

C.6-13. Elements of philosophy of culture

Location:

6. Courses from 1990 to 1993

6.1. Elements of Philosophy of Thought and Methodology, 1990-1991, (EDM1-EDM71, 97p.)

6.2. Elements of harmology 1990-1991, (EH72-EH201, 157p.)

6.3. Elements of Logic, 1990-1991 (EL202-EL321, 351p.)

6.4. Elements of Methodology, 1990-1991 (EM322-EM363, 334p.)

6.5. Elements of Platonism, 1991-1992 (EP1-EP117, 147p.)

6.6. Elements of Platonic Psychology, 91-92, (EP1-EPS114, 150 p.)

6.7. Elements of Rhetoric, 1991-1992 (ER1-ER300, 356p.)

6.8. Soloviev Cosmology, 1991-1992 (SK1-SK65, 78p.)

6.9. Apocalyptic Theology, 1992-1993 (AT1-AT71, 79p.)

6.10. The Healing of a Man Born Blind, 1992-1993 (GB1-GB85, 104p.)

6.11. Elements of thinking, 1992-1993 (logic) (ED1-ED79, 91p.)

6.12. Elements of Rhetoric, 1992-1993 (R1-R61, 70p.)

6.13. Elements of Philosophy of Culture, 1992-1993 (CF1-CF84, 92p.)

Remark: *This course has been provided with larger spacing than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current pagination of 'Word'. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'CF'. They stand for 'Culture-Philosophy', and are derived from the old page number.*

Introduction: *Plato (-427/+347), the greatest philosopher of the West, posited that the human soul strives to be connected with the body as harmoniously as possible, so that our consciousness remains properly directed toward reality. In this intentionality, in this orientation toward all that exists, one can distinguish three aspects that approach reality. First, an ontology, or doctrine of reality, which encompasses everything that exists in any way. Second, a harmology, or doctrine of order, which studies the relationships between the many data; and finally, a theory of thought or logic, which introduces us to valid reasoning. This course, "Elements of Philosophy of Culture," delves deeper into this and discusses the 'stoicheia,' the elements which, if put forward, make both the phenomenon of 'culture' and the philosophy concerning it logically understandable and transparent.*

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CF1

Introduction. -- a philosophical method. (01/10)

Philosophy has, especially since Plato of Athens (-427/-347), founder of the Academy, a method of its own. We will now briefly outline this, following what was said in the First and Second Years.

1. Man as a soul situating himself in body, 'polis' (society), and 'kosmos' (ordered universe). We refer to *E.PL. PSY. 15/16* (*The Harmonious Soul*).

Model. -- First of all: the term 'harmony' means 'integration', or also 'configuration'. Preferably—we find ourselves in Ancient Hellas—the configuration or 'harmony' is such that, through its extraordinary mode of being, it compels awe and wonder, and is thus 'kalos', beautiful. In other words: for the Ancient Greeks, and very particularly for the Paleophythagoreans (-560/-300) and the Platonists, something is 'harmonious' to the extent that it contains good integration and beauty. --

Thus in what follows, -- according to Plato.

a. Soul and body

These are, in man insofar as he is “in order”, preferably neatly joined together (which considerably weakens the notorious “Platonic dualism”).

b. Individual and 'policy'

(Literally: 'city'; 'city-state'; -- what constituted the society of that time) these are preferably joined together neatly.

c. Humanity and the cosmos

(Lat.: 'universe', the universe, the totality of all that is). These preferably fit together beautifully. -- This threefold harmony dominates Pythagoreanism and Platonism in particular.

Counter- model

Library st.: G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe* , Paris, 1980, 267/315 (*Musique et transe chez les Grecs*) .

The mentally (severely or mildly) disturbed person—the 'possessed'—who, following an offense against the body, the polis, or the cosmos, exhibits a disturbed soul (he/she is vulnerable and endures the wrath of a punishing deity), is afflicted with “divine madness” (understand: a disturbance caused by a deity). His mind is inoperative. Harmony is immediately lost. -- Ritual dance and sacrifice can restore that harmony, within the framework of a telestic or initiation mania (sacred trance). See course: 8.5. *Elements of Platonic Psychology* 1972/1973 .

CF2

The dialogical and inclusive harmony.

Cf. E.PL. 114, 110/113 -. Last year we established that for Plato, a philosophy lesson meant a 'sunousia', an intimate togetherness. Only within the framework of such a philosophical 'friendship' does the spark of insight “jump” from one student to another. Among the Ancient Pythagoreans, this 'thinking society' was already at work.

In other words: philosophizing was much more than delving into abstract matters as a solitary individual. -- This was further reinforced by religion: the student lived in 'sunousia'; intimacy with one deity or another who assisted him or her in the formative and investigative work. -- This is the dialogical

principle.

However, there is a second 'harmony': the inclusion- or inclusive character. Platon—following Herodotus of Halicarnassus (484/425 BC; the researcher of nations and peoples, known for his *Historiai* (Investigations))—begins methodically with the presentation of the opinions of predecessors and contemporaries. Incidentally, this is also found in the agora, the democratic assembly of the people: only after every citizen had expressed their opinion did decisions proceed. Again: not the self-willed, orthodox, or biased (cf. Ch. Peirce) individual, but the individual in tune with the opinions of others! So much for the harmony or the merging into a few of its consequences.

2.-- *Man as a soul displaying “the noble yoke”.*

E.PL. 34/37.-- 'Zugon', Lat.: iugum, yoke. 'Xuzeuxis' (= su.zeuxis) is also used as a metaphor: two animals, for example, carrying the same yoke in front of a plow or cart, are called a 'two-horse team'.

Platon uses this figurative term to denote the orientation of our soul with its spirit towards reality. This is called 'noble' (kalon zugon) or 'beautiful' because Platon harbors only admiration and wonder for that peculiarity of the human 'nous', Lat.: intellectus, spirit.

Indeed. **a.** Even the Primitives—or through the mouths of their magicians—know that knowledge (mantic) and magic (action) succeed only insofar as the rule “*similia similibus*” (like by means of like, the original by means of the model) is respected. Direct knowledge and action on a reality (metonymic) and representation (metaphorical) are the instruments of Archaic manticism and magic.

CF3

In other words: if the clairvoyant or the sorcerer truly wishes to grasp reality (solid knowledge, mantic; precise influence, magical), then his mind must be attuned to that reality very precisely—akribos.

b.1. Among the Ancient Greeks, Pindar of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438), the Paleopythagoreans (-560/-300), and Parmenides of Elea (-540/...) mention an analogous structure: “*hupo tou homoinu to homoion*” (by means of the similar (model) the similar (original)). Applied by Parmenides: “Being thought (model) and being (original) are the same”.

b.2. *Plato* —in his * *Politeia* *—mentioned the same structure: what is visible (metaphor for “all that is real”; original), and sight (metaphor for 'mind', model) are a yoke, a team. In other words: our mind is sight; reality is that which is visible to that mind. Mind and being, as a yoke or team, are in their interconnectedness a further example of harmony or union, here as “being attuned to one another”.

Note:

a. Medieval thinkers (Scholasticism: 800/1450), following in the footsteps of St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest Church Father of the Ancient Christian West), called the yoke or pair 'intentio' (understand: orientation, attunement).

b. Franz Brentano (1838/1917; leading figure of the Austrian School) reintroduced that medieval concept into his psychology and, immediately, into contemporary philosophy.

In the intentional Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859/1938), intentionality or consciousness-directedness (subjective noësis directed towards objective noëma) is central. In other words: as conscious beings, we project ourselves onto the world. -- Thus, we see that a medieval concept is actualized and re-established. This gives rise to three sub-approaches, which we will now specify.

A.-- Ontology. (03/05)

Ontology, or the study of reality. Among the Ancient Greeks, 'being' and 'being' were the terms used to represent the reality available to our mind.

Here is situated what Platon calls 'theoria', fathoming. Our soul, situated via body in polis and cosmos, **(a)** perceives keenly **(b)** in order to understand and explain. -- Even the Paleophythagoreans called 'theoretikos', someone who, for example, attends the Olympic Games, -- not merely for the pleasure but to fathom their true nature - their 'reality'.

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The Romans rendered the term 'theates' (one who practices theoria) with the term 'speculator', in the primary sense 'spy' (one who observes closely in order to know what it is). 'Specula' in Latin means 'watchtower'. They translated the term 'theorein' as 'speculari'. Let 'speculation' be called that which constitutes the essence of philosophizing (...): the investigation into

what emerges behind immediate observation, namely the connections. -- Compare this with what the Milesians (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes) meant – as Herodotus, for example, demonstrates this, namely:

- a. 'opsis', immediate perception,
- b. followed by 'historia', investigation into what is not immediately given.

It is therefore not surprising that Platon, following this line of thought, says that 'epistèmè', (true) science, is “theoretike tou ontos” (to observe keenly as an observer all that is real in order to fathom it).

Existence/ essence.

Ontology stands or falls with a pair that Platon already distinguished, namely, factual existence (existentia, in Medieval Latin) and the manner of factual existence (essence, among the Medievalists).

Indeed: the philosopher targets two sides of something! For example, “How cultural is something?” and “How is that something cultural?” These culturological questions are merely applications of the ontological pair: “how real is something?” (existence) and “how is that something real?” (essence). “The noble yoke” is directed at this. -- It is noted that 'something' means “all that is non-nothing”.

The Transcendentals.

It is called 'transcendental' that which transcends, surpasses, or 'transcends' all concepts—universal, particular, singular.

Bible st. : O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 372, 384; id., *Geschichte des Idealismus*, III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 1086.

Willmann states that the fourfold nature “being (reality)/ good (value)/ one (all and/or whole)/ 'true' (understandable)” is a summary of the pair “one/ true” of the Paleo-Pythagoreans and the Platonic pair “being/ good”. What does that mean?

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For the Pythagoreans, everything that was one—understand: everything that is a collection (all) and a system (whole)—was immediately—ipso facto—'true' (understand: transparent, insightful, understandable). They were,

fundamentally, 'harmologists' (harmology is a theory of order that examines the relationships between (a multitude of) data).

For Platon, everything that 'is' (really) is, truly being insofar as it is 'good' (valuable), understand: truly good. Only then was it immediately 'true' (comprehensible, sensible, acceptable to our mind).

Put differently : 'being' is something in itself, a given ('res' for the Medieval Scholastics), as distinguishable from the rest 'something' (aliquid, in Medieval Latin). Furthermore: as a totality (all, whole), being is one (which makes a multiplicity one); as an object of insight, being is 'true' (understandable); as an object of appreciation, being is 'good' (valuable).

These transcendental concepts are omnipresent. In all that we assert, they are present as presuppositions, like a light that illuminates.

Thus, a culture is a reality (being). It is a collection of elements—cultural elements—that constitute a whole or system (one). It is a set of values (good). Thus, it is understandable (true).

It is clear: if one understands the Ancient terms well, they become the axioms of our research, which is rooted in ontology as a fundamental premise.

B.-- Harmology (theory of order). (05/08)

Harmonology, or the theory of order, studies the relationships between data using the comparative method. -- In ancient times, this was called stoicheiosis, or factor analysis.

Library st.: *EW Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 29/56 (Plato), -- especially 30, 36, 38, 42.

Beth is one of the few who emphasizes this aspect—a fundamental aspect in Plato and in all of Ancient philosophy. 'Stoicheiosis' (Lat.: elementatio) means, for example, “the constructive construction from a number of primordial elements” or “the axiomatic construction of geometric theorems into a system” (Beth, oc 3).

In other words: an exposition that, taking individual elements—stoicheia—as a given, examines their connections (set, system) through comparison. A certain 'holism' (sense of totalities) is the basic prerequisite. Typical of Ancient thought.

Induction.

This is where Socratic induction is situated. -- “From a number of concrete examples— *note*: samples—Socrates attempts to deduce exactly what we mean by a particular word or concept and what the constitutive elements— *note*: stoicheia—are of the reality corresponding to it.” (*E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie** , Antwerp, 1967, 74).

It is clear: De Strycker bypasses stoicheiosis, but, in his representation of that which the investigation into the elements (stoicheia) is, namely induction, he mentions it unintentionally.

Applicative model.

Oc, 74. -- Socratic induction—thus literally, according to De Strycker—considers a number of examples (samples from a set or also from a system) in order to clarify a meaningful connection (given in language).

If **a.** a runner, a wrestler, a singer, for example, **b.1.** can also run, wrestle, or sing poorly at will and **b.2.** does not fail against their will, only then does common usage say that he is 'good'. Every skill or expertise necessarily entails as elements **i.** performing, **ii.** performing well or poorly at will.

In this way, a definition (determination of essence) is literally constructed in a Socratic-Platonic manner, namely from elements—constitutive or essence-determining elements—that are observable (verifiable) in reality. Thus, one moves from a purely nominal or verbal definition to a real or substanceary definition.

Collection/system .

When I take the Primitive culture of the Indians, I take one type—'element'—from the total collection of all possible cultures. That is metaphorical induction.

When I take, for example, their agriculture from that totality of Indian culture, I am not taking the entire culture, but the partial culture, the component or subsystem. That is metonymic induction.

Conclusion : there are two types of samples! In the first case, I situate the entire culture within the totality of all (possible) cultures (collection); in the second, I situate a part of it within the totality of the entire cultural system to

which it belongs.

The first induction leads to generalization; the second leads to generalization. – That is what Platon understands by 'stoicheiosis' or analysis of elements or factors.

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Genetic theories.

“When our thought process examines how something has developed from its inception, then it is 'genetic' (from the Ancient Greek 'gennetikos', literally: 'genetic', relating to origin).-- Thus we think genetically when, for example, we examine the genesis of a plant or the origin of an empire or the history of a text from the first draft to the final version.” (O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie* , Vienna, 1959-5,51).

Thus, Plato attempts to trace the course of Athenian culture from the founding of the city and distinguishes phases (stages):

- a. beginning,
- b . growth and degeneration
- c. purification.

In particular, one class, the 'capitalists' of that time, caused the entire culture to degenerate into a massive pursuit of profit, to the detriment of intellectual culture.

Incidentally:

Here we discern the influence of Heraclitus of Ephesus (-535/-465), whose philosophy was embraced by Crates, Plato's teacher. As A. Rivier states in **études de littérature grecque (Théâtre, Poésie lyrique, Philosophie, Médecine*)*, Geneva, 1975, 369/395 (**L'homme et l'expérience humaine dans les fragments d' Héraclite**), for the Heraclitean, a human life is structured according to pairs of opposites (health and/or sickness, waking and/or sleeping, for example). Here: cultural life is characterized by two stoicheia or elements, which form pairs of opposites, namely flourishing and/or decay, in the form of proper measure and/or degeneration. -- That is then a small example of “harmony of opposites”. -- A harmony consisting of elements that make up pairs of opposites or 'sustoichiai' (systemics). -- That, too, is stoicheiosis or factor analysis. But a diachronic rather than a synchronic one, -- an analysis that examines a dynamic system.

Summative and amplificative induction.

Imagine that one studies a number of civilizations (paratactic) or a number of components of a civilization (hypotactic), and that, at the end, one summarizes the samples; then one has summative induction.

Imagine that one draws conclusions from there regarding other as yet unstudied civilizations or parts of a civilization; then one is engaging in amplifying or information-expanding induction. The latter is, of course, hypothetical (it is assumed that it exhibits unexamined similarities). Which has not been proven.

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Inductivism.

Induction takes samples from sets (all) or systems (whole). This is even the case with axiomatic-deductive systems: after all, they posit a limited number of axioms or preconditions at the outset. That is to say: they take a sample from all possible axioms or postulates and thereby develop a limited number of theorems. Thus, traditional Euclidean geometry was replaced by another equally limited set of axioms in non-Euclidean geometries: the non-Euclidean axioms are a sample from all possible geometric preconditions.

Such a thing is certainly true as far as cultures are concerned: Islamic culture has its axioms or presupposed values; the Western Enlightened-Rational has its own. Both choices are samples of all possible cultural values. -- All this is evident from the stoicheiosis or analysis of the elements—here: axioms or presupposed values—of a geometric system or a culture.

C.-- Theory of thought (logic). (08/10)

The third sub-approach is the theory of conditional clauses in the form of “if, then”. Let us begin with an applicative model.

If the axioms (pre-established values) of a culture are merely a sample from the totality of all possible axioms (values), then the value judgments of that culture are merely restrictive judgments, valid subject to the proviso that other pre-established values entail other value judgments. -- That is Platonic dialectics. Which we will briefly explain.

The hypothetical reasoning.

Cf. E. De Strycker, *Concise History of Ancient Philism* , 103/104 (The Hypothetical Method). -- Plato distinguishes two types of conditional

reasoning.

a. The 'synthesis' or axiomatic deductive method .

Here, Stoicism starts from presupposed axioms, from which a number of 'theorems' are drawn. Mathematics at the time proceeded in this way.

b. The 'analysis' or reductive method .

Here, one starts from a proposition (e.g., a finding) and proceeds according to what it posits (here one seeks the 'axioms').

In the Jevons-Lukasiewicz diagram:

a. Deduction. If A, then B. Well, A. Therefore B.

b. Reduction: If A, then B. Well, B. Therefore A.

The antecedent “if A, then B” expresses the principle of necessary (and preferably sufficient) reason or ground upon which the whole syllogism is based.

CF9

Reductive reasoning.

Let's take a singular—concrete—little example.

Library st.: *Louisa L. Hay, You Can Heal Your Life* , Groningen, De Zaak, 1986-1, 1988-5 (// *You Can Heal Your Life* , Santa Monica, Ca., Hay House, 1984).-- This work is characteristic of the New Age and, in that sense, belongs to the Counterculture and Postmodernity. The values put forward differ considerably from the values prioritized by Modernity (since Galileo, Descartes, and the Enlightened Rationalists). Part 5 of the work contains Louisa's life story (oc, 167/176) and oc, 136/165 deals with “the metaphysical workings”.

An example.

The premise (and thus stoicheion) par excellence is “If Ao (the factor that causes misfortune), then B (the one that caused the misfortune). Well then, Bo. Therefore Ao”. The factors at work in misfortunes are called, in Hay's terminology, 'thought pattern', 'mental cause'.

Incidentally : what is not explicitly discussed but is invariably stated at the outset is a definition of misfortune. An old formula read (“Bonum ex integra causa, malum e quocumque defectu” (If something is whole (nothing is wrong with it), then it is good; if something is even slightly wrong with it, then it is not good). -- That, too, is a stoicheion or factor that defines Hay's

method of 'healing' (making whole).

a1. Given . -- Someone comes to Hay with a 'problem' (= misfortune), -- such as hemorrhoids, nervous breakdown (examples she cites herself).

a2. Requested (sought).

2. The solution.

2.1. Hay's thesis states: "The problem is rarely—note the restrictive nature of the judgment—the actual problem" (oc, 30). In other words: problems are signs of something else (Bo is a sign of Ao). They are merely symptoms (or a syndrome, a set of symptoms).

The first step in reductive analysis is "which beliefs caused this problem?" Mental causes can be, for example: fear of boundaries, anger about the past, feeling burdened, being afraid to let go, etc. Also: egocentrism, overload of communication channels.

2.2. Second step: "I am willing to let go of the idea – 'pattern' – that created the misfortune from within me. -- This will be repeatable (to be activated).

2.3. Third step: I internalize a new thought pattern.-- For example: "I let go of everything that is not love.

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There is time and space for all that I want to do. I open my heart and establish only loving communication. -- I am safe. I am healthy." Behold a few sentences that "the new thought pattern" -

Ah (salvation-building factor) - to articulate, With the intended result: **Bh** (salvation). --"I repeat the new idea, for in this way my healing process is underway".

Note: If new problems arise in the course of the healing process, the three-part scheme is repeated.

Conclusion: the factors that make 'healing' in the style of Hay understandable are=

a reductive (tracing the cause) reasoning, **b.** an opposing train of thought. ("I activate the health-promoting factor in my mind"). There you have

stoicheosis or factor analysis in a nutshell.

Note : Given the mentality William James once labeled 'physician materialism', this method must, of course, come across as 'irrational' (not justifiable from a positive-scientific perspective). Yes, even as an object of ridicule.

And indeed: the power of (positive, -- understand: imagining the favorable) thinking exists, but is it, besides being a necessary condition, also a sufficient one for the healing of, for example, a hemorrhoid or a depression? In some people, that power of thinking is indeed very great, but the great mass is certainly not ready for it.

Consequence: a restrictive judgment (Hay's method of ideas 'heals' insofar as it constitutes a necessary but perhaps not also a sufficient condition for healing).

Factor analysis .

Stoicheiosis thus encompasses two aspects. -- An element (stoicheion) is:

a. a holistic given that becomes apparent when one splits a totality into its parts and vice versa ("If all elements, then the totality. If the totality, then all elements").

b. A hypothetical or logical given, a factor or parameter, is that which, if posited as a hypothesis, makes something else understandable ('true') within a totality. Because the factor can be included in a conditional sentence, it is also logical.

The title of this course.

"Elements of Philosophy of Culture" deals with the 'stoicheia', the elements which, if put forward, make both the phenomenon of 'culture' and the philosophy concerning it logically understandable (transparent).

CF11

16 samples will follow now

1. Towards a definition of 'culture'. (11/16)

Library sample:

-- L. Fèbvre/ E. Tonnelet/ M. Mauss/ A. Niceforo/ L. Weber, *Civilization (Le*

mot et l'idée), Paris, sd (a work that discusses the history of the terms 'culture' and 'civilisation');

-- A. Hilckman, *Geschichtsphilosophie/ Kulturwissenschaft/ Soziologie*, in: *Saeculum* (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte) 12 (1961): 4, 405/420 (a humanities approach: does a science of culture exist and what then is 'culture?');

-- Norbert Elias, *The Civilization Process (Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations)*, 2 vols, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1982 (the original work, * *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* *, dates from 1939);

-- D. Roustan, *La culture au cours de la vie*, Paris, 1936 (about cultivating oneself);

-- Br. Maliowski, *Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, Paris, 1968 (// *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays*, The Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1944: an approach from ethnology (cultural anthropology), including prehistory, folklore, as well as physical anthropology);

-- J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism and Culture*, Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (*The concept of 'culture' / Culture as a factor in behavior / cultural explanation*);

-- H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, London, Faber and Faber, 1952 (the brother of the well-known Reinhold Niebuhr describes, from the standpoint of a Protestant theologian (Yale University), the harmony of opposites that are Christ and culture).

Behold a meager sample from an unmanageable mass of articles and books.

Preliminary. Cf. E.RH. 47/49 .

A. Ellis and E. Sagarin, in their work **Nymphomania* *, Amsterdam, 1965, developed an ingenious theory regarding interpretation—a 'hermeneutics' (in German)—which they themselves call the "ABC theory". 'A' is some 'being' (a given). 'B' is the set of presuppositions (in Platonic language 'hypotheses') with which a subject or a group of subjects approaches the given. 'C' is the final interpretation or 'response'. In this context, we introduce a pair of opposites or *systechie*: "meaning conception/meaning foundation". 'Meaning conception' implies that B coincides with A (however difficult that may be in practice, our mind, in its openness to "all that is", is at least in principle

capable of grasping the objective meaning of all that is given).

CF12

Sense-finding is another form of interpretation: for example, our objectively oriented mind can address the question of whether a given fact is “of value” to something or someone else. Sense-finding is therefore meaning-making or interpretation in the second degree: one must first grasp the correct meaning of what is given; only then can one introduce something that originates from something else.

In particular, 'B' signifies the conscious or unconscious prejudices—these, too, are presuppositions—of an interpreting subject. Such prejudices are a very frequent instance of sentence construction—very often an obstacle to achieving the correct comprehension of the sentence.

Objection.

When one hears many contemporary intellectuals speak, it seems that we are so trapped in our subjective prejudices that we cannot be 'objective' at all.

To this we counter: if we are so subjective that there is no longer any question of objectivity, how do we know that we are radically subjective?

If we possess no conception of meaning whatsoever, then it is impossible for us to compare our formation of meaning with the objective meaning of what is given. And ... we find ourselves in a delirious state reminiscent of psychiatric patients, -- with this difference that we still know that we are 'delirious', whereas they no longer know. The fact that we know that we are delirious proves that we are not simply delirious and ... remain susceptible to conception of meaning.

First conclusion. -- When it comes to grasping the essence of culture, we maintain, in accordance with the ABC theory just outlined, that we grasp the meaning of culture, while also creating meaning based on culture. Not the one without the other, therefore!

Assembly/disassembly.

“Construction/ deconstruction” -- “There are therefore two interpretations of 'interpretation' – thus writes Derrida. As well as of structure, of sign, of play.

a. One tries to decipher, -- dreams of “a truth” or “an origin” that escapes

the play and the ordering of the sign (...).

b. The other (...) confirms the game and tries to move beyond “man” and “humanism”.

CF13

The name 'man' is taken here as the designation for that being which—throughout the history of metaphysics or onto-theology (*note*: a term originating from M. Heidegger),—in other words, through its own history—has dreamed of “full presence”, “the reassuring foundation”, “the origin and the end of the game”.—Regarding this cited text, *H. Servotte*, **Literatuurwetenschap**, resp. *literatuurstudie**, writes in: **Onze Alma Mater** 46 (1992): 3 (August), 265, the following: “J. Derrida sees the play of language, the passing by of the signifiers (*note*: translation of the French 'signifiant(s)', the word sound containing a thought content), the language that speaks in man and that has always been spoken,—since language precedes us”.

Comments.

People like Derrida bracket the one who composes a text—man, the center of traditional 'humanism'—they stick to the word choices at work in the text and attribute those word choices solely to something like “language”, a subtle entity that precedes us all and, in our text-composing mind, predetermines the choice.

To which we note that we all, indeed, guided by a tradition, engage in an existing language ('langue') and in a pre-established usage ('langage').

But we observe that that same language and its use are simultaneously created by us. Thrown into a language and its use, we design them at the same time. The linguistic human being is both a passive subject and an active subject. So that the person composing a text is more than 'foam' (Foucault) on the waves of language structures and usage. That is one.

But there is more: Derrida and his contemporaries excessively emphasize the fact that a text is a set of 'signs' that falls into the grip of interpreters. That is correct, to begin with. But here the distinction emerges between conception of meaning by the interpreting text reader and construction of meaning by that same interpreting reader. In other words: a text author and his text (a set of 'signifiers') are not simply at the mercy of an audience and their constructions of meaning!

Conclusion. -- The same applies to texts about culture: they are situated within a language and its usage, but this does not imply that the subject is 'nothing' or can be simply defined in any way whatsoever.

CF14

Existence/essence.

The ontology of culture means, first of all, defining it in its essence from two viewpoints:

- a. its existence ("How real is culture?" Or: "Is it not fiction?");
- b. its essence ("How is culture a reality?"). Cf. *EC. 04* .-- That this is still valid is proven by what follows.

E. Van Itterbeek, Europa (Huis van cultuur), Leuvense Cahiers , 107, 1992, takes as his starting point the question "whether one can indeed speak of a cultural identity (*note* : essence) of Europe and in what that identity consists". In other words: the existence and essence of Europe as a cultural concept.

Descriptive and axiological definition.

A word can be used neutrally, melioratively, and pejoratively. The neutral meaning is purely descriptive and narrative; the value-based meaning is either meliorative or pejorative.

1. Descriptive definition.

W. Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 1 , Berlin/Leipzig, 1936-2, 5ff.-- The writer says: no more highly organized people lacks some educational ideal, but the law and the prophets in Israel, Confucianism in China, the concept of dharma in India are nevertheless something that remains thoroughly distinguishable from what the Ancient Greeks call 'paideia', formation towards a greater and higher human being. Indeed, the purely descriptive concept of 'culture' is even—according to a rather annoyed Jaeger—applicable to the way of life of the Primitives. -- The Positivist thinkers, in their positive-scientific Culturology, uphold this purely descriptive meaning, which no longer grounds value judgments. Such a culture amounts to "kataskeue tou biou"; "Apparatur des Lebens" (the device that makes life livable).

2.1. Axiological definition.

The transformation of actual humans into 'higher' humans was called 'paideia' by the Ancient Greeks and gradually came to be regarded as a true ideal. Admittedly—according to Jaeger—this cultural ideal is intertwined with

the fortunes of the Ancient Greeks and, in that sense, “historically developed.” Nevertheless, it grew into something that transcended those contingencies: they passed on that timeless ideal as a legacy to the other peoples of Antiquity and left it to us, Westerners.

2.2. Axiological definition.

N. Elias, **The Civilizing Process **, defines 'culture' as a narrowly European product: European civilization, namely, is regarded as 'the' civilization par excellence.

CF15

It bears a slight resemblance to the Ancient Greek model that identified greater and higher humanity with wisdom and expertise, preferably coupled with conscientious behavior: Elias, as a sociologist, situates the 'culture' initially among the nobility and later among the bourgeoisie here in the West, which cherishes as an ideal:

a. control of the lower drives (eating and drinking, grooming the nose, etc. are subject to rules of nobility),

b . peacefulness,

c. introduction of the distinction between 'normal' and 'abnormal' behavior. Incidentally: even by the figuration sociologists, who are his students, this argument is fiercely dismissed as 'Eurocentrism' (our European culture, after all, is only one type among many). Which again points to the dominance that the neutral view is gaining over the axiological one.

2.3.-- Axiological definition,

Kolt and Klemm. -- It is 1843: two cultural histories appear. Both works continue the high tradition regarding culture, but *Klemm, in particular* , incorporates all matters concerning material well-being within the sphere of “humanist culture.” In his **Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft **, Leipzig, 1843-1, 1855-2, it becomes particularly evident that the concept of 'culture' encompasses not only 'higher' culture, reserved for those who do not perform manual labor in society, but also 'lower' culture, characteristic of the manual-laboring class. “It is therefore clearly 'culture' when man cuts off the thick branch of the tree, sharpens it therewith with a stone or in the fire, and subsequently uses it to ward something off or to bring down animals (...) Culture is the result of the interaction between humans and nature and henceforth of the interaction between humans themselves.” Thus Gustav Klemm.

Incidentally: see J. Goudsblom , pc, 59/62 (*Towards a general concept of culture*).

Note : D. Roustan , oc, 31/57 (*Culture et métier*) also thinks along analogous lines: all adults in our industrially service-oriented society are engaged in one profession or another in which intellectual and manual labor are becoming increasingly less distinguishable. One can see it: 'labor' (intellectual and manual labor) becomes central to the concept of 'culture', which becomes a transformation of nature.

Let us conclude, with E. Van Itterbeek, *Europa (House of Culture)* : the question par excellence is what we ought to understand by the term 'culture'.

CF16

Van Itterbeek situates this main question against the background of what he calls “the gap between the Antique-Classical concept of 'culture' (think of what W. Jaeger says in this regard), on the one hand, and, on the other, the present which he identifies with... “a thoroughly commercialized, hostile to the people or at least alien and addictive lifestyle”.

Note: Hilckman, ac, raises the question of whether the concept of 'culture' is a clear-scientific concept, a nominally vague concept, or even a 'non-concept'. It will likely be one at one time and the other at another, depending on the approach.

Hilckman states that terms such as 'culture' and 'civilisation' only appear from 1750 onwards. It is also certain that, in the Dutch-speaking area, the words 'beschaving' and 'beschaafdheid' came into circulation during the course of the 18th century.

A first separate formulation of 'culture' would, according to Hilckman, be found in:

a. GW Leibniz (1646/1716; Cartesian Rationalist), in his *Novissima Sinica* (in which it appears that for Leibniz both the cultural phenomenon in its totality and its diversity in a number of cultures were a clear achievement);

b. G. Vico (1666/1744; Italian philologically oriented thinker), in his *Principi di una Scienza Nuova* (1725), a work with great lasting influence, in which cultures are described as 'nazioni'.

Note -- Pay close attention: the fact that the adoption of terms such as

'civilization' or 'culture' occurred rather late does not mean that people had no understanding of culture before the 18th century.

Besides the solid work on 'paideia', culture, by W. Jaeger, what Platon left us in this regard also applies here. The education of what he calls "the little man" within us all, that is, our spirit or sense of values, is central to him. We say "spirit or sense of values" because the good, the highest and all-encompassing idea (which encompasses all others), is that which our spirit can grasp. One should therefore not confuse the Platonic concept of 'spirit' with the Rationalist concept of 'reason'.

The great problem, according to Plato, is that people become absorbed in the "kataskeuè tou biou", the habit-making apparatus. What he calls "the great monster" (nocturnal life, eating, drinking, dwelling, -- sexual life and labor (economy)) and "the lesser lion" (sense of honor), consumes us too much.

CF17

2. Still towards a definition. (17/22)

Now that the ground has been cleared, we can address the definition of 'culture' more directly. -- Let us begin by distinguishing two types of defining: the existential and the axiological.

1. Existential definition.

We, as humans, are thrown into a situation of nature, which we can, however, also shape within our 'designs'. Passively, yes, but also actively, we do away with what might be called 'nature'.

a. W. Nölle, *Völkerkundliches Lexikon*, Munich, 1959, 85, defines 'Kultur' as follows. -- At the origin the Latin 'colere', to care for and even to venerate. Hence 'cultura' and also 'cultus' (worship). Nölle's description: "Care, development, and perfection of plants, animals, and the human form of life".

Note: Why the inanimate nature, which is given to us as a natural landscape, is absent is a mystery to us: is the transformation of the natural landscape into a 'cultural landscape' not also 'culture'?

Note-- Thassilo von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, Cologne, Phidon, 1955, 13, also connects with 'culture' to characterize what the Ancient Greeks meant by 'culture': 'refinement' of nature and man seems, practically speaking, to be what von Scheffer means.

A. Toynbee (1889/1975; British cultural historian), known for his twelve-volume *Study of History* (1934/1961), sees it as follows.

(1) *Situational* . -- A challenge - e.g. a severe or untenable situation among a Primitive tribe - elicits a response. That response aims at survival and life. When a natural disaster is over, the tribe is ready for cultural gains.

(2) *Elite* . -- The rise of culture in response to a challenging stimulus is almost always due to a discovery: resourceful ('creative') minorities can be found everywhere. Think of what cultural theologians call 'saviors' or 'redeemers' or 'rescuers'. The masses follow.

H. Richard Niebuhr, **Christ and Culture** , therefore defines culture as follows: -- Culture responds to a given nature as an activity governed by values (e.g., survival, life improvement).

CF18

a. It is the totality of that independent, purposeful activity through which man, together with fellow man (synchronically) and in a tradition to be constantly re-established and actualized (diachronically), enriches nature with new structures aimed at the ever-more successful realization of values.

b. Metonymically, 'culture' is also the totality of the results achieved.

2. *Axiological definition*

Defining 'culture' as activity in response to situations that nature presents us is one thing. Yet that activity is either goal-oriented or deliberate. Here the values emerge (which already appear in Niebuhr's definition of essence, of course).

'Axia', in Ancient Greek, means 'value' or 'price' (a cargo, a slave have value and this is translatable into price); yet 'axia' is, actually, more: it is the deserved consequence of an omen! A beautiful female slave – omen – deserves a high price as appreciation; solid work – omen – deserves a fitting wage or reward. Just as, conversely, a misdeed – omen – deserves a punishment or reproach – consequence.

'Axia' is 'continuation' (reaction) to something that is a 'good' (or the reverse); thus 'axiotheos' means “that which corresponds to the 'glory' (dignity) of a deity”.

In summary: **a** . there is a good or value; **b**. there is the appropriate valuation or valuation, assessment, - axia - So that 'axiology' actually ought to mean “theory of valuations”. However, through metonymy, 'axiology' usually means “theory of values”.

Culture as a value system.

Bibl. st. : -- J. van Doorn/C. Lammers, *Modern Sociology (A Systematic Introduction)*, Utr./Antw., 1976-2, 105/140 (*Cultural Elements*).

a. Theorists distinguish between 'material' and 'immaterial' culture. Material culture encompasses “the tangible products of human activity” (cars, radio, television, assembly line labor, etc.). This is reminiscent of Niebuhr's findings. Immaterial culture is apparently situated within the value system.

b-- Culture is then definable on the basis of values (oc, 118), objects of feeling and disposition; these give rise to goals, ideas concerning what is desirable ('ideals'); they establish expectations (oc, 115), ideas concerning what is normally going to happen; they are the basis of norms, i.e. reasons for advice, commands, and prohibitions (duties and rights). - Central to the mentioned fourfoldness are evidently values.

CF19

Note: Axiology and the theory of happiness.

Eudemonology, or the study of happiness, is one aspect—and not a small one—of the theory of values. After all, is there a value that surpasses being happy? Moreover, happiness encompasses, as it were, all possible goods.

One work among many: G. van Leeuwen, **Op zoek naar geluk* (On happiness as motive and goal/ nature and possibility of happiness/ Happiness and ethics)*, Antwerp, Patmos, 1984. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas, Kant, Marx, and the Utilitarians are discussed. However, purely secular happiness is transcended by a Biblical conception of happiness (which then leads to soteriology or the doctrine of salvation). Culture certainly has to do with the desire for happiness.

Note Sociology and Culturology .

A. Hilckman, ac, notes that since Auguste Comte (1798/1857; father of French Positivism) sociology has functioned as a cultural science. -- He opposes this, rightly so: the formal object of sociology is living together in a

group! Admittedly, there is no society without a system of values and, therefore, indirectly, sociology is concerned with values and culture. -- Incidentally, it is the same with psychology: the formal object is behavior (and inner life), -- things that never exist without values and culture and therefore have indirect cultural validity.

Culture and ethics.

A. Hilckman, ac, defines 'culture' as “the shaping of human existence”. Hilckman says that this encompasses things such as technology and economics, forms of society of all kinds, law, science, and art.

In ancient languages, these are 'technai', trades. Whoever masters such a 'trade' is an expert, “a man of the trade”. But—according to Hilckman again—what primarily distinguishes a culture (and thus constitutes its essence) from non-culture is conscience. Within a cultural sphere, a culture labels things either as morally good (righteous, conscientious) or as morally evil (unrighteous, conscienceless). “Ultimately, the unity of a culture is founded in the common acceptance of the same spiritual and ethical values” (ac, 413).

Note: In this, Hilckman continues figures like Socrates and Plato in their struggle against Protosophism (-450/-350): a thief is an expert, but he lacks a conscience (as Socrates once said in a discussion about culture).

CF20

Let us summarize this in a typical Platonic differential:

incompetent	incompetent expert	expert
conscienceless	conscientious	conscienceless
conscientious		

This differential is a curious cultural differential: the cultural level rises as one moves from left to right! -- It is therefore not surprising that *The Economist* (1989: Sept. 30, 53), in a short article titled “ *Case Study in Caring: Ethical Values*” , emphasizes The Harvard School of Business. “How can business people be made more human, refined, and responsible? The Harvard Business School attempts to pull it off.” This is how the article begins. The aim is not to teach “Business Ethics,” but to incorporate a set of ethical values into a two-year course on 'management' or policy. With: voluntary service to the community, summer jobs in the unpaid sector, and renewed interest in something other than greed.

In doing so, let us, with Paul Garcin (Geneva), emphasize information true to reality (eliminating what he calls 'intoxication' (= false information)). Indeed: businessmen are experts at deceiving their fellow men (deception entails withholding information).

Culture and 'glamour' (splendor, splendor).

Where is this fundamental concept of human life situated? Plato says:

- a. there is "the good" (= all that is valuable without further ado);
- b. there is "the beautiful" (= all that commands awe and wonder thanks to its luster of value or splendor). Glamour—let us retain that Anglo-Saxon word—is situated in the aesthetic domain of values.

Library st.: *id* magazine no. 104 (May 1992) labels itself as " *The Glamour Issue*". The publishers (who are alternative) situate glamour in "idea, fashion, clubs, music, people". In other words, all kinds of cultural domains. Already the cover girl, Helena Christensen, suggests the undertone of "alternative glamour". Club Glam, Pop Glamour, even "Pure Glamour", Stage Glamour, Soul Glamour, Paris Glamour, Fashion Glamour, Computer Glamour. Regarding "Pure Glamour", it reads: "Glamour is power, glamour is sensuality, glamour is self-expression. Glamour is politics on high heels and everyone from drag queens to performance artists is using it to get their message across". (O. c., 14). -- Briefly translated: glamour, thanks to the shine, conveys a message -- better than the lackluster reality.

CF21

Of course—and this is evident from the examples in the monthly magazine *iD*—that "splendor of value" differs from concept to concept of culture. God's glory in the Bible, for example, is fundamentally different from the 'glory' of a homosexual, a club fan, or a performance artist! But the rhetoric, the efficient way of getting a message across, is the same.

In Platonic terms, namely: the good in itself appeals, gains acceptance, resonates; the good in itself, reinforced by 'splendor' and 'glory', is beautiful and appeals more strongly, gains deeper acceptance, resonates more strongly. A splendid technician, a splendid businessman, a splendid form of society ('lifestyle'), a splendid legal system, a splendid scientific theory, a splendid work of art—they appeal more strongly, are 'more rhetorical'. A splendid culture is more culture than a lackluster one.

Culture and normality.

N, Elias says it: the introduction of the terms 'normal' and 'abnormal' is part of Western 'culture'. Here is a word.

Library st.: R. Fouraste, *Introduction à l'ethnopsychiatrie*, Toulouse, Privat, 1985. -- Ethnopsychiatry is the synthesis of ethnology (cultural anthropology) and psychiatry. The author cites M. Diop, *Allocution d'ouverture du Symposium général sur Psychiatrie et Culture* (Dakar 6/9 April 1981), in: *Revue de psychopathologie africaine* 1981, xvii, 1/2/3, 9/10. "Every society, every culture prioritizes its own ways of existence. At the same time, it develops a set of concepts concerning mental ailments and adapted therapies.

As early as 1950+, G. Devereux (known for his * *Essais d'ethnopsychiatrie générale* *, Paris, Gallimard, 1977-3) was groundbreaking in this regard. In his writings and in his teaching, culture, being normal, and being abnormal constitute a single whole. Thus Fourasté literally. In other words: every culture, as a culture, determines what 'normal' is.

The "abnormal human "

That is the man or woman who no longer belongs in the well-defined cultural system. He or she is then called 'sick', 'pariah', 'crazy', 'deviant' (oc, 28). Or he is called: "unbelieving, heretic, heathen, idolatrous" (oc, 15); or even: "possessed, damned, insane, cursed" (oc, 20).

Thus the madman was exorcised, burned, cast out, or rejected (oc, 20).

CF22

New Age (New Era, Nouvel Age).

Fourasté says, oc, 31: "The causes of ailments – he means in this context somatic (= physical) and psychological – are – understood: in non-Western cultures – essentially exogenous (*note*: coming from outside) – possession by a pathogenic spirit, attack by a (black) magician, defilement (*note*: acquiring a 'spot' or 'blemish' of an occult nature) – ; rarely endogenous (*note*: coming from within), i.e. specific to a constitution, a genetic factor, a psychological situation (understood: as this is interpreted in Western and industrialized culture)".

The gap between our Modern (Enlightened-Rationalist and secularized) culture and the non-Modern (Pre-modern, Primitive, Archaic, traditional) cultures around the globe thus manifests itself in the interpretation of what is considered abnormal. As a result, at least eighty percent of the current world

population is not served by our Western psychiatry. That, at least, is the judgment of a number of etho-psychiatrists.

Flair 25.01.1991 contained sixteen pages by Rosa Wouters , titled: “ *New Age. -- Are we really heading towards new times ?*”. The author takes a broad view: the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the acceleration observed since then leads her to say: “Everything is changing. The East is becoming free. The world seems to be getting smaller and smaller. We want to eat healthy again, live more consciously, have romance. In your daily life, too, you feel that “new times” are dawning. Environmentally friendly, worldly, peaceful times... Exactly: New Age!” (Ac,2)

On page 8 it reads: “ *Is the paranormal ... becoming more normal ?*”

Near-death experiences, telepathic contacts, witches... Do shivers run down your spine? That will likely change, because people are now speaking and thinking about these 'alternative' subjects much more openly again. Parapsychology is an ancient world that we now view with very different eyes.” Thus reads the editors' text as an introduction to Rosa Wouters' text.

This implies that the concepts of 'normal' and 'abnormal' have been enriched since Galileo and Descartes with 'paranormal,' which is neither of the two. -- Rationalists rightly see a new culture in this.

CF23

3. Modern medicine and cultures. (23/29)

Bible st. : E. Coreth, *Einführung in die Philosophie der Neuzeit,I (Rationalismus/ Empirismus: Aufklärung)*, Freiburg, 1972.

1. The author states that, prior to Modern Enlightened Rationalism, lies a long transitional period, of which “the precursors reach back deep into the Middle Ages” (oc, 11). Indeed: Scholasticism (800/1450) exhibits a tendency (among many others, moreover) that contains a genuine precursor to Modernity.

2. The author further states: the new development that emerges with Enlightened Rationalism is situated in the endeavor to 'found' or establish philosophy as a rigorous science. -- This must be understood in the context of the situation at that time, namely 1300+ (the end of Scholasticism).

1.-- The natural sciences

Physics and astronomy, in particular, had made unprecedented progress at that time. Think, for example, of Copernicus (1473/1543: heliocentrism), Johannes Kepler (1571/1630; the so-called Kepler's laws regarding the planets around the sun), Galileo Galilei (1564/1642; exact, i.e., mathematical-experimental, natural science).

Those sciences had discovered, developed, and applied the method appropriate to their nature. The result: they grew into rigorous, methodologically certain sciences.

2.-- The philosophy of the time

The latter, on the other hand, presented a divergent (disunity) and confused appearance. -- Two main tendencies dominated the minds.

a. Skepticism

b. It often took the form of **nominalism** (only the names or terms are universally valid; the content of thought differs from person to person, from culture to culture). Consequence: the skeptic adheres to the immediately given (which he cannot doubt); anything that transcends those immediately evident facts is doubtful and ambiguous.

c. Scientifics

d. The The scientifically minded philosopher of those days did not doubt the immediately given – like the skeptic –; moreover, he also did not doubt what has been scientifically investigated and rigorously proven.

René Descartes (Latin name: Cartesius; 1596/1650). -- “Four years after his condemnation (1633), *Descartes published his Discours de lamethode* (1637).

CF24

One can only understand the success of this work, which lies at the foundation of the entire philosophy and science of modern times, if one sees that it finally laid a reliable foundation for the new scientific rationality.” (*E. Vanden Berghe, Hevig verdacht van ketterij*, in: *Collationes* (Vlaams Tijdschrift v. Theologie en Pastoraal), 13 (1983) 13 (October), 328).

John Locke (1632/1704)

Founder of the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment. Following in the footsteps of William of Ockham (1290/1350; Nominalist) and *Francis Bacon of Verulam* (1561/1626: *Novum organum scientiarum* (1620); experimentally oriented academic science), John Locke is indeed a Cartesian, but with an emphasis

on experience, observation, and the empirical method (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690)). Note, however, that according to *Book IV* of *An Essay*, 'knowledge' (cognition) is perception, but not just any sensory perception, but intellectual perception or 'intuition'.

In summary

Modern Rationalism breaks down into two tendencies: Cartesian pure Rationalism and Lockean Empiricist Rationalism (in short: Empiricism).

Reason is thus the human instrument of insight (scientifically speaking) that offers certainties transcending the immediately given (to which the Skeptic clings exclusively).-- Anything that is not according to that rational method is dismissed as irrational.-- Behold, in a strongly abbreviated form, the foundations or 'presuppositions' (Platonic: 'hypotheses') of the twofold Modern Rationalism, the essence of the Western Enlightenment (= Lumières (Fr.), Enlightenment (Eng./USA), Aufklärung (Dt.)).

Modern medicine.

The medicine established in our country prides itself on being one of the 'shiniest' (*CF 20* : glamour) realizations of dual Rationalism.

Let us now examine, just for a moment, how rational that medicine, with its biomedical paradigm, actually is and how it is rational (*CF 04; 14*). That is philosophy (ontology).

We rely on an article (from many texts): *Lynn Payer, Borderline Cases (Cultures in Western Medicine)*, in: *Nature and Technology* 59 (1991): 6, 424/437. -- We extract the essentials from it. The article begins with a singular-concrete model.

Marie R., a young woman from Madagascar, had complaints of hyperventilation, anxiety, fatigue, and muscle spasms.

CF25

A French doctor diagnosed those symptoms as spasmophilia, a condition caused by a magnesium deficiency. He prescribed magnesium for her, as well as acupuncture. He advised her to return to her parents for care. Marie R. moves to the USA. The American doctors diagnosed her syndrome as being caused by anxiety.

Incidentally : the American doctors were not even familiar with the term 'spasmophilia', although French doctors had already identified that phenomenon between 1970 and 1980. She underwent psychotherapy and was given sedatives. Marie seems to have been cured since then. -- Her question in retrospect is: "What have I actually been cured of?"

This small sample shows how site-dependent and environment-dependent biomedical scientists act.

1967 .-- The World Health Organization orders an investigation.-- The same death certificate was presented to doctors from different countries. The explanations or interpretations differed regarding the cause of death.

Lynn Payer adds: "The diagnoses for psychiatric complaints also vary widely. Until a few years ago, a patient called 'schizophrenic' in the US would probably be called 'manic-depressive' or 'neurotic' in England, and 'delusory psychotic' in France. (Ac, 426).— So much for the diagnoses."

Now for the treatments or therapies.

In France and Germany, doctors recommend countless homeopathic remedies. The majority of American doctors dismiss homeopathy as 'unscientific'.

As for prescription medicines: "Germans, for example, take about six times as many cardiac glycosides or heart-stimulating agents as the French or English, but only half as many antibiotics." (Ac, 426).

In the US, bypass surgery and angiography—in which the heart is examined using a computer—are performed approximately six times more often for heart abnormalities than in England, where doctors deem the techniques unsuitable for certain patients two to three times more often than their American colleagues.

Research has proven that, apart from the financial aspect, medical perspectives differ. -- Now that 1993 is approaching, a united Europe faces a painful problem regarding prescription drugs: England, France, and Germany exhibit vastly different perspectives!

CF26

German starting lineups .

One could summarize this with the term 'heart-focused'. -- An electrocardiogram, for example, is interpreted by a German doctor much more readily as revealing a heart abnormality than in the US. -- German criteria (discriminatory standards) lead to abnormal ECGs in four out of ten people in a patient group, compared to one out of twenty when applying American standards.

Fatigue is often referred to by German doctors as 'Herzinsuffizienz' (heart weakness); in France, England, or the USA, 'fatigue' is "in fact not even considered a disease in the true sense." "Herzinsuffizienz is at present the most common ailment treated by German doctors." (Ac 427v.).-- Consequence: widespread use of cardiac glycosides.

Antibiotics. -- Colds and serious illnesses do not usually lead to the prescription of antibiotics in Germany. Bronchitis has a list of the five most commonly used remedies: antibiotics are not used,

French starting lineups.

"Every French schoolchild is encouraged to think like Descartes" (ac, 429; CF 23). Outside France, there is a sense of suspicion: Cartesianism sometimes leads too easily to a sophisticated theory with insufficient evidence. Not so long ago, French physicians announced that they were using cyclosporine to treat AIDS. This, even though they had looked at only six patients for no longer than a week." (Ac, 429).

Interpretation of illness. -- As in Germany, illness is interpreted as being caused not so much by an external attack, but by the failure of internal defense mechanisms. In Germany, one thinks primarily of the heart or the circulatory system (emphasized by Rudolf Virchow, past century).

In France, people think of "le terrain" (the constitution as a defense system). The consequence: "le terrain" is strengthened by fortifying drinks, vitamins, medicines, and health resorts. Even according to Pasteur, the founder of microbiology, "le terrain" was a matter of paramount importance.

Further consequence: French doctors are less concerned about germs than American ones. Higher bacterial levels in food are acceptable. If someone exhibits a relatively harmless infectious illness, they can be kissed (whereby one comes into contact with potential pathogens, of course, but which simultaneously confers immunity).

Up until fourteen years ago—a press conference by French hepatologists (liver disease experts) pointed out the minor role of the liver—French doctors—not the heart, as with the Germans, but the liver—identified the cause of complaints such as headaches, coughing, impotence, acne, and dandruff. “Weak liver” or “crise de foie” served as the quintessential diagnosis at the time.

English positions

Not the bloodstream (Dt.) or “le terrain” (Fr.), but external causes of disease serve as the means of interpretation. The role of antibiotics is very significant here. “The English list of the twenty most prescribed medicines includes no fewer than three groups of antibiotics. The German top twenty, on the other hand, contains not a single one.” (Ac, 430).

Minimization.

English doctors prescribe about half as much medicine as French and German doctors—half as many X-rays and, when they do so, half as many films. The daily amount of vitamin C they recommend is half that of other countries. — Generally speaking, in England you have to be much worse off to be considered 'sick', — let alone qualify for treatment. Even when it concerns high blood pressure or cholesterol levels, the standard for 'being sick' is higher in England' (Ac, 430).

Financial structure .

To a large extent, this minimization is the result of the way English doctors are paid.

a. French, American, and German doctors are paid by fee based on the services performed: the more prescriptions, treatments, and referrals to specialists, the higher the fee!

b. English doctors receive either a fixed salary or a fee per patient: the ideal patient is therefore one whom the doctor consults only rarely, with a constant fee.

Empiricism

Biomedical practice in England has yet another premise: following in the empiricist footsteps of Francis Bacon, John Locke (CF 24), and David Hume (1711/1776; the final figure of the English Enlightenment), data is diligently collected in England from statistically sound, comparative clinical trials.

Incidentally: placebos (sham treatments) are used more in this regard than in other countries.

CF28

American prepositions.

“American medicine can be characterized by one word: 'aggressive'. This approach dates back at least to the time of Benjamin Rush, a physician of the 18th century and one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence.” (Ac, 431ff.). According to Rush, the major brake on the progress of medicine was relying too heavily on the healing powers of nature. Hence his fierce criticism of Hippocrates of Kos (-460/-377; Greek physician).

Bloodletting .

Rush believed that the body contained about thirteen liters of blood—about twice as much as in reality. Consequently, he urged his followers to eliminate four-fifths of this by bloodletting. -- “In essence, not much has changed: in America, surgery is performed more frequently and extensively than elsewhere. Thus, the number of women who have their uterus removed or undergo a caesarean section is at least twice as high as in most European countries. For heart bypass surgery, this percentage is even higher.” (Ac, 432).

Aggressive drive.

“Sensible or not, people always feel compelled to ‘do something,’ even when it is far from certain whether a particular treatment is good for the patient. -- That is why Americans are always ‘in’ for ‘something new,’ especially when it comes to ‘new’ diagnostic tests and surgical techniques (...). Of course, an aggressive approach can sometimes save lives, but often the cure is worse than the disease.” (Ac, 432).

Analogical reasoning.

Even when it appears that the benefits of a treatment outweigh the disadvantages for a particular group, American doctors are inclined to extrapolate the favorable results to other groups of patients for whom this ratio is by no means established. “In America, doctors prescribe AZT to HIV-positive people. However, some doctors go even further: they also give this drug to women who have been raped by someone with an unknown HIV status—a group, therefore, that has only a small chance of infection.” (Ibid.) The underlying principle is: “It is better to do something than nothing.”

Unlike the French and Germans, Americans do not have a specific organ

to which they attribute their ailments—perhaps because they prefer to see themselves as “naturally healthy.”

CF29

Exogenous causes.

Obituaries in the US rarely mention the fact that people died of an endogenous cause: there is always—ac, 434v.—some external cause.

Illness is explained in an analogous manner: a French doctor once said that “Americans fear only bacilli and communists.” The bacillus presupposition partly explains the high frequency of antibiotics. “American doctors appear to prescribe about twice as many antibiotics as Scottish ones. Americans also regularly prescribe antibiotics for ailments such as earaches in children, -- a treatment that is considered inappropriate in Europe.” (Ac, 436).

Puritanism.

This exaggerated fear of bacilli – according to Lynn Payer literally – is also responsible for the puritanical views on hygiene (...): the daily cleansing rituals, the avoidance at all costs of anyone with a harmless infectious disease, and the attempts to confine people with diseases known to be transmissible only through intimate contact.

The general decision of Lynn Payer.

It is twofold.

1.-- Rational medicine “is not nearly as internationally valid a science as is often thought” (ac,437). What it calls “a grid of cultural values” filters the biomedical information. -- Expressed in our terms: there is a Medical multiculture, -- not a uniculture. The choice - sample (*CF 08: inductivism regarding axioms*) - of presuppositions - stoicheia, elements (*CF 05: factor analysis*) – whether or, especially, not consciously committed in various cultures – limits biomedical methods to particularisms. Without universal value. -- Well, the basic claim of Modern Rationalism is that, subjectively speaking, reason is identical in all physicians and that, objectively speaking, the information that such universal reason acquires is universally valid. --

2.-- The multiculturalism in biomedical practice amounts, empirically and experimentally speaking, to a kind of natural experiment. The doctors work differently to a large extent, but—says L. Payer—usually they do not realize

this and do not see its empirical value.

Conclusion . -- Reread *CF 11v* . (*ABC theory*): doctors, when confronted with symptoms (A), classify them according to particular presuppositions (B) and thus arrive at different systems (C).

CF30

4. The principle of sufficient reason or grounds. (30/34).

We have referred to this as: *CF 08* (at the bottom), -- From a factor-analytic (stechiotic) perspective, it comes down to this: "Something (whatever it may be, -- a figment of the imagination, science fiction, the absurd in proof by contradiction, -- a materially verifiable fact) necessarily has a 'reason' (= 'ground') by which it is understandable (yes, transparent to our human mind, transparent to every mind). Whether that reason or ground is to be found within that something or whether that reason or ground is to be situated outside that something. Which entails the concept of 'totality' (and its divisibility into elements and parts). -- In the language of Jevons-Lukasiewicz: "If A (reason, ground), then B (understandable, sensible, transparent)". That forms the antecedent of every responsible reasoning.

Library st.:

-- *E. Oger, Literature Study (Rationality, its Foundation and its Monsters)*, in: *Tijdschr. v. Filosofie* 54 (1992): 1 (March), 87/106 (an extremely solid study);

-- *M. Fleischer, Wahrheit und Wahrheitsgrund (Zum Wahrheitsproblem und zu seiner Geschichte)*, Berlin/New York, de Gruyter, 1984 (the age-old correspondence theory: knowledge corresponds to reality (correspondence theory));

-- *P. Faucon de Boylesve, Etre et savoir (Etude du fondement de intelligibilité dans la pensée médiévale)*, Paris, Vrin, 1985 (truth is the showing of being).

-- *Forum Philosophie Bad Homburg* , Hrsg., *Philosophie und Begründung* , Frankfurt a.

-- *A. Burms/ H. De Dijn, Rationality and its Limits (Critique and Deconstruction)*, Leuven, 1986 (acting rationally seems to be a magic word nowadays: yet it is limited);

-- K. Hart, *The Trespass of the Sign (Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy)*, Cambridge, Univ. Press, 1989 (Derridist in origin);

-- H. Parret, ed., *In All Reasonableness (Views on the thinking, speaking, and acting of the reasonable person)*, Meppel/Amsterdam, 1990 (on “the reason” of reason).

Incidentally : There has been an Institute for *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* (T. Horvath) and an associated journal, *Ultimate Reality and Meaning (Interdisciplinary Studies in the Philosophy of Understanding)*, since 1978.

CF31

*J. Derrida et autres, *La faculté de juger** (Colloque de Cerisy-la Salle 1982), Paris, Minuit, 1985, is a work in which six authors write about judging (of a subject, original, with a saying asserted as a model). Judging regarding scientific, artistic and aesthetic, ethical, and political matters is examined with the great crisis of cultural values in our twentieth century as the broad, comprehensive premise. In a time characterized by a desperate search for new values for which and from which everyone can live, it is striking how no one believes to possess “the truth” on the matter upon which he or she could rely (as a premise for rendering a justifiable ('justifiable', 'foundable') judgment).

Incidentally : even the commonplace judgment—such as “I see it raining outside”—presents as a preposition: “If A, then (here: if it rains outside, then (I have the right to say) “I see it raining outside”). In other words: the principle of necessary and sufficient reason or ground (which gives me the right to say something) is invariably presupposed as an 'element' (*CF 05: stoicheiosis*). That single little preposition alone justifies, 'justifies', 'founds'.

Foundation(al)ism, foundation(al)ism criticism,

As early as his ** The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception ** (1905), G.E. Moore (1873/: 1958; *Anglo-Saxon analytical thinker*) addressed the question “How do we know that p?” (How do we know that p, namely a judgment, is true, justifiable?). The focus was not on the genetic question—“How does this arise in my mind?”—but rather on “What is the justifying reason or basis for the statement or judgment 'p'?”

As early as 1925 (so many years before K. Popper's work in 1934), what is now called Foundationalism—the belief that all statements have a foundation, a base, a logically strictly formulable preposition—was becoming a major issue

for Moore.

The doubt regarding the absolutely provable 'ground' or 'reason' of all statements, in order to be the so-called “strictly scientific” (since Galileo, Descartes, and Locke), is called 'critique of Fundamentalism'. One investigates whether absolutely everything can be proven in the Enlightenment-Rationalist sense (purely or empirically). -- This, then, is the core of a theory of judgment critical of Fundamentalism.

CF32

The mirror person.

We introduce this term based on *Richard Rorty* (the title of his work translated into French is “ *L'homme speculaire* ”). According to Rorty, what characterizes “the entire Western culture”, “since Platon” (an increasingly adopted expression), is the fact that man regards himself as “the mirror” or accurate reflection, thanks to his mind of course, of reality.

One need only think of what Platon, with his predecessors, calls “the noble yoke” (the model in my mind reflects, depicts the original in reality). Following in the footsteps of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Rorty believes he may replace this (= language of justification) with a kind of Pragmatism.

Which raises the question, of course, whether Rorty's spirit—the spirit employing Pragmatic presuppositions—reflects reality better than, for example, Platon. Cf. *P. Pekelharing, Richard Rorty (The Mirror as Obstacle)*, in: *Streven* 1989: 7 (April), 614/627 (cont. 622).

One remark:

Platon and the entire Western culture have always realized that our mind is not a pure mirror of reality. But whether this—strictly and logically—must lead to the dismantling—deconstruction—of the “entire Western culture” in its philosophical foundation is another matter.

Incidentally: one of those typically Western-traditional solutions to the mirror problem can be found with *Cardinal John Henry Newman* (1801/1890). In his * *Grammar of Assent* * (1870), he attempts to 'justify' the judgment of the ordinary man of everyday life on the grounds that, both within science and outside of it, we possess over time a series of probabilities that all—or at least the majority—point in the same direction. This convergence of uncertain yet probable judgments allows us to attribute some sound cognitive value to the

(mirror) model in our minds.

Once again: that is merely one attempt to 'justify' the mirror model. At least as strictly logical as the Pragmatism of a Rorty. For the Newman model amounts to a set of samples in reality that reinforce one another (*CF 07*, where there is talk of summative induction or the summary of a set of samples). Such a type of induction counts as sufficient reason!

CF33

Reason and irrationality.

This expresses the “harmony of opposites” which constitutes one of the presuppositions or ‘backgrounds’ of the more recent discussion concerning both the validity of reason (especially in its Modern Rationalist form) and the principle of sufficient reason.

Kant, the leading figure in the critique of Rationalism before him (Hume was meant by Kant), already writes in passing that the boundaries that delineate reason from nonsense or 'unreason' are very difficult to define.

***Francisco Goya y Lucientes* (1746/1828).**

Goya's artwork—referring to paintings—displays “reason and irrationality.” A part of his works reflects—he, too, was a mirror man—the idyllic feminine side or aspect of the human reality of the time. Another part, however, reflects—rendered in a raw, disorderly manner—the gruesome side or aspect of the same human reality. Not without reason or justification—one can see: that principle operates continuously— *E. Oger, *Rationality, its Ground and its Monsters **, 105ff., dwells on Goya.

“ El sueño de la razon produce monstruos ”.

“The dream of reason produces monsters” (thus Oger translates) is the title of one of Goya's drawings: someone (perhaps Goya himself) is overcome by sleep and lies on a table; he is living through a nightmare. Above the dreamer, a group of black-ghostly birds are visible. They appear to be owls. Also bats, crows, etc. ('night birds').

This drawing is situated in a series titled “Los Caprichos” (The Whims), probably drawn by Goya a few years after the French Revolution, the quintessential realization, at that time, of French Enlightened Rationalism (1793+).

a . Goya was 'convinced' (that the French Revolution, too, was merely one sample among possible other samples (*CF 08 : axiomatic inductivism*), this only dawned on his “Modern rationality” in retrospect) a supporter of the Enlightenment and the Revolution.

b. yet, in his depiction, reason itself is asleep-dreaming: it gazes in wonder at the delirium concerning 'absolute revolution' etc. and it generates monsters.

What does this reflect? The fact that Goya witnessed Rationalism, within the framework of his Revolution, leading to a reign of terror.

CF34

Together with his becoming completely deaf, the failure of the Revolution led to a profound crisis of values (= cultural crisis): “He no longer shared the unconditional optimism of the Age of Enlightenment where, in the aspirations of reason itself, the guillotine looms. The reason of ‘Les Lumières’ necessarily produces monsters.” (Ac, 106).

Incidentally : Plato had already realized, following in the footsteps of his predecessors, that night dreams disable reason and clear the way for irrationality. We saw this briefly in *E.PL.PSY. 83/89* (*Soul and Night*): the criminal and especially the 'turannos', the dictator, expose the nocturnal twilight of reason at work within them.

Goya does nothing other than actualize and re-establish Plato (Herodotus, Sophocles) within an Enlightenment-Rationalist context. Immediately, this is a pragmatic argument: from what reason (and its revolutions) produces—its effects—its true nature becomes apparent! One knows the tree by its 'fruits'. Autonomous reason—freed from the clergy and the monarchy—replaced what came before with what it 'dreamed': the difference from what came before proved, in Goya's eyes, not so great. Simply this: the Christian monarchies did it “in the name of God”; the French revolutionaries did it “in the name of autonomous reason”.

Time and again “in the name of”, based on presuppositions or “sufficient reasons”. The very principle of necessary and sufficient reason is thereby, in the eyes of a Goya and many others, compromised. That rough and crude approach “in the name of” presuppositions made the expression “in the name of” (as Fr. Lyotard rightly observes) appear suspect.

Now, culture is nothing but a number of 'names' (preconceived values) in the name of which one labels, for example, as normal and permissible and as abnormal and forbidden (*CF 21* : Culture and Normality), indeed, eradicateable, everything that does not conform to the presuppositions.

Thus the Christian (or rather: pseudo-Christian) monarchs oppressed and eradicated “in the name of” a Christian culture. Thus, in turn, they oppress and eradicate the autonomous, religion-free systems generated by Modern reason-and-irrationality! It is cause to doubt every culture and all cultural presuppositions “in the name of which” one oppresses and eradicates (the so-called group dynamics).

CF35

5. The sufficient reason in Kafka's works. (35/39)

“If Z, then S. Well, S. So Z”—

'Z' stands for 'sin, guilt'; 'S' for punishment. With this, we explain one of the fundamental structures of Kafka's work. What follows will be one long commentary on this reductive (Platonic-analytical; *CF 08* (' *Analusis* ')) reasoning. Moreover, expressed in Platonic terms, it is lemmatic-analytical.

Reductive reasoning sometimes works with unknowns, but one can pretend to already know those unknowns. One then introduces a lemma or a tentative, provisional allegory or symbol. Here 'x', Why? Because in Kafka's eyes, the sin guilt that 'justifies' the punishment as its necessary and sufficient reason is an unknown guilt.

Consequently, according to the expert Schoeps, the reductive reasoning in Kafka's works reads as follows: “If X, then S. Well, S. Therefore X.” Modern reason is incapable of further defining our cultural crisis, which Kafka interprets as a punishment. Also: that same Modern reason arrives at an absurd experience: “If X, then A. Well, A. Therefore X.” Translated into words: “If the necessary and sufficient reason is an unknown, then there is absurdity (incomprehensibility, senselessness, absurdity). Well, there is absurdity. Therefore, there is an unknown sufficient reason or ground.” Cf. *CF 30*. -- We will now explain this.

Franz Kafka (1883/1924).

The terms 'Kafkean' or even 'Kafkaesque' have been becoming commonplace for several decades. The works of *Kafka*—think of *The Trial*—are among the most widely read in the world. They are translated into many

languages. They are adapted for film, stage, and even set to music. They are presented as reading material up to and including secondary education, for, especially since the Second World War (1939/1945), Kafka has been considered part of world literature.

Some claim that just as many commentaries have been devoted to Kafka as to Shakespeare. -- This is notwithstanding the fact that the atmosphere of Kafka's works is a "harmony of opposites": they attract through a peculiar magic; they repel through an 'Unheimlichkeit' (an atmosphere of insecurity, of absurdity). This is often a heavy burden, especially for younger, uneducated people—all the more so since teachers leave them to their inability to process Kafka, at least in a balanced manner.

CF36

Bibl. st.: it is a futile task, but we will select one work: *H.-J. Schoeps, *Over de mens (Beschouwingen van de Moderne filosofen *)*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1966, 119/141 (*Franz Kafka: The Belief in Tragic Position*), -- because this work keeps the necessary and sufficient reason at the center.

Kafka's work: ambiguous.

Kafka provoked contradictory interpretations. And indeed: he is open to multiple interpretations. For example, *A. Camus* (1913/1960; his **L'homme révolté** (1951) was challenged by both right-wing and left-wing (Sartre om) politicians) describes his work as 'existentially' oriented, and thus he says: "In any case, Kafka's work reflects the problem of the incongruous (= absurd) in its entirety" (cited by *WJ Simons, *Tijdloze actualiteit van Kafka pas laat bekend **, in: **Spectator** (Ghent) 30.08.1983, 36).

Thus, psychiatrists such as *Dr. Hesnard, *L'univers morbide de la faute **, Paris, 1949 (last chapter), interpret it psychologically (possibly – which is fashionable – psychoanalytically), indeed; as a neurological and/or psychiatric case.

What Hesnard calls "the world of sinful guilt", in its most tragic degree, can then take center stage: "This dark and absurd, incomprehensible and tyrannical sense of guilt weighed heavily on the entire existence of this artist". (Oc, 441s.).

Hesnard adds: "Moreover: Kafka behaved—throughout his entire life and in all the fields in which he was active—like a guilty man who cannot ascertain

the true essence of an unforgivable error. Well, precisely that 'Kafkaesque' world—he described it in all his works—is our morbid world of guilt.” (Ibid.).

As we said: “If x, that unforgivable yet unfathomable error, then an impression of absurdity. Well then, an impression of absurdity. So, somewhere an unforgivable but unidentifiable fundamental error.” Kafka lived with such an 'x'. Whether his relations with his parents (especially his authoritarian father) are the necessary and sufficient reason for this, as psychoanalysts in particular claim, seems to us radically unproven. The impression of absurdity extends much further than, for example, the father figure (unless one identifies that father figure with the absolute self, -- which is actually what makes the degree of tragedy in Kafka “understandable”).

CF37

Note : Incidentally: *Dr. med. Trygve Braat'y, *Uit de praktijk van een psychiater (Een populaire inleiding tot de medische psychologie en de psychiatrie)*,* Utrecht, 1939, 180/190 (* *Enige behandelen over de religie in de psychiatrie* *), can point out to us the fallacy of those who interpret the necessary and sufficient reason for the typically Kafkaesque sense of existence purely psychoanalytically. “If one is involved in psychiatric work, one will be struck by how many patients worry about religion and morality. Problems in the realm of morality almost always bear a more or less clear stamp of a religious sense of sin.”

Very striking—and often as a predominant feature of the clinical picture—are such exhausting states of anxiety in—what is called—“melancholic depression”. (Oc, 180). -- Braatoy, as an 'understanding' physician, addresses the vital question: “Why/ how does this disease manifest itself as an incessant, religious nightmare in which the patient is not left in peace for a single moment by his burden of sin, his regret and remorse?” (ibid.).

Steller says: the manner in which a melancholic poses the psychiatric problem—the language he/she displays—is strongly reminiscent of “the religious lessons of our youth” (oc. Furthermore, he says that Ole Hallesby, at the time a very influential theology professor in Norway, disseminated an image of God that can be characterized as follows: “A cruel god—something that actually proves the melancholic right in his/her reasoning. For from such a god one can expect no understanding of his difficulties” (oc,189).

Note : In Kafka, it is about an 'absolute' reason or foundation, not merely

the ephemeral, passing father figure: what Braatoy says brings us much closer to that religious reason or foundation.

What Schoeps says greatly reinforces that impression. Which provides us with the typically religious interpretation.

H.-J. Schoeps.

We dwell in detail on someone who:

a. with Max Brod, Kafka's friend, published *Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer* (1931), excerpts from Kafka's estate,

b. was of Jewish descent and a typical Jewish Christian, well-placed to penetrate Kafka's world. -- This is, then, an argument from authority, -- which is not without far-reaching value.

CF38

The laws, the deviations, and the feedback.

Pre-Socratic thinkers generally assumed that the cosmos is purposeful, indeed, deliberately guided by high deities. Any deviation therefore provokes a 'corrective' ('feedback,' as modern cyberneticists call it), whereby the purposefulness and even the purposeful divine policy of the universe make themselves felt in the form of calamity, which is perceived as a kind of punishment. -- Biblical revelation exhibits something analogous.

1.-- Schoeps, oc, 123ff., begins with a work by *Kafka, Zur Frage der Gesetze*, which deals with the 'laws' known in Jewish circles.

Theologians have much to say about this—regarding the Chassidim, whom Kafka describes as a kind of 'nobility'. Kafka, however, feels like an 'ignorant' (am ha-arez). Yet he is an 'ignorant' who has progressed so far in the analysis of “the laws” that he wonders whether those laws are not perhaps illusory laws.

Schoeps: “Kafka lives in the constant impression that he is governed by laws he does not know” (oc,123). For, in fact, phenomenal (insofar as perceptible, directly observable) is the only visible and tangible law: the 'nobility' of theologians who, for the convenience of “the people” (am ha-arez), explain them as interpreters of “the law”.

2.-- Schoeps, oc, 124ff. -- The great mass of “the people” (am ha-arez) - in contrast to the interpreters of the law - “the nobility” - has deviated from “the laws”.

3 .-- Schoeps, *ibid.* -- A deviation – interpreted in the orthodox Jewish sense – amounts to a divine judgment (*gesera*). – Kafka’s story, **The Investigations of a Dog**, expresses this painful divine judgment through symbolism.

A dog tells how “the people” of the 'dogs' went astray many generations ago. This error or sin weighs heavily on the current generation of dogs, which **a.** bears the burden of it, **b.** but cannot interpret it ('x').

Note -- The Talmud

Literally 'study' or 'instruction' -- The Talmud is a holy Jewish book, in which theological insights of Old Testament scholars are stored. Thus there is the *Talmud of Jerusalem* and the *Talmud of the Babylonians* (by *Rab Ash-ish* (352/427) and his successors).

CF39

If A and B, then C.

Reread *CF 11 (ABC theory)*. -- If one knows A and the presuppositions B by which one defines A, then one possesses sufficient reason or grounds to understand C—in this case: Kafka's reaction to the experienced calamity. The Talmud, following in the footsteps of Old Testament doctrine, has strongly defined Kafka's 'B'.

1. *The Talmud (Sanhedrin 97a)* contains a prophecy of doom: at the end of earthly history, the end times will come (eschatological perspective); it will be “a time of terrors of all kinds”; the return (Christian), the coming (Jewish) of the Messiah is then near. Then “the faces of the end-time people will be like the faces of dogs.” -- This is reminiscent of the Apokalupsis or end-time revelation of, for example, the prophet Daniel and others.

2. It is as if, for Kafka, that prediction of a harsh, 'bizarre' (incomprehensible – uncanny) end time is realizing itself in our 20th century. That bizarre atmosphere is an element or sufficient reason to understand how, for Kafka, our current existence means 'end-time existence', the end of history.

Schoeps : What **The Investigations of a Dog** says about our “canine culture” (from a Jewish perspective), which is precisely “essentially to be found in all literary works of Kafka.” Added to this is the absurdity: the forgetting of what is actually the sufficient reason or basis for the current cultural crisis

(oc, 12). Thus Schoeps literally. Which once again demonstrates the history of mentalities as a factor in textual comprehension,

Just like the atheist Nietzsche.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900; the thinker on the issue of Western nihilism or the devaluation of (higher) values) is cited by Schoeps in this context:

“The most important events find it most difficult to access the senses. -- For example, the fact that the Christian God is dead. The fact that, in what we are experiencing, there is no longer heavenly goodness and guidance, no longer a divine justice and—generally speaking—not even an immanent morality (*note*: a directly observable morality) perceptible. -- That is the terrible news that will take another few centuries to penetrate the senses of Europeans. Then, for a time, it will seem as if all 'weight' has disappeared from things (*Morgenröte* (1882))”. (Oc, 119).

CF40

6. The 'model' of the unknown reason or ground (40/42)

How does Kafka arrive at judgments regarding “the unknown ground”? A judgment—as we saw (*CF 31*)—comprises an original (here: the 'x') about which a model (the predicate) provides information. We therefore turn our attention to the artist Kafka and his art in order to characterize the 'lemma' (the object sought that one enters as 'known').

Kafka was, as Schoeps asserts, Jewish by birth. Religious beliefs that, in the eyes of his contemporaries—and perhaps his own—had become 'mythical' (meaning: “good for Primitives”) under the demythologizing pressure of Enlightened Rationalism, nevertheless led him to continually look forward to what in Jewish terminology is called “the law.” According to Schoeps, for that is, what constitutes the catastrophe in Kafka’s eyes, that present-day humanity, deprived as it is of the awareness of being a creature of God—one need only think of Skepticism (only the directly tangible exists with certainty), Agnosticism (one knows nothing about what transcends phenomena), Atheism (God does not exist)—loses the traits that characterize it precisely as person(hood), and, thereby,

- a. individually becomes a 'thing' or “inanimate object” and
- b. socially grows into a nameless mass. Cf. oc, 131.

An artistic model.

In Kafka's artistic imagination, the becoming-thing is, for example, developed into a ghostly being—reread *CF 33* : "*black-ghosting birds* " (in Goya)—he calls it 'odradeck'. In Slavic, that means something like "fallen outside the law." Deviated.

Viewed in this light, modern man is increasingly a "dog-like man," without an "I." He is rather an "it," just like the objects he increasingly makes use of in technological society. Thus Odradeck takes on "the senseless—absurd—form of a spool of yarn" (Schoeps, oc, 131). Consequently, he has become "an automatically running mechanism."

The process.

Cast in a descriptive-narrative form, what Kafka perceives, and feels, as the fundamental structure of our culture is called "*The Trial*". It has a twofold structure:

- a. she is "an enigma";
- b. she is "an unraveling" of it. -- Think of the common man or even the educated intellectual: "Where did I deserve that?". Socio-culturally: "Where did we deserve something like that?"

CF41

A narrative model. - As an artistic model, one can take *The Trial* .

(1). *The riddle.*

Joseph K. is being charged by a mysterious and superior court. The file containing the accusations is accessible neither to Joseph K. nor to his lawyers.

(2) *The unraveling.* -- Joseph K. attempts to trace the guilt for which he is being prosecuted. He therefore calls upon lawyers; their main task is to guess the offense, "To deduce from the interrogations what the content of the dossier is that forms its basis, -- that is very difficult". (Oc, 130). Schoeps, oc, 129: "Thus from the character and the form of the punishment one must try to find the 'x' of the sin, -- even though actual verification cannot succeed.

That is precisely what happens in Kafka's work. In both the great novels and the short stories, this motif recurs time and again as a tendency: to want to determine the essence of guilt (*note: original, i.e., the reason*) *from the nature of the punishment (note : model)* .

Tragedy or redemption from tragedy?

Library st.: Karl Jaspers, **Ueber des Tragische **, Munich. Jaspers (1883/1969; physician-psychiatrist and also 'existential' thinker) states that 'tragedy' presupposes transience, indeed, actual ruin, as a necessary condition. Yet that is merely the tragic situation: 'tragic' in the full sense of the word is merely the awareness of it. Cf. CF 17 (*situational*). Cf. Jaspers, oc, 18.

The answer to such a challenge (CF 17) is, normally, looking forward to redemption. -- That hope for redemption from a hopeless situation is what, according to Jaspers, distinguishes the tragic hero from the merely ephemeral or declining figure.

Is Kafka's work, now, 'tragic' in that sense? Oh yes! The 'dog-like' life of today is, for him, the contemplative Kafka, destined for transience and ruin. But—and Max Brod maintained this in a lecture about his friend in Brussels, September 1967—it is true: “Kafka strived only for a pure worldview and a more beautiful future”.

Schoeps confirms this: in Kafka lived—oc, 140—the messianic hope. Albeit in a tragic situation: “the myth of faith in a tragic situation”. In other words: situationally there was a tragedy of powerlessness; existentially there was a tragedy of the will.

CF42

History of salvation/history of disaster.

“The apostasy (of men) from the law of revelation makes history the history of human misfortune. This manifests itself as the increasing alienation of the world from its revealed destiny. This through a single series of destructions hastening toward the end which, judged by human blindness, must be regarded precisely as ‘higher development and constructive progress’.” (Schoeps, oc, 125).

Note: -- The terms “higher development” and “constructive progress” clearly refer to two main ideas of the Modern Rationalism of the Enlightened minds. Kafka, Postmodern, designates Modern reason as “human blindness”. Which in turn makes him comparable to Goya (CF 33), for whom “the dream of reason produces monsters”.

We do say 'Postmodern', because anyone who distances himself from both reason and two of its pet obsessions—higher development (as opposed to, for example, the dark, understand: unenlightened Middle Ages) and constructive progress—is no longer 'Modern' but situates himself after the end of Modernity. Such a person is Postmodern.

The reason or basis, one last time.

Schoeps, oc, 125. --"It is therefore guilt, -- in its guilt, -- guilt no longer recognizable, that has obscured the world to such an extent that its order can no longer grasp the true word. This because the pressure of the ages has already made that word too firm and the 'dogs' too 'dog-like'"

In other words: expressed in biblical terms, "the heart and soul of present-day humanity have become hardened" and no longer even grasp that God once, through sages, priests, prophets, and apocalypticists, was entirely directed at all of mankind. That "true word" has been displaced and suppressed.

To such an extent, in fact, that the tragic situation hardly comes to mind anymore (among Enlightenment optimists, for example, but also among so-called Bible believers—as S. Kierkegaard has touched upon).

The will to redemption is indeed there, but it focuses all too much on pacifiers (the dreams of reason). From an apocalyptic perspective, therefore, present-day humanity is destined for absolute tragedy: it does not even realize that guilt exists—let alone that it would seek it out as "sufficient reason or ground" for its dire situation, like the awakened Kafka; it falls asleep amidst its downfall.

CF43

7. "The other of reason". (43/48)

Library st.: *E. Oger, Rationality, its Foundation and its Monsters*, 97/106.
-- "What is this 'other' in the name of which one sometimes believes one can subject reason to criticism? (...) Or must such criticism—when it wishes to speak—always and necessarily speak in the name of reason itself?"

That is how Oger phrases the theme. The problem is the same as what we touched upon in the preceding chapters—samples—that rational people commit errors (Goya, Kafka)—in Biblical language: 'sins' ('guilts of sin'). Is it reason itself that is (let us put it crudely but eloquently) 'perverse' ('corrupt'),

or does it act rationally yet under the pressure of “the other,” which is then 'perverse' and communicates its 'perversity,' imposing it upon reason, which—of its own accord—is 'pure'? That is the question.

What is meant by 'normal'?

We saw it briefly – CF 21 (*Culture and Normality*): – a set of values, even when put forward by Enlightened reason as a “necessary and sufficient reason or ground” in the name of which that reason decides on normality and non-normality, is always a 'source' (reason) of 'normalization' (declaration of normality).

take a singular, concrete example . -- *X, Psychology: Is perversion normal?* in: *Petra* (Hamburg) 1991: September. -- The text reads: “ *Sex fantasies involving overwhelm and perversions are much more frequent than has hitherto been assumed, -- also among women (...).*”

1. “Most people frequently experience sexual fantasies,” says Dr. David Barlow, Director of the Sexual Research Program (New York State University). “Some fantasies are so outlandish that they prefer to keep them secret.”

2. An Australian study demonstrates it: depicting sexual perversions eroticizes women. Women find it particularly stimulating when they imagine being spied on during lovemaking, -- when they imagine themselves spying on others involved in sex, -- when they are compelled to engage in sex in their imaginings.

Note : The short article implicitly but correctly assumes that the men and especially the women mentioned are 'normal' and therefore possess “normal reasoning”.

CF44

'Normal' has at least two distinct meanings:

- a.** is normal anything that does not deviate from a predetermined norm;
- b.** is normally already inherent to (at least half of a population).

Here: “much more frequently than previously assumed”, “most people”! That is meaning **b.** But the title of the article “Is perverse (non-normal in meaning **a.**) normal (in meaning **b.**)?” encompasses the two distinct meanings simultaneously.

This implies that the more frequent something —a form of behavior— is among the population, the more normal it can become! Even when everyone admits that those high-frequency phenomena are abnormal, 'perverse'.

That is the result of one of the Modern achievements of a 'rational' nature, namely statistics. -- The fact that two distinguishable 'normalities' are 'rationally' at work simultaneously points to “the other of reason”:

a. 'reasonable' is a statistical finding (a statistical induction, as it works with percentages);

b. 'unreasonable', for 'perverse' is the assertion of things that offend the rational psyche. The element 'unreasonable', which is explained as 'reasonable' because it is frequent notwithstanding its abnormality, proves that “otherness of reason” within reason itself.

Put less stylistically: reason is susceptible to more than one use of reason. Including a normal and a non-normal one. Statistical reason and ethical reason are two distinct 'functions' ('roles') of the same reason.

Michel Foucault (1926/1984)

First Structuralist, then Poststructuralist). -- The critique of reason of this French thinker is summarized by Oger as follows.

He relies on *Foucault* 's famous work **Histoire de la folie à l' âge classique* * (1961). A radical critique of Reason as the Enlightenment thinkers understood it! In which Foucault “is seeking a liberation from the 'prison' of Reason” (ac, 96).

The question of whether he now criticizes Reason from Reason itself seems possible. The question of whether he criticizes Reason from “the other of Reason” (a higher instance or standpoint than supreme Reason) also seems possible. In this latter case, of course, Foucault is “a Romantic ‘rationalist’” who situates the other of Reason in madness—la folie. Madness would then have madness itself (and not Reason) as its reason or ground.

CF45

The language of Reason is also the language of the established order.

Behind this Foucaultian critique of reason emerges his “subversive politics”: “The language of reason has always been the language of ‘order’, -- of an order

that pushes out, excludes, confines”.

This is the group dynamics inherent in a rigid value system, whether Christian or Enlightened-Rationalist. -- For this very reason, Foucault no longer wishes to speak of “the other of Reason”—the madness of psychiatric cases—in the language of Reason, but in a language that is that of irrationality, madness. With such a language, one does not barbarously confine the insane, for example. -- The Reason against which Foucault is reacting is the Reason that sows terror, that sheds blood, -- the Reason which Bertrand d'Astorg, at the time, called the sufficient reason of “l' univers concentrationnaire .” -- Thus Foucault says, as recently as 1977: ... “Die Torlter, das ist die Vernunft” (Torture, -- that is Reason) (in an interview with K. Boesers; ac, 10). --- Conclusion: one feels Foucault’s Anarchism.

Note : Towards the end of his life, Foucault rereads Kant, the leading figure of the German Enlightenment, which points to a turning point in his thinking.

Hartmut und Gernot Böhme. Das Andere der Vernunft.

The night side of Reason is also discussed in their work *Das Andere der Vernunft (Zur Entwicklung von Rationalitätsstrukturen am Beispiel Kants)*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1983.

The Böhme brothers, too, wish to advance the radical critique of Reason, no longer from the perspective of Reason, but from “the other of Reason,” namely, madness, and moreover, everything that can possibly be 'irrational' (logical: the illogical; ontological: the unreal; ethical: the morally improper). The Böhmes situate this irrationality in 'nature' (as pre- and irrational reality), the human body, fantasy, desire, and feelings. That is to say: “in all that could not be conquered by Reason.” -- As omnipresent Unreason—in all the enumerated realities—the Böhmes find “the ever-active force” that manifests itself in every action, even in that of reason!

The power of Reason is also the power that wants to control everything.

Reason, therefore, expels or silences whatever offers it resistance. For it is 'narcissistic', self-satisfied. That is the essence of its madness. For it denies “the other than Reason!” -- One feels the critique of reason of Fr. Nietzsche and ... of M. Foucault!

Note - The Böhmes place “the ever-active force” at the center. They are not alone in this, even though it is within a partially different cultural system.

a. Kurt Leese , **Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion **, *Zürich*, *Morgarten*, 1954, advocates, from a Biblical perspective, what he calls “a nature religion” that shows strong similarities to the Irrationalism mentioned earlier. Johann G. von Herder (1744/1803; German theologically oriented thinker and poet), in his Bückeburg period (= 1771/1776), and Friedrich D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834; theologically oriented thinker), in his well-known ** Reden über die Religion ** (1799), held the view that 'living' religion does not so much constitute the essence of religion—reason, concepts, “general truths,” or 'law'—but rather revelation emerging in the course of history, individuality, inspired intuition, and living feeling.

What the Rationalists call “natural religion” falls under rational religion; what Herder and Schleiermacher advocate is 'romantic' religion. Romanticism, after all, does not place “Reason” at the center, but “life”. The nature around us (as landscape), the body, eroticism, women, mysticism, magic, etc., are signs of 'life'. And therefore 'religious'.

Which does not prevent Leese, as a fundamentally Biblically oriented thinker, from clearly seeing “the demonias” of that same life, as stated in oc 295ff. That is to say: the duality of life or, expressed in the words of W.B. Kristensen, its “harmony of opposites.” Herein lies the difference with the Böhmes, who include “the demonias” (the illogical, the unreal things, the morally improper behavior).

b. David Herbert, Lawrence (1885/1930)

This English writer is known for his vitalistic novels, which provoked such annoyance for their shameless depiction of “life.” “My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh as being wiser than the intellect”—so reads his creed. A strongly biological-erotic life coupled, naturally, with “nature” understood as the cosmos: “I am a part of the sun as my eye is a part of myself. That I am a part of the earth, my feet know perfectly, and my blood is a part of the sea.” Thus Lawrence in his **Apocalypse**.

CF47

Lawrence considers himself “the proclaimer of the life of the whole man”. He sees himself as a 'living' human being who, starting from the physical reality with which he sees himself situated on earth, enters life from the

unbroken, 'primary' biological functions of "blood and instinct", convinced of its (re)vitalizing power or energy.

Which, for that matter, is also found in the later Scheler. -- Sexuality, in particular, is the core of his cosmic-vitalistic religion. But note: he never defended a mere 'animalism' (ideal of animalization) or a destruction of the spirit, like the amoral Erskine Caldwell.

Cf. *P. De Wispelaere, DH Lawrence: preacher of vitalism*, in: *De Vlaamse Gids* 37 (1953): 6 (June), 368/375. -- Again: Lawrence, like the Böhmes, includes the 'demonicities', yet he desires a nature religion, because he, just like Leese (Herder, Schleiermacher), is convinced that "reason" destroys 'life' through 'devitalization' (the excessively strong rational and moralizing nature of 'Reason' kills all 'vitality').

It is fascinating to compare Foucault, the Böhmes, Leese (Herder, Schleiermacher), and D.H. Lawrence: they all engage in criticism of reason, albeit with variations. Yet—what stands out—Foucault and the Böhmes seek it in "the other of reason," while the others seek it in "the vital, or rather the revitalized, life."

The criticism of J. Derrida and J. Habermas.

Oger, ac, 102/104. -- Both Postmodernists cast doubt on Foucault and the Böhmes. They consider it impossible, i.e., unjustifiable, to articulate madness (Reason) from within madness itself: Foucault and the Böhmes are 'dreaming' when they imagine they can exercise 'criticism' upon that same Reason from something other than Reason. -- "It is always Reason itself that subjects a specific form of this Reason to criticism." (Ac, 103). Compare this with what was said in *CF 44* (statistical reason / ethical reason as two roles of the same reason). That is one point.

But there is more: Foucault argues that "Reason" sweeps away differences through its universal pretensions: the singular, the particular are stifled. Habermas believes that "Reason itself" is the source of a multiplicity of interpretations.

Incidentally : we made that clear in *CF 23/29*, where the many cultures regarding medicine (rational medicine) were discussed.

CF48

Reason and madness.

P. Friedrich , Hrsg., *Wilhelm Waiblinger, Der kranke Hölderlin* (1830-1), Leipzig, Xenien, sd.

Friedrich Hölderlin (1770/1843), the famous great German poet, went insane in 1904. This does not prevent him from being provided with profound commentary by, for example, Martin Heidegger. -- Friedrich quotes a Dr. Lange who says the following. "Apart from all that is useful and represents real importance or real progress, the masses of people are constantly captivated by all that is new and truly original. Furthermore, all that acts with great self-assurance inspires their reverence. Also all that is difficult: difficult to execute, difficult to understand—all that cannot be explained by the psychology of the everyday, all that is psychologically mysterious and enigmatic. Also all that arose 'unconsciously' is situated here. The masses love strong contrast effects, have a preference for all that stands out strongly and is extreme. Powerful passions sweep them along or compel their mute admiration. And, if an emotional movement does not shy away from sacrificing life, then such a sacrificial death still exerts an attraction on the masses."

a. Much of what is listed comes from the supernormal (das Uebernormale), the healthy, true genius. Such an influence on humanity is understandable.

b. But much of it belongs in a sickness of the mind (Geisteskrank). From this something truly new and unusual emerges—something original. Here we often find a compelling self-assurance. Here, too, all that is psychologically difficult, all that is mysterious and enigmatic—all that cannot be understood. Many sicknesses of the mind exhibit something truly striking and extreme; often enough they display outbursts of 'wild' rage that do not even recoil from death.—Thus, part of Hölderlin's influence coincides with the influence that anything mentally ill exerts on the masses." (Oc, 9/10).

We saw it (*CF* 21, 34, 43): a culture defines what is 'normal' and 'supernormal' and 'subnormal'. It is remarkable for the modern Reason of the masses—and of more than one intellectual—that the non-normal exercises such prestige. There is something in many people that compels awe and wonder for "that which is other than reason" or perhaps for "that which is other of reason". In the latter case, 'Reason' or 'reason' itself would be in a very bad state.

CF49

8. The turnaround to the opposite. (49/52)

Let us begin with a book, namely

-- Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens (Studies in Rationality and Irrationality)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press/ Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1979-1, 1984-2;

-- id., *Sour Grapes (Studies in the Subversion of Rationality)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press/Paris, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1983.

Elster, from the perspective of the social sciences, defines 'rationality' as the human capacity to purposefully ('Intention') take the future into account.

In the biological sciences, one can speak of 'purposefulness' such that there is "functional adaptation" to the changing circumstances in which 'life forms' find themselves. However, with that 'functionalism,' one does not agree that it concerns man and typically human life: there—to follow Elster's terminology—'intentionalism' prevails (= purposefulness in adaptation).

In both works, Elster also studies the undeveloped forms of rational life and, naturally, the so-called irrational life phenomena. That is the differential with which Elster works.

It is well known to all Platonic scholars that Platon gives precedence to the 'nous' (Lat.: Intellectus), mind, in the individual, the polis, and the cosmos (*CF 1; 16 (note)*). Yet—and here the fact that Platonic sentences must be interpreted restrictively is shown again—it strikes him how 'ananke', necessity (to include the non-mind element), the second, opposing aspect of the individual, polis, and cosmos, 'reigns' alongside the 'nous' or mind (with its purposefulness). One may safely equate 'ananke' to some extent with what we now call "the irrational".

Fate analysis

Fate is that which is 'ananke', that which happens to us incomprehensibly to our mind. Fate analysis is usually discussed in what is called 'philosophy of history': factual history, after all, is rather a series of events that are unpredictable, 'chaotic', 'irrational' than purposefully achieved—'intentional' (Elster's terminology)—facts.

CF50

Karl Löwith (1897/1973). *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen*, in: *W. Otto*

ua, *Anteile (Martin Heidegger zum 60 Geburtstag)*, Frankfurt a. M. 1950, 150, writes: “However inconceivable it may seem at first, namely the fact that radical secularization has its origin in a religious 'Entweltlichung' (note: withdrawing from this world), yet this would only confirm a general rule of history: in the process of history, something different always emerges than what was intended at the beginning of a movement (...).

The great innovators of history prepare for others the paths they themselves do not tread.” In other words: our Reason proposes, but fate—the vicissitudes—dispose!

Applicative models.

Karl Löwith points out a few.

1. J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778) prepared the French Revolution (1789/1799). However, he would not have recognized himself in Maximilien de Robespierre (1758/1794); Robespierre played a decisive role in “la Terreur”, the Reign of Terror, from May 1793 to July 27, 1794. Such a brutal dictatorship was not deliberately foreseen in Rousseau's mind, quite the contrary.

2. Karl Marx (1818/1883) prepared the Russian Revolution (February/October 1917). The Bolsheviks, the majority, seized power (they had taken the wind out of the sails of the Mensheviks, the minority, in Brussels and London at the Congress of 1903). Vladimir Lenin (1870/1924; founder of Bolshevik Marxism) implemented a brutal repression that plagued the Soviet Union for seventy years. But Marx, who was referring more to the constitutions of Switzerland or the US at the time, would not have recognized himself in Lenin.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900), through his aristocratizing nihilism, prepared the ground for the Fascist-Nazi Revolution. In 1942, at the Brenner Pass meeting, Adolf Hitler (1889/1945) gifted the works of Friedrich Nietzsche to his ally Benito Mussolini (1883/1945; Italian dictator, founder of the Fascist Party in 1919, a proponent, like the National Socialists, of a “totalitarian regime”). However, Nietzsche reportedly did not recognize himself in Hitler.

We can add other examples ourselves.

A. Weber, *Histoire de la philosophie européenne*, Paris, 1914-8, 234, claims

that William of Ockham (1295/1350; Nominalist), with his 'revolutionary' action aimed at the purification and renewal of the Catholic Church, really meant well.

CF51

His renewal movement, however, resulted in the shaking off by laymen—especially a number of princes—of “the yoke of Christian Rome,” something that Occam (a second spelling) would not have wanted.

Incidentally : that William of Occam achieved unexpected fame in the novel **Il nome della rosa** (*The Name of the Rose* , Milan, 1980; basis of the film of the same name), translated into many languages, by the Italian semiotician *Umberto Eco* (1932/2016).

Different model. — Martin Luther (1483/1545 German Reformer).

According to *Joseph Lortz*, **Die Reformation in Deutschland **, 1939—Lortz is the doyen of Catholic Luther research—Luther was:

- a** . a deeply religious nature,
 - b** . who unintentionally distanced himself from the Catholic Church. --
- Which is affirmed by *Dr. Günther Deschner*, **Luther (Eine Bilanz nach 500 Jahren *)*, in: **Bunte** 10.11.1983, 126. “Nothing was further removed from Luther than the founding of a new ideology. Even the fragmentation of the Roman Church was not even his intention (...). His success was fueled by other forces: they lay both in him and in the structure of his era.”

René Descartes (1598/16504)

Founder of Modern philosophy.

C. Forest, DP, Le cartésianisme et l'orientation de la science moderne , Liege / Paris, 1938, 3, says: “Cartesianism as a system was abandoned rather quickly. Yet, no less did Descartes continue to influence both Modern philosophies and Modern sciences.” Now, one of the most striking conclusions that thinkers after Descartes derived from his presuppositions was the theses of Materialism.

Father Forest: “The point is not to accuse Descartes of the Materialist interpretation of science (...). He remained a believer until the end of his life. His spiritualism is not doubted.”

But the ideas that people put into circulation go further than they have foreseen: with an inexorable logic they continue their way, through the

thinking minds.” (Oc, 4). Thus Descartes—which he himself was not—became a Prematerialist. Despite his Modern 'Reason' or 'reason'.

Conclusion : fate disposes of what our purposeful reason 'weighs'.

CF52

Georg Fr. Hegel (1770/1831)

The leading figure of German (= 'Absolute') Idealism advocated a “Philosophy of the Idea,” where 'Idea' means something like “all that is.” Yet he did not hide his sympathy for “les Philosophes” (the name of the 18th-century Enlightened Rationalists).

Even for those among them who most vehemently opposed the cause of Christianity and that of Spiritualism (the latter being a way of thinking that posits a personal God and an immortal human soul). For the 'Idea', as Hegel conceived it, encompasses both Spiritualism and Materialism as 'moments' (temporarily arising elements).

What do we see? Besides 'right-wing' pupils, Hegel also had 'left-wing' ones. Karl Marx, among others. Marx simply turned Hegel's idealism on its head and reinterpreted it as Materialism. In this respect, he is comparable to the French Materialists who pushed Descartes' Prematerialism into full Materialism: Marx and others merely thought through Hegel's Prematerialism in a one-sided manner. — Cf. R. Serreau, *Hegel et l'hégélianisme*, Paris, 1965-2, 26s. (Spiritualism and Materialism).

So much for a brief series of applicational models of Löwith's thesis. They all demonstrate that when someone, especially a revolutionary figure, sends his 'message' out into the world, he can never be certain of its interpretation—not only conception of meaning but also and above all the construction of meaning (*CF 11ff: ABC theory as meaning-making*).

Expressed in terms of the ABC theory: no one knows with certainty beforehand how the B in the mass will react to that person's A! -- The common man says: “They are twisting the meaning of my words.”

The rhetoric of the Ancient Greeks has, however, formally warned everyone: the disseminator of the message (information) is one; the message is two; the receiver (the reception) is three. Reception theory demonstrates the enormous relinquishment of everything we disseminate around us: in that

well-defined and verifiable sense, a Derrida is right (*CF 13: In the Grip of Interpreters*).

This confirms Ch.S. Peirce for the umpteenth time: many people interpret **a.** willful, **b.** orthodox (= slavishly following others), **c.** preferential – without grasping the meaning of what is given, they construct meaning –; few interpret 'objectively scientific'. As a result, a message often turns into its opposite.

CF53

9. More 'fate analysis' (53/55)

In *CF 49* , we introduced the term 'fate analysis' based on the definition of “rational action” as “deliberately taking the future into account.” This is: taking into account something that does not yet exist! “Does not yet exist” in the sense of “is not yet actual,” for the future 'is' (the term is now used in the transcendental-ontological sense) there “in a manner incoming to us” (which is non-nothing).

Let us now broaden the concept of 'fate analysis'.

Library st.:

-- *Lili Foldes, Léopold Szondi et l' enigme du destin* , in: *Sélection de Reader's Digest* (Zürich) 1986: juillet, 98/104;

-- *Daniël-Rops, Eléments de notre destin* (Essai), Paris, 1934 (the author connects with the cultural crisis just before WWII (1939/1945) and interprets life as fate from a cultural perspective);

-- *P. Boutang, Ontologie du secret* , Paris, 1973,-- especially 21/44 (*Destin*);

-- *R. Guardini, Freedom, Grace , Fate*, Antwerp, 1950.

The fact that books and articles are written about fate—the collection and the dynamic system of events—should give us all cause for reflection—whether scientific or, primarily, philosophical.

Temporality.

Better would be: 'time-boundness' -- with a set of merely temporary, fleeting moments as an element. -- Life — not only the human or biological but even the cosmic — unfolds within the constricting straitjacket of the three moments in time:

a. from the past (with its sometimes very heavy weight that 'lingers') as thrownness in situations,

b . we live in the very narrow present moment that is called 'now' or “the

now”,

c. towards the future as a design. A part; - we forget an extremely large part of the past (sometimes through suppression (conscious) or repression (unconscious)); the greater part of the elements of the situation that constitute the present escape us; we usually do not know what the future will bring us unless by guessing.

In other words: torn apart into moments in time—'temporal ecstasies,' as M. Heidegger says—we live—forgetting, ignorant, unknowing. That is time-boundness or 'temporality': thereby we are immediately 'fate-bound,' for what happens to us 'weighs' upon us as 'fate,' 'fortunes,' to which we, due to ignorance, can only react afterwards, if we can at all.

CF54

Decision:

Far from being able to “take into account” the past, present, and future! The number of elements—factors, parameters—that govern our lives is so great that only a transcendent-divine spirit can handle it. The only thing we can handle are samples from the totality of the elements that govern our lives—and indeed our fate. Which confronts us again with inductivism (CF 08).

Controlling fate.

Yet man, at least if he is still “alive a little” (and not “burned out”), is inclined to “take his fate into his own hands.” Control of fate, therefore. -- The myth is one of the means of knowing to see somewhat clearly in the tangle of fate.

a. The myth is first and foremost a story.

(which can represent the successive moments in time, in the form of “omen/continuation”). In that sense, life as a series of destinies is a sequence.

b. Life force is central.

The myth is also a story in which the life force by which one can control fate usually occupies a very central position (certainly when the myth is used liturgically and/or magically): - Let us clarify this by means of one singular, concrete sample.

The Narcissus Myth.

Let us follow one of the versions, namely that of Ovid, *Metamorphoses*. -

- Narcissus - Lat.: Narcissus - is descended from the god of the Cephissus (a river) and the nymph Leiriope. At his birth, his parents consult the blind seer Tiresias - Lat.: Tiresias, who replies: "The child will reach a great age if he does not stare at himself."

Once he had grown into adulthood, Narcissus became the object of adoration for countless girls and nymphs—for the sake of his beauty. He did not reciprocate. The nymph Echo (Reverberation) also fell in love with him, but she achieved nothing either. Desperate, she withdrew into solitude. She grew thinner and thinner until only a lamenting voice remained of her, like an echo.

The rejected girls and nymphs then turn to the goddess Nemesis, who acts with thorough punishment. She executes an 'ate', a divine judgment, upon Narcissus: on a sweltering day, he becomes intensely thirsty after a hunt. He bends over the water of a spring and "stares at himself". Whereupon he falls fatally in love with his own face. He becomes indifferent to the world and dies on the spot.

CF55

Where he died, a flower arose that bears his name, the 'narcissus' (*P. Grimal, Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine* , Paris, PUF, 1988-9, 308).

Explanations.

First, one sees the structure "normal course (behavior)/deviation (deviant behavior)/rectification" (the control engineering or, as it is now also called, 'cybernetic' structure).

*EW Beth, *Natuurphilosophie** , Gorinchem, 1948, 36, states in line with *H. Kelsen, *Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzes aus dem Vergeltungsprinzip** , in: ** Erkenntnis ** 8 (1939): the pre-Socratic thinkers—regarding Pythagoras and Empedocles (whom Cicero mentions)—presuppose a legal order, which they interpret as divine law. It comprises:

- a.** a rule for the normal course of things,
- b.** a rule for deviation from the normal course, namely the remedial compensation.

This was once the core of Ancient Archaic hylozoism (the view that even seemingly dead nature is alive, animated, and spirited). -- Thus says *Cicero, De republica* 3:11, 19, that, in the opinion of Pythagoras and Empedocles,

whoever commits violence against a living being may expect unpunishable punishments. Violation of violence against a living being is a deviation; the punishment is corrective. Thus, fate is determined by the perpetrator and co-determined by the legal order.

Second explanation :

The punishment in the Narcissus myth is situated in his life force – in Ancient Greek: 'dunamis' (Lat.: 'virtus') – The goddess Nemesis, who drastically 'smooths out' deviations, instills in Narcissus an action – atè, judgment – that strikes him at his weak spot and thus causes him to destroy his own life force (resulting in death).

Conclusion: Where hubris, arrogance, and transgression (violation of taboos) occur, a mysterious law, “a God-given law,” comes into effect which “normalizes” the abnormal. Myths understood in this sense are therefore culture-founding. Cf. *CF 21* (34; 43; 48).

Reason or the Reason that adheres to such mythical wisdom can therefore “take the future into account”, if it “produces monsters” (*CF 33 (Goya)*).

The Bible, regarding belief in Yahweh, says something analogous to what *CF 38 (Kafka's Law)* states. After all, in Kafka's view as well, reason knows what awaits it if it deviates from the law or the laws. The entire doctrine of the end times (eschatology) of the Bible illustrates this.

CF56

10. The sufficient reason or basis of “reason” (56/59)

Let us return briefly to *CF 30* (The principle of sufficient reason or ground). “If A (reason), then B (understandable)”. If B has a (necessary and sufficient reason or ground (presupposition, 'hypothesis', in Platonic language)), then B is explainable (sensible, understandable). Or: then B is 'foundable' (established on a logical, strict foundation).

The foundational analysis of reason or 'Reason'

(for at one time “la deesse Raison” became a watchword) one can—besides the problem of madness (reason or 'Reason' with its dream monsters (*CF 33 (42;55)*)—also consider—what *Oger, Rationality, its foundation and its monsters* , 89, calls—“the reason of reason” itself. We will do that now.

The questions that arise here are:

a. “Is a choice for or against rationality (especially in the Modern, Enlightened-Rationalist sense of the word) as 'rationality' actually possible? If so, is this choice “rationally well-foundable”, justifiable, 'provable?’” Immediately: “Is irrationality radically reprehensible? What exactly is 'irrationality', for that matter?”

b. “Can a ‘reason or ground or foundation of reason’ be demonstrated? Is that reason or ground to be found in or outside reason, or both in reason and outside reason?” (Cfr. *CF 06* : Collection/ system).

c. “Is there a final reason or ground for both themes just raised?” (Cfr . *CF 30: Ultimate Reality*). -- Oger, ac, 89: “These and many other similar questions still dominate a significant part of contemporary philosophy.

The answers to these questions vary from tendency to tendency, but moreover—within a certain tendency—they also diverge to a considerable extent from thinker to thinker. Behold the multiplicity.

Now for the unity: “What stands out most, however, upon observing the tangle of philosophical discussions on rationality, is perhaps that remarkable similarities sometimes emerge between philosophical currents that develop almost without taking serious notice of one another. This is what Oger, who thoroughly examined the issues together with the answers, believes he can indicate as a summary. In light of his article, we will briefly review the most important points.”

CF57

The stakes: the Enlightenment.

Library st.:

-- *M. Milner/Al. Haider, Herders kleine philosophisches Wörterbuch* , Basel/Freiburg/Wien, 1959-2, 141/143 (Rationalismus).

a. Rationalism .

What is called 'rationalism' (without a capital letter because it is a universal term) encompasses the following: A, that is all that exists; B, that is approached from reason—sometimes that reason is so hypostatized, personified into a kind of 'deity', that one writes 'Reason'—C, that which gives rise to rational behavior (*ABC theory: CF 11 (57)*). That reason expresses itself in singular, particular, and above all universal (general) concepts that are incorporated into logical-rigid thinking. Such rationalism prevails from

Platon to Hegel, for example. Hegel, for instance, says: “All that is human is human only insofar as it is worked on by thought.” That statement is characteristic of 'rationalism' in the general sense.

b. Enlightened Rationalism or 'Rationalism'

(capitalized to indicate its singularity—the proper name). What is called 'Enlightenment' (Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung) is a historically defined part of general rationalism. It is situated in the 17th/18th centuries. Enlightened Rationalism originates with R. Descartes (1596/1650) and even more so with J. Locke (1632/1704).

That is Modern rationalism, which took as its model of reality what the then emerging mathematical natural sciences understood as 'real' and “rationally attainable” (rationally knowable). G. Galileo (1564/1642: exact foundation of natural science, supported by mathematics and experiment) played a leading role in this. The Modern or Enlightened Rationalist reason therefore had a strong mathematical and experimental character (mathematical and empirical reason).

Compared to what the Ancient Greeks had achieved in mathematics and experimental sciences, this was considered a refoundation and modernization of great magnitude.

Well, the stake in the discussion concerning “the reason (foundation) of reason” is precisely that general rationalism, and very particularly Enlightened Rationalism, a part of the general. -- We will now specify this.

K. Popper, J. Habermas, and K.-O. Apel clearly prioritize the Enlightenment. - M. Foucault (the late Foucault), and J. Derrida also, but differently.

CF58

As Oger, ac, 88, says: even *P. Feyerabend* —known for his *Farewell to Reason* (a telling title)—says 'farewell' to Reason (note the capital letter) but says 'welcome' to reason (lowercase). The fact that people of such divergent thinking nevertheless remain somewhere within Enlightened rationalism rightly points, as Oger maintains, to a common characteristic.

The differences.

We will now briefly mention the trends.

1. Critical rationalism.

That is the thrust of *Karl Popper* (1902/1994). Known for his epistemology (or philosophy of science), -- for in his *Logik der Forschung* (1934).

Following in his footsteps are figures such as W.W. Bartley, H. Albert, H. Lenk, G. Radnitzky, and J. Watkins, who nuance Popper's Critical Rationalism. -- Popper explicitly situates himself within the sphere of the Enlightenment (I. Kant). -- Popper and the Popperians see in our cultural life "a proliferation of irrationalism".

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Michel Foucault and in particular Jacques Derrida are considered 'irrationalists' in their eyes. Irrationalism is "a rebellion against reason" (K. Popper). This expression appears in a famous work by Popper, namely * *The Open Society and Its Enemies* *, vol. 2, London, 1945/1966, in which he claims that it is essentially the Ancient Greeks who taught us the concept of an "open society." "From swords to words" (instead of swords to ostracize and exclude those who live differently, turn to words; discuss on the basis of critical reason) is the motto. This is directed against dictatorships, in which reason is replaced by irrational behavior.

2 -- The critical theory.

Jürgen Habermas (1929/...), the second generation of the Frankfurt School (founded by *Theodor W. Adorno* (1902/1969 under the name Institut für Sozialforschung, - in 1923), is known for his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (I (*Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (*Zur Kritik der Funktionalistischen Vernunft*) (1981) - for his *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (Zwölf Vorlesungen), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1985.

Second figure of Critical Theory: Karl- Otto Apel (1924/2017), known for his * *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie* *, Frankfurt*, 1976 (strongly influenced by the Pragmatism of Ch.S. Peirce).

CF59

Let us not forget that members of the Frankfurt School were forced to flee under Nazism. This is all the more so because, for many German (and especially Jewish) intellectuals, philosophy and specialized sciences cannot be limited to mere "academic work" but entail social engagement.

Habermas and Apel criticize the Critical Rationalism of Popper and Albert in particular. -- But regarding the 'reason' of reason, i.e., its foundation, they

diverge: Habermas and his pupil A. Wellmer differ from Apel and his follower W. Kuhlmann,

3.-- Constructivism.

The Erlanger Schule is located here, with *P. Lorenzen* as its main figure , known for his *Normative Logic and Ethics* , Mannheim/Zürich, 1969. Also located here, but at a distance, is *F. Kambartel*, *Philosophie der humanen Welt* (*Abhandlungen*), Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1989.

4 -- Deconstructionism.

Jacques Derrida (1930/2004) is the man behind “la deconstruction” (deconstruction), a variant of M. Heidegger's 'Destruction' of the Western tradition as 'logocentrism' (the logos, rational thought, in its Enlightened-Rational form, takes center stage). He is known for his * *De la grammatologie* *, *Paris, Minuit*, 1967.

Here are four notable currents regarding the justification of reason, or Reason as the fundamental premise of rationalism in general and the Modern Enlightenment in particular. We will now delve somewhat deeper into this.

But first we consider Zenon of Elea (-500/...), the defender of his teacher Parmenides of Elea. -- According to *EW Beth*, **The Philosophy of Mathematics* *, 19, Aristotle summarized the Eleatic's method of reasoning as follows: “You, opponent of Parmenides, provide no more convincing proof (understand: the necessary and sufficient reason) of what you assert, just as Parmenides does not.

We call this “the ‘neither you nor I’ argument”. *W.W. Bartley*, *Flucht ins Engagement (Versuch einer Theorie des offenen Geistes)* , Munich, Szesny, 1962 (// *The Retreat to Commitment*), states that Protestant theologians such as K. Barth, E. Brunner, R. Niebuhr, P. Tillich, et al. employ the same method against (Modern) reason or Reason: “You, rationalist or Enlightened one, prove your presuppositions any more than we, Bible believers”.

CF60

11. Critical rationalism. (60/63)

Karl Popper , in his * *The Open Society and Its Enemies* *, II, 224ff., sets himself against two tendencies.

1. Irrationalism (see above):

2. “Uncritical Rationalism”

(what he calls) “Uncritical Rationalism”, which is defined as follows. The more precise name for it is 'Justificationism', for the uncritical Rationalist puts forward as an axiom: “If and only if a judgment (statement) is completely substantiated either by experience or by reasoning or both together, can it be called ‘rationally justified’ – justified, justified”.

Popper’s refutation is as follows. The presupposition is “all genuine rational assertions presuppose a sufficient reason or ground”. Well—according to Popper—that presupposition has no sufficient reason or ground, logically speaking. How, after all, can one provide conclusive proof of the principle itself? For, if one wishes to provide that, one must necessarily already presuppose (and have proven) the principle to be proven itself. Which amounts to an endless series.

Conclusion : not all claims have a sufficient reason (because there is at least one exception).

Note -- One observes something peculiar: sufficient reason and logical rigorous proof from prepositions (which have already been proven) are equated. The Rationalist that Popper is—in the Kantian sense—reasons without further ado and remains within the series of arguments.

A solid foundation.

Apart from the principle itself—Leibniz once gave the modern formulation of it: “Nothing is without (sufficient) reason”—“solid starting points” can be found in Modern philosophy.

For example, Descartes’s ‘Cogito’ (I think) (which means: “I am consciously engaged with my reason”). For example, Kant’s ‘Ich denke’: all knowing—and especially mathematical physics (Galilei, Newton)—has “a priori conditions” or “conditions of possibility” (understand: necessary and sufficient reasons), among which, in the first place, is the fact that “Ich denke” (the fact that I am conscious when I am reasoning). For it is evident from the counter-model: if I am unconscious and therefore no longer reason (= am rationally active), then there is no longer any question of reason, and in particular of probative-reasoning reason (these activities are 'unthinkable', 'impossible').

Because Husserl recognized the weakness of the Cogito (Descartes) and the Ich denke (Kant), he resorted to phenomenological 'reduction' (which here means: “restriction to less”). Our consciousness is directed towards the (external) world (*CF 03: intentionality*). But in order to have an absolutely firm starting point, Husserl reduces that (external) world to what can be presupposed of it as a directly given—a 'phenomenon'—in the individual consciousness of each of us (for example, it is not certain (unproven, not directly given) that that (external) world actually exists “outside of what I experience of it”! Even the thinking self—Husserl’s Cogito—can be reduced to what each of us perceives of it as a directly given (whether I am a deeper self or a subject, a person(ality), is not directly given!).

Here are two aspects of what is called “the phenomenological reduction” of things in consciousness to the purely 'phenomenal' (= directly given). – Compare with *CF 04* , where the 'opsis' (the perception of what is immediately given) was discussed by the Milesians. The 'historia' goes further than that 'opsis': it attempts to prove things that are not directly given. Milesian philosophy, too, was not a mere phenomenology like Husserl's philosophy.

All this, in Husserl, to establish an irrefutable 'foundation' (a rigorously proven premise).

Note: The search for a firm foundation or reason beneath one's feet led Karl Marx, for example, to seek it in the economic base (or infrastructure) which was to serve as the reason or foundation for the cultural supra-politics (religion, politics, law; education, etc. have their necessary and sufficient reason in the economy). Marx's *Culturology* stands or falls with that axiom.

Note -- It is clear: modern, 'Enlightened' Rationalism “wants to prove everything”. This is what it understands by “the principle of reason or ground” as the lifeblood of thought. 'Reasoning' from absolutely proven or at least provable premises or 'hypothesis' (to speak with Platon (*CF 08: hypothetical method*)) is the application of the premise par excellence, namely the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” formulated by Leibniz.

Popper radically rejects such uncritical justificationism. Not everything can be radically proven. Which leads us to Zenon of Elea (*CF 59*): “neither you nor I prove everything”.

CF62

Two types of “sufficient reason”.

Library st.: A. Noiray, dir., *La philosophie (Dictionnaire Marabout)*, Paris, Gérard, 1972-2, 242s. (*Fondement (Foundation)*). -- The term 'fondement' (basis, presupposition, ground, or reason) has - according to the dictionary - two meanings.

a. The logical reasoning

(as above) is one or more preceding clauses from which a derivation can be made. In that strictly logical reasoning sense, there is, of course, no sufficient reason or ground for the principle of sufficient reason.

b. The actual ontological reason,

of which the logically reasoning person is merely an example, is anything that in any way makes something (being) understandable, meaningful—in the Ancient Greek language 'true'. Cf. *CF 10* : holistic-logical. The literally formulated principle “Everything has a necessary and sufficient reason (logical aspect) whether within or outside itself (holistic aspect)” does indeed have a sufficient reason or ground, namely within itself.

The counter-model demonstrates this clearly: assuming that this principle or premise does not apply in at least one case, what follows from that for that at least one case? That it is absurd—senseless, incomprehensible, unexplained, and even inexplicable... in the absolute sense. Even of all the Enlightened minds who claim that it is unprovable, there is not a single one who does not apply it in the ontological sense.

Note -- In Platonic terms: insight into the principle in this last (and also in the previous) sentence is a matter of *theoria* (*CF 03*).

Popper on the matter.

Popper reduces Platonic theories to an ... “irrational choice”. It is an irrational belief in reason. Whoever believes in the principle of reason or foundation has “already adopted a rationalist attitude”. Only after that unjustifiable choice can there be talk of “rational argumentation”. Proceeding in this way makes not the slightest impression on an opponent.

Conclusion: A Rationalist life depends on a preceding irrational decision. That is critical rationality, conscious of its limitations. -- This makes it understandable that Neo-Protestant theologians (*CF 59*) respond to this and say: “You, Enlightened mind, prove no more than we, Bible believers, prove everything” (understood as: “Our Bible faith is just as irrational”). - Fideistic

decisionism is Popperian.

CF63

Irrational ethical choice

Being an enlightened mind is a decision (decisionism) based on a belief (fideism). It is also a moral or ethical choice. -- “In contrast to questions concerning facts, a 'reasonable' (= rationally justifiable) discussion is not possible regarding questions concerning values (*note*: culture). Popper therefore writes: “Arguments in themselves cannot determine a fundamental moral decision”. (Oger, ac, 91).

Note: Therefore, no compelling logical proof is possible for matters of conscience.

That is the well-known distinction between—what the Germans call—'Sein' (understand: rationally provable facts) and 'Sollen' (understand: data that concern us in our conscience). This distinction is particularly characteristic of Empirical Rationalism (Hume) and Positivist Rationalism (Comte): values, whether moral or conscientious values, are merely triggers for irrational decisions. Immediately... everything that constitutes cultural matters!

Platonism has a fundamentally different theory of value: our mind, by virtue of the noble yoke (*CF 02*), has a cognitive contact with all that is 'good' (the idea of the good or simply valuable spread over all that participates in it). The theory is such that 'being' in itself is always 'value' ('good') and, conversely, that 'good' without any 'being' is immediately worthless. That is the ontological axiology.

Conclusion -- Popper's theory of rationality can be summarized as follows:

a. In principle, 'rational' reasoning is decisive ('apodictic' in Aristotle's terminology),

b. But in fact, both the Enlightenment-Rationalist fundamental attitude (choice, decision, belief, behavioral habit) and every ethical fundamental attitude (choice) remain irrational decisions—which can indeed be aided by 'rational' arguments but can never be rationally enforced.

Note: Oger, ac, 91; 105.-- Constructivism (Erlanger Schule) of, for example, P. Lorenzen also speaks of “an act of faith” when it concerns the foundation of the presuppositions of true judgments, 'Faith' in the sense of “the presupposition of something for which no 'justification' is available”!

Faith, therefore, here, in the rational-negative sense of that word.

CF64

12 Reestablish critical rationalism. (64/65)

Let us now pause for a moment, with Oger, ac, 91/93, to consider a few Popperians who believe they discover errors in reasoning in their master.

1 -- WW Bartley.

To in his *Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality*.

a. Bartley claims that Popper's irrational foundation presupposes a kind of 'fideism' that is irresponsible. For Zenonian fideists (think of the Neo-Protestants), Popper's position is too vulnerable.

b. Bartley therefore radicalizes Popper's critical Rationalism. Specifically, into a 'comprehensive' (encompassing, generalized) Rationalism or, as he says later, into 'Pankritical' ('All-critical') Rationalism. -- This total 'Critical' Rationalism has an axiom: "If and only if a judgment is "open to criticism" (understand: is refutable), it is 'rational'":

The refutation of a J. Watkins or a J. Post.

Formulating the axiom in this way amounts to simultaneously acting while understanding that it "is not open to criticism"! Thus, there is at least one exception, namely the basic judgment or axiom itself! That is fundamentally irrefutable. Such a thing amounts to a sort of 'dogma' (in the Rationalist sense of "a position elevated above all possible criticism"). One sees the "contradiction in terms" (inconsistency, logical contradiction).

2.-- H. Albert.

Including in his *Traktat übercritical Vernunft* (1969), in his *Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der Vernunft* (1982).

2.a.-- Refutation.

If the principle of sufficient reason is rational and provable, then this establishes a trilemma.

(a) Alternatively, every clause that provides a foundation must in turn be founded. The Medieval Scholastics called this "regressus in infinitum" (a never-ending series of foundations). This is an unfeasible foundation.

(b) either every founding clause must have itself as a clause or precede a clause yet to be founded. -- In medieval Latin "circulus vitiosus" ('vicious', i.e. a cycle or circular reasoning containing a logical error). This is a zero

foundation.

(c) either one encounters in (a) and/or (b) an undeniable intuition ('evidence') which precedes as a proving clause. This is an arbitrary or even dogmatic foundation. -- Three times 'irrational'!

CF65

2.b. -- Foundation

To escape from that 'aporia' (situation with no way out), Albert puts forward his own axiom: **a.** a 'justification' is superfluous; **b.** a 'critizability' (refutability) is sufficient.

In other words: "If and only if a judgment is 'critically open' (refutable), is it a 'rational' judgment." In other words: in principle, a claim must be refutable. Again: the 'falsificationism' already advocated by Popper returns here in a different guise.

Note: Only if Albert allows his axiom itself to be open to criticism is he 'consistent' (not in contradiction with himself). Otherwise, we fall into the critique of W.W. Bartley's comprehensive Critical Rationalism.

Incidentally : The bibliography threatens to become endless! We also mention here in passing: *J. Agassie / IC Jarvin, Rationality (The Critical View)*, Dordrecht, 1986. The work poses the question: "is rationality definable?" Whereby 'rationality' is understood in both the natural scientific and the human scientific terms. Popper and his pupils, including W.W. Bartley III (with his comprehensive-critical standpoint), come through strongly. Questions such as the relationship between Rationalism and magic, Rationalism and dogmatism, and Rationalism and irrationalism are also discussed.

Digression: Rationalism and Eristics.

Library st.: *EW Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1944, 78/92 (*Eristics and Sepsis*).

The 'eristic' or method of contention apparently begins with Zenon of Elea (*CF* 59) and comes to full fruition, for example, with the School of Megara (with Euclid of Megara (around -400) and Euboulides of Miletus as leading figures). In Plato's dialogues, too, one finds arguments and—endless—counterarguments that usually lead to 'aporia', a lack of way out. This is called "Platonic aporetics."

Many—including Aristotle and a number of Church Fathers (Clement of Alexandria, Jerome), Schopenhauer)—make no secret of their aversion to Eristics.

Beth, on the other hand, says: “The eristic method of refutation—one might almost say 'falsificationism'—is the method of the counter-model. It has been applied successfully, for example, in more recent mathematics and logistics.” It has also proven fruitful regarding the reason or foundation.

CF66

13. The critical theory. (66/69)

While for Popper and the Popperians and related schools of thought (disciplinary) science was the main focus regarding rationality, in Critical Theory rationality shifts to the Significa (Lady Welby) and especially to Semiotics (Ch.S. Peirce) or Semiology (de Saussure).

Central to this is the speech act with its three aspects, which we briefly outline.

- a.** “It is sunny today” is a well-syntactically constructed sentence.
- b.** If, moreover, that statement is a reflection (*CF 02: noble yoke; 32*), and indeed as accurate a reflection as possible, of the reality corresponding to it (the fact that it is actually sunny today (ontology)), then that sentence is semantically sound (it states the truth).
- c.** If we pay attention to the intentions and aims (importances) of that statement, then we grasp the pragmatic aspect. For example, one grasps pragmatism if one understands how the speaker wants to cheer up a fellow human being.

An important pragmatic element is the Significa: it focuses on the relationship between communicators and interactants. It is good to keep this in mind when one wishes to correctly situate the theory of rationality of Habermas and Apel, for example, in relation to Popperianism.

Axiom.

Our communicative action (knowledge, language, behavior) necessarily entails rationality in its practice. -- In this regard, what follows should be noted.

a. The theory of drawing

(semiotics,-- significa, semiology) is a metalanguage about language and

speech acts: for one speaks of language in a metalanguage. Now, it is the case that this metalanguage already presupposes the principle of sufficient reason, if it is to be rational or at least meaningful.

b. The speech acts,

What semiotics discusses, in turn, presupposes the said principle.

1.-- Jürgen Habermas.

Let us begin with a singularly concrete statement so as not to get stuck in the abstract. Cf. Oger, ac, 95.

-- a. "I assert, here and now, that today – 17.11.1990 – is a rainy day" (or: "It is a rainy day today").

-- b. If I assert something in a rational manner, primarily pragmatically and significantly oriented, then therein lies a presupposition: "I make a (semantic) claim to truth,

CF67

Consequently: if you make that claim, then I am prepared to argue. Here the significant element becomes apparent: I seek understanding. To that end, I am prepared to bring forward the reason, the necessary and preferably sufficient reason, in my argument. One sees it: in the very practice of constructing understanding lies the famous principle of rationality. -- In this case, for example, the reason for my assertion lies in the fact that I am going outside for a moment with my eristic-skeptic fellow man and observing (CF 24: *Locke's Empiricism regarding rationality*) whether it is in fact going to be a rainy day.

Conclusion: pragmatics presupposes principle.

c1. Now I assert:

If the established fact is, for me, the individual here and now, the reason for a true assertion, then the same ascertainable fact is immediately also the reason for true assertions for all possible rational beings whenever and wherever. In other words: the fact is universally valid, thus binding observing reason to all possible rational beings!

Conclusion : pragmatism is broadening.

c2. Now I claim something else:

"If I am honest and conscientious and perceive 'It is a rainy day', then

potentially all possible honest-conscientious beings; in other words: the necessary and sufficient reason applies not only to the perceiving reason; it also lays claim to the ethical or moral reason.

Conclusion : the appreciation, in conscience—"in good conscience," as they say—of truth is more than merely empirical-positive perception; it is an expression of conscientious, honorable empirical-positive perception. Cf. *CF 19*: the thief is an expert but he lacks conscience (as a definition, an ethical definition, of culture).

Whether Habermas would fully agree with our commentary is of no importance here: the reasoning we carried out, based on his pragmatism, leads flawlessly to what we have said.

Habermas's thesis—according to Oger—reads in any case:

a. negative: the theorem regarding sufficient reason is unprovable by mere logical reasoning (as Popper et al. demonstrate, especially H. Albert);

b. Positive: rationality (the prioritization and honest-observing application of the principle of sufficient reason) is presupposed in the very practice of knowing, language, and acting. It is therefore not a "free choice" (as Popper et al. attempt to make it seem).

CF68

Oger, ac, 95, says: "From the very first words we stammer out as children, reason begins to exercise an unobtrusive, tenacious, unshakeable 'compulsionless compulsion'. (...). Reason intentionally exerts a compulsion by incessantly orienting our speech and action. Moreover, this reason is uncompulsory since it is not an external instance alien to us and alienating (...): it lies implied in the pragmatics of every speech act." This is how Oger describes Habermas' position.

Oger says, *ibid.*: "Man often tries to withdraw from a 'reasonable' (understand: rational),—honest and open argumentation." That is, then, the unreasonable, indeed, immoral possibility.

Oger says, *ibid.*: "We have always already made the choice (namely, for or against reason). The pragmatics of language has – so to speak – already 'decided' in our place in an immemorial (*note*: escaping our conscious memory) time, but this means that there can at the same time be no question

of a decision “in the true sense”:

Behold three texts by Oger that describe Habermas's position. They become crystal clear if one rereads our exposition just before this. In other words: we interpret Habermas correctly.

Habermas' criticism of Popper.

Oger, ac, 94/96

a. Habermas criticizes Popper's 'political' presuppositions; after all, he is a 'liberal' in the Anglo-Saxon sense. Regarding epistemology and criticism of reason, an Anglo-Saxon liberal like Popper views it as follows: from the outset, the free liberal citizen finds himself faced with free choices in a “free country” (think of his critiques of dictatorial systems (Nazism, Communism)). Likewise: with the free choice between rationality and irrationality.

b . Habermas states the following:

That so-called 'choice' for rationality or against it has always already been made. How so? Language as result-oriented action 'chooses' in our place – for us (as conscious beings) and for us (in our place). That is the human aspect of man as a rational being.

In other words: precisely because he applies the necessity of sufficient reason as a presupposition from the very beginning, he finds himself in a rational 'choice' without consciously wanting it. Admittedly, as a free being, he can choose against that “pre-reflective choice” ingrained in his knowing, speaking, and acting. But then, precisely, he acts against his humanity.

CF69

2 -- Karl-Otto Apel.

Oger, 93/94 (Apel's “ultimate foundation”). --

“Completely parallel to Watkins' critique of Bartley (CF 64), Apel will also dispute that Albert – with his model of critical inquiry – has exceeded all 'justificationism'”. Thus Oger. Cf. CF 64v .. -- In other words: 'eristics' continues unabated!

What is more: Apel attempts to demonstrate that the axiom of “unlimited criticism” (Albert) contains a 'paradox'. “Strongly resembling the liar's paradox,” says Oger. Which is directly eristic.

Note : -- When a liar says “I lie,” what exactly is he saying? When he says “I do not lie,” does that differ from the previous sentence? That is the paradox or the seemingly irreconcilable statement. -- Similarly, here, when a proponent of unlimited criticizability says “I am in favor of unlimited criticizability,” what is he saying about his own statement? For he cannot say about his own axiom, “I am in favor of unlimited criticizability”! For, in that case, he calls his own main premise into question. Which he is not allowed to do rationally.

Ontology-- language/metalinguage.

Albert speaks of the principle of reason or ground (= ontology). Then he speaks of its formulation (language). After that, he speaks of the scope of that formulation, rationally speaking (metalinguage, this language about language).

Well then, if all judgments are in principle open to criticism, then the axiom that all judgments are open to criticism is itself as well. The axiom as metalinguage does not contain the open-to-criticism (otherwise it would be subject to doubt); the language of which that axiom speaks, does contain the open-to-criticism. Only if one distinguishes metalinguage and language can one somewhat agree with Albert. But ... how rational is his metalinguage (= axiom) and how is it rational? (*CF 14: existence/ essence*).

Apel remains a Leibnizian: he attempts to retain the principle of sufficient reason as a foundation, namely as an evidentiary that cannot be doubted genuinely. -- But, unlike Popper, he situates this proposition within a linguistic pragmatics which he calls 'transcendental'.

A sufficient reason is always already presupposed in our linguistic acts (and indeed as undeniable), but that presupposition itself is not 'founded' or grounded in anything else (another clause). This is what Apel attempts to demonstrate with a number of arguments (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant).

CF70

14. Deconstructionism (70/71)

Oger, 96/97. -- “In Jacques Derrida an analogous reasoning is found to that which leads Popper (*CF 60ff.* to reject 'justificationist' rationalism”.

'Justificationism' means that every—absolutely every—'rational' assertion (thesis, judgment, statement) presupposes an absolute 'substantiation' (justification, reason, or ground) in order to be (radically and definitively) valid.

This is done in the name of a single interpretation of the principle of (necessary and sufficient) reason or ground, namely, the strictly logical-scientific one (preferably in the sense of 'exact' (experimental-mathematical) science). Cf. CF 23 : "strict science" (as an ideal that is presupposed).

Oger, *ibid.*. -- "Unlike Popper, Derrida refuses to call such a doubting of the principle of (necessary and sufficient) reason 'irrational'" Cfr. CF 62 : "an irrational belief". -- From this it becomes clear that the approach of Popper and Derrida is quite different.

a. Popper, as an Anglo-Saxon 'liberal',

Popper thinks in terms of "a transition from an antisocial to a social attitude to life" (think of Thomas Hobbes (1588/1679; Cartesian who initiated the materialist interpretation of Descartes' philosophy (CF 51)) and J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778: the end of French Rationalism), with his *Contrat social* (1762: Rousseau's political views)). Popper transfers this to the scientific field: he wants a transition from an irrational lifestyle to a rational one.

b. Derrida wants something else:

The West, in his philosophies, is too 'logocentric' for him, prioritizing reasoning thinking too much. Instead, he wants a dismantling of that type of thinking. That is 'deconstruction' (which he claims connects with Heidegger – * *Der Satz vom Grund* * (1957) and * *Vom Wesen des Grundes* * (1949-3) – and his concept of 'Destruktion'). -- But beware: for Derrida, that 'transition' does not succeed if we simply think away reason itself.

In other words: the principle of reason or foundation remains intact. Moreover, it is the very essence of our entire culture, especially at the university level. As his * *Les pupilles de l'université* * (* *Le principe de raison et l' idée de l'université* *) attempts to clarify.

CF71

Similarity and difference with St. Albert .

Cf. CF 64.

1. Albert distinguishes a trilemma :

Either an unfeasible proof (*regressus in infinitum*), a null proof (*circulus vitiosus*), or a dogmatic 'proof' (undoubtable intuition). The unfeasible argument can be indicated by a metaphor that has poetic value: 'abyss'.

2. Derrida sticks to a dilemma.

Either circular reasoning (= null proof), whereby—in order to prove the presupposition—one presupposes the presupposition as already proven. Or an 'abyss', whereby one endlessly attempts to prove what is presupposed (impossible regressus in infinitum). “The principle of reason or ground:

- a. demands a basis for everything (all rational assertions),
- b. but is itself unfoundable (understand: in a rational manner)”. Thus Oger says: “It is unfounded and therefore abysmal” (ac, 96).

Obedience or disobedience.

“Derrida asks himself the question: “Do we obey the principle of sufficient ground when we ask for that which grounds this principle—which is itself a principle of grounding?” (Oger, ac, 97). Derrida’s answer:

a. *We are not disobedient !*

We do not wish to undermine it—that principle! We are not knocking it off its pedestal!—Derrida is not concerned with opposing that principle. “For then one would fall into irrationalism” (Oger).

b. *We are not slavishly obedient either !*

“For then one would fall back into a traditional rationalism” (Oger), in other words: then one would think, speak, and act 'logocentrically' -- in a word, “establish culture”.

The powerlessness of (rational) reason.

Derrida, therefore, following in the eristic footsteps of many others, poses the question of “the origin” (another word, fundamentally, for 'reason') of the principle of sufficient reason. He considers it 'self-evident'—which points to an evident truth—that the answer to such a question is “not regulable by reason itself.” One must proceed outside the realm of the rational ! “This stepping outside, however, is not contrary to the principle of reason but merely opens up the possibility of calling reason into question” (Oger).

The 'archè', presupposition (*CF 10: stoicheion as a hypothetical given*), of reason transcends that reason somewhere.

CF72

15. The lemmatic-analytical approach (72/75).

Let us return for a moment to “good old” Platonism. Let us reread *CF 08* : the analytical method! The formula reads: “If A, then B. Well, B. Therefore A”.

In the analytical hypothesis, understood Platonically, we seek “the reason” or “the ground”. Only then do we understand B, the fact that ‘historia’ (to use a Milesian word) is subjected to investigation. To ‘analysis’ (always in the strictly Platonic sense).

Let us reread *CF 35ff* .: “If x, then B. Well, B. Therefore x.” Kafka’s rational—at the same time Biblical—thought structure worked with an unknown. Thus he could write books and smaller works! -- That is the introduction of what in the Platonic tradition is called a lemma.

In passing : O. Willmann *Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2, 48ff., explains this in more detail.

Diogenes Laërtius 3:24 reports: “Platon was the first to put the inquiry by means of analysis into the hands of the Thasian Leodamas.” It consisted in introducing the sought (temporarily unknown or requested) as ‘given’ (already known). One acted, therefore, as if the as yet unknown were already known. Subsequently, one worked with it: a stoicheiosis (*CF 05*; -- 29; 31) or factor analysis (which examines the relationships).

The characteristic feature—says Willmann—is “the proactive approach to the sought”: it would be more appropriate—according to Willmann again—to introduce the name “prolepsis or lemmatic method,” since the actual analysis only gets off the ground thereafter. This analysis thus works with unknowns with which one pretends to already know them,

O. Willmann, **Abriss der Philosophie **, *Wien*, 1959-5, 137, states that one of the applications of that lemmatic-analytical method is the introduction of and working with unknowns (x, y, z) instead of digits in mathematics (algebra since François Viète (1540/1603; French mathematician) became letter calculus instead of number calculus).

Instead of “3 + 5”, one works with “x + y” (which implies generalization). -
- Another application is the “black-box method”. In electricity, one cannot open a box. However, one can test (work with) the wires coming in and out of it. In itself, the box is ‘black’ (unknown). When examined in its relationships (stoicheiosis), it reveals its secret, at least partially.

CF73

Note -- Acting as if can be an illusion.

Such is the methodical doubt. The Later Academies (Second Academy (Arkesilaos (-314/-240); Third Academy (Karneades (-214/-129)), some Church Fathers (St. Gregorios of Nussa (335/394), in the East; St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430)), R. Descartes (1596/1650: “le doute methodique”) proceeded in this way.

Charles Sanders Peirce heavily criticizes that method as genuine experience: if it is to be more than a rhetorical device, it ought to prioritize real reasons or grounds. If one does not doubt within oneself (in good conscience), one can pretend to doubt, but then one is not sincere. Just like proof by contradiction, methodical doubt, if rational, starts from a counter-model: “If I assert that, then it follows that which refutes me.”

Doubt is the reason for non-doubt, e.g. The lemmatic-analytical method is the introduction of a 'sign' that stands for what does not (yet) know but seeks (analysis): pretending manifests itself in the introduction of 'something' that temporarily replaces what is sought.

Incidentally: false doubt is equivalent to the liar's paradox (CF 69)

I (pretend to) doubt

contains something that is semantically nonsense: in the very sentence I utter, I simultaneously say something about that sentence itself (and confuse metalanguage with language and language with that which it is referring to). Cf. IM Bochenski, **Wijsgerigemethoden in de moderne wetenschap **, *Utr./Antw.*, 1961, 72ff. (*Semantische trappen **).

Reread everything the three major schools of thought say regarding the justification of the axiom of sufficient reason or ground. No one really doubts its validity, for everyone applies the principle—at least insofar as he proceeds rationally. Note the restrictive nature!

When, for example, one says that “the principle of reason has a ground, but itself hangs above an 'abyss' and is unfounded,” one is not so far from a paradox. For one speaks of judgments and presuppositions of judgments, but insinuates that it concerns more than judgments and presuppositions of judgments. It is precisely this insinuation that allows one to speak of an 'irrational' grounding of rational thought. Or of an 'abyss', or of 'faith', or of 'decision'—Seen in this light, Habermas, who emphasizes the necessity praxeologically-pragmatically (present in the very essence of all speech acts), is right (CF 67).

As Habermas says: prioritizing the axiom of reason or ground is a natural necessity. Yet, at a certain moment in their lives, a number of people arrive at rational reasoning and at the 'foundation' of that principle.

Platonically, it is as follows: it is inderivable from presuppositions because those presuppositions presuppose it; yet it is an evidential fact or self-evident truth (which is clear from itself); consequence: one introduces it as a lemma! It is unfounded in the chain of probative judgments, yet one introduces it, though unfounded, on account of its evidential fact. This evidential fact, as the absolute presupposition of all that constitutes rational proof, is a "sufficient reason" to apply it as a lemma, continuously. Until... the opposite should prove to be the case. For that is the fate of a hypothetical reality.

Conclusion : speech acts, as rational acts, prioritize the naturally necessary; their evidential nature allows them to be introduced and applied as a lemma in reasoning ("to work with it"), just as algebra works with x, y, z). To date, there is no "sufficient reason" (!) to banish the lemma as irrational (just as one banishes a hypothesis after falsification (after refutation)).

Pragmatic reasoning on the matter.

Ch.S. Peirce (1839/1914), in his * *How to Make Our Ideas Clear**, in: *Popular Science Monthly* Vol. 12 (1878: 286/302), formulates his "pragmatic maxim":

"Consider what effects that might – conceivably – have practical bearings we conceive, the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception." The sentence is very difficult to translate. But the thought is clear: "This maxim has been called – as Peirce himself later stated – a skeptical and materialistic principle."

In fact, he is merely the application of the only principle of logic that Jesus recommended: "By their fruits you will know them." At the same time, he is closely related to the ideas of the Gospel. (...).

Nor should we understand the term "practical scope" in a low and sordid sense" (R. Berlinger, Hrsg. / Kl. Oehler, Uebers., Ch.SS Peirce, Ueber die

Klarheit unserer Gedanken , Frankf.aM, 1968, 62/63).

Note: We include “Pragmaticist maxim” in the title of this section because Peirce himself, as a “Scholastic realist,” opposed William James, whom he considered too nominalistic (and who claimed the term 'Pragmatism' for himself).

“If—as Peirce writes in 1905—a specific prescription for an experiment is possible, then a well-defined experience will follow.

Indeed: as Dewey would later write, “the world in the making” is central to Peirce’s thought. If you will: the reason or foundation is explored in its future applications, brought about by human experimental intervention.

Let us repeat, in French translation, the Pragmatic Maxim: "Considérez quels sont les effets pratiques que nous pensons être produits par l'objet de notre conception. The conception of tous ces effets est la conception complete de l'objet". So wrote Peirce in 1903.

' Effectivism '

This term would accurately reflect the situation. Strictly speaking, what do we know based on observation of its effect—of, for example, the principle of sufficient reason—if we do not introduce it as a lemma (provisionally unfounded) and work with it continuously? The only thing we know of it—in that hypothesis—is “what we imagine of it”! Nothing more yet. From the “black box” or lemma, however, the effects emerge: all our rationally justifiable acts (acts of knowledge, language, and practice) derive their structure from it. The results achieved are one long and uninterrupted plea in favor of the introduced and constantly applied lemma of reason or ground.

In other words: Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim exhibits exactly the same structure as Platon's lemmatic-analytical method. -- For background information, reference is made to *John Dewey*, **Le développement du pragmatisme américain** in: ** Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale ** 29 (1922): 4 (Oct./Dec.), 411/430 (a very solid article by someone who, in his instrumentalist way, stands in the same Pragmaticist tradition as James and Peirce).

Conclusion. -- “Work with the principle of reason or grounds, and see what that yields!” Only then will it become apparent what it is worth.

16. Did Plato lie? (76/84)

Library st.: Georges Nivat, *Bulgaria / Pologne: Visite au monde de pierre*, in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 12/13.09.1992, 24.

Steller talks about two works: Tzvetan Todorov, *Au nom du peuple (Témoignages sur les camps communistes)*, L'Aube, and Tadeusz Borowski, *Le monde de pierre (Trad. de Laurence Dyeve et Eric Veaux)*, Lettre international/ Bourgois.

Let us pause for a moment to consider what Nivat says about the second work that gives his article its title.

“When he left the concentration camp as a young man, where he, as an Aryan, had worked—carrying away the corpses and the dying in the convoys en route to Auschwitz—Tadeusz Borowski became a communist: like many others, he was then convinced that ‘Communism’ was ‘the ultimate means’ to ensure that concentration camps would never be established again.” There you have phase one.

This contrasts, of course, with the book by the Bulgarian-French thinker (former Structuralist) Todorov... who gives a voice to the people who endured the Communist-Bulgarian camps. The emphasis lies on the fact that “they still encounter their tormentors in the streets, proudly pinning the badges of honor to their chests”! “You are waste!” was shouted at them, and the sticks—the sticks—were applied! Not far from there, the prisoners could see Western tourists on the beaches.” Todorov interviewed the people, including the tormentors, and classified their testimonies.

Incidentally: Nivat notes that the Communist executioners “speak exactly the same language as the SS general in the film Shoah”.

Decision:

The Hitler model found perfect imitation among its opponents. As if one and the same ground or reason was at work in opposing camps—at least in appearance. That reason or ground is called 'name'; “in the name of the people,” people were deprived of their freedoms and even stripped of all human appearance in both Hitler's Germany and the Soviet world. The 'reason' by which that barbaric behavior was 'justified'— CF 60; -- 70 —justified, accounted for, sounded “in the name of the (sovereign) people.”

Without asking whether that reason was indeed a true, 'real' (being) reason, and not a false reason.

CF77

Let us now reread *CF 21v* . (*Culture and normality*): the prisoners were, in the name of the sovereign people, renamed 'deviants' (= not (anymore) normals). The cultural values stood behind and in that 'name' which was called “the people”.

Let us reread *CF 08*; -- *29*; *33*; *54* , where emphasis is placed on the fact that a set of values does not yet represent all possible values, and even less the actual values. The inductivism that Platon, following in Socrates' footsteps, instilled in us!

A second book

Nivat: “A second work invites us on a brutal journey, -- a truly ruthless book, an unforgettable book. A book the reading of which ought to be made mandatory for all those who have forgotten (the atrocities of the concentration camps); - for the Revisionists (*note*: those Nazi sympathizers who go so far as to claim that the concentration camps did not exist and thus want to 'revise' the history books).

That book is **Le monde de pierre** by *Tadeusz Borowski* .” Thus Nivat.-- “This book is rock-hard,” Nivat continues, “because it lacks all compassion—or nearly so—because it refuses references to the ‘other world,’ namely the ‘other world before or after.’”

The main character – Tadeusz – in the book is someone who manages to pull himself out of the fray while the rest are starving; he gorges on his bacon; the dying babies who were still lying in the railway cars awaiting transport upon arrival at the Auschwitz station, he simply throws outside. -- In a conversation with his French brigade commander, Tadeusz says: “My old man, within me lives a hatred that is radically incomprehensible to me for those through whose actions I am working here. When I think that they are on their way to the crematorium, I feel nothing, absolutely nothing resembling pity. If only the earth beneath their feet could open up: I would smash it in with my fists! Surely such a thing must be pathological. I do not understand it at all.” Thus Nivat.

Let us reread CF 44 (*Foucault, the Böhmes*); 33 (*Goya*), -- 42; 55ff.): the monsters of reason or Reason. Let us not forget that Marxism (also in its Leninist version) aspires to be a Rationalism and that National Socialism, although Primitivist (the Old Germanic mythical world), nevertheless mobilized typically 20th-century people, among whom were quite a few German ... doctors (*CF 23/29, Biomedical reason*).

CF78

Nivat: "So, instilling such a hatred of beings has succeeded. -- They lay the foundation of—I do not know which—monstrous culture. -- Tadeusz loved Platon,-- he had a girlfriend, a street in which he lived,-- a mother. All those things have vanished into nothing. "Now I know that Platon lied, for this earthly world is not the image of an ideal world, but the painfully heavy, bloody work of man." This is how Tadeusz reasons." This raises the question of the correct interpretation of Platon's thesis that that world is an image of an ideal world. Specifically: in what sense is our actual phenomenal world an 'image' of an ideal world? Let us let Platon speak for himself.

The correct understanding of Platon's theory of forms.

CF 11 taught us the two modes of meaning-making, conception of meaning, and founding of meaning. -- What is an idea ('idea', 'eidos')? Let us first answer briefly.

a. She is a type of sufficient reason,

For it determines what something is (essence) and that/to what extent something exists (existence) (*CF 04; --14;24;72*). Seen in this light, it is the result of theoria (*CF 03*), di 'opsis' (direct acquisition of knowledge), possibly extended to 'historia' (research, indirect acquisition of knowledge). Or: Platon's theory of forms is the result of his hypothetical method (*CF 08*).

b. What is the reason or basis for the idea?

It is the true reason or basis of factor analysis (*stoicheiosis*, *CF 05; --29;31; 72*) or, in Kantian terms, of tracing the conditions of possibility of something. As we saw - *CF 06* - parameter analysis makes use of induction (*CF 06; 08*) and proceeds within the framework of dialogue (*CF 02*).

Both methods, induction ('epagogè') and dialogue ('dialogos'), are ways of taking samples—induction because it addresses an aspect (element, part) from a totality of data, and dialogue because it complements the one-sidedness of the samples taken by each conversation partner. After all, each

of us, each limited group, sees only a part—a sample—of the total reality.

The rule governing Platonism can be read as “Bonum ex integre causa, malum e quocumque defectu” (Good prioritizes totality in its integrity, evil exists whenever anything is lacking in that total integrity).

CF79

Bibl. st.: regarding the major role of stoicheosis (analysis of parameters or factors), see especially *EW Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano)*, Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 34/42 (The second period in Platon's thought); 42/51 (*The theory of so-called 'ideal numbers'*)

GJ de Vries, Plato's image of man , in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos* . 15 (1953): 3, 426/439 (one of the best articles).- So much for the methodological background of the theory of ideas.

Applicative model.

Spring is in full swing. I head out into nature: what do I see? Wild daffodils here and there. Anyone with a bit of Greek mythology in their veins thinks of the myth of Narcissus (*CF 54ff* .): having died—literally—from a lack of life force, he was transformed into a daffodil by the hard goddess of the leveling of misfortunes, Nemesis. That, then, is said to be “the mythical view” of the 'daffodil' phenomenon.

Platon knows the myths and values them, but restrictively (insofar as they are immoral, he rejects them as “more nothing than something” (“me on”) literally: non-being). If necessary, he incorporates a myth into his texts when he has no rational ideas at his disposal, for, even for the so-called 'world-fleeing' Platon, 'ratio' or reason is a typically human aspect of the human soul, indeed to a large extent that which makes him truly human.

However, I move past that mythical wisdom and examine attentively, probing ('theoria'), the structure of the single specimen I hold in my hand here: I observe precisely—akribos—for example, the trumpet-shaped flower. I compare it with a second specimen. And so on.

In my 'nous' (mind), the human concept of 'narcissus' takes shape, which gradually grows into a universal concept encompassing all (possible) narcissuses. That is stoicheiosis as a collection of 'elements' (= specimens, 'images') that all exhibit the common properties of 'the' narcissus (the abstract

concept).

At the same time, I observe that daffodils prefer to occur in groups (e.g., via tuber propagation). Understanding this is stoicheiosis as a system of elements exhibiting coherence.

Conclusion : Stoicheiosis leads to generalization and to generalization. Two complementary forms of totalization or the formation of a concept of 'totality'. That totality in its two forms is the idea (here: 'the' narcissus), insofar as it manifests in our concepts.

CF80

Note the restrictive nature of the last sentence: “insofar as the idea comes through in our concepts”. For the idea is not our concept! It is what makes our concept possible (condition of possibility, 'hypothesis').

I proceed, along with others who pursue the same goal—exploring the wonders of 'fusus', natura, nature—and what do we see? A deformed narcissus! How do we know that it is deformed? Because, with the universal and system-theoretical concept (generalization/generalisation), the successful narcissus (in Platonic terms: “the good narcissus”) has appeared in our mind. If you will: the ideal, perfect narcissus. Our stoicheiosis, or analysis of factors, discovers this as well. That ideal (in this case of the narcissus) is also “the idea” (of the narcissus, for example).

Note well: our understanding of that ideal is not the idea. It is the idea that makes that ideal concept or design possible. Only in this way do value judgments become possible.

In summary: general concept (all (possible) daffodils); system concept (the interconnectedness of all (possible) daffodils); ideal concept (the perfect daffodil)!

Behold what the stoicheiosis of the natural phenomenon 'narcissus' yields for us. We summarize this in the name (onoma, Lat.: 'nomen') 'narcissus'. We summarize this in the abstract concept of “the narcissus”. But the idea is neither of these. Why not? Because the idea is something that has always been at work in natural phenomena prior to any human intervention, namely... as a 'model' in the sense of an example or “exemplary cause” (as was also said in antiquity). Just as one says that a girl “poses” when painting a goddess or

making a statue of a goddess. That is why Plato says that the idea is pre-existing (pre-existent).

Note -- It is therefore a radically misleading method to treat the theory of forms within the theory of concepts (a small part of traditional logic). As *E. De Strycker*, **Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie**, **Antw.**, 1967, 95/100 (**Beensleer**), does: the theory of forms belongs in ontology. Namely, in that part of ontology which deals with the objective reason or ground for the ascertainable fact that universality, systemic coherence, and ideality are present in nature. That reason or ground is something objective, within and yet behind, above, and before the given.

CF81

The one original / the many models.

This time we do not use the term 'model' in the Ancient sense, but in the sense of more recent model theory, namely in the sense of “that which provides information (insight) concerning an original (about which information is sought)”.

When *EW Beth*, **De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde **, 46ff., raises the theme of 'ideal numbers' (a very poor translation would be better as “structuring ideas”), he says, *oc*, 47ff.: “Thus, for example, the ideas. These are incorporeal and precede the bodies. Yet every idea considered in itself is one, but considered in relation to others is many.” We wish to set out something analogous with this.

a. Our inductive journey through 'fusus' (nature) yields us only samples, and our dialogue with the other fellow investigators yields the insight that each of us produces only one perspective—another word for 'sample' (but beloved by Fr. Nietzsche).

b. How could one claim, under those very restrictive conditions, that our concepts, of an inductive-dialogical nature, truly grasp both the (universal and total) totality and the ideality faithfully and completely? Certainly not Socrates and Platon. The faithful and complete representation of the full reality and the full value of something is present only in the idea thereof. For every human approach and beyond that approach.

Conclusion : what nature offers in terms of visible and tangible phenomena—what our concepts offer us (not to mention our terms)—in this

case, a very limited number of daffodils—these are merely models of the original, the idea. That original can easily be the subject (original) in our statements (for it is the unknown), but it becomes difficult when it is used as an adage. Why? Because we have no direct grasp on the idea. We do have that 'grasp' on its models. Platon therefore rightly calls them 'images'. Images of the idea.

The imperfect images.

We saw it just now: “Look, there’s a deformed daffodil!” That can be tragic (a deformed human being, for example). But it can also be comical: think of the clown who 'imitates' the (ideal) human being in a 'deformed' manner (what is an imitation or image that makes one laugh, other than a 'caricature'? The actual models of the ideas are frequently 'caricatures' (N. Gogol').

CF82

Note-- Reread *CF 04v. (The Transcendentals)*. -- The idea is a living illustration of the fourfoldness “being, true, one good”. 'Being' is everything that is reality in any case (non-nothing). 'True' is everything that, within itself or outside itself, has a necessary and preferably sufficient reason or ground (is meaningful, understandable, explainable). 'One' is everything that belongs to one and the same set on the basis of similarity and belongs to one and the same system on the basis of coherence (set and system bring a multiplicity into unity). 'Good' is everything that represents value in any case.

Do you not see that the idea 'being' (here the narcissus sample) makes understandable ('true') by 'fathoming' that being down to the reason or basis of the similarities and connections it exhibits ('one') and down to the reason or basis of its judging capacity in the form of value judgments (succeeded/deformed, for example) ('good')?

As O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 372, states: “Euclid of Megara, of the Megarian-Socratic school, combined Socratic thought with Eleatic 'speculation' (*note*: in the Ancient sense of “probing”) and introduced the connection of the concepts of “being, truth, unity, goodness” - a connection which Platon continued to 'fusion'”.

In the light that shines forth, of the four basic ontological concepts, one understands the theory of Forms even better.

Incidentally : Willmann usually places the emphasis not so much on the

Eleatics (who particularly emphasized the 'one') but on the Paleophythagoreans (who brought unity to multiplicity through the concept of 'structure' ('arithmos') or 'configuration').

From the “ontos on” to the “mè on”.

From that which is truly real (and not apparent real), to that which is nothing rather than something (non-being)! Behold what Platonism has always asserted when it views the actual cosmos and, in particular, actual or 'phenomenal' humanity (theoria). What a number of distorted images, to weep over (tragic) or to laugh over (comic).

How can a Tadeusz (Borowski) maintain, with necessary or sufficient reason or grounds, that Platon 'lied'? He can do this solely either by not even having read Platon (except for a fleeting, easy 'summary'), or by not having read him 'properly'.

CF83

The caricatures.

“The earthly world does not reflect an ideal,” said Tadeusz (Borowski). That, of all things, is precisely a Platonic statement! After all, as *de Vries*, **Plato's Image of Man**, 430, puts it, “all of Platon’s propositions have no more than limited validity.” That is to say: they are restrictive judgments containing reservations. In this case: “The earthly world does reflect an ideal”! The two—one of the many examples of “harmony of opposites”—are somewhat simultaneously true. They are correctives for one another. -- This explains what follows.

Man as a soul situating himself in body, polis, and cosmos.

Cf. CF 01.

a. Cosmic

“Platon describes the two forces he sees in the universe: the nous, rational insight coupled with purpose, and 'anankè', inevitable co-cause which has only negative significance because its irrational existence hinders a perfect formation of the whole—the cosmos—according to a divine model.” Cf. CF 49, where we already mentioned this twofold 'formative' (universe-founding) element.

For more and historically accurate insight, see *A. Rivier, études de littérature grecque (Théâtre/ Poésie lyrique/ Philosophie/ Médecine)*, Geneva,

Droz, 1975, -- on 3/42 (*Eschyle et le tragique*) - e.g. 23: “ *Necessity, Destiny, Fatality* ” -; likewise oc, 139/161 (*A Debate on the Greek Tragedy (The Hero, the 'necessary' and the Gods)*); also oc, 163/194 (*Remarques sur le 'nécessaire' et la 'nécesssite' chez Eschyle*). Anyone who examines these texts by an expert will understand why Plato does not hesitate to incorporate the term 'anankè' (necessity, 'necessity'), along with its entire Aeschylus tragedy, into his thought.

b . Political.

Does it still need to be explained how Socrates, and Platon following in his footsteps, tackled the degeneration of society, for and especially in the typically 'rational' form of that degeneration, namely unscrupulous expertise (emphatically advocated by a number of Sophists)? Cf. *CF 19* (where we touched upon this political aspect). And what is said of the content of his Seventh Letter (where the degeneration of Sicilian society is discussed in unmistakable terms)? What is to be said regarding the death sentence of a noble man like Socrates? The polis where Platon lived was “the painfully heavy, bloody work of man”.

c. Individual.

Need it still be said: the entire Platonic psychology revolves around a tripartite nature, namely “the great monster of lower drives (nightlife, 'diaita' (dwelling, eating, drinking), sex, economy), the lesser lion (the nobler part of the soul that stands or falls with honor and a sense of honor, -- not without the frustrations thereof, such as grief, resentment, anger, etc.) and last but not least the little man (i.e., all that is spirit in the soul).

Do you see the differential “great, less great, small”? That which precisely constitutes the human in man is, in Platonic human experience—people as they actually are, phenomenally, and not as they are designed in vague ideals—the smallest of the three aspects of the soul. Does such a thing not speak volumes? But then again, one must have read Platon... oneself and meditated upon him oneself, so that, instead of meaning-making misconceptions, one attains a grasp of meaning.

Anagogy.-- not katagogy.

'Anagein' is “upward education”; 'katagein' is 'downward education'. In contemporary terms: 'anagoghè' is construction, if necessary through re-foundation and/or actualization; 'katagoghè' is then 'Destruktion' (Heidegger), 'deconstruction' (Derrida), dismantling.

In other words: notwithstanding the stark evidence to the contrary, Socrates and Plato continued to strive for the development in the souls (especially of the young) of all that is higher—particularly of higher ideas such as 'isonomia' (democratic equality) and 'dialogos'—entering into a dialogue with one another to bring the problems, through inductive sampling, a step closer to a solution—if not the ideal one, then at least some feasible one.

That is something different from the constant hammering home of “mondo cane” (dog world)—of nihilistic slogans. What solution to everyday life problems can one derive from the profound pronouncements of a 'destructive' Heidegger? What can one build with “la déconstruction,” which consists of exercising criticism and criticism of the criticism and criticism of the criticism of the first criticism...?

Is that not “regressus in infinitum” (*CF 64*), an endlessly continuing regression into 'negative' (understand: katagogical) thinking? 'Positive' (understand: 'anagogical') thinking is a motto of the New Age. Perhaps the Platonism that we have championed here tooth and nail can contribute a little to this. For the well-being of the coming 'culture'.