

Text 30. Miscellaneous

Text 30. Miscellaneous	1
30.1. Theory and helping through understanding.	1
30.2. Modernity (1).	2
30.3. Modernity (2).	4
30.4. Science and religion.	5
30.5. Concentration Camps	7
30.6. Stigmatization.	8

30.1. Theory and helping through understanding.

Bibl . st. : I. De Bie, *Hearing Voices* , in: Humo 27.01.1996, 22/27. - We summarize the essential.

Basic data

State University - Limburg. - Prof. Romme and his working group have been studying people - including children - who hear voices since around 1989. - Romme: "My GP is a sailor. He told me that he heard voices when he was alone at sea for forty-eight hours: 'It really is like you are having a conversation with someone,' he said." - "In 34% of cases, people have both visual and auditory hallucinations, but the two do not fit together." - De Bie: "Two percent of all people hear voices. Only a minority of voice hearers are actually ill or mentally disturbed. Studies at the State University - Limburg have demonstrated this."

The beginning.

Romme. - It started with a patient who was greatly troubled by voices and who was dissatisfied with the way psychiatry was responding to it. At the time, those voices were viewed by everyone in psychiatry—including me—as a symptom of illness. My patient rightly said: "That may well be, but I don't suffer from that illness! But it is impossible to live with those voices. And the medication doesn't help." - "I said: 'If you really hear voices, I must honestly admit that I know nothing about it. It might well be that others who also hear voices understand you better than I do.'" - Romme organizes a meeting. - "Then my colleague Sandra Escher came up with the idea: 'If all those people hear voices and they recognize them in each other, then we can claim that it is imagination, but that doesn't help those people.'"

Misunderstanding.

Romme. - "There are people who could talk about it as children (...). There aren't many of them." - "With a number of patients who started hearing voices early on, we have seen that they were never able to express themselves freely about it." - "A lot of people only care about whether the straight line to adulthood is followed: they are not genuinely interested in what their child is experiencing."

Theory. - Humo. - "Isn't it true that in most cases those voices are one's own thoughts?" - Romme. - "That is the theory, but that is not how they experience it. We have learned here not to prioritize theory: you help no one with your conviction. I may well think that the voices are someone's own thoughts—and I do think that I think that—but that does not help my patients. (...). You do not help people with a theory." - Sandra Escher. - "Eighty percent of the people in our study are convinced that the voice is not theirs. (...). If you believe that you hear the voice of God and I do not believe that, then we can discuss it, but that gets us nowhere."

That is the essence.

One feels, as it were, firsthand how modern rationalism—which is interpreting the established psychological and psychiatric 'theory'—constructs a theory based on those who do not know the given—hearing a voice or voices—from their own observation. True theory departs from the given itself. In this way, it grasps the question asked, namely, "What exactly is the given?" The solution only comes into view under that condition.

30.2. Modernity (1).

Library st.: A. Braeckman , *Modernity and philosophical criticism* , in: Onze Alma Mater (Leuven) 51 (1997): 2 (May), 171/192.

G.Fr.W . Hegel (1770/1831) and Fr.W. Schelling (1775/1854) together published in 1802 *Ueber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik alles und ihr Verhaltnis zum gegenwartigen Zustand der Philosophie insbesondere* .

Note - Braeckman poses the following question at the outset: "Does philosophical criticism still have an essence, something that makes that criticism philosophical criticism?" In doing so, he situates himself within the contemporary skeptical climate that dismisses speaking of "essence überhaupt"—that of speaking in terms of "the essence" and similar expressions—as 'uncomfortable'.

Meanwhile, for Hegel and Schelling, philosophical criticism apparently did have “an essence”. Braeckman's answer: Whether philosophical criticism – for us – still has “an essence” depends, according to the author, on “what modernity is”.

Definition method.

In sketching “modernity,” the author proceeds from “an ideal -typical representation” thereof. Such a form of definition is not intended to be an exact representation of a concrete historical event. Rather, this method attempts to gain insight into a historical constellation (understand: a complex event) by bringing together the logic (understand: the axioms and the applications of those axioms) and the lines of force governing such a constellation into a stylized (understand: emphasizing the striking) and abstract (understand : neglecting unnecessary details) representation.

Ideal-typical performance

There is being referred Unpleasant Niklas Luhmann, *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt am Main, 1990.- We summarize.

Functional differentiation.

That term means “social division of labor or specialization”. Braeckman – following in the footsteps of I. Kant (1724/1804; leading figure of the German Enlightenment (Aufklärung)) – posits that a culture is 'modern' if the social division of labor serves as the principle of social order within it.

Thus, religion, art, morality, science, and all other branches of culture acquire their own 'specialists'. Consequently, the totality of culture breaks down into independent subfields. To such an extent, in fact, that art, for instance, is treated as art only by the art specialist dedicated to it, and thus art as a means of moral elevation becomes the domain of the moralist whose specialty is moral elevation (ac , 192).

Note - ' Zerstückelung '. The German language has a word for the result of modern 'differentiation': 'Zerstückelung ', fragmentation - literally: ' pieces '. Do you see the moralist , who is in principle uninformed as a specialist of art, addressing that 'part' of art that is “morally uplifting” as a specialist of what 'morality' is?

Moreover: according to the basic axiom of modernity, art should no longer even be at the service of moral uplift!

To this extent – according to the author – everything is the domain of specialists. All cultural products must be 'pure,' representing only their specialization. Pure art. Pure morality. Pure religion. Pure science. Pure philosophy. Isolated domains of specialists.

Philosophy as a pure specialty.

One of the characteristics of modern purity is that a single specialist cannot judge all other specialisms without incurring a transgression . He then goes beyond his limits. Philosophy, therefore, is 'handled' as one specialism—as the author literally states—among others. Thus, its evaluative role lapses. The traditional role of philosophy—as 'metaphysics' that deals with essence—was that it was situated at the center of total culture, possessed a sacred essence, and could prescribe norms. Understood in this way, it is called “the heavenly canopy” under which the rest of culture acquires its essence. (Ac , 175). Expressed in Kant's language: metaphysics was an “ Archimedean point”.

30.3. Modernity (2).

Holistic visions.

Braeckman points out what metaphysics repeatedly was in the past, namely an attempt to provide an encyclopedic exposition in which virtually—mind you: virtually—all the knowledge of an era was incorporated. Such comprehensive views are centered around a basic concept: that of the 18th- century ' philosophers ' around 'rationality', that of Hegel around ' Vernunft ' understood historically, that of Marx around economic reason. For Schiller, art is central; for the thinkers of the Vienna Circle , 'science'; for Sartre, “human freedom ”; for Husserl, “die Lebenswelt ” (the world of life).

Such comprehensive expositions lapse as soon as knowledge of an era is no longer masterable by any single individual. The modern period is bursting with information so much that encyclopedic metaphysics are falling “out of fashion.” The cause of this explosion of information is the hyperspecializations which Kant believes represent “the essence” of modernity.

The solution.

Braeckman refers to Kant's way out: it can now still be “reflection on the conditions of possibility (including and above all the awareness of the limits) of all knowledge”. He himself restricts philosophy to “a practice of

reflection”, that is, possessing knowledge and thinking about it as “reflective engagement with knowledge” (ac , 187).

Not exclusively professional-philosophical .

Naturally, amidst the multitude of specialisms, there also exists a philosophy of profession. However, the proposed 'reflection' must not be limited to that specialism. The professional philosopher is open to all forms of 'knowledge'—including that of daily life.

Note - Which is, of course, venturing into domain-external territory. With the incompetence associated with venturing outside one's own domain.

Behold a brief outline of what modernity is and what that entails for the boundaries of philosophy.

30.4. Science and religion.

Library: JP Van Bendegem , *Tot in der Eindigheid (On science, New Age and religion)*, 29/62 (*The modern image of science and religion*). Antwerp/Baarn, 1997.

The author criticizes the standard view of science—collecting facts, identifying regularities and laws, moving from laws to theories, testing theories—and sketches—what he calls—a realistic picture of science.

“The standard image is not so much an ideal representation of the facts but rather an illusion, if not a falsification.” (Oc, 43)

The author sketches the realistic picture as follows.

1. Science is problem-solving. - What the standard view contains is “aimed at solving a problem of a certain type”(oc, 43).

2. Science is predicting. – Science, once it has reached a degree of maturity, devises tests that prioritize the ability to foresee what – according to, for example, a particular theory – should normally happen.

3. Putting science first. It is answering the why questions.

4. Science involves ambiguity . - This implies that a multitude of theories apply to the same problem.

5. Science entails progress. – This does not imply that this progress is 'linear' and must lead to precisely that type of final state.

Now follow two characteristics that are perceived by many as outside rather than within science.

6. Science encompasses metaphysics. - “In fact, metaphysics is already present in the simplest question: “What entities exist? Are there electrons, atoms? (...). Are there mental states? Often this metaphysics is implicitly given. (...)” (oc, 45).

7. Science is socially embedded. – In other words: the entire culture is reflected in the scientific process. For example, primitives do not conduct atomic tests!

Completeness regarding the answering of problems—specifically scientific or extra -scientific—is not included in the above description: science does not answer all questions.

Religion.

Oc, 51ff.- Religion limited to “a body of views” is described by the author as a theory expressed in language that

1. the epitome of a scientific imitator,
2. lays claim to 'totality',
3. generally moves on a metaphysical plane without excluding the – what the proposer calls – physical plane,
4. in any case designates at least one 'metaphysical' entity (a deity, for example) as reality,
5. texts recognized as religious or not.

Note - It is peculiar that all expositions on religion that can be taken seriously demonstrate all the characteristics of 'realistic' science: problem-solving, prediction, explanation , a multitude of interpretations, progress - metaphysics (even if its adherents do not explicitly use the term), cultural connectedness.

The 'progress' in religion is at least partially different from that of science (let us think of the Bible with its series of 'covenants' attempting to keep pace with the stages of culture), but it is there! Whether the claim to totality is radical is doubtful when studying religions. Among the 'fanatical' interpreters of religion ("theirs"), certainly. But among the other adherents?

In any case: Van Bendegem's sketch of real science is clearly to be agreed with and his “science/religion” comparison is stimulating, but his ‘image’ of religion seems to us subject to reservations. Which is not surprising given his metaphysical choice.

In his “science/religion” comparison, he limits religion to a body of views. This fails to do justice to the whole of religion, which is more than “a body of views”.

30.5. Concentration camps

An enclosure within which 'enemies' are locked up. -- Let us define it that way for the time being.

concentration camps in South Africa . -- After them came the Russian communists (which is usually not discussed).

M. Heller/Al. Nekrich , L'utopie au pouvoir (Histoire de l'URSS de 1917 à aujourd'hui), Paris, 1982, 54s., mentions .

For Vl. Ouljanov Lenin (1870/1924), the epitome of the communist dictatorship—as K. Marx had already spoken of—was the dictatorship of the French Jacobins (le Club des Jacobins (Oct. 1789/Nov. 1794)) and the Paris Commune (July 1794). In **The State ** and **The Revolution** , Lenin defines dictatorship as a power unhindered by anything and based on coercion. The proletariat cannot do this. However, its avant-garde, the Communist Party, can. It is within this framework—axiomatics —that the communist concentration camp is situated.

The honor of being the first to use the term belongs to L. Trotsky (1879/1940): in his order of June 4, 1918, he demands that Czechoslovaks who refuse to lay down their arms be imprisoned in concentration camps. On June 26, 1918, Trotsky proposes that, in addition to the bourgeoisie, officers who refuse service in the Red Army also be imprisoned in concentration camps “as bourgeois” “as bourgeois.” In August 1918, he expands the “clientele” of the concentration camps to include “sly agitators, counter-revolutionary officers, saboteurs, parasites, speculators.”

On August 9, 1918, Lenin became concerned about the size of the peasant uprising in the Penza region . He telephoned the regional executive committee and demanded that a mass terror be set in motion against the 'kulaks' (wealthy landowners), the 'popes' (Orthodox priests), and the White Guards, and that questionable elements be imprisoned in a concentration camp outside the city.

In third place is the ' Shoah ' (Hebrew for 'catastrophe' or 'extermination'), i.e., the genocide of the National Socialists (applicable primarily to, but

not exclusively to, Jews), which took place in concentration camps . -- In contrast to the two previous models, the Nazi type receives the most attention in the media and in reflections on concentration camps.

30.6. Stigmatization.

' Stizo ', ancient Greek, meant "I apply a mark". ' Stigmati as ' meant "one marked with a red (hot) iron".

Let us start with a case.

Bible st.: -- E. Jozsef, *Padre Pio* , in: *Le Temps* (Geneva) 03.05.1999, 37;
-- P. Briel, *Un religionux persecute par l'église* , ibid..

Beatified.

Francesco Forgione (1887/1968), monastic name Padre Pio was beatified on May 2, 1999. In Southern Italy, in the poorer Mezzogiorno , he is considered the most popular 'saint', especially among the poor. Among the 'educated' , he evokes reservations.

The hesitations of the Vatican.

Briefly outlined: Pope John XXIII (1881/1963) did not like it. Paul VI (1897/1978) banned the persecutions in 1965. Only John Paul (Karol Wojtyla) acted on Padre Pio appeals for the healing of a woman friend of his with cancer. -- Padre After all, Pio continued celebrating Mass in Latin before the Second Vatican Council (1962/1965)! But it was particularly in 1918 that he received the stigmata. As soon as the Vatican got wind of this, it sent a series of doctors to Padre in the course of late 1918 and throughout 1919. Pio af.

Not an unreal phenomenon.

Then it was settled: Padre Pio was truly stigmatized. He could not be cured by any medical means! For fifty years, he lost a bag of blood a day.

Interpretations.

The scientists lapsed into the following interpretations.

1. Mere statement.
- 2.1. Neurological explanation (skin and blood vessel phenomenon).

2.2. Psychological explanation (autosuggestion or heterosuggestion).

2.3. Psychiatric explanation (neurosis, psychosis).

3. Radical inexplicability.

That concludes our Padre's message. Pio , now beatified, was once forbidden by the Vatican to celebrate Mass in public or to hear confession.

Further details.

Bibl . st.: JH Van der Veldt , *Stigmatisation* , in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* , Chicago, 1967, 21:244f..

Among the 330 stigmatized individuals known at the time (starting with St. Francis of Assisi (1182/1226), who initiated a 'tradition'), there were only about sixty blessed or 'saints' in the Church. According to Dr. Imbert-Goubère, out of 321 stigmatized individuals , there are only 41 men but 280 women (+/- 1/7). This percentage alone gives pause for thought: how/why so many women? However, let us consider a definition.

Phenomenology.

Living persons display 'wounds' (stigmas) on their hands, feet, and under the heart, just like the crucified Christ. Sometimes also on the head (crown of thorns) and shoulders and back (carrying of the cross).-- Although unbelievers and Protestants were once stigmatized, the vast majority are Catholic and female.

The reason for beatification or canonization.

Not paranormal ' miraculous' phenomena such as stigmata or even 'miracles', but rather the heroic degree of 'justice' (conscientious behavior), confirmed by at least one 'miracle' (that has been thoroughly tested): behold the reason for the Church's declaration. The Church does not pronounce on, for example, stigmata.

The phenomenon, yes, but the explanation?

As modern science advances, the church becomes more cautious. For there are types of stigmata. The 'natural' (or perhaps supernatural or paranormal) stigmata wounds, as already insinuated above, are medically explained as: deception—auto- or heterosuggestion—psychosomatics, psychiatry, and the like.

Pope Benedict XIV (1740/1758 (following in the footsteps of St. Francis de Sales (1567/1622)), an expert on paranormal phenomena, assumed that

'righteous' people can display stigmata which, although unnatural , nevertheless have a strictly supernatural origin. And are therefore willed by God—perhaps as a sign.

Note-- And there are the occult interpretations.

R. Ambelain , **Le vampirisme **, Paris, 1977, 180/166 (**La stigmatisation **), puts forward the hypothesis that stigmata are a form of vampirism (*note* : blood-soul sucking).

The question is, after all: “Where does that daily blood come from?” It forms in the body. But, from an occult perspective, this is the materialization of a life force or fluid that is in excess and, as it were, overflows into the form of blood.

But the vampires in the tombs also exhibit ' hai.matidrosia ', the sweating of blood! Ambelain mentions, oc, 117/125, Makhlouf (1828/1898), whose remains yield blood that flowed from his grave (mixed, incidentally, with 'water'). In Lebanon, he is venerated as a saint. But for occultists, his sweating of blood poses the problem of his possible vampirism: by (perhaps unconsciously) sucking out the blood soul (life force in the blood) through an occult mechanism, such a person is capable of 'producing' blood.