

Text 20. An outline of the philosophy of Jaques Derrida

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20.1. Context.

Jacques Derrida (1930/2004) was a French philosopher known for a form of deconstructionism. We limit ourselves strictly to the essence of J. Derrida's thought, who is regarded as one of the most characteristic thinkers of our current era.

Bibl . st. : Theo de Boer et al., *Modern French Philosophers*, Kempen/Kapellen, 1993. -- The booklet comprises eight contributions by eight staff members at the Free University of Amsterdam.

Given. Traditional ontology, insofar as it claims a fixed foundation (basis) that functions as a unifying viewpoint for the totality of all that exists. In other words: the 'foundationism' (or 'fundamentalism' or 'integrism') characteristic of our traditional Western philosophy.

Requested. -- An unmasking of precisely that claim or 'pretension' to possess a 'reason' that grasps such an all-encompassing foundation and summary of everything. -- Or, if you will: the uncovering of the potential limits of such a claim.

Discussed are: M. Foucault (1928/1984), who, following in the footsteps of G. Bataille and M. Blanchot, attempts to refute all-encompassing power thinking;

J. Derrida, who, especially in the footsteps of Heidegger and de Saussure, unmasks and 'dismantles' (déconstruction) logocentrism, which claims to be the expression of a reason containing an all-encompassing (transcendental) insight into everything (being);

J. -Fr, Lyotard (1924/1998), who criticizes the claim to all-encompassing narratives (conceptions of human history such as the sacred history of the Bible or the modern belief in progress of enlightened minds) as invalid (dismantling of meta-narratives);

J. Kristeva (1941) and L. Irigaray (1939) who unmask phallocracy, the claim of male thought as all-encompassing insight into everything; J. Baudrillard (1929/2007) who unmasks the claim of our current communication as a communication of 'empty' signs (the simulation culture);

E. Levinas (1905/1995), who dismantles the all-encompassing 'egology' (self-centered philosophy)—a conception of an all-encompassing (transcendental) self-consciousness with the claim to valid insight into everything, characteristic of E. Husserl—in the name of the other in the Other (God); P. Ricoeur (1913), who approaches the entire tradition “with profound suspicion”.

Guido Vanheeswyck, in *Streven*, states that the terms 'postmodernism' and 'deconstructionism' (the latter term certainly fits Derrida) do not clearly reflect the true content of the work. He sticks with Woldring, who uses the term “hermeneutic philosophers” in his introduction. The reason: virtually all those discussed take text (by predecessors) as a given, prioritizing as what is requested a. an interpretation (interpretation, meaning-making) b. that unmasks.

Note -- Which gives us yet another variant of the Ancient Greek term 'paraphrasis' explanation (commentary). But then in one specific sense, namely the critique of the claims of traditional thought.

Note -- Let one not think that the scheme of the professors at the Free University of Amsterdam is the only one. There are other books on contemporary philosophy. -- Such as an issue of the French alternative review *Autrement* titled 'A quoi' pensent los philosophes ?' -- About thirty contributions attempt to outline the main points of contemporary themes (the subjects discussed) and issues (those questioned or problems connected to those subjects). The striking themes are, namely,

(1) Modernity (Derrida, Habermas define “the modern” (especially in art) as anything that constitutes a radical break with Western tradition(s));

(2)a. the foundations of the specialized sciences (physics and chemistry, biology, humanities) (the logical-mathematical sciences but also the business sciences mentioned above put forward starting points, axioms (postulates), which constitute the foundations that are tested in a foundational study);

(2)b1. Ethics (morality) (our societies struggle with questions of conscience - for example regarding gene manipulation, for example regarding chemical weapons) - : in the name of which values (pre-established goods) shall we allow our conscience to be formed?)¹

(2)b2 . The law (in our societies there is both right and wrong - let us think of migrants: in the name of which legal system shall we create the law?).

Or a V. Descombes, *Philosophie analytique versus philosophie continentale* , in : *Critique (Revue gén. , des publ . franc. et étra ngères)* 1987, mars. 240/254 (t. xlii, n. 478). –

In Anglo-Saxon countries, thinking is 'analytic': (traditional) logic (which thematizes concepts (classes), judgments (propositions), and reasoning) serves as a 'foundation' to test the statements of philosophers and the like. On the European continent, thinking is 'hermeneutic' (meaning one prioritizes a given, e.g., a text or a fact, in order to interpret it), because the thinker regards himself as a meaning-giver who attempts either to grasp the meaning or to construct a new one. In that movement, “poststructuralism” is the term often applied to French continental thinkers when they interpret (see above) – as meaning-givers who unmask. Analytical philosophy prioritizes a scientific ideal; hermeneutic philosophy prioritizes something like a literary ideal.

Note -- J, Nida-Rümelin , Hrsg ., *Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen from Adorno bis Wright* , Stuttgart, Kröner , 1991, discusses more than a hundred philosophers (biographical sketch, works, reception, epigones); Husserl, the intentional phenomenologist, is the godfather of the main phenomenological trend and Frege (Gottlob Frege (1848/1925; logically structured mathematics) is the pioneer of the analytical style of philosophizing. The emphasis is on Martin Heidegger (1889/1976) *foundational research of traditional ontology*) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889/1951; *logic in philosophy*), who each represent one of the main currents (Heidegger: phenomenology; Wittgenstein: analytical thinking) .

Guy Sorman , who in the meantime published *Sortis du socialisme* , Paris, 1990 (the collapse of socialist systems as a harbinger of nationalisms , strong

charismatic figures (populists) and dictatorships endangering democracy), gives us *Les vrais penseurs de notre temps*, Paris, Fayard, 1989:

1. Carl Sagan, James Lovelock (cosmology),
2. Ilya Prigogino, René Thom (chaology, complexity theory),
3. Stephen Gould, Edward O. Wilson, Motoo Kimura (evolutionary theory),
4. Claude Levi-Strauss, Noam Chomsky, Zhao Fusan (cultural criticism);
5. Bruno Bettelheim, Thomas Szasz, Marvin Minsky (free think),
6. Ernst Nolte, Edward Teller (polemology),
7. Milovan Djilas, Youri Afanassiev, Kenji Nakagami (Communism, Fascism.),
8. Friedrich von Hayek, Murray Rothbard (liberalism, libertarianism (anarchism)).
9. Octavio Paz, Ashis Mandy, MS Swaminaten (underdevelopment).
10. René Girard, C. Claude Tresmontant (The Crisis of Disbelief).
11. Karl Popper. Ernst Gombrich. Isaiah Berlin (foundation crisis).

Sorman met the thinkers personally and provides a short biography. A gold mine. The work strongly puts a Derrida into perspective.

20.2. Learn

We will now discuss the main features of Derrida's theory (1930/2004).

Library st. : B. Delfgouw/ Fr. van Peperstraten. *Concise History of Philosophy (From Thales to Lyotard)*. Kempen/ Kapellen, 1993, 261/265 (Jacques Derrida).

20.2.1. The ontology of “la difference”.

Derrida himself came up with this neologism for it.

a. 'Différer' – in French dictionaries (Derrida is obsessed with dictionaries) means

1. differences (“Mon opinion diffère de la vôtre”);
2. Suspensive to postpone (“La discussion est différée à la semaine prochaine”). Derrida hopes to combine the two meanings by introducing the term 'différance' (not: difference)!

b. If I want to understand myself—define myself—then I must know my ancestors (for they partly caused my being), I must know my wife and children (for they helped shape my being and will continue to do so), I must, for example, know my studies (for they helped bring about my being—that which

I am), I must know my goals (for they help determine my being—that which I am and will be). And so on.

Indeed (says Derrida): the being, which was / is / will be all that was / is / will be present in terms of reality (being), is only exhaustively or fully knowable insofar as I also know all that differs from me! For all that differs from my being helps that – to bring my being into existence, to realize it, to make it into 'being'.

It implies, strictly logically, that full ontological knowledge of my being must be postponed until ... later (when I also know and have processed all those different details). -- Since everything that differs from me counts towards knowing me, I am compelled to postpone full—exhaustive—knowledge of what I was/am/will be.

In Derrida 's usage: what a signifier (Sa), which means a sound (= term) within a language system.

1. can only be defined by differences between that term - e.g. tree.

2. - and all that that term is not - e.g. the soil in which the tree stands rooted - (the sap in the trunk of the tree, in its branches, in its blossom, for example, contains elements that come from the soil), **2.** can only be fully (exhaustively) defined after everything that differs but counts towards the exhaustive definition is known; since we can actually never know this exhaustively, the definition, understood in this way, is postponed, indeed, perhaps permanently postponed.

Note -- In Derrida 's usage : from the tree, traces (des traces) run to everything that differs from the tree. Or, if you prefer: everything the tree is refers to everything the tree is not (but helps bring it into existence).

Or, in Derrida's terminology: the tree, in its entirety (all that it was, is, and will be), is present (' presence ') to our reason only when and insofar as the absent (that which differs from the tree) is thought along with it: in the language of paradoxes as Derrida likes to speak it, this sounds as follows: the traces (references) in the tree to what the tree is not but contributes to its existence are the absent 'presences' within it!

Conclusion: -- To know everything of the tree—or of myself (preceded)—also entails knowing the rest (the complement) of the totality of all that is, being. Such absolute ('metaphysical') knowledge is impossible and therefore “for later” (postponed).

Which does not prevent us from living, on a daily basis, with such a deferred knowledge. Only 'eristic' (conversation-loving) people—thinkers—like a Derrida, keep stumbling over the fact that they do not know everything about everything! They consider this the great void of traditional philosophy as ontology or metaphysics. For, in their eristic eyes, it acts as if it knows everything about everything. Which, of course, has actually never really been true.

In everyday life, we encounter deferred knowledge when we face a problem that we cannot (or cannot entirely) solve ourselves: when the water pipes in the house stop working, we call in “an expert” (who specializes in our deferred knowledge)—e.g., a plumber. Likewise, when we are ill, the doctor represents our deferred knowledge regarding health in sickness. Plato, in his ideal state (*Politeia*), speaks of the 'genesis,' the formation, of the state. The inadequacy of the individual to satisfy his necessary needs necessitates calling upon fellow human beings. Many things are necessary, with the result that “while one calls upon this person for help and that person for that, necessity brings many together in one dwelling place to help one another collectively.” This kind of cohabitation is given the name 'polis,' city-state.

Cf. *Politeia* 2 :369C. -- If classes exist at all, this shows that the individual—even if he were the 'dialectic' (understand: thinking human being) in person—cannot think and live self-sufficiently. 'Traces' refer to fellow men. -- Now, Derrida attributes to the great ontological tradition an ideal or claim to self-sufficiency that is certainly not readily found in Plato.

Note -- One model of comprehensive knowledge is found in Hugo Symons, *Klare taal*, Zingem, Vita, 1993-3.

The cover literally reads as follows: -- “Did you know that practically all diseases can be cured? That within a few days you can be permanently relieved of migraines, palpitations, and headaches caused by sweating? That your arm or leg never needs to be amputated, except in the case of a serious accident, - - exceptionally? That your stomach, intestines, uterus, breast, prostate or appendix, your child’s tonsils, or any other body part can remain comfortably in place and does not need to be cut away if you make good use of this book—which has been written with much love?”

Several priests and nuns hailed this book as “a true gift from heaven,” and rightly so, for thousands of patients declared incurable recovered in no time

by using the more than twenty editions—provisional editions—that have already appeared of this masterpiece. -- If the doctor tells you that you have only a few days or weeks to live, do not believe him! Doctors in the 20th century know nothing about healing. The medical industries, the pharmaceutical industries abuse their power and mislead and manipulate doctors, specialists, and pharmacists. They encourage medical professionals to prescribe treatments and medicines to the sick that rarely cure them but usually make them sicker. -- “Clear Language” will not only teach you what to stay away from and steer clear of, but above all show you the way to a lightning-fast and lasting cure. In this book, you will learn more about curing diseases and staying healthy than during eight years of classical medicine at university. “Plain language” will eventually replace virtually all doctor’s prescriptions you might need during your lifetime.” – So much for the self-introduction of someone who labels himself a “master wizard.”

Well then, Derrida presupposes something like an omniscient philosopher in the long tradition he is dismantling. He knows, fundamentally, that he is dismantling a caricature (otherwise he cannot deconstruct), but he persists in this—one book after another (God knows how many he has already written),—one article after another. Derrida attributes the claim— *prétention* (in French)—of a Symons regarding healing and health to the traditional ontologist, but regarding “being,” all that is (all that was, is, and will be). The handbooks of metaphysics (ontology) are then “a gift from heaven” in which all issues—virtually all—are made solvable in a fitting manner. -- Let this not be forgotten in the following pages,

A small model of deconstruction. -- *Bibl . St. : M. Lisse, Le motif de la déconstruction et ses portions politiques*, in: *Tijdschr. v. filosofie* 52 (1990) 12 (June), 230/250. -- Lisse, *ac*, 247, cites: Micha Brumlik poses the question to Derrida regarding responsibility for Nazism and concentration camps.

Now watch closely how Derrida responds: “I am suspicious of the metaphysical concept of 'responsibility': although incorporated into the language regarding human rights (in the presuppositions of every democracy, -- in Western ethics and politics), that metaphysical concept of 'responsibility' has unfortunately been unable to prevent Nazism and Auschwitz.”

We now quote in French : “Très souvent, au contraire, le discours nazi a utilisé l' axiomatique qu' on lazy opposition. mais, à l'opposé : un réseau de complicité de toutes fut créé "Ce qui nous aujourd'hui si mauvaise conscience". -- Barrels We together .

1. The term 'metaphysical' is not used in a neutral sense, but in a 'suspect' (to be phased out) sense. That is Derrida's prerogative, but whether metaphysics as such is thereby correctly characterized is unproven: after all, there exists a good and a bad metaphysics (just as all human products can be good and bad).

2. The reproach Derrida levels against the 'metaphysical' concept of 'responsibility' is: it could not prevent the emergence of Nazism (because "the intellectuals" with their 'language use' proved not efficient enough). -- The traditional thinker will respond to this by stating that the powerlessness of a 'metaphysical' concept does not yet devalue the concept itself. On the contrary: by meditating on it and putting it into practice, much good can be achieved,

3. The language of the Nazis also employed the concept—the metaphysical—of 'responsibility' (think of: "We as responsible for the Germanic race...") in the reverse sense of the opponents (the democrats). That is correct. -- But to that the traditional metaphysician will reply: "Abusus non tollit" usum" (Misusing something does not imply that it cannot be used well). In other words, Derrida, a priori opposed to metaphysics, does not turn the ineffective and abuseable nature of a metaphysical concept against the ineffective practices of those who employ that concept—nor against the misuse itself, but against the concept itself. As if that meager concept were 'responsible' for the ineffective use, and for the misuse of itself.

Where, then, is "la différence"? -- By association—regarding the metaphysical concept of 'responsibility', Derrida thinks of its ineffective and incorrect use— Derrida finds "a trace" from the concept to its incorrect and ineffective use, in such a way that the concept is held responsible. That, in a metaphysical treatise when discussing 'responsibility', one also speaks of its 'reception' (approach, influence) and use, is sensible. But the inability and the wild—ambiguous—uses of concepts are not yet those concepts themselves.

In other words: the term 'responsibility' "goes together with" irresponsibility, in the sense of the absence of 'responsibility' in the forms of ineffective and wrong 'responsibility', such that whatever differs from 'responsibility' actually belongs to it as its absence. With this, we do not have a complete understanding of 'responsibility', for God knows what different forms of it will yet emerge in the course of human history. We do, however, have a deferred understanding. – That is to say: we have at our disposal

virtually nothing of true (complete) understanding, in which a form of 'nihilism' lurks ('nihil' = nothing).

By linking the interpretations or meanings (it is a form of hermeneutics) to the concept of uses (associative method), and doing so with an emphasis on negative uses (such as inefficient use, reverse use, or interpretation), the deconstructive or dismantling method is established.

20.2.1.1. Finding meaning.

For hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, man is a meaning-giver.
-- Fundamentally, this can be done in two ways.

1. Meaning

When we attempt to grasp the 'meaning' of something—e.g., a metaphysical concept—we direct the intentionality of our mind towards that something (e.g., that concept) itself, towards itself. Thus, 'responsibility' can be viewed as a. a given b. treating a request or problem in such a way that, in solving the problem, one assumes one's responsibilities (the involvement of conscience). My child is sick: in conscience, I cannot abandon him to his fate (given: child; requested: cure illness; solution: knowing oneself obliged in conscience to do something about it).

2. Zinstichting.

Given: the same child; requested: help the sick child; solution: "I have neither the time nor the inclination for it." The confrontation between "sick child / one's own conscientious caregiving" is not done justice here.

From a Derridian perspective, the failure to perform a duty also belongs to the (complete, pragmatic) concept. What differs from it – in the form of omission (peccatum) omissionis (in scholastic language) – belongs to it. The negate (the negation) belongs to the concept itself. – Yet neglect is something that does not belong to responsible behavior in this regard , for it is the contradiction of it! The neglecting – dereliction of duty – introduces something else (difference) into the metaphysical concept of "responsible behavior"—yes, something contradictory (radical difference). But, in Derridian conceptual theory (which associates the concept with what people do with it), the neglect is, as it were, (an aspect of) the metaphysical concept itself. For – so he says – precisely for that reason – "he is suspicious of that concept".

Schematic.

1. The conception of meaning. -- With A (e.g. a metaphysical concept) I think A.

2. The founding of the sentence. -- With A, I think not so much of A as of B, especially as -A (not -A) in the forms of inefficient, reversed, or omissionary use of A. Something new, something different is introduced through the founding of the sentence.

3. Differential conceptual interpretation.

The conception of meaning of A immediately entails the construction of A such that $A = A + B$ (possibly, Derridian : preferably as - A). Which includes the completion of A. –

Note -- Phenomenology adheres to the conception of meaning: A is grasped and expressed purely as A, - according to the formula: given A; requested: the essential representation (conception of meaning) of A. The phenomenologist, in his purity, aims for the neutral concept that permits both meliorative and pejorative usage.

The tapering (difference) of the tapering (difference).

Bibl. s t.: Ger Groot , *Jacques Derrida* , Limited Inc., Evanston (Ill.), Northwestern University Press, 1989, in: Streven 1989: Dec., 271. -. In a brief book review, Groot, who is not unfavorably disposed towards Derrida , says the following.

1. -- J.L. Austin (1911/1960) was neither metaphysical nor analytically positivist . Moreover , he regards the analysis of ordinary language use as the starting point of philosophy. A central concept for him is 'speech act', language use as communication and interaction. J. Derrida , in the concluding article of his collection *Marges* (1972), discusses Austin's philosophy of speech acts.

JR Searle (1932/...), a philosopher of speech acts following in Austin's footsteps, attacked Derrida in a scathing article (1977), not only as a critic of Austin but as a differentialist . In the same journal, *Glyph*, Derrida responds to this with a very thorough dismantling of Searle's language-act thinking . -- The book under discussion partially reflects those discussions.

2. -- Following that book, Groot emphasizes something that interests us here and now. -- In a new afterword that Derrida adds to that discussion, Derrida takes a stand “more sharply than elsewhere” against “an overly anarchistic and lax interpretation of deconstruction”. Thus G. Groot.

Indeed: some epigones (one type of interpreter) of Derrida who imitate his method “quite often attribute the decomposition method to a. arbitrariness and b. total denial of any concept or criterion (*note*: *kritèrion* = means of knowledge) of the truth in one's shoes”. Groot calls this interpretation 'vulgarization'; it was promoted by American reception (= interpretation) – which is literary-theoretical rather than philosophical.

Consequence: confusion. -- Derrida 's response emphasizes the strictly philosophical nature of his deconstruction (Groot calls this “the quasi-transcendental depth dimension of Derrida's philosophical position”). -- If one forgets this, fatal misunderstandings are inevitable. Main misunderstanding according to Derrida : deconstruction would then erase all distinction—difference—between true and false concept and misunderstanding, concept and metaphor (*note*: *trope, metaphor, and metonymy are meant*). *The unambiguous correction sets the way towards the “serious guidance of Derrida 's texts ”.*

Derrida may not have opposed such vulgarization of his position in time.”

Our conclusion: -- “We are suspicious of the philosophies of *différance* incorporated into the language of Derrida and his followers”.

For that use of language—and thus Derrida himself—“could not prevent misunderstanding from being introduced”, indeed, “that people misused his axiomatics (voice presuppositions) to arrive at the opposite of his opinion”.

Which implies that his concepts of decline show traces of things he must vehemently reject as misconceptions (inefficient use, misuse). Which in turn implies that our understanding of his *différance* must be postponed, for it leads to inefficiencies and reversals that perhaps have not all seen the light of day yet, indeed, that may well persist in the future.

The fortunes of the differential concepts are therefore exactly the same as those of the metaphysical concepts. *Medice , cura teipsum* (physician, heal yourself).

Derrida : “in the name of”. -- During an interview with a journalist from *Le Monde* - *J. Derrida , Interview with Le Monde* , Paris, Ed. Le Découverte / Le Monde) - in 1984, Derrida was confronted with problems such as the Solidarnost uprising (the Christian- Solidarnist trade union) in Poland against the then-communist regime, the Red Army's war in Afghanistan to defend a 'brotherhood', the political situations in Salvador, Chile, -- in the Middle East, human rights in Turkey, the 'racist' tensions in the then-EEC (now the European Union),

20.2.1.2. The Gulf War (02.08.1990 / 01.03.1991).

Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, invades Kuwait, a neighboring country, which he labels “the nineteenth province of Iraq”. In doing so, he invokes the situation in Kuwait before the Western powers intervened in that region.

- “In the name of territorial integrity – Kuwait is, in his eyes, an integral part of Iraq” – Saddam Hussein thus invades. -- .

“Territorial integrity” can be viewed as a metaphysical concept, if only because some specialists on the region dismiss his opinion as incorrect. “In the name of injustice done to the Kuwaitis”—think of their national sovereignty (in 1899, Kuwait became independent from Turkey under British protection)—the Allies intervened and drove out the Iraqis. -- “National sovereignty” is also a metaphysical concept.

Derrida 's two-part reaction .

Derrida 's primary concern is not so much the precise analysis of the relevant data as an immediate response: “In an immediate response he would say—urgent problems allow nothing else—: ‘In the name of justice regarding political relations, I agree with the disenfranchised —the Kuwaitis—against the disenfranchised —the Iraqis.’” What he calls “ one opposition simple et radicale”.

His indirect reaction – later – is to confirm that immediate reaction: he does not want to “let the benefit (le bénéfice) inherent in the immediate reaction be lost” (in French: afin de ne pas perdre). le bénéfice de cette prize de position ”).

Therefore, above all: “Seek a place (note: viewpoint) where the encapsulation of the position is no longer possible” (in French: “ Rechercher des lieux”) or the recovery d'une prise de position quelconque n'est plus possible ”). What interests us here is that Derrida , just like the Iraqis and the

Kuwaitis, or the allies respectively, justifies “in the name of”. If one knows how J.-Fr. Lyotard criticized that “justification in the name of” from the perspective of the crisis of “the names” (“There are no longer any names in the name of which one justifies oneself”), then Derrida’s reaction comes across as ‘metaphysical’. For in the name of something that is open to many criticisms—deconstructible—he reacts “simply and radically”. Like many a person who knows nothing of deconstruction philosophy. Like the traditional metaphysician .

After all, to decide who is rightfully acting “in the name of,” there is—certainly in Derrida’s view—no higher authority standing outside the parties involved: both parties will therefore continue to defend, even in retrospect (in history books, for example), that they were “right.” They will continue to claim that the opponent was wrong.

On both sides with the necessary arguments. So that, taking the differences into account—we will postpone the correct concept of “equality” until later. Notwithstanding all this, Derrida responds “in the name of” abstract concepts. In that sense, he is and remains metaphysical.

Note -- A Platon (-427/-347) is certainly not Derrida 's great friend . Nevertheless, there is a text with which Derrida would agree.

*P. Foulquié , *La dialectique* , Paris, PUF, 1949, 21, discusses Plato ’s philosophizing (called 'dialectics') . -- After Plato has presented dialectics as “the ability to elevate oneself to the idea of ‘the good’ (note: value without qualification)”, he seems to conceive of it as “the ability to discuss”.*

To explain why, in his ideal state, future high magistrates are only trained in dialectics at an advanced age, he says: “It is really to be avoided that they develop a taste for dialectics while they are young.”

For you must have observed—I think—that young men, once they have been introduced to dialectics, misuse it, make a game of it. They use it to contradict one another incessantly. They imitate those who refute them and refute them in turn. They get absorbed in it—just like young dogs—in involving those they meet in that quarreling and tearing them apart by reasoning.” (*Politeia* 7 :539b.

words : Plato 's dialectics (ascending together towards the higher, the idea of the good, in dialogues) is not a panache or a miracle cure either. Plato realizes this very well.

The idea of 'dialectics', once one considers it together with the ways in which people deal with it (the concept encompasses not only its proper use but also its misuse, as Platon very explicitly states), is connected with its differences. Therefore, it is to be postponed.

Derrida —as we saw above—complains that he is misunderstood: it will be a comfort to him that the great founder of Western philosophy—whom he certainly does not hold dear to his heart—has already become very acquainted with the same thing: whether it concerns Platonic metaphysical concepts or differential ones, it amounts to the same thing in terms of reception and interpretations. Especially the negative ones.

20.2.1.3. Differential thinking and the spirit of the times.

Regarding *Ph. Buyck/ K. Humbeeck , ed., *Deconstructie (Kleine diergaarde voor kinderen van nu)**, Antwerp, Restant, 1987, P. Pelckmans states in **Streven**: “Jacques Derrida ’s conceptual apparatus fits perfectly with a literary enterprise where the aim is to unmask language, to expose its pseudo-evidence and corresponding naturalness.” Pelckmans specifies how this unmasking proceeds: “Every attempt to arrive at unambiguous, definitive statements does violence to the language in which they are formulated: words, sentences—texts—are always inherently ambiguous . It never truly succeeds in bringing these untouchable elements to a single exclusive denominator. Apparent successes in that direction rest fatally on mutilating artifices.”

Note -- When one hears people speak like this, then — what we have called 'sense-taking' above — the unambiguous meaning of something — a given, e.g. a text — is always 'sense-building'. The ambiguity of everything is so massive and overwhelming that the pure grasping of what is given can be postponed. -- Pelckmans adds to this: “In my opinion, the need to emphatically cast everything on shaky ground has less to do with any intrinsic uncontrollability of language than with a historically interpretable climate of the times”. The book he briefly discusses situates Derrida in opposition to Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), the man of “ God is dead” (the death of the metaphysical concept of 'God'), S. Freud (1856/1939), the founder of psychoanalysis (conscious and rational life governed by the unconscious and subconscious parts of the soul), E. Husserl (1859/1938), the father of intentional phenomenology (consciousness directed, in a direct manner, at all

that manifests itself), M. Heidegger (1889/1978), the founder of fundamental ontology. These four minds have already initiated the decline to some extent, but Derrida thoroughly radicalizes the beginnings he finds among them.

Note -- When one learns this, it is surely not surprising that, especially in America, epigones of Derrida reinterpret his differential theory of concepts as anarchistic (libertarian) , -- to his great displeasure. Undeniably, there is an ingredient in Derrida that is anarchic .

20.2.1.4. Derrida's Jewish origins.

Oliver Tapli , *Les enfants d'Homer (The Heirloom grec et l' Occident)*, Paris, Laffont , 1990 (// *Greek Fire* (1989)) 201, writes the following.

Whether one likes Derrida or not, the construction theory has charmed students. -- Especially in the USA (where Derrida is currently working (1987)). In turn, he is surrounded by followers . -

At a conference in Los Angeles in 1987, he examined his own ideas from an autobiographical perspective. He asserts the following. As an Algerian Jew but raised in France, he felt like “an exile in his own country.” He was driven to create a space liberated from the three great traditions alien to his own intellectual life: Greece, Christianity, and German idealism.

Note -- The term “German idealism” primarily refers to the philosophies of Joh. G. Fichte (1762/1814), Friedr . W. Schelling (1775/1854), and especially Georg Fr. Hegel (1770/1831). Of the three, Schelling was also a romantic thinker.

It is not surprising that, when one sets oneself against the three European ways of thinking just mentioned, one is forced into 'dismantling': it is indeed as if Derrida cannot digest those three non-Jewish currents, as if they weigh heavily on his stomach, as if he never tires of expelling them. That explains a great deal.

20.2.1.5. Derrideanism and feminism.

The cited book by Buyck/ Humbeeck et al., **Deconstructie **, Antwerp, 1987, focuses on the domains in which the demolition theory applies: literatology (literary studies), medicine, and feminist literary studies.

Kristien Hemmereichs, *Feminism and Literary Studies (Women Read the Tradition)*, in: *Streven* 54 (1986): Dec., 237/246, writes the following: “The

French feminists are obviously not the first and the only ones who have undermined the position of authority of the autonomous and sovereign subject. One of the great driving forces of this movement is Jacques Derrida .

For him, language is the quintessential field of research to demonstrate how the authority of the subject/the father/the author is threatened and undermined. His attention is also directed not only to the mechanisms that structure the text and make it a bearer of unambiguous meaning, but also to “the cracks” in the text—the mechanisms that disrupt and destabilize the transmission of meaning and turn the text into a breeding ground for multiplicity and ambiguity. Language escapes the control of “the subject” and disrupts the mechanisms that are supposed to guarantee coherence and unity.

Linguistic utterances are not the expression of a meaning that precedes and/or transcends the utterance, but a play of signifiers (*note*: ' signifiant ' (Sa), or a sound with a meaning (' signifié ' (Sé)) in which the moment of meaning is postponed again and again . The subject has no grip on this process.

Note -- This difficult text will become clearer further on. In the meantime, this: Hemmereichs, as a feminist, speaks of the dominance of “the man” in our traditional culture, who is “the subject” par excellence, as he, with his consciousness of things, imposes his viewpoint on the entire culture and even on the nature surrounding us. Traditionally, the man was regarded as 'autonomous', meaning he has his own domain where he is lord and master, and at the same time as 'sovereign', meaning he is considered the vanguard and role model even outside his domain, e.g. for women.

Feminism rebels against that form of 'authority'—though not necessarily against all authority per se—by interpreting things in a feminine way (hermeneutics): the same given leads to both a masculine interpretation and, thanks to feminism, a feminine interpretation. It is ambiguous

Kristien Hemmereichs formulates the main complaint as follows (ac , 237) “Wie konnte die Frau wirklich leben in einer Welt an deren Gestaltung sie nicht teilhat?” (*Susanne Meyer, Jeder ist eine Frau* , in: *Die Zeit* 1986: 12 Sept.), This is one of the many questions that Susanne Mayer formulates following a recent women's festival week in Hamburg.

Actually, it is not a question but a confirmation of the feminist standpoint: women live in a culture that is not their own—in a society they did not help design. The political structures, the institutions, the consecrated art and literature are products of male thought. Forms of culture and society are made to male standards. For women, our civilization is no home. Even the concept of 'woman' is, as *Simone de Beauvoir* (1908/1986; *Le deuxième sexe*, Paris, 1977) argued, a product of male thinking”.

Note -- This harsh language—it sounds as if women were completely driven out of the culture—is the position, understand: the interpretation, of the leading feminists -- without therefore representing the position of millions of other women who feel comfortable in her roles. But that position does fit within Derridian 'subversion'.

Kr. Hemmereichs concludes as follows: “Feminism raises questions that reach much further than the equal rights of men and women. —

1. It is about much more than equal pay for equal work, equal study opportunities, equal opportunities in the labor market, -- however important these demands may be,

2. Feminism formulates questions that touch upon the foundations of Western thought and Western society. It sows doubt where complacent certainties prevail, and unmasks.

Note: The word is back! - values considered 'sacred' undermine truths held universally. - Hence, feminism concerns everyone, men as well as women.

Note -- One could say exactly the same of Derrida's differential standpoint: it touches upon the foundations of our Western culture, sows doubt where certainties prevail, -- unmasks values, -- reduces general truths to particular or individual ones. -- That is, therefore, the reason why Derrida provokes such vehement reactions, both pro and contra.

20.2.1.6. Allan Bloom on tapering hermeneutics.

Bloom is the radical defender, in the USA, of the classical tradition (from the Ancient Greeks). -- He was confronted with Derrida 's American style—against which Derrida himself, on account of its excessive anarchism, also reacts in the name of a 'orthodox' interpretation—and reacted vehemently. -- *Dl. Taplin* , **Les enfants d' Homère **, Paris, 1989, 198s., cites him.

Allan Bloom —as Taplin introduces—devotes a devastating paragraph to “the school of deconstruction”—“It is the final stage—without surprises, at least—on the road to the elimination of reason and to the denial of truth in the name of philosophy itself. The meaning-making activity of the reader is more important than the text read itself. Indeed, there is actually no 'text' anymore! There is nothing but interpretation.”

Consequence: what is most important, namely grasping the meaning of what the texts have to teach, is sacrificed to the meaning-creating, subjectively oriented person of that kind of interpreter who maintains that there is neither a text nor a reality to which that text applies. -- Such a cheaper reading method à la Fr. Nietzsche liberates us from the objective demands of works that could have liberated us from an atmosphere that is becoming increasingly suffocating.”

Note -- The anarchic (' misarchical ', to use Nietzsche's term) reinterpretation of Derrida 's position is an exaggerated form of dismantling. And the type of interpreting (reality in) the text is a caricature: yet there is an element of truth in it. In the sense that even Derrida shifts the emphasis away from objective reality and from the text concerning that objective reality to the one who—subjectively or not—interprets that reality and that text concerning that reality. That is, then, the “new hermeneutics”.

Explanation.

Bibl . st. : *H. Arvon . La philosophie allemande* , Paris, 1970, 116/120 (*L' hermeneutique*). -- 'Hermeneutics' is the skill of interpretation or interpretation. interpret (translate).

1. Traditionally, hermeneutics was an auxiliary science (in biblical studies and theology, in jurisprudence) that helped answer the question: “How to actualize (old) texts in a (new) situation so that they are (still) applicable?”

Indeed: what can an ancient text by the prophet Isaiah mean for me, for us, for a Black African, for example? Or what application of a text from the

Napoleonic Code can be justified by a judge? One sees that 'hermeneuein', interpreting, is daily fare for theologians and jurists. But then in such a way that one first attempts to grasp the correct, objective meaning of the given text (conception of meaning; D. 10), -- in order to then grasp the current situation correctly and objectively (conception of meaning). So that, thanks to comparison (which does not mean 'equating' but rather 'confrontation'), the two conceptions of meaning are thought into one another to arrive at a meaningful structuring of meaning (D. 10) in which both conceptions of meaning come into their own, -- not subject to idiosyncratic, (imposed by others) orthodox (do not confuse 'orthodox' with 'sincere') or biased (a priori) structuring of meaning,

2. A revolution in the meaning-making of traditional hermeneutics is revealed in the posthumous work *Dialektik* (1839) by *Friedr. D. Schleiermacher* (1768/1834): thanks to the foundation of meaning, he makes 'hermeneutics' something new, namely the pedestal of philosophizing.

First at home in biblical interpretation," it now sounds as follows: Schleiermacher believes that the intellectual content (information) in a text—e.g., a Bible text—only becomes fully understandable insofar as one interprets it as part of the personal life of its writer. Understanding the “Sits im Leben”—the belonging in the life of the person writing the text—is therefore fundamental.

Note -- As a method of research, such hermeneutics is adopted by the historical school. FK von Savigny (1779/1861) is its founder, -- followed by J.G. Eichhorn, W. Grimm, and especially L. von Ranke. The objective is to attempt to penetrate what happened in the past by tracing as many details as possible.

Dilthey (1833/1911) represents a new revolution in hermeneutics with his * *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* * (1883). Life (cultural-historical life) is not 'explained' ('Erklären') without empathy, like inorganic nature (thanks to physics and chemistry), but 'understood' ('Verstehen') on the basis of empathy and sympathy. That life—for example, that of people in the past whose expressions we do not directly know—is not directly knowable. What Joh. G. Droysen (1808/1884), known for his * *Geschichte des Hellenismus* * (1877/1878), calls “the Überreste” (i.e., the historian's sources of knowledge, e.g., as witness remnants of the past), Dilthey calls 'Ausdrücke' (expressions). Of what? Of life. And indeed, in the first place of the soul life, of the life of the spirit (hence the term 'spiritual science'). A cultural landscape, a monument,

a legal text, an old folk song—a tape recording, a film report—all of that is a remnant that bears witness to the inner life of fellow human beings. Through those 'manifestations', 'expressions' of the 'spirit' ('soul life'), we know that spirit, that soul life that reveals or expresses itself within it.

“The expression (of life) is the bridge, in a certain sense, between living ('Erleben') and understanding ('Verstehen')”. Or again: “Understanding ('Verstehen') is a process in which we know inner living from signs given to us from outside ourselves—think of the remnants of witnesses—namely, the expressions ('Ausdrücke')”. Or again: “Erleben, Ausdruck, Verstehen: these three parts together constitute a single inseparable unity”. Thus *H. Diwald, Wilhelm Dilthey (Erkenntnis theorie und Philosophie der Geschichte)*, Göttingen/ Berlin/ Frankfurt, 1963, 153ff. (*Der Ausdruck als Mittelglied zwischen Erlebnis und Verständnis*),

4. In the trace of M. Heidegger (existential phenomenology) and R. Bultmann (1884/1976) (existential In biblical criticism), H.-G. Gadamer (1900/2002) develops his own hermeneutics in his *Wahrheit und Methode (Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik)*, Tübingen, 1960, in which the emphasis is less on the individual soul than at Schleiermacher, Dilthey and e.g. Emilio Betti.

With this, we hope that the concept of 'hermeneutics' (which itself represents a whole series of (re)interpretations (differences/deferred insight)) has become somewhat clearer. Derrida's hermeneutics, in particular, now stands out more clearly against that background. His hermeneutics is distinctly more rebellious, more 'subversive', as he sees himself as “an exile within his own country”, namely Western cultural history.

In that respect resembling the feminists who find themselves radically alienated within a human country.

A comparison.

Hans Blumenberg, Das Lachen des Thrakerin (Eine Urgeschichte der Theorie), Frankfurt aM., Suhrkamp, 1987, connects with the in *Plato's Theaitos dialogue* Anecdote told: Thales of Miletus (-624/-545; the first typical philosopher) becomes absorbed in examining the firmament and, through carelessness, falls into a pit. His Thracian maid burst into laughter at this.

Blumenberg sees in – interpretation – Thales the 'theoria', the investigative immersion in, and in – interpretation – the maid and her everyday

'Lebenswelt'. Two interpretations, among others possible, present themselves to Blumenberg :

a. the alienation from life and the earth of philosophizing is exposed there in its uselessness as something to laugh at;

b. the claims—pretensions—of philosophy provoke the laughter of “common sense”. -- A quote from Heidegger fits here: 'Philosophy is that kind of thinking that makes maidservants burst into laughter'. -- Blumenberg's book is devoted to the interpretations—from Plato to Heidegger—of the anecdote .

Note -- We mention this work briefly because among the postmodernists there is one movement that makes fun of itself: *Fröhliche Wissenschaft* (*Nietzsche*) - about the ... indeed sometimes deadly seriousness and self-conceit of philosophy as it was traditionally practiced.

Hans Blumenberg , Die Lesbarkeit der Welt , Frankfurt ., Suhrkamp , 1981-1, 1986-2, is the work in which Blumenberg's “Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit ” (theory of incomprehensibility) is exposed.

a. Blumenberg replaces the traditional epistemology, which centers on the contact between the knowing subject and the known object (theory of meaning), with the hermeneutic epistemology, which centers on the interpretive contact between the reading and the read text,

b. But there is a pejorative ulterior motive: the text (whether the world in which we live or the texts concerning that world) – 'text' stands for “all that is interpretable ” – proves to be unreadable in the long run. Or at least the readability – understand: interpretability – of the world and its interpretations in texts is very limited (one senses a variant of difference/delay). One can interpret both the world and texts concerning the world in ever-changing ways. This endless – indeed, dead-end – process of interpretation is illustrated by a whole series of quotations from the Bible and from ancient, medieval, and modern texts.

20.2.2. -- The differential philosophy of language

We have dwelled at length on the very characteristic hermeneutics of Derrida , which defines a (metaphysical) term on the basis of all possible interpretations of that term . -- We have repeatedly established that the reality

of traditional ontology is replaced by 'the text', where 'text' denotes both the reality intended in a language regarding reality (the referent) and that language regarding reality. Immediately, “the language”, or “the use of language”, became central. -- Let us now examine these two concepts in more detail.

20.2.2.1. Twofold logocentrism .

In ancient Greek, the term 'logos ' means, among other things, “reason/reasoning faculty/reasoning,” but also “language” in which reason expresses itself. Derrida accuses “Western philosophy” of logocentrism : it consistently places the spoken word above writing as a purer form of language.

He refers to Plato for this . -- Indeed: it is as *D1. Taplin , Les enfants d' Homère* , Paris, 1989, 199, writes: “ *Jacques Derrida* , the best known of the deconstructionists , has published an essay, namely *La pharmacologie de Platon* (1968). It is a study of the *Dialogue of Phaedrus* . In it, Socrates defends the thesis that spoken language is 'more real' than written language. -- Derrida also refers to J.J. Rousseau (1712/1778; conclusion and transgression of the French Enlightenment or philosophie des lumières).

20.2.2.2. Derrida's interpretation of the tradition.

a. The spoken word gives “the impression” that sound (signifier , Se) and what is indicated or signified by that sound (meaning, Sé) coincide (are completely identical). -- For example: “I see you standing there”. Whoever hears or listens carefully seems to grasp the sentence and believes that he/she grasps what the speaker wants to say. Based on the signifier —the term expressed in a judgment—he/she grasps—or so he/she believes—he/she perceives the signified.

Whereas the written word yields only 'grammars', intrusions (think of the term 'inscription'), which are difficult for the reader to decipher: he/she must search for a signified in the signifier ! Moreover, the signs of writing are spaced apart in space, written, printed, one after the other.

Let us consider the term “I see you standing there” in the text of a letter, for example. It is possible that the meaning just mentioned is intended. However, it is also possible that “I see you standing there (dejected/triumphant)” is meant, with the emphasis on a psychological state.

Note -- How ambiguous that expression can be becomes apparent when one examines whether the speaker says it neutrally (he/she sees you standing

through the curtain, for example) or triumphantly (“(You think I do not see you but) I see you standing there”) or with yet another modality. Fundamentally, modalities are central to Derrida's practice of interpretation. -- Thus, grasping meaning is indeed very difficult and resembles a deciphering (of signs or utterances, as Dilthey already believed (D.20)).

b. Derrida on the Saussure.

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/1913), the author of Ch . Bally / A. Sècheyay / A. Riedlinger , *Cours de linguistique générale* , Paris, Payot , 1931–3, is the founder of structural linguistics , which places semiology (the study of signs in the life of society) at its center.

For de Saussure , the written word is merely a representation, an additional aid, of spoken language usage. -- Naturally, as a scholar who enjoys engaging in debates, Derrida observes : when he explains the differential (not the different) of the spoken word, he relies, among other things, on writing! Thus: the letter 'b' can also be written as 'B' or beta , as long as 'b' or 'B' or beta differs from all other (the complement) letters (signifiers, Se's) of the one alphabet.

Incidentally: on that one , all other letters are 'present' - although 'absent' (i.e., not expressed, written or co-expressed, co-written) - in the present letter 'b' ('B', beta).

Note -- Whether this is such a resounding argument against the Saussure is highly questionable. But so far so good.

De Saussure's conception of language expanded by Derrida in a differential sense. -- The basic terms of De Saussure's semiology are ' langage ' (the linguistic phenomenon), subdivided into “ langue (language) / parole ” (language usage).

In which he distinguishes two viewpoints—interpretations—regarding ' langue ' (language): one can study language diachronically (in its historical evolution) (which was done extensively before him) and synchronically.

De Saussure does not rule out the possibility of creating a linguistics that ' le' studies "parole " (language usage) and proceeds 'diachronically'. Nevertheless, he very decisively opts for "la langue " (the language), and synchronically at that.

Note: language use occurs when one speaks and writes, but also when we think and reflect in silence (for, as Platon already knew, when we reflect, we inwardly murmur words). Language does not exist without language use. -- But it is also true that whoever speaks, writes, or speaks inwardly while reflecting, encounters a language and does not invent it on the spot. Even whoever says something new that has never been said by anyone before does so in an already existing language. Otherwise, he would not be understood by his fellow men.

What strikes de Saussure is that the language is, in principle, identical in every individual who speaks it , while language use is such that each individual is distinguishable from all other language users.

20.2.2.3. Language is a system.

This is the systems-theoretical aspect. Every valid sound in a language is valid only insofar as it

- a. forms part of the whole and
- b. differs – is discriminable , distinguishable – from all other valid signs. It is evident that complementation (or dichotomy (one sign/all other signs)) is essential. Despite all difference, they refer to one another. In one sign that is present, all other signs that are absent are nevertheless present somewhere.

The language as signifiant (sa)/ signifie (sé).

Every ' signe ', sign, contains a sound that signifies something (signifier) but also a meaning (signified).

Note - - The word 'donkey' is

- a. the valid sound 'donkey' but
- b. also that which is meant by that sound. This does not necessarily have to be a real donkey existing outside of the speakers: it can also be an imagined reality.

Note - - A readable exposition of Saussure's conception of language is given by *RC Kwant*, **Structuralisten en structuralisme **, **Alphen aan den Rijn**, Samson, 1978, 11/36* (**Het structuralistische denken van de Saussure **).

Incidentally: 'structure' here means the fact that accidental signs (sounds, phonologically) are made orderly by the structures or ordering rules that characterize a language as a language. Throughout the boundless variations of speaking, the rules remain unchanged.

20.2.2.4. The linguistic relations .

Cours de linguistique générale , 170/175 (Rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs).

1. Syntagmatic relationships.

Let us take terms such as: reread, against all, the life of man, God is good, — if the weather is good, then we set out. -- 'Reread' and 'read', for example, or “if ... then ...” are simple or compound terms (signifiers) that both differ and belong together in the temporally unfolding series of words that constitute speaking (writing, thinking). This belonging together in all difference is called Saussure's 'syntagma' (literally: something placed together , arrangement).

2. Associative relationships.

Based on similarity (difference) and coherence (break, gap), whether in terms of sound or meaning, sets and systems arise as follows:

2.a. teach / point out; education/ ice; -- education/ shelter; -- let us go/ let us protest;

2.b. teach/ shape/ educate; education/ culture/ civility.

The terms, simple or compound, differ but belong together by virtue of association (one term makes one think of the other, which differs from it but belongs to it in memory—the linguistic memory).

Analogy (being partly similar/connected/partly different/separated) evidently plays a major role here. It is the basis for discovering syntagma and association (the latter is also referred to as a 'paradigm').

Incidentally: the syntagmatic connection is “in praesentia ”, because it makes currently present terms one, whereas the associative connection proceeds “in absentia”, because it makes terms that are partially absent (the complement) one,

A brief comparison.

What de Saussure does is what the ancient Greeks called ' stoicheiosis ' based on ' anamnesis '. ' Anamnesis ' (Latin: reminiscencia , well-ordered memory) differs from ' mnème ' (Latin: memoria , vague and incoherent memory). The 'anamnesis' is the basis of ordering based on comparison (stoicheiosis ; Latin: elementatio).

Plato has left us a phonological example of that.

Library st. : *EW Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics* , Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 36v.. -- In his *Dialogue with Theaetetus*, *Platon* distances himself from the method of comparative ordering or *stoicheiosis* , but in his *Philebeus* 18 B/D, after reinterpretation , he makes it his own.

“When someone—whether a god or a divine man (according to an Egyptian story his name was Theuth (*note*: also: Thoth , the inventor of hieroglyphic writing))—observed that all that is sound is infinitely different from one another, he was the first to realize:

1) that the vowels in that infinity of differences were not one but many, and again

2) that there were other sounds which, although not vowels, nevertheless possessed a certain phonetic value and that there was also a certain number of these and

3) He distinguished a third kind of letters which we now call consonants. -- Then he divided the consonants until he distinguished each one separately, -- in the same way the vowels and the semi-vowels until he also knew their number . -- He called each of them and all of them together 'letters'. -- But he realized that no one among us could learn one of them separately without all the others; -- he considered that this was a connection that made them all one, and he also assigned to them a science which he called 'grammar'”.

From this Platonic text, one sees that a multiplicity is brought into unity (connection) on the basis of analogy (metaphorical based on similarity; metonymic based on coherence). It is immediately clear that Saussure applies the same method to a newly discovered domain, namely phonological (not to be confused with traditional 'phonetic') linguistics.

Note -- Romanticism—whatever one may say of it—was well aware of the comparative order (*harmology* , theory of relations), as *EW Beth*, oc clearly observes: “The idea of a “*mathe sis universalis* ”, a “ *scientia generalis*” –

Note -- *Galen* , *Ramon Lull* , *Descartes*, and *Leibniz* had already attempted to arrive at such an all-encompassing, seemingly far-reaching order called “*mathesis universalis* ”—was fiercely opposed by *I. Kant* (1724/1804; leading figure of the German Enlightenment) but taken up again by *Fichte* , *Schelling*, and *Hegel* (D. 15: German idealism). However, the rejection of mathematics as

a paradigm led the latter to employ a style of argument that can never be satisfactory for a reader familiar with exact methods of proof.” (oc, 141).

20.2.2.5. A romantic-idealistic paragon.

Library st. : HA Ett , ad ., GA van den Bergh van Eysenga . Hegel , The Hague. Kruseman . sd ., 67ff. -- A certain Krug had reproached Hegel for deducing all things from a priori principles— aximas —i.e., from pure thought, and thereby attempting to demonstrate the necessity of all things.

Krug challenged him to an application: how can Hegel deduce the existence of every dog in every cat, indeed, the existence of his pen holder, from “the concept”? -- Hegel, in 1802, corrects that erroneous interpretation of his deductive thinking. The title read: “How ordinary human understanding conceives philosophy (made clear by means of the works of Herr Krug)”.

1. -- The actual existence .

Hegel: this requires no a priori proof, for it is given. -- Thus, dogs are an established fact.

2. -- The Hegelian deduction.

“To deduce something” means: to demonstrate that it exists outside a broader context—called 'dialectical' by Hegel

a. cannot exist and **b.** cannot be conceived. In other words: that it is indispensable as a 'moment' (**note:** movable element) within a larger whole.

3. -- The Hegelian 'concept'.

'Deducing' in the Hegelian sense is: identifying and understanding the meaning and place of something—e.g., dogs and cats, pen holder—(**note:** what happens, for example, in the theory of evolution or in the classification of animals), with the concept as the premise, namely the concept of the living whole.

The term 'concept' is therefore not at all the abstract thing of ordinary rationalists. It is the totality within which something is to be situated that comes to full consciousness.

In the broadest – all-encompassing (transcendental) – sense, “the concept” is being brought to full consciousness within which every being situates itself.

Hegel thinks 'concretely', that is, things in a context that is understood. -
- The ordinary rationalist tears things out of that context, which does not even come to consciousness except vaguely. Thus, he has attempted, albeit in a

naive manner, to deduce the solar system from the concept of the living whole that is the universe; that is, to make it understandable, -- to demonstrate its meaning and place.

One sees that this is stoicism , but in a German-idealistic sense.

When we now read *Cours de linguistique générale* , 157, after the two quotations (Platon , Hegel) , we see how de Saussure positions himself within a tradition -- “To want to define the unity within the separate sign of signifier (sound) and signified (knowledge and thought content) is a mistake. Such a thing would betray the belief that one can begin with the separate terms and thus construct the system as its 'sum', whereas one must start from the coherent whole in order to obtain, by analysis, its elements”.

20.2.2.6. Reality and language according to Saussure .

Library st. : RC Kwant. *Structuralists and Structuralism* . Alphen ad Rijn, 1978, 18.-. What Saussure calls ' nomenclature ' (terminology, list of names) is the following view:

1. Given are the 'things':
2. those 'things' are represented in concepts;
3. The concepts are expressed in words.

He radically rejects that view.

He attempts to prove this.

a. Only the nouns (and even then seemingly) can be interpreted in this way.

b . the vast majority of other words / parts of speech do not fit in there. -- “The weather” can pass as the representation in concept and word of the weather. But “It is cold weather” or “There is no water” are not such a representation.

To that must be answered that—at least in true traditional ontology and logic—it is not about 'words' but 'terms': the term is the representation in words of a concept. The 'term' in the logical sense must not be confused with the 'word' in the grammatical sense. Multiple words are often necessary to express a single concept . They then constitute only one term. For example : “some people”, “a marble palace”.

, "I sing" as a representation of "I am singing" or "I have decided to sing". -
- Cf. Ch . Lahr, SJ, *Logique*, in: *Cours de philosophie* , I (*Psychologie/Logique*). Paris, 1933-27, 492. -- In other words: "There is" means "It is a fact that".

But there is more: 'thing' in Saussure's terminology means 'something' that can be found in our human world of experience . Whereas in strictly ontological language, 'thing' simply means 'something' without further qualification (the 'something' may or may not be found in the human world of experience).

The 'signs' (Sa/ Sé) of language are reality (in the strictly non- tological sense of "all that is non-nothing") insofar as it appears in our thinking-knowing mind: they are the articulated phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon insofar as it reveals itself.

In other words: like so many others, Saussure adheres to ordinary language usage (which many confuse with strict ontological-logical language usage).

20.2.2.7. Differentiation by Derrida .

Here is how Derrida de Saus sure refers to .

1. -- The sign (Sa / Sé = signifier / signified) is a 'positive' term. -- The term 'teacher', for example, is a signifier referring to everything that is a teacher (in our mind or in our world of experience) as a 'domain'. One can define: "Someone who teaches students".

Or even better: "A man who teaches students". In Saussure's view, there is a fixed connection between signifier and signified within the sign. The fact that this unity of Sa and Sé is fixed means that the word in question is a positive term (a, man, who, teaches, to, students are parts of the linguistic system in which one expresses oneself). The definition consists of existing signs.

2.a. -- The language we use in everyday speech is a finite and closed system, encompassing all valid signs. Consequently, every element can be described 'positively' within that system, as has just been seen. The remainder of the unused terms are not mentioned. That is "the other of" the words used,

2.b. -- According to Saussure , the signifiers (Sa's) can only be defined by means of the differences with "the rest" of the linguistic elements (in the form of contrast pairs: man/woman, because the man is non-woman; --

lesson/holiday, because the lesson is work during a non-holiday; pupils/graduates, because being a pupil is not yet having graduated; -- etc.).

In other words: the terms present, such as man, lesson, pupils, etc., encompass, within the language system, through their mutual differences, the non-present terms (the opposites). The identification of the terms used takes place by means of reference and is therefore purely relational, relative. – So much for Saussure .

In summary: de Saussure already uses the "present/absent" pair to define what is present. Which is non-positive definition.

In other words: whoever wants to understand the term 'teacher' must necessarily know the entire language, even though it is not currently explicitly mentioned (= positively defined) in it. One understands the term 'teacher' and the definition “a man who teaches a female pupil” including the rest that is not explicitly mentioned (which is a non-positive, indirect definition).

The request regarding this Saussurian given. -- How, then, does Derrida interpret what was just said? He commits amplification or expansion.

“ Derrida is of the opinion that Saussure ’s theorem must be extended: while the number of signifiers in a language is finite, the number of signifieds is infinitely large. Therefore, no fixed relationship can exist between signifier and signified. Consequently, the signs cannot immediately be understood as 'positive' terms. The sign exists only through differences.” (*B. Delfgaauw / Fr. van Peperstraten, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte** , Kampen/Kapellen, 1993, 262ff.)

Note -- Derrida's remark on Saussure is not surprising, since he views the meanings of a sign as the results of endlessly continuing interpretations in all directions. That ' dissemination ' or spreading of meanings by interpreters (established by conception and especially by structuring of meaning) (D. 10) is infinitely vast.

“What do I think of when I hear the sign 'teacher'?” When I was sexually abused by a teacher as a girl, for example, that negative experience with just one teacher resonates in my definition (the inclusion), especially with the term 'man' (below: “What I have lived through with men”). Such a girl will define with the inclusion of her bad experience, even if it is not explicitly mentioned (negative definition).

What do I associate (D. 25: associative connections, but differential) with the sign 'teacher' when I have had ('survived') two who couldn't stand me? Such a person will define, without words, including those (negative) experiences.

In other words: the meanings of a signifier in a dictionary constitute only a part of the differential definitions. The 'Lebenswelt' or "Sitz" im Leben" inherent to the signs, according to their meanings, endlessly enriches the number of meanings that a single signifier must 'capture', -- whereby the empty shell of a signifier turns out to be fillable "in real life"

Let us now briefly return to D. 27 (Hegelian deduction). -- It is so clear that Derrida situates the signifiers within the living whole of all possible interpretations. But his 'concept' that he posits is that of the radical reservation regarding definition(s) that lies within the totality of all difficult interpretations of a sign (signifier / signified). That reservation compels postponement and getting stuck in the provisional.

"La trace" (*the trail of references*). --

We just saw that every signifier refers to:

- a. an infinite number meant (as the own domain)
- b. the complement of the entire system of signifiers. -- In other words: one linguistic term refers 'somewhere' - associatively (D. 25): one can never keep Saussure's chapter on comparisons based on associations sufficiently in mind - to meanings that are as much his own as possible and to the other terms, essentially: all other terms of the entire linguistic system.

a. -- ***The railway.***

Derrida calls that twofold reference "the track" with a neologism. -- Thus the signifier 'rape'.

a) The term includes the following interpretations: "brutal/cunning, undertaken rape" etc. ;

b) he refers to 'strength' / 'powerlessness' ('inability'), to 'submission', to "lack of self-control" and 'unscrupulousness', to 'test of strength' etc.

In other words: one understands the term 'rape' only 'fully' (including all associations) if one grasps it as the meeting point of all associations.

The trace or reference is thus a form of presence (explicit givenness) but posits the 'full' presence continuously, for the trace also encompasses absence

(non-explicit givenness). -- Thus, the term 'force' is embedded in the term 'rape' and resonates with, for example, 'test of strength' or 'powerlessness'.

b. -- *the trace field or 'text'.*

Derrida conceives in terms of “the concept”. What kind of concept? Not that of Hegel. Rather: the trace is the presupposed par excellence. Not only does it lie before every meaning given to a signifier within the totality of being or reality. The field or the totality of traces lies even before every first principle (that which explains the totality of all that is reality). Thus, for example, before the idea as Hegel conceived it, namely as that which explains everything (as axiom par excellence). Thus even before the traditional concept of 'being' (as, for example, Aristotle presupposes this in his metaphysics as 'archè' (Latin: principium , principle)).

How so? Because the term 'idea' (in the Hegelian sense) or even the term 'being' (in the Aristotelian sense) enter the field of traces. They are the meeting point of references. To speak of a first principle is to enter that field.

The 'textuality'

Another neologism. 'Texere', in Latin, means 'to weave', 'to interweave'. - The network of traces or references in which every term or sign is situated interweaves that term.

a. with all the possible interpretations or meanings that are its domain, and

b. with the rest of the entire terminology or language. Thinking, even thinking from “first presuppositions”, is already finding oneself in “textuality”.

Is textuality itself a “first principle”? No! In Derrida’s terminology, “first principle” implies that it concerns an all-encompassing tendency (transcendental) foundation upon which the rest of the exposition can be constructed. Such a concept is too much 'outside' the network or textuality as Derrida conceives it. The text is the very interweaving of all the signs of language: the traces are in the signs, and the very references of the signs to the domain and the remainder of the system.

Note -- We discussed ancient Greek stoicheiosis on D.25 . Well then, 'stoicheion', Latin: elementum, actually means “anything that functions as part of a sequence (a file, a line, a rank)”. For example, *Plato says*, in *Theaetetus* 202E, “grammaton stoicheia”, the letters that make up written

things. Or did the expression exist: “ kata stoicheion ” (also: stoichaikos '), in alphabetical order.

The text was thus perceived at the time as an assembly of elements, and stoicheiosis is then assigning each element its place and meaning in the living whole. This is based on ' anamnesis ' or memory, the faculty that gathers references or traces based on associations. - Derrida's Differentialism is perhaps more traditional than it appears at first glance.

20.2.2.8. *Ontology/ tropology* .

We now interrupt the exposition on Derrida's ideas to ontologically test his ' textuality '.

A. -- *The traditional concept of 'being'*

This concept means “not-nothing,” that is, anything that is anything at all, such that even a fiction or imagination, a night dream/daydream, becoming, a utopia, or a pure idea are 'being,' that is, not-nothing. A science fiction story is not-nothing, therefore something (even a fascinating and overly complex something!) and thus being.

In that sense, 'being' stands opposed to all that is absolutely nothing (what in substantive language is called “the absolute or fully extended nothing”). In that sense, the sign 'being' is all-encompassing or transcendental . For nothing that is even the slightest thing falls outside of it. All possible meanings are the domain of that sign.

B. -- *Identistic thinking* .

All experts in traditional ontology and logic agree: identity and its variations are the foundation of ontology and logic. This is called “the identitive way of thinking”.

The identical fan (differential).

The ordering practiced by traditional harmology (the study of relations, the theory of unity) rests on a single schema: two or more 'things' (understand: beings), 'somethings ', are either fully identical (totally identical : in that case they coincide, because something is totally identical with itself and only something is identical with itself) or partially identical (analogous) or totally non- identical (totally different).

A classic application (exemplification).

The traditional “logical square” is such a fan or differential: all – some yes/some no – none (all no). That is regarding the basis of the concept of a 'set'.

Another form: whole - some parts yes/ some parts no (partially) - not a single part. That is regarding the basis of the concept of 'system'.

This twofold differential or fan is “the (pre-existing) concept” of the living whole that is being (reality, all that is, -- diachronically: all that was, is, will be) from which traditional ontology and logic 'deduce'. That is to say: assigns to every 'given' (something, being) its place and meaning (D 27), situates, weaves.

20.2.2.9. Henology (unity theory).

Another saying for the same thing, already used in antiquity, goes: one - partially, one - not - one. This is said of a multiplicity. This is brought into unity on the basis of similarity/difference and/or coherence/gap.

This is what Platon already called completely and the medieval scholastics “ totum logicum ” (collection) and “ totum physicum ” (system). All instances ('elements') of a set form the same (identical) unit or “ totum ” . logicum ”. All parts of a system form the same unit or “ totum ” . physicum ”.

In the first case, the common property is identical ; in the second case, the whole is identical , because parts of a whole—however diverse—have the same common property, namely, to belong to the same system or whole.

Linguistically, this has the consequence that, upon seeing one or more instances, we think of the set (we see them including the rest of the set), viewing them as members of the same set. Linguistically, this also has the consequence that, upon seeing a part or several parts of a whole, we associate these with the entire system (we see one or more parts including the rest of the whole) . -- In both cases, we totalize unconsciously or consciously.

Note -- When, for example, Hegel the identity, as he called it “the simple one Groundbreaking immunity of traditions If he finds " Logik " (the basic characteristic of traditional logic) ridiculous, then this is because he misinterprets it.

For often, people confuse ' identitive ' with ' substantialist ' or 'atomistic': thinking in identitive terms would—at least according to that erroneous view—

make any relationship unthinkable. No: proceeding identitively is comparative—which is not the same as 'equating'—meaning seeing more than one given in its relation to something else. Identitive thinking is seeing something associatively, seeing something in a context of comparison—seeing its place and its meaning in the light of a living and comprehensive whole (which is a collection and/or system).

This is already evident from the list of Aristotle's categories, in which the category 'autonomy' ('substance') is combined with 'relationship'.

20.2.2.10. The concept of 'association';

See first D. 25 (also: 30; 31). We associate on the basis of similarity/difference and coherence/gap, the two major dimensions of identity and its variations. -- The association or thought connection has the formula: "If one thinks of b while considering a, then b is an association of a. a and b are thus thought-connected on the basis of similarity and/or coherence, the two main types of identity .

Tropology .

That the verb 'to be' is identifiocal is abundantly clear from the tropes. Two types are distinguished, metaphor and metonymy. -- connected with two types of synecdoche: the metaphorical and the metonymic.

1. -- The metaphor.

It is a shortened comparison that sees similarity. -- "That woman is a reed." Upon seeing that woman, one thinks of the pliability of a reed stalk in the wind. Both exhibit the same— identical —property of 'pliability'. This becomes apparent through unconscious or conscious comparison. There is a trace or reference from the term "that woman" to 'reed' via pliability. This is how we think of them together, all at once. Note: the term 'being' is suitable for expressing, for establishing the presence of, that common property. One therefore says: "That woman is a reed" (where: is comparable from one perspective to a reed). The woman and the reed resemble each other.

2 -- Metonymy.

It is the shortened comparison that sees coherence. -- "The beard is there." Upon seeing the man, one thinks of something (otherwise striking and characteristic) , namely his beard, which distinguishes him from the rest. Both the man and the beard are not resembling one another but belonging to the same totality or system , namely the one man - with - the - beard. Thus we think of them together and at once. Identifying them. So that instead of the

subject 'man' we say 'beard', for there is a trace or reference from the beard to the man. We speak as if the beard **is** the man. Indeed, as a striking part of the whole that is the man. -- The man and the beard do not resemble one another: they exhibit coherence.

This becomes even clearer in the Aristotelian model.

Eating apples is a contributing cause of health. The relationship is one of cause; (omen) to effect (continuation). We say metonymically: "Eating apples is healthy".

Even shorter: "Apples are healthy". -- The verb 'to be' represents—establishes—a partial identity or unity: the connection—not the similarity—between (eating) apples and health, mutually linked by a single characteristic, namely the cause-and-effect relationship. The auxiliary verb 'to be' expresses this perfectly: even the simplest common man understands that shortened comparison.

20.2.2.11. *The Synecdoche.*

While similarity and coherence are central to metaphor and metonymy, the relationship between collection/specimen and the relationship between whole/part is central to metaphorical and metonymic synecdoche.

1. *The metaphorical synecdoche.*

"A soldier does not leave his post," says the captain. He does not mean "exactly one" (specimen) but all (the collection).

2. *The metonymic synecdoche.*

"The parish numbers two thousand souls." What is meant is people (the whole), while the souls (the part) are expressed. -- Incidentally: the previous sentence (metonymy), namely "The beard is there," is already synecdochic (the part is expressed to name the whole, the man).

Two types of induction.

'Induction' is working with samples and thinking of those samples in terms of a totality (association): assigning meaning to them and assigning a place within (the concept of) the living whole to which they belong, in order to become understandable. -- This is called "extrapolating or amplifying," which expands the information obtained from the samples. -- Now, upon close observation, one sees two types of induction.

1. -- *The metaphorical induction.*

It relies on similarity. - This water and that water boil at 100°C. We associate this with the thought: all water, the entire collection of all possible samples, will boil at 100°C. We generalize in the conviction that the rest of the collection of samples will resemble those already taken .

2. -- *The metonymic induction.*

It relies on coherence. -- I get to know the Meir in Antwerp. But then I also get to know the port district. In doing so, I associate the city of Antwerp as a whole. I ' generalize ' in the conviction that the rest of the system is connected to it.

The people who come to the Meir or the harbor district also walk through the rest, so that I come to know one economic life: by sampling. -- By taking a sample at two points within the whole of Antwerp -- how people earn their money at two points -- I gain insight into the whole from the perspective of two parts. Naturally: the more samples I take, the more ' complete ' my view of the whole will be. The more real, the more corresponding to reality, will my insight be. -- That is generalization .

Note -- Associative psychology.

To demonstrate, in a brief digression, that what has been set out regarding the identifiable method is valid and fruitful, the following. –

Library st. : *Théodule Ribot, La psycho logie des sentiments* , Paris, 1917-10, 171/182 (Les sentiments et l'as sociation des idées) . -- Ribot (1839/1916) . and experimental psychologist and thinker . The work shows how the mind, as a capacity for value , involves, associates.

1. -- *Parable.*

For a young man, if he resembles her son, is the same age and so on, a mother can suddenly, D, 12 (Immediate reaction as Derrida also experiences them) - feel a sympathy arise, based on resemblance - there are aspects (parts) that are identical (analogy) - the mother is referred to her son. There is a trace of something absent, not immediately given. Her son merges with the young man,

Ribot gives a second example. -- “Thus there are fear reactions that are called ill-considered. -- A more deeply penetrating observation, however, can trace them back to a similar explanatory basis as in the case of the spontaneously sympathetic mother, where similarity was at work.” -- In other words: we partially identify spontaneously.

2. -- Cohesion.

Ribot uses the term ' boundary '. -- The feeling that an enamored lover originally experienced for the person of his mistress herself, he transfers onto her clothes, her furniture, her home.

Ribot offers a different model: envy and hatred vent their fury on the inanimate objects belonging to the enemy, for the same reason: appropriation . -- In absolute monarchies, the veneration of the sovereign is transferred to his throne, to the emblems of his power.

In other words: the mind spontaneously identifies the person and what belongs to the person (cohesion) partially (analogy). -- The erotic fetish works in the same way: the object 'is' the person! A pair of panties, a bra, a perfume 'are' (partly: analogy) the eroticizing person to whom they belong.

So much for the established phenomena. Now for the interpretation. Ribot : “It is known that the association of thought contents has been reduced to two basic laws, the law of resemblance within the law of contiguity .” He calls the tropological aspect 'transfert' ('transfer'): 'transfert par ressemblance / transfert par contiguïté '.

He calls such metaphorical and/or metonymic behavior something that is somewhat hidden, but it concerns “ une influence "souvent latente mais efficace ", a latent but effective influence.

Note -- We recall how, during a US/Iran conflict peak at the time, the US embassy was damaged (metonymically: the part for the whole) or a doll depicting the President of the US was burned (metaphorically: the likeness for the depicted). - One sees associative interpretation, a remarkable form of interpretation, if it is not ... the only or at least the principal one. What would interpret be other than 'associating'? This has as its basis (axiom): the identific ordering,

C. -- Logic (the study of thought).

That traditional logic is identical is evident from the entire—well-understood and not caricatured—tradition.

G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung , (Ein Diskussionsbeitrag), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1862, is one long proof of that theorem .

Jacoby : there are many logics (class logic, propositional logic, modal logic) but there is only one traditional logic with the schema “understanding / judgment / reasoning”.

Now one must understand that scheme well: logic begins with the concept of 'logical' (' followed '), i.e. derived, correctly reasoned. This takes the linguistic form “if ..., then...”.

That logical relationship between a preceding clause and a subsequent clause (implication or encompassment) takes on two main forms that have been known since Plato (and even before him among mathematicians).

A. “If A then B. -- well then, A. Therefore B”. That is called Platon's 'synthesis' (deduction).

B. “If X, then B. Well then, B. Therefore X”. That is called Platon 'analysis', reduction. After all, analysis posits a lemma, X, an unknown, which is sought (the question asked about the given B).

Both forms of reasoning rely on (partial) identities. When faced with A or X, we think of B, which resembles it or is related to it (metaphorical or metonymic analogy).

Reasoning from this, we deduce that B is specific to A or X.

In other words: the concepts and the judgments are merely parts of the basic form of traditional logic “if..., then...”. -- Says Jacoby, oc, 10: reality in itself (note : take the concept of 'reality' in the all-encompassing sense of “all that something is”, naturally) – whether we realize it or not – stands outside the thinking subject ('subject frei'), objectively, behind/within the revealing data, so the objective identities stand behind/within the judgments and reasonings performed by a subject that thinks.

Note -- The entire work provides the explanatory notes and the bibliography for this .

Note -- In his own way, *Josiah Royce* (1855/1916, pragmatic- personalist), in his solid work * *The Principles of Logic* *, New York, 1912-1 1961-2, grounds logical thinking on a theory of order. Thus he says, oc, 11: “Logic is the general science of order”. Inference is based on objective relations.

Theory of Judgment.

Let us further explain the insight gained, namely the identity basis, by examining what judging is.

Aristotle already said: “To pass judgment is ‘katagorein ti tinos’”, to say something (else) about something . Whether that something is imagined or to be found in our world and life experience is of no logical importance whatsoever (that would be of importance for epistemology, for example).”

How does this work? The first 'something' is the subject: the second is the predicate.

The predicate contains information about the subject. This means, in model-theoretical terms, that the subject is the unknown (original) and the predicate is the known (otherwise it contains no information) (model). -- Cf. K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, **Inleiding tot het modelbegrip**, *Bussum, De Haan*, 1969, 28.

Linguistically: to see something (the original/subject) is to situate it within the concept of the living whole that is language, such that one can speak of the subject in terms of the predicate, i.e., the vocabulary that the linguistic system holds at its disposal. By means of linguistic association, we express the traces that refer from the subject to the predicate.

An argument from authority.

P. Ricoeur, *Le conflict des interprétations (Essais d' herméneutique)*, Paris, Seuil, 1969, 8, says in this regard : “The connection between interpretation (in the sense of textual explanation: exegesis textual) and understanding (in the broad sense of understanding signs: intelligence des signes) is facilitated by one of the traditional meanings of the term 'hermeneutics' itself: Aristotle's booklet on judgment is titled “ *Peri hermèneias* ” (Latin: de interpretatione). In particular: it is striking that, in Aristotelian usage, ' hermèneia ' is not limited to, for example, allegorization, but is also given the name to any sensible judgment. Moreover: it is the making of a sensible judgment that is “ hermèneia ,” that interpretation, insofar as it “says something about something .”

Models.

Let us now pause for a moment to consider singular judgments.

1. -- Anneke is a runner.

Based on the connection— identity —between Anneke and being a runner, one can speak of her in terms of “being a runner”. After all, she is a single instance from the “ totum llogicum ” (collection/class) of 'runners’. By this is understood: (Anneke is) a (runner). -- When one sees her in action, a trace points to that collection.

2. -- Anneke is walking.

Note: in everyday language, that judgment can mean “Anneke is a runner”. Here, however, we take the second possibility: “Anneke is (currently) running”.

-- The ambiguity -of the expression “Anneke runs” demonstrates that the context provides the inclusion for correct understanding. One understands the sentence only with the inclusion of the context, which, although absent, still counts somewhere and – to speak in Derridian terms – is 'present'.

Based on the connection— identical connection, here of coherence—not, as in the previous example, similarity—between Anneke and walking, one can, indeed must—when one wishes to accurately represent a current observation—speak of her in terms of 'walking'.

In both previous cases there is identity: Anneke being a runner and Anneke running, but she is not total identity but partial identity, i.e. analogy. The first time metaphorical, the second time metonymic analogy. It is precisely the analogy that 'grounds' the associations and the judgment that the association expresses .

20.2.2.12. The traditionally logical declaration of a relationship.

One can hear logisticians say that, without their “logic of relations” (understand: logistics regarding relations), traditional logic cannot express a relationship as it should,

Let's take an example. -- “That church over there is bigger than all the surrounding buildings”.

Not only does the term 'is' go perfectly with “greater than” (“is greater than” is a sensible expression), but what is more: let us reread D. 28, where the traditional position is clearly discussed. Ontology and logic, supported by that ontology, use not words but terms. The relation “greater than” consists of two words but expresses one concept, namely, the concept “greater than”. Traditional conceptual logic contains not only 'nouns' but also relational-expressing words.

General decision

D. 33/41 (ontology/ tropology) can be concluded with this sentence: what Saussure says about the associative side of language use can be logically and strictly founded on the doctrine concerning that well-understood identity and its variations.

Note -- The measurement model.

When we say: “That church is one hundred and fifty meters high”, we are speaking about that church in terms of a measure or measurement model, -- in this case, a meter. -- This makes it abundantly clear that, as Aristotle says, interpreting the judgment is based on comparison (in the sense of

'confrontation'): when we compare that church to a meter, we multiply that one meter until the number of multiplied meters is identical to the height of the church.

In other words: in the language of traditional identity theory, that church, as height, and the one meter, if sufficiently multiplied, are identical . For the rest, that church and the one meter are non- identical . Which gives the result: partial identity or analogy.

It is a commonplace to say that analogy plays a leading role in classical ontology and logic (logic is the formulation of the if-then relations in all that exists). Yet this is incorrect: it is the entire range of “ totally identical / partially identical / totally non- identical ” that takes center stage. As clearly stated above in D. 33. In that differential, the analogy is merely the middle term,

20.2.3. - The differential critique of traditional ontology.

We began – D. 04/21 – by outlining Derridian differential hermeneutics. Afterwards, we considered Derridian philosophy of language – D. 22/41 –

Let us outline Derrida's ideas regarding the 'metaphysics' serving as such a target.

The same starting point.

O. Willmann , *Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propädeutik)*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 14, cites a text that dominates the following. It concerns a text attributed to Archytas of Taras (Tarantum ; -445/-395), a Paleopythagorean .

Incidentally: the basic concepts are ' analisis ' (reductive reasoning: if X, then B) and ' sunthesis ' (deductive reasoning: if A, then B). The aim is to adopt an exceptional standpoint that allows one to control all beings .

“If anyone were capable of reducing (analisis) all classes (concepts, ' genes ') to the same presupposition (' archa ') and deriving (' suntheinai ') and joining them together (' sunarthmèsathai ' (note: here one touches upon stoicheiosis), such a person—it seems to me—appears as the wisest and immediately as possessing all truth, and as the possessor of a viewpoint from which he can know God and all beings as he has joined them—according to pairs of opposites— sustoichiai —and orderings— taxeî .”

Frankly: apart from stoicheiosis , supported by a sought-after (but apparently not yet found by Archutas) anamnesis (reminiscencia , orderly memory), which is supposed to function as a means of discovery, something stands out here that has perhaps found even more followers in the course of metaphysics: the search for an absolute standpoint. Such that divinity and all beings are grasped in one comprehensive grasp and gaze.

Let us remember that well for what follows.

Given: Heidegger.

Requested: Derrida's interpretation. -- the fact that M. Heidegger (think of Sein und Zeit) repeatedly thematizes is traditional ontology.

His requested: “ radical Destruktion ”. Neither less nor more!

Derrida : “ Heidegger’s plan is unfeasible.” The reason: to be able to do something like that, there must be a position outside traditional ontology.

Only then can one compare both viewpoints—in particular, only then can one measure the boundedness of traditional ontology. For Derrida, such a thing is impossible.

What, then, is feasible? To take a single step outside our culture, which for more than two thousand years has been permeated by ontology, and to believe that one can simply emancipate oneself from it, as Heidegger believes, is a futile endeavor. One can, however, use the means of that ontology itself—within that long tradition—'deconstruct' – ' déconstruct '.

What does ' deconstruction ' mean?

a. It is, of course, as the term clearly states, a negative labor. -- Let us recall how, during a conference in Los Angeles in 1987, he said that Greece, Christianity, and German idealism (D. 15) are “foreign to him.” After the banishment of those three constituents— stoicheia , elementa , integrative constituents—very little remains of our great tradition!

b. However, it is also to elicit entirely different insights from “the text,” i.e., the corpus of metaphysical texts, than those advocated in the text itself. -- To use a neologism: to elicit “the otherness of the text.” -- What that “otherness of” might mean.

Note -- Regarding M. Heidegger, we refer briefly to *J. P., Faye, Le piège (La philosophie) heideggerienne et le nazisme*, Paris, Balland , 1994.

It has long been known that Heidegger was a member of the National Socialist Party under Hitler. -- 'Nazism' is the doctrine and practice elaborated by *Adolf Hitler* (1889/1945) in his *Mein Kampf*, and which became the official state doctrine in Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Germanism (the Germans are the purest race among the whites), totalitarianism (from conception to death, the German is subject to the party and the regime, from all cultural perspectives), expansionism (forming a Greater Germany was the objective), Primitivism (proto- Germanic mythological ideas are the basis) – these are some of the main characteristics of the far-right movement that was Nazism.

Heidegger could not look away, and yet: he never took a clear stance to distance himself from the excesses (think of the concentration camps) of the system that made the whole planet shudder when the barbarities were exposed by the Allies in 1945.

Faye attempts to reveal one of Heidegger's most profound intentions, namely: "I have attempted, within National Socialism and with regard to that movement, to undertake a spiritual transformation" (thus Heidegger in 1945).

Heidegger targets traditional ontology, the pedestal of Western culture. Just like the Nazis! Although more subtly, of course. Dismantling all of traditional philosophy—from Socrates and Platon to Nietzsche—as a nihilistic event runs like a thread through Heidegger's thought— Faye's book attempts to prove this.

The attack on some “superior position”.

Reread D. 42 the text of Archutias : a point of view is sought – Archutias does not say that he has found one; he merely poses the problem in such a way that divinity and all beings come under the sway of knowing and thinking. -- That amounts to the search for “a higher position”. All truth would then lie within reach.

L. van Tuijl, introduction/translation, Poe, Lacan , Derrida , The Stolen Letter , Amsterdam, SUA, 1989, contains the following.

1. Edger Allan Poe (1809/1849), an American writer with a turbulent life and death (he died of delirium tremens), wrote a short story, *The Purloined Letter*.

2. Jacques Lacan (1901/1981), a famous French psychiatrist who gave Freudian psychoanalysis a structuralist turn (D. 24: structure), delivered a notorious lecture on Poe's story in 1955. In it, he illustrated the situation and the work of the psychoanalyst using the story. He later included the text in his ** Écrits **, **Paris, Seuil** , 1966.

3. Some twenty years later, J. Derrida subjects Lacan's 'text' (always the same theme) to a 'deconstruction' .

How so? He accuses Lacan of 'dogmatism': just like the detective Dupin in Poe's story, Lacan takes a superior stance! Above and beyond the episodes and complications, he knows the truth regarding the alias.

Derrida : what Dupin and Lacan do possess is “their own truth”—above all involvement in the events (drama, psychoanalysis)—which they, however, 'sell' as “The truth (simply and definitively)”.

-- That is what Derrida also reproaches—and often not without reason—the traditional metaphysicians for !

Let us reread D. 06 (“Plain language” as a panacea): there we have in caricature what a number of metaphysicians subtly display. And what Archutes 'seeks' as an open ideal.

It is striking, however, time and again that Derrida does not so much regard the message of the text itself (sense of meaning: D. 10) above all else, but rather the self-conceit—the pretension—which is perhaps “the other side of it.” It is, then, rather pretension—investigation than text—substantive investigation. Which amounts to the construction of meaning (D. 10).

Frankly: if there is one thing that many intellectuals have adopted from Derrida —oh, to the extreme exaggeration—it is that inquiry into pretension. With Derrida, it is as if he constantly perceives his fellow man as a pretentious being. And it is likewise with his intellectual and artistic followers: woe to you if you harbor a basic conviction! That is immediately 'dismantled' as pretension.

Since traditional metaphysics aims to arrive at universal truths, it is naturally the ideal target for pretension testers of all kinds who then, naturally, claim “that no one possesses the truth” and “that there are only particular and singular truths”.

That course of action is known in the tradition by the name of 'skepticism'—an attitude that sees 'dogmatisms' everywhere and 'dismantles' them by means of eristics. — Derrida's epigones—who have understood him too well—suffer from this very foundation, denying every truth arbitrarily and sweeping every criterion off the table. We saw this in D. 11 (Anarchistic-lax and permissive interpretation). It is therefore not surprising that Derrida had to underscore the orthodox doctrine—his own—that truth does indeed exist!

Could there not—incidentally—be some 'pretension'—a counter-pretension, that is—lie in the constant tracking down of “the other” (the veiled pretension) in the texts that... Derrida himself produces? By what right and in the name of what—so his opponents argue—does Derrida present himself as the critic of the claim to truth in order to tear others down in extremely difficult and 'hermetic' (the term is used by his own followers) texts?