

Courses 3-5: Introduction to Hiero Analysis

Location:

3. Courses from 1981 to 1984

3.1. Epistemology 1981-1982 (EP1-EP30, 42p.)

3.2. Interpretation Theory, 1981-1982 (DU1-DU41, 68p.)

3.3. Logic, 1981-1982 (L01-L103, 145p.)

3.4. Methodology, 1981-1982 (ME1-ME15, 25p.)

3.5. Introduction to Hiero-analysis, 1981-1982 (HA1- HA169, 233p.)

3.6. Introduction to Greek Philosophy, 1982-1983 (GW1-GW235, 295p.)

3.7. Introduction to modern-contemporary thought , 83-84, (MHD1-MHD264, 301p.)

Note: This course has been spaced larger than the text of the original course. References in the older version of this text therefore do not correspond to the current 'Word' pagination. For this reason, the original pagination is displayed each time with the letters 'HA'. They stand for 'Hiero-Analysis' and are derived from the old page number.

Introduction: The course 'Introduction to Hiero-analysis' dates from the 1981/1982 academic year. It delves deeper into the mantic and magical aspects of religion and into subtle forces. It is specialized reading. Quite a few technical terms are involved. In a way, however, it is unique because the centric model of the Sacred is explained. Specifically: a clairvoyant person experiences the Sacred as a stream of myriads of small luminous points. It might be advisable to first go through Course 2.2 (Philosophy of Religion, from 1978/1979) and/or Course 4-2 (also titled: 'Introduction to Hiero-analysis', from 1984/1985) before starting with Course 3-6 from 1981/1982.

Courses 3-6: Introduction to Hiero Analysis

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Introduction

The study of religion falls into two types of scientific approaches:

- (a)** the scientific (= positive) method, whether natural or humanistic;
- (b)** the philosophical-theological method.

Father Pinard de la Boullaye shares the study of the differential of:

- 1.** supernatural (= divine),
- 2.** supernatural (= magical, paranormal) and
- 3.** natural (= secular-earthly) aspects of the religion(s) in two layers in:
 - (i) a** the hierography (empirical),

- (i) **b** the hierology (comparative);
- (ii) hierosophy (philosophical-theological).

The study of the *causal (factorial) side* of religious phenomena, which is experimental if necessary, deserves *a separate study*, which we call *hieranalysis*. This aspect of the investigation is the main focus of this course: hence the title.

The study of religion is not so simple. As mentioned above, one can approach it from a scientific, humanistic, or philosophical perspective. This is accessible to everyone. But it can also be done from a paranormal standpoint.

Context: informative philosophy:

(**1.** Epistemology (+ theory of interpretation), **2.** theory of thought, **3.** methodology) allows one to investigate the following major forms of thought (morphologically) over a period of three years.

The archaic (ancient) religion,

the interaction with the 'hieron' (sacred), which has come down to us from pre- and protohistory, still lives on today:

a. in the archaic religions,

especially present, in exotic (including primitive) civilizations, subject of cultural anthropology (ethnology) and primitivology,

b . in the evolved ('higher') religions

(especially Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese universalism, - even more so: Judaism, Christianity, Islam).

Subculturally, the archaic religion still lives on in evolved circles;

a. in folklore and **b .** in initiatory societies.

Religion is a form of thought that:

(i) informative (by knowledge, thinking, method),

(ii)**a.** metaphysical (concerning the preconstitutive aspect of reality) and

(ii)**b.** 'physical' (concerning the constitutive side (= nature) of reality),

(iii)**a.** ethical (concerning individual behavior) and

(iii)**b.** comes to terms politically (socially) with the universe (and nature), with life and society.

(Predominantly Greek) philosophy signifies a strengthening and earthling or secularization of thought: after the archaic (= prehistoric-primitive) cultural phase, in the ancient empires (imperia) with their urban civilization, the 'urbanized' living environment emerges, which gradually, up to the present day, on a planetary scale, replaces the ancient 'natural' environment with the current environment.

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In this, a contact with the world (universe) and life develops, which elaborates the first forms of specialized science; from then on, both natural and human sciences (natural philosophy and (proto)sophistics) increasingly determine the problems and methods of philosophical knowing and thinking life seeking 'wisdom' (the ancient or archaic term for 'familiarity with the 'sacred', but now in an earthly sense alienating from religion (as the saving principal force in life)).

Modern-contemporary exact science, improved by a modern-contemporary understanding of humanity, which displaces, indeed combats, both the archaic and the ancient-medieval sense of life and the universe—in the name of coupling logical-mathematical accuracy with experimental aggression—at times more in the tradition of Galileo and Descartes ('more idealistic') and at other times more in the tradition of Fr. Bacon and Th. Hobbes ('more empiricist'), whereby a human science since Gb. Vico (1668/1744), first philological, then German-idealistic (Hegel), acts either as a corrective or as an extension; life and the universe are now interpreted from that threefold perspective.

Part I. Methodology.

On November 26, 1970, at the State University of Ghent, at the direction of Professors Leo Apostel, Gabriël Sanders, and Roger Thibau, the Centre of Study for Religious Studies was launched within the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, from an “integral and interferential” perspective on “the essential components (of religion, specifically the historical, philosophical, psychological, and sociological aspects” (according to the text of the announcement).

At this faculty, which claims to rely on religious scholars of international renown such as Franz Cumont and Joseph Bidez, the logic of

religious thought, the psychology of religious experience, the religious-historical approach to the religious phenomenon, the sociology of religious experience, and linguistics regarding religion were therefore treated successively, in an 'interdisciplinary spirit', during 1970/1971.

One might speak, with *P. Kurtz*, **Decision and the Condition of Man**, Seattle, 1965, pp. 19/84 (cf. *ME. 2*), of 'the logic of 'coduction', that is, of the systematic gathering together of various specialized sciences, upon seeing this magnificent array of viewpoints.

It is in that same coductive (and neither purely reductionist nor purely holistic-instaurative) spirit that we, here in these simple pages, briefly outline the methodology of hiero-analysis.

Bibliographical sample. - *C. Bleeker*, **Het geheim van de religie **, Wassenaar, 1973, 3, provides an introduction to the history, sociology, psychology and, above all, phenomenology of religion (with a bibliography by both subjects and religions);

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H. Pinard de la Boullaye, SJ, L'étude comparée des religions, Paris, 1929/ 1931.

I Son histoire dans le monde occidental : splendid introductory overview from antiquity;

II Six methods :

a. comparative method, i.e. the comparison, diachronic (across epochs) and synchronic (mutual comparison of contemporaneous religions), of religions and forms of religion, - as a method present in all other methods;

b1. historical,

b2. philological,

b3. older and more recent 'anthropological' (ethnological),

b4 . psychological,

b5. sociological methods;

III (Alphabet Tables):

a small gold mine of personal and object names);

J.-E. Hocking, Les Principes de la Methode en Philosophie Religieuse , in Rev. d. Of. et d. Mor., 29 (1922): 4 (oct - déc), pp. 431/ 453

The author seeks the necessary conditions of possibility regarding the psychological and social role played by religion (psychologism and sociologism concerning religion are insufficient for explanation; the difficulty in explaining the functioning of religion lies in the fact that a part of perception and a part of interpretation are at work).

It should be noted that here we adhere to the pragmaticist method of C.S. Peirce (see *Me.*, 5ff.). This is all the more so since Peirce himself states that (see *Lo.*, 87) it is “very closely connected with Biblical conceptions”; “By their fruits you shall know them!”. We provide a bibliographic sample of the principal methods, but regard them as sub-methods of the one pragmaticist method.

1.1. The phenomenological method.

Library sample:

-- *G. van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie der Religion* , Tübingen, 1956-2. Object (the 'power' or 'the sacred') and subject (the religious person, in the religious community, viewed especially from the perspective of the 'soul') are central, given their interaction with one another (in the external and internal religious act) and in the 'world' (as religious humanity perceives it); pp. 768/798 provide an explanation regarding the method (see *Me.* 12).

-- *PD Chantepie de la Saussaye, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* , 1887, is the first work that, with a strong psychological slant, gave a 'phenomenal description' of religion.

-- *C. Bleeker, The Structure of Religion, The Hague* , sd (presents the main lines of the phenomenology of religion, and this in the Husserlian sense:

a. synchronistic: the essence of the sacred phenomena as 'holy', 'sacrifice', etc., and, also, the 'structure', i.e., the general characteristics of those phenomena;

b. diachronic: the logical progression in the evolution of those phenomena and their structure; as with van der Leeuw, 'intentionality', i.e., the duality of 'object/subject', is central here as well. In doing so, real existence (phenomenological 'reduction' or 'bracketing') and, likewise, the accidental (non-essential) aspects (eidetic reduction) are bracketed, in

order to retain only the 'essential' (the 'eidos' or 'being') insofar as it manifests itself as a phenomenon.

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Phenomenology is therefore not 'belles-lettres', not historiography or psychology, nor philosophy or theology as vd Leeuw, op. cit., 3. 781/788 states, for all those disciplines go beyond the pure description of phenomena.

On the contrary, as J.-P. Sartre says in L. Tas/ H. Bouman , trans./intro., J.-P. Sartre, *Magic and Emotion (Outline of a Theory of Emotional Movements)*, Meppel/ Amsterdam, 1981: “ *The facts are only classifiable and investigateable with the aid of the essences* ”.

For example, one ought first to describe religious phenomena merely as they present themselves (di phenomenologically); only after that descriptive part can 'positive' (i.e., further pursued scientific or philosophical and theological) research begin methodologically clearly.

-- W.Br. Kristensen, *The Meaning of Religion (Lectures in the Phenomenology of Religion)*, The Hague, 1968.

-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' hermeneutique)*, Paris, '1969, pp. 371/486 (*Religion et foi*), gives phenomenology but 'hermeneutic' (see Me, 12ff .), i.e. phenomenon-descriptive with the insertion of sign interpretation and even (Dilthean) 'comprehending' method.

-- F. Ortegat, *Intuition et religion (Le problème existentialiste)*, Louvain/Paris, 1947 (criticism of the 'existential' description of the phenomenon of religion (Sartre, Marcel, Chestov).

-- The purely understanding method can be found in H. Van Straelen, *SVD, Asian Diary*, Voorhout/Bruges, 1959 (see Me. 14/15).

It should be noted that phenomenology, hermeneutics, and the method of understanding overlap to a certain extent.

One more article : J. Brenton Stearns, *Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Models*, in *Intern*, Journal for Phil. of Religion, III: 4 (Winter 1972), pp. 195/211

Indeed, the question is whether in phenomenology (intentional, hermeneutical, understanding) the sacred (God, for example) is grasped immediately, i.e., directly and without any interpretation, or not (see *Du.*, 3ff.). On the other hand: if we do not grasp ('behold') the object in any way immediately or directly, then we cannot, simply put, speak of interpretation, for whoever realizes that he is interpreting proves that, besides his interpretation, he also directly 'grasps' or 'contacts' the thing itself (the object, as it presents itself to consciousness) (albeit amidst interpretations).

1.2. The logical methods .

1.2.1. the logical, respectively the logistic method

Biblical sample : M. Bochenski, *The Logic of Religion* , New York, 1965 (after an introduction on logistics, the author discusses religion primarily as 'discourse', (language) reason (direct and indirect reasoning of the religious person), and its logistic 'Justification' account, in which he proceeds from a differential "irrational leap/ irrational and rational justification/ perfectly rational justification".

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Furthermore, within irrational-rational justification, he distinguishes both direct and indirect justification. With direct justification, one arrives, for example, at a theoretical insight supported by a direct experiential contemplation of the sacred; or at a 'theory of trust' based on direct trust in a sacred person. Indirect justification can rely on deductive and/or reductive reasoning.

Under the 'reductive' justification, he classifies the theory of authority (one is 'religious' on the basis of authority (e.g., the authority of the word of God in the Bible)) and the theory of religious presupposition (whoever does not respect certain sacred facts ('hypothesis') will infallibly fall victim to the consequences of that 'irreligion' (prediction). Which can then be verified (verification).

It is evident that the methodology of Bochenski, **Wijsgerigmethoden in de wetenschap** (see *Lo.*, 6ff .), is applied here; that, furthermore, Lukasiewicz's dichotomy of 'de- and reduction' (*Lo.*, 73/74) is the basis of the indirect classification of the methods.

It is a pity that *Bochenski* says nothing about the theory of insight and so little about the 'blind leap' theory. According to him, it seems that the *theory of insight* “ *does not merit consideration* ” (is not worth investigating). If this is correct, then the religious person possesses no insight (neither sensory nor ideal) into 'holy' or 'sacred' realities. Which, in turn, implies that he is *at the mercy* of the (so-called 'direct') theory of trust: he places his trust in God as 'revealer'—which is surely not possible if one has no 'insight' into God as a reliable revealer.

Or, which implies the same thing, the religious person is entitled to *indirect accountability* , which is also *not possible without a minimum of insight* (direct) . Yet what is 'deduction' or argument from authority in sacred matters without the hypothesis-prediction-verification theory? (Peirce's criticism would be 'cutting' here!)

-- *M. Gluckman, The Logic of African Science and witchcraft*, in J. Jennings/ E. Adamson Hoebel, *Headings in Anthropology* , New York, 1966-2, pp. 246/253, - article related to *Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande of the Sudan*.

-- *G. Frey, Logische Modelle der Tabu-Sprachen* , in *A. Menne et al., Logik und Sprache* , Bern/Munich, 1974, s. 142/158 (both last articles now deal with the so-called lower or natural religions).

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1.2.2. The semiotic or language analytical method.

Library sample:

- *I. Ramsey, Religious Language* , New York, 1957;
- *J. Ladrière, Auto-implicatif and biblical language according to Evans* , in *Tijd-schr. v. Fil.*, 28 (1966): 3 (Sept), pp. 441/494 (on *The Logic of Self-involvement, by Evans*);
- *A. de Jong, A Philosophy of the Word (A Philosophical Study of Religion on Martin Heidegger's View of Language)* , Amsterdam, 1966;
- *L. Monden, SJ, A Language In Which We Understand God* , DDB', 1970. The subtitle ' *On the Gratitude of Christian Faith* ' covers a 'fundamental' theology, conceived phenomenologically; it encompasses a 'faith-based hermeneutics'.

A remark regarding this last book: on pp. 98ff, the author states that the 'myth' dissolves the 'being' towards death (*Heidegger* is in the background with his ' *Sein zum Tode* ' as a characteristic of man) or, in Dutch, being doomed to death, through 'repristination'. This is a kind of 'return' to the mythical primeval time, indicated in religion by the words 'In the beginning' (e.g., "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"), in order to draw fresh strength from it for periodic renewal.

Steller, in this respect like all interpreters of secularizing myths, conceives of such a thing as becoming 'sacred' (meaning: 'unhistorical') in a kind of (otherwise despised) non- or supratemporality, 'outside' of history, as modern thinkers (Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, etc.) conceive of it.

That is one possible (and in my opinion very questionable) interpretation of myth, because it is not magical; whoever detaches the myth from its magical framework condemns himself to such an erroneous interpretation; but more on that in another chapter.

-- *M. Van Esbroeck, Hermeneutique, structuralisme et exégèse (Essai de logique kérygmatische)*, Paris, 1968 (an attempt at reconciliation of Ricoeur and Levi-Strauss by de Lubac's hermeneutics with its four meanings of e.g. the Bible (*Exégèse médiévale* , 4 vols., 191959/963).

-- *Don E. Marietta, Is Talk of God Talk of Anything ?* in *Int. Journal. for Phil. of Religion*, iv:) (Fall 1973), pp. 186/195 (A. Flew, in the wake of the logical empiricist A. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* , New York, 1952).

Ayer claimed that 'theological' statements are fundamentally not real statements (judgments about truth or falsehood), because one can never prove them false (they are formulated in such a way that one cannot 'verify' them).

Consequence: theological statements such as "God loves us like a father" are 'meaningless' (in the logical-empirical sense); the article addresses this.

-- *G. Stanley Kane, God-language and Secular Experience* , in *Int. Journ. f. Phil. of Rel.*, ii: 2 (Summer 1971), pp. 78/95 (deals with *L. Gilkey, Naming the whirlwind (The renewal of God-Language)* , Indianapolis/New York, 1969, a work of 'secular' theology that, starting from logical empiricism,

adapts religion to that logical-empirical conception of language, which, like Ayer above, asserts that religious statements are not seriously verifiable. Consequence: Gilkey, under logical-empirical pressure (language analysis), abandons the traditional conception of God 'as no longer of our time'; the article addresses this.

-- Br. Garside, *Language and the Interpretation of Mystical Experience*, in *Int. Journal. of Phil. of Rel.*, iii:2 (Summer 1972), pp. 93/102. For Garside, 'mysticism' is strikingly similar in all religions and all times. R. Otto and R. Zaehner also agree with this.

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Both of the latter claim that 'mysticism' is not everywhere and always identical to experience, but differs only in interpretation (which depends on the culture in which the mystic—e.g. our Flemish Ruusbroec—lives).

-- J. Bindley, *The Logic of mysticism, in Religious Studies*, 2, pp. 145/162).

-- Very worth reading is J. Harris, jr., *The epistemic status of apologetic language*, in *Int. Journal. for Phil. of Rel.*, I:4 (winter 1970), pp. 211/ 219.

It is asserted, especially in theological circles, that speaking about God analogically is possible (e.g., "God is my shepherd") – cf. Lo, 27/33: "God stands to me as the shepherd stands (to his sheep)", which is proportional analogy (metaphorical speaking).

The author now poses the question: "On what direct (and therefore non-analogical) knowledge does the believer know that God truly behaves towards him as the shepherd does towards his flock? In other words, without a minimum of direct experience of God ('contemplation', as the phenomenologists would say; 'insight', as Bochenski would say), one does not even know whether that 'language-about-God' is correct and corresponds to anything at all. In other words, without 'literal' experience; no analogical language about God."

Conclusion: there are essentially two modes of language analysis, the logical-positive and the 'hermeneutic'. In both variants, one finds critics of religious language (whom they dismiss as "invalid speech" (primarily in the name of specialized science) – reductionists, therefore, to use Kurtz's

terminology) – and instauratives (holists), who engage in language analysis and semiotics with a religious favor.

It should be noted that for the logical positives, logistics always plays a role, whereas for the hermeneuticians, phenomenology (understanding, existential analysis) is the basis. Always the two 'cultures' of P.G. Snow!

1.2.3. The psychological method.

Bibl. sample :

-- W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience (A Study in Human Nature)*, Zeist Arnhem/Antwerp, 1963 (translation of the groundbreaking work *The Varieties of Religious Experience (A Study in Human Nature)*, lectures delivered by the brilliant, pragmatically minded psychologist in Edinburgh in 1902 and 1903. Topics discussed include: the reality of the invisible, religious optimism, illness, conversion, holiness, mysticism, etc. The book is still worth reading.

-- G. St. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, Utr./Antw., 1966 (history of the psychology of religion, theories of religion, depth psychology (Freud, Jung) and religion, religious practices (regarding prayer, worship, religious experience));

-- A. Vergote, *psychologie religieuse*, Bruxelles, 1966 (religious experience, motivation; religious 'desire' and 'father religion'; religious 'attitude, atheism, genetic psychology, (childhood, adolescence));

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-- From 'humanistic', understand: existential, psychology: A. Maurer, *Children's Conceptions of God*, in J. Bugental et al., *Challenges of Humanistic Psychology*, New York, 1967, pp. 173/178 (children's explanations point to a variety of experiences of God: creator, protector, punisher, friend, and combinations thereof).

-- J. Clark, *Toward a Theory and practice of religious experiencing*, in J. Bugental, op. cit., pp. 253/258.

-- In 1974, a journal appeared that, following in the footsteps of the Human Potential Movement (an offshoot of humanist psychology), draws attention to the enormous religious, semi-religious, and pseudo-religious 'groups'; *Question de spiritualité, tradition, littératures* (Paris).

-- For the more theoretical basis: *H. Cohen, *Psychologie als science fiction **, Meppel, 1971, in which the so-called A (altered) S (states) or C (consciousness), the altered states of consciousness that so often coincide with sacred and religious experiences, are briefly indicated (dreams, meditation, hypnosis, psychedelic experiments, etc.).

-- A fascinating and thorough overview is offered by *JM Schiff, *La ruée vers l' âme **, in "Question de sp., tr., litt., No. 10 (Jan-Fev/ 1976), pp. 65/84. The author distinguishes three forms of transgression of the Movement for Human Potential, namely:

- (i) schools for expanding consciousness,
- (ii) a groups for religious-supernatural initiation (initiatory groups),
- (ii) b groups for 'cosmic' consciousness (it should be noted that the distinction between 'religious-paranormal' and 'cosmic' is almost impossible to clearly define.

J. Moreno, one of the fathers of that movement, even states that, given the crisis and the loss of authority of traditional religions, one would do well to speak of the 'cosmic' instead of 'religious' or 'ecclesiastical', which, for him at least, merges with 'therapeutic'. This is because, according to Moreno, traditional religions and churches possessed a sense of misery that far surpasses the narrow interpretation of human problems as viewed by economic liberalism and Soviet socialism—namely, unilaterally 'economic'—an attitude and insight that Moreno deems essential regarding group dynamics.

-- *G. Frei, Magie und Psychologie, in Schweizer Rundschau*, 48:8/9 (Sonderausgabe 'Psychologie'), pp. 680/688 (situates 'magic' i.e. the manipulation of 'subtle' or 'ethereal' or 'etheric-astral' matter (matter particles), psychological rites, on the one hand, the 'gross physical' body (which we all know from biology, for example) and, on the other hand, the 'spiritual' soul peak (i.e. the purely immaterial core of the person, at least in man)).

He adds: "This intermediate layer can also be called the 'unconscious,' and the psychology of the unconscious has also had to concern itself with magical processes, of course."

-- In the same vein, but magically much more thoroughly: *Dr. Geley, L'être subconscient*, Paris, 1899.

-- See: A. De Rochas, *L'extériorisation de la sensibilité* , Paris, 1909-6 (still solid works that rescue 'depth psychology' from the narrowness of the psychoanalysis of Freud and his students (especially Jung).

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-- Two more chapters on the psychology of religion:

(i) *The experience of the 'Holy'*

See Cl. Welker, *Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher* , Leiden/Köln, 1965, especially s. 164/208 (*Ausblick und Zusammenfassender Vergleich mit R. Ottos Anschauungen* .

a . On the one hand, the human-describing method of Schleiermacher and Otto is not a 'psychologism', i.e. a reductionism, which conceives of the sacred merely psychically (e.g. a sense of reverence that 'sacralizes' unholy things and processes, i.e. surrounds them with a veil and delusion of inviolability) (oc, p. 169);

b. On the other hand, “with Otto, just as with Schleiermacher, the question is not asked 'how God, considered in Himself, 'is', (...) but in what way the religious 'mind' responds to Him (...); the question is (...) about the very nature of religious life.” (oc, 185). Which, in turn, is clearly a kind of psychologism.

In his commentary on H. Otto, **Das Heilige (ueber das Irrationale in der idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen **, Munich, sd., (30th edition), M. Meslin, **Pour une science des religions **, Paris, 1973, pp. 68/76, states that Otto's Protestant-Kantian religious sentiment was definitively confirmed in 1911, during his journey in India, where he “was seduced by the Hindu doctrine concerning a salvation not due to 'works' (i.e., the working out of sacred insights in practical life), but to the 'quality' of the 'spiritual' life” (oc, 69).

Furthermore, that Otto acquired in the *Rig-Vedas* and the Upanishads (the oldest religious literature of India) his 'own concept' of the Divine as 'das ganz Andere' (as the wholly other), that something Holy that tolerates

no 'name', no 'predicate' and, thereby, comes to differ fundamentally from the Biblical concept of 'holy' (oc, 69).

In other words: Otto, following in Schleiermacher's footsteps, radically defends an irreducible 'sacred reality' (and is thus a holist), yet in an equally radical psychologizing manner. The objective 'sacred' is in itself unknowable ('knowledge' has no hold on it), yet it is experienced ('lived') in the pious mind in a threefold emotional reaction:

- a/** as terrifying (frightening),
- b/** as fascinans (enchanting) and
- c/** especially as augustum, di as an inherently existing 'value' whereby psychologism is, at the last minute, overcome once again.

(ii) The mystical experience.

See A. Michel: *Plus person pour comprendre les mystiques ?* in *Question de*, No. 2 (1er trim. 1974), pp. 43/56;

R. Ruyer, *La gnose de Princeton (Des savants à la recherche d'une religion)*, Paris. 1974 (a fusion of scientism and vague mysticism in the Eastern style).

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Furthermore: A. Tanquerey, *Précis de théologie ascétique et mystique*, Paris, 1923 - 5 (except for the 'principles', an exposition on the three phases of 'mysticism' in the Catholic sense, namely purification, 'enlightenment', and 'unification')

-- J. Tyciak, *Mörgenländische Mystik*, Dusseldorf, 1945 (mysticism in the 'Orthodox' churches);

-- R. Puligandla/ K. Puhakka, *Holiness in Indian and western Traditions*, in *Int. Journal. f. Phil. of Relig.*, iii:3 (Fall 1972), pp. 191/175 (in India and related 'holiness', otherwise very mystically conceived, is entirely inherent in the Transcendental' (Brahman) and the 'immanent' (Atman").

1. 2.4. The sociological method.

Bibl. sample :

-- L. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*, Paris, 1973, pp. 56/67 (*Sociétés et religion*) from ± 1825, under the influence of A. Comte (1798/1875), the father of sociological positivism, a new science of religion

emerges, which emphasizes the social bonded nature of every religion, at least in its traditional forms.

-- E. Durkheim (1858/1917), *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, 1912, works as a pioneer (although fiercely contested by the 'animists' regarding the origin of religion (Erazzer))

-- L. Lévy-Bruhl (1875/1939), *Les mental functions of inferior societies*, 1910.

-- *id.*, *Le surnaturel et la nature dans la mentalité primitive*, 1931.

-- *id.*, *La mythologie primitive*, 1935. This book provides the first (unconscious) structural analysis of communal life, particularly in the religious sphere (the primitive 'classifies' people and non-human realities according to a system of 'participation' or a kind of identity between the distinct things and processes in nature and in society).

-- M. Mauss (1872/1950), more in the tradition of Durkheim and largely opposed to Lévy-Bruhl, studies the 'totality' of society according to a concept of convergence (see *Lo.*, 57; 66) in a structuralist style: psychology, sociology, ethnology, and historical science all deal in their own way with the same structure that manifests itself in different domains of life: "Just as language, so too does the social fact come to realize itself as an independent whole" (oc, 63).

See also oc, pp. 170/194: *L'analyse structuraliste et le sacré*: myths, symbols, rites (the 'languages' in which man 'expresses' the sacred) are studied 'structurally', as with Lévy-Bruhl and Mauss, yet with due regard for both logistics and systems theory (with a clear residue of sociology, incidentally).

-- Groundbreaking is C.L. Lévy-Strauss, *Anthropologie politique*, Paris, 1958.

-- *id.* *La pensée sauvage*, Paris, 1962.

-- *id.* *Le totémisme aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1962.

-- *id.*, *Mythologiques*, 4 t., Paris, 1964/197.

-- M. Meslin oc pp. 81/112 (*Les données sociales du phénomène religieux*) outlines in another type of sociology of religion, namely the purely positive and separately developed form thereof, at least from a number of viewpoints:

a/ doctrinal formulas, **b/** rites, **c/** organizational forms, **d/** interaction between religious and non-religious forms of society (cf. J. Wach, *Sociology of Religion*, Chicago, 1944); cf. M. Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus*, in Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaft u. Sozialpolitik, 20, 21, 1904/1905, based on a 'taseological' (see Lo., p. 57/59 (tension theory)) view of man and life, studies the relations tss. puritan Calvinism (especially in the USA) and economics.

-- E. Troeltsch, *Die Sociallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, Tübingen, 1912, discusses the relationship between social facts and 'Christian' views on social order;

-- J. Wach (1898/1955) is the first to attempt to establish a sharply defined science of religion within sociology (with three aspects: **a/** hermeneutics, **b/** religious experience, **c/** sociology of religion)

-- G. Le Bras, became known for his typology of 'participation' in the liturgy: aloofness, conformists, seasonal practitioners, regulars, the pious, - present in all surveys.

Bryan Wilson distinguished seven types of 'sect': conversionist (out-converting), revolutionary, pietistic (piety-minded), manipulationist, thaumaturgical (favoring miracles), reformist, utopian.

-- A third main type of sociology of religion is the 'comparatism' of G. Dumézil, *La religion romaine archaïque*, Paris, 1966 ;

-- *id.*, *Mythe et épopée*, 3 t., Paris, 1968/1973.

-- *id.*, *Idées romaines*, Paris, 1969 ;

-- *id.*, *Heurs et malheurs du guerrier*, Paris, 1969.

-- M. Meslin, *Pour une science des rel .*, pp. 156/169, summarizes its main thesis:

a/ comparatism (cf. Lo., 31/33: comparative method based on analogy, the partially identical realities);

b/ tripartite social ideology (cf. Ep., 17/22: critique of ideology): the Indo-European peoples, long before the rise of Rome, betray in their myths, rites, theology, and epics a social tripartiteness:

(i) the magical-legal dominion,

(ii) the physical strength adapted to 'war' and 'armed forces',

(iii) the fertility subjected to the former (as its 'power' source; Rome distinguishes itself from most other Indo-Europeans in that the Roman mentality, out of 'effectiveness', i.e., out of concern to make every human action succeed (ideology of result), places the deities and their strongly

distinct 'roles' (function deities) in a businesslike, indeed, desecrating, service to earthly, purely human activity and its result.

Thus, in Rome, in contrast to what usually happens elsewhere, a rational theology arises that 'sacralizes' class relations, lends them a 'holy semblance', and substitutes, instead of the sacred myth, the desecrated national, epically described ancestors, whom are venerated as paragons of daily, purposeful actions.

HA12

Through an exceptional anthropocentric worldview, unparalleled in the Indo-European world, but sometimes quite similar to the ancient Chinese view, the Latins have attributed the founding of their city, their social, legal, and religious institutions to their own ancestors.

Yet, in this epic of national princely legends, which confines the deities forever in distant solitude, we find the same cultural schemas as in the Indian, Celtic, Germanic, indeed, Greek myths, whose role consists precisely in justifying the rites, customs, and laws.

Thus, Roman religious thought proves to be an anthropology, serving as a model for a broad branch of religious studies. As early as thirty years ago, G. Dumézil drew attention to the fact that the essence of the epic stories of Rome is of a human nature, that the action takes place between people, "in calculated intrigues and precise realizations, comparable to what will later be said about the Scipiones or the Gracchi, about Sulla or Caesar". (M. Meslin, *oc*, pp. 167/168).

Indeed, worldification or secularization (if you will: the humanization and earthling of what the sacred myths offer) is one of the great themes of hierology.

A fourth main type of sociology of religion is the dialectical: M. Meslin, *oc*, 64/68, states that, in 1845, in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, K. Marx wrote down his opinion on the origin of religion.

The starting point is dialectics, i.e., the interaction within the same whole of contradictions, indeed, of antagonisms—see Lo, 20/21 (Hegel's

dialectics)—see also the sharp logical criticism of I. Bochenski, **The Logic of Religion**, New York, 1965, pp. 48/51 (** On dialectics and its use in logic of religion** : the methodological ('suggestive'), psychological, ontological, and semantic scope of 'dialectics'-).

This dialectical method is applied to the systechi 'capitalist exploiter/proletarian exploited' (for the 'systechi' see Lo, 33). Religion, after all, 'knows' the 'misery': "Religious misery (understand: misery as religion interprets it) is, on the one hand, the expression of real misery and, on the other hand, the protest against real misery. Religion is the sigh of the tormented creature, the mind of a heartless world, just as it is the 'spirit' of 'spiritless' conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for its real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions concerning its condition is the demand to give up a condition that requires illusion. The critique of religion is therefore the germ-forming critique of the vale of tears, of which religion is the halo." (*K. Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung*).

HA13

In short: religion, by harboring illusions about its 'redemptive' power, demonstrates that it is aware of the misery, but does not address its socio-economic cause; consequence:

a/ to the possessing class she gives a 'good conscience', by teaching them 'charity' and 'good works' for heavenly salvation (without having to touch the economic foundation of misery);

b/ to the proletariat she promises a prospect 'into another world' (without improving their lot in this secular world).

In summary: religion 'sacralizes' the established social order with its misery.

See also: *P. Schebesta, Origin of Religion*, Tielt/ The Hague, "1962, 197/210 (*The Marxist Answer*); 248/254 (*Bourgeois Evolutionism and Marxism*);

-- *Ch. Wackenheim, La faillite de la religion d'après Karl Marx*, Paris, 1963.

-- *H. Desroche, Marxisme et religions*, Paris, 1962 ;

--- A few more titles: -- *Th. O'Dea, Sociology of Religion* , Utr./Antw., 1968 (functionalist method, -- religious experience, institutionalization, conflicts (secularization), etc.).

-- *H. Bredemeyer/ R. Stephenson, The Analysis of Social Systems* , New York, 1962, pp. 249/275 (*Belief-Systems: Magic and Science* , - an attempt to describe 'magic' in a purely secular manner, without knowledge of paranormal phenomena (which is simply externalism and therefore questionable); pp. 276/317 (*Belief-Systems: religion and Ideology* ; "Religion can, fruitfully, be understood as a mixture of theology, magic, fatalism, morality, activism, and passivity, whereby the emphasis differs from religion to religion." (oc, 316},

-- *R. Robertson, ed., Sociology of Religion* , Harmondsworth, 1971-2 (twenty-five articles by specialists, covering a rich array of sociologically viewed subjects concerning both the 'lower' nature religions and the 'higher' ones).

-- *Fr. Hsu, Clan, Caste and Club, New York* , 1963 (the hypothesis of the book: the Chinese family (f.) is situation-oriented, Hindu society is otherworldly-centered, American society individual-oriented; - a fascinating study of society in the three major cultures)

-- A word about education in this context: one work: *J. Butler, Four Philosophies and their Practice in Education and Religion* , New York, 1968, 3, (naturalism, idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism and language-analytic philosophy each educate in a different way and, at the same time, have a different attitude in the field of religion.

We have, hitherto, seen these tendencies at work in all the previous methods as invisible determinants; – everyone's method covers an ideology, every social system likewise, structuralism, notwithstanding its critique of ideology, too.

HA14

1.2.5. The 'biological-pathological methods'.

Bibliographic sample:

-- *H. Pinard dl Boullaye, L'étude comp., I (son histoire)* , pp. 459, 465) (this method aligns itself with the 'experimental psychology' of the past century, which was strongly psycho-physiological (cf. oc, pp. 450/456), as well as strongly medical-psychiatric, - something that continues to this day:

(a) comparatism (a comparative study between Religious (mystical) and profane, especially pathological pheromones),

(b) reductionism (see *Me. 2: Kurtz*) (although Christian mystics are not scrupulants, aboelics (willless), or 'impulsives' of a morbid nature, nor are they hysterics, although hysteria may be involved, Leuba is nevertheless of the opinion that the 'faces' (visions) and the 'supernatural words' (which they hear), psychologically speaking, are merely visual or auditory hallucinations (deceptive perceptions) and that their 'raptures' (ecstasies) are merely a form of unconsciousness, characterized by a-ideism, perceiving 'nothing', which, according to Leuba, is the same as perceiving the 'Divine Nothing' (= the 'Absolutely Indeterminate').

All these 'religious' or 'mystical' phenomena spring from the needs of the organism, whereupon he notes that “our mystics, varying in degree, are 'erotomaniacs' (who have a strong degree of need for erotic satisfaction), – that they have a need for the solution of their questions, posed to them by their thinking, either by a creation or by deduction of the data, – that they have a need to 'feel loved' or for 'fellow humanity'.

In the *Rev. Phil.*, 1902 (Liv), p. 35, Leuba writes: “The fact of religion implies the presence of needs and desires: need for food, desire for power, need for dignity, etc. But there are no religious needs or desires in themselves. A need becomes 'religious' (...), when its alleviation is conceived as dependent on a force of a psychic nature, which is, usually, personal”.

Which indicates that Leuba, like many to this day, interprets religion emotionallyistically and reduces 'emotions' to biological needs. Talk about reductionism!

Note : This does not mean that the experimental method is not entirely recommendable for hiero-analysis – quite the contrary.

One need only read, for example, a booklet such as *H. Cohen, *Psychologie als science fiction (Nieuwe vinden over dromen, meditation, hypnose en LSD)**, Meppel, 1971, in which several experimental natural scientific methods are briefly mentioned, but in a holistic-instaurative (i.e., non-reducible) sense.

Contemporary biology possesses sophisticated methods that are valid to a certain extent. It is not biology (as a method), but biologism (as an ideology) that is wrong.

HA15

Note- Br. Walinowski, *Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, Paris, 1968 (Eng.: *A Scientific Theory of Culture*, 1944), pp. 66/73, discusses the 'biological foundations' (Malinowski calls this 'human nature'—which is understanding 'nature' in the very narrow sense) of culture:

“By 'human nature' I understand biological determinism (compelling behavior) that obliges every civilization and every individual to engage with somatic (= bodily) 'functions' such as breathing, sleep, rest, nutrition, bowel movements, and reproduction.”

That religious culture and the individual must 'submit' to all these 'determinisms' or 'functions' is clear; yet religion consists, among other things, in overcoming precisely these 'determinisms' if necessary, or in treating them as an expression of religious experiences: there are magicians and saints who, from the perspective of all those biological functions, differ greatly from the ordinary mortal. They can do without food; they can overcome sleep; their breathing reflects their current 'religious' state, etc. (Or consider shamanism in Siberia with its distinct 'somatic-biological' phenomena).

Leuba et al. latch onto pathological phenomena (hence the 'medical or doctor materialism' as William James once sharply put it); moreover: they sin against any sense of system or coherence: even pathological phenomena belong within the whole of the religious person (magician, mystic, shaman) who exhibits them.

It is a false comparatism to posit these phenomena as completely identical in the insane or nervous, on the one hand, and magicians, mystics, or shamans, on the other.

“The confusion between partial identity and total identity (see *Lo.* 27 (analog ordering of data)), stemming from the fact that (these specialists) detail is compared with detail instead of whole with whole.” That is the fundamental methodological error here. (Pinard, oc, p. 455).

The detail that a madman does not eat is not the detail that Jesus did not eat for forty days in the desert: the same detail belongs in a different system! That detail therefore has a partially different meaning (even if there is a partially identical meaning). This fundamental error, however, is only exposed if one starts from structures—that elements provided with a collective coherence—instead of elements. Sound systems theory, therefore!

1.2.6. The culturological method.

Since Kolb and Klemm each published their cultural histories in 1843, a general concept of culture, stripped of any 'humanistic-elitist' meaning, has emerged: it includes not only the 'higher' (humane) activities (art, science, philosophy, etc.), but also the 'lower' or 'common' (vulgar) ones (such as agriculture, technology, etc.).

HA16

Cf. *J. Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture*, Amsterdam, 1960, pp. 55/103 (Culture);

-- *H. Pinard, Et. comp., I, pp. 419/444 (Le mouvement historique en ethnologie* - the cultural-historical method, whether diffusionist (diffusion norm) or convergent (confluence method) in England, France, Germany (Kölner Schule: Gräbner, Ankermann), Austria (Wiener Schule: Schmidt, Koppers), Spain, USA (Fr. Boas, Wissler, Swanton, Lowie, Kroeber, Goldenweiser));

-- *Bronislaw Malinowski, Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, Paris, 1968 (Eng.: 1944), starts from J.G. Frazer, the founder of (cultural) anthropology, which he interprets in a 'functionalist' sense. 'Function' is “the relief of a need by means of an activity in which people act collectively, handle objects, and consume goods” (oc, 38).

Well, in order to act in this way, man needs an organization: the elementary form of organization is 'institution'. Consequently, the functional (need-satisfaction) side and the institutional side constitute culture (oc, 39). Culture arises where, through institutions, needs are satisfied with a view to life and survival.

Compare with A. Friedrich, *Die Forschungen über das frühzeitliche Jäger-tum*, in *Paideuma*, II (1941/43), S. 20/43

-- Also in C.A. Schmitz, *Religionethnologie*, Frankf. a. M., 1964, p. 206: "Culture is, reduced to a rough formula, the sum of all expressions of life of a people"

The concept of 'culture' was particularly thematized by the Culturalist school in the USA: S. Clapier Valladon, *Panorama du culturalisme*, Paris, 1976.

Culturalism originates with Fr. Boas and Edw. Sapir and focuses primarily on the differences between various cultures (pluralism), viewing them through a strongly psychological, indeed, psychoanalytic lens. It is referred to as 'personalism' or the psychological method and holism, in the sense of Malinowski (culture is always a whole).

In this respect, the American culturalist resembles M. Mauss ('le fait social total') and the structuralist Lévi-Strauss ('Social life is a system, the aspects of which are organically connected'), and relies, at least in part, on K. Lewin (field theory of social life).

Ruth Benedict, Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, and Margaret Mead are the four great figures of Culturalism;

-- Cf. R. Linton, *The Study of Man*, New York, 1936.

-- id., *The Cultural Background of Personality*, London, 1947-1 (society, personality and culture are one tripartite entity).

-- A. Kroeber/ Cl. Kluckhohn, *Culture (A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions)* Cambridge (Mass.), 1952, is a milestone.

-- Z. Barbu, *Society, Culture and Personality*, Utr./Antw., 1971, is conceived analogously.

HA17

Culturalism, whether diffusionist or psycho-cultural, is less sociological than the functionalism of a Radcliffe-Brown. Furthermore, regarding cultural analysis, it should be noted that a distinction can be made between two tendencies:

(a) the rather quantitative-meticulous analysis, which piles up an enormous amount of detail (evolutionism regarding culture, especially American diffusionism, part of functionalism);

(b) the more qualitative-holistic analysis that takes a clearer approach (E. Sapir, Malinowski's functionalism, the psycho-cultural or (as briefly outlined above) 'culturalist' school in the USA (and elsewhere), (cultural) dynamism (since World War II, focusing primarily on the dynamic side of culture, which manifests itself in changes, conflicts, and tensions), structuralism (in its own way)).

'Culture' can essentially be defined as the collection and system of ways of thinking (ideas) and ways of behaving (norms) that 'inform' (i.e., enlighten and guide) the way of life of a particular group (= sociological side) and, for the members of that group, become visible in exemplary personalities (psychological side); 'folk culture' is then the same, but limited to those members (and subgroups) who grasp only the essentials (e.g., post-school youth, common people).

The method of the history of ideas starts from a part of the overall culture: it does not lose itself in individual facts, but focuses on the founding ('informing') ideas, whether particular (period ideas: cosmopolitanism in the 18th century; the Christian state in the Middle Ages; Spirit and soul in archaic culture; technocracy today) or general (the idea of 'community', 'redemption', 'freedom', etc.).

This method coincides with the problem-historical approach, which focuses on the problems that culturally dominate either an era or the entire history (e.g., the current economic crisis, decolonization). It is overwhelmingly evident that the culturological method is applicable to religion.

“After everything that has already been said, can it still be surprising that a certain similarity exists even between the ethical-religious sphere and the actual material-economic conditions? (...).

Day after day, we do not cease the complaints regarding the fatal moral-religious effects inherent in the modern capitalist economic condition and the resulting economic hardships. Does one not, then, possess a priori a reason in this case as well to assume something similar for the earlier stages of human cultural development?

Which further investigation quickly makes indubitable" (*J. Koppers, Die materialwirtschaftliche Seite der Kulturentwicklung* , in *Settiuana Internazionale di Etnologia Religiosa* , Paris, 1926, S 102/116 (S. 110), where steller, building on E. Grosse (1862/1927) and on W. Schmidt, on nuanced (certainly not Marxist or Marxizing) way states that "economic activity constitutes the life center of every cultural whole and, in the most profound and irresistible way, conditions the other cultural factors." (*E. Grosse, Die Anfänge der Kunst* , Freiburg i.Br., 1894; also *E. Grosse, Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der wirthschaft*, Fr. i. Br. 1896.

This is called the 'Grosse' principle; in which Koppers sees a valuable heuristic principle (ac, 105)). This implies the principle of 'correspondence', the attunement of the 'forms' of culture (the economic form 'corresponds' with the other 'forms, art forms, family forms, etc. (ac, 107).

We will further establish this 'structurism', i.e., this form of paying attention to the formative coherence of the distinct cultural forms, without having to resort to Marxism or structuralism, whose ideology we do not accept (Marxism: economic determinism; structuralism; logistic relativism).

Applications: *Th. Ziegler, *Velddienst en religieen **, Amsterdam, 1918, deals with, in addition to typically religious phenomena such as the 'spiritual ground' of religion, religious feeling, religious conceptions, religious faith, also **(i)** believing and knowing, **(ii)** religion and art , **(iii)** religion and morality, **(iv)** church and state, etc.;

G. Gordh, Christian Faith and its cultural Expression, Pentice-hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1962, discusses:

- (i)** the fundamental insights regarding creation, humanity, redemption,
- (ii)** the attitudes of man towards nature, fellow man (individual and group) and himself,
- (iii)** the expressions of both (insight and attitude) in individual and collective worship, in art (in architecture), poetry, 'action', etc.

Both works discuss the coherence of cultural forms, but in such a way that they are 'expressions' of religion—rather than that the other cultural forms express themselves in religion.

A series of ethnological insights that show the opposite relationship, namely that non-religious (primarily economic) cultural forms act upon the religious form.

*L. Lévy-Bruhl, *les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures**, Paris, 1912, discusses not the individual but the collective 'representations' of the 'primitives', which only become understandable if one proceeds from a single axiom, 'la loi de participation' (the law of participation); Lévy-Bruhl relies on *K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentralbrasiliens**, and on *Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia**, London, 1899.

HA19

Von den Steinen was greatly surprised when the Bororos 'cool-bloodedly' informed him that they 'were' macaws and the Trumais that they 'were' aquatic animals.

This concerns the (what is called Lévi-Bruhl) 'mystical' (sacral-hidden) partial identity between the individual, the living man or woman, and

(i) one or another ancestor, who was either human or half-human 'in the beginning',

(ii) as well as some animal or plant that are 'totems' of the tribe or the individual; in other words, totem, ancestor and living human share in each other's essence; they 'participate' in one common 'being' of a mysterious nature.

It is evident that the cultural form—specifically the economic cultural form—plays a decisive role here, as Grosse's principle of correspondence provides, in the emergence of religion in its totemism (totem worship) and pro(to)gonism (ancestor worship, manism).

One need only consult *C.A. Schmitz, *Religionethnologie**, *Frankfurt am,* 1964, to establish that virtually all articles link one or another (strongly economically determined) form of culture in direct connection with a form of religion.

-- **a/** *W. Schmidt, Natur, Eigenschaften und Kult des Hochgottes der Urkultur*, in oc, pp. 65/84: a sort of 'Highest Being' or 'Supreme Being'

(endowed with eternal existence, omniscience, goodness, moral excellence, omnipotence, creative power) is assumed by extremely archaic cultures (such as those of most Pygmies, of the Fuegians, of the primeval Bushmen, of the Kurnai, Kulin, and Yuin in Southeast Australia, of most Arctic peoples (except the Koryaks), of most indigenous populations of North America).

--**b/** A. Jensen, *Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit* , in oc, 85/118: the Supreme Being (as Lang and Schmidt saw it) goes into hiding during a period which Jensen designates as the 'early' or 'old' planter culture, to make way, at least partially, for the 'dema', i.e. the ancestor with creative power, who, at the end of the mythical primeval age, is killed to 'rise' in the plants (often tubers or trees) and thus become a 'bringer of salvation' (culture hero) for the later common people.

“We are convinced that the demas of the old planters, much later, experienced a resurrection in the polytheistic religions of the archaic high cultures.” (ac, 116). Whereas, according to Jensen, the later culture of grain farmers and livestock breeders (on a large scale) again shows a return to the worship of 'Highest Beings', possibly mixed with dema views (ac, 90). By 'early planters', Jensen understands a form of culture widespread across almost all tropical regions, in which **a/** tuber cultivation (based on slash-and-burn) and **b/** the consumption of tree fruits form the basis of the economic system.

HA20

They do not yet know the later fertilization and plowing, large-scale livestock farming and megaliths (and presumably grain cultivation). We are dealing here with the oldest form of tropical plantation.” The bearers of this culture agree not only in important aspects of material culture, but also, and precisely, in important aspects of spiritual culture.” (ac, 92).

As examples, Jensen cites the Wemale (Ceram, Indonesia), the Narind-Anim and the Kiwai (South Coast of New Guinea), the Uitoto (South America), the Southern Californian Indians (North America), as well as Melanesian (South Pacific) and Central African peoples. Time and again, the supreme being withdraws ('deus otiosus'), and the spirits and ancestors (spirit worship and progenism) come to the forefront with the demas, which

clearly distinguish themselves from spirits and ancestors through their edifying creative power through death (if necessary, human sacrifice, headhunting, and cannibalism), sexual rites, and eating rites.

-- **c/** A. Friedrich, *Die Forschung über das frühzeitliche Jägertum*, in oc, S. 196/ 218: already Leo Fobenius, *Die reifere Menschheit*, Hannover, 1902, and *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*, Zürich, 1933, established a similarity (comparative method) in some detail between **a/** the prehistoric data **b/** the Siberian and **African** hunting culture and religion, namely in the worship of the large hunting animal.

Friedrich states that “the idea of an archaic cultural community extending over all continents” imposes itself (ac 217). A number of historical facts, which show similarities down to the details, point to a vast cultural sphere, which, in later times, was differentiated by other cultural factors, in order to by the ancestor worship (progonism) flourishing in more southerly regions.

Thus, for example, the vampire (soul-eater) is known in Siberia and in Africa; however, in Africa this is understood as 'subachistic', that is, interwoven with ancestral belief (not in Siberia); but North Asians and Africans, insofar as they are hunters, proceed from:

a/ the 'participation' (partial identity in a fluid realm) between man (individual and kin) and animal,

b/ the common origin and the parallel course of life of man and animal,

c/ the reincarnation of the (hunted) animal from its skeleton (soul) and soul.

-- M. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions (Morphologie du sacré)*, Paris, 1953, pp. 211/231: the title ' *The Earth, Women, Fertility* ' reveals the connection between agricultural fertility (both arable farming and livestock farming) and women. “It is readily accepted that agriculture was a female discovery. (...) The woman (...), aided in this by her sense of observation, which is limited but keen, had the opportunity to investigate the natural phenomena of sowing and germination and to reproduce them artificially.

HA21

On the other hand, by the fact that she was in solidarity with the other centers of cosmic fertility, namely the Earth and the Moon, woman, in turn, acquired the prestige of being able to influence fertility and to distribute it.

This explains the predominant role that women played at the beginning of agriculture—namely, at the time when this technique was still the work of women—a role that they still play in certain civilizations (cf. *U. Pestalozza, L'aratro e la donna*, p. 324, in *Rendiconti, Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Cl. di Lettere*, 76: 2 (1942-1943), pp. 321/330).

Thus, in Uganda, a barren woman is considered a danger to the vegetable garden; her husband may request a divorce solely on this economic ground (*Briffaut, The Mothers*, London, 1927, III, 55).

One encounters the same belief regarding the danger of female infertility for agriculture in the Bhamar tribe in India (*Lévy-Bruhl, L'expérience mystique*, 254). “(oc, 225).

Apparently, the planted 'participates' in the life force of the planter, the woman. Economic form and religious form go hand in hand, according to Grosse's principle. The structure, not the detail torn from its framework (system), provides insight, according to the school of Grosse, Schmidt, and Koppers.

- RF Wallace, *Revitalizationsbewegungen*, in CA. Schmitz, *Religionethnologie*, Frankf. aM, 1964, pp. 404/427 (American Anthropologist, 58 (1956), pp. 264/281): 'nativist' movements (i.e., movements that seek to revive or perpetuate certain aspects of a culture (cf. R. Linton, *Nativistische Bewegungen*, in C.A. Schmitz, oc, pp. 390/403 in American Anthropologist, 45 (1943), pp. 230/242), 'reform movements', 'cargo cult', religious 'revival' (réveil), 'messianic movement', 'utopian community', 'sect formation', 'mass movement', 'revolution' (e.g., the Jesus Revolution in the sixties), 'charismatic movement', Pentecostal movement), etc., are forms of revitalization movements.

Thousands of (ancient and) contemporary such movements characterize 'neo-sacralism' (renewal of ancient sacred religions), as can be seen in all world religions: one need only think of L. Rochedieu, *Der

*Schintoismus und die neuen Religionen Japans** , Geneva, 1973 (especially pp. 209/247, where the characteristics of the new religions are discussed).

'Revitalization' is a considered, organized, and conscious attempt by members of a society to build a more satisfying culture, which takes place abruptly and over a short period of time. R. Linton's 'magical' nativisms fall partially under this.

HA22

Its members believe that, by acting like all their ancestors (in a past culture), they are rectifying the current situation, thereby signifying a restoration of the 'good times' of their ancestors (revitalizing), or continuing the existing good culture (perpetuating).

Messianic and Millennarist movements can be interpreted as follows: the extra- and supernatural play a major role in them, as in the nativists; yet, in the nativists, the 'good' future is conceived according to a past model (ac ,393).

Bibl. Sample:

-- *J. Needleman, The New Religions* , Amsterdam, 1975 (Californian Zen, Meher Baba, Subud, Transcendental Meditation and other Eastern forms of religion that characterize the counterculture);

-- *A. Pollak-Eltz, Afro-American Religions and Cults* , Roermond, 1970 (Candomblé, Batuque, Xango, Macumba, Pagelança, Catimbo, Umbanda, - in Brazil; Shango, Shouteribaptism, Myalism, Obeah, Convince, Vodún, Santeria, in the Antilles; Maria-Lionza, - in Venezuela; Surinamese religions) are two books that provide insight into 'revitalization religions' in both Americas, where either the East or Africa functions as a source of revitalization to escape the unbearable pressure of modern Western society.

Here too, in Western Europe, these 'way-out' holds an undeniable appeal. Religious people seek, within our cultural framework, to find a form of religion that provides viability where the established churches apparently cannot (or do not sufficiently) do so (or even realize).

Always the Grand Principle, elaborated by Schmidt and Koppers: the structure of culture acts upon that of religion and vice versa.

See also: J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals (Readings in Religious Beliefs and Practices)* , Austin/London, 1967, especially from pp. 307 ff. (On L. Mair, *Independent Religious Movements in Three Continents* , in which the author discusses the Spirit Dance of the Indians of NW America, the 'cargo' cults of peoples in Melanesia, and Bantu reinterpretations of missionary Christianity—which points to the continental vitality of religions).

Bibliographical sample : the reports of the international week for religious ethnology in Mödling (1920), Tilburg (1922), Trier (1923), Milan (1925) and later remain fascinating for Catholics.

It should be noted that, in Milan, the Archbishop himself, Cardinal Tosi, advocated for a science of religions practiced by Catholics; that His Holiness Pope Pius XI himself insisted (Mödling (Vienna) in 1923) that the Week take place in Milan, which had been underway since 1911.

And also that 'field research' (Philippines (Negritos), Rwanda (Pygmies), Malacca (Semang and Senoi Pygmies), Sumatra (Kubus)) was carried out by specialists, with the Pope himself providing assistance to make it possible.

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“They are human documents that must not be allowed to perish,” said His Holiness the Pope to Father W. Schmidt in connection with the Vatican Mission Exhibition (cf. G. Schmidt, *Travaux faits et travaux à faire* , in *Settimana Internazionale di Etnologia Religiosa, IVa Sessione* , Paris, 1926, p. 28).

The Catholics themselves have not always demonstrated such open-mindedness! Ethnology or cultural anthropology provides us, from a religious studies perspective, with an enormous mass of data, from which a few samples:

-- A. Lefèvre, *La religion* , Paris, 1921 (this outdated yet still clear and orderly work by an atheist provides an overview of the theories preceding him and divides the aspects of religion as follows: zoolatry (animal worship), phytolatry (plant worship), litholatry (stone worship), hydrolatry (water and

spring worship), pyrolatry (fire worship), - procreation worship ('culte de la génération': sexual forms of religion), - animism (soul religion and worship of spirits and ancestors), atmosphere god worship (worship of rain, wind, thunderstorms, and lightning gods), astrolatry (sun, moon, constellation religion), cosmic god worship (with its mythologies: heaven and earth, Titans), - conceptual deification (hypostatization of abstract ideas into 'divine' beings, sacred history, symbolism), - liturgy (priesthood, sacrifice, prayer).

From this abundant material, the proposer draws the following definition of religion: "Religion is an illusion that sees intentions, volitional decisions, and persons in:

- a/** the things, the beings and the phenomena of nature and
- b/** in the visions, the deeds, the faculties and the concepts of man (oc, p. 570). It is evident that the author is a scientist and assumes that religion disappears as science increases).

-- C. Welter, *les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Precisely on Paleopsychology)*, Paris, 1960 (this fine little book is a primitivology with an eye for superstitions (evidence) in our cultures: thought, social order, religious beliefs (animism, magic, tabooism, blood religion, totemism, fetishism, divination, number religion) and folklore of the primitives are neatly set out with much factual material).

-- W. Howells, *The Religion of Primitive Peoples*, Utr./Antw. 1963 (of the same nature as Welter, but less folkloric),

-- P. Schebesta, *Origin of Religion*, Tielt/ The Hague, 1962 (a broadly conceived overview, presented by various specialists, of phenomena (God, gods, magic, animism, manism, fetishism, shamanism, totemism) and expressions (faith, worship, prayer, sacrifice, myth) of religion, as well as of the theories concerning the origin and evolution of religion.

This is in the spirit of the Viennese school of W. Schmidt: the definition here is: "Religion is a conscious, actual recognition of an absolute (sacred) reality, on which man knows himself to be existentially dependent". (oc, 51).

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In the field of anthologies:

-- CA Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Frankfurt, 1964 (seventeen specialists deal with basic themes from the cultural anthropology of religion: animism (N. Söderblom), 'share' ('participation': L. Lévi-Bruhl), dynamism (belief in power: G. van der Leeuw), belief in the Supreme Being (several times, against the author, called 'primordial monotheism': W. Schmidt), demon deity (A. Jensen), myth (K. Preuss), saga (Cl. Lévi-Strauss), hunter religion (A. Friedrich), cult totemism (H. Petri), concept of the soul and death (I. Paulson), shamanism (L. Vajda, D. Schröder), death magic (CA. Schmitz), rites of passage (A. van Gennep), nativism (R. Linton), revitalization (R. Wallace).

Incidentally: as a definition of religion, C.A. Schmitz gives: "Religion is the sum of all representations and actions that ought to be understood as a response to the 'numinous' experience" (oc, 1). This refers to H. Otto: the 'sacred' is the numen, numinosum).

-- J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals (Readings in Religious Beliefs and Practices)*, Austin/London, 1967 (sixteen specialists from the Anglo-Saxon world on religion).

Note: the introducer states that there are two periods in the ethnology of religion:

a/ The first, primarily psychological (Tylor, Frazer, Müller) or sociological (Durkheim, Robertson Smith, Mauss, Lévy-Bruhl), which ended with the fieldwork of Radcliffe-Brown (Andaman Islanders) and Malinowski (Trobriand Islanders).

b/ The second was set in motion a few years ago, characterized by a 'strict sociological method' (some of its texts are included in the anthology). The work has been supplemented by *Myth and Cosmos* and *Witchcraft and Curing*; --

-- M. Augé, prés., *Anthropologie religieuse (Les dieux et les rites)*, Paris, 1974. A translation of ten of the sixteen articles from Middleton's anthology, with a typically French critical discussion of the shortcomings of the English work (Middleton wants to thematize 'problems' but only reaches themes; which leads Augé to the criticism of the theories concerning magic as an example:

a / the speculative or mirror theory (the social system reflects itself in the 'speaking' about magic),

b/ the culturalist (psycho-cultural: the magic of one group serves as a reflection of the socio-economic order, but is strongly psychologizing),

c/ the (hyper)functionalist (the magic has as a 'function' to bring the members of a group to respect for community norms, e.g.

-- In the field of theories and methods; *W. Schmidt, Origine et évolution de la religion*, Paris, 1931 (brilliant overview by the leader of the Viennese school).

-- *M. Meslin, Pour une science des religions*, Paris, '1973 (supplements Schmidt, as well as *Pinard de la Boullaye, L'étude comp. d. rel., II* (Ses methods), Paris, 1925).

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-- Another remark regarding the structural method: *Cl. Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie structurale*, Paris, 1958 (especially pp. 181/266: *Magie et religion*, concerning the sorcerer and his magic; the 'symbolic' efficacy (explanation of the psychosomatic-psychoanalytic nature of magic, mixed with logistic structural analysis); structure of the myths (with a linguistic basis); - in discussion of Lévi-Strauss.

-- *J. Broekman, Structuralism* (Moscow-Prague-Paris), Amsterdam, 1973, pp. 122/129 (anthropology of L.-Str.).

-- *Rodney Needham, Structure and Sentiment (A Test Case in Social Anthropology)*, Chicago/London, '1962 (a critique by G. Homans/D. Schneider, *Marriage, Authority and Final Causes (A Study of Unilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage)*, Glencoe, Ill, 1955, which is itself a critique by *Cl. Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, Paris, 1949,-methodological).

-- A remark on psychoanalysis regarding ethnology (of religion, among others): *Géza Roheim, Psychanalyse et anthropologie (Culture- Personnalité-inconscient)*, Paris, 1967 (in which the culturalists, pluralistic as they are, emphasize the distinction between cultures (religions), Roheim emphasizes the comparison of isolated details present in different cultures (religions

(om psychanalyse de la culture australienne (oc, pp. 74/193)). In this he claims to be just as much a Freudian as the culturalists).

-- Regarding nature religion (not to be confused with 'natural' (dirational) religion of the freethinkers): *K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion**, Zurich, 1954 (the theme, religion based, since Herder (1771 ff.) and Schleiermacher (1799), on the vitalism of Romanticism, viewed from a biblical standpoint, — however, in such a way that an appreciative, rather than contemptuous, attitude is adopted; which opens the way, from Biblical theology, to a positive appreciation of the nature religions, so numerous in all peoples and their culture).

1.3. The historical method.

-- *H. Pinard dl Boullaye, L' etude comparée des rel., II (Ses methodes)*, Paris, 1929- 3, pp. 88/152 (*Methodes historique*), says, after having praised the comparative method as obviously useful—we will return to comparatism later—that “it presupposes an exact knowledge of the facts concerning every religion”,—“that establishing those facts is the actual task of historiography” (oc, 88).

The author sees the beginning of the scientific approach to the history of religion in *Otfried Müller, *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie**, Göttingen, 1825: the sense of the complexity of the data and the meticulous objectivity regarding religion is a very recent phenomenon (oc,151). 'Historical documents' are more than texts, traditions, archaeological monuments:

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(i) the philological method studies, since J. Grimm, Max Müller (following in the footsteps of Adalbert Kuhn), the witness remnants in the language of religious facts from the (deepest) past ('nature mythological school'), in order to, on the basis of often doubtful etymologies (one example: the Latin 'religio' comes from re-lego, I respectfully and meticulously (theosebeia), as opposed to neg-ligo, I neglect; the derivation from re-linguo (I make reservations), re-eligo (I choose again, - thus S. Augustine), re-ligo (I bind) is in each case linguistically incorrect);-- cf. Pinard, oc, pp. 153/194; *W. Schmidt, Origine* , pp. 559/64;

(ii) the 'anthropological' (meaning: cultural anthropological or ethnological) method studies the witness remains, such as those found among non-Western peoples, the 'savages' (as they were once called), the 'native peoples': here the cultural and historical methods partially overlap, of course; Pinard clearly sees two periods emerging:

(ii)a. Evolutionary ethnology is based on two axioms:

a/ culture (and immediately religion) evolves from the imperfect (savage) to the perfect (civilized),

b/ that cultural and religious evolution is uniform and strictly lawful (Pinard, *oc*, pp. 195/242 (*Methode anthropologique ancienne*)); however, criticism arose because this method proceeded arbitrarily, disregarded the difference (non-uniformity) between the many cultures and religions, and underestimated the exchanges between cultures and religions.

(ii)b. The 'new' anthropology initially called itself 'historical' ethnology, because, instead of evolutionary schemas, it applied the cultural-historical method (see above p. 16 (Pinard, *oc*, 243/304 (*Methode anthropologique nouvelle*))), in which 'history' was central instead of evolution; the axioms are:

a/ Positive study, excluding any a prioriism (ideology);

b/ comparatism, seeking similarities regarding rites, ideas, etc.;

c/ historical study, based on the convergence method (which sees what is previously divergent eventually converge (see *Lo.*, 57; 66 (convergence of indications pointing in the same direction, although from different angles)).

In this way, the witness remnants or superstitions of earlier religions are reached in the cultures and religions of today;

(iii) The folkloristic or folkloric (laographical) method studies inherited beliefs, institutions, and customs among 'ordinary people' (or, if necessary, among educated people, of course), which, dating from an earlier period, have nevertheless persisted relatively unchanged, notwithstanding the new cultural context;

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The word 'folklore' was first introduced into English by W. Thoms (pseudonym: Ambrose Merton) in a letter in *Athenaeum*, 1846 (August); the

interest in unchanged superstitions (witness accounts) is very old: Herodotus already had an eye for it; J. and W. Grimm, in Germany, as well as *Mannhardt* (one need only think of his * *Antieke Wald- und Feldkulte aus Nordeuropäischer Ueberlieferung erläutert* *, Berlin, 1877), founded scientific folklore around 1804 (according to *S. Reinach*, * *Cultes, mythes et religions*, IV* , Paris, 1912, where the Caylus, a Count, and the French Celtomaniacs are mentioned as pioneers).

J. Grimm worked in Paris in 1805 and was familiar with the Académie celtique, which was interested in the megaliths and Celtic literature in Scotland, Wales, and Brittany.

Tylor, *Pimitive Culture*, 1871, saw the rational value of folk customs or superstitions: “The senseless customs are survivors, which **1/** once had a practical object and **2/** at least the character of a ceremony then and there, when and where they were originally instituted”.

In other words, they are 'established reason', to use Hegel's words: there once existed a rational reason to institute them; J. *Frazer*, *The Golden Bough* , 1890-1, 1900-2, 1907-3 ... saw the folklore **1/** rural and **2/** 'wild' (i.e. among indigenous peoples).

An extremely fascinating work on the subject is *Fern. Nicolay*, * *Histoire des croyances, superstitions, mœurs et coutumes (selon le plan du décalogue)* *, 3 vols., sd (around 1900), in which this Catholic lawyer, well-versed in religious studies, offers abundant material; -- it is worth noting that intellectuals, naturally, ought first to take notice of popular religion: that this is not so self-evident, even in ecclesiastical circles, is overwhelmingly evident from the Latin American Synod of Bishops of 1974, at which it was suddenly realized that the Second Vatican Council had, until then, been an elitist affair of intellectuals, professors, and sophisticated artists (the so-called 'intelligentsia') and not a matter for the common man.

In Medellin in 1968, paradoxically, the Latin American bishops had resolved “to identify with the masses” (sic), but discovered in 1974 that, alongside 'liberation-(theology) and 'basic communities' of an 'enlightened' nature, popular religion was of importance.

“Now a group of bishops are listening to the common people” (wrote *Kerk en Missie*, 197 (1975): March). Cf. *Collationes* (Vl. Tijdschr. v. Theol.

en Past.), Oct. 1975 (P. De Haes, - Volkskatholicisme; P. Wolfs, Is there also folk catholicism among us? J. Craeynest, The Lourdes Pilgrimage as a Popular Retreat).

Historical; *MP Nilsson, La religion populaire dans la Grèce antique* , Paris, 1954 (the country estates and celebrations there; Eleusis; home and family; the cities; legalism; superstition; the oracles and divination); *A. Dieterich, Mutter Erde (Ein Versuch über Volksreligion)*, Leipzig, 1913-2.

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All this does not mean that folk religion and folklore are the same, but rather that they are partially identical: *W. Crooke, Religion and Folklore of Northern India* , Oxford, 1926.

-- *L. Knappert, The significance of folklore for religious history examined and tested against the Holda myths* , 1887;

-- *R. Hertz, Sociologie redactie et folklore* , Paris, 1928-1 1970-2 (foreword by Marcel Mauss; especially Saint Besse (*Etude d 'un culte alpestre*), oc, pp. 110/160, is a very fascinating study of Saint Bessus, celebrated on the 10th harvest every year, in the Italian Alps).

-- More in the sense of 'superstitions' as a form of superstition: *E. Eaple, Superstition and the Superstitious* , New York, 1971 (with bibliography pp. 191/192).

-- *Douglas Hill, Magic and Superstition* , London, 1968.

-- the ecclesiastical 'sacramentals' are a domain where archaic religion flourishes; one example: *X, Notes sur la ben édiction, la vertu et le rôle social de la cloche, Périgueux* , 1897 (belief in demons, as well as the magical 'belief in power' (which is clearly evident in the title 'vertu', fluid power) form a synthesis here with orthodox Catholicism).

-- Remarkable as a study of the remains of witnesses are *Kräpelin, Die Wahnwelten, Frankf . aM*, 1963-2 (1920-1) (the nervous and mental diseases concern the roots of the inner life; the child, the natural man, indeed, the animal go together here, to some extent: the question Kräpelin

poses is “to what extent disorders from the early period of personal and tribal-historical development, which have vanished in the states of illness, revive”;

-- K. Jaspers, *Strindbergh und van Gogh*, Bremen, 1949, p. 182: schizophrenics walk around among us as despised minus capable; perhaps that was once different? -- Perhaps, among us, schizophrenia is a condition for authenticity regarding domains which, in the past, could be genuinely contacted even without schizophrenia; in other words, so-called transcultural psychiatry poses the question to what extent identical diseases exhibit different symptoms in different cultures (morphology or pathoplasty of the disease), to what extent diseases are induced or inhibited by cultural living conditions (pathogenesis), to what extent diseases that we now view as disease were conceived as non-disease in another or earlier culture (transcultural) (interpretation); cf. J. Zutt, *Einführung*, in J. Zutt, Hrsg., *Ergriffenheit und Besessenheit (Ein interdisziplinäres Gespräch über transkulturellanthropologische und-psychiatrische Fragen)*, Bern/Munich, 1972, S. 7/9 In other words, not only folklore, but also 'disease' is, if necessary, a testimonial residue; yes, according to Dr Pfeiffer, diabetes may once have been a survival tool in a prehistoric society, where survival required diabetic traits (*Pfeiffer, Die Pathogenesis des Diabetes mellitus, in Deutsches Medizinisches Journal*, 21 (1966), S. 601).

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(iv) general historical religious studies is, of course, the comprehensive discipline: -prehistoric: A. Leroi-Gourhan, *Les religions de la préhistoire (Paléolithique)*, Paris, 1976-3 (the period before -40,000/-30,000 is virtually unknown in terms of religion; the Late Paleolithic, however, provides numerous facts showing that adornment, art, dwelling construction, techniques and religion exist as they do later (we recognize ourselves in them); but caution is required regarding the comparison between prehistoric people and present-day primitives.

Thus, magic, totemism, and cannibalism are unprovable (unless there are vague indications); what is certain is a richly developed complementary system in which man and woman (each with their own animals) appear in art; bone veneration (in connection with funeral rites) is also clear.

Dieux et religions antiques dans les Alpes de la préhistoire au moyen-âge, in *Histoire et archéologie*, 48 (1980/1981): December-January;

-- Historical: R. Berthelot, *La pensée de l'Asie et l'astrobiologie*, Paris, 1972 (1938-1) (between the movement of celestial bodies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the course of terrestrial life forms (plant kingdom, agriculture and animal husbandry, health and disease, etc.), consists in cyclical interaction and parallelism, which are even mathematically calculable with precision; hence the name 'astro.bio.logy'. This phase is prepared by a bio-astral phase: life observed on Earth was projected into the celestial bodies and their orbits, without measurement and numerical mathematics).

Chaldea is the cradle of this); cf. G. Gusdorf, *Science et foi au milieu du XXe siècle (Un débat de conscience de l'occidental Moderne)*, Paris, sd pp. 6/15: *La conciliation mythique et la conciliation astrobiologique*);

-- W. Schmidt ; *Origine et évolution de la religion*, pp. 125/137 (La photographie astrale et le panbabylonisme) (in 1906 this school of religious history founded the *Gesellschaft für vergleichende Mythenforschung in Berlin*, whereby it wanted to correct the above-mentioned 'philological school', which had an Indo-European focus)

-- More in the phenomenological direction: A. Bertholet, ed., *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch*, Tübingen, 1926-2 (seventeen anthologies of booklets, uncommonly fascinating, concerning the most important world religions).

-- A. Bertholet/ E Lehmann, Hrsg., *Chantepie de la Saussaye, lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1935-4.

-- M. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions (Morphologie du sacré)*, Paris, 1953 (actually a phenomenology of the principal 'forms' of religion; see M. Meslin, *Pour une science de la religion*, pp. 142/152 for an assessment of Eliade's primitivism, in which he conceives of the myth, the core element of religion according to him (which is highly debatable), as (not merely the representation of, but as) the return to a so-called 'primeval time' in the irreversible sense (so that, as 'history' progresses, the 'power' of this primeval time diminishes through secularization)).

In contrast, as a phenomenologist of the history of religion, one can posit C. Bleeker, * *Destructuur van de religie**, The Hague, sd., who interprets the 'en.tel.echeia' (i.e., the schema of development) of religion(s) much more nuancedly. In fact, Eliade's subtitle is completely misleading, unless one takes 'histoire' in the Ancient Greek sense of 'research'.

-- Fr. Heiler, *Die Religionen der Menschheit in Verleidenheit und Gegenwart*, Stuttgart, 1959 (fascinating bibliography) S. 891/956;

-- J. Asmussen/ J. Leese/ C. Colpe, *Håndbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 3 Bde, Göttingen, 1971/1975;

-- K. Bellon, introduction, J. Huby, *Christ (Handbook for the History of Religions)*, Utr. / Brussels, 1949;

-- C. Van Rijsinge, trans., *The Great Religions*, The Hague, 1957;

-- J. Sperna Weiland, ed., *Antwoord (Gestalten van geloof in de wereld van nu)*, Amsterdam, 1975 (an attempt to provide as complete an overview as possible and also to be 'topical');

-- E. Mercier/ J. Barraud, ed., *Les hommes et leurs dieux*, Paris, 1981 (goes up to the Renaissance);

-- *Encyclopedia of World Religions*, London, 1975-2 (a typical Anglo-Saxon 'comparative religion');

-- Desperately needed to fill a screaming void in virtually all books on the history of religion: *Merlin Stone, Once God Was Embodied as Woman*, Servire, 1979 (the religions in which neither a 'Father' nor a 'Man' is the central deity, but rather a 'Queen of Heaven' ('Mother Goddess', 'Great Goddess'), are discussed here, unfortunately in a feminist-militant sense);

H. Von Glasenapp, *The Non-Christian Religions*, Antw. / Utr., 1967 (known for his openness to non-Christian religions, which is already evident from his definition: "Religion is the belief (expressed in thought, feeling, willing, and acting) in the presence of supernatural personal and impersonal powers, whereby:

(i) man feels dependent, (ii) or makes the attempt to win them over, (iii) or makes the attempt to elevate himself to her.” (oc, 11/12);

-- R. De Becker, *pref.*, *Les grandes aventures spirituelles*, Paris, 1967 (Achenaton, Zarathustra, Lao-Tseu, Buddha, Orpheus and Puthagoras, Platon, S. Augustine, S. Francis of Assisi).

Finally: R. Zaehner, *ed.* *Zo zoekt de mens zijn God*, Rotterdam, 1960 (with the well-known dichotomy of the major religions: **a)** the prophetic (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, - with a personal God and his prophets),

b) the wisdom religions (Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, with their 'sapiential' bases).

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1.4. The structural-comparative method.

Bible Sample : -- H. Pinard dlBoullaye, *L'étude. comp. d. rel., II (Lesson methods)*, pp. 40/87 (*Method comparative*).

-- J. Viet, *rapp.*, *Les sciences de l'homme en France (Tendances et organization de la recherche)*, Paris/The Hague, 1966, pp. 149/175 (*Methods et techniques*);

-- G.-G. Granger, *Pensée formelle et sciences de l'homme*, pp. 109/113 (*Différence et similitude*)

-- G. Wijvekate, *Methods of Research*, Utr./Antw., 1971, pp. 103/131 (*classification*); pp. 77/102 (*structures*).

-- H. Störig, *History of the Humanities in the 19th Century*, Utr./Antw., 1967, pp. 119/120 (The mathematical school in economic science: “A particular peculiarity of the mathematical school is that it substitutes a functional mode of view for simple causality everywhere”.) We refer here to Lo., 40/59 (philosophical set theory: the distributive, i.e. purely comparative, and the collective, i.e. system structure, are the two foundations, philosophically speaking, of the doubly structured basic method, which we will now briefly outline.

1.4.1. The comparative method or 'comparatism'.

Bibl. sample : H. Pinard, oc, 40ss.; J. Viet, oc, pp. 166/168 (the typological method, which establishes types or kinds based on statistical research or on 'comprehending insight' (Max Weber, for example, who proposes 'ideal examples'), relies, according to Viet, on the comparative method).

-- M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel.*, pp. 153/169 (Le comparatisme (with G. Dumézil as application)).

-- Other domains: L. Millet/ Br. Nagnin, *Les sciences humaines aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1972, p. 87 (comparative psychology).

-- J. Bourdon, *La démographie comparée, Base de l'histoire de la population*, in *Journal de la Société Statistique de Paris*, 4/6 (1951: avril-juin, pp. 103/108).

-- Religious Paragons: S. Nadel, *Two Nuba Religions (An Essay in Comparison)*, in J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals*, pp. 77/102 (from *The American Anthropologist*, 57 (4), 1955 PP. 661/679).

-- A. Jensen, *Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit, in Mythos und Kult bei den Naturvölkern*, Wiesbaden, 1960-2 (a comparison between Schmidt's Supreme Being or 'High God' and his own 'dema' savior).

This extremely brief bibliography sufficiently demonstrates how fundamental data comparison is.

In religious studies, comparatism was introduced in a scientifically justified sense **(i)** by evolutionary religious scholars (they found, for example, fetishism in Africa, Australia, and America among the 'cultureless' (a typical 19th-century misconception) peoples; on the basis of the strict evolutionary scheme, they concluded that all 'cultureless' peoples had started out fetishistic in the religious sphere);

(ii) by the philological religious scholars (think of Ad. Kuhn, Max Müller), who avoided this evolutionary ideology, relying on comparative grammar (of the Indo-European languages); they compared the names of the gods, the myths, the rites; later Dr. Gräbner (and J. Schmidt following in his footsteps) introduced the cultural-historical variant of comparatism, while G. Foucart introduced the sampling method. (Cfr. Pinard, *oc*, pp. 44/49).

Note: E. Hamy (1842/1908) and especially A. de Quatrefages (1810/1892) applied comparatism interdisciplinarily: the “proof based on convergence of indications” (*Lo.*, 57) was arranged as follows:

- (i)** A major science, e.g. religious studies, establishes something;
- (ii)** related or auxiliary sciences verify, possibly reinforce that finding by establishing the same thing in their own way (e.g. comparative linguistics, ethnology).

-- Cfr. H. Pinard *dl* Boullaye, *Le mouvement historique en ethnologie*, in *Settimana Intern. di Etnologia Religiosa* , Paris, 1926, p. 38;

-- J. Viet, *oc*, pp. 53/88 (*Interdisciplinary Relations*), pp. 254/256 (bibliogr.: F. Braudel, *Unité et diversités des sciences de l'homme* , in *Revue de l'Enseignement supérieur* , 1 (1960): janv.-mars, pp. 17/22.

-- A. Moles, *La linguistique, methode de decouverte interdisciplinaire* , in *Revue philosophique* , 3 (1966): July-September, pp. 375/390; -- this poses, of course, the problem of a minimal and essential unified science, in the case of hiero-analysis.

At present, two are clearly visible, namely **(a)** Heideggerian hermeneutics, the philosophical human science or anthropology (for the foundations see O. Pöggeler, *Hrsg.*, *Hermeneutische Philosophie*, Munich , 1972, especially pp. 252/273 (P. Ricoeur)).

-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' hermeneutique)*, Paris, 1989, - the main work oi), for its application to hiero-analysis

-- M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel .*, pp. 253/262 (*De l'anthropologie olie*): Meslin, following in the footsteps of Heidegger and Ricoeur, states:

a/ that the human sciences cannot grasp the 'supernatural' itself (in this respect resembling Bochenski, who saw no merit in 'insight', direct insight, in his *Logic of Religion*);

b/ that they can grasp the 'sacred' only through the 'languages' (here in the sense of human systems of expression: rites 'say' something, symbols 'say' something, concepts 'say' something); well, the 'languages'

(sign systems) are human works that enlighten us about man himself; Consequence: even religious studies conceived from a humanistic perspective are, after all, anthropology.

(b)2 Saussurian linguistics, ie the systems technology or systems science of the phonologically (sound-theoretically) conceived study of signs,

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(e.g. 'e', 'z', 'l') which, isolated and on their own, mean 'nothing', but only acquire meaning when combined in a system with its language structures (e.g. 'donkey', at least in the Dutch language system, means two things: (zoologically) a long-eared quadruped, (artistically) a support surface for painters; - metaphorically (prop. analogy) a fool).

In recent years, particularly in structuralist circles, this method has been transferred to other human sciences; for example, to myth analysis, religion, and magic (for the foundations see: besides the work of Broekman, G. Schiwy, *Der französische Strukturalismus*, Reinbek b. Hamb., 1969).

-- O. Ducrot et al., *Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme ?* Paris, 1968;

-- R. Kwant, *Structuralists and Structuralism* 1968; them ad Rijn, 1978; applied to religion:

-- Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* , Paris, 1958, pp. 181/266 (*Magie et religion; La structure des mythes*).

The most striking difference between the Heideggerian hermeneutics of symbols, myths, rites, and ideas, and that of Lévy-Strauss with his structuralism, lies in the lifelike and deeply religious (however vague) aspect of the hermeneuticians, and the atheizing-nihilistic logistic-mathematical aspect of the structuralists. See also M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel.* , pp. 170/194.

-- H. Pinard vol. B., oc ., pp. 47/57, applies comparatism to the three stages of hierology as he conceives them: **a/** hierography, i.e., purely empirical description of facts; **b/** hierology, i.e., inductive or generalizing study of the religious phenomenon seeking regularities; **c/** hierosophy, i.e., epistemologically and axiologically judging (or, if you will: evaluative) stance regarding truth and life value, especially the God-involvement of religion; we will return to this later.

In Oc, pp. 58/87, Pinard reflects on the axioms of sound comparatism regarding religion: the axiom of natural uniformity is nothing other than a set theory (distributive structure); the axiom of organic unity (with the axiom of dependency) is nothing other than a system theory (collective structure).

1.4.2. The systems theory method.

Bibliogr. Sakeproef : J. Viet, oc, pp. 163ss. (*Analyse des données*), especially p. 167: the typological or classifying method, supported by the comparative, leads to the structural method, namely when the typology pays attention to the internal ordering or structure of the data and compares them as possessing structure (whether that be 'comprehension' (verstehend, compréhensiviste) à la Max Weber or 'logistic-mathematical' à la Lévi-Strauss);

Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* , pp. 227ff. (*La structure des mythes*) clearly explains the structuralist view of the system);

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It must be emphatically stated that the system-technological manipulation of signs, comparable to tinkering (Mythical thinking, for example, is comparable to 'le bricolage', tinkering" (cf. *Mes lin*, oc ., 174)), also implies its limitations: actual life, certainly religious life as 'religio', as contact with that with which one, in its seriousness and inviolability, never simply tinkers, means that such a structuralism can at most be a partial method.

Furthermore: viewing culture primarily as a communication system is also highly questionable; man is first and foremost 'en situation', situated, and ought to process the faits accomplis as living and surviving; semiotically (i.e., sign-theoretically) this means that, with Peirce, it must be emphatically stated that the sign refers first and foremost to the situation and its aspects ('a First', a 'First' or 'Quality', says Peirce, i.e., the given in its qualitative immediate givenness, - immediately followed by 'a Second', a 'second' or 'Relation', i.e., the qualitative given is an element of a collection and system, it is 'in relation to'); only after the situation becomes a sign of thought, speech, and writing, is 'culture' communication with others, - at least epistemologically.

Therefore, we prefer to start from a systems and structure theory as outlined very briefly by Pinard, op. cit., pp. 47/48. He distinguishes:

(a) The internal comparison: the constitutive elements of something - take a religion, totemism - are sought out (then the elements and the common properties (especially in a collective sense) are revealed by analysis.

Subsequently, they are specified both functionally (concerning their role within the context) and procedurally (concerning the development within the process in question: kinetic or procedural structure). Particular attention is paid to the 'factor change' or 'cause-and-effect dyad' (investigating which causes (factors, i.e., partial causes) do or do not imply (cause) changes (i.e., effects, elaboration, consequences) in the phenomenon under investigation.

All this, this 'analyzing', 'dissecting', is always done comparatively (comparing element with element, element with role or function; comparing element or function with factor (cause)). Two comparisons in particular are fundamental: processual analysis examines the succession of phases (phaseological structure) by comparing them; causal (factorial) analysis compares the factors (influences, causes) with the induced changes (effects). This is the experimental comparison. Whoever experiments compares the effect of his experiment with what was present before his experiment; this is the experimental structure.

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(b) The external equation:

The system under investigation is now situated within its framework (supersystem): once again, the subsystems (which here are the 'elements' of the overarching whole or supersystem) are examined for their common properties.

Functions (role, dependence), succession (phases), factors (influences with their effects), these primarily experimental, are analyzed, always by comparison, either synchronically ('static,' says Pinard) or diachronically ('genetic,' 'dynamic'; thus Pinard). In other words, by means of structures (distributive, collective, kinetic, - individually concrete), the unity of

common properties (partial identities) is sought within the multitude of elements (total identities). See Lo., 27 , 42, 48, 59, 79/80 . We call this structurism.

-- Applications. - N. Söderblom, **Das Werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion *)*, Leipzig, 1926–2, distinguishes as 'constitutive elements' (recurring aspects, common properties complex) of religious phenomena as such: **a/** animism, i.e. belief in life and the soul, **b/** dynamism, i.e. belief in power or might, **c/** causative belief, i.e. belief in beings of the highest or very high rank, which cause reality or important parts thereof.

Thus he says, Oc, 25: “No key can open all locks: **a/** animism cannot explain everything in the lifeworld of the primitives; **b/** / nor the recently much-discussed 'mana', i.e. the half- or wholly impersonal 'power', **c/** nor the high origin beings of the primitive worldview”. This demonstrates Söderblom's comparatism: analysis only 'saves' all phenomena and all coherence within those phenomena.

M. Augé, in *Anthropologie redactie* , Paris, 1974, pp. 20/22, discusses Elkin's four types of totemism:

a/ individual totemism, **b/** social totemism (with variants: sex-related, semi-sex, area-related, sub-area-related, (patrilineal or matrilineal) sound-related), **c/** cultural (patrilineal or conceptual) totemism, **d/** dream totemism (either individual or social).

“We shall establish that, if the various forms of totemism that have been observed—at least if we are dealing here with different kinds of one and the same reality—never coexist in one and the same society, the 'structured whole' of which Elkin speaks is not to be found in any particular society—unless perhaps in the Northeast of South Australia.

In other words: the 'ideological coherence' that Elkin seeks to demonstrate is the ideological coherence of no society. This observation coincides with the remark by Lévy-Strauss, who reproaches Elkin (...) for having preserved a concept, whereas the existence of multiple heterogeneous (dissimilar) and irreducible totemisms was confirmed by him.”

In other words, Lévi-Strauss would propose dropping the concept of 'totemism' because it represents no common characteristic.

The concept of 'ideological coherence' is also raised by Augé on oc, pp. 22ss., in connection with J. Harner's study on the Jivaros of the equator: the Jivaros have four interconnected belief systems ('ideologies'), namely concerning the soul(s), the harvest spirits, sorcery, and kinship: the question arises whether the Jivaro mentality does not possess an implicit (rather than a conscious-rational) coherence between those four seemingly independent 'systems'.

Cl. Lévy-Strauss, Anthr. str., pp. 183ss., discusses the sorcerer and his magic:

a/ there is no reason to doubt the effectiveness of the magic in some of her practices;

b/ that 'efficiency' implies the belief in magic from three complementary viewpoints:

(i) the magician's belief in his own techniques,

(ii) the belief of the sick person he cares for or of the victim he persecutes, in the 'power' of the sorcerer,

(iii) the trust and demands of collective opinion, which time and again determine the climate regarding the sorcerer and those he influences. (oc, pp. 184, 197 (' *le complexe shamaniste* ', because this concerns the shamanistic form of magic), 200 (*sorcerer, sick person (victim), public*), 203 (*group, sick person, sorcerer*).

We are faced here with a cohesive triad which, in Lévi-Strauss's case, is naturally interpreted 'linguistically' and psychologically (psychosomatically and psychoanalytically); the ideology characteristic of Lévi-Strauss is evident from the fact that he does not for a moment consider placing himself merely in the world of the three instances involved (without external psychosomatics and equally external psychoanalysis) in order to test the effectiveness of that triad, starting from its axioms, through experiment on a magical (and not on a psychoanalytic or psychosomatic) level, respectively.

A curious form of 'hineininterpretieren' (externalism characteristic of the modern 'rationalist' who, in principle, does not believe in the magic of the primitives and departs from his own axioms – which is erroneous from a systematic theoretic perspective). Cf. J. Kamstra, * *Structuralisme en religiewetenschap**, in *Tijdschr. v. Fil.*, 31 (1969): 4 (Dec), pp. 700/731, where the author states that, in Lévi-Strauss's view, religion is the humanization of nature and magic the naturalization of human action, excluding the sacred ('horizontalism') (ac, 728/750).

Th. van Baaren, Doolhof der goden, Amsterdam, 1960, p. 6, points out that 'understanding' is “to a large extent a matter of comparison,” yet strongly typological, of course.

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Conclusion: “The comparative spirit is the truly scientific spirit of our time; or rather: of all times.” (*Address at the International Congress of Orientalists*, 14/21, Sept. 1874, in *Chips* - 2, vol. IV, p. 343). Understood as set out above, based on Pinard's ideas, this is entirely correct.

1.4.3. The mathematical-logistic method.

'Analysis' is the comparison of similar and related data: this data appears in a refined form in applied logistics and mathematics.

Library sample:

-- J. Maître, *Représentations logarithmiques de phenomen es religionux*, in *Rev. franc. de Sociologie*, IV (1963):1, pp. 22 /36 ; id., *Langage mathématique et religious sciences*, in ISHR, pp. 201/215 (*Instruction aux sciences humaines des religions*, Paris, Symposium, - edited by H. Desroche/ J. Seguy);

-- id., *Les prenom s de baptême (Rite de denomination et statistique linguistique*, in *Année sociologique* - 3, 1964, pp. 31/74;74 ; - R. Goldman, *Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence*, London, 1964 (Guttman method (scale representation) as presentation method).

-- Pure mathematical: M. Barbut, *Mathématiques des sciences humaines*, I (*Combinatoire et Algèbre*), Paris, 1967 ; II (*Nombres et Mesures*), ibid., 1970.-

For the elementary foundations of the logistic-mathematical method, we refer to Lo., pp. 92/96 (mathematics, especially p. 93 (rule of three)), 97/103 (logistics, especially p. 100 (order of sciences): It is clear that logistic-mathematical methods refine distributive and collective comparison, not only through presentation, but also because structures suddenly become clear if religious phenomena are 'viewed' or 'analyzed' logistically; cf. *J. Viet, Les sc. de l'homme*, pp. 153/166, where the author points out that the new mathematics, thanks to its structuralism, gives rise to model construction (see Lo., pp. 12/15 (the idea as model)), namely deterministic or stochastic (randomness-sensitive) models; synchronic and diachronic models, etc., which depict the system coherence. Also statistical models, preferably Interpreted structurally, they naturally play an important role.

1.4.4. The informatic method.

Biblical sample : *J. Viet, Les sc. de l'homme*, pp. 163/64 (electronic calculators: **a/** make complex logistic-mathematical operations transparent and possible, **b/** make the simulation method (imitation of real things or processes) possible. Cf. *Du.*, 32/35 (*information science*); also pp. 15/21 (*clarity*).

This technical aspect of the refinement of the analysis repeatedly 'saves' from the tendency towards vagueness regarding religious research. Religion is frequently associated with a kind of primitivism that rejects modern techniques: which is a misconception.

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1.5. The Hierosophical Method.

Library sample: *H. Pinard dI B., L'étude comp. d. rel., II (Ses met hodes)*, pp. 14/27 (' *Trois étapes ou stades de travail: hierographie, hierologie, -hierosophie*) Pinard refers to *F. Réthoré (hierographie, hierologie, -philosophie de la religion, (1896), Goblet d'Alviella (hierography, hierology, hierosophy (Transactions of the Third Internat. Congress for the History of Religions , Oxford, 1908, t. II, 9, pp. 365 ss.))*.

In the footnote, p. 15, Pinard says: "This tripartite division (...) corresponds strictly to tripartiteness:

(i)a . 'history' (apparently in the semi-ancient sense of 'historia' (inquisitio, investigation) of the religions,

(i)b. science of religions,

(ii) philosophy of religions.” He adds that 'hieros' is broad enough to represent everything that is 'sacred', 'holy', or 'consecrated'.)

-- M. Buber, *Schriften zur Bibel* , Munich/Heidelberg, 1964 (see *Wort und Wahrheit*, 19 (1964): 11 (Nov), pp. 712/713) (*E. Biser, Positionen statt Gespräch*) speaks of three 'planes' on which he moves:

(i) the baseline (philological and religious-historical data),

(ii)a the interpretive or theological plane,

(ii)b the applicable plane (decides from what precedes), - in other words, the same distinction in other language.

-- W. Schmidt, (*Or. et év. vol. rel.*, Paris, 1931, pp. 16/18), naturally distinguishes between academic and philosophical approaches to religion, but notes that d'Alviella's triad has much to offer, yet does not distinguish between the history and psychology of religion, and that 'religion' is an ancient and established word (and therefore preferable to 'hieros').

The suspicion arises that Schmidt, who stubbornly defines 'religion' as 'worship of the Highest Being' (Supreme Being) – in the strictly scholastic-Catholic sense (something that is undeniably a partial truth) – struggles to incorporate the second fundamental aspect, the worship of 'power' (van der Leeuw's dynamism), into the definition, whereas Pinard does so very readily.

So much for the epistemological levels (planes, stages): for philosophy does not limit itself merely to axioms that are formulated hypothetically (and with which one works in mere specialized science); moreover, it investigates whether these axioms fit into (the totality of) 'being' (ontologically), namely whether total reality (and not merely a capriciously chosen partial reality, as specialized science does) 'tolerates' those axioms, that are depicted within them (model).

Two hierosophical methods.

M. Meslin, **Pour une science des rel.**, pp. 13/14, states: the science of religion (understood by him as the human science of religions) differs from theology or theology, which investigates religion, usually a single one or at least a single group, for its true and conscience-binding character. In other words, theology is, just like the philosophy of religion, a hierosophical discipline.

The question arises: what, then, is the distinction between theology and philosophy of religion? -- That theology, as *Th. van Baaren states in *Doolhof der goden **, *Amsterdam*, 1960, p. 7, determines which religion is “the true one” (“although it is only unfortunate that different religions—and even different branches within a single religion—all come up with their own answer, for which they claim equal authority”), is already evident from the ordering of theological sub-disciplines: every theology worthy of the name that is sufficiently critical regarding its own axioms begins with 'fundamental' or 'apologetic' (defending the faith) theology, upon which all other sub-disciplines are built as sufficiently critically justified.

One need only think of historical, dogmatic, moral, sacramental theology, etc., - not to mention recent liberation theology or the 'African', 'South American', etc. theologies).

However, to assert, with Meslin, *oc*, p. 1.3, that theology essentially stands or falls on demonstrating that one religion (or group) is the only true and salvific one, is to forget that—it should be emphasized: a sufficiently self-aware theology always begins with (at least methodological) doubt regarding the unique dignity and validity of its own religion, precisely in its investigation of foundations, called 'fundamental' or faith-defending theology.

The great Church Fathers, Gregory of Nussa and Augustine of Tagaste, in their practice of methodical doubt, are there to bear witness to that self-criticism of theology, long before Descartes' 'doute methodique' (cf. *Ep.*, 28/30), where it appears that, from the very beginning, the organization of the 'enkuklios paideia' (a comprehensive system of formation) in Alexandria, since Clement of Alexandria, reflected this ancient pagan self-criticism. The Church Fathers-theologians were so serious about the critical formation of theology—or, as it was then called, (divine) wisdom—students, that they incorporated it, as it were, into the order of the subjects of study.

O. Willmann therefore rightly emphasizes the double slogan: “Theology is the doctrine of Christian truth; philosophy the Christian doctrine of

truth". In other words, however 'dear' the Church and Christianity may be, were they not 'true', they would not (be allowed to) be 'dear'! They would be based on an irrational foundation!

This implies that true theology begins by being merely the philosophy of religion, yet in such a way that, on (supposed or real) rational grounds (justification (Bochenski)), it decides to prioritize one religion as the only true one, or at least, the fundamentally true one. Then it becomes what it was not before: theology. Thus it becomes apparent that there can be one and yet two hierosophical methods.

Hierosophy, according to *S. Thompson, A Modern Philosophy of Religion*, Chicago, 1955, pp. 137/149, does not only analyze the axiomata of one or more religions and their verification in that and one or more religions: rather, it analyzes the knowledge and life value of those axiomata in general.

Bible sample: except *Pinard, oc .*, pp. 56/57:

a/ Determination of which natural, extranatural (miracles, prophecies, revelations) and/or supernatural factors a religion consists of: what we call the differential object (natural, extranatural, supernatural).

b/ actual definition of religion with its similar (magic, spiritualism) and opposite (atheism) accompanying phenomena (again the differential, but purer: religious, parareligious, non- or anti-religious.);

c/ comparative value judgments regarding internal and external elements and structures of religion;

d/ history of religion, philosophically examined this time;

e/ of course, basic research into the sub-sciences of religion (logic and language analysis, psychology, sociology, culturology, history of religion)).

-- *AM Frazier, Issues in religion (A Book of Reading)*, Cincinnati, 1969 (Human Condition: Dostoievsky, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Rilke; - Origins of Religious Life : Freud, Feuerbach (psych.); Durkheim (sociol.); Campbell (mythol.), R.Otto, Suzuki (transcend.);- Modes of Rel. Life: Zimwer, Campbell (Or.-Occid.); Zimmer, Baillie, Fromm (salvation/reconciliation); Tillich, Wilson (symbol., language); - Doctrine of God: Anselm, Aquinas, Oman, Kierkegaard (theism); Nietzsche, Altizer ('Death of God')).

-- D. Walhout, *Interpreting Religion*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963 (three-volume:

a/ general: nature of religion (R. Otto, G.H. Glark), truth (S. Thompson, J.C. Bennett) faith (St. Gilson, P. Tillich), religion and science (W.E. Hocking, B. Ramm), religious language (R. Bultmann, W. Sourdough);

b/ theistic (ie religious position): reality of God (W. Kaufmann, L.H. Dewvolf), nature of God (W. Temple, Ch. Hartshorne), religious nature of man (M. Buber, E. Brunner), religious destiny of man (E.S. Brightman, Reinhold Niebuhr), prayer and worship; (D. Steere, R. Calhoun);

c/ Christian: the concept of 'revelation' (H. Richard Niebuhr, J.I. Packer), biblical interpretation (exegesis) (B. Anderson, E.J. Carnel), interpretation of Christ (C.S. Lewis, W. Spurrier), church (K. Barth, G. Weigel), Christian beliefs (R. Knox, H. Smith), other religions (H. Kraemer, Arn. Toynbee).

-- C.J. Ducasse, *A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion*, New York, 1953 (three main issues: definition, functions and justification of religion(s).

It is evident that hierosophy addresses a wide range of problems. However, let us dwell on one main point: the justification of religion (already touched upon when its 'logic' was discussed (see pp. 4ff.)).

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-- ***The structure of accountability.***

It is of crucial importance to know precisely what one wishes to justify in religion: Pinard rightly combines natural, extranatural, and supernatural elements and structures into a single (differential) whole.

For example, S. Thompson, op. cit., asserts that "the tests of (the truth and the vitality of) a (religious) doctrine lie in the 'fruits' of faith as they are found in attitude ('attitude') and deeds".

Steller refers to *Gal. 5:16/25* : The works of the 'flesh' (the wretched humanity) are known: fornication, impurity, and debauchery; idolatry and sorcery; enmity, strife, envy, wrath, partisanship, division, schism, and jealousy; drunkenness, gluttony, and the like; (...) But the fruit of the 'spirit' is: love, joy, and peace; patience, goodwill, and kindness; faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control).

Cf. also *Col. 3:12/15; 1 Cor. 13; 2 Cor. 3:5; 6:4/7* , etc. St. Paul formulates a criterion (means of discernment) based on the 'flesh/spirit' system (i.e., man bound to the pre-Christian nature, extra- and supernatural, as opposed to man participating in the 'spirit', i.e., extra- and especially supernatural 'power', as it springs from Jesus (and his resurrection glory and sending of the Holy Spirit)).

This criterion is twofold: **a/** ordinary moral and **b/** supernatural-charismatic. Cf. *1 Cor 12* (the special gifts (charismata) of the Holy Spirit (word of wisdom, word of knowledge, 'faith' (apparently in the charismatic degree), healing, miracles, prophecy, discernment of 'spirits' (i.e., the 'forces' and 'entities' active in the unconscious), tongues, interpretation of tongues: *1 Cor 12: 8/10* ; see also *ibid.*, *12: 27/ 30* (apostle, prophet, teacher; miracle worker, healer, helper, administrator, speaker of tongues, interpreter)).

Not that these two expressions of 'spirit' ought to be separated; quite the contrary: Paul emphasizes that the supernatural and charismatic gifts constitute one system with the moral (and the theological: faith, hope, love).

J. Thompson mocks a sect that advocates surviving snakebites unharmed as a test of faith (in the USA): yet Jesus himself says that “these miracles will accompany those who have believed: in my name they will cast out demons; they will speak in tongues; they will pick up snakes; even if they drink deadly poison, it will not harm them; they will lay hands on the sick, and they will be healed.” (*Mark 16:17/18*).

Consequence: if Paul speaks of supernatural phenomena as 'signs' of religious truth, then Jesus did this for him. One ought therefore not to exclude this side of the justification of religion a priori. Especially since such phenomena are present in abundance in virtually all religions (except for the completely secularized ones).

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P. Saint-Yves, Le discernement du miracle, Paris, 1909, pp. 253/347 (*Le miracle et la théologie positive*), especially pp. 284/296 (*Les miracles de guérison dans toutes les religions* ; - the Phoenician, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, the Buddhist and Hindu, the Islamic religions, - they

all know their firmly proven 'miracles', clearly extending over centuries and regions).

-- J. de Bonniot, SJ, *Le miracle et ses contrefaçons*, Paris, 1895-5 (especially pp. 425/457: *Les démons aux premiers siècles de l'Eglise*);-- add, to these two now outdated but still sound sources of information, the overwhelming ethnological literature (which will be discussed further on), in which supernatural phenomena (the Christian charismata (socially useful gifts of grace) have a very similar structure) are commonplace, to see how charismatic religion has always and everywhere existed (except, to say it again, the current totally earthly, secularized, 'worldly' 'religion').

-- ***The structure of the assessment of religious responsibility.***

In summary : every (unless secular) religion justifies itself with:

a/ theological (concerning the Supreme Being, Highest Being, 'Hochgott'),

b/ moral (concerning virtues) and, especially,

c/ 'charismatic' (supernatural) arguments. How can one test these arguments for their knowledge and salvific value?

Testing depends on the informative system one prioritizes: the stricter an epistemological-logical system is, the less one can prove within it.

'Soft' science starts from a 'softer' informational system: it places fewer demands on **a** . observation, **b**. explanation, and **c**. testing.

'Hard' science sets the conditions for the acceptance of **a** . observation, **b**. explanation, and **c**. its testing hyperstrictly.

This refers to the infamous 'demarcation problem': meaningful statements exist in experimental science when both observation and explanatory testing are public, repeatable by every human being (at least in principle); all other meaningful statements, which cannot pass through that strict informative 'rim', are at most possibly meaningful (meaning that until the day experimental proof is found for them, they are 'meaningless').

All positive (empirical) philosophies introduce that hyperstrict information system into philosophy (and theology).

Consequence: nothing remains of religious pronouncements; they are 'cognitively' (understand: cognitively-in-that-hyper-strand-system) meaningless. More recent positivism, or empiricism respectively, is more cautious with such a 'drastic' declaration of meaninglessness of all religious judgments.

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But it preserves—and rightly so—the radical distinction between experimentally verifiable judgments, as empiricism (positivism) understands them, and experimentally verifiable judgments, as religions understand them.

Bibliographical sample : SJ Doorman, *American Analytical Philosophy (Philosophy as Logical-Pragmatic Reconstructionism)*, in Tijdschr. v. Fil., 28, 1966), pp. 418/440. Since the rise of logistics, the delimitation problem (the distinction between experimentally meaningful and meaningless judgments) has been reformulated to 'make' logistics 'meaningful': cf. Vienna Circle, Berlin Circle, Harvard (W. Quine, M. White);.

-- G. Nuchelmans, *Overview of Analytical Philosophy*, Utr./Ant., 1969 (especially pp. 240/241: Philosophical Theology (Since Wittgenstein's remark that there is more than one usage of language, analytical philosophers have become more cautious regarding the semiotics of religious statements, of course)).

-- L. Vax: *L'empirisme logique*, Paris, 1970, pp. 117/119. Vax rightly states that, according to the empiricist, the rigorous observation and testing by the 'hard' science of the effects of prayer and magic is desirable:

a. the unbeliever considers this proof of the pudding useless (especially if he is convinced that it will turn out negative anyway, which is ideology rather than science);

b. the believer considers it sacrilegious (because he confuses a sense of the 'sacred' with scrupulosity).

-- More directly on the relationship between religion and (hard, respectively soft) science: G. Schlesinger, *Religion and Scientific Method*, Dordrecht, 1977. Theism, i.e., the belief in the Supreme Being, is treated here as a 'scientific' hypothesis; the existence of misery in creation and

(human) freedom are tested for their atheistic impression; theism is not verified (hard scientific), but is nevertheless (soft scientific) 'confirmed' ('confirmation').

-- HG. Hubbeling, *The Logic of Perfection, and other Essays in Neo-Classical Metaphysics*, La Salle, 1962,

-- id., *Logic and Experience in Spinoza's and Ruusbroec's Mysticism*, Leiden, 1973;.

-- id., *The meaningfulness of Metaphysics within Certain Systems*, in *Synthese*, 1975, pp. 593/409 (the author addresses the distinction between hard-scientific (verifying) and soft-scientific (confirmative) informative systems).

-- Older works on the subject: G. Sortais, **La providence et le miracle devant la science moderne **, Paris, 1905. Ch. Renouvier, criticizing Renan, the positivist scientist regarding religion, says that Renan did not sufficiently realize the limitations of the experimental method: experimental science, precisely because of its ultra-strict information system, denies itself access to experiments other than public ones; otherwise, it becomes an ideology, i.e., a method that considers itself the only valid one (oc, p. 151).

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-- A. Farges, *La crise de la certitude (Etude des bases de la connaissance et de la croyance)*, Paris, (pp. 193/225 (*Le témoignage humain*)) ;pp. 226/267 (*Le temoignage divin*); especially pp. 312/337 (*Le suprême motif de certitude: ll'evidence*).

Conclusion: if one first presupposes, a priori, and thus purely axiomatically, that only the experimental method—as exact Galilean natural science, as it has developed to date, conceives of it—is a valid criterion of truth, of truth regarding religion, then one does not proceed from the object, namely religion, but from something other (e.g. heat phenomena, chemical reactions, etc.) than religion.

One proceeds externally, that is, outside of direct and evidential contact with the object. To put it in the words of St. Augustine: 'bene currunt, sed extra viam' (They run well, but outside the racetrack)! Only internalism,

that method which first establishes contact with the object itself (“Zu den Sachen selbst,” Husserl exclaimed at the time as a phenomenologist) in order to then design a method based on the very nature and laws of that object, can ever grasp religion 'objectively', that is, from the object itself.

The religious structure of testing.

Religion has, for centuries, had its own method to test its validity (cognitively and/or axiologically), namely the method of the result of its own actions.

For centuries, the method has been called the “judgment of God”. We will now examine the structure of the judgment of God as Homer (9th century BC) conceived it in the word 'atè'. Semasiologically, 'atè' means:

(i) the reaction of a deity to a 'mistake', a 'sin' which is always the stimulus to which a Deity responds;

(ii) a1. the deity begins to blind and confuse the mind (the intellect) (resulting in delusion, madness) (II. 8: 237; 16: 805; Od. 4: 261);

(ii)a2 consequence: a new 'error', 'sin' is committed; this one is also called 'ate' (II 6: 356); consequence: disaster, misery, ruin are the result or effect of that (new): error (II, 24: 480; Od. 4: 261), which is also called 'ate'.

(ii)b . The deity who carries out this sanction is also called 'atè' (II. 19/91). It can be seen that the Latins were also familiar with this structure of judgment, when one hears them say: “Quos Jupiter vult perdere, dementat” (Whoever Jupiter wishes to drive to ruin, he deprives of their intellect; - which corresponds to (ii)a1 above.

It goes without saying that this structure of divine judgment is commonplace in Herodotus (historiography) and among the tragedians (especially Aeschylus and Sophocles) (tragedy or mournful play).

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We will now examine the same structure in the Bible. The purest appliqué model is perhaps - *1 Kings 22 : 1/38 (Chronicles 18:1/3)*: the

characters in question are (the prince of) Aram and his opponent (the prince of) Israel.

At a certain moment, (the prince of) Judah comes to join Israel against Aram; yet, as was very customary then (and still is now, though more hypocritically), one first consults the 'seers': in this case the 'prophets' (who fall into two types:

a. the ecstatic, not fully Yahwistic (here numbering about four hundred and fifty) and

b. the fully Yahwistic (here Mikajehu (Mikeas))), this at the insistence of Jehoshaphat, the Prince of Judah: the half-Yahwistic group (Sidkia at the head (22:11; 22:24) predicts happiness 'in the name of Yahweh' (they think); the Yahwistic Mikajehu, however, responds mediumistically in two instances:

a/ first he ridicules the prince of Israel by saying: "Go up; you will surely succeed" (22:15), - which the prince immediately understands and demands the real truth;

b/ Thereupon Mikajehu becomes serious (22:17ff.): "(...) 'I saw all Israel scattered over the mountains like sheep without a shepherd, and Yahweh spoke: 'They have no master; let them return home peacefully.' Then the prince of Israel said to Jehoshaphat: 'Did I not tell you? He never predicts anything good for me, only evil.' But Mikajehu said: 'That is untrue.' Nevertheless, listen to the word of Yahweh: I saw Yahweh on his throne, with the heavenly host (i.e., the angels) around Him. He asked: "Who will persuade Ahab (the prince of Israel) to go up to Ramah in Gilad to perish there?" One (angel) said this, the other said that. Then a spirit (who inspires prophets) stepped forward, stood before Yahweh, and said: "I will persuade him!" Yahweh asked him: 'How?' The spirit answered: 'I am going to become a lying spirit in the mouths of all his (Ahab's ecstasy) prophets (= the approximately four hundred and fifty)'. Then Yahweh said: "You may work on it, and you will succeed too. Go and do it!" Now, Yahweh has now put a lying spirit in the mouths of all your prophets, because Yahweh has decreed your destruction."

It is clearly visible that, in a Yahishistic context, the exact same ate-structure (error, blindness, new error, ruin) is at work: the 'spirit' that emerged is nothing other than the principle of inspiration that Yahweh creates wherever mediumistic people wish to 'work' with it (prophecy, 'see'), but this 'spirit' (life force emanating from Yahweh) is two-edged: in true

friends of God he produces truth, in false friends of God or opponents lies (this two-edgedness is precisely the sifting character immanent in the 'spirit' of God).

The so-called 'stepping forward', etc., is purely figurative language (and one should certainly not confuse that 'spirit' with the 'angels' around God).

Cf. A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten Testaments*, Tübingen ., 1932, p. 56 (where reference is made to other judgments of God).

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Let us continue the Bible story.

Zekia, one of the hundreds of half-Yahwistic prophets (22:11), strikes Mikajehu in the face (in protest against the assertion that the 'spirit' of Yahweh has abandoned him). (22:24) Mikajehu now formulates the experimental character of his visions and his predictions: "That you shall see (= induction), when you flee from house to house to hide yourselves." (22:25) An event is predicted (note that, in experimental science, an inductive event is predicted by deduction from an explanatory hypothesis (abduction)).

This makes it possible to verify the truth and vitality of the visions and words that the prophet receives; moreover, this verification is explicitly provided for in the system (= collective structure) of prophecy and of 'seeing' and 'hearing'.

As has been the case up to the present day, the person concerned was unable to adopt an 'objective', calm attitude then either. Except for Zechariah, who reacts with violence (the 'normal' (?) response to a prophecy of doom), Ahab, the prince of Israel, has the prophet taken prisoner and "given bad food and drink" (22:27).

Mikajehoe again formulates the experimental character of his actions: "If you return unharmed (namely, contrary to the prophecy), then Yahweh has not spoken through me." (22:28).

The diagnostic structure of the judgment of God.

We can now gradually uncover a structure: the judgment of God is diagnostic, i.e., a clarification, and indeed based on an action—namely, a clarification of a ruling concerning present and future facts. Which we will now outline very briefly.

(a)i. The affirmative-predictive aspect.

Two main examples:

1/ a kerygmatic (proclaiming) **type** (e.g. *1 Kings 18:1/46, 19:1/18* , where the Yahwistic prophet Elijah(s) challenges the prophets of Baal as prophets of Yahweh (“Show today that you are God and that I am your servant” (18:36); cf. *W. Quintens, De wondere Elia* , in *Collationes* , 1971:1, pp. 43ff. (The polemic with the Baal cult));

2/ a Legal type (namely the oath in a sacred sense; cf. *F. Nicolay, Histoire des croyances, Paris* , sd, vol. 1, pp. 309 ss. (*Le serment dans les sociétés anciennes*): there is a solemn affirmation of a truth with a promise.

(a)ii. The imperative aspect.

Wishing oneself good (salvation, happiness) or evil (misery, calamity, misfortune) is inherent in divine judgment:

1/ The preacher, e.g. Elijah, accepts that if he speaks falsehood, the sanction (punishment, misery) will not, indeed, must not fail to occur;

2/ The swearer does the same: if he swears falsehood, then he wishes misfortune upon himself.

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(“If I act knowingly, let Jupiter cast me out of the city (Rome) and its citadel, where there is safety, just as I cast this stone away” (*Nicolay, oc .* , pp. 311)).

This pragmatic (based on the result of performance) aspect applies first and foremost to the committed individual, the preacher, or the oath-giver—to his soul, his deeper 'self', and his 'dunamis', 'virtus', life force, which he brings forward as the stake. In this sense, we are dealing with a soul diagnosis.

(b)1. The invocative aspect.

To place the affirmation (affirmative aspect) and the commitment (imperative aspect) on a sacred basis, the proclaimer or oath-taker appeals

(invocation) to extra- and/or supernatural ('sacred') entities and forces, as well as to its ethics and its laws: the ancestors (pro(to)gonistic variant), the elements of nature and their spirits (naturistic variant), the deities (the polytheistic, polydemonistic variant: one need only think of Jupiter in the Roman oath), - to the Supreme Being ((mono)theistic type).

Cf. *Nicolay, oc, t. III*, p. 173; in the *Iliad* 3 : after the libation of wine, the oath-taker says: "Make their heads and those of their children flow away over the earth, like this wine, and let their wives be subjected to the stranger" (the 'element' wine has its lawfulness, which is depicted in the desired fate); - in the Yahwistic variant, a 'spirit' (as above) or an angel (*1 Cor 10:1/22* (the angel of destruction cuts off twenty-three thousand people)) is deployed as the executor of God's decrees.

P. Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité, II (La symbolique du mal), Paris, 1960, pp. 199/217, mentions the 'evil deity', who acts treacherously and blindingly (dementatio), but in the Adam myth, too, the 'serpent' appears (as the carry-outer of misfortune) with Yahweh's knowledge. In short: the 'sacred' is invoked and called upon. Jesus himself carries out the judgment against Judas, ritually.

(b)2 The judicative-sanctioning aspect.

The sacred, in one of its forms, is employed in a special function, namely to pass judgment (judicative) and to work out the consequences (sanctitive) of that judgment. In this way, the deity and others separate the 'good' from the 'evil'. The so-called Matthew effect is at play here: "Whoever has, to him shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but whoever does not have, even what he possesses shall be taken away from him" (*Mt. 15:12*); "Jesus said: 'For this judgment (crima) I have come into this world, that the blind should see and the seeing should become blind'" (*Jo 9:39*).

So that the divine judgment is also a dagnostic regarding the sacred: it exposes the extra- and supernatural instances and forces (kratophany; theophany). Not only the soul of the invoker, but also the invoked one reveals itself in their relationship.

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The experimental structure of the judgment of God.

Twofold diagnostic (with regard to the relationship with God of the person in question), the judgment of God in its full form is also experimental, empirical: the proof of the 'sum' (i.e., the predictions) belongs to the system of judgment. We will now explain this in further detail.

The approximately four hundred false prophets claim: 'the campaign will succeed'; the one true prophet claims: 'The campaign will fail'.

An digression : G. Daniëls, **Religious-Historical Study on Herodotus **, *Antw./Nijmegen*, 1946, on p. 174, asserts that, in Herodotus' schema of the ordeal by God, after what S. Freud calls the **Lustprinzip** (the pleasure principle, e.g., a ruler's hunger for land) with the 'hubris' (transgression) that flows from it, a third aspect emerges (simultaneously a third phase), namely the 'sumbouleutès' (i.e., the counselor, better: warner, 'warner'). Well, here, amidst more than four hundred false 'warners', there is exactly one 'holy remnant', namely Mikajehoehoe, the true counselor. This is still how it is today: among hundreds of dowsers, fortune tellers, and other 'seers', there is often only a single true, God-friendly warner.

But let us look at what Herodotus calls the teleute, the conclusion, the outcome of the entire divine judgment event: *1 Kings 22:29/38* tells us how, notwithstanding special precautions (disguise), the prince of Israel is struck between the joints of his armor by "someone aiming his bow at random": "But, because the battle was at its fiercest then, the prince had to remain standing upright in his chariot, although the blood trickled from his wound into the bed of the chariot. Towards evening, however, he died. (...)

When they arrived in Samaria, they buried the prince: when they washed out the chariot at the Pool of Samaria, where prostitutes were bathing, the dogs licked up his blood. Thus the word that Yahweh had spoken was fulfilled (*1 Kings 22:35/38*).

It should be noted that *La Bible de Jérusalem* translates: "The dogs licked the blood and the 'prostitutes' bathed in it, according to the word that Yahweh had spoken. (It should be noted that this is a gloss, i.e. an addition ('interpolation') that clarifies what the base text says: in this case, this gloss is very significant for those familiar with magic).

The legal form of the trial by ordeal differs, experimentally speaking, from the existential-historical form described above, in that it is dramatically staged as a spectacle with an audience and judges who pass judgment based on the outcome (the 'teleute' of Herodotus).

Bible sample : P. Nicolay, *Histoire des croyances*, t. III , Paris, sd, pp. 173/229 (Les 'jugements de Dieu': description des différentes sortes d'ordalies).

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-- G. Welter, *Les croyances primitives* , pp. 187/188 (says that 'ordalie' comes from the Old Germanic 'or.dal', judgment, verdict);

-- A. Erler, *Der Ursprung der Gottesurteile* , 1941;

-- B. Hermesdorf, *De herkomst der ordalia* , in *Tijdschr. v. Rechtsgeschiedenis* , IX (1929), pp. 271ff.;

-- Gert Chesi, *Vaudou (Force secrète de l'Afrique, Paris , 1980 (= Voodoo, Wörgl, 1979), pp. 183/186 (Le jugement de Dieu ; pp. 189/191: photos).*

The ordnance (the judicial divine judgments) was twofold:

a/ the strict ordalia by means of the elements (namely the ordeal by fire, the ordeal by water (Nicolay, oc, pp. 178/183), the ordeal by oil (ibid.),

b/ single combat (duel) by means of weapons (Nicolay, oc ., pp. 199/229 (*De la preuve par le combat judiciaire ou duel*).

Nicolaj, oc, p. 173, calls both forms 'superstitious practices'—and rightly so—but notes their very universal occurrence among all peoples of a certain cultural type, as well as the 'mercifulness' with which even someone like Montesquieu, **Esprit des lois **, in the full 18th century, writes about them: “The laws concerning combat, concerning the red-hot iron and the boiling water were so in accordance with morals that these laws gave rise to fewer injustices than the degree to which they themselves were unjust—that their effects were more innocent than their causes”.

The judicial structure of the trial by ordeal can be outlined as follows:

(i) in case of doubt among the judges as to **(a)** the guilt of the defendants or **(b)** the legal basis;

(ii) the judges decided on a judicial test or experiment **(a)** by means of the elements or **(b)** by means of weapons such that **1/** the invocation, i.e.

the taking as witness **i/** the elements, **ii/** the spirits , **iii** / God, **2/** the imprecatio, i.e. the deployment of either the integrity (partial) or the life (total) of one's own flesh and blood, made it a decision from a higher authority (sacred).

Nicolay, oc, pp. 188 ss. cites exotic contemporary examples and quotes: Dr. Barret, **Afrique occidentale** : “Whether it concerns criminal or civil proceedings in the Principality of Benin, a trial by ordeal is permitted whenever one of the parties makes a request for it. I use the expression 'trial by ordeal' (jugement de Dieu) here, according to Barret, because it accurately reflects the meaning of this custom and because this legal proof has also existed in our (Western) customary law. The comparison between Negro-African and Western customary law, however strange it may be, surprises no one who has traveled extensively: I personally have encountered this customary law in Abyssinia, among the natives in the Congo, and in the ancient law of all Asian populations.”

Two remarks:

- (1) often the trial is merely a false judgment (deception);
- (2) From a magical standpoint it is clear that deception can be made even greater.

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Note - As every biblical scholar knows, the Bible teems with examples of divine judgment in all forms. Yet one should not think that this is exclusively Biblical: all religions, even the so-called speculative Eastern ones, have at times extricated themselves from “the swamp of speculation (i.e., mere hypotheses)” to “put in its place a doctrine whose value and practical usefulness could still be put to the test in this lifetime”. (*I. Horner, Buddhism: The Theravada, in R. Zaehner , ed., How Man Seeks His God , Rotterdam, 1960, pp. 280/281* (even with the Pauline doctrine of the sow-reap law (Gal., 6:7/8) in a Buddhist version: “As the seed is sown, so is the fruit that is reaped: the doer of good reaps good fruit and that of evil, bad.” (Oc, 286)).

Note: There is a third form of divine judgment, which we will touch upon very briefly: the liturgical. St. Paul, *1 Corinthians 11:27-32* , describes this in connection with the Eucharist: “Therefore, whoever eats the bread

or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner sins against the body and blood of the Lord. Let each one examine himself, and only then eat of the bread and drink of the cup. For whoever eats and drinks, eats and drinks judgment upon himself: if he does not value the body (of the Lord) according to its worth. Because of this, **(i)** there are so many weak and sick among you, and **(ii)** so many have fallen asleep.” Immediately, St. Paul introduces a precious distinction: “If we had judged ourselves according to truth, we would not be judged; now, if we are judged by the Lord, then this is a lesson for us, so that we may not be condemned with the world.”

However, there is a warning judgment that offers the opportunity for repentance (warning: cf. Herodotus), and there is a condemnation 'with the world' (which lies in evil), which is irrevocable, meaning that, in the judgment of Yahweh, there are degrees, like a process that becomes irreversible over time.

That this process of judgment proceeds so silently for irreligious people and for complacent religious people is not the least of the tragedies of our time: since German Idealism (Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Marx), with its offshoots (including existentialism and, even, structuralism), there has been so much talk of critique of consciousness and critique of ideology. Well, here St. Paul offers an example of religious critique of consciousness and ideology: “Therefore let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall” (1 Cor 10:12).

W.E. Hocking, **Les principes de la methode en philosophie religieuse **, in **Rev. d. Methode et d. Mor **, 29 (1922): 4, p. 453*, says: “It is not religion—it is irreligion (non-religion) that is gullible toward natural phenomena. Religion is the invincible Unbelief (...) toward what appears.”

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The comprehensive structure of the diagnostic-experimental method.

Scripture is thus clearly, like all religions, (diagnostically-)experimentally oriented. And yet: we have, deliberately, set aside one, or rather the basic aspect (for the sake of clarity of the description), namely the 'intentional' (Du., 3: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, view consciousness as the 'direction' of attention, 'intentio') and 'hermeneutic' (Me, 12/15:

Dilthey's 'verstehendmethode' as an interpretation of the expressions of one's fellow man) structure, which is at work whenever one analyzes sacred facts.

Deuteronomy 29:1/5 points to the 'wound': "Now Moses called all Israel together and said to them: You yourselves have seen everything that the Lord did before your eyes in Egypt to Pharaoh, his servants, and all his land: the great calamities, the signs, and the mighty wonders, which you saw with your own eyes. -- But the Lord has not given you to this day a heart to understand, eyes to see, or ears to hear." This means that there is more than one way of encountering (intentio) with sacred facts.

John 12:37/45 points the same finger at the same 'wound': "Although (Jesus) had now wrought so many signs before their eyes, they still did not believe in him. This was so that the word spoken by the prophet Isaiah (*Is. 53:1; 6:10*) might be fulfilled: 'Lord, who has believed our preaching?' To whom has the arm (the mighty coming) of the Lord been revealed?' Therefore they could not even believe: for Isaiah said: 'He has blinded their eyes, hardened their hearts. This so that they would not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts; - lest they repent and I heal them! These words Isaiah spoke when he had beheld His glory and had spoken about Him.'"

This means that physical seeing, hearing, and touching (perception) is a first step regarding religious experience; that understanding (the diagnostic aspect: distinguishing the extra- and especially the supernatural (divine) in the natural experimental event) is a second step, - dependent on **(a)** man himself, with his limited freedom, **(b)** the extra- and supernatural active authority (spirit, Deity, Supreme Being), which 'gives' you the ability to understand (to 'see' in the second degree), which can, if necessary, act in a stifling manner (see above pp. 44/45 (atee (Homer), false spirit (*1 Kings*)) (which makes the second 'seeing', the actual understanding, even more difficult); - which implies that both one's own effort (investigation) and 'grace' (it is given) go hand in hand here.

However, if direct contact with the extra- and supernatural is not also present in and through the experimental sacred event, there is no true understanding of such transempirical (E. Reichenbach) data. (Cf. also *Jer 5:21; Ezek 12:2*).

For the 'hardening' (dementative) aspect (in the Old Testament) see G. Von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Munich, 1960-2, II, pp. 162/166 (Von Rad says that Isaiah, regarding the judgment of God, in which He 'blinds', 'petrifies', 'hardens' man (the unfit and thus to be eliminated), was an heir to an insight that, in Israel, indeed, in all of antiquity, had an undisputed basis" (pp. 164;-- yet precisely that 'evil god' aspect (P. Ricoeur) proves how human effort (autonomy) merges with grace).

For the 'mystical' (directly contacting) aspect: see G. von Rad, *oc.*, pp. 314/321 ('apocalypticism' is a deepening of the direct contact between the extra- and supernatural, on the one hand, and, on the other, the one who establishes and sees through facts: the apocalyptic books (especially since the prophet Daniel) differ from that perspective from the priestly ('historical'), the prophetic, and the sapiential books, in that paranormal faculties come into play more clearly.

See also H. Pinard *vol. B., L' ét. comp. d. rel., I*, pp. 463/471: since H. Delacroix, *Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme*, Paris, 1908, the mystics who have direct contact with the extra- and supernatural have been of interest from a religious studies perspective.

Pinard emphasizes understanding (*verstehendemethode*, Dilthey): "(...) The common 'law' of all friendship: one loves, one gives oneself to the extent that one is loved. If, therefore, the mystical life is an intimate, heartfelt communion between Creator and creature, then its development depends on the growing purification of the heart, on the progress regarding the generosity of the soul". (*oc.*, p. 465).

Id., *Les analogues psychologiques*, in *Settimana Int. di Etnologia Rel.*, Paris, 1926, pp. 76/90 (Pinard distinguishes striking, ordinary and profound phenomena in mystical experience);

-- H. Bremond, *Falsche und real Mystik (Jeanne des Anges und Marie de l'incarnation)*, Regensburg, 1955;

-- R. Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane (An Inquiry into some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience)*, Oxford, 1957 (Zaehner makes a sharp distinction between non-theistic mysticism (nature mysticism, pantheistic mysticism (often the manic aspect of manic-depressive psychosis, he claims)) and theistic mysticism, which concerns a personally living deity; the so-called psychedelic drug mysticism is also touched upon);

-- Gerda Walther, *Phänomenologie der Mystik*, Olten/ Freib. i.Br. 1955 (a very fascinating work by a phenomenologist, a pupil of Pfänder; she is also knowledgeable about modern paranormology, - which is rare);

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-- MM. Davy, dir., *Encyclopédie des mystiques orientales*, Paris, 1975 (ancient Egypt, Sumer and Hittite culture, Assyria and Babylonia, ancient Iran, India (Hinduism), Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, Yi-King mysticism, Confucian mysticism, Taoism, Chinese Ch'an, Vietnamese mysticism, Shinto, Japanese Buddhism, Zen).

-- A. Poulain, *Des grâces d' oraison (Traité de théologie mystique)*, Paris, 1901 (remains a classic; on pp. 285/536 (*Révélations et visions*, - with the question of the distinction of minds (i.e. the fluid instances at work in visions, revelations, etc.))).

-- A. Stolz, *Théologie de la mystique*, Chevetogne, 1947-2 (understood in a Biblical-church paternalistic way).

-- J. Tyciak, *Morgenländische Mystik*, Düsseldorf, 1949 (particularly fascinating introduction to Eastern Church-Patriotic liturgical mysticism).

-- M. Buber, *Ecstatic Confessions*, Berlin, sd (anthology of Indian, Islamic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic, and Christian mystics).

Two remarks:

(i) P. Saintyves, **Le discernement du miracle **, Paris, 1909 (a 'critical' book, which forgets that 'miracles' without the direct cognitive contact aspect are 'critically' incomprehensible), p. 293, briefly emphasizes the flight from the world of the 'mystical contemplatives', which he contrasts, and rightly so, with the believers who travel to the holy city of Lourdes to live, to be healthy, etc.

Indeed, a certain tradition has repurposed direct contact with the external and supernatural into a contemplative, 'reflective' sense (one withdraws to 'behold' God (or whatever else?), to 'enjoy' Him, alienated from the misery that all archaic religions saw and attempted to remedy with their miraculous magic). This does not prevent genuine, life-connected, direct contact with the external and supernatural from constituting the core of all religious experience (and experiment).

(ii) The great problem is that of the distinction of 'spirits': "Beloved, do not believe every 'spirit', but examine whether the 'spirits' are from God. For many false prophets have gone out into the world." (*1 John 4:1*). - "The fruit of the light consists in all kinds of goodness, righteousness, and truth. Examine what is pleasing to the Lord." (*Ephesians 5:9/10*).

"Do not quench the 'spirit'; do not despise prophecies. But examine everything and hold fast to what is good." (*1 Thess. 5:19*).

Indeed, St. John gives a criterion (something by which one recognizes something): "Whoever keeps Jesus' commandments remains in him and He in him. By this, then, we know that He remains in us: by the 'Spirit' that He gave us." (*1 John 3:24*).

Indeed, if, in and through natural phenomena, by direct cognitive contact (the understanding method), we ought to 'see', then the distinction between 'spirits' and 'forces' (fluids, subtle substances) is decisive. We will discuss this further in the course.

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The pragmatic structure of the experimental method.

The term 'pragmatism' originates from C.S. Peirce, who thereby wanted to distance himself from ordinary pragmatism (of, for example, W. James et al.). Pragmatism judges logical entities (ideas, judgments, and reasoning) based on the result that flows from them when applied.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, judges logical entities based on the result of their application without questioning their intellectual or conceptual character; quite the contrary: Peirce is a conceptual realist, yet his theory of ideas is always applicable in self-actual experiments. Both anti-idealistic and idealistic pragmatism are not merely application-

oriented, but take into account the well-being or ill-being that the application or result entails. This means that they do not merely think in an application-active manner, but in an evaluative-vital manner: only if the result creates life or promotes life is a logical entity (idea, judgment, reasoning) valuable.

That is the axiological-soteriological aspect of both types of pragmatism.

(i) Axiology means 'theory of value';

(ii) soteriology means doctrine of salvation (theory of salvation). In 1878, Peirce noted that his method 'of preparing ideas' (see *KO Apel, ed., CH.S. Peirce, Schriften I, Frankfurt a.M.*, 1967, p. 355) was the application "of the only principle of logic that was recommended by Jesus: 'By their fruits you shall know them' and that it "was very closely connected with Biblical conceptions".

Peirce asserts that the rule of conduct, whereby one tests ideas against experiments constructed by oneself, leads via abduction and deduction to inductive control, namely, a gradual process in which man, in all his wretched insignificance, is gradually grasped more by the spirit of God, of which nature and history are filled.

We are convinced that Peirce is telling the pure truth here. The

a/ experimental and

b/ The 'comprehending' character of religious justification (confirmation, verification) is always also related to salvation. If a religious experience increases the misery in creation, then no matter how splendid it may be, it is negative; if, however, it reduces the misery (the 'evil' in the world), then it has a good chance of being not merely extra-natural but supernatural, that is, strictly divine, in the sense of emanating from the supreme being—in the Catholic sense, from the Holy Trinity. With this we return to our starting point (see above pp. 41/42): natural good (moral virtue),—extra-natural good (charismatic virtue),—yes, but above all theological. (Supreme Being-involved, supernatural) virtue is only then probatively powerful.

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We will now explain this in more detail.

Library sample: P. Saintyves, **Le discernement du miracle **. Paris, 1909, pp. 253/347, especially pp. 263 ff., describes the 'miracle' in religions ('power miracles' (cosmic in nature) in the Old Testament and in non-Jewish religions; 'life miracles', especially raising the dead in the New Testament; 'healing miracles' in all religions).

Subsequently, the work provides a 'criteriology' of the miracle: the history of religions gives us:

1/ the miracle as the work of inspiration or mission (by deities, e.g. the Holy Trinity),

2/ the miracle as the 'performance' ('prestige') of initiates (with two types:

a/ the temple priest physique with its optical, acoustic, mechanical (deus ex machina), chemical 'miracle-working,

b/ the 'theöergia', i.e. the control of nature spirits (usually called 'deities'), both good and bad, by means of their own nature 'liturgical performances'),

3/ the miracle as the work of 'saints' (folk saints, mind you).

-- RP. Guillot, *Les miracles du Christ*, in *Historia (Les miracles)*, No. 394 bis, Paris, 1979, pp. 8/20, situates Jesus' miraculous power within the ancient context, in which the miracle was a universal fact (Hellas, the Semites), takes stock: thirty-two miracles in the whole; in that universal collection four subsets:

a/ fifteen physical healings ("concerning the most diverse ailments, the eternal 'miseries' of mankind", the lame, the limping, the mute, the deaf, dropsy, someone with a withered hand, etc.);

b/ six incantations or exorcisms (an epileptic child, a hunchbacked woman, a Syrophenician girl, mute people, etc.);

c/ raising of the dead or rather resurrections (Lazarus, the son of the widow of Naim, the girl of Jairus, Jesus' own resurrection);

d/ miracles of control of nature (**a/** the transformation of water into wine (Cana), the two multiplications of loaves; **b/** the miraculous catch of fish; **c/** 'going' on the sea, calming the storm).

Of that total collection, for example, there are ten recounted by all three synoptic Gospels, one (the first multiplication of the loaves) by all four evangelists, two by only three evangelists, five by only two evangelists, and twelve by only one evangelist.

A. De Groot, *The Bible on the Miracle* , Roermond/Maaseik, 1961, p. 32
“All documents (...) unanimously indicate that Jesus **a/** healed the sick, **b/** raised the dead, **c/** freed the possessed of demons, **d/** almighty controlled nature. About twenty texts from the Gospels mention broadly that he performed many miracles. But in addition, a number of precisely described cases have been preserved”.

W. Trilling, *Fragen zur Geschichtlichkeit Jesu* , Düsseldorf, 1966 (Dutch: *The historicity of Jesus* , Bilthoven, 1968, especially S. 96/105 (*Die Frage der Wunder*));

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Id, *Christus' Verkündigung in den synoptischen Evangelien (Beispiele gattungsgemäßer Auslegung)* , Munich, 1969 (especially 146/164) (Die zeichen der Messiaszeit: Mk 10: 46/52 (the healing of the blind); - an example of a healing miracle' (not a natural miracle):

“By 'healing' something is indicated that is essential to Jesus' activity: **(i)** the saving encounter of an individual with Jesus, liberating them from 'evil' in all its forms **(ii)** as an eschatological (= end-time) gift of God's kingdom. Jesus himself says of it: 'Go and say to this 'fox' (meaning King Horodes): Behold, I cast out demons and perform healings, today and tomorrow (...) (Lk 13: 32)'. (Oc, 153/154); further oc, S. 165/190 (*Gericht über das falsche Israel* (Mt 21: 33/46), an example of 'masjal' (parable, parable)).

For the timeframe in which Jesus is situated, as well as the first church: J. Danielou, *Théologie du Judéo-Christianisme* , Paris, 1958 (the period between +33 and +200, hitherto poorly understood, shows us a Christianity that remains thoroughly Jewish (and at the same time Semitic), dominated by apocalypticism—this before Christianity becomes fully Hellenistic (of which St. Paul's letters already bear witness)).

-- R. Schnackenburg, *La Théologie du Nouveau Testament (État de la question)* , DDB, 1961 (especially pp. 67/70; ' salvation history ', see also oc, pp. 29/30.

-- J. von Hofmann, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (W.Volck), 1886, is the first to understand history as salvation or soteriological history in a completely Biblical sense, yes, really intended by Jesus: one also

thinks of O. Cullmann, *Christus und die Zeit (Die urchristliche zeit- und Geschichtsauffassung)*, Zollikon/Zürich, 1948).

Further description of the pragmatic character.

Summarized once again: 'pragmatic' means:

(a) ideas (concepts), if necessary expressed in statements (judgments, reasoning), - i the doctrinal aspect, ('didachè' (Greek for doctrina);

(b)1/ tested against the result thereof, either the applying life or the applying experiment) (liturgical, legal, etc.),

(b)2 / assessed simultaneously on the quality of the result, namely beneficial or harmful.

We will now explain this in more detail.

= **(a) The doctrinal aspect.**

Bibl. sample: L. Ceriaux, *Jésus aux origines de la tradition*, DDB, 1968

A. Descamps, Préface, in oc, p. 11 emphasizes that Jesus' ministry is twofold: **(i)** in Galilee (proclamation of the good news directed to the multitude, which fails and leads to Jesus proclaiming only in a limited circle (and then only in mashal, parable form));

(ii) in Jerusalem (Cross Easter followed by Resurrection Easter); consequence: Christianity is **a/** a doctrine and **b/** an event of redemption; both points are carefully elaborated by Cerfaux.

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W. Trilling, *Christus' Verkündigung id synopt . Ev.*, s. 40 / 63 (*The message concerning the Kingdom of God* (*Mk 1: 14/15* : 'Repent, for the kingdom of God is near'); - "It is a theological editorial piece in a particularly pregnant form" (oc, s. 49), - in other words, this concerns genuine, transmitted doctrine, the intellectually meaningful and conscience-binding contents of knowledge and thought oc, s. 64/145 (promise of salvation and ethics-politics of the disciple (*Mt 5: 3/12*), a beatification; (makarismos); the new and true righteousness (*Mt 5: 20/22*), an apodictic and casuistic saying of the law (with an ipsissima vox Jesu, a genuine word of Jesus); God's mercy (*Lk 15: 1/10*), a parable (of the lost sheep), with criticism of the merely Pharisaic morality and politics; detachment from possessions, as well as following Jesus (*Lk 18: 18/30*), a doctrinal or dogmatic dialogue, in which three apocalyptic statements ('Truly I say unto you, it is difficult

for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven') and an apophtegma as a conclusion).

It is clear that **a/** all religions, **b/** the Old Testament, and **c/** the entire modern world are doctrinal in the first instance (one need only think of the extensive mythologies of archaic cultures, especially regarding rites), yet immediately that we need not justify this further—it is so evident, except for the adherents of the 'irrational leap' (and even then: that irrationality is unconscious, very logically and doctrinally founded).

-- (b)1 . The either existential-historical or strictly 'experimental' character of that doctrine.

Biblical sample : besides the texts cited above (salvific purpose of history, therapeutic nature of most Jesus miracles, etc.), also this: A. De Groot, *De Bijbel over het wonder* , p. 37, where he says: “In summary: the New Testament is unanimously of the opinion that the power to perform miracles;

1/ is not limited to the time of the public life of Jesus,

2/ but that this gift also remains active in the church.”

It is noteworthy, however, that it is not given to every believer to perform miracles (*1 Cor 10:29*). This gift belongs to those who are particularly inspired by the Spirit, i.e.: **1/** the apostles and 'prophets' and **2/** those whom the Spirit arbitrarily chooses for Himself.

It should also be emphasized that the miracle **1/** is not only a confirmation and ratification of the 'office', **2/** but an essential moment of the preaching of the gospel, (which aims to awaken faith in the saving revelation of God's power.”

In other words: learning and miracle go intimately hand in hand:

1/ Whoever, therefore, preaches a doctrine without at least a minimum of 'signs,' and specifically signs of a miraculous nature, falls below the standard of the evangelical requirements of proclamation;

2/ Moreover: whoever dismisses the miracles as 'myths' (Bultmann et al.) or as 'folk fables' (Marx et al.) thereby runs directly contrary to God's action in Jesus.

The inner coherence between ideas (= doctrine) and their applicability is evident not only from Jesus' teaching and its immediately applicable nature, but also from the pagan religions, at least insofar as they are what is called 'magical' or 'dynamistic'.

A prime example of this is *Bolos of Mendes* (+ -200), (who, in his * *Fusika dunamera**, the physical conceived not theoretically but 'dynamically-magically', sets himself apart from mere 'theoria', the purely speculative-contemplative study of nature, introduced into Hellas since the Ionian physicists (natural philosophers) and particularly emphasized since Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus.

Father Festugière, **La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, I (L'astrologie et les sciences occultes *)*, Paris, 1944, p. 194, says: "This criterion of utility is decisive. It best indicates the boundary where two worlds separate." The three 'realms'—the inorganic (rocks, metals), the plant, and the animal-human—are not approached as 'forms' present in matter and the object of theoretical considerations (as with Aristotle, for example), but as force-bearing forms, in order to establish salvation (or, in the case of 'black' magic or, also, negative divine judgment (see above, pp. 44/4); Jesus also applies this procedure to Judas, the betrayer: *John 13:26/30*), calamity).

Yet, besides these intellectual magics (Neo-Pythagorean, Neo-Platonic) of late antiquity, there are the ancient folk magics, with which 'intellectuals' even today feel compelled to ridicule, yet about which the liberal Catholic *P. Saintyves*, **Le discernement du miracle**, Paris, 1909, pp. 293s., wrote: "All those sick people who travel by train (...) to Lourdes do not go there driven by some idea of mystical contemplation; no: the thirst for life scorches their hearts afflicted by sickness and ailment. What, after all, to do with a body that is weak and pitiful, with which one cannot even earn one's daily bread? The sick have learned to detach themselves from many things; their feelings have weakened. Yet one feeling comes through stronger day by day; it seizes the last energies of their being: to be healed, to live again!"

They have been told that the Virgin Mary had saved incurable people; they have heard accounts of many miraculous healings. And then: one fine day, the will to live, supported by such stories, created confidence; a sense

of hope dug itself into the heart of their dedicating forces: they get ready and depart.” The 'enlightened' mind, which feels compelled to mock such life situations, even if in the name of (God knows what pseudo-)science or (ideological) belief (just as theologians with a purely anti-magical and anti-mythical disposition call their 'faith' instead of -magic-and-myth-fideism).

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- (b)2 The salvation-oriented character of the doctrine.

As Festugière says, the usefulness of the doctrine is decisive. But not usefulness per se: it is the salvific usefulness that is decisive.

We will now briefly clarify this regarding Jesus' ministry. A. De Groot, **De bijbel over het wonder**, 1961, pp. 32/61 (*The miracle and the proclamation of God's Lordship in the New Testament*), develops basic ideas, which we briefly summarize. We can capture this in two schemata:

(i) First diagram: the judgment diagram.

The miracle hand-in-hand with the doctrine is a stimulus to which the observer can respond in more than one way (ambiguity; see *Du.*, 24/31 (doctrine of ambiguity): miracle --- = answer (+) or answer (-). See *oc*, 55/61 : “It is clearly taught by Christ that the signs given by Him are sufficient for those who bring the willingness to believe. For those who lack this willingness and stubbornly resist, the miracle is of no use.” (*oc*, 59).

One cannot express the sifting character of Jesus' teaching and miracle more clearly. -- This implies that the public-pressing nature of experimental science is absent here, and intentionally so: to safeguard the radical freedom of the spectator; (see: *EP*, 12/15 (The structure of experimental or hard science)).

This does not imply, however, that there is no experimental (and thus 'hard') aspect to Jesus's actions: “Experimentation is the art of provoking the manifestation of the phenomenon ... and of dissecting it into its elements”. Thus C.I. Bernard, *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale*, 1865.

-- L. Millet/Br. Magnin, *Les sciences humaines aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1972, characterizes specialized science clearly and distinctly:

(i) Science is 'positive' insofar as it describes publicly repeatable experiences without ideological or philosophical claim (see *EP. 17/22 (Critique of Ideology)*; *23/27 (Philosophy)*; *28/30 (Theology)*).

(ii) science is 'objective' insofar as it represents the object, independent of subjective interpretation (cf. Peirce's 'external permanency');

(iii) a) science is observational, purely perceiving, insofar as it perceives, describes, compares (distributive, collective);

b) Science is experimental, empirical, insofar as it proceeds from abduction (hypothesis), via deduction (deriving experiments from that hypothesis), to induction (experiment with a result for or against the abduction). (oc, p.32).

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It is clear that the critically formed miracle spectator

1/ can begin 'positively' (phenomenologically), **2/** attempts to see 'objectively',

3/ 'observes' and, if necessary, **2/** 'experiments'.

However, the critically formed observer of the unity of doctrine and miracle is also 'judged', that is, he is assessed by his ethical-political conduct, which, in this context, operates causally (originally) and, as a result, brings salvation or misfortune. Consequently, there is a fundamental difference between scientific observation and potential experimentation, on the one hand, and religious observation and potential experimentation, on the other.

The 'ate', the judgment of God (see repeatedly above, especially *pp. 44/45*), coincides with the cognitive process, which is fundamentally identical to it (as an event of knowledge), but differs seriously from it as a process of judgment. Faith is not science, however scientific it may be! Faith is always also judgment. And thus more and different from pure science.

Note : A. De Groot, *oc.*, observes that "the miracles of the New Testament are not limited to Jesus" (p. 35). This implies repeatability (at

least to a certain extent; however, scientific experiments are not infinitely repeatable either).

(a) *Jesus himself clearly states them as repeatable.*

“When He had called His twelve disciples together, He gave them the power to:

(1) to drive out unclean spirits (exorcist side) and

(2) to heal all diseases and ailments (therapeutic aspect) (*Mt 10:1*) Not only does Jesus give the 'exousia', the power, - the disciples also exercise it: “Now he went around the surrounding villages teaching. He also called the twelve to him, sent them out two by two, and gave them power over unclean spirits (...)

They went and (i) preached that people should repent (doctrinal). They cast out many demons, anointed many sick people with oil and healed them (miraculous). Again, the typically pragmatic unity of doctrine and the effectiveness of that doctrine (all truth is causal). (*Mk. 6: 6b/12* .)

Moreover, John said to Jesus: “Teacher, we saw someone casting out demons in your name who did not follow us, because he did not join us! -- But Jesus said: “Do not forbid him; for there is no one who performs a miracle in my name and immediately afterward can mock me: whoever is not against us is for us” (*Mk. 9:37/39*).

Compare this with *Acts 19:13/18* : the seven sons of a Jewish high priest Sceva (itinerant exorcists) once “tried” (experimental character) to call upon the name of the Lord Jesus over those who were possessed by evil spirits, saying, 'I adjure you by Jesus, whom Paul preaches.' But the evil spirit answered them, 'I know Jesus; I also know Paul, but who are you?' And the man with the evil spirit leaped upon them, overpowered them, and mistreated them, so that they fled the house naked and wounded.

Here the judgmental character is clearly visible: for the one, exorcism brings salvation; for the other, harm.

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The (unconscious) soul of the one performing the conjuration plays a part. When his 'dunamis' (life force) – *Luke 5:17; 8:46* – is insufficient (for

various reasons, especially friendship with God), then such an experiment becomes fatal. All occultists know this perfectly well.

(b) *Jesus makes the teaching and sign power repeatable after his resurrection .*

“The following 'signs' ('miracles') will accompany those who have believed,” says Jesus at his Ascension (*Mk 16: 17/18* ; again: exorcistic, therapeutic, but now also cosmic (snake venom, poison is harmless) and 'charismatic' (speaking in tongues)). Again: Jesus not only gives the power; one sees the Church exercising it:

a/ apostles (Peter: *Acts 9:36/43* (*Dorcas*); *9:33/35* (*Aineias*); accompanied by power of judgment: *Acts 5:1/11* (*Ananias and Sapphira die !*). Paul: *Acts 19:11* (hands, sweatcloths, and belts have an exorcistic, therapeutic effect); *Acts 14:8/20* (*Lustra*); *Acts 28:1/6* (*the adder does not poison Paul* , as Jesus had predicted); *ibid. 28:8/9* (*therapeutic*); accompanied by power of judgment: *Acts 13:6/12* (*Elumas the magician is disempowered*).

b/ Deacons (Stephen (*Acts 6:8* great miracles and signs); Philip (*Acts 8:6/8; 8:26/40* (exorcistic, therapeutic). See also *Hebrews 2:2/4* (with emphasis on the judgmental character) -- In the Church, faithful to doctrine, people have believed Jesus' word on the matter; from this, they have derived its applicability (deduction toward experiment); while living or acting ritually, they have experimented (induction); they have experienced the results to this day, at least if one still takes up the message of Jesus pragmatically (and does not allow it to dissolve into mere devotion, mystical contemplation, academism, conceptual play, and the like).

Thus, one lives even today—now—in that doctrinally miraculous tradition, and can judge, based on what is still perceptible today, what two-thousand-year-old texts assert about Jesus and the early church (without much erudition regarding biblical texts). There is no better exegesis than this doctrinally miraculous one!

(ii) *Second diagram: the process diagram.*

Up until now we regarded the unit of the teaching miracle (= system) as judgment. Now the inner structure. *A. De Groot, oc ., pp. 38ff.*, rightly states that three names recur regarding miracle: **(1)** 'miracle' **(2)** always with

either (miracle) sign or (miracle) power - force. The concept of 'miracle' shows the singular or, better, the extra- and supernatural character.

The concept of miracle (sign) signifies its informative-doctrinal character. The concept of (miraculous) power indicates its effective-dynamic character. The miracle is a process that provides an explanation of itself (information) and creates an effect (effect).

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(I) *The informative nature.*

(i) *The miracle reveals Christ's essence to us:*

He has been sent by God to establish the kingdom, the kingdom of God. Jesus comes to 'baptize' with the Holy Spirit and with fire: he 'judges'; with the winnowing fan in his hand, he gathers wheat, while burning the chaff (separation).

“Judgment and Salvation are both preached: in this respect, judgment has a character of actuality and salvation is conceived of as future.” (*A. De Groot, oc ., 51*). “By now viewing his miracles as the fulfillment of the messianic-eschatological prophecies, Christ holds before John (the Baptist)'s eyes that **(i)** the healings, **(ii)** exorcisms, and **(iii)** raising of the dead belong to the breakthrough of the Kingdom of God.” (oc., 53).

“The miracle thus becomes the visible expression of a total restoration, - a sign that sin is beginning to lose ground” (*oc, 54*). “(Jesus') word works itself out, in miracle, bringing about redemption. His miracles are the Kingdom of God in deed. For Jesus not only proclaims the kingdom, but makes it present in his deeds”. (*oc, 55*).

However, miracles are intrinsically part of what Jesus' task is: establishing God's Kingdom. They are not superfluous: where they are not (or no longer) present, the Kingdom simply does not begin there; Jesus is misunderstood in his works. Misery, the dominion of demons (demonic misery), and the wildness of the natural elements (cosmic misery) bear witness to God's absence; however, that Jesus “went about doing good and healed all who were possessed by the devil, because God was with them” (*Acts 10:38; Luke 4:18/19*) precisely proves (the beginning of) God's active

presence, the exercise of his princely power in the person and work of Jesus.

Behind the leper, the possessed, the dead, Jesus discerns the enemy. Characteristic of this is the reading about the healing of the leper (*Mark 1:14*): “Jesus, moved with compassion ('philanthropia,' says the Eastern liturgy), stretched out his hand to heal” or “Jesus, grim, enraged, stretched out his hand.”

Both belong together: compassion for the bound man and wrath at the destructive power—a compassion and wrath that moves Jesus to tears (*John 11:33/38*). (oc, 40).

(ii) Regarding the Exorcism:

Because of the emphasis placed on exorcisms, it is not right to regard them as mere healings of the mentally ill. (...) To regard the mention of demons as a result of insufficient knowledge (namely of modern medicine) does (...) shortchange the intention of Scripture. When Christ addresses the evil spirit in a sick person, he proceeds from a different standpoint that lies outside that of a physician or a psychiatrist. He points out what lies hidden behind the naturally observable. He acknowledges, beneath the physical torment, the power of evil: Satan. This is not verifiable by science (...) He works through the natural and adapts himself to it (oc, 48).

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(iii) Regarding the existential-historical miracle of Jesus' incarnation.

And this not without her Easter of the Cross and the Resurrection:

(A)1 Jesus destroyed death through his death on the cross.

They referred to the centuries-old Roman liturgy, where it states that Jesus “destroyed death by dying (himself) and restored life by rising (himself)”: every magician knows what that formula means: for only by repeating a process oneself can one master that process (magically speaking, at least).

a) Jesus is incarnated. That is to say, he himself relived the earthly life, although he was the second person of the Holy Trinity.

b1) Jesus applied the phrase 'suffering servant of the Lord' (especially Isaiah (= Is) 49:1 ff (Second and third song of the 'Ebed Yahweh')), at least in terms of its content, to Himself: He personally re-enacted the suffering, the misery, especially in His Easter on the cross:

b2) Jesus applied the word 'Son of Man' (Dan 7:13 : 'I 'saw' in the night visions. Behold, coming on the clouds of heaven, as it were, a Son of Man (i.e., someone belonging to the species 'man')) to himself: he demonstrated the resurrection, himself, in his own person.

c) Equally 'magical' is the solidarity between, on the one hand, humanity and, on the other, Jesus as the suffering servant who becomes the glorified Son of Man: a magical exchange takes place. The 'experiment' of being human in misery (ebed Yahweh) grows out of and for Jesus and for humanity fluidly solidary with him into the 'experiment' of 'being human in glory'.

On Easter Sunday, the Byzantine liturgy, which reflects the archaic religion better than the Roman (with its secular juridism) cf. G. Dumézil), says: “Yesterday I was buried with You, Christ: today (the 'hodie' of the Roman liturgy) I was raised from the dead with You, who rose again. Yesterday I was crucified with You: You Yourself, let me partake in Your glory in Your kingdom, Savior.” (Easter Canon of John of Damascus, Ode 3).

(A)2 Jesus' descent into hell.

Even the 'nekuia', the descent into hell, inherent in the misery of unredeemed humanity, Jesus himself retraced: “With the body you were in the grave, with the soul in 'Hades' (hell, the underworld of unredeemed souls), as God. With the robber (i.e., the 'good' thief) you were in paradise, while you, Christ, are on the throne with the Father and the Spirit, fulfilling everything, yourself infinite”. (From the Troparia).

We therefore say in our Roman Creed every Sunday “who has descended into hell”, hopefully still knowing what that expression meant in the archaic-magical world.

Conclusion: the greatest miracle is the resurrection from the dead in glory, prepared by solidarity in misery—intended to be equally solidary. Note: the resurrection of Jesus (and ours immediately) is not simply coming to life again (in a miserable—earthly manner); it is different, glorified,

coming to life again.—Behold the miracle as a sign, as a message, knowledge and thought content, centered around Jesus.

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(II) *The effective nature.*

A. De Groot, *oc*, 42, rightly notes that the four evangelists, although placing different emphases, nevertheless all also emphasize “that God’s power is at work in Christ”, “that this is also expressed in the miracle stories”. De Groot states the following:

(a) Healing follows an authoritative word, a decision of the will.

(b) Jesus casts out demons with the command: 'Be silent, and come out of him' (*Mark 1:24; compare 5:8; 9:25*).

(c) He calms the storm by the power of his word (*Mk 4:39*). With a single word He heals a blind man (*Mk 10:52*), a withered hand (*Mk 3:5*), a leper (*Mk 1:40; cf. Mt 8:16*). Of course, the action, the gesture, are not absent from the miracle either. Christ has the sick person stretch out his hand (*Mk 1:41*); He sometimes touches the spot to be healed (*Mk 7:32; Mt 9:29*) and even uses saliva and mud (*Mk 7/33; 8:23*). This has nothing to do with healing technique or magical manipulation, but is a characteristic emphasis of the word and sometimes has a symbolic meaning. However, the healing is accomplished not by the gesture, but by the word.” (*o .c., 42/43*).

We radically disagree with this last point: if the word or the gesture can be miraculously effective, then it is thanks to the power ('strength') in and through that gesture or word, or the two together. After all, there are also 'empty' words and equally 'empty' deeds (gestures), which are not charged with power. Moreover, these empty words and/or gestures can underscore (which is not yet an effectively miraculous phenomenon, but merely psychosocial). They can be purely symbolic (which is absolutely not a power-charged quality, but an analogy within a psychosocial framework).

A false 'spiritualism', dating from late antiquity (Neo-Platonist tendencies), repeatedly leads to minimizing the incarnation, i.e., the embodiment of Jesus: Jesus also repeated the magical-dynamic acts, while attributing to them a sense of glorification or resurrection, which they, indeed, could not possess in the **(a)** folk magics, **(b)** the temple-physical magics and the theurgies, because these are usually practiced outside the

system of the Kingdom of God. Yet nothing prevents Jesus, who did indeed repeat and glorify the suffering and death, from also repeating and redeeming the magics .

Why speak contemptuously time and again of what archaic mankind regarded as typical of **a)** the Supreme Being, **b1)** the gods, **b2)** the fairies and other nature spirits, insofar as

i) these are 'power-charged', 'mana' (Polynesian term) or, as people like van der Leeuw (*Phänomenologie der Religion*) like to say, 'power'-charged and

ii) apply this force or power, external and/or if necessary supernatural (i.e. in unity with the Supreme Being), to alleviate misery (and thereby anticipate the Kingdom of God)? 'Only radical unfamiliarity with magic is the cause here of this 'spiritualistic' alienation from life and incarnation.

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Incidentally: De Groot himself, oc, 43, contradicts himself where he writes: "the power of Jesus' word reveals his participation in the creative power of God's word, through which the world came into being and is preserved (*Gen 1:3, 6, 9; Ps. 33:6, 9; 147: 18*). Christ's work thereby takes on the character of a new creation".

Yet that is precisely what all magicians mean, including the so-called initiatory (temple physicists or theurgists), insofar as they do not practice 'black', i.e., anti-god magic. Let us not, once and for all, confuse 'magic' (universal) with 'unscrupulous' magic (particular)!

For many magical practices, parapsychology may provide a better explanation than the history or philosophy of religion. If the magician (medicine man) derives his power from God, the magic might well take on something of a religious character.

*Father Placied Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy **, Antwerp, 1946, writes that his Baloba could not understand why the missionaries wanted to forbid them magic. 'Surely it cannot be wrong to make use of the means that God had given man to maintain and strengthen his life force!' (*P. Schebesta, *Origin of Religion** , Tiel/The Hague, 1962, p. 63).

A little earlier, speaking of the (otherwise radical and directly connected with the judgment of God) distinction between 'white' (conscientious) and 'black' (unconscionable) magic, namely among the great mass of exotic (and primitive) archaic cultures, Schebesta says: "The life force comes from the highest being, which itself possesses the most 'power', and is therefore also the greatest magician and can do everything. (oc, 59).

That exactly the same view existed in Israel—specifically in Yahwistic circles—is proven by *Isaiah 44:25/26* (in the form of the sifting of God's judgment): "I am the one who frustrates (makes ineffective) the 'signs' (miracle signs) of the seers (magicians), makes the soothsayers work like madmen, and causes the 'wise men' (those who (magically) 'know') to retreat by making their 'knowledge' incomprehensible" (oc,25).

So far the godless, indeed, god-hostile magicians (in some of their functions: **1/** miraculous power, **2/** foresight, **3/** insight into laws); And now the god-friendly magicians: But he who confirms the word (magical understanding) of his servants, makes the counsels of his messengers succeed" (26).

That is the true distinction of the 'spirits': "Beloved, do not believe every 'spirit', but examine whether the 'spirits' are from God; for many false prophets have gone out into the world." (1 John 4:1). 'Spirit' means first of all extra- and (in a Biblical context) especially supernatural power (only very late in the New Testament does this word mean the third person of the Trinity, incidentally the person par excellence of the 'power'). "Now this Spirit of God governs the whole life of Christ." (De Groot, oc, 47).

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However, two 'phases' can be distinguished therein:

(i) by reliving the misery itself, in the 'weakness of the flesh', from his conception in Mary's womb up to and including his descent into hell (i, the end of Cross-Easter) - ancient, especially archaic man thought 'tellurically' (and descent into hell is a 'telluric' phenomenon) - the 'spirit', i the power of his divine nature (as the second person of the Trinity) was 'repressed', indeed, 'suppressed' (though not entirely), as is evident from his miracles);

(ii) However, by overcoming the misery of the 'flesh' within itself (as a prototype of a new creation and thus 'for us' (pro nobis)), the 'spirit', the power of the divine glory, which briefly emerged from its repression and suppression on the mountain (Thabor) in the transfiguration, came forth in its full power in the resurrection. St. Paul has brilliantly expressed this miraculous turnaround: “(Jesus is), **a/** according to the flesh, sprung from the seed of David and, **b/** according to the spirit of holiness, as Son of God, empowered by his resurrection from the dead”. (*Rom 1:4; 2 Cor 13:4; Phil 2:7/11*).

That Jesus accomplished this prototypically, as the founder of a new humanity united with him, is stated by the beautiful theology of baptism of St. Paul: “You were buried with (Jesus) through baptism. You were also raised with Him through faith in the omnipotence of God, who raised Him from the dead. He also made you alive together with Him, you who were dead through your sins and through your uncircumcised flesh.” (*Col 2:12/13*).

It is therefore not surprising that the Church declares 'Holy' those people who, before or after their death, perform miracles in which their extra- and supernatural 'power' ('spirit' which they received from Jesus, especially on the basis of their baptism) manifests itself.

Jesus' teaching and miraculous power ('spirit', 'power', in which He went about doing good and healed all who were controlled by the devil, because God was with Him (*Acts 10:38; cf. Luke 4:18/19*)) is visibly and tangibly experimental in its own way—in the 'saints', i.e., those who prove their life-power in their miraculous deeds.

Cf. H. Delehaye, 'Sanctus' in *Analecta Bollandiana* , t. 38, p. 175; *id.*, *Les origines du culte des martyrs* , Bruxelles, 1912 (in both works Father Delahaye, in a masterful analysis, (according to N. Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens* , Leipzig, 1926-2, S. 56f., 180f.) exposes the semasiological history of the word 'sanctus' (holy), which, gradually, means purely ethical-political exemplary instead of miraculous power-ladenness). Cfr. N. Söderblom, *oc .*, s. 157/ 157 (*Religion und Magie*).

Conclusion: the pragmaticist method (*pp. 54/66* : theory of ideas, testable against its result) provides conclusive evidence regarding the truth

and vital value of that theory of ideas, here, for example, the doctrine (with praxis) of a religion.

HA67

The schedule is:

(a) the doctrine is taken (abductively) as a hypothesis (i.e. as an explanation of the result of that religion);

(b) with a view to repeating that result, conclusions are drawn (deductively) from that theory which are experimentally applicable;

(c) the experiment (whether existential-historical (in full life: one lives according to that doctrine) or ritual (in separate short magical experiments of a liturgical, juridical (ordalic), therapeutic, etc. nature)) is set in motion: the result thereof provides conclusive evidence (inductive) regarding the epistemological (= truth) and axiological-soteriological (= life) value of that doctrine.

Briefly recap: **(a)** the theory (= ideas in judgments and reasoning) before the experiment (testing); **(b)** the theory (= conclusions derived from it intended experimentally) before the experiment; **(c)** the theory in the experiment (the testing itself as a judgment); **(c) bis** the theory after the experiment (the conclusions or inductive results).

Bibl. Sample regarding some aspects of the pragmatic method.

(A) The doctrine of misery.

-- **(i) Psychological-sociological starting point:**

The understanding method, discussed above (and in methodology), is the pre-eminent condition for being able to act religiously and internally, as an insider or initiate; regarding human care, reference is made to C. van Peursen/ S Kwee, **Wegwijs in de wetenschappen**, Rotterdam, 1966, p. 70:

-- Gendlin, **Schizophrenia (Problems and Methods of Psychotherapy)**, 1964, departing from Rogers' method of 'empathy'—that is, by understanding and putting oneself in the shoes of the patient (stimulated to personal growth)—discovered that schizophrenics 'remain silent' in a very peculiar way—unlike non-schizophrenics, they are closed off and resistant to anyone who wishes to help them escape their 'demonic misery'; the consequence: a deepened, much more thorough 'empathy' or

'understanding' was necessary; it is this deepened method of understanding, which is desperately needed in religious matters, that 'clairvoyants' and 'sensitives' (what other names are there for the same cognitive processes?) possess.

-- Fr. Kallenberg, *Offenbarungen des siderischen Pendels (Die Leben ausströmende Photographie und Handschrift)*, Diessen v. M, 1921 (old but still excellent as an introduction to 'pendulum dowsing', that 'seeing' and 'feeling' reinforced by means of dangling objects (= cognitive process)), which is simultaneously diagnostic in terms of therapy (though usually does not go beyond that pure diagnosis); - it is not because so many (unformed (and thus idea-poor) pendulum dowsers) spoil an excellent cognitive procedure that its principle should, for example, be ridiculed.

HA68

-- R. Thetter, *Magnetismus, (das Urheilmittel)*, The Hague sd. - an excellent little work that begins with a long quote from J.W. von Goethe: "Magnetism is a universally operating force. Everyone possesses it except for some individual differences. Its effects extend over everything and over all cases. The magnetic force of man encompasses all people, encompasses animals and plants. Indeed, man does not know what he is, nor what he possesses and what he can do. That is why he is so miserable, so powerless, and so clumsy."

This 'magnetic force' is nothing other than one of the many forms of '(holy) spirit' (discussed above): it is not merely:

(i) empathetic ('einfüllend' understanding), because, thanks to her, fusion takes place between the soul-body of the 'radiating' (of the magnetic force) and that of the encountered human (plant, animal, object, landscape, etc.).

(ii) it is 'diagnostic' both in terms of misery and in terms of assistance;

(iii) it is saving 'pneuma' (as the ancient Greeks said), 'spirit', that power which works to destroy misery (effective side); regarding dowsing and magnetizing, however, all the rules briefly outlined above regarding the

judgment of God apply (which is forgotten, indeed denied, in almost all manuals and learning systems without books, because one presents dowsing and magnetizing, consciously or unconsciously, as an art that one simply learns like other techniques of a purely profane nature): outside the kingdom of God ushered in by Jesus, one does not know what one is doing when one dowses or magnetizes;

-- W. Tenhaeff, *Aussergewöhnliche Heilkräfte (Magnetiseure, Sensitive, gesun-beter)*, Olten/ Freiburg i. Br., 1957: An erudite work that deserves recommendation from very many viewpoints (except one; the judgment of God, which penetrates all fluid actions, is not discussed).

-- C. Von Reichenbach, **Der Sensitive Mensch**, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1854/1855 is one of the first methodological works in which the 'sensitive' human type is described. We take this opportunity to briefly outline this actual and extremely thorough method:

(a) 'Sensitive' is, first of all, the one who feels more and differently than the non-sensitive: comical situations often reveal this God-given gift (one cannot sit in just any chair in church without discomfort, perhaps even nausea and sickness, for example); but pleasant situations also reveal it (one feels comfortable in the presence of people who radiate goodness, for example);

(b) 'Seer' is, secondly, the sensitive person who, in addition to and apart from the sensations briefly mentioned above, also 'sees' 'things, processes' - supposedly in his imagination (psychologists like to call this 'associations' or even 'hallucinations', if these 'visions' present themselves as perceptions).

HA69

This is called 'hallucinations' when one does not personally (internally) know these perceptual processes according to their cognitive value, albeit with the same reservation, namely the realization that whoever 'sees', or wishes to 'see', is directly confronted with the sphere of God's judgment: if God or his emissary, under whose authority the 'seen' falls, does not want one to see it according to his truth and (un)salvation, this will not succeed (see above pp. 44/45 (1 Kings 22: 1/38 : more than four hundred

(professional) seers actually 'see' only their own optical illusion; one true seer, Mikajehu, 'sees' the God-willed truth and Disaster.

The ability noted in the booklet by magnetizer Meyer (1825) to 'see' "the fluid" (= 'spirit', 'pneuma', etc., also 'radiance') flowing from the fingertips of the magnetizer is only a first, very vague form of 'seeing' the 'aura' (namely the emanation of a person's life force).

The actual 'seeing' of salvation and damnation (= misery), the actual religious 'seeing' lies much, much deeper: only there can God's judgment be felt; this implies that Kilner or Kirlian photographs, for example, are just as superficial as the quick 'aura' seeing noted by Meyer; religion is not a surface phenomenon, let it be stated once and for all.

This is called 'association' if one interprets the coherence (structure) between physically visible and tangible things and processes, and what arises in the imagination (mind) of the 'seeing' person as unexpected (seemingly logically 'crazy' things, processes; seemingly morally 'reprehensible' matters), solely within the mentality of Hume's 'associationist' 'psychology'—precisely where God's 'enlightenment' should become active, which only then provides the true interpretation of the connection between those two, the empirical and the transempirical (so-called purely imagined) given.

Take, for example, someone who is seriously ill:

(i) the academic physician analyzes the 'case' according to his 'books' and 'clinical experience' and 'cures';

(ii) according to *Freud's Interpretation of Trauma* and other (meta- and depth-) psychological therapeutic basic concepts (Oedipus complex, 'aggression', (repressed, respectively suppressed) eroticism, etc.) the psychoanalyst analyzes and 'treats';

(iii) the dowser bends over the case: he 'sees' such and such diagnostic elements and 'treats'; or the magnetizer acts according to his own method: what these three or four 'specialists' forget time and again is, for example, what the church (especially since St. Paul) calls 'original sin' (what Hindu reincarnists call 'karma'), namely an inherited debt incurred in another culture, in another earthly or extraterrestrial life, which, according to God's

ideas of guilt and penance, ought to be repaired by undergoing the exact same punishment that one has inflicted on others (remember what Jesus says: 'whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit (i.e. God-given life force), receives no forgiveness in eternity (*Mk. 3:29*)' - understood to mean: 'but ought to atone for it with the exact same truth-restoring attitude to life').

HA70

This is an application of what *A. Bertholet*, **Die Religion des Alten testaments**, pp. 8/9, calls 'similia similibus' (replacing something with its like). He gives *Num. 21:6/9* as an example (Yahweh has Moses make a bronze serpent to be delivered from snakebites.)

Let us return to our sick:

Suppose he has ever done what *Ezek. 13:17/23* brilliantly cites, namely 'imprisoned' the 'soul' (i.e., the bearer of one's Holy Spirit of life-creation) or appropriated it for himself in a black magic rite (in order not to have to give his own life for a crime). Only when the victim forgives this along with God can he be healed of his deadly (i.e., exhausting his new life-soul power) illness, which he carries until the victim meets him and grants him forgiveness.

If this 'recovery' (cf. the steering principle) does not occur as described above, then all kinds of healers will conclude (the academic ones most certainly) that for some mysterious reason (as 'they' call it) the therapy fails, whereas in other cases it did succeed (and this regularly, even, through inductive reason).

The reason lies in God's strict justice: whoever 'steals' someone's soul (however: black magic through crime), will flawlessly and certainly, at the moment of his 'final' judgment by God, restore this by the same (similibus). Reason: a sin against the Holy Spirit, or against the *dunamis* or life force, bestowed by God for the protection of life and happiness—something that is commonplace in all archaic religions—is forgiven neither in this world nor in the coming one by the giver of life, God, without the co-forgiveness of the victim.

One does not toy with the sacred, which, in those same archaic religions, is perceived as misery-destroying, indeed, as misery-preventing

and happiness-founding (just as in the Bible): *N. Söderblom rightly protests, *Das werden des Gottesglaubens **, p. 162, against Durkheim's misconception that the 'sacred' (in Buddhism, that is) lies in the four truths concerning 'suffering' (i.e., felt misery). No, says Söderblom, in the three refuges, "which set themselves sharply against the suffering inherent in existence and misery";

Well then, back to our sick person who is not recovering:

A 'seer', who, confronted with him, suddenly 'sees' a face behind him "as association", where she 'sees' him committing a murder in a Zairean jungle, is in the truth concerning the primal guilt (which becomes 'hereditary guilt' with conception).

However: baptism removes the principle of guilt, but, say the old theologians, not its 'consequences'. Indeed, those 'consequences' ought first to be 'seen' and remedied before the sick person in question can be healed.

HA71

The so-called 'association' is the key to the diagnosis. However, one can either simply not 'see' it, or one can 'see' it but not correctly, interpreting it as the key to divine judgment if one is not authorized to do so by Yahweh. That is 'charisma' (in the archaic sense – not in the secularized sense of, for example, Max Weber, who turns it into a purely sociological category).

'Charisma', however, is itself spiritual, God-given life force made functional in the service of the suffering fellow man. Therefore, St. Paul emphasizes the charismata—gifts of grace in the service of one's fellow man—alongside the ordinary moral ones and, especially, the theological 'gifts of grace', which are directly related to God.

Interpretation by C. v. Reichenbach, oc, 1854/1855: Tenhaeff, oc, 27, notes that if sensitives look around for several hours in complete darkness, all objects 'see' 'light'. This subjective 'seeing' goes hand in hand with the objective 'lighting' within the intentionality of the charismatic's encounter with that which he 'illuminates'.

However, where Tenhaeff draws attention to the blue color around the exhaling right hand and the yellowish-red around the left, the charismatic working within the Kingdom of God founded by Jesus sees much more; and this with the correct interpretation thereof.

He sees first of all the flesh-soul with its usually yellow ribbons (what acupuncturists call 'meridians') over the entire fleshy area, provided with luminous nodes (the energy centers), but also, almost always, with splits (where injuries once occurred) and dark spots, which betray the removed energies.

Upon 'looking' deeper, the charismatic also sees the bone soul: this usually appears as a collection of small cubes where the bones sit in the skeletal system (the color can vary from deep gold to foul-smelling 'black' - the latter 'stinks' because, along with the 'seeing', the paranormal sense of smell also comes into action; this is infallibly demonic).

Furthermore, the charismatic 'sees' the 'flames' of the brain's life force emanating from between the tailbone and the genitals (what is called 'kundalini' or serpent energy in India and is mobilized in yoga meditation). This 'blossoms', indeed, as Hindus have 'seen' for centuries, gradually open in the neck in the form of some kind of flower, which, at its root and lower stem, 'fights' with a dirty-gray mass the life-killing 'force' that God-hostile people and/or spirits 'radiate' into the life center of their victims.

Furthermore, this life-force current of the brain, usually flaming yellow-orange-red (in this case of friendship with God), exhibits seven (sometimes more, sometimes less distinct) vertebral canals (called 'shakram' in India for centuries). Around the entire biological-physical body, the charismatic also 'sees' the exchange of the spirit, usually called the 'aura', with its various components.

HA72

(i) First of all, the bodily soul (so called because this form of 'spirit' is identical with the gross physical form of the body. After death it can 'appear' or show itself as a reflection in a mirror as a bodily 'phantom', by which one recognizes its former earthly bearer.

(ii) Then follow the various 'spheres of radiation', capricious and pliable in form (think of Kirlian photographs of, for example, healthy and sick plants, which also possess such auras), through which the bearer thereof both expresses himself and takes 'feeling' of the world surrounding him. Indeed, the aura or soul-emanation penetrates the environment: into objects (especially utilitarian and decorative objects), into the home, into fellow man (especially the loved or hated, for example: feelings 'invest' fluid (life force) in the objects intended by the feeling, which, in turn, influence the aura and the entire soul-body (which becomes visible in the identical colors).

It should be noted that sexual feelings, in particular, penetrate very deeply into the desired object and absorb the desired object just as deeply into the aura and the 'sexual soul' of the person concerned. Thus, for example, a God-friendly charismatic seer sees very clearly the fluid imprint of sexual intercourse; the sexual soul or magnetism is one large radiating force field, the center of which is situated, approximately, either in the clitoris (in women) or in the glans (in men) and shines (like the tip of the so-called magic wand of the fairies).

Well, Cv Reichenbach calls the totality of matter, of which all these partial souls of a subtle (ethereal) nature consist, 'od'. This word has a far-reaching significance of religious-historical significance. He derived the word from the Old Germanic 'wodan' (or 'wuodin', 'odin', 'odan'), that all-pervading force ('fluidum', the Latin for 'flowing' (through everything)' is an excellent translation).

Compare this word with, for example, what *G. Van der Leeuw* writes in **Phänomenologie der Religion**, p. 6: "The 'dema' of the Marind-Anim (a tribe in New Guinea). (...). 'Everything can be 'dema', – every human being, every thing (...)! Dema are also the ancestors." The most famous internationalized word, however, is still the increasingly misinterpreted 'mana', a Melanesian term (VdL, oc 4: "It is a power or an influence, not physical and in a certain sense supernatural (here in the sense of extra-natural).. It manifests itself, however, in bodily strength or in every force or capacity inherent to a human being.

Well then, the misery (i.e., the informative (knowledge- and thought-) misery, the basis of the preconstitutive (situated before the origin of earthly

life) and constitutive misery, as well as of the ethical-political misery) is clearly discernible in the 'od' or life force, especially in the form of black-dark spots, which naturally represent the exposed 'voids' of the odic life force.

HA73

Normally, the life soul (= odic life force or spirit) has a 'full' form, with colors that appear beneficial (orange, 'pleasant' red, blue, green, etc., indeed, especially gold); once wounded, exhausted, or drained, it displays 'pale', if necessary dirty-black or simply dark (difficult to 'see') colors, which, naturally, ought to be interpreted correctly.

This interpretation proceeds in phases:

The first phase is the feeling (the sensing of value) – for example, a pale spot feels unpleasant, perhaps even nauseating; or, even worse, especially in hyper-sensitive individuals who are highly charged and therefore very 'open' and mediumistic, this pale spot awakens signs of possession in a person's 'soul' (namely when that pale spot emits nature spirits which, having penetrated the hyper-sensitive person, rob him of his normal self-control and induce (instead of latent) full possession).

The second phase is that of ideal (conceptual) interpretation: a pale grey spot, for example, is the result of a lustful erotic gaze directed at a lady, who emits (what the ancient Greeks call) 'emposesai' ('to thrust'); an 'empousa' is a female-shaped phantom of a fluid nature, emanating from a vampirizing person (i.e., sucking out the blood fluid or, as the Old Testament says, the blood-soul).

So much for a sample of the inner-soul voids (symptoms of misery). There are also the external-soul signs of misery, namely the shadows of malevolent beings. These degenerate into two types:

a/ souls of the deceased, residing in the aura of the living to, for example, suck out their life force;

b/ 'spirits' from the world of nature beings, which the church usually calls devils (who fall into various types: e.g. small nature spirits that have been Satanized (although not so bad in themselves) and large 'evil' spirits, of which Satan is the first, but absolutely not the only one (or certainly not

the most dangerous) in the line and who are 'creators of misery' by 'profession' (through their cynical selfishness).

It should be noted that **a/** feeling (experiencing through feeling) and **b/** 'seeing' (the clear degree of sensitivity), whether or not accompanied by conceptual interpretation, is not safe, indeed very dangerous, outside the framework of the Kingdom of God, as Jesus founded it and as it existed in an initial stage both in the God-friendly (theologically awakened) archaic religion and in the Old Testament, anticipating ('ex praevisis meritis', based on merits (of Jesus as a suffering servant of Yahweh (*Jes = Is*) and of God-friendly suffering servants of Yahweh)) the New Testament spiritual mission with its charismata.

For malevolent forces and entities, once one 'feels', 'sees', and, above all, interprets them, strike back without mercy. Whoever is therefore not equipped by God for this ought to remain outside of it.

HA74

- - **(ii) *The theodicy*,**

Since Leibniz, theodicy has been that branch of theology (or philosophy of religion) that deals with the relationship between God and the 'misery' in the universe and humanity.

Library sample:

-- RF. Sertillanges, *Le problème du mal (L'Histoire)*, Paris, 1948 (an overview of the 'explanations' given to 'evil' in world cultures, from prehistory to the existentialists).

-- Nelson Pike, ed., *God and Evil* , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964 (anthology: Pike, F. Dostoevsky, D. Hume, J.St. Mill., J. Mackie, H. McCloskey, N. Pike (Hume on Evil), N. Smart, - with bibliography).

-- P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité (I (L'homme faillible), II (La symbolique du mal* (the most interesting part regarding the sequence 'blemish/sin/guilt' and the myths concerning misery (creation drama, tragedy, Biblical conception, exile - soul myth)), *III (Le volontaire et l'involontaire* (around pp. 350/384 (*L'inconscient*, - .vm) Freud)), typically Protestant), Paris, 1960/1967.

-- G. Maertens, *God and Suffering* , in *Collationes* (Flemish Journal of Thyme and Pastoral History), 1973: 4 (Dec), pp. 459/486 (attempts at

neutralization by means of certain attitudes (objectification, flight, defense); speculative attributions of meaning; valorization).

It should be noted that while such theodical reflections are fascinating, they depend heavily on the author's personal involvement with misery (his sense of suffering). Consider, for example, Bertrand Russell, who, through contact with a suffering person—namely the wife of A.N. Whitehead—slips from serene, academic calm into emotional intensity! Only the direct method, with its 'understanding' of the miserable fellow man as an 'I once again' (Schopenhauer: Ich-noch-einmal) and this within the framework of the Kingdom of God, provides the correct 'theodicy'!

-- (iii) *The more direct interpretations of misery.*

The sense of misery manifests itself in certain religious interpretations of current movements: R. Michiels, *De materialistische Bijbellezing*, in *Collationes*, 10 (1980): 4 (Dec), pp. 442/465 (the Marxist-colored reading of the Bible, advocated by the 'Christians for Socialism', takes into account the economic-social foundations of misery (and advocates political solutions)).

-- Related: G. De Schrijver, *Liberation Theology in Europe*, in *Streven*, 49 (1982): 7 (Apr), pp. 587/598 (the - socially critical - analysis advocated by the grassroots movements of the economic and social misery in the Third World and in Europe).

-- Y. Spiegel, Hrsg., *Psychoanalytic Interpretationen biblischer Texte*, Munich, 1972 (articles by early and later depth psychologists)

-- Fr. Dolto, *L' évangile au risque de la psychanalyse*, Paris, 1974,

-- A. Uleyn, *Exegesis and psychanalysis*, in *Collationes* 10 (1980): 4 (Dec), pp. 405/425 (with bibliography).

HA75

K. Marx already saw the connection between misery and religion: "Religious misery is, on the one hand, the expression of real misery and, on the other hand, the protest against real misery. Religion is the lament of the desperate creature, the mind of a heartless world." (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*, Einl.).

Immediately thereafter, Marx stigmatizes religion as the opium of the people, speaking from his materialist ideology; this does not prevent him from seeing that religion possessed a sense of misery.

Freud, as a materialist, naturally dismisses religion as a (neurotic) illusion, although he also saw that religion possessed a sense of misery.

Consequently, the starting point of the misery theory of Marxist dialecticians and psychoanalysts is only partially valid, even and especially where they, Christianized, engage in Bible reading and 'theology' (their secularism primarily distorts true 'seeing').

Yet they have a greater 'sense' for misery than, for example, the traditional historical critics (*A. Denaux/P. Kevers, De historisch-kritische methode* , in *Collationes* 10 (1980): 4 (dec.), pp. 387/404 (with the three stages: source criticism, form criticism, and editorial history of the texts)) and the text scholars in the structuralist style (*H. Servotte/L. Verbeek, De structuralistische Bijbellesing* , in *Collationes* 10 (1980): 4 (dec), pp. 426/441, with bibliography): both latter are text-scientific, strong, and irreplaceable, but often unfamiliar with misery, whereas dialecticians and depth psychologists, from the outset, read texts using a sense of misery as a 'lens'; referring to either social or psychological misery.

However, *J. Moreno, Who shall survive ?*, New York, 1953-2; *id.*, *Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama* , Stuttgart, 1973-2, around p. 3, is more thorough, to a certain extent:

Man is a cosmic being. He is more than a biological, psychological, sociological, or cultural being. By restricting man's responsibility to the mere biological, psychological, or social sphere of life, one makes him an outcast. Either he is co-responsible for the entire universe, for all forms of 'being,' and for all values, or his responsibility means absolutely nothing. The existence of the universe is important: it is, in fact, the only thing of significance; it is more important than the life and death of man as an individual, as a particular civilization, or as a species.

Following Schopenhauer's 'will to live', Nietzsche's 'will to power', and Weiniger's 'will of value', I postulated a 'highest will of value' which all beings perceive and which truly unites them. I therefore put forward the

hypothesis that the becoming cosmos is the first and last existence and the highest value. Only this cosmos-in-becoming can give meaning and significance to the life of any part of it in the universe—be it man or a protozoon.

HA76

Science and experimental methods must, if they at all claim truthfulness, be applicable to the theory of the cosmos. The therapeutic group is therefore not merely a branch of medicine and a form of society; it is at the very same time the first step into the cosmos.

As regards the method, Moreno seeks a deeper approach: “However weighty language may be in the development of the individual and the group, it is always merely the logicized and syntactic form of communication” (oc, 3). “There was therefore a need for a method to reintegrate these experiences—the magma, the totality, the 'surplus realities' specific to the supralinguistic and the prelinguistic world, from which the linguistic world separated itself as a part—into a synthesis with language.”

The psychodramatic method attempted to fill this gap by developing a depth psychotherapy of the group (oc, 4). Immediately thereafter, Moreno says: “The essential nature of modern group therapy introduces, into the group, problems that formerly belonged to the domain of religion” (oc, 4). - In particular, there is Moreno’s thorough criticism of Marx and Freud:

Marx viewed the situation of man merely as a member of society; he saw the struggle within the bosom of society as his ultimate fate. Freud saw the place of man as that of a pilgrim between birth and death. The wider cosmos was not involved.

“It is our task in the 20th century to give man his place in the universe again.” (oc, 3). The threefold root of *Moreno* 's method is therefore:

- (i) sociology (cf. *his Grundlagen der Soziometrie* , Cologne, '1954);
- (ii) medicine. His group is a psychotherapeutic group; - in sharp contrast to Freud's individualistic therapy and his conversational method, Moreno's therapy was, as early as 1914, psychodramatic, based on archaic

religious models (oc, 14 (where Moreno sketches the story of an ethnologist who tells of a therapy of Pomo Indians));

(iii) religion: Moreno observes that churches and religions are losing their grip due to secularization and replaces them with a kind of universalist religion (oc, 2/3); this religious attitude leads him to deepen the concept of misery; hence his thorough critique of the purely socio-economic views, namely the communist and the capitalist ones, which exaggerate now the collective and then the individual side as the cause of the radical health of man:

“The oldest proletariat (...) consists of the victims of an unbearable, untherapeutic order: it is the therapeutic proletariat. It consists of persons suffering from one form or another of misery: psychological misery, social misery, economic misery, political misery, racial misery, or religious misery. (...).

HA77

The therapeutic proletariat cannot be 'redeemed' by economic revolutions: it existed in primitive and pre-capitalist societies. It exists in capitalist and it exists in socialist societies. Marxism is an idea of the previous century. The war of communism is an aftermath of the 19th century in the 20th century. It is the struggle for an idea that has ceased to reflect the decisive living conditions and problems of our time.” (oc, 7/8).

Behold, certainly, a sense of misery that we make entirely our own—except for one point: Moreno's universalist religion expresses itself all too unclearly regarding the concept of the 'Kingdom of God' outlined above. Also: the group psychodramatic method exhibits shortcomings in practice, which, incidentally, Moreno also clearly observed. Only the charismatic form of that group psychodrama can succeed.

More religious methods are:

-- C. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, Zürich, 1949 (the section on ancient temple medicine is sound; the Jungian symbolism is questionable);

--Dr . J. Guilhot, *La psychiatrie morale et le problème de Dieu (Le renouvellement des methods d'approche, du problème de Dieu)*, Paris/La Haye, 1957 (at pp. 123 ss. on the tsedek psychiatry of Dr. H. Baruk).

-- W. Daim, *Tiefenpsychologie und Erlösung*, Vienna/Munich, 1954 (the method is **a/** phenomenological-hermeneutic, **b/** yet deepened by depth psychology ('understanding the precisely grasped phenomena in their unconscious foundations' (oc 20/21)), **c/** within the framework of an existentially interpreted religious doctrine of redemption.

-- In this connection, reference should be made to B. Bartmann, **Verlossing, zonde, verzoening**, Voorhout, 1934, especially pp. 109/115 (**Modern Errors regarding Redemption **). Although outdated, it is still relevant: nowadays 'people' are so eager to refute both the idea of 'sin' and the idea of reconciliation. Daim hardly ever commits this error; that is, therefore, the guiding value of his book, which is too unbiblical and especially unarchaic, and which is much more 'therapeutic' than that of Dr. Guilhot, who constructs 'theory'.

(B) The doctrine of redemption.

We will briefly consider two types of way out of 'therapeutic' misery, characterized above by Moreno.

- (a) On an extra-biblical basis:

A. Gatti, *Bapuka*, Zurich, 1963 (Gatti is a physical anthropologist who has traversed Africa on behalf of governments, yet with an open eye and heart for Negro-African culture. One day he saves Sakaimunga, who, out of gratitude, takes him to his native region (in Zambia and surrounding areas); Sakaimunga's father is the 'priest' of Bapoeka, a goddess of love and life of a very gifted and noble nature.

HA78

Gatti and his wife subsequently experience, for years, that they enjoy exceptionally effective guidance and protection and radiate morally and politically elevated influences, until, with the death of his wife, the goddess statuette shatters and falls. – Something that is proof of the fact that, without charisma within the framework of the Kingdom of God, these arch-good beings completely exhaust themselves in their life force ('dunamis')

and thus, weakened, fall into the hands of the 'high' (the exceptionally cynically powerful) evil demons.

Such deities (especially goddesses or highly gifted women from the world of nature spirits) are, after all, only safe if they help people on this earth within the framework of the Kingdom of God. (This only occurs with extraterrestrial beings who, like Bapoeka, are not sufficiently prepared for the type of human that has passed through both Greek philosophies and the higher religions (more explanation coming year).

Michaela Denis, Un léopard sur les genoux, Paris, 1956 (a book written by an actress who, together with her husband, caught the travel bug, especially in Africa: one day, in Central Africa, she has herself initiated into a secret society of dancing Black African women: she and her husband subsequently experience, for years, the beneficial, protective, and uplifting influence of that initiation, even though it is labeled as 'pagan' (heathen) by Catholic sisters somewhere in New Guinea (to which those same sisters immediately say that she 'lived much better than many Catholics'), yet, once again, the same thing: without a Kingdom of God framework, such a thing continues only until the death of one of the people involved).

- (b) On a Biblical basis:

B. Bro, The Theological Activities of Thérèse of Lisieux, in *Collationes* 1973: 4 (Dec) pp. 502/526 (the author points out the characteristic nature of the testimony of the 'little' Thérèse, namely "She experiences her faith not only on the plane of 'life' (*note*: here in the secular sense), (...) but as an anticipation of glory. (...). It is therefore very significant that some of our Orthodox brothers have recognized themselves in it.

Faith is about much more than humanism (...) No, through faith man is invited to attain a 'plus' - to be a child of God, to find a new status - that of deification." (ac, 514).

Cf. *I. Görres, The Hidden Face (Sketch to a Life Image of Thérèse of Lisieux)*, Utrecht/Brussels, 1950).

(C) The judgment of God.

A work can be recommended: *G. Daniëls, Religieus-historische studie over Herodotus*, Antw./Nijm., 1946 (Herodotus' historiography is

structured according to his insight into the intervention of the gods, which is a typical 'judgment-of-God structure').

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So much for a monograph on pagan matters. - For a quick orientation regarding Biblical 'judgment' (or 'judgment', as is now often said in a Dutchifying way), see *B. Alfrink et al., Bijbels woordenboek*, Roermond, 1941, pp. 1169/1171, where 'judgment' is discussed under the two main viewpoints:

a/ the 'particular' (understand: individual) judgment that every person undergoes separately (e.g. Judas after the administration of the baptized bread at the Last Supper), - something that never occurs totally individually and is therefore always 'particular', which concerns a small group of people surrounding the person concerned (who are judged along with them;

b/ the 'general' (universal) judgment that 'the nations' and the entire population of the earth undergo; the time in which that planetary judgment takes place is usually called the 'Day of Yahweh' (*Isa (= Is) 2:12; 13:6, 9; Joel 4:14*), in which two aspects stand out that correspond to the sifting character of every judgment of Yahweh, namely **b/1** total destruction, accompanied by cosmic horrors;

b/2 a remnant that survives and participates in the 'messianic or end-time miracles (regarding the glorification of the resurrection); -- it is strange that both 'judgment' and 'judgment' in *B. Reicke/ L. Rost, Bijbels Woordenboek* , Utr./ Antw., 1969, indicate virtually a couple of vague generalities.

1.6. The apocalyptic method.

The apocalyptic or method of revelation ('apo.kalupsis' = uncovering, revelation) consists in the fact that what the priests (in the primarily 'historical' or priestly books), the prophets (prophetic books), and the sages (in the wisdom or sapiential books)—each kind in its own way—bring to light, is seen by the revealers:

1. on the basis of paranormal methods of knowledge (quite often 'visions', but also other forms of knowledge),

2. In the context of divine judgment as it has been at work from primeval times until the end times, – and this both on this earth and in the 'other world', with a particular eye to the genesis (origin), development, and outcome of misery (the 'evil');

3. Both preceding points are consistently situated within the framework of the Kingdom of God (see above p. 54 (bottom: supernatural), 56 (end-time gift of the Kingdom of God), 62 (conflict Kingdom of God/Satan), especially pp. 64ff. and 68 (situating paranormal methods of knowledge within the Kingdom of God and the judgment of God), 70/71 (charisma as theological paranormal giftedness), 78 (doctrine of redemption)).

Bibliographic sample :

-- S. Aalen, *Apocalypticism and Apocalyptic books*, in B.Reicke/ L. Rost, *Biblical dictionary*, I, 94/97.

-- A. Robert/ A. Tricot, *Les genres*, in A. Robert A. Tricot, *Initiation biblique*, Paris, 1939, pp. 185-189 ; 217 / 221 (*L'apocalyptique*).

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-- DS. Russell, *Apocalyptic Literature*, in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, 2, pp. 112/115 (where Daniel (OT) and Revelation of John (NT) are emphasized for the diachronic aspect).

-- Especially G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments, II (Die Theologie der prophetischen Ueberlieferungen)*, Munich, 1961, S. 314/321 (*Die Apokalyptik*), 322 / 328 (Daniel); but, for a proper understanding of what Von Rad says about apocalypticism, one should first read I (*Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen Israëls*), S. 415/438 (*Die Erfahrungsweisheit Israëls*) and 439/451 (*Die theologische Weisheit Israëls*),:

'Wisdom' is **a.** supported by experience **b.** intended practically **c.** knowledge concerning the laws (order structures) inherent in the world and life in a society (oc, 415); “empirically proverbial wisdom proceeds from the 'stubborn' premise that there is a secret order at work in things and processes, which, admittedly, only becomes known on the basis of great patience and through all kinds of painful experiences, and that this order is beneficial and just” (oc, 419); “just as the 'word' is for the prophet the

actual form in which he casts his speech, so is 'instruction' this for the priest and 'counsel(giving)' for the sage” (oc, 428, where von Rad quotes *Jer 18:18* literally).

In time, in Israel, this gnomic-empirical wisdom developed into a didactic and theological system (oc, 449); -- yet its final outgrowth is apocalypticism: “This sapiential theology experienced a final broadening through its fusion with apocalypticism: one only clearly perceives this change in the most recent book of the Hebrew canon, the book of Daniel. The sage also masters the secrets of the future. Thus, this later wisdom is a phenomenon of astonishing complexity.” (oc, 450). “Daniel is brought up to be a 'sage' (*Dan 1:3ff.*) and is therefore classified among the 'sages' (*Dan 2:48*); charismatic wisdom makes him suitable for his dream interpretation (*Dan 2:30; 5:11*) and his book, which contains an 'almost crushing impact of learning' (O. Eiszfeldt (1956)), culminates precisely in an apotheosis of the wisdom teachers (*Dan 12:3*)”. (*v. Rad, II, p. 319*).

In other words: the foundation of apocalypticism, since Daniel, is sapiential. The peculiarities of the apocalypticism of that time, such as symbolic language, secrecy regarding one's own identity, and the like, are outgrowths of an unexplained paranormal and contemporary type of human being.

Transferred to our present time, apocalypticism can become a true method of hierosophy:

- a) the pragmatic method (see above) is the sapiential foundation;
- b) the paranormal method of knowing, practiced charismatically, is the second layer in such a hierosophy.

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2a. The systematic exposition on archaic religion.

The concept of 'archaic religion'.

Fundamentally, all religions (current and past) can be divided into two types, which themselves are merely the expression of two sides of every religious phenomenon, namely:

- The ' *empirical*' or *public*- earthly side, which is accessible to virtually everyone (the actual object of hierography in the strict sense, i.e., the

description of the phenomenal or the immediately given nature of religion for everyone);

- The ' *transempirical*' or hidden side, which is not so immediately accessible to the average believer or even the average hiero-analyst; objectively speaking, the transempirical side breaks down into two fundamentally distinct aspects, namely:

(a) the *ideal* (often called 'logical' or 'structural' side), which, indeed, reveals the deep structures, i.e., the *similarities and connections that only become apparent after logical-comparative analysis* (see Lo. On the distributive (= set) structure and the collective (= system) structure);

(b) the ' *otherworldly*' (also called 'holy' or 'sacred') realities, such as:

i/ the conscious *spirits* or 'intelligences' (nature spirits, souls of the deceased, deities (gods, goddesses), fairies, monads, - the Supreme Being);

ii/ the ' *power*' or 'dunamis' (Luke's Gospel), which is the medium of magic and is rightly called 'magical power' ('might' (van der Leeuw));

iii/ ' *Life*', as religions, at least the archaic-magical ones, conceive of it, namely as the unfolding of intelligence and magical powers.

Let one not, therefore, confuse the ideal with the sacred realities, as modern (and indeed, even archaically present) materialists so often do, who (conceptually) identify the other-worldly and the ideal.

The archaic nature of a religion stands or falls with the ' *holy*' or sacral aspect: whoever intelligences, magical power, 'aliveness':

a/ directly *perceives* (as the 'seers' (seeresses) in every truly archaic religion do) or

b/ takes seriously into account the mentality of those 'sighted' who 'is' ' *archaic*' regarding religion.

Who, however, only the empirical (public, earthly, inner-worldly) side:

a/ sees and

b/ takes seriously, with or without the ideal-logical side (that depends on the intellectual level), is typically ' *secular*' regarding religion.

Consequence: with great clarity, there is a right to classify religions into two main types, namely the *archaic-sacred* and the *secular-desacralizing*.

HA82

Since the aforementioned specialized scientific (hierographic, hierological) methods in principle concern themselves only with the publicly accessible, the most essential data concerning secular religion have already been covered.

However, the archaic data have been addressed far too little (or interpreted secularly, i.e., misinterpreted for too long). Hence this one-sided *emphasis on the 'sacred' side*.

Desacralization.

Before we broach this, we will briefly clarify the process of desecration—or profanation—that separates both types (sides) of religion.

Library sample:

-- RJ Werblowski, *Beyond Tradition and Modernity*, London, 1976 (the demythologization (often synonymous with desecration), resulting in both worldliness (secularization) and politicization (one need only think of the purely socio-critical interpretations of religion, for example), is analyzed both melioratively and pejoratively).

-- Alasdair MacIntyre, *The Religious Significance of Atheism*, Columbia Un. Press, 1969 (the question here is:

a/ modernization, since the 18th century, with its 'Enlightenment' (Lumières, Enlightenment, Aufklärung), implies scientism (triumphalism of science), as well as physical materialism (the denial of every reality except the gross-material-sensory);

b/ this leads to agnosticism (declaring oneself incapable of acquiring certainty regarding sacred realities) or atheism (denial of god);

c/ the question remains: is that naturalistic-rational attitude to life of the Enlightenment such that religion is no longer possible, or does it make a new kind of religion necessary?

-- Leroy S. Rouser, ed., *Philosophy, Religion, and Coming World Civilization* (Essays in Honor of E. Hocking), The Hague, 1966 (Prof. Hocking, at Harvard until 1943, says: "It is time that the West is reminded

that man always takes precedence, – not the machines, not the money, not the 'things'").

-- Ph. Ashby, *History and Future of Religious Thought (Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam)*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963 (Which are the vital and enduring elements in the world religions?).

-- P. Berber, *The Heavenly Baldachin*, Utrecht, 1969 (sociological).

-- Dr. Sperna Weiland, *Orientation (New Paths in Theology)*. 'An attempt to let inspiration speak for people for whom traditional conceptions of faith have become unclear or have disappeared entirely', Baarn, 1966-1;

-- *id.*, *Continued Orientation (New Paths ...)*, Baarn, 1971 (Paul Van Buren, Harvey Cox, Dorothee Sölle, Richard Shaull, JB. Metz, J. Moltmann, the Neo-Marxist Interpretation);

-- *id.*, *The End of Religion (Further on the Trail of Bonhöffer)*, Baarn, 1970 (Sp. Weiland is practically the Bible of the secularizing or even simply secularist tendency, which, if it retains anything of religion, calls this remaining part: 'faith' (as opposed to 'religion')).

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This coincides with 'demythologizing' theology (R. Bultmann), 'honest' theology (J. Robinson), and the notorious God-is-dead theology (Altizer, Hamilton, Vahanian, Van Buren, Keen—also called 'radical' theology)—not to mention 'political' theology (Moltmann, for example, for whom the essence of religion is a kind of social critique). Moreover, the critiques of religion are very diverse: religion is 'irrational' (Hume, Kant), 'unsocial' (Kant, Marx: 'opium'), 'infantile' (Freud), etc.

(1) With regard to de- or demythologization:

-- J. De Vries, *Forschungsgeschichte der Mythologie*, Munich/Freiburg, 1961 (general interpretation history); Kerygma und Hythos (Ein theologisches Gespräch), I, Hamburg-Bergstedt, 1948-1, 1967-5.

-- R. Bultmann, the most notorious demythologizer, assumes that the worldview of the New Testament is a 'mythical' worldview: "The world is presented as being composed of three levels: in the middle the earth, above it heaven, below it the underworld. Heaven is God's dwelling place and that of the angels; hell is in the underworld as a place of torture; but the earth is not 'earthly': it is the sphere of operation of supernatural and extraterrestrial powers".

It should be noted that Bultmann here characterizes the catechism-like and extremely simplistic popular form of religion: anyone who truly engages with religion internally knows how 'simple' this three-tiered representation is.

(2) Regarding the metaphysics crisis:

-- Max Müller, **Crisis de la metaphysique **, DDB, 1953. Müller is a Heideggerian, but strongly scholastic: cf. B. Heidegger, **Was ist Metaphysik **, Frankfurt aM*, 1949, in which the great fundamental ontologist and existentialist thinker defines 'metaphysics' in his idiosyncratic way, namely very time-bound and very 'rational' and interwoven with theology).

Myth was once one of the means of formulation for archaic man (stories of deities and spirits, recounted whether or not within a ritual framework, concerning the history of human salvation). The awakening, in Greece (but also in India, China, etc.), of 'reason'—that is, the *critical faculty* by which man discovers *regularities* (structures), preferably in the visible and tangible world—caused the 'myths' to wane and fade, to make way for a metaphysics that was still strongly influenced by mythology and theology.

Well, in desacralization (already at work in Protosophistic in Greece, but especially in the 18th-century Enlightenment), the crisis of foundations of both (theological-mythical) metaphysics and mythology means that the common root of metaphysics and myth—contact with the extra- and supernatural world—has been extinguished. Thus, sacralization becomes the antonym of religion.

It should be noted that, besides this substantive (concerning reality as a whole) and theological (concerning the deity) meaning, 'desacralization' also has a social meaning: the transfer to the layperson of what was specific to the clergy (e.g., secularization of church property).

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(3) Regarding natural religion,

as the liberals, especially since the English Enlightenment, introduced them in Europe:

-- K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, Zurich, 1954, S. 15/44 (*Die natürliche Religion von der Stoa bis zur Aufklärung*).

-- R.C. Zaehner, *Concordant Discord (The Interdependence of Faiths)*, Leiden, 1970 (the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, delivered at St. Andrews 1967/1969).

-- R.T. Carroll, *The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edw. Stillingfleet* (1635/1699), The Hague, 1975 (the Cartesian idealism of innate ideas with its penchant for 'clear and distinct representations' and, somewhat later, the common-sensist empiricism, that is: after the scholastic Middle Ages (with their theology primarily from the monasteries), revise the relationship between 'religion' and 'reason' (reason now understood in a Cartesian and/or Lockian sense). It is clear that the foundational crisis of the European-American religions begins in full force with such a 'natural' (= rational) type of 'religion', in which miracles and mysteries, visions and ecstasies are deemed questionable.

The fact that the ancient Stoicism can serve as a model in this regard with its physical and political theologies proves that this crisis of foundations was already at work in antiquity.

(4) Regarding the nihilistic degree of that foundations crisis:

-- D. Arendt, (*Die Anfänge des*) *Nihilismus*, Cologne, 1970 From Jacobi to Nietzsche, the predominantly German intelligentsia draws the conclusion that, if God does not exist, nothing has absolute value anymore (and, in that narrow axiological sense, 'sacred', which is in principle inviolable) and forms the foundation of ethics and politics. Instead of a fullness of high (transcendent) ideas, ideals, and values, there now comes the 'great emptiness' of a 'nothing' (over ideas, ideals, and values). Here, God, the Supreme Being, is seen only as the foundation of ethics and politics (which is a partial truth).

-- M. Heidegger, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, Pfullingen, 1967.

-- J. Godsblom, *Nihilism and Culture*, Amsterdam; 1960 (culturalological interpretation of nihilism).

-- V. Soloviev, **Crisis de la philosophie occidentale **, Paris, 1947. Soloviev reflects on positivist ideology, which, after the theological and metaphysical stages—which rationally articulate the traditional foundation of religion—lawfully sees a third and definitive stage developing, namely the positive or strictly scientific—which is one of the ways in which desacralization is captured in a theory.

Decision : the desecration has:

- (i) undergone a certain development in relation to rational thinking (philosophical and scientific);
- (ii) it has taken on various forms, the most notable of which we have briefly described bibliographically.

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The core of it remains, after all, what *E. Renan* says in **Vie de Jésus**, 1879-16 p. v/ vi: the 'critical' (testing the value of these texts, 'historical' authenticity and reliability, etc.) study of the life of Jesus proceeds axiomatically:

(i) The miracles of the Gospel are invented (mythical, fabulous, parabolic) stories;

(ii) the texts are not inspired by the Holy Spirit, but merely human editorial work (history of tradition). "These two denials are, in our work, not the result of biblical research; they precede it; they are the fruit of an experience that knows no refutation: miracles are those things that never occur (...). No intervention of the deity, neither in the creation of a book nor in any event whatsoever, has ever been proven." (oc, vi).

The French (naive) clarity with which Renan, the skeptic, here posits his own secular (miracle-less and uninspired) 'experience' as the only 'critical' one and forges an axiom from it is truly crushing! This is how the secularist reasons, if he dares to formulate his axomata.

(iii) Secularization has, over time, taken on an aggressive form: *G. Szczesny, Die Zukunft des Ungalubens*, Munich, 1958, ('unbelief' here means: **a** . the establishment of de-Christianization, **b** . professing or confessional atheism as an anti-Christian confession, which claims that the 'future' belongs to unbelief. It is already the case that a percentage of Western people, especially those scientifically and technologically educated, perceive the "mysteries as an offense" (which St. Paul already noted among the pagans and/or Jews of his time), - that large masses experience Christianity as a purely externalist tradition or convention; post-Christian irreligion regards theological religions or the scientific and political 'substitute religions' (ideologies) as equally absurd in a completely materialistic universe in which man is completely intertwined, yet with a

adaptability that surpasses that of inhuman beings (irreligious humanism).

-- G. Szczny, *Religions Answers to Thirty-One Questions by G. Szczny*, Amsterdam/Hilversum, 1966 (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam - albeit with the intention of underlining the divergence of the answers).

-- H. Schleite, *Skeptische Religionsphilosophie (Zur Kritik der Pietät)*, Freiburg, 1972 (whoever takes into account the Enlightenment, the critique of religion of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, and the 'evil' in our era, must surely be 'skeptical').

-- B. de Lubac, *Le drame de l'humanisme athée*, Paris, 1945 (Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Comte, Dostoevski).

-- H. Arvon, *L'athéisme*, Paris, 1967 (materialist and humanist atheism, primarily philosophical - thoroughly described).

So much for the most essential aspect concerning desacralization.

HA86

Neo-sacralism. Bibliogr. sample:

-- M. Eliade, *La poursuite de l'absolu*, in *l'Express* (01.09.1979, pp. 64/70), interview, in which Eliade discusses the recent inclination towards things like yoga, Zen, alchemy, myths, etc. 'hermeneutically' (i.e., seeking the 'meaning' of religious phenomena), points to the 'counterculture' that is emerging within our scientific-industrial (or: post-industrial) society shaped by the Enlightenment.

-- M. Eliade, *Méphistophélès et l'androgynie*, Paris, 1962 (in the introduction the author says that: **1/** the discovery of archaic and exotic cultures (orientalism, ethnology, religious studies) and

2/ the discovery of the unconscious (depth psychology) compels traditional humanism in the West to undergo a thorough revision (broadening); for he says: "It is not excluded that our era will go down in history as the first to have rediscovered the various religious experiences, abolished by Christianity when it triumphed" (oc, 10).

-- M. Eliade, **Occultisme, sorcellerie et modes culturelles **, Paris, 1978, broadens what was stated in the previous work to include the 'outburst of occultism (esotericism)' in the sixties (oc, 79ss.); indeed, he says: "As a historian of religion, I cannot escape the astonishment aroused by the remarkable popularity of witchcraft in the culture and subcultures of the modern West" (oc, 93). -- This leads us to conclude that there is a dual concept of 'counterculture' and 'neo-sacralism'.

Counterculture:

That is the culture that, within the dominant enlightened, technological culture, taps into sources of knowledge and life other than technological ones.

-- Cfr. Th. Roszak, *The Rise of a Counterculture (Reflections on Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opponents)*, Amsterdam, 1971 (Allen Ginsberg, Alan Watts (Orientalism), psychedelic experience, P. Goodman, etc.).

-- C.A. Reich, *Flowers in Concrete (The Greening of America : How the Youth Revolution Tries to Make America Livable)*, Bloemendaal, 1971 (on the pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial eras; consciousness I, II, III).

-- *Politics or Mysticism ?* in Tijdschrift v. Theologie, DDB (Emmaüs), 1973 (a socially critical response).

Neo-Sacralism:

That is the revival, within the 'enlightened' technocratic culture, of sacred experiences of a very diverse nature (see Eliade's expressions and works above), which do connect with archaic traditions, but which are, generally speaking, innovative and incorporate modernity in a sacred sense.

Bibl. sample :

-- M. Choisy, *L'être et le silence*, Geneva, 1964 (a synthesis of psychoanalysis and Teilhardism, interpreted with due regard to primitive and Eastern religions);

-- J. Needham, *The New Religions*, Amsterdam, 1975 (connects to the 'Californian outburst': Hinduism, Buddhism, Sufism, Zen Buddhism, Meher Baba, Subud, Transcendental Meditation, Krishnamurti, Tibetan Buddhism, Gurdjieff, etc. are discussed (doctrines, organizations, leaders)).

-- J. Jongedijk, *What Does Your Neighbor Believe?* Wageningen, n.d. (Quakers, Salvation Army, Moral Re-armers, Free Catholics, Members of the Christian Community, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Sufis, Spiritists, etc. (exposition, discussion)).

-- *Private: A. Pollak-Eltz, Afro-American religions and cults* , Roermond, 1970 (the West African religions (**a/** Gold Coast (Ashanti), Dahomey (Ewe, Fon), Nigeria (Yoruba); **b/** Congo - Angola (Bantu) are the root of the African-American neo-religions in South America (Brazil: batuque, candomblé, umbanda, xango, casa de minas, pagelança, macumba), Antilles (santeria, convince cult, myalism, voodoo, shango shouters), Venezuela (maria lionza), Suriname (maroons)) and in North America (negro churches, hoodoo);

-- A. Gatti, *Bapuka* , Zurich, 1963 (an ethnologist seemingly accidentally comes into contact with worshippers of Bapuka, a goddess of love and fertility; over time, the increased resilience in harsh situations becomes apparent, - In a typical form of neo-sacralism (see also his *Tamtams in de nacht* , Antwerp, 1944 (more loosely written, but accurately describing African religious life)).

-- S. and R. Leacock, *Spirits of the Deep (Drums, Mediums and Trance in a Brazilian City)* , New York, 1972 (about the batuque in Belém, Braz.; the batuque, like the other African-American neo-sacralisms, is a typical medial (mediumnic) religion, where rapture, led by deities and spirits, is central.

-- S. Bramly, *Macumba (Forces noires du Brésil)* , Paris, 1981 (an excellent little work, which reproduces interviews and allows a 'mother of the gods' (leader of the Macumba ceremonies) to speak unhindered—something many ethnologists, with their axiomatic approach, do not do and through which they proceed externally).

-- G. Playfair, *Le pouvoir de l'invisible* , Paris, 1975 (fascinating description of the paranormally gifted in Brazil, especially in the circles of Kardecist spiritualists).

- J. Kerboull, *Le vaudou (Magie ou religion)*, Paris, 1973.
- *id.*, *Vaudou et pratiques magiques* , Paris, 1977 (missionary who closely studied the voodoo of the countryside)

- E. Rochedieu, *Der Schintoismus und die neuen Religionen Japans* , Geneva, 1973 (8. 209/247: thorough overview of the characteristics of the more than three hundred registered neo-sacralisms in Japan).

- D. Logan, *America Bewitched (The Rise of Black Magic and Spiritism)*, New York, 1973 (reflects on the sunny, but even more so on the pejorative aspects of North American neo-sacralism).

So much for a selection from an unmanageable mass of data.

HA88

Conclusion of the overview.

Without a doubt, there exist two different sides to religion and, connected to them, two diametrically opposed types of religion: the archaic-sacred and the modern-secular.

The bibliography indicated above already proves this without going into it. Before starting the investigation of archaic-sacred religion, a brief word on the true reason for this dichotomy: the structure of the Judgment of God (not merely, indeed, especially not legal), recognized as the structure <i>pure</i> of the religious process (see above), contains the reason.

After all:

a. The sowing-reaping law (*Gal. 6:7/9; Ekkli (= Sir) 15:11/20*) governs all causality, including religious causality—namely, an inner retribution (immanent sanction) is at work in every part of creation and in creation as a whole. This ensures that the effect bears witness to the cause, that the cause undergoes its 'judgment' in its effect, specifically that 'judgment' which it itself caused.

b. The selection, or 'crisis', as the New Testament Greek language says, takes place on the basis of that immanent lawful succession 'cause/effect'.

c . God reveals Himself not unambiguously, but ambiguously. That is to say, on His part there is absolute unambiguity, but on the part of the recipient of His message there is a possible misunderstanding or a possible correct understanding of that message. Therefore, all precise-thinking minds have the impression that 'religion is so 'obscure', 'mysterious', 'cryptic', etc., but they have grasped only the earthly-secular side: the divine-transcendent side is unambiguous for whoever 'has a heart to 'see" (as Moses said to the Israelites) (see above).

d. this implies that that decipherable message, by virtue of its ambiguity, indicated more than sufficiently above, is a test of the one to whom God (or his emissaries, who are manifold) addresses himself. God puts 'heart (conscious side) and kidneys (unconscious side)' to the test. He fathoms them, according to *Acts 1:24* , where, in the choice of Judas's replacement, the betrayer:

(i) relies on the fact that the candidates were indeed with the disciples, "starting at the baptism of John until the day on which (Jesus) was taken away from us (= Ascension)" (ib., 21/22),

(ii) yet realizing that this condition was necessary individually but sufficient only together with one other, namely that God makes the choice, and indeed as a prober of heart and soul. Thus God lays bare the innermost being of the creature and the judgment of God, which separates the sacred from the secular, is one (perhaps the principal) form of judgment of God, terrifying in its consequences.

HA89

After all, besides the generally religious elements present in virtually all religions (God, angels, demons, heaven, hell, purgatory (underworld distinguished from actual hell)), enlightenments (visionary, auditory) and miracles (healings, exorcisms, control of nature), there are the specifically Christian elements:

- a.** The divine pre-existence of Jesus as the second person of the Trinity,
- b.** The virgin birth, the divine and also messianic self-awareness of Jesus, his miraculous and prophetic activity within the framework of the Kingdom of God, foreseen by the Old Testament prophets for the end of

times, the God-willed Cross Easter together with the historical fact of his glorification in resurrection and Ascension (Resurrection Easter), his historical return at the end of times in 'power'.

These two types of sacred data are eliminated in modern secular interpretation, even though attempts are made to reintroduce or 'save' them, usually in one form or another, symbolically fideistically (i.e., the religion-free 'faith' (fideism) sees in them 'symbolic references to purely earthly realities' (symbolism)).

The German believers said that Bultmann was engaged in 'liquidation', not 'interpretation'!

2b. The encounter with the sacred.

This short chapter deals with two aspects: the method and the object.

2.1. The epistemology of the sacred.

We first explain the method or subjective approach using two understandable application models.

Model I.

L. Chochod, **Huê la mystérieuse **, Paris, 1943, pp. 295 ss., provides a splendid example of hiero-experience in connection with his exposition on the An-Hôi pagoda in Annam. The author tends "to believe that the deities of which he just spoke exist only 'really' in the imagination of the Annamites".

He specifies: "When an Annamite has a dream which, for some reason, leads him to regard as truly unnatural, or when a somewhat extraordinary event befalls him, he builds a small straw temple where, according to his intuition, the occult power has manifested itself, and he performs a sacrifice there."

The event becomes known, gains scope, and generates a tradition, which is supplemented and develops in smaller or larger modifications. Nothing more is needed to give rise to a new deity or, 'more accurately', a new symbol of the 'Supernatural Power'. Hence the titles 'Ngoc Fhu Nhan', 'Chua Ngoc', 'Thiên Fhi Ngoc Nu' (also a goddess name: oc, 293), 'Duc Thanh Me', etc., which define nothing 'precise' and are applicable to a multitude of genii, demons, or demigods."

One sees that the author thinks in a strongly occultist way (and is in that sense open to a sacred experience), but is equally Western 'precise' and, immediately, inclined to understand what the Annamite 'sees', 'experiences', as a 'symbol' of a vague concept of 'Supernatural Night' (in a dynamic-magical sense).

He is, however, honest where he states that not only a dream, but a motive that leads one to regard that dream as extra- and/or supernatural, is decisive (dream and 'reason' are separately necessary, jointly sufficient conditions).

The same applies: an event in itself is not sufficient; 'something' more is needed to make that event qualify as 'extraordinary' (event, 'something more' are individually necessary, collectively sufficient conditions).

It should be noted that the author speaks correctly when he understands imagination as the organ of perception of the sacred among the Annamites: however, one should not confuse imagination with imagery ;

All people with sound sacred experience (**a.** life force, **b1** . Sensitivity, **b2** . Seeing and **b3** . Interpretation; see above pp. 67/69) know that extra- and supernatural realities and processes manifest in the imagination, which is the organ of those things. If sufficiently critically formed or, failing that, if sufficiently familiar with the consequences of their 'perception', they will make a sharp distinction between imagination, i.e. the 'visualization' (eidetic faculty) of (the workings of) extra- and/or supernatural realities that are felt, and imaginative illusion, i.e. the totally arbitrary creation of imaginary data without real contact with extra-subjective realities. Every magician, in particular, knows that distinction.

Model II.

Mt 2:1/12: "When Jesus was born in Bethlehem (Judah) in the days of King Herod, behold: then wise men (magoi) from the East came to Jerusalem. They said: 'Where is the Prince of the Jews, who is just born? We saw his star in the East and came to worship him.'"

Now when King Herod heard this, he was distressed, and all Jerusalem with him. He summoned all the chief priests and scribes and asked them where the Christ would be born. They said: "In Bethlehem of Judah, for so it is written by the prophet (Micah 5:1): 'And you, Bethlehem, land of Judah,—you are certainly not the least among the 'chief towns' (clans) of Judah;—for out of you shall come a prince,—who shall lead a people Israel'."

Then Herod secretly summoned the Magi and questioned them carefully about the time when the star had appeared to them. He sent them to Bethlehem and said: "Go and inquire carefully about the Child, and when you have found Him, report it to me, so that I also may go and worship Him." When they had heard the king, they departed. -- And behold, the star which they had seen in the East went before them until it came over the place where the Child was, and stood there.

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When they saw the star, they were exceedingly glad. And when they had entered the house, they found the Child with his mother, Mary. They fell down to the ground and worshiped him. They opened their treasures and offered him gifts: gold, frankincense, and myrrh. Since they had been warned in a dream not to return to Herod, they departed by another way to their country.

For an externalist, both the (appearing) star, which they had 'seen', and the 'dream' with the warning would have existed only in the imagination, just as just now for Chochod what the Annamites had 'seen' or 'felt' as extraordinary or unnatural. Renan, the skeptic, says that 'miracles' and 'inspirations' (the two key phenomena according to him regarding religion) 'do not exist'.

Let us leave the dream warning out of consideration (due to a lack of data). For an internalist, the text of Matthew is instructive; after all, the pragmatic-experimental structure of a developed sacred experience is briefly indicated therein. The persons acting are 'wise men' ('witches', those who 'know') or, more accurately translated, 'magicians', i.e., Eastern diviners (who bore the name of a tribe of the Medes, known for its sacred functions) (*Jer* 39:13; *Dan* 2:48; 4:6; 5:11); In the days of Jesus,

astrologers (*Isa* = *Is* 47:13) and 'Chaldeans' (*Dan* 2:2) were considered scholars (here the 'wise men' from the East. One should distinguish somewhat from these the sorcerers in the proper sense (Simon (Samaria: *Acts* 8:9, 11) and Bar-Jesus (*Cyprus: Acts* 13:6, 8)).

Now, these astrological scholars: **(i)** 'see' a star, which 'appears'; this 'eidetic' experience, in the 'imagination' (not in the 'imagination') is **(ii)** accompanied by an interpretation: that star 'is' the 'sign' that a prince of the Jews has been born and, what is more, a command (to go and seek him out and worship him).

Apparently, the threefold structure of the miracle is present here: **a.** wonder, **b1** sign, **b2** power. Something paradoxical stands out here: these pagan astrological scholars know that something extraordinary has occurred sooner than 'Jerusalem' and its prince Herod!

Based on this visual experience with interpretation, they undertake the journey: the confirmations are forthcoming.

a. The prophetic writings of the Jews confirm something like 'the birth of a prince over Israel' in Bethlehem (cf. *2 Peter* 1:16/21 , where the transfiguration corresponds to a prophecy);

b . the eidetic experience resumes on the spot (*Mt* 2:9) to their very great joy;

c. the discovery of Mary with her child 'confirms' in the physical order.

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In other words: the 'first sight' (ordinary sensory seeing) confirms the preceding 'second sight' (second sight, zweites Gesicht).

Conclusion: The Magi freely responded to the miraculous sign; their departure has, epistemologically speaking, the character of an experiment that begins:

(i) on the basis of a first observation (by induction), namely the 'seeing' of the star, with the interpretation (abduction),

(ii) they decide (deductively) to risk the journey to the Land of Jews;

(iii) once carried out they encounter three confirmations (second observation, namely the experimental one, with its induction or result).

It should be noted—what Chochod neglects—that in Annam, too, people reason in this way: they quickly perceive whether further signs appear at the place where the straw hut temple is erected. That is why we spoke of a fully developed sacred experience: many so-called 'critics' simply do not address the further sacred experiences that follow the initial sacred experience (if specialist scientists adhered only to the observational or perception stage without the experimental stage, the same criticisms would apply).

It should be noted here the distinction between a purely symbolic phenomenon (namely the star as the star of the birth of a ruler) and a truly sacred phenomenon (namely a miraculous or extra- and/or supernatural force that possesses a sign character (is informative)): 'symbol' is the mere reference in the mind (mentality) of the Magi; 'force' that is more-than-natural and has sign value is an extramental reality that is testable on more than one level (eidetic, prophetic, physical). Those with a secular mindset simply confuse these two radically different types of reality. For internalists, this distinction is paramount.

It should be noted that Patristics interpreted the Matthew text approximately in that spirit: “(An unusual star appears; thereby) He who gave that sign also gave insight”; “and, what He made insight, He also made seek out and, once sought out, He also allowed Himself to be found”. (Pope Leo the Great (*Sermon 1 of the Epiphany*)).

We will now briefly consider the regulative structure (model) of those two application models, primarily through a bibliographic sample (due to lack of time).

-- MM. Moncrief, *The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception* , London, 1951:

a/ the traditional, understand, secular interpretation of perception.

This is based on ordinary sensory experience:

1. A physical-physiological process conditions the origin;
2. from that process arises, in any event, a representation of what is perceived within us;

3. once the observer reaches this point, he becomes aware of it;

Three main difficulties :

(i) The transition from purely physical-physiological to proposed and conscious order;

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(ii) The image character or unambiguous connection between the thing and/or process outside us (extramental) and the conscious representation within us (intramental).

(iii)a. The direct or, as the Austrian school (Brentano, Meinong, - Husserl) called it, the 'intentional' or encounter character of perception ('I see you coming' is a direct experience, even though it can be divided and analyzed into aspects and phases);

(iii)b. the occult or, in a milder sense, the paranormal perception (e.g. clairvoyance is a proven fact, which is denied only by ideologists and prejudiced people).

These three or four difficulties remain, in the traditional interpretation, a 'foreign body' that one ought to step outside of in order to 'integrate' them, which means that the axioms of the classical explanation are necessary but not sufficient; hence the psychophysiological explanation as inadequate, together with broadenings thereof;

b/ the 'clear', 'clairvoyant' view.

This starts from both an immediate (intentional, phenomenological) and a paranormal structure to 'explain' ordinary, non-paranormal, and paranormal perception (which posits the separately necessary and collectively sufficient conditions as axioms).

The predecessors of Moncrieff are

(i) HH. Price, the introducer of the work;

(ii) H. Bergson (who broke away from mere image theory);

(iii) Hans Driesch , *Alltagsrätsel der Seele* (1938) ("The Self, to the best of its ability, is and remains fundamentally universally clairvoyant; its actual clear 'seeing' was, however, restricted and bound to states of that part of its body called 'brain', because otherwise the Self would not be able to live due to the excessive abundance of 'faces'.

Occasionally, of course, in the paranormal, the original universal form of grasping the other breaks through.” (oc, 38).

For Moncrieff, the clear (paranormal) degree of perception is the first and ever-present form of perception: it is immediate (encounter, being directly with things and processes, 'compresence') and is not caused by the physical-physiological process; this process is selectively limiting—primarily attuned to the biological needs of everyday life.

It goes without saying that Moncrieff here casts an ancient insight, which appears self-evident to all those with religious and magical experiences, into a modern form.

-- *JP Vernant et al., Divination et rationalité*, Paris, 1974: divination is far from anti-positive; it is the first form of scientific thinking (which is clarified by means of data from Chinese, ancient Mesopotamian, Greek, Roman, and African cultures and continues Moncrieff's thesis on an epistemological level).

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Regarding actual paranormology:

-- *H. Driesch, Parapsychologie (Die Wissenschaft von den 'okkulten' Erscheinungen (Methodik und Theorie))*, Zurich, 1952-2: In a preface by J.B. Rhine, a study by H. Bender (paranormology from 1930 to 1950),- then *Methodik* (recognizing deception and error; recognizing irreducible phenomena) and *Theorie* (role and structure of a necessary and sufficient 'theory'; overview and critique of existing theories).

-- *B. Visser, Parapsychology (Facts and hypotheses)*, Maaseik, two chapters: **a.** the clairvoyant phenomena (paragnosis = paranormal knowledge); **b.** the parergic phenomena (parergy = paranormal event).

-- *G. Murphy, Parapsychology* , Utr/Antw., 1963 (spontaneous and experimental cases; clairvoyance; precognition; psychokinesis (= parergy, paranormal physically observable event; afterlife; - interpretation).

-- *J. Feldmann, *Okkulte verschijnselen **, Brussels, 1938 (a still sound work that distinguishes between psychic and physical phenomena,

discusses the general theories (deception hypothesis); animistic (= psychophysical and purely psychic) hypothesis; spiritualist hypothesis; demonistic explanation); extensive study, also conceived from a cultural-historical perspective, of

- 1.** telepathy and clairvoyance (the two cognitive processes) and
- 2.** apparitions and ghostly phenomena (two parergic processes).

-- *Y. Castellan, La metapsychique*, Paris, 1955 (historical overview:

a. the predecessors (Mesmer, Reichenbach);

b1 the Anglo-Saxon school (Crookes, Gurney, Myers, with the two societies: Society for Psychical Research (Eng.) and American Society for Psychical Research, and the first quantitative experimentation);

b2 . the classical European school (Flammarion, Maxwell, A. de Rochas, Boirac, Dr. Geley, Dr. Osty, Richet).

b3. Dr. Grasset (metapsychika (= paranormology) and general epistemology).

b4. the (then current) metaphysics (Rhine, Carington; polyzoism and polypsychism; 'fourth' dimension; physiological hypotheses regarding telepathy; C.G. Jung).

-- *J. Björkhem, Die verborgene Kraft (Probleme der Parapsychologie)*, Olten/ Freib. i.Br., 1954 (parapsychology epistemologically; telepathy and clairvoyance; psychometry (interpreting something clairvoyantly by touch); spiritual healing and miracle healing; hypnosis and crime; English spiritualism; 'automatic' (transported) writing and speaking; telekinesis and materialization (materialization is the sudden disappearance and sudden physical presence of objects); explanations; the second part contains experiments and documents).

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-- *R. Ashby, The Guidebook for the Study of Psychical Research*, London, 1972 (solid, small encyclopedia, with a preface by Renée Haynes);

-- *S. Smith, ESP (Extrasensory Perception)*, The Hague, 1974 (ESP = Extra. Sensory Perception; the booklet deals with psychicism as distinct from PK (Psycho-Kinesis)).

-- *A. von Schrenck-Notzing, Grundfragen der Parapsychologie*, Stuttgart, 1962 (reedition by G. Walther: **a.** psychic phenomena, **b.** physical

mediumism (materialization phenomena, etc.), **c.** ghost phenomena, **d.** necrologies (Liégeois, A. von Keller, G. Geley, K. Gruber);- still fascinating).

-- *Lyall Watson, Natural or Supernatural (A new, original approach to strange phenomena and their place in nature)*, Baarn, 1974 (**a.** the cosmos, **b.** matter, **c.** mind, **d.** time, which points to a new perspective, compared to ordinary parapsychological books).

-- Regarding the Soviet Union (and Eastern Bloc countries): *Sh. Ostrander/Lynn Schroeder, Parapsychological Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain* , Haarlem, 1972 (Russia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia performed groundbreaking work in the field of paranormology, albeit based on a Marxist-materialist hypothesis).

-- *H. Gris/W. Dick Les nouveaux sorciers du Kremlin (Deux surveyeurs américains font le point sur la parapsychologie en URSS)*, Paris, 1979 (supplements previous work.

-- Besides the Eastern Bloc, Brazil is also doing groundbreaking work: *G. Playfair, Le pouvoir de l'invisible* , Paris, 1976 (especially in the mediumistic field, under the influence of Kardecist spiritualism (*Allan Kardec, Le livre des esprits* , 1857, is the source of inspiration for a spiritualism that is very social (clinics, orphanages, nursing homes, vocational training centers, schools, poor relief)); in 1939 the Spiritualist Federation of the State of São Paulo was founded; with the gigantic spiritualist center of Rio de Janeiro (Tupyara), it is impressive as a medical achievement);

-- Finally, one example from the recent experimental direction:

-- *J. et Chr. Dierkens, Manuel expérimental de parapsychologie* , Tournay, 1978 (the book coincides with the Human Potential Movement and its offshoots; it is encyclopedic).

-- *Parapsychology: Appearance and Reality* , Dossier, in *Kultuurleven* 45 (1978): 10 (Dec), pp. 866/920 (uneven set of articles, the most fascinating of which is *J. Walgrave, Explanatory Models of Parapsychological Phenomena* (ac, 901/911)).

Note (i) It is good to know that, in the 19th and early 20th centuries , a fierce struggle arose between the depth psychological (and physiological-psychic) explanations (called 'animism' by Aksakof), which situated the root of paranormal phenomena in the individual or (like Jung) in the 'cosmic' (also: 'collective') unconscious, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the

spiritualists (Du Prel, von Aksakof), who attributed them to the souls of the deceased.

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(ii) One should clearly distinguish the following subjects of an epistemological nature:

a/ From the psychology of consciousness to the psychology of the unconscious (others also distinguish a superconscious), there is a step; the depth psychologist starts from conscious phenomena—e.g., slipping the tongue, neurotic symptoms such as a vague anxiety, etc.—in order to conclude (deductively) from there that there are unconscious or superconscious 'factors' (variables), without seeing, feeling, hearing, etc., these himself.

b/ From depth psychology to parapsychology there is again a gap, epistemologically speaking: many depth psychologists do not assume what parapsychologists do, namely insofar as the parapsychologist does not depart from ordinary psychology, psychotherapy, and psychiatry, but from occultism, as it has existed since time immemorial (but especially since the Renaissance in Western Europe).

The parapsychologist aims to isolate from occultism (identified methodologically as non-scientific) those phenomena (and their explanation) that correspond with either a strictly natural scientific (preferably experimental) or a human scientific method.

The remainder—that which is scientifically inaccessible (due to the non-public aspect) and inexplicable regarding occult phenomena—is banished as negligible; yet here, too, deductively, regarding observable and/or experimentally verifiable, public (accessible to everyone) phenomena, one concludes that there are no longer phenomenally given 'factors' (variables).

If, by accident to him, the parapsychologist himself were to see, hear, touch, etc., these phenomena, then his fellow scientists would write him off as no longer 'scientific'; reason or cause: science as a public is secular, earthly, 'this-worldly'.

Conclusion: Religion and magic (and occultism) are too direct as cognitive-practical phenomena to be public-scientific; only the indirect externalist method is 'scientifically' tenable. Depth psychology and parapsychology escape this 'sin', yet, in doing so, they condemn themselves to the indirect method, externalism.

(iii) Reference should be made to *Dr. Phil. Encausse, Sciences occultes et déséquilibre mental*, Paris, 1958 (the method of ecstasy, as spiritualists frequently practice it, and magic, as it often is in fact, frequently lead to psychological and/or physical ailments. The meliorative use of religion, magic, etc., should not obscure the fact that there is often a pejorative use. This implies that religion and magic in the sacred sense are not without dangers; that is one of the reasons for secularization.

Without the framework of the Kingdom of God, things do not always work, and even then, a thorough degree of the Kingdom of God! That is to say, one must banish from this Kingdom of God all elements that do not belong in it!

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In this pejorative context, attention should be drawn to two systechies: 'ana.normal/ kata.normal' and 'trans.a.scendent/ trans.de.scendent'. If 'normal' corresponds to that which corresponds to teleology, then 'ab.normal' is that which deviates from that teleology, and 'para.normal' is that which does deviate but then higher than normal' (ana.normal) or lower than normal' (kata.normal), which is expressed in Latin terms as 'trans.a.scendent' (ana) or 'trans.de.scendent' (kata).

If one pauses, even for a moment, to consider the causes of catanormal occult or religious processes, one encounters 'soul-catching' ('prendre au piège les âmes' says *the Jerusalem Bible*), as is so accurately outlined in *Ezekiel 13:17-23*.

'Soul-catching' means that one, consciously or, as happens much more often, unconsciously, exhausts or even sucks out the 'soul'—in this case the 'dunamis' (Luke), the life force (magnetism) ('sucking out' means emptying to the very bottom, so that one can speak, as religious historians like to say, of a 'lost soul' or 'loss of soul' (see *Ivar Paulson*,

Seelenvorstellungen und Totenglaube bei nordeurasischen Völkern , Ethnos 1960, H. 1/2, pp. 84/118)).

Such 'soul-eatery' (an Egyptian term) is the typical work of:

(i) black, or abused magic,

(ii) which is itself usually inspired by Satan (or 'demonic' in the pejorative sense). If one views this process purely externally, one sees either black magic blood-shedding rites ('red magic') or equally black magic sex rites ('sexual magic'). The reason for this is that the partial soul (particular magnetism), which is either in the vascular system or in the erotic-sexual system (the oral, anal and especially genital body parts form its three principal zones), 'works' most powerfully, which is effective. But more on that later.

If one views the matter differently again, now psychologically (again externally), then arises what is called 'grippedness' or 'possession' (Ergriffenheit, Besessenheit), i.e., some degree of disembodiment, 'Selbst.ent.fremdung', 'alienation'.

Even seemingly innocent practices such as (self-)hypnosis, merely due to the fact that the person involved is either dominated or controlled to such a degree that the controlled 'is no longer themselves' (the typical phenomenon of disembodiment), are radically satanic and/or black magic.

The same applies to the 'medial' (mediumistic) religions in, for example, Negro-African or Afro-American environments: the media are 'ridden' ('chevauché(e)s') by 'spirits', 'deities' that suck dry, only to release, and only then release, what they 'want' to (authoritatively) communicate regarding healing, counsel, and clairvoyance.

Consequence : First, they make their 'media' (intermediaries) 'manic' (whipped up), only to leave them exhausted and thus 'depressed'.

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The same applies to spiritualism, insofar as it makes use of mediumistically gifted individuals who must allow themselves to be 'ridden' (as the Flemish commoner says of the 'mare' or nightmare).

The psychotherapies operate in an equally pejorative manner, giving free rein to either the famous 'aggression' ('thanatos') or the equally famous 'eros': there, manic-depressive grip (possession) runs to the detriment of quiet self-possession, so to speak because, in the disembodiment and anti-culture (*Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*), whereby the pleasure principle escapes the reality principle—seemingly more 'itself' than 'under the pressure of civilization'—the hidden, subconscious or superconscious 'truth' concerning the true 'essence' (the 'self' or whatever one calls it) comes to the surface.

Certainly where one 'handles' not in a Freudian-psychic sense, but in a Reichian-energetic sense, one falls into all the laws of medial demonism. We will return to this later.

Epistemological conclusion:

All these 'techniques' ('methods'):

(i) To reveal, 'unveil' (apocalupsis) indeed and truths concerning the self implied therein and truths 'for others' or 'for the situation' in which that self finds itself;

(ii) to conceal, just like the transported sibyl (at Delphi and elsewhere in the oracle sites investigated by Herodotus (numbering sixteen)) in order to mislead, at least in part, and not to release the 'grip' on that same self.

rightly wrote , *Le Logos fondateur de la dialectique* , in A. Marc et al., *Aspects de la dialectique* , Paris, 1956, pp. 125ss. (*Le lumineux et ten ébreux devenir*): “Heraclite d'Ephèse - creator of terme même philosophos (fr. 35) - est le premier grand héros de la tragédie philosophique. Et il écrit : La “Sibylle qui, par sa bouche délirante (through her crazy mouth), prononce des choses graves (from serious words), sans parure et sans fard (without adornment and without blanket), traverse (...) des milliers d'années (continues for thousands of years), animée par la Divinité (animated by the Deity) (...). Le Maître, dont l'oracle est à Delphes, na parle pas (oute legei), ne dissimule pas (oute kruptei): il signifie (sêmeinei)”. (D. 92, 93). The last words read: “The Lord (Apollon), whose oracle (divine speech) is in Delphi, neither merely conceals nor merely reveals: he gives a 'sign'”.

One is familiar with the scathing critiques of logistics theorists like Bochensky of dialectics (of Hegel and Marx), claiming that it is a completely logically invalid linguistic form.

Well, that same (no other) criticism also applies to the 'methods' cited above for approaching 'occult' (unconscious, subconscious, superconscious) and/or sacred phenomena: whoever embarks on that path walks the endless, never-completed path of the dialectic at work in such techniques as **1.** (self-)hypnosis, **2.** 'mediumism', **3.** free-associative and at the same time anti-cultural therapies.

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Note: Semasiological: one often says 'parapsychology'; 'paranormology' would be much better, for paranormal phenomena are paraphysical, parachemical, parabiological, parapsychological, parasociological, etc. The term 'metapsychica' should not be confused with Freudian 'metapsychology' (which discusses instances such as the 'superego', etc.); especially in Anglo-Saxon circles, one frequently speaks of 'psychical', 'psi', to represent 'paranormal', 'paranormal power (manifestation)'.

The specifically hierosophical scope.

All those paranormal things are briefly discussed here because of their religious significance: a sacred experience is always paranormal. If it is sufficiently 'clear' as perception and experiment, and is more than merely secular.

Bibl. Sample:

(i) From a cultural-historical perspective, one work among many: C. van Os, *Moa-Moa, Modern Thinking and Primitive Wisdom*, Amsterdam, sd (+1951) (this professor of mathematics sees salvation only in a sort of return to the pre-intellectual primitive man. We ought to reclaim what has become 'archaic' within us, without neglecting the modern-rational-scientific.

Reason : modern rational behavior and archaic, so-called 'irrational' behavior belong together complementarily; the author is therefore not an 'irrationalist' like, for example, Klages or Dacqué);

(ii) Philosophically also one work: *P. Boutang, Ontologie du secret* , Paris, 1973 (peculiar and difficult to read, which touches upon our problem in a number of pages).

(iii) Regarding religion and paranormology: *R. Haynes, The Hidden Springs (An Inquiry into Extra-Sensory Perception)* , London, 1961 (very thorough; particularly important: pp. 198ff., where this Catholic English expert talks about the ideas of Prosper Lambertini, the later Pope Benedict XIV, who thoroughly studied the relationship 'religion/parapsychia').

-- *Canon J. Pearce-Higgins/Rev. G. Stanley Whitby. Ed., Life, Death and Psychical Research (Studies on behalf of The Churches' Fellowship for Psychical and Spiritual Studies)* London, 1973. These beautiful Anglican-non-Anglican studies cover:

a. the nature and teleology of paranormal phenomena (telepathy, physical phenomena, psychokinesis, ecstasy mediumship, out-of-body experiences and survival after death, paranormal healing);

b. the Bible and paranormal phenomena (the so-called Biblical taboos regarding paranormative research (a factual analysis of what the Bible actually says)), Biblical miracles, ghostly phenomena, possession);

c. inferences (philosophy and paranormology, the nature of life after death, theology and paranormology, God's presence).

-- Simpler: *Van Willigen Van der Veen, Parapsychology and its significance for the Christian faith* , Leiden, 1947 (connects with the Theological Day held in Amsterdam in January 1946, organized by the Study Association for Psychical Research).

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(iv) Epistemology, yes culturology and paranormology:

-- *S. Kicken, Alternative Science (on the trail of new paradigms)* , Antw./Amsterd., 1975 (natural sciences, (para-)psychology, sociology, medicine, engineering are 'shifting' towards new, completely different paradigms).

-- *L. Pauwels/J. bergier, Le matin des magiciens (Introduction au réalisme fantastique)* , Paris, 1960 (book which, along with Planète et al., caused a stir because it tapped into an existing 'need' that crushed its authors; not without reason, *Le Dossier de la Quinzaine* , through the voice of *G. Baguet* , posed the question: '*Planète*': *Phénomène religieux* ?).

-- L. Wijnsberg/P. Warnaar, *Religious Experience in the Mirror of Consciousness*, Apeldoorn, 1974 (dozens of interviews with Protestants, Roman Catholics, and non-churchgoers; interpretation by a physician-psychologist regarding the levels of consciousness).

-- Stuart Holroyd, *PSI and the Consciousness Explosion*, Baarn, 1977 (positioning of the paranormal side).

-- R. Ruyer, *La gnose de Princeton (Des savants à la recherche d' une religion)*, Paris, 1974. At a very high scientific standard, world-renowned scientists have quietly outgrown shallow and refined materialism to advocate a kind of 'gnosis'—a revival of the gnosis of antiquity, but substantiated by modern scientific principles—as a solution on the epistemological level.

Conclusion: 'Faith' – now interpreted not secularly as opposed to 'religion', but sacredly, as it is consistently understood in the Bible, for example – is the breaking through of the first sight, into a second sight 'given' by God's grace (or, at least, that which shares in it): “What (...) was visible (conspicuous) to our Savior (Jesus) (namely during his earthly ministry), has passed into the 'mysteries' (sacramenta)”. (*Leo the Great, Sermo 2 de ascensione Dni .*).

Maw in the sacraments of the Church is Jesus:

(i) First visible' (in the pomp or in the simplicity of the liturgies throughout the world),

(ii) But He only becomes 'visible' (in the second degree, namely) in (the 'second sight' of) faith.

The entire traditional-sacred theology of faith stands or falls with that twofold manner of 'seeing', already articulated by Moses. Cf. above, p. 51 (the 'understanding' structure given by God's grace): “You yourselves have 'seen' everything (first sight) that Yahweh did before your eyes in Egypt (...): the great calamities, the signs and mighty wonders, which you beheld with your own eyes.

But Yahweh has not given you a heart to understand (second sight) to this day. So it is with Jesus and what is (first) 'visible' in him.

2.2. The sacred (the 'holy').

Bibl. sample :

-- R. Otto, *Het heilige (Een verhandeling over het irrationele in de idee van het goddelijke en de relatie ervan tot het rationele)*, Hilversum, 1963 (the Dutch translation of the famous German-Protestant book, published in 1917. The subtitle is significant: on p. 12, Otto even claims that the 'sacred' (the 'numinous') is “an arrèton, an ineffabile (something unspeakable), insofar as it is completely inaccessible to abstract concept”. This assertion stands or falls with one specific conception of 'abstract concept', which we, for purely logical-epistemological reasons, do not accept).

-- M. Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane, (A Study on the Religious Essence)*, Hilversum, 1962. Contents: **a.** the sacred space and the sacralization of the world; **b.** the sacred time and the myths; **c.** the sanctity of nature and the cosmic religion; **d.** human existence and the sanctification of life. “For the religious person, space is not homogeneous: it shows cracks and fractures; there are parts of space that differ qualitatively from the others: “Do not come closer,” said the Lord to Moses, “Take off your sandals, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground” (*Ex 3:5*) (oc, 9).

Just like space, time is not homogeneous and constant for the religious person: on the one hand there are the intervals of sacred time (largely periodic feasts) and, on the other hand, there is profane time, the ordinary duration of time, within which events without religious significance take place.” (oc, 36).

“For the religious person, nature is never exclusively natural”: it is always full of religious significance” (oc, 63). “(...) Familiar (...) with the folklore of the European peoples: in their beliefs and customs, their attitude towards life and death, many archaic 'religious situations' can still be recognized” (oc, 89). These are the four introductions to the four dimensions of the sacred, as M. Eliade, one of the world's greatest hierologists, outlines them.

-- R. Caillois, *L'homme et le sacré*, Paris, 1950 (sociological work).

Essential determination.

With despair, the sociologist *Caillois* introduces his little work on *The Sacred* (Sacred): "Essentially, he says, (...) the only thing one can validly say about the 'sacred' in general is contained in the very definition of the term: namely, it is opposed to the profane." (oc, 11).

-- N. Söderblom, *Das werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion)*, Leipzig, 1926- 2, p. 179, says: "(According to all this) the best definition of personal religion will be: 'Pious is he who holds something holy', and the main characteristic of institutional religion is the distinction between the sacred and the profane. No linguistic word is so characteristic of religion as 'taboo' (holy)."

HA102

(1) In God-believing piety, 'holiness' is the divine attribute for all others. 'Holy' and 'divine' (or 'belonging to God') become synonymous concepts. 'Holy' was, in its origin, a religious, not a moral concept. (...). Even today, a religious meaning cannot be separated from 'holy'. 'Holy' means 'supernaturalness' and, since in the religions of revelation the supernatural is recognized as a personal deity, 'divinity'.

(2) 'Holy' furthermore depends on that in which one seeks the supernatural, the divine.

(i) That could be a miracle (then the canonization committee asks about signs and wonders (...)).

(ii) Or it may lie in moral heroism (in which case the memory of saints-with-power clings to their love of humanity and their striving for purity). To the same extent that religion and belief in God developed in the moral realm, the word 'holy' was imbued with a moral-ideal value, but it never changed into a purely moral term (...). Despite all Protestant moralizing tendencies, the word 'holy' retains, even in Kant and in current usage, a supernatural and mystically charged meaning. (.....)" (oc, 179/180).

The great hierosophist continues: "The word 'holy' cannot simply mean 'good' or 'moral'. After all, it contains a relationship to religion" (oc,

181). With this, the semasiology of 'holy' is initiated. However, this now ought to be thoroughly addressed.

The typically sacred determination of the being.

A. Bertholet, **Die Religion des Alten Testaments**, Tübingen, 1932, p. 7, footnote d, writes: "Holiness means 'increased power-chargedness'." This brilliant footnote will serve us as a phenomenological guide. We say 'phenomenological' guide, but in two instances; namely according to the basis of all sacred phenomenology indicated above (pp. 51, 100), which exposes what can be contacted in 'seeing' (the eidetic act of viewing, says Husserl), which structurally (structurally), if necessary, reveals what shows itself in the direct encounter with something sacred, which (through many changes) is its task.

(A) *The content of the sacred*

In the bibliographic sample above, M. Eliade in particular has set out for us the 'scope' (extensio, the scholastics called it; denotation, the logistiekers call it) of the idea 'sacred' (space and time; nature and existence).

Such things still belong to the first 'seeing' of phenomenology; what N. Söderblom just said takes it a step further. The 'content' (comprehensio, connotatio) of the idea 'holy' was given briefly but accurately:

- i. distinguished from profane,
- ii. supernatural (divine), in the theistic sense (theological)
- iii a. Wonderful (miraculous, sign, power sign);
- iii b. moral).

HA103

Here, a remark is appropriate regarding the religious symbol that, so to speak, provides access to the sacred; Th. Munson, **Religious Consciousness and Experience**, The Hague, 1975, notes that as the demand for logical clarity and empirical accuracy increases among theologians, religious symbolism diminishes.

We would like to endorse this: a symbol is, after all, that which refers to something else; a sacred reality refers not (unless in a second instance):

it 'is' the sacred – present, yet defined (in time and space); it is only that defined character that can be interpreted as a symbol.

An Example : Referring to Judges 4:4/5, where it is said that Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, exercised the office of judge over Israel and, in doing so, resided under the Deborapim, between Ramah and Bethel in the mountains of Ephraim, A. Bertholet, oc, 30, says that “the original (di-archaic) conviction prevails that inspiration (insight) flows from the tree (spirit) upon whoever is within the reach of that tree”.

He refers to *1 Sam 22:6*; *Gen 12:6* (the prescribing oak); *Judges 9:37* (the oak of the diviners). Apparently, that palm tree is a dedication tree or 'holy' tree.

Hierologists like M. Meslin, **Pour une science des religions **, Paris, 1973, pp. 197/222 (**Le symbolisme religieux**), will call such a tree a (religious) symbol or emblem. But listen to Meslin's definition: “Every emblem is **a/** a visible and active sign, **b/** that proves to be a bearer of psychological and social forces.” (oc, 197). The question is: where exactly is the typically religious aspect?

People like Durand, *L'imagination symbolique*, Paris, 1964, distinguish:
a/ reductionist views (Freud, Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss),
b/ instaurative views (E. Cassirer, C.G. Jung, G. Bachelard) and
c/ synthetic (P. Ricoeur, who introduces both a reductive and an instaurative side into his approach).

What is missing in all those humanistic and fundamentally still very externalist views is the sacred experience at second sight.

The same, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to myth and rite, which are very often treated in the context of symbolism. Meslin, oc, 222/251 (*Des mythes*), says: “The analysis of symbolism calls forth that of myth to the extent that myth is a symbolic exploration of man's relations with beings as with the divine.” (Oc, 222). He adds: myth is a kind of 'language', not the product of pure imagination (as arid rationalism thought), but the expression of a reality intuitively perceived by man.

The sacred symbol is similar: in that symbol, the religious person perceives 'something' 'intuitively'. Unfortunately, one consistently fails to provide precision: what exactly, and what kind of perception is correct?

HA104

As for the symbol (see Durand), so too for the myth: *F. Schelling, *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie** (1856), notes three attitudes:

a/ negative (cf. reductionist), who dismisses the myth as a story without truth (Fontenelle, Lessing, Herder, Heine, Humboldt, Hume, Comte);

b/ more positive (cf. between reductionist and instaurative interpretation), who conceive of the myth as a merely imagery-rich cladding of a cryptic (hidden) truth of a non-mythical nature (discoverable through allegorical hermeneutics) (this opinion was already at work in late antiquity);

c/ positive, which sees in the myth a truth grasped by immediate intuition expressed (cf. the Instaurative view; that of the last Schelling himself); see also *M. Eliade, The myth of the eternal return (Archetypes and their repetition)*, Hilversum, 1964; *Dan Sperber, Le structuralisme en anthropologie*, in *Qu' est-ce que le structuralisme ?*, Paris, 1968, pp. 192/208, divides myth analysis into two types: **a/** the symbolic explanation of the German School (Fr. Creuzer, *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker*, Leipzig, 1810/1812, etc.); **b.** the functionalist explanation (*Br. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, London, 1922; *Radcliffe Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, London, 1963, etc.). The structuralist critique of this:

a. the ethnocentrism of both schools (which do not see how planetarily spread and mutually similar the myths are);

b. like the symbolist, the structuralist seeks the meaning of the myth not outside (functional) but within its text (textuology), but by seeing in it a system of 'mythemes' (= myth elements), constructed according to linguistic-logistic rules).

One sees: division once again! Cf. Also *H. Diephuis, Mythologie der Griechen*, The Hague/Antwerp, sd, pp. 529/547 (*Essence and origin of*

mythology : three interpretations are distinguished: **a.** null truth (the myth contains only imagination), **b.** indirect truth (the myth is a concealment of a truth; allegory), **c.** direct truth (the myth expresses a truth that can only be expressed mythically),-- one recognizes Schelling's tripartite nature.

Remarkable, from a sacred point of view, are the opinions of K. TH. Preuss (magical version), A. Jensen, *Mythos und Kult bei den Naturvölkern* (1951) (the mystery religious version) and van Raff. Pettazzoni, *Die Wahrheit des Mythos* , in *Paideuma*, 4 (1950) (the initiatic-magical opv.).

It is a fact that the myths, among peoples who still think mythically, are themselves ambiguous: there are purely playful myths (for the pleasure of storytelling and listening: myths contain fable, legend, and fairy tale elements, which also have a playful effect); there are aitiological (= explicative) myths (to explain something in the form of a story); there are ritual myths (to give a rite its verbal expression).

HA105

There are fluid (purely magical) myths (in which 'power' is processed and incorporated).

-- J. Cazeneuve, **Sociologie du rite **, *Paris*, 1971, bears the subtitle '*Tabou, magie, sacré* ', - which indicates that **ritus** contains something sacred. His definition reads: **ritus** is an act, individual or collective, which, through all kinds of changes, remains faithful to certain rules which, precisely, constitute the ritual within it (oc, 12).

Thus, immutability and the repetition of precedents are characteristic: a gesture or a word that would not repeat something, he says, could perhaps be a magical or a religious act, but not a rite. This is the reductionist view. One finds it among ethologists (the mating behavior of birds, for example, they call 'rite'), among psychiatrists (the obsessive behavior of neurotics they call 'rite'). Ethnologists transfer this meager meaning to magical and religious forms of behavior (e.g., liturgies consist of rites).

-- F. Buytendijk, *Zur Phänomenologie der Begegnung* , in *Eranos-Jahrbuch* (1950), Vol. XIX (*Mensch und Ritus*), Zurich, 1951, pp. 431/486,

situates the rite within the framework of the 'encounter', but starts from a much more instaurative position: "In the rite of magical and religious acts, man seeks and finds encounter and communion with a reality which, in the phenomena, is suspected with fear or reverence. In the sphere of the primitive, opaque to us, and in the clarified climate of differentiated spiritual life, the rite and the ceremony are the necessary conditions for the presenting of a reality which addresses man in a destiny-determining way (...).

Only the ritual actions and words formed within the tradition of the community, stylized forms and gestures possess the power to make the hidden perceptible and to transform the encounter with people, natural and cultural objects into real encounters." (ac, 431).

It is evident that a more realistic view of the rite is achieved here (more instaurative), yet limiting the encounter with the sacred to this is inappropriate: one encounters the sacred also in new gestures, words, etc. (symbolic actions)! The stylized (unchangeably repetitive) is a non-essential aspect of rite: a symbolic action is already a rite, whether stereotypical or not.

In **Mystical Rites and Rituals**, London, 1975, such symbolic acts would be called 'ceremonial' acts (oc, 17), whereas 'ceremonial' acts are acts in which the performing persons "have no understanding of the occult powers implied therein" (ibid.); the book distinguishes **a.** rites of passage, **b.** rites of life cycle (e.g. fertility rites), **c.** religious rituals, **d.** playful rites (dance, drama, masks, games); **e.** magical rites (grimoires (magic manuals), incantation, oath, gesture play, Freemasonry), thereby listing the scope rather than the content of the rite.

HA106

Joint conclusion: The allegorical (symbol), the myth, and the rite are ambiguous (profane, sacred; reductive, instaurative); they are connected with the sacred, but are not necessarily so; the sacred reveals itself in them, if necessary—namely in the magical-religious use of allegoricals, myths, and rites. It is depicted in them, expressed, if necessary; nothing more. One therefore fails to understand the great importance that many hierographers

attach to them. They possess no second view of those three realities and, at the same time, of the sacred itself.

(B) The second view of the sacred.

We refer to A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. Alt. Test.*, pp. 45/46. He first cites *Isaiah 63:7/11* (a passage from the psalm): Yahweh is praised for his direct intervention (63:9); “but (the Israelites) became rebellious; they grieved his holy spirit; thereupon he became their enemy. (...).

Where is He who put His Holy Spirit in him (Moses, Israel), who caused His mighty arm to act at Moses' right hand, who parted the waters before their feet? (...) The Spirit of Yahweh led them to rest.” At 63:10 (they grieved His Holy Spirit), Bertholet notes that the word 'Holy Spirit' refers to the organ of God that was embodied, in a certain sense, in the guidance of the people of Israel.

He then quotes *Psalms 51:12/13* : “Create in me a clean heart, God, and restore to me a steadfast spirit within my being. Do not cast me away from Your presence, nor take Your Holy Spirit away from me.”

Here Bertholet notes that “in older times (archaic, therefore) the spirit is more of a physical agent, which raises man above himself in terms of power (cf. *Judgment 14:6*).

Conclusion: The Holy Spirit is a force, whether in a group (Israel here) or in an individual (*Ps. 51*), which it raises above itself; that force is physical (rather) and is situated in community or person; it proceeds from God (His mighty arm).

In summary: that power emanating from God is both transcendent and immanent (above and at the same time in community or person). Now, this characterization corresponds to what 'seers' call fluid, ethereal or subtle matter, 'subtle' substance. This subtle matter is omnipresent, but not univocal (one sensible) but analogous:

- a. theologically she is holy in the sense of 'divine' (as Söderblom notes);
- b. creaturely she is miraculous (Söderblom) or ethical (bringing about heroic virtue (Söderblom; - see above p. 102).

Structured model made of subtle fabric.

It is insufficient to see that 'sacred' is co-extensive (equally comprehensive) with 'subtle'. To be cognitively and experimentally operational, a model ought to be designed. Here are the main features, which will be clarified further.

*J. Prieur, *L' aura et le corps immortel **, Paris, 1979, p. 247, states: "Atomism and monadology both accept singular 'entities' (beings), particles consisting of indivisible matter, the final element of all that exists." It would be better, instead of attributing monadology primarily to Leibniz, to attribute it to Puthagoras of Samos (-540/-497): the 'number' (better 'number structure' (arithmos)) that constitutes the essence of the universe consists of a number of concrete, extended points, according to Puthagoras. "The One is the Monad (monas), which constitutes the perfect and original number, just as the arithmetic unit is the 'principle' of all numbers." (*I. Gobry, *Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie** , Paris, 1973, pp. 44/45).

In other words: the deity is the Monad (capital letter), source of the rest; the monads (lowercase letter) or units make up the numbers starting from two.

Frans Mercurius van Helmont (1614/1699),

He was the son of Joh. Bapt. van Helmont (1577/1644) and created a monadology: every creature consists of monads, which are guided by the central monad, and has as its life goal the attainment of perfection by means of 'merging into the Monad of God'. Leibniz had a favorable opinion of his doctrine. (*Winkler Prins Enc .*, 1951, 10, p. 528).

GW Leibniz (1646/1716)

This asserts that all bodies are a force, in their deepest essence (dynamism),

- power which is material in its effects, but immaterial in its essence;
- that in every body there is a bundling of 'primitive' forces, called a monad, which, as mathematical points, have no extension and, as physical points, have objective reality;

- that plant, animal, and human are a bundle of monads such that one monad governs the other (the soul (monad));
- that every monad, although isolated, is nevertheless a microcosm, an image of the universe.

It is known that Leucippus of Miletus (5th century) had Democritus of Abdeira (-460/-370) as a pupil; his teaching amounts to this:

a . reality consists of 'atoma' (indivisible units) that move purely mechanically;

b. reality consists of more than one kind of atom: the evil eye, benevolent or malevolent daimones, - dream and telepathic images are of a different nature than the gross material ones (Eidola doctrine), whereby we can 'see' them (apparently with second sight).

HA108

With this proposition, atomism does not belong to gross materialism, as people who do not read accurately think, but to pluralistic materialism, which assumes more than one kind of matter (the gross and the subtle or fine matter).

The assumption of a plurality of matters is called 'hylistic' (= material, relating to substance) pluralism. Cf. *J. Poortman, Ochêma (History and Meaning of Hylistic Pluralism)*, Assen, 1954.

A nuanced conception of a model of subtle matter selects eclectically from both the monadologies (from Puthagoras to Leibniz) and the atomistics (since Leucippus).

She views them theocentrically (like Pythagoras, Leibniz, etc.), avoiding one-sided atomism (which accepts no Supreme Being, but gods, except in the Stoics (at least some Stoics)). Analogy theory is the key. Created reality consists of monads (atoma), which combinatorially ('numerical,' as the Pÿthagoreans would say, di structurally) build up the entire reality. Behold the basic insight that will guide the rest of the course as a working hypothesis.

Applicative model: - A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. AT*, p. 7, cites Ezek 44:19, (23): "If (the priests) go to the outer court, to the people, then they must

take off their service garments and put on other robes; otherwise, they sanctify the people with their robes. (...) (they must teach my people to distinguish between 'holy' and 'profane' and between 'clean' and 'unclean').”

Bertholet refers to *Lev 16:23ff.* (Aaron), *Deut 21:13* (captives/woman). The axiom of this text is that there is a kind of 'contamination', or rather: 'transitivity' (transitionality) between service garments and non-holy garments and persons or things; as Bertholet rightly states, 'holy' here is 'particularly charged'.

The seers 'see' this as a stream of 'particles' (monads), which overflow into less charged realities and penetrate into them. That process is called 'sanctification' of profane(er) realities. This proves that the archaic people 'saw' (resp. interpreted) - or at least 'felt' - that **(i)** force **(ii)** which is transitive, as a kind of substance flowing through the gross material realities and thus 'fluid'.

Applicative model: Luke 8:43/48 gives a New Testament example: “Now there was a woman who had suffered from a flow of blood for twelve years and had spent all her money on physicians, but no one could heal her. She followed (Jesus) and touched the hem of his garment: immediately her flow of blood stopped. Jesus said: ‘Who touched me?’ All denied it, and Peter said: ‘Master, the crowd surrounds you and presses upon you!’ But Jesus said: ‘Someone touched me, for I knew power went out from me!’”

HA109

When the woman saw that she had been discovered, she stepped forward trembling, fell at His feet, and told all the people why she had touched Him and how she had been healed immediately. But He said: “Daughter, your faith has saved you.”

(i) Jesus himself (*Luke 4:18/19*) had pointed out that he knew 'the Spirit of the Lord' resting upon him to proclaim healing to the blind (to remove misery within the framework of God's Kingdom); well, the dunamos (power, virtue) was directed at healings (*Luke 5:17*), which were within Jesus' power.

(ii) The people understood the situation: “There was also a large group of his disciples and a large crowd (...) who had come

(i) to hear Him and

(ii) to be healed of their infirmities. All who were tormented by unclean spirits were healed (from this it appears that 'healing' is broad in meaning). And all the people sought to touch him; for power went out from him, which healed all.”

The transitivity of that force

This was apparently known in this archaic culture: the contactual (sometimes 'contagious') character is evident from the facts. These axioms apply to the woman with the bleeding: not only is the *dunamis* transitive; it is also directible, controllable (cybernetic): both from Jesus (whose combating of misery coincided with the Kingdom of God and directed his *dunamis*) and on the part of, for example, this woman, who wanted to be healed by means of that directable power emanating from him.

She proceeds (abduction) from that hypothesis; deduces from it that she need only touch him (not only his body, which is the physical source of that force, but, through touch (very intimately), his clothes are 'force-charged') (deduction) to risk the effect (experiment) with the result (induction) of her instantaneous healing.

(iii) Jesus 'egnon' (knew), 'felt' that power was passing through: this shows that Jesus was sensitive. See above *pp. 67ff* . His words, which contain 'touch' and 'power going out', leave no doubt about it. He even knew that someone had touched the hem of his garment. The woman herself experienced the physically, secularly verifiable fact.

(iv) That this power is direct is evident from the fact that Jesus says: “Your faith has saved you.” Without faith, of course, power also passes over (we saw this in *Ezek 19* , where the garments of service automatically 'sanctify').

But Jesus' power is not so simple: it does pass without Him being addressed, yet it also presupposes faith in His mission and power, etc. The active cooperation of the patient is even, according to Him, decisive. Fluid is indeed subject to the ideas and choices of people (even though this is not entirely so).

Note: That ideas and the attitude of the will play a decisive, if necessary, role in sanctification processes is evident from *Mark 6:5*: “(Jesus) could not perform any miracle ('dunamis') there (i.e., in his hometown, among his relatives and in his family), except to heal a few sick people by laying hands on them. And He marveled at their unbelief (apistia)”.

Incidentally, Mark, mirroring Peter's teaching, places strong emphasis on the contactual aspect of sanctification: “Wherever (Jesus) went—in villages, towns, or hamlets—there they laid the sick down in the squares and begged Him that they might touch only the hem of His garment. And all who touched Him were healed. (*Mk 6:56*).

The transitive-contactual sanctification process becomes even clearer when one examines certain changes:

(i) *Mark 7:31/37*: (in the Decapolis region) “There they brought a deaf-mute (...) and begged (Jesus) to lay his hand on him (laying on of hands is touching). He took him aside—outside the circle of the crowd—put his fingers in his ears, spat, and touched his tongue with them. He looked up to heaven and said to him: 'Ephphatha' (di 'be opened'). And immediately his ears were opened and the bond of his tongue was loosed, and he spoke well.”

Note how there are 'dry' (the fingers in the ears) and 'moist' (the saliva of Jesus on the tongue) touches: all magnetizers, healers, etc. know that the body parts differ and possess specific 'dunamis', pneuma (spirit), and 'sanctification' .

A. Bertholet, **Die Rel. d. AT.** , pp. 1/9, cites biblical texts that demonstrate how archaic man knew the special degree of power-chargedness (sanctifying capacity): hair, eye, hand, blood, saliva, breath (breathing), word (blessing and curse), name (function, essence), clothes, adornment, staff, tools, weapons—man, his body, and whatever comes into contact with it are 'particularly powerful' (Bertholet), 'holy', yet water, fire, minerals, plants, objects, writing, etc., also appear subtly charged, power-bearing in the biblical texts. See also *Acts 19:11/12* (the hands, but also the cloths and belts of Paul).

(ii) *Mk. 8: 22/25* : (at Bethsaida) “There they brought a blind man to (Jesus) and asked Him to touch him. He took the blind man by the hand and led him outside the village:

(a) He put saliva on his eyes, laid his hands on him, and asked him, "Do you see anything?" The blind man began to look and said, "I see people as trees I see them walking."

(b) Then He laid His hands on His eyes again: now He saw more clearly. He was healed, so that He saw everything clearly.” - Here the process character, the phaseology (succession of phases) in transitive sanctification, is beautifully revealed.

Cf. *John 9:6* (Jesus spits on the ground and makes mud to heal).

HA111

(iii) *Mark 10:13/16* (Jesus is in Galilee) “Now children were brought to him to touch them. -- But the disciples refused them. When Jesus saw this, he was displeased (èganaktèsen, indigne tulit) and said to them, “Let the children come to me and do not hinder them; for the Kingdom of God belongs to those who are like them. Truly I say to you, whoever does not receive the Kingdom like a child will not enter it.” And he embraced them, laid his hands on them, and blessed them.”

Anyone who is still somewhat 'human' understands this text immediately, without comment. However, one should note that **(i)** embrace, **(ii)** laying on of hands, **(iii)** blessing (the word of Jesus is power) are three forms of the same touch.

The acts of Jesus 'through the pure word' tempt **a/** immaterialists and **b/** Puritans to confuse this with acting purely 'spiritually' (immaterially): they forget that the word (blessing or curse word) is one form of emanation, sanctification, just as transitive-contactual as the rest, but, to those who 'see' only secularly (and have no heart to 'see' what is at work behind, within the visible and tangible surface), it indeed looks 'spiritual'. Only thorough hiero-analysis breaks through that illusion, that deceptive view.

One more remark, an argument from authority: **La Bible de Jérusalem**, Paris, 1956, p. 1336, states, in reference to ** Mk* 5:30* (the bleeding woman, of whom Jesus 'knows' that she has touched, tapped off, as it were, his spirit, power, holiness): "This power is understood as a physical outflow that effects the healings, cf. ** Lk* 6:19* – by means of touch – cf. ** Mk* 1:41; 3:10; 6:56; 8:22* ". From this note, one sees that honest exegesis clearly sees the same thing. The point is that a number of people unconsciously think immaterialistically and/or puritanically and, departing from those immaterialist-puritan axioms, 'hineininterpretieren' their opinion, as the Germans say.

2.2.1. Centric structural model of the subtle fabric.

'Centric' is that which is related to or resembles a center point (think of eccentric and concentric). 'Centric' is in one system (pair of opposites) with 'peripheral'.

So far, the following has been discussed:

(i) the granular (unit) structure (monadic, 'atomic') and

(ii) the transitive, or fluid structure (like a stream of monads, subtlety flows through gross material reality so much so that it gives the impression of being purely 'immaterial', 'spiritual'). Both structural aspects reveal, upon hiero-analysis, a

(iii) third aspect structure, namely they are subject to ideas (contents of knowledge and thought), whether or not linked to attitudes of will and mind (e.g. belief/disbelief).

HA112

(vi) Now a fourth structural aspect comes into play, the centric-peripheral.

With this, we enter a completely new and different dimension of the 'sacred'. Fr. Heiler, **Das Gebet (Eine religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische Untersuchung *)*, Munich, 1921, 8. 109/131, speaks of ' *die im Gebet angerufenen höheren Wesen* ', the 'higher' beings invoked in prayer.

We will briefly analyze this extremely fascinating and well-substantiated chapter by this excellent hierosophist, who is a Savior:

2.2.1.1. *The nature spirits and the nature gods (S. 109/116);*

For among these are fetishes (S.111) which consist of at least two 'sanctities' (of two 'centres'), encapsulated in a physical casing (e.g. a packet of herbs), ipso facto provided with a small nature spirit as a mediator between the two 'centres', such as two persons, the healer and the patient; soul substances (S. 111), which are the image – the emanation – of a soul (plant, animal, human soul, for example), having become a new 'centre' and seen as a 'moving being' by 'seers' (the so-called emanated soul but connected by a small umbilical cord to its first 'centre'); and work-and-protective gods (S. 111/113), which are 'centres' of 'sanctity' (subtle substance, rarefied substance), which have reached a higher level of independence than the aforementioned soul substances (encapsulated and thus fetishistic, possessing an 'ongon' character, as one sees in Siberia says) or free (ordinary soul matter)), but which possess no human self-awareness, but a purely purposeful consciousness'.

After all, they are 'created' by either God himself, or high God-friendly '(arch)angels', or humans, or satanic demons, with a very precisely defined purpose that they, as it were, embody. They are called 'gods,' but in a strongly illegitimate sense (what is true, however, is that the satanic holiness centers of that level or rank, in particular, can present a divinityous appearance of a subtle nature to 'impress' seers).

Local 'gods' (theoi poli.ouchoi, theoi en.chorioi said the ancient Greeks; S. 113), i.e. activity and protective spirits, which instead of being able to move freely, are bound to a specific place, indeed, bound to the earth and, from their place, 'radiate' (transitive-fluid activity) what their 'creator' (God, archangel, man, demon) imposed upon them, tribal, folk, nation, family, and individual 'gods' (better: spirits) (S. 113 /116), i.e. non-locally bound, but human-bound centers of power ('spirits', 'genii' (masculine), 'iunones' (feminine)), provided with them by the creators for (blind) protection and damage (protection: their protégés; damage: the enemies of their protégés);

2.2.1.2. *The ancestral souls or spirits (or even gods)*

(p. 116/118),

the souls, power centers, that survive death;

2.2.1.3. High, transcendent deities

(after A. Laneg);

We refer here to, for example, A.E. Jensen, **Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit**, from his ** Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölkern **, Wiesbaden, 1960-2 (reprinted in **CA. Schmitz*, *Religionethnologie **, Frankf.aM, 1964, pp. 85/118), in which Jensen sharply distinguishes between the actual gods of polytheism (which is usually indistinguishable from polydemonism) and the Supreme Being, as A. Lang and especially W. Schmidt, SVD, described with his 'Urmonotheismus' (primordial monotheism), on a purely ethnological, non-Biblical basis – apparently Heiler, in 1921, did not yet make this fundamental distinction as sharply as is possible after Jensen, for example.

b.2 The actually strictly Biblical (and post-biblical, e.g. Islamic) **Supreme Being**, 'God', 'Yahweh', as we Catholics know Him from our upbringing (S. 118/ 126).

For this, we refer to two Bible texts: *Daniel 7:1/28* Daniel has a dream with visions:

a. symbolically interpreted, but actually centric beings, called 'animals' (beasts), which are functional gods of empires, realms (one need only bear in mind that Satan, during Jesus' temptation, offers Him all the realms of the earth),

b. the 'Ancient One', i.e. the subtle 'angel', i.e. mode of appearance of God, who is, in himself, immaterial and thus invisible both to the gross material eye (first sight) and to the subtle eye (second sight), but who, in order to communicate with seers, creates for himself a new 'center' that, naturally, adapts to the mentality and situation of the seer, here the prophet-apocalypticist Daniel;

c. the Son of Man, that 'center' of subtle holiness, which subtly portrays 'man as such' (and, in that very defined sense, is symbolic, which does not mean that it is not a subtle-subtle 'being' (= center). It is known that Jesus, together with its opposite, the suffering Servant of the Lord (Jes

= Is), has 'applied' this symbolically-centric figure to himself, identifying himself with it as its realization, and indeed on earth in a human existence.

It should be noted, in passing, now that we are reading in Daniel anyway, that the word 'god' in the non-strictly monotheistic sense is common in the Bible; thus *Daniel 5:10/16* says, speaking of Daniel as a highly gifted seer-interpreter: "There is a man in your kingdom (Belshazzar, namely), who is filled with the spirit of the gods and in whom—in the days of your father—insight, shrewdness, almost divine wisdom were found.

King Nabukdonozor, your father, appointed him leader of the seers, soothsayers, magicians, and astrologers. For the king, your father, had found in Daniel (...) an extraordinary spirit, with knowledge and insight into interpreting dreams, solving riddles, and untangling knots.

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(...) When Daniel was brought before the prince, the latter said to him: 'You are Daniel (...)? I have heard of you that the Spirit of the gods rests upon you and that insight, shrewdness, and extraordinary wisdom are found in you.'

In short: a striking (mana, orenda, dema, etc., as cultures understanding those terms would say) degree of intelligence-in-the-practical-sense is the sign that Daniel possesses the 'spirit', the fluid of the 'gods', the superior beings, centers of power. See above, but on a primordial monotheistic level, *p. 106* (the organ of a subtly transitive nature of God in the guidance of Moses and/or his people).

Thus, Daniel is a kind of fluid-transitive extension, the 'medium' (but in the non-transported sense) of some 'god' or other, at least in the eyes of the not sufficiently sharp-distinguishing seer's gaze of the Chaldean-magicians, etc., who, however, do 'see' ('feel' naturally as well) that Daniel possesses an aura, a halo, which makes him appear 'almost divine'. One should not think that all such texts should simply be 'demythologized' as 'fable', 'imagination', 'myth' (in the secular sense), or something similar; on the contrary, it is high time that exegesis learns to interpret internally, that is, within the system of sacred texts (that first learns to 'see' with 'comprehending').

The second text that somewhat distinguishes the Supreme Being from the rest of the sacred is *Revelation 1:1-18* : in it one distinguishes:

a. Him who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty (*Rev. 1:4,8*);

b. Jesus, the glorified Son of Man (*Rev. 1:1,5* (the true Witness, the Firstborn of the dead, the Supreme of all the rulers of the earth, etc.), 6b/7 (see: He comes with the clouds);

c. the 'angel' of Jesus, i.e. the emanation of Jesus (his organ), charged with the writing instruction for John (*Rev. 1:1*);

d. the 'seven' (i.e. the ideal collection) spirits before the throne of God (*Rev 1:4b*), which are the seven 'organs' of God, i.e. fluid-centric function centers, charged with the commission of the 'seven' (the ideal collection) churches (local centers of Christianity).

Behold in Dan and in Revelation, two 'visions', two 'apokalupseis', 'revelations', 'revelations', which give an idea of the center—simply of holiness—simply. One should not think that this was not sensed by the peoples outside the Bible, indeed, somewhat 'seen', but, as all ethnologists establish, the primordial monotheism is a primordial monotheism of a deus otiosus, a lazy God, who is 'on vacation', more absent than present, or at least fluidly-transitive.

So much for the centric-peripheral side of the structure of 'the' sacred, which is both impersonal-granular and personal; or, at least, is centric, for nature spirits, for example, are not persons but centers of function that look like 'persons'.

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Ontological structural model of the subtle substance.

'Holy' means:

- a.** monadic-atomic and at the same time centric,
- b.** subject to idea and mind, respectively volitional dispositions,
- c.** ontologically-metaphysically structured. We will now explain this very briefly.

O. Willmann, *Abrisz der Philosophie (Phil. Propädeutik)*, Wien, 1959-5, 357, dealing with Aristotle's onomastikon (list of terms), states that, for Aristotle, 'ousia', essentia, essence, can semasiologically have the following meanings:

a1 The 'essence' of something can be earth, water, fire, in other words the substance (hulè, materia) from which something consists (the first Milesian thinkers looked in that direction)

Applied to the idea of 'sacred', this is correct: something that is 'sacred' is 'material' yet not in the nature of earth, water, air, fire, but much more subtle, namely the monads, atoms, of the transitive-fluid flow, briefly outlined above (which will become clearer over time);

a2. The 'essence' of something can **1.** be life (in *De anima* Aristotle says that “where it concerns living beings (zoa), their 'being' (= essence) is life”); but **2.** the 'essence' of a body can also be 'daimonion', namely the fact that a body is 'spirited' by a daimon, daimonion (diminutive of daimon); then the essence of that body is its daimon, respectively daimonion; in the language of Aristotle, 'daimonios' does not mean demonic (Catholic sense), but something divine that resides within (enters into) something non-divine (e.g. a human soul or an animal body).

b1 The 'essence' of something can, finally, also be the immanent principle of existence, life, etc. in something – e.g. the 'soul' in a living being which, once devoid of soul, is dead; in that sense, according to the thing, not the word, it coincides with **1 above** (life is only possible on the basis of being-animated); but that is not really the point here.

Aristotle means what he designates by the word 'ti en', the 'previous' of something; for him, the previous of something comes into play in the definition of something; the determination of essence, after all, states what something is (man is a living being endowed with reason, for example), by designating a subset within the broader set (the specific difference: **(i)** universal set is here 'living being'; **(ii)** subset based on specific difference is here 'endowed with reason')).

In Aristotle, as in Plato and the entire archaic tradition, that which something is is always predetermined, pre-existent, taken concretely in relation to what one is here and now. From a philosophical-historical perspective, this mentality has consistently been called the 'theory of ideas'. Now, 'sacred' is always the idea that precedes its materialization. This will become increasingly clear over time.

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O. Willmann , *Gesch. d. Id., I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2 p. 548, says: "That which forms things informs the knowing mind (reason). The conceptual (ideal) content in the objects constitutes the objective in the thoughts. Identical content:

- (i) gives things their 'being',
- (ii) gives thought its truth".

With that, the most essential thing has been said about the sacred in things:

- (i) the 'sacred' gives things 'reality' ('being')
- (ii) but the sacred in things is also their knowability and conceivability (that we can know them and, knowing them, order them into sets and systems, is only possible because that 'sacred' in things is thoroughly idea, intelligible).

Now the sacred is structure through and through, identity amidst non-identity, unity amidst multiplicity, order amidst disorder. Indeed, in themselves the monads are disorderless, chaotic.

Yet they are not so: their 'being' (their 'essence') is simultaneously possible disorder (pure mobility, pure changeability, - pure 'matter' (as the ancient scholastic thinkers said)) and pure orderliness.

1. Orderliness, **2.** which, in fact, always acquires some form of order (whether **(i)** elemental (earth, water, air, - fire) or **(ii)** soul, **(iii)** centre of subtle matter (di 'spirit', 'demon' in the ancient meliorative sense of Aristotle (di three examples of 'ousia', essence, being)).

De Strycker, **Concise History of Ancient Philosophy **, Antwerp, 1967, p. 114, says: "The view according to which the ideas (he speaks of Plato)

are the thoughts of God does not go back to Plato, but only to the so-called Middle Platonism: we find it elaborated for the first time in Albinus”.

Well, Albinos (-/ +150) situates himself within Neoplatonism. This is, then, the theological aspect of the sacred viewed from its ideal side. However, this does not mean that, as immaterialists and/or Puritans constantly assert, the sacred in its subtlety (subtle matter) is not created directly forth from God (God himself is immaterial, radically non-material, but the source—creating—free origin of subtle matter with its monads).

The two together—subtle matter, which is in principle susceptible to order(ing), although pure disorder manifests itself (the 'primordial chaos,' says M. Eliade), and at the same time order, this structure, this system of ideas (not one idea in itself, but the entire system of partial ideas which, individually necessary yet collectively sufficient, constitute God's idea concerning his presence in creation)—these two aspects together are the sacred rightly understood. This is the axiom of hiero-analysis.

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b2 . The essence of something can thus be divided into at least two major categories: as Aristotle has well preserved in the usage of 'ousia' (essence or essence), it is:

(i) hylion (= material) - earth, water, etc. and/or soul, daimon, daimonion, etc., - where it should be noted that soul and daimon(ion) are still subtle or ethereal realities or

(ii) ideal, conceptual, conceptual ('eidetic', as the Husserlians like to say), - which always has a collectivist character and is therefore summarizing (and thus also immaterial): the idea 'horse or horseness', says Plato, encompasses all horses, the actual and the possible, and is unique (in one idea all possible horses, specimens, applicative models are summarized in a supratemporal insight, which is at the same time supraspatial). This immaterial side is the 'previous', the 'before' (ti and, said Aristotle, although no longer a Platonicist in the full sense).

b3. From a religious-historical perspective, this basic dyad manifests itself in the two major types of 'centers' of subtlety. To understand this, one ought to start from the worldview of the sacred-archaic man, susceptible to sacred (subtle) realities as system components. “The Pygmy believes that

God 'closes the jungle,' i.e., gives no more game, if people refuse to make the offering of the firstfruits. Somewhere, the primitive still sees his sacrifice in connection with the entire world order. The Semang Dwarf is convinced that a catastrophe would break out over all peoples if he ceased sacrificing in his forests.” (*P. Schebesta, Origin (...)*, p. 94).

This broad cosmically perspective is essential if one wishes to understand the true extent of the sacred, not only ideally and immaterially, but also and above all subtly and ethereally.

*Vl. Soloviev, *La justification du bien **, Paris, 1939, p. 206, adds another dimension to this, or rather two at once: speaking of person and community, he says: “Those who had the opportunity to descend into the underworld ('hell') or ascend into heaven, such as Dante and Swedenborg, did not find there (...) individuals in isolation, but only groups and social circles”.

As *Ch.M. Des Granges* states in **Les littératures étrangères **, *Paris*, 1946-2, pp. 11 ss.*, Dante and Swedenborg had predecessors, namely *Homer* (**Odyssey**, 11 (*nekuia* = (sacrifice with a view to) summoning the dead))) and *Virgil*, as well as the medieval mystics; Des Granges then forgets *1 Sam 28:3/25* (the woman summoning the dead at En-Dor, to whom King Saul seeks advice, “sees” a spirit (the soul of the prophet Samuel) rising from the earth)—at least as far as the 'descent into hell' is concerned.

Of course, the secular externalists 'smile' superiorly at such data: however, it becomes more serious when one knows that we, Catholics in our Creed, 'bear witness' and 'proclaim' of Jesus that he **(i)** underwent a 'descent into hell' ('who descended into hell', i.e. the underworld) and **(ii)** experienced an ascension, namely as two phases in his resurrection.

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M. Eliade, Images et symboles , Paris, 1952, p. 218, poses the question: “Do we have the right to regard Orpheus as a shaman and to compare the descent into hell of Christ with similar descents of the shamans in ecstasy?”

M. Choisy, *L'être et le silence*, Geneva. 1964, pp. 276 (Le héros), 284/285 (*Le descente aux enfers; Herakles myth*), 314/317 (*Orpheus myth*), also deals with these motifs. Orpheus was indeed also regarded as someone who had gone through hell (cf. *Virgil, Georgics*, in fine).

The true explanation is not mythical (unless myth is practiced magically), but 'centric': besides the function beings (subtlety centers), discussed above on page 112, as more or less independent 'beings' (with an inchoative (= initial-form) 'personality', created with a view to a single function (function gods, -spirits)), it ought to be added that these function beings or centers also have their own sphere or region (regional structural aspect).

Thus, the underworld is the sphere, the fluidic and intercentric milieu of the earthbound 'spirits' (centers of holiness); thus, 'heaven' is to be distinguished in a clear and distinct manner from what on *page 114* was called 'the center-without-further-qualification-of-holiness-without-further-qualification', namely the throne sphere of God—the sphere or region of the centers of function attuned to the ideal, usually called 'angels' (in Catholic circles), which—let it be expressly repeated—are merely 'centers' and not fully human, i.e., fully 'personal' (intellectually awakened and endowed with full accountability) beings! That is why they are just as one-sided as the underworld centers, but in a different way, namely 'heavenly', i.e., Uranian.

A. Lefèvre, **La religion **, Paris, 1921, pp. 145/168 (**Le culte de la génération **), describes 'chthonism' (also called earth religion or telluric religion) - chthon = tellus earth - as earth worship (with a lunar (moon) aspect, as well as an elemental aspect (moisture) and a genetic or procreation aspect (sexual magic, but with a female-lesbian dominant: fertility religion in the same sense)) and 'ouranism' (*ouranos = coelum = heaven) (also called heaven or sun religion) (with a solar (sun) aspect, as well as an elemental aspect (fire) and a genetic aspect (sexual magic, but with a male-homosexual dominant; fertility religion in the same sense).

Notwithstanding his complete incomprehension—he is not alone—Lefèvre is objective enough to see that it is not so much the female or male sex, but rather, as he states very precisely, the female or male principle

('principle'), as well as the corresponding energy, that are central to these 'lower' religions.

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In the balanced 'lower' religions, there is a complementary worship of both the earth-bound and the heaven-bound aspects (region, functional centers, subtle or ideal).

One need consider the 'fusion' of Dionysian and Apollonian religions in Hellas; one need consider the primordial pair religions (= pro(to)gonistic conception aspect).

The name Iuno presumably has the same root as that of Jupiter. Since Jupiter is the king of the heavens and the 'gods'—apparently here the 'Olympian' gods, distinguished from the chthonic 'gods' (centres)—Iuno is worshipped in Rome as the queen of the heavens and the wife of Jupiter.

As protector of women, she accompanies them throughout their entire lives, from birth to death: she fulfills the role of a kind of doppelganger, for every woman has her Juno, just as every man possessed his genius. For every decisive stage in a woman's life, she has a nickname: at marriage, she is called Iugalis. Women giving birth invoke her assistance under the name Juno Lucena. The children who are born are placed under her protection. Even more so than the goddess of husbands, she is the supreme mistress of the housewives, the Juno Matronalia. Her political role is equally not to be neglected. (...).

The Roman Juno, who is less important but stands closer to mortals than the Greek Hera, with whom she is identified, testifies above all to the fertile power of woman.” (*J. Schmidt, Greek and Roman Mythology* , Helmond, 1968, p. 151).

The role of Jupiter, the male function god, is commensurate; yet, instead of 'begetting' a Juno—a female-structured center of holiness—at the conception of a girl (naturally!), he begets (generates) a genius, a male-structured center of holiness, at the conception of a boy. From this remarkably accurate description by a connoisseur like Schmidt, one can further deduce that 'gods,' 'first pairs of gods,'—'angels,' etc.—are not fully

personal beings, but function sanctuaries, fluid centers with their own sphere of activity—just as Yahweh (*Isa* = *Is* 63:7/11; *Ps* 51:12/13 (see p. 106 above)) 'poured out' his 'holy spirit' in individuals and in groups.

That is why we did not speak above of 'person', 'personification', or 'hypostasis' (hypostatization), as so many religious scholars do with vague concepts, but of (function) centers.

b4. The basic dyad, discussed here, is also reflected in philosophy.

(i) *K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion *, *Zürich*, 1954*, clearly distinguishes two definitions of the word 'fusus' = natura = nature: the first extends from Stoicism to the Enlightenment (rationalist) and is 'Uranian-ideal'.

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That is to say that the word 'nature' means the same as essence in the ideal, conceptual, and conceptual sense (the essence of the horse is the nature, nature of the horse); ancient medieval and modern contemporary rationalism stand or fall with this; -- hand in hand with this, naturally, the 'natural' religion (oc, 15/41).

(ii) id., p. 41ff.. discusses the second concept of 'nature', introduced or, rather, restored to honor in a rather vitalistic-romantic sense by Herder (1771/1776: the time Herder spent in Bückeburg; cf. *H. Stephan, Herder in Bückeburg, Tübingen* , 1905, and by *Schleiermacher (Reden über die Religion* , 1799). Not the pure, abstract idea, not a 'natural' (read: rational) religion, but a sensitive-'seeing' religion takes center stage. Gradually, through the remnants of bourgeois sentimentalism, this acquires a typically modern deviation from sensitivity: matter, body, - woman, sexuality and eros, - so despised by the 'higher' religions - regain their 'sacred' meaning, - at first murky, confused with all kinds of deviations or cultural-historical misinterpretations – later, in the resurgent occultism once again heavily demonized, but captured more purely as 'sacred'.

“The experience of nature is, apart from the fact that it is truly an experience of nature, at the same time a religious experience: (...) The divine is sensed through the life of nature. (oc, 195).

Naturally, the age-old debate between Biblical and 'natural' (meaning: nature-conscious) religion resurfaces here with full vehemence. K. Leese, *oc*, pp. 288/368 (*Naturfrömmigkeit und christliche Glaubenshaltung*), as a theologian, dwells on this at length, in detail, and with good documentation.

It should be noted that the primordial biblical Yahweh religion is itself one possible form of nature religion. Two characteristics, after all, betray that nature.

a/ On the one hand, the Yahweh of the Old Testament, in its oldest layers at least (and even in Judaism), is a desert god characterized by a terrifying nature-determination: namely, he is a volcano god (fire deity). Cf. A. Bertholet, *Die Rel.d. AT*, pp. 39ff. (*Ex 19:16/19* (the Sinai Revelation), *20:18*; *Deut 4:11*; *Mikea 1:*; *Deut 32:22*; *Ps 104:32*).

b/ On the other hand, the Yahweh of the pre-prophetic Israelite religion, however much he is a god of war (*Ex 15:20/21*; *17:14/16*; *1 Sam 4:5/7*; *4:19b/22*; *5:2/7*; *Joshua 6:21, 24* (the excommunication of Jericho); *Deut 13:17* (excommunication); *1 Sam 15:18/22, 32/33* (id.), is a god of piety and moral excellence (A. Bertholet, *oc*, pp. 56/59) and center of worship (*oc*, pp. 60/68), in which all the eccentricities of the 'pagan' worship services are strictly eradicated, insofar as the indigenous population can handle this. Naturally, this will change thoroughly with the prophets.

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b5. In summary:

The 'essence' of something (its 'nature') is always, as Aristotle still knew, twofold:

a. Material (fluid to begin with, - which he apparently no longer knows, unless purely speculative in the concept of 'protè hulè', *materia prima*, 'first, purely passive matter'), then psychic (soul) and, finally, daimonic (inspiring, enthusiastic);

b. Ideal (in the mentality of Socratic philosophy: conceptual-moralistic).

Those two interconnected aspects constitute the essence, in the integral sense, of something. Occultists, paranormologists—religious scholars,

philosophers of religion, theologians, exegetes—who do not take this, that dyad, into account, commit a misconception regarding 'holy' or 'sacred' data.

The taboo nature.

Until now came

(i) the granular (punctual, monadic-atomic and transitive-fluidic structure of the 'sacred' is discussed,

(ii) as well as the centric-personal (and at the same time peripheral) structure;

(iii) subsequently the 'ontological-ideal' and at the same time 'ontological-material' nature or essential structure (dyadic), to which the previously established subjectivity to ideas (together with emotional and volitional attitudes - about which more later) is to be attributed;

(iv) now the 'dangerous' (risky) character (taboo character) comes into play.

*H. Webster's *Le tabou* (Etude sociologique), Paris 1952, is a detailed study: the nature of the taboo; its applications to biological (reproductive), sexological (concerning divorce, relations), necuological (concerning death, the deceased), ethnic (especially foreigners), -- concerning 'foreign' things, 'sacred' (concerning consecrated persons, as well as such matters), ethical (concerning the stain of sin), economic and, finally, — to make it complete! — societal phenomena.*

One might ask the question whether anything can be dangerous! However, let us set aside the scope to examine the content of the concept.

Steller distinguishes three types of prohibitions:

a. purely **social** (which pose no problem: we know those too; e.g. driving through red lights);

b. extrasocial, which he subdivides into two:

b1 . ' **Animistic** ' , i.e. prohibitions concerning divine judgment ('animistic' called by ethnologists, because the word 'animism', a major misconception, denotes all that is 'soul', 'spirit', 'daimon', etc., - whereby the radical distinction between a mere center (see above *pp. 112ff.*) and a real 'person' (personality) has been totally lost): whoever violates 'animistic' - understand: divine judgment (see above *pp. 44ff.*) - prohibitions, ignites the wrath of extraterrestrial and supernatural beings (thus the author);

b2. tabooistic : here the 'cause/effect' structure is again at work, as in its divine-judgmental form (whoever violates a prohibition introduced by a center or an extraterrestrial or supernatural person suffers the consequences, immediately or after centuries (see Herodotus' historiography regarding this: after centuries the descendants still 'atone' for the transgressions of their first or their ordinary ancestors (protagonistic: concerning first parents; protagonistic: concerning ordinary ancestors)).

But in the taboo transgression and its immanent sanction (i.e. its consequence inherent to its cause), neither a fluidic center (e.g. a nature spirit) nor a deity of a personal level intervenes: “transgressions provided with an entirely 'impersonal' (understand this in the sense of Webster, of course) sanction” (oc, 12) are taboo transgressions.

“Ultimately, it concerns prohibitions that are just as 'impersonal' (same note) as their sanctions”.

(ibid.). **Consequence** : “from the transgression thereof results automatically, for the 'guilty' party, an extremely serious condition, for he becomes taboo-laden (...); well, this condition is simply ritual impotence, dangerous for himself and often also for others.” (oc, 12). If he is not exorcised, then, sooner or later, as in the judgment of God, a form of misery (illness, death, in the worst cases) will come upon him (and, if necessary, upon others). (ibid.).

Semasiological note: the word 'taboo' originates from the 18th-century captain-explorer Cook, who uses the word in his third and final travelogue of his voyage around the world, during which he visited the area of the Tonga Islands in 1777.

Webster sees two word explanations:

(i) taboo is composed of two parts: ta, to mark, to provide with a mark, and pu, very (intense), - thus 'strongly marked', 'very marked';

(ii) taboo comes from pu, conch trumpet, and ta, to beat, to strike, also: to mark, - thus 'to mark with the conch trumpet'. (oc, 13).

Captain J. King, Cook's successor in 1779, notes that the Sandwich Islanders use the word 'taboo' for many things and processes: things and people are qualified by it; it could also mean holy, excellent, set apart by a promise—which proves that, upon closer examination, the sacred basis shines through into the language usage, even if the language users seem to have forgotten its originally archaic nature.

Such expansions of meaning, based on proportional (metaphorical) or attributive (metonymy) analogy, are, linguistically, ultra-frequent, a fortiori in the case of a structure as universally applicable as the causal taboo structure.

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H. Dubois, SJ, La morale chez les malgaches, in *Settimana Intern. di Etn. Rel.*, Paris, 1926, comparable to Webster's work, although smaller in scope, shows a very similar structure: the ethical-political principles of the inhabitants of Madagascar are, according to him:

(i) practical 'wisdom' aimed at clanal needs, - comparable to Webster's purely social rules;

(ii) tradition-bound pro(to)gonistic rules of conduct, coinciding with pneumatological rules of conduct ('pneuma' = spiritus = center of holiness) resulting in “an unmistakable attitude of fear regarding possible contacts with the inhabitants of the other world: **1.** ancestors (pro(to)gonism), **2.** 'spirits' (pneumatology) or **3.** God” (ac, 183);

(iii) the moral-soteriological sense of an 'instinctive' retribution or, according to Dubois, who lived in Tananarive for more than twenty years as a Catholic missionary with a keen observer's eye, tabooism: guilt, stain (blemish), incurred as a result of violating the countless 'fady', di taboos.

“In the thousands of fady (taboos) - (...) - the native sees only the fear of the disastrous consequences, fear based either on the will of the ancestors (pro(to)gonistic tabooism) or on the law of the clan (clanal tabooism) or on the precepts of the witchers ('sorciers', apparently in the pejorative sense of black magicians: magical tabooism) or on childish associations' (purely associative tabooism, often feigned childishness, in fact sometimes very justified, which Dubois does not see) (ac, 182).

“In all matters concerning purification rites (afana), such as regarding faults (ota, tsiny), that which the native brings forth is the 'material' and automatic character of the transgression and of its rectification.” (Ibid.).

Furthermore, Dubois—precisely by doing so breaking through his narrow-Western axioms in his analysis—touches upon the core of tabooism: “The constantly repeated recourse to a 'theory' which absolves the native from seeking another sanction for the evil: the theory of the immanent justice of things, the theory of the 'rebound' or of the 'choc en retour' (French magical expression), so clearly expressed in the constantly repeated saying: 'One needs no countermeasures: what one has done comes back upon the perpetrator'”. (ac, 183).

Conclusion: without realizing it, Dubois formulates the magical basis of tabooism. Errors can occur consciously, but even more so unconsciously. Which proves—if proof were still necessary, after all that has already been cited—that tabooism is only indirectly a moral-political matter: tabooism is first and foremost a matter of sanctity, a matter of fluid and the laws of subtle matter inherent in, and the energetic and the ideal-cybernetic character thereof. Which brings us directly into dynamic magism (more on which later).

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P. Ricoeur. Finitude et culpabilité (II, La symbolique du mal), Paris, 1960, pp. 9/150, deals with the threefold nature of 'spot (blemish), sin, guilt': “Wash me spotless from my guilt and cleanse me from my sin, for I am conscious of a transgression and my sin is ever before my mind.” (*Ps 51 (50): 4/5*).

Ricoeur, unfortunately, regards this triad as a diachronic triad, - whereas it is synchronic: the archaic man:

(i) feels, indeed 'sees' (in himself and/or in the other) the stain (spot) of a subtle nature that forms as soon as he merely thinks (and wants to begin) of the evil he is about to commit; it is therefore, once again, not a symbol, but a material-ideal, (= fluid reality, a reality of a 'sacred' nature;

(ii) feels, indeed 'sees' (with his second sight), in himself and in others, what Ricoeur calls the 'ontological' state called 'sin'. That is, the crime committed e.g. contaminates, stains, thoroughly the 'being', the 'essence' itself of the person in question: he is sinful (separated) in his deepest 'being' (ontological) and

(iii) knows, aware of, that he is, at least to some extent, accountable, guilty.

It is therefore inappropriate to complete these three as a diachronic sequence! This is how the typical modern thinker acts, who no longer 'feels' and/or 'sees' (with his second sight) what is taking place in the 'sacred' realm. He 'saves' the 'phenomena' with a kind of symbolic fideism: the diachronic schema derives from Vico in the interpretation of A. Comte (*loi des trois stades*).

Ezekiel 22:26 gives a Yahwistic interpretation of tabooism, which, while hesitantly shining through among the 'Gentiles' insofar as they possess primordial theism, nevertheless comes through too little: "The word of Yahweh was addressed to me: "Son of man, say to the (city of blood): 'You are a land (...). Its princes devour people alive like a roaring, prey-seeking lion.

They take away what is beautiful and precious and increase the number of widows. Their priests violate my law and profane what is holy to Me. They make no distinction between 'holy' and 'profane'; they teach no difference between 'clean' and 'unclean', and they keep their eyes closed to my Sabbaths. Thus I am dishonored in their midst."

Ezekiel 44:15-27 further specifies this: "The Levitical priests must teach my people the distinction between 'holy' and 'profane' and teach them to distinguish between 'clean' and 'unclean'! (...). They may not come near the corpse of a human being; otherwise, they defile themselves; only by the corpse of father or mother, son or daughter, brother or unmarried sister may they defile themselves."

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If (the Levitical priest) has then become unclean, then he must let seven days pass, and when he again enters the sanctuary and the courtyard to

minister in the sanctuary, he must bring a sin offering. Says Yahweh, the Lord.

'Modern' thinkers will, of course, express themselves with a sovereign smirk regarding those taboos surrounding corpses, but 'seers', at least enough Yahweh-abiding seers, will judge 'cautiously', that is, taboo-aware: still, in the full twentieth century, the 'holiness' of a corpse is a very negative, pejorative one.

In short: whoever does not live fluidly, very strongly, indeed, closely connected to the Supreme Being, is, for example, after a corpse care of at least ten minutes (mathematical precision is at work here too: one need only verify this experimentally), 'drained dry' (as the sensitives say), having lost his 'holiness' (dunamis (Luke), life force) to that corpse and his former 'soul' in the 'other world'.

One may find these reflections dreadful, indeed balladish, but they are an experiential truth and an empirical truth, at least for those who do not impose their own idiosyncratic axioms on 'sacred' phenomena, as so often happens. One should therefore not mock this Ezekiel text too easily, which, in the developmental history of Israel, can already be considered 'advanced'.

One need only read the title of, for example, a randomly chosen article: MD Bromet, **The Danger of the 'Supernatural'**, in *Bres-Planète* 11 (March 1968), pp. 54/59 (note : 'supernatural' here is to be understood as paranormal, or rather: 'holy', for paranormal things are merely the striking degree of 'holyness'; therefore they are so much more dangerous than non-paranormal ones).

Cf. also G. v. Rad, *Theol. d. AT.*, I, S. 271ff (leprosy, corpse; sex, blood), A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. AT.*, S. 7 (*Uebertragbarkeit des Krafthaltigen* : Lev 6: 20/21; 16: 20/22a; 14: 3b/7; Deut 21: 1/9a); G. vd Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Rel.*, S. 27ff.; F. Nicolay, *Hist. des croyances*, Paris, sd, t. I, p. 16 (*fetishism*), 17 (*Manito belief*).

Sympathy and antipathy.

Semasiologically, a twofold meaning is attached to those words:

(i) the ancient, 'sacred' or fluidic: the conjunction or non-coincidence of more than one radiating 'centre' (function-spirit, full fluid person);

(ii) the more recent psychosocial one: whether or not more than two people are capable of understanding each other. Here, of course, we are dealing with the archaic-fluid meaning (which, incidentally, was clearly at work in ancient Stoicism): Dr. Seligmann, **Die Zauberkraft des Auges und das Berufen**, The Hague, sd, (1921-1), p. 463, says that Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (17th century) notes that all (living) beings radiate an atmosphere, and indeed mutually (which he strongly emphasizes).

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This reciprocity (symmetry) is the core of the taboo phenomenon: when two or more fluid emanations are 'discordant' (antipathetic, opposite), then there is a 'taboo': the other, precisely insofar as it is antipathetic, is a 'taboo', to be avoided! H. Holzer, **Heksen en demonen**, Helmond/Antw., 1975, p. 154, gives a splendid example of the sheer reciprocity of taboo: the hawthorn is, in the house, harmful, but, in the right place, beneficial.

Par. Yogananda, **Autobiography of a Yogi**, Deventer, 1966, pp. 161/163, deals with the Sama Veda (the oldest Hindu scripture on musicology); the deeper intention is to have music, with or without chanting, incorporated into the so-called 'cosmic' (understand: 'holy', sacred, fluid) chant, in a sankirtan (instrumental-vocal form of yoga gathering); its foundation is the ragas (established musical patterns, numbering six (with one hundred and twenty-six raginis and poetras, the derived ragas)).

Well then, each of the six basic ragas has a sympathy (concordance, correspondence) on a fluid level, i.e. subtle) with:

a. (diachronically) a season and an hour of the day (precisely then one ought to observe sankirtan, if one does not wish to transgress a taboo, the loss of fluid, 'loss of soul' (expression of peoples, of ethnologists)) and

b. (synchronically) a leading 'deity' (understand: a functional center), which grants it special 'power', precisely through the concordance.

These laws of sound sympathy were, according to Indian tradition, discovered by the archaic rishis (sages, experts in holiness or fluids) whom

one so easily dismisses in secularized circles as half-crazy, neurotics, or infants.

Thus, every note (of the seven fundamental tones) of the octave is also, in mythology (see pages 104/105 above), at least insofar as mythology is the work of the 'sages', experts on saints, 'associated' with a color and/or the call of an animal or a bird (thus C with green and peacock, D with red and lark, E with gold and goat, F with yellowish-white and heron, G with black and nightingale, A with yellow and horse, B with a mixture of all colors and elephant).

These taboo-preventing energetic process models—for sympathies of such a nature are so—can still be verified experimentally today by sensitives and/or 'seers', especially with hypersensitives, who **a.** feel comfortable when taboos are respected and **b.** exhibit symptoms of possession (with or without ghostly phenomena) when those vocal-musical and instrumental-musical prohibitions are violated.

The evil eye (the evil look).

Dr. S. Seligmann, *Die Zauberkraft des Auges und das Berufen (Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte des Aberglaubens)*, 1921-1, speaks of the 'good' and the 'evil' gaze, which, if necessary, proceeds from precisely the same things and processes to which the taboos adhere.

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Steller briefly and suggestively recounts the 'evil' (understand: taboo) gaze emanating from Yahweh when Moses, in the burning bush—which creates 'holy' ground (with a taboo of 'footwear prohibition')—did not dare look up at Him: for the taboo said that no one could 'see' Yahweh and remain alive.

It may seem improbably strange, but it is still true: whoever is not in the right sympathetic state ('in a state of 'sanctifying' grace,' said the archaic theologians) and Yahweh (the supreme being) 'sees' (with the so-called second sight, mind you), will not survive this life for long with his physical-biological (for with his fluid life force) life.

For such an unsuitable person, such an encounter is the great or final judgment, which takes place not only collectively at the end of time, but continuously individually in the course of 'profane' history, which is never purely profane, but always, continuously taboo—for those who are in a state of 'mortal'-sin, as the archaic theologians said (and rightly so, for, at the very first opportunity, when they encounter a man sent by God, to whom He has entrusted the great or final judgment within history, at least insofar as this occurs on earth (one need only think of the sins crying out for vengeance, of the sins against the Holy Spirit), these alienated persons die (on the grounds primarily of their original sin) within the shortest possible time).

'God is not mocked,' says St. Paul (*Gal 6:7/9*): 'what a man sows, that he will also reap.' St. Paul, like all ancient 'sages,' is speaking of a causal process.

The conflictological aspect of the angry gaze

(and immediately of the reciprocity) it was established, for example by a Howitt in his ethnography of the Iroquois: every thing, plant, animal, human; thus the Iroquois 'sages' possess 'orenda' such that life consists of an uninterrupted, mysterious rivalry between the various (understand: antipathetic) orendas.

Something—a humanistic misinterpretation of enormous proportions (given the vast erudition behind it)—regarding that rivalry, namely the antipathetic-taboo rivalry, is discussed in R. Girard's mimetic-antagonistic ideology, those anti-Cartesian-Freudian axioms, applied to sacral-social phenomena without distinction of level in the epistemological realm (modern humanistic 'cognition' (as it is called now) is not an archaic-sensitive 'cognition!'). (*Cf. N. Söderblom, Das Werden d. G.*, p. 55 regarding the Iroquois).

Conclusion: the entire chapter on taboos stands or falls with the dyad 'subtle energy/ideal steering' (see *p. 117 above*). Fluid reality is energy, which is effective; it is idea, which is standardized-informed (and thus cybernetic). More on that later. Magic, after all, is intervening oneself in that process of ideal energy.

Hierozoism.

'Hieros = holy; 'zoe' = life: the fact that holiness, fluid, is not merely 'force' (energy, effectiveness) but moreover life, is expressed in that technical term. Heuristic, from our standpoint, are:

- **(i)** *EB. Tylor, Researches into the Early History of Mankind* , London, 1865-1; id., *Primitive Culture (Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom* , London, 1871, in which the term 'animism' is used for the first time in a religious-historical sense: based on:

a. the difference between living and dead bodies, one concludes that there is 'the' life 'in' that body,

b. the 'appearance' of shadows in dreams and second visions leads to a conclusion of a second type of being, namely the shadow;

Both, life and phantom, were perceived as a single reality, yet with different functions; behold the core of Tylor's world-famous 'animism';

(ii) the twofold reinterpretation that animistic theory underwent;

(ii) a. *W. Wundt. Völkerpsychologie (Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte)*, Leipzig, 1900-1 (in several volumes); especially Bd IV (*Mythos und Religion*) says that 'mythological apperception' does not yet distinguish between subject and object and, on the basis of imagination, ascribes 'feeling' and 'life' to all things - which again involves a typical-modern misunderstanding of sensitivity and/or 'seeing'.

Furthermore, that there is a dual origin of the concept of the soul:

1/ the 'Körperseele' body-soul is located in one or more parts of the body;

2/ the 'Freiseele', 'freie Seele', 'Psyche', the free soul, which, to a greater or lesser degree, can move freely, independently, indeed, outside the body.

Wundt, the great experimental and ethnic psychologist of enormous erudition, found that the concept of 'free soul' is most frequently present among peoples in the concept of 'breath soul' and the idea of 'phantom'; the Australians, at Cape Bedford for example, call the invisible in a human and in a thing 'wau-woe' (an onomatopoeic term that phonetically imitates breath); the Zulus, for example, say of a human who commands reverence and fear that "he possesses a phantom"; the souls of the dead are called,

among us, 'phantoms' when they appear (cf. N. Söderblom, *Das Werden d. G.*, p. 10.

-- I. Paulson, *Seelenvorstellungen und Totenglaube bei nordeurasischen Völkern*, in CA. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Frankf.aM, 1964, S. 238 (Arbman (1926/1927), Hultkranz (1953), Paulson himself preserve that dual view, but with refinements);

(ii) b. RR. Marett, *Pre-animistic Religion*, in Folk-Lore, 1900, t. XI, pp. 162/182;

-- *id.*, *The Threshold of Religion*, London, 1914.

-- following in the footsteps of J. King, *The Supernatural (Its Origin, Nature and Evolution)*, London, 1892, who was the first to advocate a magical-dynamic view of the concept of 'life';

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-- In parallel with J. Guyau, *L'irréligion de l'avenir*, Paris, 1887, who, instead of attributing an actual 'soul' to everything, attributed only a kind of 'will' (= pan(en)theism, panvitalism), in the mentality of archaic man, who 'saw' a 'will', a purpose in everything, even 'dead' things and precesses.

-- Also parallel to A. Réville, *Prolégomenes de l'histoire des Religions*, 1881, 1886-4, who, in the archaic mentality, established the close contact, via and in nature, with the 'spirits', their presence and intentions, and spoke of 'naturism' (without precisely presupposing a strict 'soul', again) (cf. Pinard vol. B, *Et. comp.*, I (*Son histoire*), pp. 389s.).

-- Marett et al. espouse preanimism or, better, animatism, belief in life (in one of three variants: pan(en)theistic (Guyau), naturistic (Réville); magical (King, Marett); Marett himself was prompted to do so by R.H. Codrington, **The Melanesians**, Oxford, 1891, who had established that the Melanesians are called 'mana' the:

(i) in itself impersonal force, which can lead to striking effects (e.g. prosperous livestock breeding or plant cultivation, successful combat, etc.,

(ii) always connected with some high essence, which (in itself, impersonal) is in that relative, genetic sense, seemingly, yet again 'personal' (we would say either centric (merely) or personal-centric). This latter aspect

has been rather misunderstood by quite a few 'dynamists' ('magists'). Codrington defines what 'mana' (force-charged) is not as a 'soul' or 'animated' in the strict sense, but as 'a kind of communicable energy, 'a force, distinct from physical force, at work in all kinds of intentions for good or for evil!

Marett saw in Codrington's mana a confirmation of his opinion that archaic man regarded even dead things as 'animated,' in the sense of 'living somewhere' and endowed with intention and feeling, without an actual soul, insofar as unusual, sacred power is present within them. Hence the name animatism (belief in life).

It should be noted, however, that *GB. Vico, in *Scienza nuova**, already devised an evolutionary scheme in which, in the infancy phase of a culture, man 'views all things as animated'. Tylor et al. were therefore not so new!

*J. Monod, *Le hasard et la nécessité (Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne *)*, Paris, 1970, pp. 35/55 (**Vitalismes et animismes **), is a work that likewise advocates Vico's interpretation: the childlike man, averse to all strangeness of nature in relation to him, projects essential similarity with him into nature, the inorganic and the organic;

(i) He defines 'vitalism' as the acceptance of teleology within the biosphere (excluding the inanimate), - 'metaphysical' (H. Bergson, 'scientific' (H. Driesch,- Elsässer, Polanyi) (oc, 39/42).

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(ii) 'Animism' is defined as the acceptance of teleology not only in the biosphere, but cosmically-universally: Marxism, which places dialectical movement in the heart of all matter instead of the 'soul' (in the mentality of Hegel), and Teilhardism, which places 'energy' in all matter instead of the 'soul', are both anthropocentric, animistic ways of thinking, characteristic of 19th-century scientific progressivism (oc, 43/52).

On pp. 52/55, Monod is annoyed by the fact that animism, vitalistic or cosmic, persists so stubbornly: after all, at the beginning of the universe or life, people simply want a goal-directing 'force', 'soul', 'God', or whatever.

For Monod, that is an 'illusion' (oc. 53: *'l' illusion anthropocentriste'*), a projection of man into the world surrounding him.

That not all specialist scientists agree with this is evident from, for example, H. Jans, **Man and Cosmos: A New Definition ?** in *Streven* 49 (1982): 5 (Feb), pp. 442/453 (B. Carter's cosmology et al.).

It goes without saying that Monod and his associates posit their own axioms (determinism, mechanism, a priori exclusion of all experience other than the non-naturalistic) and, deductively, design all their biological experiments in that axiomatic sense. Naturally, the inductive result is therefore also non-animistic! Every axiomatics deduces experiments on its basis and yields similar inductive results. Viewed from its hierosophical plane, Monod is externalist: he positions himself outside the religious system.

Hierozoism, internalist.

How is it that sensitives and/or seers so easily 'see' and 'feel' intentions, life, 'spirits' in nature, etc.? The reason is simple: holiness, the fluid, is, upon thorough analysis, itself alive and spirited!

Very sound seers, just like birds of prey that 'see' a mouse walking from an improbable height, willy-nilly—whether unconsciously (usually) or consciously-experimentally—magnifie the 'points', 'monads', (atoms) of holiness (see above, pp. 107ff.).

What do they see, then? Coupled nature spirits! These nature spirits, which usually look like cephalopods, appear, in the non-magnifying perspective of the seer, as points, grainy masses of points. Let us examine this couple phenomenon more closely: they are, apparently, sexualized (male and female), always engaged in a kind of elementary love game (unless they are abused in contradiction to the First Person of the Holy Trinity and to Mary: or, even, are satanically reoriented so that, quasi-hypnotized, they readily submit to godless purposes). This may seem strange, yet one repeats the experiment, and one will observe the same phenomenon again and again ('external permanence,' said Peirce of objective realities!).

This explains the fact that archaic man senses, indeed sees, 'everything' as 'alive'. That is the foundation of animatism—better known as 'hierozoism'. Only a true hiero-analysis reveals this, structured as follows.

a. Without a genuine bond of sanctifying grace with the first person of the Holy Trinity, who is usually called God the Father, one cannot gain access to these primordial couples; moreover, without an androgynous conception of the personality of God the Father, who is thus mother-father to these nature spirits—monads—one will never be able to see these couples; for they are structured in such a way that they are taboo, and therefore dangerous (indeed, deadly in the short or long term; divinely judgmental), for anyone who is not in a state of grace with the First Person and does not perceive Him as androgynous, indeed, see Him.

b. Moreover: this first condition is separately necessary, yet insufficient: only a created female being that is in a state of immaculate conception like Mary, the Mother of God, or like Jesus, who were conceived free from original sin (the one 'ex praevisis meritis', i.e. for the sake of the future redemptive grace of her Son, Jesus; the other for the sake of his divine nature as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity) and endowed with the necessary force field ('Holy Spirit' said the Old Testament; see above *p. 106*: the organ of a fluid nature with which a supernatural and/or extraterrestrial being can act within this world and its misery) and finally, endowed with a mediumistic, mediating earthly human being who satisfies very strict conditions, -- only such a female being can enable a seer to see these monad pairs without perishing from them.

That is the mysterious reason why the Church (and all religious systems or figures friendly to God) has so emphatically advised against all occultism (which is essentially contact with and/or manipulation of holiness).

They were, usually unconsciously, but precisely guided by God's mercy, sharply 'aware' of the taboo character of the monads—or rather: superconscious (to use this alienating word for 'inspired' by God, the Supreme Being Himself), the basis of the infallibility that so offends many people today—and always, for that matter—which archaic people have attributed not only to the Pope, but to all 'sages' of the true kind.

Not that these 'wise men' (experts on holiness), considered infallible, deserve such a thing in themselves: no, God himself, as responsible for a humanity that does not 'see', protects this humanity by safeguarding its religious leaders.

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c. Finally, apart from the two previous separately necessary but collectively insufficient conditions (God the Father (as male-female) and Our Lady), it is necessary to correctly sense, indeed to correctly see, the relationship between God the Son (not as incarnated) and God the Holy Spirit, as felt and perceived by the monad pairs: if the First Person appears as a fluid hermaphrodite 'centre' (that organ is of the Kingdom of God in the midst of those monad pairs), then, always naturally, before those pair points, God the Son appears as male-female (dominant male) and God the Holy Spirit as female-male (dominant female), directed toward one another, specifically as an image in two distinct divine persons of the First, the basic androgynous Person.

I may be excused for having to give such a gendered representation of the deity: this concerns a nature-spiritual (and not a human) idea of the Trinity. Centers are not full-fledged persons: nature spirits are, as stated (see above , *p. 112ff* .), merely infra-human, subhuman beings without higher immaterial consciousness.

God and the three persons reveal themselves to mere centers (nature and function spirits) in a radically different form (phantom) than to humans; their 'organ' of a fluid nature (see above, *p. 106* : 'holy spirit') to communicate and interact with nature spirits is therefore correspondingly different.

A large aura (radiant sphere), centered around an either dominant male or dominant female androgynous 'phantom', which the center pairs sense—indeed, see—as God-for-them. Moreover: their activity consists in imitating this God-for-them as the Father-Mother and as the image (Son/Spirit), in order to thereby transmit the fluid organ through which the Trinity communicates and interacts with them, the nature spirits, to higher centers and persons.


Maw God builds creation from below upwards: the higher beings cannot build up or develop themselves without the basic holiness that constitutes the monad pairs.

The lower, the stronger and more indestructible; the higher, the more vulnerable and dependent on lower beings. This fundamental truth is the brilliant truth that the so-called nature religions, which center nothing but center worship as nature religions, have left to us as a legacy.

If they have remained stuck in mere naturism (worship of the center)—which is immaturity regarding religion and fatal in the long run, as will become apparent further on—the so-called higher religions act wrongly and against God's order of creation when they do not value the nature spirits in the proper, God-willed manner.

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Structural diagram of the androgynous monad: upper male; lower female.



Note: The little hat is, as it were, the shell, in which the hermaphroditic point (indicated by 1 and 2) emits a halo (aureola) towards the partner, whereby the 1, as it were, surrounds the 2: the 1 is much more powerful than the 2. This explains why female beings are much 'holier' (more power-charged) than male ones, even among higher beings.

Note : The large dot, where 1 and 2 the 'cap' (little hat) begins, is the so-called genital organ (on a micro level, of course), with which the androgynous cells collectively scan the entire universe. Rays travel back and forth in both directions—outward (projective) and inward (introjective), constituting, as it were, a bidirectional respiratory system.

Leibniz says that the monad is attuned to the universe and that the universe, as in a microcosm, is represented in the monad.

M. Eliade, Traité d'hd rel ., Paris, 1953, p. 385, says: "Ultimately, an object that becomes a 'symbol' (namely 'sacred') tends to coincide with the universe, just as, incidentally, hierophany (i.e., the fact that the sacred manifests itself in a symbol) tends to incorporate the sacred in its totality—it tends to exhaust alone all revelations of the sacred."

The very first Vedic (= Ancient Indian) altar stone, by becoming Prajapati, tends to identify the entire universe with itself. Likewise, every local goddess tends to become the Great Goddess and, ultimately, to incorporate all available sacrality.

This magnificent characterization of the macro-microcosmic structure by the brilliant hierosophist, which Eliade is here, is ultimately supported by the smallest hierophany (revelation of holiness) possible, namely the androgynous monad, which Leibniz saw only as a point in his mind, but whose macrocosmic character he nevertheless perceived.

The macrocosmic-microcosmic structure is, incidentally, a theme that occurs in all cultures (think of the Pygmy in the jungle, who, through his sacrifices to the forest (i.e., the sacred forest 'center', with its halo radiating outwards into the universe), feels responsible for the universe).

Note: 'Hylozoism' is an ancient doctrine (the Stoics revived it in their own way, as did Cūdworth, the modern English Neo-Platonicist), which posits that all matter is alive in itself or animated by a world soul.

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Something like that is a general (but precisely for that reason all too vague) philosophical translation of the hierozoic nature of the sacred.

Note: *G. Gusdorf, *Science et foi au milieu du Xxe siècle (Un débat de conscience de l'Occidental moderne. Du nouveau sur l'affaire Galilée*), Paris, sd, p. 9s., states that a first reversal (regardless of prehistoric-primitive views) occurs during the third millennium BC in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and China: the first true systematic thinking, which he, with Berthelot, calls 'astro-biology'. Astrobiology 'explains' (abduction) in a completely transparent manner, according to Gusdorf, earthly events on the basis of astral influences.*

Centuries later, this astrobiological mentality can be felt in Puthagoras, Ptolemy, Plato and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, etc., according to Gusdorf (oc, 12/17), — until the Renaissance, with its disintegration of the ancient medieval worldview and view of life (Galilei), causes “the glorious system of security” (oc, 12) to vanish into what Pascal calls “the terrifying eternal silence of the boundless spaces”.

*R. Berthelot, *La pensée de l'Asie et l'astrobiologie **, Paris, 1938-1, 1972-2, pp. 47/54 frl., states that, prior to that astro-biological system, there was a bio-astral way of thinking at work which exhibits fewer lawful, less mathematical and experimental, but more life- and earth-proximate characteristics, yet which anticipates astrobiology.

Bio-astral (even bio-solar) thinking, says Berthelot, is a generalized vitalism that assumes that all beings (even more or less conscious ones) are living beings, and indeed as a system (that all (living) beings are in communication and interaction): **a.** fire, tools, places, **b.** social relations are 'vital' realities (sacred in nature, incidentally, which Berthelot, with his scientistic mentality, fails to recognize to a great extent); **c.** souls, phantoms, **d.** celestial bodies (sun, planets, stars, moon)—all of this vitally merges in that bio-astral thinking, in which Berthelot, incidentally, believes he discovers two layers, namely the animal type (hunters, female) and the vegetative type (farmers).

The bio-astral type of thinking, **a.** instead of starting from the celestial bodies to 'calculate' everything from there, as later astrobiology does, **b.** remains more earth-bound.

It should be noted that, whether in bio-astral or astrobiological thought, the living character of seemingly dead matter is central. Which merely confirms our hierozoism.

In Scripture, for example, there is one instance of such connections: *Aggeües (Haggai) 1:1; 2:22*; in its entirety, there is proof that the denial of the holiness of Yahweh's temple—taboo, even into the bio-astral realm—has a catastrophic 'effect'. Cf. *A. Van Hoonacker, Les douze petits prophètes*, Paris, 1908, pp. 551/558.

Hierozoism, Theological (Theocentric)

St. John, Revelation 22:1/5 , describes the fact that he “saw a stream of the water of life, clear as crystal, bubbling up from the throne of God and the Lamb (= Jesus as the suffering servant of Yahweh, who is the glorified Son of Man)” that “in the middle of the square (of the new Jerusalem, i.e. the Kingdom of God on earth), surrounded on both sides by the (above-mentioned) stream, stood the tree of life, which bears fruit twelve times and yields its fruit every month; - “that the leaves of the trees bring healing to the nations and that there shall be no more curse”.

This is a clear reply to the Book of *Genesis (creation story)* ! Including *Gen 3:22b* (“If only man does not stretch out his hand to pluck and eat from the tree of life, so that he may also live forever!”), where the entire creation culminates in the tree of life plucked by man, made possible by God's life on earth.

St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two orders or degrees of Life: the natural-supernatural life and the strictly supernatural life. It is clearly a Hellenized form of Scripture, in which he speaks of both a first, ordinary life and a second, higher life subject to conditions by God.

Both levels of life spring from the Supreme Being, who is Himself wholly 'life': “I am alive and the whole earth is filled with the glory of Yahweh” (*Num 14:20*) says Yahweh to Israel! 'Glory' (kabod) is what gives someone 'prestige', 'weight(ness)', function; what gives someone or something 'splendor' (aura) or 'radiance', that seen, striking holiness! Or 'Holy Spirit', that is, throughout Scripture, Old and New Testament, a force that creates one form of life or another:

a1 . ordinary life (*Gen 1:2; Ezek 37:1/14*);

a2 . extraordinary life (*Judges 11:29 (Jesse); 23:3,5 (Naziriteship); 14:6 (Samson) (16:9)*); also official-extranatural: *Num 11:17,25; 1 Sam 16:13* (David, once anointed) or noble-extranatural (*Isa = Is 11:1/6* (the moral spiritual gifts of the messianic prince); *Ps 51:12/14* (climax of Old Testament morality);

b. End-time life (*Mt 3:11*(= *Luk 3:16*), where the Messiah carries out end-time cleansing with Holy Spirit and fire; *Acts 1:8* (*Pentecost*; *1 Cor 6:11* (in the baptized as sanctifying power); *Joh 3:5/8* (in the baptized as 'principle' i.e. as life-soul, but now of eternal life), etc.

This apparently in very close connection with:

a. the third person of the Holy Trinity: *John 16:8*, etc.

b. but at least equally with the second person: *1 Cor 15:45* ('The first man Adam became a living soul; the last Adam (= Jesus) became a life-giving spirit'), namely since his glorification (resurrection Easter); again that radically Trinitarian being of 'power' toward life!

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Note: That the theological character has also penetrated beyond Biblical revelation is evident, for example, from what *P. Schebesta* says in **Oorsprong van de godsd **, p. 59, speaking about the magical-religious mentality: "the life force comes from the highest being, which itself possesses the most power, and is therefore also the greatest magician and can do everything."

The role of pro(to)gonism (first and ancestor worship) in this is described as follows: "the life force passes from the progenitor to the descendants and propagates itself continually".

Apparently, the 'protogonoi', the first parents, are the link between the Supreme Being and the offspring. This is the genealogical side of holiness, which, in its 'first' cause, is divine in the strictest sense, namely Supreme Being property. Which is also what the Bible says!

"From this point of view," Schebesta says immediately thereafter, "all sorts of things can be explained which, at first glance (apparently not at 'second' glance, we add between his words), seem naive and nonsensical:

a. all medical practices, **b.** partly the legal system as well, indeed, the entire social order is built on this 'philosophy'. (...) A Negro who is robbed or insulted demands no compensation or punishment for the perpetrator, but restoration of vitality." (Ibid.). Which *Pl. Tempels, La philosophie bantoue* , pp. 36/39, also confirms: "L'être est force" ('Being' is 'force').

Note: The theological character of the life force is also evident, once again outside the Bible, from A. Vorbichler, **Das Opfer auf den ältesten uns erreichbaren Stufen der Menschheitsgeschichte **, *Wien* (Mödling), 1956: in the sacrifice, man expresses his complete dependence on God by offering the right to life of the created realities to the Supreme Being; life itself, not the material value of the sacrificed object, is the true offering. Life is, after all, the central concept in the mentality of the most primitive humanity.

After all, survival is the daily task in such a culture: as a result, the sacred foundation of the seemingly banal life emerges more clearly than in 'safe' cultures like our own. The Pygmies, the Samoyeds, the Koryaks, and other ancient primitives offer—by burning, for example (Pygmies), by abandoning (Samoyeds, Koryaks)—what is normally essential to them or even a delicacy (heart, liver, stomach of an antelope, bone marrow).

But that is the first sight. The second sight 'sees' in those offerings for the seat of life, which, in the final instance, belongs only to the supreme being.

A. Bertholet, **Die Rel. d. AT**, p. 2, gives us the biblical-archaic explanation: "The soul (nēfesh') of the flesh is in the blood. Therefore I (Yahweh) have permitted it to you as an altar offering, to make atonement for your souls. For the blood atones, insofar as it contains soul (di leven). Therefore I commanded the Israelites: 'No one among you may consume blood' (cf. 17:14)."

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As Schebesta, op. cit., 92, says: "From this standpoint all kinds of sacrifices can be explained:

- (a) the firstfruits offering;
- (b) the animal sacrifice; -- for those two see e.g. *Gen 4:3* (Cain: fruits); *Gen 4:4* (Abel: firstborn of the flock);
- (c) the atoning sacrifice of one's own blood (*1 Cor 11:25* : "This is the cup of the new covenant in my blood," Jesus says at the Last Supper);
- (d) the strange ritual in which an animal is strangled or in which the spine of an animal is broken without blood flowing: for with this blood life itself could escape (we can add: the bleeding is internal)".

Conclusion: the fluid, often called 'soul' (like *nefesh* in the Old Testament), is the holiness of something—here: of the sacrificed thing: all holiness comes, ultimately, from the Supreme Being; in the sacrifice, one offers the holiness of the sacrificed thing to its exalted origin.

Total conclusion. The second view of the sacred understood as fluid (106) was successively clarified as follows:

(a) The basic structural model: the sacred is punctual (granular, monadological - atomic), i.e. a collection and/or system of ultra-small particles, which

i/ transitivity and

ii/ susceptible to idea, mood and/or will (*pp. 107/111*).

(b) further structural features, at least the universal ones or virtually so, all exhibit the duality of 'supreme being/creature': on a holiness created by the Deity as an infrastructure, creation builds a superstructure (superstructure) (*pp. 111/136*).

(b)1 . Holiness exhibits 'centres' (at a certain level 'personal' centres), which are provided with a subtle periphery (in different layers, moreover, about which more elsewhere); these centres are:

(a) nature-spiritual, ancestral and highly divine;

(b) supreme being (*pp. 111 / 114*) .

(b)2. Holiness, viewed ontologically (di as essence), is dyadic: on the one hand, material energy (effectiveness); on the other hand, ideal steering ('double nature' concept) (*pp. 115/121*).

(b)3. Holiness exhibits a 'taboo' structure, i.e., it is risky (and as cause and effect it is, in principle, accessible only to those with sufficient sight and power) not only psycho-socio-cultural, but in itself, as holiness, provided with a cause-and-effect chain which is the same as that of the judgment of God (see above *pp. 44/50*); this occurs on the basis of reciprocity (sympathy: mutual strengthening; antipathy: mutual weakening) (*pp. 121/127*).

(b)4. Holiness is life on all levels (animatism; vitalism; animism; better: hierozoism) (*pp. 128/136*).

2.3. The encounter with the sacred in the fetish. (138/157)

This chapter, for lack of time, limits itself to one applicative model of hiero-analysis, namely fetishism or fetish belief.

2.3.1. The scope description of the phenomenon 'fetish' (138/145)

Semasiological remark: - The 'word' itself is a bearer of meaning, usually socially established, - and indeed on the basis of two kinds of people, language creators and language users: those who possess only the first sight and those who also possess the 'faith', i.e. the second sight.

The word meaning, generally speaking, is therefore ambiguous and has an uncertain basis. Nevertheless, it is heuristically interesting. Which is what we are about to establish.

S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions*, IV, Paris, 1912, pp. 8/9, discusses C.H. De Brosses, *Du culte des dieux fétiches*, 1757, 1760-2, the book that definitively Westernized the word 'fetish', 'fetishism'. However, this French magistrate had apparently observed the phenomenon very accurately (much more accurately than his copyists).

According to Reinach, who quotes De Brosses, he defines 'fetishism' as "the reverence paid towards inanimate things, which one regards as endowed with life". Tylor sees in this the discovery of his 'animism' (see above, p. 128), but, according to Reinach, that was incorrect: "De Brosses, he says, op. 9, realized that the 'savage' (i.e., the fetish believer) caused a spirit to dwell in that fetish".

But the material object—in which it is located is merely a first glance! Life in that fetish arises because a spirit (a center, mind you) is banished within it. Just like Tylor, A. Comte, in **Système de philosophie positive (Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l'humanité*)*, Paris, 1851/1854, also interpreted De Brosses animistically and even, surpassing De Brosses, called the sun, the moon, and the earth (!) 'les grands fétiches' (the high fetishes) (which De Brosses did not do).

For Comte, with his law of three stages, following the line drawn by GB Vico (1688/1744; *Principii di una scienza nuova*, 1725-1, 1744-3), fetishism is situated in the infancy stage, namely the poetic-theological phase. This begins with fetishism, from which successively (true to the

axiom of evolution) polytheism and, later, of course, monotheism 'developed'.

Following Comte, *J. Lubbock, The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, London, 1870, reframes fetishism on an ethnological basis. Much theorizing characterizes the positivist Comte and the ethnologist Lubbock. Result: few followers.

As a word, 'fetish' is said to come from the Latin 'factitius' (related to 'fac. titare', usually to make, to manufacture) or from the Portuguese 'feitiço' (**i**/ fetish, **ii**/ fate, (black magic) enchantment); feitiçeira = i/ sorceress, ii/ fairy; feitiçaria = sorcery, magic), which then amounts to an artificial object containing power.

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C. Bleeker, Encyclopedia of Religions, Churches, and Sects, Amsterdam/Brussels, 1978, pp. 129/130, defines 'fetish' as 'an object, manufactured (think of factitius) and 'effectively' conceived in the magical realm'.

“Such fetishes are not objects in which a spirit resides. They are not worshipped, for they are simply skillfully crafted. Every fetish has a specific function. In this, the Portuguese meaning of a magically powerful and manufactured object comes through. However, it immediately becomes apparent that Bleeker here holds a purely dynamistic (= magistic) view regarding fetishes. In itself, this is correct, but apparently incomplete. As will become clear later.”

G. vd Leeuw, Phänomenol. d. Rel., Tübingen, 1956-2, pp. 19/27 (*Ding und Macht*) says: “The older analysis assumed that the power of a fetish is always an indwelling spirit. Nowadays, there is a tendency toward the opposite view. It seems, however, that the way in which one conceives of power is secondary to the structure of fetishism. The power of the Ark of the Covenant (*1 Sam 4:3*) comes from Yahweh; the power of a tjurunga (*note: an Australian native object that represents for an individual the bond with the totemism of the tribe*) comes from a totem.

Naturally, the power of a fetish is very often simply assumed without containing even a single idea of spirits or gods, thus purely 'dynamic'. (oc, 21).

As can be seen, the word usage is fluid, like all standard language usage regarding religion and/or magic. However, the remark that the word 'fetish' (worship) originates from *Godefridus Carolinus*, **Het hedendaagsche heidendom (Beschrijving van den religie der heidenen)**, 1661, who is said to have used it first, is interesting; as is the observation that *Horace*, **Carmina 2:18** ('the large landowner, greedy, sends his client away 'in sinu ferens deos' (with, upon himself, his gods')) would deserve a fetishistic interpretation. (oc, 20, footnote 1; 21).

Indeed, vd Leeuw, oc, 20, rightly observes that the feeling of being able to bear power upon oneself is characteristic of fetishism; given the fact that a fetish is not large, - in contrast to idols (images of idols) e.g.

But again: some idols are extremely small and are, indeed, carried on oneself, and, in West Africa, large statues, natural realities, etc., are nevertheless labeled as 'fetishes'! Mere linguistic analysis becomes entangled in contradictory word usage!

Alb. Schweitzer, Histoires de la forêt vierge, Paris, 1941, p. 82, insinuates a magical conception: "To manufacture an effective 'fetish' against a human being, according to the belief of the primitives, a particle of his body, however small, is one of the essential ingredients.

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Fearing that it might fall into the hands of a sorcerer for evil use, the primitives carefully scrape away all debris when clipping their nails, in order to destroy it. The cast of lots, performed on a small part of the body, spreads its effect over the entire man—so they believe.

Apart from the word 'fetish', there is nothing here that bears witness to true fetishism: all terms are purely black magic terms (a part of the whole, but understood fluidly, thus a part of the soul-body (= bodily sanctity), strikes the black magician, indeed; but that is for another chapter).

Fr. Olbrechts, Maskers en dansers in de Ivorkust, Leuven, 1940, pp. 157ff., beautifully situates the use of fetishes. At Fanyabli, Dawa, and Tulepleu (on the border of Liberia) in particular, the writer saw acrobatic groups at work (a kind of variety art,' he says). "When the performance begins, a mat or a cloth is spread out, on which the 'grigri' (*note*: these are ingredients of fetish and) of the group is laid (usually an animal skin, from which the male actors draw new 'strength' after every grip or feat)". (oc, 159). Here it is clearly evident that the animal skin is 'strengthening', but distinct from the group grigri!

Conclusion: for the fetishist himself, there is a distinction that must have sufficient reason! Yet look at the 'powerful' stance of the actors:

(i) behind the grigri mat (or more accurately: the mat with the group grigri on it; there is a reason for that) the three or four drummers line up (Olbrechts says that they 'are simply part of it, like police officers or ice cream vendors, in Europe': what a bewildering mistake for an ethnologist of the caliber of an Olbrechts! But, well, he only 'sees' with his first sight).

(ii) for the mat with grigri the three to seven male acrobats ('dancers', beautiful athletes) and

(iii) for these three to eight black girls (aged three to eight), light and agile.

The performance begins with a drum roll, accompanied by the men moving in place, while the girls, until the end of the performance, "hold their hands, palms forward, beside their faces, which are continuously shaken at a rapid pace from left to right, so that it resembles a trembling or shaking more than a shaking". (oc, 159)

Sometimes the girls' hands also hang down: they are then thrown continuously and alternately from top to bottom to the rhythm of the drum. While doing this, the girls stamp their feet continuously in place, rhythmically lifting now one foot and then the other alternately (ibid.). That is the opening action.

Thereupon, two of the men step forward with a few dance steps and position themselves diagonally directly opposite each other. At a nod, two girls each walk towards a man.

Then it begins: the athletes grab the girls by the wrist at a full run, sling them vertically or horizontally through the air, release the grip: the girl threatens to plummet, yet, just when his head is still a hand from the ground, the athlete grabs the ankle and the slinging resumes—sometimes feigning losing the grip with one hand—which the other promptly corrects, causing the spectators not to suppress a cry of terror.

But listen carefully now to how archaic-religious people practice seemingly profane art: “Now the girls are released back onto the ground floor: they trot to their places, where they trip again, shaking their heads and stamping their feet, as if nothing had happened. The athletes make their way, with a restraint that does not exclude a touch of self-consciousness, to the gri-gri spread out on the mat, over which they briefly stroke their hands “to renew their strength”.

Then every athlete goes to his little partner to communicate the renewed 'strength' to her: he grasps her left wrist with his right hand and quickly slides his left hand along the child's arm to her shoulder, then *mutatis mutandis* the same with the child's right arm.” (oc, 160).

We refer to the granular fine dust which constitutes the sacred and its transience and pliability to idea, mind and/or will (see above *pp. 108 ff.*: 'sanctification'). (For the use of the mat, woven or not, see Olbrechts, oc, 129).

*Amadou Hampaté Ba, *Animisme en savane Africaine*, in *Les religions africaines traditionnelles*, Paris, 1965, pp. 33, says: “The fetishes – in Bambara 'boli', 'siri', 'tafo' and in Fulani 'kongol', 'dabaré', 'tîmgal' – are neither deities nor even demigods. They are simply sacred objects that allow people to speak with God, – Masa Dambali (among the Bambara), Gueno Doundari (among the Fulani).”*

This being is of such sublimity (transcendence) that even those in authority could not approach Him. Out of reverence, they do not invoke Him directly. Masa Dambali is a force that is hidden from what it is not itself: it—this inaccessible force—(...) is simultaneously (in the meantime) the cause and mover of the contingent (accidentally existing) creation.

It was she who placed spirits in all beings of the universe. In animism, the current form of the religion of unevolved humans, in the Western sense of the word (unevolved), then the concept of 'fetish' is a more widespread mentality than one wishes to admit.

Steller, Ambassador of Mali and Director of the Institut des Sciences Humaines in Bamako (Mali), and a devout Muslim, then explains how the Negro uses intermediaries to communicate with high-ranking officials: "From that necessity—and solely from it—arose the concept of 'fetish,' with the task of conveying complaints to Masa Dambali or receiving orders from Him." (oc, 34).

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Fetishes are, therefore, in the eyes of AH Ba, sacred objects for communication (and interaction): "They are never more than intermediaries without inner power." (Ibid.). Thus we have a purebred Negro-African who now claims—albeit as a convinced follower of Islam—which, naturally, given the aggressive monotheism of the Muslims, like the Jews and the Christians, is decisive—that the fetish is anything but charged with power. Behold to which mere semasiology (language analysis) leads us once again.

Admittedly, our ambassador from Mali says on the following page: "To return to fetishism: if—besides that great worship (of which he just spoke)—fetishism is also the belief in the guarantees that the possession of a 'given' object can provide for warding off misery or for acquiring happiness, how many people who believe in confessions of revelation are not fervent fetishists?" (oc,35).

Which then amounts to assuming two radically different fetishisms, a Supreme Being and an animistic one' (to use Ba's vocabulary)! A curious form of eclecticism in the sense that, in such a case, one uses two incoherent definitions as if they were still coherent in some way.

VI. Soloviev, *La justification du bien *, Paris, 1939, p. 187, has a very different, and moreover, extremely hierosophical, perspective. In footnote 3, regarding the sentence, he says: "The stone exists; the plant exists and lives; the animal (exists and) lives and is conscious of its life in

its various states; man (exists, lives, is conscious of that life and) understands the meaning of life according to his ideas; the children of God (exist, live, are conscious of themselves and their life and the meaning thereof - understanding and) actively realize that meaning of life, i.e., the perfect ethical order in all things to the end”.

I speak here of the stone as an example of the most characteristic and concrete aspect regarding inorganic bodies in general. Such a body taken into itself possesses no true life of its own.

Something entirely different is the 'metaphysical' question of the life of nature in general, or the presence of a soul in the more or less complex aggregates of nature, such as the sea, rivers, streams, mountains, and forests.

Meanwhile, isolated inorganic bodies such as stones, although deprived of their own life, can serve as steadfast means for the living activity of spiritual beings localized within them: thus, for example, were the dedication stones or consecrated, holy stones, the Bethels (bethil's), 'houses of God', which were associated with either the appearance and action of angels or of divine forces that seem to dwell in those stones.

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Clearly, here we have, for the first time, a comprehensive philosophy of life that is purely secular (see the hierarchy in the cited source text) and transempirical – sacred, – the latter understood Biblically (the children of God).

Against this integral background, we understand that Soloviev, who, with Comte, defines fetishism as 'the deification of either natural (stone, tree) or artificial objects', says: “The seeds or remnants of such material worship are undoubtedly always to be found in all religions.” (Oc,84).

His very personal critique of Comte et al. regarding fetish worship proceeds from the premise that the person who, for example, worships stones, ought to already possess a different and more profound sacred experience beforehand. Soloviev finds this basic experience of a supreme being—relying on his own childhood memories, which he claims to have

seen confirmed time and again in others, with a few exceptions—in the maternal experience of the baby.

“According to my own recollections, the first impression of the starry sky, as far as I remember, is situated at the age of six (an impression awakened by a truly striking cause, the comet of 1859). In contrast, the series of memories connected with family life begins very clearly from the age of four. Neither in real life nor in literature have I encountered even the slightest indication pointing to a child development demonstrating a reverse evolution. And, if a child of three years of age were to become known to us with a particular interest in astronomical phenomena, then, I think, we would be somewhat worried.” (oc, 85: Comte, as stated above on p. 138, extended the concept of 'fetish' to celestial bodies).

We also cite this text to point out that, regarding the parent-child relationship in babies and toddlers, there exist impressions and 'complexes' other than Oedipal (Freud's pet theory) (including not only negative ones, as appears to be the case with Freud), also because Soloviev, who was apparently fed and raised by his mother, finally (!) puts forward something other than phallocracy regarding religious child developmental psychology.

One more remark: Soloviev lives, here, on the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox churches: whoever wishes to understand more of this than what sometimes penetrates in the West should read:

--Dr . J. Gasper, *Weltverklärung im liturgischen Geiste der Ostkirche* , Freiburg iB, 1939.

-- J. Tytiak, *Die Liturgie als Quelle östlicher Frömmigkeit* , Freib. iB, 1937 (especially S. 114f, 119ff.);

-- *id.*, *Heilige Theophanie (Kultgedanken des Morgenlandes)* , Trier, 1959. In it, Soloviev's ideas are clearly expressed as common ground among our brothers in faith, who still know the true but Biblically interpreted hierozoism.

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Note: Of course, 'fetish(ism)' also has profane meanings: for example, 'fetishism' in relation to someone can mean having 'an exaggerated adoration' for him (this also applies to objects (Marx spoke of the “Fetish

character of the Goods”, fetish character of merchandise); there is also the sexological meaning: exaggerated sexual adoration with related connotations for objects belonging to someone, reminding them of something, etc.

-- JB Pontalis, **Objecte des fetischismus** (German of Eva Moldenhauer), Frankfurt, 1972, distinguishes **(i)** an ethnological concept, **(ii)** a psychoanalytic, a Marxist, and an ideology-critical 'fetish(ism)' concept. However, these belong, largely at least, in epistemology. See EP. 17/22 .

Note JE De Mirville, *Pneumatologie (Des esprits et de leurs manifestations diverses; Mémoires adressés aux Académies)*, Paris ; 1863-4 (1853- 1),- t. I (*Premier Mémoire: Manifestations fluidiques devant la science Moderne*) pp. 294/335 (*Faits transcendants du magnétisme ou intervention des esprits démontrée par les faits*), deals with magnetism in the magical sense (think of Du Potete.a.; 'magnetism' is holiness in the living human being who gives advice and/or heals, etc.).

Now, in this meaningful context, De Mirville discusses the 'magnetic aids' which he defines as 'objects which, once magnetized, serve as a vehicle for the occult influence poured out upon them by the magnetizer' (Oc, p. 296, n. 3).

Well, argues De Mirville, who has investigated the matter thoroughly and eruditely (through very broad reading) and in the field (by visiting, for example, haunted houses in the area, including the presbytery of Cideville (Dép. dl Seine-Inférieure), where, from the beginning of March 1849, the pastor and others were able to observe the strongest ghostly phenomena, whether individually or in groups; oc, pp. 339/368 (*Le presbytère de Cideville en 1851 ou les esprits au village*)), the magnetic objects bear witness, time and again and universally observable, to an executing force and, in that execution, to either an immanent intelligence (information) or to a 'spiritus rector', a governing spirit, which holds the execution in its hands.

De Mirville accepts only such types of abduction as a necessary and, above all, sufficient condition to 'explain' the ever-repeatable facts of 'magnetism'.

He concludes: the so-called magnetic object is the talisman of the ancients (ibid.). These objects, which are called talismans, are intended for one or more specific persons who have requested them from the magnetizer, who imbues them with both a task (e.g., healing, protecting, inspiring, relieving of fear, etc.) and a power that executes accurately from a distance.

Let us admit: this closely approximates the fetish as it is 'made', especially in West Africa, but everywhere in the world.

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Yet we have immediately surpassed semiotic-semasiological research: the 'talisman', the 'magnetic object' (tool) is not 'called' 'fetish', although it is undoubtedly one type of 'fetish', especially if we take the texts of Bleeker, Van der Leeuw, Schweitser (even Olbrechts' grigri does not surpass it), and AH Ba (the animistic type considered to be very widespread) as a guide for experimental research.

Only De Brosses, Van der Leeuw (partially) and De Mirville (hesitantly, then, for he does not 'see' sufficiently) define 'fetish' as a certainly magical, but moreover 'inspired' material object, which is the result of real 'manufacturing', as all apparently (except for natural fetishes) posit as essential.

Behold what linguistic analysis, the inevitable starting point of all research, including and indeed especially experimental research, provides us with: a Babel-like confusion of tongues, which may perhaps experience its 'Pentecost' (as a restoration of linguistic unity) in the following pages. Now we at least have a heuristic idea of the possible extent of the 'fetish' phenomenon.

'Content' says what something 'is'. We are going, true to Moses' words, to attempt to see with the 'heart (and the kidneys)' in order to truly 'understand', with 'eyes' in order to truly see (a second sight of the same thing that the first sight has long seen without 'truly' 'seeing'), with 'ears' in order to truly hear what the texts, especially those of 'seers', tell us about what the 'fetish' (and its worship) really 'is' to them. (See *page 51 above*).

2.3.2. The content description of the phenomenon 'fetish'.

Phenomenological guideline .

As a guideline for our research, we take *N. Söderblom, *Das Werden d. Gottesgl.**, p. 54: “Edgar Reuterskiöld and Uno Holmberg speak of 'power' (the basic dynamic idea) among the Finns and the Lapps. 'Vaki' can mean 'people' and was formerly pronounced of the small mythical inhabitants of the earth, the water, - fire (we are rearranging the order), etc. Now Holmberg acknowledges Power in it.”

As a variant, 'voima' (power) can be used to speak of the 'power' of the earth, the water, - thunder, - the forest, etc. (we rearrange the order). The Magi 'know' how to use 'vahi' or 'voima' for their purposes.

In other words: Magical power and small nature beings (centers) are said to be, originally, identical. The magicians know this and apply this knowledge, nothing more. Whoever controls the nature spirits, with or against their will, can 'perform magic'.

2.4.3.1. D. Fortune: the vengeance demon

(145/154)

Dion Fortune (= Violet M. Firth), Psychic Self-Defense (A Study in Occult Pathology and Criminality), Amsterdam, 1937, pp. 72/76, gives us an experimental (though coincidental) example of the identity of the magical force and the smallest nature spirits (below the centric level of the fairy, namely).

HA146

First, a word about the distinction between the thought form and the artificial elemental.

(i) the thought form, or rather: 'ideal form', is that which arises when a personal center conceives of an idea sufficiently clearly and distinctly, especially if this idea also appeals to the person in spirit and will, and indeed in fine matter (fluid, holiness), where, at least when it concerns created persons (the divine idea is immaterial), a form (with color, sound vibration, scent, if necessary perfume, the incense of the fairies, etc.), visible to the second sight, is 'received' (conceptus = concept) in the life center of the person in question, for eternity ('stat sacrum, dum volvitur saeculum': 'Eternal is the sacred, perishable the secular').

There is not a single creaturely-originating idea that is not thus 'visible' and—the emphasis lies on this—forever. Consequence: man is responsible for the world of ideas of which Platon, which he 'creates' around himself, or rather 'begets' (for it is always—like everything in the fluid world—a process of begetting or generative production), and which he, inevitably, given the transitive character of 'holiness' (fluid), spreads around himself.

A healthy Platonism is indispensable when it comes to ideas in the sacred!

(ii) The artificial elemental arises analogously to the thought form (ideal form). 'Element' is contained in the adjective 'elemental', which is, as it were, drawn from the sphere of an element (in the Empedocleic sense (Empedocles of Akragas (Agrigentum)) as a constituent. There are three ordinary 'elements' (fluid states of aggregation), namely earth, water (moisture), and gas (usually called 'air').

It is not the chemically pure form of water and gas (air) that is meant, but the actual composition, or at least the fluid or sacred representation thereof in low-subtle matter. 'Low-subtle' differs from 'high-subtle' (we avoid the terms 'ethereal' and 'astral' (theosophical terms) because they lead to misinterpretation) in structure.

1. The highly subtle matter is, in its finest form, identical with the coupled 'points' (atoms, monads) - see *page 133 above* -.

2. Combinations of such monads give rise to more complex and/or intricate 'monads' (rightly also called 'monads', because one monad builds up a configuration or ordered system around itself and thus becomes a compound monad, until that type of subtle matter is reached which, if configured even further, gives rise to coarse matter)

3. Those types of fine matter which, in man, animal, plant, stone, etc., are immediately or at least very immediately at work for 'materialization' (i.e., coarsening), are the low-subtle ('etheric' (theosph.)) matter, or rather: 'holiness'.

Well then, earth (i.e. all 'rock' of soft, semi-soft or hard nature), water, air (as just described) have an aura (radiating sphere), which emanates from the 'soul', i.e. its low-subtle double.

This is precisely the low-subtle doppelganger intended when one uses the word 'element' (stoicheion) in the pseudo-Empedoclealic sense (Empedocles blended the two planes, the gross and the subtle) in a hiero-analytic context. Consequently, this has absolutely nothing to do with the current Mendeleev table, which merely unravels the secularly accessible intra-atomic structure.

We can now proceed to the commented-upon presentation of D. Fortune's magical-hiero-practical experience, which, for us, is studyable as an experiment. The essential core of an artificial 'elemental', better 'nature spirit' (a word we will use from now on) 'situated in one of the three layer-subtle doppelganger spheres (earth, water, air)', is its thought form, better: 'ideal core'.

As stated above (*p. 116*), energy is of a sacred nature, or rather: fluid (i.e., transient holiness that flows through gross matter), always at the same time 'idea' (i.e., a concept formation standing clear and distinct before thought: beings that think only vaguely are totally unsuitable for the formation of an artificial nature spirit).

This idea can be either salvific or misery-causing: its ethical-political nature depends on this (see above, *pp. 67ff.*), which we discuss in another context. We emphasize that the taboo character (see above, *pp. 121/127*) of a nature spirit created by a human being is such that its creator undergoes his judgment with infallible certainty. We will not return to this point.

After this introduction with its two basic concepts, 'ideal form' and 'natural spirit created by a man', we can follow D. Fortune's narrative closely (interrupted, if necessary, either by explanation within a hiero-analytical framework (which is not hers, except partially) or by excerpts from her works). In more than one place in **Psychic (understand: occult, paranormal) self-defense**, she gives the 'formula', i.e., the idea in

abbreviated form (forma, formula), of the artificial natural spirit. She distinguishes three aspects:

(i) the sharply defined representation (ideal form);

(ii) the animation with something from the essence of the maker, i.e. the generating or generative energy (holiness as a source) present in the life center of the maker, - center, which is his basic monad (his genius) (if male), his iuno (if female; - see above *pp. 118/119; 130ff.* (coupled nature spirits)); when this and sexualized - vital and nature-spiritual - dual 'source' (generating capacity) is not or not sufficiently active, then the creation of a nature spirit by the earthly man fails, and indeed to his detriment.

HA148

The reason: earthly man, once engaged in creation, works with his central monad (genius, iuno) insofar as it is both an image and (especially) an understanding communication with the other monads of the entire creation—micro-macro-cosmos.

(iii) The realization of the concept animated by genius or iuno in the suitable natural force, i.e. in one of the three elements (earth, water, air), viewed from the perspective of its low-subtle double; for the monads of earth, water, and air are vital as the 'living center' of the nature spirit, whether it is created naturally (i.e. by God himself (trinitarian) angelically, demonically, -satanically) or artificially human.

This natural sphere (earth, water, air) is, after all, also essential for human life. Now, what is essential for the Creator is also essential for that ideal form of his, which is the nature spirit created by him. This nature spirit, created by himself, indeed takes part (participation) in the basic monad (as image and as understanding communication).

On page 200 (oc), Fortune gives some further explanation regarding the invocative (calling up, namely by means of invocation) aspect of the magical-nature-spiritual operation ('operation'), in the context of the creation of a 'curse' (i.e., an artificial nature spirit that must perform a curse on someone or something).

She says: “The accuser says: “I curse you by ... and ...” . For through these magically-carrying words (see *p. 110 above*), the already existing number of nature spirits intended by the maker to be created here and now are, as it were, 'awakened'; that is, they make and/or acquire (simultaneously) contact and image character in relation to the nature spirit to be created, which is like their 'brother' ('sister') (for these nature spirits also have a gender that is either female, male, or whether dominant or non-dominant male, and hermaphroditic).

Once and in accordance (namely with the 'purpose' given to the work by the maker here and now (e.g. a curse, a blessing)) and in contact (understanding) with the nature spirit to be created, all kindred spirits, attuned—contacted—can cooperate. This cooperation is absolutely necessary if the 'operation' (as occultists so like to say, 'imitating scientific language') is to succeed.

For if all contemporaries do not cooperate, this has a paralyzing effect on the nature spirit starting here and now, with the result that its creator must generate power again and again (with his base monad in unity with all the monads of the entire universe: it is absolutely necessary to always keep in mind that ontologically broad structural coherence of the created 'being').

HA149

Incidentally, attention should also be drawn to two other aspects of this adaptation, namely

a/ just as the magician-nature spirit creator strengthens the nature spirit through e- and invocative contact with his peers,

b/ thus he strengthens his genius or *iuno* with that of the group, whose cooperation he (she) obtains if necessary;

c/ moreover – one need only think of C.G. Jung's archetypes. *di* in the highest sphere of the sacred (the highest degree of its highly subtle sphere) resides the 'kosmos noëtos' (*mundus intellegibilis*, system of knowledge and thought), the so-called world of ideas, which crowns the 'akashia' (constitutes its highest layer).

Well then, by concentrating from the very beginning on that highly subtle world of ideas (selectively, of course, depending on the concrete goal that the maker of the nature spirit sets for himself here and now) (i.e., simply directing his consciousness very attentively. This is not about those morbid or half- or wholly sickening Eastern or Western thought techniques), the maker connects (associative process) his ideal form, the center of his nature spirit (see *pp. 146/147 above*), with all analogous or identical ideas in the universe and, in particular, on earth.

Conclusion: there are three aspects: ideal form, animation (genius, iuno), and situating in the sphere of nature. There are three reinforcements: archetypal (worldly of ideas), groupal (congenii, coniuonones), and invocative (fellow-nature spirits). Behold the regulative model of what will now follow as one possible applicative model.

Praxeology.

'Praxeology' is the description of a praxis, practice, or action, such that
a/ and her synchronic and her diachronic framework

b/ as well as its phaseology becomes clear.

This dual structure contributes to the intrinsic value of what the magician-nature-spirit creator wishes to achieve: the more praxeological (in the sense described above), the clearer and distinct his idea regarding the nature-spirit idea, his own monad (genius, iuno), and the natural sphere (earth, water, air), and the three possible reinforcements thereof.

Ad.a. Fortune situates the incident

(for it is not an actual experiment) in her own life as an occultist. Diachronically, therefore, the narrative is vague. Synchronously, there is only one detail: she had been wronged greatly by someone whom she had helped financially at the cost of great sacrifices. At least, she thought—for, upon hiero-analysis, it appears that she, in a former earthly life—reincarnation as a mere working hypothesis does not formally contradict the dogmatic position of the Church on the matter, since we are working purely experimentally (and not fully dogmatically ecclesiastically) in these pages—had wronged this man greatly. Precisely that detail escaped her otherwise so sharp analytical mentality, because she had to rectify this harsh injustice.

Ad.b. We now pause, phase-wise, to reflect on the events.

(i) -- Fortune, resting on his bed one afternoon, plots revenge, but falls into pre-sleep. Midway between the waking and sleeping states, man is more receptive than in the fully awake state to paranormal (understand: sacred) experiences, indeed, effects.

It was precisely at that moment that the thought occurred to me to abandon all self-restraint and strike. In my imagination, the old Norse myths (Eddas) rose up: I thought of Fenris, the dreadful Norse wolf.

“Immediately thereafter I got the peculiar sensation that, at the level of my ‘solar plexus’ (= nerve bundle in and around the stomach), something was leaving my body: next to me, on the bed, a large wolf was in the process of materializing. (...) Just like Z. (on page 69, oc, Fortune recounts the materialization of a dog, which originated from Z., a man, who acted upon her), that figure looked grey and colorless and, just as with the former, I felt the pressure of his weight.” (oc, 73).

Note : (a) 'Materialization' is the formation of a fluid form such that it becomes not only highly subtle but also low-subtle and even coarse-material (then it becomes perceptible with the ordinary senses, of course);

(b) That the formation of nature spirits can go even that far is a widespread belief: the author of *The Occult and the Supernatural* , London, sd, p. 97, says that magic, if sufficiently developed:

(b)1. creates living beings (think of the homunculus or little human) and/or

(b)2. imbues images or statues with life (cf. P. Saintyves, *Le discernement du miracle* , Paris, 1909, pp. 304ss. (*Les prestiges des prêtres; la physique des temples*: “the art of making 'gods', of fabricating statues that predicted the future and interpreted dreams” (oc, 307)).

The Talmud, for example, also mentions such phenomena: the 'golem' was a real creature that served its master (its maker) by performing henchman tasks; in this regard, *Psalm 139:16* (Your eyes have beheld my formless members) was taken as a model.

(c) In our country too, several people experience the partial or complete formation of the nature spirit, as described by Fortune: they are

often simply laughed at by those who lack understanding (physicians, psychotherapists, family members), who do not 'see' and have no system of interpretation.

(ii) - Fortune, unfamiliar with that practice, knows enough about such monsters: if she does not panic, she can control that wolf with her will (imagination too: see oc, 279): the materialization “snarled and showed its teeth”.

Yet she pushes him off the bed: he then transforms into a dog (metamorphic aspect), to her relief, incidentally. Thereupon the northern corner of her room 'vanishes' into nothingness (= dematerializes) and Fenris, now a dog, vanishes through that 'opening'.

HA151

Yet Fortune has the 'feeling' (always the first, sensitive degree of 'seeing') that it was not over yet. This 'hypothesis' (of her sensitivity) is confirmed the following morning. A housemate had woken up after a restless sleep, having dreams about wolves (the dream can have sensitive value), and had then, in the dark, “seen the fiery eyes of a wild animal in a corner of the room” (oc,74).

Note: Seeing only the eyes of an 'apparition' is, in the sense, normal that the eyes are pre-eminently the accumulation of 'holiness' (energy, specifically fire energy, about which more later), with the result that a waning materialization is, in the long run, nothing more than 'eyes'.

(iii) Fortune, worried, consults her magician-master. He says that the wolf, or dog, is an “outward-stepped part of herself” and that she must, at all costs, call him back by “taking him (back) into herself”; (oc, 75). This, according to her teacher, would only be possible if she removed her resentment and plans for revenge from herself.

Thereupon Fortune herself writes that “she found herself at a crossroads”, meaning that, if she pursued that resentment and plans of revenge, she was embarking on the path of black, god-hostile, magic: “If I provided myself with the opportunity to satisfy my vengefulness, then the wolf form would be born into an independent existence and then the devil

would have broken loose, both literally and figuratively. I got the impression, clearly, - and in 'psychic' (understand: occult, sacred) matters impressions are very important - (cf. supra *pp.* 68/69) - that, if the wolf impulse had once manifested itself in some act or other, the wolf would tear itself free from the psychic (understand: sacred) umbilical cord that bound it to my 'solar plexus', - after which it would no longer be possible for me to take it back into myself. (oc,75).

Fortune's task was therefore twofold:

a. to let go of her revenge in her heart (consciousness), i.e. to repent (meta.noia, penitentia) (the ethical-political side)

b. to reabsorb the wolf form in her 'kidneys' (unconscious/subconscious) instead of sending it to the 'enemy' (or – we add this to Fortune's incomplete list of possibilities – to let it be absorbed into something else (stone, plant, animal, another fellow human being, nature spirit, demon, satanic spirit). Most 'exorcists', for example, do not act like Fortune (who possessed a remnant of Biblical Christianity from his upbringing, namely Christian Scientist healing), but simply 'relocate' the form, which they 'see' (?) as a satanic spirit to be shunned, which must be punished, rebuked (see the texts of the *Rituale Romanum*), etc.

This widespread practice of exorcism immensely exacerbates the 'power' of the artificial nature spirit.

HA152

These displacement processes (instead of absorption processes) - plural because of the multitude of types of people who engage in this (most unconsciously, yet all the more effectively; rare ones - true initiates - very consciously) - are seen in: **(i)** physicians, **(ii)** psychiatrists, **(iii)** psychotherapists, **(iv)** nursing staff, **(v)** educators, etc. - in short: all those who care for people directly or indirectly - at work.

"I decided (...) to let the opportunity for revenge slip away and, at dusk, called the 'creature' back. It entered my room through the northern corner (later I learned that the 'Ancients' considered the north an evil direction) and stood on the mantelpiece in a friendly and even tame posture. In the semi-darkness, I achieved an excellent materialization and would have

sworn that an Alsatian Mastiff was looking at me. It was a tangible apparition, and even the scent of the Great Dane was not lacking.

From me ran a shadow-like ectoplasmic line, one end of which was attached to my solar plexus (in and around the stomach region), while the other, at the level of his belly, disappeared into his shaggy fur (but I could not see the exact point of attachment).

Note: The fact that Mrs. Dion Fortune could not 'see' the correct attachment point is due to the fact that she does not 'see' the monads (and their hermaphroditic structure).

“By an exertion of my willpower and imagination, I began, along the silver thread, to 'suck' the life out of him (not with the mouth, as incidentally added to Fortune's account, but with the base monad, her 'iuno') (...). The wolf began to fade; the thread grew thicker and more substantial.

A fierce emotional storm began to brew within me: I felt the furious impulses to go out and tear apart everything and everyone who crossed my path (...). With a tremendous effort, I overcame those impulses, - after which the storm subsided.

The wolf form had now withered away into a formless grey mist: I absorbed that, too, into myself along the silver thread. The tension diminished. Finally, I was myself again—bathed merely in sweat.

As far as I know, this is the end of the story. (...) What was particularly remarkable was that, precisely during the short life of the thing (i.e. the artificial nature spirit) (twenty-four hours), an opportunity for a formidable act of revenge presented itself.” (oc, 75/76).

Behold the description of the origin of possession: the fluid penetration (dwelling in man; who, thereby, becomes a 'fetish' (spirit house)) – in the kidneys (the unconscious) – generates (generatively: via the iuno/ genius) the emotional – volitional ferocity of the animal in the otherwise so calm man (in the heart).

One immediately sees, thanks to her final determination regarding 'synchronicity' (as noted by C.G. Jung), that—when on a lower (the natural-spiritual) level—'in the kidneys,' the Bible says—an intrusion (think of transitivity) of a purely fluid essence ('intelligence,' a number of occultists wrongly say) has succeeded,—on a higher, this time truly ideal-directional level, by which the fate of the beings of creation is determined (God acts as the principal determiner),—one need only think of the expression 'throw of lot,' high satanic spirits, apostate 'angels,' this time on a personal level (not mere centers)—the situations are arranged in such a way (directional aspect) that the nature spirit in the depths of the latently possessed spirit is given the opportunity to manifest itself.

Whoever, in this case, like Freud and most psychoanalysts, believes that indulging oneself (*das lustprinzip*) is the norm for 'liberation' from 'tensions' ('stress', etc.), commits an unforgivable error that is not immediately apparent.

On the contrary: the person in question feels 'good', 'liberated', etc. on a purely emotional-conscious level), but later, when no one thinks anymore of the effect of that second effect (namely in the victim of the occult-satanic attack, the first effect having already taken place in a foreshadowing manner in both the high satanic angels and in the foolish man who engages in black magic, only then does what Freud calls the reality principle—what the Bible and all religions call the violated taboo (see above , *pp. 121ff.*) or divine judgment—emerge, namely in the fact that, once out of the human victim, the nature spirit, being without fetish or 'dwelling' ('ban'), seeks out the company of its kind, finds them (through its *iuno* or genius) and, strengthened, returns: “When the unclean spirit has departed from someone, it wanders around in barren places (see Tobias = *Tobit*) 8:3). He seeks 'rest', 'anapausis', 'requies') and finds none.” (*Luke 11:24*).

Naturally, the nature spirit finds no 'rest': nature spirits are not persons, but merely 'centers' (see *pp. 111ff.* above), which are indeed 'independent' to a certain extent, but connected, through some 'silver cord' or other (the Biblical name), either to the creator-and-the-satanic-angel-inspirer or to the victim (at least when it concerns an unclean nature spirit; 'pure' nature spirits (centers) have an origin friendly to God or even divine, of course).

A nature spirit, pure or impure, needs a being of silver cord, i.e., a fetish. That is the sacred definition of 'fetish'. Whether that fetish is an object, a plant, an animal, a human, an extraterrestrial being, or indeed, God, is of importance only to the one who created it.

But, once created—for that is the only correct word for 'generate' (beget via iuno, genius)—the 'spirit', 'pneuma', spiritus, needs a dwelling place in which it can 'reside', which feeds on 'spirit' (pneuma, spiritus), which life force (holiness).

HA154

a. Pneumatology is a theory of spirits (see above *p. 144* : De Mirville, especially pp. 112/113: Heiler's list): it is one of the basic aspects of the fetish being.

b. The other side is the aspect of inhabitation, particularly noticed by observers (ethnological, tourist): in Fortune's story, it was expressed with remarkable thoroughness (possession).

Conclusion: In Fortune's story with commentary, the structure of the naturalistic religions has been exposed, with the origin, outlook, banishment, and expulsion of spirits.

(II) Macumba: he had played with 'the doll' (154/157)

True to our phenomenological guideline, we have already exposed one aspect of it (see *p. 145* above), namely the nature spirits (natural or artificial). For the sake of clarity, and to explain the taboo danger of the naturisms (nature spirit worship; see *p. 129 above* (Réville's naturism, parallel to Guyau's panvitalism (pan(en)thelism) and Marett's animatism)) increasingly penetrating our Western culture, as well as to already begin the second aspect of our phenomenological guideline, namely the identity of magical power and control over nature spirits, we briefly consider *P. Grégor*, **Dans la jungle des nombreuses morts**, *Paris*, 1962, pp. 131 / 189, where the author, a former lumberjack, entrepreneur, and foreman in the Brazilian jungle, gives a touristy but accurate (stripped of all ethnological prejudices) description of the Macumba, which is also

penetrating here, in Belgium, like so many other 'cults', these nature-spirit religions.

Let us listen, well prepared by D. Fortune's explained story, to the text: "After one of those gruesome duels with the hatchet (the tool of his jungle workers in their fifties), the outcome of which is always fatal, I attempted to discover the motive for the murder.

Epaminondas, the old mateiro (guide), had made a disapproving gesture towards the corpse with the smashed skull: 'He had played with the doll too much,' he had said. (...). I realized, moreover, immediately that the motive for the murder had something to do with one of our three 'cooks' (namely the one who prepared the food). (...). I took my position on the night of the full moon. (...).

I discovered a young caboclo (recruited worker). (...). He stared intently at the moon. (...) Osorio, a wretched boy, toothless, very ugly and very timid. In his right hand he held a cylindrical object, (...), one of those roots which, by a quirk of nature, mimic the shape of the human body.

Several minutes passed: **(i)a** . Staring straight into the moon, **(i)b**. Osorio slowly stroked the root, **(ii)** while his lips murmured inaudible words. (Steller then describes the jungle night).

HA155

Suddenly, a shadowy image of the itaperi (communal living area) came to mind: I recognized Aparecida, the slimmest and most surly of our three cooks. With the staggering step of a sleepwalker, she came toward Osorio.

When she was with him, I clearly distinguished her face. I had to suppress a cry of surprise, even of horror: I had rarely seen such a terrifying countenance. It was simultaneously alive and dead. The girl's eyes were wide open, but had no eyeballs. One saw only the whites of the eyes; she was in ecstasy.

Osorio stood up softly, took hold of her: she woke up with a start. I heard Osorio say: 'Quietinha!' (Quiet!), softly, but with an energy and authority I did not know in him. Then he pulled her along behind the bamboo hedge." (oc, 132/135).

Before beginning the commentary: the author notes on p. 158 (the nocturnal Macumba ecstasy of the three young women), 179 (idem), that this rolling of the eyes is also typical when the women, who are subjected to black (= immoral) magic, enter into dancing ecstasy.

The 'trance' (ecstasy) is practiced in virtually all naturisms (nature spirit worship). It is common in our (self-)hypnosis. Earlier, we pointed out the subjugating nature of such deprivation of self-awareness, whether it be:

- a/** naturist,
- b/** Pentecostal-charismatic (ecstasy is also noted in those circles, indeed, often regarded as a 'good sign' of the working of the Holy Spirit) or
- c/** is practiced or induced (auto)hypnotically. It is and remains a loss of self-possession and, to that end, alienation, *selbstentfremdung* (as Hegel, after him, and Marx reinterpreted from an economic perspective, would say).

One sees such things less and less in the Old Testament Yahweh religion and sporadically in the New Testament-charismatic phenomena (see *1 Cor 14*, where Paul, with all due respect to 'phenomena' ('prophesying' (*14:3*) is preferable, because it is understandable; 'glossolalia' (speaking in tongues) in the spirit (ecstasy) (*14:2, 4*) is not bad, but to be avoided, when Paul dares to speak through it; the same with **(i)** praying with the spirit (ecstasy) and **(ii)** praying with the understanding (nous) (*14:14/15*; where nous (understanding) is considered superior to pneuma (spirit (ecstasy))).

Let us examine the structure of magic (here woefully 'black' (immoral, indeed, demonic-satanic"). Osorio has (see above pp. *146,147*),

A . a sharply conceived ideal form (namely sexual pleasure with that girl in ritual form (macumba) to be certain that she

a . comes to him awakened from her sleep from a distance

b . remains completely silent afterwards);

B. a nature spirit at the disposal as a macumba member, namely as a consecrated or 'holy' man during the liturgies (oc, 157), yet he strengthens him through his personal creation that moon night: he evokes (see above p. 148 (realization in the responding natural force), which is twofold here.

a: the softened sunlight (= moonlight), which all true magicians know as much more efficient than full sunlight, which contains too strong 'fire' - element (fire as an element, i.e. as a doppelganger aura and - life force (holiness) in and behind what we call plasma, to use a modern term, i.e. intra-atomic transformation of existing substances, is not that which we know as fire in everyday experience, unless, insofar as, intra-atomic processes are also at work within that fire (which justifies the naming in the past)).

It is understood that, hitherto, we have always kept the three (earth, water, and air) elements well separated from the so-called fourth in the series (which is distributively false), which in fact falls entirely outside the series, as a state of aggregation.

b. The root lamentably not mentioned by its biological name: here one aspect of the law of magic comes into play, namely resemblance (imitative, mimetic magic; cf.

-- *J. Frazer, The golden bough* , London, 1890-1, 1907/1913-3 (12 vol.).

-- *C.A. Schmitz, Todeszauber in Nordost-Guinea*, in *C.A. Schmitz, Religionethnologie* , Fr. aM, 1964, pp. 335ff., for the further attempts to structure the magics on a purely (or virtually) ethnological-cultural basis, - which has not succeeded very well up to Schmitz).

The resemblance is, after all, no different from what the ideal form, the idea of the nature spirit (or center) to be created, is in gross material form: the root, applied here and now, is the girl, as bodily pleasure, one more time (cf. the 'verstehende' method, which conceives the fellow man like I one more time).

It is even certain that, as a good magician, Osorio licked the root, (apparently) also caressed it, while he identified that root, fetishistically, yet now in the sexological sense (see *p. 144 above*), with the body of Aparecida to be enjoyed and emptied in its holiness.

Indeed: identification is the cognitive and at the same time effective-pragmatic instrument of every true magic worthy of the name.

The discussions surrounding contagious (understand: contactual) and imitative magic proceed from 'seeing' in the first form; whoever 'sees' magic in the second form (belief) sees that imitation and contact merge.

The sexual fetishist instinctively senses a fundamental phenomenon of all magical knowing and acting, yet:

a/ shifted to the purely psychological-sociological-cultural plane and,
b/ moreover, narrowed down to a single phenomenon, the erotic-sexual.

But who functions as contact imitation (or rather: fore-imitation)? The nature spirit recently created by Osorio! He arises from both the moonlight fluid and the root fluid simultaneously (earth and moonlight).

HA157

C. The animation of that nature spirit with something from the very essence of Osorio (see *p. 147 above*) – which is abundantly clear here, namely sexual magic, as practiced in the experience of the macumba in the jungle, which can differ greatly from the more civilized urban and especially the macumba narrative for tourists (given that civilization smooths away many rough edges, such as sexual subjugation) (this is further described in Grégor's book accurately with an outsider's eye, very distant yet 'erlebt' (charged with experience), which makes his book, like all non-scientific descriptions, a truly understanding (Dilthey: 'Verstehen') approach.

After this second explained reading, we are able to fluently describe and structurally interpret common fetishes. Which is what we are now going to do, using mainly West African material (*II 157*).

But first, a word on totemism, not in the ethnological or culturological sense, but in the sacred sense. Hieroanalytically, totemism is one (and indeed the most striking) form of fetishism: a stone, or even an artifact (a natural product processed by humans)—a plant system, an animal system, a human system—all of these can be a totem, that is, the reproduction (repeated relationship) of either an individual, a collection, or a system (group) of individuals.

Library sample:

-- M. Besson, *Le totémisme* , Paris, 1929 (well-documented account of the phenomenon and of the theoretical-cultural interpretations).

-- Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Le totémisme aujourd'hui* , Paris , 1969 (the structural pulverization of all existing conceptions regarding culturological totemism).

-- N. Bancroft-Hunt, *Les peuples du totem* , Paris, 1979 (on totem worship on the Northwest coast of North America).

-- S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions* , Paris, 1922-3, t. I, p. 9/85 (several articles on totemism)

-- J. Frazer, *L'homme, dieu et l'immortalité* , Paris, 1928 (pp. 51/144 (*L'homme en société* : the classical interpretation of totemism, purely sociological, especially as a marriage system, - which is merely an offshoot thereof, which, hiero-analytically, is without underlying significance).

-- Cl. Lévi Strauss, *La pensée sauvage* , Paris, 1962, pp. 48/99 (*La logique des classifications totémiques* : a purely distributive-logistic analysis); pp. 144/177 (*Totem et caste*).

Behold, a small selection from an unmanageable mass. Why those boundless interpretations and reinterpretations? Because the analysts do not 'see' with second sight!

We will not return to that. Reason: it becomes a sawmill in the long run, but hopefully the reader will now know the reason for the boundless conceptual confusion resulting from not engaging in phenomenology with the second sight.

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2.3.3. The culturological scope of fetishism.

(157-169)

Fetishism in the strict semasiological sense is West African; yet in the hieroanalytic sense, 'seen' with the second sight (belief), it is planetary. Briefly reviewing, it looks as follows (based on a sample):

(i) N.-Siberia, Filnand, etc.:

-- DK Zelenin, *The Nongone Worship in Siberia* (*Leningrad Academy of Sciences*), Moscow/Leningrad, 1936 (Russian), of which A. Friedrich, *Die Forschungen über das frühzeitliche Jägertum* , in CA. Schmitz, *Religionethnologie* , Fr. aM, 1964, S. 206ff., provides a summary view.

An ongon is, according to *Zelenin*, the banishment (' *Festsetzung* ') of a spirit into a 'lekan'. A 'lekan' is a small, roughly finished image of animals (aquatic fauna, birds, quadrupeds), as well as of people, usually made of wood or bark, but also of leather, fur, stone, or metal. Function: medical (curing disease), economic (hunting success, livestock success). Among the ancient Finns, the haltias and tadebeyos come to dwell in objects (Nicolay, oc, 21).

(ii) Japan : theshintai is a well-defined object (stone, saber, mirror) in which an invisible 'deity' (we are gradually beginning to understand that this word primarily means nature-spirit in this context) 'embodies' (is banished); cf. *M. Eliseev, Mythologie du Japon* , in *P. Couchoud, Mythologie asiatique illustrée* , Paris, 1928, p. 379. The go-shintai ('venerable body of the god') is a phallic deity' (!) in polished hard stone, which is normally framed in a small wooden shrine.

(iii) Polynesia: the tiki is a small 'deity' (!), at least in an individual or family sense, which usually has an animal appearance (totemistic side of fetishism) - which, of course, can also be contained within an object (Nicolay, oc,20).

Behold, three random grabs to orient the reader somewhat hastily.

***The hiero-analytical content of fetishism.* (158/159)**

Major A. Glyn, **The Lower Niger and its Tribes **, London, 1906, says: We do not direct our prayers, sacrifices, and tributes to those objects themselves, but to those objects as symbols, which the deified ancestors of the family, the clan, the tribe carry within themselves, harbor, or represent.

In this way, Glyn renders the language of the fetishists he met. The representation can even serve as a definition, provided that 'spirits' (of ancestors) are simply substituted instead of 'deified ancestors'.

-- *J. Van Wing, Etudes Bakongo (Sociologie, religion et magie)*, DDB, 1959, pp. 382/425 (*Les nkisi*), states that an nkisi is an artificial object, inhabited or influenced by a spirit, endowed with a superhuman ability, but controlled by a human; he has the impression that it is usually the soul of a deceased person, which, after his death, has assumed a 'body' adapted to its new mode of being; yet an 'independent' spirit can also reside in an nkisi.

In short: pneumatologically (spiritually), Heiler's list (see *p. 112 above*) is sufficient to know who can inhabit, or better yet, be banished (for 'fetish' differs from 'indwelling' in that 'fetish' means banished dwelling)—except for the 'soul substances' mentioned by Heiler, which are not spirits but mists that are on their way to becoming a spirit or center.

What is true, however, is that 'soul substance' (i.e., the animation with 'something' (the emanation of the iuno (eve) and/or the genius (adam) and of the magician-fetishmaker and of the beings involved in that fetish-making)) is present in every fetish (see *p. 147 above*).

Idolism (idolatry, idol worship),

'Eidolon', idolum, idol, can be a form of fetishism, namely if the image has been magically-pneumatologically modified such that an 'organ' (see above *p. 106* : Holy Spirit as an organ in the individual, people, etc.) of the deity contacted within and through it is of a personal level (thus not merely an infrapersonal center).

1. See above, e.g. *p. 141ff.* (AH Ba).

2. Olbrechts, *Masks and Dancers in the Ivory Coast*, Leuven, 1940, pp. 126/142 (We have an interview with the Glee spirit), states that, besides ordinary spirit worship, the Glee religion (originated in 1928 (Ivory Coast), especially in the Gereë area), features a fetishism that identifies the resident 'deity' (center) with Nyon-Swa, the High God, the Creator (which Olbrechts himself observed on the spot in 1933 and 1938).

Olbrechts describes a fetish as follows: "Some matter or hodgepodge of matters ritually manipulated by a 'fetish man (or woman)' so that 'power' and 'action' reside within and emanate from it, especially during 'treatment'". This is the typical ethnological-cultural description, of course, but it is particularly subtle.

3. A. Gatti, *Bapuka*, Zurich, 1963, pp. 53ff., describes with masterful lifelike realism the idol of Bapuka, the goddess of life and love—a little idol, whose benign-protective 'effect' he and his equally educated wife (Gatti was an ethnologist) experienced daily for years—which proves that even non-fetish believers, if sufficiently open, can ascertain the 'effect' of an idol fetish.

Naturally, there remains a Biblical (and supreme-theological) reservation regarding the deepest essence of that seemingly benevolent operation. However, that has already been touched upon elsewhere.

Cf. *Book of Wisdom 13:10; 14:11* (*J.-J. Weber, Le livre de la sagesse* , Paris, 1949, PP. 300/308).

Of course: the Ark of the Covenant (OT) was, not to be forgotten, an idol fetish, but Yahwistic! (see *Vd Leeuw, Phänomenologie*).

Summary description : so far we have established two basic aspects:
(i) The banishment (more broadly: the dwelling, namely when no magical-pneumatological intervention by an earthly human has taken place);

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(ii) totemism (i.e., the understanding-magical fusion between a natural or cultural reality and one or more people). That totemism (understood hiero-analytically) forms an integral part of fetishism (even culturologically) is evident from the list of 'symbols' (natural and cultural realities) that the fetish believer considers capable of fetishism (cf. Nicolay, op, pp. 11s.):

(a) Dead fetishes:

(a)1. white pebbles, - pieces of metal, pieces of earthenware and pottery;

(a)2 . Pearls, pieces of ivory, feathers, animal horns, wild animal claws, pig bristles, snake heads, cow tails, etc.;

(a)3. Pieces of wood, grains, - in one word plant remains;

(b)1. The Mpongwe , a tribe in Gabon, have a 'very special fetish', namely okundu, which is apparently a necyofethish (nekuo = relating to dead people); the grigri ingredients are: **a.** strangely shaped stones, **b.** antelope horns, snail shells, **c** . funerary relics from graves: human hair, teeth, bones, cremated human flesh kept in a small bag (this grave aspect makes okundu an extremely taboo fetish);

(b)2. The Mpongwe (Gabon) have fetishes and/or idols (idol fetishes) into which a few particles of human relics are incorporated (from then on, they claim, the summoned spirit resides in their protective figurine).

(c)1. *living fetishes*: caimans, badgers, cats, foxes, - in Dahomey (land of Voodoo worship): leopard, snake (in the city of Weida, it is said, there was a 'temple' with more than a thousand snakes).

(c)2. *Ipori*, the third guardian spirit of man, so claims *Father Baudin, La Guinée* (Nicolay, oc,237), has sought his dwelling (fetish) in the toes of the foot; this spirit is in the worst condition, fluidly speaking: for one rarely offers sacrifices (i fluidly nourishing acts via e.g. food that is allowed to decay, etc.); what does happen—and with this we are in fetishism as a cult—is that, if a Negro-African is about to set off on a journey (a great journey), he 'fetishes' (i acts fetishistically) on his toe with a little chicken blood and oil so that the spirit is satisfied and favorably disposed.

Again: that chicken blood, that oil are viewed sacral (fluid); the 'soul' (understand: nature spirit, which arises from it jointly during the 'sacrifice' (= formation of nature spirit; see pages 147/148 above) of the Negro-African (his iuno, genius) and of the killed chicken and the vegetable or animal oil), - the nature spirit, therefore, is meant (not the gross material blood, oil, etc.).

Well then, all these dead or living fetish symbols are so many totems, insofar as they are regarded as 'brothers, sisters' (the totem believer-once again)

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In other words: the fetish (nature spirit) is, as it were, of the same fluid 'tribe', 'family', with the result that the totem worshipper treats him (her) as 'brother' ('sister').

Indeed, they share in exactly the same genius (iuno). Nicolay, oc, 32, gives us a lifelike image: the goddess of water (here: center of power) is Olosa; the caiman (alligator) is her 'angel' (messenger) and is worshipped in that title:

“In Porto-Novo (Guinea), near the mission house, there is a fetish caiman who is very approachable. As soon as he hears the fetish women ('féticheuses') coming, singing and dancing, he emerges from the water and crawls toward them. The fetish women, always keeping a respectful

distance, throw him, as a gift, a choice food (a cake, poultry). Near the water, there is an enclosure of bamboo poles and palm leaves, which serve as a 'sacred' refuge for him.”

Such a cult, nonsensical to us Westerners, is in fact identical with the use of the Ark of the Covenant of the Old Testament: both banishing or indwelling realities harbor the organ (see p. 106 above) of either a pagan but benevolent function goddess (mere center, which is the collective totem of the local group of worshipers) or of Yahweh.

Such a thing is not so ridiculous after all, if one knows that 'emblems'—such as the national flag of a country—when viewed from a second glance, naturally contain just as much a nature spirit, a fusion of genii and iunones and of, for example, flax (if the flag consists of flax fabric) and of the 'worshippers' (or worshipresses) of that flag: the 'ritual' formalities (the hoisting of the flag, for example) are the more veiled fetish cult!

(I) Religious or fetish tattooing (161/165)

Nicolay, oc, 54/55, describes another type of fetishism: “Religious or fetish tattooing was commonplace among the heathens of Guinea (only the Muslim believers do not participate in it). In Benin, among the coastal inhabitants, a native who did not bear this tribal or even family mark was very rare. The tattoo marks ('uê' in the Dahomean language) are applied to children aged eight to ten. Those capable of doing so are called 'uê.gboto'.

(i) The incision is made using a small iron rod (roughly our penknife).

(ii) Afterwards, the uê-gboto cover the incised lines with an ointment (with soot and palm oil as the main ingredients). The tattoos vary greatly according to the people, rank, or profession.

Especially the fetish men and fetish women make frequent use of them: the drawings consist of the figures of a caiman, a turtle, and a lizard. These drawings are taboo, because they are 'fetish' (sacred). (Thus Father M. Cordioux, missionary on the coast of Benin).

Here one sees, in the detailed account of a missionary, how **(i)** sacred, **(ii)** fetish and **(iii)** totem go together.

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The functional character of fetishism also becomes immediately apparent: even the profession gives rise to it. Nicolay, op. cit., 47, rightly says, not realizing how accurately he describes: “Le totem ou porte-bonheur (the totem or savior).”

L. Lévy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures, Paris, 1910-1; 1928-9, pp. 61ss., says: “An Asjanti (resident of Gold Coast):

- (i) had acquired a fetish (...);
- (ii) he hastens to venture an experiment with it:
- (iii) he is wounded by a gunshot, which shatters the bone of his arm.

The fetishist explains the event, to everyone's complete satisfaction, by saying that the offended fetish had just revealed to him the reason for that failure (it concerned an invulnerable fetish): the young man had had sexual intercourse with his wife on a 'forbidden' (taboo) day. The offended man confessed that it was true. The Ashanti have lost nothing of their faith.

Apart from the primitive pragmatism that is clearly evident here—see *pp. 54ff.* above—there is the explanation of the fetishist: this explanation naturally arouses skepticism, indeed, ridicule, among the visually impaired. Nevertheless, one ought to be very careful, especially with sexual taboos: let us not forget:

a/ that the genitals (and all erotically sensitive zones) are very closely involved in the generative aspect of holiness (see above *pp. 117/119*) (as well as *pp. 130/133*).

b/ that lovemaking (within marriage) always has a generative-sacred effect (sacramental grace),

c/ that (see above *pp. 147/148*: the 'animation' of the artificial nature spirit takes place via and within the genius (adam) and the iuno (eve)) every erotic-sexual act (gesture, word, idea) has a generative sacred effect (which declares the very strict ethics and politics of control in this regard in civilized countries to be sacred; which suggests the disastrous consequences that the breakdown of erotic self-control and social restraints generates in the sacred realm today).

All people who 'see' with the second sight become acutely aware of the taboo nature (divine character) of eroticism and sexuality.

Of course: whether this Ashanti idea is valid here is another question: we merely wished to point out the general sacred foundation of what the

fetishist believes, together with his tribesmen, collectively, apparently supported by centuries-old, archaic (ancestral, indeed, protogonistic) insights) – it is not without very serious reason that we have just had the word genius translated by Adam and Iuno by Eve, or rather: specified.

Adam and Eve (genius, iuno) is what the first humanity has passed down to us, namely the hierozoic principle of life. Once that is touched by wrong eroticism and sexuality, the generative aspect of the sacred is violated. This is emphasized in passing.

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Nicolay, oc, 15, points out another aspect of fetish belief: “In Daluni (Kilimandjaro travelogue) one encounters fetishes just about everywhere”.

(A) “For example, a small hut, carved out of a tree hollow, intended for the mzimu, the wandering ghost of some ancestor (Progonism - ancestor worship; by ethnologists, since Herb. Spencer (1820/1903), follower of A. Comte, the father of French positivism, 'manism' (actually called 'ghost worship') (cf. *W. Schmidt, Origine et évolution vol. , Paris, 1931, pp. 89/104*).

The genius or iuno principle is actually worshipped in the ancestral phantom. That hardly needs explaining anymore. It is not the ancestral soul, but the ancestral phantom (or rather one of the many 'phantoms') that is the strict object of manism.

Pro(to)gonism is broader: it also encompasses earthly-secular ancestor and first-parent worship. Yet manism is always embedded in pro(to)gonism.

See now how manism is performed: “In order that the shadow (mzimu) might come to 'rest' there, one offers her **(a)** an ear of corn and **(b)** pours out the libation for her in honor of the sorghumer.” (See above *p. 161*).

(ii) “At the crossroads one sees a bundle of straw fastened by means of stakes with a handful of grain in it for the wandering spirits”.

Here, too, the question arises, as with the nkisi (see *p. 158 above*), whether ordinary nature spirits are also worshipped, in addition to the ancestral spirits. Actually, fluidly speaking, the question makes little sense: the ancestral spirit is strictly distinguishable from the true soul of the ancestor.

Let one compare:

a/ the protagonistic worship (first-parent belief), distinguished from ancestor belief (cf. A.E. Jensen, for example, where he speaks of the demagogues, who, according to the mythology of the Demaists, only 'work' at the end of the paradise age).

b/ cf. *Ezek 32 :17/32* (the descent into hell; to distinguish it from the structure of the heroes' destiny: heroicness is a form of pro(to)gonism;

c/ cf. 168, finally the apotheosis (deification): the later Roman emperors (cult of deification) allowed themselves to be deified in this way; famous is Cicero, who, after the death of his beloved daughter Tulliola, attempted to acquire divine honors for her (Nicolay, oc, 102, 106): behold the three striking forms of soul-deification.

(B) Admittedly, the exorcism performed by fetishists proves that beings other than souls or even ancestral spirits are worshipped, namely the disease-nature spirits, for example, which, once without a 'place of banishment' (fetish), are dangerous as long as they wander. 'Wandering' is fetish-free life, if one may call such 'life', for it is the certain 'death' (fluidity) of the fetish-free spirit, merely expelled and not re-introduced (whether it is a nature spirit or an ancestral spirit). The liberation of a sick person or a possessed person (essentially the same thing) takes place according to the principle 'Similia similibus' (homeomagia).

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“(...) A healing Spirit (center) is transferred by the laying on of hands by the magical healer or, alternatively, that spirit is 'banished' (by the same person) in, for example, a drink (= first fetish phase) in order to be 'banished' from there into the sick person (= second fetish phase). Precisely because of this (see principle of reciprocity: pp. 125/127 supra (// 164: attunement): sympathy and antipathy) the disease-causing spirit (center) is: **(i)** combated, **(ii)** expelled or **(iii)** rendered powerless. (...).

The fetish swoon men think that the sick mind, after that banishment, begins to 'dwell':

(i) in the body of an animal (a chicken, for example), which is 'sacrificed' by the magic healer for that purpose and thrown very far from the hut (of both the magic healer and the sick person).

(ii) In a 'keti', which is a trivial thing - a nail, glass trinkets, a rag, etc. - what matters is that one provides a dwelling (fetish) to the mind and prevents it from 'wandering', which becomes a danger to everyone." (Nicolay, oc, 7).

"In other cases, the (magical healer) will make a figurine depicting the sick person and allow protective powers to act upon that figurine. He will place his lips on the painful area of the body and 'suck up the sick spirit', which will hide (se blottir, contract) in a stone or a piece of wood (oral fetish), which the healer places in the mouth beforehand, to make it, from then on, the dwelling of the spirit. (...). Afterwards, one buries the stone and burns the piece of wood." (ibid., 9).

On page 14, oc, Nicolay does not explain, but mentions the fact that the Gabonese fetishists, if they deem it necessary to appease 'the 'god' (center) by shedding blood, fulfill the role of sacrificer. We add that once again 'similia similibus' (like for like: principle of reciprocity) plays a role: one only reaches the spirit if one approaches that spirit, homeopathically as it were, in possession of the same fluid (with **1** / the ideal form included, **2** / as well as the same 'soul' (here the soul (heart) of a cruel being), with which one fills that ideal form (from genius, iuno)) and **3** / also the same 'element' (see above *pp. 147/148*)).

Whoever, whether as a magician or as a healer (with a pendulum, with the laying on of hands, 'charismatically, medicinally, with herbs, etc.': all these 'acts' with or without instruments are fetishistic acts, even if one does not believe in fetishism, for their essential nature is pneumatological, that is to say, nature-spiritual), or as an 'ecclesiastical or non-ecclesiastical' exorcist, fails to respect this principle of reciprocity, and involves the client in that own failure as well.

That is the true (fetishistic) reason why, in 1976, two people in England and Germany died after being exorcised by the Church. The exorcists did not respect the principle of reciprocity, crossing a taboo that proved fatal for the people they were supposed to help.

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One would be much better off thoroughly studying fascism than devouring thick books on demonology, exorcism in a purely rational Western sense, etc.!

The magician-healer-exorcist, which every good fetishist-man or fetishist-woman is, knows much more about it and, above all, proceeds much more rationally than the 'empiricists' (in the sense of 'random experimenters'), which is essentially what virtually all highly religious magicians-healers-exorcists are.

Let us take the diagnosis as a small example.

Nicolay, oc, 13/14, writes: "Among the Negro-African population of Gabon, the fetish-us men constitute a separate caste. (...) They claim to be attuned ('en correspondance': one need only think, incidentally, again of the principle of reciprocity) to the 'imbui' (the spirits) and to the 'ibambo' (abambo) (the 'souls' (note: 'shadows') of the dead).

They command them and claim to 'raise' them at will "by summoning their shadows (reflections) on the surface of, for example, a mirror or clear water". (*Dr. Barret, Afrique occidentale*, II, 166)." The diagnosis of a spirit action (under its threefold aspect: idea, animation, (rg. 147/148) (heart and element) is only possible when the magician-healer-exorcist himself:

- a/** sufficiently charged (magnetism),
- b/** sensitive (feeling) and
- c/** "seeing" (eidetism or, in weakened form, grey (white-black) 'seeing' with mere intellect and imagination), with
- d/** equipped with a tested interpretation system (see above p. 73 (67 ff .)).

Well then, however ridiculous Western rationalists may find this superficial viewing, it is sometimes the only means of hastily and sparingly establishing precise contact with the adversary, namely the one or more (Jesus speaks of one, reinforced, possibly with 'seven', which is the 'ideal' number according to the spirit mentality (*Lk 11:26*)) or even of a 'legion', many (*Mk 5:9*) spirits, who inflict misery on the victim.

a. feel, **b** . see, and **c. interpret** the nature and number of the opponent(s) thanks to his 'power' (magnetism) will infallibly and certainly violate a taboo and undergo his 'judgment' (see above pp. 125/127).

2.3.4. Excursus: the fire element.

(165/166)

Earlier (p. 156) we briefly touched upon this theme. To prove how cleverly 'lower' religions have shaped their followers, the following excerpt from Nicolay, oc, 301/302: "In 1886, in Grand-popo (Guinea, Slave Coast), a woman was struck dead by lightning near the wall of a dwelling against which she was sheltering during a thunderstorm. Immediately, after long and noisy preparations, fetish men and fetish women approached the corpse and dragged it with a rope through the streets of the city for hours." In the evening, at sunset, amidst cries and shouts, the body was brought onto the beach and divided into as many

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pieces, if there were us men and us women of the fetish. Everyone devoured greedily and without any preparation his share of this repulsive favorite dish, the bones of which were carefully preserved.

Recently we saw one of the fetish females at Grand-Popo, who had participated in that meal: she wore, suspended by her neck amidst other amulets, the bones of the first two joints of a human finger, as a reminder of the wild ceremony just mentioned." (*RP Baudin, La Guinée*).

For comment:

(i) This appropriation of fire spirits (of small size, incidentally) unfortunately coincides with the vampiric method, widespread across almost the globe, which consists of confusing the gross body with the subtle.

'Vampirism', mentioned in passing, has three main meanings:

- a.** The behavior of the bat-like bird;
- b.** The criminal conduct repeatedly established by jurists, in which a man usually bites his victim (usually in the left neck) after rape as well as killing a woman.
- c.** The sacred-criminal behavior, of which an applicative model is given above in Guinea.

The reason for this frenzied behavior (think of the dragging for hours) is the group appropriation of the fire spirits.

(ii) The appropriation of fire spirits via the victim of lightning, whether or not mixed with subtle (sacral) vampirism, in any case induces frenzy (think of D. Fortune, *p. 152 above*). Now, the cleverness of the ancient magics, such as those in Guinea, consists in creating a tradition such that the frenzy rages out at the forefront (in the hours-long dragging, with noise, shouting, dancing, etc.); When this frenzy (true, complete possession) has raged itself out, such that the fire spirits exhaust themselves—insofar as they are frenzy-inducing—only then do they eat this dreadful, ballad-like funeral feast (think of our own medieval song 'Heer Halewijn': "A banquet was held there, - The head was placed on the table"), whereby all sadistic-masochistic impulses are acted out once and for all, roughly according to the 'pleasure principle' of Freud et al., yet with, after the death of these sadistic-masochistic fetishists, divine judgment upon this criminal act.

In other words, the artifice of this satanized form of the fire-spirit appropriation tradition lies in keeping the possession (man as a fetish of a spirit is latently or fully possessed by that spirit) latent, at least in its modality of ecstasy, or in its later, pre-death cynically sober modality of execution. Is it surprising, then, that a brilliant depth psychologist like Freud, notwithstanding his atheistic materialism, exposes aggression everywhere, in the very kidneys (unconsciously or subconsciously)? Yes, aggression mixed with 'eros' in its rawest forms?

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(III) Initiation rite to become a wise man (167/169)

Nicolay, oc, 15, gives us the abbreviated version (*RP. Baudin, La Guinée*) of the initiation rite to become a weaver: "The candidate (heir from that point of view of his lineage predecessors) is usually a child of eight to fifteen.

(i) One begins with (bloody) sacrifices in honor of the Spirits, whose minister he is to be. One washes the neophyte with a decoction of 'one hundred and one' plants, girds his loins with a young palm shoot. He follows, with the fetish effeminate men, a procession around the sacred grove.

(ii) This is followed by the principal ceremony, during which one attempts to determine whether the fetish accepts the candidate presented to it or not (*note* : The word 'fetish' is analogous: it means:

(a) the kind of reality in which (see continuing above),

(b) the nature spirit or ancestral ghost itself, which dwells within.

P. Baudin only explains at the end how one forces the fetish (= spirit) to make its opinion public: one creates a fetish (object-in-which) and brings this object into (physical) contact with the candidate, until the end of the ceremony.

We now continue translating: “Here is how one consults the Spirit (mantics = the science of consultation):

a. The child takes his place on the fetish chair” (*note*: since every transfer of 'spirits' takes place via the 'foundation' (one need only think of the French expression: 'le fondement'), i.e. the lower body, the candidate becomes contacted with that foundation, i.e. that with which he contacts the foundation of the predecessors who have sat on that same 'holy' (= power-laden) chair—consider the fact that the papacy is still referred to today as 'the holy see' (a very sensible expression, if one wishes to understand it hiero-analytically)—one places the child-candidate on the same sacred seat where his predecessors received the same power.

b. “Again the fetish-loving men wash his head with the herbal decoction and loudly invoke the fetish (...) three times (*note*: always in honor of the Holy Trinity, although these fetishists do not know them; see above *pp.* 131/132 : the monads, which also play the leading role here, act merely in response to triadic signals, which reflect both the androgynous Father and the androgynous (but predominantly male) Son and the androgynous (but predominantly female) Spirit).

They resume their cries, while simultaneously dancing and skipping around the neophyte. (*Note*: dancing and skipping is, consciously or unconsciously, imitating the behavior of the monads; the point spirits of holiness then begin, through resonance, to intensify their 'dance of love' as well, with the result that its usual 'power production' (charging, 'sanctification' (see above *pp.* 108; 111), which is described in classical aretalogy, is no longer present). Meanwhile, the drums and all kinds of old iron make a hellish noise.” (*Note*: this sound is produced amplified by vibration on the physical plane, the influence on the monads). “For, among the Negro-Africans, the more hellish the noise, the more solemn the celebration.”

c. The possession by the candidate's fetish (spirit) emerging from its latency (and thus becoming 'patent'), which, once a 'fetish', i.e., the dwelling or spell of the spirit, becomes possessed either latently or patently precisely because of this.

“Gradually the candidate, who must show everyone that the spirit is overwhelming him, begins to tremble: his body shakes; his eyes become wild (see above, mentioned in passing, *p. 155* (Aparecida)) (...).

Soon such excitement overtakes him that he often has to be restrained or tied down to prevent him from harming himself or others. (See, incidentally, above pp. 151/152 (D. Fortune's possession)).

d. The apotheosis ('apothē(i)osis' = deificatio = declaration of God, deification; see page 163 above, - which is present here in a more veiled, but at least equally strongly meant form): “Thereupon all those present cheer the Fetish with cries of joy - one need compare, incidentally, the acclamations in honor of the late Roman emperors, who had themselves deified - 'Orisja Ô!' (It is the Fetish!) Orisjagun Ô! (The Fetish takes possession of him)'.

e. The expansion of the celebration. The celebration must 'expand' if it is not to degenerate, in retrospect, into the craziest and cruelest manifestations of collective obsession (see *p. above. 166*). “Then, after a few hours of noise and frenzy, the fetish object that had come into contact with the whipped-up candidate (see *p. 110 above*) is withdrawn: he gradually comes to.

“His frenzy ceases to make way for exhaustion.” (oc, 15). - Already above (*p. 97*) we pointed out the **(i)** manic (whipped up) and **(ii)** depressive (dejected) character of such ecstasy religions; whether they are Catholic, charismatic, or pagan, they remain subject to St. Paul's urgent counsel (and assembly order) in *1 Cor 14:26ff* .: “How then, brothers and sisters? At your gatherings each may have something (he means the mad and the controlled). (...) but everything must be done for edification.” -- Which, here, does not happen in this fetishistic initiation.

Nicolay, oc, 14/15, also gives, in a greatly abbreviated form (unfortunately), the initiation formula of a fetish woman: “Sometimes the functions of a fetish human are entrusted to women. According to *Dr. Lestrille, in Revue Coloniale*, the woman vying for this envied role ought to distinguish herself from her fellow men by exceptional qualities. Once presented, she is covered with ribbons and bells and colored with magical colors. (*Note*: color is light; light is vibration; vibration (of whatever nature, sonic or optical) acts upon the monads). -- Thereupon she isolates herself from the profane for several weeks to attune herself, so it is said, to the spirits. (*Note*: see the principle of reciprocity above; *p. 164*).

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After she has subjected herself to a regime of feverish ecstasy (exaltation), which turns her into a true 'neurotic woman' (note: it is a physician speaking who is using his language – for lack of hiero-analytical terms that would speak of 'the accumulation of the evil (misery) to be fought by her in the future, in the form of corresponding spirits of all kinds (again: principle of reciprocity)'), the woman leaves her place of seclusion (*note*: think of our places of reflection and 'retreat') amidst drumming and she surrenders herself, before all, to the delirium of the Python”.

The Pythonissa, a phenomenon that existed both now and in classical antiquity (one need only think of the seeress of Delphi on her 'sacred throne' in ecstasy over a crack in the earth that was emitting gases, consulted by all the great men of the realm and high thinkers and mystics of her time) – which actually, originally (archaically) meant 'snake-woman', or 'python-woman' more accurately – is acceptable only when she proves that she:

a. in an 'understanding' relationship with the spirits, - see principle of reciprocity, to hammer it home again and again, -

b. is possessed again and again without any form of misery thereof being detectable afterwards, either within herself (both physical-earthly and social-communicative (thus infecting others)) and in her home, comforts, etc. This is the typically feminine type of combating misery: in contrast to the fire-spirit eaters (see *p. 166 above* ; there, after death, the misery only became patent, through ghost phenomena, immediately after the death of these subachists (subtle vampirists) or even extended over

years, see also just above this: *p. 168*), insofar as they proceed in a purely masculine manner, we women can:

a . at least if they live in deep and true friendship with the Trinity (state of sanctifying grace: see above) - even if they do not consciously know the Trinity (baptism of desire)

b1. first imitating and absorbing the misery

b2. to subsequently absorb this identical misery again (and if necessary minimally imitating it—which is normal when the misery deeply affects her iuno (for that is patent possession, actually)), as it were, 'sweat it out' (the patient she treats, reacts, as the psychoanalysts say, her misery onto her healer ('abreaktion' says Freud), whereby the healer herself can exhibit the minimal symptoms).

Conclusion. Behold, a hiero-analysis of fetishism. Perhaps the fetish-believer now comes across as less 'crazy', 'infantile', or whatever other erudite insults were bestowed upon it by our academics without having experienced the phenomenon themselves.

Deo trino gratias maxima!