

Course 5-2. Rhetoric, (literatology, 'theology of eloquence')

Location

5. Courses from 1987 to 1990

5.1. Philosophy of Thought and Methodology 87-88, (WDM1-WDM397, 453p.)

5.2. Rhetoric, 1988-1989 (RH01-RH152, 147p.)

5.3. Philosophy of the Life Course, 1988-1989 (FLL1-FLL290 , 258p.)

5.4. Questions from the Philosophy of Culture, 1989-1990, (KF1-KF351, 414p.)

5.5. Ideology Analysis, 1989-1990, (IA1-IA59, 72p.)

Note: *This course has been spaced larger than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current 'Word' pagination. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'RE'. They stand for 'Rhetoric' and are derived from the old page number.*

Introduction: *The main focus of this course lies in being able to prepare a final project in a responsible manner. It is increasingly heard that not only young people but also quite a few adults fail to meet these standards, even though drafting texts correctly is becoming increasingly important. An attempt is being made to address this through a number of sample surveys.*

Content : *Click on the text below that you wish to read.*

Course 5-2. Rhetoric, (literatology, 'theology of eloquence')	2
Introduction (01/05)	2
1. Is the discipline of 'eloquence' separable? (06/10)	7
2. The divisions of the rhetorical act (11/16)	12
3. The origin ('genesis') of Greek rhetoric. (17/27)	20
4. Rhetoric in the sense of literary science. (28/37)	32
5. Rhetoric as information or communication theory. (38/51)	43
6. The theory of treatise. (52/59).	57
6.1. Treatise Theory: existence/ essence (60/65)	66
6.2. Theory of Dissertation: problem hermeneutics (thematics). (66/73)	72
6.3. Theory of Dissertation: Topic (Commonplace Theory) (74/81)	81
6.4. Theory of Treatise: Logic and Methodology. (82/91).	90
6.5. Theory of Treatise: Pathos. (92/105)	101

7. The theory of description. (106/121)	116
8. Story theory (narrative, narratology). (122/140)	134
9. Report writing. (141/152).	155

Course 5-2. Rhetoric, (literatology, 'theology of eloquence')

RE1

Introduction (01/05)

This 'rhetoric' is not merely general rhetoric, but also a 'thesis theory' – for the benefit of Hivo students. Admittedly, the principal characteristics of 'being able to write and/or speak well' (for that is, in its later, broader sense, 'rhetoric' as applied theory regarding language proficiency) will be discussed, albeit in a very abbreviated form. But the emphasis lies on “being able to responsibly compose a final paper”.

A cultural mistake.

About a century ago, a section of the then-current—primarily French—intelligentsia began the deliberate 'dismantling' (to use Derrida's words: “la déconstruction”) of rhetoric approximately four to twenty-five centuries old (and successfully applied). In order to... (do not be surprised) to introduce it today, for the past few decades, albeit in a re-established sense.

With this, we wish to emphasize that the “rhetoric craze” that is gripping a number of intellectuals is more than a passing fashion. At least, from our point of view. To us, it is the re-establishment—one might also call it ‘actualization’—of a rock-solid discipline (subject) that has made countless educated individuals proficient in language—even though, from our own—again time-bound—standpoint, we judge rhetoric and its applications differently (sometimes very ‘critically,’ pointing out the errors). Who among us has not learned to say ‘empty rhetoric’ in secondary education?

Our teachers have, usually, forgotten to add that, besides a very real 'hollow' ('dung') rhetoric or art of speaking and writing, there existed—and still exists—a non-hollow, very useful rhetoric. The term “(hollow) rhetoric” has been ideologically loaded with prejudices (that is, based on sometimes very learned presuppositions of little value, except for the subjective opinion expressed within it). The text that follows will (rest assured) launch a furious attack against this. For the following reasons.

A growing complaint.

At the college, one in three young French people no longer master their

own language. A report by the Inspection générale shows us that, upon admission to the Sixth, four out of ten pupils can be branded as 'illettrés' (illiterate).

RE2

They cannot even—with understanding—read or write down a simple and brief exposition of facts directly related to their daily lives. Consequently, they do not possess the necessary attainments to integrate themselves, at a minimal level, into our society. (*Anne Vallée, Expression écrite : zéro !*, in: *Sélection du Readers Digest* (Zürich), 39 (1986), April, 5/14).

Note-- Dr. Guido Geerts, **Some reflections on language proficiency and culture **, in: ** Onze Alma Mater ** 38 (1984): 2, 87/99, says: “(...) Here and elsewhere, in the past and present, 'people' complain that 'they' cannot write. (...). I could fill whole pages with texts in which I have encountered the complaints just mentioned. (...). 'They' cannot write, then. Nor can 'they' speak (...). The 'new illiteracy' has been analyzed by *Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism ** (1978), as an aspect of anti-intellectualism. (...)”. (Ac,87v.).

Note-- Cl. Callens, *La réforme du Français* (a photocopied text), says: “*Oswald Ducrot/Tzvetan Todorov* (both attachés de recherche au CNRS, known for collaboration on *Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme ?* Paris, 1968), authors of *le Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage* , stated in the broadcast ' *Science et technique* (*France Culture*):

“Today, a disorderly impression prevails in the linguistics, -- if only from a terminological point of view. The technical terms are far from fixed; they vary constantly. Almost every system of learning ('doctrine') -- linguistic systems of learning emerge every month, every year -- creates for itself its own language of technical terms ('terminology') such that the same words often cover very different meanings; -- indeed, sometimes, from system of learning to system, they have a contradictory meaning”. (*Bulletin SBP F* 72/73, 1972, 90, n. 34).

Conclusion: Lasch sees 'Anti-intellectualism' at work; the French Structuralists 'Babel-like confusion of language' among linguists themselves. This latter observation prompts us to adhere as much as possible to established, traditional technical terms precisely so as not to create conceptual confusion.

In addition to the aforementioned factors, one can mention: the Sturm und Drang aspect of Romanticism (with its 'genius' cult and individualism), the

earliest Positivism (with its aversion to linguistic aspects), the 'Californian Revolution' (with the Hippie phenomenon and New Left), symbols of 'Counterculture' and 'Gauchism' to the point of being anti-intellectual, which further deepen the so-called 'generation gap' (instead of bridging it through calm dialogue).

RE3

The topicality of rhetoric.

The bibliographic samples that the remainder of the text will present will more than confirm the topicality.

However, on a broader level of Commonsense, reference is made, for example, to:

(i) *Jutta Möller-Bäzner, Rhetorik (Riskieren sie die grosse Lippe)*, in : *Cosmopolitan* (Für die Frau), 1985: 10 (Oct.), 128/133 (where a case is made for - especially - learning to perform in public);

(ii) *AG, La persuasion , -- cela s' apprend* in: *Journal de Genève* , 23.02.1989 (Gérald Menthe, marketing professor at the Université de Genève, sets up an accelerated course in 'rhetoric' for non-university students);

(iii) *Modèles de discours pour les dirigeants et cadres d' entreprise* , Paris (weka), 1987 (is a set of elaborate models of 'commonplaces' ('lieux communs'), in the most traditional style, although adapted to a modern atmosphere).

Conclusion: women, non-academics, business leaders—they are all served up 'rhetoric' here and there—the subject that 'Modernists' began to abolish a hundred years ago—the subject that is now 'in' again.

Bibliographic sample.

(1) *H. Morier, Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique* , Paris, 1961-1, 1981-3.

(2) *ER Curtius, La littérature européenne et le Moyen Age latin* , Paris, 1956 (German original: 1948);

-- *Ch.G. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (Interpreted from Representative Works)*, Gloucester (Mass.), 1928-1 (both works are 'standard works').

(3) The first - naturally another Greek - to write a rhetoric turns out to be the early Protosphist *Anaximenes of Lampsakos (-380/-320)*, with his *Peri*

rhètorikès , - a little work that appeared shortly before Aristotle's Rhetoric (the classic, which dates from +-362/-361).

Anyone wishing to know more about Ancient Greek rhetoric can, for example, read (from an overwhelming mass of books and articles) : *H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité* , Paris, 1948, 81/98 (*Les Sophistes*), 268/282 (*L' enseignement supérieur: la rhétorique*).

Also: *C. Rehdantz, Demosthenes: Acht philippische Reden* , Chft 1, Leipzig, 1865-2, 13/16 (*Kurze Geschichte der Redekunst*), 109/133 (*Rhetorischer u. stylistischer Index* ; -- still valid);

-- *JW Hey Atkins, Greek Rhetoric* , in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* , 1950-2, 766/767;

RE4

-- *E. von Tunk, kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Literatur* , Einsiedeln u. Kiln, 1942, 40/51 (*Die Redekunst*);

-- *R. Stock, Eloquence* , in: *Helitoon (Anthology of Greek and Latin writers*), Antwerp, sd, 243/306.

(4) Positioning, preferably Modern, of the rhetoric within a broader conceptual framework:

-- *G. Fauconnier, General Communication Theory (An overview of the scientific theories of communication)* , Utrecht/ Antwerp, 1981, 19/27 (*From rhetoric to general communication theory*);

-- in a semiotic (= sign doctrinal) sense: *R. Barthes, L'aventure sémiologique* , Paris, 1985, 85/165 (*L'ancienne rhétorique*);

-- *Umberto Eco, La structure absente (Introduction à la sémiotique)* , Paris, 1972, 19 (*Rhetorique* , 154/166 (*Le message persuasif : la rhétorique*). It should be noted that we have two models of the theory of signs at our disposal, the semiotics of Peirce (Morris) and the semiology of Saussure.

(5) Further works: *H. Plett, Hrsg. Rhetorik (Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung)* , Munich, 1977 (theme: *inherited rhetoric as a research method following the Symposium in Essen* ; -- literary-theoretical, pragmatic (result-oriented), action-theoretical (= praxeological), -- cultural-historical); --

-- *Chaim Perelman, Rhetoric and Argumentation* , Baarn, 1979 (a groundbreaking and very solid work);

-- *M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, Modern Eloquence (Handbook for Oral Language Proficiency)* , Amsterdam/ Brussels, 1968-3;

-- *G. Vardaman, Effective Communication of Ideas* , New York, 1970;

- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion* , Paris, 1985;
- O. Reboul, *La rhétorique* , Paris, 1984;
- J. Kopperschmidt, *Allgemeine Rhetorik (Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation)* , Stuttgart, 1973;
- G. Klaus, *Die Macht des Wortes (Ein erkenntnistheoretisch-pragmatisches Traktat)* , Berlin, 1969-4;
- K. Lehrer/ C. Wagner, *Rational Consensus in Science and Society (A Philosophical and Mathematical Study)* , Dordrecht, 1981;
- S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy (What happens when people speak?)* , Bilthoven, 1975;
- H. Lausberg, *Elemente der literarischen, Rhetorik* , Munich, 1967-3;
- H. Elentsen, *Moderne Rhetorik (Rede und Gespräch in der Wirtschaft und im öffentlichen Leben)* , Heidelberg, 1963-2;

Last but not least, an occultist approach:

- P.-C. Jagot, *L'éducation de la parole (Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire et assurée)* , St. Jean de Braye, 1975.

RE5

Initial descriptions.

From what precedes, a vague concept of 'rhetoric' has surely arisen in your mind. However, this is, for the time being, insufficient. Therefore, a few descriptions, or approximate definitions (determinations of essence).

(1). -- P. Larousse, *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle* , 15 vol., 1866/1876 ; --13, 1143, says:

"Rhetoric is the study of eloquence, in which 'eloquence' is understood as 'l'art de persuader', the art of persuasion (persuasive influence)". Gérusez, the author of the article, adds to this the classical method of the rhetoricians (rhetoric teachers):

(a) as a prescriptive (normative) science, classical rhetoric provides maxims, or precepts, which serve as the presuppositions, or hypotheses, of good writing and speaking;

(b) as a reductive science based on historical induction, classical rhetoric tests these presuppositions against the great masterpieces of good writing and speaking. So that over time a solid cultural-historical material was accumulated (in the good textbooks, at least).

(2). -- RR Bolger, *Rhetoric* , in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica* , Chicago, 1967,

19: 257/260, puts it somewhat differently, but that does not mean he contradicts G ruzez. "Rhetoric is the name that, true to tradition, is given to

(a) language usage

(b) as a skill ('art'), supported by a system of ordered knowledge".

As we just heard.

But Bolger teaches us something. After Older Positivism (A. Comte (1798/1857), *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830/1842)) came Neo- -or Logical (also: Linguistic) Positivism, which "in the 1930s drew attention to the importance of the analysis of language use" (ac, 259).

Bolger therefore refers to *IA Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric ** (1941), who advocates for rhetoric instruction in schools and universities in the USA. Good academic science invariably pays attention to scientific language use.

RE6

1. Is the academic discipline separable from 'eloquence'? (06/10)

It will come as a surprise that (Neo-)Positivists, of all people, focus attention on—possibly 'rhetorical'—use of language. Do not rigorous (professional) science, based solely on facts, and 'Positivist philosophy' stand at the center of every Positivist?

Therefore, in a first chapter, an digression that is simultaneously a direct introduction to the rhetorical aspect of every (specialized) science.

New description.

a. G.G. Granger (1920/...), a convinced Rationalist, attempts to substantiate two claims in his ** Pens e formelle et sciences de l'homme **, Paris, 1967, 21/24 (** Rh torique et contenus **).

(a) 'Rhetorical' language use differs radically from 'scientific' language use, because it confines itself to a verbal universe: (oc, 21). In other words: we have rhetoric; understood as wordplay (RE 01), which we learned about in our education. In other words: an ideological, biased use of terminology.

(b) Rhetoric - says what further on (oc,22) Granger - uses language as a means of influence between more than one subject, - if only for the purely aesthetic (= beauty) enjoyment that the speaking and listening or reading subject derives from it.

Specialized science, on the other hand, uses the language:

(i) not merely as a means of understanding between the subjects engaged in scientific practice (the scientists),

(ii) but also as a means of interpretation between those same subjects and the perceived world, such that the objects from that perceived world become 'maniables' (manageable) (oc,23).

If we understand the cited Granger correctly, then academic language is one of many rhetorical uses. 'Rhetorical use', after all,

(i) uses language as a means of communication, between writer or orator and audience and

(ii) uses language as a means of interpretation to make the objects the writer or speaker is discussing 'manageable' together with the audience. For the audience, or at least that audience that primarily wants to learn something, is faced with 'unmanageable' things - think of a teacher who has to explain the concept of 'square' for the first time - and expects from the (speaker/writer) that those same things become 'maniables' (to use Granger's terminology).

RE7

Explanation:

a. Take, for example, that you, as a teacher, actually have to explain the concept of a 'square' to children who are learning this for the first time.

For such little creatures, the idea of 'square' is a radical unknown (and, therefore, in Granger's terminology, 'unmanageable'). Such a child does not even possess the purely human concept of 'square' and must also learn the term (the word in which the concept is captured).

Idea (in the Platonic sense of "that which governs and, immediately, illuminates all our concepts and terms, as well as the things to which those concepts and terms apply"), concept (that which penetrates our mind from the idea), term (the word or group of words in which our concepts are fixed in the linguistic context), -- the thing itself, all this is unknown and 'unmanageable' (the child in question cannot "work with" it).

b. You enter the classroom, -- with, for example, a metal 'square' (visual instruction), with your prepared mind. What do you do first? For example, draw a square on your board (in Platonic terms: the phenomenon in which the

idea exhibits exactly one image ('specimen')).

Furthermore: the word (the term 'square')—pronounce it and perhaps write it on the board. Last but not least, pass the small metal square around, from child to child—to look at and touch it. -- What have you done rhetorically?

(i) As regards means of understanding, you have both a drawing on the board (“material phenomenon”) and, perhaps, the word 'square' on that same board and the small metal square put into circulation, -- all this summarized in the term 'square', which you repeat almost constantly, in order to let it gently penetrate, amidst the sentences you utter, into the awakening minds that are your children. Thus you establish the basic phenomenon of every rhetorical act.

(ii) Regarding means of interpretation, you have exactly the same data: for 'to interpret' ('to interpret') is **a.** a given ('something' in the ontological sense) **b.** to separate from the whole ('totality') of all that is ('being'), in order to give it a name and thus make it manageable.

From that moment on, you can start thinking about, for example, refining the geometric area. The formula reads “Side x side”. In this way, literally, the square also becomes geometrically, for example, ‘manageable’.

RE8

The rhetorical act contains “language as a means of influence”

(1) When one scientist speaks to another about his discoveries, his scientific data or insights, he uses both means of understanding and means of interpretation to ... influence that colleague by means of scientific language (take a set of mathematical formulas that exactly describe the phenomenon being analyzed; take, for example, a protocol statement, i.e., a description of an experiment). Whether he likes it or not, he influences the other scientist.

That “making his insights and experiences gain acceptance” in the mind of the colleague is typically rhetorical.

(2) When you, as a teacher, speak to your children about, for example, the square, you are using both means of understanding (after the lesson, if it succeeds, the children 'understand' you and you can, in understanding, 'handle' the square with them) and means of interpretation (they have, with you, the square (and all possible squares), i.e. the idea, separated from total reality and given names).

But you immediately influenced them. Namely, you made the idea of 'square' (with all that it governs—the concept of 'square', the term (word) 'square', the instances ('phenomena') of it found in nature or in culture) “take hold” in the thinking and reasoning minds of the children. Which is the definition of 'rhetoric'. Whereby 'rhetoric' is anything but 'empty 'rhetoric' or wordplay.

An argument from authority.

Our proposition is therefore: teaching, as a teacher, -- a subject-specific discussion (possibly a debate), -- they are two types (kinds, 'species') or applicative models of a universal idea “rhetoric”.

These are understood, for the time being, as using both means of understanding and interpretation to make a message (to speak in terms of current communication theory), i.e., information, gain acceptance. Yes, perhaps there is no better definition of the rhetorical act.

As an argument from authority, we cite Thomas Kuhn (1922/1996), who—along with Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, and Paul Feyerabend—is regarded as one of the great epistemologists (philosophers of science) of our time (cf. A. Chalmers, * *What is Science Called? (On the Nature and Status of Science and Its Methods)*, * Meppel/Amsterdam, 1981, 114/127 (Kuhn's Paradigms)).-

RE9

In his * *Destructuur van getenschappelijke revoluties* * (1962), Meppel, 1976-2, 135, Kuhn states the following: “If we survey the extensive experimental literature (...), then the suspicion arises that something like a paradigm also underlies perception. What a person sees depends on:

(i) both of the object he is looking at

(ii) as of what has learned to see, -- through his earlier visual-conceptual experiences. In the absence of such training (*note*: practice) there exists only - in the words of William James (1842/1910) - “a blossoming, buzzing confusion”.

The great religious psychologist James articulates here brilliantly what Granger calls 'unmanageability'. What 'visual-conceptual experiences' encompasses may be illustrated as follows.

For example, a teacher teaches what a 'camera obscura' (the closed box inside a camera; metonymically: the camera itself) is. Without the visual

aspect (seeing a camera), without the conceptual (= understandable) aspect that goes with it (because the teacher refers to the object with the term 'camera (obscura)'), the pupil actually 'sees' an unprocessed, 'unmanageable' thing (a box, for example).

Note that, by 'attaching' the term 'camera (obscura)' to the object, the teacher situates that same object within language (linguistic aspect) and, immediately, introduces understanding and interpretation. The pupil is initiated into the group of people who both know the term 'camera (obscura)' and prioritize the language system (to speak with Saussure and the Structuralists) within which the term is situated. Only when this twofold aspect is prioritized can the pupil 'see' (perceive). Otherwise, he or she 'sees' merely an amorphous (meaningless) 'something'.

He/she does not see what the teacher sees—what everyone sees, as long as he/she has not learned to see—as long as the teacher has not influenced him/her in that direction through means of interpretation and understanding. This is: as long as the teacher's 'rhetoric' has not operated in that sense.

Kuhn's application model.

Oc, 36, gives Kuhn an application.

“At some point—between 1740 and 1780—the electricity theorists were, for the first time (RE 07: for the first time), able to accept the foundations of their field, without further ado.

RE10

(i) - From that moment on, they threw themselves into more concrete (*note*: defined) and hidden problems and reported - increasingly - their results in articles addressed to other electricity theorists, -- instead of in books addressed to the developed world in general.

(ii) - As a group they achieved what **(1)** the astronomers, in Antiquity, **(2)** the motion researchers, in the Middle Ages, **(3)** the physical optics, at the end of the 17th century, **(4)** the historical geologists, at the beginning of the 19th century, achieved.

In particular: they had produced a (paradigm (*note*: from the ancient Greek 'paradeigma' (model, conceptual model, example)) that proved capable of guiding the research of the entire group.

Except with the aid of 'hindsight', it is difficult to find another 'criterion' (

note: from Ancient Greek 'kritèrion', means of knowledge -- that by which something is distinguishable (and thus interpretable) from all other things) that so clearly proclaims a field of study to be a (specialized) science.

So much for Kuhn, who made the ancient term 'paradigm' (also translated as textbook example) common again.

In other words:

(1) the specialist scientist, usually favored by some chance, finds a new 'view' (in Kuhn's language game: paradigm) on at least one object of observation;

(2) he shares that view with other subjects (to use Granger's words), which

(2)a the educated reader (vulgarizing rhetoric) or

(2)b the 'specialist' (peer) (high-level information, or rhetoric). In this way, he influences the 'view' (paradigm, -- means of interpretation, and, at the same time, means of understanding) of the observable world (the 'objects'), until his 'view' gains acceptance.

Decision.

'Theory' is, in the current sense, a set of concepts and judgments—preferably axiomatic (derivable ('deducible') from strict presuppositions (axioms))—such that an ordered series of propositions concerning a field of study (the objects) is formulated.

'Metatheory', just like 'metalanguage' (language about language), is a theory that has the theory, in the sense just defined, as its object. A true metatheory about science—such as about the teacher's speech—certainly includes a rhetorical moment, for, in all scientific behavior, we encounter a minimal (and precisely definable) 'rhetorical element'.

What we have attempted to demonstrate.

RE11

2. The divisions of the rhetorical act (11/16)

We do say 'act', that linguistic act. After all, rhetoric has invariably been a theory of action or praxeology (from the Greek 'praxis', deed, action). One has a message ("The speaker has something to say"). One wants to make this message or 'report' (information) take hold by means of means of interpretation and understanding. As we saw just now. This entails: one acts—actively—into one's fellow man.

What, then, are the major parts, 'stoicheia', elementa, divisions (components), of this action? Five. - Aristotle provided four. But - especially since the Protosophist Hippias of Elis (-470/-400; cf. J.P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs* (*Etudes de psychologie historique*), I, Paris, 1970, 106s. (*Mnemotechnie d' Hippias*)) - memorization has been added to it.

A -- Textual rhetoric. (11/12.1)

An essential component of a rhetorical act—think of an advertising poster—is minimal and essential text. Hence the term 'textuology'. Imagine a fragrant soup tureen on a chicken advertisement. One sees a fox, greedily, circling the bowl, but the words “Contains chicken” clarify what it is about. That is the textual element. However small. The effect is that the viewer already feels the aroma of tasty chicken rising in their nose and the taste in their mouth.

That is the total rhetoric of advertising, which encompasses both text and linguistic act. An act, therefore, that makes use of the relational element of text (“This contains chicken”). An act of influence, mind you.

Library st.:

- P. Larousse, *Grand dict .*, 1143;
- A. Langlois, *Le style : la chose et la manière* (*Du XVIIe au XXe siècle*), Bruxelles, 1925, 56/58 ;
- R. Barthes, *L'aventure sém .*, 4, 121, 123.

According to these proponents, textual rhetoric was divided into three parts, which Géroze, in the Larousse, characterizes as follows: “All intellectual work is accomplished on the basis of invention (heuresis, inventio), arrangement (diataxis or taxis, dispositio), and shaping (stylization, lexis, elocutio)”.

Thus Géroze. -- The Latins describe:

(i) “invenire quid dicas” (to find what you are going to say; to build up the message);

(ii) “inventum disponere” (to arrange what has been found according to a plan; the sequence scheme of the message);

These two sections form the business part.

“Ornare verbis” (to convert into (stylized) words; -- in other words, the 'design' or shaping of the message). Which is the literal part. -- Note: these three adaptations are distinct, but not separate.

A.1.-- *Heuristic rhetoric.*

The invention, the traditional title, provides the 'pisteis' (probationes), the 'proofs' (the argument).

Logic (the theory of thought), and especially applied logic (= methodology), which deals with concepts (terms), judgments (propositions), and reasoning, dominates this section in a certain sense. However, pathos (the theory of emotional arguments) also plays a decisive role here.

Result: all elements, understood as raw data material—what Herodotus of Hallicarnassus (-484/-425; founder of geography and ethnology (W. Jaeger) or, as usual, 'father of historiography') calls 'historia', research materials.

A.2.-- *text formation rhetoric.*

In Herodotus, textual rhetoric is called “the doctrine concerning the 'logos', the text”. -- Traditionally, two aspects are distinguished. --

(I). *The harmological rhetoric.*

The arrangement (such is the transmitted title) worked on, with the spirit that establishes order ('harmology' (theory of order), the loose materials of the investigation, - note the plan, the sequence of text sections, the exposition scheme, the division. - We will return to this regularly in what follows.

(II). -- *The stylistic rhetoric .*

The design, the stylization, is the final reworking by our mind, as if endowed with a sense of 'beauty', of the ordered text. -- We will not go into this in a separate chapter.

Library st.:

-- H. Suhamy, *Les figures de style*, Paris, 1983-2 (the figures of speech, including the tropes (tropology) are idioms);

-- P. Barucco, *Eléments de stylistique*, Paris, 1979 (current theories).

Style is the manner in which one expresses a thought by means of language (J. Broeckaert).

-- As R. Barthes says in *L'av. sém.* 155/164, the Ancient term is 'lexis' (Lat.: 'elocutio'). Or also 'hermeneia' (Lat.: 'interpretatio', interpretation).

A purely logical-pathetic content can be expressed in more than one way.

The advertisement from just now: “Eat chicken, because chicken is healthy” or “There is chicken in this” (says the greedy, gluttonous fox, depicted on the poster, -- model of the hungry one).

Applicable model

-- R. Bruzina, *Eidos (Universality in the Image or in the Concept?)*, in: R. Bruzina/ B. Wilshire, *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague/ Boston, 1978, gives us a highly striking example of 'styles'.

The same 'message' ('message', content) can be 'encoded' (converted into text) in more than one way.

Situation: Along with the Whites, Negro-Africa sees a new religion entering the country.

RE13

(1) - Negro-African style.

The high priest informs one of his sons that it is necessary to send him to the church (in West Africa). -- "I desire that one of my sons accompany these people, to be my eyes there. If there is nothing in it, come back. But if there is something in it, bring me my portion home.

The world is like a mask that dances. If you wish to see that world, do not remain standing in one and the same place. My spirit tells me that those who are not friends of "the white man" will say today or tomorrow: "If only we had known!"

(2).- Western style.

"I send you as my representative among these people, -- precisely to be safe should this new religion arise and take hold. One ought to move with the times; otherwise one remains lagging behind. I have a vague suspicion that those who, today, do not come to an understanding with the Whites, will, in time, bitterly lament their lack of prospects." (From: *Chinua Achebe* (Nigerian writer), *English and the African Writer*, in: *Transition*, 4 (1965), 18:18/19, -- a text that discusses two styles in English, insofar as it is written/spoken by Negro-Africans).

Traduttore traditore.

"To translate is to betray." -- So goes an Italian proverb.

H. De Vos, *Einl. / Erl., Ernst Jünger* (1895/1998), *Lob der Vokale und Sizilischer Brief an dem Mann im Mond*, Brussels. sd, 19f., gives an application.

Rendering the Latin verse "Nulla unda tam profunda quam vis amoris furibunda" as "Keine Quelle/ So tief und schnelle/ Als der Liebe/ Reissende Welle" does not accurately capture the ancient, mysterious atmosphere of Latin. (No wave is as deep as the perseverance of 'love' beyond itself).

B.-- *The Dramaturgical Rhetoric* . (13/15)

'Dramaturgy' means "the theory concerning the art of theatre or, better, acting". As we said above: rhetoric is understood most purely when it is called a theory of action. The text is one thing. But the delivery of the text is another. And 'delivering' is acting, influencing an audience—even if it were only a single listener.

B.1.-- *The mnemonic rhetoric.*

(1) The Latins called this part of the rhetorical act "memoriae mendere" (to entrust to memory; the memorization of the message).

Library st.: Larousse, Langlois, Barthes , as above. -

(2) The 'mnème', memoria, memory, is an Archaic heritage. This is evident from what *JP Vernant, Mythe et pensée* , I, 80/123, says about it.

a. The poets, for example (such as Homer, -- between 900 and 700), bore

RE14

reciting the poems from memory, sometimes thousands of verses long. Ellis's Hippias, mentioned above (RE 11) (cf. *JP Dumont, Les Sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)* , Paris, 1969, 145s.), possessed such a phenomenal (in the sense of 'exceptional') memory.

b. According to Vernant, the historical psychologist, a memory like that of Hippias was, for example, the secularization of

(i) Mnemosune, the goddess of memory (and expanded consciousness as some Alternatives now say),

(ii) who substantiated the actually ascertainable (in Platonic terms 'phenomenal') memory by inspiring it.

Decision:

In mnemonic rhetoric, an ancient sacred element lives on in a secular (= worldly, 'earthly') form.

(3) This chapter also includes the theme of improvisation. Let us say: "to recite a text ... off the cuff, at the very moment it is conceived". This implies that one has memorized the main points of a message (= text), but 'improvises' the final wording, including the stylization. Which, in very many cases, is the best recitation of it.

(4) A text can be memorized either silently or aloud (possibly in front of those present).

(5) One piece of advice: some speakers proceed as follows (and with success): the memorized text is in the memory at a given moment; from then on, samples are taken from it, which are recited (silently or aloud), but reciting as if one were already actually speaking, in the future, that is.

This is reminiscent of what is called 'prophetic perspective' in the Bible: the prophet in question spoke as if he were already the contemporary of a future humanity. Something similar is found, to some extent, in what rhetoricians call 'descriptive hypotypose' ("I already see the city burning...").

B.2.-- The 'hypocritical' rhetoric

(1) The Latins called this rhetorical aspect "agere et pronuntiare" (acting and pronouncing; acting out the message).

Bible st.: except the already mentioned *Larousse* (*Géruzez*), *Langlois et Barthes*, essentially mentioned:

-- *Sir Charles Bell* (1774/1842; famous neurophysiologist), *Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts* (1806; on the muscular movements that usually accompany the drives and feelings);

-- *Ch. Darwin* (1809/ 1882), *Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals* (1872; Darwin mentions Bell);

-- *EW Straus* (Lexington, Kentucky), *The Sigh* (*An Introduction to a Theory of*

Expression), in: *Tijdschr.v.Phil .*, 14 (1952): 4, 474/, 95).

RE15

(2) Straus, who emphatically mentions both Bell and Darwin, refers to an analogy formulated by Bell: "Expression is to passion what language is to thought." Analogous scheme: expression / passion = language / thought. As an actor or orator, respectively, one would do well to take this analogy into account.

(3) The Ancient Greek term 'hupokrisis' does not mean 'feigning' unless very secondarily, but rather acting. 'Hupokritikos' is, therefore, in Ancient Greek, "that which goes hand in hand with acting".

The Latins, aware of the praxeological character of rhetoric, rightly

translated 'hupokrisis' as 'actio', to act. "Agere et pronuntiare" even mentions acting for speaking.

Textuology and mnemonic technology are merely preparatory stages. The action, which encompasses both diction (verbal ability) and gesture (sign language ability), is further substantiated by

(i) the overall appearance of the actor (a type of clothing can come across as 'eloquent'; think of a Punker doing the talking) and

(ii) the infrastructure (think of the evidence that lawyers present in court: "Here is the weapon of crime!"; think of teachers who use the blackboard; think of the convincing impact of tables or computer screen images): all these aspects form, in fact, a unity.

An examination of conscience.

The students of the Hivo (Higher Institute for Educational Sciences) are, usually, engaged in active teaching. It might be useful to analyze the teaching and upbringing behavior they exhibit based on the five rhetorical divisions.

A.1 . The teacher has a message, the content of her lesson, which can be broken down into a number of elements.

A.2. She has a message, the lesson content, organized according to plan.

A.3. She has a message, articulating the lesson content with minimal stylization.

B.1. A well-prepared teacher has minimal memorization but spices this up with fluent improvisation (if only because a student raises their hand and asks a sometimes unforeseeable question that disrupts the programmed text).

B.2. Finally, if one considers it carefully, teaching is, to a minimally essential extent, acting. A teacher who never 'expresses' feelings, displays stuttering diction, limp gestures, a bland appearance, and a flawed infrastructure, will—quite certainly—influence the small audience before her differently than one for whom all those aspects are not present.

RE16

The message suffers from a lack of rhetoric. Sometimes one hears teachers complain: "It didn't sink in." That is a direct reference to her/their rhetoric, which... -attempts to make the message sink in by means of communication and interpretation (overlapping across the five levels).

Note: Are people gradually beginning to understand why, above (RE 1),

there was talk of a 'cultural mistake' regarding the minimization or even radical abolition—which has unfortunately happened—of age-old rhetoric? Teaching is a rhetorical act.

Assertiveness

The agogen (pedagogues, andragogists), the agogiekers (theorists) of agogic behavior—all of them, in recent years, largely under the influence of the New Left, have emphatically spoken of assertiveness. 'Assistancy' means being "emancipated." Free from the grip of one's fellow man, who acts as an 'alienating' (estranging) force. Anyone who has studied rhetoric sees much more easily where, when, how, and by what means that same fellow man 'acts' and 'manipulates'.

Semasiology.

'Semasiology' is 'the study of word meaning'. -- 'Rhetoric' can be defined in more than one way. -- R. Barthes, oc, summarizes the meanings. --

A.-- Persuasion technique, -- say: speaking skills. -which, thanks to "being articulate", makes a message (= report) easily gain acceptance. --

B. (i) Instruction in language skills and persuasion techniques "-- initially by the Ancient 'rhetoricians', -- later by ordinary teachers.

(ii) What Barthes calls 'protoscience' (= beginning science),-- i.e. the analysis of the phenomenon (linguistic behavior), in terms of what one might call a 'metalanguage' regarding linguistic language use).

Ethical-political orientation.

In contrast to the merely 'positive' (= definitive) inquiry of our day, traditional rhetoric was never – what is now called – 'value-free'.

(i) Influencing someone so that the message is accepted has always been considered an act for which one is responsible in conscience.

Note-- However, there are differences .

a. Protosophists such as Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410) or, even more so, Gorgias of Leontinoi (-460/-375) sometimes did not take the ethical aspect very seriously.

b. The Paleopythagoreans (Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500) and his school, as well as Plato of Athens (-427/-347), who advocated a thoroughly conscientious rhetoric, -- together with the great Platonic tradition - such as Cicero (-106/-43; the greatest Roman orator) or Quintilian (+35/+96; De institutione oratoria, a full-fledged rhetoric) - adhered, as strictly as possible, to some ethical system or other. As Barthes says: this moral attitude was

predominant up to and including the 19th century.

RE17

(ii) To influence someone so that a message, with the models of interpretation and understanding attached to it, gains acceptance, was invariably considered an act for which one is responsible—not only as a conscientious individual, but also—as a co-responsible citizen. -- 'Polis', city-state, was the term that led to our word 'politisch' or 'politiek'.-- Civic sense was the quintessential sign of conscience. Hence the 'ethical-political' pairing.

Note-- The humanities.

Around 1950, a new term emerged to replace the term 'moral and political sciences', which was perceived as outdated.

Library st.:

-- J.Freund, *Les théories des sciences humaines* , Paris, 1973.

-- D. Hollier, dir., *Panorame des sc. humaines* , Paris, 1973.

3. The origin ('genesis') of Greek rhetoric. (17/27)

As the great Catholic educator O. Willmann (1839/1920), **Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propdeutik *)*, Vienna, 1959-5, 51, 414*, states, the so-called 'genetic' approach—that is, studying something from its origin—is one of the most appropriate for understanding it (think of Aristotle or Hegel). We will apply this method to rhetoric, just briefly —not to expand the text or to give the appearance of erudition, but to offer you, who are about to write a thesis, one of the possible methods for 'developing' your theme and the associated issues.

Yet Roland Barthes, as a Structuralist (in the Saussurian sense), is also right when he writes: “Rhetoric must always be 'read' (*note*: understand: interpreted) within the structural interplay of its neighbors, namely grammar, logic (RH 12), poetics (*note*: the theory of poetry), -- philosophy. It is the interplay of the system—not each of its parts separately—that is, historically speaking, meaningful.” (Oc, 118/120).

In other words: emphasizes an O. Willmann, strongly influenced by Historicism (*note*: the German Romantics), the so-called diachronic view, the Barth view. -- Saussurian, equally rightly emphasizes the synchronic or system-theoretical view. -- You who are preparing a thesis, please view your theme and its problematic from that twofold, complementary method.

1.-- Ancient tradition of the (democratic) Greeks . (17/19)

Homer, the great epic poet (RH 13), has often been regarded as the founder of rhetoric. Ernst Curtius (1814/1896; known for his *History of Greece* (1857/1861)) rightly noted that almost half of the *Iliad* and more than two-thirds of the *Odyssey* consist of speeches by protagonists, -- often of considerable length. The 'cunning Odysseus' (...) in particular is a masterful orator." (*M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, Moderne welsprekendheid* , A'm/ Bssl, 1968, 38).

RE18

Indeed: in Homeric culture, the 'agora'—at that time the assembly of the people or army, incidentally of sacred law—occupies a central position.

Appl. mod.

Agamemnon, the prince of Mycenae (Lat.: Mycenae), leader of the Greek army before Troy (= Ilion, later Pergamon, -- a city dating back at least to 2000 BC, in Asia Minor) — at that time also called 'Achaeans' — receives, in a God-given dream (Biblical Revelation also features God-given dreams, -- think of Joseph, the foster father of Jesus), the command to gather the people (= the warriors) (Il. 2: 1ff.). This demonstrates the Archaic-sacred (or 'consecrated') character. 'Sacred' is usually confused with 'authoritarian-sacred'.

But look: Telemachus, Odysseus' son, receives the inspiration—because of the goddess Pallas Athena, who appears to him in the guise of Menelaos—to convene the agora (assembly of the people)—to denounce the cynical suitors who are literally devouring the palace of his mother, the queen Penelope (also 'Penelope'), who, mindful of her sacred marriage contracted before its deities, awaits Odysseus, her husband and true prince.

Well then, the agora disperses after discussion without making a decision: it learns merely that, if deliberate suitors continue in their blindness, an 'ate', a judgment of the deity ('judgment of the gods'), will befall them like fate. Everything amounts to a God-given warning, nothing more. Cf. *Od. 1* :289ff.

It is not only the occasion, let's say: leadership, that is sacred. The meeting structure is as well.

The one authorized to speak receives the Scepter of Zeus—which, in that mentality, meant that he is authorized to speak freely under the direct protection of the Supreme Deity, Zeus (think of Jupiter among the Romans). To use the Zeus-protected word is—immediately—inviolable (one also says:

'sacred', (power-laden) or, even, 'taboo' (but not in the Freudian misinterpretation)). Even if, while speaking, he turns against the army commander.

Appl. mod.

Diomedes, for example, turns against Agamemnon in the midst of the agora with the words: "Atrides (*note* : Atreides, son of Atreus), against you, first of all, I ought to take a stand, because of your lack of insight, -- as it is 'themis', Lord, in the agora". (cf. *F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes (I: Altertum und Frühmittelalter)*, Zollikon - Zurich, 1954, 14).

'Themis' is the name for the oldest, sacred legal system in Hellas, when the Archaic Greeks still worshipped the Mother Goddess religion, -- for the legal system that placed the Olympian deities at its center.

RE19

The right of Themis applied to the family, the kinship (the collective relatives), 'the house (dwelling) and hospitality, -- the veneration of the dead' (Flückiger, oc 20). The 'function' (domain of activity) of Themis, who was sometimes identified with Gaia, the Earth Mother, applied to life, especially as a source of fertility, -- furthermore the night, as well as the earth and the underworld (oc, 29). -- As always, in a sacred view of life and the world, it is here too:

(i) 'Themis' is the (Mother) Goddess who establishes ('causes'; hence she can also be referred to as 'Urheberin' (Söderblom), 'Cause-maker');

(ii) but 'Themis' is also (as is often the case in the Homeric texts cited above) the legal system itself, as the earthly manifestation of Themis's operation. In modern terms: there is a 'transcendent' (supersensual, extraterrestrial) and an 'immanent' (earthly, 'secular') side to the whole concept.

"This is the cradle of later democracy" (F. Flückiger, oc,14): in the oldest legal class a minimum of 'democracy' prevailed, -- in the sense that freedom of speech and decision prevailed even in the midst of wartime. Unfortunately, that type of freedom, a source of rhetoric, was limited to one class, the princes, the military leaders, -- the 'nobility'.

2.-- *The polis (city-state) as a democratic legal system. (19/23)*

After the Homeric era, true democracy emerges. The 'agora' is now no

longer the army assembly, but the people's assembly. Freedom of speech is no longer that of the aristocrats, but of all 'free citizens' (excluding female and male slaves).

With the polis of the 'politai', citizens, a new sacred legal system arises, the religion of Zeus, with Dikè (literally: law) as the goddess of law. -- The 'domain' (function) of this goddess is the city-state and the law of the citizens. But now no longer in the name of Mother Goddesses ('chthonic', telluric, earth-bound), but in the name of Zeus and the surrounding 'Uranic' or celestial gods, predominantly male in essence. -- In time, the motto became "it is themis and dike" (to express complementarity). -- Behold the two-layered sacred background.

RE20

First legal thought, philosophically speaking.

Thales of Miletus (-624/ 545) was the first strictly Greek 'thinker'. Based on 'hetaireia', a society of thought, he founded the Milesian school of thought, which, for example, labels the later Aristotle as 'physical' (derived from 'fusis', natura, nature).

Indeed: 'fusis' (which is quasi-synonymous with 'genesis') is all that was, is, and will be.

Humanity, the 'nature' surrounding it, the entire cosmos—together they constitute the 'fusion' or 'genesis': it is as if total reality (= ontology) is a very great process of creation ('genesis').

Well, it is against this background that we situate the first philosophical rhetoric (in the sense of language proficiency). We do not know whether Thales also founded the first 'science' (with or without education; RH 16) that had his language proficiency as its object.

Appl. mod.

(1). -- ***Economic rhetoric.*** -- There are two stories about Thales.

(i) As an astronomer (as a philosopher he was literally interested in 'everything'), he was able, at a certain point, to foresee a rich olive harvest for the following year. He then lent all the oil presses in Miletos. When, later, the pressing season arrived and oil presses were urgently needed, he lent them out at the exorbitant (usurious) price he had demanded.

(ii) The other version says: long before the olives reach ripening time, Thales buys up the entire olive harvest from his hometown. Later he then sells it at an exorbitant price.

Two remarks:

(i) One clearly feels the Early Capitalist stage within the Greek city-states here; usurious prices, enforced by monopolization (all oil presses, the entire olive harvest), seem 'normal';

(ii) Thales had to persuade either the owners of oil presses or the owners of olive groves, who, thanks to linguistic skill, imposed his own means of interpretation and understanding, as it were, on them, so that they allowed themselves to be influenced by them. Is that not the definition of rhetoric as linguistic skill? (RH 8).

(2). -- Political rhetoric.

The following anecdote teaches us Thales's political linguistic skill. -- Lydia, under the tutelage of Croesus (-560/-546), the immensely wealthy, at a certain moment threatens the Twelve Ionian Cities along the coast of Asia Minor (including Miletus). Thales advises them to form an alliance.

This recommendation is, once again, a rhetorical act, but now on the political level. Only Miletus entered into an alliance; the other states thwarted Kraisos.

RE21

That Thales intervened in political matters was 'normal': after all, the Greek city-state practiced direct democracy (without the 'political class') and, immediately, 'isonomia'—equal rights—prevailed for every free citizen, so that there could be free discussion of 'takoina', communia, as well as 'res publica', the public, non-private affairs.

A second reason lay in Thales's background: G. Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, II (*The First Philosophers*), London, 1955, points out that Thales came from a family of priest-kings (note: Thomson is a Marxist). By upbringing, therefore, he could hardly avoid politics. -- Perhaps there is a third explanation: according to a moral saying attributed to Thales, "it is preferable to be the object of envy". Is this, unintentionally, a sign that Thales wanted to shine, -- also in public life?

Historia, theorie.

Two terms are in circulation to characterize the work of the philosophers at the time of Thales:

- (i) 'historia' (inquisitio, investigation) and
- (ii) the 'theoria' attributed to Pythagoras, speculation, understanding. The first term lives on in 'histoire naturelle' (natural history, -- from the Latin 'historia naturalis', investigation of nature).

The second lives on, but distorted, in our concept of 'theory' (RH 10). Both terms refer to:

- (i) phenomena, visible and tangible data,
- (ii) which are investigated ('historia') and/or fathomed ('theoria') on their invisible, intangible 'grounds' (understand: presuppositions, -- 'stoicheia', elements, -- 'archai', principia, principles), -- grounds which govern the phenomena (the consequence of which is that, without presupposing those grounds, one cannot understand or explain the phenomena).

Thales' pupil, Anaximandus of Miletus (-610/ -547), was perhaps the first to use the term 'archè, principium' – that which 'explains' a given – that which makes something that is immediately perceptible understandable.

Well then, how—if we immerse ourselves in that atmosphere for a moment—would Thales have 'examined', 'fathomed' his own rhetorical acts? He would have interpreted them as a piece of 'fusus', a natural event, in the midst of the sea of natural phenomena. And, just as the orbit of the stars seemed predictable, so too the course of the olive harvest, for example, as well as of economic life, in and around his hometown of Miletus.

RE22

But – apparently – Thales was convinced that man is a piece of 'fusus', nature, of a special nature: he or she can, namely, intervene in nature, – especially in that which is and will be.

Could Thales not, for instance, convince his fellow citizens to use up all the oil presses for him or to sell him the entire olive harvest? Are the decisions in the agora, the popular assembly, not proof of the 'efficiency', the effectiveness, of such intervention by means of the spoken word? That spoken word is, therefore, in Thales' 'physical eyes' (his philosophical style), a very special kind of 'fusion' ('genesis').

The question must therefore have arisen immediately in Thales' astute mind: which 'element', which principle, which 'archè', must be put forward to

explain such a thing? As is known, Thales put forward 'supple water' as a universal (actually, expressed ontologically: transcendental or all-encompassing) element. 'Supple', 'fluid' (in French), is that which, even without any fixed form, can assume all possible and conceivable forms. It is that which, 'subtly' (ethereal or fine matter), 'flows' or 'moves' through the entire 'fusion'.

Elusive, yes, but the basic energy in all 'beings' (Thales begins, according to W. Jaeger, to use 'ta onte', the beings, in a philosophical sense), -- in the past, the present, and the future beings.

Behold the fundamental characteristic of the Thaletic historia: investigation, theoria, fathoming. Man, for instance as intervening in the lives of his fellow men by means of the spoken word, must then also possess a special dose of 'malleability' ('water' as the primordial substance—not 'water' as our current chemical element, of course). Behold a hypothetical, but entirely conceived within the Milesian theoria of historia, 'explanation' of 'rhetoric'.

If you will, a (proto)scientific explanation of language proficiency. -- Please note: this 'fluid' or 'primordial' explanation (better: hypothesis) has been taken seriously to this day by a minimal number of thinkers, since the Milesians.

We said, RH 19, "first legal thinking". 'Right' or 'wrong', even now, especially in Archaic cultures, is a matter of dosing the basic cosmic element, the malleability in all things.

RE23

Viewed within the Milesian way of thinking, which is an Archaic type of philosophizing, 'justice' or 'injustice' must have been something of that nature. – The Greek 'hubris', arrogance, transgression (overestimation of oneself), points in this sense: an Ancient Greek prioritized, consciously but even more so unconsciously, the notion that 'justice' was always distributive or apportioning justice.

Whoever, for example, experienced the average measure of happiness was considered to be in a state of 'hubris' (he/she transgressed boundaries). Which boundaries? In the Thalesian-Milesian hypothesis (the all-encompassing pliable 'water'), these boundaries were those of the dose, or rather: lot (share), pliable primordial substance (in Thales' case: pliable or primordial water).

'Right' is, therefore, the dose of primordial substance (basic energy) deemed 'acceptable' by the deities and fellow men. 'Injustice' is, consequently, the excess or deficiency of basic energy required to cope with life within 'fusion', the sometimes very harsh and merciless nature.

From a Thaletically perspective: rhetoric is 'good' (justifiable in conscience) insofar as it seeks to keep the dosages of the primordial substance in check, just as deities (Thales believed, notwithstanding his 'critical mind', in 'theoi', 'daimones' (deities in the fusions)) and fellow men considered this 'legitimate'. It is 'evil', morally bad, when the speaker falls into 'hubris', transgression. Applicable: must Thales not have felt his monopolization (all presses, the entire harvest) and the (usurious) price achieved thereby as a 'transgression', in order to remain consistent with himself within his theoria, within the presuppositions of his historia?

Decision.

RH 17 taught us, with R. Barthes, the systems thinker in the style of de Saussure (Structuralism), to see the connections: do you see, now, how, by starting solely from

(1) The scarce historical data and

(2) Thales's presuppositions, that we have had to think together economy and politics, law and ethics, nature and intervention in nature? With this Archaic example we wanted to give you a simple example – which remains of great cultural-historical value, as it stands at the cradle of our entire current Western culture – of what 'system thinking' is: thinking together the data (facts, presuppositions), seeing them synchronously.

RE24

3.-- The Sicilian 'agonistic' , (24/27)

R. Barthes, L'av. sém., 90; rightly draws attention, in a certain sense, to the fact that Western rhetoric only truly begins with (what we call) 'agonistics'; 'Agon', a test of strength, is, after all, the core of a new type of Ancient Greek rhetoric.

Change of regime.

a. Around -485, two Sicilian 'tyrants' (tyrants, 'cocks'), Gelon and Hieron, deported a number of populations, expropriated them to populate Syracuse and provide mercenaries with a plot of land.

b. But in -460 they were driven out by a democratic revolution. The brand-

new democracy wanted to restore the former state of affairs. However, based on 'isonomia'—equal rights as an ideal—this gave rise to endless lawsuits.

Thus forensic or legal rhetoric arose. -- In that narrower sense, therefore, Barthes is right.

Emergence of an 'agonic' rhetoric.

In order to convince the democratic people's court of its 'legitimate law', the expropriated parties had to be "articulate". Hence the need for expert drafters of legal self-defenses.

Now, the Paleopythagorean thinker Empedocles of Akragas (= Agrigentum) (-483/-423), known, especially in occultist circles, for his doctrine concerning the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), happened to have a pupil, Koraks of Syracuse (between -500 and -400), who began—as a rhetorician (RH 16)—to provide those concerned with good texts, which they could, on their own initiative, recite in court or, at least, assert.

Thus arose an initial rhetoric sui generis (of its own nature). We see this when we analyze the oldest schema (RH 12: arrangement) of judicial speech.

(1) 'To pro.oimion' (pro.oemium, exordium, preface or introduction).

(2) 'Hoi agones', controversiae, debates). The term 'agon', test of strength, has thus - for a Korak - grown into a rhetorical term. Now, one does not need much imagination to see what kind of discussions, quarrels, conflicts, etc., not to mention fights, the deportees faced upon their return to their native land! It was a good thing that a court existed, even though that court was susceptible to influence based on language skills of all kinds.

(3) 'Ho epilogos' (peroratio, conclusion),

Incidentally: that type of eloquence spread from Sicily to Athens.

RE25

Initial eristics.

'Eris' meant – in Ancient Hellas – 'armed combat', discord, rivalry. 'He eristikè technè' (in Plato of Athens (-427/-347)) is therefore "the skill, respectively the (proto)science or the instruction in the skill of (boundless) discussion." Known for such a philosophy was the School of Megara (with, for example, Euclid of Megara, Euboulides of Miletus, etc. as representatives), one of the 'dialectical' (reasoning-driven) tendencies that sprang from the teaching of Socrates of Athens (-469/-399; Plato's teacher) (Microsocratics).

Very early, however, in the emerging Greek, Archaic philosophy, one sees an advance toward eristic, namely among the Eleatics (Parmenides of Elea (-540/...), especially his pupil and fellow thinker Zenon of Elea (+/- -500/...), who was actually practicing eristic). There, in the southern Italian city of Elea, reasoning and counter-reasoning become the primary focus. Admittedly, this led to the birth of theory of thought or logic, but from the very beginning, it was simultaneously a thirst for discussion.

Appl. mod. 1.

Koraks of Syracuse had pupils. -- For example, Teisias (= Tisias) of Syracuse, about whom more later; -- Gorgias of Leontinoi (RH 16), one of the greatest Sophists; -- Isocrates of Athens (-Sophists; --a rhetorician par excellence, rivaling, as an educator, Platonism, which he considered too 'learned' and too 'specialist');

Lusias of Athens (-459/-380; the democratic-minded orator, author of several hundred forensic orations). -- Very resounding names in Ancient Greek 'paideia' (idea of education).

Appl. mod. 2. The relationship “teacher (rhetor)/student (fellow thinker)”.

Korak teaches Teisias, on the condition that he pays Korak's fee, “to always win the argument in the agon (discussion)”.

Money, which from now on begins to play a leading role in Ancient Greek philosophy, is gratitude on account of the effectiveness, the usefulness—the Anglo-Saxons say 'efficiency'—of the education received. The pragmatic side (i.e., the purposeful side) of education takes precedence.

A spicy detail: that money is payable if Teisias wins his first plea.

RE26

Turning point.

But Teisias does not plead: he immediately becomes a rhetorician himself, just like his teacher; indeed, he does it even more brilliantly and, naturally, does not pay.

It comes to a lawsuit, the eristic eloquence of which we now let you feel.

(i) Teisias finds a 'dilemma', a two-part lemma (preposition), on it. The

logical 'syntax' (understand: structure) of this dilemma reads as follows, thesis (propositio). -- Your demand for payment is unfounded (necessary and sufficient reason).

Argument (pisteis, probationes).

(1) Model.

Either I provide you, Koraks, with convincing proof that I owe you nothing.
-- In that case, you, Koraks, are right to withdraw your claim.

(2) Counter-model

Either I am not providing you, Koraks, with convincing proof.

But do not forget, then, that this is my first plea. It fails. Which proves that your rhetoric instruction proves unusable. -- In that case, Koraks, you are right to withdraw your demand, as agreed.

(ii) Korak, not without eristic tricks either, sets up a counter-dilemma. proposition, -- My demand for payment is, indeed, well-founded. Argument.

(1) Model .

Either you, Teisias, do not provide convincing proof of your refusal to pay.
In that case, you must, of course, pay.

(2) Counter-model

Either you, Teisias, provide convincing proof. In that case, your first plea is indeed effective and our agreement applies. In that case, you must pay,

One can see it: the realm of sophistry is beginning. It is for this reason that 'forensic' rhetoric, typical of lawyers, enjoys such a 'bad reputation' to this day. As a purely logical activity, mind you. As an interpersonal relationship, mind you. If the Sophists then come forward with such a philosophy, it is only natural that Paleo-Pythagoreans and Platonists (with Socrates as their leader) take a stand against this realm of sophistry. To this day, too. And indeed in the name of a sense of objective truth—in the name of genuine human relations worthy of the name.

Protagoras of Abdera.

RH 16 introduced him to us as a Protosophist. He emphatically advocated 'eu.boulia', sound (understand: pragmatic) deliberation. Property acquisition and political influence were his primary objectives. Eristics fits perfectly into this.

RE27

Note-- The origin of the trivium.

a. Protosophistics (-450/-350), to be distinguished from a later sophist movement called Deuterosophistics (under the Good Emperors), established a paideia, a method of cultivation. This system of education, perfectly suited for the (agonal) democracy of the Sicilian type, comprised three basic subjects, 'technai', 'disciplinae' specialized sciences.

(1) Grammar sharpened the sense of the word (the term) and the language as a word system.

(2) Dialectics, as a theory of reasoning (logic), sharpened the sense of reasoning and counter-reasoning (argumentation).

(3) The rhetoric, which prioritized both, was then the doctrine that instilled a - sometimes paradoxical (we saw this in the case of Korac and Teisias) - form of understanding , - on the basis of means of interpretation and understanding, which were geared towards “achieving it in any case” (euboulia).

In the Middle Ages, this was called 'tri.vium' (three methods).

b. The areas of life.

Within a democracy, one must always prevail over one's fellow man.

(i) on the court (forensic court),

(ii) in the popular assembly (in a direct democracy),-- in parliament (in an indirect democracy, which has a political class) (political rh.),

(iii) in a hall or, preferably, certainly in Ancient Hellas, in the open air, when one gives a sample to a public fond of rhetoric, as Gorgias of Leontinoi introduced (demonstrative rh., which cultivates the zone 'showy speech'). In this 'eipdeictic type' of speaking, it concerns a 'demonstration' of eloquence.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 400, says the following.

“The Greek system of higher education, as constructed by the Protosophists, dominates the entire civilized world today.” -- It must be added, however, that this—what Jaeger calls—'formal' (understand: language-bound) education eventually merged with the paideia of the Paleopythagoreans, which encompassed arithmetic, geometry (= number and spatial mathematics), -- music theory, and astronomy (in fact: cosmology, the study of the universe).

This merger originated in Alexandria during the Hellenistic-Roman period (320+). This synthesis was called 'enkuklios paideia', general education. Middle-century Scholasticism (800/1450) adopted this scheme but re-established it: trivium et quadrivium.

RE28

4. Rhetoric in the sense of literary studies. (28/37)

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 94s., 100/102, outlines the conceptual change that the word 'rhetoric' underwent.

A. Plato, all rhetoricians—for beginners—have advocated the Aristotelian interpretation.

Aristotelian works are:

(i) rhetoric, in which public reason, with its pre-scientific reasoning (especially 'enthymemes' (popular, usually non-explicit syllogisms)), is central;

(ii) politics, in which epic, lyric, and dramatic imagination takes center stage. Rhetoric, in this sense, breathes the spirit of Sicilian agonistics (RH 24), and is strictly distinguished from poetry, except, perhaps, in demonstrative (epideictic) speech.

Aristotle - according to Barthes - founded the theory, the Roman orator Cicero (RH 16) practiced it and the Roman rhetor Quintilian (RH 16) introduced it into education and training.

B.1. The Augustan era (Emperor Augustus lived from -63 to +14) sees a profound change in meaning. Namely, a merging of rhetoric and politics takes place; 'Rhetoric', thus encompassing poetics, becomes literary scholarship 'literatology'.

No longer mere pre-scientific, popular reasoning (Aristotelian interpretation), but good writing and speaking becomes the essential core—figures such as Horace (-65/-8; Roman poet), even more so: Ovid (Roman poet (-43/417)),-- Dionysius of Halicarnassus (+ -30, -8; rhetorician),-- later: Plutarch of Chaironeia (+45/+125; Platonizing historian and thinker),-- Tacitus (55/119; Roman historian), - not to mention the treatise **Peri hupsous**, **On the Sublime** (a treatise that thematizes literary (called 'sublime') style), - all signs of the fact that the idea and the term 'rhetoric' are exhibiting a broad meaning.

B.2. Neo-Rhetoric (Deuterosophical). From +100 to +400, the broad idea of 'rhetoric' predominates in the Hellenistic-Roman world;

As an era, it is characterized by peace, -- with flourishing trade relations, especially in the Middle East. It is the era of the 'oikoumene', the entire inhabited world: the same culture prevails in both Syria and Spain, -- the same Deuterosophism, the same rhetoric. 'Rhetoric' encompasses everything that constitutes linguistic skill (eloquence, poetry, literary criticism).

RE29

The schools of this period reflect this situation: the 'Sophist' (in the second sense, which differs significantly from Protosophistics) is the school principal appointed by the emperor or the city government, while the 'rhetor' (rhetoric teacher) is the teacher—educator.

Note: Subject to the necessary cultural changes, this type of rhetoric passed into the Middle Ages (think of the Rhetoricians).

Textuology (29/32)

The text (RH 11v.) is one side—indeed the decisive one—of 'literatum', a literary phenomenon.

HI Marrou, Hist.d.l' éducation dans l' ant ., 239, mentions that the Deuterosophists knew 'progumnasmata', preliminary exercises, as elementary rhetoric. One could also call this 'pre-rhetoric'.

1. Secondary education.

Here is the text typology of that time, listed by Marrou: story (myth), -- chreia (chreia; a kind of treatise, about which more later); -- gnomè (sententia (saying, -- fact, which is the subject of an essay), -- kataskeuè (confirmatio, confirming proof) and anaskeuè (refutatio, refuting argument); -- koinos topos (locus communis, commonplace, -- a literary term that applies as a subset in many texts).

2. Higher education.

The types of text were: enkomion (laudatio, praise (oration) of someone's words and deeds) and psogos (vituperatio, blame (oration), 'criticism' of someone),-- sunkrisis (comparatio, comparison, 'parallel': prosopopoïia (prosopopoeia: description of appearance,-- representing external appearance and behavior) and ethopoïia (ethopoeia: description of the soul,-- representing the inner self - temperament and character),-- compare with current

Behaviorist and Consciousness psychologies;-- ekfrasis (descriptio, description);-- thesis (propositum, propositio, position, in which one defends a thesis (RH 26: Sicilian model);-- nomos (lex, discussion of the law).

Compliances.

This rich textual tradition has been maintained, naturally modified and/or supplemented. -- A few samples.

(a) Noël Delaplace, *Leçons françaises de littérature et de morale (avec préceptes du genre et des modèles d'exercice)*, Bruxelles, 1844, 552 pp. Note the fact that, in addition to textual scholarship, the ethical-political side is also discussed (RH 16: ethical-political slant).

RE30

The Deuterosophists and their rhetoricians wanted a comprehensive formation. Note also the fact that 'préceptes du genre' (prescriptions, valid for the text type) and 'modèles d' exercices' (practice paradigms) go together, as we saw in RH 05 (normative and reductive sides together). -- The book in question is divided into two parts.

I.-- Prose.

The story, the 'scene' (in French: 'tableau' (a 'picturesque variant of description)), the description, the definition (which encompasses more than the merely logical 'definition': the value judgment or 'evaluation' is also contained within it); -- the fable, the allegory (detailed description by means of a model). -- Religious morality, -- lay morality ('philosophie pratique').

The letter (a text type that encompasses many variants). -- The speech, the oratorical fragment ('oratorical' = regarding the speech), -- the introduction to the speech and the conclusion of the speech (closing speech). -- The philosophical dialogue (a Platonic type), the 'literary' (belles-lettres) dialogue. -- The characterization (cf. ethopee), the portrait (both outlook and characterization), the parallel (political, literary, ethical comparisons)

II.-- Poetry.

Here follows the same list as for the prose (with the exception of the letter: letters in verse form seem non-existent). Added to this is: the lyrical fragment.

Decision.

One senses one long tradition, but with clear evolution.

(b) Less heavy expositions are books for secondary education, of course.

For example, *Ch.-M. des Granges/ Mlle Maguelone, La composition française (Livre du maître)*, Paris, 1930. -- The story, the description, -- the portrait (describing outlook and soul), -- the letter. Naturally, in the ethical-political tradition: the 'moral' (essays on ethical and civic values). -- Finally: literary analysis, literary criticism.

Note: The 'oratorical' text types have been omitted here. Another model: *J. Gob, Précis de littérature Française*, Brussels, 1947.

(i) Introductory concepts (scientific, philosophical, 'aesthetic' (understand: belletristic) texts)

(ii) language skills (invention, arrangement, design (RH 12), -- poetry, --

RE31

writing exercises (description, story, treatise);

(iii) literary genres (= text types):

a. the essentially 'literary' (understand: belletristic) text (description, story, -- lyric, drama),

b. the incidentally 'literary' text (the letter, -- the didactic (explanatory) text (which practically amounts to a treatise), -- the scientific and the philosophical text; -- the historical text; -- textual criticism. -- Attached: didactic poetry, the eloquent ('oratorical') text. -- Follows a remark on satire and the press).

Conclusion. -- Once again: tradition and re-establishment of tradition (evolution).

Without presuppositions ('prescriptions') blind. Without applications (paradigms) empty .

Late Antique rhetoric (literary theory) was the synthesis of the regulative model (the rules) and the applicative model. A textual science that merely indicates abstract rules remains 'empty'. A textual science that merely provides examples remains blind.

Consider a child listening to a fable (appliqué model) without explaining what a fable is—what makes it a fable (the criteria)—remaining blind. Consider a child hearing an explanation of what a fable is: without telling at least one, the word 'fable' remains empty. Only the two together (axiomatic and reductive) provide full instruction. The Late Antiques understood this well.

The importance for you, final thesis author

It may seem superfluous to dwell on text typology. Yet this is not the case. There are people who submit a thesis that demonstrates they have not even assessed its text type. In such a thesis, there are texts where one expects a description. What does one find? A value judgment. There are theses in which a narrative is necessarily required. What does one see? The story is clumsy, because one has never learned or studied the theory concerning storytelling.

In a final thesis, there are usually four text types: the description (one reports what is neutrally or as neutrally as possible), the narrative (one recounts a progression, methodically), and the treatise (this is the main type in a final thesis, within which descriptions and narratives have a place).

Finally, there is the report, which comprises the three previous ones: a report is usually an abbreviated treatise.

RE32

What, then, is your task? To become fully clear about the type (kind, genre) of text you are to compose. Nothing is better for this purpose than examining a text typology such as Deuterosophy and its tradition have attempted to establish. Hence this brief historical overview.

The more recent textuology. -- (32/34)

Library st.:

-- TA van Dijk, *Modern Literary Theory (An Experimental Introduction)*, Amsterdam, 1971;

-- the issue of the magazine *Poétique* (Paris), -- om *Poétique (Raconter, representer, décrire)*, No. 65 (Fevrier 1986 ;

-- R. Wellek/ A. Warren, *Theory of Literature* , New York, 1942 (Fr. transl.: *La théorie littéraire* , Paris, 1971).

Around 1950, a new literatology emerged. Names such as J. Kristeva, R. Barthes, J. Derrida, Ph. Boilers, N. Chomsky, M. Bense, A.J. Greimas, R. Jakobson, Ch.S. Peirce, T. Todorov, and many others introduced a series of new auxiliary sciences into traditional rhetoric. In particular, attempts were made to define more precisely than before what a text is and what text types exist. What a trope (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche) is. What style is. This gave rise to -what is now called 'narratology' or 'narratives' (story theory). And the like.

One striking feature: hyperspecialization (with, for example, formalization—also with hypersophisticated language), which we will not

discuss further here.

An example.

J. Kristeva, Sémiotikè (Recherches pour une sémanalyse), Paris, 1969.

Semanalysis, in Kristeva's sense, is a variant of traditional sign theory (the semiotics of Ch.S. Peirce; the semiology of F. de Saussure). The text is, in a strongly Marxist sense, interpreted as a 'product', 'produced' by a producer, the 'text producer'.

Phenotext/ genotext.

This system (pair of opposites) governs semanalysis.

a. The text, as we usually read it superficially, is the 'phénotexte'; the phenotext. It is the product of a subject that writes or speaks and, thereby, enters into communication and interaction with other subjects.

b . The genotext ('génotexte') is the true text, for whoever writes or speaks writes as a member of a social class (Marx) and from the unconscious layers of the soul (Freud). The consequence of this is that the person producing a text communicates a great deal that he or she does not realize.

RE33

But, according to Julia Kristeva, it is possible to uncover the depth of the genotext through the surface of the phenotext... through semanalysis.

Moreover: the person who writes or speaks from a social class or from an unconscious or subconscious layer can also consciously conceal or distort. This, too, is exposed by sem-analysis.

The auxiliary sciences, here, are

(i) Marxist social analysis (primarily Marxist critique of ideology), -- which is one type of sociology;

(ii) Freudian Psychoanalysis, with its critique of consciousness, -- which is one type of psychology.

Both auxiliary sciences are an attack on the conscious subject in the Modern sense of the term: the 'rational' man, detached from ancient traditions, who believes himself to write and speak radically 'autonomously', as well as independently of both social and unconscious factors.

This entails that external text analysis is performed here: the text is not examined in itself, without any reference other than its literal essential form

(= internal text analysis), but rather from the perspective of factors outside the text itself, namely the social situation and the unconscious (or subconscious) situation of the text producer, insofar as these are discernible within the text itself (or in what it precisely does not say)—"reading between the lines," as the common man says.

Critical reading.

Cl. Hülsenbeck et al., *The Little Red Book for Students*, Utr./Antw., 1970, 22/29 (Authority), gives us one example of sem-analysis.

Scene 2: Authority at school.

Speakers: teacher, head of school, director.

Silent ones: students. - "I didn't ask you anything." "Do you do that at home too?" "No, you go sit over there." "Do that somewhere else, but not here, friend!" "You are guests in my classroom." "Pick up that bread." "You could be much better than 2B." "Just get out."

By, for example, labeling the students merely as silent ones, *The Little Red Book for Students* nails them into precisely one schema—the schema of the New Left (New Left, Gauchisme). Yet, however one-sided, in the view of the age-old 'authoritarian' teacher, every student is, in fact, essentially a 'silent one'. Through the phenotext, *The Little Red Book* exposes the 'authoritarian' genotext.

RE34

Library st.:

TA van Dijk, *Text Science (An Interdisciplinary Introduction)*, Utr. /Antw., 1978. This book also contains text analysis, but in a different way from Kristeva's sem-analysis and the (socially) critical (text) reading of *Het rode boekje voor scholieren*.

Conclusion: a wide range of approaches to texts can be found in more recent literary studies.

Drafting a final thesis.

Why did we pause briefly, for example, at semanalysis and (semanalytically interpretable) social criticism? To point out to you, a student who is about to compose a text in turn, that you too, perhaps, are writing from the perspective of your social class (situation) and from your subconscious layers.

In other words: such a reading of a text forces us all to learn to realize the right 'measure' (this situation) of our writing and speaking. -- Which, in the terms of Fr. Nietzsche, is called 'perspectivism' (approaching something (your theme) from one or more perspectives or viewpoints). Adopting a dogmatic-authoritarian tone becomes radically impossible from the perspective of this Perspectivism.

Recent literary criticism. (34/37)

Besides Van Dijk, **Modern Literary Theory**, and Van Dijk, **Textual Science**, were briefly cited:

-- G. u. I. Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon* (*Stichwörter zur Weltliteratur*), Stuttgart, 1984 (an extremely rich book);

-- H. Mahlberg, *Literarisches Sachwörterbuch* , Bern, 1948 (obsolete, but very useful);

-- J. Peck/M. Coyle, *Literary Terms and Criticism*, Houndmills / London, 1984, (a very solid overview of the major literary theories can be found on pp. 149/168 (*Critical Positions and Perspectives*));

-- M. Milner, *Freud et l'interprétation de la littérature* , Paris, 1980 ;

-- C. Pichois/ A.M. Rousseau, *Comparative Literature Studies* , Utr./Antw, 1972;

-- P. Brunel/C1. Pichois/A.-M. Rousseau, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature comparée ?* Paris, 1983.

' **Criticism** ' – in the scientific sense – means “logically justifiable value judgment”. -- not (necessarily) 'social criticism', of course.

-- Peck/ Coyle, *Lit. Terms and Crit.* , mentioned just now, indicate as the main (though not all) trends regarding literary criticism:

RE35

(1) internal textual criticism : American New Criticism (1940/1960),

-- FR Leavis and 20th-century British Criticism ; -- Russian Formalist literary criticism (+/- 1917); Structuralist literary criticism (following the Saussurian linguistic model); -- these tendencies, whether one-sided or not, focus on the text itself, apart from its author and the time or situation in which the text and author are situated);

(2) Feminist literary criticism (which detects sexism);

Marxist literary criticism (which analyzes the text economically and socially); -- Poststructuralist literary criticism (which analyzes the 'dismantling' of Modern subject-values); -- or, yet differently: Romantic-

Phenomenological literary criticism (which tracks down, within the text, the uniquely singular personality expressing itself in it);

Finally: the Reception Theory (R. Jauss: also known as Reader-Response Criticism, which examines how the reader/listener processes the text ('reception' = absorption, processing)).

Peculiarly enough, Peck/Coyle do not mention depth-psychological literary criticism (which tracks down the unconscious and subconscious in the text). These tendencies can be labeled as external textual criticism.

Also worth mentioning is Socialist Realism, which was dominant in the Soviet Union until the glasnost and perestroika of M. Gorbachev, but has now received (open) criticism from the Liberals as a competitor.

Are you up for this?

You, student, who are about to write a final paper, will read—sometimes read quite a lot. Read texts. How will you read? Will you take the text in itself, abstracted from the author, from the time and space in which it is situated (internal reading)? Or will you—while starting from the text—pay more attention to its author, to the time and space in which it becomes more understandable (external reading)? It is up to you, before you begin... to become aware of this.

Appl. mod.-- Let us compare two recent foundational studies of the police novel (1) ('polar').

(1). *Patricia Highsmith, *L'art du suspense**, Paris, 1987, outlines the psychology at work in her own—famous—crime novels ("the queen of crime" is her label). From the first intuitions to the final text (RH 17: genetic method), her main concern is: "How to captivate the reader from the very first sentence?"

RE36

Note: This is a typical 'rhetorical act'. Pay close attention to what Protagoras of Abdera (RH 16) once stated as the objective of the 'euboulia', the efficient council:

1. To attract attention,
2. To stimulate interest,
3. To stir up desire,

4. Eliciting consent

(Cfr L. Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et sophistique*).

Incidentally: one of Patricia Highsmith's hallmarks is her USA flair for box office success (whereby she calls “a good book” the book that “has many readers”).

Alongside this primary concern, shackles, comes a second: the police—based on indications (one type of sign)—track down the criminal. In this lies what the old rhetoricians call 'suspensio', intriguing stories.

J. Broeckart, *Le guide du jeune littéraire*, t. I (*Eléments généraux et compositions secondaires*), Brussels, 1872, 100, explains: 'suspensio' means keeping the listener/reader engaged, while 'suspense' (look at Highsmith's title: ' *L'art du suspense*') is the fact that one keeps the listener/reader in suspense about what one is about to say.

Incidentally, a solid work like Metzler's *Literaturlexikon* does not even have the term 'suspensio' (suspense) in its repertoire, but one does find it in a J. Broeckart, a good century ago, -- which makes it clear that one should not throw away “an old book” too quickly. The one who does mention the term 'suspension', with the necessary, sometimes very sophisticated explanation, is H. Morier, *Dict. de poétique et de rhétorique*, Paris, 1981-3, 1053/1057.

(2) Ernest Mandel, **Meurtres exquis **, Paris, 1987, outlines for us the (Marxist) sociology that 'explains' the readership of the crime novel. Mandel is the theorist of the Fourth International and the author of a **Traité d'économie marxiste**. Mandel devotes considerable attention to both the success and the evolution (RH 17: genetic method) of the 'polar', the detective novel. The police novel is also known as “the opium of the new middle classes”.

Indeed: it began with highwayman stories, continued with the whodunit and the USA-style Série Noire, right up to the sociological detective stories since 1968. Through this phenomenon (a visible and tangible given), Mandel 'reads' until he discovers the 'hypothesis' within and behind it: the middle classes perceive bourgeois-capitalist society as an opaque mystery: who, actually, unravels the mechanisms that cause oil prices to rise and fall.

RE37

Why is our daily bread suddenly becoming much more expensive? What

lies behind the fluctuating interest rates? And so on.

Conclusion: an inextricable living environment.

If we understand Mandel correctly: in the detective novel, the middle class encounters, above all, a model of the original (society). A model is something known such that, by means of that known element, one better understands something unknown (here: the mechanisms of society). Model theorists call that unknown element “the original”.

Here, Mandel refers to *Ernst Bloch* (1685/1977), known for his **Das Prinzip Hoffnung** and his commitment to the pacifist student movements.

There is nothing surprising about the fact that educated people are, as it were, obsessed with mysterious histories: after all, does not the entire bourgeois society function as one great mystery?

Decision.

Once again: the auxiliary sciences—namely psychology, sociology, and, inevitably overlapping, cultural studies—become active, as it were, in text and literary studies.

Therefore, when you write your final thesis, bear in mind that the texts you read in that context might also be susceptible to what we have just indicated (very sketchily), namely the approach by the three mentioned sciences.

The 'corpus' of the texts that you read.

The 'corpus' is, here, the totality of the texts available -- for example, when you have completed your final thesis readings. -- But it is not that simple. You cannot possibly list all the texts. You will, therefore, have to choose. What are you going to choose from that corpus?

We refer here to the pupils of *Ferd. de Saussure*. They—and not he—published his world-famous *Cours de linguistique*, Paris, 1916-1.

Reason: Saussure's teachings were scattered throughout the entire corpus that he left behind.

1. Publishing everything comprised superfluous sections.
2. Exactly one course was incomplete.
3. The original parts were too one-sided.
4. From all the texts his students created a new work, but reproducing the master as faithfully as possible.

5. Rhetoric as information or communication theory. (38/51)

R. Barthes, L'av. sém ., 95, rightly draws attention to the fact that Aristotle exhibits a peculiar method in his Rhetoric:

(i) *Rhetoric I* treats the messenger as the source of a message, the orator (with his argument, etc.);

(ii) *Rhetoric II* discusses the message receiver as the “receptor/receptrix” of a message (whereby the audience and the theory of drives are developed);

(iii) *Rhetoric III* treats reporting as a carrier of a message (in which 'taxis' (dispositio, arrangement; RH 12) and 'lexis' (elocutio, design; RH 12) come into play).

This form of exposition by Aristotle reveals a clear theory of communication. It is therefore not surprising that this basic theory recurs in an updated form in more recent literary studies.

Bibl. st ..

- *G. Fauconnier, General communication theory* , Utr./Antw. 1981;
- *JR Pierce, Symbols and Signals (Nature and Operation of Communication)*, Utr./Antw., 1966 (English original work: *Symbols, Signals and Noise* , New York, 1961; Pierce draws very clearly on the mathematical theory of communication or information of *Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication* (1949));
- *Colin Cherry, On Human Communication (A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism)* , Cambridge (Mass.)/London, 1966-2 (a basic work);
- *G. Mannoury, Handboek der analyse significa* , Bussum, 1947 (the work deals with the entire life of human relationships and the 'critique of concepts' addressing these phenomena);
- *B. Stokvis, Psychology of Suggestion and Autosuggestion (A Significant-Psychological Exposition for Psychologists and Doctors)*, Lochem, 1947 (an applied signfica);
- *J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* , Frankf.aM, 1981 (on which *Th. Mertens, Habermas and Searle (Critical reflections on the theory of communicative action)* in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos.*, 48 (1986): 1 (March), 66/94

*R. Barthes, *L' av. sém .*, 86*, defines 'Ancient rhetoric' as the metalanguage (speaking about) about language, as it has been spoken and interpreted rhetorically (narrowly and broadly) from the 5th century BC to the present day. This spoken (and written) and interpreted language is then, in

jargon, the 'object language' of that metalanguage. Although Barthes admits that Ancient rhetoric is 'mal connue' (oc. 86), poorly known, he nevertheless advocates—what he calls—a new semiotics (theory of signs) concerning the written and the spoken. This entails that he situates himself within the theory of communication.

RE39

Semiotics.

Since the communication of information (message) takes place by means of signs ('symbols'), a theory of signs has its place within a theory of communication.

Library st.

-- Ch.W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of signs* , in: *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science* , Series I, No. 2, Chicago, 1938 (Morris valorizes the semiotics of Ch. Peirce (1839/1914));

-- Colin Cherry, *On human Communication* , 219/257 (*On the Logic of Communication* (*syntactics/semantics/pragmatics*) ;

-- IM Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science* , Utr./Antw., 1961, 48/50 (*The Three Dimensions of the Sign*).

-- T. van Dijk, *Textual Studies* (*An Interdisciplinary Introduction*), Utrecht/Antwerp, 1978, 71/74 (What is pragmatics?);

-- Max Bense, *Semiotic (Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen)* , Baden-Baden 1967;

-- B. Toussaint, *Qu'est-ce que la semiologie ?*, Toulouse, 1978 (the Saussurian counterpart of the Peircian theory of signs);

-- U. Eco, *Le signe* (*Histoire et analyse d'un concept*), Bruxelles, 1988.

We briefly repeat what semiotics says.

For example, you say to a student: "What do you understand by a square?"

Syntactically: the order of the words that make your sentence a meaningful (information-containing) whole is examined by syntactic semiotics.

Semantically, the meaning (= information, message) that you put into that sentence and which you hope the child understands is the object of semantic semiotics.

Pragmatic: by uttering that sentence, you wish to achieve a result; the 'importance' (purposefulness) of your speech is examined by pragmatic semiotics.

Note -- According to *JR Pierce*, **Symbols and Signals **, 11, AJ Ayer (1910/1989; linguistic analytical thinker) elucidated the universality of the information process: we communicate not only factual information, but also mistakes, wishes, commands, and states of mind.

Heat and breast milk are transmitted and exchanged on the animal plane.
-- Movements of all kinds, energies are exchanged in inorganic nature.

Result: communication is both ubiquitous and extremely important.

RE40

Here, of course, we are primarily discussing the typically human exchanges.

Note - A. Heymer, *Vocabulaire éthologique* (Allemand/ Anglais/ Français), Berlin/ Hamburg/ Paris, 1977, 191s., discusses behavioral biology, which establishes means of understanding in animals and humans. Consider tactile (e.g. grooming the body through all kinds of touch), chemical (e.g. perfumes), optical (movement, facial expressions, for example), acoustic (sounds, words), and even electrical (think of some fish) means of communication and interaction.

We do say: “means of communication and interaction,” because the communication of mere information invariably becomes, in the 'reception' (the receiving, the reception of messages), the cause of a reaction to an action. So much for this ethological remark.

Two types of communication theory

G. Fauconnier, *General Communication Theory* , points out how varied information theories have become in recent years.

A. -- Electrical communication and its analysis gave rise to a widespread theory of communication that thinks in technical, mechanical terms. Since *Cl. Shannon/W. Weaver*, **The Mathematical Theory of Communication **, Urbana (Illinois), 1959, we have, indeed, a very technical theory of messaging that speaks of 'the source (sender)' of the message, the 'encoding' (converting into signs) and 'decoding' (understanding those signs as the carriers of the message), and the 'receiver' (recipient) of the message.

B.-- More in the spirit of Phenomenology (E. Husserl) and the “verstehende

Methode” (W. Dilthey) - the spirit of the Geisteswissenschaften - is, for example, *M. van Schoor, *Bestaanscommunicatie**, Bloemfontein, 1977: the theory of message exchange is human - intersubjective, -- in terms of 'communicator' - 'medium' (= code, signs), in which the 'communication' (message) is interpreted - 'receiver'.

Here, communication and interaction are discussed in terms of 'meeting' (an introduction between persons, -- and not between things or objects).

RE41

The significant approximation. (41/48)

a. Lady Victoria Welby, formerly a lady-in-waiting to Queen Victoria (1819/1901), was shocked by the many forms of misunderstanding (and mistrust) that governed relations between the distinct groups within society. To eliminate these, she initiated the Significant Survey in 1896.

Incidentally: *E. Walther, Hrsg., Ch.SS Peirce, Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und meer Schriften*, Baden-Baden, 1965, 143 (*Ueber Zeichen,- - aus Briefen an Lady Victoria Welby*), tells us that this lady maintained high scientific relations.

b. What does this significant study? “The significance in all its forms and thus ...working in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose”. (The 'meaning' in all its forms, and, thus... at work in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose).

The 'Significant Circle'.

The 'Significant Circle' included *Gerrit Mannoury* (1867/1956; Dutch mathematician, who was the pioneer, in Holland, of fundamental research in mathematics; author of *Handboek der analyse signfica*, 2 vols., 1947/1948, and of an introductory work, namely *Significa*, 1949),

-- LEJ Brouwer (1881/...; *Intuitionistic foundational research into logistics and mathematics*);

-- Frederik van Eeden (1860/1932; figure of the Eighties, -- physician, philosopher, orator, -- poet and prose writer; converted to Catholicism; was very gifted in the occult);

-- Father J. van Ginneken, SJ, Professor of Literature at the University of Nijmegen; linguistic pioneer);-

-- also: Dr. Godefroy, Prof. Clay, Prof. Westendorp Boerma, Prof. Fischer, etc.

The meetings took the form of Socratic exchanges of ideas (dialogues). -- In the spirit of Victoria Welby, attention was paid to the means of human understanding, especially from a psychological and sociological point of view.

Reason: the 'relativity' of every linguistic utterance. After all, a linguistic utterance is only fully understood when it is situated within the psychological-sociological context.

Mannoury, in particular, engaged in systematic signification, as his works demonstrate. He defined 'signification' as "the doctrine concerning the means of understanding." Under this, he placed, in the first but not the only place, the linguistic utterances by which we influence one another.

RE42

In that context, Mannoury spoke of kinds of 'language gradations'; after all, he noted the many ways ('perspectives') in which language is used as a means of understanding.

Appl. mod..

In this way, language use can be characterized from the perspective of the social context. By this, he understood "the totality of social circumstances" (which points to a sociological point of view). Thus, he distinguished colloquial language from official language.

'Common' means interacting with a fellow human being to the extent that he or she treats them confidentially, on an equal footing. One of the variants of commonality is interacting 'intimately' or 'familiarily'. A civil servant, as a civil servant, simply does not do that.

Consider your neighbor, the notary. As a neighbor, he shares a relationship with you that may even be familiar. But as a civil servant—for example, when he reads a notarial document to you—he will shed that familiarity, at least partially; then, even towards you, although a neighbor, he behaves distantly—officially.

Conclusion: two forms of understanding are intertwined here, the familiar and the official.

Note -- Compare this to your behavior as a teacher, for example: as a neighbor's child, you will address and treat one of your pupils—at your home—quite differently than when that same child is sitting at your desk. In

other words: your behavior, your language, shifts from familiar to 'official'.

Bally's critique of traditional rhetoric. (42/43)

Charles Bally (1865/1947) was one of the many pupils of F. de Saussure (1857/1913), the semiologist. In his **Le langage et la vie**, Geneva/Lille, 1952-3, 13th s., he discusses classical rhetoric and the linguistics associated with it. Until about 1800—so he says—language was never studied for its own sake. Whether it concerned grammar or rhetoric (narrow or broad), the aim was invariably—by means of language—to

- (i) provide logical formation,
 - (ii) learning to write and speak with style,
 - (iii) impart especially literary culture, through the great classical writers.
- All things that Bally considers perfectly justified.

RE43

He notes one thing: the underestimation of everyday spoken language, which was easily perceived as too 'unimproved' (RH 28). In French this is even more evident: 'la langue vulgaire'.

This language—according to Bally—is, nevertheless, “the only true language, because it is the only original language” (oc,13). What one may, to a certain extent, question is: what exactly is meant by 'true language' (langue véritable)? Here Bally defends a kind of 'language populism'. -- Which is his prerogative, of course.

Around 1800, an earthquake occurs: Sanskrit is discovered, a language that, from certain perspectives, is 'more archaic' (older) than Greek and Latin, which had until then been cultivated as the oldest languages. As soon as analogies arise between the various Indo-European idioms and comparative grammar, it is discovered that, besides conscious thought, the collective unconscious is also at work much more in large masses than in the intellectual upper echelons, shaping language.

Bally also opposes, with all due respect, the one-sidedly rational and one-sidedly intellectualist view of language held by his mentor de Saussure. He does so on the basis of the analyses of 'natural language', insofar as it is spoken in a non-literary manner, but in real life (not so much in writing, but certainly). For three aspects of linguistic behavior emerge therein that are hidden within Saussurian semiology:

- (1) the speaking subject (I, you, we speak),

(2) the whole situation in which the conversation takes place (e.g., you and I are teachers and are talking about our difficult students),

(3) the illogical angle from which one speaks (for example, I see that my colleague, 'you', has “become neurotic because of it”).

Etienne Gilson (1884/1978; the great expert on Middle Ages Scholasticism), in his *Linguistique et philosophie*, Paris, 1963, 68, says:

“To know the meaning of the word 'horse', one must have seen one. It is immediately sufficient to connect the name of the animal with the animal in question or with its image to grasp the meaning. (...)

The meaning of a word emerges in life and in history: by being confronted with data while living (within the framework of the history of a people with a language), and attaching words to that data, one learns the terms of a language and their meanings.

What one might call a kind of “philosophical-historicist” view of life.

RE44

Moreno's psychodramatic 'significa'.

Jacob L. Moreno (1889/1974), the founder of group psychotherapy.

In his **Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama** (**Einleitung in die Theorie und Praxis**), Stuttgart, 1973-2 15f, he outlines his position as follows. One can speak of three psychiatric revolutions:

(1) *Philippe Pinel* (1745/1826; *Traité medico-philosophique sur l' aliénation mentale ou la manie* (1801)) advocates a 'gentle' approach to the insane instead of harsh treatment of them (“He liberates the insane from their/her chained condition”);

(2) *Sigmund Freud* (1856/1939; *Psychoanalysis*) established psychotherapy as an integral part of medicine, instead of one-sided medical treatment;

(3) *Moreno*, with his sociometry, sociatrie, and psychodrama, replaces individual psychotherapy with group psychotherapy. This began around 1914. See here the Moreno law, which states, oc, 3/4:

The therapeutic group is (...) not only a branch of medicine and a form of society, but also the first step into the cosmos.

The question arises: "Does a cosmic type of understanding exist?" Moreno explains what he means by that rather strange term 'cosmic communication' as follows:

(i) there is, first of all, the purely conversational (he calls this 'dialogical') form within the groups, -- a method that is and remains valid within a group, -- a method that makes use of language;

(ii) there is, at the same time, the 'cosmic' form of communication and interaction: "However important language may be in the development of the individual and the group, it is always merely the essentially logical (...) form of understanding". Thus Moreno literally.

Non-linguistic factors play a leading role, especially in the world of the baby and the child. "Language represents only a part of the entire psyche." Moreno's own words, once again. In the so-called 'groups', therefore, a method of communicating and interacting that transcends language is appropriate.

Note: Moreno uses the term 'cosmic' to indicate that man, besides being at home in society (sociology), is also at home in the entire cosmos, the whole universe (which entails sensitivity, etc.). From all this it appears that a theory of communication must contain more than a generalized theory of information of the C.S. Shannon type.

RE45

Berthold Stokvis' significant psychology (75/78).

B. Stokvis, **Psychologie der verbeelding en autosuggestie** (*A Significant Psychological Exposition for Psychologists and Doctors*), Lochem, 1947, 33/58, sets out to us "the elements of the process of suggestion and autosuggestion".

Note how communication-theoretical (RH 38) his viewpoint is:

(i) the suggestion takes place as a process, i.e. a progression, between
a. the suggestor and **b.** the suggested, who **c.** exchange a suggestion (called 'content');

(ii) autosuggestion is a process between
a. the autosuggestor and **b.** the autosuggested, who **c.** exchange a 'content'. -- 'Mass suggestion' (oc, 216/226) is the same process but characterized by
a/ similar tendency of many individuals

b/ on the basis of their togetherness as the decisive cause.

Oc, 31, attempts to give a kind of (vague) definition of 'suggestion': it stands or falls with 'psychic resonance', i.e., the general capacity for mutual influence between people, insofar as they experience a shared experience.

Due to the very general nature of 'suggestive processes', we will dwell on this for a moment. -- Stokvis, oc,33ff., explains this. --

(i) The suggestor must be able to establish belief and confidence in **a.** the possibility (as a hypothesis) and **b.** the effect (as a resulting action) of something like 'suggestion' (RH 10).

(ii) Only then does the suggested party respond to the thoughts, feelings, and acts of will of the suggestor (the content), -- so that the suggested party perceives this 'content' as coming from himself (which then becomes 'autosuggestion').

Indeed: from the suggestor's perspective (perspective 1), there is heterosuggestion; from the suggested's perspective, it begins as heterosuggestion but ends as autosuggestion (perspective 2). In other words: eventually, the relationship is such that what is foreign is experienced as one's own.

Stokvis treats the physician as the quintessential paradigm.

Such significant action does not occur merely because the doctor 'suggests' the patient with words—in Moreno's language: logically. Medical suggestion also takes place by means of other interpretative and understanding means—in Moreno's language: 'cosmic', non-logical. Prescribing a medicine, recommending a diet, electrically treating the patient, him/her

Note: sheet RE46 is missing.

RE47

Note -- It should be noted that Stokvis is engaging in cultural history and especially in ethnology here. Anyone wishing to know more about this can consult, for example, G. Welter, **Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances* (* Précis de paleopsychologie *)*, Paris, 1960. A man like Freud was right when, in order to understand Modern Man, he harked back to Archaic Man, especially in his unconscious layers (the 'cosmic' layers, to use Moreno's words), -- to the rudiments, 'les survivances', the witness remnants thereof,

Note: It should be noted that Stokvis, here, raises a type of suggestion, namely suggestion via a material object, in which 'something' (always that curious ontological basic concept) is present that is transmitted as the content of suggestion. Suggestion can also occur without such a material object, of course.

In this connection, it should be noted that Moreno's distinction, indeed, separation of 'linguistic' and 'non-linguistic' communication is highly relative: a Mannoury speaks of a 'language act'. A word or a sentence, for example, can be both logical and extralogical at the same time.

For Archaic man, the 'magically charged word' applies (in which, with the sound and the thought contained within it, 'something' that is neither that sound nor that thought is transmitted).

Thus says Mannoury, *Introduction*, in: *Stokvis, Psychology* ... 13;

“Significa is the study of speech acts. -- A speech act is an act by which one person or a group of people (in short: 'the speaker') wishes to exert certain psychological effects on another person or another group of people (in short: the 'listener')”

Here, reference is briefly made to the language analyst *J.L. Austin* (1911/1960; **How to do Things with words**), who was one of the first to place the action character of, at least, a part of language at the center. Language, in the 'constative' (determining) sense, 'represents' (= renders) reality; language, in the 'performative' (language act) sense, changes reality. Which leads to descriptive statements and linguistic actions.

Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between 'descriptive' and 'performative' language. In everyday language, the two usually merge. When I say, for example, “I promise you,” this is representing reality and, at the same time, making the promise—in those descriptive terms.

Austin designates the action character of language with 'illocution'.

RE48

The explanation of the introjection mechanism.

With this, we had arrived—in Stokvis's text above—at the aspect of 'reception' (acceptance, intake) of the process. -- “This introjection mechanism is only possible if the (patient) identifies, 'identifies', with the doctor. And this

introjection and identification mechanism can only take place if the bond through sympathy exists.” (Oc,34v).

In doing so, Stokvis falls back partly on depth psychology, to which he expressly appeals in oc. 112ff. The necessary 'sympathy', with all kinds of emotional reactions related to it (reverence, awe, -- 'libido', sense of pleasure (in the Freudian sense)), derives the suggested from his 'Eros' (not to be confused, as often happens, with sexuality in the sense of adult sexuality, of course).

It goes without saying that, besides this Psychoanalytic explanation, there are others. For example, the occultist one, which speaks either of 'magnetism' (think of Mesmerism, for instance) or of 'life force'.

The application in your life, student,

Given how frequent communication is, it would be difficult to find a thesis where this does not come in handy.

But there is more. Stokvis says: “Mutatis mutandis (after having changed what needs to be changed), the same (suggestion) process takes place in upbringing, -- when thought contents or representations are passed on to children by parents or teachers. -- Here, too, we have the 'erotic' (*note*: in the very broad sense just indicated) bondage - the authority of the educator - through which the identification and introjection mechanism takes place.

“Bad teachers” are, often, those with whom 'erotic bonding' does not develop or does not develop sufficiently.” (Oc,35).

We should certainly examine this aspect of our life as teachers. Does 'something' emanate from what we are, say, show, etc.? What kind of axiological (value-theory) property does that 'something' exhibit? “As soon as I even see or perceive it, I feel nauseous,” one sometimes hears said. That means that the 'something' that is radiated as suggestive content comes across as 'not good'.

“That student is making me sick,” one occasionally hears people say: he or she radiates 'something' that the teacher perceives as negative. -- Suggestion is a very frequent occurrence.

RE49

The theological approach. (49/51)

Communication (and interaction) implies the fact that the message (the 'content', the 'information') is received, -- which is the reception aspect.

A -- (German) hermeneutics.

Library st.: H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, 116/ 120.

1. Initially—and still today—'hermeneutics' meant an auxiliary science of jurisprudence and theology: it analyzed the updating of ancient texts—legal texts, biblical texts—which, coming from the past (a bygone culture), had to be reinterpreted and reinterpreted in a new way.

2. However, since D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), 'Hermeneutics' has become the name for an entire philosophy (in his *Dialektik* (1839)): for Schleiermacher, the understanding, the interpretation of a text, is only complete when its content (the message or information) is absorbed ('integrated') into the life of the one who 'reads' the text. It becomes an epistemology or theory of knowledge.

Since then, this broadened interpretation of 'Hermeneutics' has been adopted (and, in part, reinterpreted) by the historical school (FK von Savigny (1779/1861: understanding the text through massive detailed knowledge) and by W. Dilthey (1833/1911: *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883), -- with the 'verstehende Methode'), to live on to the present (think of P. Ricoeur, *le conflit des interprétations* (*Essais d'herméneutique*), Paris, 1969).

B -- Peirce's theory of interpretation .

Ch. Peirce (1839/1914; RH 39 (semiotics); 41: V. Welby) has also left us a theory of interpretation.

Library st.:

-- WB Galle, *Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, 1966;

-- K.-O. Apel, Hrsg., *Ch.B. Peirce, Schriften I/II*, Frankf.am, 1967/1970.

For Peirce, man is essentially—what he calls—'an interpretant' (an interpreter). And specifically of signs (hence the central role of semiotics).

Appl. mod.

(i) A surprising fact, F, is established. E.g. "This child studies poorly".

(ii) But, if the abduction, A, is true, then this astonishing fact, F, becomes 'understandable' ('abduction' = assumption, hypothesis).

(iii) **Consequence** : there is serious reason to guess that A contains truth.
-- 'A' is a sign, a mental sign, in the mind, that contains the interpretation

(explanation) of F. Consider, for example, the broken family of the poorly performing child, -- as a possible explanation.

RE50

The ABC theory of personality.

A very fascinating application of both interpretation theories is offered to us by A. Ellis/ E. Sagarin, **Nymphomania* (A Study on the Hypersexual Woman *)*, Amsterdam, 1965, 137ff.

A.-- Point 'A', in the language of both psychologists—psychiatrists—is a fact, e.g. a deep disappointment incurred either with one of the parents or with a fiancé—a 'frustration', as people like to say nowadays.

B. -- Point 'B' is the interpretation—not so much a conception of meaning as a construction of meaning—by the person in question, who experiences fact 'A'. In the words of Ellis/Sagarin:

“B is what the person makes himself believe based on A” (oc,138).

C.-- Point 'C' is the (wrong) reaction to A, identified as 'neurotic' in B. “At A I did not get what I wanted and 'therefore' I became overstrained in C”. (Oc,137).

Behold the ABC theory of personality, especially psychiatric personality. -
- in this case, the personality of the 'nymphomaniac', who is driven from one man to another, with the following characteristics

a. radical lack of self-control (“If the urge arises, it must be satisfied quickly”)

b. insatiability (“the nymphomaniac constantly needs to get into bed”).

c. compulsiveness (“Even if I wanted to, I cannot master it”). -
'Compulsivity',

d. self-contempt (“I am a slut”).

The ambiguity.

'Multiplicity' means that one given, 'G', gives rise to more than one interpretation, 'D' (D1, D2, Dn).-- Ellis/Sagarin clarify as follows.

I.-- *The interpretation of 'common sense'* (as the authors themselves say).

At point A, I experienced something I will never forget. But – at point B – I say, “I can process this unfortunate event – e.g., a severe sexual disappointment (e.g.: ‘I cannot reach an orgasm’) – I will always regret fact A,

but I can bear it.”

Result: at point C I experience tempered feelings of disappointment, regret, annoyance—nothing more.

II.-- *The interpretation of the neurotic state of mind.*

At point A, I experienced something that I cannot forget. - At point B, I say, “I cannot process what happened. It is simply terrible. It is horrible. It makes me a worthless person.”

RE51

Result: at point C, the final editing, I fall prey to intense negative emotions (grief, depression (melancholy), anger, hostility, or 'tearjerker' (melodrama)).

Conclusion : - Not the failure (fact A), but the attitude, disposition - interpretation - towards the failure (interpretation B) gives rise to e.g. nymphomania (neurosis) (final editing C).

Note-- Ellis/Sagarin, oc, 191ff., mention a number of easily recurring 'misinterpretations' which they call 'irrational ideas'. For example:

-- “It is horrible and disastrous when things do not go as one would like them to.”

-- “It is essential for an adult to enjoy the esteem, indeed, the affection of practically every person of any significance in their surroundings.”

-- “One ought to be, in all possible respects, thoroughly capable, adapted, and, above all, successful, in order to be able to consider oneself a 'person of value'”

-- “Human happiness depends on external factors: he or she has little or no power over what causes worries and anxieties, obstacles and disappointments.”

-- “As soon as something comes across as dangerous—seemingly or actually—one must become 'terribly worried' about it and constantly think that it could end badly”

-- It is easier to avoid certain life problems than to face them bravely.

-- “There is always exactly one good, right, and perfect solution to human problems: it is disastrous when this one perfect, ideal solution is not found.”

-- “A person's past determines his/her personal behavior in a decisive manner: if something happened in that past that made a deep impression, it will invariably exert the same influence”

-- “One must always depend on someone: one needs a strong personality

to lean on.” “Problems and disorders of fellow human beings completely confuse you; that is unavoidable.”

-- “Some people are bad, -- cunning, mean; they therefore ought to be severely punished for that meanness.”

Here are some examples of interpretation ('B'), which give rise to neurotic or at least failure-involving final reactions (C'). They express themselves in 'little sentences', as above.

RE52

6. The theory of treatise. (52/59).

Introduction.

The remainder of this work deals exclusively with one type of text, the treatise ('final paper', 'thesis'). Everything that precedes is not without a direct connection to the treatise.

a. For example, the preceding chapter – on communication.

There is hardly a subject of treatise that does not deal with or touch upon an interpretive phenomenon somewhere. This is then one of the many methods (thought schemas) to shed light on your theme.

b . For example, the suggestion emanating from your subject. Your professor has recommended J.J. Rousseau (and, for example, his system of education) as a subject. Something (RH 48) emanates from him personally, from some of his texts or terms, from the fact that he does not touch upon certain things, etc.

For many a HIVO student, this has a negative effect. (“I don’t care much for Rousseau”) or a positive effect (“What wonderful ideas Rousseau is selling”). For a treatise, certainly do not let yourself be taken in by either those negative or those positive suggestions.

The suggestive allure of your subject may be useful to your exposition (if only because you explicitly address that aspect), but it can cloud your common sense, according to Plato, who calls it 'the little man' within us, the only—sometimes very narrow—basis of sound reasoning.

Library st.

-- O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie* , 9/13 (*Die Materien der Logik, von der aufsatzlehre aus gesehen*), 47f. (Chrie);

-- G. Niquet, *Structurer sa pensée/ Structurer sa phrase* (*Techniques*

d'expression oral et écrite), Paris, 1978 ;

- SP Moss, *Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California), 1966;
- O. Pecqueur, *Manuel pratique de dissertation française* , Namur, 1922-2 ;
- J. Bojin/ M. Dunand, *Documents et exposés efficaces (Messages, structure du raisonnement, illustrations graphiques)*, Paris, 1982 ;
- H. De Boer, *Schriftelijk melden (A practical guide to compiling reports, notes, memoranda, theses, dissertations, business correspondence and the like)*, Utrecht/Antwerp 1961;
- G. Beville, *L'expression écrite, image de l'entreprise (Structure, style, presentation)*, Paris, 1979 ;
- U. Eco, *How do I write a thesis ?* Amsterdam, 1985.

RE53

The definition.

The (Platonically understood) idea of 'treatise' hangs like a light that illuminates the mind of us all. But clarifying this idea by means of a definition (essence) fixed in words is something else: there are, therefore, more than one definition.

1.-- Deuterosophism (RH 28) had at its disposal a whole set of models of treatises, the list of which can be found in RH 29. But what it called “the thesis, propositio, literally: proposition (which one advocates)”, is the text type that most closely approximates our general concept of 'treatise'. Deuterosophism defined the 'thesis' (the term is still used) as “the systematic (methodical) development of an abstract subject”.

2.-- E. Flerackers, **De verhandeling **, Antwerp, 1944-13, defines: “the treatise is the reasoned development of a theme”. -- One sees: by replacing 'abstract subject' with 'theme', Flerackers generalizes the definition.

The artery of your dissertation.

- S. Moss, *Composition by Logic* , 121/136 (*Opinion Statement*), says:

“A preconceived opinion (...) is the thesis (*note*: thesis, propositio) that we wish to realize throughout the entire text.” (Oc,121).

We will come back to the arrangement (text order, plan) in a moment, but here is a sneak peek.

The thesis is touched upon in the introduction (e.g. by drawing attention, creating a favorable atmosphere, or by explaining how one arrived at such a

final work, for example).

It is expressed in the position: this section of text explicitly formulates your position and, preferably, with the greatest caution.

The structure of your exposition, in other words your plan, indicates in brief how you will attempt to substantiate your thesis. In the structure, you list the main points of the thematic development.

In the descriptions, in the stories, and in the reports with which you flesh out your dissertation, the factual aspect inherent to your thesis is discussed.

In the argument, your thesis is proven or, at least, made plausible.

In the refutation—of those who challenge your thesis—your thesis is indirectly substantiated—through the negation of the counter-model.

RE54

In the summary, in which you reiterate the main points of your development, the thesis is once again subtly substantiated.

In the conclusion (the 'closing speech'), the thesis is briefly highlighted once more—in a farewell—(situated in a broader context, examined axiologically (positive or negative value judgment, emotionally reinforced, etc.)).

Typology.

There are, as already mentioned, many kinds (types) of trading.

1. Fleerackers, oc, 13, states that in a treatise the entire spirit—intellect and reasoning faculty, temperament, will—is at work. In that light, he rightly distinguishes three types:

(i) ***the reflection*** – speculative, in Ancient Greek 'theoretical', treatise – with its 'abductive' (hypothesis-forming) power, allows intellect and 'reason' to weigh in;

(ii) ***Musing*** allows the element of emotion to come through strongly in all of us, although one continues to advocate a position;

(iii) ***The plea*** (speech)—written or, preferably, spoken—places the will to incite action at the center.

Note: It is up to you, student, to decide what type you will achieve in your final thesis! And for what reasons. Preferably in consultation with your supervisor.

2. Pecqueur, oc, distinguishes two types:

(1) informal treatises (oc,356/385: dissertations badines),

upon which most treatises in secondary education amount; all kinds of themes, emotional (self-love, sadness and joy) or dry (the role of education in society), are developed 'informally', i.e. unpretentiously, without claiming scientific validity; let us say: pre-scientific work.

(2). Formal treatises , which Pecqueur divides into

(i) ethical-political (oc, 13/166) (RH 16) -- such as self-love (La Rochefoucauld) or “people ought to help one another” (Lamennais)

(ii) literary (oc,167/318) e.g. “La Fontaine is our Homer” (Hipp. Taine).

(iii) strictly scientific (oc,319/355) e.g. “science, industry and poetry” (Max Ducamp).

Only in the case of the latter is the exposition as logically closed as possible, of course.

The task hermeneutics (task designation). (54/59).

We saw what 'hermeneutics' is in RH 49. —

RE55

The second artery of every final work—besides the thesis, present in all parts as the unity in the multitude of text parts—is the correct assignment (task). The text that you ought to compose is to be determined entirely on the basis of the correctly understood task.

A -- The 'given/asked' system.

Library st.:

-- O.Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus* , III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), Braunschweig, 1907-2.48 (*Das Prinzip der Analysis*).

O. Willmann, in his exposition on the beginnings of Modern mathematics, connects with Platonism.

(1) The 'analytical method'.

The premise of Platonic 'analysis' ('analysis') of something, a given, such that its 'stoicheia', elements, are revealed, is the duality “given (the known) / asked (the unknown)”. We all know this schema from our mathematical

problem-solving (where 'solution' stands for the Greek 'analysis').

Please do not proceed differently for your final thesis. Once you have defined your assignment with your supervisor, do what comes first: “What data do I have at my disposal? What should I look for now?” The 'solution' or 'analysis' that follows will increase the data and refine what is requested (what is being sought). So that, after a while, the final text will become possible.

(2) *The lemmatic-analytical method.*

In antiquity, Plato is known as the founder of the lemmatic or hypothetical-analytical method.

a. It is one application of his hypothetical method. Platon thought continuously in 'if, then' sentences. The 'if-sentence' is the assumption or 'hypothesis'. The 'then-sentence' is the inference. Please learn to express your thoughts—the position in the first place—in such strictly logical language as well. Logic is the basis of discussion.

b. When one must continue the analysis of the subject without fully knowing the given information—and that is virtually always the case—one can apply Platon's method. One turns the sought-after (unknown) into a hypothesis: one acts as if one already knew the unknown and introduces it as an assumption. This was called the 'lemmatic-analytical' (in short: analytical) method.

This only works if one introduces a sign for the unknown (what is being asked). Just as we enter 'x' or 'y' in equations, for example.

RE56

***An application model* (56/59)**

Suppose: a student comes up with a theme such as “The Mother Goddess Religions”.

Such a theme might come across as 'rare', but it has already been a fact at Hivo.

1. Respond, in such a 'strange' case, with the pair 'given/asked'.

What data is at our disposal? The first task is to locate the sources. This is done using a minimal bibliography (the term 'bibliographical sample' means making a random selection (if there is no other option) from a multitude of works and articles). Anyone browsing a bit through the relevant bibliography

will soon come across, for example, two more recent books: *CJ Bleeker, *De Moedergodin in de Oudheid **, The Hague, 1960 (a factual account of what is found in the Ancient data—including Ancient Germania and present-day India); -- *Merlin Stone, *Eens was God als vrouw belichaamd **, Katwijk, 1971. (A plea, feminist in nature).

Note: As soon as you discover an article or a book, ask yourself what type of text it represents. A Bleeker is business-scientifically oriented; a Merlin Stone, as an aggressive feminist, certainly seeks 'positive' (definitive, scientifically certain) data, but only to put it at the service of "the liberation of women" as quickly as possible! That entails that she interprets! And perhaps somewhat hastily, 'hineindeutet' some Modern phenomena into the Ancient (as the Germans say, engaging in sentence construction where conception of meaning is expected).

Do you understand better now why the previous text of this exposition spoke of the doctrine of interpretation? There is nothing so universally relevant as the phenomenon of 'interpretation'. It is not surprising that a thinker like Ch.S.S. Peirce essentially "interpreted" man as an 'interpretant'!

By the way: please include your bibliography in your text, as this will allow your assessor to make an initial assessment.

2. There is, therefore, data. Now for what is requested.

Your professor might leave you free, or perhaps not. If he/she tells you: "Consider whether we, as contemporary people with a Western European mentality, profoundly influenced by the Skepticism (doubt) of Enlightened Rationalism, still possess serious reasons to take that seriously," then you are bound by a task formulated by your professor.

RE57

If she/he merely says: "Do what you wish, -- as long as you submit a good treatise to me", then you are seemingly free, unbound, except for the bondage to your given.

Conclusion: the so-called 'radical freedom' regarding discourse, advocated by, for example, the Anarchist-Romantics or similar groups, is an illusion. Either one discourses, in which case one is bound by data (thematic, the professential), or one simply does not discourse. An 'unbound style' (as it is called) never fits into a final paper.

Naturally, in the second case, you are faced with seeking the requested item yourself. The question arises immediately: “What is the universal idea of ‘the requested item’? In other words, what exactly may, or must, be designated as the requested item—in all possible cases?”

There are two types of possible answers to that.

1.-- *The haphazard, 'empirical' answer.*

One can find something like this in all handbooks on dissertation writing. M. Roustan, **La dissertation littéraire **, Paris, sd (note: 's.d' means, in Middle Ages Latin 'sine dato' (without a date of publication)), one of the rare works on treatise writing that attaches decisive importance to the hermeneutics of the assignment (pc 95/42), notes, regarding the problem that this part of the hermeneutics of the assignment deals with the subject matter, that 'treatise writing' can encompass:

a. to report (to give a report: in this case, you do, in a less roundabout way, what a Bleacher does),

b. explain (then you consider both the defeat (which is always the first step) and the necessary and sufficient conditions that allow the given to be made understandable; for example, in our case: there must have been seers who 'saw' something like Mother Goddesses (in an occult or paranormal way), otherwise one understands nothing of the given),

c. to defend or refute a proposition (in this case: “Those who claim that the Mother Goddess cult, as it still persists today among some Peruvian farmers, is based on nothing but delusion, misunderstand at least part of the facts” could be such a proposition (to defend or refute)).

2.-- *The systematic answer.*

Only ontology (theory concerning all possible reality) can show us the way here.

RE58

Library st.:

-- R. Barthes, *L'av. Sémiolog* .,141, states that Port-Royal (a group of thinkers in the 17th century) in his Theory of Commonplaces (the so-called Topics,-- about which more later) followed the trail of Joh. Clauberg (1622/1665; Cartesian, who introduced the term 'ontology');

-- furthermore, that *Père Bernard Lamy*, **Rhetorique** (1675 (see Barthes, oc,118)), among the commonplaces that occur in virtually every treatise, also

includes ontological commonplaces (such as, for example, the systechie 'whole/part', the pair of opposites, the teleological and operational causes, etc.)

Well then, if there are two interconnected commonplaces of an ontological nature, then it is the pair “existence/essence” (the actual existence of something, the mode of being of something) -- a pair that, according to *M. Heidegger*, **Einführung in die Metaphysik**, Tübingen, 1953, 138, is already to be found in Plato's texts ('estin' (that is something) and 'ti estin' (what is something)).

This seems obsequiously abstract, of course. But look: let us return to our Mother Goddesses. If your professor gives you the freedom, then you can, in any case, develop two viewpoints (for clichés are fundamentally nothing more than 'perspectives' (approaches) applicable to your theme):

(i) you wonder whether mother goddesses actually exist, e.g. (question of existence) and

(ii) you ask the question of what 'mother goddesses' might be (essential question). Imagine that, after a great deal of research, you could answer those two questions in a justifiable manner; do you still think that those two commonplaces are pre-eminently so 'alien to life'? It is clear that, besides those very general viewpoints, there are other, more 'telling' viewpoints. But none of them is as fundamental as those two.

All other viewpoints on your theme and, therefore, all other questions depend on those two: what would you be able to say that makes sense, when that which you are discussing is not even an actually existing thing and, moreover, has no mode of being whatsoever?

It is only possible to give an account, explain, or defend or refute a proposition regarding, for example, Mother Goddesses ('something') if they (that 'something') exist and possess an independent being (= essential form, distinguishability from the rest of reality).

RE59

The actual existence as an 'lemma'.

Suppose: you are required by your professor to investigate “what exactly is going on with those famous Mother Goddesses that Merlin Stone, the

feminist, talks about.” What are you going to do when, in any case, you cannot determine whether such a thing actually exists? Then there is an answer: apply the lemmatic-analytical method. How to proceed?

Well, you say: “Whether such a thing exists, I personally cannot determine. I have neither criteria nor means of testing.”

1. But what is given is that there are people, even to this day, who believe in mother goddesses (a form of belief). What is given is that every now and then someone appears who claims to 'see' them (a mantic testimony).

2. If those two facts, which are certain (this must be evident from your question regarding existence and the answering thereof), exist, then I can introduce a lemma (the Platonic term): I act as if it is already certain (given, known) that there is such a thing as mother goddesses; immediately, as a sign of this, I introduce the term 'mother goddess', which has been in common use for centuries, -- but note well: I myself do not assert (= proposition) that they exist; I assume that they might possibly exist.

In other words: if I use the term 'mother goddess' continuously, I use it only in the lemmatic, hypothetical sense!

Whoever speaks in this way about such a 'rare', understand: 'non-Enlightened-rational' theme, remains within the strictly scientific attitude and can, miraculously enough, come to an understanding—even with the most rabid Rationalist; such speaking leads to genuine dialogue.

Therefore, keep no plea (RH 54)—nor any musing, but at most a 'theory' (RH 54) in a truly Platonic-hypothetical spirit—in your final work, when it goes against public opinion within our Enlightened society on such subjects. Then you can do justice to the essence of 'treatise', which produces justifiable texts.

Note: Aristotle, the great ontologist, distinguished
(i). Apodictically certain propositions of
(ii)a. 'dialectically' questionable scientific claims,
(ii)b. as well as purely 'rhetorical' propositions (RH 26) 28), in the stricter sense of “purely emotional and mass-oriented” propositions.

That triad can still be of use today.

RE60

6.1. Treatise Theory: existence/ essence (60/65)

It is therefore clear: the first, the middle, and the last thing you must expose in your final work is the fact that something (your theme, your thesis) exists and its mode of being (essence). We have just come to realize this. -- What follows will reinforce this further.

Cultural anthropology.

Library st. :

- P. Mercier, *Histoire de l'anthropologie* , Paris, 1971;
- Sol Tax, ed., *Horizons of Anthropology* , Chicago, 1964 (about twenty specialists, each with an article);
- Th. Rhys Williams, *Field Methods in the Study of Culture* , New York, 1967 (the research 'in the field', i.e. living with the people being studied).
- JD Jennings/ EA Hoebel, ed., *Readings in Anthropology* , New York, 1955-2 (anthology, in which Margaret Mead, *Anthropology and an Education for the Future* (oc,3/5), opens the series).

Note -- What is called 'physical' (biological) anthropology (human science) concerns itself with the analysis of the biological body, insofar as it takes form in time and space (across the entire globe). Cultural anthropology (often simply: 'anthropology') studies cultures in time and space, taking form planetarily.

A Prof. Franz Boas (1858/1942), Columbia University, sends a female student to Samoa for a dissertation.

-- S. Clapier Valladon, **Panorama du culturalisme **, Paris, 1976, teaches us that (ethnological) culturalism is one movement among many, characterized by:

- a.** the study of personality as the center of a culture (psychological aspect);
- b.** the analysis of the culture in which the personality is situated, as a totality;
- c.** the emphasis on the multiplicity of cultures and the cultural relativism associated with it (no single culture may claim to be the true one);
- d.** cultural optimism (cultures are improving; conversion of ethnological insights into educational ones);
- e.** 'positivism' (the will to let the bare facts speak for themselves as much as possible, and in meticulous detail).

Ruth Benedict (1887/1948), Abram Kardiner (1891/...), Ralph Linton (1893/1953), Margaret Mead (1901/1978) are the pioneering figures.

Note-- Cultural determinism and heredity determinism.

The cultural determinist says: we are all 'determined' by our culture.

The heredity or biological determinist says: we are all determined by our hereditary factors.

RE61

Some posit: our personality is acquired, our behavior shaped by our civilization. Others say: our proposition is that our personality is innate (and influenced by 'natural selection').

Among the others, we note *Sir Francis Galton* (1822/1911; *Hereditary Genius* (1869); eugenicist), who introduced a distinction between biologically valuable and biologically inferior individuals.

Among the first, the cultural determinists, was Franz Boas, the professor highly revered by the student M. Mead.

By now, it will have become clear to you that both tendencies think 'oppositely': they fixate unilaterally on a single factor, such that the other factor—advocated by the opposing direction—defended equally oppositionally, is either minimized or disregarded.

It is clear to the unbiased that both heredity ('res') and culture shape our personality. -- Not to mention the individual soul, of course, for individual differences emerge within the same heredity and the same culture.

Margaret Mead had an economics professor as a father and a feminist sociologist as a mother. Her grandmother was a teacher, a supporter of the 'New Education' (Maria Montessori; Friedrich Fröbel). Consequently, she was raised 'freely' and felt, throughout her life, to be "ahead of an era" of the next generation.

When she is twenty-four years old, she is sent by Boas to the Samoa Islands to study adolescence. On August 31, 1925, she sets foot ashore in Pago Pago, the capital of Samoa.

The origin of a treatise.

Let us briefly apply the genetic method (RH 17, 35, 36).

The stay lasted nine months, -- largely on Manua, an eastern island.

She took up residence with an American family in an outbuilding that served as a small clinic. After all, ER Holt, a pharmacist in the U.S. Navy, was her host.

Upon her arrival, she did not know the local language; however, she learned its elements over a period of nine weeks.

In addition, she stayed for another ten days with a tribal chief in Vaitogi, whose daughter was—what is sometimes called—“a ceremonial virgin” (a type of hostess with a subservient role).

RE62

The daughter in question knew a little English and was honored in her community. M. Mead spent the nights with her under the same mosquito net.

In Holt's small polyclinic, she met some sixty Samoan girls, with whom she held long conversations—about the relationship between 'parents/children', 'boys/girls', and the upbringing system.

The proposition to be tested was:

Sexual maturation, with its pubertal crisis as the West knows it, is not a biological necessity (if heredity, then pubertal crisis), but a cultural phenomenon susceptible to change (if culture, then pubertal crisis), since culture is changeable and, with it, upbringing,

Since 1900 (with his * *The Spirit of Primitive Man* *), Fr. Boas had defended this thesis. He expected a verification from M. Mead.

The main features of the text of the treatise.

1. The fact

In her analysis of the transition from child to adolescent, Mead established in Samoa that no adolescent crisis existed (the question of existence answered negatively). Behold the fact.

2. The statement .

The factors at work behind this absence of the Sturm und Drangjahre—puberty, which is normal for us Westerners—lay in the difference in upbringing—a system of upbringing that, in turn, had to be situated within the totality of Samoan culture (one recognizes the theses of culturalism). Especially regarding sexuality, the Samoans differ from the Western 'culture pattern'.

Striking feature: No deep bonds with just one personality.

Genuine and heartfelt appreciation for both the parents and the sexual partner is rare in Samoa.

Result:

'Free love' is generally accepted; it is "a light and pleasant dance". Non-free love (of which rape constitutes the ultimate degree) is virtually non-existent. -
 - Consequence: the girls spread their erotic favors among such a large number of boys that a deep commitment to just one boy is rare. The emphasis lies, after all, on virtuosity in erotic techniques.

Further characteristic:

Aggression, rivalry, and the drive to perform are non-existent. "Samoa is a place where it is never about high stakes. No one there is under pressure to get the best result out of life." (*S. Clapier Valladon* , Panorama, 185/191).

RE63

a. The coming of age in Samoa . New York. 1927.

Behold the famous title of her treatise. Followed by many works and articles during the eventful life of M. Mead. One of these is of interest: *Culture and Commitment* (*A study of the Generation Gap*), New York, 1970, translated into French the very next year: *Le fossé des générations*), -- dealing with the sometimes so painful 'generation gap' (*S. Clapier, Panorama* , 158/165 (*L'anthropologie comme science du futur*)). In which one sees the broadening of the ethnological method to our cultural crisis. -- M. Mead was called "the goddess of anthropology".

Verification.

As is evident from the foregoing, this book came across as a thorough confirmation of Boas' hypothesis.

Reception

The reception the book received was facilitated by certain cultural trends in the West, particularly the USA.

1. Bertrand Russell (1872/1970), the emancipator, along with a number of others, welcomed it with enthusiasm. The relationship between the sexes, the role of marriage, the value judgment regarding marital infidelity, regarding 'free love'—the abolition of a number of 'taboos' (ethical prohibitions) surrounding sexuality—all this kept a layer within the intelligentsia going in the 1920s. Did not a certain *Calverton* write a book, **Marriage Bankruptcy** (1928)?

2. We are all familiar with exoticism, the (naïve) veneration felt for what is foreign ('exotic'). *J.J. Rousseau* (1712/1778), with his critique of culture (*'Back*

to Nature'), and, even more so, *Bernardin de Saint-Pierre* (1737/1814), known for his *Paul et Virginie* (1787), were the spokesmen for a cultural movement that celebrates both exoticism and primitivism (the desire to return to 'the primitive', the unpretentious, happy life).

Our hippies today cultivate such values. Our travel agencies exploit this thoroughly. -- Samoa, described by M. Mead—and scientifically at that—fitted into the mindset of a growing number of people in the West.

For those two reasons, Mead's book received a special reception.

RE64

Another treatise.

Derek Freeman (1916/2001; New Zealand anthropologist) publishes *Margaret Mead and Samoa (The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth)*, 1983.

The subtitle reveals its thesis: the construction and deconstruction of a 'myth' (here meaning 'imaginary representation'). Freeman clearly reformulated his thesis for the New York Times:

(1) M. Mead's theses were accepted as valid by the established scientific intelligentsia (and disseminated in all textbooks and encyclopedias);

(2) these statements are false: the reality in Samoa is fundamentally different.

The method.

Freeman lived in Western Samoa, in the field of education. -- He learned the native language thoroughly, including taking exams. He was 'adopted' by a Samoan family and even participated in the sessions of a group of tribal chiefs, who exert such powerful influence on the traditional segment of the Samoans. -- Freeman is a proponent of an extremely detailed account of phenomena. His book is therefore strictly scientific.

The main content.

(1) *The facts (existence/essence).*

a. The 'free love' Mead speaks of is non-existent. For example, virginity is a high value in the native mentality.

b. Competition (including in the erotic sphere) is just as frequent there as in the West. The urge to attack is very strong: murder occurs frequently; Samoa ranks at the top in the percentage of rapes.

(2) Mead's statement.

The facts refute her explanation based on local upbringing, rooted in the total culture. -- Freeman has established (existence/essence) that the upbringing, notwithstanding American presence, is ancestral – authoritarian.

Which, according to him, produces psychological ailments: neurosis (hysteria) and suicide go hand in hand with it.

Refutation of an objection.

Freeman arrived fifteen years later: Samoan culture has changed in the meantime. What he does not accept: Mead, for example, neglected to thoroughly consult the police records of her time. These contradict her claims.

The explanation for Mead's mistake.

(i) Her 'free' upbringing at home, which she grew up so well on, must certainly have played a role.

RE65

(2) But besides these possible educational biases, which can be suggestive (“Something (RH 48) emanates from educators”), there is a methodological error at work which is considered possible even by those who still defend *Mead's Coming to Age* : ethnologists working in the field encounter this more often. Mead tried to arrive at dialogues which were, in fact, interviews, in the service of a power idea (A. Fouillée): the native girls gave answers that spring from “Archaic civility”. Primitives often do not answer to convey the objective truth, but to be liked. They want to appear civil.

Conclusion: consequently, Mead has fallen into errors of observation.

The moral lesson

You who are preparing your thesis may be in an analogous situation to Mead: your theme does not consist of texts (articles, books), or at least not solely texts, but of actual life details. Therefore, be careful not to fall into analogous errors.

a.-- Make a strict distinction between conception of meaning and construction of meaning (RH 50) in your interpretations of the given information.

b. Pay attention to the range of your theorem.

Mead acts as if all (or practically all) young people in Samoa 'live freely'. What she has gathered from her research is likely partially true: at least one,

some young people, fit her definition (which, consequently, becomes factual (accurately representing the existence and the essence of what is perceived) rather than 'verbatim' (nominal)), but absolutely not all. Singular and particular differ from universal or predominant.

c.-- Recall the epistemological wisdom of *K. Popper* (1902/1994; RH 08), to state in his * *Logik der Forschung* * (1934): verification, i.e., finding that the data correspond to the representations (interpretations), is sometimes an extremely difficult matter.

Popper states that theories (theorems, interpretations) such as those of K. Marx, S. Freud, and A. Adler, as well as astrology, can rely heavily on 'verifications' and explain all sorts of things—too much not to arouse suspicion. Such confirmations, in a broad sense, must be subject to a second degree of testing—by asking the question: “Verification, yes, but what exactly in my interpretation is verified by the observed fact?” Determining that can be very difficult. Remember that well!

RE66

6.2. Theory of Dissertation: problem hermeneutics (thematics). (66/73)

We already have a first glimpse of what it is: “the interpretation of the task” (hermeneutics of what we have to do first and foremost). Let us now cast this into a fixed form.

a. The ancient mathematicians left us, as valued above, the duality of “given (known) / sought (requested; unknown)”. We have already been able to sense how fundamental this starting point is.

b.-- (i) *P. Brunel et al., Qu'est-ce que la litt. comp ., 115/134*, has the dual title: “ *thématique et thématologie*”.

'Thematics' is the treatment of the theme, as we do here. -- 'Thematology' differs slightly from that: take, for example, *P. Brunel, dir., *Dictionnaire des mythes littéraires **, Ed. du Rocher, 1988, an encyclopedic work on a number of recurring themes in belles-lettres.

For example, M.-J. Bénéjam-Bontemps, oc. 1188/1207, discusses Satan in literature under the title: “ *Satan, héros romantique* ”. Brunel calls these themes 'motifs'—things, details, that resonate within a text. Whether one speaks of themes or 'motifs', the point is that these are what one is discussing.

b.-- (ii) *PR Bize/ P. Gaguelin/R. Carpentier, Le penser efficace* , I (*Le fonctionnement mental*) in which a chapter on “ *les étapes préparatoires de la problémation* ” (the preparatory phases of the problem),-- II (*la problémation*), Paris, 1982.

With this, we have, in a re-established (updated) form, 'given (theme)/requested (problematic) the Ancient duality': together they constitute the task.

As already stated (RH 57), *M. Roustan, La dissertation* , 5/42, discusses the problematic nature, i.e., the questions that arise when writing a treatise, i.e., when one is presented with a theme.

The problem state (question state). (66/67)

The main objective of some dissertations is to draw up the 'status quaestionis' (in French: 'l'état de la question'). Your supervisor might also ask you to do something like this.

Appl. mod.-- *J. Kellerhals, dir., Figures de l'équité (La construction des normes de justice dans les groupes)*, Paris, 1988.

The question was: when one wishes to distribute the wealth of a group in a just manner (= 'équité') (distributive justice), according to which guidelines ('normes') does one proceed?

RE67

Behold the central question (problem) of the book. The work presents four answers to that question.

a.1. The economic principle prioritizes that the quantifiable interests of individuals and groups underpin the prevailing norms or distribution rules.

a.2 . Relativism posits that, when comparing different norm systems, the singular—concrete—situations that govern the prevailing norms in the distribution are all too different (the rules of distribution are 'relatively' dependent on significantly different situations).

a.3. Functionalism posits that, when devising distribution rules, one must start from their 'functions' (that which they serve).

b. Kellerhals, a professor at the University of Geneva, advocates

interactionism: the factors of importance when distributing wealth must be viewed as “acting upon one another” (interaction), i.e., as a single system in which no factor may be favored or excluded. The factors in question are countless: status (sex, race), social status (poor, rich), sentiment (disdain, respect), nature of goods (money, services, protection), distribution methods (democratic deliberation, appeal to outsiders, authority figures), objectives (to each his own (= harmony), group competitiveness), group type (family, professional group), favoritism (promoting talent, rewarding effort), etc.

*Ch. Widmer, *Ethic (Justice for one, justice for all *)*, in: **Journal de Genève ** (January 28, 1989) characterizes the problematic nature of Kellerhals' work: “In fact, the book leads us nowhere: it pays attention above all to all the nuances of reality”.

In other words: three theories are refuted as insufficient; one is advocated—with extreme hesitation—as possibly offering a solution to the question.

The book remains focused on a problem, but is at the same time a state of affairs regarding the problem: one knows where one stands with it.

The themes . (67/73)

Let us now return in more detail to the themes. After all, these govern the formulation of the questions.

O. Willmann, Abriss , 10, gives us the Scholastic (800/1450) insight into the matter. The medievalist distinguished two main types:

(1) “quaestio simplex de uno vocabulo” (= simple question about exactly one term);

(2) “quaestio con iuncta de propositive aliqua” (= multiple questions regarding one statement or another).

RE68

It goes without saying that this distinction remains highly valid to this day. Which we are now going to demonstrate briefly.

At the root of this lies the distinction between what current model theorists call 'original' and 'model (of the original)'. In the problem, the given is the original, naturally. That given may, just as naturally, include a question imposed by your professor. But then there is already a question concerning something (the original), and the question is the question regarding a model of it.

'Original' is that about which information is requested. 'Model' is the information used to explain the original and make it more understandable.

A. Antepredicative themes . (66/70)

We call a statement in which no statement (with a predicate about the subject) occurs 'antepredicative'.

A.1. Monoterm problems.

Example: 'Labor; 'The proverb. We have already seen it (RH 57: "Do what thou will"), such assignments present you with the problem: "How to begin?". The answer is: view the assignment from the perspective of commonplaces (information: report, -- explanation, defending or refuting an opinion (RH 57: haphazard, empirical problem-solving)) or formal (systematic: among which - essence/existence are the fundamental ones, as demonstrated above). 'Commonplaces' are, after all, viewpoints that are universal ('common to all subjects').

A.2. Polynomial problems.

Examples: "Work and leisure", "Work, leisure and play" (note the conjunction 'and'); "Proverbs as folk wisdom", "Work as therapy (occupational therapy)" (Note the conjunction 'as', i.e. 'from the perspective of').

"Either work or play", "Either learn or fail" (note the dilemmatic (or in any case disjunctive) phrasing through the conjunction 'either ... or').

"Above all, no Communism." "No educational reform" (note the numeral 'no', which expresses the negation, the banishment).

These word themes reveal, except for 'if', the connectives (connection of logistics (mathematical logic). -- It is clear that the original or originals in those themes are already accompanied by a model.

RE69

Thus, for example, "Work and leisure" does not mean first a treatise on 'work' and then one on 'leisure', but a treatise on the relations between the two themes. "Work as therapy" requires a treatise—not on all possible viewpoints regarding 'work', but on precisely one viewpoint.

"Either learn or fail" does not discuss each of the two factors in succession, but rather the choice that must be made.

“Above all, no communism” actually reveals two clichés:

- a. 'none', which expresses the refusal (for whatever reason),
- b. 'especially', which then still entails a priority in the refusal.

One appl. mod.

Tzvetan Todorov, **Nous et les autres** (* *La réflexion Française sur la diversité humaine* *), Paris, 1989, is a work— 1963, inwritten by a Bulgarian who has lived in France since—about the relationship between us, with our mentality, and the 'others';—here not in the general sense of 'the others', but in the particular sense of “the others, insofar as they are different (in terms of mentality)”. The question posed is: “Are we, with our mentality, capable of accepting (integrating) the others as different into our community?”

It is clear: one must meditate on a title slowly and thoroughly. Why? By examining its ambiguity (RH 50): for example, one asks the question: “If someone else were to read this title, what would he/she be able to see in it?”

The range.

Library st.: G. Booij et al., *Lexicon of Linguistics* Utr./Antw., 1980-2, 38 (Scope).

A concept (and themes are concepts) has content and a scope or extent.

Appl. mod..

Imagine that, in the context of educational research, your professor suggests you take as the title of your dissertation: “Like father, like son” (compare with: “The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”). The whole question—comparable to (RH 65) Mead’s research—is not whether that phrase is true, but rather whether it is always (universally) true. There is, for example, a counter-model: the French proverb says: “A père avare fils prodigue” (The father’s stinginess provokes the son’s extravagance). Here, one proverb corrects the other, since both merely sell divisibilities.

This is also expressed in quantifiers (the logical square, as the Scholastics called it): all/ some yes/ some no, none.

RE70

Note: It may cause surprise that we cite a predicative model here, in the discussion of antepredicative themes: “As the father (is), so (is) the son”: but look, a sentence can also be expressed antepredicatively: “The influence of the father’s behavior on that of the son; insofar as that influence establishes similar behavior”. One 'term' (= literal formulation of a concept (which here is

a very complex concept)) may possibly express itself in more than one word.

Well then, as for the 'scope' of a concept (i.e., the things to which that concept 'applies'), that is here the 'reach' of the saying in question.

Applied: for some 'father/son' relationships, the son adopts the father's behavioral type. Under understood, within the logical or set square: for some other relationships, the statement does not apply.

Incidentally, the names of the quantifiers are: universal quantifier (all), particular quantifier (some), existential (= singular) quantifier (exactly one).

Tropological lecture.

The tropes surround the synecdoche. Here, in the proverb, a synecdoche can be read: one says 'father', respectively 'son', but means 'parent' and 'child'. - When you, therefore, receive a title for a treatise, pay attention to the style, i.e. the form (RH 12: stylized wording). The tropes are one type of stylization of what is said.

The reflexive, (loop-shaped) 'if':

Suppose your professor assigns you the theme: "Labor as labor" (= "Labor as such" = "Labor as such"). What are you going to do?

First, understand the expression, interpret it! The loop-shaped 'as' refers to the existence/essence of something, to the exclusion of the rest. After all, there is a duality (complementation) inherent in that type of 'as':

(i) on the one hand, all that is work: the fact, the mode of being ('form' or 'essence'), by which something that exists differs from the rest;

(ii) the rest of reality. Naturally, in such a treatise one will bring up 'the rest' -- by way of comparison -- in order to indirectly highlight that by which something is distinguished from the rest of reality. But, in itself, the treatise consists merely in speaking of 'labor-and-nothing-else'.

RE71

B. Predicative subjects. (71/73)

Here the structure of the judgment (proposition, statement) comes into play. -- From the subject (of the sentence), as the original, the predicate is stated as a model.

B.1.-- One-sentence exercises.

“Labor ennobles.” Here, the treatise focuses on the fact that the manner in which labor exists ennobles. Or, as we have already encountered: “Labor as a source of nobility” or “Labor, insofar as it ennobles.” Precisely one viewpoint is requested for the treatise.

B.2. -- Sentence exercises

We quote the motto from *Nerin E. Gun, Eva Braun (Mistress and Wife of Adolf Hitler), Rotterdam, sd (English original, New York, 1968)*.

A 'motto' – it can also be useful for discussion – is a sentence, a motto, placed somewhere at the beginning of an exposition, to indicate in abbreviated form its intention, say: its thesis.

Here: if Hitler ever had an Eva Braun as a mistress (and, at the end, as a wife), then this is merely the illustration of the motto – which we now present.

(1) Friedrich Nietzsche: “A hero must live freely”.

(2) Adolf Hitler: “That is the worst thing about marriage, it creates legal rights! It is much more right to have a mistress. The burden is removed and everything remains a gift. -- That applies, of course, only to excellent men”. (That is the worst thing about marriage, it creates legal rights! It is much more right to have a mistress. The burden is removed and everything remains a gift. This applies, of course, only to excellent men).

How are you going to approach such a theme? There are, of course, many sequences, but they will come down to the following.

(A) A striking limitation is noteworthy. Nietzsche's statement can be rewritten in logical language as follows: “If a hero, then (as a duty) be free (from marriage)”.

That is the aristocratic heroism (hero or Übermenschen worship) of Nietzsche.

Hitler's statement rewritten in logical language: “If outstanding above the rest ('hervorragend'), then (much more appropriate ('richtiger') to have a mistress ('Geliebte'), instead of a wife)”. It is known that, like Nietzsche, whom they read extensively, the Nazis engaged in hero worship (which current Neo-Nazis still do).

By clearly formulating that strong analogy, the worldview and

philosophical background (logically: the presupposition) that governs the rejection of marriage becomes clearly apparent.

RE72

(B) The great difference between the two quotations is that Hitler's also indicates the reason: a 'relationship' that takes the form of marriage is burdened with 'Rechtsan-sprüche' (legal claims); in a 'free' relationship, 'die Last' falls away. -- In your treatise you can, indeed, must assess that responsibility for what it is, of course.

(C) A third approach is the comparative method.

Compare the above statements with what *Calverton says on the matter in *The Bankruptcy of Marriage** (RH 63), -- alongside Margaret Mead's 'free love'. Nazi or non-Nazi, a number of emancipated people (some out of heroism, others out of a 'desire for liberation') advocate either a restriction of marriage (the Nazis restricted free love rather to the 'Objectives') or a 'loosening of its screws' (Mead, Russell). Starting from different premises, they arrive at partially the same conclusions.

A little extra.

The Sumerians were a people who -3.000 insettled in Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq-Iran) between 4000 and 1000. We have two proverbs dating from around 2000.

(i) "Marry for the sake of pleasure; divorce after deep reflection". (Reminiscent of Freud's pairing of 'pleasure principle/reality principle').

(ii) "You may have a master. You may even have a king. But the man you really must fear is the tax collector" (More than one contemporary would most certainly agree with this).

Note -- The 'gnomè', sententia, utterance (saying) - RH 29 - is a statement, like, for example, the two Sumerian ones above: it contains wisdom of life and, insofar as it is intended as such, it is a statement (formulating the existence of a phenomenon). It can be reinterpreted as advice, but in essence, it is not. Cf. R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 132.

Treatise on a poem.

A poem can be interpreted as a multi-sentence exercise.

What would you do with, for example, the following poem by G. Gezelle (1830/1899)?

“O beautiful rose -- that smiles, beyond all limits of loveliness and enchanting glances. -- Yet you are fragile -- and will soon wither. -- Come, stand and remain in my thoughts. Shall you, free -- of duration and unspoiled, -- reflected in memory, henceforth, -- delight me, -- let your stem already be dead and let the wind play, swirling, in your leaves”. (April 1878 (?)).

RE73

(A) The first thing one can do is try to grasp the main impression: what do you think when it is proposed to speak of 'musing' here? 'Musing', in our language, encompasses **a.** pondering, thinking, **b.** rather quiet and, perhaps, somewhat vague, **c.** in a more or less melancholic mood of the mind, **d.** a state in which one becomes absorbed. The treatise as 'musing' (RH 54) is a variant of this, in which the thoughtful discourse carries more weight. - Gezelle stands before a rose, as a breakthrough of all that is beautiful (“... beyond all boundaries of loveliness and enchanting allure”), -- with the impression of eternity emanating from it. 'Yet' note: present in the text, that beauty is hollowed out from within in a natural process. Hence the melancholy that overtakes him and makes him muse.

(B) The second is, for example, the structure. Here it is clear. -

(i) a “O beautiful rose ... smiles”. The splendor of the rose --

(i) b “yet you are fragile ... wilting” The decay of the rose.

This harmony of opposites—beauty/fragility—constitutes the antithesis. This contrast returns in a modified form in the second part.

(ii) a “Come, stand and stay ... rejoice”

(ii) b “Let your voice already ... blâan”.

Gezelle was, fundamentally, a Platonicer in the Christianized sense: the eternal, the immortal, the enduring stood central. But the aspect of temporality, mortality, and transience was, to him, just as unmistakable. The human spirit (noology), however, transcends, to some extent, the harmony of opposites in all natural processes. That spirit possesses a memory: “Come, stand and remain in my thoughts. There you shall, free from duration and uncorrupted...”

In other words: let the natural process cause the rose to meet its demise; in my memory, the beautiful rose remains, reflected.

(C) Anyone who knows Gezelle a little knows that, in many other poems,

an analogous main impression and structure can be found. Which you could elaborate on in your treatise.

Decision

Charles Baudelaire (1821/1867), the precursor of 'Modern Poetry', once said that even aesthetic things, such as lyric poetry, are susceptible to intellectual-rational analysis. This great poet believed that one should not fall into absolute 'irrationalism' when interpreting beauty and art.

RE74

6.3. Theory of Dissertation: topic (commonplace theory) (74/81)

As R. Barthes states in *L'av. sém.*, 125/148 (*l' invention*), classically speaking, topic (the doctrine of commonplaces) is part of heuristic rhetoric (RH 12).

How to 'find' thoughts, indeed, how to organize them? According to the perspective of 'commonplaces': basic insights that apply to any subject. The term 'topos', locus, literally means 'place' (where one finds thoughts).

Note: Language usage that is no longer aware of its very useful value uses the term 'cliché' only in the pejorative sense: an idiom that comes across as 'worn out'. But we also use the term in the meliorative sense.

1. This has already been discussed thoroughly – RH 58 (Port-Royal, Lamy) – where it became clear that 'existence/essence' are the two great 'topoi', loci, places where inspiration for text formation can be found.

2. RH 60/65 (Mead/Freeman) taught us that whoever does not first look at the given situation, the circumstances—in order to then draw conclusions—produces a failed treatise. Had Mead—thanks to rigorous observation (for the actual existence and the inherent mode of being of something can only be grasped through accurate observation)—first examined the existence/essence (the two always go together), then her treatise would have taken root in reality.

Whatever Barthes admits in his own way, oc, 142 (the modalities: possible/ factual/ impossible etc.), 144s. (the question “An sit?” (Does it exist? Are there facts?), possibly: “An fecerit?” (Did he/ she/ it do it or not? What are the facts?), -- 142 (the question: “Quid sit?” (What is it? The essence or mode of being), -- possibly: “Quale sit?” (Of what quality is it?)).

Of course, there are also non-universal 'places', which then become

particular 'commonplaces'. Cf. Barthes, oc, 143.

These are specific not to all, but to some themes. Thus, in a theological work, one will 'find' arguments at certain 'places' (topoi, loci) of Holy Scripture (very great authority), the Church Fathers (already less authority), and the theologians (even less authority), which are then theological commonplaces.

Can you imagine a psychoanalyst who does not know the Oedipus complex as a commonplace in depth psychology? Every discipline, every subject has its commonplaces in order to find thoughts on them.

RE75

Epistemological (logical) and axiological commonplaces.

When you first examine whether something exists (given) and what it is (given), space opens up for the question: "What value does it have?" This question is the main question, axiologically (in terms of value theory) speaking.

A value judgment —now easily called an 'evaluation'—is a normal concluding section of any complete treatise. -- We already saw, in RH 64, a scientific value judgment: Freeman calls M. Mead's propositions 'false' ("The reality in Samoa is fundamentally different"). 'Objective truth' regarding statements is, scientifically speaking, the 'value' (truth value) par excellence.

When we reject Neo-Nazi propositions—e.g. hating, indeed eliminating, or exterminating our fellow man because he or she is different (RH 69) in terms of race ('racism')—then we are making an ethical (moral, moral) value judgment founded on a very high value, namely, the fellow man as a fellow man, belonging to one and the same humanity, despite all differences (= forms of 'otherness').

Truth value, humanity, are values and, as such, commonplaces where one 'finds' axiological arguments (heuristic value).

A list of traditional clichés.

(A) A. Langlois, *Le style (La chose et la manière. -- Du xvii^e au xxe siècle)*, Bruxelles, 1925, 57, gives us such a list.

"The Ancients attached great importance to this heuristic section. (...). (They had a whole arsenal at their disposal"

1. The definition and the enumeration (classification), --
2. The similarity and the difference (contrast), --
3. The circumstances, including the pairing 'omen' (cause) / consequence

(effect) -- these are the most striking commonplaces with which one can find ideas to develop a text concerning a theme.

(B). *SPB Moss, Composition by Logic*, Belmont, Calif., 1966, discusses this at length. He distinguishes what follows.

1. 'Fact Statements' (protocol statements, determinations of facts),-- 'Example Statements' (exemplifications, examples, -- determinations of singular cases of a general concept).

2.a. 'What Topics' and 'Definition Statements',-- 'How Topics'.

2.b . 'Comparison Topics' (comparison question), -- 'Contrast Topics' (contrast question: what is the opposite of it? -- one type of comparison); -- 'Compare and Contrast Topics' (similarity and contrast question simultaneously). –

RE76

One sees that Moss confuses 'comparing' with 'equating', whereas we define 'comparing' as “placing side by side, in order to see both similarity and difference”). Note how comparing, in the broad sense, is merely a precision of the 'essence' (mode of being), which is thereby more sharply defined.

3. Under the circumstances, Moss brings forward only one, namely 'Why Topics' (the question of the how/why -- the explanation).

Decision:

Moss does nothing other than actualize and re-establish the age-old commonplaces mentioned by Langlois. In both enumerations (= typology, classification), three main commonplaces are at work:

- a.** existence (which Langlois does not mention) - fact, exemplification -;
- b.** essence - definition, classification (enumeration, typology), - what? How? -- These specified by similarity and difference (comparison) -;
- c.** circumstances (especially 'omen/ continuation', -- whereby/ why). One need only think of a 'detailed description', a 'detailed story', a 'detailed account' (RH 31); which are called 'detailed' only because, besides essence/existence, they also include the circumstances, the entire situation.

That through which, that why something is, is merely one circumstance. That the commonplace of circumstances is still relevant is evident from *McLaughlin, Robert, What? Where? When? Why?* (*Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation*), Dordrecht, 1982. The title of this Australasian treatise

speaks volumes.

What is, of course, easily forgotten is value (the axiological commonplace par excellence). Once **1/** factual existence, **2/** essence, and **3/** circumstances are known, one can make a responsible value judgment,

Antique models.

How, then, can one forge a treatise from those commonplaces? Antiquity has left us models,

The 'chreia' (chrie).

J.Fr. Marmontel (1723/1799), *Eléments de littérature* (1787), says that the chreia is the interpretation ('definition', he also says) of either a statement or a remarkable fact.

Library st.:

- *HI Marrou, Hist.d.l' éducat .*, 241;
- *O, Peccieur, Man, prat .*,12;
- *O.Willmann, Abriss* , 9;
- *R. Barthes, L'av. Sem .*,138.

In ancient secondary education, the text size amounted to “a small page”.

RE77

The structure.

It is eightfold: eight paragraphs (= text sections), called 'kefalaia' or 'capita', are just as many commonplaces. The ambiguity (RH 50; 69) of the theme is evident from this.

Imagine that you work with it. How are you going to do that?

A.1. Given : “Isocrates of Athens (RH 25) once said: “The roots of education come across as bitter, but the fruits thereof have a pleasant taste”.

A.2. Required : text formation according to the eight-part chreia. - that concludes the assignment.

B. The elaboration.

BI Characteristic of Isocrates.

One begins by characterizing the personality in whose name either a fact or a saying stands, and thus discussing its factual existence and definition, rather briefly. You can find such a thing in an encyclopedia.

Note: In antiquity, this was often an 'enkomion' (a eulogy; RH 29), in which

the greatness of the figure is revealed. Here: of the great rhetorician.

B. II. *The saying (incidentally the fact).*

All the following paragraphs deal with this aspect.

a. Paraphrasis, in three lines, of Isocrates' aphorism (*note*: short statement, without its context). You formulate in other terms, a model, what Isocrates said (the original).

Note: tropologically speaking, a metaphor is at work here (RH 70). Upbringing is compared to a plant whose roots give off a bitter taste, but whose fruits taste sweet: the foundation of upbringing is unpleasant; the superstructure is not.

b. *The argument* (argumentation).

b.1. 'Kataskeuè', justification.

Here one seeks the verification of the paraphrase that contains the theorem.

b.2. 'Anaskeuè', refutation. -- Here the opposing model (counter-model) is subjected to falsification, refutation. The opinion that contradicts Isocrates' proposition is undone by arguments.

Note - The chreia systematically takes into account those who think differently, -- situates itself in a pluralistic intellectual climate.

c The further argument.

c.1. ' *Sunkrisis* ', comparison. -- Here Isocrates' assertion is compared with analogous theorems.

c.2. ' *Anecdote* ', illustrative example.

RE78

Here, a fact is stated that is an application (and, at the same time, proof) of the statement or proposition. For example, Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322), the great orator, suffered from a weak voice (which, in a culture without a microphone, is a disaster) and had little dramatic (RH 13: recitation) inclination. Driven by a powerful idea—to become a great orator—he nevertheless learned to speak, with stones in his mouth and, on the coast, against the surging sea. He became the most famous orator of the Greeks. Analogy: bitter roots/ Demosthenes' practice pleasant fruits/ famous eloquence.

c.3 . *Argument from authority* (testimony).

In late antiquity, 'the Ancients', such as Homer and Hesiod of Askra

(between -800 and -600), for example, were regarded as spokesmen for high truths. -- We can, of course, bring this into current.

Conclusion. We have seen a number of already known commonplaces at work, but have also discovered new ones. Perhaps this diagram will come in very handy in your final thesis—if only for verification.

The chreia of aphthonios of antiocheia (+270/...).

This Deuterosophical rhetorician (RH 28) taught it as follows.

A. Introduction . -- a word of praise for the saying/the fact.

B. Middle .

a. Paraphrase (description, rewriting) thereof.

b.1. Explanation, -- 'cause' ('a causa'), -- which amounts to a verification.

b.2. Opposite ('a contrario'), -- the counter-model, which is subjected to falsification.

c.1 . Comparison ('a simili'), to explain an analogous case.

c.2 . Example ('ab exemplo'), i.e. a fact that confirms the statement/the fact.

c.3 . Argument from authority, testimony ('a testimonio').

C. Conclusion . -- “A brevi epologo” (a brief conclusion). For example, “Behold the sound thesis of Isocrates regarding education. — One sees that Aphthonius' model is merely a variant of the previous one. Which points to flexibility in Ancient rhetoric: commonplaces were not all that immutable after all.”

A mnemonic formulation.

A. Introduction . -- Quis? Who (spoke or acted like that?).

B. Middle . - **a.** Quid? What? (Paraphrase). **b.1** . Cur? On the basis of what (why? By what means?) (Verification). **b.2** . Contra, counter-model (falsification). **c.1.** Simile, analogous case (similarity). **c.2.** Paradigmata, examples. **c.3.** Testes, witnesses (arguments from authority), both 'scripta' (sayings) and 'facta' (facts).

C. Conclusion . -- Aanstiming bv

RE79

Applicative models of commonplaces.

Although the concepts of 'definition' (in the sense of essential definition)

and 'enumeration' (= classification, theory of types, or typology) must be known from logic, we will nevertheless quickly provide a few examples.

A -- Definition of essence .

a. To 'define' (determine) something can, first of all, mean expressing an opinion about something (e.g., in a position). Consider judges who, at the end of a trial, deliver a verdict: they 'define', in terms of law and jurisprudence, what someone has done or committed. Such a 'definition' is both a (legal) essential definition and a (legal) value judgment.

b. Here, however, we are talking about 'defining' in the logical sense: delineating something from the rest of 'being' (= reality), setting it out as distinguishable ('discriminable') against the background of the rest of the universe.

Appl. mod..

The Paleopythagoreans were apparently among the first in Ancient Hellas to formulate definitions. For instance, the famous Archutas of Tares (Lat.: Archytas of Taren-tum) (-445/-395): "Calm is **(i)** the air mass **(ii)** in a state of rest". "Still sea is **(i)** the wave motion **(ii)** that has come to a standstill".

But it was Socrates of Athens (-427/-347) who introduced 'horismos' (literally: to delineate), definition, determination of essence, very consciously and with strict logical application, into philosophy.

A current example:

"Labor is **(i)** effort, **(ii)** insofar as it creates economic value." This definition is not general: it refers, whether willingly or unwillingly, to economic labor. Someone who wishes to create non-economic value and makes efforts to do so is also laboring, but not necessarily economically. Consider the intellectual labor performed by a lyric poet... without economic intentions. We underline 'will'. Why? Anyone who makes efforts without the will to create value is not 'laboring'. Consider a young man who dances all evening long: he sweats from it, but does not wish to create value; he amuses himself (unless one considers mere relaxation, as consciously willed, as one type of 'labor' (in the very broad sense, then)).

Conclusion : Formulating essential definitions is a very difficult undertaking. You, student, understand now why the Ancients asked the pupils for only a 'paraphrase', not a formal definition.

That defining the essence (and always existence) is a serious matter is evident from, for example, R. Kühnl, **Faschismus (Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung *)*, in: ** Blätter für Deutsche und internationale Politik xiii** (1968); this essay is, in a certain sense, nothing other than one sustained attempt to—what 'Fascism' is!* This,—according to the statement:

- a. given: Fascism (as name and reality);
- b. requested: as precise a definition as possible. Which requires extensive research.

B.-- enumeration (= classification, typology).

Plato of Athens (-427/-347) is considered the first to formally introduce division. 'Diairesis', divisio, division, -- namely, of a universal set into its particular sets (= subsets).

Appl. mod.

We were just talking about labor. -- Think of manual labor and mental labor as two types, -- think of light and heavy labor as two other types. The classification is a kind of enumeration, namely of the types.

1. Especially since Aristotles of Stageira (the Stagirite; -384/-322), a definition is divided into two aspects: genus (= universal set) and specific (= specific) difference. The latter is the basis of types. Or 'subsets', in the language of set theory. Take: labor and its lightness give 'light labor'.

2. Ch. Lahr, SJ, *Logique* , Paris, 1933-27, 612, emphasizes the main requirement. Analogy, understood as similarity (= gender) and difference (= specific or typological difference), is the basis of classification. The essential point is and remains that the difference is irreducible. Such that the types of 'labor', for example, cannot be reduced from one to the other. Thus, light and heavy labor are distinguished to such an extent—except in borderline cases (think of the differential that attempts to classify slight differences)—that they truly represent types of labor.

Conclusion : it is the borderline cases that can make defining types so difficult. Pay attention to this in your thesis.

Note -- We treat 'enumeration' and 'classification' under one and the same heading. Why? Because enumeration is always summative. Which means: it is based on a totality (universal set, overall system).

Appl. mod..

The review *Autrement* bv was recently entitled “A quoi pensent les philosophes?”.

In other words, the current philosophical challenges. -- Some thirty contributions attempt to outline the main points of contemporary themes and issues. -- We can 'list' them in summary, -- without claiming completeness (which, as a classification, is a shortcoming).

(i) First theme: the modern (la modernité). Philosophers of art, J. Derrida (1930/...; Post-Heideggerian), J. Habermas (1929/...; Frankfurt School, second generation) define 'the Modern' as the break with, the crisis of 'the (Western) tradition.

(ii) Second theme: ethics (moral philosophy). Our society grapples with urgent matters of conscience (think of biological manipulations, of chemical weapons). Some thinkers prioritize values, in whose name they attempt to shape our conscience.

(iii) Third theme : foundational research of the specialized sciences.

Sciences—logical-mathematical, natural-scientific, and humanistic—prioritize premises, the foundations; which actually constitute philosophical points. A number of thinkers make a contribution in this sense.

(iv) Fourth theme : The law. Our society—think of the 'rights' of immigrants—struggles with right and wrong. Some thinkers make this a matter of priority.

Decision: **a.** it concerns only main points; **b .** our list (enumeration, typology, classification) is certainly incomplete—a flaw, purely logically speaking. But even a flawed classification is valuable.

Appl. mod..

S. Freud, **Das Unbehagen in der Kultur **, Vienna, 1929, contains an enumeration. In connection with his concept of the 'Lustprinzip' (RH 72), the pleasure principle, he divides both the causes and the forms (= types) of suffering, the violation of the pleasure principle, as follows. -- “Suffering threatens us from three sides,

a. in our own body which, doomed to decay and disintegration, does not reach completion without the alarm signals that are pain and fear;

b . because of the outside world, which possesses invincible forces to hurl itself upon us and destroy us;

c. the third threat, finally, arises from our relations with other human beings". -- Although very incomplete, this list is and remains suggestive and thought-provoking.

RE82

6.4. Theory of Treatise: Logic and Methodology. (82/91).

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém* :, 125s., says that the goal of the rhetorical act is

(i) to persuade, which makes a line of reasoning accept and

(ii) to stir, to give rise to a value judgment.

In that twofold form, a message ('information') emanates from the writer or speaker, respectively, in order to find a way in with the recipient.

Let us briefly consider the first aspect. It is, admittedly, a logical and methodological aspect. However, emphasizing a few very important points seems absolutely necessary to us if we wish to outline a somewhat complete theory of the treatise.

Let us depart from the main point.

Isocrates of Athens (RH 25,77) gave, as a means of interpretation and understanding, two usages of language:

(i) "to speak in such a way that one provides (logically strict) proof" or

(ii) failing that, "speak in such a way as to make one's position credible".

Decision.

(a) Whoever, therefore, restricts 'rhetoric' to the second type (as, for example, Aristotle does), namely attempting to 'make true' an opinion by 'all kinds of persuasive means', distorts the meliorative concept of 'rhetoric', as Isocrates just described it.

(b) Moreover: what orator—writer—will, whether in a theoretical exposition, in a hearty 'musing', or in a vehement or unheld plea (RH 54: three types of treatise), neglect strictly logical and methodological proof? No one.

'Pisteis', probationes, proofs. ((82/83)

R. Barthes, *oc*, 126/136, briefly sets out the traditional theory of (rhetorical) proofs.

He rightly distinguishes—with the Ancient Greek rhetoricians—between 'pisteis a.technoi', object-based proof, and 'pisteis en.technoi', subject-based proof.

(i) When countless people today emphatically repeat before human rights committees that they were tortured, either by the (state) police or by (private, semi-public) bodies, the facts speak for themselves (through the testimony), 'a.technos', without the speaker or writer weaving any 'arguments' around them.

(ii) Ancient rhetoricians distinguished between three types of facts regarding subject-related reasoning.

RE83

a. The '*tekmèrion*', the certain sign ,

For example, when a girl becomes pregnant, this is the certain sign that she was fertilized (how—that is another matter; was she raped? Did she seek it?). The reasoning reads: “if pregnant, then fertilized” (deductive). What is perceptible to the senses by, in principle, everyone (universally verifiable) is '*tekmèrion*', a certain indication. This approximates apodictic reasoning (RH 59), which, according to Aristotle, is characteristic of 'hard science'.

b. the probable

When, among all peoples, traditions say that one “ought to honor one’s parents and superiors”, then it seems likely that this rests on firm presuppositions. The reasoning reads: “if such a universal-planetary opinion exists, then it is in all probability justifiable”.

While it was '*tekmèrion*', the certain designation, almost object-bound ('a.technos'), the probable, '*eikos*', requires reasoning—certainly in a number of situations (circumstances, RH 76). Consider, for example, the situation created by the generation gap (RH 63): for a number of young people, this planetarily verifiable given—father and mother, as well as authority figures—is no longer 'evident' (in Ancient language '*eikos*', obvious, 'probable').

c. The '*semèion*', *indicium*, the mere indication.

Imagine—in U. Eco’s novel, **The Name of the Rose **, Amsterdam, 1985, 35—that someone 'reads' “tracks in the snow” (to use the language of the semioticians). A track—footprints,—stains of blood, with which the novel overflows, so that it depicts “a great and heavenly bloodbath” (oc, 53)—can be a mere indication, insofar as it is vague and ambiguous enough, cf. RH 50,89.

Here, subject-bound reasoning must play a significant role. The less verifiable and the more ambiguous something is, the more reasoning is necessary. And 'rhetoric'—in the narrow Aristotelian sense—plays a role.

Decision.

Dear student, please do take into account the Ancient Theory of Proof just explained. This will save you from many well-intentioned incorrect arguments.

RE84

The reasoning, viewed from the reception (interpretation). (84/85)

Just above, we saw the arguments arising from the given itself (which may or may not be (sufficiently) 'eloquent' ("speaks of itself").

Let us consider them, now, from the perspective of their interpreter. -- The four methods of reasoning of *Ch. S Peirce* (RH 49).-- Peirce, in an incomplete list, distinguishes four types, - in his *The Fixation of Belief*, in: *Popular Science Monthly*, xii (1877), 1/15.

1.a. “The method of tenacity” (the method of willfulness).

The person who 'reads' (= interprets) other people's opinions or objective facts from the perspective of their own prejudices is called 'stubborn' by Peirce. Rhetorically speaking, only that which fits within those presuppositions is typical of the individual one is gains acceptance.

He gives as an example an acquaintance of his who was opposed to (trade) protectionism and who only read literature that was pro-free trade.

Teachers can become acquainted with this type, for example during home visits. One “cannot get anything into it,” unless it aligns somewhat with individual 'axioms'.

1.b. “the method of authority” (the method of orthodoxy).

Note: in Dutch, 'oprecht' is the subjective quality whereby one “spends what one has inside”, whereas 'rechtzinnig' is anything that, in its thinking and life, allows itself to be guided by the group or authority -- in any case by others.

Take, for example, the traditionalist: “It has always been this way.” The steadfast people, who adhere to an (established) doctrine: such as the 'orthodox' Nazis or Communists. What Hitler or Marx taught, they call 'truth'.

To “get something into” that, one must proceed, with such people, from their presuppositions, -- just as had to be done with the headstrong. Except that here the other takes precedence and the 'own' (individual) is absent or comes through very timidly. --

1.c. “The a priori method” (the a priori method).

This line of thought departs from either idiosyncratic or orthodox

premises, but considers them open to dialogue and discussion—to such an extent, in fact, that dialoguing and discussing seem decisive.

Quite a few 'liberals'—here not as a name for some alliance or other, but as the name of a mentality—forget, in their heavy emphasis on freedoms of opinion of all kinds, that what decides truth or falsehood is the matter itself. And not endlessly debate “in absolute freedom”.

RE85

This type is perhaps the most inaccessible: the idiosyncratic or the orthodox has firm premises (is a 'fundamentalist') and, if one can convince him or her from that perspective, any message succeeds; the aprioritous—in Peirce's terminology, understand: the one who invariably asks: “How do you know that? How do you prove that?”—is—fundamentally—impervious to any dialogue with a result. He or she gets no further than an endlessly drawn-out investigation of foundations or presuppositions. This attitude is characteristic of the current crisis of foundations and values in our society.

2. 'The Method of External Permanency' (also: 'The Method of Science'.)

Here the given entity itself, in its existence and essence together with the circumstances, is decisive and is deemed decidable, at least in principle.

Whether one starts from idiosyncratic, liberal, or apriority premises is of secondary importance: one always starts from one or more presuppositions—called 'hypotheses' by Platon (RH 55: hypothetical method) but:

- (i) people are open to discussion (human aspect) and
- (ii) one opens oneself to reality itself, as in principle susceptible to (individual or collective) investigation -- investigation which, in contrast to the 'a-priority method', is considered capable of solid results.

According to Peirce, this is typical of (modern) scientific research: hence the title 'Scientific Method'. Rhetorically speaking: when dealing with this type of reasoning and method, one forgets, in order to look with one's fellow man at that at hand, all one's own, collective, or apriority concerns. Here, genuine, justifiable understanding is radically possible. Which is the goal of all rhetorical acts.

Note - A sociological bonus.

Uli Windisch, **Le raisonnement et le parler quotidien** (1985), examines the

reasoning of the Modern mass man (the great majority, -- according to Windisch), who plays a colossal role in our Western democracies (in elections, for example, that type decides on matters of life).

It appears from the said work that the vast majority of that mass is idiosyncratic, orthodox, or, to a much lesser extent, aprioritious, and therefore open to discussion. Of which we take note.

RE86

The syllogistic design of an argument. (86/90).

Library st.:

-- K. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (1835/1870; the history of logic, from Aristotle to the 15th century);

-- JM Bochenski, *Logik*, Munich/ Freiburg i.Br., 1956 (logic, as a methodology, is multifaceted: Greek, Scholastic (Medieval), 'mathematical' (formalized), Indian, etc.);

-- JL Golden/ JJ Pilotta, ed., *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs* (*Studies in Honor of Chaim Perelman*), Dordrecht, 1906 (a work in the spirit of Ch. Perelman (1912/1984), *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities* (*Essais on Rhetoric and Its Applications*), Dordrecht, 1979);

-- F. van Eemeren et al., *Argumentation Theory*, Utr./Antw., 1981-2, 9/16 (*What is argumentation?*).

Behold an ultra-small sample from a mass of works and articles.

Prototype of argument.

Van Eemeren, oc, says that 'argumentation' is: "the defending of positions", understand: the verification of propositions.

The syllogism serves as the prototype—the work referred to in this manner. This argumentative text form is a line of reasoning consisting of

(1) two prepositions ('premises'; preposition 1 (= VZ1) and preposition 2 (= VZ2)), i.e. the 'arguments', (in the narrower sense), and

(2) a concluding clause (decision, derivation, conclusion (= NZ), i.e. the 'opinion' (position) that one advocates. (oc27).

Two arrangements (order):

a. the progressive one, which formulates the antecedent clauses first and only then the consequent clause;

b. the regressive, which places the subsequent clause at the beginning (as that which must be proven) and, only then, elaborates the subsequent clauses (the 'proofs') (oc,32).

Jan Lukasiewicz, ground plan.

Jan Luksiewicz (1878/1956; on Aristotle's Syllogistic (1951)) attempted to 'axiomatize' convoluted rhetoric! -- He exposed two basic schemata.

A.-- The deductive syllogism. - Schematically expressed “If A, then B (= axiom, hypothesis, lemma, 'abduction'). Well, A. (The two preceding sentences are the prepositions, VZ1 (hypothesis) and VZ2 (second preposition)). Therefore B. (The conclusion or theorem to be proven)';

B.-- The reductive syllogism . —Schem. “If A, then B. Well, B. Therefore A”.

Conclusion: it is evident that the second antecedent, which expresses the step into extralogical reality, is the determination (of existence and essence, with the circumstances) of either antecedent A or antecedent B.

RE87

From the joint reflection on premise and determination, one arrives at a position ('opinion') that is—precisely because of this—justifiable.

Appl. mod.. (87/90)

The abstract model can seem barren and empty. It is, until the applicative model makes it alive and 'real' (RH 31: without abstract schema blind, without paradigm, applicative model, empty).

Library st.:

-- R. Denker, *Aggression* (Kant/ Darwin/ Freud/ Lorenz), Amsterdam, 1967, 76/78 (Frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Yale School);

-- G. Müller, *Toynbees Reconsiderations* (*Die Studie zur Weltgeschichte neu durchdacht*), in: *Saeculum* (*Janrbuch für Universalgeschichte*) 1964: 1, 311/326 (in particular: ac 320f. (Challenge - Response)),

-- Based on AJ Toynbee, *A Study of History xii, Reconsiderations* , London, 1961; Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, *Lessons for the Living* (*Conversations with the Dying*), Bilthoven, 1970 (questions 40/140: the ways of coming to terms with the fact that one is going to die)

-- Arno Plack et al., *Der Mythos vom Agreseonstrieb* , Munich, 1974.

The main point here, in our little example, is the relationship “disappointment/attack” (cf. with RH 50v. (ABC theory), conceived within the schema “stimulus / response”). The impetus for the famous “frustration-aggression hypothesis” is given by facts such as the following.

(i) A young man, full of the future magic of a beautiful summer afternoon with his fiancée, takes the bicycle, hops on it, and discovers that the frame is broken. It is impossible to ride any further with it. You understand, by feel, his reaction: he is very displeased and says under his breath: “You can never count on a bicycle.”

(ii) The same young man walks to the bus. He waits, with many others. The bus does not arrive at the expected time. His reaction: “That cursed bus isn't coming now either. Buses are never there when you need them.”

Briefly analyzed :

Twice the young man is deceived regarding what is very dear to his heart ('frustration', 'disappointment'); twice he reacts to this with unease, -- 'aggression', 'attack impulse'. Even the most ordinary man of the people establishes such a causal connection, -- guided by 'common sense' (the (all) common understanding).

RE88

Designing a theoretical insight. (88/89).

Let us first examine, in a greatly abbreviated but perfectly understandable form, what the Yale School, for example, did.

a. Freud's Footprint (1856/1939: RH 72; 81).

Two statements:

1. if inhibition of pleasure-seeking (pain-fleeing) behavior, then disappointment;

2. if disappointment, then an urge to attack, directed against the inhibiting factor (object, person: think – in our twofold case – of the bicycle, the bus, against whom the young man – displeased, indeed, furious (typical of 'aggression') – lashes out, in terms of cursing).

b. The formulas of the Yale School.

b.1 . In 1937 John Dollard formulates: “If frustration, then aggression;

Note-- Pay attention to the 'if-then language' (i.e., the formulating of observable facts in logical-methodological terms).

b.2. In 1939: *J. Dollard/ LW Doob/ OH Mowrer/ RR Sears, Frustration and aggression* , New Haven, 1939, -- with the twofold statement:

(i) for all cases of aggression, it always holds that frustration precedes it as a 'harbinger' ('cause: 'explanation') (in short: “if frustration, then

aggression”);

(ii) In all cases of frustration, aggression always follows as a 'follow-up' ('consequence'). -- Definitions (RH 79).

Without definitions, however imperfect, there is no exact or, at least, accurate understanding: 'frustration' is defined as “the hindrance of an endeavor” (towards a goal: here, a lovely afternoon with the fiancé); 'aggression' is described (paraphrased) as “an action aimed at an attack on the hindrance factor (object, person)”.

Note: It was noted at the time that 'independent aggression', i.e. without prior frustration, was not taken into account in the wording.

b.3 . In 1941: *NE Miller/ RR. Sears/ DH. Mowrer/ LW. Doob/ J. Dollard, The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis* , in: *Psychological Review* , 1941: 48, 337/342. -- Corrections (improvements) were introduced.

(i) Theorem 1 (“Only if frustration, then aggression” understood to mean that aggression always requires frustration as a precursor) is retained.

(ii) However, statement 2 (“If frustration, then always aggression”) is improved.

RE89

Rode :

a. Frustration can, in some cases, provoke another reaction;

b. 'aggression' must be split into **(1)** “aggression tendency” ('intent') and **(2)** “actual effect of the tendency”--- this instead of “action aimed at an attack on the impediment factor (object/person): Whereby the emphasis lies on the term 'action', now split into “tendency towards action” and “action (effect)”.

Conclusion : “Frustration evokes impulses for a series of different reactions, one of which is the impulse of aggressive tendency,” read the correction.

Verification.

The phenomenon of 'resentment' (in French: le ressentiment) is well known. M. Scheler (1874/1928; axiologist), *Von Umsturz der Werte* , I, 1919, 43/236 (*Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen* , -- resentment as a factor in the construction of moral systems), had already clearly recognized what the Yale School discovered: the impulse for revenge, at work in resentment or 'resentment',

a. inhibits the immediate reaction of destruction of the impediment factor and

b. relies on its delayed form (“Just wait! My day will come someday”). From this it is clear that there is always a reaction act, but not always a full act of aggression), 'act' here in the Schleierian sense of “act of will”

Verification.

E. Kübler-Ross, *Lessen* , 141, states that at least a five-membered reaction group is possible.

Stimulus : very distressing information, e.g. the fact that one is expected, by the doctors and those around them, to die. - But, incidentally, this “sad news” can also be, for example, the moment when a man who loves his wife dearly learns that she is 'cheating' on him, or the news heard at home that the man will not be returning home alive because he was involved in a car accident.

Reaction (answer) Kübler-Ross distinguishes at least five responses to such a situation, namely denial (with, as a possible consequence, isolation, a tendency towards loneliness) - think of:

Denial: “No, that cannot be true. Not me” (“No, that my wife is cheating on me; that is unthinkable”)

Anger (the real aggression) – think of “Why me?” (“Why do I encounter something like this?” “Just wait: if what I am only just learning is true!”)

Things (bargaining) – think of “I will do better from now on” (understood as: then God might let me live a little longer”) (“I will be nicer than ever; then everything will be fine again”)

Melancholy ('depression'), think of “since then I worry all day long; I feel vaguely guilty somewhere, but don't know exactly how”. (“Since the death of my husband I just can't seem to get over it”) -;

Acceptance – think of “Yes, it was to be expected, wasn't it; everyone dies” (“Now I have reached the point where I accept divorce. I don't get angry about it anymore”).

Note: One could, of course, expand on all this considerably. Consider Y. Michaud, **La violence **, Paris, 1986,3, where it is stated that 'violence' ('violence') encompasses things such as killing, striking, damaging, -- war, oppression, -- criminality, terrorism. That 'violence' represents 'aggression' is evident from a definition thereof: “an act which, directly or indirectly, aims to restrict, injure or destroy persons and/or property” (HL Nieburg, **Uses of Violence **, in: ** Journal of Conflict Resolution **, 1963, 3, vol. vii-1, 43).

Falsification.

An analysis is not complete – since Karl Popper (RH 65) this is abundantly clear when one does not attempt to 'falsify' a hypothesis, i.e., to catch it in incorrectness.

A. Plack, **Der Mythos vom Agressionstrieb**, criticizes the views on aggression of Freud, Konrad Lorenz (1903/1989), Nico Tinbergen, and Alexander Mitscherlich (1908/1982); ** Aggression und Anpassung ** (in: **Psyché **, Stuttgart, 1956: 1957, 10, 177/193). Plack reproaches them for insufficient factual material (RH 64: existence/essence), which is exploited unilaterally. -- Plack (and the other authors of the book) hold the following thesis: 'aggression' is

- (1) not innate (cf. RH 60: cultural determinism) and
 - (2) not as universally widespread as, for example, K. Lorenz et al. claim; -
- this, both in animals and humans.

Argument (abbreviated):

- a. great apes are rather friendly than aggressive;
- b. Primitives exhibit a type of 'humanity' to such an extent that they—in their harsh living conditions (RH 76; 83)—were able to survive. -- Which we note here as a corrective to some 'theories' in circulation (sometimes of great renown).

Incidentally: R. Girard, **La violence et le sacré **, Paris, 1972, criticizes

the interpretations of violence specific to the humanities (which we will not discuss). Student, please draw lessons from this chapter for 'your thesis' and 'your argument'.

RE91

Natural and humanities 'explanations'.

We saw that D. Schleiermacher and, especially, W. Dilthey introduced the strict distinction between natural science and humanities (RH 49/51).

We will now clarify this by means of a brief analysis of the relationship 'frustration/aggression'. This is especially important because you, a student, will almost certainly need this for your final thesis.

(A). A. Toynbee derived the fundamental concept of human history—according to his own account—from the poet R. Browning (1812/1889)—which proves that belles-lettres (RH 72v,) can also contain 'theses'—and from the Old Testament.

This basic concept reads: "Challenge and Response." According to the great historian, besides 'cultural determinism' (in the limited sense that our behavior is entirely 'determined' by the culture in which we live), there is also fundamental freedom at work somewhere, which detaches us from our environment.

He himself says: "The response to a challenge is not the effect of a cause." G. Müller paraphrases: " *History* is (...) always what man makes of it."

(B). Dilthey (and the humanities scholars) will express this as follows: "History – all typical human behavior – cannot be 'erklären' (explained scientifically, for example in terms of 'causes/effects', preferably in a deterministic way) in a natural scientific manner, but 'verstehen' (explained in a humanities manner) in a humanities manner."

For the 'Verstehende Methode' (comprehensive or 'understanding' method) is one type of explanation that makes something understandable, starting from presuppositions (hypotheses) or necessary and, preferably, sufficient conditions.

Now apply the ABC theory of personality (RH 50v) yourself, student, to the relationship between 'frustration' (= point A) and 'aggression' (point B), and through B, point C). 'Verstehen' is understanding the interpretation (point B)

of a fellow human being and, from that interpretation, explaining his behavior. What natural science does not exclude as an additional 'explanation' (as Dilthey and Spranger have explicitly stated) is that it is not a matter of exclusivism.

RE92

6.5. Theory of Treatise: Pathos. (92/105)

The term 'pathetic' is used in the following sentence: "The pathetic aspect of a tragedy leaves a deep impression on the viewing public." In Ancient Greek, the term 'pathos' (the word is still used untranslated in Dutch) has many meanings that are not so easily brought under a single heading.

Yet one characteristic invariably recurs: that which one undergoes, goes through, or experiences, especially as a human being. -- 'Pathetics' - here - is therefore to be understood in that sense: the doctrine concerning what one experiences, especially as a human being, when reading something or hearing someone speak.

The three divisions of classical pathos . (92/105)

Three aspects emerge when attempting to summarize the centuries-long rhetorical tradition regarding pathos.

A. -- The emotional reactions of the message recipient . (92/93)

R. Barthes, *L' av. sém.*, 146s., this is called, with the rhetors, 'pathe' (plural of 'pathos'; Lat.: 'passiones').

Barthes, who conceives of rhetoric in a very Aristotelian way, names a series of systems specific to the average person: anger/inner peace, hatred/'love', fear/trust, ingratitude/gratitude, -- envy (rivalry), etc.

Barthes himself rightly states that, in Aristotle's view, pathos entails "a sociology of mass culture"—certainly regarding emotional reactions.—When one examines Aristotle's teacher, Plato, in this regard, a very different 'rhetoric' is revealed (RH 15), in which the emotional reactions provoked—via a text, written or spoken—are much more sublime (Platon has left us a precious expression: "the noble soul").

Note: This would be the place for a theory concerning the mind.

Library st.:

- Th. Ribot, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917-10 (still valid);
- H. Albrecht, *Ueber das Gemüt*, Stuttgart, 1961;

-- S. Strasser, *Das Gemüt (Grundgedanken zu einer phänomenologischen Philosophie und Theorie des menschlichen Gefühlslebens)*, Utr. / Ans. / Freiburg, 1956.

In its place, we have some passages listed above (RH 41/48: significant, in which the 'pathetic aspect' comes strongly into its own; 50ff. (ABC theory); 87/90 (frustration/aggression)).

RE93

Note: Very early, in the Protosophist rhetoric (RH 24/27), we see figures such as Thrasu(m)machos of Chalkedon (450/-380) placing the greatest emphasis on working on the emotional life, -- by means of

(i) stylistics (RH 12: design) and

(ii) action (RH 14v.: the art of acting). His contemporary and intellectual Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375; RH 25) has left us, in his Eulogy of Helen, beautiful words about the (artificial, 'stylized') word as a 'pathetic device'.-- All this situated within the art of words.

B.-- The visual impression ('imago', 'figure of the reporter' . (93/95)

In R. Barthes , **L'av. sém .**, 146, this aspect is called—like the classical tradition—“èthè, the temperamental characteristics, the character traits, of the one who writes or speaks (the plural of 'èthos', disposition).”

Note: The term 'ethos' is also used untranslated in modern Dutch (not to be confused with the Greek 'ethos' (note the first sound: not è, but e), which means custom or manner). The Ancients, after all, insisted that the one who writes or speaks employ his own essential nature ('personality') as a guarantee of the 'authenticity' (in common Flemish 'sincerity') of his message. If you will: the one who persuades is himself his 'argument'.

I. Kant (1724/1804; leading figure of the German Enlightenment), in a text on the thesis of J.J. Rousseau (1712/1778; RH 63), “back to nature”; describes the visual impression of a person as follows:

Fundamentally, Rousseau did not want man to return to the state of nature, but rather that he—from the level of culture at which he now stands—would look back upon it.

Rousseau's premise (RH 86: Lukasiewicz's schema) was that “man is good by nature”—where 'nature' is understood as 'inherited nature'—but in a negative way. Specifically: man is—of his own accord and intentionally— not malicious, but he does run the risk of being infected and corrupted by

malicious or clumsy leaders and exemplary figures.

Since, however, good people are once again required for this purpose, who, in turn, must themselves be educated, and there is hardly a single one among them who does not carry within himself (whether innate or acquired (RH 60v.; 90)) depravity, the problem of the education of the conscience remains unresolved. For a malicious inclination inherent to our race is indeed disapproved of by general human reason—possibly even curbed—but thereby not yet eradicated (*J. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., Kantbrevier* , Hamburg, sd, 339 (No. 788)).

RE94

Note: Kant, as a radical Enlightened Rationalist, emphasizes—what he calls—“general human reason” (which, in his own words, differs fundamentally from ‘common sense’, advocated by the Commonsense philosophers), but immediately admits that even “Enlightened Reason” cannot thoroughly deal with “the evil in the world.”

Note: We have underlined the words “not/ but; not/ but yes; -- yes/ yet not”. Why? Because we have a figure of speech here (RH 12: form), called by the Greeks “schèma kai 'arsin kai thesin” (a schema containing negation (arsis) followed by (re)affirmation (thesis) or vice versa). By speaking in this way—and who never does?—we place emphasis that gives our opinion (position) 'color': what gives our writing and speaking 'color' is called 'style'.

Appl. mod..

We present here a very simple, but all the more expressive (RH 82v.: a.technos) model.

You may know the actress Charlene Tilton, who played Lucy Ewing in the Dallas series. Listen to what she once said: “I have always admired Marilyn Monroe (*note:* the sex symbol of the first hour) immensely. I have read everything that was ever written about MM—a whole library. Or rather: devoured it. -- For a long time, I even wanted to change my name: I absolutely wanted to be called Norma Jean.”

The first time I saw a film in which MM acted, I was beside myself. I immediately felt that there was something (RH 46: suggestive 'something') that connected us.

Many people who knew MM directly maintain that I am “very much like her, -- not so much physically (I am, for that, too short in stature), but

certainly mentally. The start of our careers is identical (RH 48: identical trait): we were both very early starters; we became sensational front-page figures from the very beginning; -- we owe our right direction to 'older men'; -- we both have concerns about our body weight; -- we are both very vulnerable.

Conclusion : I cannot come to terms with the fact that she allowed herself to be manipulated until she succumbed to that manipulation. I, however, am walking around with the decision: I follow my instincts; I let no one lead me.” (Joepie , 379 (21.06.1981).

RE95

We recognize, in such 'boundless adoration', the phenomenon of the 'fan' (or also 'freak'), about which psychologists, sociologists, and cultural scholars devoted countless pages.

There are, of course, also other 'emanations' of 'rhetorically' powerful, influential figures. Consider the concept of 'charismatic authority'.

C. Rogers (1902/1986) described it as follows:

(i) this type - called 'new man' - is averse to any form of authority imposed from the outside, 'authoritarian' (RH 84: orthodoxy);

(ii) it has profound confidence in its own individual experiences, -- so much so that — precisely because of this — it draws others along; it creates 'inspirers' --- figures to whom others look up (RH 51: “One must always depend on someone”).

People like C. Rogers and also A. Maslow (the great man of Humanistic psychology) must have been such 'charismatic leaders' -- 'charisma' (= a socially intended gift of grace), which has a suggestive effect ('something', something powerful, emanates from them).

C. -- The value character of the message itself . (95/101)

We have now examined the pathos from two perspectives,

(i) the reporter,

(ii) the message receiver. Now from that which is exchanged between both terms: the message itself.

We start with an application model.

R. Barthes , *L'av. sém .* , 136, presents it himself as a model of 'epicheirema' di syllogisme (RH 86), in which the two preceding clauses are immediately followed by their verification. First, the situation in which the reasoning is

situated.

In March 1965, Chinese students demonstrated in front of the American embassy. The Russian police suppressed the demonstration, against which the Chinese government lodged a protest.

Thereupon the Russians send the following note, a perfect model of epiceirema.

1.1. There are diplomatic norms that are respected in all countries (*note*: an example of 'eikos', the obvious, the 'probable': RH 83) -- This is the thesis.

1.2. The argument: the Chinese themselves, in their own country, respect those norms.

2.1. Well, the Chinese students, outside their country, in Moscow, have not respected those norms.

The determination.

2.2. The argument: a description of the manifestation (insults, acts of common law falling under Russian criminal law).

3. So (unexpressed: 'enthymeme').

RE96

Note: In traditional rhetoric, 'argumentum', argument (proof, 'argument'), is any reasoning—valid or invalid, insofar as it conveys the message. Among such 'arguments', one most frequently encounters—what used to be called—the enthymeme. Since Quintilian (RH 16, 28), this concept denotes the syllogism insofar as it exhibits (at least partially) unexpressed formulations.

By not expressing the conclusion ("Thus...") in the Russian note, the Russian diplomat who drafted the final text of the note upheld a centuries-old tradition of rhetoric. The reason was crystal clear: the two premises (prefaces) spoke for themselves.

The axiological commonplace (96/97).

We have already provisionally defined them (RH 75). There we gave two 'values' as examples: truth and one's fellow man as a fellow man.

1. *Library st.:*

except for the axiological (= value-theory) literature to be discussed in the Ontology, reference is made to:

-- J. Beatty, *The New Rhetoric : Practical Reason and Justification* (*The Communicative Relativism of Chaim Perelman*), -- this, in one of the issues of *Journal of Value Inquiry* (Dordrecht).

In such a journal, values are examined insofar as they are addressed in ethics (moral theory), social studies, legal theory (theory and practice), aesthetics (theory of beauty and art), specialized sciences, and methodology. In the Russian memorandum, those values are called 'norms'.

2. The ancients, of course, had no theory of value as we have it now. But they knew 'value' very well, though under other names.

Thus, according to Plato, the good—understand: value without qualification ('absolute' value)—is the idea, that immaterial -higher reality par excellence, in which all other ideas (= immaterial realities, whether visible and tangible or not in the material things around us) 'participate' (participation), the reason why everything represents 'value', albeit in a very varied way.

Thus, Aristotle distinguishes 'topoi', 'places' (commonplaces), which represent 'values'.

Appl. mod..

Suppose: a politician wants to push through a measure in the agora (RH 19). Therefore, he will propose a 'good' measure. He proves this 'goodness' (= value character) for example by demonstrating that he increases happiness, which in itself also represents value, for one can define 'happiness' as “the human value par excellence”, in which all other values are partial values.

RE97

That this is the case to some extent can be seen from what is called 'eudemonology' (= theory of happiness). To name just one work that outlines the history of eudemonology: Wl. Tatarkiewicz (1866/1981), * *Analysis of Happiness* *, The Hague, 1976 (semantic, psychological, biotechnological, and ethical perspectives on eudemonology, especially since **De vita beata** by Seneca of Corduba (+1/+65; Laatsteieker)), -- a work that takes an explicitly axiological approach.

Other axiological commonplaces.

There are, of course, as many axiological commonplaces as there are types of values. -- Aristotle, along with all of Antiquity, will, for example, view the sense of moderation, justice, magnanimity, -- the public interest, honor, etc. as types of 'good' (= value magnanimity, -- -- Max Scheler (1874/1928; axiologist) has attempted to introduce an ordering of values.

In this way, he distinguishes:

(i) 'sensual' or sensational values: all that is pleasure (feeling), enjoyment

(or the opposite: pain, unpleasantness) (the (un)pleasant: “I have pain in my thigh”);

(ii) vital values attached to the entire body, such as well-being, freshness (the opposite: lethargy, fatigue), -- health (illness) (“I feel great”). -- Note: “I do have pain in my thigh, but otherwise I feel perfectly healthy”. According to M. Scheler, 'the noble' (the wicked) also belongs to this sphere of values.

(iii) The '**spiritual**' values form a higher category: the aesthetic (beauty (ugliness) and art (artlessness)); -- the juridical (right/wrong); -- knowledge (truth/false).

(iv) Highest value, according to Scheler: the sacred.

Note-- Student, should you find yourself having to make a case for some value ('good') in your final thesis, check, using this list of 'commonplaces', exactly which value(s) you advocate.

Types of valuing. (97/99).

People such as Ed. Spranger (1882/1963; *Lebensformen*, Halle, 1921) or M. Scheler view values as objects of valuation.

A work like A.O. Bettermann, **Psychologie und Psychopathologie des Wertens**, *Meisenheim am Glan*, 1949, does not analyze the content, but the act of valuing (werten) itself (the subjective side).

RE98

Steller does this to distinguish healthy from pathological valuations. -- Bettermann distinguishes four major groups of 'valuing'.

(1). The naive appreciation.

This seems “very widespread” to Bettermann. Children, in particular, value in this way without introducing distinctions, without asking questions about it; very self-assured ('centered' (around one's own person), as a Piaget would say), the naive valuation is absorbed – especially – in 'hereditary values'.

(2). The emphatic (emotionally emphatic) appreciation.

Emotionally charged appreciation—see RH 94: boundless admiration—is at work here, labeled 'irrational' by down-to-earth, pragmatic fellow human beings: it springs from the essential core ('soul') of the appreciating personality, independent of the environment. Unconsciously, the value being

appreciated is somehow 'deified', placed on a throne, and perceived as inviolable.

Bettermann says that **(i)** every true love and **(ii)** all true religiosity tend towards this type of valuation.

(3) . *The appraising (estimating) valuation.*

Here, something is valued in relation to something else. For example, social standing or a profitable position. It is not the spontaneous but the deliberate that stands out. The calculating intellect is the predominant factor here. Consider a painting for which the art lover falls into "boundless admiration," while the art dealer is already calculating how much it will fetch.

Bettermann says: this type of valuation is typical of 'conventional' bourgeois culture.

(4). *The alienation of value valuation.*

Bettermann's term is 'Wert.ent.fremdung'. The valuer is and remains aloof, distant from the value in itself (as an object), -- which was already, to some extent, active in the estimating assessment. Bettermann distinguishes a multitude of types here. For example, 'aestheticism' (appreciating something beautiful or artistic, -- not because it is beautiful or artistic in itself, but because of the thoughtful, analytical, lived experience of it). Or 'intellectualist critiqueism' (which radially undermines the basis of any surrender to any value whatsoever (cf. with RH 85: "endlessly stretched foundational research")).

What Bettermann calls a 'humorous attitude towards value' seems to us rather an 'ironic-sarcastic valuation': he describes it as, by taking distance from a value, protecting oneself against the emanation of that same value.

RE99

Note: 'Humor' is the innocent, good-natured act of making fun of something (a value). 'Irony' is the scornful 'appreciation' of that which one truly disapproves of, with detached laughter—not without bitterness (which is entirely absent in humor). 'Sardonic' laughter is the grinning, mocking degree of this. 'Sarcasm' (from the Greek 'defleshing') is biting irony, not without malice.

'Humor' has absolutely not lost its value. Irony, sarcasm—I agree that they belong to the fundamental tone of a life—are.

According to Bettermann, alienated valuation, in its fullest degree, is found only in psychosis ('mental illness'). We all know the alienating laughter of the

insane.

Note-- The temptation. (99/101).

Rhetoric would not be rhetoric if it did not—at least in a remark about seduction—speak of it.

Library st.:

-- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 78/82 (*La logique de la séduction*);

-- J. Baudrillard, *Da la séduction*, Paris, 1979.

There is a twofold side to the term 'seduction':

a. passive: "I was seduced";

b. enterprising: "He tried to seduce her".

We provide Proverbs here. (The 'parakuptousa: literally: the one who looks sideways while bending)).

The text describes, in Biblical style (RH 12: stylistic rh.), passive and active seduction. But the text contains a story (RH 31: part of a treatise) with structure. So pay attention to that narrative structure, simultaneously.

(A). Introduction.

"My son, apply my words; keep my precepts within your heart. For if you carry out my precepts, then you shall 'live' (*note*: here in the Archaic sense of "life that comes from Yahweh, God") (...).

Say to wisdom (*note*: here: **a.** insight into life and the universe, **b.** that reflects God's insight) / You are my sister! Title insight (*note*: wisdom) with the word 'relative'. This is to shield yourself against a strange woman, against an unknown lady who speaks seductive words.

(B). Middle ('corpus').

I. Voorknoop. -- One day I was sitting by the window in my home, looking through the bars. I saw the scene of youthful sages.

RE1400

I saw—among what one ought to call "still children"—a young man without 'insight'. (*Note* : here in the Biblical sense).—He creeps—through the alley—close to the corner where 'She' (*Note*: the 'parakuptousa') stands: he heads in the direction of her house—in the evening twilight, when the day is drawing to a close, in the heart of the night and the darkness.

II. *Knot.* -- Look: a woman approaches him, -- dressed up like a maiden, - her heart deceitful. How enterprising and provocative she is! Her feet, naturally, cannot stand it in her house! At one moment she is to be seen in the streets, then again in the squares; she stands guard on every conceivable corner. Look: there she already has him; she embraces him immediately. Shamelessly she addresses him: "I still had to make an offering, to fulfill my vows; with that I have come to meet you. Searching, I have found you. I have covered my couch with blankets,—with embroidered and Egyptian fabrics. Where I lie, I have sprinkled myrrh,—aloe and cinnamon oil. Come on down: let us, intoxicated with love, live until morning,—just enjoy,—in lust! A husband is not to be found in my house anyway: 'he' is away,—away for a long journey! And 'he' has, moreover, taken the bag of coins with him. So 'he' will only come home again at the full moon!"

III. *Turning point* (turning point).

By means of persuasion with power she seduces him; with the sweet magic of her lips she enthrones him. -- Indeed: without delay he follows her, like an ox marching to the slaughter, -- like a madman, shackled in leg irons, marching to his torture chamber, until an arrow pierces his liver. Or like a little bird flying into a net. Without realizing that his 'life' (*note*: again in the Biblical sense) is at stake.

(C) *Conclusion*

And now: listen to me, my son! Pay attention to the words of my mouth! - Should your heart not be led astray towards the ways of such women. Do not get lost on the paths of such a thing.

have struck such women with 'death' (*note*: in the Biblical sense of "loss of divine life"; they have literally 'beheaded' the strongest men.

Her home is the road to 'Sheol' (*note*: the Biblical word for 'underworld'), the ramp that leads to the 'realm of the dead'.

RE101

Explanation.

(i) The text is, truly, a Biblical treatise: the proposition is there ("if observance of the precepts, then 'life'") With the proof – in Biblical style – by means of the counter-model: if one, like the deceived young man, does not fulfill the precepts (of 'life'), then one ends up in the realm of the dead.

(ii) But, in order to dramatize the proposition, particularly the counter-

model (a method which Aristotle already encountered in the theories of a Zenon of Elea (RH 25) -- Achilles, who does not overtake the tortoise, as an illustration of a geometric-ontological theorem), the proposer employs a story that vividly depicts the process of deception (RH 12: shaping).

Just give it a try, student: your children only truly grasp an (abstract) proposition when it is told in a dramatized way. Or do they? But, in every treatise, opportunities for stories arise—for example, to depict an (event) (process, encounter). In that case, try to consciously examine the narrative structure—pronunciation (= introductory story)/ node/ (perhaps) node/ ... / turning point (conclusion story)—and present it clearly in your text. That increases the rational 'power' of your style.

Theoretical explanation.

It is clear that the 'seductress' plays on the sense of values—the naive, or the emotionally emphatic type thereof—of the seduced. -- Now, there is more than one theory of seduction.

(i) *J. Baudrillard* (1929/2007), *De la séduction*, says: if narcissistic type of man, then seducer. Possibly.

(ii) *L. Binswanger* (1881/1966; psychiatrist) - known as the only one with whom *S. Freud* maintained friendly relations - gives us a more accessible key: he distinguishes between “taking as” (RH 68: (reflexive) 'as'; see also RH 70) and “taking with”.

Appl. mod..

The maiden takes the young man as a weakling (seducible) and, therefore, she takes him—especially—by his weak spot. “We come across as seducible because our vulnerability is evident to our fellow man.” (Bellenger, oc, 79).

Theorem: if seduce (actively), then take along. -- Perhaps the narcissist sees our weaknesses better.

RE102

Sales science (marketing). (102/105)

It is especially in sales techniques that the great importance lies.

Library st.:

-- *L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et sophistique*);

-- P. Vervaeke, *Prof. Dr. Ernst Dichter penetrates untrodden territories of sales*, in: *De Nieuwe Gids* (Ghent), May 18, 1962. The literature is, of course, overwhelmingly diverse. Nevertheless, a brief look into salesmanship is rhetorically necessary. We are, after all, all consumers and, as such, buyers.

Marketing,

Market analysis is the methodical analysis of the sales opportunities of a product (with the premise that, especially in a free-market economy like the Western one, sales conditions remain either optimized or maintained).

Publicity ('advertising'), 'public relations' (maintaining contact), and forward-looking business management play a role in this.

Note -- School principals, for example, if they wish to proceed 'rationally', can view and 'steer' (manipulate) the recruitment and retention of students from that perspective.

The businessmen of 5th-century Greece had themselves instructed in rhetoric by Sophists. And leaders—such as politicians—in our 20th-century culture entrust themselves to 'market analysts'. Thus says Bellenger. Let us, then, briefly examine the phenomenon of the 'market'.

One sample.

P. Vervaeke, ac, says that—since figures like E. Dichter and Louis Chesking (Color Research Institute of America)—the 'pub' (publicity) has been thoroughly changed.

A -- Traditional market research .

The task was summarized in six commonplaces (RH 75: circumstances):
1. what? -- **2.a.** where? **2.b.** when? -- **3.a.** how much? **3.b.** how? -- **4.** to whom? (i.e., is sold). In light of these key points of analysis, information is gathered regarding sales opportunities. The geographical and current (respectively future) prospects of the market in question, -- its economic and social aspects, -- the psychological structures at work within it—fixed in factual material, preferably made exact by means of figures—are examined.

B.-- The more recent marketing model .

We consider a major factor of change. -- Dr. E. Dichter (1907/...) was a doctor of psychology and a Freudian.

RE103

In Paris at the Sorbonne, Dichter, who comes from Vienna, obtains a

licentiate in Philosophy and Letters. In 1938, he settles in the USA. His key idea (Fouillée): to introduce specialized psychology and sociology as auxiliary sciences (RH 32) into salesmanship.

In 1946, he already had his followers ready at the Institute for Motivational Research. In the sixties, he was a figure dominating salesmanship.

The facts and their hypothesis.

(a) *The facts.*

We cite another source, namely MA, The 'second state' of the impulsive consumer, in: *De Linie* 07.02.1964.

Some time earlier, a bookseller in the Federal Republic of Germany conducts an experiment. -- Goal: to try out a new sales stunt. -- Means: he places a 'gondola' (open hanging basket with displayed merchandise) (how?) at a central point in his shop (where?). In it, he places a few expensive scientific books (what?).

Above the whole thing, he hangs a sign with a warning: "Caution! These books are difficult to read and require additional knowledge." (How?).

Result: the package of books was sold out within a few days; a few weeks later, an important inquiry was still ongoing.

Decision.

(i) Pay attention to the circumstantial method of analysis of the experiment (RH 76: What? Where? When? Why?). It may, eventually, become a basic structure of analysis and presentation in your final thesis. Note, however: one circumstance ('parameter', factor) was not explicitly mentioned, namely 'to whom?'. But this is evident from the 'what?': they were 'scientific' books, obviously intended for intellectuals.

Conclusion: We too, the intellectually educated, are 'seduced' by convenient, 'manipulative' stimuli, to which we 'respond' (RH B7: stimulus/response schema). It is therefore not only the masses, with their common-sense insights, who are 'defenseless' against treacherous techniques of 'marketing'.

(ii) Such purchase agreements are called 'impulsive' purchase agreements. Something about which thorough research has been conducted. And these analyses show that, in a large number of sectors, the planned, well-considered, 'rational' purchase is significantly lower in percentage terms than the impulsive, 'irrational' purchase. 'Impulsive' buying takes place in a "état

second” (“a second state”).

RE104

(b).-- *The explanation* ('hypothesis').

It is so clear that the German bookseller actively influenced the value judgment in the act of deciding to buy. His 'message' (“Buy these books”; RH 38) “got in” (RH 11: to make it take hold). And apparently not so much by 'rational' and 'conscious' means. 'Something' was at work (RH 46ff.), something very suggestive even. And: “Beware. These books...” was a speech act (in significant terms; RH 47).

Let us now listen to Ernst Dichter.

The 'axiom' (the poet was trained in psychoanalysis) read: “if you assume that most sales transactions proceed irrationally, then you will conduct ‘motivational research’ in salesmanship and, immediately, achieve greater results in sales”:

Indeed:

(i) Ordinary pollsters target conscious behavior, -perhaps indirectly the unconscious factors that partly (but not solely) control this behavior.

(ii) The 'motive research' type Dichter proceeds psychologically, sociologically, and even psychiatrically (RH 44: Moreno; RH 50: ABC theory; RH 99: psychosis). - Dichter distinguishes three levels in our mind:

a. *the level in question* , within which people, at least in part, reason logically;

b. *the subconscious level* ; in which Dichter et al. situate fear, envy, sense of shame, -- prejudices of all kinds.

App1. model

Chrysler, the car manufacturer, once asked Dichter his opinion regarding a sales campaign for the Plymouth model.

(i) Chrysler's market researchers had asked the following survey: "Why/how do seventy percent of car buyers purchase a model of the same brand when they switch cars?" The answers: "Because we are satisfied."

(ii). The poet responded to this with: “We must penetrate the (sub)conscious of those buyers, in which fear of the unknown determines that they do not change brands.” The need for certainty is inherent to all

individuals. We must, therefore, indeed show the new brand that is being offered for sale on the market, but point out its traditional essence. Hence, a motto to go with it: “Five minutes suffice to familiarize you with this new Plymouth”.

c. The third level .

The poet probes even deeper: there is an even deeper emptiness in each of us.

RE105

He calls this layer 'the unconscious'. -- According to Dichter, psychic processes—including sales processes—find their principal 'moving energies' in that unconscious. At this depth, even the awareness of what we are doing is absent. It is there that the truly conditioned reflexes are situated (think of the Psychoreflexology of Pavlov and von Bechterev, of the Behaviorism of Thorndike and Watson, which explain all forms of behavior based on reflexes, unconscious reactions to stimuli).

In his *Strategy of Desire* , Dichter therefore views our culture as a 'psycho-economic civilization'.

Note: Like all innovators, Dichter has had ardent admirers (RH 98: emotionally emphatic type) and fierce detractors (RH: estimating type). Among the latter is Vance Packard (in his * *The Status Seekers* *, but previously in his **The Hidden Seducers* *): people like Dichter transform the commercial enterprise into a system of conditioned reflexes—without integrating ethical values. Specifically: is such a 'demonic sales technique' still justifiable in conscience?

Journal of Business Ethics.

In that context, we understand a periodical (Dordrecht) as the aforementioned Journal. -- A multidisciplinary approach with the theme 'doing business' ('business') and the problem of a “conscientious manner of doing business”. By 'business', the review understands “all systems within which the exchange of goods and services takes place”. By 'ethics' (moral theory), it understands “all human action aimed at safeguarding a 'good' life”.

Black market .

R. Sedillot, Histoire des marchés noirs , Paris, 1984, offers us the opportunity to see a market mechanism sui generis.

The book has the following thesis: “if

(i) excessive government regulation and/or
(ii) too high a degree of scarcity (goods, services, -- e.g. food shortage, foreign exchange shortage), than 'black market'.

'Black market' is defined as: "market operations insofar as these

(i) outside the recognized channels and

(ii) take place on the edge of lawfulness".

Counter-model: "Abolish rules and laws and ensure there is no excessive scarcity, and suddenly there is no longer a black market:

The Prohibition period in the USA (1919/1933) gave rise to the term 'black market' in common usage.

RE106

7. The theory of description. (106/121)

RH 58 we saw what the representation of existence (actual existence) and the essence (way of being), the commonplaces par excellence, is.

RH 60/65 showed us what a treatise becomes when, on the basis of observation points, one does not (sufficiently) represent "the facts" (= data, existence + essence). Mead's treatise was, therefore, falsified years later by a Freeman (RH 64ff.), who was caught out on errors of observation and interpretation—or rather: gaps.

Finally, RH 76 showed us how the circumstances (i.e., the 'situation') further refine the representation of existence and essence (RH 102ff. gave us a small marketing example of this).

Last but not least: the value judgment, which normally permeates or even explicitly expresses in the text itself any treatise worthy of the name, can only be valid when, first and foremost, a representation of the data (once again: existence + essence + (preferably) circumstances) is available (RH 76). -- In this context, the chapter on description becomes understandable.

Library st.:

-- *Poétique* 65 (Feb. 1986): Raconter/ représenter/ décrire ;

-- C. Ginzburg, *Ekphrasis and Quotation* , in: *Tijdschr.v.Filosofie* 50 (1988): 1 (March), 3/19;

-- E. Zola, *De la description* , in: *Le roman expérimental* (1880), in: *Œuvres complètes*, x, Cercle du livre précieux, 1968; -- Ph. Hamon, *Qu'est-ce qu'une description?* in: *Poétique* 12;

-- J. Ricardou, *L'ordre des choses ou une expérience de la description*

méthodique , in *Pratiques* (Metz), numéro spécial, 75/84;

More traditional works:

-- C. Lefèvre, *La composition littéraire* , Bruxelles, 1963-3, 300/322 (*La description*);

-- J. Gob, *Précis de littérature française* , Bruxelles, 1947, 151/154 (*La description*).

-- Also: Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Temps et description dans le récit d'aujourd'hui* , in: *Pour un nouveau roman* , in: *Idées* (Paris) 45.

The origin.

According to R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.* , 148s., the origin of the 'ekphrasis' (RH 29) is what is called "a digressio (in Greek: par.ek.basis)—also: 'excursus', elaboration.

In poetic, rhetorical (*sensu strictiori*), and scientific-philosophical works, one deviated from the 'actual' theme or "elaborated" on a 'secondary theme' (an 'exemplification' or 'example', a refutation of an objection, even a kind of self-contained treatise).

RE107

The definition.

It would be best to start from the definition (RH 79v.). For—viewed at its essence—a definition (determination of essence) is one type of description, namely the shortest possible description of that which is concerned—albeit viewed according to its 'distinguishability' (discriminatoriness or 'essence form' ('forma')).

Whoever 'describes' in the current sense of the word does nothing other than provide an extensive definition. -- From this standpoint, 'definitions' of description become understandable and—what is significant—improvable. For example, "Description is the verbatim, (...), detailed representation of a sensually perceptible fact." (C. Lefèvre, *oc*, 300). Drop 'detailed', 'sensually', and even 'perceptible', and the definition is general, i.e., a true definition. What the author provides is precisely one type of description. After all, one can also describe an imagined, non-'perceptible' fact. Why? One can describe anything, i.e., represent it.

Note: One can, however, note three divisions of the descriptive act:

- (i) the one who represents (the subject),
- (ii) that which is represented (in the description) and
- (iii) the representation or description itself.

Unambiguity.

Hermeneutically (RH 49), we must strongly emphasize one main characteristic, namely object-boundness. Representing what is factual, and what this actually is, with or without the circumstances, as a descriptive work, is responding to a single given in a single, unambiguous manner.

Note: This does not exclude the possibility that there may be different descriptive perspectives, for example. Thus, the Husserlian phenomenologist will describe the given subject as an individual and introspectively attuned to what he wishes to represent. Similarly, the true Marxist wishes to describe—as objectively as possible—from the standpoint of class struggle. But the Positivist wishes to describe in the same way—“as objectively and factually as possible”—yet verifiable by other academics.

The result will vary, of course. But this does not prevent the essential and minimal objectivity (= unambiguousness) of every type of description.

RE108

Note: The unambiguousness referred to can also be understood in another, object-related way: C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d'élucution*, Dour, 1910, 61, sees two variants:

(a) The totality (Gestalt psychologically speaking) is represented as a totality” by making the choice of details (*note*: circumstances) subordinate to the overall impression”. That 'totality', after all, gives the description its unity (cohesion);

(b) The variation in detail lends that unity richness thanks to diversity; above all: the partial impressions—as Ansotte says—preferably original and new, “powerfully paint the given, bring out its characteristic features, -- in a word: make it 'see'”. -- In Ancient Greek terms: the details represent the multiplicity. -- So that both unity (cohesion) and multiplicity (variety) go hand in hand.

Note -- GJ Warnock, *Qualities*, in: *Enc. Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, 18, 914/916, states that the term 'poiotès' was coined by Plato and Latinized by Cicero (RH 16, 28) as 'qualitas' (quality). Cf. *Theaetetus* 182a .

1. 'Property' means anything that makes something distinguishable from the rest (feature, characteristic, 'uniqueness'). Understood in this sense, the

term refers to anything that can be attributed to something in a description.

Conclusion: in that Platonizing sense, one can say that 'to describe' is: to capture the 'properties' of something in words.

Note: In contrast to logistic usage, which contrasts 'property' with 'relationship', Platonic usage holds that something, as a characteristic ('property'), has a relationship with something else. "The earth is larger than the moon" represents a 'property' of the earth (and, mutually, also of the moon, which is then called 'smaller than'). "Liesje is the daughter of Hendrik" represents a 'property'—a 'relational property'—of Liesje (and, mutually, of Hendrik, who is "the father of" Liesje).

2. The Platonic term 'property' also means – according to Warnock – value-property. Two types of clothing, for example, have different properties (in the sense indicated above). But even if they do not differ (the same fabric, for example), they can exhibit a difference in value.

Conclusion: 'property' (Platonic) is very broad.

RE108.1.

Appl. model

Imagine this: your professor asks you to write a thesis titled "Characteristics of Rousseau". 'Characteristics' is, here, the name of one type of description.

Library st.: O. Willmann, *Abriss d. Phil.*, 34, 153f..

(1).-- 'Characterizing' something (thing, person), says Willmann, entails that one

(i) to represent ('describe') the essential (the essential by which it is distinguishable from the rest),

(ii) omitting the unreal. -- In our current usage, one can also use the term 'characterize' for this.

(2).-- The structure. Willmann takes "The characteristics of a personality" as an example. This includes:

a.1 . The viewpoint description ('prosopo.pee', RH 29) answers the question: "What does someone look like?". In actualized form, this is the viewpoint of the behavior description ('Behaviorism').

a.2 . The social positioning, which gives someone a 'place' in society (= situate), – which entails indicating something like 'status' (social standing),

profession, etc. 'Outlook' here is meant sociologically – not physically. – In Dilthean terms, this would be 'scientific' description ('Scientistiek'; RH 91), which clings to what everyone can perceive through the senses. -- The outlook: as an individual in a social whole.

B. *The description of inwardness* ('etho.pee', RH 29)

answers the question: “What kind of 'person' (soul, spirit, character, and temperament) is someone?”. This noological viewpoint (for, in Willmann's eyes, 'person' is synonymous with intellect/reason, disposition, and will (RH 54), the 'spirit'; -- which is discussed in noology, the analysis of the spirit) is actualized in the Diltheyan *verstehende* method (RH 49,91), which, through the perspective, attempts to penetrate to the 'soul' (personality).

Note: Willmann, *ibid.*, notes that, in the characterization, more than one viewpoint is possible.

(1).-- *The idealization.*

Aristotle, *Poetics* 15, states that, for example, 'good' (meaning: seeking the ideal in harsh reality) painters render the characteristic features of something, but, despite all fidelity to the object, “they portray it more beautifully.” According to Aristotle, a writer who depicts flaws of temperament and character ought nevertheless to render his figures in an ennobled manner.

RE109

(2).-- *Naturalism.*

If idealization represents ('describes') 'reality' purified ('cleansed') and elevated to a higher plane (which the Ancient Greeks denote with the term 'catharsis'), naturalism aims to represent ('describe') the same 'reality', uncleaned, not elevated to a higher plane—'degraded' if necessary. The naturalistic approach perceives 'idealization' as an “escape from harsh reality”—which contains truth, but degenerates, certainly today, into 'miserabilism' (what the Germans call 'Elendmalerei', painting of misery).

What P. Ricoeur (RH 49) once labeled “the three critical materialists”—K. Marx (economic-social misery), Fr. Nietzsche (cultural misery), S. Freud (depth psychological misery)—can serve as an example of that 'degrading' description.

If one were to read only those three writers, one would not escape a one-sided view of human nature. One could categorize those three authors as—what Bettermann called 'intellectualist criticism' (RH 98) or even as 'ironic-

sarcastic valuation' (RH 98).

Note: Nikolai Gogoli (1809/1852; Russian novelist) displays a rare mixture of both idealization and degrading portrayal, which Leo Kobbilinsky-Ellis once called Gogoli's "weeping laughter": as a Christian Platonist, Gogoli lived by the high, idealizing ideas of God, but as a 'realistic writer' he was confronted so rawly with the degraded Russian society of his day that he—thinking of the ideal, wept (the shortcomings of God's plans for humanity)... while, looking at the caricatures of those ideas of God, he had to laugh bitterly.

Applicable model (109/112)

The union of description of appearance and interior is traditionally called, in addition to 'characteristic', also 'portrait'.

We will now give a small example of this. But in such a way that you simultaneously become acquainted with a type of description called 'tableau' (painting).

Within the general type of 'tableau', one usually situates the painting hypotypose. The Greek 'hupotuposis' means

(i) sketch, but also

(ii) realistic sketch.

The characteristic ('property' in Platonic terms) par excellence of the hypotypose is – what the Latins call – 'evidentia', placing oneself before one's eyes, – "situating you in the midst of it".

RE110

1. A 'painting hypotypose' well known among today's youth is the famous "I have a dream" by Martin Luther King (1929/1968).

More banal, yet still 'hypotypotous', the common man says: "I can already see myself experiencing that!" Or the student: "I can already see myself succeeding!"

Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1636/1711) describes, hypotypotically, the atmosphere of the time of the 'Lazy Kings': "Four oxen, slow and steady, // Walked in Paris, the indolent monarch". The time of the 'lazy' kings shared so much in the laziness of the high lords that the oxen, slow by nature, were the symbol of the times.

2. *Marcia, the girl of the night* (110/111).

She has something of a cat about her. Dark and full of mysteries... Like many cats, Marcia only becomes active at night. The hours after darkness falls

are the element in which she truly feels at home.

“Even as a teenager—it still comes to her mind, now that she is 21—I was someone who truly went into hiding in the night.” -- It is, then, not since she has been living as a barmaid in a bar, in an 'Exclusive Club' in London, that the night has been her element. -- “This, -- to the great sorrow of my mother especially, who was consumed by worry, until, when midnight had passed, I floated to the surface again. Which, every time, made me promise to mend my ways.”

Yet the sea of light that is the big city drew me in time and again—'magnetically,' says Marcia (RH 46: suggestion; 'psychodynamic effect')—and held me in its grip. Where the neon signs of entertainment establishments, of clubs and bars and discotheques turned night into day, there, for me, was 'true life'. I simply could no longer sit quietly at home once it dawned on me that 'out there' people were laughing, drinking, living, and engaging in eroticism.

Between sunrise and sunset, labor, frantic pursuit, stress, the pursuit of career and success, livelihood, and money determine the course of time.

But then suddenly the offices and businesses close. And the doors of the venues and entertainment venues open.

RE111

But perhaps the main reason for my hiding at night lies in the fact that I was raised in a poor, pitifully ugly part of London, where—to be honest—life during the day was not a pretty sight.

On top of that, my parents separated after an argument and there was no question of—what is called—'harmonious family life' (Frech (Frankf.ac), 7,51).

—

Note-- As can be seen: RH 72v. (fiction analysis) provides an initial insight.

a. Main impression: 'misery' amidst 'glamour' (= enchanting sex appeal);
b. structure: the comparison with cat life dominates the representation;
c. Instead of describing distantly what the Latins called 'evidentia', the author of this piece of literature throws us into the midst of what he wishes to depict.

Student, if you can, try either to draft something like that yourself or to find such a piece of description, -- for example, to prove the thesis you advocate.

Note: the 'view description' element regarding the barmaid's own person is

missing. "Why?"

(i) The nature of the sheet Frech already says of itself (RH 82: argument) what the piece may contain.

(ii) By situating her in a 'nightclub', her appearance (personal view, -- 'look' is what we say now) speaks for itself. There is therefore no need to describe it unnecessarily.

Appl. model. -- (111-112)



First, take a good look at the photo next to this text before you read the rest. Then compare your impression with what the portrait painting offers.

B. Heimo, Lolita (Une femme peut en cacher une autre), in: Genève Home Informations , No. 566 (12.09.1985) 97r "For Lolita Moreno, since her election as Miss Switzerland, time has passed very quickly.

RE112

In the meantime, she has proven that a Miss can not only have beautiful legs, but also a head full of plans (...).

Egyptology (*note:* study of Egyptian culture) – immediately all her university studies are forgotten. A career as a fashion model could not satisfy her.

In contrast, our former 'most beautiful woman in Switzerland' possesses ambitions: she is launching herself into the business world – in a clothing firm, a promotional agency (showbiz, sports); she is currently 'the image' ('l'image de marque', figurehead) – and quite prominently so – of Telecinema (

note: a TV chain). (...)

Amidst jeans and T-shirts, Lolita Moreno is just as spontaneous and down-to-earth as ever. She does not, however, shed the title of beauty queen that established her fame. At the same time, she realizes that the label 'Miss Switzerland' will remain attached to her for a very long time. "People walk around with a cliché in their heads: to them I am 'Miss Switzerland'—so I cannot possibly be doing anything serious." (...).

Lolita Moreno has quite a few activities and is approached from the most diverse sides. Yet she radiates a smile and good humor. "Sometimes I do struggle with it. I need a lot of sleep. But complaining—one shouldn't do that too much. My conviction now is that we possess hidden energies somewhere: I would never have thought, in the past, that I would be able to keep it all up." (...).

Note: The look, or rather the visual impression 'imago', that a person has in the (superficial) eyes of fellow human beings can insinuate the opposite of what the 'verstehende' (comprehensive) method (RH 49, 109), which looks through appearance, discovers. This—through personal contact, through 'participating observation', by seeing people at work in the midst of their activities. Student, something like this can be decisive for your final thesis, in its 'persuasive value'.

Note: What Willmann calls 'characteristic' and others, most, 'portrait', can already be found—determined by the historical context—in German-Rosophistics (RH 28ff.), namely in the eulogy ('enkomion').

Apart from the very explicit value judgment (praise), that text type is characterized by two parts:

- a. view and
- b. description of interiority

RE113

The parallel: (113/115)

We already encountered this text type – very briefly, RH 29.

The 'sunkrisis', comparatio, comparison, contains at least two facts that are confronted with each other in such a way that both similarity and difference (which is 'analogy') – both with equal justification – are revealed.

The parallel, sensu stricto, is the description of more than one subject, -- in order to draw them against one another.

Appl. model

We take as the basis of our paradigm *Et. Barilier, Les petits camarades*, Paris, 1987.

The portrait of Raymond Aron (1905/1983), a liberal thinker, and the portrait of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980), a left-wing thinker, are unveiled in the first part of the said book. Although Barilier is pro-Aron, his attention is subsequently drawn emphatically to Sartre.

To better understand both 'figures', one must have sufficient 'background information'.

Incidentally: remember well the “figure/background” system. Specifically: here the 'figures' are Aron and especially Sartre, but the 'background' of both is largely identical.

1. Both were born in the same year. They met at the École normale supérieure (1924/1928). And—both very freedom-minded—became friends.

2. During the First World War (1940/1945), Aron left for England and, along with many Frenchmen, placed himself under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle (1850/1970). In London, Aron became editor-in-chief of *La France Libre*. Intellectually very honest as Aron was, he eventually found himself obliged to critically distance himself from his leader: he accused him of claiming to represent only 'the legitimate France'.

3. In 1946, a definitive break arose between Aron and Sartre. This was due to very divergent views regarding the 'Left'.

(i) To a certain extent Aron was 'Left'. But he could not tolerate that what presented itself as 'Left' descended into hollow rhetoric.

(ii)a. Aron's criticism was not directed so much at the real Communists. Moreover, they systematically avoided any discussion with - what they contemptuously called - 'bourgeois thinkers'.

(ii)b. In France in particular, there were very many intellectuals – what were then called – 'Progressors'. These mercilessly denounced every flaw in the Western Liberal democracies, – in the name of slogans such as 'Left' ('la Gauche'), 'Revolution', 'Proletariat'.

RE114

This, -- while she

a. engaged in 'crude politics' and **b.** with sophisticated 'arguments' either attempted to cover up or rationalize the gravest crimes of established

Communism.

4. Aron saw, for example, how his 'friend' Sartre and the Left Existentialist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908/1961) evolved into pro-communist intellectuals. -- In 1955, Aron's * *L'opium des intellectuels* * was published , in which he denounces the hollow rhetoric of the 'Progressists', -- with rock-solid arguments.

Ch. Widmer, Projecteur sur le cas de Jean-Paul Sartre , in: Journal de Genève , 18.04.1987, outlines the further evolution of the mentality in France as follows.

A. “From 1968 (*note*: the year of the New Left May revolt) and into 1980, Sartre and Aron are identified with the following visual impressions (RH 112). Aron becomes rigid as 'reactionary', a spoilsport, someone who is old before he begins to live.

Sartre freezes into a 'libertarian' enthusiast, someone who remains young in later life.

Fortunately, people are now recovering from this simplistic dichotomy. Moreover, the tide is turning. 'They' now admit that Aron is “a meritorious man”—we would say: they are now exaggerating in the opposite sense. Sartre, meanwhile, is subjected to often devastating criticism, regarding both his literary work and his style of thought.

B. Widmer then summarizes. Relying on the data provided by Bernier, he states, in summary, the following.

(i) Aron masterfully represents the characteristics of the professional intellectual: a sense of proportion, a rational method (though Aron is aware of its limitations), the concern to make his own propositions verifiable through research, never forgetting that the data, especially the political data, are very complex, and refusing to sacrifice objective truth to so-called “urgent emergencies.”

Note-- Student, these characteristics are all the characteristics par excellence exhibited by a sound treatise.

(ii) Sartre, on the other hand, wanted, above all, to get noticed, in order to engage in 'philosophical' books and articles. By writing plays and novels. And indeed: Sartre is and remains even now -- a sometimes brilliant psychologist, a masterful writer of novels, “novels à thèse” (novels incorporating a Thesis

that is 'defended'), Leftist plays that depict realities “pris au vif” (caught in the act).

RE115

For two decades, Sartre has dominated the political arena: he is widely read, commented upon, and translated. “Some still haven’t gotten over Sartre,” says Widmer.

But: the propositions Sartre advocates he “proclaimed for publicity rather than verified”. Thus Widmer literally. “Sartre immediately arrogated to himself the 'right' to disregard the actual data as well as those sciences that describe that reality in a strictly methodical way”.

Barilier's treatise,

The problem (RH 66). -- As we saw, the problem breaks down into two aspects

A.-- The given .

Two people of the same age, fellow students, freedom-loving and fighting for the safeguarding of man—as a freely acting 'subject' (the name, especially in France, to refer to the autonomous aspect in us all)—yet each of them took an opposite path (which we have briefly explained above as background information).

B.-- The requested .

The explanation of the given fact. Especially regarding Sartre, Barilier, who is pro-Aron, is intriguing.

Note: This is not the place to discuss the rest of the work. Nevertheless, the following. Regarding Sartre, Barilier sees two hypotheses.

a. The psychological hypothesis.

If one places Sartre's childhood years (especially) at the forefront, then one understands his libertarian urge for freedom.

b. The creativity hypothesis.

If one prioritizes that Sartre is an artist (literary figure) rather than a 'thinker', then one understands his success.

But – as Barilier writes – this implies that one should never take Sartre's texts too literally. The reason is: for him, it was not about being radically objective; he wanted to be a writer who enriches the world with his work and,

immediately, stands fully in the present.

Note: What *J. Parain-Vial*, **Tendances nouvelles de la philosophie **, **Le Centurion**, 1978, 61st pp., confirms, the author classifies Sartre among the 'Sophists' without batting an eyelid (RH 25 (Gorgias); 26 (Protagoras)).

RE116

The 'topography' (landscape description) (**116/119**).

Do not think, for a moment, that traditional rhetoric did not extend beyond man as well. Not that it developed the sense of the (natural) landscape that Romanticism, for example, discovered. Far from it. And yet. Classical rhetoric had a term: 'topography' ('topos' as 'place', in the sense of "space in which a theme is situated").

Appl. model

(I). We begin with what *Pierre Fontanier* (*Les figures du discours* , Paris, 1977) calls a 'chronography': this is not a 'story', but the description of a short/long period of time. One describes an event (in that sense chronography has something of a story), but one focuses on the 'accumulation of the circumstances (RH 76, 83, 90, 106), whose confluence helps determine the event.

Aurora Bertrana, *Fenua Tahiti* (*Vision de Polynésie*), Neuchatel/Paris, 1943, 106s. (Huhaine, one of the islands), gives us a 'chronography'.

"(...) We penetrate deep into the jungle (...). Between the tall branches, something of the pristine blue color of the sky shines through. The forest is bathed in the rays of a fiery sun. Air is scarce here. The heat is truly stifling.

In the absolute silence of this nature, all things come through more strongly and have a profound effect on the mind. Such as the smallest sounds, the buzzing of thousands of insects, the chirping of a bird, the creaking of a branch. – An inextricable tangle of branches and tree trunks envelops us: we are, literally, the 'prisoners' of this pristine, wild nature.

At a certain moment, the heat truly becomes too much: we halt. Our breathing, after all, is rapid, our heartbeat pounding. Instantly, mosquitoes ambush us, latching onto our arms and legs and my bare neck. A moment later, our skin, already scorched by the sea air, is covered with hundreds of black spots. So, we fight, swinging arms and legs back and forth, making leaps, maneuvering skillfully in all directions at once.

Result: small insect corpses scattered over our skin and our blood, which had become theirs, splattered all over our skin. -- I, stunned, exhausted, thinking: "What senseless scum! They have never seen humans. Why/how then do they throw themselves upon us in exactly the same way as our 'civilized' fellow human beings?"

RE117

(II) Traditional 'rhetoric' had the commonplace 'locus amoenus', pleasure residence.

If we extend this fantasy to the present day, we encounter, for example, *Christine Brooke-Rose, A Rhetoric of the Unreal (Studies in Narrative and Structure, Especially of the Fantastic)*, Cambridge, 1983.

In the spirit of the Russian Formalists and of the Structuralism that evolved from them (RH 35), the author analyzes the distinction 'real/unreal' as it occurs in narrative prose (*Tolkien, Lord of the Rings ; Vonnegut/McElroy, 'Science fiction' stories*; the French Nouveau Roman (e.g. *Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute*); the more recent 'Metafiction').

She puts forward the classification of Tzvetan Todorov (RH 69), who distinguishes 'the uncanny' and 'the marvellous' within the fantastic. But beware: Science Fiction, for example, encompasses the fantastic strongly mixed with a kind of 'realism'.

It is in this atmosphere that we situate, for example, the work of *Ernst Jünger* (1895/1998), known for his **Der Arbeiter ** (1931) and the Magical Realism featured in it.

Inevitably, you, a student, come into contact with this issue. The children you interact with daily still live to a significant extent in a fantasy world. Which... is absolutely not an unreal world. On the contrary: when a child, certainly before the age of twelve, lacks such a fantasy world, something is going wrong. Just verify that. But without prejudice (RH 59: actual existence as 'lemma'). Thus it happens that a child 'sees' 'head-footed figures' (in his imagination), or, like a *Frederik Van Eeden* (RH 41; *De kleine Johannes*), 'sees' 'nature spirits', -- and emphatically maintains that this 'seeing' is no mistake.

The Romantic idyll.

We have already seen it, RH 63, Western man—at least in part—carries 'Romanticism' within himself. Hence the following little example—which might

come in handy for your final thesis, student.

Stevens W. Mosher, Journey to the Forbidden China, New York/London, 1985, 42ff. (in South China, in Kwangsi Province, west of Guangzhou).

1. The settlements were, here, more spread out in this deeply incised landscape, and the roads rarely brought us into their vicinity. But, at a place where the road makes a sudden bend, I sensed a village—far below us, nestled in the curve of a rushing stream. A small corner of the world, tucked away far from the rest.

RE118

(...). Enclosed as it was, the village seemed like something that existed entirely in itself—a magical, enchanted world of some twenty sturdily built dwellings constructed from sun-dried bricks ('adobe'). We were only twenty miles from Wu-chow, but we felt as if we were far removed in time and space.

Only the wires of the electricity grid, stretched along the river, bore witness to the century in which we live. The rest seemed like a window onto a distant past. -- The whole scene was a feast of colors. In the pale blue of the sky, a brilliant white cumulus cloud nestled, slowly drifting past.

In soft, blue-green throngs, the mountains drifted away, the group of posters past the river, which wound sea-green around the garden slopes. Purple-stemmed sugarcane fields, together with radiant-green grain stalks, formed a checkerboard, in whose center a gigantic square of red and ochre-yellow—the village—could be seen. People with nut-brown faces and dressed in black moved within it—slowly and with the appearance of ceramic peasant figures.

The entire landscape was a splendor, conveying a sense of profound peace. This was the ideal place to experience the parable of human existence while still alive—birth, engagement, childbirth, raising children, old age, death—into the sheltered atmosphere of a small village. Naturally, one fell under the spell of this blue-green solitude in eastern Kwangsi (...).

2. What appeared as a masterpiece of form, composition, and color—from the vantage point from which I stood admiring it—would undoubtedly take on a very different appearance once I entered the village. This matter-of-fact consideration brought me back to the world of sober reality, within which this village would amount to “a village like any other.”

And yet: for a certain period of time I had experienced the village as if immersed in completely clear tranquility, a quality which—although I realized it was an illusion—continued to fascinate me.

A 'performance'—the Romantic concept of 'idyll'—had distracted me. Escaping, while dreaming, into a life of rural simplicity within a closed community is an important part of the fantasy life of contemporary Western humanity.

RE119

J.-J. Rousseau (RH 63), who lived in a Europe of peasants, ennobled the 'savages' while musing on the Hobbesian-harsh reality of tribal life. (*Note: Thomas Hobbes* (1588/1679; Enlightened rational thinker, known for his *Leviathan* (1651 (a picture of a kind of police state))).

Western man, living in the oppressive furnace of the age of electronics, views rural life 'Romantically', at least from a distance, while forgetting or suppressing the fact that the so-called 'man of nature' is often trapped in poverty, driven by labor, and undermined by illness (...).

The appearance of this village's isolation was a deception—a ruse of its location. Units of the Red Army had traversed the region during the final days of the civil war. (...) Young officers had arrived in the early fifties to arrest the rich and collectivize the poor. Red Guards had reached here in the late sixties (*note: the 'Cultural Revolution'*) to destroy the statues of the deities and the memorial plaques of the ancestors.

This hamlet was a 'production system', part of a 'production brigade', which, in turn, was part of a 'commune', -- for here too the 'production' of maize and sugarcane follows 'the central plan'. However pristine and isolated this settlement seemed, it was, unmistakably, the furthest reach of the leash of power, in the hands of Peking”.

A little extra.

-- *Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization* , New York, 1934;

-- *Jeremy Rifkin/ Ted Howard, Entropy (A New World View)* , New York, 1980, discuss the medieval lifeworld.

(1) The natural landscape was (predominant feature; RH 108: totality) “forests in which people lived”.

(2) The cultural landscape was accordingly: before coal and the steam engine, 'wood' was the energy type par excellence. It was the raw material, fuel and core of finished products (used objects, hand tools, appliances (ships, oil and wine presses, printing presses)). Popularly: "It was all about forest and wood".

RE120

Typology.

We can now summarize.

Library st.:

-- B. Vouilloux, *Le tableau : description et peinture* , in: *Poétique* 65 (*Raconter, représenter, décrire*), 1986 Feb., 1/18.

-- In that article, Vouilloux refers to *Gérard Genette, Introduction* , in: *P. Fontanier, Les figures du discours* , Paris, 1977, 16. There, Genette rightly asserts that traditional rhetoric recognizes six main types of description:

1. Topography (landscape description);
- 2.a. Prosopography (view description),
- 2.b. Ethipoeia (description of innerness);
3. Portrait (in Willmann's terms: characteristic);
4. Parallel;
5. Tableau (painting).

To which Fontanier adds another seven: type, the chronography.

Above, we have provided both characteristics and application models for all seven.

Note: When you read, therefore, or compose text yourself, attempt, when you determine the type of description, to form a clear image of the correct type.

Description is not an 'explanation'.

This is where the 'reductions' (understand: 'Ausklammerungen' (eliminations)) of Edm. Husserl (1859/1938; founder of intentional Phenomenology) come into play. 'Describing', in the Husserlian spirit, is grasping the theme 'purely'—by eliminating everything that is not immediately given. It is pure perception—sensory or spiritual—and nothing more than that.

The shutdowns are mainly:

1. the actual existence outside the act of perception itself (e.g. "In the distance I think I see a person coming"; for the time being I continue with that uncertainty; RH 59: lemmatic method (i.e. focusing on the 'essence' (called 'eidos' by Husserl, i.e. the preferably general mode of being of the given));

2.1. the observing self and its acts of non-observation (e.g. “I think I see my personal enemy approaching in the distance”; the value judgment concerning him is 'clashed in')

2.2. the traditions concerning the object (“What others, before me or simultaneously with me, think about that person” is eliminated);

2.3 . The theory regarding the theme (“Every enmity projects untrue things onto what is hostile or occurs”: that thought is not applicable when one merely describes). - Student, please take this Phenomenological advice into due consideration when you merely 'describe', accurately representing your direct observations.

RE121

The description of the value judgment.

Library st.: J. Ruytinx, *La morale et les sciences* , in: *Philosophica Gandensia* (Meppel), New Series, 10 (1972) 1/12.

David Hume (1711/1776; the pinnacle of the English Enlightenment) is known for his thesis that one cannot derive ethics (the value judgments of conscience) from facts. Philosophy of language analysis has taken up that Humian theme.

Normative, behavior-prescribing clauses never arise from prepositions in the demonstrative manner (indicative premises). More strongly, and stated literatologically: one cannot derive non-descriptive clauses from purely descriptive prepositions. For example, prescription-containing ('normative'), value-evaluating ('evaluative'), and commanding sentences.

Here we refer to M. Scheler (RH 97) and AO Bettermann (RH 97). Scheler, in particular, stated: “Es gibt ein ursprüngliches intentionales Fühlen” (There exists an original (i.e., reducible to nothing else) 'intentional' (i.e., attuned to an object) feeling).

Appl. model

For example, “I have a feeling of remorse, -- on account of a transgression.” This feeling can arise and drift away. Therein lies a sense of value. I sense the value of not doing harm. Of 'acting well'. The fact that I have partially deceived a fellow human being in the course of my merchandise now strikes me as 'reprehensible'. The deception is a fact. The reprehensibility, from an ethical point of view (i.e., if I let my conscience speak), is not — nothing, but 'something', a factual given, a reality with its own essential nature. The perception of this is a sense of value.

Decision:

The disapproving sentence "I perceive my act of fraud as reprehensible" is a statement of a fact and the factual (non)value of that fact (which are distinguishable, but not separable).

Admittedly, various objective and subjective factors play a role in acts of value perception. I can follow up the stimulus—which is the perceived (un)value—with a reaction in more than one way (RH 89): I can deny the remorse (repress, suppress); I can become furious with myself; I can become depressed by it; I can also accept the (un)value. But for that group of possible reactions, the contact with value is situated—the contact with a fact. This fact encompasses the actual (un)value. I can describe this in descriptive sentences.

RE122

8. Story theory (narrative, narratology). (122/140)

Library st.:

- Rimmon-Kenan (*Sholomith*), *Narrative Fiction*, London/New York, 1933;
- Cl. Bremond, *Le message narratif*, in: *Communications 4 (Recherches sémiologiques)*, Paris, 1964, 4/32;
- R. Fayolle, *La critique*, Paris, 1978, 213/216 (*L'analyse du récit*);
- Mieke Bal, *Narratology*, Paris, 1977;
- P. Ricoeur, *La narrativité*, Paris, 1980;
- G. Genette, *Nouveau discours du récit*, Paris, 1983;
- J.-. M. Adam, *Le récit*, Paris, 1984;
- id., *Le texte narratif*, Paris, 1984.

' **Narratives** or **narratology** (from the Latin 'narrare', to tell stories) is a new name for an old subject. Plato and Aristotle already had texts on the subject.

Incidentally: following the Greek 'diègèsis', story, the study of narrative is also called 'diegetics'.

1. Narrative texts ('poetry'), according to Plato, encompass both purely verbatim-textual storytelling and drama, which, of course, also includes texts, but the latter situates an 'actio' (RH 13v.: dramaturgy), an acting.

Incidentally: P. Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, I, Paris, 1983, follows Platon in this: drama and diegetics form a single type.

2. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1450a 2/3, calls the core of drama (theatre) 'muthos', story (here not in the religious studies sense of 'myth').

Incidentally: In **Nouveau discours du récit**, Gérard Genette adheres to Aristotelian terminology: a story is indeed, if you will, that which is acted out in a play, but it is not a drama. He opposes the broadened meaning.

Conclusion: a matter of agreement. As we saw, Deuterosophism (RH 29) also had its narrative science.

Current narratology gained significant momentum, among other things, following Vladimir Propp, **Morfologija Skazki** (**Morphology of the Fairy Tale**), Leningrad, 1928 (in the style of the Russian Formalists; RH 35)

Note -- A kind of problem position (RH 66) of recent narrative is *M. Mathieu-Colas, Frontières de la narratologie (Discussion critique)*, in: *Poétique* 65 (Raconter/ Représenter/ Décrire), 1986 (févr.), 91/110.

Description and story.

Actually, storytelling, in a well-defined, broad sense, is a form of description. *B. Vouilloux, Le tableau (Poétique 65)*, 11s, states that every given subject (theme) is susceptible to two perspectives:

RE123

- a.** the given is represented in its synchronic essential form (description);
- b .** The same given is presented in its diachronic essential form (story).

Which, for example, *J. Broeckaert, Le guide du jeune littéraire* , Brxlls/ Paris/ Bois-le-Duc, 1872,180, expresses as follows:

(i) the description of a simultaneous set of data (“un tableau simultane”) is a description;

(ii) the description of a course of events (“une action successive”) is a story.

This combination is entirely understandable: the primary purpose of describing and narrating is not, for example, 'explaining' (RH 120), for one merely explains—methodically—what one has first described (in its existence/essence and, possibly, in its circumstances). Nor is the primary purpose of describing and narrating 'evaluating' (RH 121), for a value judgment—methodically justified—only follows the description, or the story, respectively. This is due to object-orientation (RH 107), which is defined, as it were, (RH 107) either in the description or in the story.

The anecdote (smallest narrative unit) (123/125)

Descartes (1596/1650; founder of Modern Enlightened Rationalism) – in

order to make an unmanageable totality ... 'rational' (manageable) – split it up into its smallest elements. Thus we take the 'anecdote' as, perhaps, the smallest 'unit' of storytelling. To read, within it, the structure of all stories.

'An.ek.doton', in Ancient Greek, means 'unpublished'. Now, 'anecdote' means a story that is short but punchy (concise, witty, sharp, engaging).

M. Maloux, L'esprit à travers l'histoire, Paris, 1977, 20, characterizes the anecdote as follows.

Anecdotes are characterized by

- i. original (singular) or at most rare (exceptional) or
- ii. picturesque sayings or facts.

Georges Lenôtre (1857/1935) once said that one penetrates large-scale history through small-scale history. *Prosper Mérimée* (1803/1870), *Chronique du règne de Charles IX*, preface, says:

“Actually, in historiography, only anecdotes interest me. Among these, my preference lies with those anecdotes that represent a faithful depiction (RH 109) of the customs and characters of a particular period.”

Note: the serious anecdote provides us with a historically verifiable event, whereas the 'little story', 'little history', (little fabrication) is either true or 'cleverly conceived'.

RE124

Applicable model

(1), George Bush, president of the USA, in 1988, was once in conversation with Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła, Pope since 1978), about Mao Tse Tung and Mrs. Brezhnev.

a. Bush was the US ambassador to Communist China. Mao Zedong (recent spelling; 1893/1976; founder of the People's Republic of China) was, shortly before his death, in conversation with Bush: “Soon I will go to heaven. I have already received my invitation from God.” Which, of course, does not align with 'religion opium of the people' (Marx).

b. Bush was at the solemn funeral of Leonid Brezhnev (1906/1982), head of state of the Soviet Union. “There – in the midst of the center of a totalitarian, cold – sad state – stood Mrs. Brezhnev, for the last time, looking at her husband. With an unmistakable gesture she bows down ... to make the sign of the cross over her husband's chest”. (*Journal de Genève* 21.09.1987).

(2) *Michaele Denis*, **Un léopard sur les genoux **, Paris, 1956, 35s., recounts that, as an actress in a Hollywood -crew, she experienced the filming of **The Mines of King Solomon** (Kenya) . -- Her story is a more extensive anecdote. We are dividing it up.

a. Voorknoop ('ektnesis', expositio). -- I had hired a nine-year-old boy to carry my makeup kit. The tips I gave him placed him in a category higher than that of his father. I suspect that he was very attached to me.

b. Knoop ('desis'). -- About a year later, -- when we were about to leave Nairobi (...), he came to see me. I looked at him: I suspected that he wanted to say something. I thought that he was in financial trouble and wanted to give him money.

c . Conversion ('peripeteia'). -- He refused. His head bowed, he stood before me, with a mist of tears before his little dark eyes. -- "Explain," I said. -- "You must adopt me as your child." -- "But your father and mother," I said, "would be very angry if they lost their son!" -- The little black boy gave no answer.

d . Unraveling ('lusion'). I took him by the chin and said: "I will be your aunt, your mother's sister." -- His little face brightened. Cheerfully, he said: "See you again." I saw him walk away singing.

Compare the structure with RH 99/100, where, however, the denouement is almost entirely missing. This gives the story a 'finis ex abrupto', an abrupt ending.

RE125

Note: We have chosen the second applicative model of anecdote because it depicts an encounter ('rencontre', 'encounter').

Library st.: *F. Buytendijk, Zur Phänomenologie* (RH 120) *der Begegnung* , in: *O. Fröbe - Kapteyn, Eranos-Jarhrbuch* , 1950 (*Mensch und Ritus*), Zürich, 1951, 431/486.

Buytendijk sets out a kind of theory there concerning the (Existential-Phenomenological interpretation of the) encounter. In short: "meeting someone" amounts to arriving at a more than superficial acquaintance. Through the 'view' (RH 108.1: object of prosopopee; 'prosopon' is, in Ancient

Greek, 'mask'), on a 'deeper level', one gets to know one's fellow man so that one communicates with each other "from soul to soul" (RH 108: object of ethopee) and enters into interaction (object of signific (RH 41ff. (Understanding);44 (psychodramatic form of the encounter)).

The film actress, in a very simple story, suggests more than she says, a real 'encounter' between her and a Negro-African boy who is, in principle, totally strange, -- across the boundaries of "being different" (RH 69).

Note: What is called 'histoire anecdotique' or 'History From Below' consists essentially of a thesis supported by a set of (well-chosen) anecdotes.

Cf. HC Ehalt, *Geschichte von Unten*, Vienna, 1984, in which an older folkloric tradition, re-established as Alltagsgeschichte, proves the coexistence of 'Alltag' (everyday life) and 'Kultur' (culture as a whole).

Student, here becomes the reason why we dwell on both description and story: in every description and story, a thesis (RH 86).

A. Whoever describes or narrates purely leaves the thesis unexpressed (implicitly). That can be charming—as pure description, as a story for the sake of the story.

B. He who writes a treatise constantly incorporates descriptions and stories, but expresses the thesis within them.

For example, M. Denis' anecdote: by 'reading' (interpreting) the description of an 'encounter' into it, the thesis contained therein was made explicit.

RE126

Further description.

In RH 123 we saw the definition: "the representation of the diachronic essence of a given".

Let us now specify ... - Aristotle, *Poetry* *, 1450a 2/3, defines: "The 'muthos', the story, is the 'mimèsis', representation (not imitation), of a 'praxis', action".

The object—according to the Stagirite—is 'ta pragmata', the facts. The story is, of these, the 'sunthesis'. The closed representation. In *Poët* *, 1450b 23, Aristotle calls the story a 'sustasis'. The structural representation of the facts such that they emerge from the story as a complete and coherent 'action'

(= event 'process'). It is therefore normal that this 'action' has a certain 'megethos', a certain minimal scope (one can hardly call a sentence or two a 'story').

The detailed story.

U. Eco, Postscript to The Name of the Rose , Amsterdam, 1984, 41, points out, in this context, the classical requirements: the 'action' in question must show unity (cohesion) and, preferably, also unity of time (diachronic); and place (synchronic).

This involves the circumstantial method (RH 7, 106,-- especially 116 (description type).

C. Ansote rightly states , *Traité pr.*, 49: “The story is the exposition of a real or imagined fact, -- with all the interesting (significant, 'relevant') circumstances that accompany it, from the origin to the conclusion.” *T.A. van Dijk, Tekstwetenschap* , 150/155 (*narrative structures*), says that only the non-redundant (non-superfluous) circumstances do not bore (keep the narrative tension going: what follows must, after all, be unknown, 'new', or, at least, quasi-unknown).

Note-- 'Praxeology'

'Praxis', an event, constitutes praxeology, the study of action. Stories is a praxeological event: the action, its phases, and the circumstances are the object of praxeology.

Appl. model

L. Rademaker/ H. Bergman, Sociological movements , Spectr./ Intermediair, 1977, 148, 149, gives us an application.

The situation (= the totality of circumstances) of the persons involved, which is examined sociologically—their actions, their behavioral alternatives—are placed in an appropriate context by the report ('account'): “Who said that again? To whom? Where/when?”

RE127

Note -- *Alfred North Whitehead* (1861/1947; co-author with *Russell* of *Principia mathematica* , one of the foundational works of modern logistics) is known for his process thinking,

Central idea: the universe, which he designates as an 'organism', consists of 'events' (occurrences): not of 'things' (which, in his terminology, by

definition, know no movement, change, or 'action'). In such a philosophy, therefore, storytelling is a principal matter.

Incidentally: 'process' is 'course' of a series of partial events that together constitute one whole 'event'. -- Which corresponds strongly with, for example, Aristotle's definition above.

The 'actants'. (127/130)

Library st.: Kr. Hemmereichs, *A Plausible Story and a Plausible Way of Telling It* (*A Structuralist Analysis of Jean Rhys' Novels*), Frankf.aM/ Bern/ New York, 1986.

-- Jean Rhys (1890/1979) is an English novelist, -- with around five novels. In a structural style, Hemmereichs dissects the structures. She relies on AJ Greimas and G. Genette. Narrative theory distinguishes, in that case, in a Saussurian-Structural sense,

- (1) a surface structure (the 'actantial' side) and, hidden,
- (2) a depth or 'semantic' structure.

The 'actants', the actors/actresses of a story, pursue a goal, ordered either binarily or in 'systemics' (a pair of opposites). Specifically: they want, for example, to acquire something or, the counter-model, to avoid something. -- In the 'background' (in Structural language: 'depth'), Hemmereichs sees 'powers'. These are, in a certain sense, 'actants', but in the 'depth' of the event (the action).

Thus, for example, they act, even in binary terms (in systematic form), upon the enterprise (action) of the actors: for example by favoring or, the counter-model, by acting against.

Conclusion: the 'power' is the facilitating/opposing 'entity' (part of the event) and the 'actant' is the facilitating/opposed 'entity'.

In Jean Rhys' novels, now, something peculiar occurs, at least from Hemmereichs' perspective: the actantial roles are absent. The heroines, for example, 'live' there, simply, in complete accordance with themselves and their surroundings, -- as 'free and independent beings'; without 'powers'.

RE128

An application.

However unusual Hemmereichs' presentation may seem to you, there is nevertheless a genuine insight in the schema "actants/ powers (surface/ depth)"—even outside the Structuralist perspective—that might possibly

inspire you, student.

Consider, for example, *Ch.R. Maturin* (1782/1824; Irish writer of 'noir novels'; such as * *Melmoth or the Wandering Man** (1820)). The book was translated into French: **Melmoth ou l' homme errant* * (Integrated Translation), Paris, 1988.

Upon reflection, one is reminded of Ch. Baudelaire (RH 73) or André Breton (1896/1966: Surrealist). Melmoth expresses something ancient, already known in Archaic cultures, namely the 'demonic' (in ecclesiastical language: 'Luciferian') element or, in Hemmerechts' language, 'power'. In every man, in every woman.

Do not be so surprised: someone like *M. Scheler* (RH 97,121), in his **Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* *, Darmstadt, 1930 (written when Scheler was no longer Catholic), 83, speaks very emphatically of “the demonic, likewise all spiritual ideas (to be understood rather Platonically (RH 53)) and values blind urge” in the entire cosmos, specifically in man.

Appl. model

R. Ambelain, Le vampirisme (De la légende au réel), Paris, 1977, 205, recounts something that 'actants' and 'powers' clearly understand or sense.

1. In the last century, there lived a woman, between thirty-five and forty years old, Eugénie... in Edney, near Bordeaux. (// Therèse Neumann) She was considered a 'seer' (mantically gifted) and was, moreover, highly gifted in the occult and could, for example, at will, make beings from the other world 'appear' ('theurgy').

A medical peculiarity: her belly was regularly swollen; she had legs like those of a 'hydropique' (dropsy); she lived—so it seems—on nothing but water for twelve years—a phenomenon that is still told today.

She was, of course, known here and there, even in Enlightened France. Many great figures of the world, including Adolphe Thiers (1897/1877; historian and statesman)—many doctors, naturally, including a Dr. Fortin, who serves as a source for Ambelain—came to 'view' her.

2.a. As is very often the case in 'alltagsgeschichte' (RH 125), quite a few people, very naively, interpreted “ses dons” (her gifts) as signs of God-given 'holiness'. The result: children were brought to her from all over the department “to bless them”.

2.b. (a) *The fact.* -

The very striking manner in which (*note*: circumstance: how?) she acted as a healer aroused great suspicion: she fell, literally, onto those children, seized them, kissed them passionately (“avec fureur”) on the lips, the throat, the head.

2.b (b) *The interpretation.*

Some bystanders said, inevitably: "It is as if she, like a 'vampire', is gorging herself on children's blood."

The verification.

(i)a. During the winter period—when the roads of the past century were difficult—Eugenie received few children as 'clientele'. Curiously enough: simultaneously with that absence of children (omen), 'the saint' fell ill.

(i)b. But, in the summer the mothers with children turned up again in large numbers. Curiously enough: simultaneously with that (omen) she clearly came back to life” (thus, literally, Ambelain).

(ii) Dr. Fortin, who was apparently a shrewd physician, one day came up with the idea to 'magnetize' them (*note*: administer a dose of 'life force'), but without notifying them. The result of this deliberately performed experiment: to the great surprise of those around them, this was followed (omen) by a uterine hemorrhage (continued).

Later, after a lot of emotions, Eugenie got up, regained a normal appetite like everyone else, and recovered in a short time.

a. We have intentionally divided the story, because a different story structure is immediately revealed.

b. We have partially made the basic pair of all stories “omen/continuation” appear at the end, in the testing section (verification), within the text itself.

c. Now we point out: the actor, on the surface, was apparently Eugénie, the 'saint'; the 'power', in the depths of her 'acting' (there is no better name), was... what? People like Ambelain, based on undeniable material, believe in 'vampirism', the fact that some people—along 'occult' (which means nothing other than “difficult or even impossible to verify scientifically”) lines—'suck out' something like the 'blood soul' (the expression appears in all Archaic

cultures), so that, for example, the children were indeed 'blessed', but lost 'something' (RH 46: something (suggestive model), 94 (Tilton versus Monroe), 104 (irrational buying)), instead of gaining it.-- Which, according to teachers, also seems to occur in schools, for example.

RE130

Note

-- J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankf.aM, 1981;
-- H. Kunneman, *Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action (A Summary)*, Meppel, 1983, gives us a further theory regarding the 'actants'.

According to J. Habermas (1929/ ...), second generation of the Frankfurt School (neither Positivist nor Hermeneutic), all intersubjective (occurring between 'subjects' or individuals) and social actions can be classified into two types.

1. The 'strategic' actions.

The 'actors/actresses' prioritize their individual needs and interests (e.g., the pursuit of profit, maximization of utility value to achieve objectives; in other words: exerting pressure or making compromises through money or a position of power; cf. RH 98 ('estimated valuation')).

2. The 'communicative' actions.

The actors wish to integrate their actions by means of mutual understanding. To this end, they 'define' (RH 79) the situation of action (= circumstances) – “This ought to be done” – jointly, and mutual instructions arise – “I am going to undertake this; you take that upon your responsibility”. Instead of power relations, contestability emerges here: the 'regulatory speech acts' (cf. RH 47: speech act), i.e., the definitions and instructions just mentioned, can always be contested – by a question type such as: “What good reasons do you have for speaking like this?” – One is involuntarily reminded here of *Alltagsgeschichte* (RH 125), in our homes, kitchens, and gardens, where one can hear such 'communicative action'.

The order of facts: (130/137).

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 152s., states that during the Early Scholasticism (Carolingian Renaissance), a contemporary of Alcuin (730/804) saw the sequence of events as twofold:

- a. 'ordo naturalis', which relates the parts of the action in the order of the facts themselves (from the beginning);
- b. 'ordo artificialis', which one begins somewhere later (in the middle, for

example).

Note-- The 'Nouveau Roman',

(1) In the traditional novel, 'the thread' is clear: place and time, actors, the course of the action (omen/continuation; forerunner/complications/resolution) are presented in an ordered and, above all, transparent sequence.

(2) In the 'New Novel' - since 1950+ (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Flanders and elsewhere) - there is, as it were, 'no thread'.

RE131

(i) An Alain Robbe-Grillet, a Michel Butor, a Nathalie Sarraute, a Claude Simon, -- each of the protagonists of the New Novel works very individually.

(ii) Main impression: the maze labyrinth. After all, the current sense of life and the world is burdened by the massive impression that both one's own personality ('soul') and the world around us as a totality are totally opaque in the exhaustive sense. The experiences and perceptions we have of both ourselves and our surroundings are merely inductive samples, nothing more.

With a *U. Eco* (1932/2016; *The Name of the Rose*), the semiotician, one can at most make something of vague 'signs' and confusing 'traces'.

(iii) The narrative sequence reflects this labyrinthine sense of life and the world: reading new novels is 'difficult' - not that they are 'learned', but there is, as it were, no 'thread'.

It is just like on the daily TV -screen: Brigitte Bardot, 20th century, appears before Charlemagne (early Middle Ages), followed by a Walt Disney clip, followed by the news, followed by commercials!

In that sense the New Novel is 'realistic': it presents the subject matter in an analogous order to that which daily life—again Alltagsgeschichte (RH 125)—experiences: now I am working, now people are on the phone, now I am eating, meanwhile I am listening to the radio.

(iv) The reception (RH 38) that the authors of the New Novel assume on the part of the reader is that the reader identifies with the authors, insofar as they ... undertake an attempt to decipher the labyrinth that is life and the world, -- which the reader also helps to decipher.

Note-- The crisis of the 'subject'.

(i) Modern man believed in an autonomous subject that establishes order amidst a chaotic world. The typical 'Modern' novel therefore placed “the subject”, the acting self, at the center.

(ii) People like the Structuralists (think of Michel Foucault (1926/1984: “The subject is merely foam amidst the structures”) or a Derek Parfit, **Reasons and Person**, Oxford, 1986, claim that that Modern 'order-establishing subject; master of the actions of life', fundamentally either does not exist or is highly subordinate to 'structures' (physical, psychological, cultural).

Which is somewhat leaning towards Nouveau Roman.

RE132

Note - What is called “The Modern Subject” comes into its own even more when one examines Middle-century authorship. Claire Jaquier, **Deux visions du Moyen âge**, in: ** Journal de Genève **, July 11, 1987, briefly analyzes two books:

-- R. Dragonetti, *Le mirage des sources (L'art du faux dans le roman médiéval)*, Paris, 1987;

-- P. Zumthor, *La lettre et la voix (De la 'littérature' médiévale)*, Paris, 1987 -, from which it appears that the medieval writer preferred anonymity in most cases. Not only did he not want to be known as the author; he did everything to ensure that no one would ever find out that he had written the piece.

Even the clerks who copied texts took great liberties with authorship: if necessary, they invented the text they were supposed to copy! Which is, of course, 'contradictio in terminis' (internal contradiction). Literary theft ('plagiarism', i.e., passing off the text of another as one's own) gave rise, in the Arabic term for 'poetry', to the idea that 'poetry' was literary theft.

But Cl. Jaquier says: “Rien n' était, en ce temps, plus créateur que le copie” (freely translated: Nothing was, at that time, as creative as copying).

How do we understand, from 800 to 1450, of the 'Modern subject', which wishes to be 'author; indeed, absolute author, of its individual work. That wishes above all to be known for it!

Further analysis of the pair “omen/continuation”, (132/133)

A text that narrates establishes a sequence. The smallest unit within it is the contrasting pair 'omen/continuation'. Pay attention to the sentences: the adverbial clauses, in particular, reveal the true nature of 'omen/continuation'.

“Because/due to the fact that she had seen that, she could not sleep” (omen: having seen something; continuation: not being able to sleep (causal or motivating connection);

“She had seen that so that she could not sleep” (consequence-indicating sentence) amounts to the same thing in thought. -- “When he arrived there, she was just boiling the potatoes” (temporal connection between the first sentence and the second); -- “I want you to come immediately” (the first sentence has its content in the second).

Conclusion: 'Ominor/ continuation' merely indicates the pure order of the sentences (including causal connection). -- Aristotle and, with him, Middle-century Scholasticism defined 'time' as the order 'earlier/ later'.

RE133

Well, there is no better definition of the 'sign/continuation' pairing, which expresses any connection between the preceding sentence and the next. Let us take a small example from Vl. Propp.

1. “A prince gives an eagle to a hero. That eagle carries the hero away to another principality.” The omen: “A prince gives ... an eagle”; the continuation: “That eagle carries ... away.”

2. InPropp discovers an analogous fairy tale: “An old man gives Soesjenko a horse. This horse carries Soesjenko away to another principality.” -- Yet in another analogous case: “A princess gives Ivan a ring. Young people spring from that ring, who carry Ivan away to another principality.”

The analogy. -- Is 'analogous' anything that is partly identical and partly non-identical? Propp's 'Formalist Analysis' relies on this.

(i) The actants are non-identical (prince, old man, princess, -- eagle, horse, ring (these are also 'actants' in the broader sense), -- hero, Sushenko, Ivan).

(ii) Identical are the actions (events) that Propp calls 'functions'.

The essential and the incidental.

(i) Incidental are 'by whom' the action is performed (human, animal, plant, -- object, -- supernatural being), -- 'how' (by what means) the agents (= actants) proceed (persuasion, deception, violence, magic), -- 'with what intention' (damage, service, pastime).

(ii) Essential is 'what is done' (the function, the action). Cf. *Cl. Bremond*,

Decision.

In Proppian Formalist analysis, the 'sign/following' relationship is essentially a relationship of 'functions' (actions) that follow one another. In this regard, we personally have the impression that the term 'what is done' is better replaced by 'whether ... is done'. The pure fact, without much essence!

Applicable Model

Take a fairy tale in which: "The princess entered the eyes of the wicked witch. She was, instantly, turned into a gemstone." Or: "The princess entered the prince's field of vision. Instantly she vanished into nothing." When we look not at the sentences but at the contents of the sentences, then, clearly, the 'omen/continuation' connection is one of "Something is happening"/ "Something is happening" / "Something is happening."

RE134

Further analysis of "foreknot/ knots (turns, wraps)/ unknotting".
(134/ 137).

When the story is not a 'mangled story', as in the nonsensical or New Novel style, then the sequence "prelude/knot or knots/resolution" is discernible, at least partially.

Phaseology

'Fasis', in Ancient Greek, was the passing of the moon in its 'phases' (rising, appearance).

A. Every 'process' (Greek: 'kinesis', Latin: 'motus') normally exhibits three phases:

- i.** the initial phase (discussed in the protology),
- ii.** the turning point or turning point phase (object of kairology),
- iii.** the final phase (object of eschatology).

B. Dramaturgically (RH 13) and, therefore, also narratively, those phases are as follows.

a. The preliminary knot ('ekthesis', expositio, introduction).

The initial circumstances (time/place, characters (actors)) – at least partially – are narrated. Ansotte says: "This gives the opening sequence its local or, better, unique, even singular color."

b. The knot/ the knots.

'Desis' (binding) or 'plokè' (complication, intrigue) is the phase in which the action splits into more than one branch. Broeckaert: 'une complication d'incidents' (a complication consisting of unforeseen incidents).

Aristotle defines 'knot' as that part of the story that extends for better or worse from the beginning to the turning point. RH 100 and 124 gave a small example of a 'turning point'.

c . The denouement ('lusis', decomposition).

Ansotte understands this to mean the outcome or result of the action. Aristotelian: the story from the 'peripeteia' (peripeteia) or 'metabasis' (turning point) to the end. -- RH 100 did, however, give us the absence of such a resolution. It is then called "finis ex abrupto" (sudden breaking of the story). -
- Incidentally, it can also begin like this: one is thrown into a knot and must then deduce from the continuation of the story what the initial knot was.

Appl. model

We take a ballad. It is by Joseph von Eichendorff (1788/1857), from the Heidelberg Catechism of the Young Romantic School. This very balanced Romantic was once, together with Ludwig Uhland (1787/1862), exceptionally popular with the German public.

RE135

Defining the ballad and the balladesque is not easy. Perhaps Börries von Münchhausen, who composed quite a few ballads himself, comes closest:

(i) central to an action;

(ii) this has a foreground, visible and tangible, but at the same time a mysterious background is at work. This gives the ballad at times something idyllic, (RH 117) at other times something tragic; but in such a way that the tragic predominates. As a result, the ballad stands in stark contrast to 'everyday history' (RH 125).

Note-- KG Young, **Talewords and Storyrealm (The Phenomenology of Narrative *)*, Dordrecht, 1986, states that stories exhibit two ontological modes of being (types of reality):

a. 'storyrealm', the facts, here and now -- surface phenomena;

b. 'taleword', a type of events in an 'other world'. 'Stories' would then be the back-and-forth between both realms. – Be that as it may: the ballad displays

(i) actants and powers (RH 128v.);

(ii) this world and the other world.

Note : The title 'Lorelei' can be split into **a.** die (also: der) Lei, rock, and **b.** die Lure, elf, nymph (female nature spirit). Such female beings, especially in incarnated form, are considered “executors of a divine judgment” (Homeric: an 'ate'): beautiful and very attractive as they are, any contact with them that is not permitted is 'deadly'. Thus an old 'belief'.

So that this ballad is simultaneously a fate-analytical ballad. We know 'fate analysis' from mythologies, but a *Leopold Szondi* (1893/1986; *Schicksalsanalyse* (1944)), who arrived at this idea following a reading of F. Dostoevsky (1821/1881; novelist; Christian Realist), re-established it in a psychoanalytic sense.

So now: **That Lorelei.**

a.-- Pre-sale . --”Es ist schon spat. Es ist schon kalt. It is already late. It is already cold.

b.-- Button .

Was reitest du einsam durch den Wald? Waarom rijdt gij eenzaam door het woud?

Der Wald ist lang. Du bist allein. Het woud is lang (om lopen). Gij zijt alleen.

Du, schene Braut, ich führt dich heim!” You, beautiful bride, I lead you home.

“Great is the deceit and trickery of men.

RE136

Vor Schmerz mein Herz gebrochen ist. Door smart is mijn hart gebroken.
Wohl irrt das Waldhorn her und hin. The forest horn wanders back and forth.

O flieh: du weizt nicht wer ich bin”. Vlucht toch: gij weet niet wie ik ben.
So reich geschmückt ist Rosz und Weib. Zo rijk uitgedost is paard en vrouw.

Such a wonder of the young Leib. The young body is so beautiful.

c.-- Cover.

Jetzt kenn' ich dich: Gott steh' mir bei! Now I know you: God help me!

"You are the witch Lorelei!"

You know me well: from high stone. You know me well: from the high rock
Schaut still mein Schlosz, tief, in den Rhein. Kijkt still mijn slot, diep, in

de Rijn.

d.-- Denouement

Es ist schon spät. Es ist schon kalt. It's already late. It's already cold.
Kommst nimmermehr aus diesem Wald. Gij raakt nooit meer uit dit woud”.

That concludes this exquisitely beautiful ballad.

That the theme 'Lorelei' is a 'motif—a theme spread across several workers; RH 66)—is evident from *M. Genevoix, Lorelei*, Paris, 1978. This work is a novel in which young French people meet Germans (RH 125: meeting).

Here is how Genevoix presents a Lorelei, not in a Romantic—distant—but in a businesslike—nearby form. -- Oc,57.

“It was in Zabern (*note*: the present-day Frenchified Saverne (Bas-Rhin). -
- They ended up in a restaurant (...). Upon entering, they came face to face with a woman, -- tall, somewhat majestic, -- yet a tad pale and with a somewhat absent look. -- Her drawn but extremely beautiful eyes immediately caught his attention and the way she was dressed penetrated deeply into him (...).

She brought the menu, noted down the order, -- without revealing even the slightest thing, anything of her inner life. “What a curious figure,” said Brigitte, as soon as she had turned her back. “But it is a ‘nixie,’ an apparition. Just appeared from the other world. For us. Or rather: for you, Julien! She seemed to ‘point’ at you with her eyes. Did you notice them, those eyes? Two abysses. With colors like a stream. Enchanting. -- One might say: a Lorelei from days gone by, -- with her gold jewelry, her golden comb. I literally saw her locks of hair flow over her shoulders. -- Be extremely careful, my boy: in your place, I would start to get scared.” Everyone then laughed heartily for the umpteenth time.

RE137

The evidential value of the story. (137/140)

Before we address this topic, let us refer to an application model.

*H. Uyttersprot, *Reflections on Franz Kafka, 2. Style as Alternating Current or the Line to Infinity **, in: **De Vlaamse Gids**, vol. 37 (1953): 9 (Sept.), 534/548, reflects on the fact that the stories (novellas, novels) of Franz Kafka (1883/1924) exhibit two styles (forms; RH 12):

Without difficulty, one recognizes a fairly regular alternation in *The Trial* , in *The Castle*:

(i) Kafka discusses sharply and strictly;

(ii) he also tells the story smoothly and lightly.

He is a dialectician (*note*: reasoner) and a narrator. In the great novels he is both at the same time, and in such a proportion that narrative, respectively descriptive parts and dialectical parts roughly balance each other out.” (Ac,534).

The argumentative style is evident in “the accumulation of discussion terms” (ac,546), such as “deuten, Meinung, erklären, einerseits/ auf der andere Seite”. “In the discussion itself: this endless series of 'facts', 'hypotheses', 'distinguo' s. (*note*: from the Scholastic language: 'I distinguish'), -- of which it is expressly stated that it can be continued indefinitely (...)”. (Ac,546ff.).

Incidentally : this is reminiscent of RH 85 (“endless foundational research”), 98 (“intellectualist criticism”).

It is clear that Kafka writes 'stories', but with the essential nature of a treatise, with its theses and its arguments. Also: that these are stories, in themselves, as we saw RH 82 ('a.technos'), seeking to prove something somewhere.

Appl. model

Lou Andréas Salomé ou l'intelligence au féminin , in: *Pénéla* (Paris), 1968: 16 (Sept.), 39/49, gives us the following introduction

“Is it not preferable to fall into the hands of a murderer than to end up in the dreams of a woman in heat? ... Woman is, today, not yet capable of friendship. Women are still cats and birds or—to put it accurately—cows.” Thus speaks *Fr. Nietzsche* (RH 109) through the mouth of Zarathustra (*note*: the book’s imagined spokesman), when, in his **Also sprach Zarathustra **, in 1883, he decided to glorify the 'Übermensch' (*note*: the more highly evolved)—only to proceed, immediately, to a massive reckoning with all of (*note*: existing) humanity.

RE138

There is no urgent need to undertake a textual interpretation of this masterpiece by *Nietzsche anymore. On the other hand, the genesis of Also sprach Zarathustra* is far less well known. Specifically: what drama—

intimately experienced and subsequently generalized—plunged Nietzsche headlong into his unbearable loneliness, which, a few years later, would culminate in the emptiness of his madness? Where exactly should one seek the origin of this grandiose vision of the future (*note*: which is his *Also sprach Zarathustra*) (...)? (...).

A small man, -- misunderstood by his social environment, -- abandoned by his friends, -- undermined by illness, -- but driven by the will to act as a 'prophet' (*note*: hence likely the pseudonym 'Zarathustra'), attempts to escape from himself. As a weakling he dreams of greatness, -- as one *betrayed* by 'friends' slanders all that is friendship, -- as one rejected by a woman he brands all that is woman. (...).

The heroine of this drama with three characters (*note*: Lou von Salomé, in +/- 1882, meant—erotically speaking—a great deal to Nietzsche, but she only wanted him insofar as she was also 'friends' with a second man)—drama, which plunged Nietzsche into a—admittedly fruitful—despair,—despair, which would provoke him (*note*: the *abusive prose of his *Also sprach Zarathustra** briefly cited at the beginning of this quote— was named Lou von Salomé, then not yet twenty years old.

Lou was tall, decisive by nature, and inexorable—if you will: a female specimen of Nietzsche's Übermensch. Lou was the type that goes straight for his goal, without wasting words, coolly knowing what it wants—a type that recognizes no law other than its own 'law'.

“For all eternity I am faithful to 'memories'. But to men I will never be faithful.” So Lou noted it in her diary, shortly after her introduction to Nietzsche.

Such a little sentence is astonishing—from the pen of a young girl, a century ago. The undeniable cynicism (*note*: shamelessness) in that sentence betrays a remarkable insight into her own nature. Loyalty—that, indeed, Lou would never be. Or rather: she knew no 'loyalty,' except when it concerned her—otherwise strongly idealized—childhoods: through all phases of her mind's life, she attempted, time and again, to revive the atmosphere of her early youth.

That concludes the text from the women's magazine *Pénéla*.

RE139

Note the striking similarity of tone between what Margaret Mead believes she can observe in Samoa (RH 62: "no profound bonds to just one person", -- which Mead rather affirms), -- what Nietzsche/Hitler claim regarding non-marital love (RH 71) and what Lou von Salomé notes as something self-evident.

Compare with the variants of 'valuation' that Bettermann RH 98 has noticed.

Biographical note.

After this 'suspension' (RH 36), it is time for us to say something about Lou von Salomé, who has now, for several years, also enjoyed immense interest in France. As recently as May 1988, Jean d'Ormesson elaborated at length on television about Lou von Salomé's 'la vie agitée'.

Lou von Salomé (S; Petersburg (= Leningrad) 12.02.1861, Göttingen 05.02.1937) is the daughter of a Russian general.

She derives her name 'Andreas-Salomé' from her marriage to Carl Andreas (Djakarta (Indonesia) 1846/ Göttingen 1930), who, although of Dutch descent, became a full German (and an Orientalist).

Apart from the 'meeting' with Nietzsche, around 1882, she had a long-standing 'relationship' with Rainer Maria Rilke (1875/1926; lyricist), whom Lou met in Munich in 1897 (Lou published *Rainer Maria Rilke* (1928) regarding this).

Sigmund Freud (1856/1939; founder of Psychoanalysis) also met Lou, who became both his (very good) student and his friend (which she describes in her * *In der Schule bei Freud**, Munich, 1965 (posthumous), as well as in *Open brief aan Freud* (1983 inpublished in French)).

Library st.:

-- Ernst Pfeiffer, Hrsg., *Lou Andreas-Salome, Lebensrückblick* , Frankf.aM 1951-1 (French: *Ma vie (Esquisse de quelques souvenirs)*, Paris, 1978 - 3).

-- R. Binion, *Frau Lou (Nietzsche's Wayward Disciple)*, Princeton (Jew Jersey), 1968;

-- E. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., *Lou Andreas-Salomé, Eintragungen (Letzte Jahre)*, Fr.aM, 1982 (French: *Carnets intimes des dernières années* , Paris, 1983).

RE140

Note: Lou was an 'intellectual' through and through. Proof: in 1880, her mother sent her to Zurich (Switzerland). There she took courses in theology

and religious studies, philosophy and art history. To such an extent, in fact, that, suffering from nervous exhaustion, she had to go to Rome—Italy was, at the time, the refuge for the 'overwhelmed'—there she ended up with the German feminist Malvida von Meysenburg, in whose salon the European intelligentsia gathered for years—for example, Friedrich W. Fröbel (1782/1852; educational reformer), Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807/1882; politician), Alexander Herzen (1812/1870; Russian revolutionary), Richard Wagner (1814/1883; composer).

There, Lou meets a Paul Rée, who, like her, was interested in philosophy. Rée immediately fell in love with Lou. But, in time, a prophetic dream of Lou's would come true: she had dreamed, during a night, that she was sharing an intimate life with two men at the same time in a large apartment—with a library room and three secluded rooms. Rée was dismayed but agreed to something. He even summoned a friend of his, on sick leave in Italy—a certain Friedrich Nietzsche. This rather impoverished, sick man—he was almost blind, suffered from terrible squinting headaches, had stomach cramps, and was chronically insomniac—immediately and extremely enthusiastically acceded to Rée's request. Nietzsche fundamentally wanted Lou as his wife, but Lou wanted only 'friendship' and intellectual conversations with both Rée and Nietzsche.

The genesis of 'also sprach zarathustra'.

RH 17 (35, 36, 61) taught us the genetic approach. Here we have one little model of application. -- Nietzsche, a connoisseur of human nature, assesses her, this Lou: she has remained at the same time very childlike and incredibly self-assured; she knows damn well what she wants without asking permission from those around her or worrying about their judgment (so writes Nietzsche to his friends).

Which verifies Penéla's thesis.

There is much more: with Lou, conversations take place regarding a shared concern: the emptiness of a world in which God is dead. -- In February 1883—within a few days—Nietzsche enters a state of inspiration: wildly enthusiastic, he writes his **Also sprach Zarathustra**. Which also verifies what Penela asserts.

RE140.1

The narrative principle of sufficient reason (ground).

a. Herodotus (RH 12) organizes the loose materials, collected thanks to 'historia' (inquisitio), into a 'logos', a closed and stylized narrative.

But, in the Greek 'logos' lies more than an orderly story. Through storytelling, Herodotus aims to make understandable ('explain'). To make something understandable through narration, the 'sufficient reasons' (= presuppositions, -- Platonic: the hypotheses (RH 55,85)) - in the form of 'omens' - must be incorporated into the closed and stylized story.

b. Thucydides of Athens (-465/-401; the great historian), according to Meyerson, **Le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire**, in: **Journal de psychologie**, 1956, 340, applies this literally: for Thucydides, for example, recounting a battle amounts to verifying a thesis regarding that battle—a thesis in which the omens (in fact: the logical axioms) are formulated—verification in which the subjects 'confirm' the omens. Time, for him, is both chronological (theory of time) and purely logical.

Decision:

The sensible story can also be expressed in “if/then” sentences. In other words: if all the omens (= necessary and sufficient conditions), then the sequels (= necessary or possible course of events).

In common sense language: “(Given all that we know about it) it was bound to happen eventually or, at least, it might well happen.” Note the ontological modalities 'necessary' and 'possible'. Hegelian and Marxist dialectics.

Those who interpret Hegel and Marx as historical dialecticians solely from the perspective of the triad 'thesis / antithesis / synthesis' understand only one—albeit frequent—commonplace. This commonplace ought to be situated in the Hegelian Deduction: If one presupposes the (living) whole (totality), with its propositions, contradictions, and compositions (narrative omen), then one understands logically—strictly—a—at first glance merely 'coincidental' (again an ontological modality)—fact (= narrative continuation).

Note: This is how it should be interpreted: “Was intelligent, that is 'wirklich' (*note*: corresponding to the presuppositions); and that, was wirklich ist, that is intelligent” (Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts, Vorrede*).

9. Report writing. (141/152).

A treatise may also require a report. Therefore, a brief word on the nature and structure of the 'report'. We are all familiar with the terms 'reporter' or 'school report'. But we usually never stop to consider what 'reporting' actually is.

1.-- The object.

Objectively speaking, there are two major types of reporting.

a. The case report.

There is no text, but your client asks you to draft a text regarding a synchronic data point (e.g. the situation at school) or a diachronic data point (e.g. the decline of a small neighborhood school). In the first case, the report will be a description (see RH 106/121), in the second a story (see RH 122/140).

b. The text report .

There is a textual given. Spoken or written. In that case, you ought to describe, in your own words, to relate, -- to 'discuss' what the text contains as a message (report, information).

2 -- The text length.

a. The concise ('brief') report provides the characteristics (RH 108.1, -- or at least the general definition of 'characteristic'), i.e., the objective representation of the essence. The 'main points' are the focal point of such a report.

b . The detailed or comprehensive report.

Besides existence and essence (RH 58, 106; -- 64; 50), the circumstances—also called 'details' (RH 102)—are then presented, which represent existence/essence more precisely.

Note: When the subject matter is textual—a book, articles—a concise report has, for some time now, been called a 'textual contraction'. The structure is 'multi-ambiguous'.

In summary.

The report is defined by

a. the given (an object or a text) and

b . the requested information (a brief or detailed report).

The latter with or without a value judgment on your part (RH 75).

The origin . (141/143)

Historically speaking, it seems to us that Herodotus of Halicarnassus (-484/-425; the 'Father of Historiography') is the first Ancient Greek to have formed very precise thoughts regarding the nature and value of the account.

RE142

Library st.:

-- Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft* , I (*Die Begründung einer*

Wissen-schaft von der Natur durch die Griechen), Freiburg, 1971, 141/167 (*Die Quellen des Erdbildes von Hekataios von Milet und Herodotos von Halikernassos*);

-- CCJ Daniëls, *Religious-historical study on Herodotus* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946.

As Krafft indicates in the title and, even more so, in the treatment framework—the Ionian 'physics' (= natural science and natural philosophy)—Herodotus (Lat.: Herodotus) is to be situated within a movement that is very empirically oriented. Observations form the foundation. It is within this objective framework that one must understand what follows. As Daniel, oc, 16, 100, 178, states, Herodotus distinguishes two ages in the report.

a. What he calls 'the historiè' (in another Ancient Greek dialect: 'historia'). By this he understands “the free investigation into the circumstances (information, message)”, which characterizes all possible data. The 'historiè' is, in other terms, the material or accumulated data, insofar as there is no arrangement or shaping (RH 12) present in it. In other words: all loose elements of the invention (RH 12).

The method.

The finding or heuristic proceeds in two ways.

(i) The 'aut.opsia', the eyewitness account, provided by people who directly observed the data - the facts.

(ii) The 'marturion', the testimony, provided by the act of 'marturia', the giving of witness. In which the reporter observes indirectly.

b. What Herodotus calls 'the logos'. This is the substance 'formed' by arrangement and design. The text, therefore, that constitutes the account.

The method.

What characterizes Herodotus's reporting is the perspective, the point of view, through which a disparate multitude of data can be brought into unity, into logical coherence. Notwithstanding that Herodotus labels himself as 'histor'—informant, seeker of information—the facts do not always speak for themselves (RH 82: subject-bound argument). Besides the material, 'logos'—processing by the human mind—is necessary. This expresses itself in the point of view.

Applicable model

With him, this is essentially the kuklos idea. In 'fusus' (nature; RH 20, 21), a process (RH 127) is regularly underway. Many data **a.** begin small, **b.** grow,

c. reach a peak, **d.** only to be suddenly thrown down (oc, 27; 93v.; 199

RE143

In human terms: someone starts 'small', sees his business expand; instead of knowing moderation and his own limitations, he/she - usually - continues. The 'high' - 'happy' (e.g. fabulously wealthy) - state thus caused entails both an objective transgression of boundaries and a subjectively experienced 'pride' (hovaardij) - called 'hubris', arrogantia (RH 23).

These two aspects together form an 'aitia', a situation of guilt, -- normally followed by a 'tisis', atonement. This process is — according to the deeply religious Herodotus — governed by 'to theion', one or another deity (god, goddess) or even the collective body of polytheistic deities (they are the 'archè', principium, the preposition, of it). But it is intrinsically ascertainable in the 'fisis', the essence, of things — plants, animals, people (especially political systems) — for whom:

- (i) from the perspective of the 'kuklos' (cycle, loop)
- (ii) provides thorough information.

For example, land hunger (imperialism) is, for a number of countries and their ruler(s), the driving force behind that cyclical process “beginning/ increase/ peak (border transgression/ debt/ downfall”.

Appl. model

Anyone listening to radio or television regularly encounters this reportage. This is clearly the 'autopsia', the eyewitness account, of a Herodotus. According to *GUI Schweikle, ed., Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 364f(Reportage), a good reportage comprises two aspects:

a. the pure report, i.e. the objective - factual representation (description/story) of the facts (a character, a situation, an event, -- a book) and

b. possibly but not necessarily an interpretive feature (which runs parallel to Herodotus' perspective (angle of view)). The reportage, in the journalistic sense, originated around 1880 as a form of reporting for the daily newspaper.

Appl. Model: Georges Simenon (1903/1989) (143/144)

“Georges Simenon is 85. -- Lausanne 10 (ATS). -- Georges Simenon is considered the most prolific French-language novelist since *Honoré de Balzac* (1799/1850; *La comedie humaine* (+/- 90 volumes)). This coming Friday, he

will celebrate his 85th birthday in Lausanne, -- he has lived there for a good thirty years. -- He was born on February 12, 1903, in Liège (Belgium). He traveled just about the whole world until he 1955 insettled in Switzerland.

RE144

Georges Simenon published nearly two hundred and twenty novels under his own name, including eighty police novels that made Commissioner Maigret famous. Under a pseudonym, he published nearly three hundred other works. His books were translated into seventy languages and printed in forty countries. They were adapted for film sixty times and for television more than two hundred times.

It is estimated that nearly five hundred million readers have already read him. And that hundreds of millions of listeners and TV viewers have heard and/or seen his psychological or police works—across the entire planet.

Officially, G. Simenon ceased writing in 1973, but in 1981 he published his **Leerinneringen** (Memoirs of Life). He was honored with the honorary medal of the city of Lausanne. He was honored many times abroad. Living very reclusively in a small cottage, Simenon lives in the canton of Vaud, his thirtieth residence.

We mention “for the record” (RH 125) that he was supposedly born on 13.02.1903, but that his mother, due to her superstition, had him registered on 12.02.1903.

Note: We have deliberately not clearly organized this little article from *Le Journal de Genève* 11.02.1988. Student, there are certainly clichés in it (regularly recurring sections (text parts) in this type of report), as was described approximately RH 74ff. (topic): could you extract them from the text? Which perspective (Herootean) governs the elements of the text here? To mention just one example.

Deuterosophistic models (144/146)

Marrou, ** Hist.d.l' éducation **, 239, tells us that the pupils had to learn to recount a 'muthos' (story, fable). -- We provide a typical antique model.

The lion and the fox.

A lion, growing older by the day, became very weak. Due to his strength and speed, he could no longer reach his food. As a result, he stayed constantly in a cave, pretending to be sick. The animals—thinking this was appropriate—

came inside his cave to visit him. Time and again, the lion caught them to devour them. A fox also came nearby. He saw through the lion's trick and sat down outside the cave. From there, he asked the lion how he was doing. The lion said: "I am doing badly. But I have a question: for what reason do you not come inside the cave with me? Then we could talk." To which the fox replied: "I would like to come inside, were it not that I see many footprints of animals entering, but not a single footprint of anyone coming out."

RE145

In a similar manner, clever people make 'signs' from 'tekmèria', (RH 83: clear signs), 'signs'; they spot the dangers and escape them. -- Student, try again **(i)** to find the structure, **(ii)** to formulate the perspective that governs the story - a classic animal story, such as you probably also tell in your class.

In this way, you learn to write a report yourself, using 'small examples' ('paradigmata' or textbook examples). Perhaps you can also try to capture the main impression—pathetic (RH 73)—specifically: what feeling exactly arises after one has just chosen a story?

Deuterosophism (RH 28,-- 112,-- 53, 78) has left us a small example through recovered witness remains. Perhaps it can be of use to you in the classroom. The *Fayoum Papyrus* has left us a small student project.

Given: a myth in verse form (not preserved);

Requested : a paraphrase (a report in which one summarizes what the text offers in one's own words).

Behold the assignment (RH 66 (/ / 115).

Here is the text the student wrote in response. "A boy, who had murdered his father and "who feared the legislation regarding parricide, fled into the desert" (*note:* is a quote or excerpt from what the teacher read aloud).

As he traveled through the mountains, he was pursued by a lion. With that lion on his heels, he climbed into a tree. Thereupon he saw a snake ('drank') rushing towards his tree to, possibly, climb into it as well. (...). While fleeing from that snake, he made a trap. -- (Gnomè, sententia) (RH 29, 72): The villain does not escape a deity: "The deity will summon the villain to judgment" (again a quotation in verse).

RE146

Regulatory and Applicative Model.

If there is a pair that is a commonplace, then it is the universal model and the particular, or singular, model. -- Cf. RH 31, 87. -- Here we have an application.

(i) In the first fable, the moral lesson is pronounced at the end. It is a model-theoretical formula: the shrewd man (the original or unknown) is described in terms of the fox (the model or, thanks to the fable, the known). It is even a semiotic wisdom (RH 49): just as U. Eco, in his **The Name of the Rose**, places the interpretation of 'signs' – traces – at the center, so too in this Ancient fable the interpretation of signs is central (but incorporated into fate analysis (RH 135): the cosmos in which we situate ourselves, – the society within which we live, they are sinister. (As in the ballad); they give rise to a feeling of insecurity.

But only one reaction, the strong one, stands up to it (RH 50: ABC - theory); 89 (stimulus/ response)): the 'fox' acts as Herodotus, namely, either through 'autopsia' his own investigation or through 'maituria' the testimony of others, he seeks the traces of danger. -- so as not to fall for it.

Decision:

Without the moral lesson, i.e. the regulative-universal model, the fable is blind; without the story, i.e. the appliqué-singular model, the fable is empty.

(ii) In the second fable, the last sentence is a verse by Menander of Athens (-342/-291; -- from which we know that the text dates from after that time), a famous playwright of comedies. It is a typical 'mythological moral lesson': In ancient myth, which has not yet been hollowed out, the deity (with all kinds of 'mythical' creatures) appears whenever a transgression occurs (as we just saw in Herodotus; RH 143: kuklos): parricide is a transgression.

Once again, the fable (mythical fable) is an analysis of fate: whoever inflicts the 'fate' of being murdered upon his father may, because of one mythical power or another (RH 128, 135), expect a corresponding 'fate'.

Once again: without the moral lesson, the regulative model, the mythical fable remains a blind text without 'perspective'; without the singular little narrative, the abstract moral lesson remains empty.

Note-- *M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit* ,I; Tübingen, 1927, 1949-6, 191/196 (The Fable of the Cura (Sorge)), proves that even a Fundamentalontologist like him can find insights in a fable.

The text contraction. (147/152)

Bib1. st.:

-- Y. Balloni, *Method de contraction et de synthèse de textes* (*Concours d'entrée des grandes écoles*), Paris, 1983-2;

-- J. Moreau, *La contraction et la synthèse de textes* , Paris, 1977; -- Editions Marketing, *Contraction et synthèse de textes A l'entrée des grandes écoles* (*Epreuves intégrales des concours*), Paris, 1983.

In recent years, in France, the traditional treatise has been replaced by the singular ('contraction') or the plural ('synthese') contraction.

Appl. model

The Ed. Marketing, oc,5/8, give the following specimen. -HEC 79 (Polytechnique).

Roger Caillois (1913/1978), * *L'esprit des sectes* *—in four hundred words. Highlight in doing so

(i) the main ideas and **(ii)** the author's train of thought (*'l' articulation de la pensée'*). -- Indicate the number of words used at the end of your copy.

Note: Notices the quantification of the text in correct numbers.

Given: the text by Caillois;

Requested: a quantified report of a text-reducing nature.

Behold the task.

Appl. model

ESCA 79. -- Duration: three hours. -- Summarize the following text (...) in four hundred words. -- On the manuscript, candidates must indicate the number of words used in the margin using 'slices of fifty lines' (all fifty lines), -- directly opposite the line corresponding to that number.

The total number of words used is stated at the end of the copy. -- An overshoot of ten percent is permitted. Above 440 words, however, one point will be deducted for every ten-word increment during correction. -- The correctors take the execution into account (oc, 109/113).

Specification.

Y. Stalloni, oc,7, specifies: usually the point deduction is one point for each section (= text part) – one point out of a total of twenty – for every 'section' of ten words above the tolerance threshold. If, for example, 400 words are required, the margin is 40 (deviating up to 360 or 440). From 359 or 441 words

(too few or too many), the candidate loses one point; from 359 or 441 words (too few or too many), he loses two. -- Conclusion: a hefty requirement to pass.

RE148

Definition (regulatory model).

J. Moreau, oc, defines 'contraction' (simple text contraction) as follows.

Given: one text;

Requested: reduce this to one third, one fourth, one fifth, etc., of its length.

The 'synthèse' (multiple text contraction): here the relationship is 'many-unambiguous'.

Given: more than one text;

Requested: present these texts in an abbreviated form. And do so from the perspective of their unity (cohesion, similarity), -- either by subject or by treatment.

This means that text shortening concerns both the 'historiè' (the content, the 'elements' of the subject matter discussed in the text) and the 'logos' (the arrangement (= plan, structure, train of thought)) and the design (stylization), -- unless stated otherwise in the assignment.

The working method.

Suppose you are faced with such a task. What are you going to do? -- Y. Stalloni offers the following advice.

(1).-- Read the text in its entirety first.

Stalloni says that one needs about 30 to 40 minutes for 4,000 words.

Note: We concur with this advice: whoever fails to do so (and immediately begins with the partial analysis) risks disregarding the principle of economy (since the Late Scholastic Petrus Aureolus (Pierre d'Auriol; +1322): one gets lost in details. The principle of economy states: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" (Existing entities (points of an analysis, for example) should not be multiplied, except when necessary).

In short: don't do with 'more' what you can do with 'less'.

The initial comprehensive reading of your text will allow you to discover main ideas, main impressions, and important parts.

(2).-- Analyze the text sections afterwards .

Stalloni: **a** . first summarize the larger parts of the text (which entails an insight into the plan, the structure); **b**. subsequently summarize the paragraphs (= parts of the text, each containing just one thought). **c**. Summarize the entire train of thought after the summary of each paragraph.

Note: For point **c** , we would make a small reservation: yes, if one summarizes the entire line of thought separately.

Small-scale model. (149/150)

Library st.: *G. Niquet, Structurer sa Pensée/ Structurer sa phrase* , Paris, 1978, 10/12.

Given: a set of shorter texts;

Requested: display this text in a shortened form.

RE149

(A)1 . The TV runs late at night: it is often partly responsible for our morning fatigue.

(A) 2. Not a muscle is moved anymore! Moving around to experience something else or to meet fellow human beings: out of the question! One sits, glued to the TV screen, gaping (...).

(A)3. The human being as a television viewer is engaged in a merely passive introduction to the universe: he/she receives information via the TV, but does not actively inform himself/herself.

(A)4. The TV images swirl across the screen like gusts of wind (...). The world becomes a whirlwind, a vortex. Like falling leaves, the news reports, once passed on, are swept along.

(A)5. What is real and what is purely imagined—it all merges: Stendhal (= Henri Bayle, this 'Stendhal' (1783/1842; French novelist)) right next to Georges Pompidou (1911/1974; French president 1969/1974); (...) Don Juan (legendary figure; perhaps once a Spanish nobleman, Don Juan Tenerio, who lived in Seville during the 16th century) falls in love with Sylvie Vartan (current French actress). (...) Culturally speaking, it is full-on 'Flemish carnival'!

(A)6. Tell me how you spend your free time, and I will tell you to what type of culture you belong (so says a sociologist). Applied to television processing, this phrase shows us that Sunday TV programs offer a possible measure of the dissemination of television culture. They range from the Western in the

afternoon to the tearjerker performance in the evening. What disappointing mediocrity, spread across wretched scenarios, scripts, intentions, and images on the TV -screen! It all comes down to killing time. Result: precisely when viewership is particularly high, one encounters a massively distributed, tasteless mediocrity.

(A)7. A TV report ('reportage'; RH 143) never appears on the TV screen in its entirety and without 'explanation' ('commentary'). The TV reporter limits his/her footage to a narrow selection and adds his/her own interpretation. It is immediately crystal clear: the TV imposes its viewpoint and its value judgment regarding the events on us.

(B)1. Sometimes people think that TV images come across directly and are processed passively. The reality is different: one member of the family wants a sports broadcast, another a film, yet another technology or theatre. The media enthusiast is, at the same time, a media interpreter, indeed, a media critic. Far from constantly compartmentalizing them within their own perspective, TV can also prompt family members to discuss among themselves.

RE150

(B)2. The popularity of broadcasts about medicine should come as no surprise: these broadcasts address a need among viewers -- the need to obtain information regarding medicine. (...).

(B)3. Television makes world literature available to the public. Something that – without television – would never have reached beyond a small circle of interested parties.

(B)4. I am a teacher of French literature. One day my students surprised me: they were engaged in a dispute about **Le rouge et le noir** (a novel by *Stendhal* (1831)). I was curious (...): they had, lo and behold, seen a film – the evening before – based on the said novel. My bookseller told me that, besides young people, others had done the same; moreover, sales of the book had increased significantly since then. The same thing happened after **Germinal** (from the series **Les Rougon-Macquart** (1885) about the life of the miners, – by the Naturalist *Emile Zola* (1840/1902). (...). – That concludes the text presented.

Your report.

(1) According to the Stalloni method, you have now read the text as a

whole.

Note: The lettering and numbering that we have added on our own initiative is intended to make your analysis proceed more smoothly, just this once. Could you already capture the main idea(s), together with the main impression (axiological), in a concise, summarizing title? In such a way that parts (A) and (B) are included in that title?

(2) Always the Stalloni method: can you, on a separate piece of paper (be practical), summarize the train of thought (= arrangement, order of thoughts) - if necessary paragraph by paragraph - summarizing (it is a text condensation)?

(3) Compare, incidentally: (A)3/ (A)7,-- (A)3/ (B)1,-- (A)4/ (A)5,-- (B)1/ (B)2, 3, 4. What emerges from this application of the comparative method? **4)** Could you, in terms of 'thesis' and 'argument', formulate the entire text (summarized, of course)? See RH 86. -(5).

Count the words of both the assignment text and your summary.

RE151

Applicative models. (151/152)

(1).-- The presentation of a book.

Suppose a publisher asks you to 'announce' a book on the cover. What are you going to do? There must be a few lines and value (make the two main points ('commonplaces') of a treatise) 'take root' with the public (RH 11) - the quintessential theme of all rhetoric. Here is a paradigm. -

On the cover of *Gaël Fain, translated by Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie*, Paris, 1951-1, 1984-2, the following report (text summary) can be found.

a. *Joseph Aloys Schumpeter* was born in Austria in 1883 and 1950, died in the USA. He is considered one of the best economists of our time. He was the undisputed leader of the Vienna School. Later, he became a professor at Harvard University. He quickly gained international recognition.

b. His famous work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, London, 1942, is considered one of the foundational works on modern economics. It offers an unparalleled analysis of economic phenomena as we experience them. -- Can Capitalism survive? Can Socialism succeed? The author provides an answer

to both questions. Meanwhile, he offers a foreshadowing of the development of our economy in the world of tomorrow.

Note-- The two commonplaces of a book offer are, of course:

a. the author of the text, **b.** the very briefly outlined content of his book. -
- Which we clearly find in the above announcement.

(2) -- USA: 'Fast Food' of California culture.

Journal de Genève 03.11.1981.-- Santa Monica,1(AFP).

“So many books; so little time!”-- Two Californian publishers wanted to solve this dilemma: they are publishing a cassette that allows you to 'read' ten classic works in ten minutes.

This cassette is intended for the Yuppies, -- young American careerists, who are always short on time and are keen on an easily acquired culture. ---
“The sales of books recorded on cassette are increasing in the USA. We thought it was high time to bring them all together.” Thus Jim Becker (31).

With “ten classics in ten minutes,” it is possible to find out in six hundred seconds what *Moby Dick*, *Gone with the Wind*, *Robin des Bois*, *The Grapes of Wrath*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Gatsby*, *A Tramway Named Desire*, *Alice in Wonderland*, *Oliver Twist*, and *the Odyssey* are about .

RE152

These text contractions are read aloud by an actor known for his speaking speed. They each last sixty seconds.

Except for *Gone with the Wind* and *Gatsby* , which are given 0.48 and 0.75 seconds more respectively. “The 'great literature' needs this additional half second,” explains Andy Meyer (32).

Some literature lovers might well protest upon learning that *Gejaagd door de wind* undergoes a—indeed astonishing—textual contraction: the work is condensed into three sentences—with a total of three hundred and fifty words. Impossible: to condense *War and Peace* into sixty-five seconds.

The textual constraints imposed by Becker/Meyer on text length apparently also have their limits. For example, *War and Peace* does not belong to the 'Ten Classics': it was simply impossible to condense Lev Tolstoy's text within sixty-five seconds.

Tropological bonus.

'Tropology' is one sub-section of stylistics (RH 12, 38, 70, 93ff., 99, 101, 137, 142). -- The tropes are metaphor, metonymy, - synecdoche. --

C. Stutterheim, **Het begrip 'Metaphor'* ; Amsterdam, 1941, 517,-- cited in A. Mussche, **Nederlandse poëtica* , Brussels, 1948, 49, shows us how the metaphor is based on text contraction.

- a.1. Colonel A. fought in Aceh as bravely as a lion.
- a.2. Col. A. was as brave as a lion.
- a.3. Col. A. fought like a lion.
- a.4. Col. A. was like a lion.

A comparison works up to this point.

Now the metaphor:

- b.1. Col. A. was a lion.
- b.2. Col. A., the lion of Aceh, ...
- b.3. This lion....

Decision.

Both tropology and, for example, the Californian text contraction types cited above prove that the concept of "report," in the sense of "text-shortened report," constitutes a fixed component of both the ancient language (the metaphor is known to all Primitives) and the currently evolving language, which is intended for, for example, hasty-living contemporaries attuned to solid information.

A. T'Jampens, 9730 Nazareth

Deo trino et uno Mariaeque gratias maximas (03.04.1989)

Contents:

Introduction . -- 01/05

(The 'new illiteracy'; bibliographic sample; First descriptions).

1. Is the academic discipline separable from 'eloquence'? 06/10

2. The divisions of the rhetorical act 11/16
(textuological and dramaturgical rhetoric).

3. The origin ('genesis') of Greek rhetoric. 17/27
(Homeric era; the 'polis' (Thales of Miletus);
The Sicilian agonistic; the trivium)

4. Rhetoric in the sense of literary studies. -- 28/37

(The Augustan period/ Deuterosophy;
the more recent textuology (auxiliary sciences).

5. Rhetoric as information or communication theory. -- 38/51

(Message giver/message/message receiver; semiotics; significant;
Theory of Interpretation (German Hermeneutics/ Peirce's theory of interpretation);
ABC theory).

6. The Discourse Theory. -- 52/59

(Definition; the artery; typology; -- task-hermeneutics
(= task description) given/ requested + analytical and
lemmatic-analytic method).

6.1. Theory of Treatise: existence/ essence. -- 60/65

(M. Mead: The Coming of Age in Samoa; -- Derek Freeman).

6.2. Theory Theory: problem hermeneutics (thematics). -- 66/73

(Given (theme)/ requested (issue). -- the problem state
(Question state); themes (antepredicative and predicative
Topics)).

6.3. Theory of Dissertation: Topic (Commonplace Theory). -- 74/81

(Epistemological and axiological - commonplaces; --
Existence/ essence and circumstances; -- the Chreia; -
Essential definition; enumeration (classification, typology).

6.4. Theory of Treatise: Logic and Methodology. -- 82/91

(Providing logically rigorous proof or, at least, making a proposition
credible; -- proving (object-bound/subject-bound); reception (Peirce's four
types of thinking); -- syllogistics (J. Lukasiewicz's schema: deductive and
reductive); - designing a theory; -- natural science and humanities).

6.5. -- Theory of Treatise: Pathos. -- 92/10

(Pathos: emotional argumentation in messenger/message and message
receiver; axiological commonplaces
(Scheler; Bettermann). -- persuasion; -- salesmanship).

7. The theory of description. --- 106/121

8. The theory of story (narratives, narratology). -- 122/140

9. Reporting. -- 141/152