("That barrel is vain"),
- b. 'self-absorption', i.e., prejudice regarding oneself such that one perceives what is not there as existing, and vice versa.

It is not sexual aspirations—as Freud posits—that disturb our (self-)knowledge in the first place, but our vanity. Thus Diel. And regarding our vanities concerning sexuality, our own and those of others.

P. Ricoeur, **Le conflit des interprétations **, Paris, 1969, op. 171, ss. 238, relies on the reflective method. Following the trail of self-knowledge from Socrates of Athens (-469/-399), through J. Nabert (** Les philosophies de la réflexion **), to the present day, Ricoeur posits that philosophy is 'reflection' (oc. 322), specifically thinking about oneself (Descartes, Kant, Fichte).

"I think" is an experience (of the mind) that is unmistakable and therefore 'true' (evidently). But this does not yet imply that a panacea, a miracle cure, is at hand. Within that "I think" all sorts of things reveal themselves—true and false! The 'I think' is "a basic truth which, although unmistakable there, is nevertheless 'abstract' and 'empty'" (oc, 322)!

CF41

What does one do with that? Regarding self-knowledge and regarding knowledge of the rest of all that is? But it remains what Diel says: thanks to self-knowledge, we can discover whether we suffer from conscious or unconscious self-deception. Whether we grasp being according to itself (so.frosunè) or according to us.

"What is, is."

One cannot believe this without a minimum of reverence for all that is 'true' (evident and therefore, if necessary, verifiable or ascertainable). Reverence for the truth of what reveals itself is a spiritual quality that manifests itself through this sentence: "What is (so), is (so)". Indirectly. But unmistakably as "that over there" (to use Husserl's term). Reverence is acknowledging what is (so).

"What is, is."

One cannot mean this without a minimum of honesty. Honesty is the respect of someone who, with profound engagement with conscience (responsibility; CF 31), surrenders himself to what is true, that is, what presents itself as already (so) being and not otherwise.

In all honesty, as a subject of (co-)responsible behavior, I say the following: "If I am honest (with myself and also with what is given, as it exists), then I must acknowledge "in conscience" that what is, is."

In other words: the axiom of identity is a matter of truth—what reveals itself—regarding what is in itself (according to itself), and thus a matter of conception of meaning, but also and simultaneously a matter of reverence for truth as truth and of honesty with myself and towards the truth, and thus a

matter of founding meaning or interpretation or meaning, which is acknowledgment. "In my opinion, it is so according to what is in itself!"

In ABC-theoretical terms: what A is, is A! The given, even if it is disappointing, is the given. My B is such that I take A as A is. Thus, my final response to the given A is 'true', but at the same time honest and based on reverence for all that is, i.e. for all that presents itself as being and thus proves to be 'true'. Cf CF 35 (ABC).

Conclusion.-- The principle of identity continually found in ontologies, logics, logistics, and mathematics is judgment, the expression of acknowledgment, respect, and honesty, -- without which culture in the 'true' sense is unthinkable.

CF42

13. The declining interpretation. (42/45)

Let us pause for a moment to consider a very current school of thought, deconstructionism. - **Bibl. st.:** *Theo de Boer et al., Modern French Philosophers*, Kampen/Kapellen, 1993.

This booklet, one of many publications on the phasing-out philosophy, comprises eight contributions by eight staff members (active at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam). -- Topics covered include:

M. Foucault (1926/1984), who, following in the footsteps of G. Bataille and M. Blanchot, attempts to refute the thinking of power, one of the influential factors within our Western culture;

J. Derrida (1930/2004), who, in the wake of M. Heidegger ("die destruktion") and Saussure (CF 22: structuralism) (what Derrida calls), tries to "dismantle" ('déconstruire') 'logocentrism' (in practice: traditional Western ontology);

J.-Fr. Lyotard (1924/1998), who dismantles the claim of all-encompassing narratives (i.e., comprehensive interpretations of human history, such as the sacred history of the Bible or the belief in progress of modern thinkers) and unmask them as thought constructs;

Julia Kristeva (1941/...) and **Luce Irigaray** (1939/ ...), who dismantle phallocracy, the claim of male thought to the monopoly of absolute truth;

J. Baudrillard (1929/2007), who unmask the realm of signs within our Western society as a simulation culture;

E. Levinas (1905/1995), who unmask all-encompassing egology (philosophy of the self), which claims to grasp all-encompassing being within an equally all-encompassing self or consciousness, from a Jewish perspective;

P. Ricoeur (1913/2005), who attempts to integrate the three critical thinkers, namely K. Marx, Fr. Nietzsche, and S. Freud, as unmaskers of modern self-conscious thought.

Guido Vanheeswyck, in a brief review (Streven), states that the term 'deconstructionism' (which certainly fits, for example, Jacques Derrida) does not clearly reflect the true content of the thinkers discussed in the work. He sticks with Woldring, who uses the term "hermeneutic philosophy" in his introduction.

The reason is: virtually all those discussed take a text (by predecessors) as a given, requesting an exposing interpretation! In ancient Greek: a 'paraphrasis' that is 'eristic'.

CF43

Note: Let no one be too alarmed: Derrida, the figurehead (up to and including the anarchist interpretations attributed to him), says himself that when M. Heidegger attempts to 'destroy' the entire Western ontological tradition ("radical destruction"), he is undertaking an impossible task, for, in order to be able to do such a thing—according to Derrida—he would have to find a position outside traditional ontology. Only then can one compare both positions. Only then, above all, can the limitations of traditional ontology become apparent. Such a thing seems impossible to Derrida.

Derrida himself said, during a speech delivered in Los Angeles (1987), that Greece, Christianity, and German idealism (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) are "foreign to him" because of his Jewish ancestry. That explains a great deal regarding Derrida's deconstructionism.

Eristics. (43/44)

'Erizo' in ancient Greek means "I dispute" (with or without physical altercation). -- "Hè eristikè technè" means 'eristics' (skill of dispute). Thus Plato, *Sophistes* 231e.-- The School of Megara was called "hoi eristikoi (filosofoi)", the eristics.

Library st.: EW Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 78/92 (*Eristics and Skepticism*).

According to Beth, raising paradoxes is typical of the Eristics. This method consists of interpreting a text in such a way (hermeneutic method) that the contradictions (absurdities) are exposed. This is known as the “reductio ad absurdum”. For example, Euclid of Megara (-450/-380; the founder of the Megarian school) did not attack the axioms of texts, but rather the deductions that flow from those axioms.

Zenon of Elea (c. 500/...; pupil of Parmenides) already applied this method. Aristotle summarizes his reasoning scheme as follows: “ Neither you nor I present irrefutable proofs for what you assert.” In other words: neither one nor the other possesses convincing, generally acceptable, 'rational' grounds.

This eristic method has been dismissed as 'playfulness' or a disease of contention. However, Beth says, oc, 84: “The method of the counter-model (= the eristic refutation method) was applied with great success by modern mathematics and logistics”. Opposite the model that is being dismantled, one proposes a counter-model derived from the absurdity of the model.

CF44

The notorious “proof by contradiction” (provided, at least, that there is no more than a model and a counter-model present (“excluded third party”(CF 39)).

A little Socratic-Platonic example.

Sophists claimed that only the 'expert' (in modern language: the 'rational') human being is the 'good' (understand: livable, resilient, useful, virtuous) human being. -- Behold the text.

Now for the winding down .

To which Socrates replies - Plato: “If only the expert is the good man and if the thief is an expert (in stealing goods, the property of a fellow man), then the thief is “a good man”.

Something that even the uprooted and nihilistic sophist would not so easily agree to!

From the unacceptable conclusions of the model, one insinuates that the counter-model is acceptable. Rationally speaking. Reasoning speaking.

We do say: spoken 'rationally' or 'by reasoning'. For eristics is essentially counter-argumentation. It is essentially 'paraphrasis', commentary. Textual commentary, because it targets the opponent by his weak spot, namely his (personal or more general) axioms and the unacceptable deductions derived from them. In this sense, the “reductio ad absurdum”, the reduction to the absurd, is also an “argumentum ad hominem”, a line of proof played out against the person of the opponent who provided the text to be interpreted. One targets him through his text.

Conclusion. -- We summarize.

1. The conception of meaning .

When I think of the text, I think of the true meaning of the text.

2. The sentence foundation .

Regarding the text, I am thinking somewhat about the meaning of the text, but rather about the unacceptable conclusions that, in my opinion, flow from the (meaning of the) text via reasoning—or rather, counter-reasoning.

We shall see that, for example, Derrida mixes far more than just the logically strictly derivable, unacceptable interpretations into the text—in order to dismantle the text from every possible perspective. Of which here is a small example.

The concept of 'responsibility' 'interpreted' in a Derridian way.
(44/45)

Bible st. : M. Lisse, Le motif de la déconstruction et ses portées politiques ,
in : Tijdschr. v. philosophy 52 (1990): 2 (June), 230/250.

CF45

Lisse, ac, 247, cites. -- Micha Brumlik poses the question to Derrida regarding responsibility for Nazism and concentration camps.

To which Derrida replied: “I am suspicious of the metaphysical concept of 'responsibility'. Although incorporated into the language regarding human rights (in the presuppositions of every democracy—in Western ethics and politics), that metaphysical concept has nevertheless been unable, unfortunately, to prevent Nazism and Auschwitz from coming into being.”

Note: With this, Derrida attempts to emphasize the powerlessness of ingrained concepts incorporated into texts. Which, of course, every traditional thinker who dealt with “metaphysical concepts” also knew.

Yes, the common man knows that, for example, basic concepts instilled through upbringing, at least among a portion of the educated, do not produce the result that those who educated them expect. It is even certain that Derrida's deconstructive concepts, in turn, do not achieve the result that he, at least, wanted to reach with them! As proof: he had to emphatically reject the anarchist interpretations of his philosophy! Plato, back in the day, already complained that some of his students misused his dialectics "like dogs tearing one another apart"!

But Derrida goes further. -- "On the contrary," very often Nazi language itself employed the axiomatics with which Nazism was combated!"

Note: The National Socialists under A. Hitler also used the term 'responsibility'. But based on Nazi axioms.

Derrida. -- "Not only did the governments allow Hitler to act. The pronouncements of intellectuals, the theoretical concepts derived from this notion of 'responsibility', were also insufficient to adequately halt Nazism. Moreover, the opposite became true. A network of complicity was created on all sides. All this gives us a bad conscience to this day."

Derrida plays the tragic fate of the concept of 'responsibility', which he calls 'metaphysical', against that concept itself.

In other words: he speaks as if a (metaphysical) concept also encompasses his sentence structures! The irresponsibilities of people, who have their mouths full of 'responsibility', seem to be part of the concept itself! Which, of course, becomes so deconstructible.

CF46

14. The reasoning. (46/47)

We saw it just now (CF 44): "If only the expert is the good person and if the thief is an expert (regarding the misappropriation of goods from a neighbor), then the thief is "a good person".

We have also already noted in passing that traditional logic is ontology insofar as it is expressed in "if-then" sentences.

Let us now address that hypothetical sentence as such.

E. De Strycker, SJ, **Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie **, Kapellen, 1967-1, 103v. (*The Hypothetical Method*), states that Plato

borrowed this mode of reasoning from the mathematicians of his time. By 'hypothesis' he understands "a proposition (judgment) that is assumed without proof (by the conversational partners within dialogical philosophizing), from which another proposition (judgment) can be derived".

Deduction/reduction.

De Strycker notes two forms.

1.-- 'Sunthesis' (deduction).

"If A, then B". Where A is a given statement.

Thus, "If only the expert is a good person, then the thief, insofar as he is an expert, is a good person."

2.-- 'Analusis' (reduction).

"If X, then A". Where X is a sought theorem.

Thus: "If the moon moves in front of the sun, then there is a solar eclipse". As long as the first sentence or preface is not proven, the second sentence or converse remains dependent on a theorem that has yet to be tested. Therefore, we have provided the preface with X, the unknown.

The Strycker

a. The usual method of the mathematicians of that time is deduction or 'sunthesis': they proceed from a set of 'archai', presuppositions, or 'stoicheia', elements, which they consider to be purely given (for which they seek no proofs).

b . Platon, however, in dialectics (philosophy), aims to conduct research into foundations and attempts to find a proof for the axioms proposed by mathematicians without any proof. That is 'analusis' or reduction.

One sees that the hypothetical sentences are indeed 'stoicheiosis' (CF 03), but now in the form of "if-then" sentences.

CF47

One sees that the lemmatic-analytical method (CF 08) is a deductive form of reductive reasoning (one acts as if X is already A), -- that proofs by contradiction or *the apagogical method* (CF 44 ; "apagoga eis adunaton," says Aristotle, An. priora 1: 7,4) is also a deductive form of reductive reasoning (compelling from the absurdity of derivations from presuppositions to other presuppositions). All this is Platonism. So it is still today.

Indeed: *IM Bochenski, OP, *Wijsgerigemethoden in de moderne wetenschap* *, Utr. /Antw., 1961, 93v., says: “As J. Lukasiewicz (1878/1956; Polish logician) – incidentally following in the footsteps of St. Jevons (1835/1862) – demonstrated, every method of proof can be divided into two major classes, namely into deduction and reduction.” This can be phrased as follows:

Deduction: if A, then B; well, A; therefore B.

Reduction : if A, then B; well, B; therefore A.

Whereby induction (*CF 19*), which concludes from the specimen to the class (set) or from the part to the whole (system), is one very frequent form of reduction. As Bochenski, *oc*, 94, shows.

“If all water boils at 100° C., then so does this water and that water. Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C. (the result of testing experiments). Therefore, all water boils at 100° C.”

The axiom of necessary and sufficient reason or ground.

What is the purpose of the peculiar preposition in Lukasiewicz's formulation “if A, then B”? Or in our example “if A, then B” or “if X, then B”? That is the 'hypothesis'! Regarding B, either the already known sufficient reason or ground (or at least the necessary reason, 'archai' or 'stoicheion') is stated, or the necessary and/or sufficient reason yet to be found is articulated.

“All that exists has, either within itself or outside itself, a necessary and/or sufficient reason or ground 'archè' or 'stoicheion')”.

The logical form of stoicheosis, orderly thinking, stands or falls with that axiom. The proof of which has still not been provided in a convincing manner (in an eristically irrefutable manner), but which is grasped by direct intuition.

According to *Ch. Lahr, Cours* , 531, reasoning is seeking out, revealing, provisionally unknown relations (*CF 15: identitive fan*) between concepts. At least in traditional logic.

Once again: what would we do, practically and theoretically, without the capacity for reasoning? This is a cultural asset of inestimable value.

CF47.1.

The reasoning as an extension of the phenomenon.

Let us revisit *CF 13, ad 4* (*The positive integer*). Aristotle notes that a phenomenon (here: a domain) is represented by a finite number of axioms.

Applied to the concept of numbers.

Change the axiom “If a is a number, then the successor of a ($a+$) is “in no case” 0”, into “If a is a number, then the successor of a ($a+$) is either 0 or not 0”. The phenomenon that reveals itself in this way is both the positive and the negative integer. The smaller the conceptual content, the more comprehensive the scope of the concept: by dropping an axiom, one can, for example, introduce $-1+ = 0$, i.e., the successor of -1 is 0.

Phenomenology and definition.

This relationship is reciprocal. Representing the given or phenomenon according to its essence takes place in the form of, for example, axioms (as in the term 'number') or in the form of a text (longer or abbreviated definition: CF 06v.). Thus, the text of a story shows the event to be defined.

The reverse is also true: it is precisely by defining, for example in a longer text or in a concise 'definition', that one sees the phenomenon, whether that be the entire positive or negative number, a building that is described accurately, or whatever else.

Decision.

1. What is seen is represented in a phenomenon representation (axiomatic or not).

2. A representation of a phenomenon (axiomatic or not) shows the phenomenon, depicting it as accurately as possible.

The reasoning is an 'amplification' or expansion of knowledge of the phenomenon.

In that sense, a line of reasoning is an extended phenomenology. Based on strict logical rules.

Applicable model. -- “If it is before 7:00 PM, then the boutique is open. Well, the boutique is not open. So it is not before 7:00 PM.

One recognizes the rule: “If A , then B . Well, $\neg B$ (not B). Therefore $\neg A$ (not A)”.

(*J. Anderson/ H. Johnstone, Natural Deduction (The Logical Basis of Axiom Systems)* , Belmont (Calif.), 1962, 7).

From the closed nature of the boutique, one concludes, via “modus tollens” (the rule), to the hour that reveals itself via that detour and thus becomes a phenomenon.

Conclusion . -- Phenomenology shows the phenomenon. Reasoning demonstrates a phenomenon related to it (*CF 05*). From the manifesting to the demonstrated.

15. Culture as a value system. (48/51)

In CF 01 we defined 'culture' as the manner in which

- a. reality ('being' / 'being') is grasped and
- b. tasks, amidst reality, be handled, solved.

Now, we saw that reality is grasped in conception of meaning and construction of meaning (CF 29ff.: *interpretation, meaning-making*) and reasoning (CF 46ff.)

We saw—with regard to the object of interpretation and reasoning—that reality is interpreted (and reasoned) as an existence/essence couple (CF 14 : “ *How real is something? How is it real ?*”).

But there are other interpretations of reality:

- a. as identity and its variants (CF 15: *differential*),
- b. as obviousness or 'truth' (CF 39).

All that remains for us now is one major characteristic of graspable reality: 'value' (by which a good is a good).

Value(s). (48/50).

The term 'value(s)' is originally a term usable in economic contexts. The use value of, for example, a basket of apples or its exchange value is a matter that has traditionally been self-evident.

Philosophically, however, 'value(s)' becomes something central starting from H. Lotze (1817/1881). And indeed in a typically positivist climate.

1. The concept of 'reality' – in the eyes of a positivist – is limited to everything grasped by the senses, – preferably in the form of exact (mathematical-experimental) sciences. These view everything that is real 'value-free'! That is, without wishing to pass any value judgment. As a purely sensually perceptible given.

It is evident that, given such an axiomatics, positive thinking very quickly becomes materialistic, limited to what our earthly senses reveal. Reducing everything that is not perceptible by the senses, either to illusion or to some form of matter.

2. H. Lotze, following in the footsteps of Christian Herm. Weisse (1801/1866; Hegelian but a devout Christian), experiences life as oriented towards values: these constitute “the meaning of life”.

But they are not 'reality' in the positivist-materialist sense. They are “a realm of values” in themselves. He calls their type of reality 'validity'. They validate—have value, represent a good or goods—without being positive and materially tangible. -- The 'axiology' ('axia' is 'value' in ancient Greek; related to 'axiom', predetermined value) is born immediately.

CF49

1.-- The Neo-Kantian axiology.

The Baden or Südwestdeutsche Schule forms a first offshoot. Wilh. Windelband (1848/1915) and *Heinrich Rickert* (1863/1936) are leading figures. For Rickert, knowing is essentially grasping value. His * *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* *, Tübingen, 1899, prioritizes universally valid and normative values of culture. These are not grasped by means of positive natural sciences, but by cultural science.

Human history is therefore essentially cultural history, which encompasses the realization (by the culturally minded person) of values within the material world.

Following in the footsteps of *Wilh. Dilthey* (*Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883)), *Eduard Spranger* (1882/1963) develops an axiology regarding education. Education is essentially a cultural event in which 'culture' is a system of meanings and values, supported by a group of people as guiding for behavior.

Educational science has a philosophy of culture as its axiomatics. -- Following in the footsteps of *Franz Brentano* (1838/1917; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874)), who places intentionality at the center, *Alexius von Meinong* (1853/1920) develops his own axiology, of which his *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie* , Graz, 1894, testifies.

2.--The phenomenological axiology.

Related to Brentano's “love' characterized as true to reality” (i.e., the sensing of objective value or values) and to Meinong's “emotional presentation” (i.e., the offering of feelings eliciting value(s)) is the “intentional feeling” of value (...) of *Max Scheler* (1874/1928; with *Ed. Husserl* founder of the Phenomenological school).

Scheler believes that values are grasped not so much by the rational side of our mind, but by the sensing of our mind. A 'sensing' that is entirely distinct from mere subjective feeling. For values 'apply' objectively. Scheler develops the ethical side. Morality and values go hand in hand.

Nicolai Hartmann (1882/1950) developed an axiology analogous to that of Scheler but much more ontological.

According to Jaensch, both Scheler and Hartmann fall into a dual system of value-free reality (following the path of positivism) on the one hand, and, on the other, of valid values emerging primarily through the human mind.

CF50

3.-- *The value relativist theories.*

'Relativism' regarding value(s) is the view that value(s) apply only to a single person, a single group of people (e.g. a single 'race' or class)—diachronically speaking, to a single time period. Universally applicable values therefore do not exist.

One example: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900; the theorist of nihilism), who claimed that “die Herren der Erde” (practically: the founders of culture; cf. *CF 10* : elitist) devise and impose values on peoples and all of humanity.

Note: Psychologists, sociologists, and cultural theorists—without a solid ontological background—very easily fall into such value relativism: they forget that values with limited validity can indeed be found, but against the background of general validities.

4.-- *The “God-is-dead” axiology.*

In the USA and elsewhere, a view is gaining increasing traction that, now that religions are in crisis, now that “God is dead” (Fr. Nietzsche), humanity can replace religions and God with 'values'. Thus, axiology replaces theology.

***The ontology regarding the good and values.* (50/51).**

Traditional ontology calls “the good” or 'value' a transcendental property of all that is.

In other words: anything that is something is susceptible to sensing value, -- within the spectrum from “positive valuation” through “appearing neutral” to “disapproving valuation”.

The conception of dual value is thoroughly rejected: positive facts in themselves carry within themselves the objective reason for our value judgments.

In other words: they 'validate' insofar as they represent value in themselves, "according to themselves" as Parmenides of Elea said) and not merely according to us.

Library st.: O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien , 1959-5, 382/388 (*Die Transzendentalien* ; -- vrl. oc 371/388 (*Das Seiende und das Gute*).

It was Euclid of Megara (-450/ -380; later of Socrates) who was the first to compile the list of transcendentals—being/identity (unity)/evidentity (truth)/value (goodness).

Platon addressed this more thoroughly. He enriched the One and the True of his predecessors with Being and the Good.

CF51

Whereas the Paleo-Pythagoreans, for example, sought "the evident ('true') connection ('unity')" in their arithmology (theory of order), Platon addressed reality with as his main axiom "to ontos on", the truly real, and "to agathon", the (truly) good or valuable.

This shows that the all-encompassing or transcendental concepts are more than a kind of unrealistic figments of the imagination.

The "value/disvalue" fan.

Between a highest value (accepted by many) (which is often the divine or at least the sacred) and absolute non-value (which is absolutely nothing, since "absolute non-value" is a figure of speech), situated values that can be ordered according to some ranking, i.e., a 'hierarchy of values'. The various cultures show us a boundless variety of such arrangements. Let us note just one such arrangement for reasons of its cultural-historical impact or 'reception'.

Plato , in his *Nomoi* (Laws), says: "Man owes gratitude for three possessions: the deities, his soul, his body".

GJ de Vries, *Plato's image of man* , in: *Tijdschr. v. phil.* 15 (1953): 3, 430ff., says: "Hence the soul—just as well as it ought to take care of itself (*Phaedo* 115b)—ought to satisfy the desire that it take care of all that is inanimate (*Phaedrus* 246b)".

For example, a premature “liberation of the soul” from the body by suicide is impermissible in Plato's view (ac, 431).

Conclusion. -- One should not attribute radical dualism (soul/body) to Platon, nor absolute contempt for the body (which he never harbored). Rather, hierarchy.

His psychology recognizes three aspects of the soul:

- a. the great monster aimed at goods such as 'diaita (settlement with dwelling, food, etc.), night's rest (“good sleep”), sexuality, economic labor;
- b. the smaller lion that is attuned to honor (sense of honor);
- c. the little man who is attuned to being (unity, truth, goodness).

Which proves that Platon does not hold the actual human being in such high regard... based on a hierarchy of values. For—note this carefully—the three soul parts are each types of valuation. Which proves that Platon's psychology was actually a psychology of values and, at the same time, a psychology of culture and upbringing.

CF52

16. Soloviev's hierarchy of values. (52/54)

Vladimir Soloviev (1853/1900) belongs to the Russian Christian realists and is considered one of the most thorough thinkers of Russia.

We focus on one work, namely TDM, trad., Vl. Soloviev, *La justification du bien* (*Essai de philosophie morale*), Paris, 1939-2, 27/134 (*Le bien dans la nature humaine*).

Oc, 98. -- “A person who is in fact as he/she ought to be in conscience is a 'virtuous' person. Expressed differently: virtue is the normal and conscientiously imposed relationship to everything. After all, one cannot conceive of attributes without relations.”

Note -- With these words Soloviev defines what ethics or morality is. It is giving what is due to everything -- itself, the rest of all that is.

But relation does not imply that there is no diversity of relations. -- When we distinguish ourselves from what is not ourselves, then we must prioritize or define what is not ourselves in a threefold manner.

Either we are dealing with something that is by nature lower than us, or equal to us, or higher than us.

Note -- Soloviev, as a thinker-ontologist, first considers what is given. He situates that given in relation to man. From this, he arrives at value judgments, which represent what is given as value or 'good'.

It logically follows from this that our conscientious relationship to ourselves and the rest will also be threefold.

1. Thus it is evident that we ought not to value that which is below our level of existence, such as a tendency inherent in our purely earthly nature, as if it were higher (let us say, for example, a divine commandment).

2. Likewise, it would be contrary to what ought to be if we were to situate a being of our level—let us say a human being—either below us (to regard that human being as if he/she were an inanimate being) or place him/her above us (to see a deity in him/her).

Note -- Compare with *CF 51* : Platon's three arrows: the Platonism of the Eastern Christian realists becomes very clear.

All this entails that we know and feel ourselves to be either superior, equal, or subordinate to the rest.

CF53

The Five Realms.

Typical of a Christian realist, Soloviev distinguishes the following levels of existence.

1. He calls the lowest degree “the inorganic realm”, of which he (oc, 187) indicates the stone as a model.

2. Above that, he situates “the plant kingdom,” which both exists materially and lives (arises and perishes as a living being).

3. Higher stands “the animal kingdom,” which exhibits life as well as a degree of consciousness regarding states (a dog wags its tail in a friendly manner when it meets a familiar person but bites when it feels threatened).

4. What he labels as “the human realm” rises above it because man exists materially (inorganic), lives (plant-like), has animal consciousness (animal-like), but above all grasps the meaning of life in the light of ideas inherent to his intellect, or rather his spirit.

5. Surprisingly for us Westerners who have learned to think in a secularized way since the Enlightenment, Soloviev mentions “the Kingdom of God” as the most natural thing in the world: for as a Christian realist he knows that the meaning of life is only fully and truly realizable thanks to sacred or salvation history, in which God—in the events of Easter and Pentecost, which are central to all Eastern liturgies—saves the meaning of life—in the literal sense. -- Cfr oc, 190ss.

Note -- We immediately know more precisely what Soloviev means by “anything lower than man” (stone/plant/animal) and what, in terms of the human level of existence and culture, can be lower and higher (the kingdom of man and of God).

Three basic feelings.

Soloviev distinguishes three senses of value in human nature. We will explain briefly. They seem to us to belong to the very foundation of all culture.

a. The feeling of shame.

This feeling arises, at least under normal circumstances, when one behaves below one's human standard. Even the phallic worship in paganism still bears witness to sexual shame in the sense that, including the awareness that this may be inferior, they surrender themselves to 'excesses' which appear as a disgrace outside the ritual context. Thus Soloviev, oc, 28/31.

In other words: as soon as someone behaves below their standard (or below what they perceive as such), shame arises upon being caught.

CF54

b.-- The tenderness ('humanity').

As soon as a person meets a fellow human being under normal circumstances, an appreciation arises that is called humanity or, in evangelical terms, 'love of neighbor'.

According to Soloviev, the main phenomenon (as a prominent sample regarding humanity) is empathy, especially in the form of pity.

“Generally speaking, the essence of compassion consists in the fact that a given subject (= human being) senses the suffering or distress of another in a compassionate manner, -- that is to say, he/she feels sorrow to a greater or lesser degree and thereby shows that he/she is in solidarity with his/her fellow man”. (oc, 35).

No serious thinker—he adds—denies the thorough and innate essence of compassion, which, unlike shame, already manifests itself—albeit in a rudimentary manner—in many animals. Such a thing, therefore, cannot be the result of human upbringing.

Note -- One need only think of the profound tenderness emanating from mother animals when caring for, indeed, pampering their young. -- “If the shameless ('cynical') man falls back to an animalistic level, then the merciless man falls below the animalistic level.” (Oc, 35).

c. - - Reverence (*piety*).

Faced with that which is higher, man, under normal circumstances, feels not shame—nor compassion—but reverence, awe. In this, Soloviev sees the basis, in the nature of man himself, of all religion.

Even in animals, behavioral psychologists distinguish something like a rudimentary form of awe for certain animals. For humans (think of trainers).

Thus says Ch. Darwin, the evolutionist: “The religious feeling that we call 'devotion' is very complex. It consists in a kind of love, in a total submission to a higher being (...). We see something in that nature that resembles it in the deep bond of the dog with his master (...).”

Soloviev, oc, 37, cites Darwin. -- Darwin also mentions the ape walking toward the guardian of his preference. The submissive attachment of dog and ape differ greatly from their behavior toward their conspecifics with whom they consider themselves equals,

Conclusion. -- What kind of cultured person would someone be who knew neither shame, nor pity, nor reverence and awe?

CF55

2. *Capita selecta* (55/200)

The method of exposition of this course is inductive, as the text consists of 'samples' that aim at both generalization and, above all, generalization (CF 19; 47).

The first part, however, attempted to introduce a certain logical coherence into the samples. That is now behind us.

Now 'samples' also follow, but in a radically loose connection. Why? Because the essential characteristics of the phenomenon 'culture' were

articulated in the first part. The following “capita selecta,” selected chapters, complete what was said in the first part and, above all, presuppose that first part.

Definition as induction.

Reread *CF 47.1* .-- There was an expansion of knowledge or phenomenon twice.

1. By changing the definition (e.g., changing the axioms regarding number), one changes (the view of) the phenomenon.

2. Through reasoning, one primarily generalizes (e.g., in induction concerning specimens) or generalizes (e.g., in induction concerning parts; e.g., in deduction or reduction-in-general) the phenomenon. Phenomenon that was first represented in a definition (long text; definition kept brief; axiomatics).

Check this: people with a very defined axiomatics (di presuppositions, e.g., in the form of prejudices) see only what that axiomatics reveals. The other phenomena, accessible through (at least partially) other axioms, remain a dark spot.

Examine the definitions formulated by such prejudiced people: they reflect their presuppositions or axioms! This implies that they engage in axiomatic induction, for through their prejudices (legitimate or not) they take samples and thus observe phenomena. They truly see something. But what they see—what reveals itself to them—is limited by their presuppositions. We call this “axiomatic induction”.

As long as these people realize that their view of reality is and remains limited, there is no problem: it is their method. The danger is that they do not realize this and fall into an ideology that confuses one sample with all other possible supplementary samples.

CF56

17. The 'domain' ('scope') of the concept of 'culture'. (56/59)

Every concept consists of conceptual content and a conceptual scope or domain. In other words, what does the concept of culture refer to (defined as problem-solving)? We will now examine this in more detail.

Bibl. st.: J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism and Culture* , Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (*Culture*).

Introduction.

(1) Goudsblom starts from the Latin terms 'colère' and 'cultura'. 'Colère', literally: 'to cultivate', means to finish something that is unfinished (underdeveloped, unworked), to work it out, to work it out further. The given is the unworked. What is required is the working out. One can see the similarity with our previous pages where 'culture' means solving problems. A 'problem' always involves something that is unfinished. Problem solving always involves finishing it.

Incidentally: 'ontwikkelen' and 'ontwikkeling' can, if necessary, also be used as translations for 'colère' and 'cultura'. Thus, a “developed person” is a “cultivated person”.

(2) Goudsblom refers to *Cicero* (-105/-43; orator, politician and writer), the great proponent of 'humanitas', literally: 'humanity' (di education).

In his *Disputationes tusculanae* 215: 13, Cicero writes: “(model) Just as the best arable land, insofar as it remains uncultivated, will yield no harvest, (original) so too the mind, which, insofar as it is deprived of philosophical training, remains something barren”.

Note -- Understand the ancient usage well. -- In the Bible and among the ancient Greeks, 'wisdom' means something like 'development', a capacity such that one can handle the problems of life. Consequently: “philosophical schooling” in the broad sense of “general development” means the capacity to be 'real' (in the Hegelian sense: to be able to handle problems).

As early as *Herodotus of Halicarnassus* (-484/-425), called the “father of historiography” (better, with W. Jaeger: “researcher of countries and peoples”), in his *Historiai* (literally: 'to investigate'), one finds the term 'philosophy' (desire for wisdom) in that broad sense of “universal education” (still the ideal of Harvard University).-- A 'sage' in ancient cultures was an 'educated' person.

CF57

A series of definitions.

Based primarily on Goudsblom, we note a limited number of definitions that clarify the domain or scope of 'culture' for us.

AI-- The Western-oriented 'humanist' tradition.

When, in those days, things from “the world of art and culture” were announced on the radio in the morning, the term 'culture' was still used in the 'humanistic', rather narrower and elitist sense.

Johann Chr. Adelung, Versuch einer Geschichte der Cultur des menschlichen Geschlechts, Leipzig, 1782.

Adelung defines negatively, by means of a counter-model: “The entire state, bound to the senses and thus 'animalistic', i.e. the true state of affairs characteristic of “pure nature”, is “the absence of all culture”.

Adelung's axiom is a distinction, namely “(Pure) nature/culture”. In other words: the given that is worked on in all cultural labor is pure, undeveloped and underdeveloped 'nature'. Whereby 'nature' is used in a very narrow sense, namely “undeveloped and underdeveloped reality” (especially regarding man).

Adelung, in the spirit of modern humanists and rationalists, calls this condition, insofar as being human is concerned, 'animalism' (a term that Darwin, for example, still applies when observing the Fuegians (at the tip of South America)). Hume, the leading figure of the English Enlightenment, also calls the Negro-Africans 'animals'! Meanwhile, ethnologists have corrected that misconception, of course.

The role of the 'vanguard'.

The Russians, at the time, called the cultural spearhead 'intelligentsia'. -- It is an age-old experience: 'models' (= paragons, 'examples') attract!

Thus, for Adelung, 'culture' is a characteristic of the entire people, yet with a strong emphasis on that same entire people insofar as the privileged classes leave their mark upon it. Which amounts to a degree of elitism.

A.II.-- The planetary definition.

With an Adelung, the Western man and his Western cultural model stand. -- Others see it more broadly, -- more ethnologically.

(1).-- *Gustav Klemm, Allgemeine Cultur-Wissebreder*, -- Leipzig, 1855-2; id., *Allgemeine Culturgeschichte der Menschheit*, Leipzig, 1843-1.—

CF58

Klemm, following in the footsteps of E.F. Kolb—more on that later—lists components to characterize the entire domain of culture: family life, religion,

science, art, techniques of all kinds, and indeed, even military science. In this context, Klemm views 'culture' as the result of interactions between:

- a.** Nature (in the sense just described) and humanity and
- b.** People interacting with one another.

Conclusion. -- Kolb and, following in his footsteps, Klemm arrive at a concept of 'culture' that encompasses all areas of life. Which turns out to be considerably broader than the humanist concept.

(2).-- E. Fr. Kolb,

E.Fr. Kolb, Culturgeschichte der Menschheit , Pforzheim, 1843-

1. The domain to which the concept of 'culture' refers encompasses, in addition to intellectual and moral formation (= a part of the Ancient Greek paideia (cf. W. Jaeger) or of the Ancient Roman humanitas); also social institutions (think of the family, for example) and material prosperity (think of economic labor, for example) and even personal care (which has always been a part of the Ancient Greek paideia or formation).

Which provides us with a solid, greatly expanded understanding of 'culture'.

Note: Kolb and Klemm's 'interpretations' of the lemma 'culture' allow ethnology to use the (broadened) concept of 'culture' also when referring to 'traditional', pre-modern 'cultures'.

a. -- *Edw.B. Tylor* (1832/1917), the well-known religious ethnologist, says in his *Primitive Culture* (1871) that 'culture' is “the complex whole that encompasses expertise (insight), belief, art, legislation, custom and any other faculties and achievements of man as a member of a society”.

b. -- *AL Kroeber/Clyde Kluckhohn*, *Culture (A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions)*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1952.

According to its proponents, culture consists of conscious or unconscious models that become visible in behavior and that are acquired and passed on through 'symbols' (signs such as specific words or forms of behavior (rituals, for example)) as characteristics of human groups.

In the background—according to the proposers—values (*CF 48: Lotze*) arise. Which provides us with an axiological definition or 'interpretation'.

It is clear: Kolb and Klemm paved the way for a general definition or elaboration.

CF59

B.1 .-- axiological or value-theory definition.

J. van Doorn/ C. Lammers, Modern Sociology (A Systematic Introduction), Utr./ Antw., 1976-2, 105/140 (Cultural Elements), states that culture encompasses values.

a. The ancient term 'axia', Lat.: valor, value, meant something (being) that appears so significant that it serves as an objective, rule of conduct (norm), and expectation (investment), and is thus presupposed ('axiom').

b. Van Doorn/Lammers state that values indeed function as ends (one wants to realize them), norms (one judges behavior according to values) oc, 112), and expectations (one wants a result from them; oc, 115).

B.II .-- Singular/ private/ universal.

It is striking that the preceding definitions are rather or even exclusively sociological.

a. *Ralph Linton, The Study of Man* , New York, 1936;

-- *id.*, *The Cultural Background of Personality* , London, 1947, defines 'culture' as a universal human phenomenon: what is formless becomes stylized.

In other words: culture is design.

b. This design (in the broadest sense) is admittedly situated in groups (sociologically), but is nevertheless incorporated into their members (psychologically).

Thus, Linton arrives at a spectrum (= differential): culture is singular (individual), particular (there is a multitude of (sub)cultures), universal (the general concept).

That concludes a word about Linton's action theory.

C.-- Basic Tripartite structure.

*Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Society, Culture and Personality (Their Structure and Dynamics)** , New York, 1947, emphasizes this: the individual, as a subject acting within community and culture type, -- society, as the totality of individuals in communication and interaction, -- culture, as the system of values, -- they form a unity or system.

Talcott Parsons/Ed. A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, views 'action' as the merging of personality/society/culture. -- Psychology/sociology/cultural studies merge.

Mikhail Bakhtine (1895/1975), Russian thinker and literary scholar, speaks of the voice that speaks (individual), the voice that is addressed (community), and the voice of culture as elements of all language use.

CF60

18. The concept of 'culture' in Herodotus. (60/62)

Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-425) left us a remarkable work, -- entitled ' *Historiai* ' (Lat.: inquisitiones), explorations (investigations).

In it, he gives an account of everything he—primarily as a businessman—saw or heard said during his travels around the Mediterranean and the Black Seas.

As a reporter—he is usually called “the father of historiography” (which does not correspond to reality)—he viewed the countries and peoples (W. Jaeger) through the eyes of a businessman who, as a deeply religious man and a thinker enlightened by Ionian-Milesian natural philosophy, aimed for 'wisdom' (Greek: 'sophia', Lat.: sapiëntia), which provided the broadest possible information and the most thorough possible explanation.

As a historian, he is of incomparable value: his keen eye for countries and peoples is reflected in his accounts. Rarely has anyone—at least in that period—recorded what he himself saw and heard.

Incidentally: clarifications can be found in *H. Verdin, Greek Historiography (Different but the same ?)*, in: *Our Alma Mater* 46 (1992): 2 (questions 288/293).

Verdin discovers both myth and historiography in Herodotus.

This is beautifully confirmed in *GCJ Daniëls, *Religious-historical study on Herodotus **, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946: Herodotus' philosophy of religion is discussed there. One of the main themes reads: “As soon as there is a transgression ('hubris', Lat.: arrogantia), whether in nature or in man(hood), “the deities” (“to theion”, literally: all that exhibits divine nature) intervene in a manipulative manner, so that the deviation is restored”.

Herodotus applies this religious axiom to imperialist states: they move towards a climax in an (often unconscious) transgression of boundaries, only to perish under the cybernetic influence of “the deity.”

Herodotus, the Ionian.

Halicarnassus was located in Caria, on the present-day Turkish coast. Ionia was the central coastal region of Asia Minor. One type of Greek had settled there, the Ionians, after they had been driven from their homeland by the Dorians (think of Sparta, with its 'Spartan' customs).

CF61

Cities such as Miletus (Dutchified: Milete), where the Milesian thinkers and natural philosophers lived, and Ephesus (Dutchified: Efese), home to Heraclitus, bore witness to the refined Ionian culture dating back to Homeric times (-900/-700).

The Ionian Greeks were, in part, businessmen and sailors who knew the inhabited world, the 'oikoumene' of those days—from the Caucasus to Gibraltar. For a considerable time before Athens, for instance, Ionia achieved solid prosperity and, in its wake, a high level of cultural flourishing.

Understanding method.

Since *Wilhelm Dilthey* (1833/1911; *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883)) and *Eduard Spranger* (1882/1963: *Die Psychologie des Jugendalters* (1924)) we have been used to the 'verstehende' (understanding, comprehensive) method. But already in Herodotos' work the result of the then understanding method is clearly visible.

DH Teuffen, Herodot, (Sieben und andere Wunder der Welt), Vienna/Munich, 1979, 46), writes: “Business people seek, for example, trade relations. Such a thing thrives only in a climate of mutual trust, -- a kind of trust that can only arise from accurate information about the business partner.

This was especially true in a world where totally isolated local cultures, rooted in their own traditions, lived side by side—with relatively sparse connections.

Incidentally: we call this “pre-modern multiculturalism” in one of its older forms. In Herodotus' time, tribes and villages or small neighborhoods fragmented the people, which often complicated relations.

Herodotus, as a businessman, sought out people. His attention ('intentionality' (Franz Brentano)) focused on what was going on inside those people. They, in turn, focused on what was going on inside him. Thus, understanding arose—mutual comprehension—mutual trust (in the successful case).

Is that not precisely what constitutes the essence of Dilthey and Spranger's understanding method?

Multiculturalism

This term consists of 'multi-' (Lat.: many) and 'culture'. It signifies the fact that people with sometimes strongly differing presuppositions (dogmas, principles, mentalities, prejudices) live within the same social context.

CF62

So, whether they like it or not, they must learn to understand that others are 'different'! They must learn to feel good about that!

The Ionian Herodotus was a thoroughly multicultural thinker! DH Teuffen, oc, 19: “Herodotus writes with the will to neutral objectivity about the Greeks but also about the barbarians: he writes the history of humanity”.

Note-- Pay attention to ancient usage: 'barbarian' meant “someone who does not speak Greek”. Contempt was usually not implied so directly.

Teuffen, oc, 46. -- “Herodotus testifies to impartiality regarding observation. With that type of observation he approached all phenomena characteristic of foreign cultures. Indeed, with that same openness he even approached the cultures of Greece's immediate enemies.

Note: It should be noted that Herodotus was born in Caria, his homeland, under Persian occupation—at a certain point Hellas's enemies par excellence—and that he experienced the Persian Wars in his youth. Nevertheless, he shows understanding for all that was Persian.

Countries and peoples.

W. Jaeger characterizes it correctly in his *Paideia! J. Lacarrière, En cheminant avec Hérodote (Voyages aux extrémités de la terre)*, Paris, Seghers, 1981, mentions the countries (and peoples) that Herodotus depicts:

Lydia, Persia, Babylonia (*Hist. 1*),
Egypt (*Hist. 2*),
Ethiopia, India, Arabia (*Hist. 3*),
Scythia, Libya (*Hist. 4*).

The first four 'reconnaissances' (investigations) are a comprehensive introduction to the story of the battles (five reconnaissances).

Lacarrière: "The rare errors in Herodotus' work made us too quick to forget that, in a time when everything was still to be explored, the inquiry and ordinary observation that constituted an accurate representation of reality required the same creative qualities of man as those which we now—today—display in the exploration of the imaginary ('l' imaginaire')". (Oc, 258).

Lacarrière says: claiming that he was an "agent of Athenian imperialism" (as some leftists assert) is thoroughly refuted by the factual data in his work. Thus oc, 12/13.

CF63

19. Herodotus' interpretation of fate" (63/65)

'Dramaturgy' is the theory concerning acting (theatre studies). -- The narrative character of acting (theatre: drama, comedy) opens it up to the study of fate (fate analysis).

To a certain extent, Verdin accuses Herodotus of remaining stuck in myth. The question, however, is whether Verdin does not thereby overlook Herodotus's intention.

For already in antiquity it was established that Herodotus is indeed a historian and thus presents (the surface of) the facts—as accurately as possible (which Thucydides later does much better), but "traces the presuppositions of everything that takes place".

Well then, the deeply religious, though enlightened in natural philosophy, thinker that Herodotus was, believes that one of the presuppositions of the naked facts is situated in the myth.

That is why we reflect on *J. Lacareer, En cheminant avec Hérodote*, Paris, 1981, 36/39 (Une chasse fatale au sanglier (Histoire d'un homme marqué par le destin)).

The 'structure' (= generalization) of the tragedy is exposed here. For Adrastus, the '(stage) hero' of the story, is a man who displays the signs of fate, of destiny. In our vernacular: an unlucky fellow.

Note: For the ancients, tragedy was a 'divine' model or epitome:

a. the naked facts of (tragic) life, directly observable by everyone, are the foreground;

b. what “the divine” (all that is divinity) has 'foreseen' (providence) is the background which, for those with a sufficiently mythical eye, shines through in and through the visible facts of (tragic) life. Herodotus testifies throughout his accounts that he still believes in that twofold structure.

Adrastos' history.

The algorithm (sequence) of facts is as follows.

1. Kroisos (Lat.: Croesus), the last king of Lydia (-560/-546), known for his transgression ('hubris') regarding wealth and happiness, had two sons, among whom Atus (Lat. Atys).

Croesus once had a dream (mantic phenomenon): in his dream, he 'sees' Atus die as a result of a spear thrust. He therefore does everything possible to keep every weapon out of Atus's life.

2.1 . Atus marries. During the celebration, a stranger appears from the princely family of Phrygia.

CF64

He asks to undergo a purification rite ('katharsis'; Lat.: purificatio) according to the Lydian rituals. To which Croesus agrees.

2.2. Thereupon he questions the Phrygian: his name is Adrastus; he is the grandson of King Midas. “I have unintentionally killed my brother. I have nothing left. Here I seek an 'asulon' (later: 'asylum'), a refuge,” says Adrastus.

2.3. Croesus: “Your ancestors were invariably my friends (*note*: understand 'friend/friends' in the ancient-sacred sense). So I will treat you as well. You are at home here.” Adrastus thus lives in the palace.

3. Shortly afterwards, a huge wild boar is sighted. The hunt is organized. At a certain moment, Adrastus spots the animal; he throws his spear but unintentionally kills Atus, Croesus' son.

4. At that moment, Adrastus realizes, more than ever before, what his name entails: 'a.drastos', in ancient Greek, means "one who does not flee". The second, unintentional act of fate drives him to the tomb of Atus, where he kills himself.

Explanation.

Since Homeric times, the ancient Greeks knew the concept of 'ate', fate. Some deity or other, who is also metonymically called 'ate' as 'cause of 'ate'', has 'foreseen' (predestination) it in such a way that it is inescapable. “Do as you will: you will not escape it”.

Another ancient Greek concept was 'daimon', spirit of fate. 'Eu.daimonia' meant the fact that, acting actively within oneself, one possessed a benevolent spirit of fate; 'kako-daimonia' was the fact that one was driven, from the unconscious and subconscious layers of the soul, by a spirit of doom.

One sees the convergence of the two concepts: the ate is the external, predetermined fate in Adrastus; his kakodaimon carries out what the ate has foreseen. Thus, he unintentionally causes his own failure.

Note: In Biblical terms, this is a type of possession by one or more unclean spirits acting as destiny-determining elements of this cosmos. It is that structure that Herodotus still accepted with faith.

Tragedy

The term 'tragedy' encompasses a “fatal outcome”.

Karl Jaspers (1883/1969; existential thinker) wrote a small book about it: *Ueber das Tragische* , Munich, Piper, 1947.

CF65

The cultural value (problem-solving value of the tragedy) lies in the fact that it accepts a failing life (“fatal life”) as a given, and, as the one requested,

takes upon itself the 'explanation', the necessary and sufficient reasons or grounds. Every person who experiences a fate, good or bad, can ask themselves the question: "What lies behind this that I succeed or fail?"

Jaspers points to the heroic sagas in all cultures that are concerned with that problem. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides are the three great tragedians who bring the problem to the stage within the framework (axioms) of ancient Greek religion. Shakespeare, Calderon, Racine, Lessing, Schiller, and the tragedians of the 19th century follow in that age-old footsteps. Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche are "tragic thinkers".

What Herodotus thus offers in the story concerning Adrastus leads us into that great tradition.

Lacarrière says that Herodotus gives the story of Adrastus a diachronic structure that characterized Greek tragedy of the time.

1. A prophetic dream.
2. Adrastus unintentionally realizes the dream of doom during the hunt.
3. A messenger reports the disaster that has occurred.
4. Whereupon Croesus bursts into a tragic lament.
5. The arrival of the hunters with Atus's remains.
6. The funeral of the hero.

In other words: Herodotus does not simply tell stories haphazardly; he structures his narratives. Something that some fail to see.

Lacarrière, op. cit., 39, notes that some interpreters of Herodotus' text claim in this regard that he lied here.

Lacarrière considers such a claim "nonsense"! -- Herodotus did, however, confuse a myth told to him with a historically verifiable fact. Atus was indeed a Phrygian god, -- a vegetation god whose annual death (just as plants die annually with the seasons) was celebrated with ritual lamentations.

Herodotus, therefore, misunderstood what he "knows by hearsay." He, who otherwise proceeded with the meticulousness of nature and precision characteristic of the Milesians (Thales, Anaximandrus, Anaximenes), mixed a mythical story with a historical fact. -- Thus Lacarrière.

Note: Religious scholarship has indeed established such myths and associated rites outside Phrygia as well.

20. Herodotus' method of natural philosophy. (66/67)

The first Greek thinkers were labeled by later thinkers as 'fusikoi', Latin: physici, natural philosophers (also 'fusiologi'; Latin: physiologi). Why? Because they were called 'fisis', Latin: natura, nature, summarizing all that is (diachronically: all that was, is, and will be).

'Nature' was then an all-encompassing (transcendental) concept that included both the inorganic and the living natures—indeed, that also contained the entire invisible world (such as, for example, the deities or what the Greeks called “the daimones”). In fact, that was a true doctrine of being or ontology captured in a single all-encompassing concept.

It is precisely because of this that the wisdom of nature—for that is what it truly was—of a Thales, an Anaximandros, an Anaximenes was already genuine philosophy in the present sense, that is, a study, an observation (phenomenology) and a fathoming (extended phenomenology) based on reasoning, of all that is in any sense whatsoever 'reality' (being, being).

A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature Grecque*, Geneva, 1975, 344s., states that Herodotus contrasts his accounts (descriptions, stories, treatises) with the texts of the poets of his time, for he indicates his sources:

- a. What he himself observed ('opsis', 'gnomè');
- b. What he knows thanks to observers chosen by him ('historiè').

Rivier, oc, 346, adds that “it is evident that Herodotus and Thucydides of Athens (-465/-395; historian) place themselves in the footsteps of the Ionian 'histories' (*note*: here in the broader sense of 'method of research')”.

Herodotus' accounts of his explorations—the title reads 'historai' (metonymic for 'accounts concerning his explorations')—are therefore a representation of what he observed or heard said—with the open eye of the Milesian thinkers.

Direct and indirect knowledge.

In his **Wijsgerigemethoden in de moderne wetenschap**, Utr./Antw., 1961, I.M. Bochenski, OP . (1902/1995: logician) discusses direct knowledge (perception) and indirect knowledge (reasoning). Cf. oc. 25v.

Well, around -40 an unnamed Greek writer writes:

A. “Do you see, fellow thinker, how Herodotus takes hold of your soul when he leads it through the lands and thereby changes your hearing into sight?

CF67

B. Even above the explorer ('historian'), however, stands the man Herodotus—with his sympathy for the subject matter he deals with—with his empathy, driven by controlled passion, for all that takes place and whose preconditions he traces.

That, precisely, constitutes the totally personal magic that Herodotus radiates.” (*DH Teuffen, Herodot* , Vienna/Munich, 1979, 20).

Note - Pay attention to the division:

A. Herodotus “changes your hearing into (being) seeing (perceiving)” and

B. “he tracks down the preconditions of everything that takes place”.

The direct and indirect knowledge of the data is expressed in ancient—praising—words.

That is typically Milesian! The Milesians saw the phenomena, “ta onta” (beings), i.e., the foreground, the directly visible and tangible side of the 'fusis', nature. But they did not dwell on this: they sought to make “ta onta”, the beings of nature, understandable (transparent) by tracing its 'archè', the preposition (Anaximandros explicitly uses the term) or the 'stoicheion', Lat.: elementum, another term for 'preposition' (with the emphasis on 'part' or 'aspect') (indirect knowledge). By 'fathoming' “ta onta”, the boundless multitude of things that collectively constitute nature (uncovering its reasons or grounds).

As *Herodotus* himself says in Hist. 2:33ff.: “opsis adèlon ta fainomena” (seeing that which does not show itself (occurs through) visible things). A text to which *Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft* *, I (**Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen **), Freiburg, Rombach, 1971, 173, explicitly refers in order to formulate the axiom of inquiry: “From the visible (the phenomenon) I conclude to the invisible (the transphenomenal)”.

Thales sought the invisible in “water” (as pliable primordial substance), Anaximandros in “to apeiron” (the pliable, that which itself has no form whatsoever but is present in all forms of nature, beings).

Anaximenes in 'aër' (air) or 'psuchè', breath (as pliable realities).

Herodotus is less of an ontologist and more of a specialist scientist, but remains faithful to the axiom of inquiry: “through the phenomena to the reasons or grounds, -- to the 'explanations' thereof”.

CF68

21. The concept of 'multiculture' in Herodotus. (68/69)

we briefly reread *sample 20* , we observe that the (tragic) poets also trace a foreground (phenomenon), the failure of life, the background (trans-phenomenal grounds). And thus, in this respect, they do not differ from the Milesian natural philosophers. Only the type of reason or ground (preposition) differs.

In other words: the poets paved the way (especially from the myth, which invariably, if it is truly a myth, is axiomatics)!

What type of presupposition does the natural philosopher mention other than the fluid (= pliable) primordial substance (water, apeiron, air/breath)? Herodotus teaches us.

*J. Lacarrière, *En cheminant avec Hérodote** , Paris, 1981, refutes the allegations (especially from leftists) claiming that Herodotus was an 'imperialist', an 'ethnocentrist'. 'Ethnocentrism' means prioritizing one 'ethnic group' (people, culture) over all others. Which, therefore, implies one-sidedness. -- Let us see.

Hist. 3:38 (*Teuffen, Herodot, 46f.*).

That text gives us an application model.

a. When Darius, the 'basileus' (high prince) of the Persians, reigned, he once summoned all the Greeks at his court to ask them: “What must one give you so that you would be willing to eat your father once he is dead?” Answer: “In no case do we commit such a crime.”

b. Thereupon he summoned the courtiers who were of the Indian tribe of the Calatians (and who eat the remains of their parents). When all the Greeks had left the area, Darius asked through an interpreter: “What must be given to you so that you would be willing to burn your parents once they are dead?” With a loud voice they cried out: “Do not utter such godless words!”

Herodotus ' concluding remark: “Such is the state of the conduct of the peoples”.

Note: One sees that, behind the foreground—the mentalities expressed in statements—Herodotus means the background, the axioms (presuppositions). These 'principles' are ethnocentric.

To quote Ch. Peirce: they are stubborn, orthodox, or biased, and thus blind to other axioms.

CF69

The 'absoluteness' (absolute certainty) with which those involved reject what does not belong to their presuppositions demonstrates the blindness.

Herodotus' openness.

Hist. 5:58 . -- The Phoenicians (Phoenicians), between the mountains of Lebanon (Syria/Lebanon) and the Mediterranean Sea, were a people who explored the entire Mediterranean as experienced seafarers, Herodotus calls “a barbarian people”.

Now there were migrants in Boeotia (the region around Thebes in Greece).

Herodotus: “They taught the Hellenes many knowledge and skills. Such as the written characters which the Hellenes – “so it seems to me” (says Herodotus) – “did not know before.” In other words: a “barbarian people” (a non-Greek people) can be culturally very valuable, and groundbreaking for the Greeks.

Herodotus' multicultural.

It can be outlined as follows.

a. -- It relies on logic, -- applied logic.

He conceives of the presuppositions of peoples in terms of axioms—the nameless admirer in -40 notes that Herodotus looks them up—from which individuals and groups (peoples, tribes) draw conclusions (deduce). Their opinions, their customs, their value judgments are deductions from presuppositions (which they do not question, -- usually).

A culture, in his view, is therefore a set, indeed, a system of presuppositions, instilled through upbringing, from which propositions are derived. Cf. *CF 12ff*. (An axiomatic definition).

b.-- It relies on the comparative method.

Cf CF 15 (*Identitive culture*). -- The range or differential read: totally identical / partially identical (analogous) / totally non-identical. Cf also CF 27;-- 39; 47ff.

When proceeding according to theological order (harmological, 'stoicheiosis'), the following variants may be observed.

The concordist places unilateral emphasis on everything that is similar and coherent.

The differenti(al)ist places unilateral emphasis on what difference and gap are.

The identity-based reasoner sees both similarity/cohesion and difference/gap simultaneously. As a result, the concept of ' *analogy* ' (which entails similarity, respectively cohesion, and difference, respectively gap simultaneously) takes center stage.

Herodotus, with his Ionian-open mind, compares as objectively as possible. He therefore sees both similarity/connection (the Phoenicians are teachers of the Greeks) and difference/gap (they are 'barbarians').

CF70

22. Herodotus' democratic method (70)

The multicultural idea in Herodotus is also very clearly evident in his 'democratic' method.

Note: 'dēmokratia', in ancient Greek, can mean “the confused control of the state by the mob” (think of current populisms. As with Plato. -- “Democratic method” here means 'iso.nomia' ('isos' = 'equal'; 'nomos' = 'law'), equal rights for every citizen on the basis of laws. Which amounts to a dialogical method: people talk it out among themselves.

Herodotus was an enthusiastic supporter of the democratic system of equal rights, although not without reservations regarding the excesses of every democracy. The 'polis', or city-state—Athens for example—tried to allow everyone to speak freely and frankly.

The sacred origin.

Library st.: F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes* , I (*Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*), Zollikon - Zurich, 1954, 9ff. Flückiger situates democracy in Homeric times. Homēros (Lat.: Homeros) lived around -850, according to Herodotos. According to most current experts, what the Iliad and Odusseia depict is at least as old as the IXth century.

The sacred rule of conduct.

Flückiger, oc, 14. -- “Even the daily schedule of the agora, the gathering of soldiers for example, is laid down in a sacred rule.” -- Whoever is authorized to speak receives the scepter, the symbol of Zeus, the supreme god of the time. By doing so, he stands under His protection and is inviolable.

Note: 'taboo' – “even when he turns against the army leader”. -- “The popular, or army, assembly – agora – is a sacred living space within a society still dominated by archaic military life. There, under Zeus' protection, reigns freedom of speech, freedom of decision-making”.

Flückiger decision: “Es ist die urform der späteren demokratie” (It is the original form of later democracy).

Applicative model.

Odyssey 2:37ff.; 3:138. -- Diomedes, son of Tudeus, prince of Argos, takes the liberty, within the context of the army assembly, to take a stand against Agamemnon, the general leader of the Greeks, during the siege of the city of Troy. “Atrides, first of all against you, because of your lack of understanding, I must act. For such is indeed themis, lord, in the assembly.”

CF70.1.

Note: The ancient Greeks recognized two periods regarding deities: **a.** the time before Zeus; **b.** the period under Zeus. 'Themis' dates from before Zeus' time. It is the law handed down from ancient times. It probably stems—according to Flückiger—from the forms of deliberation within the domestic circle that constituted the essential core of the Themis period. Later, the polis, the city-state, becomes the center of deliberation. Under Zeus.

Applicative model.

'A.sulos' means 'inviolable', taboo, sacred. Our term 'asylum' derives from it. -- Whoever, pursued by anyone (princes, for example) in those days, takes refuge in a “hieron asulon”, an inviolable sanctuary, is, metonymically, through adaptive association, also inviolable. For he/she stands under the high protection of the deity worshipped in the temple.

Incidentally: this right of asylum (albeit desecrated, secularized) is to this day still one of the basic phenomena of the so-called human rights (the rights of the individual).

Herodotus' democratic style of discourse.

Teuffen describes Herodotus' text formation as follows.

a.1. Homer, whose texts consist largely of orations (the basis of rhetoric), allows the various viewpoints surrounding a theme to be presented.

a.2 . Herodotus, when writing texts, grants the floor to everyone who has something to say about the theme under discussion, showing not the slightest preference or aversion.

Incidentally: the later Roman writer Tacitus (55/119) calls this “sine ira et studio”, without antipathy or sympathy.

b. Only after allowing all other opinions to be heard does Herodotus present his own opinion. If he is not (entirely) certain regarding the facts, he makes this evident in his wording.

In other words: democratic writing is not 'exclusive' but inclusive. Including (all) other opinions.

Plato's dialogues reflect precisely the same structure: they begin with the opinions of others and end with one's own opinion. -- The Homeric agora is depicted in Milesian natural philosophy (Herodotus) and in Platonic 'dialectics' (dialogous thinking),

This persists: a set of problems is formulated around a theme (thematic area). This is how science operates.

CF 71

23. Model/ illustration. (71/75)

The ancient Greeks possessed a *systechi* (pair of opposites) “to archetupon (archetype, model)/ to apografton (copy, image, representation)”.

This pairing applies to earthly examples and their copies, of course. But there is a 'mythical' (understand: sacred, consecrated) use. Since this is so fundamental, we will pause to consider it.

M. Eliade, The Myth of Eternal Return (Archetypes and their Recurrence), Hilversum, 1964 (// Le mythe de l'éternel retour , Paris, 1949), 14/18 (Regions, temples, and cities as imitations of celestial archetypes), gives examples of the use of sacred language.

For example: “The oldest document concerning the archetype of a sanctuary is the inscription of Gudula (*note*: Gudula is the Sumerian prince of Lagash around -2054), which relates to the temple he erected at Lagash.

The king 'sees' in a 'dream' the goddess Nidaba who shows him a panel on which the beneficial stars are listed, and a god who 'reveals' the design of the temple to him. (Cf. *E. Burrows, Same Cosmological Patterns in Babylonian Religion* , in: *The Labyrinth* (Hooke, London, 1935, 45/70), 65ff.).

Note: The religious studies term 'to reveal' (Greek: apokaluptein, in the New Testament; e.g., *Matt. 11:25/27*), which is central to the term 'apocalypticism'. Note well: 'apocalypticism' means not only 'end-time revelation' but also simply “unveiling of secret, sacred realities” (as Jesus uses this in *Matt. 11:25/27* to indicate that his heavenly Father “reveals the kingdom of God” (God’s working) to “little ones”).

Likewise: “All Babylonian cities had their archetypes in constellations (*note*: which themselves were in turn the image or copy of 'celestial' constellations): Sippar in Cancer, Nineveh in the Big Bear, etc. (...). Sennacherib (Assyrian ruler from -705 to -681; he made King Ezekiel of Jude tributary) had Nineveh built according to the plan (to archetupon) that had already been drawn up in very early times (*note*: one also says “in the beginning”) in the construction of the heavens. Not only does a model precede the earthly structures, but moreover, this model is situated in an 'ideal' (= celestial) sphere of “eternity” (Eliad, oc, 15).

Note -- The term 'eternity' means the origin of all that is time; thus, for example, the origin of all (cultural) epochs. The term 'origin' means both what we now call 'origin' (cradle) and axiom (pre-establishment).

CF72

The 'eternity' in the sense just described is brilliantly expressed in the Christian-liturgical 'verse' “as it was “in the beginning” (“in the beginning”) and now and always and for ever and ever”. Past, present, and future—that is, in ontological language “all that was, is, and will be”—are the (encompassing) 'ages' (understand: periods) that flow from “eternity”.

Or again, “Thus the world that surrounds us (in which one experiences the presence and the creative power of man), -- the mountains that man climbs, the regions populated and cultivated by man, the navigable rivers, the

cities, the sanctuaries, -- all of this has an extraterrestrial archetype. This is interpreted either as a blueprint or as a 'form' or as a doppelganger. These simply exist only on a higher 'cosmic' (*note: understand: non-earthly*) plane". (Oc,16).

Two types of archetypes.

In the cited work, Eliade is sometimes somewhat careless in his use of language. -- 'Cosmic' can mean both 'heavenly' and 'chaotic'. He himself writes: "The desert regions inhabited by monsters (*note: Mark 1:13* says that Jesus stayed in the desert "with the wild animals"), or the regions that have not yet been cultivated, or the unknown seas on which no seafarer has yet ventured, ed" (oc, 16) have a different archetype, -- a 'chaotic' archetype that predates the shaping by heavenly entities (Eliade calls that 'creation' but that is in a non-Biblical sense)

Myth and rites.

Whoever enters the desert, cultivates a barren landscape, or sails an unknown sea, does not do so without transforming the chaotic models present there into 'heavenly' (ordered and therefore harmless to man) models. He then invokes deities, heroes, and ancestors to have the new model, feasible for man ('heavenly,' says Eliade), 'revealed' (Apocalypse), and to cause it to penetrate the chaotic reality (which comes across as something 'unreal') through rites.

Not only the habitat: also the action.

So far, it was about cities, temples, and landscapes.

CF73

Eliade, Oc, 12: "Let us now turn our attention to human actions (and naturally those which do not occur merely automatically). They derive their meaning and value not from their purely physical 'reality' but from the fact that they are the representation (to apograpon) of an action "from primeval times" (*note: an action performed "in the beginning"*), which repeat a mythical primal image (*note: archetypal model*).

Thus, feeding is not merely a physiological act (...). Marriage and the joint orgy (*note: a sexual-magical rite*) refer to mythical symbols. They are realized anew because they were 'sanctified' (*note: demonstrated on a consecrated plane*) "in the *beginning* " ("in illo tempore" (at that time; thus the liturgical readings of Holy Scripture begin); "ab origine", since the origin) by deities, heroic figures, and ancestors .

The 'archaic' (primitive) man.

Eliade, oc, 13: “Into the smallest details of his conscious behavior, the 'primitive', the 'archaic' man knows no act that was not performed and experienced 'formerly' (*note*: in eternity) by an 'other' (*note*: higher) being: by an 'other' being that was not a (*note*: merely earthly, secular) man. What he/she does has already been done. Life is, after all, an uninterrupted 'repetition' ('to apografton') of actions initiated by 'others'”.

Note: “These deliberate repetitions of precisely defined exemplary actions suggest the presence of a very original ontology.” (Oc, 13).

'Ontology' means 'study of reality'. Indeed: 'reality'—for the sacral or mythical-minded person—is, without the light of a revealed myth and without the life force of a rite bringing that myth about, rather 'unreal' than 'real'. This means that whoever acts without that light and without that life energy becomes 'unreal' (not solving the problem). Becomes 'insignificant' ('chaotic').

An entire philosophy of culture becomes abundantly clear with this.

CF74

The Biblical viewpoint.

To begin with, the Bible possesses a radically unique concept of creation: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” (*Genesis 1:1*). He creates out of nothing (*note*: out of nothing outside himself, i.e., from his own thought and life force). Whereas the ordering creation from above presupposes a disordered reality, God’s act of creation presupposes nothing.

Two types of reality.

Just now it sounded: chaotic and 'heavenly' (in ancient Greek terms: titanic and Olympian). Now it sounds: “You shall not eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for on the day you, man, eat of it, you shall be subject to death.” (*Gen. 2:17*).

Indeed: man becomes unreal because he commits the sin that culminates in death.

Which *Psalms 1:1/3* confirms: “Blessed is the man who does not follow the counsel of the wicked ('evil ones') (...) but delights in the law of Yahweh (*note*: of which the Ten Commandments text (*Exod. 20:1/17* and *Deuteron. 5:6/21*) offers a popular summary) and meditates on His law day and night. (...).

Whatever he does succeeds. None of that applies to the wicked ('evil ones'), -- none of that at all”.

It is evident: if one observes the code of conduct, the Decalogue or Law of the Ten Commandments, which comes from Yahweh and applies “in the beginning and now and always and for ever and ever,” only then does everything one does succeed. Human action, only insofar as it is “to apograpon,” the copy, of God’s law, is ‘fruitful’ and solves problems—is therefore ‘real’.

The counter-model expresses *Psalm 4:3*: “that going up into nothingness, -- that race to illusion”.

All that comes from “eternity” is real in the truly real and not in the apparent real sense.

So first of all, the crown of creation, man: “God created man in his own image. In his image he created him. He created them, male and female.” (*Gen. 1:27*).

The apocalyptic models mentioned above also appear in the Bible. For example, *Exodus 25:40* , where the golden candlestick is prescribed by Yahweh: “Look and carry out according to the pattern (“to archetupon”) that was shown to you on the mountain.”

See also *Exod. 26:30; 27:8* . See also *Numbers 8:4* . Cf. Eliade, oc, 14ff.

CF75

The pre-existent savior.

The Savior, before he acts as a redeemer on earth, already exists “with the deity”.

Thus in Parsism (the Parsis are the descendants in India of the Persians who posit Ahura Mazda, championed by Zarathustra (Zoroaster), as the supreme deity): the Saoshent exists beforehand, while his 'parousia' (= full saving appearance) is expected at the end of time.

Similar to this is *Daniel 7:13/14* : “I watched during the night visions ('revelations'). Look: “on the clouds of heaven” (*note*: from eternity) comes one who looks like a Son of Man (*note*: someone who possesses human nature)”. Jesus applied that text to himself—albeit in his own arbitrary way.

Elijah concerning the ideal future in the Bible.

Oc, 15ff. -- "A heavenly Jerusalem was created by God before the city of Jerusalem was built by the hand of man" Cf *Tobias 13:16; Isaiah 60:1ff.; Ezekiel 40*. "To show Ezekiel the city of Jerusalem" (Revelation) God takes Ezekiel up a very high mountain in a state of ecstasy (*40:2*). (Oc, 15).

Comparable to this is the 'apokalupsis' of Jesus regarding his own glorified state , *Matthew 17:1* : "Six days later Jesus took Peter, James, and John and led them up a high mountain in solitude. He was transfigured before their eyes: his face shone like the sun and his clothes became dazzling white." Jesus' full saving activity will also only become clear in the end times.

Eliade returns to this in his **Het heilige en het profane ** (*A study on religious essence*), Hilversum, 1962 (// *Das Heilige und das Profane* , Rowohlt). Om oc, 51/54 (*The myth as an exemplary model*).

Incidentally: K. Hübner, **Die Wahrheit des Mythos **, Munich, 1985, points out that the current sciences, starting from their own axioms, are superior neither as rational activities nor as contents of truth to the myths, which, starting from different axioms, concern themselves with reality in a radically unique way.

Gabriel de Tarde (1843/1904) and, in a more Freudian manner, René Girard (1923), maintain that man imitates paragons (mimetism). Indeed: primitive man, and sacred man in general, imitates sacred paragons, whereas secularized man merely imitates humans.

CF76

24. The structure of the Narcissus myth. - (76/78)

Let us now consider a single myth.

However, we must first expose the structure that finds an applicative model in that myth.

R. Godel, *Une Grèce secrète* , Paris, 1960, 236/239 (*Le destin*), is eminently suitable for this purpose.

Steering

CF/CS 60 (*imperialism*), 63 (*Adrastos*) already gave us two applications. -- Godel explains.

1.-- 'Moira', share of fate, is a fundamental concept. It corresponds to what 'rei.ki' (a Japanese alternative medicine) is: 'rei' is the share; 'ki' is the omnipresent energy. "When an ancient Greek thinks of the share of 'life' that was allotted to him in the immeasurable context of universal life, then that 'portion' appears to him as a part that was cut out for him (...)".

It is clear: the individual or the group possesses "a share" amidst the immeasurable life energies in the universe. One must keep this "share/whole" dichotomy firmly in mind if one wishes to understand not only ancient Greek but simply any pagan philosophy regarding fate.

Incidentally: it is thorough animism that is the axiom here.

2.-- 'Anankè', the mysterious decree of fate. -- By whom, by what is every part of the universe allotted "its share", moira? By the mysterious anankè, opaque to our rational mind—our 'nous' (Lat.: intellectus). "Upon this rests the mysterious order of the cosmos" (Gadel, oc, 236).

Incidentally: reread CF/CS 72 (*eternity*). It will become clear that 'eternity' and 'anankè' (the totality of all possible destinies) coincide.

The 'gnome', right thinking, a sign of 'sofrosune', true contact with reality, adheres to the share.

But deviation is possible: that is 'par.ek.basis', literally: taking a step outside the prescribed line, -- 'aidos', shameful behavior, -- 'hubris', transgression, -- 'parafrosunè', thinking reality unreally (thinking alongside reality, harboring delusions).

To this, anankè responds by rectification (corrective): 'rhuthmosis', feedback, follows, as well as 'ep.an.orthosis', retroactive rectification, -- through the action of 'nemesis', revenge (restoration of disorder),--

CF77

usually set in motion by 'fthonos', the offense of deities, heroes, ancestors, -- carried out by an 'alastor', someone who never forgets and leaves nothing unpunished (a tormentor), -- by the 'erinues', the goddesses of vengeance ('venge' means 'rectification') or also the 'moirai', the goddesses of fate, -- by one or more 'kakodaimones', 'spirits' active within, -- and this in the form of an 'atè', a punitive lot.

Unless one undergoes a timely 'catharsis', a ritual cleansing of the committed error or deviation, performed by someone thoroughly knowledgeable in the science of fate.

Godel gives examples of deviations: to wrong a defenseless person; to deprive someone who begs for your protection: for example, an orphan, an old person, a woman, a suppliant, a stranger, a beggar; to deprive his parents either in deeds or in words.

You can see it: an entire code of conduct is contained within those examples.

'Koros', conceit, overestimation of oneself.

Psychologically—according to Godel—it is striking that overconfidence is the element that causes the measure to overflow and provokes rectification. Tragically, this overconfidence usually remains unconscious, and thus the blind person who crosses boundaries prepares his own fate.

Incidentally: this can even happen to deities who commit a transgression or deviation.

Narcissus.

Library st. : *P. Grimal, Dictionary of mythology grecque et romaine* , PUF, 1988-9, 308s.

There are multiple versions, reinterpretations (paraphrases), of every myth. Grimal lists two. The first is that of *Ovid* (-43/+17; Latin poet), in his *Metamorphoses* .

Narcissus is the son of the river god of Cephisos (a stream) and the nymph Leiriope. At his birth, both parents consult the blind seer Teiresias, who replies: "If the child could not see, he would lead a happy life." Narcissus grows into a beautiful young man who, however, rejects all eroticism. He arouses feelings of love in a large number of young girls and nymphs without ever acting on them.

Thus falls for the nymph Echo, Echo, fatally in love with him, but, like all other women, is smashed to pieces by Narcissus' rejection.

CF78

Out of sheer despair, Echo withdraws, wastes away (her life force vanishes) until only the echo of her lamenting voice remains.

The rejected women then turn to the goddess Nemesis, the cool, hard-hearted restorer of fate. She devises the next 'ate', the divine judgment.

On a sweltering day, Narcissus returns from hunting and bends over the water of a spring to quench his intense thirst. Suddenly, he sees his reflection on the water's surface. He instantly falls in love with his own reflection. He becomes so absorbed in it that—having become indifferent to the rest of the world—he stares incessantly at his own image. Gradually, his life force wastes away, and he dies.

Even on the banks of the Stux, Lat.: Styx, the river in the underworld, he seeks out the reflection! To such an extent has the ate within him grown into madness, parafrasunè.

At the place where he died, a flower grew, the narcissus.

Note: The transgression must be understood within the axioms of Greek pagan mythology: eros, the passion for love, is one of the main elements! So much so that whoever does not act upon it is written off as an 'abnormality'. It is part of the moira! The second transgression lies in the transgressive male beauty—sex appeal—of Narcissus and the koros, self-esteem, springing from it. Through this, he transgresses his moira, his share of fate.

The Boeotian version.

Narcissus is an inhabitant of the city of Tespiiai, not far from Mount Helikon. Young, very beautiful, yet with disdain for eros. -- Ameinias, in love, falls for him. Narcissus rejects him. When Ameinias knew nothing of remission, Narcissus sent him a sword as a gift. Ameinias receives the message and commits suicide with the gift at Narcissus's doorstep. Dying, Ameinias invoked the curses of the deities. One day, Narcissus sees his image in the water and falls fatally in love with himself. Driven to despair by his own passion, he commits suicide in turn. At the spot where his blood dried in the grass, a flower arose, the narcissus.

Note: One sees the same structure: what he did to others by crossing boundaries becomes his fate thanks to the deities.

25. The essence of Christianity. (79/80)

“From the sixth hour the whole earth came into darkness, -- until the ninth hour (*note*: from twelve to fifteen o'clock). Around the ninth hour Jesus cried out a loud cry: “Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (*Matt. 27: 45/46*).

These words are a paraphrase, a personal interpretation, of *Psalm 22(21):1/2* . “My God, why have you abandoned me? Far from saving me! These words I cry out. -- My God, by day I call to you and you do not answer.”

The same words become clearer when one relates *Ps. 71(70):9/1 2* : “Do not cast me off in my old age, when my life force fails. Do not forsake me then. For my adversaries speak against me; those who plot against my soul (strength) conspire: ‘God has forsaken him. Persecute him. Seize him: he has no one to defend him.’ God, stay with me. My God, hasten to my aid.”

The psalm is animistic:

The life force, the soul, or soul-force, stands at the center. Specifically in its failure, in its state of exhaustion.

Let us now reread the myth of Narcissus: there too the life force departed from Echo, and there too, in retribution, the life force departed from Narcissus. For 'soul' is invariably the seat of life force: when the adversaries of the old man “have their sights set on his soul”, then they wish him 'dead', exhausted and ready to die.

Dying, Biblically speaking: the consequence of sin, is everyone's fate. Jesus, in his grace, was willing to undergo that fate. Therefore, he calls upon well-defined psalms (which he prayed regularly, incidentally) that articulate the exhaustion of life force, the cause of death.

One will raise, rationally and secularly: “What is God doing in this?” The answer is simple: the source of life force, of 'soul', lies in the deity (the pagan or the biblical). Such that contact with God is simultaneously contact with the source of life force! Feeling exhausted is therefore feeling 'cut off' from God. The theocentrism present in this has that origin or explanation.

CF80

It is against this background that we, with *Otto Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus* , II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scolastiker*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 9, wish to describe Christianity in its essence (in that which distinguishes it from the rest).

Willmann characterizes Christianity by means of three moments (namely, the history of salvation before Jesus' ministry, his ministry itself, and its continuation after him) which are situated in one higher moment, namely 'eternity' (*CF/CS* 72; 76). Willmann relies in this on a New Testament text (*2 Tim. 1:9/10*). -- In it, the writer says what follows.

1. The 'counsel' (that which determines our fate) of God, Yahweh/Trinity, is the origin of everything, -- due to the fact that God 'calls' us to His salvation.

In other words: God calls us to a happy destiny from His eternity.

2. That council resolution is valid and present from all eternity to all eternity (from the beginning, now, and always). But through the mouths of prophets, Jesus, and apostles, it breaks through into the consciousness of earthly people. And that in three moments: past, present (Jesus' time), and future.

Behold, expressed in clear words, what *2 Tim. 1:9/10* says.

Willmann could have added another scriptural text that is even broader: "By faith we realize that the worlds (the 'aiones', the ages in the limited sense of epochs) came into being by a word of God. So that from the invisible the visible came into being."

The invisible here stands for 'eternity'. *La Bible de Jérusalem* , Paris, 1978, 1738, footnote, states in this regard: "The belief in the creation of the worlds by God is a fine example of insight into 'the invisible'; before they were created, the realities existed in God from whom everything originates".

Note-- Christian Platonism.

Albinus of Smurna (c. 100/ +/-175), a late Platonist, is the first to identify the essential forms (what makes them what they are) of the things in these visible worlds with God's thoughts on the matter.

When we see a tree, we know that in God's spirit that tree already exists "from all eternity." So with everything.

Plato set us on that path, but it was only Albinos who developed that idea. In such a way that thinking Christians—following in Albinos' footsteps—could embrace a Christian paraphrase, their own interpretation.

25b. Language and culture. (81/ 82)

(Greek) antiquity remains a constant source of inspiration regarding our current (cultural) problems. What follows proves this abundantly clear.

We live, especially since the advent of modern media (TV, radio, magazines, etc.), in a cultural diversity or 'multiculture' in which the same term can carry more than one meaning. What is called: 'ambiguity'. And this entails confusion.

Reread *CF/CS 61 (Multiculture)*, 68ff. (*The concept of 'multiculture' in Herodotus*), 70ff. (*Democratic method*).

Only in a democracy does multiculturalism find a place where it can somewhat live and breathe. Non-democratic systems, such as Nazism, Fascism, fundamentalisms, and integrisms today, and Soviet systems, stifle diversity through a dictatorial 'concordism' in which all differences are smoothed over.

Nominalism.

'Nomen', Latin, means 'name' as a word sound. 'Nominalism' is the premise that attempts to maintain that the meaning of the 'nomina', word sounds (plural), is decisive for our understanding of reality. Reality gives us names, not insights into reality.

We fill in the empty shells and names—according to particular or singular 'arbitrary choice' (understand: autonomy)—nothing more.

Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406).

The third most famous tragedian, after Aeschylus and Sophocles, a contemporary of Herodotus, puts it as follows.

In *Foinik* . 49gv.: “If 'good' and 'wise' were the same everywhere, then there would be no more dispute among people.

In fact, only the word sounds, as used by people, are the same everywhere. However, what is meant by them differs from region to region.

Note: Reread *CF/CS 68* , where Darius confronts Greeks and Kalatians with each other's customs (Greeks with Kalatian customs and Kalatians with Greek customs): the former cry out 'crime'; the latter “impious words”. In other

words, 'good' / 'evil', for example, are identical in sound, but non-identical in content ('filler').

Whoever adheres to this and does not investigate further by observation (theoria) is called, especially since the Middle Ages, a 'nominalist'.

CF81.1.

Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410).

Protagoras (Lat.: Protagoras) is the figurehead of the First Sophistic (Protosophistic), which played a major role in ancient Greek thought from 450 to 350. The main problem that the “first sophists” tackled was:

a. *The fact* that only the names were identical, while the (sometimes greatest) disagreement prevailed regarding the reality indicated by those names;

b. *The problem* arising from this, namely, “in the name of what” (i.e., in the name of which axiom) can we now justify our actions? The ‘question of accountability’ or “question of foundations” is central.

We possess names, but not consensus, like-mindedness, or agreement regarding the meaning of those names.

' ***Humanism*** '. -- Even today, at the end of the 20th century, Protagoras is honored as a 'humanist' by the Humanist Association. —

'Humanism' is defined as follows.

A.-- In itself, the “in itself”,

As Parmenides of Elea said, no single 'being', this reality, is 'good' or 'bad', 'wise' or 'foolish', “the best” or “the worst”, etc. “In itself” means “independent of individual or group interpretations”. Reality is simply a pure 'lemma' that one interprets according to one's own humane (hence 'humanism') interpretations. Man stands at the center, but then as an autonomous, radically independent interpreter.

B .-- Since the being,

which makes something distinguishable from the whole rest, is 'neutral', which is merely a meaningless stimulus for interpretation, there is no foundation bound to the essence -- opinions, the individual and especially the public, are the first, obvious rule of conduct.

Appl. model . -- “The best” -- The best, for Protagoras, is therefore what the consensus of all (absolute consensus, -- never existing) or rather of the majority decides on the matter.

Assertiveness ('pushing through').

To arrive at a concrete measure, for example, persistence is a necessity! In a democracy, this persistence is achieved through efficient rhetoric, which teaches the skill of pushing through an opinion ('thesis'). To force understanding. For example, in the agora, the people's assembly. Or in court.

Or in business. -- Money, a symbol of power, therefore played a powerful role. Whoever has money gives, can “assert” their opinion.

CF82

26. The foundations crisis. (82/85)

To properly understand what follows, it is advisable to reread *CF/CS 71ff* . (*Model/image*). Why? Because it is precisely the 'models' that 'show' the deities that fall into the cultural crisis. We will explain this. Since the “first sophists” experience cultural criticism very profoundly, we take them as a model.

Library st. :

-- G. Romeyer-Dherbey, *Les sophistes* , PUF, 1985.

In that fine little work, Protagoras, Gorgias—the two leading figures—are discussed, as well as Luke, Prodikos, Thrasummachos, Hippias, Antiphon, and Critias.

-- J.-P. Dumont, *Les sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, PUF, 1969. In this excellent little work, oc, 9/19, the axioms of Protosophistics are discussed.

1.-- Main Axiom.

Human knowledge is limited to sensory perception that goes no further. 'Theoria', Lat.: speculatio, 'reflection', which penetrates by perception to that which possibly extends beyond the senses ("the suprasensory", including the sacred), is therefore inaccessible.

Dumont: from this flows a materialism that limits the lifeworld to the earthly, the 'secular' or 'secular' or the 'profane'.-- This earth and its possibilities form the biotope of the sophist.

2.-- The derivations (deductions).

We will dwell on the secular, desacralized view of law, as *F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes, I (Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter)*, Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 98/124 (*Die Wandlung vom mythischen zum understanding Denken*), explains it.

From myth to rationality.

a. First there was the archaic culture of the Greeks, the animistic-sacred story, the myth (*CF/CS 72 (Myth and rites ; 75 (Hübner)*; -- 63ff. (*Adrastos myth*) ; 76ff. (*Narcissus myth*), governed behavior as a basic axiom. From this the mythical man deduces.

b. Then there is conceptual thinking, which aims at 'rationality', understand: the earthly use of the 'ratio', reason.

From basic concepts—axioms, 'principles', presuppositions—the demythologized person deduces his actions. He/she finds these principles in the opinions of people—his own or those of the groups—cultures—in which he/she lives.

CF82.2

The principles of the “first sophists” practically exclude everything that is immaterial, namely:

- a.** the general concepts (abstraction is non-existent) and
- b.** the sacred realities (such as deities, for example).

After all, these two escape earthly perception. The names (nominalism) for those two 'realities' do not correspond to any sensory, everyday perception. They are, for the time being at least, “empty names”. Concepts without sensory verifiability.

A. The archaic-sacred (mythical) forms of law.

These rely on 'apokalupsis' (revelation) and 'aretai' (miracles). The seers and the Magi are their representatives. The mythologists are their spokespersons.

AI-- The Themis right.

Its mythical (theological) foundation was – according to Flückiger – Titanic ('wild') goddesses such as Gaia, the Earth Goddess or Earth, and Themis, the goddess of justice. -- Fundamentally, the two are indistinguishable.

St. Paul calls such beings or numina “elements of this cosmos”, i.e. the factors that govern this world and thus make it understandable.

They are goddesses of fate, for they determine the fate of people and things. That fate is outlined in the myths in its general characteristics, revealed in the revelations of the seers, and influenced in magic.

They are – to use the words of N. Söderblom – 'Urheberinnen', causers. The quintessential domain of cause for these goddesses was the family (household and clan), private property, and hospitality (through which one was temporarily or permanently accepted into the family).

Among the nobility, the social upper class, the privileges (such as princely power) of the 'nobles' belonged to their domain of fate. This explains, at least in part, the concept of 'dynasty' (royal house).

The Themis right.

It was a maternal right: marriage and blood and affinity, its core, revolve around women, mothers.

Note: In some cultures today, the family (household and kinship group, the collective relatives) is still the central point.

This is the case with the Tuareg, a Berber tribe in North Africa. The husband belongs to the woman's social class. Just like the children.

CF83

Whoever is the Queen's husband inherits the throne.

However, as with the ancient Greeks of the tribal era, strictly political and legal work is a man's task.

A.II.-- The dike right.

The mythical foundation here is Zeus with Hera (Here), the main couple. Surrounded by an entire system of deities, heroes, and daimones, each of whom had their own domain of causation.

This new generation of deities is called “Olympic deities”: they conquered supreme dominion in a theomachia, a battle of the deities on the occult level with the Titanic deities (including Themis).

Incidentally: this is the structure of polytheism. 'Dikè' primarily means “regulated conduct”. For example, customary law. But Dikè with a capital letter is the cause, whose domain is the law of Zeus, which provides life in the polis, the city-state, with rules.

The Dikèrecht.

Alongside Themis law, Dikè law eventually emerges, namely in the city-state. No longer the nobility, as in the past, but “the people”—consisting of politeis, citizens (with the exception of male and female slaves)—is the bearer of this new legal order.

The agora, the popular assembly, decides. Under the guidance of the deities of the Dikerecht, an attempt is made to reach a consensus or unanimity.

Only gradually—often thanks to fierce struggle—were the rights of the Themis order (family law) pushed back or merged with legislation into the city-state system by the will of the citizens.

B.-- The legal system interpreted sophistically.

In the mind of the first Sophists, the archaic legal order (Themis and Dikè) went into definitive hiding as mythically justifiable: “Law became unilaterally paternal and rational” (thus literally Flückiger, oc, 123f.).

Crisis of faith

Protagoras of Abdera, a leading figure among the early Sophists, says: “The existence of deities is 'obscure' and earthly life is too short.” Most likely, he meant that the existence of deities is a matter for seers, for initiates. Thus, inaccessible to everyday reason based on sensory perception.

So that 'belief', in the fideistic sense now, is an opinion among many other opinions. From a 'public' perspective, such an opinion is too weak to establish consensus as in archaic cultures.

CF84

Thus, religion became a matter of individual opinion. Nothing more. But with a downside: the earthly opinions that took the place of religion were divided, dissensual! If there were differences among the religions themselves, there were also differences in the rational systems they replaced.

The secular foundation.

With its demythification, Protasophicalism became a crisis of the foundations of culture.

BI-- The crisis of tradition.

What had been considered 'sacred' or 'inviolable' until then was interpreted by the Sophists as a product of autonomous human decisions. Yes, as a product of human autonomy to the degree of arbitrariness.

The ancient religions were 'explained' in this way. One of the sophistical hypotheses stated: the “good old law” is, after rational investigation, merely a product of the ruling class. Thus, the “sacred magic” woven around it is a deception of the people. Thus, everything that was once tradition became 'suspect'. “We have been led to believe that it was the will of the deities. But it turns out to be the work of humans.”

In the early days of Protosophistics, it therefore seemed that amidst such a crisis of values, “there were no real foundations left.” That—now that the foundation establishing order had been lost—“everything was possible,” indeed, “everything was permitted.” This was the case for many.

B.II.-- A new foundation.

Flückiger, oc, 87: “Later sophists nevertheless attempted to find a rational-earthy foundation, in the name of which one can justify deeds.

The group dynamics of the time, which viewed the group as an autonomous entity, required justification: “What lived within the group, within society, became law,” but on what did this rest? Basic concepts were a necessity.

(1) Natural law.

“The Sophists were the first to establish a natural law” (oc, 88). The “antropine fuis” Lat.: *natura humana*, was a basis.

1. Medical model . -- The doctors of the time reasoned as follows: someone with an ailment is treated with a method of treatment adapted to their “own nature” or way of being.

2. Legally original. -- Every individual, every group possesses a “nature of its own” with its own needs and possibilities. After rational deliberation, the individual or the group can proceed and establish the 'law' adapted to its own nature, -- without deities, without myths, revelations, or magic. Autonomously or independently deductive.

CF85

Flückiger: “Both the brutal right of the stronger and the right to life of the weaker could be rationally derived from ‘their own nature’”.

Thus justice was updated, yes, re-established.

(2) Other basic concepts.

Universal, common properties were revealed through the investigation of (own) nature—*historiè fusikè*, Lat.: *historia (inquisitio) naturalis*, founded by the Milesians—which could serve as axioms for justification.

Like this: one sacred enthusiasm or another ('mania') as in “the olden times”.

Likewise: “to *hèdu*”, the pleasurable (all that is pleasant or useful), the basis of hedonism. Thus – what Euripides calls – ‘*thumos*’, inspiration, impulse (which can lead to irrational action) that manifests itself, for example, in great passions (sense of honor, hate/love).

Pluralism.

J. van Breda, Pluralism, in: *Alternatief* - 1975: Nov., 21, defines ‘pluralism’ as follows.

1. Philosophical significance.

The doctrine that prioritizes multiplicity regarding all that exists is called ‘pluralistic’. This stands in contrast to ‘monism’, which, as a philosophical system, constitutes a doctrine of unity (all being is one). For example, in Spinoza (1632/1677).

2. Sociological .

A society that, because no two people are entirely alike and never feel exactly the same, never think entirely the same, actually reflects such diversity regarding individual nature in a diversity of organizations—in genuine tolerance regarding life and worldviews “that exist in society”—is pluralistic.

A pluralistic democracy – according to van Breda – will therefore be a form of government in which every citizen is free to express their views, to campaign for them, to organize with like-minded individuals, to strive for power within the state by – legal – means, and possibly to share this power with those of different views.

Above all, one characteristic: pluralism is ideological, that is, regarding axioms, neutral—except regarding its own basis.

Protosophistics developed into its own pluralism.

CF86

27. The concept of 'freedom' (86/88)

Let us start with a text.

W. Peremans, *Greek Freedom (Message and Warning)*, Hasselt, 1978v.

We are in the full 4th century (-400/-300).

The time of the “first sophists”.

Peremans -- “Exhausted by the long warfare, the Greek man now asks above all for ‘peace and tranquility’ for himself, -- personal advantage and material gain. The individual enriches himself while the state becomes impoverished. He no longer concerns himself with formerly applicable principles, no longer feels bound by laws and worship, and frees himself from hindering regulations and statutory provisions. -- The concept of 'freedom' takes on a different meaning.” (Oc, 16v.).

Here is the representation of Plato.

I can well imagine that a 'democratic' (*note* : populist) state, thirsting for 'freedom', will not know when to moderate itself and will start revelling in the undiluted wine of 'freedom' (...).

1. Leaders who have no say and subjects who have everything to say: that is the motto! Such a thing deserves all praise and honor, both public and private (...).

2. The father gets used to placing himself on an equal footing with his son and to fearing his children. The son considers himself “just as good as the father”: he neither spares nor respects his parents, for, indeed, “he wants to be free”.

3. In such a state, it is the master who fears and flatters his pupils, while the gentlemen students look down upon their teachers from above.

4. The situation is no better for the private tutors.

5. Young people place themselves on an equal footing with the elderly: they oppose them in word and deed. Old people adapt to such youth; they exhaust themselves in jokes and jest: so as not to give the impression that they are petty and bossy, they ape the youth.” (*Polit.* 8: 562ff .)

Works such as that of Peremans as well as, for example, *AJ Festugière, liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs* , Paris, 1947, or *M. Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit (Wesen und Werden eines lebensideals)* , Heidelberg, 1955, outline the development of the concept of 'freedom':

- a.** archaic (the law restricts wild freedom),
- b.** anarchic (lawlessness),
- c.** internalization (anti-democratic systems silence freedom).

What Peremans and Platon depict is the second phase, the anarchic one.

CF87

One should reread *CF/CS 84* (“ *autonomous human decisions* ”) and bear in mind that this behavior, as autonomous, is the same as behavior “according to one’s own (autonomous) nature” (*CF/CS 84*). Which is then the same as 'free'. And free without further ado.

Freedom today.

That the entire issue of Protophysics is, to a large extent, applicable to our time is evident from what follows.

Bibl.st. : *M. Danthe, La liberté et ses collisions* , in: *Journal de Genève* 04.10. 1989.

Writer, observer during the XXXII International Meetings in Geneva (October 1989), reports on one of the talks. -- The general theme was “Usages de la liberté” (“How to make use of freedom”).

The second speaker was the Italian thinker Salvatore Veca (familiar with I. Kant as well as with Anglo-Saxon philosophy).

Two types of freedom.

Veca identifies two types of freedom in our culture. This duality was introduced in 1958 by Isaiah Berlin (1909/1997; of Jewish descent), who is a professor at All Souls College (Oxford) and has shaped several generations of the British elite.

A.-- Negative freedom.

We—I, you, each of us in principle—choose independently (/ / according to our own nature) what we desire. What is decisive is that we perceive something as valuable (to us). -- with a reservation: not to cause harm to one's fellow man. The latter is a duty.

Axiom: only the person acting is truly informed regarding the value in question.

Consequence.

a. Anything that promotes self-indulgence, provided it does not hinder one's fellow man, is ethically and 'politically' (= for society) 'good'.

b. Institutions—economic, social, political—to the extent that they make that negative type of being free possible, are 'good'. -- Veca: that type of freedom is characteristic of traditional liberalism.

B.-- Positive freedom.

We—I, you, we all—are only truly free to the extent that we choose what we ought to desire in conscience. In other words, to the extent that we can realize a destiny (purposefulness, meaning of life).

Axiom:

An ideal is put forward. Veca calls this 'rational' life (in the narrower sense of the term), which is justifiable by our reason (attuned to ideals).

CF88

The question arises: “Which ideal?” Why? Because we live in a society that is so pluralistic regarding ideals that precisely one ideal becomes unthinkable for all.

Since the church (or churches) lost its grip on the Western mentality, one lacks a single governing ideal. As G.Fr.W. Hegel said: “An educated people without metaphysics, -- which is like an otherwise abundantly decorated temple without the Holy of Holies”.

The proper role of an ideology.

Library st. : Jacques Delors, *La grande misère des politiques*, in : Le point 31.08.1995, 37. -- The former President of the European Commission reasons as follows.

1.1. In European democracies, there is a conviction that a thorough economic reform is necessary to bridge the gap between those who find work (and are therefore 'included') and those who do not find work (and are therefore 'excluded').

1.2. The disease from which our European democracies suffer is one that sinks every serious attempt to thoroughly reform society. The name of this disease: “le désenchantement” (disillusionment).

2.1. As causes of that ailment, serious people indicate – according to Delors –:

a. the economic prosperity during the “wonderful thirty years” (1960+) with the comfortable lifestyle associated with it that has an enthusiasm-killing effect;

b. the 'materialism' (CF/CS 81) that breeds selfishness in individuals and in groups.

J. Delors then reflects on a fact.

2.2. “Over the last few decades, ideologies—he means liberalism with its 'free-market economy' and communism with its planned economy—have lost their grip on people. For liberalism is clearly showing its limits and communism has collapsed.

Delors then discusses *Alain Leroux, Retour à l'idéologie (Pour un humanisme de la personne)*, PUF. Leroux defines ideology as follows.

A coherent, open set of principles applicable to society as a whole, which are put forward with the aim of presenting a picture of human life in society.

Note: This amounts to the fact that, after the metaphysics of the Middle Ages lost its leading role as the ideal of society (the clergy was replaced by the intelligentsia), a new—yet to be found—ideology is sought by Delors. In order to transform freedom into positive freedom.

CF89

28. Justification of the law. (89/92)

It sounds astonishing, to say the least: the law, once reason, especially autonomous reason, concerns itself with it, requires 'justification', accountability!

Today, amidst our cultural criticism (which concerns a crisis of values), the question reads as follows: “Is justice justifiable?” The current intelligentsia (the intellectual-artistic vanguard) doubts everything that is not immediately given to such an extent.

Library st.: MW Fischer, Hrg., *Worauf kann man sich noch berufen ? (Dauer und Wandel von Normen in Umbruchszeiten)*, Stuttgart, 1987.

The title speaks for itself: “What can one still appeal to?” Or: “In the name of what does one justify something?” The famous 'justification problem'.

In the language of Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt School), in search of the foundations or axioms for his 'critical' theory of society, it reads: in our 'post-

metaphysical' thinking (now that traditional metaphysics is being called into question), all that remains is “a theory of discourse or argumentation”. Without religious dogma. Without even some kind of rational metaphysics.

That is to say: without generally valid, or at least generally accepted, clauses (in which fixed, universally accepted axioms are formulated). Which, in turn, means: with only singular (individual) or at most particular (applicable to limited groups) clauses (in which fixed axioms are raised by an individual or by groups). Do one see the fragmentation? The pluralism? The divergent thinking within the same society?

Ottfried Höffe's attempt.

Höffe is a German thinker who teaches in Fribourg (Switzerland). In his **La justice politique**, he attempts to justify law, particularly regarding state power and social justice.

We rely on M. Hunyadi's report, *Légitimer la justice ? Pas simple !*, in: *Journal de Genève* 03.08.1991.

A.-- The dismantling of the “critical materialists”.

Karl Marx (1818/1883) (in his critique of ideology), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900) (in his genealogy of morality), and Sigmund Freud (1856/1939) (in his psychoanalysis of morality) have radically called into question the possibility of justifying every morality within which law and justice are situated.

CF89

Marx: the morality that governs a society is imposed by the “ruling class” (in Western Europe, the wealthy bourgeoisie).

Nietzsche : the morality that governs a society is the expression of the “*Will to Power*” (the drive for self-assertion).

Freud: the morality that governs a society is the expression of (repressed) drives in the unconscious and subconscious layers of the soul.

In those three 'critical' perspectives or axioms, there is no longer any question of conscientious behavior in the higher sense of the word. In other words: there is no longer any question of a 'metaphysical foundation'. All behavior is situated within the individual (psychologism) or within society (sociologism).

BI -- A reconstruction of the 'foundation'.

John Rawls publishes his *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford, Oxf. Univ. Press).

The work is interpreted as the Magna Carta of a democracy that, in a more universal sense, embodies liberalism. This is evident from his * *Political Liberalism* *, *New York*, Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.

Rawls re-establishes the justification of morality and especially law. Albeit in an indirect utilitarian sense and without addressing the higher idea of 'justice'.

B.II.-- A justification of morality and in particular law.

Ottfried Höffe attempts to expose the lofty idea of 'justice'.

Hunyadi outlines as follows.

1. The notion that one person forces another “in the name of justice” and thereby identifies himself as 'just' is radically contested by anarchism. Thus, for example, every government is not only factually but fundamentally 'unjust'.

Note: We refer here to Murray Rotbard, who claims that “the state is theft” and advocates total privatization of state power in the USA. He calls himself a libertarian.

2. -- Positivism fundamentally disputes the notion that any political ruler can act “in the name of a higher law” other than their actual position of power. After all, there are nowhere “higher norms” that are immediately evident to every earthly human being. Only factual norms exist, introduced by people themselves.

CF91

Höffe goes against both tendencies.

He rejects both anarchism, which opposes all state power, and positivism, which records only the factually ascertainable state powers as bare facts.

Höffe posits the ideas of 'law' and 'justice' as axioms. From this, he deduces that not every de facto state power is justifiable in conscience: there are, therefore, just and unjust state powers. This is contrary to the positivists. There are indeed just, and therefore justifiable, state powers. This is contrary to the anarchists and libertarians.

By what means—the 'kritèrion', Latin: criterion, means of distinction—is one able to determine whether a state power is just or unjust? One can see this in the fact that it upholds (higher) law as an ideal.

Höffe attempts to make this a reality by engaging in “descriptive semantics”:

- a.** describe the sense and meaning of the words - e.g. the word 'justice'
- b.** with the intention of deriving potential norms from it or of exposing them in it.

In this way, a law can be interpreted from three perspectives.

- a.** That law is good insofar as it achieves its objective through appropriate means.
- b.** It is good insofar as it aims at the welfare of the subjects.
- c.** It is good insofar as it is not only efficient (**a**) and promotes well-being (**b**), but also morally justifiable.

Hunyadi's criticism.

The entire work stands or falls with the idea of 'justice'. -- But how to theoretically prove that idea today? After all, we live in a climate in which “the nature” of things, or “the nature” of man, or “the values that apply independently of man” are questioned.

Note: The terms 'nature' and 'values' are used in this sense in their universal (metaphysical) sense. Not in the singular or particular sense. For since the “crisis of metaphysics,” concepts such as “(general) nature,” “essence,” or “(objectively valid) value” have become mere question marks. Not to say “pure word sounds” (*nominalism* ; CF/CS 79).

Hunyadi argues that Höffe engages in a “circulus vitiosus” (circular reasoning): to prove the idea of 'justice', he proceeds in his preposition from the fact that that idea is already evident somewhere and is therefore proven!

In other words: the requested (GV) is placed first in the given (GG). One proves by placing as proven that which still needs to be proven.

CF92

From metaphysics to rhetoric.

Traditionally, 'metaphysics' concerns itself with the 'elements' or 'preconditions' ('stoicheia', 'archai') that govern all of reality.

Rhetoric is the theory of persuasion. Rhetoric is situated in singular or particular circumstances, not in universal ones. It attempts to 'prove' what is provable, given the conversation partner or the audience, together with their mentality (axiomatics). Nothing more.

Let us consider this aspect in terms of legal doctrine.

O. Ballweg/Th.-M. Seibert, Hrsg., *Rhetorical Legal Theory*, Freiburg/Munich, 1982.

Nineteen studies, introduced by Ballweg. The argumentation regarding law is decisive. But this is rhetoric. Nothing more. No longer philosophy of law, but merely legal theory.

Legal life stands or falls—according to the authors—on making sense of things, namely, grasping the concrete situation. Knowing which sections of legislation were applied or not is secondary. The human being stands above the text!

Let us return to Höffe's **Polite Gerechtigkeit**. -- When he wishes to 'found' law and justice, to derive them from presuppositions, he presupposes—Hunyadi points out—what he has to prove.

One can therefore say that he is engaging in circular reasoning and thus proves nothing.

But in practice, it is not that simple. Even anarchist theory and positivist theory employ the concept of 'law' ('just'). The anarchist calls the state unjust. On what grounds does he label the state as unjust? Assuming that law and justice are already given! The positivist calls law “merely positive,” that is, a mere fact, without a higher norm.

How does the positivist arrive at the clear—and provable—distinction between 'factual' and 'higher'? Based on an intuition that presupposes that something higher regarding justice can exist, even though it is not given by the senses!

Both the anarchist and the positivist live from the light that illuminates and that is called the idea of 'justice' in traditional metaphysics.

But it is true: there is nothing more than a rhetorical argument in favor of such a universally valid and higher idea of 'justice'. In practice, anarchists and positivists also engage in circular reasoning.

29. The principle of sufficient reason or grounds (93/95)

Let us now consider the foundation of all reasoning, namely the principle (axiom) of sufficient reason or sufficient grounds.

As *HJ Hempel* states in **Variabilität und Disziplinierung des Denkens **, Munich/Basel, 1967, 17ff., “classical logic” prioritizes subordinate clauses, which, incidentally, have only been called 'laws of thought' in modern times.

Steller reduces them to two:

- a.** the principle of identity (which coincides with the principle of contradiction and the principle of the excluded third) and
- b .** the principle of sufficient reason (ground).

The terms 'stoicheion', Latin: elementum, 'element' (i.e., something that helps something exist and make it what it is) and 'archè', Latin: principium, principle (i.e., something that governs something and therefore must be known in order to understand that something) have been commonplace since the earliest Greek philosophers and scientists.

Plato says, “Nothing exists without reason,” and thereby formulates in the form of a sentence or statement what all his predecessors had put forward as an axiom.

Leibniz (1646/1716) formulated it as follows: “Nothing happens without having a cause or at least a reason that determines it. Such a determining reason is something that can serve to justify a priori how/why something exists precisely in this way and not otherwise”. Cf Hempel, oc, 18.

We phrase it precisely.

If A (reason, grounds), then B (given) (understandable, sensible, 'reasonable').

In practice, B comes first: B is what presents itself (phenomenon, given). Only then does the question arise: “How to understand B?” or “How is B understandable?” The answer to that question is “If A, then B” (understood in each instance meaning 'understandable').

The reason or basis that makes it understandable can be found within A, the given, or outside of it. With regard to the latter, this leads us to comparison

('compare' in the sense of "confront with something else" (in this case: something situated outside A but still related to it)).

Decision. -- Completed: "If within or outside BA, then B (understandable)".

Note: With A. Noiray, dir., * *La philosophie* *, Paris, 1972-2, 242s., the French term 'fondement' (English: 'foundation') can be included here. The work distinguishes two types of foundation.

CF94

a. Ontological.

The reality—even if it were a utopia, an illusion, a dream, indeed, the incongruous or the absurd—which makes a reality understandable ('explains'), is the foundation of the latter.

b . Logical.

Logic is, especially since Aristotle, ontology insofar as it expresses itself in "if-then clauses". The antecedent clause introduced with 'if' is then the basis of the consequent. "If predicate, then neutral (conceivable)".

Life as reasoning.

Let us make an ordinary judgment: "I see it raining outside." Implicitly, the reasoning here is: "If it is raining outside, then (I have the right, indeed, the duty to say) 'I see it raining outside.'" The fact that it is raining acts upon our (logical) mind: it is 'responsible,' 'justified,' 'well-founded,' 'justified' to claim that it is raining outside.

HJ Hampel, oc, 18, quotes *H. Dingler, Das Prinzip der logicalen Unabhängigkeit in der Mathematik (zugleich als Einführung in die Axiomatik)*, Munich, 1915, 4.

Dingler speaks of the principle of identity, the principle of sufficient reason, and says: "Apparently, I cannot logically prove these foundations in turn. After all, such a thing would presuppose the logic to be proven in advance!"

The question thus arises: "How do we know that, for example, the principle of sufficient reason is valid?" If this cannot be done by stringing together logically coherent sentences, how then can it be done? Hampel: Since W. Dilthey (1833/1911) and W. Wundt (1832/1920), the proposition has been held that direct experience (lived perception; observation) is the reason or

foundation of thought, -- in order to establish the great axioms such as the principle of sufficient reason or foundation.

Hampel cites E. May , **Am Abgrund des Relativismus** , Berlin, 1941. -- "All those principles are merely different ways of articulating the original experience which consists in the fact that something being lived through, at the very moment it is lived through, is lived through precisely as this and not something else".

One sees that May is talking about the identity principle.

From which Hampel concludes: the directly experienced is simultaneously conceptually understood and expressed within the sign system of a language.

Thus, when elaborating on a logic, for example, it becomes an 'axiom'.

CF95

The reasoning method.

Life that makes use of the highest principles of logic (ontological logic) proceeds as follows.

A.-- Problem/ solution.

The ancient mathematicians, confronted with a (mathematical) problem, proceeded as follows.

Problem. -- A distinction was made between given (GG) and requested (sought) (GV), for a distinction was made between direct knowledge (observation) of what presents itself immediately, the phenomenon (= GG), and indirect knowledge (reasoning) of what can be demonstrated, the sought (GV). -- The solution focused on the two aspects with the input of other information.

That this ancient duality still holds true is evident from *IM Bochenski, OP, *Wijsgerigemethoden in de moderne wetenschap** , Utr./Antwerp, 1961, 25 ff.. Steller situates (Husserlian) phenomenology as a description of the given (phenomenon) within direct knowledge. In indirect knowledge, he situates linguistic analysis and, above all, the strict reasoning that reveals the subject matter (deduction and reduction).

B.-- Reasoning.

Since Plato, we have had the duality of 'synthesis', deduction, and 'analysis', reduction.

These two fundamental forms of reasoning remain central. As evidence: Bochenski, op. cit., 93v.: J. Lukasiewicz, following in the footsteps of St. Jevons (1853/1862), demonstrated that all 'styles of argumentation' can be divided into two major classes.

1.-- Deduction. "If A, then B (understandable). Well, A. Therefore B".

For example: "If all girls are beautiful, then this and that girl. Well, all girls are beautiful. Therefore, this and that girl are beautiful."

Note: The premise of that reasoning is a theory of order: "if all, then some". -- So much for the forward or deductive reasoning.

2.-- Reduction. "If X, then B (understandable). Well, B. Therefore X".

For example: "If all water boils at 100° C., then this water and that water (samples). Well, this water and that water boil at 100° C.. So all water boils at 100° C."

Note: Again based on order theory: "if all samples, then some samples". One recognizes the hypothesis in this, specifically in the form of induction (generalization, generalisation).

So much for backward reasoning. Deduction takes on a special form in reasoning "ab absurdo" (from the absurd), and reduction, or backward reasoning, is recognized in lemmatic-analytical reasoning.

CF 96

30. Rationalism(s) (96)

Library st.: M. Müller/Al. Halder, *Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel/Freiburg/Wien, 1959-2, 141/143 (Rationalismus).

Rationalism is twofold.

A. Rationalism

Without a capital letter, in the general sense. -- Can be defined as follows. In ABC terms. -- A, all that exists, B. is approached from reason (Lat.: ratio), C. such that from this arises 'rational', i.e., responsible or at least justifiable behavior.

That 'reason' expresses itself in singular, particular, universal, indeed, transcendental (all-encompassing, ontological) concepts that are incorporated into logical-rigid thinking, if necessary.

From Plato to Hegel, such a 'rationalism' prevails. Hegel says, for example: "All that is human is human only insofar as it is brought about by thought." Man and rationality are equated—albeit in many variations. The principle of sufficient reason or foundation is the lifeblood of such a rationality. People wish to live responsibly.

B. *Enlightened rationalism.*

What is called 'Enlightenment' (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung) is a historical component of the general rationalism outlined above. It is situated in the 17th and 18th centuries. It originates, primarily, from R. Descartes (1596/1650) and even more clearly from J. Locke (1632/1704).

Figures such as Copernicus (1473/1543), with his heliocentric revolution regarding the solar system, -- Tycho Brahe (1546/1601), Johannes Kepler (1571/1630; think of Kepler's laws), -- especially Galileo Galilei (1564/1602), with his exact method (mathematics + experiment) in natural science, paved the way for modern or 'enlightened' rationalism. In particular: the rigorous ideal of (natural) science conquers philosophy, which from then on wants to become "strictly scientific".

Compared to what the ancient Greeks had founded in mathematics, science, philosophy, or rhetoric, Enlightened rationalism was regarded as an actualization, indeed, a radical re-establishment.

Rationalism, whether narrow (Enlightened) or broad, stands or falls with the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason or grounds. The following pages will show us how these principles are subject to heated debate.

CF97

31. *Foundation(al)ism (fundamentalism, integrism). (97)*

To be able to act, we all need a basis, a 'foundation'.

People who wish to impose such a foundation on everyone in order to 'found' a society are called 'foundationists' or 'fundamentalists' (those who wish to preserve the integrity of such a foundation at all costs are called 'integrists').

The foundation of all behavior is the given.

That which reveals itself, the 'phenomenon'. -- Now there is a boundless multitude of 'data' which can thus potentially serve as a basis, a presupposition, for action (reasoning).

The 'cogito'.

'Cogito' is Latin and means "I think".

P. Ricoeur, **Le conflit des interprétations ** (*Essais d'herméneutique **), Paris, 1969, 233, states that Descartes, with his cogito, situates himself within the entire series of 'reflective' philosophies (Socrates' "Care of your soul"; Augustine's "inner man"; Kant's "Ich denke"; Fichte's 'Ich'; Husserl's egologie ('egology')).

P. Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, Neuchâtel, 1968, views the introspective method, albeit logically refined, as the foundation of all scientific psychologies.

What drives those people to fixate on the self and its inner life—around thinking (la réflexion)? The need for a presupposition or foundation!

Descartes, for example, to escape the absolute doubt of the late medieval thinkers: 'think for a moment'. "I doubt everything". That means that the fact, phenomenon, given that I "try to doubt everything", is undoubtable! Also: Descartes reasons correctly: "Cogito. Ergo sum" ("I think, am conscious of myself and my thinking. Therefore I am (something real)").

It would have been better if he had said: "I think. Therefore my thinking exists," for the 'I' remains something mysterious in that context!

Husserl does not commit that fallacy: he performs "phenomenological reduction": he reduces (limits) the phenomenon to the pure phenomenon, that which reveals itself immediately and only that which reveals itself directly. The self, for example, does not reveal itself so directly: thus it is "bracketed" (it belongs not to the given but to the question). Husserl describes, i.e. defines in detail, what he perceives, what he knows directly.

CF98

32. The sufficient reason in Kafka's works. (98/100)

Life is about reasoning while living. This is called "existential reasoning," where "exist" means "to live as a human being in our world." One, and artistically superior at that, model of such reasoning can be found in the works of Kafka.

What has been published on Kafka is disorganized. One work: *HJ Schoeps, *On Man* (Reflections of Modern Philosophers)*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1966, 119/141 (*Franz Kafka: The Belief in Tragic Position*).

Together with *Max Brod*, Kafka's friend, Schoeps published **Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer ** (1931), an excerpt from Kafka's estate. Moreover, he is of Jewish descent and is therefore well-placed to penetrate the world of Kafka, who was also Jewish.

Incidentally: Schoeps has become a Christian.

Franz Kafka (1883/1924).

The terms 'Kafkaesque' have become commonplace over the decades. The works of *Kafka* —think, for example, of **The Trial **—are among the most widely read in the world. They have been adapted for film, stage, and set to music. -- Even in secondary education, they are presented as 'reading material'.

Especially since the Second World War (1939/1945), Kafka has been considered part of world literature _-- Some claim that as many commentaries have been devoted to Kafka as to Shakespeare.

This is notwithstanding, or rather because, Kafka's works exude a very bizarre atmosphere: they therefore primarily attract contemporary people who find in them an artistic interpretation of their own bizarre sense of life; they repel others through the 'Unheimlichkeit', the lack of security, and absurdities of all kinds.

Let us now, with Schoeps, consider a few 'elements' or 'presuppositions' that characterize Kafka.

The Talmudic end-time doctrine.

'Talmud' literally means 'study', 'instruction'. The Talmud is one of the Jewish holy books. Theological insights of Old Testament legal scholars are recorded in it.

There is the Talmud of Jerusalem and the Talmud of the Babylonians (by Rab Ashi (352/427) and his successors).

The Talmud strongly shaped Kafka's mentality. Here is how.

1. The Talmud contains a prophecy of doom: one day, at the end of times, "the end times" will come.

CF99

Incidentally : this is common to Jews and Christians, -- with the difference that Jesus, for Christians, ushers in the end times in their first phase, whereas for the Jews “the Messiah” is yet to come. -- Traditionally, the idea of 'end times' is associated with: all kinds of horrors; a worldwide upheaval, etc.

The Talmud: “Then the faces of the end-time people will be like the faces of dogs.”

Note-- For information. -- Howard P. Lovecraft et al., * *Le Necronomicon**, Paris, Belfond, 1979 (/ / *Neville Spearman*, **The Necronomicon* * (1978)), in his own way upholds an end-time doctrine and, above all, an end-time prophecy, in which 'monsters' will rule this earth. The book—or rather: some eighteen pages—were written by Abdul al-Hazred, a mad poet in Yemen around 700+. The title was “Al-Azif”, a term used by the Arabs to describe the nocturnal buzzing of insects. In the case of the **Necronomicon**, this is meant to metaphorically denote “the buzzing of demonic beings” that will rule the earth in an end time.

Incidentally : the forbidden book was already published in Antwerp in 1571 under the title: *John Dee, The Necronomicon* (*The Book of Dead Names*).

Its bizarre character is reminiscent of the bizarre in Kafka's works.

2.-- Kafka must have had the impression that that prediction might well be realized precisely in our time and its confused and confusing culture.

Just as Lovecraft (and the group around him) interpret our time and its culture somewhat in the same vein, from the perspective of “the buzzing of insects”.

In other words: we are experiencing “the end of history”. A theme that can also be found elsewhere.

The navigation background.

Even pre-Socratic thinkers proposed the following as a schema of the genesis of things and the fate of men.

Something—a landscape, a person, a culture—is either goal-oriented or consciously pursuing a goal (finalism, teleology). But that something can deviate from the goal. This provokes, sooner or later, a corrective—'feedback,' as modern cyberneticists call it. This corrective becomes palpable in the form

of some misfortune that invites restoration. -- Aristotle knows that schema very well.

CF100

Kafka's steering 'law'.

Here is how Schoeps, oc, 123ff., a work by *Kafka—Zur Frage der Gesetze*—which speaks about the laws as they were interpreted in Jewish circles.

1. The 'theologians'—referring to the Hasidim (whom Kafka describes as a kind of nobility)—talk at length about “the laws”. Schoeps: “Kafka lives with the constant impression that he is governed by laws he does not know” (oc, 123).

Note: The worldview in this regard exhibits a dual structure. On the one hand, there is “the nobility” (the theologians), the interpreters of the law, and on the other hand, “the people” (“am ha-arez”), the hearers. The latter are 'am ha-arez', ignorant people.

In this regard, Kafka feels himself to be **a.** ignorant like the people **b.** but nevertheless someone who has progressed so far in the analysis of the laws that he wonders whether those laws are not perhaps sham laws. Which could indicate a crisis of faith.

2.-- Schoeps, oc, 124ff. -- The great mass of “the people” has, in contrast to the interpreters of the law, “the nobility”, deviated from the laws.

3.-- Schoeps, ibid. -- A deviation, interpreted in the orthodox Jewish sense, provokes a divine judgment ('gesera').

One sees the three-part schema of sacred or salvation history. The “great story” of the Bible. Paradise/ Fall/ Restoration.

Tracks by a dog.

This is the title of a work by Kafka.

A 'dog'—an end-time human—tells how “the people” of the 'dogs' went astray many generations ago. This error or guilt of sin weighs heavily on the current generation of dogs.

Note: This is reminiscent of Jeremiah 31:29: “The fathers have eaten green grapes and (as a result) the teeth of the sons are sharp.”

The current race of dogs **a.** bears the burden of a debt of the fathers, **b.** but cannot define that debt. That debt is and remains an 'x', an unknown.

Schoeps: "What *The *Investigations of a Dog* * says about our 'canine culture' is, precisely, essentially to be found in all of Kafka's literary works. With the emphasis here on the absurd or incongruous nature of the fact that one suspects the sufficient reason or ground for the current cultural calamity but cannot articulate it. Our cultural criticism is, in its true, salvific-historical cause, an 'X'.

CF101

33. The trial in Kafka. (101/102)

How does Kafka translate his theological presuppositions and experiences into artistic models? We will now delve deeper into this.

Odradeck.

This Slavic word means "fallen outside the law," deviated. -- The "dog-like man" in our cultural criticism is increasingly without a human 'I'! More and more he/she becomes a 'thing': an 'it'. Just like the objects we make use of in our technological society. -- Thus Odradeck takes on "the senseless – absurd – form of a spool of yarn". (Schoeps, oc, 131). In this way, Odradeck becomes "an automatically running mechanism".

The trial

This is the title of Kafka's most famous novel. It would never have seen the light of day had Max Brod, Kafka's friend, done what he had asked, namely, to destroy the manuscript. -- There has even been debate about the correct order of the chapters. According to some critics, Brod is said to have arranged them incorrectly!

The scenario (story).

A. Joseph K. is still lying in bed one morning when he is told that he faces trial. Neither his subordinates nor the one questioning him know the reason or grounds for his guilt. Nevertheless, he is released on provisional liberty.

B. When he 'appears', both the judge and the public are 'bizarre'. -- The steps and interventions in his favor only make "the case" more complicated. Just like Huld, his lawyer, Tintorelli, a painter who wants to help him, fails. - - In a final conversation with a priest, he speaks of "entry into the law" (a parable).

C. On the eve of his thirty-first year, “two gentlemen” come to fetch him, take him outside the city to kill him with a butcher’s knife “like a dog”.

The soil structure.

This is twofold. Riddle/unraveling. Both the trial of Joseph K. and our culture.

1 -- *The enigma.* Joseph K. is being charged by a mysterious and superior court. The file of accusations is accessible neither to Joseph K. nor to his lawyers.

Note: One recognizes the X that corrupts our culture.

2.-- *The Unraveling* . -- Joseph K. attempts to uncover the guilt for which he is being prosecuted. To this end, he also enlists the help of lawyers.

CF102

Their main task is to deduce the contents of the file from 'signs' (traces). “To deduce from the interrogations, for example, what the content of the file is that forms its basis, -- that is very difficult”. (Schoeps, oc, 130).

Or again, oc, 129: “Thus, from the character and form of the punishment, one must attempt to find the 'X' of sin, -- even though actual verification cannot succeed. -- That is precisely what happens in Kafka's work. In both the great novels and the short stories, this motif recurs time and again as a tendency: to want to determine the essence of guilt (*note:* original) from the nature of the punishment (*note: model*)”.

A comparison.

People know the infamous novel by *Umberto Eco*, *The Name of the Rose* , Amsterdam, Bert Bakker, 1985 (// *Il Nome della Rosa* , Milano, 1980).

The subject is called Eco himself, oc, 53, with a bizarre term: “a great and heavenly bloodbath”. The method reflected in the work is that of Sherlock Holmes: in 1327, the Franciscan William of Baskerville investigates a crime. And as follows: “The concepts I employed to imagine a horse that I had not yet seen (*note:* compare Kafka’s guilt which he cannot bring before the gaze of his mind), were thus ‘pure signs’ just as the imprints in the snow (*note:* horse hooves, for example) were signs of the concept of ‘horse’: one employs signs only, and signs of signs, when the things themselves are absent”.

Cf. A. Blanch, *The Semiotic Rose of Umberto Eco*, in: *Streven* 51 (1984): 5 (Feb.), 439/448.

Note: U. Eco is a semiotician, a theorist of signs. This is reflected somewhat in his novel. One can compare it to the traces that J. Derrida repeatedly places at the center, the references to 'things' that repeatedly appear 'fleetingly' and vanish.

So that we, with Eco and Derrida, but also with Kafka, end up in the postmodern sphere: modern reason, indeed, reason pure and simple, is confronted with the undecipherable to such an extent that it must actually be proclaimed non-reason.

Her representations of the given (GG) are time and again constructions, not actual reflections of the given: and what is asked (GV), e.g. the reason or foundation, keeps escaping. Unsolved! We know, postmodern, that we do not know!

CF103

34. The ambiguity of a work. (103/105)

'Multiplicity' means that a single piece of information (GG) A, based on a set of presuppositions of the interpreter, B, as an interpretation, elicits a multitude of meanings (C).

We will briefly apply this to Kafka, who provoked contradictory 'receptions' (welcomes, interpretations).

1.-- A psychiatric interpretation.

Let us have the floor: Dr. Hesnard, *L'univers morbide de la faute*, Paris, 1949.

Hesnard speaks of "the world of sinful guilt". He puts it as follows: "This dark and absurd, incomprehensible and tyrannical sense of guilt weighed heavily on the entire existence of this artist". (Oc, 441s.).

In particular: "Kafka behaved—throughout his entire life and in all the fields in which he was active—like a guilty party who cannot ascertain the true essence of an unforgivable error.

Well, precisely that Kafkaesque world—he described it in all his works—is our morbid world of guilt." (Ibid.).

Note-- See e.g. Dr. med. Trygve Braatoy, *Uit de praktijk van een psychiater* (*A popular introduction to medical psychology and psychiatry*), Utrecht, 1939, 180/190 (*Some reflections on religion in psychiatry*):

If one is involved in psychiatric work, one will be struck by how many patients worry about religion and morality. Problems in the realm of morality almost always bear a more or less clear stamp of a religious sense of sin.

Very striking – and often as a predominant feature of the clinical picture – are such debilitating states of anxiety in – what is called – “the melancholic depressive”. (Oc, 180).

Braatoy, as an 'understanding' physician, addresses the decisive question: “Why/ how does this illness manifest itself as an incessant, religious nightmare in which the patient is not left in peace for a single moment by his burden of sin, his regret and remorse?” (Ibid.).

Note: Braatoy answers that question by referring to a certain type of preaching and religious doctrine: “A cruel god, -- something by which the melancholic is actually proven right in his/her reasoning. For from such a god one can expect no understanding of his difficulties”. (Oc, 189). -- That is exactly one explanation. Nothing more.

CF104

The role of “the father”.

This abstract word, typical of psychoanalytic language, often plays a role in the analysis of “the Kafka case” by psychiatrists and psychologists of all kinds.

The 'absurd' in Kafka's works is said to be due to his powerlessness in the face of his 'authoritarian' father.

Braatoy, with his concept of God, brings us much closer to the true Kafka as his works portray him. It is not about the ephemeral, passing 'father figure' but about the God of the Jewish-interpreted Old Testament of the Bible.

2. *An agnostic interpretation.*

Where the atheist denies God or deity, the agnostic says that he does not know whether God or deity exists.

Albert Camus (1913/1960)

He is, among existential thinkers—an outsider—and writes: “In any case, Kafka’s work reflects the problem of the 'absurd' in its entirety.” This text is cited by *WJ Simons*, **Timeless Actuality of Kafka Only Late Recognized **, in: *Spectator* (Ghent) 30.08.1983, 36. -- We explain.

A.-- Camus. The Annoyed Agnostic.

Camus is both an agnostic and morally minded: “I do not believe in God, but that does not make me an atheist ('athée’).” “The concept of 'God' is ineradicable in the heart of man” (**The Myth of Sisyphus ** (1942)).

He expresses his ethical and moral concern as follows: “The brutal fact of evil in the world of an almighty and infinitely good God is an offense” (*L'homme révolté* (1951)).

B.-- Camus, the prophet of the existential absurd.

The term 'absurd' is not used here in the purely ontological sense (the unthinkable, the impossible) but in the 'existential' sense: 'to exist' is “to live as a human being in this (incomprehensible) world,” whereby the 'incomprehensible' becomes a constant source of annoyance.

One can see: Kafka wrestled with an analogous problem. -- The absence of God robs—according to Camus—the world of justification and explanation: that is the reason or ground of the absurd.

“Human existence for those who do not believe in immortality is a complete absurdity” (*Le mythe de Sisyphe* (1942)). “Life is therefore ‘faire vivre l'absurde’ (bringing the absurd to life).”

Result: “There is only one real philosophical problem: suicide” (*Le mythe de Sisyphe* (1942)).

CF105

Incidentally: Le Point (Paris) 14.08.1993, 50/64 (Relire Camus) devotes a piece of text to the lively relevance of *Camus* among today's French youth: “For young people, *L' étranger* (1942) is a celebrated book. And Camus plays the role of life guide” (ac, 60).

3. The Jewish interpretation of Schoeps.

We provide a schema: “If Z (guilt of sin), then S (punishment). Well, S. Therefore Z.” That is perhaps, at least according to Schoeps, the fundamental structure of Kafka’s works. But not without one more term: S is phenomenon, but Z (the sufficient reason or ground) is a pure mystery. A pure mystery that

irritates. That 'grounds', 'founds', 'justifies' the absurdity of life on this earth in our era.

Thus, “If Z (guilt of sin), and indeed radically enigmatic Z, then absurd S (punishment). Well, life exhibits an enigmatic ground or reason such that the punishment appears absurd.” The punitive character predominates. Without sufficient reason, such a punishment is absurd. Kafka is situated within the (post)modern experience of “the absence of God.”

Skepticism , which accepts nothing except the immediately given (phenomenon), to the exclusion of all that is transphenomenal.

Agnosticism , which brackets a transphenomenal God or deity as unknowable, or at least unknown,

Atheism , which denies God and divinity, formed one major aspect of Kafka's environment.

Schoeps: Kafka was Jewish by birth. Religious beliefs that had become 'mythical' (meaning: “good for primitives”) in the eyes of his contemporaries (and perhaps his own) nevertheless made him look forward time and again to what, in Jewish terminology, is called “the law.”

In other words: although critical of his own religion, Kafka was nevertheless 'post-religious', marked by at least one religious thought, “the laws”.

Consequence . -- That which in Kafka's eyes is “the catastrophe” consists in the fact that present-day humanity, having been deprived of the awareness of being a creature of God, loses the traits that precisely characterize it as person(hood): it thus becomes individually a thing or inanimate object (Odradeck) and socially a nameless mass. Cf. Schoeps oc, 131.

Note: Schoeps, oc, 119, therefore compares Kafka with F. Nietzsche where the latter speaks of “the death of God” in our culture.

CF106

35. Tragedy or redemption. (106/107)

When one reads a work like that of *Karl Jaspers* (1883/1969; physician, psychiatrist, existential thinker) – * *Ueber das Tragische* *, Munich, 1952 – one sees 'tragedy' defined as follows.

Whenever there is transience, indeed, actual ruin (radical failure) and this is hopeless, then there is a tragic situation. Tragedy becomes full tragedy insofar as that situation penetrates consciousness: the realization that the situation is hopeless fully defines the tragedy. Thus Jaspers, oc, 18.

However, when redemption from that tragedy emerges, the tragedy ceases. So that tragedy and redemption from tragedy never go hand in hand.

So that, namely, the pagan religions, insofar as they culminate in tragedy, remain without prospect of redemption. Whereas Christianity, however, overcomes tragedy by offering redemption.

Camus (*CF/CS 104*) is, after all, a tragic thinker who sees the question arise time and again: to continue living in meaninglessness (absurdity) or to commit suicide?

Kafka.

Max Brod, in a lecture in Brussels in September 1967, maintained that "Kafka merely strived for a pure worldview and a more beautiful future".

Schoeps, oc, 140, summarizes: "In Kafka lived the messianic hope. Albeit in a tragic situation: "The myth of faith in a tragic position"

As long as there is hope, redemption is in sight, and the situation, however containing failure, is not (radically) hopeless and therefore not radically tragic.

Incidentally: the most dangerous thing was Kafka's (possible) disbelief, which turns Old Testament-Biblical salvation into a question mark.

Salvation history that becomes disaster history.

Schoeps, oc, 125. -- "The apostasy (of men) from the law of revelation makes history the history of human misfortune.

This manifests itself as the world's increasing alienation from its revealed destiny. This is caused by a single series of destructions hastening toward the end which, judged by human blindness, must be regarded precisely as "higher development and constructive progress".

Note: In Kafka's case, this is the questioning of the modern notion of "progress based on reason." Which makes him postmodern.

CF107

The reason or basis of the radical unease.

Schoeps, oc, 125. “It is therefore guilt—guilt admittedly no longer knowable in its essence—that has obscured the world. To such an extent that its order can no longer grasp the true word. This is because the pressure of the centuries has already made that word too firm and the 'dogs' too 'dog-like' (*CF/CS 100: “dog-like culture”*).”

Note: It is both a Biblical and an occultist conception that “evil” (especially in its deepest sense) 'accumulates' over the centuries and makes “a pressure of the ages” felt.

A parallel.

As briefly noted earlier, Schoeps compares Kafka to Nietzsche. Nietzsche, too, sees “a pressure of the ages” (from Plato, he claims)) that weighs heavily on the degenerate Western culture. Nietzsche, the son of a clergyman, also speaks of a religious-Christian phenomenon: “The most important events find it most difficult to access the senses. -- For example, the fact that ‘the Christian God is dead.’ The fact that, in what we experience, heavenly goodness and guidance, divine justice, and—generally speaking—not even an immanent morality are perceptible anymore.”

That is the terrible news that will take another few centuries to sink into the senses of Europeans. Then for a time it will seem as if “all weight” has vanished from things. (*Fr. Nietzsche: Morgenröte* (1882)). - Quoted in Schoeps, oc, 119.

Note: Just as the “law” of the Jews is 'dead' – except among the nobility – so the God of the Christians is 'dead' in our Western culture.

Even the atheists, at the time of Nietzsche, did not yet realize how profoundly the death of God was already present. Nietzsche reproaches them for this incomprehension of things in our culture.

'Atheism' is much more than the elimination of the term 'God' from people's reasoning (“heavenly goodness and guidance”, “divine justice”, etc.): the “weight” of things (i.e., the richness of meaning amidst the hardships of daily life), which stands or falls with God's 'presence', is at stake!

When the weight is taken out of things, they become meaningless—absurd, even irreconcilable—'absurd'. From that perspective, Kafka and Nietzsche agree. Except that Nietzsche had completely lost his Protestant faith.

36. “The Death of God” according to J.-P. Sartre. (108/110)

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980) was a celebrated thinker for at least two generations. With international resonance.

We will briefly consider one aspect of his highly multifaceted personality, namely Sartre's interpretation of our profound cultural criticism. His interpretation remains relevant today, for it is one of the many forms of 'dismantling' ('deconstruction') and settling accounts with what remains of human possibilities after that dismantling of the great tradition.

We take his **L'existentialisme est un humanisme**, **Paris**, Nagel, 1970, as **our bibliographic source**, and let him speak for himself as much as possible.

Criticisms.

At a certain point, French existentialism was subjected to fierce criticism.

a. Both Catholics and Communists criticize Sartre's starting point, namely Descartes' cogito (CF/CS 97), for viewing man merely as an individual, and then only within his inner life (“sens intime”). As a result—so his detractors claim—all human solidarity is undermined: the social dimension of actual existence in this world (= 'existence') is either prioritized from the outset or dismissed afterwards as a meaningless appendage.

b.1 . Christians reproach Sartre for the dismantling of the “Ten Commandments” as a summary of eternal values, -- a dismantling that leaves nothing but the total absence of justification for any behavior.

b.2 . The communists reproach him for the 'quietism' (total resignation) inherent in his despairing thinking, which they interpret as a last remnant of bourgeois thought. Whoever preaches despair—some of Sartre's students committed suicide (CF/CS 104; 108) under the influence of his desperate philosophy—is resigned and does not become active.

The sufficient reason or ground: the death of God.

However paradoxical it may seem: Sartre's thought has as its premise “the absence of a God as the ultimate reason or ground”. He condenses this into a term he borrows from M. Heidegger, “le délaissement”: “God does not exist”. From this, one draws the ultimate consequences. These ultimate

consequences are called “standing alone”. “God-forsaken life in this world”. Cf. oc, 33 (*Angoisse et responsabilité*).

CF109

Two types of lay morality.

Sartre, oc, 33/37, characterizes his position by means of a counter-model, namely French radicalism with its classical secular morality.

A. -- *The counter-model.*

We quote as literally as possible. The existentialist is the radical opponent of that kind of “morale laïque,” or secular morality, which posits that eliminating God as the foundation of all morality entails virtually no disadvantages. When—around 1880—French professors attempted to construct a secular morality, they asserted roughly the following.

1.-- *Atheism.*

God is an unusable and, moreover, demanding hypothesis. So we drop it.

2.-- *Axiology (theory of values).*

With a view to morality, society, and a civilized world, it is necessary that some values be taken seriously and understood as existing a priori.

Note: In Sartre's terminology, 'a priori' here means conceived by a divine consciousness before humans exist. This is his articulation of traditional Christian Platonism, which asserts that God's ideas are both the reason or foundation and the norm or ideal of all that is created.

Thus, for example, acting honestly, not lying, not outdoing one's wife, fathering children, etc., etc., must be obligatory a priori. We, French radicals, are therefore going to briefly demonstrate that those values do exist after all... “In a world existing in thought (“ciel intelligible”), notwithstanding that God does not exist”.

Note: It is typical of radicalism, therefore, that they reject God's thinking before anything exists, but do put forward “a thinking before anything exists.” A remnant of theology, then—necessary to preserve an a priori. An a priori or sufficient reason or ground for conscientious action. “Put differently: nothing will be changed if God does not exist” (oc, 35).

B.-- *The model.*

Oc, 35 ss. -- The existentialist, on the other hand, is of the opinion that it is very annoying that God does not exist. For, with Him, every possibility of prioritizing “a thinking that exists before whatever actually exists” and finding values therein vanishes.

Note: For Sartre, 'values' are essentially pre-existing values.

CF110

Sartre: “An a priori is impossible since there is no longer an infinite and perfect consciousness to think that a priori” (oc, 35s.). After all, it is nowhere written that, for example, “the good” exists, -- that one must be honest, -- that one must not lie. “For we find ourselves in a living space in which only human beings still exist” (oc, 36).

Dostoevsky (1821/1881; Russian novelist).

Sartre: “Dostoevsky wrote: ‘If God did not exist, then everything would be permitted’.”

Note: One must understand Dostoevsky correctly: he does not claim that, because God has been eliminated, everything is in fact permitted, for fellow human beings—think of the police and the judiciary, for instance—are there to set limits to a godforsaken freedom; he does, however, claim that in principle everything would be permitted if God, as lawgiver and judge, were “bracketed.” It is also the case, moreover, that Sartre wants Dostoevsky to be understood.

Definition of existentialism.

“Well, that is precisely the premise of existentialism.” Oc, 36.

Indeed: if God does not exist, then everything is permitted. Consequently: man is 'délaissé', stands alone, since he/she finds neither within nor outside himself/herself any presupposition to which he/she has a foothold.

1. On the one hand, man finds no excuses left. For if 'existence' (the actual man in this world without God) precedes 'essence' (the a priori existing value), one will, for instance, never again be able to employ an actual and unchangeable human nature to explain something. In other words: determinism does not exist. Man is free. Man is freedom.

2. On the other hand, if God does not exist, we are not confronted with values or commands that justify our behavior.

Consequence.

We stand alone, without excuses based on values. "I express that as follows: "Man is condemned to be 'free'". Oc, 37.

Note: Sartre's concept of 'freedom' is the freedom of the godforsaken. He uses 'determinism' in a sense unique to him, namely to denote the 'carcass' within which God's thought compels man to take into account the values and commandments that exist for man.

CF111

37. The essence of Christianity. (117)

Sartre's characterization of God's role in culture is not so far removed from the great tradition regarding the essence of Christianity. Therefore, the following concerns what distinguishes Christianity from the rest.

O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus* , II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 8, characterizes Christianity as follows: the sacred or salvation history before Jesus, in Jesus, after Jesus has as its origin (reason) eternity, which is that of God (Yahweh / Holy Trinity).

Willmann refers to *2 Timothy 1:9/10* in this regard .

A. The origin.

The 'counsel', that God's will which determines our fate, is the 'origin' of all that has been created, -- from the fact that God calls us to a happy fate ('salvation').

That council decision exists "in the beginning and now and always" as an present, valid power. For Jesus, in Jesus, after Jesus.

B. The revelation of the origin.

Through the mouths of prophets, through those of Jesus, through those of the apostles, for example, God reveals His counsel. They reveal (apocalypticism) and present signs (aretalogy).

The same basic idea appears in *Heb. 11:1* . -- "By faith we understand that by a word of God the worlds ('aiones') came into being. So that out of the invisible the visible came into being."

Note: “Word of God” means “the creative articulation of reality”: what God 'wills' and thus 'expresses' becomes real.

Christian Platonism.

La Bible de Jérusalem, Paris, 1978, 1738, says regarding *Heb. 11:1*: “The belief in God’s creation of the worlds is a fine example of insight into ‘the invisible’: before they were created, the realities existed in God from whom everything proceeds.” Cf. *CF/CS 71; 75*.

Albinus of Smurna (c. 100/ c. 175), a late Platonist, is the first to situate the essential forms (which make them what they are) of things within God's ideas on the matter. If we see a tree, we know that in God's spirit that tree has existed “already from all eternity.” So it is with everything that has been created.

In other words: Plato set the course; Albinus situated it in the Godhead; Christian Platonism developed this in a purely Biblical manner.

CF112

38. Divine idea and human freedom. (118)

Atheists, for example, have difficulty with the fact that we, as autonomous human beings, are created according to a divine idea. This is because they, unconsciously, project human concepts and designs onto the ideas of God as creator. This is primarily because they cannot reconcile being created and being free. -- Yet let us listen to the Bible on the matter.

1.-- The Old Testament.

Genesis 1:26ff. -- God in the midst of his act of creation is characterized as follows. -- “God said: ‘Let us make man in Our image, after Our likeness, and let men have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, the cattle, all the wild animals, and all that crawls on the earth.’”

God created man in his image. In his image he created him. Male and female he created them.

Note-- Reread *CF/CS 71/75* (*Toonbeeld/ illustration* ; frl. *CF/CS 74*) and the text just cited will become abundantly clear.

Ben Sira (*Ekklesiastikus*) *15:11/20*. -- This text completes the previous one: besides the likeness to God regarding the control of lower beings, there is the likeness to God regarding freedom. Thus *Ben Sira 15:14ff.* .:

“The Lord, in the beginning, created man and left him to his freedom. – If you wish, you shall keep the commandments to remain faithful to him in a good understanding. Before you he laid 'fire' and 'water': according to your desire, stretch out your hand toward them. Before people are 'life' and 'death': as they choose, they receive either the one or the other.”

Psalms 62 (61):13 confirms: “You, Lord, pay man according to his works.” See also *Ezek. 14:12*, for example.

2.-- The New Testament.

Galat. 6:7/8. -- “Do not be deceived: God is not mocked! For whatever one sows, that is what one reaps; whoever sows in the 'flesh' will reap destruction because of that 'flesh', but whoever sows in the 'spirit' will reap eternal life because of that 'spirit'”.

Cf. *Matt. 16:27; Rev. 2:23*. -- 'Flesh' = “god-alienated humanity”; 'spirit' = “divine principle of life”.

Conclusion. -- The idea of 'man' in God's spirit includes the idea of 'freedom'. But not without the idea of the “Ten Commandments”. The cosmos is an orderly conceived reality, not a 'wild' one.

CF113

39. An incorrect denial of atheism. (119/120)

Let us remain for the time being in the previous line of thought, namely the relationship between “divine idea/created freedom”.

'Theodicy' (Greek: *theos* + *dikè*), meaning to do justice to God, is a term introduced by Leibniz. The given: the brutal fact of physical but especially moral evil in 'creation', on the one hand, and, on the other, the existence of an almighty and good God. Cf. *G.W. Leibniz, Essais de théodicée* (1710). Cf. CF / CS 104 (*Camus' opinion*).

A. -- The colloquial wording.

Rule: “If you assert that, then it follows what you refute.”

Prefix 1.

If God exists, then he is almighty - and - good.

But either if God can prevent evil but does not want to, then he is not good, or if he wants to prevent evil but cannot, then he is not omnipotent.

Prefix 2.

Well, evil can only exist either if God can prevent it but does not want to, or if he wants to prevent it but cannot.

Prefix 3.

Well, evil exists.

Nazin.

So God does not exist.

Note-- That looks like a perfect reasoning if the three preceding clauses, then the one concluding clause!

B.-- The logical-syntactic rewriting.

'Syntax' in the logical sentence focuses on the sentences insofar as they are interconnected (logically or not). To this end, the sentences are rewritten in symbol-shortened form.

a.1.-- Rewriting of the sentences .

"God exists" = p. "God is good" = q1. "God is almighty" = q2. "God can prevent evil" = r1. "God wants to prevent evil" = r2. "Evil exists" = s.

a.2.-- Rewriting of conjunctions.

The encompassment (implication: if, then) = $\Rightarrow$. (Peano's pasigraphic manner).
 -- The contradiction = w (which corresponds to the Latin 'aut': or (dilemma)).
 -- The negation = - (e.g. the negate p: not p). -- Behold the connectives.

b.-- The logical syntax of reasoning .

The framework of the reasoning. -- We first note separately for the sake of clarity. We immediately introduce the conjunction 'and': 'and' = $\wedge$.

CF114

VZ 1. -- $p \Rightarrow (q1 \wedge q2 \wedge r1 \wedge \neg r2) \Rightarrow (\neg q1 \wedge r2 \wedge \neg r1) \wedge \neg q2$ -

VZ 2.-- $r1 \wedge \neg r2 \wedge r2 \wedge \neg r1 \Rightarrow s$

VZ 3.-- s

NZ -- negative p

The entire reasoning: $VZ 1 \wedge VZ 2 \wedge VZ 3 \Rightarrow NZ$.

C.-- *The ontological screening.*

Stringing sentences together is one thing. But addressing the truth of those sentences is another!

1.-- *The artery, viewed from a God-fearing perspective,*

This is: the autonomy of the creature. God can prevent evil, but he does not willingly do so because he respects the autonomy or freedom of the rational creature. God wants to prevent evil, but to the extent that he respects the autonomous freedom of the spiritually endowed creature, he cannot do so without further ado.

In other words: the reasoning starts from a misinterpreted idea of “creation of free beings” (as seen above). Cf. *CF/CS 112*: the idea of man is a composite idea! Being human, in God’s idea, encompasses both freedom and decision regarding the Ten Commandments.

2.-- *Argumentum ad hominem.*

For the believer in God who clearly understands the idea of God regarding man in the universe, God is not the cause of evil. He tolerates it out of respect for man's autonomy.

In other words: the sufficient reason or ground for evil lies entirely outside of God.

Paradoxical: the atheist, precisely on the basis of his atheism, radically agrees with this! Indeed: for him, God does not exist. But evil does exist! Therefore, the sufficient reason or ground for that evil certainly lies not in God, directly or indirectly, but in the created, experienceable world itself.

In other words: the sufficient reason or ground for evil lies entirely outside of God.

Note: Non-Biblical religions were very familiar with the problem: *WB Kristensen, *Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions **, Amsterdam, 1947, states that, for ancient theologians, the sufficient reason or ground of evil admittedly lies in man, but at least equally in the deities who reside in good and evil. What Kristensen calls “the harmony (merging) of good and evil” (as the Bible perhaps meant in *Genesis 2:17* (knowledge of good and evil)) as well as *Genesis 3:5* (*knowledge of the deities of good and evil*).

40. Fate and Inductive Reason. (121)

Fate analysis. Fate science.

Library st.:

- Lili Foldes , *Léopold Szondi et l'énigme du destin* , in: *Sélection (Reader's Digest)* (Zurich) 1986: juillet, 98/104;
- R. Guardini , *Freedom, Grace, Fate* , Antwerp, 1950;
- Daniel-Rops , *Eléments de notre destin* (Essai), Paris, 1943.

Fate always has something to do with everything that actually happens. The share of the facts allotted to us. That is what 'fate' is.

1.-- Temporality (time-bound nature).

Existence, whether cosmic or, for example, human, unfolds within the constricting straitjacket of the three moments in time.

a. From the past—think of “the pressure of the ages” (*CF/CS 107*)—which sometimes weighs very heavily, we experience ourselves as thrown into situations.

b. Currently, we live within the very narrow and fleeting 'now' or 'present'.

c. The future lies before us, that which is coming our way, -- with the task of making a design of it.

2.-- Inductive knowledge.

Induction is based on samples. Nothing more. The totality (except in summative induction) escapes our reason.

a. An extremely large part of the past, certainly from a cultural-historical perspective, that has shaped us, we do not know—we do not even suspect—we forget (sometimes consciously suppressing or rather unconsciously repressing).

b. The greater part of the elements that make up our current situation escapes our reason: e.g., what do we know of what days of life remain to us? Now? Our current health encompasses elements that are sometimes treacherous. Elements that only penetrate us later, or perhaps never at all.

c. We usually do not know what the future will bring. Unless by guessing.

Decision.

If the powerlessness of reason becomes apparent anywhere, whether understood generally or in an enlightened-rationalist sense, it is when it is confronted with fate, the share of the facts that concerns us and is allotted to us.

The reason.

The true reason is the enormous number of elements that determine the facts constituting our destiny. The number of factors—parameters—that destiny encompasses is so great that only a transcendent-divine spirit can know them all exhaustively.

Incidentally: this is the decisive reason why believers pray: to supplement sample-based knowledge!

CF116

41. “God does not exist. Everything is permitted” (Sartre). (122/123)

Summer 1995. —England

Big commotion. -- Alcoholic soft drinks widely available on the market for young people. Imported by adults.

1.-- The origin.

a. Producers of alcoholic beverages commission a study on alcohol consumption among young people. Result: many teenagers drink considerably less than their parents. In establishments where ecstasy or cannabis is 'in', virtually no alcohol is consumed.

b. The producers, after that 'scientific' research—which was in any case carried out by adults calling themselves scientists “on behalf of”—implement behavioral change by simply bringing alcoholic soft drinks to the market.

2.-- The result.

A huge success! “The producers” can barely keep up with the demand! -- 'Hooch', a lemonade from Bass, is being celebrated. Also in demand is Cola Lips (a cola with 5% alcohol), a cola from the Lanchester Group. The success of Cola Lips is greatest among young people between 18 and 20.

3.-- The criticism.

British teachers' organizations complain that “quite a few children come to school drunk because they have had too much soda”.

The Sunday Times conducted a survey: most young people do not realize at all that they are drinking alcohol, but find the soft drinks “very tasty”.

The health organizations call that marketing or sales technique 'cynical' and shameless. For – so they say – young people under eighteen, who are not served beer in pubs, are now getting a taste for it through 'innocent' soft drinks.

What did Sartre say again? “Since God does not exist, everything is permitted” (in our culture after “the death of God”).

USA. -- Summer 1995.

In Oklahoma, an official building was destroyed by an attack. All of America was shocked.

Some time later, *The Washington Post* reports : William Pierce , the leader of the antisemitic “National Alliance” (in West Virginia), described in his novel *The Turner Diaries* acts of terrorist resistance against an imagined American government controlled by Zionists (Jewish sympathizers). The American far right considers the book a “Bible”.

CF117

Well, the book describes an attack “that bears a striking resemblance to the attack in Oklahoma City”.

Reasoning: given the strong resemblance, it is very likely that the perpetrators held the book before their eyes as a model.

So that the author of the book is jointly responsible for what his work causes.

J.-P. Sartre: “In our culture, ‘God is dead,’ as Nietzsche said last century: therefore everything is permitted.”

Autumn 1995.

ARD (Erstes deutsches Fernsehen) at 8.15 pm, on 04.10.1995.

Wild Hearts: Children of Satan. -- A TV movie. -- In the newspapers “A girl runs in panic through the streets. She is possessed by fear of an invisible enemy that only she seems to see”.

In fact, the following was visible. -- A trio of girls knows closely a shady fellow who, in his spare time, nestled away in his den, reads magic books and summons spirits. Girls are his beloved confidants in this matter.

Suddenly, of course, there is one in particular that develops manic giftedness by experiencing the bizarre rites (drinking blood and stripping

naked to engage in sex). It 'sees' a phantom. The phantom of a deceased girl. Her death was surrounded by bizarre circumstances.

All this within the day-to-day context of a German secondary school.

The film is ambiguous.

a. It can be interpreted as a warning: solid information about what is indeed—one should not wish to gloss over it—happening in our current Western culture, under the influence of New Age, which, in addition to mere alternative ideas, also exhibits a distinctly bizarre streak.

b. However, the images are so cinematically compelling, especially for natures already attuned to such things, that the same information prompts imitation (mimesis, urge to imitate). This latter point notwithstanding the fact that clear reservations are evident in the film itself from the behavior of at least the majority of the actors.

Sartre. -- “Since the death of God, man is 'free'. He/she is 'freedom'”.

Journalism, media, lobbies, etc. use that 'freedom' for good and ... also for evil.

CF118

42. Nazi narrativism. (124/125)

Narrative studies has undergone a stormy development in recent years under nominalist influences. The extreme: the thesis that the terms of a story have nothing to do with facts independent of those terms. The terms—words, sentences, paragraphs, entire texts—are 'auto-referential', meaning they refer (referentially) only to themselves (auto-)!

In other words: a nominal assessment is always possible (assessing texts against other texts); a real or objective assessment (assessing texts for their truthfulness against facts) is virtually impossible. -- That is what characterizes a narrativist of pure quality.

'Revisionism'.

'Revisionism' (literally: revision of what has been said and still asserted regarding the Nazi concentration camps as politically willed and organized extermination camps) is one form of radical narrativism. Contrary to strong evidence—which is increasing thanks to research—revisionists maintain that Hitler's system never had politically willed and organized extermination camps. What is said about it is “hearsay ('texts') being passed on ('texts')”.

In other words: texts that 'produce' texts! Whereby humanity never escapes the closed system of texts that provoke texts. An auto-referential system.

Library st. :

J. Koechlin, *Auschwitz (La mécanique du génocide)*, in: *Journal de Genève / Gazette de Lausanne* 28.10.1993.

Koechlin provides an account of *Jean-Claude Pressac, Les crématoires d'Auschwitz (La machinerie du meurtre de masse)*, Paris, 1993.

This work breaks through the radical narrativism of the neo-Nazis in its own way, namely by exposing the mechanics (the machines, those who make the machines, etc.) on the basis of irrefutable documentation. He proves that, instead of being imagined (fictional) stories, the assertion that the Nazi camps were genuinely politically organized are historical stories. Not even mixed stories (a romance of historical facts)! Hence the title Koechlin gives: "la machinerie".

Pressac. -- Born to parents who were teachers in 1944, he developed a passionate interest in all things military at a very early age. He refused to attend the military school at Saint-Cyr. He became a pharmacist.

In his free time, however, he delves into the history of the Second World War (1939/1945). He reads the memoirs of Rudolf Höss, chief commandant of the Auschwitz extermination camp.

CF119

Out of curiosity, he visits the camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka: from then on, he becomes fixated on the analysis of the structure of the Nazi mass murder. Around 1982—without any training as a historian—he begins his research, equipped only with maps and photographs.

Meanwhile, he is at home in French revisionist circles. Faurisson, the figurehead, casts doubt on the existence of extermination camps.

After several months, he pulls himself out, disgusted by the blind denial of the brutal facts: "For a long time I toiled in the mud of that revisionist swamp. Now I am out."

Pressac . -- “Faurisson, for example, does not even know that the single French term 'désinfection' (*note*: usually translated as 'disinfection') is represented by three German terms.

1. 'Disinfection' (killing microbes, getting rid of pests);
2. 'Entlausung' (delousing);
3. 'Entwesung' (**a.** to rid of vermin , **b.** to strip something of its essence, in Casu extermination of people).

Well, in the reports from the Auschwitz camp that I had access to, those three terms are decisive, for they prove that the extermination was planned.

The book.

Pressac's work is a dry book. Masses of diagrams, figures, technical explanations, tables! To have been taken from the courier between the twelve firms that built the incinerators and the 'Bauleitung' (the SS guys in charge).

Kurt Prüfer.

One figure – the German engineer Prüfer – is described by Pressac as “a brilliant and inventive magician of cremation”. When Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, Prüfer became a convinced Nazi. Over time, he became a specialist in crematoriums (Dachau (1940), – later Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Auschwitz).

Pressac's work has one main value:

It proves irrefutably that from 1942 onwards, the 'Endlösung' (final solution to the racial question) was planned by the government. That which the revisionists deny precisely! As *Le Nouvel Observateur* says: “The gas chambers really existed”.

CF120

The occult background.

The death of God has freed 20th-century man from (the slavery of) God's Ten Commandments. Nazism is one of the many phenomena of this. -- Therefore, a brief digression regarding the background of that Nazism.

1.-- Social Darwinism.

Nazism is undeniably a biologism: it defines man “in terms of” biology. But biology in a deepened sense. For example, it distinguishes in man “Körper, Seele und Geist”, “getragen von tiefer Gottgläubigkeit” (R. Benze).

The racially interpreted biologism is, for example, dissected by *H. Jans*, “*Mein Kampf*” was not original (*Social Darwinism and Nazism*), in: *Streven* 1983: June, 797/809 . *Mein Kampf*, Hitler 's main work, was inspired by predecessors. Jans situates those predecessors primarily among the (German) intelligentsia. Which is, of course, a proven fact.

2. -- Nazi occultism.

Yet that racist biologism is merely a surface phenomenon.

a. *L. Rasson*, *Robert Brasillach Literature and Fascism* (*Hitler, the Last of the Magicians*), in: *Streven* 1985: April, 533/541, outlines the ideas of Brasillach (+1945), who clearly interprets Hitler as occult.

b. Much more convincing, however, is *N. Goodrich-Clarke*, *Les racines occultistes du nazisme* (*Les Aryosophes en Autriche et en Allemagne* (1890/1953)), *Puiseaux, Pardès*, 1989 (// *The Occult Roots of Nazism*, *Wellingborough* (Nath.), *The Aquarian Press*, 1985).

It is a strictly scientific analysis of the occultist movements and figures that prepared and guided racist Nazism in the occult realm—especially SS Nazism. Gnosis and racism combined spoke of “a higher race” long before Hitler.

Note: That the German intelligentsia played an important role is evident from the role of the magician, Dr. Faust, in German intellectual life.

P. Leemans, **Het Faustische** (*Ideologie en mythe**), in: ** De Maand ** 5 (1962): 10 (Dec.), 580/587, connects with *H. Schwerte*, **Faust und das Faustische**, *Stuttgart*, 1962, and states: Goethe's **Faust** is the masterpiece of all German literature. Moreover, Faust has become a national heroic figure. Faust was even more: he was the central content of the dominant German ideology of the pre-1914 era and of the Hitler era.

In particular: Faust is man in his unstoppable will to act!

CF121

“In the beginning was the deed” (verse 1237). The term 'deed' here means acting “through thick and thin,” without much thought and certainly without many questions of conscience. Free! In that sense, this ideology stands close to French radicalism as Sartre outlines it (*CF/CS 109*) and even more so to the existentialist rule “existence precedes essence” (ibid.). For the Faustian man creates his own 'values' autonomously, without the Ten Commandments.

Just think for a moment: how could German citizens, albeit indoctrinated by a Nazi ideology, go so far as to coldly kill millions of Jews and Roma? Surely a brake must have been removed! The brake of “What am I actually doing?” (Thinking) and of “How can that be reconciled with conscience?” (Question of conscience).

The new era.

The occultist grounds of Nazism can be situated within a broader movement, namely neo-paganism.

JP Van Term, Van heidendom tot paganisme (Studies on Freemasonry), Hilversum, Brand, 1915, 377, outlines as follows.

The broad intellectual movement, which encompasses Gnosis, Kabbalah, Templars, Alchemists, and a part of Freemasonry, is **a.** sprung from paganism, **b.** opposed to Christianity.

It necessarily leads to Neo-Paganism, a new era in which ancient paganism reorganizes itself, but in such a way that account is taken of what both cultural currents—old paganism and Christianity—have achieved. “That will be la terza età” of which *Giuseppe Mazzini* (1805/1872; Italian militant patriot) spoke (*Opere XIV* , 246).

The Nazis also envisioned such a third era.

In evidence: *R. Benze/G. Gräfer, Hrsg., Erziehungsmächte und Erziehungshoheit im Groszdeutschen Reich* , Leipzig, 1940,-- fl. oc, 1/26 (*Die deutsche Erziehung und ihre Träger*).

First the ancient Germanic-German paganism, -- then the interlude of Christianity ('Rom') and the Enlightenment, -- now finally the revived Germanic-German neo-paganism, in which the pre- and non-Christian elements reappear in an actualized form.

Whereby Hitler himself never concealed that his ' *Nationalsozialismus* ' should actually have been called “ *Magischer Sozialismus* ” (*Conversations with H. Rauschning*).

Which leads back to the mythical “harmony of opposites” characteristic of paganism, as was briefly indicated at the bottom of *CF/CS 114*. The Old Germanic 'belief in God' belongs to that mythical 'harmony'.

43. The narrativism of Margaret Mead. (128/131)

To describe, or respectively to narrate and report, is to render the existence (how real is something?) and the essence (how is that something really?) in a longer, elaborate definition.

In 1925 (August 31), Margaret Mead, then 23, set foot ashore in Pago Pago, the port capital of American Samoa. To stay there for exactly nine months. To formulate an argument: to prove, based on the lives of the young islanders, that there are no innate differences between people (heredity determinism), but that these differences are brought about by culture (cultural determinism).

In other words: to what extent is the growing girl (yes, the adolescent in general) influenced by the culture she enters? More precisely: “Are the conflicts—which we know in our Western civilization between elders and young people—inherent to the very soul of the adolescent or not?”

“If not, is culture then an element of a conflict-provoking nature?” -- Prof. Franz Boas (1858/1942), Columbia University, sent his student, Margaret Mead, to Samoa to find evidence for his cultural determinism.

Mead's cultural environment.

Her father was a professor of economics. -- Her grandmother was a teacher, a supporter of “the new education” (Maria Montessori; Friedrich Fröbel). Her mother was a sociologist and feminist. Hence her “free upbringing”. In the process, she grew into a 'progressive': throughout her life, she felt herself “ahead of an era” in relation to the rising generation.

This is reflected in her research and in her treatise, namely *Coming of Age in Samoa* (*A Study of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Society*), - later recast as *A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization* .

Mead's samples.

She moved in with an American family in an outbuilding that served as a small polyclinic. E.R. Holt, a pharmacist in the U.S. Navy, was her host.

Upon her arrival, she did not know the local language. However, she did learn the basic words of it over a period of nine weeks.

In addition, she stayed for another ten days with a tribal chief in Vaitogi whose daughter was a “ceremonial virgin” who knew a little English.

M. Mead spent the nights with her under the same mosquito tent. -- In Holt's small clinic, she met some sixty Samoan girls with whom she had long conversations about the relationship between “parents/children”, “boys/girls”, and the upbringing system.

The thesis or proposition.

Boas, with his **The Spirit of Primitive Man** (1900), defended the thesis that sexual maturation, with its puberty crisis as the West knows it, was not a biological necessity but a cultural phenomenon.

Consequence: sexual maturation is susceptible to 'engineering', manipulation, and alteration. Behold Boas' culturalism, which maintained that a value system is 'relative' (relativism). Boas expected a confirmation of that thesis from Mead.

Mead's characteristic.

'Characteristic' is a representation that depicts the main points.

A. The fact.

Mead: “There is no adolescent crisis in Samoa. The question of existence is answered negatively.”

B. The statement.

Mead: “The upbringing system, within the context of the overall culture, is different than in the West.” “The Culture Pattern” is different.

Elements of explanation.

1. The people of Samoa have “no deep bonds to just one person”: genuine, heartfelt appreciation for both parents and sexual partner is rare.

2. Consequence: the relationships – if they exist at all – are 'non-binding'. Free love is generally accepted. It is “a light and pleasant dance”.

Practically speaking: the girls sleep with as many as possible, such that “deep commitment” to just one boy is rare.

3. The emphasis lies on the virtuosity in the erotic techniques.

The drive to attack, the second element of importance in the West, is non-existent: rivalry and the drive to achieve are absent. “Samoa is a place where it is never about high stakes. No one there is under pressure to get the best result out of life.” (S. Clapier Valladon).

Note-- *The Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, 1927, was followed by many other texts (books, articles). Such as *Culture and Commitment (A study of the Generation Gap)*, New York, 1970, -- already translated into French in 1971 (*Le fossé des générations*). The term 'generation gap' has meanwhile become both a fact and a sort of dogma, especially among left-leaning contemporaries.

CF124

The goddess of anthropology.

The reception was overwhelming, -- at least in some Western circles.

a. Primitivism.

All kinds of people want to “return to primitive life” (with its exoticism and naturism). In this regard, J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778; cultural criticism with “Le retour à la nature”), Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (1737/1814; Paul et Virginie (1787), and others were groundbreaking.

Note-- The Beatniks (1955+), the Hippies and the (politically oriented) Yippies (1962+), -- our travel agencies stand in that tradition.

b. Anti-tabooism.

Bertrand Russell (1872/1970),

With its urge to abolish all taboos, Mead's work was received with great enthusiasm. “Finally, the facts!” Facts demonstrating that our moral laws and institutions regarding sexuality are cultural products, man-made,—without universal and objective value. Cf. CF/CS 84 (*Protosophistics*); 110 (*Sartre's existentialism*). Nominalism reigns supreme in such schools of thought.

An astronomical mistake.

Meanwhile, M. Mead has been removed from recommended reading at American universities. After all, *Derek Freeman* (1916/2001), a New Zealand ethnologist, published his * *Margaret Mead and Samoa** (*The Making and the Unmaking or an Anthropological Myth*) (1983).

The New York Times phrased Freeman's statement as follows:

1. Mead's theses were accepted by the intelligentsia (all textbooks and encyclopedias reflect this);
2. They are untrue: the reality in Samoa is fundamentally different.

Derek's method.

He lived in Samoa, was active in education—taught the language of the inhabitants thoroughly (including an exam), was adopted by a Samoan family, and even participated in the sessions of a group of tribal chiefs (who exert such profound influence).

Freeman aims for an extremely detailed representation of the phenomena. He is strictly scientific.

Characteristic.

Here are the main points.

1. -- *The facts.*

a. The free love Mead speaks of is non-existent. For instance, virginity is highly valued in the local mentality.

CF125

b. The rivalry—in the erotic realm—is just as frequent as in a Western cultural model. Moreover, the urge to attack is very strong: murder occurs frequently; Samoa ranks at the top in the percentage of rapes.

Decision.

Mead has constructed “a story” narratively; she elaborates on what her professor said—without thoroughly checking it against the facts. In other words: literal definition yes; factual definition no, or at least far too little.

2.-- *The statement.*

Mead explained from the perspective of upbringing. -- Freeman established that, notwithstanding the American presence, upbringing in Samoa is ancestral-authoritarian.

This is ascertainable in some of its effects, namely psychological problems such as neuroses (including hysteria) and suicide.

Gap.

Mead, for example, neglected the police records in her time. She should have consulted them thoroughly. Well, they contradict her thesis. Freeman: not much has changed since then.

Misunderstanding.

Ethnologists conducting fieldwork more frequently find that, when striking up conversations,

a. in the service of a hypothesis (e.g. Boas' theorem),

b. archaic politeness gives answers that do not reflect the objective facts but rather the desire to please a Western conversational partner. Samoan girls wanted to appear 'polite' in this way (and thus flatter).

Even those who still attempt to defend Mead's book after Freeman's work admit that Mead possibly made the mistake of believing the girls. -- Which therefore entails a second methodological error.

Axiomatic induction.

Induction, if it is to have scientific value, must:

- a.** be as large as possible quantitatively (samples: the more the better) and
- b.** to be qualitatively “at random”, unbiased, haphazard.

Mead's “free upbringing” at home, which she grew up with so much,—together with the axiomatics of her Professor Boas—have influenced the choice of her samples to such an extent that they are no longer random but selective.

Her axioms from her home and her culturalist professor have influenced her samples to such an extent that her induction was at least partially spoiled. Too little objective testing and definition!

CF126

44. Communist 'rhetoric' (132/134)

Let us define 'rhetoric' as the theory concerning language proficiency as a means of communication. One speaks, gives signals, to 'persuade' fellow human beings of one's own 'position' (statement, thesis).

Based on a booklet titled “ *Sensitivity Training* ” (Leven en Aktie, Ghent), we focus on one persuasion method among many others because it is so bold.

We translate 'training' as 'practice' and 'sensitivity' as 'sensing values'. So that “sensitivity training” coincides with “practice in sensing values”.

Group dynamics.

Sensitivity training easily takes the form of 'group dynamics'. ! 'Dynamics' refers to “everything that lives within a group—a sometimes radically closed group, that is” (cf. CF/ CS 84). Under the leadership of leading men and women – becomes:

a. carried out a (sometimes radical) dismantling or 'deconstruction' of everything that had hitherto been considered valuable to the members of the training,

b. to simultaneously promote a development or reconstruction regarding the sensing of values. -- To put it bluntly: a. brainwashing, b. re-education.

The communist model.

The booklet, *Sensitivity Training*, refers here to *Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One*. During the Korean War (1950/1953), communist 'brainwashing' was applied to American prisoners of war.

Since this raw form of persuasion subsequently served as an example on numerous occasions, particularly in left-wing circles, albeit in milder forms, we will briefly consider its structure.

Note: Some among us have remarked that precisely the same methods employed by Nazis (or fascists of another type) can count on no mercy whatsoever, whereas those methods, when applied by the Left, seem to be "acceptable." Double standards, then, among the intelligentsia.

Characteristic.

To put it in two words: not the traditional—police or military—torture techniques, but rather group dynamics. What stands out here is the narrativism: from leading up to repeating, without objective verification or definition, within the domain of the aggressive rhetorical word. A word that here is 'accusation' and 'confession of guilt'. By 'confessors' and 'penitents'!

CF127

We do say "confessors/penitents", because what follows regarding "human engineering" (behavior modification) is only possible when "God is dead" -- when his voice is stifled—murdered—in the depths of conscience.

Incidentally: when one reads *A. Danet, trad., Henry Institoris (Kraemer) / Jacques Sprenger, Le marteau des sorcières (malleus maleficarum)*, Brignoud, J. Millon Ed., 1990, one is already confronted, merely within a clerical framework, with the schema "confessor (inquisitor) / penitent (witch)", in which the preaching (in the name of Jesus) gives rise to the echoing in confessions, accompanied by torture. -- Even then, "God was dead"!

The (socially) critical method.

The trainer knows the only good system (understand: culture, but with the emphasis on the sociological structure of oppression). He advocates it to the one who adheres to the evil and bad system. The latter parrots him after dismantling their own.

Indeed: immediately after their capture, the American prisoners of war were divided into 'groups' (think of group dynamics). They were 'criticism groups'. The criticism stood or fell with 'stories'.

Thus, no group was granted permission to eat, for example, as long as not all members:

a. had produced a 'self-critical' account in which they confessed something wrong – guilt – or

b. had delivered a (hetero)critical account in which remarks – criticism – regarding fellow prisoners were expressed.

Consequence: thus, for example, in order to be able to eat, the group itself eventually exerted pressure on “the deviations” who had not yet managed to produce such a (socially) critical narrative. These became “black sheep” if they continued to refuse.

Participation.

'Participation' was the message. Every prisoner was required to take part in the group confession. Anyone who refused was branded a 'reactionary' ('individualist', 'dissident'). Became the black sheep.

Incidentally: Anglo-Saxon scholars call this 'scapegoating'. The group vents its unease and exclusion on “the scapegoat” (just as the Israelites drove the scapegoat into the desert, -- “burdened with all the sins of (the thereby cleansed) Israel”). -- A phenomenon that, according to R. Girard, constitutes the fundamental phenomenon, or at least a basic phenomenon, of human groups—sacred or profane. At least insofar as 'true' Christianity has not yet penetrated.

CF128

Model of a 'confession' .

A prisoner of war could 'prove' that he accepted the communist system—and was therefore willing to engage in good understanding (the goal of the persuasion)—by confessing a triviality.

Thus, someone recounted “that he had not managed to brush his teeth.” Instantly, “the group” was satisfied in the person of “the leader,” who determined that—through that confession—“a contribution had been made to the system.” After all, by openly confessing that his teeth were not brushed, he had submitted himself to both the group and the leader.

The distrust of all towards all.

Such a method is brutally Marxist and Leninist-Maoist. But it was effective. -- For example, not a single prisoner could ever escape. For only when there is group work can the tunnel required for that purpose be dug.

'Canaries'.

Because the prisoners were trained—'raised'—in criticism of fellow prisoners, informants were cultivated in Korea. Within the group, these formed a subgroup—for example, a trio or quartet. They betrayed everything. They were called 'canaries': the leader liked to hear them 'sing' (betray). Consequently, every escape attempt leaked out.

Note: During the re-education after the war, it became apparent how effectively that type of mutual distrust had developed and how 'friends' or 'comrades' had been transformed into 'enemies'.

Epilogue.

In the week of June 19 to 24, 1989, the Socialist International (more than 80 parties) met in Stockholm to celebrate the centenary (1889/1989).

1. Undivided positive value judgments about the liberal market economy and

2. Sufficient critiques regarding the roles in the economic sphere of both the state and, in particular, nationalizations were included in the program. The social democratic parties of Northern Europe were already largely market-oriented. The attitude of the other parties was more ambivalent (the French socialists and a number of Third World socialists).

Broadly speaking, the radical economic failure of the socialist model was assumed. -- But that based on a business-like assessment and definition that truly represents the genuine induction regarding the matter. -- Pretending had already been abandoned in the Soviet bloc in 1986 (Gorbachev) based on the facts.

CF129

45. Progressiveness. (129/131)

The term 'progress' is a remarkably modern term. The great thinkers—from Galileo to Einstein—of the modern natural sciences were convinced that they had found the panacea, the miracle cure, in the exact natural sciences.

That progress took primarily the form of modern techniques which, indeed, have solved and continue to solve a great many problems.

'Progressism' is the conviction that such progress is and remains meaningful.

But it is abundantly clear: 'progress' is double-edged. The ecological response to that progress is there to expose the dark side.

Moreover, the term 'progress' frequently covers things that represent progress—that is, problem-solving—only in appearance. -- We will now devote a few sentences to such a type of 'progressism'.

From a human perspective.

In French, “respect humain”. 'Opzicht' means “to pay attention to (with the fear of that which one pays attention to)”. “Human” means two things:

a. the fact that something like this happens to 'weak' people and is therefore 'human' (understandable);

b . the fact that one observes people, fellow human beings in that case, with a certain fear of their reactions.

In what follows—again a form of sensitivity training or values practice—that phenomenon manifests itself very clearly. Consider the phrase: “What are people going to say about that?” Or: “What will people say about that?”

Library st.: Sensitivity Training , Ghent, sd, 23. -- A woman was encouraged to undergo such training once a week.

Pavlov

Ivan Pavlov (1849/1936) was a Russian physician and physiologist. He analyzed the functions of the salivary glands, for example—as a form of “conditioned reflexes.” He received the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology in 1904. His thrust runs, to a certain extent, parallel to behaviorism (the study of externally observable behavior).

The woman. -- “Our leader fascinated us with his renditions of Pavlov's theory. It was applied by him in working groups on human relations.”

Note: The so-called training groups usually rely on some kind of 'theory' (understand: axiomatics that constitute the lens through which reality is viewed, understand: (re)interpreted).

Incidentally: that the leaders of such system-changing groups know exactly what they are doing, namely subversion (dismantling), is evident from the pseudonyms used to adorn the business they operate: group dynamics, group discussion, group evaluation, integration training, “human relations”, interpersonal relationships, meeting groups, interpersonal expertise, meetings without class distinction, democratic thinking, self-criticism, group confession, and yes, prayer therapy.

The woman.

“When the leader was ready to begin the session, he asked someone from the group to express his impressions and interpretations of another member of the group. -- This entailed that we had to speak about a complete stranger about whom we knew nothing.

Note: The traditional term to describe such a thing is “frivolous judgment” (a judgment made without much information of an objective nature) . It is immediately clear that we have here the analogue of (hetero)criticism in the communist system (CF/CS 127). What follows now is self-criticism with confession.

The woman.

An artist described his marriage, which was neither extraordinarily successful nor extraordinarily unsuccessful: “He had highs and lows like most people.” -- After ten minutes, the group decided that the man needed a divorce. An alternative solution was not even given the chance.

Note-- Which amounts to a collectively frivolous judgment.

Emotionalism.

Neither reason nor logic, but feelings, emotional in the first place, prevail.

The woman.

As time passed, we got to know each other better and actively and intensely engaged in mutual emotional exchange.

A heated session.

The woman. -- “The sensitivity training quickly evolved into a heated session. -- I was constantly criticized because I kept defending certain moral values. An exceptionally bothersome, negativistic atmosphere resulted from

this. As a result, we did not approach the mutual affection, and especially not the love, that we initially thought we would find.”

We did, however, accede to the request for 'openness' and 'honesty' as initially promised.

CF131

Note: Here one senses the true nature of such sensitivity training: system change, specifically: value change, cultural revolution.

The woman.

“For what purpose, however? Just to sob emotionally and make all sorts of bizarre movements?”

The woman voices criticism: “The system of raw, emotional confession exacerbates one’s own problems. After all, one confesses to things one was never guilty of. Solely to satisfy the leader.”

Note: Compare with the communist epitome: an analogous pressure and lack of freedom that extorts 'confession'.

General suspicion.

What follows is typical of a person with a socially critical outlook.

The woman. -- “If one only confesses things that are not very degrading, one is accused of ‘deceiving oneself’ or ‘refusing to cast off one’s own false masks’.”

After such remarks, one automatically arrives at the conclusion “every human being is sick, conscienceless, depraved”.

Note: Who does not recognize in this the opinion of many intellectuals who, influenced by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, see nothing but people wearing a false mask, deceiving themselves about their true—understand: depraved—nature? The three unmasking materialists—as Ricoeur calls them—have developed a mentality that stands diametrically opposed to the old adage “Nemo malus nisi probetur” (No one is bad unless there is proof to that effect). Diametrically opposed also to the New Age adage “Think positive”.

Social criticism.

The woman. -- “Sensitivity training aims to stir up hatred against society in all participants. In such sensitivity training, one should not attempt to prove that many people are still sincere, honest, and good.”

Behold what one type of progressive group accomplishes. -- It is possible that the woman gives a testimony that is partially inaccurate. A 'testimony' is one form of uncovering the truth, namely, admitting without any scientific pretension that one has experienced something and describing as accurately as possible what one has experienced.

One thing is certain: what the woman says corresponds to reality.

CF132

46. Resistance to 'indoctrination'. (132-135)

' **Indoctrination** ' -- 'Doctrina' (Latin) means 'system of learning'. Indoctrination is therefore "the instilling of a system of learning". Many intellectuals today who "take a critical stance" lie in wait to denounce and eradicate the slightest sign of doctrine, rigidity of doctrine, indoctrination, etc. To 'unmask' such a thing. Specifically as 'integrism', 'fundamentalism', 'foundation(al)ism', words that imply prioritizing foundations for thinking and living.

In the previous chapter, we encountered a woman who—from a human perspective—broke down and even 'confessed' things she had never done “to please the leader.”—Now we turn our attention to a strong personality—“the individual” (as S. Kierkegaard would say)—a 21-year-old student (Sensitivity Training, 24).

The student. -- “I took sensitivity training for a while. However, this term was not used, but rather 'speaking course'. Essentially, it amounted to sensitivity training. However, to attract students, the leaders had avoided the term.”

The winding down.

(Hetero)criticism! The student. -- “During “the course,” I was constantly attacked by the leader. Also by the other members of the group. -- Simply because I rejected their so-called “new morality.”

The leader naturally refused to accept my “pure feelings” and my “moral and religious conviction” as genuine and true: I was accused of not being

sincere and honest regarding my attitude towards premarital relations (which I do not accept in any case).

I was mocked and thoroughly humiliated. I experienced that (...) the individual with high morals must be broken and separated from the rest of the group. I was not appreciated for my willpower regarding chastity. On the contrary: I was met with an awful lot of blame!

The ridicule and humiliations were provoked by my professor-group leader: I was portrayed as 'conservative', 'backward', 'outdated', 'false', 'hypocritical', etc.

Note: One can see it: the progressive leader leading the way and those who parrot him! Cf. *CF/CS 122* : M. Mead felt herself to be ahead of an era her entire life! Anything 'different' is laden with abusive language!

CF133

Swearing that is a sign of powerlessness and takes the place of calm, logical, and strict reasoning and discussion. Emotionalism!

Immediately, the cynical note comes through: everything human is evil and hypocritical; the 'good' person is, at most, hypocritically good!

Incidentally: this tendency is already clearly evident in the ancient Kunieker (Lat.: Cynics) or “dog-like thinkers” (Cfr. *Maria Daraki, La sagesse des Cyniques Grecs* , in: *Cl. Mossé, prés., La Grèce ancienne* , Paris, 1986, 92/108). They were nominalists, of course. Cultural pessimists as they were, they rejected traditional culture as 'corrupt'—for all that was shame culture and marital morality. These Kuniekers are still relevant today. This is all the more so as “God is dead”.

The 'individual'.

We take this term in the Kierkegaardian sense: “the individual who braces himself against everything that can undermine him in his convictions”.

The student. -- “However, I did not let myself be destroyed so easily! In turn, I accused the leader and my companions of attempting to break the values I held onto. Solely for the sake of tearing.”

Note -- The female student acts like Socrates with the First Sophists: he sought them out on their own turf and resisted them with their own reasoning skills.

'Democracy'.

To fully understand what the student is about to say, one must know that the term 'democracy' and especially 'democratization' appear here with a specific meaning.

John Dewey (1859/1952), according to *Time* “the foremost educator of the 20th century”, a materialist and atheist (“There is no mind. There is no soul”), is known for his * *Human Nature and Conduct** (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*), New York, 1922. This work served as axiomatics in the service of “social engineering” (and the manipulation of social processes), a curious form of rhetoric.

'Democratization' in this context entails “the establishment of a society without general and established norms and values”. Thus, Dewey supported B. Russell, who lost his chair in 1940 after his introduction of “free love” to the school, accused by “concerned parents”.

Dewey, incidentally, wanted something analogous regarding school and education: they are 'instruments' ('instrumentalism') of his type of democratization that combines the Left with anti-tabooism.

CF134

The student. -- “If the dismantling of my life principles meant a victory for the group and especially for ‘democracy,’ then I’d rather go to hell with ‘democracy’! I reproached the group for possessing no valuable morality whatsoever, -- being unable to replace anything I valued and truly loved.”

Social criticism.

The student. -- “The leader criticizes everything: family, relatives, friends, -- fatherland, -- moral viewpoints, religion and faith, self-denial. -- And all this is done on purpose: to instill in all members the morbid habit that bears the name 'criticism'. With this, he wants to bring about a complete change in spirit and mentality.

Nothing in society is any good anymore. So let us dismantle everything. Such as loyalty to one's spouse, family, children, fatherland, God, and religion. All those things are nonsense. Afterwards, the question arises: “Where does

the training leader get the nerve to pretend that he possesses all knowledge and science?”

Note -- In the Platonic dialogues, criticism is systematically applied, i.e., a logically rigorous testing of assertions for their real rather than apparent value. All opinions are presented 'democratically' (i.e., here: with the same right to speak) before judgment is passed.

In the 'democracy' rejected by the student, human rights (understand: the individual) are violated in the manner described above: in the name of a massive, self-assured axiomatics.

A comparison.

The media swarms with media people who aim for such a democratization. Sometimes with a great many methods of deception. Radio, TV, and film serve axioms that are imposed in a perverse and subversive manner. -- Just one example.

Library st.: Joepie 31.08.1980, 64v. - The Blue Lagoon is being talked into. -- A fourteen-year-old girl (Brooke Shields) and her cousin (Chris Atkins) are shipwrecked and wash ashore on a paradise island (Fidji). After a while, they fall innocently and naively in love with each other. The result: pregnancy.

1.-- This film was once a celebrated film - a 'hit' - among US teenagers. -- Brooke Shields: “One could call it a film about ‘teenagers’ rights.’ After all, the central theme is a girl and a boy growing up outside the 'restrictions' - taboos - of ‘society’ that is ours.”

CF135

Note: Compare this with CF/CS 124 (“*The Goddess of Anthropology*”). The film’s director, Randal Kleiser, goes even further in terms of 'honesty': “Everything the film shows becomes universal and normal for a teenager. Anyone who perceives something like this as artificial, unnatural, or bad should be urgently referred to a psychiatrist.” One can see that such “democratizing progressives” do not suffer from an excess of humility!

2.-- The same film provoked a different reaction from established society: “What can a fourteen-year-old thing do with a baby without established society?”

The individual, lost in the crowd.

The student. -- “During sensitivity training, most participants completely renounce all the values by which they have until now lived superficially without a deeper experience of them. It is therefore understandable that they do not defend themselves against the vulgarities and eccentricities of a training group.

Higher morality must constantly be defended. The masses possess no higher morality.

Usually, people distance themselves step by step, eventually falling into the lowest common denominator of “the group”. If one then knows what kind of people make up a training group, one can well imagine just how large this lowest common denominator must be.

The student further states that she found that few—practically no one among young people—demonstrate strong conviction and strength of character when confronted with “absolute morality and ethical relativism”.

Note-- Pay attention to both extremes:

- a. absolute morality, namely that of the leader and the rest of the group;
- b. relativization of all other—the established—moral systems which—in apparent contrast to that of the leader—are merely human products and are therefore relative, relative, to be interpreted including those who 'invented' and 'imposed' them.

Conclusion. -- One should now reread *CF/CS 110* (*Sartre's definition of existentialism*). Now that “God is dead”, everything is permitted in principle, and enormous space opens up for 'leaders' of groups.

CF136

47. Constructionism/essentialism. (136/138)

We will now focus on a pair of contrasts, “constructivism/essentialism,” because they were fundamental in the previous pages.

In doing so, we rely on a critique on the subject, namely *E. Hulsens, *Wat is lesbien ?** (*A sample of lesbian history*), in: *Streven* 62 (1995): 9 (October, 791/803).

1.-- Myriam Everard,

Soul and Senses (On love and lust between women in the second half of the eighteenth century), Groningen, 1994.

Everard investigates the prehistory of the 19th- and 20th-century lesbian. She searches for forerunners:

a. soulmates such as Betje Wolff and Aagje Deken who maintained loving relations;

b. women in men's clothing who sometimes also married a woman;

c. women who appeared before the court with other women “on account of caresses and obscenities”.

Interruption (discontinuity).

As a constructivist and differenti(al)iste, she sees a very radical break between a previous culture (1750+) and a subsequent one (1800+).

1. She even refuses to use terms that emerge later to refer to things from an earlier cultural period.

Thus, she cannot even use terms such as 'sexuality' and 'homosexuality' for the late 18th century because those words were not in use between 1750 and 1800. The difference or 'difference' between the 'constructions' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is too great for that.

2. Moreover: not only the language usage but the realities themselves differ to such an extent that “for what is called ‘female homosexuality’ at the end of the 19th century, there is no equivalent in the 18th century. -- ‘Equivalent’ is “anything that resembles something”.

Result:

Cultural history is not an uninterrupted or continuous event. It is a succession of cultures separated from one another by radical breaks or gaps.

Hulsens: “In other words, this is lesbian history that cancels itself out” (ac, 792), because history exists as a series of omens (VT) and continuations (VV), notwithstanding that breaks occur. These are never such breaks, “are different”, differences, that there would be no similarities.

CF137

2.-- Hulsens.

Hulsens responds by stating that Everard's axiomatics reflects the axioms of Michel Foucault (1926/1984; CF 42 (deconstructionist)). Foucault was convinced that homosexuality is something 'constructed' that stems from a

society (constructionism or constructivism). Insofar as that society, with its culture which it itself creates or 'constructs', is subject to ruptures, those constructions are so mutually different that they are incomparable.

Hulsens quotes Everard: "Female homosexuality – that is my starting point – is not of all times – despite the ancient Sappho – and is not a 'natural' or, if necessary, 'unnatural' orientation that manifests itself – provided it is unhindered – in a fixed percentage of the female population".

Note : In other words, sexuality has no 'nature,' which is a reality distributed over a collection and a regulation that prescribes behavior. Thus, saying that, for example, lesbianism is 'natural' (and therefore occurs regularly) or 'unnatural' (and therefore goes against the regulation or precepts inherent in the very nature of sexual life) is unanswerable.

Value judgments are therefore nowhere justifiable. One simply establishes empirically, specimen after specimen, without similarity. In that sense, Everard is an empiricist who collects materials but sees no similarity or coherence whatsoever. Nor does she discover any moral, prescriptive nature. -- Which amounts to radical nominalism.

Everard. -- "(...) Whatever the recent pathological-anatomical and genetic quest for the biological basis of homosexuality may suggest in this regard . -- It is such a constructivist that research into a possible biological basis (as an entry) of, for example, lesbianism is rejected by it as virtually meaningless. It is a 'social' – understand: cultural – phenomenon.

Everard. -- "In the international history of homosexuality, the debate between essentialism and constructivism was settled long ago in favor of the constructivist position that (claims that) homosexuality is a 'historical' category (fundamental concept) of recent making".

Note: 'Historical' here stands for "developed from a cultural-historical perspective".

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To which Hulsens replied: -- The book she refers to contains contributions of a very different view.

Thus writes Jan Schippers, *Homosexual Identity (Essentialism and Constructivism)*, in: D. Altman et al., *Homosexuality (Which Homosexuality ?)*, Amsterdam, 1989, 144:

“It is clear that both constructionism and essentialism have some strengths and some weaknesses. Neither theory has been scientifically proven and probably never will be. At this moment, it would probably be best to view both theoretical systems as two different ways of addressing questions about homosexuality, -- without becoming 'dogmatic' about either one.” (Ac 792);

Maw: “neither you nor I prove conclusively” (Zenon v. Elea)

Note-- ' Essentialism '. -- The term 'essence' is used here as the same as the term 'nature' above. 'Essence' does not mean 'way of being' merely (which also applies to singular or particular data) but rather “universal or general way of being”, that common property found in a multitude of instances. 'Essence' simultaneously means “nature of being that prescribes rules”.

Together, these two contents represent the correct meaning of 'essence' contrasted with 'construction'. 'Construction' means **a.** no (universal) nature or essence and **b.** no universal nature or essence in which rules of conduct are present.

Note: Hulsens's definition, ac, 792, reads: “Essentialism is the assumption, or prioritization, of something as a timeless phenomenon that only needs to be made visible and scientifically described”, is certainly open to criticism.

The term 'timeless' seems to suggest that one is dealing with a “fact situated in a heaven of thought,” alien to life. Unearthing the essence of something is more than merely “scientifically describing and thus making visible.” Yet it is true that Hulsens' definition is circulating in the minds of many a contemporary fellow man.

We refer to CF/CS 109 , where the term 'values' in Sartre's terminology stands for 'essences'. However, Sartre is also an empiricist, as he nowhere establishes empirically given 'essences' or 'values'. Just like Everard. But his attention is focused on the godless consequences that can be drawn from this, whereas Everard emphasizes the cultural rifts.

CF139

48. Religious nominalism. (139/141)

We first clearly encountered nominalism CF/CS 79 (*Language and Culture*). Later it came up for discussion CF/CS 91 (*Refutation of Traditional Metaphysics*). -- What exactly is 'nominalism'?

The oldest nominalism.

Library st.: WB Kristensen, *Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions* , Amsterdam, 1947, 231/290 (*Cycle and Totality*).

1.-- 'Totality'

Here, that term means "harmony (= merging) of opposites".

Kristensen cites Babylonian mythology (= theology).

Anu was characterized by 'totality' in the religious sense: in his soul and conduct, as the cause (co-cause) of the fate of mankind, ideas and energies were visible that signified both good and evil, both salvation and calamity. All—the totality—ideas, all—the totality—energies or life forces were interwoven within him.

"Good and bad flowed from him," says Kristensen (oc, 272). Healing/sickening, success and failure, telling the truth and telling falsehood: all types of action were united in him. The 'totality' of his being and operation encompassed contradictions. He was "a vessel full of contradictions." The entire pantheon (system of deities) was of exactly the same nature.

What St. Paul calls "the elements of the cosmos", i.e. all destiny-determining beings and actions that are non-Biblical, exhibited and still exhibit today (in non-Biblical religions and magic) the totality of opposites.

"Salvation and calamity, downfall and rise were derived from the ancient pagan deities. Those contradictions which constitute the enduring life of the world and in which the Babylonians saw 'the divine totality'". (Oc, 273).

2.-- Nihilism.

That totality indicates that the pagan deities acted autonomously. The 'essences' of things, such as health and sickness, truth and falsehood, salvation and calamity, were for her, as a value in themselves—especially as a higher value that binds in conscience—'nihil', nothing, nothing binding.

God as the supreme being standing behind the essences and values was 'dead'. That "death of God and the higher values" explains why they were practically "vessels full of contradictions".

Note-- CF/CS 110 taught us that contemporary nihilism—Dostoevsky, in the hypothetical sense, Sartre, in the factual sense—states that if God, the God of the Bible who stands behind the essences (expressed popularly in the Ten Commandments) was dead (Dostoevsky), is dead (Sartre), then 'totality'—'everything' (say Dostoevsky and Sartre)—is permitted.

So that the basic axiom of ancient paganism and that of atheistic existentialism are, fundamentally, exactly the same. “If the morally superior being and its values (commandments) are nihil, nothing, then good and evil are permitted”—then the totality is permitted! The totality or 'harmony' of opposites!

3.-- *Demonic.*

Our – logically linear – concepts (values, essences) – such as good, distinguishable from evil, – success, distinguishable from failure, – telling the truth, distinguishable from telling falsehood, – health, distinguishable from illness – were “no law” for Anu. Anu’s 'nature' (*note:* own way of existence) was demonic in the religious studies sense” (Kristensen, oc, 272).

“No law”, that nihil, nothing to bother about in the bottom of the earth. So that one could live as a “vessel full of contradictions”, although one was not allowed to. The freedom of ability coincided with that of permission.

What this entails is that power – ability – was decisive. Not known. Kristensen, oc, 273.

The will of these gods was fate, the moira (in ancient Greek): divine yet inhuman. -- They were not 'just' in the ordinary sense of the word: by their actions they betrayed “the laws” which they had nevertheless established for mankind. -- The ancients were fully aware of this contradiction in the divine nature.

Kristensen refers to the Babylonian Lamentations, for example, as evidence in this regard.

4.-- *Two language uses.*

Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/-465), at home in the enigmas of the divine totality (“the obscure”), said: “With 'God' everything is beautiful and good and just.

“But people consider one thing unjust and another just” (Fr. 102).

Likewise, the Babylonians were aware of two language uses, as Kristensen, op, 273, says:

a . The Babylonian believers had their own logically straightforward concepts - sickness/health,

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truth/falsehood, salvation/disaster, justice/injustice: they like to elaborate on this in their religious texts. Thus Kristensen.

b. These same believers—just like the Greek thinker Heraclitus later—knew that their logically strict distinctions within the 'totality' were 'nihil', nothing, to the deities whom they realized were co-cause ('Urheber', says N. Söderblom) of their misfortunes. This 'cosmic' (understand: supernatural, sacred, 'divine', pagan) meaning of the terms of the totality constituted a second use of language.

Religious nominalism.

If, for example, the ancient Babylonians fell ill, this was ultimately caused by a 'divine' nature. One deity or entity or group of beings, 'numina', was partly—not solely—responsible.

Based on the rule that “he who causes illness and misfortune also heals and restores,” people turned to those entities that were jointly responsible. A medicinal plant, yes, as a natural remedy for example, but also, and even primarily, an appeal to the 'demonic' entity(ies) that had helped cause the evil: nature and extra-nature were the rule.

With due regard for the demonically incalculable, the unpredictable, that could then emerge. For the deities of the 'totality' of contradictory possibilities were such that one never knew how one held them!

Note: One need only consult, for example, C.A. Meier, **Antieke Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie **, Zurich, 1949, 17: “Ho trosas iasetai”, he who has set in motion the ailment will also cure it. “For the divine physician is both the disease and the cure”.

Nominalism.

Defining the divine, in the pagan sense, in its 'essence' thus encompassed contradictory terms. The name was the same. The reality intended, indicated, and represented by that name—nomen—was an integrated contradiction.

The only certainty, therefore, was the sound of the word. All the rest had to be awaited. Hence the “mysterium fascinosum (what attracts) et tremendum (what repels)” characteristic of pagan religions. The more one delved observantly (= theoria, Lat.: speculatio) into “the divine,” the more one fell into religious nominalism. The name does refer to something real, but as if to “a vessel full of contradictions”!

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49. A contemporary nominalism. – (142)

Let us pause for a moment to consider one type of nominalism that is typically modern.

Library st.: *H. De Coninck, Hours of admiration: Leo Apostel* , in: *Humo* 29.09.1983, 50/53.

Leo Apostel (1925/1995; graduate of the ULB) was an internationally recognized epistemologist. Here is his philosophical 'confession' in an interview.

“Philosophy: that is almost religious. That is the longing for the unity of everything. -- once God had fallen away, I had to have something in his place. I am actually still working on that.” “Back then, I went through a period where I thought: ‘If God doesn’t exist, does the world exist? Do I exist? Isn’t it all a dream?’ ‘Vida es sueno’. If you experience that existentially, it is a horrible experience. Especially for a boy from a not-so-cultured background. What saved me was daring to say it.”

I could still see the table standing in front of me, but I was no longer convinced that it was real. – If I had said that out loud, I probably would have been committed. After a while, that disappeared.

But an intense interest in epistemology and logic still remains from that: “Can I prove that that table really exists?” To me, that has never been an 'academic' (*note*: alien to life) issue.

God turns out not to exist: but then the world must surely be explainable in another way. Religious ethics then falls away as well: but then you must surely be able to find rules for living somewhere else.

Note-- Compare with *CF/CS 109*.

“Moreover: you simply do not have immediate access to extreme reality. -- In the history of literature, you can still find examples of “loss of sense of reality.” “I can see you sitting there, but perhaps you are just scenery! Is it all unreal!” When you are very tired, you often experience this: it all seems like cardboard. Then you really have to convince yourself: “No, there is a real world, and I even know a part of it.” That epistemology is therefore truly the result of my need to reach the world, to reach people.”

Note: The Apostle, 58 at the time, confesses that he has “still not solved” that problem. But he has gained much learning.

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50. Nominalism is first of all 'empiricism' (143/144)

Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626) is the precursor of modern scientific thought (*Novum organum siëntiarum* (1620)). He characterizes modern scientific thought as follows.

1.-- Empiricism.

Empiricists resemble ants that content themselves with it.

a. materials (data, information)

b. To collect without mutual connection (similarity, coherence).
'Observation'.

2.-- A prioriism.

The a priorists resemble the spider which **a.** from its own essence (in this case: reason) **b.** devises beautiful networks in which sophistication and symmetry can be found, but without solidity or usability.

Bacon thereby characterizes the two traditional, modern rationalisms (empiricism, intellectualism) that use the same reason differently. John Locke, along with René Descartes, serves as a model for one of them.

3.-- Experimentalism.

The experimentalists resemble the bee that:

a. extracts materials for her honey from the flowers (// empiricism)

b. but in her own way develops this into its nectar (// a priori, intellectualism).

In his *Novum organum* he says: “In this way one can expect everything from the close conjunction of perception and reason”.

Characterization of empiricism.

We just did this for a moment CF/CS 137. We will now do this using R. Jolivet, **Les sources de l'idéalisme **, *Paris” 1936, 24/30 (*L'empirisme occamien*).

William of Ockham (Occam) (1300/1349) was a Franciscan monk with a fiery temperament who wanted to reform church and state. His variant of nominalism is called 'terminism' or 'Ockhamism'.

Note-- R. Van Zandt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of American History* , The Hague, 1959, 124/156 (Realism versus Nominalism), says that:

1. nominalism is the foundation of empiricism, of which materialism and positivism constitute the derivations together with secular thought (desacralization);

2. Ockham's nominalism undermines and dismantles medieval scholasticism (800/1450), and founds all modern thought.

Van Zandt cites J. Feibleman, *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy* : “There was a tidal wave of nominalism. Descartes was a nominalist. Locke (and all that stems from him in terms of thinkers Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, and even the commonsensist Reid) is a nominalist.

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Leibniz was an extreme nominalist. Kant was a nominalist. Hegel was a nominalist, but with a realistic longing. -- Thus—to put it in one word—“all modern philosophy” was nominalist.

The nominalist Weltanschauung grew into—what I dare to call—the true flesh and blood of the average modern mentality.

Thinkers such as Dewey, Cohen, Randall, Burt, Dampier, and Carré endorse Feibleman's assertion, so that Occamianism constitutes “the tacitly accepted axiomatics” of modernity.

Van Zandt further states that nominalism is pre-eminently an Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Ockham came from Oxford. English and American thought is nominalist through and through.

Jolivet on empiricism.

Ockham's ontology stands or falls with the singular 'thing'. He calls this 'real', the actual. The rest seems to him 'irreal', unusable.

A. The singular (individual).

Take "this beautiful girl". -- She is merely a set of loose, mutually different, and even separate 'properties'. If we see one beautiful girl in her, this is due to our 'concept' (understanding), produced in our mind as a result of the perception of "that beautiful girl". It is our thought sign that sees one being in her. In itself, she is "a dust cloud of separate properties, the connection of which remains incomprehensible".

B.-- The singular 'things' among themselves.

The 'realia', the individual 'things' (Jolivet speaks of 'chosism'), are "a dust cloud of isolated things whose mutual connection remains incomprehensible". "A dust cloud of 'phenomena', a discontinuous (136) universe of 'things' existing side by side".

Modern Subjectivism (142)

Differences and gaps govern things. Through difference and gap, the nominalist subject is distinguished and separated from "the things".

Jolivet calls this 'immanence thinking' (immanence = inwardness). -- Between us, the subject, and things, there are situated agreed-upon signs, mental signs, our concepts or notions in 'termini', terms (words) that can be fixed. These differ from what they denote and are separated from it by a chasm. -- The mental, not the things existing outside the inwardness of our consciousness: that is what we know.

CF145

51. Nominalism. Since Ockham comes conceptualism. (145)

Let us now consider what Bacon calls 'a prioriism' (intellectualism, idealism). Reason within the 'immanence' or interiority of our (modern) consciousness is now described from a single perspective.

J. Largeault, Enquête sur le nominalisme, Paris/Louvain, 1971, in the preface to Poirier (oc, Vss.), says that the term 'nominalism' denotes "an endless series of things". But he begins with main points.

1.-- Phasing out of the 'essentials'.

'Essence' means:

- a.** the common properties (found through induction) in the data,
- b.** the general value judgments founding properties in the data. Universal and value judgment-founding concepts: that is what essences are. 'Essence' is therefore not used here in the general ontological sense (mode of being, possibly even of singular data), but in a limited sense, namely in the metaphysical sense.

Nominalists – before Ockham (since the Protosophists) – see in metaphysical realities (the universal and the (higher) value) merely products of the brain, “empty names or word sounds”, of which one never truly comes to know exactly what corresponds to them in the reality outside (the immanence or interiority of) our subjective consciousness.

2.-- Conceptualism.

In place of the 'universalia' (general concepts loaded with value aspects), Ockham proposes 'concepts', concepts, notions.

- a.** Does only the singular thing exist 'really' (i.e., empirically or 'positively' ('definitely') observable (see previous chapter))? Not the general essence of that thing, including other things connected with it. Not the value aspect in that thing.

- b.** What, then, does “the general” amount to, which even Ockham cannot deny? When, for example, he establishes a common characteristic, with or without a value judgment, in a multitude of things, he limits this to:

- 1.** the name (nomen, word sound) as the ancient medieval nominalists did,
- 2.** The concept or notion that is constructed (*CF/CS 137*), conceived, in response to something that is perceived. This concept summarizes, but in an informal way, superficially, from the perspective of the conceiving subject—not from the common or valuable aspects of things.

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52. Nominalism as experimentalism (146/147)

The typically modern 'subject', in its enclosed 'inwardness' or 'immanence', develops **a** . Empiricism, **b** . A prioriism, **c** . Experimentalism. Let us consider this last aspect.

Library st.: *W. Fuchs, *Denken met computers **, The Hague, sd, (// *Knauers Buch der Denkmaschinen*), vol. 237ff., gives us a practical example of exactness, i.e. experimentation and calculation.

A.-- *The technician,*

just like the physicist – is often faced with the problem of a 'box' (switchboard), – whether of a natural or artificial nature. Characteristic: the box cannot simply be taken apart to see what is inside. It is therefore called a “black box”. – Behold the given fact.

Now to the question asked. -- For reasons of efficiency—as stated throughout by Fuchs, op. cit., 234.—the given 'thing' is designated as a “black box” because it provisionally keeps its structure hidden. -- The term 'structure'—a word that is constantly used today as a basic term or concept for 'unknowns'—is nothing other than the set of features within the box.

Note: It is clear that the nominalists have thereby introduced a substitute product of the Platonic lemma into an analysis (reductive reasoning).

Behavioral or behavioral method.

To expose the black box to some extent, one applies a (e.g. electrical) stimulus (recently called 'input' or 'supply') to force the box to respond with a reaction ('output'). -- Thus, the nominalist learns—without knowing “the inside” through direct observation—by trial and error or experiment whether there is any order in the box (existence) and what that order is (essence).-- Fuchs: the black-box method originated in electrical engineering.

Fuchs. -- The exact natural sciences have always applied this method. In doing so, he refers to his work “Modern Physics,” where he discusses experimental research regarding atoms and atomic nuclei. -- So much for the experimental aspect.

B. The mathematical aspect.

The black box method also includes a mathematical 'moment' such that it can achieve 'exactness'.

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(I) Current mathematics designs - constructs - schemata (for schematic operations) and rules so that structures can be represented.

(II) Semiotics (the study of signs).

a. Syntactically speaking —di as combining signs—it 'constructs' the mathematical signs that form a syntax thanks to a system of relations.

b. Semantic and pragmatic . -- Mathematical signs can be used to depict (represent, describe) something that is non-mathematical. In this way, the signs of syntax acquire 'meaning' (semantics or the study of meaning) and 'usefulness' (pragmatics).

Think of the Einsteinian formula " $E = mc^2$ " -- in itself, that formula is a mathematical equation. Nothing more. That is syntax.

But the day Einstein fills in, denotes, and interprets the empty shells (Platonic lemmas) of that formula, they become descriptive terms: E = energy, m = mass, c = speed of light. -- Thus Einstein describes the structure of the set of elements comprising E , m , c^2

Model-theoretical expressed :

The syntactic but empty formulas or 'shells' acquire semantic content and become pragmatic and usable. They are physical models that provide information regarding physical realities.

Physical models.

Fuchs. -- When an architect designs a house, he repeatedly obtains information about the house to be built thanks to a model that, on a small scale (change of scale), with pieces of plank and the like (material model), provides insight.

Main condition: isomorphism, the material model and the original (the house) must be identical in form, isomorphic.

One sees the analogy between a mathematical model and a material model: both provide information about an original. -- One also sees that 'model'—whether mathematical or non-mathematical—represents the structure, the unity, or the relationship of the parts.

Conclusion. -- Thus, the nominalist replaces the Platonic lemmatic-analytical method. Both deal with unknowns. However, the nominalist restricts himself to the domain of everything that is empirically and conceptually accessible, whereas, for example, Platon transcends that domain into metaphysics.

CF148

53. *Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas. (148/150)*

We will examine in more detail what separates the three classical theories of knowledge.

1.-- *Nominalism.*

What is beautiful? “This beautiful girl.” This protosophist statement is telling. It answers a universal question with a singular model or specimen! Empirically speaking, “a beautiful girl” is a set of characteristics into which our concepts project a structure.

2. -- *Abstract theory.*

For the Aristotelian conceptual realist, it is different. What is beautiful? 'Beautiful' is a property found in actual data that, thanks to induction, is expressed in a term, namely the abstract noun or generic term 'beautiful'. -- 'Abstract' means that our attention disregards the rest of the singular 'things' or, better, data.

Whether it concerns physical, spiritual, artistic, technical, etc. beauty—abstraction is made from that (that is put in parentheses; no attention is paid to it). One limits oneself to what is strictly speaking and generally viewed as 'beautiful' (e.g.: “Is beautiful all that takes us out of our daily rut and arouses awe and wonder.

3.-- *Theory of Ideas (Ideation).*

Plato is the founder of a third theory of knowledge.

The starting point is the singular data, of course. Abstraction sees in the singular cases (specimens) and in the types or kinds the one and universal beauty, with the exclusion—or bracketing—of the rest. To this extent, Platon is an Aristotelian conceptual realist.

But he goes further. -- Whether beautiful girls actually exist, -- whether beautiful works of art exist or not: “beauty in itself” has always been there and will always be there.

“ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” Whether two plus two apples exist or not: “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” will always exist, independent of the instances in which that formula becomes reality in the perceptible sense.

In other words: empirically verifiable data merely confirm what already exists a priori, from all eternity to all eternity! Before the actual cases (pre-existing) and after the actual cases, when they cease to exist (after-existing), there is the idea of eidos 'beauty' or “two plus two is four”.

Abstraction would be impossible without those ideas: they are the eternal light that provides the overarching light (metaphysics of light). So much for the universals.

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Now the transcendentals.

Traditional, Platonizing metaphysics prioritized all-encompassing concepts – universals of a very special kind. -- The first is 'being', that is, all that is something in any event. 'Reality' (in the all-encompassing sense).

Two 'essences'.

The first essence or idea in the strictly Platonic sense reads: "What is, is." Possibly "What is so, is so." This is: everything that is existence and essence in any way must be acknowledged as such in conscience.

a. This is radically general: only absolute nothingness, which is absolute nothingness, falls outside of it.

b. In this, a higher value announces itself that lays claim to our honesty (if we are honest, then we ought to affirm that ontological axiom) and to our reverence (if we show reverence for the higher power that appeals to us in that principle of identity, then we affirm it).

In other words: being is an essence, a concept that is value-charged and universal (indeed, transcendental). - Cf. CF/CS 94 (*Identity principle*).

The second essence or idea in the strictly Platonic sense reads: "All that exists has, either within itself or outside itself, a sufficient reason or ground." -- Cfr CF/CS 93v . (" *If there is a sufficient reason, then it is understandable* ").

a. That principle is likewise radically universal.

b. Likewise in this, the Higher lays claim to our honesty (the desire to have known) and our reverence (affirming the Higher as standing above us).

In other words: both strictly all-encompassing and value-laden (thus essence)

The truth as essence or idea.

Accompanying the second, but especially the first axiom is "What is true (reveals itself, is a phenomenon), is true (reveals itself, is a phenomenon)". The alêtheia or 'unconcealment' of being(the). -- That is the third transcendental.

Unity as an idea.

“Whatever is connection (similarity, coherence) is connection.” This is: “a multitude of beings becomes one by virtue of similarity or coherence.” The basis of the set and the system.

The idealistic character.

The general concept of 'beauty' or “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” can still be justified abstractly (induction). The transcendentals cannot: one can only abstract insofar as one is enlightened by the transcendental concepts and axioms—by ideas.

CF150

Concepts such as 'being' and the other transcendentals just discussed come through like a light that illuminates, -- not thanks to abstraction starting from singular cases. -- They are certainly not constructed as the nominalists would dare suggest. How could the modern subject construct, 'conceive', something like 'being' from its own essence?

In other words: when all-encompassing concepts come into play, nominalist and abstract theories touch upon their very clear limits. Only 'ideation'—the emergence of a peculiar light that illuminates data “in the light of” all-encompassing concepts such as being, truth and comprehensibility, value and unity (connection)—can provide a sufficient reason or foundation for us, as conscious beings, to think comprehensively on an absolute scale.

Note: Here we touch upon the root of metaphysics. Upon the root of “the essences” or “the higher values” that ground essentialism in its irrefutable and sound core.

Let us reread *CF/CS 139 (Nihilism)*: the pagan deities, precisely because they regard the light of ideas of a transcendental nature—think, for example, of “what is, is” or “What is true, is true”—as 'nothing', are “vessels full of contradictions”!

They construct, conceive, indeed, an autonomous world that is only conceivable—comprehensible—insofar as the essences of a transcendental nature are repressed, suppressed, 'denied'. Then one indeed enters a universe “in which God (as the one who transmits the light of the essences into consciousness) is dead and everything, the 'totality', is admitted”.

Decision. -- R. Van Zandt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of American History*, The Hague, 1959, 125, quotes Feibleman: “An overview of the history of philosophy reveals the fact that – from a specific point of view – there exist

only three radically different metaphysical positions that can be adopted by anyone, at any place or at any time.”

There are, of course, more than three. Yet all are merely variants of the fundamental three.” Van Zandt explicitly names them: nominalism, abstractionism, theory of ideas.

The first two are valid but limited and become ideologies if they do not integrate the theory of ideas.

CF151

54. Modern nominalist culture. (151/153)

Let us set sail with a semasiological remark.

E. De Strycker, SJ, Concise History of Philosophy , Antwerp, 1967, 95, no. 39, says the following.

The terms 'eidos' (being) and 'idea' (idea) – in Platon and in Platonism – indicate an objective 'structure' – not a representation in our mind.

This structure is perfect for what it is. In other words, it is the ideal type of its images in the concrete world.

If, for example, a craftsman wants to produce “good work,” he must ‘look’ at the idea; it must “hover before his mind”; it must be present in his mind. - Thus, in the 16th century, people came to use the term ‘idea’ for an “ideal representation” in the mind, and later for “any concept.”

However, this has never been the case in antiquity.

Incidentally: in that subjectivization, that displacement into the modern subject with its constructive spirit, lies a whole piece of word history *and* history of mentality. In the 16th century, people still had some understanding for the ideal in the purely Platonic idea, but by identifying 'idea' with 'concept' in our mind, one thoroughly betrays the Platonic concept of 'idea'. Yes, the modern subject or 'I' that 'constructs' a world around itself from an inner world emerges—at first hesitantly, later radically.

Ockhamism as an expression of the spirit of the times.

A. Weber, Histoire de la philosophie européenne , Paris, 1914-8, 234, says what follows

William of Ockham was so convinced within himself that he meant well with the Church. -- Yet fundamentally, his nominalism—like all philosophy—is the mirror in which the main concerns of his time are reflected, namely, shaking off the yoke of Christian Rome, the great concern of all that was in the power of the laity: intellectual education, the sciences and the arts, philosophy, -- states and peoples.

As soon as nominalism indeed re-emerges, philosophy observes the development of national life and of modern languages. These set themselves against the unity that Rome, the heiress of the tradition of the Roman emperors, had imposed on Europe.

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Nominalism, under the mask of “deep attachment” to the Church and of “extreme piety”, in fact concealed a multitude of tendencies hostile to Catholicism.

Ockham himself did not develop a 'system', but rather a theory of knowledge that could serve as a 'basis' or 'foundation' for a multitude of schools of thought that drew the consequences from it.

Sciences.

A. Boulenger, *Le Moyen âge (De Clément V à la Réforme (1305/1517))*, Lyon/ Paris, 1936-4, 343/346 (*L'école occamiste*), outlines the demarcation or delimitation problem in Ockham as follows.

(a) Ontology.

“Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate” (Entities should not be multiplied without necessity) is the great axiom of economics or austerity (which Petrus Aureoli (1250/1322), a Franciscan, had already introduced for nominalist reasons).

Applied: “the essences” of traditional metaphysics are superfluous as empirically unverifiable 'entities'. For 'real' in the nominalist sense are only the singular 'things' that we represent in thought signs, concepts, or notions, fixed in terms, because we, as knowing beings, wish (voluntarism) to accept them as 'real' (we believe in them), primarily on the basis of experiment.

(b) Specialized sciences.

In the spirit of Oxford, his birthplace, Ockham declared the experimental method to be the only one capable of arriving at apodictic (irrefutable) certainties. Cf. *CF/CS 146* (*Experimentalism*).

“Irrefutable certainties” in the empiricist sense! Are the scholastic metaphysical 'concepts' such as God (existence and essential attributes), the soul (its existence, its essential attribute 'immortality'), and freedom (its existence and essential attributes) experimentally unprovable? Those 'entities' of metaphysics are 'rationally' (experimentally) unprovable.

Fideism.

But “faith” ('fides' = faith) saves as “willingness to understand” (voluntarism). If one can still speak of 'metaphysics', it is based on the freely willed conviction ('faith') that God and soul (freedom) are 'real' somewhere. The freely willing subject is decisive.

CF153

(c) *Ethics* .

The soul is a free-willing subject. The distinction between conscientious and unconscionable does not rest on a distinction “in the very essence” of good and evil; only a free act of will by God as an autonomous subject at the highest level establishes this distinction.

In other words: from a nominalist perspective, things and deeds are 'neutral'—neither good in themselves nor evil in themselves. “God decides on good and evil to such an extent that, if He changes His value judgment regarding good and evil, what was hitherto 'holy' and 'just' turns into 'unholy' and 'unjust'.” That is how Ockham puts it.

The thesis of conceptual realists—abstractionists and ideatists—is that even God, however omnipotent, cannot change the nature or essence of good and evil. The property of 'good' and 'evil' is in many cases something objective, inherent to the given itself.

Compare Ockham's 'voluntarism' with *CF/CS 140* : Anu, like all pagan deities, knows no essential distinction, situated in the very essence, between good and evil, health and sickness, truth and falsehood, salvation and calamity. To him, these distinctions were “no law”, 'nothing', nothing binding in conscience. Autonomous as they behaved, the “elements of the cosmos” (St. Paul) were those who arbitrarily determined what was good and evil. As “autonomous subjects”

(d) *Biblical theology.*

'Science' in the experimental sense and 'supernatural' theology (not to be confused with the 'rational' theology of above) are strictly separated in Ockham's mentality. Instead of the “vain earthly science of natural or rational theology” of the scholastics, the Church should adhere to the Bible and its own teaching authority insofar as it is supported by Biblical faith, which is not to be confused with the 'natural' faith of above.

Here, in the sphere of revelation, 'concepts' such as God, the soul, and freedom belong. When the Bible and the Magisterium present to us that God, the soul, and freedom exist, this insight is guaranteed not by virtue of natural experience but by virtue of revelation. -- Which naturally rests on the “blind leap” of Biblical faith, -- 'blind' because it is not supported by natural observations. -- Which gives us a Biblical fideism.

Note: That political and economic liberalism were yet another offshoot of Ockham's autonomous subject is evident.

CF154

55. *The term 'modern' (154)*

A distinction is made between pre-modern, modern, and postmodern language use.

(A). *Premodern.*

There are two phases in this.

1.-- *Antique language usage.*

The Latin 'hodiernus' (incidentally: 'hodie' means 'today') was a word that, from ±500, was also pronounced as 'modernus'. It meant “current/actual/contemporary”. We could simply translate it as “what is in”.

2.-- *Medieval language usage.*

From around 900, the term is used in ecclesiastical circles—where the clergy begins to dominate culture as a “cultural vanguard”—in two ways.

a. *Meliorative.* -- Enterprising, -- up to date with the latest data (facts, ideas) and therefore “up to date”. Open-minded. Sometimes: liberal.

b. *Pejorative.* -- Eager for anything new or that seems new simply because it is or appears new. Fashionable. Actualistic (focused on the fleeting moment),

driven by the momentum of currents rushing past. Frivolous (not delving deeply into matters).

(B) *modern*.

Primarily between 1520 and 1650, the term 'modern' was first deliberately used to denote “non-medieval” ('post-medieval').

The term, applied melioratively, means

- a.** Current, current, 'in';
- b.** Forward-thinking, progressive.

Note: This is related to the modern ideology of “progress”. After all, instead of metaphysics dismissed as outdated, there emerges nominalist (empirical, conceptualist, and experimental) philosophy of progress: specialized sciences and techniques are the instruments of a thorough improvement of life and the world. -- Instead of sacred history, the philosophy of history posits cultural history, which is outlined as “one grand narrative of progress”.

(C). *Postmodern*.

Postmodernism operates precisely against that “grand narrative” of mere progress: for empirical, conceptual, and experimental reason exhibits dark sides (the social question, wars, environmental pollution).

CF155

56. *The great story of reason. (155)*

Quite often, the ideology of progress in modern times is summarized as follows.

- 1.** Nominalist rationality, with its empiricism, conceptualism, and experimentalism, constructs sciences and techniques.
- 2.** Thus, she designates the world as a malleable world, i.e., a living and working space that can be rationally transformed.
- 3.** That transformation is expressed in a collective ideology, namely the idea of progress transforming the entire planet.
- 4.** That transformation is realized in a system of upbringing and education that instills rationality, sciences and techniques, and the transformation of the planet, in the all-encompassing light of the concept of 'progress'.

1.-- *Pre-modern culture*.

Sometimes with sovereign contempt, the rationalists of modernity look down upon all that is primitive (archaic), ancient, and medieval. That is called 'underdeveloped'.

Even the two hundred million primitives who now remain after planetary modernization are disappearing. -- Classical antiquity lives on more “in minor”. -- The Middle Ages are melting away.

2.-- Modern culture.

With the beginning of the modern era (1450/1640), modernity takes root. -- Rise of the modern natural and human sciences (Galilei; Hume). Discovery of the printing press. Discovery of the entire planet (it begins with America in 1492). Rise of modern states (on a Machiavellian basis: rational science and technology, economy, war machine).

In the background: modern individualism (think of Humanism and the Renaissance, -- later of Enlightened Rationalism). -- The quintessential supporting class is the 'bourgeoisie', the middle class emerging in late medieval cities.

Progress.

From the transitional period (1450/1640), modern culture succeeds in developing economic, military, and political superiority: the entire planet comes under – what the French positivist Auguste Comte (1798/1857) calls – “Western domination”.

Result. -- The formation of a planetary uniculture that gradually makes all previous cultures, which made up a multicolored panorama, more uniform. With the problem: the identity crisis of the many cultures that maintain multiculturalism but are becoming increasingly Westernized.

CF156

57. Modernization is revolution. (156/158)

The term 'revolution'.

The Latin term 'revolutio' was originally an astronomical and astrological term. -- Consider the title of the work by one of the founders of the modern exact method, the Polish canon *Nikolaus Copernicus* (1473/1543): “ *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri sex*”, Norimbergae, 1543.

Or consider an earlier work by Geoffrey Chaucer (1340/1400), an English poet, who in 1391 knew only the astronomical sense of the term 'revolution'.

Modern meaning.

As soon as the modern period dawns, the meaning broadens. 'Revolution' becomes 'upheaval' in the cultural sense. Thus, there are scientific revolutions. Thus, there are political revolutions: the English Revolution (1642/1688); the American Revolution (1776/1783); the French Revolution (1798+); the Soviet Revolution (1917); the Chinese Communist Revolution (1949); the Gorbachev Revolution (1986). In each case, it was about one progress or another that was pushed through thanks to upheaval.

The revolution from humanism to enlightenment.

This is the axiomatic revolution.

As G. Vanheeswijck, **De vele vormen van de moderniteit**, in: ** Streven ** 61 (1994):11 (Dec.), 1009/1014*, sets out, Milan Kundera and Stephen Toulmin see an emergence of modernity in two periods: first there is the doubtful – tolerant humanism of the sixteenth century; then there is the 'abstract' enlightened rationalism of the eighteenth century. Louis Dupré, **Passage tot Modernity **, speaks in an analogous vein:

- a** after 1350 early humanism;
- b.** in the 18th century the enlightened rationalism that posits the human 'subject' as the sole source of rationality.

Similar is G. und I. Schweikle, Hrsg., *Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 200/201 (*Humanismus*); 29/31 (*Aufklärung*):

“Contrary to earlier theses (J. Burckhardt): the thought of Humanism (and the Renaissance) is not yet 'enlightened' ('aufklärerisch') and does not represent a break with the tradition of the Middle Ages” (oc, 201). However, it does pave the way to the Enlightenment through the emphasis on the individual freed from the grip of the medieval clergy and through the rise of the modern intellectual and artistic avant-garde, which consisted mainly of lay people.

CF157

The transition, in France, from the 17th to the 18th century.

From Christian humanism to enlightened liberalism.

P. Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne* (1680/1715), Paris, 1935, 3/29 (*De la stabilité au mouvement*).

Where the nominalist revolution truly takes hold, radically rids itself of tradition, *there* everything moves. -- Hazard. -- “What a contradiction! What a sudden transition.”

Between 1680 and 1715.

1. Hierarchy, discipline, order (of which the authorities took it upon themselves to ensure), dogmas that firmly govern life. That is what the 17th-century thinkers prioritized.

The majority of the French population thought like *Bossuet* (1627/1704; Bishop of Meaux, known for his major historical-theological work *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681)).

2. Coercion, authority, dogmas: that is what those who immediately follow, the 18th-century thinkers, spew out.

Suddenly France thinks like *Voltaire* (1694/1778; known for his *Candide ou l'optimisme* (1759; ridiculing Leibniz's optimism); *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1760; the antithesis of Bossuet's view of history)). -- “in other words: a revolution”.

A turnaround to the contrary

(1). The 17th-century Christians are established Christians: they prioritize an order of law founded on the deity; they feel secure in a society in which classes are unequally entitled.

(2). The 18th-century thinkers are opposed to established Christianity: for them, purely human nature is the foundation of every legal order. They dream of only one thing: “equality”. Cf. *CF/CS 109 (Lay morality)*.

A general human nature

—so thought the enlightened minds—is the basis or foundation of a 'rational' society. In France, in the 18th century, alongside humanists, libertines and materialists played an important role. An aggressive atheism — mixed with an equally aggressive anti-clericalism — took hold of the intelligentsia or vanguard. It prepared the French Revolution, which was much more than a mere political revolution. “La république” wanted a secularized state — to this day. La république radically — as radically as possible — dismantled pre-modern religion, science, art, and the state, and 'modernized' them.

CF158

The menopause.

H. Barth, *Revolution und Tradition* (*Ein Versuch zur Selbstverständigung der Philosophie*), in: *Saeculum* (*Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* (Munich)), 14 (1963): 1/10, focuses on the French Revolution.

a.-- Between the Renaissance (°Francesco Petrarca (1304/1374 ; humanist) and 1789 (Fr. rev.), axiom revolutions are situated.

Fénelon (1651/1715; Archbishop of Cambrai)

Télémaque (1699) , he levels merciless criticism at the social ills within the then-sacred monarchy ("l'Ancien régime"). From a Christian-humanist standpoint. -- In his philosophy of the state, he prioritizes not the monarchy, nor "the savage masses," but the sovereign people.

Rousseau (1712/1778)

Le contrat social (1762); *Émile ou sur l'éducation* (1762) - favors three revolutions.

1. An educationalist who undermines traditional authority and order and all kinds of traditions to advocate "a return to (purely human) nature" (*Emile*).

2. A political one that shakes the traditional principality, with its authority and order, to its core (*Contrat social*).

3. A religious person who questions the 'positive' (read: based on revelation) religion in order to return to the 'natural' (pre- and extra-biblical) religion. Not without sentimentalism.

Rousseau.

"You rely on the current established order. Without considering that this order is subject to inevitable revolutions (...). The great man of the realm becomes a small man. The rich man becomes a poor man. The sole ruler becomes a subject. (...). We are approaching 'l'état de crise' (the critical phase) and the century of revolutions'. (*Emile*).

b.-- After the French Revolution.

Barth. -- Alexis de Tocqueville (1805/1859; *L'ancien régime et la révolution* (1856)) in 1850: "At this moment it is clear: 'the tide is rising'. We will not see the end of the unprecedented revolution".

Maurice Joly , in his *Conversation in the Underworld between Machiavelli and Montesquieu* (1854): " *L'ère indéfinie des révolutions* " (*The infinite era of revolutions*).

J. Burckhardt (1818/1897) **Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien** phrases it as “die ewige Revision” (the eternal revision). Modernization is, according to these thinkers, continuous revolution.

CF159

58. Dialectical rationalism. (159/161)

Let us summarize: nominalism is the epistemological root of modern rationalism. This took hold of the Western intelligentsia or vanguard, especially from 1750 onwards. Modernization is 'rationalization'. But that is 'revolutionization', and indeed revolutionization without end. Static descriptive rationalism fell short in its concepts. Revolutionary progress required a narrative dynamic rationalism to articulate its ideology, its conceptual framework.

H. Barth, *Revolution und Tradition (Ein Versuch zur Selbstverständigung der Philosophie)*, in: *Saeculum* 14:1/10, dwells on that aspect. After the empirical determination, the conceptualization (converting what the facts show into concepts).

Barth sees two types of philosophizing.

A -- 'Dogmatism'.

Based on traditional metaphysics, the critique of the nominalists rejects and rests on the eternal foundations.

B.-- Criticism,

which finds its expression especially in I. Kant's **Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft** (1781), dismantles the 'dogmatics' of the tradition.

I. Kant.-- “Kant had already said that one cannot proceed from something fixed, but that “the true and the right” only comes at the end”.

Thus G. Van den Bergh van Eysenga, *Hegel*, The Hague, sd. 81, who thereby very clearly formulates the revolutionary aspect of the Enlightenment in Kant.

G. Hegel .

The same author, oc, *ibid.*: “Hegel, too, wants nothing to do with a supreme fundamental principle from which everything else must be derived. In a letter to Sinclair (1811), he says concerning the beginning of philosophy: “In a foolish manner, non-philosophers in particular demand a beginning that is something absolute against which they cannot immediately bark, -- an irrefutable first. (...). Those who immediately place the very idea of philosophy

itself at the very beginning—namely, the absolute and Our Lord with His entire glory—at the forefront, have in any case little understanding of (dialectical) philosophy”.

What, then, does 'philosophy' actually consist of?

Hegel: “The beginning, precisely because it is the beginning, is imperfect: the whole of philosophy itself is nothing other than a combat, refutation, and destruction of the beginning.”

CF160

Barth describes it as follows. -- In Hegel's usage of language, there is a “positive/negative” pair of opposites that illuminates the thesis.

a. The positive.

That is all that actually exists (established, traditional) insofar as it claims imperishability, inviolability, 'absoluteness', 'holiness'. -- Not only all that is pre-modern (primitive, ancient, medieval) but even the static axioms of the 18th-century rationalists and materialists, -- in other words, all that is prejudice, superstition, philosophical dogmatisms of all kinds, is 'positive'.

b. The negative.

That is what casts doubt, and more thoroughly than the rationalists before Hegel.

Barth. -- Philosophy as critique subjects “all that is positive” to a critical evaluation. -- Not that the positive, that which already exists, is simply worthless! No!

Criticism sets in where the positive or established is 'unreal'—no longer reasonable or rationally justifiable, no longer necessary. And so it must disappear to make way for something that has become reasonable through the evolution of things.

The Grand Narrative of Hegel.

Friedrich Engels (1820/1895), a fellow thinker of Karl Marx, expresses brilliantly in his * *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* *, IV: “The great fundamental idea that the world is not to be interpreted as a complex of finished things but as a complex of processes has, since Hegel, been drawn into the consciousness of the average person to such an extent that it is hardly contradicted by that degree of dissemination.”

In this, seemingly stable things, as well as the concepts that are their representations in our world of thought, undergo an uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, in which, notwithstanding apparent randomness and despite all fleeting decline, a progressive development ultimately prevails.

That is the idea of progress of rationalism, but expressed in the form of a story.

Abstract rationalism and dialectical rationalism.

'Abstract' here means "anything that does not entail movement, development, or progress". 'Dialectical' means "anything that entails movement, change, development, revolutionization, and revolution, or progress". Thus, there are two types of concepts or notions: abstract and dialectical.

CF161

As *P. Foulquié, La dialectique*, PUF, 1949, 51, says: "There are two kinds of reason:

a. abstract reason, such as mathematical reason, which processes abstract data and precisely for that reason remains outside "reality";

b. the 'concrete' reason, such as that of the physicist or the historian who works "reality" themselves, by diving into that reality methodically, to closely examine its becoming." This is how Foulquié characterizes dialectical reason.

This dialectical reason works on the facts by means of 'contradiction', i.e., critique. Note: 'contradiction' means, in Hegelian and Marxist terminology (in dialectical terminology), not the absolute inconsistency of traditional logic, but rather the exposing of the outdated within the established through critical inquiry. Exposing the 'unwirkliche' within the factual is practicing contradiction. Contradiction could be translated as 'contestation'.

Hegel's naturalism.

R. Serreau, *Hegel et l'hégélianisme*, PUF, 1965, 26s., states it as follows.

1. It is established that, at least verbally, Hegel always celebrated spiritualism. Time and again, therefore, he speaks of 'God' and calls "die Idee," the very core of his idealism, 'Spirit'.

2.1 . But it is by no means certain that he preserved the two essential elements of spiritualism—the existence of a personal God and the personal immortality of the soul—of which Kant still made the postulates (presuppositions) of practical reason.

2.2. What is certain is that—apart from Kant, Spinoza, and the Aufklärer (enlightened minds) who more or less agreed with Wolff's doctrine—Hegel knew very early on the French materialists whose doctrine—at least outside the universities—in fact dominated the 18th century.

Victor Cousin: “Hegel did not hide his sympathy for the philosophers of the 18th century, -- not even for those who had most vehemently opposed Christianity and spiritualist philosophy”.

Conclusion. -- Hegel was naturalistic but integrated key spiritualist concepts into his system. Which means one never really knows exactly how to categorize him. In any case: he is and remains the flower of Western rationalism, -- nominalistic but with “nostalgia for metaphysics”.

CF162

59. Rationalism is the Industrial Revolution. – (162)

Rationalizing is revolutionizing. -- Also in the technical-industrial sector and, in its wake, in the socio-economic field.

A.-- The Medieval Industrial Revolution.

J. Gimpèl, **La révolution industrielle au Moyen âge **, Paris, 1975, says: “From the 11th to the 13th century (1000/1300), Western Europe experienced a period of intense technological activity. (...). This period should actually have been called ‘the first industrial revolution’, were it not that the English industrial revolution of the 18th century is already referred to by that name.”

B.-- The 'first' industrial revolution.

Bibl.st. : WW Rostow, *Les étapes de la croissance économique* , Paris, 1962.

In the wake of the voyages of discovery and the scientific revolution, together with the modern technological revolutions, the (first) industrial revolution emerged between 1780 and 1880—not in Holland, which until then had been at the forefront economically, but in England, which possessed the necessary resources (coal, for example), the necessary fleet, the necessary mentality (the Calvinist-Puritan religion), and the necessary political

structure. The cotton industry, coal mines, and steel industry could be consolidated. The steam engine (energy revolution) could be valorized. His empire could develop intense foreign trade.

C.-- The 'second', the informational revolution.

Energy, materialized in the (steam) engine, was central to the previous revolution.

In the information revolution, the machine is also central, but now as an information-processing machine.

Note: The term 'post-industrial' for this revolution is misleading: industry is thoroughly involved with information technology!

*J. Peperstraete, *Employment in the Information Society *, in: *Onze Alma Mater*: 987: 2, 67/79, states that information theory, computer science, microelectronics, and telecommunications are the axioms.*

But the day the chip was invented, our culture changed very fundamentally. Knowledge technologists now represent modern reason at the forefront of the cultural vanguard, while the rest risks being left out in the cold—economically and socially.

CF163

60. Rationalism (163/164)

We will pause for a moment to consider what *Peter Sloterdijk, *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, *Frankfurt a. M.*, 1983, teaches us.*

Here is what *G. Groot* says regarding the matter in his article *Peter Sloterdijk, Cynic*, in: *Streven* 1985: Jan. 322/336.

(A) The lighting.

Rationalism reaches its peak with I. Kant (CF/CS 159). Sloterdijk's title, moreover, very clearly recalls Kant's **Kritik der reinen Vernunft** (1781/1787) and his **Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft** (1788). In turn, Sloterdijk criticizes 'critical' reason.

(B) The great miscalculation.

1. In his book *Was ist Aufklärung?*, Kant called for 'critical' reasoning, i.e., autonomous (independent), without allowing oneself to be deceived ('illusionless'). “Sapere aude”, dare to think independently.

In Kant's spirit, critical reason fearlessly and 'gründlich' (thoroughly) probes everything within itself and everything outside itself.

2. But things can 'change', or turn into their opposite! In the two hundred years that separate us from it, Kantian reason has led to the opposite of what was intended by the enlightened minds, namely, to 'found' a critical culture.

Critical culture is indeed in need of 'illusionslessness', but in such a way that—as septic reason—it acknowledges only what are brute facts. To the exclusion of all that transcends those brute facts. “All that other,” according to Groot, “is romantic obscuration that must be demythologized as quickly as possible, reduced to the ‘vulgar reality that lies behind it’. ‘Sobriety’, ‘unmasking’, ‘desecration’ are the watchwords of a reason that wants to ‘penetrate to the very foundation of things’ and can see this foundation of things as nothing other than lust for power and self-interest.” (Ac, 324).

Cf. *CF/CS 131* (*General Suspicion*), *133* (*The Cynical Note*), where we saw cynical reason at work. In which the three “critical materialists”

K. Marx, Fr. Nietzsche and S. Freud—as P. Ricoeur calls them—must not be forgotten, as was explained in *CF/CS 89* .

Note -- P. Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine* , Neuchatel, 1968, goes so far as to brand cynicism as a form of psychological disorder, but one that does not have the appearance of being a psychological disorder.

CF164

S. Kierkegaard on cynicism.

Kierkegaard (1813/1855) was the convinced opponent of rationalism in the name of a very devout Protestantism of the individual (*CF/CS 133*) as a believing Christian who wishes to be the 'contemporary' of Christ in the midst of an increasingly cynical world.

In his **Kritik der Gegenwart **, Basel, 1946; 21, he characterizes cynicism as follows.

“The distinction between good and evil is undermined by a frivolous, 'noble', theoretical knowledge of all that is evil—by a self-satisfied shrewdness that posits that in the world good is not esteemed and remains unrewarded, so much so that, viewed in the short term, it amounts to stupidity.”

Incidentally: the small work dates from 1846.

Fr. Engels on cynicism.

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* , I, he characterizes as follows.

Just as the bourgeoisie practically undermines all stable, traditionally revered institutions through big industry, competition, and the global market, so dialectical philosophy casts doubt on all conceptions of a definitive, 'absolute' truth and the 'absolute' human situations based upon it: for that philosophy, nothing exists that is definitive, 'absolute,' or sacred.

Marx and Engels on cynicism.

In 1848, the text of the Communist Manifesto was published in London by both of them. For decades, all socialist programs were based on it.

An excerpt. – “The bourgeoisie has played a very significant revolutionary role in history. – Wherever it has come to power, it has disrupted all medieval patriarchal, innocently – sweet relations. The bourgeois has mercilessly torn apart the multicolored bonds that in the Middle Ages connected man to his natural chieftains, leaving no other bond between man and man than pure self-interest, than cold cash payment. It has drowned the sacred emotion of pious fanaticism, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of petty-bourgeois melancholy in the ice-cold water of selfish calculation. It has caused personal dignity to vanish into exchange value and substituted the one unscrupulous freedom of trade in place of the countless, guaranteed, and hard-won freedoms (...)”.

CF165

61. Rationalism as materialism. (165/168)

Library:

-- FA Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart* , Leipzig, 1866;

-- Joh. Fischl, *Materialismus und Positivismus in der Gegenwart* , Graz/ Wien/ Altötting, 1953 (the work deals with 19th-century and 20th-century materialism in its two forms, the mechanistic and the dialectical);

-- O.Bloch, *Le matérialisme* , Paris, 1985 (in which oc, 59/61 (*Le mécanisme cartésien*);

-- JK Feibleman, *The New Materialism* , The Hague, 19701 -- especially R. Dasne, *Les matérialistes Français de 1750 à 1800*, Paris, 1965.

Note -- For the sake of completeness , e.g. JJ Poortman, *Ochêma (History and Meaning of Hyllic Pluralism)* , Assen, 1954, and id., *Vehicles of*

Consciousness , I-IV, Utrecht, 1978, should be mentioned, for materialism is not always averse to the concept of “subtle or ethereal matter” (fluid matter). On the contrary: for instance, a number of Soviet scholars incorporated such a concept into the dialectical materialism that was the official doctrine before Gorbachev’s revolution.

Cartesianism as prematerialism.

C. Forest, *OP, Le cartésianisme et l' orientation de la science moderne* , Liège/ Paris, 1838, 3, says: “Cartesianism as a system was abandoned rather quickly. Yet, because of this, Descartes continued to influence both modern philosophies and modern sciences no less.”

(1) Descartes was thoroughly spiritualistic both as a believer and as a thinker (*CF/CS 161*).

(2) At the same time, he was the precursor of French and Western materialism. Voltaire says that he knew many people—he lists them—who claimed that Cartesianism had led them to stop believing in God altogether” (Cf. Lange, *oc*, I, 368). Descartes was therefore clearly ambivalent.

Explanation . -- The nominalist atmosphere in which Descartes thinks is:

a. empirical (she records the impressions of the material world or 'nature' (which is moreover conceived as an all-encompassing machine (mechanistic interpretation)),

b. conceptually (she notes “la vie intime”, the inner, conscious life (which she interprets as a kind of angelicness)). - This explains the famous Cartesian dualism that describes man as “an angel inhabiting a machine” or “an angel operating a machine”.

CF166

The concept of 'mechanism'.

It was just asserted that, according to Descartes, the human body is “an apparatus”, “a machine”. Something like that is 'mechanicism' (sometimes: 'mechanism'). -- This is an interpretation of material nature. Nature as a totality consists of inherently immutable parts that are assembled into “a machine”. Nature as a process proceeds in the form of mere changes in position of the parts or some kind of whole within nature, but in such a way that from (the knowledge of) the sign (the knowledge of) the consequence is entirely logically derivable and predictable.

Descartes' mechanics is not so much a mechanics of mass as a geometric mechanics: a boundary shift flawlessly triggers an infinite chain reaction.

According to Descartes, plants and animals are 'automata'. Nicole Malebranche (1638/1715; one of the most important Cartesians) expresses this reduction of, for example, an animal to a machine as follows: "If an animal cries, then this is according to 'the laws' that govern the escape of air from a body in which that air is trapped: there is no difference between a bell that rings and a dog that barks." (Quoted by Forest, oc, 5).

Note -- This is a form of 'reductionism' or the reduction of the higher to the lower: "The higher, such as a plant or an animal, is 'fundamentally' merely a higher form of the lower".

Mechanism becomes materialism in the mechanistic sense if the mental operations of man are also 'reduced' to purely mechanical operations.

Since Hegel's dialectics gained acceptance, there has existed a dialectical materialism (called 'Diamat' in the Soviet Union) that rejects mere mechanics.

Materialism.

In the most general sense, 'materialism' is the view that everything that exists has matter (substance) and material processes as a sufficient reason or basis. In this regard, the results of physics and chemistry and, to the extent that they are 'reducible' (reductionism) to physics and chemistry, those of biology are utilized as evidence.

'Being' is "material being": it is an ontology that reduces the all-encompassing concept of being or reality to "material being".

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Types of materialism.

One should not imagine that materialism is of one kind. Far from it!

I.-- Methodical materialism.

This is merely method in life, or especially in the sciences: the gaze of observation, thought, and experimentation restricts itself, fully aware of its limits, to the material aspect of things. Matter as reality and its processes: behold the materialist reduction.

II.-- Ontological materialism.

Here is 'ideology'!

1. -- *Ethico-political materialism.*

One could also call it “practical materialism.” Life is limited to what “this earth” (did Nietzsche not say: “My brothers, remain faithful to the earth!”) and the purely material cosmos have to offer as a kind of all-encompassing biotope. -- In the colloquial language of religious people, the term 'materialism' frequently has this 'practical' meaning.

2. *Theoretical (and practical) materialism.*

In antiquity, such materialisms existed, but within the framework of the philosophies of the time. -- Thus, the atomists (Leukippus (-490/-...) and especially Democritus of Abdera (-460/-370) are materialists in the strict systematic sense. -- They inspired atomism and the 'modern natural sciences and philosophies'.

Later, his eccentricism (Zenon of Kition (-336/-264)) and Epicureanism (Epicurus of Samos (-341/-271)) were religious materialisms. Indeed: the Stoa was very religious and Epicureanism retained a minimum of religious concepts.

Mechanistic materialism.

Thomas Hobbes (1588/1679), a Cartesian, is the pioneer. -- *Lamettrie* (1709/1751; *L'homme machine* (1747)), *D'Holbach* (1723/1789; *Système de la nature* (1770), the main work of French atheist materialism) founded full materialism.

C. Vogt (+1895), J. Moleschott (+1893), *L. Büchner* (1824/1899; *Kraft und Stoff* (1855), foundational work of German materialism) represent full materialism in Germany. -- Br. Bauer and D.F. Strauss (1808/1874) are “left-wing Hegelians” who become materialists.

The materialism in Descartes' works, together with his mechanics, comes to full manifestations of all kinds in those just mentioned.

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Incidentally: antiquity knew atheism and materialism, but these differ very fundamentally from what was just called “full Western European materialism.” Let this be clearly borne in mind.

Mechanistic materialism challenged.

Mechanism is a 'strong' position on the one hand, but subject to 'strong' reservations on the other.

1.-- *Dialectics.*

Cfr. *CF/CS 159ff.* - The four axioms of dialectics that have become classic are:

a . reality, 'being', is “a totality of interconnected and mutually influencing elements;

b . this totality is incessant change – called 'movement' in the very broad sense of that word – ;

c . this moving totality exhibits qualitative leaps during gradual quantitative changes that represent something new (such as, for example, water changing into ice at 0 degrees C);

d . that same changing totality, exhibiting qualitative leaps, displays 'contradictions', i.e. inner tensions (*CF/CS 161*) which may eventually lead to reconciliations (thesis/ antithesis/ synthesis).

Dialectical materialism applies these axioms to matter and its processes, which are thus more than mechanical and different in nature.

2. -- *Energetics.*

Technology—think of the steam engine and coal—discovers the fundamental concept of 'energy', which stands out against matter as something new. Let us think of R. Mayer, Joule, Helmholtz: “the axiom of conservation of energy”. Traditional atomistic mechanical materialism, in particular, struggled to integrate this new concept.

3.-- *Information theory.*

Matter, energy, yes, until *Norbert Wiener* (1894/1964; *Cybernetics* , Paris, 1948) discovers that material and energetic processes proceed in an informed manner. This within the framework of a general systems theory (Ludwig von Bertalanffy).

This was a new challenge for traditional materialism, which had to arrive at the tripartite nature of “matter/energy/information” if it was to survive in a constantly evolving world ('dialectics').

4.-- *Hylic pluralism.*

New Age revived ancient animism in a renewed way and compelled the integration of subtle matter.

62. Rationalism as libertinism (freethinking). (169/171)

Library st. :

- A. Adam, *Les libertins eu XVIIe siècle* , Paris, 1964 ;
- Cl. Reichler , *L'age libertin* , Ed. de Minuit, 1987.

Medieval freethinking.

Modernity has multiple roots in pre-modernity. -- To what end would some troubadours in the Middle Ages have ennobled "love," if there had been no degrading love? In 1938, *Denis de Rougemont* (+1985) published **Amour et occident ** (on the troubadours in the South of France). We refer to it for more information on the subject.

17th-century libertarianism.

A *Théophile de Viau* (Adam, oc,7), a *Gaston d'Orléans* (oc, 9), and the author of *Les quatrains du déiste* (oc, 10) constitute a genuine enlightened rationalism around 1624.

Better known are freethinkers such as La Mothe Le Vayer (1588/1672), a radical skeptical Christian, the 'précepteur' (private tutor) of Louis XIV (1661/1715), the Sun King who became embroiled in a black magic scandal around 1680+ but "converted" following that unsavory history. Better known is Gassendi (1592/1655), the rival of Descartes (oc, 15), who was rationalistically 'ahead' of his time.

Note -- J.-P. Dubost et al., *L'Enfer de la Bibliothèque nationale* 7, Paris, 1988, gives *Œuvres érotiques du XVIIe siècle* . This shows that French libertinism has Italian origins. Such as *Pietri Aretino* (1492/1556), the voluptuous writer of *Sonnetti lussuriosi* (1536) and *Ragionamenti* (1556).

Cl. Reichler. -- L'age libertin covers roughly the period of 1680/1789.

The ultimate axiom: man knows himself to be so 'liberated' that he lets himself go. Central to this is the woman, and especially the woman as an erotic body. What we now call 'sex' is also central.

The individual axioms are pushed through to such an extent that the axioms of (established) society are reduced to ... 'nothing' (nihilism).

Three types.

a. The poet Th. Viau openly admits it, with the result that he ends up in prison by royal order.

b. The thinker-historian *Pierre Bayle* , known for his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1696/1697), which is practically the first modern history of philosophy, although a libertine, hides behind the mask of “un honnête homme”, an honorable man.

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c. In the 18th century, libertarianism becomes 'theatrical'.

Yet free-spiritedness is not what it has become in our day, for example: besides the external restraints, such as religion, established morals, and monarchy, there were also, in that era, the internal restraints, for centuries of 'restrained' culture are not simply shed.

A. Adam . -- Les libertins au XVIIe siècle , 7, says: “around 1620, freethinking – “le libertinage” – grows into a wildfire that sweeps along a good part of the young nobility in Paris”.

Let us just note: Galileo encounters the first difficulties regarding heliocentrism around 1610, and Descartes is twenty-four. That concludes the history.

Definition . -- What, then, are the axioms that define libertinism? After all, we have only briefly indicated them.

AI-- critique of tradition.

Under skepticism on a nominalist basis, the spiritualist tradition (Church, -- Christian Platonism; -- God and the soul; -- the Bible included) is being dismantled. “God is dead”.

Criticism of religion. What are religions, viewed from a free-spirited perspective? They are forms of political deception of the people: the powerful—the political class—make the powerless—the ordinary 'unenlightened' people—believe that a deity, a moral law, and the like exist! To foist a false morality upon the powerless of this earth and thus keep them 'obedient'—a morality in which the powerful do not even believe themselves.

Note: Some protosophists already proclaimed an analogous doctrine in antiquity.

Rationalism. The rationality is evident. -- A. Adam, oc, 12s., says: libertinism as free thought is apparently 'enlightened' ('illuminé', 'enlightened:', 'aufgeklärt'). Such that it 'critically' distances itself from the errors of "the common people" who have been abandoned to the illusions and deceit of "common sense". Which amounts to an elitism in the name of "reason" in its free-spirited form.

A.II.-- Own axiomatics.

Fatalism (naturalism). -- "Destiny," fate, governs everything as the supreme law. As "première puissance" (first power, primal power, -- which replaces God so that the void God leaves behind, once he is completed, is 'filled'), it has ordered nature and continuously orders it. Our life, too, is programmed by it.

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Living principles.

Life stands or falls with 'principles' that represent life. Apparently, this fills the void entailed by the dismantling of the concept of 'soul'. -- These 'principles' move from one (life) form to another. In eternal motion. So that the 'forms'—plants, animals, humans—are made into living beings.

B.-- 'Materialism'

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klasischen deutschen Philosophie , Stuttgart, 1888, II, characterizes the average concept of 'materialism' -- "The Philister (*note*: narrow-minded citizen) understands 'materialism'

- a** . Eating, drinking,
- b** . Peeking, carnal lust,
- c** . Greed, avarice, covetousness, pursuit of profit, stock market fraud and
- d** . Arrogant behavior. In short: all those nasty qualities to which he secretly surrenders himself.

This definition reflects Plato's psychology. Plato defines the average person:

- a** . as focused on food and drink ('diaita', standard of living),
- b** . sexually inclined,
- c** . obliged to work in an economic context,
- d** . as sensitive to honor.

Plato mentions this under a metaphor: the great monster (diaita, sexual life, economy), the lesser lion (sense of honor), the little man (the higher spirit). One sees that Engels, consciously or unconsciously, uses that Platonic

definition to characterize the 'materialist' in the ethical-political, practical sense (*CF/CS 167*). Except for one point, namely the little man, i.e., the low degree of spiritual life that is 'anagogic', directed towards the higher (values, essences).

It is clear that libertinism and materialism, in the sense just described, coincide at least partially.

A. Adam, oc, states that, besides lustfully cruel libertines, there are also coolly calculating libertines. When we compare this dichotomy with Reichler's tripartite division (open, masked, and theatrical), we notice that the single name 'libertine' denotes a plurality of variants.

The libertarian "observes" (empiricism), constructs concepts (conceptualism), and experiments (experimentalism) in his own way.

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63. The Rationalism of de Sade. (172/179)

Donatien Alphonse François, Marquis de Sade (1740/1814), is one of the purest examples of rationalism, even though this may be surprising.

That is why we will dwell on this quite extensively. -- To describe him somewhat broadly and provisionally: where Rousseau is sentimental, de Sade is 'raw'. Both introduce an emotional factor into nominalism, but with very different emphasis. -- We will briefly explain this.

One need only read any work on psychopathology regarding this: 'algolagnia', that is, the experience of sexual lust following the causing (sadism) or undergoing (masochism) of physical and/or psychological torment, brings De Sade and Rousseau close together! De Sade is known as the prototype of sadism that is named after it.

Rousseau —what is less well known (or perhaps even concealed)—was masochistic by nature: "To be at the knees of 'une maîtresse impérieuse' (a dominatrix), to obey her commands, to have to ask her forgiveness, were for me very pleasant pleasures." So writes he in his *Confessions*.

With this, we find ourselves in the company of two rationalists and naturalists who, each in their own way, observed empirically, constructed conceptual notions, and experimented—who were nominalists. And thus we immediately have the atmosphere in which we can define de Sade.

Current affairs.

The sexual revolution that gradually takes off after World War I (1914/1918)—after 1920 we see the term 'sex appeal' emerge from the USA as a desacralized and commercialized mass product centered on 'stars'—and which persists after 1955 into the planetary pornographic being, is living proof of just how brilliantly de Sade foresaw the development of emotional life, especially regarding 'sex' (a term that emerges from the same 'enlightened' USA after 1955 to express total freedom regarding sexual life). Sex has permeated—in all its psychopathological forms (including sex with animals)—all strata and layers of our current 'rational' society.

This alone justifies the fact that we delve somewhat more thoroughly into what the rationalism of “le divin marquis” actually entails and what its ramifications are for our culture in crisis.

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Characteristic.

We reflect on the soul and its behavior. -- De Sade possessed a cynical self-knowledge: “Authoritarian, hot-tempered, without measure or purpose. As for moral conduct: surrendered to a confused fantasy unparalleled. An atheist to the fanatic. -- In short: that is who I am! Kill me or take me as I am, for I will not change myself anyway.” (Quoted by *Simone de Beauvoir*, *Faut-il brûler Sade* ?).

Some facts.

(1) His captain, who knows him from the army as a lieutenant in Germany, for example, describes him as: “Fort dérangé mais fort brave”. This means: “Severely mentally unstable but brave”

His family wants to “bring him to reason” and succeeds in getting him to marry at the age of twenty-three. But it is not long before rumors circulate that trap de Sade for many years between his mother-in-law, who wants him in prison, and his wife, who moves heaven and earth to keep him out.

(2) According to the minutes of the Arcueil trials, April - June 1768, he subjected a peddler, Rose Keller, to “erotic flogging” there.

He brings forward a group of prostitutes to, together with his valet, subject these women “to a number of perversions”. Which leads to the Marseille trials, June–September 1772.

In his castle La Coste (Provence), de Sade founded a polygamous sex group with homosexual relationships, -- including excesses with minors.

Incidentally: H. Leyser, *Sade oder der Andere Florestan (Eine Skizze zur Tragikomödie der Intelligenz)*, in: Antaios II (1961): 6 (März) 515/526, sees in Sade “rationality in a perverse degree. Of the deviations just mentioned, Leyser says that they can only be understood “from the Ebene des aufgeklärten Intellektualismus” (in the field of enlightened intellectualism).

Note-- Fine, but then there is the nominalist intellectualism that gathers empirical sexually torturous impressions, 'justifies' them with theoretical concepts, and in such a mentality 'experiments' with its own body and with the bodies of fellow human beings.

Just as the libertines – CF/CS 171 – designate living beings – plants, animals, humans – as 'forms' in which what we now, since 1955, call 'sex', occupies a central position.

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One need reread CF/CS 148/150 (*Nominalism/ abstractionism/ ideation*), where it becomes apparent that the nominalist does not even see the higher ideas (of God) or the essences (modes of being included as higher values), let alone realize them in his life. Thus, for the radical nominalist de Sade, sexuality is totally profane, empirical material, interpretable and experimental according to his idiosyncratic concepts.

De Sade and the Revolution.

Good Friday 1790: the revolutionaries grant “general amnesty”. De Sade is released. -- Under the name 'Brutus', “the citizen of Sade” became a member of one of the many revolutionary clubs. He even becomes its president. In the spring of 1793, he is appointed judge. -- But, since he does nothing but acquit the accused—even his former enemies—he is accused of 'moderantism' (a political stance that preaches moderation against fanaticism and extremism) and immediately arrested again.

End of life.

Under Napoleon (1789/1821), he was confined in a lunatic asylum, Charenton, until his death.

A look inside de Sade's library.

Angela Carter, **La femme sadienne**, H. Veyrier, 1979—a feminist work—65s., emphasizes rationalism. Thus, the following were to be found in his library

a. Novels, such as *Miguel de Cervantes* (1547/1616), *Don Quichotte de la Manche* (1605-1; 1615-2) and *Madame de Lafayette* (1634/1693), *La princesse de Clèves* (1678),

b. Rationalist works such as *Voltaire, Œuvres complètes* (85 volumes) and *J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres complètes*. Voltaire and Rousseau are leading figures of the French Enlightenment.

According to Carter, de Sade subjects precisely that world of 'rationality' to his libertarian critique. Which is why he cloaks it in pornographic works.

Libertarian pornography.

Les 120 jours de Sodome (1787), *Justine ou les malheurs de la vertu* (1791), and *La philosophie dans le boudoir* (1795) are pornographic works. *Le Petit Larousse* (1972) characterizes them as follows: “Novels in which the heroes/heroines are possessed by the tendency to torture innocent souls (sadism). But important because they depict “the revolt of a free man against God and society.”

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The Sadian system.

Although expressed in the form of stories, de Sade's thought is logically coherent. We cite a few axioms.

AI-- basic axiom.

Strict nominalist rationalism.

Sade scholars know this from the texts. For example, “I let myself be guided by no other 'light' than the light of my own reason” (says Juliette, the cold heroine (in the style of Voltaire's heroic figures, for example)). Note the metaphor 'light' (Lumières = Enlightenment). But note the radical individualism: “only the light of my own reason”.

'Freedom'

Reread CF/CS 87. -- Neither negative freedom nor positive freedom according to Isaiah Berlin applies to de Sade. He wants “libertine freedom” which knows no boundaries except those of necessity! A. Carter, oc, 68: “De

Sade remains a monument of civility, simultaneously monstrous and impressive.

Yet I would like to believe that he placed pornography “at the service of women.” Or perhaps that he employed an ideology in pornography that is not the antithesis of the women’s movement as an emancipation movement.

Let us, in that spirit, pay homage to that old devil and begin by quoting the following pleasant piece of rhetoric: “Charming sex! Free you shall be! You shall experience pleasure—just like the men—in all your experiences of lust that nature (*CF/CS 171*) imposes upon you as a duty. You shall stop at no lust. -- Must “the most divine part of humanity” inevitably be shackled by the other part? Alas! Break your shackles: nature wills it.” -- Angela Carter speaks here as a libertine feminist, of course.

*Bertrand d'Astorg, *Introduction au monde de la terreur*, Paris, 1945, 29,* is considerably less enthusiastic: “The woman. -- Her destiny is “to be like the bitch, like the she-wolf: she must be available to all those who desire her” (to be like the bitch, like the she-wolf: she must be at the disposal of all who desire her).

Moreover: d'Astorg, *oc*, 25/33, compares de Sade with ... Saint-Just (1767/1794; a figure of the French Revolution who acted coldly) and William Blake (1757/1827; a painter with occult backgrounds). In other words, Carter, for instance, sees torture for erotic reasons as a humiliation of the (masochistic) woman, but values this 'valorization' as an equation with the man whom she 'elevates' through torture.

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Anarchism.

Perhaps Nietzsche's term ' *misarchy* ' (miseo; I despise; archè, all that controls) would be the best representation of the fundamental dogma of anarchism, which 'despises' both the higher ideas, together with the God founding these ideas, and all authorities of a traditional nature. In this way, anarchism or 'libertarianism' is a cultural revolution.

He who despises considers himself superior.

De Sade—as we saw when he demands to be accepted as he is—despises his fellow man and considers himself superior. -- So does every consistent individualist. Let us compare with two figures.

1.-- J.-J. Rousseau : “I alone. I feel my heart and I know people: I did not come into this world like all the others who live on it. If I am not worth more, then at least I am different.”

2.-- Goethe's Wilhelm Meister : “To develop myself as ‘nature’ has made me was, somewhere from my youth, my desire and my destiny.”

Bible st. : H.Arvon, *L'anarchisme* , Paris,1951,

We are well aware that “anarchism”—generally speaking—is a 'social' movement and, for example, fights for greater justice, primarily originating from small communities. Nevertheless, an individualistic and even a libertarian core is present within it. The concept of 'freedom' used in anarchist circles is situated in that region.

Simone de Beauvoir (1908/1986), known for her work that caused a stir at the time, **Le deuxième sexe** (1949), writes: “The true value of de Sade’s model lies in the fact that it disturbs us. It compels us to ask anew the essential question which, in a contemporary manner, prompts our time to reflect: ‘What is the true relationship of one man to another?’ With this pressing question, de Beauvoir concludes her study of de Sade.”

A.II.-- Basic Axiom.-- true and radical nominalism.

B. d'Astorg, oc, 27, quotes de Sade: “Do not doubt, Eugénie. The words 'virtue' and 'vice' refer only to purely local (*note*: particular, individual contents of thought.

There is not a single act—however exceptional you may imagine it—that is a true crime. Nor is there a single act that can be called a true virtue.

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Note: De Sade means to say that 'virtue' and 'vice' are merely names, Latin: nomina.

There is nothing in the actions themselves ('nihilism') that corresponds to this and justifies the concept of “true virtue”. Consequence:

a. nor universally applicable,

b . nor charged with a higher value.

“God (and his ideas) are dead”, and thus everything is permitted in principle (there are no principles). As Sartre says (*CF/CS 109*). 'Principles' are universally valid and charged with higher values. 'Essences', as Sartre says.

Bla-- Naturalism/ Materialism.

We have already encountered the term 'nature' regularly. He is the all-explainer! Replaces God.

R. Dasne, Les matérialistes Français de 1750 à 1800, Paris, 1965, 88s.: La Durand, a materialist, says to her friends: “My friends—so tells us La Durand—the more one studies nature, the more one steals its secrets,—the more one knows its energy.”—Here we encounter perhaps the fundamental concept par excellence of the psychology of de Sade.

From which La Durand concludes: “All the more one becomes convinced of the uselessness of ‘a God’. The erection of that idol is, among all illusions, the most hateful, the most ridiculous, the most despicable. This disgusting fable, arising in all men burdened by the sense of fear, is the utmost that human madness can achieve.”

I repeat: to attribute a creator to nature is to misunderstand it. To assume that “cette première puissance”, this first power, this primal power, is guided by another power, amounts to fixating on all that this primal power, nature, can produce.

Behold the creed—for it sounds like a confession of faith proclaimed with emphasis and fervor by a female minister—of the free, atheistically emancipated woman.

Bib-- Energetic ethics.

D'Astorg, oc, 30: “De Sade has continuously used the term 'energy' in the most modern sense of 'élan vital'—life drive, that is, the dynamism that propels mankind in the direction of its brutal self-development and self-surpassing.”

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Two models of 'energy'.

The term 'energy' reveals itself in what follows.

1. Permissive ethics.

The term 'permissive' (allowing everything) stands in contrast to 'repressive' (suppressing everything). -- *Justine or the Adversity of Virtue*, Amsterdam, 1978-11, 318ff.

“At the same time that libertine pulled up my skirts” (oc, 318). -- “Gasping like a dying man, this incorrigible libertine also uttered terrible blasphemies” (oc, 321).

“My buttocks serve as a lustful spectacle for some, and as a target of their cruelty for others: our two libertines (...) finally withdraw (...)” (oc, 323).

“The two libertines seized me” (oc, 326).

One sees that Sadian ethics is libertine through and through. And indeed as the expression of 'energy'. Note the two characteristics of sadism: lust and cruelty.

2. Permissive ethics.

The theft.

A theft – according to de Sade – is a single expression of energy! “The person who is so negligent as to allow himself or herself to be robbed should be punished.”

The charity .

“Being charitable is to be condemned because it accustoms the poor to a series of forms of assistance that harms their energy.” If that isn’t anarchism or libertarianism!

B.11.-- Social studies.

Ethics grounds 'politics', by which I mean the view of society.

B.II.a.-- The laws

D'Astorg, oc, 23.- “Society—in order to uphold its fragile rule—has invented legislation for it. The laws are therefore in perpetual contradiction with the individual interest, which, mind you, is always in contradiction with “the common good”. The laws that are 'good' (for society) are “very bad” (for the individual who is a member of it). The reason: for that one time that the laws protect the individual, they hinder him—constrain him for three-quarters of his life.” Thus de Sade. -- Once again: if that is not anarchism or libertarianism!

B.II.b.-- The crime.

The 120 Days of Sodom . -- “Even if it is true that crime does not possess the high nobility found in virtue, is it not nevertheless always the most sublime?

Does crime not continuously display the hallmark of the grand ('grandeur') and the sublime ('sublimité')? Does it not thereby—and will it not always—surpass the monotonous and effeminate ('efféminés') charms of virtue?

Note: The free, libertarian-free man is bored to death within the framework of a conscientious society and seeks sensation, orgasmic breakthroughs! And of a typically masculine nature at that.

Note: According to Ludwig Feuerbach (1804/1872; Left Hegelian), the atheist (cf. *CF/CS 109: French radicalism*) rejects God as a person but retains the holiness (grandeur, sublimity) of God. That is precisely what de Sade does: the characteristics that the great theistic tradition attributes to God as a person—grandeur, sublimity—he attributes to the crime, which is thus sacralized as “mysterium tremendum et fascinosum”. However, this concerns only the mere sense of the grand and the sublime—not the grand and the sublime itself, in itself (which for the nihilist de Sade are 'nothing' in themselves).

B.II.c.-- The murder.

R. Dasne, oc, 237, quotes. -- “Never will a 'wise' nation come up with the idea of condemning murder as a crime.

In order for murder to be a crime, one would have to presuppose destruction as a possibility. Well, just now we saw that this proposition is unacceptable. -- I repeat: murder is merely a change of form in which neither the regularity inherent in the biological kingdoms (plants, animals, humans) nor the regularity of nature lose anything at all. On the contrary: both regularities gain enormously from it.” Cf. *CF/ CS 171* (form), where the term 'change of form' becomes clear.

De Sade continues.

“Why, then, punish a person solely because he or she once returned a portion of matter to the elements of nature? Specifically: by murdering someone, the criminal accelerates the process of decay of that person’s body. -- From a materialistic perspective, even a human being—just like all bodies of nature—is a portion of matter. Nothing more.”

Moreover: it is the case that that portion of matter naturally returns to the elements of nature. These elements of nature, as soon as it has returned to

them, use this portion of matter to compose new forms from it . Is a fly worth more than a pasha or a Capuchin monk?

Note: The living principles move from one life form to another.

Note-- So claimed 18th-century French materialists.

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64. Students and libertarianism. (180)

Library st.: *Claartje Hülsenbeck/ Jan Louman/ Anton Oskamp, The Red Booklet for Students* , Utrecht, 1970-1; 1971-8.

“Contemporary teachers – who call themselves 'critical' teachers – in collaboration with their students” reason in the booklet in such a way that their nominalism regarding virtue and vice becomes 'founded'.

The Basic Axiom is a four-part critique that culminates in the question of “more justice”;

1. The parents manipulate the children;
2. The teachers manipulate the students;
3. The 'bosses' manipulate the employees;
4. The caregivers manipulate the elderly.

While it is tacitly assumed that the subordinates are virtually perfect and pose no problem whatsoever.

In that context, sexual morality is instilled. -- For instance, every 'critical' school should have a class for sex games.

We pause to consider one example. -- “If the newspaper reports that someone has committed a sexual offense, it sounds worse than it is. It concerns someone who can ‘only’ climax in a certain, unusual way.”

One sees reductionism: forms of sexual behavior are reduced to empirical facts that are explained by a constructionist conceptual framework and thus become susceptible to experimentation.

“ 1. If you read that someone has acted indecently, he has usually unzipped his pants and shown his penis. He is then 'called' an 'exhibitionist'.

2. If you read that a man or a woman committed indecent acts with minors, then they masturbated in the presence of children.

3. When you read about a voyeur (peeping Tom), it refers to a man or woman who enjoys watching others have sex: they spy on couples making love

who think they are alone. -- Occasionally, these people are thrown into a panic. This is due to the way others react to their behavior. They then no longer know what they are doing, and sometimes it leads to violence.” (Oc, 100).

Note-- In other words: “the others” are in error. The 'deviants' are thoroughly innocent. Not to mention the skewed representation of the three facts as they repeatedly are in reality.

How de Sade and the libertarian rationalist would rejoice at such social criticism.

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65. Political philosophy. (187).

Library st.:

-- Cl. Lefort, *L'invention démocratique* , Paris, 1981 ; --. id., *Essais sur le politique (XIXe-XXe siècles)*, Paris, 1986;

-- A. Vandeputte, *Power and society (Cl. Lefort on democracy and totalitarianism)* in: *Tijdschr. v. Filos* . 49 (1987), 395/433;

-- Ph. Van Haute, *Claude Lefort, The political significance of human rights* , in: *Streven* ;

-- Alfr. Dufour, *Droits de l'homme, droit naturel et histoire* , PUF.

1.-- The royal 'absolutism'

However despotic this system may have acted, the absolute monarch before the French Revolution did not establish law. He was merely the human interpreter and executor of the idea of 'justice' in God's spirit. If he exceeded that role, the people had the duty, and thus the right, to decide on a “justifiable rebellion.”

Dufour states that the school of natural law in the 17th century (Grotius, Pufendorf) prioritized the rights of the (individual) human being.

2.1.-- Democracy.

Democracy stands or falls, at least in current views, with “human rights,” but these in a nominalist sense. In particular, the community—the people and the leadership—is autonomous. It unilaterally defines what is right and wrong. -- In this, “public opinion” plays a leading role.

Arlette Farge, **Dire et mal dire* (*L'opinion publique au XVIIIe siècle*)* (*Seuil*), even claims that what the man in the street said could carry political weight in the 18th century. And J. Habermas, in 1962, showed that 'opinion'

in the 17th century meant the uncertain opinion, to be contrasted with the “eternal truths”—ideas, essences—and that 'opinion'—especially “public opinion”—in the 18th century meant the nominalist opinion: autonomous reason debated 'freely'.

In today's democracies, no one possesses “the truth” anymore, and “the will of the autonomous people” expresses itself in endless discussions that make governing very difficult, as Lefort emphasizes.

2.2.-- The totalitarian state.

Equally autonomous, yet structured differently: the abuses and excesses of democratic discussions and 'questioning' provoke a dictatorial reaction that stems from precisely the same group dynamics as democracy, but imposes the “true opinion” through leaders. As Nazism and Communism showed us.

CF182

66. Religious instruction. (182)

W.-E. Hocking (1873/1966; professor at Harvard University) wrote that the 'opinions' of his time regarding religion “showed a contradiction: on the one hand, it is impossible without religion; on the other hand, one does not know how to keep them alive. Cf. his *Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse*, in: *Rev. d. Métaphysique et de Morale* 1922: 4, 431.

Today, 'religious education' in our Catholic schools exhibits three types:

- a.** the waning traditional style that instills dogmas and cultivates morality;
- b.** the predominant critical tendency that calls into question 'opinions';
- c.** the 'new-age style' appearing timidly here and there, which attempts to evoke experiences.

We now present a text entitled "Readers Write," without any references so as not to offend anyone and to engage with the pure problem. It characterizes critical religious doctrine. -- (...)

The noncommittal platitudes the bishop has spouted in your newspaper illustrate the malaise that has penetrated even into the highest echelons of the Church.

A non-binding attitude that obligates to nothing and that, above all, does not invite a structured approach in which the bishops should take the lead.

However, due to their unclear stance, the bishops leave the way open for:

- a .** experiments,
- b.** individual interpretations, or

c. even denial of articles of faith in the 'Catholic' schools.

They should go and take a look on the spot to see with their own eyes how the subject of 'religion' has degenerated into cozy chat sessions, full of:

a. personal testimonies and

b. "I think" theories, which very often tear down the very essence: faith.

c. And that is not to mention how the institution 'Church' and its highest representative (the Pope) are treated by numerous horizontalist-minded teachers. (...)"

One can see it: nominalism, which observes purely empirically (and thus sees no extra- or supernatural facts), incorporates constructionist concepts (and thus fails even to grasp fundamental religious concepts), and experiments on that narrow, secular basis, stands out very clearly in the picture the traditional believer captures when he hears his children articulate at home the ideas—opinions—acquired during 'religion' class.

CF183

67. The sufficient reason for discussion (1). (183)

We again refer directly to CF/CS 93/95 (*Principle of sufficient reason*), -- question 94 (*unprovability*). But we will now go into relatively detailed discussion of the debates surrounding the principle that is the lifeblood of all rationalism (CF/CS 96 : Rationalism), together with the principle or axiom of identity (CF/CS 93; 148).

These discussions have flared up all the more intensely since *G.E. Moore* (1873/1958; Anglo-Saxon linguistic analyst) already posed the problem in his * *The Nature and Reality of Perception* * (1905): "how do we know that p?"

'P' is a judgment (proposition, sentence, statement). Not the (psychological and genetic) question "How does p arise in my mind?" but rather the epistemological-logical question "how do I know/prove that p?" was the problem Moore posed.

In other words: "what sufficient reason or grounds does p have?". -- Immediately and indirectly, Moore addresses the problem of 'fundamentalism' (CF/CS 97: *Foundationism/ fundamentalism/ integrism*) is posed, namely the question of whether we, as rational human beings, can prove everything or not. Or whether we, as beings searching for a sufficient ground for our statements and our behavior (acting "in the name of"), actually find that sufficient ground.

The nominalist approach.

Nominalism – distinguished from conceptual realism (abstractive or ideatative) – is limited to empirical observation (CF/CS 143), conceptual construction (CF/CS 145), experimentation on that twofold, narrow, 'earthly' and secular basis (CF/CS 146)

The artery is empiricism, which is sensualistic, limiting itself to what our ordinary senses grasp of the reality within us and outside us.

It is precisely this empiricism that separates nominalism (conceptualism, terminism) from abstraction, which relies on a perception that grasps the very essence of the perceived, albeit partially; and above all from ideation, which relies on a perception of both the essence and the higher idea and value present in the given. Cf. CF/CS 148 (*Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas*), where we have briefly explained ideation in particular.

Incidentally: Karl Popper, **Logik der Forschung ** (1934), revisits Moore's problem regarding 'justifying', accounting for, and 'proving' from his perspective.

CF184

68. The sufficient reason (2) (184/186)

Library st.:

-- E. Oger, *Literary Study (Rationality, its foundation and its monsters)* , in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos* . 54 (1992): 1 (March), 87/106;

-- H. Parret, ed., *In All Reasonableness (Views on the thinking, speaking, and acting of the reasonable person)*, Meppel/Amsterdam, 1990 (on “the reason” of reason);

-- M. Fleischer, *Wahrheit und Wahrheitsgrund (Zum Wahrheitsproblem und zu seiner Geschichte)*, Berlin/New York, 1984 (*correspondence theory*);

-- *Forum Philosophie, Hamburg, Hrsg., Philosophie und Begründung* , FrankF. aM, 1987 (*ten writers on justification (sufficient reason)*).

Oger essentially identifies four positions. We will briefly review them.

Critical rationalism.

Karl Popper (1902/1994). Following in his footsteps: W.W. Bartley, H. Albert, H. Lenk, G. Radnitzky, J. Watkins, who nuance Popper's position.

Incidentally: Popper clearly situates himself within Kant's Enlightenment.

Incidentally: J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel (more on whom later), M. Foucault (at least the later Foucault), J. Derrida (more on whom later as well) can be understood in the tradition of Enlightened Rationalism, but with nuances, of course.

We note: J. Agassie/ IC Jarvin, *Rationality (The Critical View)*, Dordrecht, 1986, which attempts to answer the question “is rationality definable?”.

This concerns the rationality of both the humanities and the natural sciences. Questions such as “rationalism/magic”, “rationalism/dogmatism”, and “rationalism/irrationalism” are also discussed. Popper and his pupils (W.W. Bartley) are strongly present.

A. Irrationalism.

'Irrationalism' is “rebellion against reason” (K. Popper). This expression appears in *Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies **, vol. 2, London, 1945/1966. The ancient Greeks are the ones who essentially taught us the concept of an “open society”: “from swords to words” (instead of swords to kill and exclude those who live differently, turn to words, i.e., discussion based on critical reason)! The work is directed against the totalitarian systems (Nazism, Communism) that uphold a “closed society” and are dismissed by Popper as 'irrationalisms'.

CF185

Popper and his contemporaries see “a proliferation of irrationalism” in current cultural life. – Science theorists such as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, a (post-)structuralist like Michel Foucault, and a deconstructionist like Jacques Derrida are considered 'irrationalists' in their eyes.

One sees that Popper and his followers adhere to a more traditional rationalism, with a strong emphasis on scientific rigor in the very strict – falsificationist – sense.

B.-- Uncritical (justificationist) rationalism.

This type of rationalism posits as an axiom: “If and only if a judgment (statement) is completely substantiated, whether on the basis of experiences (empiricism), reasoning (conceptualism), or both together (based on

experiments) (experimentalism), can it be called 'rationally justified' (justified, justified)".

Popper's refutation.

1. The premise of all rationalism is that "all truly rational assertions presuppose a sufficient reason or ground".

2. Well, that premise itself has, logically speaking (within a nominalist framework), no sufficient reason.

How, after all, to prove that this axiom is correct? How does one know/how does one prove that? One would have to demonstrate on strictly proven grounds that there are absolutely no 'irrational' (= without reason) facts! Who can do that? No one!

Moreover: to 'prove' that axiom in the strict sense, one must posit it as 'proven' at the front! Thus, one can begin an endless series of prepositions of the axiom but never complete them. Deriving the axiom as a sub-clause from preceding clauses that have already been proven is therefore impossible.

Conclusion. -- Popper radically rejects such uncritical rationalism: not everything can be proven.

Popper's fideistic decisionism.

1. Whoever wishes to prove something has already presupposed the belief ('fides' = faith; *CF/CS 152*) in reason as an axiom. Only then can there be talk of "rational proof".

2. Faith is not so much reasonable insight as it is decision.

Conclusion. -- A rationalist life depends on a preceding 'irrational' decision that believes in it. That is 'critical' (aware of its limits) rationalism.

Note -- Neo-Protestant theologians respond: "You, rationalist, prove no more than we, Bible believers, do. Our faith is therefore just as 'critically rational'."

CF186

Ethical choice

Enlightened rationalism is therefore a decision to believe in it. It is also an ethical choice. We have already seen that it was a political choice (*CF/CS 184*: "open society").

Here too, Popper is a decisionist: “In contrast to questions about facts, a 'rational' discussion is not possible regarding questions about values. Arguments in themselves cannot determine a fundamental moral decision.” (Oger, ac, 91).

Note: For matters of conscience—and in general for valuations of all kinds—no compelling logical proof is possible. In German: 'Sein' (understand: to be in fact) and 'Sollen' (understand: to ought, to have as a duty) are separated. Cf. CF 48 (*Lotze's axiology*). This means that, insofar as it entails cultural values, it is strictly logically unprovable and involves a choice.

Conclusion. -- Rational arguments cannot prove the rationalist fundamental attitude. They can, however, contribute to it without rationally enforcing it. -- In contrast to conceptual realism, which considers reason entirely capable of grounding 'rationally' (= abstractly or ideatively) (which is metaphysical), nominalist reason is incapable of doing so on the basis of (secular and 'earthly') empiricism.

Note-- Constructivism.

This name refers to the Erlanger Schule, with *P. Lorenzen* as its main figure , known for his *Normative Logic and Ethics* , Mannheim/Zürich, 1969. *F. Kambartel, Philosophie der humanen Welt (Abhandlungen)*, Frankfurt, 1989, is also located here - but at a distance.

Oger, ac, 91; 105. -- P. Lorenzen, for example, also speaks of “an act of faith” when it concerns the 'foundation' of true judgments. 'Faith' in the sense of “the presupposition of something for which no justification is available”. 'Faith' thus has a typically nominalist meaning here.

Note: In his **Objective Knowledge * (An Evolutionary Approach)*, Oxford, 1972, *Popper* advocates a kind of 'evolutionism' regarding objective knowledge:

“The most suitable theory concerning the facts survives in the battle of opinions.” “Our work is fallible (fallibilism).”

“We constantly make mistakes and there are objective standards regarding truth, content, validity, and the like that we cannot meet.” That is Popper.

CF187

69. The sufficient reason (3). (187)

Re-establish critical rationalism. A few Popperians are discussed.

1.-- WW. Bartley .

In his **Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality **, Bartley calls Popper's fideism unjustifiable. He therefore radicalizes Popper's critical rationalism into a comprehensive rationalism, or—as he later states—a pancritical rationalism. With the axiom: “If and only if a judgment is open to criticism (meaning: is in one way or another 'refutable' (falsifiable)), it is rational.”

J. Watkins and J. Post refute this: “Stuffing the axiom in such a way sounds as if it is not even open to criticism”! Which amounts to a dogma that stands above all criticism.

2.-- H. Albert.

Om *Traktat übercritical Vernunft* (1969), -- *Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der vernunft* (1982).

The principle of rationally proving sufficient reason presents a trilemma.

1. Either every preposition must in turn have another preposition ("regressus in infinitum"). Which is an unworkable foundation.

2. Either every preposition must have itself as a preposition or precede another preposition yet to be founded (“circulus vitiosus”). Which is a null foundation.

3. Alternatively, in 1 and 2 above, one encounters an undeniable intuition acting as a precondition. Which constitutes an arbitrary or even 'dogmatic' foundation.

Decision. -- three times irrational!

Albert's way out.

He puts his own axiom first:

a . a justification is superfluous;

b. a refutability (principled refutability) suffices.

In other words: “If and only if a judgment – including the axiom itself – is ‘criticizable (falsifiable, refutable),’ it is a rational judgment.” In colloquial language: “in principle, every judgment must be capable of being tested with the intention of refuting it, including the principle itself.”

Note: Either Albert states that the axiom is grasped intuitively (*CF/CS 94* ; Dilthey/Wundt) or he states that it is logically proven in antecedents and consequents.

The intuition that 'grasps' the axiom as valid for any reasoning in antecedents and consequents stands close to conceptual realism (abstractive or ideatative).

CF188

70. The sufficient reason (4). (188)

Let us now consider a language-bound rationalism.

Lady Welby's signification—the semiology of Saussure and the semiotics of Peirce—place the speech act, i.e., acting as speaking, at the center.

1 .-- “It is sunny today” is a syntactically well-constructed sentence. After all, the parts of speech fit together well linguistically.

2 .-- “It is sunny today” reflects the fact that the weather is indeed sunny. The sentence has semantic 'meaning'.

3 .-- “It is sunny today” prompts my wife to “head out for a bit”. The sentence has a pragmatic 'meaning', for it attempts to establish understanding around a 'project' (a trip).

Communication and interaction.

Traditional rhetoric concerned itself with the word as a pragmatic tool.

Neo-rhetoric re-established them. -- This is sometimes referred to by the term “the linguistic turn,” the emphasis on the linguistic, or rather 'linguistic,' aspect. And indeed within the context of our rational society.

Ad -1.-- When I say “It is sunny today”, do I have a reason or basis for doing so? Within the Dutch language system, I formulate a sentence that respects its rules of syntax—grammatically and logically. The reason why I arrange the words in this way is grammar.

Ad 2. I utter the sentence “It is sunny today” as a representation of a fact or phenomenon. The reason or basis is that it “is so” (*CF/CS 94: Dilthey/Wundt* : “ *direct experience* ”) based on the axiom of identity of traditional and current formalized logic.

Regarding 3. The sentence “It is sunny today” has a communicative and interactive reason or basis: I know, for example, that my wife likes to go out then. I encourage her to do so.

Conclusion. -- The signs of our signification or semiotics (semiology) are thoroughly supported by sufficient reasons or grounds. As a result, they are 'rational'. Accountable or at least accountable. Justified or justifiable. Logical, yes, but also ethical.

Let the three types of reason or grounds fall away: my speech act becomes conscienceless: it is no longer justifiable in conscience. In that case, I speak "against my better judgment".

CF189

71. The sufficient reason (5). (189/191)

The critical theory.

The Frankfurt School was founded by Th.W. Adorno (1903/1969) under the name "Institut für Sozialforschung" in 1923.

J. Habermas (1929) belongs to "the second generation". He is known for his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, I (*Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (*Zur Kritik der Funktionalistischen Vernunft*), 1981; -- his *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Zwölf Vorlesungen)*, Frankfurt a.M., 1985.

Karl-Otto Apel (1924), second figure of the "Critical Theory": known for his * *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie* *, Frankfurt a.M., 1976 (strongly influenced by Ch.S. Peirce's semiotics).

Thesis

Human communicative and interactive action (knowledge, language, behavior) necessarily entails rationality in its practice.

a. The speech acts discussed in semiotics, for example, already presuppose (the principle of) sufficient reason.

b. But the language concerning speech acts (metalanguage)—which is essentially what semiotics (signification, semiology) is—also already presupposes (the principle of sufficient reason). That is, if speech acts and theory concerning speech acts are to be rational. -- Reread the previous chapter for this.

1. -- Jürgen Habermas. He leads the way.

a. Negative.

The axiom of sufficient reason is unprovable on the basis of purely logical reasoning (preface clauses/consecutive clauses) – as Popper and especially Albert et al. demonstrate.

b. Positive

Rationality, that is, the prioritization and observant application of the axiom in question, is presupposed in the very practice of knowing, language, and (communicative and interactive) action.

It is therefore not a free choice (as Popper and others wish to maintain decisionistically). Oger, ac, 95. -- “From the first words we stammer out as children, reason begins to exert an unobtrusive, tenacious, unshakeable “coercionless compulsion.” (...).

1. Reason exerts (...) a compulsion by incessantly orienting our speech and action.

2. Moreover, this speech is non-coercive since it is not an external instance alien to us and alienating (...). It lies implied in the pragmatics of every act of speech”.

CF190

Explanation. -- Habermas uses a metaphor to describe his prereflective (situated before any 'reflection' or conscious thought) 'choice' performed by “language”. What does that metaphor really amount to?

On the fact that, insofar as our use of language and, more broadly, our use of signs is truly rational, this use of language encompasses the axiom of sufficient reason. And indeed more than merely pragmatically, as we explained in *CF/CS 188*): syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically, there exists a rational use of language provided with sufficient reason.

That “the language as result-oriented (= pragmatic) action

a. chooses for us (di chooses in our place and

b. chooses before us (i.e. before we consciously think of it)” is and remains a metaphor and thus figurative language in Habermas' texts.

In this context, language is presented as a personified figure with the traits of a conscious person.

“That is the human nature of man as a rational being,” says Habermas. -- “We have always already made the rational choice.” The pragmatics of “language,” so to speak—as a figure of speech—has already decided in our place in an inmemorable time (note: what exactly is that?). Which implies that

the term 'decide' is used here in a figurative, figurative sense. -- Which is weak as 'rational' argumentation.

Yet, according to Habermas, Popper is right to some extent.

a. Habermas accuses Popper of an “Anglo-Saxon liberal use of language”. Popper is a liberal. Habermas is a socialist. -- Regarding the theory of science and criticism of reason, Popper reasons—according to Habermas—as a free citizen who finds himself faced with free choices in a free country. -- Popper transfers this form of behavior of a political nature to the free choice between rationality and irrationality.

b. Habermas, however, must also agree with Popper. For the actual man often attempts to evade rationality—from what presents itself (semantic language use)—by lying, for example. For the actual man often cherishes aims—pragmatic—that are neither justified nor justifiable.

That is then an unreasonable and, what is more, immoral, unscrupulous choice, where 'choice' is not used figuratively.

CF191

2.-- Karl-Otto Apel.

Leibniz was the first among the moderns to introduce the axiom of sufficient reason into 'logic'.

Apel remains a Leibnizian: he posits it as an evidentiary truth to which genuine, lived doubt is impossible. It is therefore a foundation. -- But he situates it within a linguistic pragmatics (which he calls 'transcendental' (not 'transcendental') because this pragmatics goes hand in hand with the thinking and, above all, pragmatically acting subject). (The presupposition of) sufficient reason has always already been presupposed in all our linguistic acts, and indeed as undeniable. But that presupposition itself is not 'founded' in anything else. Apel attempts to demonstrate this by means of a number of arguments (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant). Cf. CF/CS 94 (*Dilthey and Wundt*).

Criticism.

Cf. CF/CS 187: Watkins and Post refute Bartley (the axiom itself is beyond all criticism). Similarly, Apel disputes Albert (*ibid.*), who, according to him, has not avoided all justificationism!

Moreover: Apel demonstrates that the “axiom of uninhibited criticism”, as Albert puts it, contains a paradox. According to Oger, ac,93/94, a paradox that strongly resembles the liar paradox.

Note -- EW Beth, **De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde**, *Antw./Nijmeg.*, 1944, 78/92 (**Eristics and skepticism**), puts it as follows: -- “One asks someone: ‘If you claim that you are lying, are you really lying or are you telling the truth?’ If he answers: ‘I am lying’, then the questioner:

“If you claim that you are lying and you are actually lying, then you are speaking the truth. Therefore, your answer is incorrect. If he answers: “I am speaking the truth”, then the questioner: “If you claim that you are lying and you are speaking the truth, then you are lying”.

Note -- If you assert that, then it follows what you refute! Each of the two answers is led “ad absurdum”, the absurd.

According to I.M. Bochenski, **Wijsgerigemethoden in de moderne wetenschap**, *Utr./Antw.*, 1961, 71ff.*, the language of the liar is “semantic nonsense”. This becomes clear when one considers that he speaks about his language, in a metalanguage, in an unscrupulous manner.

So when a supporter of unlimited criticizability says that he adheres to this axiom, what does he say about his own statement? For he cannot call his own statement into question.

CF192

72. The sufficient reason, (6). (192/193)

Deconstructionism.

Cf. CF 42/45 (*The Deconstructive Interpretation*). J. Derrida (1930) wrote a work that perhaps expresses his fundamental position, namely **De la grammatologie**, Paris, 1967 (in which it is asserted that we and all fellow human beings are 'written' somewhere (he says: “in our very existence”)).

By way of introduction.

J. Derrida et autres, **La faculté de juger**, Paris, 1985, is a book in which six authors discuss our capacity to judge in scientific, artistic and aesthetic, ethical, and political fields, within the context of our culture in crisis. In our time, people are desperately searching for “new values” by which and for which everyone can live. Yet it is striking how no one equates “the truth” with their own opinion—truth upon which our culture could rest as a sufficient reason

to pass a 'justifiable' judgment! In other words, a crisis of foundations. Cf. CF/CS 81/85.

Heideggerian.

Derrida claims that his concept of 'déconstruction' connects with *M. Heidegger*, **Der Satz vom Grund ** (1957) and **Vom Wesen des Grundes ** (1949), as well as with Heidegger's concept of 'Destruktion'.

Following in the footsteps of Fr. Nietzsche, some view the entire Western culture as an unbroken tradition that was on the wrong track from the very beginning. Not only the modern phase, but already the 'onto-theological' synthesis of the classical Greek thinkers, has led European culture astray into a problematic rationalism.

Martin Heidegger and, in our day, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty share with Nietzsche this view of thinking after Socrates." (*G. Vanheeswijck*, *The Many Forms of Modernity* , in: *Streven* 61(1994): 11 (Dec.), 1009ff.).

In other words: with Derrida, we are in the company of Postmodernism, which subjects the entire rationalist tradition—the metaphysical (antiquity/Middle Ages) and the nominalist (modernity)—to a foundational examination.

Logically, therefore, the postmodernists should make the lifeblood of rational life, the axiom of sufficient reason, the target of their criticism. With the danger, of course, that their own judgments, and in particular their critique of the axiom of sufficient reason (the basis of every rational judgment), would also be called into question! Which would be a re-enactment of the paradox.

CF193

1.-- Derrida tov Popper.

As seen in CF/CS 185, Popper rejects 'justificationism'. Given his contribution on the foundation of every judgment mentioned just above, Derrida does the same. But fundamentally differently.

The West, from Plato to the present day, is too 'logocentric' for him, prioritizing either metaphysical ideas or abstract concepts or nominalist terms too much. He radically dismantles those traditions, knowing full well that he never truly breaks free from them. To conjure away reason itself, in its

metaphysical or nominalist versions, proves to be a shortcut: the axiom of sufficient reason remains the foundation.

Incidentally : it is the essence of our entire culture, especially at the university level, as he asserts in his *Les pupilles de l'université* (*Le principe de raison et l'idée de l'université*).

2.-- Derrida and Albert.

CF/CS 187 .-- H. Albert saw a trilemma (impossible proof/ null proof/ 'dogmatic' proof). The impossible proof is sometimes called the 'abyss'!

Derrida sticks to a dilemma. -- Either circular reasoning (= null proof) - the second case with Albert - or an 'abyss' - the first case with Albert (impossible proof).

In Medieval Latin: either “circulus vitiosus” or “regressus in infinitum”.

The axiom of reason or ground

a. demands a foundation for everything (for all judgments)

b. but is itself unprovable and in that sense unfounded.

In the poetic language of Derrida: “It is unfounded and therefore abysmal”.

(Disobedience.

a. We are not 'disobedient' (i.e., to the axiom), because we do not want to 'undermine' it. Reason: we would fall into irrationalism!

b. But neither are we slavishly obedient, for then one falls into some form of traditional rationalism that is 'logocentric'!

Note -- The 'disobedience' is in fact a “critical attitude”. Which is, after all, and remains 'rationalistic'.

The axiom of sufficient reason is 'self-evident'.

(which points to 'evidence' (CF/CS 187 : *Albert's undoubtable intuition*). But reason itself cannot 'arrange' ('prove') it. One must step outside reason to find “the origin” of the axiom.

CF194

73. The cultural vanguard ('intelligentsia'). (194)

Popper, Bartley, Albert, -- Habermas, Apel, -- Derrida: they are 'intellectuals'. Together with countless others, they constitute the 'vanguard'. But—as we saw—“they make use of their own reason ('dialectics') to constantly

contradict one another and to tear apart everything that approaches them” (*Platon, The Republic vii*: 539b).

Th. Geiger, De creatieve voorhoede (On the social functions of the intelligentsia), Rotterdam/Antwerp, 1970, 73: “The name 'intelligentsia' itself underscores the supremacy of the rational spirit in the culture of the modern age, the foundation for which was laid in the Baroque era (*note*: 17th century). The name 'intelligentsia' clearly refers primarily to those who perform scientific and technical creative work, -- however, in a broader context, it also encompasses the fine arts.

The rational mind is thus the name-giving for the entire layer of creative minds.” -- This is confirmed by, for example, *P. Rabinow, French Modern (Norms and Forms of the Social Environment)*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1989.

“Modern rationality” in France, from Napoleon to World War II (1939/1945), is embodied not only in artists and pure theorists but above all in military personnel, architects, engineers, and social reformers—called “planners”—who control society in the name of “the sciences,” “in the name of techniques,” and “in the name of, above all, their own expertise.”

Incidentally, *Stephen Hawking* says : “The only thing that seems unbounded is the power of reason” (in: *The Unbounded Universe*)!

But things can change.

*G. Groot, *Intellectuals Let Themselves Be Misled **, states, regarding *P. Hollander, *Political Pilgrims (Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba 1928/1978)**, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1981: on the one hand, many intellectuals were extremely critical of their own society; on the other hand, they lapsed into “an uncritical idolization” of the 'socialist' societies (Soviet Union, China, Cuba).

Hollander’s consistent and even 'persistent' overview is – according to Groot – “highly disturbing”. It is apparently time to subject the term 'intelligentsia' to a radical re-evaluation. Thus Hollander.

CF195

74. Postmodernity/postmodernism. (2195/198)

1870: the salon painter J. Watkins Chapman, in England, wants to paint 'postmodern' with his like-minded peers in order to surpass the Impressionists of the time.

1934 (F. de Oniz), 1942 (O. Fitts), 1947 (A. Toynbee (CF 10)), -- 1917 (Rudolf Pannwitz, *Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur*), in which the “postmodern man” is discussed, -- after all the disappearing images of humanity, -- in Nietzsche's footsteps): the term 'postmodern' crops up again and again.

After World War II (1939/1945), it becomes a common term. -- In philosophy, it appears definitively: 1979. -- For example, J.-Fr. Lyotard, **La condition postmoderne ** (1979). For example, Julia Kristeva in 1980.

J. Derrida uses the term 'a-modernism' (deconstructionist). R. Rorty uses the term 'sur-modernism'. Time and again, the term means “what comes after the end of the modern era”. In other words: there is always some form of—what Americans call—'endism' at work. Not without “a radicalization of modern culture”.

A definition.

G. Vanheeswijck, *The many forms of modernity* , in: *Streven* 61 (1994): 11 (Dec.), 1009, describes.

A.-- Modern

It is modern to believe in an all-encompassing (ontological, metaphysical) knowledge—called 'totalitarian' knowledge—in a “grand narrative” (CF/CS 160 : *Hegel's dialectical belief in progress*), such as the sacred history of the Bible, but interpreted rationally, in a reason capable, on a planetary level, of transforming the human biotope through techniques of all kinds, of 'modernizing' it (the malleability of the world).

B. -- postmodern

is no longer believing in modernization. The postmodernist unmasks rationality as all-encompassing—and—immediately—valid knowledge, as the inventor of grand narratives, as the source of the boundless malleability of man and the world. -- Vanheeswijck mentions one more characteristic: accepting the 'other' as different would be a characteristic of postmodernity. Which modernity would not do.

He distinguishes two types.

a. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty believe that modern rationality has been present since Plato;

b. Hans Blumenberg, Eric Voegelin, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Louis Dupré believe that modern rationality only begins with humanism (the Renaissance)

and takes hold in the mid-17th century. Milan Kundera and Stephen Toulmin also hold this latter view.

CF196

Vanheeswijck emphasizes the role of nominalism in connection with the development from humanism to the full Enlightenment.

Nominalism undermines the concept of “God as simultaneously omnipotent and wise and present in this world, accessible via natural (and supernatural) reason (in the more abstract and ideative sense)”.

“From now on, God is in a supernatural sphere, clearly separated from nature.” In such a nature, man, observing empirically, constructing conceptually, and experimenting within those narrow—secular or 'earthly'—boundaries, becomes “the interpreting instance, the only source of values and meanings.” (Ac, 1011).

have attempted to demonstrate in all the preceding pages, following *Otto Willmann*'s three-volume *Geschichte des Idealismus* . - Cfr. CF/CS 108 (*The Death of God*).

Derrida's postmodernism.

Bibl. st .: D. De Schutter, *Derrida on the End of Philosophy* (*The Limit as a Task*), in: *Streven* 60 (1993): 2 (Feb.), 148/156. -- The 'logocentrism' inherent to philosophy according to Derrida consists in the fact that cultural history is, ultimately, the history of philosophy.

That is certainly Hegelian. But whether it can be attributed to all of Western philosophy is highly questionable.

Hegel, relying on that logocentrism formulated in this way, attempted to give everything—ethics, politics, art, religion, and the entire rest of culture—a place within his 'system'—which he conceived as ontological—all-encompassing.

On which Derrida attempts to gnaw away at such a comprehensive 'system'.

He points to the concept of 'mimèsis' (imitation), 'chora', which in Plato's terminology means both 'space' and 'separation',-- the concepts of 'the sublime' and 'parergon' in Kant,-- the concept of 'memory' in Hegel,-- the concept of 'writing' in Rousseau,-- the concepts of 'tympanum' and 'the

colossal' in architecture,-- to demonstrate that these concepts do not appear to be readily amenable to 'the tradition', but can be assigned a precise place in a comprehensive 'system'.

He points to “forgotten traditions” (concepts, movements throughout history) that have not been considered (sufficiently) in order to “incorporate” them into “the system”. Such as the relationship between the thinkers before Plato and his metaphysics, and so on.

CF197

“In this way Derrida seeks domains that essentially elude philosophical rationality.” (ac, 151).

Note -- In doing so, Derrida defines the concept of “philosophical rationality” narrowly enough that he can find forgotten elements that fall outside of it! Cf. *CF 11* , where Aristotle, the great father of classical metaphysics, already points out two rationalities:

a. the all-encompassing but vague concept of being, from which absolutely nothing escapes,

b. the interpretations (interpretations – which, in a narrower sense of the word, are 'metaphysical') that are less or not vague but not all-encompassing.

They are in fact subjective or objective inductions, i.e. samples, based on axioms specific to a person or a group of people, or specific to some given. – This is very clear from Socrates and Plato onwards. – This does not prevent a limited view of the totality of reality from appearing possible, based on those limited samples in which the totality of all that was, is, and will be, is reflected to a certain extent.

Feminist postmodernism.

'Postmodernism' is ambiguous. *Kristien Hemmereichs, Feminism and Literature (Women Read the Tradition)*, in: *Streven* 54 (1986): 12 (Dec.), 237/246, says the following.

French feminism is the child of May 1968 (the revolt against the establishment and against sexism). – “The existing order (...) is critically observed and analyzed. Or (...) deconstructed”. (Ac, 243).

The writings of the spokeswomen – Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Monique Wittig, Annie Leclerc, Claudine Hermannee – are permeated with Marx, – Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, – Lacan, Macherey, Foucault.

So that French feminism is “political, radical and subversive”. -- “The liberal humanist 'subject', the individual therefore, was always a man. (...). The woman is defined “in-her-relation-to-the-man” (...) whereby the female pole is always the subordinate”. (Ac, 244).

Note -- The woman as, rightly and with (sufficient) reason, different from the man, did not come into her 'own' or did not come into her 'right' sufficiently within the tradition. That tradition is therefore being dismantled as 'sexist', 'deconstructed'.

Which is indeed a variant of postmodernism. But a postmodernism that fixates on primarily one aspect of traditional rationality: sexism.

CF198

Note -- Dismantling is already questionable. But a Derrida, through his crude radicalism, has provoked an anarchist interpretation of his position (which he opposes, incidentally). French feminism calls itself 'subversive' (inciting).

Which leads A. Finkelkraut, **De ondergang van het denken* (The Downfall of Thought)*, Amsterdam, 1990, to conclude that the relativization of “eternal truths” (metaphysics) entails that all cultures are unconditionally equal, -- that every “sacred cow” can be torn down, -- that everything is merely time-bound. In our time, postmodernism—so says Finkelkraut—adopts that relativizing attitude.

Christian postmodernism.

G. Vanheeswijck, **Girard bekent kleur**, in: **Streven**, draws attention to another variant of postmodernity.

René Girard (1923) -- **La violence et le sacré** (1972) -- is a postmodern theorist who undermines modern autonomy, leaving man “on his own” (CF/CS 110 (Sartre)) and making him “vulnerable.” But unlike most leading postmodern thinkers of today, he assumes that “a better world” without God—autonomous, therefore—is simply impossible, or rather, unrealizable.

“In this he is not alone. George Steiner, Leszek Kolakowski, Charles Taylor, and Vaclav Havel are the best-known representatives of a movement that I would call “an alternative form of postmodernism.” All human thought regarding the deeper meaning of life revolves around three concepts that have been called the “metaphysical Trinity”: God, man, and world.” (A”c., 397).

Vanheeswijck. -- "The modern Western cultural project that gradually took hold from the 15th century onwards provided for well-defined definitions

Note -- Axioms - of these three concepts: man is autonomous; the world is a complex mechanism (CF/CS 166 : machine); God is a hypothesis to which we no longer need (CF/ CS 109 : Morale laïque).

What one can observe is that Vladimir Soloviev (1853/1900) and with him the Russian "Christian realists" (who reject nominalism) such as F. Dostoevsky, N. Berdiaev, S. Bulgakov, etc., are both postmodern and (Platonizing) believers, indeed, Christians.

CF199

75. Anarchism (libertarianism). (199/200)

The term has already been mentioned more than once. Most recently in connection with Derrida (CF/CS 178) and some of his contemporaries. Previously in connection with de Sade (CF/CS 178) and libertarianism (CF/CS 169). Therefore, a separate word on this subject.

Library st. D.Guérin, *Ni Dieu ni Maître (Anthologie de l'anarchisme)*, I (*Les pionniers: Stirner/Proudhon/Bakounine*), Paris, 1976;

-- *Un proscrit, L'inévitable révolution* , Paris, 1903 (frl. oc, 303/307: *Déclaration des anarchistes accusés devant le tribunal de Lyon* (1883));

-- G. Sorman, *Les vrais penseurs de notre temps* , Fayard, 1989 (oc, 253/262 : Murray Rothbard (*L'état, c'est le vol*)).

History

Guérin, oc, 9, says that he begins with *Max Stirner* (1806/1856; *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*), whose libertarian works date from 1842/1844—the time when *PJ Proudhon* (1809/1865) published his *Qu'est-ce que la propriété ?* (1840).

Also worth mentioning are: M.A. Bakunin (1814/1876), Peter Kropotkin (1842/1921), and Elisée Reclus (1830/1905). *Sergei Nechaiv* is also well-known for his " *Revolutionary Catechism* ," in which he preached "the propaganda of the deed" ("direct action") or 'Pandestruktion' and cultivated the Russian nihilists as kindred spirits.

Definition.

Anarchism can be considered a type of socialism using ultraliberal means. They desire “absolute justice,” but in defiance of any organized form of authority.

“The anarchists are citizens who, in a century in which freedom of opinion is preached everywhere, believe that it is their duty to advocate unlimited freedom” (thus the anarchists in Lyon in 1883). They want “absolute freedom, nothing but freedom, total freedom”, that is, the ability of every human being “to do what he/she deems good and not to do what he/she deems bad”. “The anarchists are therefore going to teach the people to live without a government just as they are already beginning to learn to live without God. They will likewise learn to live without owners”. (Un proscrit, oc, 303;305)

Moreover: “The evil does not lie in one government or another. The evil lies in the very idea of 'government'. It lies in the principle of 'authority', which must be replaced by 'le libre contrat', the freely entered contract that can be revised and broken at any time.” (Ibid.).

CF200

In other words: without God, which is autonomous, leads to without government, without owners, which is likewise autonomous. The modern nominalist basic idea! “Unbounded freedom”!

The current anarchist atmosphere.

Library st.:

-- J. Moulaert, *Red and Black (The Anarchist Movement in Belgium 1880/1914)*, Leuven, 1995.

-- J. De Maere, *Anarchism* , in: *Streven* 62 (1995): 10 (Nov.), 937/940, devotes a discussion to Moulaert's work.

'Definition'.

Following Proudhon, Moulaert defines 'anarchism' as “the absence of all authority or government”. Lösche defines it as: “the voluntary association of articulate, emancipated individuals”. Everything that 'hinders'—state, bureaucracy, party, parliament, church, etc.—must be dismantled. The anarchists themselves reject any 'definition' as a kind of 'coercion' and constraint that impedes the absolute freedom of definition that anarchism advocates!

“Our answer must be: a stubborn and implacable struggle that cannot end except with the complete destruction of the ‘dirty gang’, namely throne, purse, and altar.” (1887).

One sees that religion, intertwined with principality and capitalism, is always present.

The libertarians did not find social democracy (ordinary socialism, let us say) radical enough. Although they had much in common with that variant of socialism. This commonality is evident from the fact that far-left social democrats became anarchists. Sometimes the Belgian anarchists had 'allies': such as E. Reclus, a geographer who was appointed to the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and the *Flemish-minded youths* around *Van Nu en Straks* .

Conclusion -- “Moulaert implicitly demonstrates how much anarchism lives on without its name being used. In postmodernism, which rejects all hierarchies (*note: forms of authority*) and has shelved the “grand narratives” (*CF/CS 160 (Hegel); 195*). In many young people for whom “neither God nor Master” is a matter of course without them knowing its historical roots.” (Ac, 940).

J. De Maere, ac, 937: “ *A spectre haunts Europe: the spectre of anarchism* ”. Anarchist ideas are very much alive as consciously anti-authoritarian and anti-organizational, -- elusive and ghostly.

CF201

Study Notes . (201/212)

From a purely philosophical perspective, abstracting from the philosophy of culture itself, pages 148/150 (Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas)—along with pages 196 (God/ nature/ man) and 198 (God/ nature/ man)—are central. For here minds diverge into two or three basic choices, which, incidentally, point to three or at least two types of personality.

1. The nominalist (one model of whom is p. 142 (Apostle's loss of sense of reality)) pays attention only to what this earth presents to be seen and experienced. After all, his perception extends no further.

2. The ideational (adherent of the Platonic or Platonizing theory of ideas that prioritizes 'essences' (value-charged concepts), called 'ideas') pays attention both to this earth and what it has to offer, and at the same time,

through what this earth reveals, to what ... is invisible, intangible, unreal to the nominalist, but for him, as an ideational, is 'real' and thus already 'given'.

Thus the transcendentals (being, truth and sufficient reason, value, unity (= likeness/coherence). Thus God and numinous beings (spirits, souls). Thus paranormal data (fluid, for example, as p. 168 clearly shows us where nominalist materialism is confronted with “hylistic pluralism”). This is: virtually all of New Age.

3. The Aristotelian abstract is situated in between.

He does grasp the abstract concepts as 'real', but he does not view them as ideas or 'essences' independent of any concrete realization (here in the sense of higher, value-laden concepts).

The transcendentals already pose a major difficulty for the Aristotelian abstractionist: they cannot simply be 'abstracted' from our sensory experiences by comparison and the elimination of individual characteristics! Nevertheless, they are posited as a remnant of Platonic theory of ideas.

God and numinous beings, subtle matter, all that is now called New Age, remains, fundamentally, “a fairly closed book” for an Aristotelian abstraction.

Historically, it is established that, in late antiquity, the Aristotelians, rather skeptical as they were, thought and lived in a very secularist manner, oriented towards this earth.

Pages 136/138 (Constructionism/Essentialism) immediately make it crystal clear! Deo trino et uno gratias maximas.

CF202

Study notes.

01

01/03. -- Problem/ solution.. - Information/ method. - Common sense/ common sense. 04.-- Regulatory model: if, then. Applicative models.

05/09. -- direct knowledge (experience/ indirect knowledge (reasoning).

Describe what presents itself immediately (= phenomenon).

To demonstrate by reasoning what does not immediately reveal itself—set on the way thereto by signs.—What reveals itself is always the beginning.

Note -- The phenomenological method is a descriptive method: representing the pure phenomenon or directly given (phenom. reduction) in such a way that (especially) the generic name (eidet. reduction) is elaborated.

Appl. mod . M. Scheler's phenomenology of (Catholic lived) repentance.

Note -- In the description, what is requested is the given to be represented as. In the reasoning, the given differs from what is requested.

10.-- Structure of traditional logic.

Based on concepts (conceptual theory) incorporated into judgments (judgment theory), the reasoning formulates an if-then sentence. Concepts defined as well as possible are central. One therefore speaks of conceptual logic, which transitions into conceptual theory, judgment theory, and reasoning theory.

A.-- ontology as the basis.

Logic is ontology expressed in if-then sentences. Specifically: if reality **1** (= being or something 1), then reality **2** (= being or something 2). The key is to ontologically distinguish the concept of 'reality' from (sometimes very sloppy) everyday or even scientific language usage regarding the matter.

' **Reality** ' (= **being, something**). -- If one can say whether something exists and what it is, then one has defined its reality. Do concentration camps exist and, if so, what are concentration camps? Or: how real are concentration camps and how are they real? In Medieval Latin: existence/essence. Note that these always go together.

Applicable models . -- Let everyday or even scientific language say that a (day or night) dream, science fiction, lust, the signs of logistics and mathematics, -- are, etc., "not real", but for ontology and traditional logic they are kinds or types of reality. As long as something is 'something': "not - nothing"!

Note -- Hegelian concept of 'real'. -- 'Wirklich' in Hegel means "all that solves its problems". A teacher who does her job well is called 'real' by Hegel. A 'worn-out' teacher becomes unreal.

Syntax of signs . -- Axiomatic - deductive reasoning. -- Both as models of 'realities' and connections between realities! After all, a sign is not - nothing, but something in itself. Mathematics and logistics work with it in a strictly logical manner. If a sign were entirely unreal, such operations would be meaningless.

CF203

Study notes

AI .. -- The two basic insights of ontology and thus of logic.

1.-- The Identity Law.

-- "If a, then a". Identity, understood ontologically, is the existence/essence of a. Specifically, the total identity of a with itself. In other words: something coincides totally with itself.

Principle of contradiction . -- If a, then a and not not-a.

Principle of excluded third (predicate). -- If a, then only a and not not - a: a third predicate is excluded. For it is either a or not - a. There is no third possible sentence. Parmenides on this matter.

2. The law of necessary and/or sufficient reason (ground).

If there is sufficient reason or ground, then it is understandable, sensible.
-- In other words: everything that exists has either within itself or outside itself a (sufficient) reason or ground. Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes regarding this. -- All this 16/20.

A.II.-- The identificative or ordering (harmological) ontology. - (21/32).

Identity theory . -- This manifests itself in a basic differential: total identity of something with itself ($a=a$); partial identity (=analogy) of something with something else (a = partially identical with e.g. b); total non-identity of something with its opposite (a = contradictory with not- a). Or: a and b are possible together, but a and not- a are not. -- This differential governs all of logic.

II.A.-- Topology as applied identifiable logic.

A trope amounts to thinking of (something) as being including something else, and that something defines something in terms of that other thing and thus speaks of it figuratively.

Figurative language is only possible if that other thing either resembles the first thing or is connected to the first thing.

Metaphor . -- That woman is a reed. -- collection. -- All instances of a collection resemble one another based on at least one common characteristic (here: the reed is pliable; the woman is pliable in her own way). One speaks of the woman in terms of a reed.

Metonymy . -- Apples are healthy. -- system or structure. -- All parts (aspects) of a system are connected on the basis of at least one common

property, namely: together they form the same whole, the same whole causes health; health is caused by apples). One speaks of apples in terms of health.

Metaphorical sign : the map (resembles).

Metonymic sign : the signpost (related to).

Applications .

(1) The ontological term 'being' expresses both metaphor (similarity) and metonymy (coherence), di partial identity (analogy). The same ontological term also immediately expresses encompassing (if, then) or implication: “If that woman, then reeds” and “If apples, then health”.

(2) Tropological psychological-sociological behavior (Th. Ribot).

(3) model theory. -- Anything that provides information about something, namely the original, is called a 'model'. Relationship “subject (original)/predicate (model)”.

CF204

Study notes.

The total model ($a=a$) reveals itself in the definition. The partial model is either a metaphorical model (if Johnny, then rooster in front) or a metonymic model (if smoke, then fire). One also speaks of a proportional model (rooster in front) and an attributive model (fire).

II.B.-- Tropology as applied identifiical logic.

The synecdoche . -- One instance is spoken of *in terms of* the entire collection (and vice versa). One part is spoken of in terms of the entire system (and vice versa). -- One soldier is all soldiers. The threshold is the whole house. “One soldier” is metaphorical; “the threshold” is metonymic.

Theory of Induction . -- The traditional theory of induction is depicted in the synecdoches. – To induce is to take samples.

Generalization . -- If at least one copy, then all copies.

Generalization . -- If at least one part, then all parts.

This water boils at 100°C. -- This sample provides information, - partial information, about all water. -- The Meir and the Port of Antwerp as examined. -- This two-part sample provides partial information about the whole of Antwerp.

B.-- Theory of order or theory of relations (harmological ontology).
(28/32).

Everything that precedes in terms of ontology (laws, identifiable aspects) allows us to organize the data. Basis of correct or valid reasoning.

28.-- Platon's stoicheiosis (theory of order): ordering letters.

29.-- Harmological ontology: combinatorics (theory of configuration).
Assigning something a place within a set of places (configuration).

30. Application -- 27 x 35. -- Systematics and differential as sets of positions or configurations.

31.-- **Basic differentials** . -- Totally identical/ Partially identical/ Contradictory.

Logical square (all or some yes/all or some no). -- The medieval people about the distributive concept (totum logicum), which collects, and the collective concept (totum physicum), which systems. - In other words: all and whole (= all together). -- J, Royce.

32.-- Theory of unity or henology. -- Identity establishes, 'is', unity in a multiplicity. Based on similarity or based on coherence.

So much for the pedestal of traditional logic.

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Conceptual theory. -- 33/55.

33/34. -- Definition. -- Being insofar as in our mind. Terms (different from words) as linguistic form of concepts.

The conceptual content defines (depicts, represents, refers to) the conceptual scope or domain. -- "All that (something) is". -- 'Something' is content. "All that ...is" is scope. -- Porfurius' tree diagram.

35.-- Textuology. - A text is a term consisting of many words. 36.-- types of extent. -- Singular-distributive/ collective-transcendental (= ontological) concept.

37.-- **classification: scope types** . -- Classification is listing distinct or separated data (distributive or collective).

CF205

Study notes

38/39. -- **structure/ definition** : a text as a model. 40.-- Categories (distributive). Five in number.

41.-- Categories (collective). Ten in number.

- 42.-- Theme: a material object/ more than a formal object. -- the concept of 'ambiguity' (poly-interpretability).
- 43.-- Thematics: words as themes (word/ relation/ judgment). 44/45. -- chreia, a developed and justified definition. -- theory of definition. -- A typology follows now.
- 47.-- Partial (verbatim) and complete (substantive) definition.
- 48.-- Semiotic and non-Semiotic definition. --
- 49.-- Locke's concept nominalism and Willmann's concept realism.
- 50.-- Definition of 'culture' (existential definition).
- 51.-- Praxeological definition: algorithm.
- 52.-- Kitchen definition (algorithmic).
- 53.-- Accumulating (cumulative) definition: 'treasure hunt!
- 54.-- Judicial definition: narratives and logic.
- 55.-- Definition of the singular (idiographic definition).
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-

Theory of Judgment . -- 56/68.

Note well: traditional logic does not work with concepts, but with defined concepts! A judgment that works with undefined concepts does not know what it says!

- 56.-- Definition: "To assert something about something (subject (original)) (predicate (model)).
- 57.-- Quantity (sing./ distrib. + collect./ transcendental) and quality (affirmative/ with prior quality (rictive)/ negative) judgment.
- 58: ***the comparative method*** (comparing/identifying), examining similarity/coherence and difference/gap. -- Internal and external and quantitative (measurement model) and qualitative comparison.
- 59.-- Comparison as the basis of a judgment.
- 60.-- Negative predicate ('not'): correlative/ contrary/ privative/ contradictory opposition.
- 61.-- The absurd is absolutely nothing (square circle).
- 62.-- Relationship-indicating judgment. -- Traditional logic does not work with words but with terms ("greater than", "part of") because it is conceptual logic (and specifically of well-defined concepts).
- 63.-- The semiotic sufficient reason for a judgment (It is sunny today: syntactic, semantic, pragmatic).
- 64.-- Text and context of a judgment: (the predicate) (Hilde walks).
- 65.-- The sufficient reason within the judgment:
1. the crisis of modern rationalism regarding the principle of sufficient reason (cf. CS 56); 2. Leibniz: analytical judgment (analysis of the definition) and synthetic judgment (testing against scope, i.e. the data).

66. - The sufficient reason for a value judgment (If someone can be mistaken regarding the value of something, then this value is something objective and not merely a creation of a subject).

CF206

Study notes.

67.-- Subject/ predicate/ modifiers (grammatical modalities such as realis, potentialis, irrealis, etc.: “A girl appears on the beach”; as well as concessivus, dubitativus, conditionalis).

68.-- Exactness, yes, but also akribeia or ordinary accuracy. -- The term 'to be' or 'being' is not ambiguous but identificative.

.....
.....

Theory of Reasoning. -- 69/92.

69. **The conditional clause** , -- possibly conjunction or disjoint. -- if, then. Logic in the traditionally strict sense.

70.-- **Logical modalities.** -- **necessary/ non-necessary (possible)/ necessarily not (impossible).** - Within the judgment. Within the reasoning. - **Deduction** : if A, then B; well, A; therefore necessarily B.-- **Reduction** : if A, then B; well, B; therefore possible A.

A.-- The immediate derivation . -- 71/77. -- This seemingly consists of two sentences (in which an axiomatic clause is omitted, left unsaid).

71. -- Models: “Three is greater than two. Therefore, two is smaller than three.” Or: “I think. Therefore, I am” (Descartes’ basic sentence).

Note -- The lowercase term 'so' hypotactically replaces “if, then”.

72.-- Mathematical induction (“If one number, then all numbers”) and summative induction (“if each element separately, then all together”-- which is summative induction).

73.-- A fortiori reasoning. -- “One would understand by this: “All the more for greater reason” for less.”

74.-- Analogical induction. -- From less similarity/coherence to more similarity/coherence: “The planet Earth has an atmosphere. Therefore, the planet Mars also has an atmosphere.” Comparative science.

75. -- Contrary judgment -- “If all people who do not 'think' are superstitious, then all people who do 'think' are not superstitious”.

76.-- Reversed judgment. -- Rule: “Although one may deduce some from all, one may not deduce all from some”.

B.-- The indirect derivation (syllogism) . -- 77/92.

77.-- From “I think; therefore I am” to “Preface 1. Whatever thinks, is. Well then, Preface 2, I think. New side Therefore I am”. This is: from a regulative model to an applicative model. -- two basic types (since Platon): sunthesis (= deduction) and analusis (= reduction).

78.-- **Deduction** (If A, then B. Well, A. Therefore B), of which proof by contradiction is one form (Platon).

Reduction (If A, then B. Well, B. Therefore A), of which the lemmatic-analytical proof is one form (Platon).

79.-- Conceptual content and scope depicted within the reasoning. - three concepts: deductive: Tyra Banks/ top model/ star. Deductive: Tyra Banks/ star/ top model.

80.-- **two types of reduction.** -- Peirce's bean example. -- deduction. -- reduction: induction (generalization (sampling) and hypothesis (generalization)).

CF207

Study notes.

The donkey bridge . -- 80.

1.-- Thanks to distributive summative induction, we form the concept of a set of instances ('elements'). -- If A (set), then B (subset). Well, A (set). Therefore B (subset).

Deduction . -- All beans from this bag are white.

Well, these beans come from this bag. So these beans are white.

From all to this one! -- This is a distributive-deductive syllogism

Induction . -- These beans come from this bag.

Well, these beans are white.

So all the beans from this bag are white.

From these to all! Generalization.

II.-- Thanks to collective summative induction, we form the concept of a system of parts. -- If A (system), then B (subsystem or part). Well, B (subsystem). Therefore A (system).

Hypothesis -- All beans from this bag are white. These beans are white.

So these beans come from this bag. (Not necessary).

From This (part) to “this bag”, (system). Generalization.

Note -- Peirce's models are not entirely complete. The reason is that one sentence is missing, namely “All white beans come from this bag”. For the collective deductive syllogism such as e.g. is missing.

Deduction. -- All white beans come from this bag.

Well, these beans are white.

So these beans come from this bag. (Necessary).

From all white (system) to this (part) generalization.

81. The simple deductive reasoning comprises three terms. Chain reasoning (polysyllogism) and accumulation (sorites) confirm this rule. 82. $4 \times 64 = 256$ 'forms' of syllogism, of which 19 are valid and 5 to 6 are common.

83.-- Eulerian geometric models as proof of the identical nature of every reasoning.

85.-- **collective syllogism** . -- "If a triangle has two equal sides, then it necessarily has two equal angles. The connection—not the resemblance—counts. -- It is lawful. To view it as lawful is (Aristotelianly interpreted) 'abstraction' or (Platonically interpreted) 'ideation'.

86/87. -- the authority argument, Deduction or Reduction. --the conceptual content (expertise) to the conceptual scope (domain of authority).

88.-- Epicheirema (conclusion with incorporated proofs). -- Mathematical and legal model.

89. -- Dilemmatic concluding argument. -- A single or two-part concluding clause.

90.-- Proof **by contradiction** .-- If the counter-model is asserted, then it follows from this what refutes (makes absurd) that counter-model.

CF208

Study notes .

91/92. - - Lemmatic - analytical reasoning. -- "If X (lemma), then B. Well, B. Therefore X." "Look, miss, a feather!" A collective model: from a part (a feather) to the whole bird. The subject is unknown, but one introduces a sign X and attaches it to the subject as if it were already known. - Compare with Peirce's hypothesis.

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Applied logic or methodology . -- Selected chapters.

I. **Mathematical thinking** (02/14).

II **logistic thinking** (15/17).

III **empirical scientific thinking** (18/36), -- including amplifying induction (20/30).

IV. **Subjective thinking** (37/76).

V. **Rhetorical thinking** (77/80).

01 -- **methodology** . -- Method is applied logic. -- science or epistemology.

1.-- **Mathematical thinking** (02/14). -- Some characteristics or samples.

02.-- Quantitative (numerical and spatial mathematical aspect).

- 03.-- Set theory as a definition of mathematics.
- 04.-- Differentiation: mathematical and non-mathematical (jumps).
- 05.-- Combinatorial nature of mathematical operations.
- 07.-- Formalism. -- Syntax: merely terms governed by syntactic rules.
- Logical syntax.
- 08.-- Fr. Viète: analysis. -- From (operative but not universal) numerical arithmetic to (operative but universal) algebraic arithmetic as an application of the Platonic lemmatic-analytical method.
- 10.-- Genetic" (= constructive) definition. -- "Reasoning from a known 1/5 to the unknown 5/5". As a definition of an unknown.
- 11.-- **Axiomatic definition** . -- Older language: general axiom and particular axiom or 'postulate'
- 12.-- **Axiomatic definition of a concept (positive integer)**. - G. Peano.-
- 5 axioms, the last of which is exclusive. This is the second mnemonic.
- 13.-- Axiomatics is a collective concept. —
1. Every axiom is distinct but not separated from the rest.
2. Its conceptual content refers to the entire range of positive integers and only to that entire range. Range.
- 14.-- Structure of axiomatics. -- It is a system of a finite number of basic concepts and basic judgments.
- 11.-- **Logistical thinking** (15/17). -- A few characteristics.
- 15.-- J. Royce : logical algebra of actions (doing nothing, -- doing something and doing something else, -- implications).
- 16.-- the three waves of the history of logic. The positioning of logistics therein.
- 17.-- Logistics is symbolic, mathematical, but above all formalized logic. – Whitehead, Russell, principia mathematica (1910/1913).

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Study notes .

- III.-- empirical scientific thinking (18/36). -- Main characteristics.
- 18.-- Mathematical (exact) and non-mathematical (non-exact) proofs.
- 19.-- the empirical cycle. -- 1. Observation. -- 2. Hypothesis (lemma).
-- 4. Testing of the hypothesis. -- value judgment. (Analysis). This is the third mnemonic. The amplificative induction (20/30). -- The summative was summarizing. This one is knowledge-expanding.
- 20.-- amplificative induction. -- Reason from the tested (summatively summarized) to the testable specimens.
- 21.-- Platonic induction. -- name/ definition/specimen ('image') as the basis of 'knowledge' that yields to the 'idea' (ideation)~ Visual instruction as its application.

22.-- Universal and statistical induction. -- universal: 0% or 100%. Causal induction (23/26). -- Examining a dynamic system for its causal relationship.

23.-- Causal induction. -- Anaxagoras. -- Fr. Bacon's experimentalism. Testing empiricism and concept against experiments.

24.-- Causal induction. -- L. Pasteur: "If there is a living cause, then there is (the origin of) life".

The rules of experiment by Fr. Bacon and J. St. Mill, "the Bible of the empirical method". This is the fourth mnemonic.

25.-- Causal induction according to J. St. Mill. -- similarity/difference and intensity. -- Clarification of the foregoing.

26.-- The sequence "sign (VT)/ continuation (VV)". -- Only the necessary and sufficient condition is the cause in its entirety. --

The sequence "day/night".

27.-- dialogical induction. -- The ancient Greek democratic method in Herodotus, Socrates - Plato. It is generalization.

28. Biological induction. -- "Reasoning from individual living beings via analogical induction to types or species of living beings.

The Human Sciences (29/32). -- Man is one type of living being.

29.-- anthropological induction. -- W. Dilthey's hermeneutics: "Reasoning from individual people/cultures via analogical induction to types of people/cultures" thanks to the tripartite nature of "experiencing, insofar as expressed in behavior, 'understanding' ('verstehen').".

30.-- "Thesis / hypothesis" (J. of Salisbury). -- Situational thinking. -- "Is marriage 1. a duty for Anneke (individual), 2. for "humanity" (species)?" Situational morality.

31.-- the humanities. -- 1. Ancient: moral and social sciences" 2.1. Modern: Hume. 2.2. Recent: 1950+ (gamma sciences: see CS /63).

32.-- The humanities once again ethical - political (moral - social). -W. Lepenias: the crisis since 1989 (economics) in the gamma sciences.

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Study notes.

33.-- "new philosophy". -- ±. 1910: H. Bergson: "life that gradually becomes aware of itself". -- But G. Hegel and Marx, S. Kierkegaard and Fr. Nietzsche already anticipated this.

34.-- Historical reasoning. -- "It was bound to happen". (Common sense). Thucydides of Athens: "If the omens, then the consequences (deducible)".

35.-- Hegelian 'deduction!' -- "Assigning the place and meaning to every fact based on the concept of the living whole (= all that was, is, will be)" is Hegelian combinatorics.

36.-- Peirce's "pragmatic rule". -- "By their fruits one will know them" (Jesus). The testing of a concept reveals its content and scope thanks to the effects that are observed.

IV.-- Subjective thinking . -- 37/76. -- Thinking is always the thought life of a person (in a group within a culture).

37.-- the law of identity - thanks to a sense of honor, respect, conscience - affirmed (or disregarded) by the subject, the human being. -- foundation of morality.

38.-- meaning-making = conception of meaning or founding of meaning. - Hermeneutics. -- Man is a meaning-giver.

39.-- Intentionality. -- Scholasticism, and following in its footsteps Fr. Brentano, place consciousness as intentionality at the center: our consciousness "issues upon", "is directed towards", data. -- Thus: **1.** Understanding: something is understood by someone (subject). **2.** Judgment: something is asserted by someone about something. **3.** Reasoning: something is reasoned about by someone.

This is the fifth donkey bridge.

40.-- Ellis Sagarin: common sense and neurotic reason. -- If A (disappointing fact) and B (common sense), then A "not tragic". - If A (disappointing fact) and B (neurotic reason), then A 'tragic'. Proponents summarize the concluding clause with the letter C. Hence: the ABC theory of personality.

Kübler - Ross: denial/anger/things/despondency acceptance as application of ABC theory in response to approaching death.

41.-- method and ideology. -- A. Lange. -- Materialism as mLange. -- yes; materialism as ideology: no! The same material object (= given) elicits more than one formal object (interpretation).

42.-- Axiomatic perception and judgment. -- Method. Materialism: "There are material presuppositions". Ideological Materialism: "There are exclusively material presuppositions". Axiom of exclusion.

43.-- axiomatic theory or understanding and helping. -- A. hearing voices, B. interpreted by established (rationalist) psychology, C. leads to incomprehension and helplessness. But A. hearing voices, B. interpreted by a psychology closely aligned with the data (A), C. leads to understanding and the capacity to help. -- Pragmatic principle!

The prejudices of Galileo and Bekker. - Astrology, yes, all supernatural facts are, interpreted rationally, superstition.

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Study notes.

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46.-- Galileo's true merits. -- "Although Scripture is infallible, some of its interpreters are fallible." (Pope John Paul). "Science and theology must act in the most complete autonomy." (Id) -- Galileo did not prove heliocentrism but did found dynamics, a branch of physics. - Was not tortured.

47.-- Ch. Peirce. -- idiosyncratic/ orthodox/ preference-seeking and scientific opinion formations.

48.-- Orthodox method: revenge as "heroic morality".

49.-- Orthodox method: established scientists declare revolutionary colleagues as heretical (BBC), heretics.

50.-- The history of science is the history of fate and is therefore, notwithstanding the 'rational' (logical) character of science, unpredictable to a specific degree. -- J. Zinck: "I think you have given them diabetes".

51.-- History of science, according to P. Feyerabend: "Anything is possible", mutual untranslatability, limited soundness of science, limited validity of "non-scientific ways of thinking".

of Science: A Psychologist's Blind Spot. -- Torey Hayden, world-renowned child psychologist, confesses **1.** Ignorance regarding Satanism, **2.** Blindness, **3.** Exclusivism, **4.** Career concerns. She neglects some of the facts a priori.

54.-- axiomatic induction. -- No one possesses all possible axioms such that he/she can deduce all possible facts from prepositions. -- All factual axioms exhibit a finite number of axioms, -- with or without an added exclusive axiom. They make only parts of the total reality understandable.

This is the sixth donkey bridge.

55.-- Presupposing the unproven as if it were proven. -- *petitio principii* and *circulus vitiosus*. -- Port-Royal: deriving correct (incorrect) inferences from incorrect (correct) presuppositions. (Hyper)critical thinking (56/60).

56.-- Rationalism that establishes a lack of truly sufficient reason: H. Albert: "There is no final sufficient reason. Then just make do with provisional sufficient reasons. Irrational basis of such rationalism.

57.-- Lack of truly sufficient reasons. -- Zenon of Elea: *eristic* (reasoning, counter-reasoning, counter-reasoning). Consequence: neither you nor I (have a final sufficient reason).

58.-- The bubble of reason alien to experience (constructionism).

59.-- EW Beth: dogmatic (something positive) and skeptical (criticism and deconstructionism) reasoning.

60.-- Psychological deconstruction of Plato. -- Psychoanalysts explain his thinking in terms of the Oedipus complex: Plato is said to be more neurotic and his logical method merely a 'rationalization' of his 'unprocessed' disturbance.

Study notes.

61.-- indecisiveness. -- “That girl over there”. -- The lie is not nonsense but an indecisive statement as long as it cannot be verified.

Alpha, Beta, Gamma sciences (62/70).

62.-- Alpha and beta sciences. -- PC Snow, *The Two Cultures* (1959).

Humanities and Sciences “living together apart”.

63.-- Alpha and gamma sciences. -- 1950+. -- Humanities/ Social sciences/ Sciences. -- Tp. -- Current chaology: chaos, determinism, predictability (probability theory), -- complexity, turbulence and the misinterpretations thereof in alpha and gamma cultures.

Note-- Steering-oriented thinking (67/70).

67.-- Steering thinking in the alpha culture. -- “If order *and* deviation from that order, then restoration of that order”. The ancient Greeks.

68.-- Steering in the humanities - culture. -- The Bible: “The wrath of God as the restoration of a broken order”. Fr. Kafka: “The mysterious X, 'odradeck' the deviation, behind our cultural world that has (deviated)”.

68.-- Control science in the beta and gamma sciences. -- N. Wiener, *Cybernetics*, Paris, 1948. -- In self-regulating systems, goal-directedness/deviation/feedback occurs. -- Regulator, -- homeostasis/reflex, -- intentional behavior as models and levels.

Note-- computer thinking (71/76).

71.-- definition. -- Machine that processes information in a goal-oriented manner (dynamic system) by means of algorithmic thinking. -- Equipment (hardware) and software together.

72.-- comparison. -- Automatic washing machine (very pre-programmed) and computer (much less pre-programmed).

73.-- Computer thinking is applied logic. -- Five insights.

74.-- Programming is logically constructing an algorithm (iterative, sequential, selective).

75.-- Neuronal network. -- Fri. 1985+: human brain as a model.

76.-- Lhasa - computer. -- E. Corey (Nobel Prize 1990): synthesis, retrosynthesis, total synthesis in chemical processes.

V.-- Rhetorical thinking (77/80).

77.-- The enthymeme as rhetorical, or persuasive, reasoning.

78.-- Rhetorical philosophy. -- “Corporate philosophy” and consultancy philosophy.

79.-- Sophie's World. -- Philosophy as education for children. -1974: Matthew Lipman: philosophizing based on stories that are read and discussed together from a logical standpoint.

80.-- Literary rhetoric. -- P. Mertens, Une paix royale (1995). -- Anonymous, Primary Colars (1996). -- freedom of expression interpreted permissively but contested.

Note-- Careful attention was paid to the six donkey and donkey bridges that contain important basic insights.

1

1.-- 'Culture'. Is a concept.	02/05
2a.- Definition of the singular.	05/06
2b.-- 'Culture' as a concept to be defined.	07/08
3.-- 'Lematic-analytical' definition.	09/10
4.-- A 'metaphysical' definition of 'culture'.	13
5.-- An axiomatic definition.	12/14
6.-- Identitive culture.	15/16
7.-- Tropological culture	17/21
8.-- The structural cultural element.	22/25
9.-- Judgment.	26/28
10.-- Interpretation.	29/31
11.-- Representation and interpretation of the phenomenon.	
32/37	
12.-- The Axiom of Identity: Conception and Interpretation.	
38/41	
13.-- The declining interpretation.	42/45
14.-- The reasoning.	46/48
15.-- Culture as a value system.	49/51
16.-- Soloviev's hierarchy of values.	52/54
17.-- The 'domain' ('scope') of the concept 'culture'!	56/59
18.-- The concept of 'culture' in Herodotus.	60/62
19.-- Herodotus' interpretation of fate"	63/65
20.-- Herodotus' natural philosophical method.	66/67
21.-- The concept of 'multiculture' in Herodotus.	68/69
22.-- Herodotus' democratic method.	70
23.-- Example/ illustration.	71/75
24.-- The structure of the Narcissus myth.-	76/78
25.-- The essence of Christianity.	79/80
25 -- (bis). -- Language and culture.	80/81
26.-- The foundations crisis.	82/85
27.-- The concept of 'freedom'	86/88
28.-- Justification of the law.	89/92
29.-- The principle of sufficient reason or grounds	93/95

30.-- Rationalism(s).	96
31.-- Foundation(al)ism (fundamentalism, integr.).	97
32.-- The sufficient reason in Kafka's works.	98/100
33.-- The trial in Kafka.	101/102
34.-- the ambiguity of a work.	103/105
35.-- Tragedy or redemption.	106/107
36.-- "The Death of God" according to J.-P. Sartre.	108/110
37.-- The essence of Christianity.	117
38.-- Divine idea and human freedom.	118
39. -- An incorrect denial of atheism.	119/120
40.-- Fate and Inductive Reason.	121
41.-- "God does not exist. Everything is permitted" (Sartre) .	122/123
42.--Nazi narrativism.	124/127
43.-- The Narrativism of Margaret Mead.	128/131
44.-- Communist 'rhetoric'	132/134
45 -- Progressiveism.	135/137
46.-- Resistance to 'indoctrination'.	138/141
47.-- Constructionism / essentialism.	142/144
48.--Religious nominalism.	145/146
49.-- A contemporary nominalism. -	148
50.-- Nominalism is first of all 'empiricism'	149/150
51.-- Nominalism. Since Ockham is conceptualism.	151
52.-- Nominalism as experimentalism	152/153
53.-- Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas.	154/156
54.-- The modern nominalist culture.	157/159
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56.-- The great story of reason.	161
57.-- Modernization is revolution.	162/164
58.-- Dialectical Rationalism.	165/167
59.-- Rationalism is the Industrial Revolution. -	168
60.-- Rationalism	169
61.-- Rationalism as materialism.	171/174
62.-- Rationalism as libertinism (freethinking).	175/177
63.-- The Rationalism of de Sade.	178/185
64.-- Students and libertinism.	186
65.--Political philosophy. -	187
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67.-- The sufficient reason for discussion (1).	189
68.-- The sufficient reason (2)	190/192

69.-- The sufficient reason (3).	193
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71.-- The sufficient reason (5).	195/197
72.-- The sufficient reason, (6).	198/199
73.-- The cultural vanguard ('intelligentsia').	200
74.-- Postmodernity / postmodernism.	201/204
75.-- Anarchism (libertarianism).	205/206
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