

C.5-5. Ideology analysis

Location

5. Courses from 1987 to 1990

5.1. Philosophy . theory of thought and methodology 87-88, (WDM1-WDM397, 453p.)

5.2. Rhetoric, 1988-1989 (RH01-RH152, 147p.)

5.3. Philosophy of the Life Course, 1988-1989 (FLL1-FLL290 , 258p.)

5.4. Questionnaire from the philosophy of culture, 1989-1990, (KF1-KF351, 414p.)

5.5. Ideology Analysis, 1989-1990, (IA1-IA59, 72p.)

Remark: *This course has been provided with larger spacing than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current pagination of 'Word'. For this reason, the original pagination is consistently indicated by the letters 'IA'. They stand for 'Ideology-Analysis' and are derived from the old page number . In a number of footnotes, the course master wished to further explain the original text of this course.*

Introduction: *Times change constantly, and those changes turn out to have a cause. According to Plato, philosophy consists in tracing the causes of those changes, starting from them, and making them understandable. The question then is from which conceptions one must start in order to understand those changes. According to a number of historians, the French Revolution of 1789 appears to be central to a better understanding of our time. The 17th century is dominated by authority and dogma. But that is precisely what thinkers of the 18th century spew out. Suddenly, they think like Voltaire. In their view, the idea of 'justice' became central: the right of the individual, the right to express criticism, rights as a human being and as a citizen. All this was realized within just a few decades. Its importance for our culture can hardly be underestimated. However, a number of experts say that the Roman Catholic Church took far too long to appropriate this new spirit of the times. Yes, they argue that only from the Second Vatican Council (1962/ 1965) did what was achieved in the period between 1680 and 1715 gradually begin to sink in. Apparently, cultural revolutions do not occur simultaneously everywhere. This course in 'ideology analysis' aims to illustrate this through a number of samples.*

Course 5-5. Ideology Analysis

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Foreword (01/10):

The main theme: tradition and revolution.

The title of this preface was taken from *H. Barth, Revolution. and (tradition (ain attempt sour selbstverständigung der philosophie)*, in: *saeculum (jahrbuch*

für universalgeschichte (Munich), 14 (1963), 1/10, in which we find one of the main themes of this third-year course . -- Therefore, we summarize the very solid article at the beginning.

Central to the aforementioned article is the revolution of 1789 ^{1*}, -- the so-called French Revolution. -- the question will immediately arise in your mind, student: “what can our ‘philosophy’ course possibly have to do with such a fleeting date and event?”

Answer : Did we not see, in the second-year course, that the process—in ancient Greek ' kinèsis ' (Lat.: ' motus ',—literally: 'movement') in the sense of “all that changes, or is changed”—stands central to all of ancient Hellenistic philosophy? This, even in a Platon , who nevertheless has the (very undeserved) reputation of (wanting to) see only the 'eternal' (the transcendental).

Note well: we observed that the so-called immutable ideas (= grounds for explanation, presuppositions), which naturally make the essence (the form of being) of changeable things, which are invariably 'processes', understandable, are present not only before and above, but also within the processes themselves.

Consequence : If 'philosophy', at least for a Platon , consists in:

1. to start from the changing phenomena
2. In order to trace its 'elements' (= presuppositions, ' grounds ', principles), why should this—in 1989, two hundred years after the French Revolution—one would better say: “the French transformation (of things)”—have to be any different now? That is precisely what Hans Barth explains to us to some extent in the article in question.

¹ *The French Revolution (1789–1799) was an influential political upheaval at the end of the 18th century in which the absolute monarchy that had ruled France for three centuries was abolished and the First French Republic was established. The power and privileges of the nobility and clergy were massively curtailed under pressure from radical political groups, the urban masses, and peasants in the countryside. The old ideas of absolutism, aristocracy, and the power of the church were replaced by the principles of Liberté, égalité, fraternité, or liberty, equality, and fraternity. The French Revolution brought about far-reaching and lasting changes in France, which spread throughout Europe. (Source: Wikipedia 2017)*

a. Paul Hazard (1/2)

The conscience crisis Européenne (1680/ 1715), Paris, 1935, preface , says the following. -- He delineates the 'revolution' in minds between 1680 and 1715. In those thirty-five years, a formidable shift in mentality takes place, which Hazard outlines as follows.

-- “What a contrast! What an abrupt transition! The hierarchy, the discipline, the order (of which the authorities took it upon themselves to ensure), the dogmas that firmly govern life: That is what the 17th- century thinkers prioritized. -- Coercion, authority, the dogmas: that is what those who immediately follow, the 18th- century thinkers , spew out” -- Hazard explains further:

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(a). The 17th- century people are Christians; they prioritize an order of law founded on the deity; they feel at home in a society in which the classes are unequally entitled ;

(b). The 18th- century people are opposed to established Christianity; for them, mere 'human nature' is the foundation of every possible legal order; they dream of only one thing: ' égalité ' (equal rights).

-- “The majority of the French thought like Bossuet (1627/1704) ' l'aigle de Meaux ' ²(where he was bishop); *Discours sur history universelle* (1681; a work conceived from a history-theological perspective). Suddenly they think like Voltaire (1694/ 1778) *Candide ou l'optimism*, (1759); *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (1760; a work conceived from a philosophical-critical perspective). In other words: a revolution.

b. H. Barth (2/3)

He builds upon what Hazard wrote. -- Between the Renaissance (between the Trecento ³(= the 14th century in Italy) and ± 1640), of which the period in

² C'est Voltaire, au siècle des Lumières, qui a surnommé Bossuet l'Aigle de Meaux. L'aigle est l'un des rares oiseaux capable de voler face au soleil sans être ébloui (blinded). Or Bossuet était un évêque irrévérencieux (irreverent), their own religion in their tête à Louis Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, born in Meaux in 1681, was born in his life. (source: le parisien 01 08 2012)

³ The Trecento (Italian for 300, or for "mille trecento", 1300) refers to the 14th century in Italian cultural history, and more specifically to the period between the Gothic and the Renaissance. Additionally, the Trecento is often considered the beginning of the Renaissance in art history. (source: Wikipedia 2017)

France between 1680 and 1715 was merely the elaboration, and the French Revolution, which it prepared more directly, something is situated in terms of intellectual history that can never be underestimated, -- thus Hazard, expressly cited by Barth: “In place of the culture that was based on the idea of 'duty' — the duties towards God, the duties towards the sovereign — the 'nouveaux philosophes ' (*note*: the term ' philosophe ' acquires, in the course of the 18th century, a very narrow meaning: “revolutionary thinker”) attempted to establish a culture that stood or fell with the idea of 'right': the rights of the individual, -- the rights of criticism, the rights of 'reason' (*note*: the term 'reason' acquires, in the same period, a very narrow meaning: the 'critical' (understand: foundational research of all established (conducting) reason), the rights of man and of the citizen”. –

Note - student, do you not get the impression that it was only with the Second Vatican Council (1962/1965) that what was already causing a sensation among the French intelligentsia in 1680/1715 penetrated the Roman Catholic Church? Conclusion: cultural revolutions do not proceed simultaneously in all aspects.

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Note -- Contemporary sociologists and cultural scholars will attempt to explain this time difference to you on the grounds of 'pillarization'. The Church of Rome—just like other cultural groups—has succeeded in isolating its 'flock' and, literally, indoctrinating it.

By presenting this 'doctrine'—even where it was merely a 'human intellectual product' (e.g., what theologians devised)—as 'Divine' (without differentiating between what is strictly God-given and what is purely a human intellectual product), it succeeded in establishing ecclesiastical authority as a 'pillar' that held firm up to and including the communication-doctrinal revolution (in which the notorious 'media' (press, film, TV) played a leading role), through which the 'revolution' of 1680/1715 could finally penetrate into all families, for example, not to mention the schools.

Something analogous occurs with “the new theology” (the new catechesis): without making a strict distinction between what is “of God” and what is of new, liberal theologians, “church doctrine” is presented to children, for example, and to student youth, as being “backed” “on a biblical interpretation,” for instance.

Whereas every 'new theologian' knows very well that a number (not all, of course) of basic ideas of current catechesis date only from either the Renaissance, 1680/1715, or later. –

Using a term from John XXIII (1881/1963; Pope from 1958 to 1963; he initiated Vatican II a year before his death, in 1962): 'aggiornamento' (adaptation to the current cultural period).

Or, to use a sensational term coined by Michael Gorbachev: 'perestroika' (Restructuring).

Or, as in China: 'cultural revolution' (= the Little Red Book (1964) evolves into the 'cultural revolution', from 1966).

c. François de Salignac (3/4)

The Archbishop of Cambrai, *François de Salignac de la mothe-Fénelon*⁴(1651/1715; *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699))—whom one would certainly call a 'progressive bishop' today—delivers in the aforementioned book a merciless critique of the social ills during his episcopate.

Along with a number of Christian and liberal thinkers, he prioritizes the rights of the (sovereign) people. If the so-called 'Christian' absolute French monarchs continue to allow themselves to be 'venerated' by the people as God's direct representatives, then inevitably, a day will come when “ the tyrannical despotism of the

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sovereigns ” (particularly absolute monarchs) turns into its opposite, namely “ the despotism of the multitude ” (particularly: after the French Revolution, what sociologists call 'the modern masses'). In a purely Platonic sense (think of Platon's *poilteia* , the state (also known as: the republic), says Fénelon :

⁴ *François Fénelon, full name François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (Fénelon Castle in Sainte-Mondane, August 6, 1651 – Cambrai, January 7, 1715) was a French writer, archbishop, moralist, orator, and supporter of Quietism. Due to his social criticism, he is considered one of the precursors of the Enlightenment. His ideas were a direct inspiration for philosophers such as Voltaire and Rousseau. Because of his emphasis on emotion and his poetic style, he can also be regarded as a precursor to Romanticism. His most famous work is the pedagogical novel *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699), written for his pupil, the Duke of Burgundy—the Little Dauphin. The book was also published without his knowledge and earned him the wrath of Louis XIV (1638-1715), because the latter had read a condemnation of his reign in the book. (Source: Wikipedia 2017)*

La liberté sans order est un libertinage qui attire le despotisme . est un slavery who gets lost in anarchy ”. (Freedom without order is a free-thinking that provokes despotism. Order without freedom is a slavery that ends in anarchy).

Note: -- Liberals of all stripes sometimes dare to present it in such a way that it creates the impression that “the church” (without differentiating between absolutist thought and popular sovereign thought) simply stood behind the 'ancien régime': a Fénelon brilliantly refutes that distortion of history.

d. Jean-Jacques Rousseau ⁵(4/5)

(1712/1778) is simultaneously the pinnacle of the French lumières (= enlightened rationalism) and its complement by sentimentalism, the cradle of romanticism. Besides 'reason', the center of the one-sided Enlightenment thinkers who dreamed of industrialization, Rousseau also prioritizes the mind. Specifically: man grasps a kind of reality through his or her mind as well.

-- **Note:** - as you know from your history lessons, Rousseau was both in favor of an educational revolution (*Emile or sur l' éducation* (1762)) and for a simultaneous political revolution (le contract social or principle of law politique (1762). Both revolutions are expressed in one in a short chapter of his *Emile*, namely *Confession de foi du vicaire . Savoyard* .

⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712/1778) was a pioneering philosopher and writer. He exerted a profound influence on literature, pedagogy, and politics. He composed seven operas and other musical works. With his love for nature, Rousseau stood at the beginning of Romanticism. In his novel *Emile*, Rousseau sets out his vision of human nature and proposes what he considered to be the ideal method of education. The philosopher-writer Goethe was one of his many admirers, but the philosopher Voltaire ridiculed him. Rousseau belonged to the era of the Enlightenment. In his autobiography, he wrote about his many lies, delusions, and masochistic tendencies. (Source: Wikipedia 2017).

In 1749, the Academy of Dijon issued a competition: “Has the founding of arts and sciences contributed to the purification of morals?” Rousseau replied: far from purifying morals, arts and sciences owe their origin to our vices and serve no other purpose than to reinforce them. Reason: they distance us from 'nature'. In 1755, he wrote his “Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes”, an argument on inequality among men. In it, he states that man is good by nature, in a primitive state like a “noble savage” (“bon sauvage”), and prior to any education. He becomes bad through experiences in society. Rousseau described his ideas on education in his “*Emile ou de l'éducation*”, among others. However, this did not prevent him from taking his five illegitimate babies to a foundling home and having them raised there. He confessed: “I didn't even keep track of their birth date”.

Note: -- One easily forgets the religious revolution that Rousseau ushered in: he distinguishes two types of 'religion':

1. The 'historical' religion, which relies not only on human nature but also on historical facts. -- such as the birth, the suffering, the death, the post-death appearances of Jesus;

2. The 'natural' religion, which either abstracts from those historical facts or categorically banishes them. Basis: the natural landscape around us and our inner, primarily sentimental experiences.

Rousseau concludes from this, for example, that in order to live a 'truly' religious life, one needs no religious instruction as a child: that child will, in time, either come to religion on their own or need absolutely none.

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Like Fénelon , but more pagan, Rousseau foresees the era of revolutions. -
- H. Barth quotes from * *Emile**, 3 : “you rely on the current established order, -- without ever thinking that that order is subject to inevitable revolutions. (...).

The great man of the realm becomes a small man; the rich man becomes poor; the absolute ruler becomes a subject. -- Are the hammer blows of fate then so rare that you can count on never having to deal with them? We are drawing close to the state of crisis ('l' état de crise ') and the century of revolutions. Who, then, can say at this point what will become of you then? All that people have caused, people can destroy. Letters that can never be erased do not exist, unless they are those letters imprinted by nature (*note*: the basic concept of enlightened rationalism). Well then, nature causes neither ruler nor great man of the realm nor the rich.

Conclusion . -- The Renaissance era, the “1680/1715” period in France, -
- they prepared and foresaw revolutionary shifts to the contrary.

e. De Tocqueville / Joly / Burckhardt / Frantz (5/6)

Clairvoyant minds like the four mentioned in the title have clearly repeated it after the French Revolution, in the course of the century that immediately precedes us.

1. Alexis de Tocqueville ⁶, in 1850: “It is clear today: ‘the tide is rising’. We will not have seen the end of the unprecedented revolution. But the child being born now will, probably, never experience it either.” -

2. Also in France: Maurice Joly ⁷, in 1864: “l'ère indéfinie des révolutions” (the never-ending epoch of revolutions) (in his conversation in the underworld between Machiavelli and Montesquieu).

3. In Switzerland: Jakob Burckhardt ⁸, the cultural historian of the Renaissance. In 1867: “the eternal revision” (the eternal revision). Thus he says: “the main phenomenon of our days is ‘das gefühl des provisorischen’” (the feeling that it is all merely provisional).” -

4. In Germany: Bismarck's opponent and champion of German and European federalism, Constantin Frantz ⁹, in his **Naturlehre des Staates** (1870): “The provisional is the general characteristic of the present situation: the universally observed determinations of the new seem merely a pause in the reversal itself.

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Note: -- H. Barth states that two figures— Joly and Burckhardt —also believed they could indicate the main cause, namely, popular sovereignty. -- See here only Burckhardt regarding this . -

⁶ Alexis-Charles-Henri Clérel, Viscount de Tocqueville (1805/ April 1859) French political philosopher, sociologist, historian, and statesman, theoretical founder of modern political liberalism, visionary: (source: Wikipedia 2017).

⁷ Maurice Joly (1829/ 1878), lawyer in Paris, journalist, and writer. In his **Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu**, he describes—as a philosophical discussion—the aims of politics—how Napoleon manipulated the economy, the media, the workers, and everyone to establish a totalitarian regime. He writes that the Emperor reduced the French people to a nation of subservient and unfree slaves. (Source: Wikipedia 2017).

⁸ Jacob Burckhardt (1818/ 1897) Swiss cultural and art historian, known for his **Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien** (1860). (Source: Wikipedia 2017).

⁹ Constantin Frantz (1817/ 1891); philosopher, diplomat, political scientist, precursor of European federalism. He challenged Bismarck's policy aimed at establishing a German national state gradually through the waging of wars. He opposed the violence of war as a means of resolving conflicts. (source: Wikipedia 2017)

a. The decisively new thing that has entered our world since the French Revolution is the permission to change and the desire to change, -- provided it is for the public welfare. –

b. The new (*note:* in a stricter sense, now) flows from the equality which has since allowed universal – or at least very extensive – suffrage to decide. (...). –

Consequence: since then, state power is either only conditionally available (insofar as it is constantly threatened by revolutionary desires) or it is the despotic reaction to that threat. (...). –

a. From a societal perspective, an all-powerful state is invariably posited. Reason: that society would realize social wishes of its own accord (*note:* without state intervention)—as it actually ought to be—is neither expected nor hoped for.

Consequence: that task is assigned to the state. The state possesses the necessary coercive means for this purpose or creates them. This is to enable it to perform the task of comprehensive precaution, something for which unprecedented power is required.

1. But the ambitious ('die streber') want to seize precisely that almighty state and lead it. –

2. The origin, or rather, the presupposition, of this social program lies in Caesarism. –

Note: -- the term 'Caesarism' means the fact that:

- 1.** By means of real or apparent democratic means (e.g. a free election)
- 2.** A despot, absolute monarch/dictator, or whatever, comes to power—something that, according to H. Barth, characterizes our twentieth century.

f. The philosophical processing of the continued revolution (6/7)-

How do a number of philosophers—the main characters—react now to that revolutionary structure of our current society?

I. Kant (6/8)

(1724/1804) Kant, the leading figure of the German Enlightenment (Enlightened Rationalism) – as H. Barth consistently states – sees it in two ways:

(i) on the one hand, what he calls 'the inherited metaphysics', which, in his enlightened interpretation, is not much more than a form of dogmatism translated into logical language, i.e. the will never to allow any investigation into the foundations of one's own presuppositions, -- with endless debate as an aftermath

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between proponents and opponents of so-called 'absolute truths', -- in which the contrast 'orthodox / heterodox' plays a decisive role.

(ii) On the other hand, what Kant calls “die kritische Vernunft ” (critical reason), that type of use of understanding and reason which engages in foundational research both regarding transmitted 'metaphysics' and regarding its own propositions. The characteristic of this is called by Kant 'selbstkritik der vernunft ' (the self-criticism of reason also examines itself, in its practice). 'reason', it subjects itself to criticism).

Conclusion: on the one hand, dogmatism (refusal to have one's own presuppositions examined, 'tested'), on the other hand, critique (demand for the examination of presuppositions). -- This is, according to H. Barth, the essential core of the Enlightenment.

That duality—so he says—cannot simply be interpreted as something unique to the 18th century, with its enlightened rationalism: instead of being limited in time and space, this duality is universal.

A confirmation.

-- *Fr. Châtelet, Platon* , Paris, 1972, 22nd pp., says, regarding the matter , what follows. –

(i) before Plato appeared as a thinker, there were in the Hellas of his time and before:

a. forms of religion of all kinds, the opacity of which he, as a philosopher of the 'spirit', clearly sensed,

b. established public opinions of all kinds, from which he emphatically distanced himself since the death sentence of his extremely beloved teacher, Socrates of Athens (469/-399),

The pre-Socratic thinkers, whom he usually knew thoroughly, but whose 'dogmatism' he deplored.

(ii) Plato founded philosophy, in the very strict sense, -- according to Châtelet.

justification ' of the propositions— from religion, from established public opinions, and from his own thinking predecessors .

He is, therefore, known as the general introducer of the hypothetical method, ' hypothesis ', presupposition!

Either one starts from known 'hypotheses', like the mathematicians of his time, and reasons deductively ('synthetically' in his language), or one seeks— from one's own or others' theorems—the still (at least partially) unknown 'hypotheses' ('analytically' in his language), -- which in the language of Jan Lukasiewicz would be called ¹⁰the ' reductive method'. — One may perhaps see the striking resemblance to Kant.

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Note: -- Do not think for a moment that a serious man like I. Kant was unaware of the dangers inherent in independently thinking 'reason'. –

In a text cited by H. Barth (Faculty Struggle), the great Enlightenment thinker says: “whoever leaves behind the wall of the sole saving church-bound faith enters the open field, the free field, of his own judgment and philosophy.”

Once he has escaped the control of the clerics, he is exposed there to all the dangers of anarchy.”

What a number of liberals, who invoke the Kantian 'critical spirit' for example at will, seem to forget.

'Reason' as the supreme court.

Let us now examine in more detail the Kantian manner of conducting foundational research. – Our era – says Kant – is the true era of criticism, – through autonomous (independently thinking) reason. Everything ought to submit to it. –

¹⁰ Jan Lukasiewicz (1878/1956), Polish mathematician and logician. Devised three-valued logic (something is true, false, or indecisive). Performed work in the field of the history of logic, focusing on Aristotle's syllogistics.

a. Transitive criticism. -- Religion, by virtue of its 'holiness': -- legislation, by virtue of its 'majesty' (*note*: inviolable authority), -- they usually wish to evade critical examination. Precisely for this reason, they arouse justified suspicion. Precisely for this reason, they cannot lay claim to undivided appreciation. 'Reason' bestows appreciation only upon what survives free and open scrutiny. –

Note: -- Compare with Plato's objects of foundational inquiry: religion, established public opinion (not infrequently the basis of legislators). –

b. The loop-shaped (reflexive) criticism. – 'Reason' is itself in search of truth. It ought, therefore, in all that it undertakes, to subject itself to scrutiny—free, open scrutiny. If an independently thinking enlightened mind fails to do this, then he too cannot count on undivided appreciation. He makes himself suspect. –

Note: -- Compare with Plato's criticisms directed at a number of predecessors in philosophy. –

Kant's conclusion. -- Nothing is so 'sacred' (inviolable, -- (to use a term from the history of religion) 'taboo' to scrutiny), nothing possesses such utility value that it may evade foundational research. –

A form of research ' historia ', Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/ -425; father of historical research), would say, who – according to Kant – knows “no favoritism”.

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GW Hegel (9/10)

Hegel¹¹ (1770/1831) , the leading figure of so-called German (= 'absolute') idealism, as H. Barth consistently puts it - likewise sees it in a twofold manner.

¹¹ *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a German idealist philosopher, is one of the central representatives of German idealism. He was friends with Hölderlin, Schelling, and Goethe. He is the author of *Phenomenologie des Geistes* (1818) and was rector of the University of Berlin. Hegel viewed reality not as static but as dynamic, in which new contradictions are constantly resolved. The key word here is 'resolve' (the German *aufheben*), which means to lift up, abolish, and preserve. During the dialectical process, something (for example, a moment) is first posited, then denied, in order to finally arrive at a higher truth. Earlier, Fichte used the concepts of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis for this, which he in turn had borrowed from Kant, and which were later adopted by the Marxists. The Spirit developed from subjective Spirit (the individual human*

-On the one hand 'the positive'. -- The young Hegel attached the term 'emphatic' to it.

(' positiv ') is given a distinctive meaning. Is 'positive' all that in fact exists, indeed, is established (traditionally), insofar as it claims to be imperishable, 'holy' ('taboo: 'inviolable') and an object of veneration, and persists in this, if necessary by violent means that, for example, inhibit freely testing foundational research. -- In this context, Hegel is thinking, for example, of all that the 18th-century enlightened minds called 'prejudices', 'superstition', 'philosophical dogmatism'.

On the other hand, philosophy as critique. -- The later Hegel—according to H. Barth—says that philosophy is essentially 'critical': starting from a 'Masz' (measure, norm, namely the legitimate order of things), it subjects all that is 'positive' to a value assessment. Moreover: 'philosophy'—in the eyes of the 'involved' Hegel ('involved' in the sense of 'engaging in society')—is, first of all, theoretical, but, secondly, practical: only the practical philosopher is the true thinker.

In other words: just as with very many ancient Greek thinkers, among whom certainly Plato, philosophizing was only fully valid when it was ethical-political (concerning both morals and society), so too with Hegel: Hegel, for example, does not hesitate to address matters of conscience and political affairs.

Note: -- One can see it: just like Kant, a duality, but in partially different terms.

Note: -- H. Barth draws attention to a text on the history of philosophy by Hegel. -- To properly understand his text, first this: Patristics (33/800; the philosophy of the Church Fathers) and medieval Scholasticism (800/1450; the philosophy of ecclesiastical theologians) were types of philosophy that were, in fact, theological philosophy. –

being) to objective Spirit (in history, the world spirit) to Absolute Spirit (in art, religion, and science). The '(World) Spirit' reached its full unfolding upon attaining 'the Truth' or 'the Absolute' (knowledge). Hegel's followers split into Left-Hegelians and Right-Hegelians. Ludwig Feuerbach (see p. 11) became a Left-Hegelian. The Right-Hegelians remained faithful to traditional Hegelian ideas.

Descartes changes this: as a layman he thinks theology-free, -- and now Hegel. -- for the first time since the Neoplatonic school (-50/+600; a pagan reaction against the encroaching Christianity of patristics), we come with

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René Descartes (1596/1650; Discours de la méthode -- pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences (1637), the founder of modern philosophy - rightly in independent thinking philosophy.

vernunft ' (reason) in an independent ('autonomous': church- and theology-free) manner .

-- It knows very well that self-conscious thinking is an essential characteristic ('moment', the movable element, says Hegel) is of the truth,

-- that Hegel, when he says 'autonomous' just like Descartes, means 'theology-free', becomes clear where he says: philosophy, with Descartes, enters its own, its own domain; with this, it completely abandons philosophizing theology, -- and this on principle (this as one of the basic presuppositions).

With Descartes—according to Hegel—we experience the beginning of that formation of the thinking mind which is typical of the 'new age' (understand: the modern period).

Note: This tendency, articulated here for the umpteenth time (e.g. by Hegel), is called 'laicism' (lay thinking, -- not without a sometimes very strong anti-clerical connotation). -- Which is not quite the same as 'desacralization', 'desecration', or, as it were, 'secularism' (worldliness).

Hegel, although free of theology, nevertheless remains strongly 'sacred', in the broader sense of the word. Only actual 'nihilism' (the fact that one interprets all higher ideas, ideals, and values as no higher, but as a cover for 'lower desires') will thoroughly desecrate. The latter will be addressed, for example, by Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) and his interpreter, Martin Heidegger (1899/1976).

Chapter 1. -- the modern. 'New' dialectics.

H. Barth does not elaborate on the very precise manner in which philosophy processes the dismantling of tradition, la déconstruction de la tradition (to use J. Derrida's words), hand in hand with the revolution.

One of these reworkings is called "the new dialectics" (we borrow the term from P. Foulquié , **La dialectique** , Paris, 1949, 41/122 (** la dialectique nouvelle **)) which exhibits two types, a philosophical one (e.g. Hegel) and a scientific one (e.g. Bachelard, Gonseth).

However, by way of introduction, a striking text by a philosophical dialectician, Friedrich Engels.

IA11

1.1. Reasonableness and reality (11/23)

What is reasonable is 'real' and what is 'real' is reasonable.

(11/ 23) Fr. Engels ¹²(1820/1895) is, along with Karl Marx ¹³(1818/1883), the founder of scientific socialism, -- both theoretically and practically. In his *Ludwig Feuerbach¹⁴ und der Ausgang der Klassischen Germans In *Philosophy** , Stuttgart, 1888, 1, he connects to that Hegelian thesis.

She comes from Hegel's *Basic principles of the philosophy of right Natural law and State Science Treasure in grundrisse* , Vorrede : "Was clever ist , das ist really und was wirklich ist , das ist rational ." -- Since Marx and Engels were both scientific and philosophical dialecticians when they re-established

¹² Friedrich Engels was a German industrialist, social scientist, author, political theorist, philosopher, and co-author of *The Communist Manifesto* with Karl Marx.

¹³ Karl Marx, a German thinker with great influence on political, philosophical, and economic fields. Founder of the labor movement, socialism, and communism. Works: *Das Kapital*, and, together with F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. Marxism is based on their ideas.

¹⁴ Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804/1872) was a German philosopher. He argued that God is a projection of man, an illusion he elaborates in his **Das Wesen des Christentums** (1841) and which influenced Marx. Feuerbach belonged to the Left Hegelians. They appreciated Hegel's dialectics, but not his idealism and metaphysics. Hegel wrote that God became alienated from Himself when He created man. Feuerbach reversed the claim. He wrote that man became alienated from himself when he created God. He even claimed that belief in God and the Holy Family is the cause of all disharmony on earth. For Feuerbach, the soul is the product of the complex functioning of the brain, which is the subject of physiology.

socialism, primarily in its communist form, we enter simultaneously both into the generally defined dialectic and into one of its most particular forms.

English begins by pointing out two interpretations. –

a.-- For example, Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770/1840) – as well as most of his subjects – interpreted the slogan – for that was what Hegel's thesis had in fact become – as a way to the canonization of the established political order (= despotism (Ia 04: the French absolute monarchs, for example), the police state, the judicial powers, censorship).

Note: -- We have just read the texts of Hegel: it is a true mystery how people like the Prussian prince, and also many Germans of that time, can give an interpretation that is diametrically opposed to the real one. Is our distinction, regarding the attribution of meaning, between conception of meaning and founding of meaning brilliantly applicable here? He who interprets in a diametrically opposed way, interprets as a founder of meaning, -- not as a conceptor of meaning.

b.-- Hegel himself—according to Engels—interpreted it as follows. -- For Hegel, there was a strict distinction between merely factually existing, 'established', on the one hand, and 'real' on the other. -- Yet again, one of those idiosyncratic word interpretations, of which many thinkers attest, of course. Although, this time, Hegel aligns with a pre-philosophical usage. –

Consider an aging headmaster who is beginning to show signs of senility: is it not said, at a certain point, that “his policy has become unreal”? That is: no longer aligned with the factual data. Well, keep this in mind, and you will understand the following very well.

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Engels comments -: “for Hegel, not everything that actually exists (is established) is simply 'real' “is 'real'

- (1) all that actually exists (such as all that we call 'established tradition'),
- (2) to the extent necessary. –

Note: -- Hegel's type of deduction comes down to this:

1. There is a totality of data,
2. Within that totality there are, in principle, an infinite number of 'moments', di elements-in-motion;

3. Prioritize the totality, and you can deduce every moment (element in the process) from it and thus make it understandable.

Once any moment is deducible, by reason, dialectical reason, then it is necessary. -- One sees it: just as the senile director became 'unreal', so too do all moments within the dialectical totality, as soon as they are no longer 'deducible' (= necessary) from that totality.

- **Note:** -- Situational thinking. -- Hegel is a thoroughly enlightened rationalist. And yet: a part of Romanticism has been integrated by him (just as a Rousseau, who was a thoroughly enlightened rationalist, nevertheless, as a sentimentalist, combined an initial Romanticism with a rationalism; Ia 04).

The Romantics placed life (as history, a fabric of changed situations) at the center. Hegel incorporated this perfectly—without falling into 'irrationalism'.

Engels continues. - Some application models. –

1. Model. -- The Republic in Rome (founded in -509, by a revolution against the ruler, Tarquinius superbus) is 'real' (corresponding to the totality - or quasi-totality (human totalities are always quasi- totalities) of the situation (= totality of circumstances) --

2. Counter-model. -- Yet in 27 BC, after a long struggle, Octavian receives from the (republican) Senate the title of 'Augustus' (thereby becoming ' princeps ', -- which in our usage is called 'emperor'), -- a title that passes to all subsequent emperors.

Reason: the Senate, although republican, realized that the republican form of government had become 'unreal'.

1. Model. -- The French monarchy was founded, with the cooperation of the early medieval clergy, by Chlodwig (Clovis; 481/511), founder of the Merovingian dynasty. It was, in a Hegelian dialectical sense, 'real'. –

2. Counter-model. In the 18th century (1680/1715; Ia 01v.) it begins to become 'unreal', until, in 1789, it is replaced by the ' République Française'.

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Conclusion. -- The changeable situations involve model/countermodel, i.e., in antique

Greek terms 'harmony of opposites' (i.e., the intertwining of model and counter-model). -- In modern dialectical language: reversal.

What, for example, in political terms, can be a 'revolution'. 'Real' is 'reasonable' (Better: rationally justifiable). –

English continues.

a. Thus, in the course of the development (process), all that was former becomes 'unreal', for it loses its 'necessity'—understand: the rational justification of its right to exist, its 'reasonableness'.

b. In place of the dying reality (which is another word for 'unreality'), comes a new, 'vibrant' reality.

This, -- In a peaceful manner, if 'the old' is wise enough to vanish with death without resistance; In a violent manner, if it resists the new necessity.

A revolutionary philosophy.

-- Always English.

-- 1. All that is 'real' within human history becomes, over time, 'unreal', 'unreasonable' (no longer justifiable),

-- 2. Whatever is 'reasonable' in the minds of men is destined to one day become 'real' (*note*: here Engels uses the term 'real' in the sense of 'actually realized', of course). -- Even if it comes into contradiction ('contradiction') with the established order—which in appearance is still 'real'.

Engels—without saying it explicitly—quotes Mephistopheles' words (in Goethe's *Faust*): “all that exists is worthy of destruction”. In this precisely—says Engels—lies the true scope of the Hegelian dialectic of history: it is thoroughly revolutionary philosophy. For it puts an end—once and for all—to the 'definitive' ('positive' (Ia 09)) character of all products of human thought.

The Hegelian dialectical concept of truth. –

a. Prior to Hegel. -- 'Truth' is a collection of 'finished' (dogmatic (Ia 06: metaphysics)) statements, which, once formulated, merely had to be memorized. –

b. Since Hegel. – 'Truth' is merely the process of knowing itself, which undergoes a long development in the course of human history. 'Science', the hobbyhorse of modern philosophers since Descartes, is a process. Not a set of truths, fixed once and for all and passed on authoritatively. –

The 'truth' concerning reality (here in a broad ontological sense) ascends, in principle, from step to step, ever higher—without ever reaching a so-called endpoint by finding an 'absolute truth' (understand: a system that would encompass all definitive truths).

Every phase (= phaseological aspect) is 'necessary' (because 'rational') and thus 'real' (in the dialectical sense of “deducible from the totality”), -- at least as long as the time during which the circumstances (= situation) remain the same lasts, for to this it owes its 'origin': -- a 'chronology' or theory of time is inherent to every dialectic in the Hegelian sense. -- Rise and fall are, as it were, lawful.

The economic base. -- according to Engels. –

The analogy.

-- **(a)** the Western European bourgeoisie (meaning: the capitalist upper class), through big industry, competition, and the world market, causes all steadfast institutions, considered 'inviolable' since ancient times, to practically evaporate.

-- **(b)** Hegelian dialectics, by designating nothing as 'sacred' (understand: definitive truth), causes all representations that articulate so-called 'definitive', 'absolute' truth, as well as all situations that correspond to such definitive representations, to theoretically evaporate into all that exists. Hegelian dialectics thus exposes transience.

Conservative/revolutionary.

Engels emphasizes this: there is, indeed, a conservative side to Hegel's dialectics; namely, it acknowledges the right to exist of well-defined phases of knowledge (science) and of society—within the time in which they are rationally deducible.

But the conservative is relative (limited), the revolutionary, on the other hand, is absolute (unlimited). “The only absolute that it tolerates,” says Engels.

Systems thinking. (p. 14/16).

We saw it: the totality—of all moments—is decisive. Hegel therefore attempted in all his works to construct a total philosophy of all that ever evolved.

Just as ephemeral as all human works is, of course, Hegel's work. And, just as Plato's work gave rise to more than one interpretation, so too does Hegel's work. Which does not prevent a minimal and essential coherence from existing in both of them, of course.

-- *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807). --

Engels states that a parallel (= analogy) can be found in the embryology (individual development) and the paleontology (collective development) of life forms, but, in Hegel, that individual and collective development applies to the individual 'spirit' (e.g. in every human being) and the collective 'spirit' (humanity as a whole).

Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of spirit . In his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel outlines the developmental trajectory of the (individual and especially collective) spirit of humanity throughout all—known to him—phases of culture: the spirit, which, for Hegel, coincides with God, reveals itself in the phenomena, i.e., the cultural products, that every cultural period produces.

Note: -- Do not confuse Hegel's 'phenomenology' with, for example, that of Edmund Husserl (the latter is purely descriptive and presupposes, for instance, no 'spirit' ('God') appearing in the phenomena).

-- *Logic, -- Naturphilosophie , Philosophie des Geistes . --*

'God' - a very unclear and highly controversial concept in Hegel

- 1.** begins as the absolute idea (= concept of the universe);
- 2.** thanks to his transformation in nature (again a very unclear and highly contentious concept in Hegel) God becomes alienated from himself (becomes different, indeed, another),
- 3** .but God returns to himself again—from the alienation from nature—by becoming spirit (the third very unclear and highly contentious concept in Hegel).

Logically, from a natural-philosophical perspective, and from a spiritual-philosophical perspective , God 'develops' himself in reality.

This concept of God is, of course, anything but Biblical. This ambiguous concept of God led to Hegel being interpreted as atheistic at times and as God-believing in one sense or another at other .

Philosophy of history. –

The third aspect of God's 'development', the fact that he becomes 'spirit' in human products of the mind, is detailed—as Engels rightly says—by Hegel in a multitude of partial works: philosophy of history and history of philosophy, -- philosophy of law, of religion, of art, -- ed.

IA16

English: In all those cultural-historical fields, Hegel attempted to find the thread of development and provide proof thereof. His encyclopedic scholarship—his information (as one would say now)—meant that he created, as it were, a gold mine of cultural-historical knowledge—with very original insights.

Note: - Even now, entire sections of his work are more than worth reading, -- insofar as one can - what is called in English - 'violent' Konstruktionen ' (constructions that do violence to the data), more or less present everywhere, banishes.

Those constructions are the result of Hegel's systems thinking: he wants to mold total reality (his Logic, Natural Philosophy, and Philosophy of Spirit are, in fact, an ontology) into a single form. – “With all philosophers,” according to Engels, “it is precisely the 'system' that is ephemeral.” Which, oh, is very true.

Engels' value judgment (p. 16/17).

Besides the value judgments, already expressed above, one more thing.

A. -- philosophical. -- instead of wanting to construct an absolute system, as Hegel (who surpassed virtually all previous thinkers in this) attempted to do, Engels, along with Marx, abandons this imaginary objective. –

Let us first seek —thanks to the positive sciences—the 'relative' truths within our reach (“die erreichbaren ”). relat Truths ”) up. –

Note: -- We would call this method the method of inductive sampling, -- whether or not positive-scientific (pre-scientific knowledge can be very sound).

In this way, one arrives at a number of partial truths, which can be recorded in a summary.

-- **Note:** -- Auguste Comte (1798/1857; following in the footsteps of J.L. D'Alembert (1717/1783; with D. Diderot (1713/1784), publisher of L'Encyclopédie), father of positivism) devised something analogous to yank traditional philosophy out of its negative stage. 'Philosophy' then becomes that summary of as many 'positive truths' as possible.

Engels retains Hegel's dialectical schema, -- to give that summary a 'form'.

-- **Note:** -- for Comte, the 'form' of that summary was sociology. In this respect, French positivism clearly differs from German Hegelian or Marxist dialectics.

IA17

A second philosophical critique by Engels is this: – The picture (understand the description) that Engels gives of Hegel's dialectics – of which we gave a summary Ia 11ff. – is a deduction from Hegel's method (namely, the dialectical method). – But – according to Engels – Hegel as a system builder has himself betrayed that method.

(i) In his *Logic*, truth coincides with the endless process itself (idea (= logical), nature (= alienation), spirit (= self-becoming)) -- with all its cultural-historical phases.

(ii) but his actual 'system', in its elaborated form, does show an end to the process.

Thus Hegel himself asserts that 'God' (= that absolute idea) ought to be realized in the monarchy of Friedrich Wilhelm III (Ia 11), based on a society of estates. This monarch—according to Engels—stubbornly promised such a monarchy of estates, but, otherwise, in vain.

It comes down to this: 'God' becomes 'phenomenon' (visible) in the German, petty-bourgeois conditions of the time. The rule of the propertied classes adapted to this: it was limited and moderate, -- that 'rule'. Moreover, Hegel attempts to 'prove' (to 'deduce' (Ia 12)) that the nobility was likewise 'necessary'. –

Note: -- Whether Hegel saw the endpoint of the universe's process in this is debatable. It is possible that Hegel simply deduced from the then-current, transient situation. – But for an Engels, who desired a positive-scientific philosophy (and not a merely Hegelian-speculative one) and fought for an ideal, classless society, the fact that Hegel's 'God' ends up in such a petty-bourgeois class system is a mere pitiful affair.

-- (B). – Scientific ('positive'). -

Hegel's concept of an 'endless process' is, from a natural scientific perspective, open to debate. -- The natural science of Engels' time (1888) certainly foresaw an end: the earth, for example, can perish, -- or at least it is “fairly certain” that its habitability will come to an end. -

Engels' conclusion: if (note that deliberately chosen conditional sentence) this scientific outlook is true, then the history of humanity exhibits not only an upward trend (as Hegel's optimism claimed), but also a downward trend. -
- Engels' dialectic is scientifically substantiated.

IA18

Karl Marx on 'universals' (general concepts) (p. 18/20).

As is well known, 'universals' (the scholastic- medieval term for general understanding (= universal collection)) have been a controversial subject among the ancient Greeks since Protosophism (-450/-350).

Mobilism or the philosophy of change, present in all modern dialectics, gives the impression that from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture—everything is changeable and that no general concepts apply. Reread what Engels says about the Hegelian method, and you will have the impression that everything, absolutely everything, is 'different' from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture.

Let us now listen to his friend and kindred spirit— 'hetairos', the archaic Milesians would have said— *Karl Marx*—in a text of his, * *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Berlin, 1953 (posthumous), p. 7 (*Introduction*), -- a draft that discusses the concept of 'production' (a fundamental concept in economics) speaks a different language to us. –

(1) -- a sensible abstraction. –

Here is how we summarize the first part of Marx's text. – “'Production' in general is an abstraction, but a sensible abstraction, insofar as it truly (*note:*

we would now say 'verifiable') brings out the common, fixes it, and immediately spares us the repetition”.

Note: -- When one sees Marx writing like this, one imagines him a pupil of Aristotle, the abstractionist : a general concept is a representation of characteristics that a collection of data has in common; precisely because of this, it is 'abstract', a model of the original, the multiplicity of data. - Marx emphasizes the parsimonious aspect.

Meanwhile, this general—or the common self separated by comparison—is a multiply articulated thing, that something that can be split into a multitude of characteristics.

Some of those characteristics belong to all periods; others are a common feature of only a part of the periods. -- A part of the characteristics, therefore, will be a common feature of both the modern period and the oldest periods. One cannot imagine 'production' without that.” -

Note: -- The novelty in contrast to Aristotle with his theory of abstraction does not lie in the comparative method, by which the general is revealed. It lies in the diachronic comparison,

IA19

who analyzes the development of modes of production throughout the sequence of cultural periods and ...perceives, amidst all differences, also identical characteristics, -- so much so that one cannot conceive of 'production' without that universal quality that sustains itself through the diachrony. –

Marx, as a true thinker, speaks of the very conceivability of production, whereby the essential form, i.e. the distinguishability, of all that is called 'production', comes clearly before our mind.

But let us listen further. For here, Marx uses, indeed, a Platonic term, namely “production without further ado” (that suffix 'without further ado' appears more than once in main texts of Plato , -- to denote the idea (e.g. of production)). –

(...) “the characteristics that apply unconditionally to production must be precisely separated, so that, notwithstanding the unity (*note:* the ancient term

for 'similarity'), which is already evident from the fact that the subject, humanity, and the object, nature (*note*: Marx views 'production' as the working of nature outside of man by man), are the same—the essential diversity is not forgotten.

In this forgetting lies, for example, the entire 'wisdom' of modern economists, insofar as they 'prove' the 'eternity' and the 'harmony' of existing social relations.

Note: Another difference with the abstractionist Aristotle is revealed here: where Aristotle (and certainly the classical tradition) emphasizes immutability, Marx, as a dialectician amidst all immutability (which he does not deny), emphasizes change, the process. Cf. Ia 13ff. –

Conclusion : Marx outlines a dialectical theory of abstraction for us here.

Note: -- We have placed the terms 'wisdom', 'eternity', and 'harmony' in quotation marks. Why? Because Marx is apparently being ironic here: as a dialectician , he sees the differences all too clearly from period to period (Ia 14: chronology), and for him, the 'eternal' (understand: unchanged, indeed, unchangeable) is a partial distortion of the facts. 'Harmony' in a society experiencing class struggle is, for Marx, a beautiful word.

-- (2). -- **An example.** –

Marx now gives us a sample of his economic analysis. -- “No production is possible without an instrument of production, even if this instrument were only the hand. -- No (production) possible

IA20

without past, accumulated labor, even if this labor were merely the skill which, in the hand of the 'savage' (*note*: the enlightened-rational word for archaic or primitive man), has been gathered and concentrated through repeated practice – Capital is, among other things, also a tool of production, also past, 'objectified' (*note*: fixed in an object) labor. –

Thus, capital is a general, 'eternal' relationship of production. This means: if I omit precisely the specific, which, precisely, is what makes 'instrument of production', 'accumulated labor', into capital.

Note: -- One senses that Marx, in order to establish his 'Marxism' as a theory, needs basic concepts with universal scope. Take, for example, the idea of 'production'. To ensure that this theoretical idea is validly defined, he restricts it to its 'thinkability'—or, as he also says in Kantian terms, its 'possibility'. — For instance, in his interpretation, naturally, is 'production' possible (understand: thinkable) without an instrument? Answer: no. Consequence: throughout all cultural epochs, however different they may be, in order to find 'production', one must immediately also identify 'instruments of production'.

As in Platonic dialectics, so too here, in the new dialectics of a Marx: one concept merges with the other. One can distinguish one concept from the other (essence), but one cannot separate the two (cohesion). In Platonism, this is called the 'dieretic -synoptic method'.

For example: Is 'production' possible (conceivable) without accumulated, objectified labor? Answer: No. Consequence: throughout all cultural periods—if one wishes to analyze production—one must invariably also be able to identify 'accumulated labor'. Otherwise, one is not dealing with true 'production', but with something else.

Once again an application of the Platonic 'dieretic -synoptic method' regarding conceptual analysis. –

Conclusion . -- Engels, Marx, -- they were men of praxis. But look closely: as true Enlightened rationalists, they believe that praxis, if it is to be 'enlightened' (illuminated by reason), prioritizes theorizing.

Here, in this remaining draft, we find a beautiful appliqué model of Marxist theory formation. Theory formation that refers to conceivability (= essential form, universal idea).

IA21

Marxism and 'physicism' (belief in nature). (21)

A. Braeckman, *The French Revolution Critically Reimagined (on Marx and the cuckoo's egg of liberal historiography)*, in: *Streven* 1989:7 (April), 642/654, -- following up therein with G. Comninel, *Rethinking the French revolution (Marxism and the revisionist challenge)*, London/New York, 1987, distinguishes—quite rightly—liberal materialism (understand: materialism

advocating free-market economics) and socialist (understand: advocating guided economy) materialism (ac , 649ff.).

For example, both types of materialism denote 'progress' (a 18th- century Enlightenment favorite theme) as a result of class struggle. But, when it comes to the idea of 'property', Marxists and liberals differ, of course.

We are interested, now, here, in the true nature of that difference of opinion. This is because it is fundamental and has a dialectical scope.

1. The 18th- century materialists, who championed the propertied class—the so-called Liberals—situated the premise of the right to existence (Ia 13: 'reasonableness') of actual property in “human nature”. This 'nature' (from the Latin 'natura', a literal translation of the Greek ' fisis ') was conceived as general and universal, inherent to all people, at least in principle.

Since ' fisis ', 'natura', nature, was something normative, governing, and, thus, a rule for behavior, “to possess property”, insofar as it is rooted in such nature, was 'inviolable', the basis of legal order. The 18th- century thinkers therefore call 'property' “a natural thing”.

2. The Marxists, insofar as they were socialists and thus challengers of established property relations, were of the opinion that actual property is merely (listen closely to that 'merely') the result of historically grown, indeed, malformed developments of all kinds. For Karl Marx, in particular, that malformation consisted in the relations of exploitation at work in the production process. –

Decision. –

(i) The owning class, through the liberal materialists, is physicist , i.e., believer in nature.

(ii) The dispossessed , as exemplified by the socialist-minded Marx, is historicist , i.e., faithful to history. The difference is immediately clear: a historical- dialecticist like Marx had the process in mind. The liberals prioritized nature.

IA22

Our first ideology analysis (22/)

Much has already been written about the term 'ideology'. There is more than one definition, of course. -- Let us bring some order to this tangle of ideology analyses. –

1. In older works, 'ideology' is the same as 'science of ideas' (where the term 'idea' is either Platonic or Patronizing (and thus represents the preposition of the universal and higher (immaterial) in singular phenomena (= data, 'facts')) or modern (especially since the 16th century (and thus "representation within our consciousness"). –

In short: Platonically, an idea is a preposition of facts. In modern nominalism, an idea is a representation in our mind. -- 'Ideology' is then the theory concerning the 'ideas' designated in such and such a way.

– 2. -- In more recent works, the non-Platonic view predominates: 'ideology' is a system of ideas or representations that is presented as the justification for the existence of facts, but in fact does not represent those same facts, or does not represent them entirely accurately. -- The dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, for example, offers us one model of this more recent definition.

(i) Every cultural system—religion, philosophy, morality, political science, etc.—that presents itself as 'reasonable' (Ia 13: justification), as a right to exist, but in fact formulates the material situation (the economic relations of exploitation turned upside down) into a type of theory, is typically 'ideological'.

(ii) Applied: it is clear that the theory, the attempt at justification, of the liberal materialists regarding the legal basis of factual property does indeed speak of 'human nature' (the right to existence), but in fact obscures—'displaces', 'suppresses' (as we might say with the Freudians)—the process of exploitation at work in the historical growth of that property.

Such a 'theoretical justification' is, in Marx's eyes, an ideology. That is: a system of ideas or representations that is ostensibly high, indeed venerable, theory, but is in fact based on barely concealed self-interest.

From a linguistic analytical perspective: one speaks of 'nature' so as not to have to speak of '(exploitation) process'. It is a form of rhetorical speech: by diverting attention, one attempts to maintain unlawful situations, indeed, to give them a semblance of legitimacy.

IA23

The idea 'nature' and the idea 'process' (23/)

We can now conclude this short chapter. -- On the one hand, we saw—particularly based on Engels' account of Hegelian dialectics—the enormous

emphasis placed on the idea of 'process' (change, mutability). On the other hand, we also saw—in two ways—the emphasis on the idea of 'nature' (just now with the conservative, liberal materialists, but shortly before also with Karl Marx, where he attempts to prepare the nature of production, with its immutable essence ("production simply"), free from the mass of historical facts). –

Physicism , process thinking . –

Behold the bipolar tension between which our thoughts are stretched when we analyze modern thought a little more deeply.

Note: -- This justifies - Ia 01 - the fact that we have chosen 'tradition and revolution' as the main theme. The traditional person will readily speak of the 'eternal nature' of things. The revolutionary person, on the other hand, prefers to speak of 'change', 'changeability'.

After we have dwelled extensively on mobilism (= process thinking), and on Hegel, Marx, and Engels (the dialectical form of mobilism), we will briefly define in more detail what the term 'nature' might mean in everyday language.

(1). -- Since both ' fisis ' (according to W. Jaeger, Archaic Greek, identical with 'genesis', origin, literally: birth) and 'natura' mean the process of origin and the process of birth, respectively, it is plausible that 'nature' means: the essential nature of something, insofar as this determines the life process by virtue of birth, --

(2). -- Since, in archaic cultures, the origin, which is active and manifests itself in the birth, the creation of something, is central - the myths are frequently texts narrating origins and thus the nature (being form) of something - it is plausible that 'nature' means: the programming which directs, 'guides', the life course of something from birth, i.e. from the origin causing that birth (control-related or cybernetic definition of 'nature'). One might also say: nature as norm. Among other things, of the process that is provided for in that nature from the very beginning. –

Conclusion . - One should not too readily see an absolute contradiction between nature and process. In fact, they are related (Ia 20) concepts.

1.2. -- The idea 'dialectics' (24/)

Let us begin with a bibliographic sample. –

-- P. Foulquié , *La dialectique* , Paris, 1949 (a well-documented and comprehensive overview, -- on the old dialectics (from Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/465)) up to German (absolute) idealism (especially Hegel)), -- then on the new dialectics (both purely philosophical and scientific)), --

-- A. Marc et al., *Aspects de la dialectique (recherches de philosophie , II)* , Paris, 1956 (a number of contributors on aspects),

-- D. Dubarle / A. Doz , *logique et dialectique* , Paris, 1972 (logistic research concerning the purely logical value of especially Hegel's dialectics), --

-- W. Biemel , *das wesen der dialectetik bei Hegel und Sartre* , in: tijdschr. v. Filos ., 20 (1958): 2, 269/300 (in Hegel, dialectics is an entire ontology; in Sartre, it is merely a characteristic of our human consciousness);

-- *Dialectica* 57/58, Neuchâtel (Ch), 1961 (gives an idea of what dialectical thinking, -- here especially regarding the limits of our knowledge (including scientific knowledge), can investigate), -- particularly regarding Hegel:

-- GA Van den bergh van Eysenga , *Hegel* , The Hague, sd . (the great stages of Hegel's life, -- by a Hegelian);

-- R. Serreau , *Hegel et l'hégélianisme* , Paris, 1965-2 (a view, from, on the enormous influence of Hegel);

-- H. Arvon , *le Marxisme* , Paris, 1960-2 (especially oc,11/40 (*la dialectique*); also oc,41/68 (l'aliénation (note: 'alienation: usually 'alienation'))).

Note: -- Part 1, just before this, gave us insight into the method, especially logical (think of the Hegelian deduction (Ia, 12), which forms the core part) of a dialectician like Hegel (and also Engels or Marx). -- This chapter aims to proceed in a clear and organized manner.

1.2.1. The four main prepositions. (24/ 59).

1.2.1.1. First principle. (24/28).

To properly understand how the new dialectics came into being, one should start from the idea of 'mathesis universalis ' (all-encompassing structure of reasoning).

1. Besides Plato of Athens (-427/-347), with his aim of a stoicheiosis , elementatio , systematic analysis of factors, conceived hypothetically (expressible in conditional sentences), there are the following thinkers:

Galen of Pergamon (129/201; physician) wanted, at some point, to prepare a comprehensive reasoning structure . -- *Raymundus Lullus* (Ramon Lull (1235/ 1315), with his *ars generalis* ,

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He, in turn, as a Neoplatonist , advocates an analogous theory of order . -- Ordering, orderly thinking, is, after all, central to such attempts.

2. With René Descartes (1596/1650), the founder of modern, Enlightened-rational thought, a new approach to harmology , or the theory of order, begins.

Library st.:

-- *EW Beth, the philosophy of mathematics (from Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antw./ Nijmegen, 1944, 93/117 (*R. Descartes*);

-- *M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses (une archéologie des sciences humaines)*, Paris, 1966, 64/72 (*l'ordre*).-

Beth, oc 103, says: “The mathesis universalis , which Descartes wanted to construct as a generalization (*note*: generalization) of analysis and algebra, had to be at the same time an ars disserendi (*note*: a method of exposition) and an ars inveniendi (*note*: an inventive or heuristic method). In doing so, he adopts, once again, an idea that had already been adopted much earlier by Raymundus. Lullus was defended.” –

(i) A letter from Descartes to Mersenne (November 20, 1629) explains this. -- Descartes contemplates the invention of a kind of Esperanto , a constructed language. Just like Plato , with his linguistic stoicheosis , he sets out how the word stems of a universal language (and the corresponding characters) ought to be composed.

Note well: in Descartes, there is a kind of mathematism : the numerals and numbers serve him as models in the construction of that general language.

(ii) Beth: “One should establish an order among human thoughts, just as exists—by nature—among numbers. Then one could construct a language that could be learned in a very short time.” (Beth, oc,103).

Foucault wishes to deny that Descartes took a mathematical approach: this, however, seems undeniable.

(iii) Beth: “Only true philosophy, however, would make the execution of this plan possible. For only it enables us to distinguish, enumerate, and arrange human thoughts.” (Ibid.).

It is evident that Descartes' ideal was, indeed, a total philosophy based on a mathematical model.

(iv) Beth: “If one were ever to have at one’s disposal an inventory (*note*: a summative induction, a collection) of the simple representations (*note*: 'Ideas' in Cartesian language), from which all

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if thoughts are added together, then a universal language would be possible, which would support judgment to such an extent that error would be almost impossible.
(ibid.).

Here we have the lifeblood of modern enlightened rationalism: gaining a grip, via sign systems designed according to a mathematical model (language is a system of signs), on human thought in its totality—and doing so in such a way that, reasoning quasi-mechanically, one excludes all errors. A kind of reasoning machine, then.

Think of our current computers. This is the modern ideal of science. And also the modern ideal of philosophy.

Beth, oc, 104, says that in his *géométrie* Descartes realized a specimen (= applicative model) of his mathesis universalis , “from which the fruitfulness of his ideas can be seen”.

-- One can put it even more broadly: in 1637 *Discours de la méthode (pour bien) appears to carry out the research and study of the sciences , plus the dioptries , the metres , and the geometry , sont les essais de cette méthode)* , -- a thick book of 527 pages, like *Alexandre Koyré , Introduction à la lecture de Platon* , -- *suivi de entretiens rightly notes regarding Descartes*, Paris, 1962,

166. The exposition ('discourse') on the method, on which he held such great esteem, is dominated by Descartes' idea of 'mathesis universalis '. As we will specify further on.

M. Foucault , **Les mots et les choses **, 70, states that neither the mechanism (conceiving reality as a device, 'machine') nor *mathematization* (reality, in the sense of that of the physics of his day ('mathematical physics')) are essential to the Enlightened rationalists, but rather the **mathesis universalis **, -- understood as “ science” universelle de (la mesure et de) l'ordre ” (oc, *ibid*), as Descartes designed them.

Even measurability (one of the mathematizations to which reality is subjected), by means of a measure (measurement model), is merely one application of general order theory. -- From this arise, then,

1. general grammar ('grammaire générale'; think of our linguistics),
 2. natural history (think of our biology) and
 3. the analysis of riches ('analyse des richesses '); think of our economy), -
- all three applications of the theory of order.

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Note: -- (1) The term “(thinking) machine” can be defined in two ways. –

a. Is 'machine' a material system whose changes of state—thanks to the regularity revealed by mechanics (theory of motion)—in a broader sense: revealed by natural science regarding inorganic nature—are predictable? The mechanics understand the term in this way.

b. Is 'machine' defined as a material system whose state changes are predictable (= mechanistic aspect) -- designed, manufactured, and used as a tool by humans (think of the term 'apparatus') -- The opponents of modern mechanism , such as the German biologist-philosopher *Hans Driesch* (1867/1941; *Geschichte des vitalismus* (1905)) or Jakob von Uexküll (1864/1944; ethologist and ecologist), interpret the term 'machine' in this narrower sense: they are called vitalists.

-- **(2)** even Beth, oc, 113, admits that the ancient- medieval view, since Descartes (insofar as he is a mechanist) and Thomas Hobbes ¹⁵(1588/1679;

¹⁵ *Thomas Hobbes, English philosopher and founder of modern political philosophy. Author of *Levathan*, the basis for modern Western political philosophy, in which he developed a theory*

continues Descartes' mechanicism) , has been severely displaced by the modern- mechanist one . -- for Hobbes 'language' is a kind of calculating machine (" reason (...) is nothing but reckoning (that is adding and subtracting (...))". Hobbes even applied this engineering viewpoint to state life.

Note: -- **The one who, of course,** attempted to develop the *mathesis universalis* is *GW. Leibniz* (1646/1716; like Hobbes, strongly under Cartesian influence), -- in his *De arte combinatoria* (1666). Cf. ew Beth, oc,118/ 144.

a. *Dialectics as mathesis universalis* . -

Like *H. Scholz, die wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos* , 1937, 407, says: the idea 'Mathesis universalis ' (= *siëntia generalis*) was interpreted or reinterpreted in different ways .

b. *Immanuel Kant*

Kant (1724/1804; leading figure of the German Enlightenment and initiator of German idealism) was a fierce opponent of it. Partly under the influence of Pietism (an ascetic, detached way of life characteristic of some Protestant sects (especially Lutheran), which, in the 17th century, reacting against dogmatism, returned to biblical experience), a tendency that held supreme control over the schools where Kant studied and viewed mathematics as something unchristian.

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— sometimes radically — rejected, I. Kant adopted a rather negative attitude towards Cartesian theory of order.

c. *The German idealists* -

JG Fichte (1762/1814; influencer of Romanticism), Fr. W. Schelling (1775/1854; Romantic thinker), -- especially GFW Hegel (1770/1831; under partial Romantic influence) -

1. share in the A- mathematism (even Anti- mathematism) of the pioneer Kant,

of absolutism. In theology, his view that man, God, Heaven, and Hell all consist of matter and motion, and for that reason obey the same laws of nature as other material things, has proven highly influential. Hobbes denied the existence of a non-material reality. Human life was also completely materialistic, mechanical, and deterministic. Man has no immaterial soul or spirit.

2. but nevertheless take up the idea of 'mathesis universalis ' again. - cf. EW Beth, oc,141, 145, 148, -- 169 (B. Bolzano (1781/1848; precursor of the Austrian school (including E. Husserl)) as a critic of that a- mathematism).

d. The Marxists –

K. Marx (1818/1883) and Fr. Engei (1820/1895) in turn adopt the idea of 'mathesis universalis' —that is, dialectics—from the idealists, but re-establish it materialistically. It is materialistic-historical dialectics.

Note: -- *H. Arvon , Le Marxisme, Paris , 1960-2, 210/213 (conclusion),* sets out how Marxism has been able to become one of the integrating components—in Platonic terms: ' stoicheia ', elements—of our age. All attacks upon it prove unable to break its 'power'. “The key to this apparent mystery is provided to us by the comprehensive coherence of a doctrine, which constitutes a comprehensive whole.” –

If, for example, Marxism were merely a purely economic, social, or political doctrine, history would have swept it off the table long ago—just like so many other non-comprehensive systems that nevertheless present themselves as some means of reform.—No: the resistance that Marxism mobilizes against the all-deteriorating passage of time originates in the fact that it encompasses a comprehensive conception of the world—a complete philosophy.

Within its whole (the totality), all parts are forged together by an inextricable bond. -- Marxism corresponds perfectly to the human desire to acquire a view of the world around us that shows coherence.

Note: -- precisely that—that mathesis universalis , that all-encompassing—ontological-reasoning-reasoning-structure—is dialectics both among the German idealists and among the Marxists. -- We will explain this in more detail shortly.

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1.2.1.2. Second premise. (29/30).

In a Platon of Athena, one regularly discovers two levels of thought, --
1. the archaic-primitive mythical thought pattern and
2. the hypothetical philosophical analysis of the elements (factors that govern a domain) of the spiritual philosophy. –

Could it be that behind dialectics as we know it, a mythical pattern of thought emerges ? - *WB Kristensen , Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions*, Amsterdam, 1947 (see also his *Introduction to the History of Religion* , Haarlem, 1980-3), teaches us quite a lot regarding this point.

a.-- The demonic deities of totality (29/30) -

Thus, *bvoc*, 273, Kristensen says the following. -- He discusses polytheism , which dominated the entire ancient world (the East, the Babylonians, Hellas , Rome). He notes a basic structure therein. “Salvation and calamity originated from the highest deities: downfall and ascent (*Ia* 17; Engels *terzake* , 13, harmony of opposites), the opposites that constitute the enduring life of the world and in which the divine totality was precisely perceived. -

The will of these gods was fate, the *moira* (*note*: ancient Greek term for 'share in good and evil'), 'divine' but inhuman. They were not 'just', in the ordinary sense of the word: by their actions, the gods betrayed the laws which they had, after all, established for mankind.

The ancients were fully aware of this 'contradiction' in the 'divine' nature. Some of the most impressive pieces of religious literature we possess bear witness to this: **(1)** the book of Job, **(2)a** the Babylonian lamentations, **(2)b** the bound Prometheus”. -

b.-- The Hidden Harmony (30/31) -

Kristensen , *oc.* 289, continues: “The ancients call Heraclitus of Ephesus (*Ia* 24) “the obscure one”, and not without reason. For, in a truly 'ancient' (*note*: in Kristensen this means the mythical level) spirit, he considered the mystery of totality more important than the rational relations of existence (*note*: the secular, visible and tangible side, controllable by 'reason'). Heraclitus says : “the hidden harmony (' harmonie') *aphanes* ') is stronger than the perceptible” (*Fr.* 54). -

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Note: -- Heraclitus , the father of the new dialectics, means the following: the 'harmony' (= integration , order) of things and processes presents two perspectives:

1. that which we experience directly of it (as immediately given, -- visible, tangible, palpable and, immediately, reasonable ; the perceptible harmony or integration ;

2. that which governs that visible and tangible harmony, the hidden harmony, over which both our perceptions and our reasoning faculty have much less or even no hold.

Note: -- A thinker like Heraclitus , who exerted a very great influence on Plato of Athens' idea of transformation, remained very close to archaic polytheism, -- with its treacherous contradictions, briefly described above. May one regard Heraclitus 's short text as a philosophical transmission of precisely that? Kristensen suggests so.

Kristensen : “However important the idea of totality was considered in later times is evident from the fact that, from religious and philosophical thought— (*note*: note those two levels; with Max Scheler one could speak of ' conformity thinking ': 'conformity' (model resemblance between religion and philosophy)—it has never entirely disappeared up to the present day.—thus, for example, this idea—returns religiously 'viewed' (*note*: pre-scientific, pre-philosophical), but philosophically formulated—in the dialectic of Hegel, in which thesis, antithesis, and synthesis form the triad (*note*: threefoldness) of the self-development of 'reason' (*note*: vernunft , 'deity' (Ia 15)) forms”. (Oc,289). –

It is clear: Kristensen , a leading specialist in religious studies (not to be confused with theology in the current sense), is formal.

Note: -- EW Beth claims that dialectics, as introduced by Hegel for example, can never be satisfactory for mathematically minded people.

I.M. Bochenski also writes in an analogous vein in **The Logic of Religion **, New York, 1965, 48/51. His logistic attitude is dismissive. Yet Bochenski says : such a dialectic is 'fruitful'.

1. as 'a set of suggestions '
2. insofar as these are subjected to logically strict testing. –

Platonic: as lemmas, semi-transparent hypotheses that become clearer in the course of analysis (testing against the facts). -- Let us now set out in an orderly manner the four great axioms, 'principles', presuppositions ('hypotheses' , as Platon would say).

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Introduction. -

We are going to do as *P. Foulquié* , **La dialectique **, 62nd pp. He adheres to the representation of I. Stalin, **Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism** (1937).

Note: we said, with Scholz, that the new philosophical dialectics entailed a re-foundation of the Cartesian- Leibnizian mathematizing mathesis universalis , as it was set out, in simplified terms, in Descartes' discours de la méthode (1637).

Stalin's work, in its French edition (1937), is apparently a reply. Although one can criticize Stalin's portrayal—specialists claim that it is merely an echo of Marx's and Engels' doctrine, reinterpreted in the style of Lenin (1870/1924; founder of Marxism-Leninism)—it nevertheless seems to us that, as regards the essentials (that which matters), Stalin points out very correctly.

b.1. First entry: the totality (31/35).

Foulquié , oc, 63, quotes the Hungarian Marxist *Georg Lukacs* (1885/1971; *om Geschichte and class consciousness* , Berlin, 1923). The thesis, the proposition, that the whole ('totality') is the principle - archè , principium - that governs the (sub)parts, is the quintessential doctrine of, for example, Marxism (as also in Hegelianism).

“It is not the priority given to economic motives regarding historical interpretation that decisively distinguishes Marxism from 'bourgeois science' (*note*: non-Marxist science; liberal materialists, for example). No: it is the viewpoint of totality.” –

Note: -- This will surprise many a superficial expert on Marxist dialectics. But we are noting it.

Organicism

With Romanticism in particular, a type of thinking emerges in the modern realm of life called ' organicism '. This is: the organism—understand: the living totality—controls all parts. One speaks—for example, with Ludwig von Bertalanffy , the systems thinker of ' organic ' thinking. - It is so clear: both Hegelianism and Marxism are ' organic forms of thought'.

Interaction. –

The totality does not merely govern the aspects or parts. -- Every part, however small, eventually governs the others in turn. “There exists an active, mutual interdependence between the various parts of reality.” (Foulquié).

Reverse organicism . -

We saw it: the whole governs the parts. But also the other way around: the parts—specifically one, some, all—co-govern the whole. -- Conclusion: ' organicism ' encompasses the three aspects: whole governs parts / part governs part / parts govern whole. -

Where the term 'control' is used in the ancient Greek sense: something controls something else, as an ' archè ' element that is a 'factor', in the sense that the second thing is not understandable without the first.

Appl . Model . -- Hegel himself, in an early treatise on the philosophy of nature, with which he obtained his habilitation as a teacher on August 27, 1801, attempts to demonstrate that, for example, the solar system is a 'peculiar' dialectical whole: precisely for this reason, no single celestial body may be thought of in isolation, but only in connection with the totality. -- thereby Hegel attempted to demonstrate “reason in nature”. Cf. a. *Vd Bergh v. Eysenga* , *Hegel*, 70. -

This is one (natural) scientific model of Hegelian dialectics. Compare with Ia 17 (where Engels' model is discussed). -- Let it not be forgotten that Hegel harbored an interest in nature from his youth. While living in Stuttgart, he was already engaged in astronomy, surveying, botany, and mineralogy. In Tübingen, he was occupied with Linnaeus. There he attended classes on anatomy, mathematics, and physics. In Bern (Ch), during travels in the Alps, he conducted geological and mineralogical studies. In Jena, he became a member of physics societies (in 1803 he even became assessor of the mineralogical society). Since the winter of 1805, he gave classes in mathematics three times. Cf. *vd Bergh*, oc,71. -

Conclusion: although influenced by Romanticism, German idealism was not as scientifically alienated as is sometimes portrayed.

Abstract— rationalist, yes; romantic—concrete, even more so. -- German Romanticism criticized the ' atomic rationalism ' that disentangled everything. Häring , a Hegel scholar, says that what connects the young with the old Hegel is the very lively sense for all that is a living whole. 'Life—in that sense—was central to (German) Romanticism.

Hegel attempted to realize that Romantic central idea in his dialectical manner. Even all concepts are 'subsumed' in the unity of life, -- as vd Bergh, oc, 69, rightly states.

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A. De Waelhens , ** Existence et signification **, **Louvain / Paris**, 1958, 76, speaks of Hegel in an analogous sense: "The identity of (life) experience and its explanation is Hegel's great discovery, the essential core of what is called 'Hegelian thought'". One and the same human being lives **and** thinks while living.

Appl . Model . -- A certain Herr Krug had challenged Hegel. After all, Hegel's type of deduction was being misinterpreted. It was thought, in an enlightened-rational sense, that 'deducing', even in Hegel's case, meant: 'deriving' a given from a priori, alien abstractions ('concepts'): interpreting it as necessary.

Krug wanted Hegel to demonstrate his art by, for example, "deducing" the existence of every dog and every cat, even the existence of his pen holder, "from the concept". Hegel answered Krug with a treatise entitled: "How ordinary human understanding conceives philosophy, -- made clear by means of the works of Herr Krug".

(1802). -- Hegel's answer comes down to this. -

1. The existence, the fact, of dogs and cats (nature) or pen holders (culture) is given. 'Proving' that they exist, in the sense of 'actually being there' (existence, -- in ancient language), is pointless. It is the initial evidence. -

2. - What is required is: to demonstrate, to prove, that dogs and cats, or pen holders respectively, cannot exist and cannot be conceived, -- without the vast totality of moments (= movable elements) which constitutes reality, like a living organism. - Cf. Marx's analysis of the idea of 'production' (1a 19ff: precisely the same 'deduction'). - It concerns living conceivability, intelligibility. "To point out and understand the meaning and place of each part from the concept of this living whole is something entirely different from proving its 'existence'". (*GA*Vd Bergh v. Eysenga , Hegel , 68). -

Rationalism fixates too much on the isolated fact and neglects (dialectically interpreted) 'reasonableness', i.e., comprehensibility, explainability, which invariably includes the whole, the unity of life, in its understanding. Cf. 1a 12 (appl . mod .).

Concrete thinking, in K. Marx. –

In an introduction to the Critique of Economy, Marx clarifies, albeit in a materialistic manner, what non-abstract, concrete thinking is. -- “It seems to me that the good method consists in starting with the real and the concrete, which the

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be actual presupposition. – Consequence: in economics, for example, 'the population' is the basis; it is the (acting) subject (Ia 19) of the overall social act which is production. -- But beware: as soon as one delves deeper into this, one realizes that this involves a mistake.

What is called 'the population' remains an abstraction if, for example, one disregards the Classes of which it consists. In turn, these classes are an empty word if one does not know the elements upon which they rest. These are, for example, wage labor, capital, etc.

In turn, these presuppose exchange, division of labor, price formation, etc. -- (...) what we call 'the concrete' is 'concrete' only because it is the synthesis (*note*: connectedness, coexistence, fusion; Ia 20 diere .- synopt . meth .), 23) of many characteristics.

In other words: Unity in multiplicity; it is for this reason that the concrete only emerges in our thinking as a synthesis process, as a result—at the end, not at the beginning. This does not prevent the concrete from being the true starting point and, consequently, also the starting point in our direct insight, in our representation.”

Note: -- It is clear: 'concrete thinking' (and dialectics is concrete thinking, for it seeks to reach totality) is seeing the coherence of a multitude of moments. Which proves impossible, unless through profound analysis. Thus Marx.

Leninist appl . model. –

The interconnectedness of a multiplicity is clearly evident, for example, in the definition Lenin gives of Marxism. -- *H. Arvon* , **Le Marxisme **, Paris, 1969-2, 41st pp., states that Lenin views Marxist thought as the convergence of the three principal currents of the 19th century: English economics, French socialism—they are separate moments. The 'synthesis' is the fact that they

were interpreted by Marx and Engels on the basis of classical German idealist philosophy (understand: dialectics).

According to Lenin, Marx improved partial truths by making them complement one another within a totalizing worldview. “By bringing them to 'completion', Marx succeeded in creating a worldview regarding the modern world that encompasses all its aspects and reveals its total truth.”

Note: -- One may agree with this or not: what matters here is that one grasps that Lenin means dialectics as a vision of totality.

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Stalinist appl . model. –

Up until now, dialectics has limited itself to description. -- But it can also function normatively. -- Foulquié , oc, 62, quotes Stalin: “The individual (*note*: the human person considered in isolation) is merely an abstraction.

Reason: the individual:

1. (synchronic) depends on the effect exerted upon him by the beings surrounding him;
2. (diachronic) he depends on his entire past.

-- Consequence: one can only understand the individual if one situates him at the intersection of all acting influences and of his reactions to his environment .

Note: -- As stated there descriptively, this is still non-binding. It becomes a different matter when one sees a Stalin translate this description into a collectivist social system.

Critical remark. –

Totalization as a method of thought has been subjected to considerable criticism. -- from the defender of (individual) human rights, Bertrand Russell (1872/1970). After his Patronizing period, Russell became a typical Anglo-Saxon nominalist. In nominalism, the earthly observable and the individual are central. Anything that is not sensually perceptible and individual (singular) is suspect.

Such a way of thinking is called atomism, which divides the concrete unit of life into 'atoms' -- like loose grains of sand -- what Russell primarily opposes is the primacy — see Ia 31: organicism — of the totality — understand, for example, political science — over the individual. If one thinks through

organicism without a corrective — thus Russell — then one arrives infallibly at collectivism, authoritarianisms of all kinds, which, through their 'organic' thinking, no longer have any regard for the rights of the individual. -- For the atomist Russell, the totality is an abstraction and the individual, the singular being, is real. –

Note: -- It is immediately clear that Russell is hereby expressing a truth that must be understood as a necessary corrective to the organismic type of thinking. If one emphasizes only the primacy of the whole (society, represented by those in authority), one eventually loses all basis for understanding the true rights, the right to existence, of the individual human being.

In other words: the individual, too, as an autonomous being existing in itself, is—from the concept of concrete reality—somewhere deducible, and therefore 'necessary'.

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b.2. Second entry: the movement ('change'). (36/41).

We have already seen (Ia 01: process, 13, the process itself of knowing; 23, process): the 'kinesis', Lat.: 'motus', change, process, is central to Hegelianism and Marxism. -- just as the 'kinesis', process, was central to Plato's thought (his teacher, Cratylus, was a Heraclitian).

Platonic dialectics—but also—though different—the new dialectics (Hegel, Marx)—they are a way of dealing with the 'movement' (in the broad sense). It means that the story is an essential component of every dialectic. And that, immediately, historicity (the fact that things are actually processes with a history) is too.

Foulquié, la dialectique : “Everything constantly transforms itself: both the world of inanimate matter and that of life and of thought. -- For this thought, 'state of rest' would be equivalent to 'death'. -- This is so for the Marxists as for Hegel.” (Oc,64).

Variological thought system.

Mobilism, process thinking, -- these are terms to denote such a movement-based way of thinking. - *HJ Hampel, variabilität and Disziplinierung des Denkens*, Munich/Basel, 1967, 97, states that this type dates from the days of German Romanticism.

As a supporting text, he cites a text by Fr. W. Schelling (1775/1854; a friend of Hegel, incidentally, notwithstanding differences of opinion): “(...) Movement is the essence of science. -- If propositions are lifted from this element of life, they die, -- just like the fruits torn from the living tree. –

Unconditional sentences, valid once and for all, are contrary to the essence of true science, which consists in progress. (...). Merely a restless wheel, a never-stopping rotation ...). –

Note: -- Ia 28 we learned that the German idealists, following Kant and Schelling, did indeed adopt the idea of 'mathesis universalis' from the Enlightened rationalists, but amathematically: not so much the idea of 'totality' (which we find in the ideas of 'set' and 'system', -- both perfectly compatible with Mathematism), but rather the idea of 'life' as 'movement', these thinkers removed from the mathematicians: mathematics, certainly of that time, would not have known very well how to represent 'life' in formulas.

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Variology

Means “analyzing what 'varia' (different things) is”.

Note: One immediately notices that the idea of progress characteristic of the 18th-century 'philosophers' (= enlightened minds) returns here as well, in a romantic reinterpretation.

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the opening of the classics Germans Philosophie, 1886-1, states: “(...) The revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy (...). The fundamental insight that the world is not seen as a complex of finished things, but as a complex of processes, --

1. In this, both seemingly stable things and the ideal representations thereof in our minds (we call them 'concepts') undergo a continuous change—typical of what becomes and passes away (Ia 17,29) by --

2. In it, notwithstanding all apparent coincidences—and despite all momentary (= temporary) setbacks—a progressive development continues. -- This great fundamental insight has, particularly since Hegel, seeped into everyday consciousness to such an extent that, in that generality, it hardly encounters any contradiction anymore.”

Critical remarks. –

(1) notwithstanding the clear variological basic idea, we propose, in the Hegelians and Marxists nevertheless hold onto conservative factions.

a. Among Hegel's disciples, at least three shades were distinguishable: conservative-Protestant theists (believers in God), pantheistically enlightened idealists (' pantheism ' consists in 'God' coinciding with the universe), and, also, left-wing Young Hegelians .

b. Esprit (Paris), XVI (1948) (May - June) - the famous French magazine - bore the title “ *Marxisme ouvert*” contre *Marxisme scolastique* ” (open Marxism against 'scholastic' (here in the sense of 'conservative - closed') Marxism). –

Conclusion: mobilism is not alone at work. In Hegelianism and Marxism, the fixist (nowadays also called 'essentialist') side applies as well.

(2) We have noted, to quote Marx, this tension between nature (immutability) and process (change) - Ia 18ff. (Sensible Abstraction), 23 - Engels also recognized this. According to Foulquié , oc, 6b, Engels admitted that there are definitive, irrevocable truths.

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-- For example (i) mathematical science is subject to historical development, (ii) but there are no definitive mathematical results, --

Note-- F. Onseth , *Fondements des mathématiques* , Paris, 1926, -- the work of a scientific dialectician , also establishes this.

At first glance, the idea of 'eternal philosophy' is diametrically opposed to this new dialectical idea. -- Agostino Steuco (= Augustinus Steuchus) (... /1550), *De perenni philosophia* , Lyon, 1540-1, defends - as bishop and librarian of the Vatican library - a thesis which he adopted from the Church Fathers (33/800), but re-established , in the style of his time, the Renaissance.

-

1. Pagan philosophy (= both the hieratic ' (= sacred) of the Near and Far East and the 'classical' of Hellas and Rome),

2. is the precursor of both Old Testament and New Testament ways of thinking, as well as of the philosophy connected to them (thinking on a Biblical basis).

In other words: there is an unbroken tradition. Since archaic times, one and the same basic philosophy has prevailed over all humanity, with an unchangeable, 'eternal' essence. -- Now pay close attention: with this patristic stance, Steuco rejected both the rigid, closed traditionalism present among his contemporaries and the 'open' Enlightened thought, also present among his contemporaries. --

None other than the Cartesian G.W. Leibniz (Ia 27) defended Steuco's thesis. He even defended the name 'perennis'. philosophia ' (eternal philosophy). This - according to him - met a need. Cfr . O. Willmann , *Geschichte des idealismus* , Braunschweig , 1907-2, III (*der idealismus der neuzeit*), 172/179. -- Otto Willmann , the Catholic educator, is also the defender of this Steuchian position.

Narratology. --

Since the 1950s, narratology (a re-establishment of the ancient theory concerning the story, part of classical rhetoric (understood as literary theory)) has been updating our understanding of what stories are. -- Hegel, Marx, -- they are narratologists avant la lettre: what moves, changes, is not susceptible to rigid description, -- but to narrative. Yet, as with Herodotus and Thucydides , the two founders of ancient Greek historiography, storytelling is simultaneously a description of the process.

IA39

This includes

-- if we follow the theory of Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-424; father of ancient Greek historiography) -- two aspects.

(i) What he, in his dialect, calls 'historiè ', historia , the personal inquiry so that one has information; to this end Herodotus mainly used two methods:

a. ' Aut.opsia ', the fact that he was an eyewitness to the data (the 'material' of his story),

b. ' Marturion ', the testimony of others (eyewitnesses themselves or learners through others). -- A Hegel, a Marx, -- as dialecticians , will proceed in exactly the same way: informing themselves personally.

(ii) What Herodotus, in his jargon, calls 'logos', ratio (Latin), i.e., the insight into the data (their structure) and, at the same time, the story itself, as an ordered (the plan that regulates the train of thought, -- the arrangement, as

the rhetoricians say) and stylized (the design based on correct wording or text) representation. --

Here a Hegel, a Marx introduce their dialectic: they see the totality (see lemma 1) and, as we will explain shortly, they see, in the facts (data), the qualitative leaps and the tensions (thesis, antithesis, synthesis); -- these they record in an ordered and stylized text. - Cf. GCJ Daniëls, *religieushistorische studie over Herodotus* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946, 16, 100. –

Note: -- Experts on Thucydides of Athens (-65/-395; the second great historian of Greek antiquity) claim that his stories resemble axiomatic-deductive texts: he arranges the facts so that the events he recounts exhibit a logical sequence.

In other words: if one knows the presuppositions (contained in the situation), then the facts (the 'outcome') follow from them strictly logically (insofar as possible). -- Compare this with Ia 12 (Hegel's type of deduction), - 17 (critique), 24, 33.

Narrativism . –

Assuming that 'narrativism' is understood to mean the fact that only if (if and only if) data ('historiè') are understood and narrated ('logos'), do they become understandable. Well, in their ancient Greek manner (and very different from one another), Herodotus and Thucydides (incidentally, in Latin Thucydides) are 'narrativists': things and processes only become meaningful if they are investigated ('historiè') by them and narrated from their 'understanding' of them.

IA40

(logos). -- So too, in an analogous manner, Hegel and Marx: for them, the mass of 'brute facts' (that which Platon would call 'anankè', matter insofar as it is opaque, but a brute fact) is only comprehensible if they have made them 'dialectically' transparent in a logical narrative of the facts.

Library st.:

-- *Poétique (raconter, représenter, décrire)* 65 (1986: février);
-- J. Peck/ M. Coyle, *Literary terms and criticism*, Houndmill / London, 1984 (approx. and vs. 88f.: 'plot', -- a term also common in literary Dutch for our pure Dutch 'complication' (i.e. the structure of an event, insofar as this

constitutes the driving force of the narrated event) ;-- precisely that, that driving force in the narrated event, interests a Hegel or a Marx, -- what Herodotus would call the 'logos').

Note: -- What Herodotus and Thucydides do as historians, the Paleo-Pythagoreans did (Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500; Paleo-Pythagoreans (-550/-300)): they sought, in the movable data, the ' arithmos ', the structure (translating by 'number' is distorting the term; it does work somewhat with ' number-form harmony ') or - which amounted to the same thing - the ' Psuchè ', the 'soul' (understand: the moving-naturally structured-force in the 'movement'). –

Platon did something analogous: the ' fainomena ', the moving data, what comes into being and passes away, were understood solely from a presupposition, namely the accompanying idea, reaching above it but working within it, which constitutes the driving force of the event.

Historicity

-- The existentialist thinkers (since Soren Kierkegaard (1813/1855; father of existentialism)) have accustomed us to the term 'historicity', i.e., the fact that our 'being' (= reality) invariably takes the form of a history, which ... is recountable.

The ever-changing situations inherent in our 'being-in-the-world' carry within themselves a structure (called 'life's destiny', for example). This is precisely what a Herodotus or a Thucudides , a Hegel or a Marx see. -- The existentialists emphasize, in this context, the fact that man, or humanity as a whole, is seemingly at the mercy of fate and stands 'alone' (which is, of course, only one possible interpretation): we leave that aspect of their definition of historicity to them.

IA41

It is clear, after all that we have written above, that the one understood in this way
'Historicity' (historical character) was self-evident to Hegel and Marx. –

Library st.:

-- A. Brunner , *Geschichtlichkeit* , Bern/Munich, 1961;

-- H. Arvon , *le Marxisme* , Paris, 1960, 34ss. (*la notion de historicité*).

b.3. Third entry: the qualitative leap (41/50).

Assuming that we, with Herodotus, have gathered the necessary brute facts—the 'history'. -- The 'logos'—in those moving facts—comes down, first of all, to (what Hegel and Marx call) 'the qualitative leap'.

Library st.:

-- P. Foulquié , *la dialectique* , 64s .(“... créateurs de nouveauté”); -- H. Arvon , *Le Marxisme* , 38s. (*the principle of variation qualitative*).

Upon closer examination, the third lemma comes down to this: the progression (which constitutes the object of the dialectical narrative) exhibits, over time, gradual or abrupt quantitative changes, among which the gradual ones have the characteristic of immediately entailing a qualitative leap.

Appl . Model . -- The classical model is water (natural scientific type). -- put water on a fire, in a forest, on vacation, and admire the third lemma: gradually the water absorbs the heat (= quantitative change in temperature, - - measurable via a thermometer). At a certain moment the water becomes 'turbulent' ('turbulent' say the more recent physicists): it starts boiling too suddenly (= qualitative jump). –

The medical-pharmaceutical model. –

Archaic sorcerers and sorceresses have known poisons since ancient times: they know damn well that the gradual dosage entails sudden changes for the person handling them (an overly strong dose suddenly becomes harmful, whereas a lighter dose acts as a beneficial medicine).

A psychological model. –

Tease someone, and you will, in time, find that the teasing suddenly seems too unbearable and that, from being pleasant for the victim, it turns into the opposite.

In other words: there are 'thresholds', 'chasms', 'gaps', and this with a gradual increase - or decrease. -- Another small example: a spectacle can seem interesting, -- until it lasts 'too long', then it turns into its opposite ('harmony of opposites').

Note: -- H. Arvon , *Le Marxisme* , 38s., says that Marx speaks of the qualitative change (leap) in two ways. –

1. What we will explain in more detail shortly, namely contradiction, is one model of such a qualitative leap.

2. In passing, *Das Kapital* (*Kritik der Politischen oekonomie*), 3 Vol . , Hamburg, 1872/1894, discusses this fundamental principle of dialectics in the sense just described. –

A sum of money, an amount – increases gradually, for example (quantitative change), – to such an extent that, suddenly, one can speak of “a capital” (qualitative leap). – Marx literally says “in this (*note*: economic) field – just as in natural science – the law discovered by Hegel, in his *logic* , is verifiable as precisely, – a law which states that purely quantitative changes, having reached a certain degree, transform themselves into qualitative differences”. –

This text clearly demonstrates the esteem Marx held for Hegel's bourgeois philosophy.

Note: -- Engels also appreciates this 'law'. -- In a letter (14.07.1858) to Marx, he expresses his satisfaction with the fact that he found “Hegel’s assertion regarding the qualitative leap in the quantitative series” confirmed in – at the time – recent discoveries in physiology (Arvon , oc,39).-- In his ' *AntiDühring* ' (= *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft - philosophie political In *Oekonomie . Sozialismus **, Leipzig, 1878), Engels gives a whole series of confirmations of this—from higher mathematics and chemistry.

Note: -- The Marxists, after these two founders, have - partially - their doctrine on the matter reinterpreted . -- A section among the Marxists sought in dialectics more an 'argument' for revolutionary intentions than a testable theory. They reinterpreted the 'qualitative leap' in a revolutionary sense. Not reforms within the established system of society ('reformism'), but a violent transformation, i.e., a revolution, would—with a single qualitative leap—realize the transition from the capitalist to the socialist system. 'Reforms' merely yield gradual quantitative changes, -- nothing more.

-- **Appl . Model** -- Stalin , *dialectical materialism and historical materialism* , says that that transition to a liberated working class

not on the basis of slow changes, 'reforms', but on the basis of a revolution is possible. Cf. Arvon , oc,39.

Not Hegel. But ancient Greeks.

Marx writes that Hegel discovered the 'law' of quantitative/qualitative changes. This is false.

1.-- P. Foulquié , **La dialectique **, 65, notes that, for example, a microsocratician (of the so-called 'Dialectic' school ('dialectics' here in a partially different sense, namely geared towards discussion)), Euboulides of Miletus (-380/ -320; a megarician), clearly recognized conscious regularity. –

Appl . Model.-- the ' soros ', the heap of grain.-- Exactly one grain does not constitute a heap of grain. That is evident.-- Neither do two.-- Gradual quantitative increase, by adding grains one by one, causes colloquial language to suddenly decide on a qualitative leap: “now one can speak of a heap of grain”.-- What the eristic Euboulides , in the protosophist sense, attempted to explain it as unprovable.

2. The tropical theory of Ainesidemus of Knossos (+- -50), a skeptic , viewed it by means of the frequency of phenomena. If data occur more or less frequently within a single time span (interval), qualitative jumps are observed.

–

For example: both the comet and the sun are celestial bodies; yet a comet evokes wonder, while the sun does not. Reason: within the same time span, the sun is so frequent that one gets used to it (absence of wonder), and the comet is so rare that one marvels at it.

For example: the dosage. -- a small dose of wine, for instance, “strengthens the soul”; if one increases it gradually, one suddenly observes the opposite (the reversal). -- Or small doses within too short a time span! (Frequency).

3.-- Not late, but early Greeks saw the lawful nature of quantitative changes, with qualitative leaps. -- Let us return to the historian Herodotus (Ia 39).

-- G. Daniëls, *rel.- hist . studie*, 93v ., gives us a Herodotusian model. -

A whole series—concerning political processes (the formation of a state, for example)—exhibit what Herodotus calls ' kuklos ' (cycle, loop, cycle): it begins small; it grows larger; it reaches a maximum; then it suddenly reverses into

the opposite: reduction, disappearance (possibly). In that 'series', clear qualitative leaps occur, which Herodotus clearly saw.

IA44

A surprising confirmation (p. 44/45).

M. Ambacher, *Les philosophies de la nature*, Paris, 1974 (frl . oc , 103ss. (*Les philosophies de la nature procèdent d'une expérience qualitativement constituante*)), teaches us that nature can be studied in two ways:

1. nature viewed from the Cartesian- Leibnizian mathesis universalis , -- with a clear preference for the mathematical side;
2. Nature viewed from the dialectical – or more broadly: the qualitative – mathesis universalis , – with a clear preference for the qualitative side.

The first type is often called 'exact' (a mixture of experiment and calculation), the second 'dialectical'.

Now, since the seventies, it has been happening that, within the exact approach, room is opening up for the dialectal one.

Library St.: J. Gleick, *La théorie du chaos (vers une nouvelle science)*, Paris, 1989 (Eng. Orig .: *Chaos*, New York, 1987);

-- G. De Gennes et al., *l'ordre du chaos*, Paris, 1987 (24 specialists have their say on - what is called - the butterfly effect as a cause of disorder);

-- H. Degn et al., *Chaos in biological systems*, New York, 1987.

– Ervin Laszlo, *La grande bifurcation (une fin de siècle crucial)*, Paris, 1990, Tacot International ISBN 2-907308-04-1 (preface by Ilya Prigogine)

We all know the folk saying "how a dime can roll". Well, especially since the 1970s+, physicists—as well as other specialized scientists —have discovered that the rolling dime might belong to the fundamental structure of the universe.

Appl . model.

a. The counter-model: determinism. –

Newton, - especially Pierre Simon de Laplace – in short: Laplace (1749/1827) - defined 'determinism' as follows.

Assuming that a system is known exactly with regard to a certain state in which it finds itself. This is called “the initial conditions” of the study of said system.

If that system is truly 'deterministic', then one can deduce flawlessly from those initial conditions what the subsequent states will be. In other words: the system, in its 'functioning' (operation), is predictable. Cf. G. de Gennes *et al.*, *l'ordre du chaos*, 139 (Laplace).

b. The model. -

The butterfly effect. -- It was a mathematically trained mathematician, who studied the weather with the aid of the first computers, who first recognized this phenomenon in the 1970s. -- We explain this in further detail, insofar as the theory of the dialecticians regarding qualitative leaps based on gradual quantitative changes finds an otherwise brilliant confirmation therein.

IA45

-- James Gleick, *oc* , 46ss. (*la roue Hydraulique de Lorenz*). Describes to us, without too much technical jargon, the water wheel of Edward Lorenz. –

a. The first disorderly system discovered by Lorenz, which is famous precisely for that reason, can be mechanically represented (= mechanical appl . model). Moreover, it shows analogy (partial identity/partial difference) with the convection current, which constitutes a second representation (model). –

Willem Malkus, a professor of applied mathematics at MIT (= Massachusetts Institute of Technology) – years later – constructed such a water wheel in the basement of his lab to convince the skeptics among his colleagues.

b.-- a. We know what a water wheel is: a wheel with 'blades' (cups, containers) which, once filled with flowing water, set the wheel in motion. Think of our watermills. -- Well, as a model of the butterfly effect, it looks as follows.-

b.1 . Water flows continuously from an overhead water supply system into the small receptacles inside the wheel. -- When the input is very small, the receptacles do not fill sufficiently to overcome the frictional resistance (of the stationary wheel): the wheel remains motionless. –

b.2 . Gradual quantitative increase in supply causes fuller bowls, -- with the result that the wheel, for example, begins to turn to the left. This at a constant speed. –

b.3. Further quantitative increases in the supply cause an acceleration of the wheel motion . -- Over time, however, this disrupts the filling of the bins: sometimes the bins do not get sufficiently filled. In addition, it may happen that the rotational motion reverses: the wheel may turn to the right (for example, it starts to slow down, comes to a standstill, and rotates in the opposite direction). –

Decision.

-- Edward Lorenz discovered that—when viewed over the long term—rotational motion can reverse into its opposite several times, -- without exhibiting a constant speed or a predictable movement.-

The unpredictability of the system just described proves that Newton's and Laplace's definition of determinism is flawed, at least in part. Within so-called fully deterministic systems, there is room for non-deterministic, 'chaotic' (= disorderly) processes.

IA46

Note: -- *Suren Erkman , Voyages en zones de turbulences , in: Journal de Genève*
28.11.1987, explains the term 'butterfly effect'.

(1).-- The parts (sub- or hyposystems). -- As a meteorologist, Edw . Lorenz dealt with the atmosphere. The partial movements of the air mass, the movements of the particles floating within it in the form of 'suspension', -- the temperature fluctuations, the air pressure fluctuations are governed by determinism and are, by virtue of strict laws, predictable. –

(2).-- The totality (super- or hypersystem). -- The atmospheric system as a whole exhibits 'sensitivity', -- which here means that, to an extremely small stimulus, it responds with a sometimes extremely large reaction. This lightheartedness gives rise to the butterfly effect: the fleeting and capricious path a butterfly travels through the air mass today causes air movements that will influence the weather, -- not tomorrow, but in a month, in a year.

Consequence: only when one is informed of the slightest breeze within the entire atmosphere can one predict rain or sun with certainty. Something that is impossible. With the result: the unpredictability of the weather, except for a

brief and approximate duration. One literally does not know how the weather will turn.

Note: -- Add to this the fact that the information regarding the atmospheric system that we actually have at our disposal regularly contains smaller or larger inaccuracies ('measurement errors'). Which further increases the unpredictability. –

Conclusion . -- Unintentionally, without a doubt, the scientific journalist S. Erkman uses the basic terms of the first dialectical lemma, totality and parts. Cf. Ia 31. This proves that what is called Father Bochenski —'the set of suggestions ', at the basis of dialectics—is nevertheless always very useful, -- even in natural scientific matters.

Crisis theory. (p. 46/49)

A. Noiray et al., *La philosophie , t. 1 (abondance/ expression)*, Paris, 1972, 83/86 (crise), teaches us that the term 'crisis' became common in philosophy and the sciences in the course of the XIX century (liberal thinkers/Marx (economic); Nietzsche/Freud (psycho - socio- , culturological); Husserl (historical of science)). –

- **Appl . Model** : The economic crisis. –

a.1 . Classical liberal theory, in its economic optimism, attempted to prove that economic crises are either impossible or temporary.

IA47

a.2. However, the facts falsify that theory, at least partially. Also: since the Great Depression (= prolonged crisis) within capitalist systems, between World War I (1918+) and World War II (1939), the crisis has been central to economic theory.

b. Karl Marx was one of the first to attempt to analyze the economic crisis in depth. He identified it as the result of overproduction. The capitalist system places (profitable) production (Ia 18ff.) at the center, especially since it possesses means of production (regarding the machine). At a given moment, there is overproduction, with the resulting consequences for sales. For Marx, as a dialectician , this is a 'contradiction' (more on that later): because production is so successful, it turns from profitable to loss-making.

c. The cyclical theory asserts that there is an up-and-down pattern: phases of prosperity alternate with times of adversity ('recession'), -- some three to four per century. -- However, since the Great Depression of 1929, this has been falsified rather than proven.

Note: -- The demonic or hellish cycle. -

What strongly dominates thinking regarding the economic crisis is what follows.

If there is overproduction, with an oversupply of goods and services, then there is a lack of sales (the market cannot keep up), resulting in the formation of 'stock' of unsaleable goods.

If stockpiling occurs, then there will be price declines and layoffs, resulting in income reductions and, consequently, a decrease in purchasing power (reinforcement of stockpiling). "The crisis est un cycle qui s' étend" (the crisis is an expanding, an extending cycle). -

Conclusion -- an economic crisis exhibits two characteristics:

1. is a turning point (turning point) that usually prioritizes gradually increasing factors (production, purchasing power, for example) within the economic process;

2. At the same time, it is an independent process, exhibiting factors that are independent of the previous phase: this means that a qualitative leap is involved, resulting in the emergence of something new, something different.

The concept of 'life crisis', --

Library St.: *Ch . Zwingmann ua , our psychology of life crises* , Frankf.am ., 1962. -- the book shows us a series of 'qualitative leaps':

IA48

1. Growth crises (in children and adolescents (including, for example, crises that lead to suicide among young people);

2. Crises typical of middle age (unmarried people, impotent people , marital crises); Crises characteristic of the third age (premature aging, personality changes, climacteric, retirement, periods of mourning);--

3. Crises, independent of age (seasonal crises, illness, -- dying). -

This brief summary, which does not convey the richness of the book, is impressive: when the dialecticians assert that "being" (all that is real) is

essentially 'movement' (change) -- and this in the form of gradual quantitative changes, with—in due time—qualitative leaps -- then this is certainly true (= verified) with regard to the human life cycle.

Note: -- Archaic mankind was already well aware of human changes. Proof: the rites of passage, of which the folklorist-ethnologist *Arnold van Gennep* (*les rites de passage*) gave us an approximate description.

Archaic man—regarding birth, sexual maturation (puberty)—this is quite certain—marriage (fertilization certificates), the dying process; illnesses, momentous events; and birthdays (for 'archaic' man, the calendar is, as it were, his life pattern)—has instituted rites and consecrated acts (i.e., sacred or holy acts), of which *H.F. Jans et al.*, **Ethnological Encyclopedia**, Zeist/Ghent, 1962, 20/34 (religion and magic), says that they bring man over his crises.

Indeed: what is called, in archaic usage, “soul” (possibly: soul substance , life force (in the Gospel of Saint Luke, for example: 'dunamis' (= Lat.: virtue))) falls, after all, amidst the qualitative leap that life crises represent, into anguish of the soul , into a lack of life force.

Precisely for the purpose of restoration ('catharsis': one presupposes the previous phase, cleanses it (= the 'catharsis', purificatio , cleansing, in the narrower sense) and raises it to a higher level (Christian-theological: grace presupposes, cleanses, and raises nature)), -- precisely to provide for that anguish of the soul , characteristic of the identity crisis (“I no longer know who/what I am”), archaic cultures instituted 'rites'. -- On a mythical-religious level, they are the first diagnoses and therapies.

IA49

Note: -- As is known, the archaic Magi/ Magicians attached great importance to the menstrual cycle. -- *Wilhelm Fliess*, *Die beziehungen between nose and female geschlechtsorganen (in ihrer organics meaning dargestellt)*. Leipzig/Wien, 1897 (in French transl.: *Les relations entre the nez et les organes genitals female (presented season theirs significations biologiques)*, Paris, 1977), is a strictly physiological study, of which none other than Sigmund Freud himself, however, claimed in a letter of December 1896 that “ Fliess constitutes nothing less than the very pedestal of psychoanalysis”.

This judgment suggests that the strictly physiological character of the Fliessian text is clearly exceeded. And, indeed, the book has a 'revelatory' effect. First of all, the relationship ('relationship' = constant connection) between the nose, primarily that of women, and the reproductive system. Which manifests itself in swelling, hypersensitivity, and a tendency to bleed (during menstruation).

Chapter VIII of the said work reveals to us that—with gradual quantitative changes—a qualitative leap takes place each time—every twenty-three and every twenty-eight days (also in the ... man). The work teems with mathematically expressed observations.

Conclusion: if the Archaic peoples attached great importance to the menstrual cycle, as to a cyclical 'crisis' (the relevant rites prove it), then a Fliess may well have briefly lifted the veil on it.

Note: -- Among the works on the stages of life, mention should be made of: *J.K. Feibleman, The Stages of Human Life (A Biography of Entire Man)*, The Hague (the Netherlands), 1974, in which the individual is discussed on a behaviorist basis (not exclusively), - with his stages of life.

Note -- The definition of a life crisis. -

Ch. Zwingmann, *Einführung*, in: Ch. Zwingmann *et al.*, *zurpsychology der Lebenskrisen*, XI/XVII, clarifies as follows.

(1) Subjective. -- A life crisis involves expectation, but rather pejorative: one fears a more or less profound deterioration.

Language usage will, for example, when one expects something happy, although in the tension of uncertainty, nevertheless not speak of 'crisis'—not even if the change is very profound.

IA50

-- **(2) Objective.** -- Here any valuation act is methodically excluded (value-free consideration) so that the pure process as such can be exposed. A 'crisis' is one type of change. With two 'specific' or similar differences.

(i). -- Quantitative. -- Within a time period (interval), the 'being' in question changes faster than outside of it (before and after) (process acceleration). --

(ii). -- Qualitative. -- The change, in contrast to the previous and subsequent course of the process, is unpredictable (Ia 45: disorderly system). In Zwingmann 's terminology : “die krise steht , also , sozusagen , unter einem question mark ” (the crisis (understood as: crisis) is dominated, so to speak, by a question mark). In other words: one never knows how the coin of a life crisis might roll.

-- **Appl . Model .**

From a medical-clinical perspective—according to the author—the process of a 'serious illness' is a phenomenon that, in the case of gradual change, suddenly entails a stage without a prognosis , which can result in either survival or death. The indecisiveness is expressed very clearly in that “either/or”.

Defining a (life) crisis psychologically will likely be a more complicated matter than what follows -- always guided by Zwingman . But it sets the way.

—

Human processes, as soon as they—individually, intersubjectively (between individuals), socially (within a societal framework)—cause a 'substantial' (*note* : more than superficial) dissatisfaction in response to quantitative changes of all kinds, a qualitative leap in the life of drives (think, for example, of our countless wishful dreams), can be labeled a 'crisis'.

In other words: as soon as the number of dissatisfactions changes (increases) to such an extent that the overall structure (= totality; Ia 31; / 46) of the psyche is “at stake” (understand: is in an unpredictable phase) and “one does not know how it will end”, there is clearly a 'crisis'.

-- **Conclusion:** What chaos physicists characterize as a 'disordered' or 'turbulent' (boisterous, 'turbulent') system is clearly present here.

b.4. Fourth entry: contradiction. (50/58)

By way of introduction . -- When dialecticians speak of 'contradiction', a logical remark is appropriate, as P. Foulquié , oc, 67, rightly states. -- In logic, at least four types of contradiction are distinguished. —

IA51

a. -- the strictly contradictory opposition. --

Appl . Model : 'white/ non-white '. -- If Hegelians say that, for example, the French absolute monarchy had become 'unreal' just before the French Revolution (Ia 12), then this is diametrically opposed to 'real' - in the sense of 'justifiable' -. If Marxists claim that the capitalist production process entails 'injustice', then this is strictly contradictory to 'justice'. –

The principle of contradiction applies here: either there is, for example, injustice or there is justice. One of the two can exist; not both at the same time. After all, something cannot simultaneously be (so) and not be (so). -- This plays a role, for example, in proof by contradiction, in which the model (affirmation) radically excludes the counter-model (negation) (in Latin: aut).

b. -- The non-contradictory opposites. --

Here we distinguish more than one type. –

1. the denial of private or robbery. –

Appl . Model: “the proletarian does not have his subsistence minimum”. Understand : to which he is normally entitled. He is 'robbed' of what needed to be there. The negation expresses a void.

2. The contrary or ordinary opposition. - Within the same set, characterized by common properties, one can introduce a dichotomy (complementation) and label both subsets as ' negativity ' (negation) of each other.

Appl . Model : “Except for white, all other shades of color—blue, red, green, yellow, orange, lilac, etc. —are “not white”. In this context, black is perhaps the extreme, which, in the worst degree, is ' not-white '. Hence the phrase “white-black contrast”. To indicate polarization between social groups. -- The entire subset of 'not-white' colors is contradictory to the 'white' color, of course.

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Note: -- Nevertheless, usage permits an expression such as: “This wall is white and not white.” Namely, when it initially suggests white, but, upon closer inspection, contains non-white elements. This is an affirmation and negation expressing nuance . --

(3). -- The (cor)relative negation . -- Here a mutual predominates (Symmetrical) relationship the contrast. –

Appl . Model : the master and the servant; both presuppose each other (without master no servant; without servant no master).

Yet we say: “He is not the master, but the servant.” -- Just as the mother is not the daughter, yet both contain one another.

Conclusion. -- Negation is frequently thematized by many thinkers. However, due to a lack of logical rigor, this sometimes devolves into mere wordplay. Hence this logical introduction, -- primarily intended for a whole series of thinkers who feel compelled to belittle traditional logic, particularly regarding its principles of identity and contradiction. –

1.-- Alternatively, there is taseological thinking . The ancient Greek ' tasis ' means 'tension'. As soon as a number of dialecticians discover a tension, they use the term 'contradiction', which should then be taken with a grain of salt.

2 .-- Or there is differentist thinking . ' Differentiism ' (sometimes ' differentiationism ') is that tendency which prefers to discover differences and gaps everywhere. As soon as they discover even the slightest difference— distinction and separation (note: these two are different)—they emphasize this as a kind of insurmountable, 'absolute': 'contradictory' gap.

The Hegelian doctrine of contradiction, or rather: negation.

Hegel himself uses, very frequently incidentally, the terms “affirmation”, “negation”, and “negation of the negation”. - Dutch-speaking Hegelians say: “thesis/ relationship/ summary”. -- Often one says: “thesis/ antithesis/ synthesis ”. –

Note: -- For the second term of the triad, one also says: *entfremdung* (Absoluteization, -- usually: alienation, -- from the French: ' aliénation ' ('alienation')). This points to privative or dispossessive negation: in the negation, the affirmation is deprived of itself (“ sie”). Ist sich alienated, ” Hegel would say). –

For the third term, one also says: *aufhebung* (lifting, -- with nuances: removal (ceasing to exist), elevation to a higher level). This points to the preservation of the previous one, but with a change in meaning. Consider the ancient Greek ' katharsis ' (ia 48), which is certainly related to it. –

Note: -- For the second term, one also says 'overturn' (understood as : the opposite; examples of which: Ia 43, 45). Already present in Heraclitus of Ephesus (Ia. 24, 29): ' enantiotropè ', also: ' strofè '. –

Now reread Ia 29v., about the religious-historical background. -- One also immediately sees that Ia 15 (logik / naturphilosophie / philosophie des geistes) is one example

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is of the famous Hegelian tripartiteness: 'God' is – as a kind of universe-idea – (affirmation); then, having become nature, he is no longer himself (“Er ist sich alienated ”) (negation); then, ultimately, he has become spirit, once again himself on a higher plane (negation of the negation), no longer nature. –

Which is, of course, a very un-Biblical conception of God. 'God' is the universe process in three phases.

Note:

1. The 'affirmation' plays, as it were, the role of the conservative: it is something passive, which serves as a starting point for the next 'moments'.

2. The 'negation' and the 'negation of the negation' is not purely 'negative': in itself it is just as 'affirmative' ('positive') as the 'affirmation', for it “arises from the affirmation”, even though it is, to a certain extent, the negation of it (the 'affirmation', after all, just like the 'negation', carries the negation—somewhere—within itself as a potential divisive force).

H. Arvon , **Le Marxisme **, 15, rightly says: “Negation is the essential element of dialectics. It is its driving soul. From the opposition of affirmation and negation arises the negation of negation. The negation of negation is the affirmation that managed to 'conquer' negation, in such a way that the negation is absorbed into it (at least as regards its content that remained valid). The negation of negation is, thus, a higher affirmation.” –

Now: the examples will clarify this hyper-technical language. Remember above all that the core of Hegelianism comes down to the process of or within a totality, with qualitative leaps, with gradual quantitative changes—a totality or its parts, which are full of 'spreading fungi'—contradictions, tensions—that cause them to change. In other words: without those 'contradictions' situated within the very essence, there is no process.

The dialectic of the master and the servant (slave).

H. Arvon , *Le Marxisme* , 12/16, gives us a summary of this Hegelian passage. –

(a) **Confirmation** (the false freedom).

-- The gentleman—think of the aristocrat of the Ancien Régime—is, seemingly at least, the free man. For he controls:

the servant, the 'common' man, who acknowledges him as the master and nature (“matter”), thanks to the servant, who controls nature through his labor, transforming it into something enjoyable.

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Consequence : The master displays a self-awareness befitting that control: in his own estimation he is a ruler, and this is confirmed by the estimation of the servant, who the 'common' man submitting to him. –

1. negation (alienation). -- The 'common' man, the servant (slave), is the one who, thanks to his efforts, directly subdues nature and, immediately, as the direct master of nature, experiences the joy of labor. -- Yet he is “deprived of himself” (“ sich”) entfremdet ”, he is alienated from himself):

2. as possession, nature does not belong to him (he does not rule over it);

3. The product created by him does not belong to him (he does not rule over it).

Consequence: the servant lacks the master's self-awareness. He considers himself twice unfree, “a common man”.

Note: -- It is clear that, based on economic and social relations, the master and the unfree correlatives are: in their opposition, they presuppose each other.

(c) *negation of negation (abrogation).* –

(1). The master, however, despite his consciousness, suffers from an inner contradiction ('spreading fungus'). -- Apparently - at first glance he is “the free one”, the ruling one. And yet, upon closer analysis, his rule is rather dependency: as long as the servant acknowledges his master and as long as the servant - in his service - controls nature for him, through his work, until then he remains the master. In fact, the master is controlled both by the servant and by nature. –

Yet the servant, although in essence the master, is not the master: a rebellion would merely reverse the roles, so that the roles of “master”/“servant” would remain; only the individuals who fulfill those roles are exchanged.

The true way out is – in Hegel’s eyes – the Stoic attitude to life. The servant finds that way out:

On the one hand—as a servant of life—he fears death (he is governed by his attachment to his life, -- not so much by the lord);

On the other hand, he feels constantly threatened, causing him to detach from everything outside of him, to attach himself solely to what is within him, his personality. This appreciation creates true freedom. Thus, the servant is the signpost for his master: being free is an 'ascetic', detached form of life.

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This, -- with something haughty in it: although, economically and socially, the controlled, the Stoic servant nevertheless controls the situation, because, from his Stoic 'self-consciousness', he views and appreciates things from a height and, precisely because of this, undermines them, as it were.

Decision

(1) As H. Arvon , in **le Marxisme **, 14, says, this dialectical description, in **de Phänomenologie des Geistes **, is only one type of description of consciousness and, in the long road that 'God' (as spirit) goes through, only one phase.

(2) The first two moments (affirmation and negation) appear valid as 'historia' (Ia 39), as research materials.

Hegel, living in a society of masters and servants, gathered information; Hegel's description also seems valid as 'logos' (Ia 39), as a narrative bearing witness to insight: Hegel discovers a structure in the disparate materials of his observations. The initiation of the third moment—the 'aufhebung' of that social and intersubjective tension—also seems valid.

But whether the Stoic interpretation is such a brilliant achievement, we leave to you, the reader. Admittedly, the essence of Stoic philosophy and its lasting influence to this day (Zenon of Kition (= Citium) (-336/-264) founded this philosophy), the invariably somewhat haughty 'mastery' of what is outside ourselves, through a detached attitude towards it, is accurately rendered.

Note: -- The Stoic / Stoics resemble, incidentally, the fox who, because he could not get them under his control ('mastered' them), undervalued the grapes as "too green" and thus 'detached' himself from them.

The Marxist doctrine of 'contradictions'.

Stalin, in his text on dialectics, quotes Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich) Ulianov , nicknamed 'Lenin' (1870/1924), the leader of the Bolsheviks , who formed the majority within the Russian Communist Party). -- "Things and phenomena entail internal contradictions ('contradictions').

Note: -Think of our metaphor 'splitting fungi'. –

(1). -- The reason is: they all have a negative and a positive side. For example, they all have both a past and a future. For example, they all have both elements that disappear and elements that develop. –

(2). -- The struggle of these opposites - such as the struggle between old and new,

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between what perishes and what develops, between what dies and what is born, -- that struggle is the inner content ('meaning') of the process of that development, -- of the shift from quantitative changes into qualitative changes (...). –

Dialectics in the true sense of the word – according to Lenin – is the study of the contradictions in the very essence of things.

The dialectics of the classes. –

The Marxist doctrine regarding contradictions (spreading fungi) becomes clearer when one analyzes an applicative model.

(A).-- Confirmation (statement). -

The initial phase is the archaic times. The division of labor is the viewpoint that Marxists extract from the totality of archaic humanity.

Everyone can perform all necessary and useful forms of labor (modes of production; ia 18 ff., 47) themselves, such as picking, fishing, hunting, etc.

The only division of labor is that of man and woman, each exhibiting their own type of work. The societal consequence of that economic situation is that every human being is independent of their fellow man, and there is general

equality. -- Yet man is governed by nature (as is evident, for example, in 'nature religions,' with their subjection to invisible beings): the 'divine' power controls the situation.

(B). -- *Denial (dating)*. –

The second phase in cultural history sees the emergence of divisions of labor ('specializations') alongside the gender-based one: one sees a society growing with priests, professional soldiers ('warriors'), farmers (= arable farmers, livestock breeders), -- slaves, 'serfs', wage laborers.

Not everyone can handle all forms of work now: there are now 'classes'.

As a result, social inequality in various forms arises from those economic situations (i.e., from the way people earn their living).

Gain: the rationalization that accompanies specialization displaces, indeed suppresses, the nature-religious fear of the 'divine powers' (nature is a field of work, nothing more).

But now the sacralization is transferred to society with its class inequality: the upper class now appears 'divine' (and, in the Marxist view, 'alien'): within this framework, an antagonistic structure emerges.

“Capital/labor” (ploutocrat / prometarian).

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(C). -- *negation of the negation (summary)*. --

In a future phase, the collectivization (' communalization ') of the means of production (= land for agriculture, workshops (factories, offices) for industry, the service sector) will eliminate the scourge of class inequality.

Immediately, the desecration ('desacralization') is pursued thanks to a kind of atheism: not only nature, but also class society is stripped of its 'sacred' ('inviolable') appearance—in a thorough secularization ('worldliness'), whereby the archaic nature religion and its theological remnants disappear definitively.

Thus, a re-establishment of the archaic equality of all arises, but at a modern level of living. So that Marxism is not a ' reprimatation ' (a primitivist return to an idealized primal state characteristic of natural humanity), but an ' aufhebung ' (abolition) thereof (both a suspension and an elevation to a higher cultural plane).

Conclusion . -- It is evident that the same three-part conceptual framework is ambiguous (multi-interpretable): Hegel, for example, uses it to

denote his 'God' in his (three-part) phases; Marx uses it to denote society in its (three-part) phases.

Note: -- Heraclitus of Ephesus (Ia 24, 29, 52) is considered the first dialectician , although within an archaic Greek framework. -- Listen, for example, to the following fragment (Fr.

53): “

' Polemos ', the struggle ('war'), is the father of all things, the ruler over all things: he makes the some into deities, the others into men; he makes the some into 'servants' (slaves), the others into free people.

One sees that, here, in a searching manner, someone is speaking who sees the 'contradiction' (the divisive force of the struggle) and in 'opposing classes' sees (deities/ humans; free people/ slaves) at work. –

Fr. 67 : “God is day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, abundance/famine. -- He changes just like fire, which, when perfumes are thrown into it, takes on the name of the perfume it exhales.” –

This bears some resemblance to Hegel's 'God', who evolves along with his creation. The style of Heraclitus , with his ' Systechiae ' (pairs of opposites), perfectly reflects the inner 'contradictions'.

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Fr. 88: “It is one and the same in (us): living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old.

The first terms, if they turn into their opposite (' meta.pesonta '), are the second, and these, if they turn into their opposite, are the first.” –

This is, of course, the idea of a 'shift into the opposite'. Something we have encountered more than once.

Conclusion. -- for the umpteenth time it is an ancient Greek who paved the way (Ia 43).

Summary. -- With *H. Arvon , Le Marxisme* , 33 ss., we can summarize.-- English , in his *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (= *anti-Dühring*) , Leipzig, 1878, in his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen German Philosophy* , Stuttgart, 1888,

-- *Lenin*, in his main philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908) and *Stalin*, in his *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* (1937), -- they all, in that order, clarified the presuppositions of the Marxist method. (...). –

It came down to putting forward four principles upon which dialectics rests: **1.** Totality, **2.** Movement, **3.** Qualitative change, **4.** Contradiction.

Expressed logically and methodologically: if these four lemmas, then the data to which they apply are understandable (to begin with: describable, definable).

Chapter 2. Analysis of Ideology. (58/59).

Ia 22 gave us a first opportunity. -- One little Marxist example.

a. In early December 1984, on a Friday, the government of the People's Republic of China relativized the scope of the ideological aspect of the Communist Party—ideology (pointing out its 'relative', its limited, dilapidated character). On that Friday, namely, in an editorial on the front page of the People's Daily, the proposition was put forward that, viewed from the perspective of modernization, the teachings of Karl Marx are outdated. -- This article caused a shock.

b. Marx died in 1883, 101 years ago. His works were written more than 100 years ago. -- Since the formation of his doctrine, tremendous changes—the 'process' of history—have taken place. –

Consequence: some of Marx's ideas—as well as those of Engels and Lenin—no longer reflect the current situation. They did not experience the present time. They did not face the same problems.

Consequence : the solution to contemporary problems presupposes works other than the Marxist and the Leninist.

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As a reminder: Mao Zedong (at the time: Mao Tse Tung ; 1893/1976) was the headmaster of a primary school in Shanghai ; in 1920 he became a Marxist. In 1921, the Communist Party of China was founded. In 1949, the People's Republic of China came into existence. –

Western diplomats previously did not quite know how to interpret the text of the article. However, it was the first time that China, in a text, expressed so clearly and openly the relativity of what – until then – had been considered “absolute truth.”

Two factors were suspected, then:

The Chinese communists have always spoken of a socialism the Chinese way (their own national character was thus a prerequisite, alongside the great principles of Western philosophy);

The old Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping , whose interpretation of Marxism and Leninism clearly seeps through the editorial in question, is a pragmatist. This means that he considers 'teachings' (i.e., an ideology) to be testable based on results—without clinging to them as untestable, 'immutable' dogmas (which would be called 'dogmatism' and would automatically create ideology).

Analysis of ideology. -- What P. Foulquié , oc, 76/122, calls 'scientific dialectics', also entails a critique of ideology, -- but in her own way. –

The Hegelian, the Marxist or Hegelianizing or Marxizing Dialectics originated 'speculatively', -- by which is understood that they originated, at least substantially, outside the sphere of definite or positive sciences. –

Note: -- As is evident from the foregoing, people like Hegel, -- Marx, Engels, et al., although philosophical, certainly had an appreciation for the specialized sciences, - which, at the time, were not so advanced.

dialectics mentioned are too often a simplistic schematism (oc, 77), into which the facts are fitted. -- That, too, is true, of course. But from what precedes, it appears that the founding figures did indeed, in due time, transcend and soften that schematism—let us say, with rhetoric, “commonplaces.”

Note: -- The greatest mistake lies, oh, in this: that dialectics is called a logic (it is applied logic or method) and that it is seen as an explanation, whereas it is usually merely a description.