9.7.2. *Elements of cultural philosophy volume 2, pp. 112 to 220.*

Contents: see p. 219; study notes, see p. 208

Sample 35.-- Tragedy or redemption. (106/107)
When one reads a work like that of *Karl Jaspers* (1883/1969; physician, psychiatrist, existential thinker) - *Ueber das Tragische*, (On the Tragic), Munich, 1952 - one sees "tragedy" defined as follows.

Whenever there is transience, indeed actual ruin (radical failure) and it is hopeless, then there is a tragic situation. Tragedy becomes fully tragic insofar as that situation penetrates consciousness: the realization that the situation is hopeless defines tragedy fully. Thus Jaspers, o.c., 18.

However, when redemption from that tragedy emerges, then tragedy ceases. So that tragedy and redemption from tragedy never go together.

So that namely the pagan religions, insofar as they end in tragedy, remain without prospect of salvation. Whereas Christianity, by offering salvation, overcomes tragedy.
Camus (*CF/CS 104*) is, after all, a tragic thinker who sees the question looming over and over again: to live on in futility (absurdity) or to commit suicide?

Kafka.
Max Brod, September 1967, in Brussels, in a lecture, insisted that "Kafka was only striving for a pure worldview and a brighter future."

Schoeps, o.c., 140, summarizes, "In Kafka lived the messianic hope. Admittedly in a tragic situation: "The myth of faith in a tragic position"

As long as there is hope, there is redemption in sight and the situation, no matter how failure-containing, is not (radically) hopeless and therefore not radically tragic.

As an aside, the most dangerous thing was Kafka's (possible) unbelief which makes Old Testament-Biblical redemption a question mark.

Salvation history that becomes unholy history.
Schoeps, o.c., 125.-- "The apostasy (of men) from the law of revelation makes history the history of human calamity.
This makes itself known as increasing removal of the world from its revealed destiny path. This by a single rushing series of destruction which, judged by human blindness, must be considered precisely as 'higher development and constructive progress'."

Note.-- This is with Kafka the questioning of the modern idea of "progress on the basis of reason." Which makes him postmodern.

CF/CS 107.
The reason or ground of radical unease.
Schoeps, o.c., 125. "It is guilt, then,--in its essence admittedly no longer knowable guilt, which has darkened the world. To such an extent that its order can no longer grasp the true word. This is because the pressure of the centuries has already made that word too fixed and the 'dogs' too 'dog-like' (*CF/CS 100: "dog-like culture"*)."

Note.-- It is both a Biblical and an occultist conception that "evil" (in its deepest sense especially) "accumulates" over the centuries and makes "a pressure of the ages" felt.

A parallel.
As already briefly noted, Schoeps compares Kafka to Nietzsche. Nietzsche, too, sees "a pressure of the ages" (from Platon onwards (he claims)) that weighs on degenerate Western culture. Nietzsche, son of a pastor, also speaks of a religious-Christian event: "The most important events find the hardest access to feeling.-- For example, the fact that "the Christian God is dead." The fact that, in what we experience, no longer heavenly goodness and guidance, no longer a divine justice and -- generally speaking -- not even an immanent morality is perceptible.

This is the terrible news that will take a few more centuries to penetrate the senses of Europeans. Then, for a time, it will seem as if "all weight" has disappeared from things." (*Fr. Nietzsche: Morgenröte* (Dawn), (1882)). - Cited in Schoeps, o.c., 119.
Note.-- Just as "the law" of the Jews is "dead" -- except among the nobility -- so the God of Christians is "dead" in our Western culture.

Even the atheists, at the time of Nietzsche, did not realize how thoroughly the death of God was already present. Nietzsche blames them for this lack of understanding of things in our culture.

'Atheism' is much more than the erasure from people's reasoning of the term 'God' ("heavenly goodness and guidance", "divine justice" etc.): "the weight" of things (i.e. the richness of meaning in the midst of the woes of everyday life) that stands or falls with God's 'presence', is at stake!

When the weight is out of things, they become meaningless, -- incongruous, unrhyming even, -- "absurd. Under that point of view, Kafka and Nietzsche agree. Only that Nietzsche had totally lost his Protestant faith.

CF/CS 108.

Sample 36.-- *"The Death of God" according to J.-P. Sartre.* (108/110)

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980) was, for at least two generations, a celebrated thinker. With international resonance.

We dwell for a moment on one aspect of his very versatile personality, namely Sartre's interpretation of our deep cultural criticism. His interpretation is still topical because it is one of the many forms of 'dismantling' 'deconstruction' and putting paid to what remains of human possibilities after the dismantling of the great tradition.

We take as our ***Bibl. sample:***. his *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*, Paris, Nagel, 1970, and let him speak for himself in it as much as possible.

Critiques.

At some point, French existentialism was subject to fierce criticism.

a. Both Catholics and Communists accuse Sartre's starting point, namely the cogito, I think, of Descartes (*CF/CS 97*), of considering man merely as an individual and then only in his inner life ("sens intime"). As a result - so his opponents claim - every human solidarity is undermined: the social dimension of the actual existence in this world (= 'existance') is either put first from the outset or dismissed afterwards as a meaningless appendage.

b.1. Christians blame Sartre for the dismantling of the "Ten Commandments" as a summary of eternal values,-- dismantling that leaves nothing except total absence of justification of any behavior.

b.2. The communists reproach him with the "quietism" (total resignation) inherent in his despair thinking, which they interpret as a last vestige of bourgeois thinking. Those who preach despair - some of Sartre's students committed suicide (*CF/CS 104; 108*) under the influence of his desperate philosophy - , resign and do not become active.

The sufficient reason or ground: the death of God.

Paradoxical as it may seem, Sartre's thinking has as its premise "the absence of a God as a final reason or ground." He sums this up in a term he borrows from M. Heidegger, "le délaissement" (abandonmen) : "God does not exist." From this one draws the extreme consequences. Those extreme consequences are called "being alone." "Living God-abandoned in this world". Cfr o.c., 33 (*Angoisse et responsabilité*), (Anxiety and responsibility).

CF / CS 109
Two types of lay morality.
Sartre, o.c., 33/37, typifies his position through a counter model, namely French radicalism with its classical lay morality.

A. -- *The counter model.*
We quote as literally as possible. The existentialist is the radical opponent of that kind of "morale laique", lay morality, which states that disabling God as the foundation of every morality has virtually no drawbacks. When - around 1880 - French professors tried to put together a lay morality, they claimed pretty much the following.

1.-- *Atheism.*
God is an unusable and also demanding hypothesis. So we drop them.

2.-- *Axiology (theory of values).*
For the sake of a morality, a society, a civilized world, it is necessary that some values be taken seriously and taken as a-priori existing.

Note.-- In Sartre's parlance, 'a-priori' here means thought by a divine consciousness before there are human beings." This is his articulation of traditional Christian Platonism which claims that God's ideas are and reason or ground and norm or ideal of all that is created.

For example, working honestly, not lying, not cheating on his wife, fathering children, etc. etc. should be a-priori mandatory. So we, French radicals, are going to show for a moment that these values exist after all, ... "In a world existing in thought ("ciel intelligible"), notwithstanding God does not exist".

Note.-- Typical of radicalism, then, is that while they reject God's thinking before whatever exists, they do set up "a thinking before whatever exists" for it. A rest of theology thus, -- necessary to preserve an a-priori. An a-priori or sufficient reason or ground of conscientious action. "In other words, nothing will have changed if God does not exist" (o.c., 35).

B.-- *The model.*
O.c., 35ss. -- The existentialist(s), on the other hand, is of the opinion that it is very annoying that God does not exist. For, with Him, weakens any possibility of putting "a thought that exists before whatever actually exists" first and finding values in it.

Note.-- For Sartre, "values" are essentially pre-existing values.

CF/CS 110.

Sartre: "An a-priori is impossible since there is no longer an infinite and perfect consciousness to think that a-priori" (o.c., 35s.). After all, it is nowhere written that e.g. "the good" exists,--that one must be honest,--that one must not lie. "For we are in a space of life in which only human beings exist" (o.c.,36).

Dostoievsky (1821/1881; Russian novelist).
Sartre: "Dostoievsky wrote: 'If God did not exist, everything would be permitted.'

Note -- It is important to understand Dostoievsky correctly: he does not claim that, because God has been eliminated, everything is in fact permitted, because e.g. the fellow men - think of the police and the courts - are there to put a stop to a godforsaken freedom; he does claim that in principle everything would be permitted if God as legislator and judge had been "put off".-- It is also true, by the way, that Sartre wants Dostoievsky to be understood.

Definition of existentialism.
"Well, precisely this is the premise of existentialism." O.c., 36.
Indeed: if God is not there, then everything is allowed. Consequently, man is "délaissé", alone, since he/she does not find in himself/herself or outside of him/her any prepositions to which he/she can refer.

1.-- On the one hand, man no longer encounters apologetics. After all, if "existence" (actual man in this world without God) precedes "essence" (a-priori existing value), one will never again be able to employ an actual and unchanging human nature to explain, for example, anything. In other words: determinism does not exist. Man is free. Man is freedom.

2.-- On the other hand, if God does not exist, we are not confronted with values or commands that justify our behavior.

Consequence.
We are on our own, with no apologies due to values. "That is what I express as follows: "Man is condemned to be 'free'". O.c., 37.

Note.-- Sartre's notion of "freedom" is the freedom of the godly. "Determinism" he uses in a sense only his own, namely, to denote the "carcass" in which God's thinking compels man to take into account values and commandments that are there for man.

Sample 37.-- The essence of Christianity.

Sartre's characterization of God's role in culture is not so far removed from the great tradition concerning the essence of Christianity. Therefore, the following about that which makes Christianity different from the rest.

O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker*), (History of Idealism, II (The Idealism of the Church Fathers and the Realism of the Scholastics)), Braunschweig, 1907- 2, 8, typifies Christianity as follows: the sacred or salvation history before Jesus, in Jesus, after Jesus has as its origin (reason) eternity, which is that of God (Yahweh / Holy Trinity).

Willmann refers to *2 Timoth. 1 :9 / 10.*

A. *Origin.*

The "decree of counsel," i.e., God's will determining our destiny, is the "origin" of everything created,--among other things, of the fact that God calls us to a happy destiny ("salvation").

That decree of counsel is there "in the beginning and now and always" as a present, valid power. Before Jesus, in Jesus, after Jesus.

B. *The revelation of the origin.*

Through the mouth of prophets, through that of Jesus, through that of the apostles e.g., God reveals His counsel. They reveal (apocalyptic) and bring forth signs (aretalogy).

The same basic idea occurs for *Heb. 11:1*.-- "Through faith we see that thanks to a word of God the worlds ('aiones') came into being. So that out of the invisible the visible came into being".

Note -- "Word of God" means "the creative articulation of reality": what God 'wills' and thus 'expresses' becomes real.

Christian Platonism.

La Bible de Jérusalem, Paris, 1978, 1738, says at *Heb. 11:1*: "Belief in God's creation of the worlds is a beautiful case of insight into 'the invisible': before they were created, the realities existed in God from whom all things emanate." Cfr. *CF/CS 71; 75*.

Albinos of Smurna (+-100/ +-175), a late Platonist, is the first to situate the essence forms (which make them what they are) of things in God's ideas on the subject. If we see a tree, we know that in God's mind that tree "already exists from all eternity". So with everything that is created.

In other words: Platon set out; Albinos situated in the Godhead; Christian Platonism worked this out in a purely Biblical way.

Sample 38.-- Divine idea and human freedom.

Atheists, among others, have a hard time with the fact that we, as autonomous human beings, are created according to a divine idea. This is because, unconsciously, they project human conceptions and designs into the ideas of God as creator. This is mainly because they cannot reconcile being created and being free.-- Yet let us listen to the Bible on this matter.

1.-- *The Old Testament.*

Genesis 1:26v.. -- God in the midst of his act of creation is characterized as follows.-- "God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and that (thus) men may have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, the cattle, all wild beasts, and all that crawls as beasts over the earth.'

"God created (actually) man in his image. In his image he created him. \Man-and-woman he created them".

Note.-- Reread *CF/CS 71/75* (*Tone Image/Picture*; esp. *CF/CS 74*) and the text just quoted will become abundantly clear.

Ben Sira (*Ekklesiastikus*) *15,:11/20.--* This text completes the previous one: in addition to the divinity concerning control of the lower beings, there is the divinity concerning freedom. Thus *Ben Sira 15:14f*:

"The Lord, in the beginning, created man, leaving him to his freedom. - If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments to be faithful to him in good standing. For you he placed "fire" and "water": according to your desire stretch out your hand to them. Before men are 'life' and 'death': as they choose, they receive either the one or the other".

Psalm 62 (61):13 affirms, "You, Lord, pay man according to his works." See also *Ezek. 14:12 e.g..*

2.-- *The New Testament.*

Galat. 6:7/8 -- "Make no mistake: with God one does not mock! For what one sows, one reaps Whoever sows in the 'flesh' will reap destruction by virtue of that 'flesh'; whoever sows in the 'spirit' will reap eternal life by virtue of that 'spirit'."

Cf. *Matt. 16:27; Apok. 2:23.--* 'Flesh' = "godly humanity"; 'spirit' = "divine life principle".

Conclusion.-- Included in the idea of "man" in God's mind is the idea of "freedom. But not without the idea "Ten Commandments". The cosmos is an orderly conceived reality, not a "savage.

Sample 39. -- An improper profanity. (113/114)

For now, we remain in the previous line of thought, i.e., the "divine idea/created freedom" relationship.

'Theodicy' (gr.: theos + dikè), i.e. to render to God his due, is a term introduced by Leibniz. The fact : the brutal fact of physical but especially moral evil in 'creation', on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the existence of an all-powerful and good God. Cfr . *G. W. Leibniz, Essais de théodicée* (1710). Cfr *CF / CS 104* (*Camus' opinion*).

A. -- *The circumambulatory wording.*
Rule: "If thou dost so assert, it follows that which thou dost refute."

Preposition 1.
If God exists, then he is all-powerful -- and -- good.--
But either, if God can prevent evil but will not, then he is not good or, if he wants to prevent evil but cannot, then he is not omnipotent.

Preposition 2.
Well, evil can only exist either if God can prevent it but will not, or if he wants to prevent it but cannot.

Preposition 3.
Well, evil exists.

Nazin.
So God does not exist.

Note.-- That looks like perfect reasoning if the three prepositional phrases, then the one postpositional phrase!

B.-- *The logical-syntactic rewrite.*
'Syntax' in the logical sense pays attention to the sentences as far as they are interconnected (logically or not). To this end, the sentences are rewritten in symbol-shortened form.
a.1.-- *Rewriting of sentences*.
"God exists" = p. "God is good" = q1. "God is all-powerful" = q2. "God can prevent evil" = r1. "God wants to prevent evil" = r2. "Evil exists" = s.

a.2.-- *Rewriting of conjunctions.*
The entailment (implication: if, then) =). (Peano's pasigraphic mode).-- The contradiction = w (which corresponds to the Latin 'aut': or (dilemma)).-- The negation = - (e.g., the negate p: not p).-- Behold the connectives.

b.-- *The logical syntax of the reasoning*.
The skeleton of reasoning.-- We first note separately for the sake of clarity. We immediately introduce the conjunction 'and': 'and' = ^.

CF /CS 114.

Phrase 1. -- p). q1 . ^ q2 ^ r1 ^ negate r2.) . negate q1 w r2 ^ negate r1) . negate q2-

Phrase 2.-- r1 ^ negate r2 ^r2 ^negate r1). s

Phrase 3.-- s

Conclusion-- negate p

The whole reasoning : VZ 1 ^. VZ 2 ^. VZ 3). NZ.

C.-- *The ontological vetting process.*

Stringing sentences together is one thing. But to act on the truth of those sentences is two!

1.-- *The artery, Godward,*

This one is: the autonomy of the creature. God can prevent evil but, to the extent that he respects the autonomy or freedom of the rational creature, he will not do so without more. God wants to prevent evil but, to the extent that he respects the autonomous freedom of the spirit-gifted creature, he cannot do so without more.

In other words: the reasoning starts from a wrongly interpreted idea "creation of free beings" (as seen above). Cfr *CF/CS 112*: the idea human is a compound idea! Being human, in God's idea, includes freedom and decision regarding the ten commandments.

2.-- *Argumentum ad hominem.*

For the God-believer who properly understands the idea of God concerning man in the universe, God is not the cause of evil. He tolerates it out of respect for man's autonomy.

In other words, the sufficient reason or ground of evil is totally outside of God.

Paradoxically: the atheist, precisely because of his atheism, radically agrees! Indeed: for him God does not exist. But evil does exist! So the sufficient reason or ground of that evil certainly does not lie in God, directly or indirectly, but in the created, experienceable world itself.

In other words, the sufficient reason or ground of evil is totally outside of God.

Note -- The extra-biblical religions knew the problem very well: *W.B. Kristen-sen, Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of the Ancient Religions*, Amsterdam, 1947, says that, for the ancient theologians, the sufficient reason or ground of evil may lie in man but at least as much in the deities who are at home in good-and-evil. What Kristensen calls "the harmony (union) of good and evil" (as the Bible may have meant in *Genesis 2:17* (knowledge of good and evil)) as well as *Genesis 3:5* (*knowledge of the deities of good and evil*).

CF/CS 115.
Sample 40.-- Fate and inductive reasoning.
Fate analysis. destiny.
Bibl. sample :-- Lili Foldes, *Léopold Szondi et l'énigme du destin*, (Leopold Szondi and the enigma of fate Leopold Szondi and the enigma of fate), in: *Sélection* (*Reader's Digest*) (Zurich) 1986: juillet, 98/104;

-- *R*. Guardini*, Freedom, grace, destiny*, Antwerp, 1950;

-- Daniel-Rops*, Eléments de notre destin* (Elements of our destiny), (Essai), Paris, 1943.

Fate always has something to do with all that is factual. The share in the facts that is imputed to us. Behold what "destiny" is.

1.-- *Timeliness (time constraints).*

Existence, both cosmic and e.g. human, proceeds within the pressing straitjacket of the three moments of time.

a. From the past - think of "the pressure of the ages" (*CF/CS 107*) - which sometimes 'weighs down' very heavily, we experience ourselves as thrown into situations.

b. Actually we live within the very narrow and fleeting "now" or "present.

c. Before us lies the future, i.e., what is coming our way, -- with the task of designing it.

2.-- *Inductive Knowledge.*

Induction is based on sampling. Nothing more. Totality (except in summative induction) escapes our reason.

a. An extremely large part of the past, certainly cultural-historically speaking, that made us, we do not know,-- we do not even suspect,-- we forget (sometimes consciously suppressing or rather un(der)consciously repressing).

b. Most of the elements that make up our current situation escape our reason: e.g., what do we know about what is left of our life days? Now? Our health now includes elements that are sometimes insidious. Elements that only come to us later or even never.

c. What the future will bring, we usually do not know. Unless guessing.

Conclusion.

If somewhere the impotence of reason, whether conceived in a general or enlightened-rationalist way, becomes apparent, it is when it is confronted with destiny, the share of facts that concerns us and is imputed to us.

The reason.

The true reason is the enormous number of elements that determine the facts that make up our destiny. The number of factors - parameters - that comprise destiny is so great that only a transcendent divine mind can know them all exhaustively.

As an aside, this is the overriding reason believers pray: to replenish sample knowledge!

Sample 41.-- "God is not there. Everything is allowed" (Sartre). (116/117)
Summer 1995.-England

Big stir.-- Soft drinks-with-alcohol plentiful on the market for young people. Introduced by adults.

1.-- *The origin.*
a. The producers of alcoholic beverages are doing a study on alcohol consumption among young people. Result: many teenagers drink a lot less than their parents. In places where ecstasy or cannabis is "in", there is virtually no alcohol consumption.

b. The producers, after that "scientific" study - at least it was conducted "at the behest of" adults who call themselves scientists - implement behavioral change by simply marketing alcoholic soft drinks.

2.-- *The result.*
Great success! "The producers" can barely handle the demand! -- Celebrated is "Hooch," a lemonade from Bass. Also in demand is Cola Lips (a cola with 5% alcohol), a cola from the Lanchester Group. The success of Cola Lips is greatest among young people between 18 and 20.

3.-- *The critique.*
British teachers' organizations complain that "a lot of children come to school drunk because they have too many lemonades in them."

The Sunday Times did a survey: most young people do not realize they are drinking alcohol at all but find the soft drinks "very tasty."

The health organizations call this marketing or sales technique "cynical" and shameless. Because - they say - young people under eighteen, who don't get beer in pubs, are now getting a taste for it via "innocent" soft drinks.

What did Sartre say again? "Since God does not exist, everything is permitted" (in our culture after "the death of God").

USA.-- Summer 1995.
In Oklahoma, an official building was destroyed by an attack. All of America was shocked.

Sometime later, *The Washington Post* reports: *William Pierce*, the leader of the anti-Semitic "National Alliance" (in West Virginia), in his *The Turner Diaries*, a novel, described terrorist acts of resistance against an imagined Zionist' (Jew) controlled American government. The American far right considers the book "a bible."

CF/CS 117.

Well, the book describes an attack "that is like two drops of the Oklahoma City attack."

Rationale: Given the strong resemblance, it is highly likely that the perpetrators held the book up to their eyes as a paragon.

So that the writer of the book is co-responsible for what his work causes.

J .-P. Sartre: "In our culture "God is dead", as Nietzsche said last century : so everything is allowed".

Autumn 1995.
ARD (Erstes deutsches Fernsehen) at 20.15 h., on 04. 10.1995.

Wilde Herzen: Kinder des Satans.-- A TV movie.-- In the dailies "A girl runs through the streets in panic. She is possessed by fear of an invisible enemy that only she seems to see".

In fact, the following was on display.-- A trio of girls knows up close an unsavory fellow who, in his off hours, tucked away in his loft, reads magic books and summons spirits. Girls are his beloved confidants in this regard.

Suddenly, of course, there is one in particular who develops mantic giftedness by witnessing the bizarre rites (including drinking blood and posing naked to commit sex). It "sees" a phantom. The ghost of a deceased girl. Her death was surrounded by bizarre circumstances.

All this in the day-to-day setting of a German high school.

The film is ambiguous.
a. It can be interpreted as a warning: solid information about what indeed - one should not want to gloss over it - is happening in our present Western culture, among other things under the influence of New Age (New Age) which apart from just alternative ideas also shows a clearly bizarre bias.

b. But the images are so cinematically compelling, especially for natures already attuned to such a thing, that the same information incites imitation (mimetism, urge to imitate). The latter notwithstanding, in the film itself there is clear reservation evident in the behavior of at least most of the actors.

Sartre.-- "Since the death of God, man is 'free'. He/she is 'freedom' ".
Journalism, media, lobbies et al. use that "freedom" for good and ... also for the worse.

CF/CS 118.
Sample 42.-- Nazi narrativism. (118/121)

Storytelling, under nominalist influences, has been going through a stormy development in recent years. The extreme: the proposition that the terms of a story have nothing to do with facts independent of those terms. The terms - words, sentences, paragraphs, whole texts - are 'auto-referential', i.e. they refer (referentially) only to themselves (auto-)!

In other words, nominal testing is always possible (testing texts against other texts); real or factual testing (testing texts for their truth against facts) is virtually out of the question. -- Behold what characterizes a narrativist(s) of pure allure.

'Revisionism'.

Revisionism'' (literally: revision of what has been said and is still being said about the Nazi concentration camps as politically willed and organized extermination camps) is one form of radical narrativism. Against strong evidence - which is increasing thanks to research - revisionists maintain that Hitler's system never had politically willed and organized extermination camps. What they say about it is "hearsay ('texts') itself further saying ('texts')".

In other words: texts that 'produce' texts! In which humanity never gets out of the closed system of texts provoking texts. Auto-referential system.

Bibl. sample :

J. Koechlin, Auschwitz (*La mécanique du génocide*), (Auschwitz (The Mechanics of Genocide)), in: *Journal de Genève/ Gazette de Lausanne* 28.10.1993.

Koechlin provides an account of *Jean-Claude Pressac, Les crématoires d'Auschwitz* (*La machinerie du meurtre de masse*), (The crematoria of Auschwitz (The machinery of mass murder)), Paris, 1993.

This work breaks through the radical narrativism of neo-Nazis in its own way, namely by exposing the mechanics (the machines, those who make the machines etc.) through irrefutable documentation. He proves that instead of being imaginary (fictional) stories the claim that the Nazi camps were really politically organized are historical stories. Not even mixed stories (a romance-ring of historical facts)! Hence the title Koechlin gives: "la machinerie".

Pressac.-- Born to parents - teachers in 1944, he puts very early passionate interest in all that is military. To the military school of Saint-Cyr refuses him. He becomes a pharmacist.

In his spare time, however, he immerses himself in the history of the Second World War (1939/1945). Among other things, he read the memoirs of Rudolf Höss, the chief commander of the Auschwitz extermination camp.

RF / CS 119.

Out of curiosity, he visits the camps of Auschwitz and Treblinka: from then on he bites into the analysis of the structure of Nazi mass murder. Around 1982 -- without the formation of a historian -- he begins his research,-- provided only with maps and photographs.

Meanwhile, he is at home in the French revisionist midst Faurisson, the leading figure, questions the existence of extermination camps.

After several months, he pulls out, disgusted by the blind denial of brutal facts: "For a long time, I toiled in the mud of that revisionist swamp. Now I am out".

Pressac.-- "Faurisson does not even know, for example, that the one French term 'désinfection' (*note:* usually translated by 'disinfection') is represented by three German terms.
1. 'Desinfektion' (microbicide, get rid of pests);
2. 'Entlausung' (deflating);
3. 'Entwesung (**a.** to get rid of vermin**, b.** to strip something of its being, in Casu extermination of people).

Well, in the Auschwitz camp reports of which I had access, these three terms are decisive because they prove that the extermination was planned."

The book.
Pressac's work is an arid book. Masses of diagrams, figures, technical explanations, tables! Extracted in part from the courier between the twelve firms that built the incinerators, and the 'Bauleitung' (the SS men in charge).

Kurt Prüfer.
One figure - German engineer Prüfer - is called by Pressac as "a brilliant and resourceful magician on corpse burning." When Adolf Hitler comes to power in 1933, Prüfer becomes a convinced Nazi. In time he becomes a specialist in incinerators (Dachau (1940),-- later Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Auschwitz).

Pressac's work has one main value:
It proves irrefutably that the "Final Solution" (final resolution of the race issue) was planned by the government from 1942 onwards. That is precisely what the revisionists deny! As *Le Nouvel Observateur* says: "The gas chambers really existed".

CF /CS 120
The occult background.

The death of God has freed XX century man from (the slavery of) the Ten Commandments of God. Nazism is one of many phenomena.-- Therefore a brief digression regarding the backgrounds of that Nazism.

1.-- ***Social Darwinism.***

Unmistakably, Nazism is a biologism: it defines man "in terms of" biology. But then biology in a deepened sense. Thus e.g. it distinguishes in man "Körper, Seele und Geist", "getragen von tiefer Gottglaubigkeit" ("Body, soul and spirit", "carried by deep faith in God"), (R.Benze).

The racialized biologism is expounded e.g. by *H. Jans, "Mein Kampf" was not original* (*Social Darwinism and Nazism*), in: *Streven* 1983: June, 797/809. *Mein Kampf, Hitler'*s main work, was inspired by predecessors. Jans situates those predecessors mainly among the (German) intelligentsia. Which is, of course, a proven fact.

2. -- ***Nazi Occultism.***

Yet that racist biologism is only a surface phenomenon.

a. *L. Rasson, Robert Bresillach Literature and Fascism* (*Hitler, the Last of the Magicians*), in: *Streven* 1985: April, 533/541, outlines Brasillach's (+1945) views that Hitler clearly identifies as occultist.

b. Much more convincing, however, is *N. Goodrich-Clarke, Les racines occultistes du Nazisme* (*Les Aryosophes en Autriche et en Allemagne* (The Occult Roots of Nazism (The Aryosophists in Austria and Germany), 1890/1953)), Puiseaux, Pardès, 1989 (// *The Occult Roots of Nazism, Wellingborough* (Nath.), The Aquarian Press, 1985).

It is a strictly scientific analysis of the occultist currents and figures that prepared and guided racist Nazism, in the occult field,--especially then the Nazism of the SS. Gnosis and racism in one had been talking about "a higher race" long before Hitler.

Note.-- That the German intelligentsia played an important role is shown, among other things, by the role of the magician, Dr. Faust, in German spiritual life.

P. Leemans, Het Faustische (*Ideologie en myth*), in: *De Maand* 5 (1962): 10 (Dec.), 580/587, links up with *H. Schwerte, Faust und das Faustische*, (Faust and the Faustian,), Stuttgart, 1962, and says: Goethe's Faust is the main work of German literature. Faust, moreover, has become a national heroic figure. Faust was even more: he was the main content of the dominant German ideology before 1914 and of the Hitler era.

In particular: Faust is man in his will to act that cannot be inhibited by anything!

"Im Anfang war die Tat" (verse 1237). The term "act" here means to act "through thick and thin," without much thought and certainly without many questions of conscience. Free! In this sense, this ideology is close to French radicalism as outlined by Sartre (*CF/CS 109*) and even more so to the existentialist line "l' existence précède l' essence" (existence precedes essence), (ibid.). For the Faustian man creates his 'values' himself, autonomously, without the Ten Commandments.

Think about it: how could German citizens, although indoctrinated by a Nazi ideology, go so far as to kill millions of Jews and gypsies in cold blood? Surely a brake must have been lost! The brake of "What am I actually doing?" (thinking) and of "How is that consistent with conscience?" (question of conscience).

"The New Era.

The occultist grounds of Nazism can be located in a broader movement, namely neo-paganism.

J.P Van Term, From Paganism to Paganism (*Studies on Freemasonry*), Hilversum, Brand, 1915, 377, outlines as follows.

The broad spiritual movement, which includes gnosis, kabbalah, templars, alchemists, part of freemasonry, is **a.** descended from paganism, **b.** opposed to Christianity.

It necessarily ends in neo-paganism, i.e., a new era in which ancient paganism reorganizes itself but in such a way as to take into account what the two cultural currents - ancient paganism and Christianity - have achieved. "That will be la terza età" of which *Giuseppe Mazzini* (1805/1872; Italian fighting patriot) spoke (*Opere XIV*, 246).

Such a third era was also what the Nazis were aiming for.
In evidence: *R. Benze/ G. Gräfer, Hrsg., Erziehungsmächte und Erziehungshoheit im Groszdeutschen Reich*, (Educational Powers and Educational Sovereignty in the Groszdeutsches Reich), Leipzig, 1940,-- esp. o.c., 1/26 (*Die deutsche Erziehung und ihre Träger*), (German Education and its Sponsor).
First Germanic ancient paganism,--then the interlude of Christianity ('Rom') and Aufklärung,--now finally the resurgent Germanic neo-paganism, in which the pre-Christian and extra-Christian elements reappear in updated form.

In which Hitler himself never hid the fact that his "*Nazionalsozialismus*" should actually be called "*Magischer Sozialisrnus*" (*Conversations with H.Rauschning*).

Which leads back to the mythical "harmony of opposites" peculiar to paganism, as *CF/CS 114*, below, briefly indicated. Old-Germanic "godliness" belongs to that mythical "harmony".

Sample 43.-- The narrativism of Margaret Mead. (122/125)

To describe, resp. to narrate and to report, is to represent the existence (how real is something?) and the essence (how is that something real?) in a longer drawn out definition.

In 1925 (August 31), Margaret Mead, then 23, set foot in Pago Pago, the port-capital of American Samoa. To stay there for a precisely counted nine months. To make a plea: to prove through the lives of the young islanders that there are no innate differences between people (heredity determinism) but that these differences are brought about by culture (culture determinism).

In other words: to what extent is the growing girl (yes, the adolescent(e) in general) influenced by the culture in which she finds herself? More accurately, "Are the conflicts - which we know in our Western civilization between elders and youth - peculiar to the soul itself of the adolescent(e) or not?"

"If not, is culture an element of conflict?" -- Prof. Franz Boas (1858/1942), Columbia University, sent his student wife, Margaret Mead, to Samoa to find evidence for his cultural determinism.

Mead's cultural environment.

Her father was a professor of economics. -- Her grandmother was a teacher, a supporter of "the new education" (Maria Montessori; Friedrich Fröbel). Her mother was a sociologist and feminist. Hence her "free education." In the process, she grew to be a "progressist": throughout her life she felt she was "ahead of the game" against the rising generation.

This is reflected both in her exploration and in her treatise, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (*A Study of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Society*),-- later recast as *A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization*.

Mead's samples.

She took up residence with an American family, in an outbuilding that served as a polyclinic. E.R. Holt, a pharmacist in the U.S. Navy, was her host.

Upon her arrival, she did not know the native language. However, she did learn the elementary words of it for nine weeks.

To supplement this, she stayed for ten days with a tribal chief in Vaitogi whose daughter was a "ceremonial maiden" who knew a little English.

With her, Mr. Mead spent the nights under the same mosquito tent.-- At Holt's clinic, she met some sixty Samoan girls with whom she had long conversations about the relationship "parents/children," "boys/girls," and about the parenting system.

The thesis or theorem.
Boas, with his *The Spirit of Primitive Man* (1900), defended the thesis that sexual maturation with its puberty crisis as known to the West was not a biological necessity but a cultural phenomenon.

Consequence: gender maturation is susceptible to "engineering," manipulation, modification. Behold Boas' culturalism,--which maintained that a value system is "relative" (relativism). -- Boas expected Mead to confirm that thesis.

Mead's characteristic.
'Characteristic' is a rendering that captures the essentials.

A. *The fact.*
Mead: "On Samoa, there is no adolescent crisis. The existence question is answered negatively.

B. *The statement.*
Mead: "The parenting system, in the context of the overall culture, is different than in the West." "The Culture Pattern is different.

Elements of explanation.
1. The people of Samoa have "no deep attachments to just one person": real, heartfelt appreciation both for parents and for sexual partner(s) is rare.
2. Consequence: the relationships - if any - are "non-committal. Free love is generally accepted. It is "a light and pleasurable dance".
Practically speaking, the girls go to bed with as many as possible in such a way that "deep commitment" to just one boy is rare.
3. The emphasis is on virtuosity in erotic techniques.

The urge to attack, second element of importance in the West, is non-existent: rivalry and the urge to perform are absent. "Samoa is a place where the stakes are never high. No one is under any strain to get the best out of life". (S. Clapier Valladon).

Note.-- *The Coming of Age in Samoa*, New York, 1927, was followed by many other texts (books, articles). *Culture and Commitment* (*A study of the Generation Gap*) New York, 1970, for example, was already translated into French in 1971 (*Le fossé des générations*). The term 'generation gap' has in the meantime become a fact and a kind of dogma, especially among contemporaries of the left.

CF/CS 124.
"The goddess of anthropology".
The welcome was crushing,--at least in some western midlands.

a. *Primitivism.*
All kinds of fellow men want to "return to primitive life" (with its exoticism and naturism). To which J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778; cultural critique with "Le retour à la nature"), Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (1737/'1814; Paul et Virginie (1787) et al. were trailblazers.

Note.-- The Beatniks (1955+), the Hippies and the (politically oriented) Yippies (1962+), -- our travel agents are in that tradition.--

b. *Anti-Tabooism.*
Bertrand Russell (1872/1970),
With abolitionist attitude regarding all taboos, Mead's work was received with great enthusiasm. "At last the facts! Facts which show that our moral laws and institutions concerning sexuality, among other things, are cultural products, made by men,--without universal and objective value. Cfr. *CF/CS 84* (*Protosofistics*); (*110Sartre's existentialism*). Nominalism reigns supreme in such schools of thought.

"An astronomical mistake.
Meanwhile, M. Mead has been removed from recommended reading at American universities. After all, *Derek Freeman* (1916/2001.), New Zealand ethnologist, published his *Margaret Meed and Samoa* (*The Making and the Unmaking or an Anthropological Myth* (1983).
The New York Times articulated Freeman's thesis as follows:
1. Mead's theses were accepted by the intelligentsia (all textbooks and encyclopedias reflect this);
2. they are false: the reality on Samoa is thoroughly different.

Derek's method.
He lived on Samoa, was active in education -- learned the native language thoroughly (exam included), was adopted by a Samoan family, even participated in the sessions of a group of tribal leaders (exerting such profound influence).
Freeman aims for an extremely detailed account of the phenomena. He is rigorously scientific.

Characteristic.
Here are the main points.

1. -- *The facts.*
a. The free love that Mead talks about is non-existent. Thus, among other things, virginity is a high value in the local mentality.

CF / CS 125.

b. Competition - including erotic competition - is as frequent as in a Western cultural model. Even more so: the urge to attack is very strong: murder is frequent; Samoa is first in the percentage of rapes.

Conclusion.

Mead has constructed "a story" narrativistically she broods on what her prof has said, -- without thoroughly testing against the facts. In other words: verbal definition yes; business definition no or at least far too little

2.-- *The statement.*

Mead explained from education.-- Freeman noted that, American presence notwithstanding, education on Samoa is ancestral-authoritarian.

This can be seen in some of its effects, namely psychological problems such as neuroses (including hysteria) and suicide.

Gap.

Mead, for example, neglected police reports in her time. She should have consulted them thoroughly. Well, they contradict her thesis. Freeman: Not much has changed since then.

Misunderstanding.

Fieldwork ethnologists more often experience that, when engaging in conversations,
a. in the service of a hypothesis (Boas' theorem e.g.),
b. archaic affability answers that do not reflect objective facts but the desire to be in the taste of a Western interlocutor(s). Samoan girls wanted to appear "affable" in this way (and thus talk to their mouths).

Even those who still try to defend Mead's book after Freeman's work admit that Mead may have made that mistake of believing the girls.-- Which thus involves a second methodological error.

Axiomatic induction.

Induction, if it is to have scientific value, must:
a. be quantitatively as large as possible (samples: the more the better) and
b. are qualitative "at random", unbiased, haphazard.

Mead's "free education" at home, on which she went so big,-- along with the axiomatics of her prof Boas, have influenced the choice of her samples to such an extent that they are no longer haphazard but selective.

Her axioms from her home and her culturalist prof influenced her sampling to such an extent that her induction was partially at least spoiled. Too little business scrutiny and definition!

CF / CS 126.

Sample 44.-- Communist "rhetoric" (126/128)

We define 'rhetoric' as the theory of language as a means of understanding. One speaks, gives signs, to 'convince' fellow men of one's own 'point of view' (thesis, thesis).

Following a booklet entitled "*Sensitivity Training*" (Life and Action, Ghent), we dwell on one method of persuasion among many others because it is so brutal.

'Training' we translate by 'practice' and 'sensitivity' by 'value sensing'. So that "sensitivity training" coincides with "practice in sensing values".

Group Dynamics.

Sensitivity training easily takes the form of "group dynamics. ! Dynamics' refers to "everything that lives in a group - a sometimes radically closed group" (cf. *CF/ CS 84*). Under the leadership of protagonists - men, women - the:

a. committed a (sometimes radical) dismantling or "deconstruction" of all that had previously been considered of value to the members of the training,

b. to promote at the same time an edification or reconstruction concerning values sense. -- Grossly stated: a. brainwashing, b. re-education.

The communist model.

The booklet, *Sensitivity Training*, refers here to *Eugene Kinkead*, *In Every War But One*. During the war in Korea (1950/1953), communist "brainwashing" was applied to American prisoners of war.

Because this raw form of persuasion served as a model on several occasions afterwards, especially in left-wing circles, albeit in mitigated forms, we will dwell for a moment on its structure.

Some of us have remarked that the very same methods used by Nazis (or other types of fascists) can count on no mercy, whereas those methods, if used by the left, seem to "pass muster." So double standards among the intelligentsia.

Characteristic.

To put it in two words: not traditional - police or military - torture techniques, but group dynamics. Here the narrativism stands out: from pre-talk to post-talk, without factual review and definition, within the realm of the aggressive rhetorical word. Word which here is 'accusation' and 'confession'. By 'confessors' and 'confessors'!

We do say "confessors" because what follows now in terms of "human engineering" (behavior modification) is only possible when "God is dead" -- when His voice has been smothered - murdered - in the depths of conscience.

By the way: when one reads *A. Danet, trad., Henry Institoris* (Kraemer)/ *Jacques Sprenger, Le marteau des sorcières* (The witches' hammer), *malleus maleficarum*), Brignoud, J. Millon Ed., 1990, one is already confronted in clerical context with the scheme "confessor (inquisitor)/ confessant(s) (witch)", whereby the preaching (in the name of Jesus) begets the post-treatment in confessions, accompanied by torture. -- Even then, "God was dead"!

The (society's) critical method.
The trainer knows the only good system (understand: culture but with emphasis on the sociological structure of oppression). He talks it over to the one who adheres to the evil and bad system. The latter talks it down after the reduction of his own.

Indeed: immediately after their capture, American POWs were divided into 'groups' (think group dynamics). They were 'critique groups'. Criticism hinged on 'stories'.

For example, no group was given permission to eat until all members were:
a. had presented an "autocritical" story in which they confessed to something wrong - guilt - or
b. had uttered a (straight) critical story expressing remarks - criticism - of fellow prisoners.

Consequence: in order to be able to eat, for example, the group itself finally put pressure on "the deviants" who had not yet reached such a (socially) critical stage. These became "black sheep" if they continued to refuse.

'Participation'.
'Participation' - participation - was the message. Every prisoner had to participate in the group confession. Anyone who refused became a 'reactionary' ('individualist', 'dissident'). Became the black sheep.

As an aside, Anglo-Saxon scholars call this "scapegoating". The group reacts its uneasiness and exclusion to "the scapegoat" (as the Israelites chased the scapegoat into the desert,-- "laden with all the sins of (the thereby cleansed) Israel." -- Phenomenon which, according to R. Girard, constitutes the basic phenomenon, at least a basic phenomenon, of human groups -- sacred or profane. At least insofar as "true" Christianity has not yet penetrated.

CF/CS 128.

Model of a "confession".

A prisoner of war could "prove" that he accepted the communist system - and thus was prepared for good fellowship (goal of pre-treatment) - by confessing an inanity.

For example, someone recounted "that he had failed to brush his teeth". On the battle "the group" was satisfied in the person of "the leader" who determined that - by that confession - "had contributed to the system". After all, by openly confessing that he had not brushed his teeth, he had submitted himself both to the group and to the leader.

The distrust of all towards all.

Brutally Marxist and Leninist-Maoist is such a method. But effective it was.-- For example, no prisoner could ever escape. For, only if there is group work can e.g. the tunnel be dug to that end as necessary.

'Canaries'.

Because the prisoners were trained -- "educated" -- in criticism of fellow prisoners, informants were cultivated in Korea. These became, within the group, a subgroup,-- e.g. a trio or a quartet. They betrayed everything. -- They were called "canaries": the leader liked to hear them "sing" (betray).-- In this way every escape attempt was leaked.

Note.-- Re-education, after the war, showed how effectively that type of mutual and reciprocal distrust had developed and how "friends" or "comrades" had been transformed into "enemies.

Epilogue.

In the week From June 19 to 24, 1989, the Socialist International (more than 80 parties) met in Stockholm to celebrate its 100th anniversary (1889/1989).--

1. Undivided positive value judgments about the liberal market economy and

2. sufficient criticism of the roles in the economic field and of the state and in particular of nationalization were included in the program. The social democratic parties of Northern Europe were already largely market-oriented. The attitude of the other parties was more ambivalent (the French socialists and some third-world socialists).

Broadly speaking, the radical economic failure of the socialist model was assumed.-- But that in virtue of business review-and-definition which only represents the true induction on the matter. - Pretending had already been abandoned in the Soviet bloc in 1986 (Gorbachev) on the basis of facts.

CF/CS 129.
Sample 45. -- Progressism. (129/131)
The term "progress" is a remarkably modern one. The great thinkers - from Galileo to Einstein - of the modern natural sciences were convinced that they had found the panacea, the panacea, in the exact natural sciences.

That progress took mainly the form of modern techniques that, indeed, have solved and continue to solve very many problems.

'Progressism' is the belief that such progress is and will continue to be meaningful.

But it is abundantly clear: "progress" is bipartisan. The ecological response to that progress is there to expose the downside.

More so the term "progress" more often than not covers things that represent progress, i.e. problem solving, only in appearance.-- To such a type of "progressism" we now devote a few sentences.

Human perspective.
In French, "respect humain." 'Oversight' means "to pay attention to (with the terror of that which one pays attention to)". "Human" means two things:

a. the fact that such a thing happens to 'weak' people and is therefore 'human' (understandable);

b. the fact that one watches people, fellow human beings then, with a certain terror of their reactions.

In what follows - again, a form of sensitivity training or values rehearsal - this phenomenon is very clearly expressed. One thinks of the phrase: "What will people say about that?" Or: "What will people say about that?".

Bibl. sample : *Sensitivity Training*, Ghent, s.d., 23.-- A woman was induced to go through such training once a week.

Pavlov.
Ivan Pavlov (1849/1936) was a Russian physician and physiologist. The salivary gland actions e.g. - as a form of "conditioned reflexes" - were analyzed by him. Nobel Prize in medicine and physiology 1904. His thrust runs, to some extent, parallel to behaviorism (study of externally observable behavior).

The woman.-- "Our leader fascinated us with his renderings of Pavlov's theory. It was applied by him in working groups on human relations".

Note.-- The so-called training groups usually rely on some kind of 'theory' (understand: axiomatics that make up the glasses through which reality is viewed, understand: (re)interpreted).-.

CF/CS 130.

As an aside: that the leaders/leaders of such system-changing groups do know what they are doing, i.e., subversion (dismantling), is evidenced by the denominations with which the business they conduct is graced: group dynamics, group discussion, group evaluation,-- integration training, "human relations," interpersonal relations, -- meeting groups, interpersonal expertise, -- meetings without class distinctions, democratic thinking, self-criticism, group confession, -- yes, prayer therapy.

The woman.

"When the leader was ready to begin the session, he asked someone from the group to reproduce his impressions and interpretations about another member of the group.-- This involved speaking about a generally strange person about whom we knew nothing.

Note.-- The traditional term to represent such a thing is "light judgment" (a judgment skillfully made without much information of an objective nature).-- Immediately it is clear that here we have the analogue of (hetero)criticism in the communist system (*CF/CS 127*).-- What follows is autocriticism with confession.

The woman.

"One artist described his marriage as neither extraordinarily successful nor extraordinarily unsuccessful: 'He had highs and lows like most people.'" -- After ten minutes, the group decided that the man should get a divorce. A swap solution was not even given a chance".

Note.-- Which amounts to collective light judgment.

Emotionalism.
Not reason nor logic but feelings, emotional first and foremost, prevail.

The woman.

"As time went on, we got to know each other better and actively and intensely engaged in mutual exchange of feelings."

"A Hot Session.
The woman.-- "The sensitivity training quickly evolved into a hot session.-- Constant criticism was levied at my person as I continued to defend certain moral values. An exceptionally annoying, negativistic mood resulted from this. So that we did not approach the mutual affection and especially not the love we initially thought we would find.

We did, however, accede to the request for 'openness' and 'honesty' as originally promised."

CF/CS 131

Note.-- Here one probes the true nature of such sensitivity training: systems change, specifically: values change, culture revolution.

The woman.
"For what purpose though? Just to sob very emotionally and make all kinds of bizarre movements?".

The woman criticizes: "The system of rough-emotion confession causes an aggravation of one's own problems. After all, one confesses things one was never guilty of. Only to satisfy the leader".

Note.-- Compare with the communist paragon: an analogous pressure and unfreedom that extorts "confession.

Overall imputation.
Now follows what is typical of more than one socially critical person.

The woman.-- "If one confesses only things that are not very degrading, one is accused of "deceiving oneself" or "refusing to throw off one's own false masks."

After such remarks, one automatically comes to the conclusion "every human being is sick, unscrupulous, depraved."

Note.-- Who does not recognize in this the opinion of many intellectuals who, influenced by Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, see only people with a false mask who deceive themselves concerning their true, understand: depraved, nature? The three unmasking materialists - as Ricoeur calls them - have developed a mentality that is diametrically opposed to the old adage "Nemo malus nisi probetur" (Nobody is bad unless there is proof). Diametrically opposed also to the New Age adage "Think positive".

Social Criticism.
The woman.-- "Sensitivity training steers toward arousing hatred of society in all participants. In such sensitivity training one should not try to prove that many people are still sincere, honest and good."

This is what one type of progressist group works out.-- It may be that the woman gives a testimony which is partly inaccurate. A "testimony" is one form of exposing the truth, that is, without any scientific pretension, coming forward to say that one has experienced something and describing as accurately as possible what one has experienced.

One thing is certain: what the woman says corresponds to reality.

Sample 46.-- Resistance to 'indoctrination'.

'**Indoctrination'**-- 'Doctrina' (lat.) is 'learning (system)'. Indoctrination, then, is "the imbibing of a system of learning." A lot of intellectuals, today, who "take a critical stance," are on the lookout to denounce and eradicate the slightest sign of doctrine, doctrinal fastidiousness, indoctrination, etc. To "expose" such a thing. And to do so as 'integrism', 'fundamentalism', 'fundation(al)ism', words that mean to put foundations first in order to think and live.

In the previous chapter we came across a woman who - from a human point of view - went down on her knees and even "confessed" things she had never done "to satisfy the leader. -- Now we dwell on a strong personality -- "the individual" (as S. Kierkegaard would say) -- , a student woman of 21 (Sensitivity Training, 24).

The female student.-- "I took sensitivity training for a while. However, this term was not used, but 'speaking course' was. Basically, it amounted to sensitivity training. However, in order to attract students, the leaders had avoided the term".

Deconstruction.

(Straight) criticism! The female student.-- "During "the course" I was constantly attacked by the leader. Also by the other members of the group.-- Simply because I rejected their so-called "new morality".

The leader, of course, refused to accept my "pure feelings" and my "moral and religious beliefs" as genuine and true: I was accused of not being sincere and honest regarding my attitude on premarital relations (which I do not accept under any circumstances).

I was mocked and thoroughly humiliated. I experienced that (...) the few with high morals must be cracked and separated from the rest of the group. I was not appreciated for my willpower regarding chastity. On the contrary: a lot of blame was put on me!

The ridicule and humiliation was provoked by my professor-group leader: I was portrayed as 'conservative,' 'backward,' 'outdated,' 'false,' 'hypocritical,' etc."

Note.-- One sees it: the preaching of the progressist leader and his copycats! Cf. *CF/CS 122*: M. Mead felt like a period of time throughout her life! All that is "different" is loaded with invective prose!

CF/CS 133.

Swearing that is sign of impotence and takes the place of calm and logically rigorous reasoning and discussion. Emotionalism!

Immediately the cynical note comes through for a moment: all that is human is evil and hypocritical; the "good" human is at best hypocritically good!

As an aside, this tendency already comes through clearly in the ancient Kunieker: (Lat.: cynics) or "dog thinkers" (Cfr. *Maria Daraki, La sagesse des Cyniques Grecs*, (The wisdom of the Greek Cynics), in: *Cl. Mossé, prés., La Grèce ancienne*, Paris, 1986, 92/108). They were nominalists, of course. Cultural pessimists as they were, they repudiated traditional culture as 'depraved',--among other things, all that was shame culture and marriage morality. These criticisms are still relevant today. All the more so as "God is dead".

The "single person".

We take this term in the Kierkegaardian sense: "the individual man who braces himself against all that may degrade him in his beliefs."

The female student.-- "I did not, however, allow myself to be finished off! I, in turn, accused the leader and my peers of trying to break down the values to which I had a foothold. Just to break down".

Note -- The female student.-- does as Socrates did with the First Sophists: he sought them out on their own turf and resisted them with the their own reasoning skills.

'Democracy'.

In order to properly understand what the female student.-- is about to say, one must know that the term "democracy" and especially "democratization" appear here in their own meaning.

John Dewey (1859/1952), according to Time "the foremost educator of the XX century", materialist and atheist ("There is no mind. There is no soul"), is known for his *Human Nature and Conduct* (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*), New York, 1922. This work served as an axiom in the service of "social engineering" and (manipulation of social processes), a curious form of rhetoric.

'Democratization' in this context involves "foundation of a society without general and established norms and values." Thus Dewey supported, B. Russell who in 1940, after his introduction at the school of "free love" among others, accused by "distressed parents", lost his chair.

Dewey, by the way, wanted something analogous regarding school and education: they are "instruments" ("instrumentalism") of his type of democratization that combines the left with anti-tabooism.

CF/CS 134.

The female student.--.-- "If the dismantling of my life principles meant a victory for the group and especially for "democracy", then to hell with "democracy"! I reproached the group for not having any valuable morals,--not being able to substitute anything for everything I valued and truly loved."

Social Criticism.

The female student.--.-- "The leader criticizes everything: family, relatives, friends,-- fatherland,-- moral positions, religion and faith, mortification.-- And all this is done on purpose: to instill in all members the morbid habit that bears the name 'criticism.' By doing so, he intends to effect a general change in spirit and mentality.

In society, nothing is virtuous anymore. So let us reduce everything. So e.g. fidelity to one's marriage partner(s), family, children,-- homeland, God and religion. All these things are nonsense. - In retrospect, the question arises, "Where does the training leader get the nerve to pretend that he has all the knowledge and sciences?"

Note -- In the Platonic dialogues, criticism is systematically practiced, i.e., logically rigorous testing of assertions for their real and not apparent value. All opinions are presented 'democratically' (i.e. here: with the same right to speak) before judgment is passed.

In the "democracy" rejected by the female student.--, the rights of the human being (understand: the single person) are raped in the manner described above: in the name of a massive self-confident axiom.

A comparison.

The media is teeming with media people who seek such democratization. Sometimes with a lot of scaling methods. Radio, TV, film serve axioms imposed in perverse and subversive ways.-- One example.

Bibl. sample : Yup 31.08.1980, 64v.. - The Blue Legoon is pre-taped.-- A fourteen-year-old girl (Brooke Shields) and her cousin (Chris Atkins) are shipwrecked and wash up on an island paradise (Fidji). After a while, they fall in love with each other, guilelessly naïve. The result: pregnancy.

1.-- This film was once a celebrated film - a 'hit' - with the USA - teenagers.-- Brooke Shields : "One could call it a film about 'the rights of teenagers'. After all, the basic theme is a girl and a boy growing up outside the 'constraints' - taboos - of 'the society' that is ours."

CF/CS 135.

Note.-- Compare with this *CF/CS 124* ("*The Goddess of Anthropology*").-- The film's realizer, Rendal Kleiser, goes one step further in "honesty": "All that the film shows becomes universal and normal for a teenager. Anyone who feels something like that is artificial, unnatural or bad should be urgently referred to a psychiatrist." -- One sees that such "democratizing progressists" do not suffer from excess of humility!

2.-- The same film provoked a different reaction from established society: "What can a fourteen-year-old thing with a baby do without established society?"

The single person, lost in the crowd.
The female student.--. "During sensitivity training, most participants completely renounce all the values of which they have hitherto lived superficially without deeper experience of. It is therefore understandable that they do not defend themselves against the vulgarities and extravagances of a training group.

Higher morals must always be defended. The masses do not possess higher morals.

Usually one distances oneself step by step to finally fall into the lowest common denominator of "the group". If one then knows what kind of people make up a training group, one can easily imagine how big this lowest common denominator must be."

The female student.-- goes on to say that she found that few - among young people, practically none - demonstrate strong conviction and character stability when confronted with "absolute morality and ethical relativism."

Note.-- One paid attention to the two extremes:

a. absolute morality, namely that of the leader and the rest of the group;
b. relativization of all other - including established - moral systems which - in contrast seemingly to those of the leader - are merely human products and thus relative, relatable, i.e. to be interpreted including those who "invented" and "imposed" them.

Conclusion.-- One now rereads *CF/CS 110* (*Sartre's definition of existentialism*). Now that "God is dead," everything is fundamentally permissible and a huge space is freed up for 'leaders' of groups.

CF/CS.
Sample 47 -- Constructionism/ essentialism. (136/138)
We now dwell on a pair of opposites "constructivism/ essentialism" because they are fundamental in the previous pages.

We rely on a criticism in this regard, namely *E. Hulsens, What is lesbianism*? (*A proof of lesbian history*), in: *Streven* 62 (1995): 9 (October, 791 /803.

1.-- *Myriam Everard,*
Soul and Senses (*On love and lust between women the second half of the eighteenth century*), Groningen, 1994.
Everard examines the antecedents of the XIXth and XXst century lesbian. She looks for precursors:
a. soul mates such as Betje Wolff and Aagje Deken who maintained loving relationships;
b. women-in-men's clothing who sometimes also married a woman;
c. women who, for reasons of "liefkozeryen and vuyligheden" (caresses and filth), came to court with other women.

Interruptedness (discontinuity).
As constructivism and differenti(ali)st, she sees a very radical break between a previous culture (1750+) and a next (1800+).

1. Even she refuses to use terms that appear later to mention things from an earlier cultural period.
For example, she cannot even use terms like "sexuality" and "homosexuality" for the late XVIIIth century because those words were not in vogue between 1750 and 1800. The difference or "differentiation" between the "constructions" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is too great for that.

2. More than that, not only the language but the realities themselves differ to such an extent that "for what is called 'female homosexuality' at the end of the XIXth century, there is no equivalent in the XVIIIth century."-- "Equivalent" is "all that is similar to something.

Results:
Cultural history is not an uninterrupted or continuous event. It is a succession of cultures separated by radical breaks or gaps.

Hulsens: "In other words, this is lesbian history that cancels itself out" (a.c., 792), in that history' exists as a series of foreshadowings and sequels consecutively, notwithstanding the occurrence of fractures. These are never such breaks, "being different," differences, that there would be no similarities.

CF/CS 137.

2.-- *Hulsens.*

Hulsens then says that Everard's axiomatics echoes the axioms of Michel Foucault (1926/1984; *CF 42* (deconstructionist). Foucault was convinced that homosexuality is something "constructed" that stems from a society (constructionism or constructivism). Insofar as that society with its culture that it creates, 'constructs' itself, is subject to ruptures, those constructions are so different from one another that they are incomparable.

Hulsens quotes Everard: "Female homosexuality - this is my starting point - is not of all times - the ancient Sappho notwithstanding - and is not a 'natural' or if need be 'counter-natural' orientation that expresses itself - if unimpeded - in a fixed percentage of the female population."

In other words: sexuality has no 'nature', i.e. a reality which is spread over a collection and a regulation which prescribes behavior. Thus, to say that e.g. lesbianism is "natural" (and thus regularly occurring) or "unnatural" (and thus contrary to the regulation or prescriptions located in the very nature of sexual life) is unanswerable.

Thus, value judgments are not accountable anywhere. One simply establishes empirically, copy after copy, without similarity. In this sense, Everard is an empiricist who collects materials but sees no similarity or coherence. Nor discovers a moral, prescriptive nature of being. -- Which amounts to radical nominalism.

Everard.-- "(...) Whatever the recent pathological-anatomical and genetic search for the biological basis of homosexuality in this matter may suggest."

Note.-- She is such a constructivist that the exploratory works concerning a possible biological basis (as a lemma) of e.g. lesbianism are rejected by her as virtually meaningless. It is a 'social' - understand: cultural - phenomenon.

Everard.-- "In the internationally taken in hand history of homosexuality, the argument between essentialism and constructivism has long since been settled in favor of the constructivist position which (claims that) homosexuality is a 'historical' category (fundamental concept) of recent manufacture."

Note.-- 'Historic' here stands for "cultural-historical grown".

CF/CS 138

To which Hulsens.-- The book to which she refers contains contributions of a very different view.

Thus writes *Jan Schippers, Homosexual Identity* (*Essentialism and Constructivism*), in: *D. Altman et al, Homosexuality* (*Which Homosexuality*?), Amsterdam, 1989,144:

"It is clear that both constructionism and essentialism have some strengths and some weaknesses. Neither theory has been scientifically proven and probably never will be. At this point, it would probably be best to conceive of the two theoretical systems as two different ways of posing questions about homosexuality,--without becoming 'dogmatic' about either one." (A.c. 792);

In other words, "neither ye nor I prove decisive" (Zenon v. Elea)

Note -- '*Essentialism*'. -- The term 'essence' is used here as the same as the term 'nature' of above. 'Essence' does not mean 'mode of being' without more (which is also true of singular or private data) but "universal or general mode of being," i.e., common characteristic findable in a multitude of specimens. 'Essence' means at the same time "nature of being that prescribes rules".

Those two contents together reflect the proper content of 'essence' posited against 'construction'. 'Construction' means **a.** no (universal) nature or essence and **b.** no universal nature or essence in which rules of conduct are present.

Note.-- Hulsens' definition, a.c., 792, reads, "Essentialism is the assumption, resp. presupposition, of something as a timeless phenomenon which only needs to be made visible and described scientifically," is certainly open to criticism.

The term "timeless" seems to indicate that one is dealing with a "fact situated in a thought heaven", alien to life. To uncover the essence of something is more than merely "describing it scientifically and thus making it visible." But it is true that Hulsens' definition is circulating in the minds of many a contemporary fellow human being.

We refer to *CF/CS 109*, where the term 'values' in Sartre's language stands for 'essences'. Yet Sartre too is an empiricist, i.e. he nowhere establishes empirically given 'essences' or 'values'. Just like Everard. But his focus is on the godless consequences that can be drawn from them, while Everard emphasizes the culture breaks.

Sample 48.-- Religious nominalism. (139/141)

We first met nominalism clearly *CF/CS 79* (*Language and Culture*). Later it came up *CF/CS 91* (*Debunking traditional metaphysics*).-- Now what exactly is "nominalism"?

The oldest nominalism.
Bibl. st: *W.B. Kristensen, Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions*, Amsterdam, 1947, 231/290 (*Circle and totality*).

1.-- 'Totality'
That term here means "harmony (= interlocking) of opposites".
Kristensen cites Babylonian mythology (= theology).

Anoe (= Anu) was characterized by 'totality' in the religious sense: in his soul and action, as causer (co-causer) of the fate of mankind, were ideas and energies visible that meant both good and evil, both salvation and calamity. All - the totality - conceptions, all - the totality - energies or life forces were interwoven in him

"Salvation and calamity emanated from him" says Kristensen (o.c., 272). Making healthy/sick, succeeding and failing, saying truth and saying untruth: all types of action were united in him. The "totality" of his being and functioning included contradictions. He was "a vessel of contradictions." The whole pantheon (deity system) was of precisely the same nature.

What S. Paul calls "the elements of the cosmos," i.e., all destiny-defining beings and workings that are non-Biblical, exhibited and still exhibit today (in non-Biblical religions and magics) the totality of opposites.

"Salvation and calamity, doom and rise were from the ancient pagan deities. Those opposites which make up the permanent life of the world and in which the Babylonians saw 'the divine totality'" (O.c., 273).

2.-- *Nihilism.*
This totality indicates that the pagan deities acted autonomously. The "essences" of things such as health and sickness, truth and falsehood, salvation and calamity, were to her as a value in themselves, especially as a higher value that binds in conscience, "nihil," nothing, nothing binding.

God as the supreme being standing behind the essences and values was "dead. That "death of God and the higher values" explains that they were practically "vessels of contradiction."

CF/CS 140

Note.-- *CF/CS 110* taught us the actual nihilism Dostoievski, in the hypothetical sense, Sartre in the factual sense argue that if God, the God of the Bible who stands behind the essences (popularly articulated in the Ten Commandments) was dead (Dostoievski), is dead (Sartre), then the "totality" - "everything" (say Dostoievski and Sartre) - is permitted.

So that the basic axiom of ancient paganism and that of atheistic existentialism are, fundamentally, precisely the same. "If the morally superior being and its values (commandments) are nil, nothing, then good-and-evil is admitted", -- then totality is admitted! The totality or 'harmony' of opposites!

3.-- *Demony.*

Our - logically straightforward - notions (values, essences) - such as good, distinguishable from evil,-- success, distinguishable from failure, -- saying truth, distinguishable from saying untruth,-- health, distinguishable from disease - were "for Anoe 'no law'." Anoe's 'nature' (*note :* own mode of existence) was demonic in the religious sense" (Kristensen, o.c., 272).

"No law", i.e. nil, nothing to be bothered with in the ground. So that as a "vessel of contradictions", although one was not allowed, one could still live. The freedom of possibility coincided with the freedom of possibility.

Which implies that power - ability - was decisive. Not known. Kristensen, o.c., 273.

"The will of these gods was destiny, moira (in ancient Greek): divine but inhuman.-- 'Righteous' in the ordinary sense of that word they were not: by their modes of action they denied 'the laws' which they had nevertheless established for men.-- The ancients were perfectly aware of this contradiction in the divine being."

In this regard, Kristensen refers, e.g., to the Babylonian Lamentations as evidence.

4.-- *Two uses of language.*

Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), at home in the mysteries of the divine totality ("the dark one"), said, "With 'god' everything is clean and good and righteous.
 But men conceive of one as unjust the other as just" (Fr. 102).

Similarly, the Babylonians had an awareness of two languages, as Kristensen, o.c., 273, says:
a. The Babylonian believers had their own logically straightforward concepts - sickness/health,

truth/untruth, salvation/ calamity, right/justice - : in their religious texts they like to elaborate on this. Thus Kristensen.

b. The same believers - like later Greek thinker Herakleitos - knew that their logically strict distinctions within the 'totality', were 'nihil', nothing, for the deities they realized were partly the cause ('Urheber' says N. Söderblom) of their destinies. This 'cosmic' (understand extra-natural, sacred, 'divine', pagan) meaning of the terms of totality made up a second use of language.

Religious nominalism.
If, for example, the ancient Babylonians became ill, this was, in the last instance, 'divinely' caused. Some deity or entity or group of beings, 'numina', were partly - not solely - responsible.

Based on the rule that "the one who makes sick, causes mischief, also heals, recovers", one turned to the entities who were partly responsible. A medicinal plant, yes, as a natural remedy e.g., but also and even especially the appeal to the 'demonic' entity(ies) who had also founded the evil: nature and outer nature were the rule.

Taking into account the demonically incalculable, unpredictable, that could then emerge. After all, the deities of the 'totality' of contradictory possibilities were such that one never knew how to hold them!

Note.-- One reads e.g. C.A. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, (Ancient incubation and modern psychotherapy), Zürich, 1949, 17, on it: "Ho trosas iasetai", who has instigated the malady, will also cure it. "For the divine physician is both the disease and the remedy".

Nominalism.
To interpret the divine, in the pagan sense, in its "being" thus included contradictory terms. The name was the same. The reality intended, indicated, represented by that name - nomen - was interlocked contradiction.

So the only certain thing was the word sound. All the rest had to wait. Hence the "mysterium fascinosum (what attracts) et tremendum (what repels)" typical of pagan religions. The more one immersed oneself observationally (= theoria, Lat.: speculatio) in "the divine" the more one lapsed into religious nominalism. The name does refer to something real, but as to "a vessel full of contradictions"!

CF/CS 142
Sample 49.-- A current nominalism. - (142)
Let us dwell for a moment on one type of nominalism that is typically modern.
Bibl. sample : H. De Coninck, *Hours of admiration:* Leo Apostel, in: *Humo* 29.09.1983, 50/53.

Leo Apostel (1925/1995; graduate of ULB) was an internationally recognized epistemologist. Here is his philosophical "confession" in a Q&A.

"The philosophy: that's almost religious. That's the desire for the unity of everything.-- once God fell away, I have to have something in its place. I'm actually still working on that". "At the time I had a period where I thought, 'If God doesn't exist, does the world exist? Do I even exist? Isn't it all a dream?". "Vida es sueno (Life is a dream). When you experience that existentially, it's a horrible experience. Especially for a boy from a not too cultured environment. What saved me is that I dared to say it.
I still saw the table in front of me but I was no longer convinced that it was real.- Had I said that out loud, I would probably have been locked up in an institution. After a while that disappeared".

"But from that still remained an intense interest in epistemology and logic: 'Can I prove that this table really exists?' That has never been an 'academic' (*op-ed:* life-altering) problem for me.

God turns out not to be there: but then the world must be able to be explained in some other way. Religious ethics then also falls away: but then you must be able to find precepts somewhere else".

Note -- Compare with *CF/CS 109.*

"Besides: you just don't have immediate access to extreme reality.-- In the history of literature you can still find examples of "loss of the sense of reality". "I see you but maybe you are just décor! Is it all unreal!". When you are very tired, you often have this: it all seems like cardboard. That's when you really have to convince yourself: "No, there is a real world and I even know a bit of it". So that doctrine of knowledge is really the consequence of my need to get to the world, to get to people".

Note -- Apostle, at that time 58, confesses that he has "still not solved" that problem. But has gained much learning.

KF/ CS 143.

Sample 50.-- Nominalism is first and foremost 'empiricism' (143/144)

Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626) is the pioneer of modern professional scientific thought (*Novum organum sciëntiarum* (1620)). He typifies modern scientific thought as follows.

1.-- *Empiricism.*

Empiricists resemble ants who are content with it

a. materials (data, informations)

b. To collect without interrelation (similarity, coherence). 'Perception'.

2.-- *Apriorism.*

The apriorists resemble the spider who **a.** works out of its own being (in this case: reason) **b.** beautiful networks in which refinement and symmetry are detectable but without soundness or usefulness.

Bacon thus typifies the two traditional modern rationalisms (empiricism, intellectualism) that use the same reason differently. - John Locke is a model along with René Descartes for one of the two.

3.-- *Experimentalism.*

The experimentalists resemble the bee that:

a. picks materials for her honey from the flowers (// empiricism)

b. but in its way elaborates these into its nectar (// apriorism, intellectualism).

In his *Novum organum,* he says, "In this way, everything can be expected from the close conjunction of perception and reason."

Characterization of empiricism.

We did this for a while *CF/CS 137.* Now we do so on the basis of R. Jolivet, *Les sources de l'idéalisme*, (The Sources of Idealism), Paris" 1936, 24/30 (L'empirisme occamien).

William of Ockham (Occam) (1300/1349) was a Franciscan monk with a fierce temperament who wanted to reform church and state. His variant of nominalism is called "terminism" or "ockhamism.

Note.-- *R. Van Zandt, The Metaphysical Foundations of American History*, The Hague, 1959, 124/156 (Realism versus Nominalism), says that:

1. nominalism is the foundation of empiricism, of which materialism and positivism are the derivations along with secular thought (desacralization);

2. Ockham's nominalism undermines, demolishes, and founds all of modern thought in the mid-century scholasticism (800/1450).

Van Zandt cites *J. Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy*: "There was a tidal wave of nominalism. Descartes was a nominalist. Locke (and all that sprang from him of thinkers Berkeley, Hartley, Hume and even the commonsensist Reid) was nominalist.

CF/ CS 144.

Leibniz was an extreme nominalist. Kant was nominalist. Hegel was nominalist but with realistic nostalgia.-- Thus -- to put it in one word -- "all modern philosophy" was nominalist.

The nominalist Weltanschauung grew into - what I venture to call - the true flesh and blood of the average modern mentality."

Thinkers like Dewey, Cohen, Randall, Burtt, Dampier, Carré subscribe to Feibleman's assertion. So that ockhamism constitutes "the tacitly accepted axiomatics" of modernity.

Van Zandt goes on to say that nominalism is preeminently an Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Ockham came from Oxford. English and American thought is nominalist through and through.

Jolivet on empiricism.
Ockham's ontology stands or falls on the singular 'thing'. This he calls 'reale', the real. The rest seems to him 'irreal', useless.

A.-- The singular (individual).
Take "this beautiful girl". -- She is just a bunch of loose, mutually distinct and even separate 'properties'. If we see one beautiful girl in it, it is due to our 'concept' (understanding), produced in our mind in response to the observation of "that beautiful girl". It is our conception that sees one being in it. In itself, she is "a dust cloud of separate properties, the connection of which remains incomprehensible."

B.-- The singular 'things' among themselves.
The 'realia', the individual 'things' (Jolivet speaks of 'chosism'), are "a dust cloud of separated things whose mutual connection remains incomprehensible". "A dust cloud of 'phenomena', a discontinuous (136) universe of coexisting 'things'".

Modern subjectivism (142)
Differences and gaps govern things. Through difference and gap, the nominalist subject is distinct and separate from "the things."

Jolivet calls this 'immanence thinking' (immanence = interiority).-- Between us, the subject, and things are situated agreed signs, thinking signs, our concepts or notions in 'termini', terms (words) recordable. These differ from what they designate and are separated from it by a gap.-- The mental, not the things existing outside the interiority of our consciousness: behold what we know.

CF/CS 145.

Sample 51.-- Nominalism. Since Ockham, conceptualism. (145)

Do we now dwell on what Bacon calls 'apriorism' (intellectualism, idealism). Reason within the 'immanence' or interiority of our (modern) consciousness is now described under one point of view.

J. Largeault, Enquête sur le nominalisme, (Investigation of nominalism,), Paris/Louvain, 1971, in Poirier's preface (o.c., Vss.), says that the term "nominalism" designates "an endless series of things. But he begins with main points.

1.-- *Decrease of "essences".*
'Essence' means:
a. the common properties (detectable by induction) in the data,
b. the general value-judgment founding properties in the data. Universal and value-judgment founding notions: see what essences are. Essence' is not used here in the general ontological sense (mode of being, possibly even of singular data), but in a limited sense, namely in the metaphysical sense.

Nominalists - before Ockham (since the protosophists) - see in metaphysical realities (the universal and the (higher) value) only brain products, "empty names or word-sounds," of which one never really gets to know what precisely corresponds to them in reality outside (the immanence or interiority of) our subjective consciousness.

2.-- *Conceptualism.*
In the place of the 'universalia' (value-aspect loaded general notions) Ockham puts forward 'concepts', concepts, notions.

a. Does 'really' (i.e. empirically or 'positively' ('definitely') observable (see previous chapter)) exist only the singular thing. Not the general being of that thing including other things connected with it. Not the value aspect in that thing.

b. To what then does "the common" which even Ockham cannot deny, amount? When, e.g., he identifies a common characteristic, with or without a value judgment, in a multitude of things, he limits it to:
1. the name (nomen, word sound) as the ancient-medieval nominalists did,
2. the concept or understanding which, in response to something perceived, is constructed (*CF/CS 137*), conceived. This concept summarizes but in an informal way, superficially, from the conceiving subject,--not from the common or valuable in things.

Sample 52.-- Nominalism as experimentalism (146/147)

The typically modern 'subject', in its closed 'inwardness' or 'immanence: develops **a.** Empiricism, **b**. Apriorism, **c**. Experimentalism. Dwell on this last aspect.

Bibl. sample : *W. Fuchs, Thinking with computers*, The Hague, s.d., (// *Knauers Buch der Denkmaschinen*), (Book of Thinking Machines), esp. 237v., gives us a practical example of exactness, i.e. experiment and calculation.

A.-- *The technician,*

like the physicist -- is often faced with the problem of a 'box' (switch box),-- either of natural or artificial nature. Characteristic: The box cannot be taken apart just to see what is inside. It is therefore called a 'black box'.-- Behold the fact.

For reasons of efficiency - says Fuchs, o.c., 234. - The term 'structure' - a word which is constantly used nowadays as a basic term or concept for 'unknowns' - is nothing other than the set of features within the box.

Note.-- One can clearly see that the nominalists herewith introduced a substitute for the platonic lemma in an analysis (reductive reasoning).

Behavioral descriptive or behavioral method.

In order to somewhat expose the black box, one applies a (e.g. electrical) stimulus (recently called "input" or "supply") to force the box to respond with a reaction ("output").-- Thus, the nominalist -- without knowing "the inside" thanks to direct observation -- learns experimentally or experimentally whether any order is sticking in the box (existence) and what that order is (essence).-- Fuchs: the black -- box method originated in electrical engineering.

Fuchs.-- The exact physical sciences have always used this method. To which he refers to his work "modern physics" where he talks about the experimental research on atoms and atomic nuclei.-- So much for the experimental aspect.

B.-- *The mathematical aspect.*

The black-box method also includes a mathematical "moment" such that it can arrive at "exactness.

CF/ CS 147.

(I) Current mathematics designs - constructs - schemata (including schematic operations) and rules such that structures can be represented with them.

(11) *Semiotics (drawing theory).*
a. *Syntactically* - i.e. as combining signs - mathematical signs 'construct' a syntax thanks to a system of relations.

b. *Semantic and pragmatic*. -- The mathematical signs can be used to depict (represent, describe) something in them that is not mathematical. Thus the signs of syntax acquire 'meaning' (semantics) and 'usefulness' (pragmatics).

Consider the Einsteinian formula "$E = mc^2$" -- By itself, that formula is a mathematical equation. Nothing more. That's syntax.

But the day Einstein fills in the blanks (platonic lemmata) of that formula, i.e., indicates, interprets, they become descriptive terms: E = energy, m = mass, c = speed of light.-- Thus Einstein then describes the structure of the set of elements that comprises E, m, c^2

Model-theoretically expressed:
the syntactic but empty formulas or 'shells' acquire semantic content and become pragmatic, usable. They are physical models that provide information about physical or physical realities.

"Physical Models.
Fuchs.-- When a structural engineer designs a house, he obtains information several times about the house to be built thanks to a model that, in miniature (scale change), with pieces of board and such (material model), provides insight.

Main condition: isomorphism, i.e. material model and original (the house) must be formally similar, isomorphic.

One sees the analogy between mathematical model and material model: both provide information regarding an original.-- One also sees that "model" -- whether mathematical or non-mathematical -- represents the structure, the unity or connection of the parts.

Conclusion.-- Thus the nominalist replaces the platonic lemmatic-analytic method. Both deal with unknowns. But the nominalist limits himself to the domain of all that is empirically and conceptually accessible, while e.g. Platon exceeds that domain to metaphysics.

Sample 53.-- Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas. (148/150)
We take a closer look at what separates the three classical theories of knowledge.

1.--Nominalism.
What is clean? "This beautiful girl." This protosophical statement is telling. It answers a universal question with a singular model or specimen! Empirically, "a clean girl" is a set of properties in which our concepts project a structure.

2. -- *Theory of abstraction.*
For the aristotelian conceptual realist, it is different. What is clean? Clean' is a property which, found in actual data, thanks to induction, is expressed in a term, namely the abstract or generic name 'clean'. -- 'Abstract' means that our attention is detached from the rest of the singular 'things' or better data.

Whether it concerns physical, spiritual, artistic, technical, etc. beauty, -- abstraction is made of this (it is put in brackets; one does not pay attention to that). One limits oneself to what is strictly and generally considered to be 'clean' (e.g.: "Is clean everything that takes us out of our daily routine and arouses astonishment").

3.-- *Ideation (ideation).*
Platon is the founder of a third theory of knowledge.
Starting point are the singular data, of course. The abstraction sees in the singular cases (specimens) and in the types or species the one and general beauty with elimination, parenthesis, of the rest. So far Platon is aristotelian conceptual realist.

But he goes on.--Whether beautiful girls do in fact exist,--whether beautiful works of art exist, or not: "the beautiful in itself" has been there since always and will always be there.

"2 + 2 = 4" Whether two plus two apples exist or not, "2 + 2 = 4" will always exist, regardless of the instances in which that formula becomes reality in the experiential sense.

In other words: empirically determinable data only confirm what is already there a-priori, from all eternity to all eternity! Before actual instances (pre-existing) and after actual instances, when they cease to exist (post-existing), there is the idea of eidos 'beauty' or "two plus two is four".

Abstraction would be impossible without those ideas: they are the eternal light that precedes light (light metaphysics). So much for universals.

CF/CS 149.

Now for the transcendental.

Traditional, platonizing metaphysics posited comprehensive concepts -- universals of a very special kind. -- The first is 'being(de)', i.e. all that is anything anyway. 'Reality' (in the all-encompassing sense).

Two "essences".

The first essence or idea in the strictly platonic sense is "What is, is". Eventually "What is so, is so". This is: all that is anyway existence and essence must be recognized as such in conscience.

a. This is radically general: only absolute nothingness, which is absolute nothingness, is excluded from this.

b. Therein a higher value announces itself which lays claim to our honesty (if we are honest, then we ought to assent to that ontological axiom) as well as to our reverence (if we have reverence for the higher that appeals to us in that identity principle, then we assent to it).

In other words: being(s) is an essence, a concept that is value-laden and general (yes, transcendental).- Cfr. *CF/CS 94* (*Identity Princ*.).

The second essence or idea in the strictly Platonic sense reads, "All that is, whether in itself or outside itself, has a sufficient reason or ground." -- Cfr *CF/CS 93v*. ("*If sufficient reason, then something intelligible*").

a. That principle is also radically general.

b. Also in this, the higher one claims our honesty (wanting to know) and our reverence (acknowledging the higher one as standing above us).

In other words: and strictly all-encompassing and value-laden (i.e. essence)

Truth as essence or idea.

With the two, but especially with the first axiom goes "What is true (shows itself, is phenomenon), is true (shows itself, is phenomenon)." The alètheia or 'unconcealedness' of being(de).-- That is the third transcendental.

Unity as an idea.

"All that is related (likeness, coherence) is related." This is: "a multitude of being becomes one by virtue of similarity or coherence". The basis of the collection and the system.

The ideative character.

The general concept of beauty or "2 + 2 = 4" can still be accounted for abstractly (induction). The transcendentalisms are not: one can only abstract as far as informed by the transcendental concepts and axioms ,-- by ideas.

CF/CS 150.

Concepts such as 'being(de)' and the other transcendentalisms about which we have just spoken, come through like a light that precedes light,--not thanks to abstraction that starts from singular cases.--They are certainly not constructed as the nominalists would dare to suggest. How could the modern subject construct something like 'being(the)' out of its own being, 'conceive'?

In other words: when the comprehensive concepts come into play, the nominalist and the abstractive theories touch its very clear limits. Only 'ideation' i.e. the coming through of a peculiar light which illuminates data "in the light of" comprehensive concepts such as being(the), truth and intelligibility, value and unity (connection), can give a sufficient reason or ground by which we as conscious beings think summarily on an absolute scale.

Note.-- Here we touch upon the root of metaphysics. At the root of "the essences" or "the higher values" which foundation essentialism in its irrefutable and sound core.

Rereading *CF/CS 139* (*Nihilism*): the pagan deities, precisely because they consider the light of ideas of a transcendental nature - think e.g. "What is, is" or "What is true, is true" - are "vessels of contradiction"!

They construct, conceive, indeed, an autonomous world that is only conceivable - understandable - insofar as the essences of transcendentalism are repressed, suppressed, "denied. Then, indeed, one enters a universe "in which God (as the one who transmits the light of essences into consciousness) is dead and everything, the 'totality', is admitted."

Conclusion.-- *R. Van Zandt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Amencan History*, The Hague, 1959, 125, quotes Feibleman: "A survey of the history of philosophy reveals the fact that -- from a well-defined point of view -- there are only three radically different metaphysical positions that can be taken by anyone, at any place or at any time.

There are, of course, more than three. Doch all are only variants of the fundamental three". Van Zandt explicitly mentions them: nominalism, abstractionism, theory of ideas.

The first two are valid but limited and become ideologies if they do not integrate the theory of ideas.

CF / CS
Sample 54.-- *The modern nominalist culture.* (151/153)
We start off with a semasiological remark.

E. De Strycker, S.J., Concise History of Philosophy, Antwerp, 1967, 95, n. 39, says what follows.

"The terms 'eidos' (being) and 'idea' (idea) -- with Platon and in Platonism -- denote an objective 'structure'-- not a representation in our minds.

This structure is perfect for what it is. In other words, it is the ideal type of its images in the concrete world.

If, for example, a craftsman wants to do a "good job", he must "look" at the idea; it must "float before his mind"; it must be present in his mind. -- Thus in the XVIth century the term "idea" was used for an "ideal representation" in the mind and later for "any concept".

However, this has never been the case in ancient times".

By the way: in this subjectification, i.e. displacement in the modern subject with its constructive spirit, lies a whole piece of history of words and history of mentality. In the XVIth century one still has an understanding for the ideal in the pure platonic idea but by identifying 'idea' with 'understanding' in our mind one thoroughly betrays the platonic concept of 'idea'. Yes, the modern subject or I that 'constructs' a world around itself from an inner world comes through,--at first hesitantly, later radically.

Ockhamism as an expression of the zeitgeist.
A. Weber*, Histoire de la philosophie européenne*, (History of European philosophy) Paris, 1914-8, 234, says what follows

"William of Ockham was in himself so convinced that he meant well by the Church.-- Yet fundamentally his nominalism--like all philosophy--is the mirror in which are reflected the chief concerns of his time, namely, to shake off the yoke of Christian Rome, the great concern of all that was in the power of the laity: the intellectual education, the sciences and arts, philosophy,-- the states and the nations.

Indeed, as soon as nominalism reappeared, we saw the first development of national life and modern languages. These opposed the unity that Rome, heir to the tradition of the Roman emperors, had imposed on Europe.

CF/CS 152.

Nominalism, under the mask of "deep attachment" to the Church and of an "extreme piety," in fact covered a crowd of tendencies hostile to Catholicism.

Ockham himself did not elaborate a "system," but rather a theory of knowledge that could serve as a "foundation" or "groundwork" for a crowd of ideologies that drew the consequences from it.

'Sciences'.

A. Boulenger, Le Moyen âge (*De Clément V à la Réforme* (The Middle Ages (From Clement V to the Reformation)), (1305/1517)), Lyon/ Paris, 1936-4, 343/346 (*L 'école occamiste*), outlines the problem of demarcation or delimitation at Ockham as follows.

(a) *Ontology.*

"Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate" (Entities should not be multiplied without necessity) is the great axiom of economics or saving (which already Petrus Aureoli (1250/1322), a Franciscan, had introduced from nominalist considerations).

Applied: "the essences" of traditional metaphysics are superfluous as empirically unverifiable 'entities'. For "real" in the nominalist sense are only the singular "things" that we represent in thinking signs, concepts or notions, laid down in terms, because we as knowing beings want (voluntarism) to accept them as "real" (we believe in them), especially on the basis of experiment.

(b) *Professional Studies.*

In the spirit of Oxford, his birthplace, Ockham declared the experimental method as the only one that can arrive at apodictic (irrefutable) certainties. Cfr *CF/CS 146* (*Experimentalism*).

"Irrefutable certainties" in the empiricist sense! Are experimentally unprovable the scholastic metaphysical "concepts" as there are God (existence and being properties), the soul (its existence, its being property "immortality"), freedom (its existence and being properties). Those 'entities' of metaphysics are 'rationally' (experimentally) unprovable.

Fideism.

But "faith" ('fides' = belief) saves as "wanting to see" (voluntarism). If one can still speak of "metaphysics", then in virtue of the freely willed conviction ("faith") that God and soul (freedom) are somewhere "real". The freely willing subject is decisive.

 (c) *Ethics*.

The soul is free-willed subject. The distinction between conscientious and unscrupulous does not rest on a distinction "in the very essence" of good and evil only a free will act of God as an autonomous subject at the highest level establishes this distinction

In other words, nominalistically, things and actions are 'neutral' - neither good in themselves nor evil in themselves - . "Such is the decision of God concerning good and evil that, if He changes His value judgment concerning good and evil, what has hitherto been 'holy' and 'just' turns into 'unholy' and 'unjust'." Behold how Ockham puts it.

The thesis of the conceptual realists - abstractionists and ideationalists - is that even God, however omnipotent, cannot change the essence or nature of good and evil. The property of "good" and "evil" is in many cases something objective, inherent in the given itself.

One compares Ockham's "voluntarism" with *CF/CS 140*: Anoe, like all pagan deities, knows no creature distinctions, located in the very essence, between good and evil, health and disease, truth and falsehood, salvation and calamity. These distinctions were for him "no law," "nihil," nothing binding in conscience. Autonomous as they were in their behavior, the "elements of the cosmos" (S. Paul) were the ones who determined in their own right what was good and evil. As "autonomous subjects"

 (d) *Biblical theology.*

'Science' in the experimental sense and 'supernatural' theology (do not confuse with the 'rational' theology of here above) are strictly separated in Ockham's mentality. In place of the "vain earthly science of natural or rational theology" of the scholastics that the Church adhere to the Bible and her own Magisterium insofar as supported by Biblical faith, which is not to be confused with the 'natural' faith of above.

Here, in the sphere of revelation, "concepts" like God, soul, freedom belong. When the Bible and the Magisterium hold out to us that God, soul, freedom exist, this understanding is guaranteed not thanks to natural experience but thanks to revelation.-- Which of course relies on "the blind leap" of Biblical faith, -- 'blind' because not based on natural observations.-- Which gives us a Biblical fideism.

Note.-- That political and economic liberalism were yet another offshoot of Ockham's autonomous subject is evident.

Sample 55.-- The term "modern" (154)

One distinguishes a premodern, modern and postmodern language.

(A). *Premodern.*

In this, there are two phases.

1.-- *Antique language.*

The Latin "hodiernus" (in passing: "hodie" means "present") was a word that, from ±500, was also pronounced "modernus. It meant "present/ current/ contemporary". We could translate a.o. but not only by "what is in".

2.-- *Mid-century language.*

From +900 onward, the term is used dichotomously in church circles-the clergy beginning to dominate culture as the "cultural vanguard."

a. *Meliorative.--* Enterprising,-- up to date with the latest data (facts, conceptions) and thus "being with it". Open-minded. Sometimes: liberal.

b. *Pejorative*.-- Preoccupied with all that is new or seems new because it is or seems to be. Fashionable. Currently (set to the passing moment), carried by the momentum of current, passing currents. Lighthearted (not going deep into things).

(B) *modern.*

Between 1520 and 1650 especially, the term "modern" is first employed in a deliberate way to denote "non-medieval" ("post-medieval").

The term, used melioratively, means
a. Present, current, "in";
b. Progressive, progressist.

Note.-- This is related to the modern ideology of "progress". In place of the metaphysics written off as obsolete comes after all the nominalistic (empirical, conceptualistic and experimental) philosophy of progress: professional sciences and techniques are the instruments of a thoroughgoing improvement of life and the world.-- The philosophy of history proposes instead of sacred history the cultural history outlined as "one big story of progress".

(C). *Postmodern.*

It is precisely against this "grand narrative" of mere progress that post-modernism goes: after all, empirical, conceptual and experimental reason has downsides (social issue, wars, environmental pollution).

CF/CS 155
Sample 56.-- The great story of reason. (155)
Quite often one summarizes the ideology of progress of modern times as follows.

1. Nominalist rationality with its empiricism, conceptualism and experimentalism constructs sciences and techniques.
2. In this way, she interprets the world as a makeable world, i.e., a life and work space that can be rationally transformed.
3. This transformation is articulated in a collective ideology, namely the idea of progress transforming the entire planet.
4. This transformation is made true in a system of upbringing and education that inculcates rationality, sciences and techniques, transformation of the planet, in the all-encompassing light of the concept of "progress.

1.-- *Premodern culture.*
Sometimes with sovereign contempt, the rationales of modernity look down on all that is primitive (archaic), ancient and mid-century. This is called "underdeveloped.

Even the two hundred million primitives that now remain, after planetary modernization, are disappearing.-- Classical antiquity lives on more "en mineur" (in minor).. -- The middle ages are melting away.

2.-- *Modern culture.*
With the beginning of modern times (1450/1640) modernity gets off the ground.-- Rise of modern natural and human sciences (Galilei; Hume). Discovery of the printing press. Discovery of the whole planet (it starts with America in 1492). Rise of modern states (on Machiavellian basis: rational science and technology, economy, war machine).

In the background: modern individualism (think Humanism and Renaissance,-- later Enlightened Rationalism).-- The supporting class par excellence is the "bourgeoisie," the bourgeoisie that rises in the late mid-century cities.

Progress.
From the transitional period (1450/1640), modern culture manages to develop an economic, military and political superiority: the whole planet comes under - what the French positivist Auguste Comte (1798/1857) called - " Western domination".

Result. -- The formation of a planetary uniculture that will make all previous cultures, which made up a multicolored panorama, more uniform from the side. With the problem: the identity crisis of the many cultures that maintain the multiculture but become increasingly westernized.

CF/CS 156.

Sample 57.-- modernization is revolutionization. (156/158)

The term "revolution".

The Latin term "revolutio" was originally an astronomical and astrological term.-- Consider the title of the work of one of the founders of the modern exact method, the Polish Canon *Nicholas Coppernicus* (1473/1543): "*De revolutionibus orbium coelestium libri sex*," Norimbergae, 1543.

Or consider an earlier work by Geoffrey Chaucer (1340/1400), English poet, who in 1391 knows only the astronomical sense of the term "revolution.

Modern meaning.

Once the modern period arrives, the meaning broadens. 'Revolution' becomes 'upheaval' in the cultural sense. Thus there are scientific revolutions. Thus there are political revolutions: English revolution (1642/1688); American revolution (1776/ 1783); French revolution (1798+); Soviet revolution (1917); Chinese-communist revolution (1949); Gorbachev's revolution (1986). In these, each time it was about one progress or another being pushed through thanks to revolution.

The revolution from humanism to enlightenment.

This is the axiomatic revolution.

As *G. Vanheeswijck, The many forms of modernity*, in: *Streven* 61 (1994):11 (Dec.), 1009/1014, expounds, Milan Kundera and Stephen Toulmin see an emergence in two eras of modernity: first there is the doubtful-tolerant humanism of the sixteenth century; then there is the "abstract" enlightened rationalism of the eighteenth century. *Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity*, speaks in an analogous vein:

a after 1350 early humanism;

b. in the XVIIIth century plenty of enlightened rationalism that prioritizes the human "subject" as the sole source of rationality.

Similar is *G. und I. Schweikle, Hrsg., Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 200/201 (*Humanismus*); 29/31 (*Aufklärung*):

"Contrary to earlier theses (J.Burckhardt): the thinking of Humanism (and the Renaissance) is not yet 'enlightened' ('aufklärerisch') and does not represent a break with the tradition of the middle ages" (o.c., 201). It does, however, prepare the way for enlightenment through its emphasis on the individual freed from the grip of the medieval clergy and through the emergence of the modern intellectual and artistic vanguard composed primarily of laymen.

CF/CS 157.
The transition, in France, from the XVIIth to the XVIIIth century.
From Christian humanism to enlightened liberalism.

P. Hazard, La crise de la conscience européenne (1680/1715), Paris, 1935, 3/29 (*De la stabilité au mouvement*), (From stability to movement).

Where the nominalist revolution really takes hold, radically divests itself of tradition, that's where everything moves.-- Hazard.-- "What a contradiction! What sudden transition!"

Between 1680 and 1715.
1. Rank, discipline, order (of which the authority took the assurance), dogmas that firmly governed life. Behold what the XVII-d' centuryers put first.
The majority of the French population thought like <u>Bossuet</u> (1627/1704; bishop of Meaux, known for his theological treatise *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Discourse on Universal History), (1681)).

2. Coercion, authority, dogma: behold what those who immediately followed, the XVIII-d' centuryers, spewed out.
Suddenly France thinks like *Voltaire* (1694/1778; famous for his *Candide ou l 'optimisme'* (1759; mocking Leibniz's optimism); *Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations* (Essay on the manners and spirit of nations , (1760; the antithesis of Bossuet's conception of history)." -- "in other words, a revolution".

Hazard.
(1). The XVII-d' centuryers are established Christians: they put forward a deity-based order concerning law; they know themselves to be secure in a society whose classes are unequally judged.

(2). The XVIII-th'centuryers are against established Christianity: purely human nature is for them the basis of any legal order. They dream only of one thing: "égalité (equal justice)". Cf. *CF/CS 109* (*Lay Morality*).

A general human nature
so thought the enlightened minds - is the basis or foundation of a "rational" society. In France, in the XVIIIth century, besides humanists, libertines and materialists play an important role. An aggressive atheism - mixed with an equally aggressive anticlericalism - occupies the intelligentsia or vanguard. It prepares the French Revolution, which was much more than a mere political revolution. "La république" wants a laicized state, -- to the present day. La république radically -- as radically as possible -- dismantles and "modernizes" the premodern religion, science, art, state.

CF/CS 158.
The transition.

H.Barth, *Revolution und Tradition* (*Ein Versuch zur Selbstverständigung der Philosophie*), (Revolution and Tradition (An Attempt at the Self-Conception of Philosophy), in: *Saeculum* (*Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte* (Munich)), 14 (1963): 1/10, puts the French Revolution at the center.

a.-- Between the Renaissance (°Francesco Petrarch (1304/1374; humanist) and 1789 (Fr. rev.), axiom revolutions are situated.

Fénelon (1651/1715; archbishop of Cambrai)
In his *Télémaque* (1699), he ruthlessly criticizes the social abuses within the sacred monarchy ("l'Ancien régime") of the time. From a Christian-humanist standpoint.-- In his philosophy of state, he does not put monarchy, nor "the wild masses" but the sovereign people first.

Rousseau (1712/1778)
Le contrat social (The social contract), (1762); *Émile ou sur l'éducation* (Emile or on education), (1762) - favors three revolutions.

1. An educator who debunks traditional authority and order and all sorts of traditions to tout "a return to (purely human) nature" (*Emile*).
2. A political one that challenges traditional principality with its authority and order (*Contrat social*).
3. A religious that questions "positive" (understand: revelation-based) religion to return to "natural" (pre-biblical and extra-biblical) religion. Not without sentimentalism.

Rousseau.
"Thou trustest thyself to the present established order. Without thinking that that order is subject to inevitable revolutions (...). The rich man becomes a little man. The rich man becomes a poor man. The autocratic monarch becomes a subject.(...). We are approaching "l' état de crise" (the critical phase) and the century of revolutions'. (*Emile*).

b.-- *After the French Revolution.*
Barth.-- *Alexis de Tocqueville* (1805/ 1859; *L' ancien régime et la révolution* (The old regime and the revolution) (1856)) in 1850: "At the moment it is clear: 'the tide is rising. We shall not see the end of the unprecedented revolution".
Maurice Joly, in his *Conversation in the Underworld between Machiavelli and Montesquieu* (1854): "*L'ère indéfinie des révolutions*" (*The endless epoch of revolutions*).
J. Burckhardt (1818/1897; *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*) articulates it as "die ewige Revision" (the eternal revising).-- Modernization, according to those thinkers, is constant revolution.

CF/CS
Sample 58.-- The dialectical rationalism. (159/161)

Summarize: nominalism is the knowledge theoretic root of modern rationalism. This takes possession of the Western intelligentsia or vanguard especially from 1750 onwards. Modernization is "rationalization. But that is 'revolutionization' and it is revolutionization without end. Static descriptive rationalism fell short of its concepts. Revolutionary progress needed a narrative dynamic rationalism to articulate its ideology, i.e. its set of concepts.

On that aspect H. Barth*, Revolution und Tradition* (*Ein Versuch zur Selbstverständigung der Philosophie*), (Revolution and Tradition (An Attempt at the Self-Conception of Philosophy)), in: <u>*Saeculum*</u> 14:1/10, silent. After the empirical determination the conceptualization (turning into concepts what the facts show).

Barth sees two types of philosophizing.
A -- *The "dogmatism".*

based on traditional metaphysics, refuses the criticism of nominalists and rests on the eternal foundations.

B.-- *Criticism,*

which finds its articulation especially with I. Kant's *Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), builds off the "dogmatics" of tradition.

I. Kant.-- "Kant had already said that one cannot start from something definite but that 'the true and right' comes only at the end."

Thus G. Van den Bergh van Eysenga, *Hegel*, The Hague, s.d.,81, who thus formulates very clearly the revolutionary nature of the Aufklärung (Enlightenment) in Kant.

G. Hegel.

The same proposer, o.c., ibid.: "Hegel, too, wants to know nothing of a supreme foundation from which everything else must be derived. In a letter to Sinclair (1811) he says of the beginning of philosophy: 'Foolishly, nonphilosophers in particular demand a beginning which is something absolute against which they cannot immediately bark,--an incontrovertible first. (...). Those who at the very beginning put forward the very idea of philosophy - namely, the absolute and Our Lord with all His glory, have in any case little understanding of (dialectical) philosophy".

So what does "philosophy" consist of?

Hegel: "The beginning, precisely because it is the beginning, is imperfect: the whole of philosophy itself is nothing but a combat, refutation and destruction of the beginning."

CF / CS 160.

Barth describes it as follows.-- There is in Hegel's language a pair of opposites "positive / negative" that illuminates the proposition.

a. *The positive.*

That is all that actually exists (established, traditional) insofar as it claims to be imperishable, inviolable, 'absolute', 'sacred'. -- Not only all that is premodern (primitive, antique, mid-century) but even the static axioms of XVIII-th century rationalists and materialists,-- i.e. all that is prejudice, superstition, philosophical dogmatism of all kinds, is 'positive'.

b. *The negative.*

This is all that is challenged and more thoroughly than the rationalists before Hegel.

Barth.-- Philosophy as criticism subjects "all that is positive" to critical evaluation.-- Not that the positive, that which is already there, is without question worthless! Nay!

The critique starts where the positive or established 'unreal', no longer reasonable or rationally justifiable, no longer necessary. And thus needs to disappear to make way for something that has become reasonable through the evolution of things.

The Great Story of Hegel.

Friedrich Engels (1820/1895), Karl Marx's contemporary, in his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy), IV, brilliantly articulates, "The great fundamental idea that the world is not to be interpreted as a complex of finished things but as a complex of processes, has since Hegel been drawn into the consciousness of the average person to such an extent that with that degree of diffusion it is barely contradicted.

In it, things that appear stable - as well as the concepts that are their representations in our world of thought - go through an uninterrupted process of becoming and decaying, in which, notwithstanding apparent coincidence and all momentary regression, a progressive development ultimately takes place."

This is the progress idea of rationalism but expressed in the form of a story.

Abstract rationalism and dialectical rationalism.

'Abstract' here means "all that does not involve movement, development, progress". 'Dialectical' means "all that involves movement, change, development, revolution and revolution, progress." Thus there are two types of concepts or notions, abstract and dialectical.

As *P. Foulquié, La dialectique*, PUF, 1949, 51, says: "There are two kinds of speech:

a. *abstract reason*, such as e.g. mathematical reason which processes abstract data and, precisely because of this, remains outside "reality";

b. *the 'concrete' reason*, such as that of the physicist or the historian who works 'reality' itself, by immersing himself in it, methodically, in order to examine its becoming closely." This is how Foulquié characterizes dialectical reason.

This dialectical speech edits the facts through "contradiction," i.e., criticism. One should note: Contradiction" means, in Hegelian and Marxist language (in dialectic language), not the absolute conflict of traditional logic, but rather the uncovering of the obsolete in the established by means of critical examination. To expose the 'unwirkliche' in the factual is to practice contradiction. Contradiction could be translated by 'contestation'.

Hegel's naturalism.
R. Serreau, *Hegel et l' hégélianisme*, PUF,1965, 26s., puts it as follows.

1. It is certain that at least with his mouth Hegel always honored spiritualism. Again and again, therefore, he speaks of "Gott" and calls "die Idee" the very core of his idealism, "Geist.

2.1. But it is by no means certain that he preserved the two essential elements of spiritualism - the existence of a personal God and the personal immortality of the soul - of which Kant still made the postulates (presuppositions) of practical reason.

2.2. What is certain is that - apart from Kant, Spinoza, and the Aufklärer (enlightened minds) who more or less agreed with Wolff's teachings - Hegel was very early to know the French materialists whose teachings - at least outside the universities - effectively dominated the XVIIIth century.

Victor Cousin: "Hegel did not hide his sympathy from the philosophers of the XVIIIth century,--not even from those who had most fiercely opposed Christianity and spiritualist philosophy."

Conclusion.-- Hegel was naturalistic but integrated spiritualist main concepts into his system. Which makes that one never really knows how to hold him. In any case: he is and remains the flower of Western rationalism, -- nominalist but with "nostalgia for metaphysics".

CF/CS 162.

Sample 59.-- Rationalism is industrial revolution. - (162)

To rationalize is to revolutionize.-- Also in the technical-industrial and, in its wake, the socio-economic field.

A.-- *The mid-century industrial revolution.*

J. Gimpèl, La révolution industrielle au Moyen âge, (The Industrial Revolution in the Middle Ages) Paris, 1975, says: "From the XI - th to the XIIIth century (1000/1300), western Europe experienced a period of intense technological activity. (...). This epoch should actually have been called "the first industrial revolution", were it not for the fact that the English industrial revolution of the XVIIIth centuries the XIXth century is already referred to by that name."

B.-- *The "first" industrial revolution.*

Bibl.st.: *W.W. Rostow, Les étapes de la croissance économique*, (The stages of economic growth,), Paris, 1962.

In the wake of the voyages of discovery, the scientific revolution and the modern technological revolutions, the (first) industrial revolution took place between 1780 and 1880, not in Holland, which had been at the forefront of the economic field until then, but in England, which had the necessary resources (e.g. coal), the necessary fleet, the necessary mentality (the Calvinistic-Puritan religion) and the necessary political structure. Cotton industry, coal mines, steel industry could be bundled. The steam engine (energy revolution) could be valorized. Its empire could develop intense foreign trade.

C.-- *The "second," the informational, revolution.*

Energy, concretized in the (steam) machine, was central to the previous revolution.--

In the informational revolution, the machine is also central but now as an information-processing machine.

Note.-- The term "post-industrial" for this revolution is misleading: industry is thoroughly involved in computing!

J. Peperstraete, Employment in the information society, in: Our Alma Mater: 987: 2, 67/79, says that information theory, computer science and microelectronics and telecommunications are the axioms.

But the day the chip was invented, our culture changed very profoundly. Knowledge technologists now represent modern reason at the vanguard of culture, while the rest risk being left out in the cold,-- economically and socially.

CF/CS

Sample 60.-- Rationalism

We pause to consider what Peter Sloterdijk, *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft,* (Critique of Cynical Reason)*, Frankfurt* a. M., 1983, teaches us.

See what *G. Groot* says on the subject in his article *Peter Sloterdijk, Cynic*, in: *Streven* 1985: Jan. 322/336.

(A) *Lighting.*

Rationalism reaches its zenith with I. Kant (*CF/CS 159*). Sloterdijk's title, by the way, very clearly recalls *Kant*'s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781/1787) and his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Critique of Practical Reason), 1788). In turn, Sloterdijk criticizes "critical" reason.

(B) *The big miscalculation.*

1. In his book *Was ist Aufklärung*? (What is enlightenment?), Kant called for "critical" reasoning, i.e. autonomous (independent), without being deluded ("illusionslos"). "Sapere aude", dare to think independently.

In Kant's mind, critical reason undauntedly and "gründlich" (thoroughly) perforates everything within itself and everything outside itself.

2. But it can 'turn', i.e. turn into its opposite! Kantian reason, in the two hundred years that separate us from it, has led to the opposite of what was intended by the enlightened minds, i.e., to 'foundation' a critical culture.

Critical culture is indeed up to 'Illusionslosigkeit' (Illusionlessness'), but in such a way that - as septic reason - it recognizes only what are brutal facts. To the exclusion of all that exceeds those brute facts. "All that else - says Groot - is romantic obfuscation that must be de-mythologized as quickly as possible, reduced to 'vulgar reality hidden behind it'. 'Sobriety', 'unmasking', 'desecration' are the watchwords of a reason that 'wants to penetrate to the ground of things' and is unable to see this ground of things in any other way than as power drives and self-interest." (A.c., 324).

Cfr. *CF/CS 131* (*General Suspicion*), *133* (*The Cynical Note*), where we saw cynical reason at work. Where the three "critical materialists"

K. Marx, Fr. Nietzsche, and S. Freud - as P. Ricoeur called them, must not be forgotten, as *CF/CS 89* broke down.

Note -- P. Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, (Healing Psychology and Medicine), Neuchatel, 1968, goes so far as to brand cynicism as a form of psychological abnormality but which does not have the appearance of being psychological abnormality.

CF/CS 164.
S. Kierkegaard on cynicism.

Kierkegaard (1813/1855) was the staunch opponent of rationalism in the name of a very faithful Protestantism of the individual (*CF/CS 133*) as a faithful Christian who wants to be the "contemporary" of Christ in the midst of an increasingly cynical world.

In his *Kritik der Gegenwart*, (Critique of the present), Basel, 1946; 21, he typifies cynicism as follows.

"The distinction between good and evil is invalidated by a light-hearted, 'distinguished', theoretical knowledge of all that is evil,--by a self-righteous sagacity which presupposes that in the world good is not esteemed and remains unrewarded, so much so that seen in the short term it amounts to stupidity."

As an aside, the piece dates from 1846.

Fr. English on cynicism.

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, I, he typifies as follows.

Just as the bourgeoisie, through big industry, competition, and the world market, practically undermines all stable, traditionally respected institutions, so dialectical philosophy calls into question all representations of a final, 'absolute' truth and the 'absolute' human situations that are based on it: for that philosophy, there is nothing that is final, 'absolute', sacred."

Marx and Engels on cynicism.

In 1848, both of them published the text of the Communist Manifesto in London. For decades after, all socialist programs relied on it.

An excerpt.-- "The bourgeoisie has played a very high revolutionary role in history.-- Where it has come to power, it has disturbed all medieval archaic, innocently - lovely relations. The bourgeois has unmercifully torn up the multicolored bonds which in the middle ages bound man to his natural chiefs, and has left no other bond between man and man than pure self-interest, than cold-hearted cash payment. She has drowned the sacred emotion of pious bigotry, of chivalrous fervor, of petty-bourgeois melancholy in the icy waters of selfish calculation. She has made personal dignity disappear in the exchange value and has substituted for the innumerable, guaranteed and hard-won freedoms the one unscrupulous commercial freedom (...)".

CF/CS 165.
Sample 61.-- Rationalism as materialism. (165/168)
Bibl.st.:

-- F.A. Lange*, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, (History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance in the Present), Leipzig, 1866;

-- Joh. Fischl, *Materialismus und Positivismus in der Gegenwart*, (Materialism and positivism in the present,), Graz/ Wien/ Altötting, 1953 (the work deals with XIX-d' century and XX-st' century materialism in its two forms, the mechanistic and the dialectical);

-- *O.Bloch, Le matérialisme*, Paris, 1985 (quoting o.c., 59/61 (*Le mécanisme cartésien*);

-- *J.K. Feibleman, The New Materialism*, The Hague, 19701-- especially *R. Dasne, Les matérialistes Français* de 1750 à 1800, Paris, 1965.

Note -- For the sake of completeness, e.g. *J.J. Poortman, Ochêma (History and meaning of hylic pluralism)*, Assen, 1954, and id., *Vehicles of Consciousness*, I-IV, Utrecht, 1978, should be mentioned, for materialism is not always averse to the concept of "fine or rarefied matter" (fluidic matter). Quite the contrary: for example, a number of Soviet scholars included such a concept in the dialectical materialism that, before Gorbachev's revolution, was the official doctrine.

Cartesianism as prematerialism.
C. Forest, O.P., Le cartésianisme et l' orientation de la science moderne, (Cartesianism and the orientation of modern science,), Liège/ Paris, 1838, 3, says: "Cartesianism as a system was abandoned rather quickly. Yet Descartes continued to influence both modern philosophies and modern sciences no less as a result".

(**1**) Descartes was both a believer and a thinker through and through spiritualist (*CF/CS 161*).
(**2**) At the same time, he was the pioneer of French and Western materialism. Voltaire says that he "knew many people -- he lists them -- who claimed that Cartesianism led them not even to believe in God any more" (Cfr. Lange, o.c., I, 368).-- Descartes was thus clearly dualistic.

Explanation.-- The nominalistic sphere in which Descartes thinks is:
a. empirical (it notes the impressions of the material world or "nature" (which, moreover, is understood as an encompassing machine (mechanistic interpretation)),

b. conceptually (she notes "la vie intime," the inner, conscious life (which she designates as a kind of angelic life)). - This explains the famous Cartesian dualism that denotes man as "an angel inhabiting a machine" or "an angel driving a machine."

CF/CS 166.
The concept of mechanics.

Just now it was claimed that, according to Descartes, the human body is "a device," "a machine." Such a thing is "mechanicism" (sometimes: "mechanism"). -- This is an interpretation of material nature. Nature as a totality consists of in itself immutable parts joined together into "a machine". Nature as a process proceeds in the form of mere changes of place of the parts or of some whole within nature but then in such a way that from (the knowledge of) the omen (the knowledge of) the sequel is perfectly logical and predictable.

Descartes' mechanicism is not so much a mechanic of mass as it is a geometric mechanic: a boundary shift unerringly provokes an infinite chain reaction.

According to Descartes, plants and animals are "automata. Nicole Malebranche (1638/1715; one of the most important Cartesians) expresses this reduction of e.g. an animal to a machine as follows ''If an animal cries, this is according to "the laws" which govern the escape of air from a body in which that air is confined: between a clock that resounds, and a dog that barks, there is no difference.'' (Cited by Forest, o.c., 5).

Note -- This is a form of "reductionism" or reduction of the higher to the lower: "The higher as e.g. a plant or an animal, is "fundamentally" only a higher form of the lower.

To materialism in the mechanistic sense becomes mechanicism if man's mental operations are also "reduced" to purely mechanical operations.

Since Hegel's dialectic took hold, there has been a dialectical materialism (called "Diamat" in the Soviet Union) that rejects mere mechanicism.

Materialism.

In the most general sense, 'materialism' is the view that all that is has, as sufficient reason or ground, matter (substance) and material processes. In doing so, the results of physics and chemistry and, to the extent that it is 'reducible' (reductionism) to physics and chemistry, those of biology are used as materials of evidence.

'Being' is "material being": it is an ontology that reduces the all-encompassing concept of being or reality to "material being".

CF/CS 167.
Types of materialism.
One does not imagine that there is only one kind of materialism. Far from it!

I.-- *Methodical materialism.*
This is purely method in life or especially in the sciences: the gaze of perception, thought and experimentation is limited, well aware of its limits, to the material aspect of things. Matter as reality and its processes: such is the materialist reduction.

II.-- *Ontological materialism.*
Here there is "ideology"!

1. -- *Ethical-political materialism.*
One could also call it "practical materialism. One limits life to what "this earth" (didn't Nietzsche say, "My brothers, remain faithful to the earth!"?) and the purely material cosmos have to offer as a kind of all-encompassing biotope. -- In the everyday language of religious people, the term "materialism" regularly has this "practical" meaning.

2.-- *Theoretical (and practical) materialism.*
In ancient times such materialisms occurred but within the framework of the philosophies of the time.-- For example, the atomists (Leukippos (-490/-...) and especially Demokritos of Abdera(-460/-370) are materialists in the strict systematic sense.-- They inspired atomism and the "modern natural sciences and philosophies.

Later, Stoicism (Zenon of Kition (-336/-264)) and Epicureanism (Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271) are religious materialisms. Indeed: the Stoa was very religious and Epicureanism retained a minimum of religious concepts.

Mechanistic materialism.
Thomas Hobbes (1588/1679), Cartesian, is the pioneer.-- Lamettrie (1709/1751; *L'homme machine* (The machine man), (1747)), *D'Holbach* (1723/1789; *Système de la nature* (Nature's system), (1770) , the main work of French atheistic materialism) found full materialism.

C. Vogt (+1895), J. Moleschott (+1893), *L. Büchner* (1824/ 1899; *Kraft und Stoff* (Power and substance), (1855), foundational work of German materialism) represent full materialism in Germany.-- Br. Bauer and D.F. Strauss (1808/1874) are "left hegelians" who become materialists.

The materialism in Descartes' works together with his mechanicism come to full effect in the aforementioned.

CF/CS 168.

As an aside: antiquity has known atheism and materialism but these differ very profoundly from what has just been called "full Western European materialism". One keeps this well in mind.

Mechanistic materialism challenged.

Mechanism is a "strong" position on the one hand but subject to "strong" caveats on the other.

1.-- *The dialectic.*

Cfr. *CF/CS 159vv.* - The classic four axioms of dialectics are:

a. reality, "being," is "totality of interrelated and mutually influencing elements.

b. this totality is incessant change - called 'movement' in the very broad sense of that word - ;

c. this moving totality, with gradual quantitative changes, exhibits qualitative jumps that represent something new (as e.g. water at 0 degree C. changes to ice);

d. that same changing, qualitative jumps knowing totality exhibits 'contradictions', i.e. inner tensions (*CF/CS 161*) which may lead to reconciliations (thesis/ antithesis/ synthesis).

Dialectical materialism applies these axioms to matter and its processes which are thus more than mechanical and different in nature.

2. -- *The energetics.*

Technology - think of the steam engine and coal - discovers the basic concept of "energy", which stands out against matter as something new. Think of R. Mayer, Joule, Helmholtz:- "the axiom of the conservation of energy". Traditional atomistic mechanical materialism especially had difficulty integrating this new concept.

3.-- *The theory of information.*

Matter, energy, yes, until when *Norbert Wiener* (1894/1964; *Cybernetics*, Paris, 1948) discovered that material and energetic processes proceed in an informed fashion. This within the framework of a general systems theory (Ludwig von Bertalanffy).

This was a new challenge to traditional materialism which had to arrive at the triad of "matter/energy/information" if it was to survive in a constantly evolving world ("dialectic").

4.-- *The Hylian pluralism.*

New Age revived time-honored animism and forced the incorporation of fine matter.

CF/CS 169.
Sample 62.-- Rationalism as libertinism (freethinking). (169/171)
Bibl. sample :
-- A. Adam, Les libertins eu XVIIe siècle, Paris, 1964;
-- Cl. Reichler, *L' âge libertin*, Ed. de Minuit, 1987.

Mid-century freethought.
Modernity has multiple roots in premodernity. -- To what end would some minstrels, in the Middle Ages, have ennobled "the minne" if there had been no degrading minne? In 1938, *Denis de Rougemont* (+1985) published *Amour et occident* (Love and the West), (about the troubadours of southern France). We refer to it for more information on the subject.

XVII - d' century libertinism.
A Théophile de Viau (Adam, o.c.,7), a *Gaston d' Orléans* (o.c., 9), the author of *Les quatrains du déiste* (o.c., 10) make up a truly enlightened rationalism around 1624.

Better known are freethinkers such as La Mothe Le Vayer (1588/1672), a radical skeptic-Christian, the "précepteur" (private educator) of Louis XIV (1661/1715), the Sun King who around 1680+ became embroiled in a scandal of black magic but "repented" as a result of that unsavoury history. Better known is Gassendi (1592/1655), the rival of Descartes (o.c., 15), who was rationalistically "ahead of his time.

Opm.-- J.-P. Dubost et al, *L'Enfer de la Bibliothèque Nationale* 7, (The Hell of the National Library 7), Paris, 1988, gives Œuvres *érotiques du XVIIe siècle* (Erotic works of the 17th century.) This shows that French libertinism has Italian origins, among others. Thus *Pietri Aretino* (1492/1556), the voluptuous author of *Sonnetti lussuriosi* (1536) and *Ragionamenti* (1556).

Cl. Reichler.-- L'age libertin covers pretty much the period of 1680/1789.
Axiom par excellence: man knows himself to be 'free(fought)' to such an extent that he/she indulges himself. Central to this is the woman and especially the woman as an erotic body. What we now call 'sex' is also central.

The individual axioms are pushed through to such an extent that the axioms of the (established) society are reduced to ... 'nothing' (nihilism).

Three types.
a. The poet Th. Viau comes out openly for it with the result that, by royal command, he is imprisoned.
b. The thinker-historian *Pierre Bayle*, known for his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1696/1697), which is about the first modern history of philosophy, although libertine, hides behind the mask of "un honnête homme", an honorable man.

CF/CS 170.
c. In the XVIII century, libertinism becomes "theatrical.

Nevertheless, freethought is not what it has become, e.g., in our day: in addition to the external brakes, such as religion, established morals,-- the kingdom, there are still, in those days, the inner brakes, for centuries of "inhibited" culture one does not simply discard.

A. Adam.-- Les libertins au XVIIe siècle, 7, says: "around 1620, freethinking -- "le libertinage" -- grows into a running fire that carries away a good portion of the young nobility in Paris."
Note for a moment: Galilei gets the first difficulties regarding heliocentrism around 1610 and Descartes is twenty-four. So much for a history.

Definition.-- Now what are the axioms that define libertinism? After all, we have only indicated them briefly.

A.I.-- *tradition criticism.*
In virtue of kepticism on a nominalistic basis, the spiritualistic tradition (Church,-- Christian Platonism;-- God and the soul;-- the Bible included) is being phased out. "God is dead".

Religion Criticism. What are religions, liberally speaking? They are, among other things, forms of political popular deception: the powerful -- the political class -- make the powerless -- the ordinary 'unenlightened' people -- believe that there is a deity, a moral law, etc.! In order to foist a false morality on the powerless of this earth and to keep them 'well-behaved' -- morality in which the powerful do not even believe themselves.

Note.-- Some protosophists have proclaimed an analogous doctrine as early as ancient times.

Rationalism. The rationality is evident.-- A. Adam, o.c., 12s., says: libertinism as freethinking is apparently "enlightened," ("illuminé," "enlightened:", "aufgeklärt"). So that they 'critically' distance themselves from the errors of "the common people" who have been given away to the delusions and deceptions of "the common mind". Which amounts to elitism in the name of "reason" in its freewheeling form.

A.II.-- *Own axiomatics.*
Fatalism (naturalism).-- "Le destin", fate, as supreme law governs everything. It has, as "première puissance" (first power, primordial power,--which replaces God so that the void left by God, once finished, is "filled up"), ordered nature and orders it continuously. Our lives, too, are programmed by it.

Living Principles.

Life stands or falls with 'principles' that represent life. Apparently, this fills the gap that includes the deconstruction of the concept of the soul.-- These 'principles' move from one (life) form to another. In an eternal movement. So that the 'forms' -- plants, animals, humans -- are made into living beings.

B.-- 'Materialism'

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang del klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1888, II, typifies the average concept of 'materialism'--"The Philister (*op.:* narrow-minded citizen) understands 'materialism' to mean

a. Eating, drinking,

b. Peeping, carnal lust,

c. Greed of money, scrape, greed, pursuit of profit, scholarship scams and

d. Haughty conduct. In short, all those sordid traits to which he surrenders himself in secret".

This definition reflects Platon's psychology. Platon defines the average person:

a. as focused on eating and drinking ('diaita', level of life),

b. sexually inclined,

c. obligated to work in an economic context,

d. as honorable.

Platon mentions this under a metaphor: the great monster (diaita, sex life, economy), the lesser lion (honor), the little man (the higher spirit). One sees that Engels, consciously or unconsciously, uses that Platonic definition to characterize the "materialist(s)" in the ethical-political, practical sense (*CF/CS 167*). Except for one point, namely, the little person, i.e., the low degree of mental life that is 'anagogic', oriented toward the higher (values, essences).

It is clear that libertinism and materialism in the sense just described partially coincide at least.

A. Adam, o.c., says that in addition to lustful-wreaking libertines, there are also cold-blooded libertines. When we compare this dichotomy with Reichler's threefold division (overt, masked and theatrical), we notice that the one name "libertine" indicates a plurality of variants.

The libertine "observes"(empiricism), constructs concepts (conceptualism) and experiments (experimentalism) in his own way.

CF/CS 172.

Sample 63.-- The rationalism of de Sade. (172/179)

Donatien Alphonse François, marquis de Sade (1740/1814), is one of the purest examples of rationalism, even if this may surprise you.

That is why we dwell on it at some length.-- To describe him somewhat globally and provisionally: where Rousseau is sentimental, there de Sade is "raw. Both introduce an emotional factor into nominalism but with very different emphasis.-- We explain this briefly.

One reads some work on psychopathology: 'algolagnia', i.e. living through sexual lust after having caused (sadism) or undergone (masochism) physical and/or psychological torture, brings de Sade and Rousseau close together! De Sade is known as the prototype of sadism named after it.

Rousseau-that is less known (or perhaps even concealed)-was masochistically inclined: "To find oneself at the knees of 'une maîtresse impérieuse' (an imperious mistress , a domina), to obey her commands, to have to ask her forgiveness, were for me very pleasant pleasures." Thus he writes in his *Confessions.*

With this we are in the company of two rationalists and naturalists who in their own way, each, observed empirically, constructed concepts and experimented, i.e. were nominalists. And so we have at once the sphere in which we can define de Sade.

Topicality.

The sexual revolution which after WWI (1914/1918) - after 1920 we see the term 'sex appeal' emerging from the USA as a desacralized and commercialized mass product around 'stars' - gradually gets off the ground and after 1955 continues, among other things, in planetary pornography. in planetary pornography, is living proof of how genius precisely de Sade has foreseen the development of emotional life, especially with regard to 'sex' (a term which emerges from the same 'enlightened' USA after 1955 to express total freedom with regard to sexual life). Sex has penetrated - among other things in all its psychopathological forms (including sex with animals) - into all sections and layers of our current 'rational' society.

This alone justifies going a little deeper into what the rationalism of "le divin marquis" actually means and may have as offshoots for our culture-in-crisis.

CF/CS 173.
Characteristic.
We dwell on the soul and its behavior.-- De Sade possessed a cynical self-knowledge: "Authoritarian, hot-tempered, without measure or purpose. As for moral behavior: given over to a confused fantasy that has no equal. Atheist to the point of fanaticism"-- In short: this is how I am! Kill me or take me as I am, for I will not change myself anyway". (Cited by *Simone de Beauvoir, Faut-il brûler Sade*?).

Some facts.
(**1**) His captain who knows him in the army as a lieutenant in Germany e.g., characterizes him: "Fort dérangé mais fort brave". This is: "Not right in his mind to a bad degree but brave".

His family wants to "bring him to his senses" and manages to get him married at the age of twenty-three. But it is not long before rumors are circulating that prance de Sade for long years between his mother-in-law who wants him in prison, and his wife who moves heaven and earth to keep him out.

(**2**) According to the minutes of the trials of Arcueil, April - June 1768, there he subjected a leurner, Rose KeIler, "to eroticizing floggings."

He recruits a group of prostitutes to, with his chamberlain, subject these women "to a number of perversions." Which leads to the Marseilles trials, June - September 1772.

At his castle La Coste (Provence), de Sade founded a polygamous sex group with homosexual relationships,-- indulgences with minors included.

In passing: H. Leyser, *Sade oder der andere Florestan* (*Eine Skizze zur Tragikomödie der Intelligenz*), (Sade or the Other Florestan (A Sketch of the Tragicomedy of Intelligence)), in: Antaios II (1961): 6 (März) 515/526, sees in de Sade "rationality to a perverse degree. Of the deviations just indicated, Leyser says that they can only be understood "auf der Ebene des aufgeklärten Intellektualismus" (on the plane of enlightened intellectualism).

Note.-- Fine, but then the nominalist intellectualism that empirically takes sexually torturous impressions, "justifies" them with theoretical concepts, and in such a mindset "experiments" with one's own body and with the bodies of fellow human beings.

As the libertines - *CF/CS 171* - refer to living beings - plants, animals, humans - as "forms" in which what we now, since 1955, call "sex" is central.

CF/CS 174.

One rereads *CF/CS 148/150* (*Nominalism/ abstractionism/ ideation*) where it appears that the nominalist does not even see the higher ideas (of God) or the essences (modes of being as higher values included), let alone actualize them in his life. Thus sexuality, for the radical nominalist de Sade, is totally profane, empirical material, interpretable and experimentable according to his idiosyncratic concepts.

De Sade and the Revolution.

Good Friday 1790: the revolutionaries grant "general amnesty". De Sade is released.-- Using the name "Brutus," "le citoyen de Sade" becomes a member of one of the many revolutionary clubs. He even becomes president there. In the spring of 1793, he is appointed judge.-- But, since he does nothing but acquit the accused -- even his former enemies -- he is accused of "modernism" (a political attitude that preaches moderation against fanaticism and extremism) and immediately arrested again.

End of life.

Under Napoleon (1789/1821) he was confined to an insane asylum, Charenton, until his death.

A look at de Sade's library.

Angela Carter, La femme sadienne, (The sadistic woman,), *H. Veyrier*, 1979-a feminist work, 65s., emphasizes rationalism. For example, in his library were found

a. Novels, as *Miguel de Cervantes* (1547/1616), *Don Quichotte de la Manche* (1605-1 ; 1615-2) and *Madame de Lafayette* (1634/1693), *La princesse de Clèves* (1678),

b. Rationalist works such as *Voltaire, Œuvres complètes* (85 volumes) and *J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres complètes*. Voltaire and Rousseau are top figures of the French Lumières (Enlightenment).

According to Carter, de Sade subjects precisely this world of "rationality" to his libertine critique. Why he encapsulates them in pornographic works.

Libertarian pornography.

Les 120 jours de Sodome (The 120 Days of Sodom), (1787), *Justine ou les malheurs de la vertu* (Justine or the Misfortunes of Virtue), (1791), *La philosophie dans le boudoir* (Philosophy in the boudoir), (1795) are pornographic works. *Le Petit Larousse* (1972) characterizes them as follows. "Novels in which the heroes/heroines are possessed of the tendency to torture innocent souls (sadism). But important because they set apart "la révolte d'un homme libre contre Dieu et 1a société", (the revolt of a free man against God and society).

CF/CS 175
The Sadian system.
Although expressed in the form of stories, de Sade's thought is logically conclusive. We cite some axioms.

A.I.-- *basic axiom.*
Strictly nominalistic rationalism.
Sade connoisseurs know it from the texts. E.g. "I am not guided by any other 'light' than the light of my own reason" (says Juliette, the cold-hearted heroine (in the style of Voltaire 's hero characters e.g.)). Note the metaphor 'light' (Lumières = Enlightenment). But note the radical individualism: "only the light of my own reason".

'Freedom'
Reread *CF/CS 87*.-- Neither negative freedom nor positive freedom according to Isaiah Berlin qualify for de Sade. He wants "libertine freedom" that knows no limits except those of necessity! A. Carter, o.c., 68: "De Sade remains a monument of civility, at once monstrous and impressive.

Yet I would like to believe that he was putting pornography "at the service of women." Or perhaps that in pornography he was employing an ideology that is not the antithesis of the women's movement as a de-legitimization movement.

In that spirit, let us pay homage to the old devil and let us begin by quoting the following pleasant piece of rhetoric: "Enchanted sex! Free shalt thou be! You will live through pleasure - just like the men, in all your lustful experiences that nature (*CF/CS 171*) imposes on you as a duty. Halt shalt thou for no lust.--Must "the divine part of mankind" inevitably be shackled by the other part? Ah, do thou break thy fetters: nature wills it". -- Angela Carter speaks here as a libertine feminist, of course.

Bertrand d'Astorg, *Introduction au monde de la terreur*, (Introduction to the world of terror,), Paris, 1945, 29, is quite a bit less enthusiastic: "The woman. -- Her destiny is "d' être comme la chienne, comme la louve: elle doit appartenir à tous ceux qui veulent d'elle" (to be like the bitch, like the wolf: she must be at the disposal of all who covet her).

In the other place: d'Astorg, o.c., 25/33, compares de Sade with ... Saint-Just (1767/1794; figure of the French revolution who acted ice-cold) and William Blake (1757/1827; painter with occult background) In other words, Carter sees e.g. in the torture for erotic reasons indeed a humiliation of the (masochistic) woman but values this 'valorization' as an equivalence with the man who torturously 'elevates' them.

CF/CS 176.
Anarchism.

Perhaps Nietzsche's term '*misarchy*' (miseo; I despise; archè, all that controls) would be the best rendering of the basic dogma of anarchism that 'despises' both the higher ideas, together with the God who founds these ideas, and all authorities of a traditional nature. In this way anarchism or 'libertarianism' is a cultural revolution.

Those who scorn, consider themselves higher.

De Sade -- we saw this when he demands that people accept him as he is -- despises fellow men and considers himself higher.-- Thus any consistent individualist. Compare with two figures.

1.-- *J .-J. Rousseau*: "I alone. I feel my heart and I know the people: I have not come into this world like all the others who live on it. Am I not worth more, at least I am different".

2.-- *Goethe's Wilhelm Meister*: "To unfold myself as "nature" made me was, somewhere from my youth, my desire and my destiny."

Bibl. sample : H.Arvon, *L'anarchisme*, Paris,1951,

We do know that "anarchism"--generally speaking--is a "social" movement and, e.g., fights for more justice,--especially starting from small communities. Yet there is an individualistic and even a libertine essence in it. The concept of "freedom" used in anarchist circles is situated in that region.

Simone de Beauvoir (1908/1986), known for her then controversial work, *Le deuxième sexe* (The second gender), (1949, writes: "The real value of de Sade's model lies in the fact that it worries us. It forces us to ask anew the essential question which, in a contemporary way, forces our time to think: 'what is the true relationship of one man to another?'" With this pressing question, de Beauvoir ends her study of de Sade.

A.II.-- *Basic axiom.-- Real and radical nominalism.*

B. d'Astorg, o. c., 27, quotes de Sade: "Do not doubt, Eugénie. The words 'virtue' and 'vice' mean only purely local (*note :* private, individual thought contents.

There is no act - no matter how exceptionally you imagine it - that is a true crime. Nor is there any act that can be called a true virtue".

CF/CS 177.

Note.-- De Sade means to say by this that 'virtue' and vice' are only names, Lat.: nomina.

To this, in the acts themselves, nothing ("nihilism") justifies the notion of true virtue. Consequence:

a. nor universally applicable,

b. nor loaded with higher value.

"God (and his ideas) are dead," and so everything is principled (there are no principles) allowed. As Sartre says (*CF/CS 109*). 'Principles' are universally valid and loaded with higher values. 'Essences', as Sartre says.

B.I.a.-- *naturalism/ materialism.*

We already came across the term "nature" on a regular basis. He is the all-knowing one! Replaces God.

R. Dasne, *Les matérialistes Français de 1750 à 1800*, (The French materialists from 1750 to 1800), Paris, 1965, 88s.: La Durand, a materialist, says to her friends, "My friends -- so La Durand tells us -- the more one studies nature, the more one steals her secrets,-- the more one knows her energy." -- Here we stumble upon perhaps the basic preeminent concept of de Sade's psychology.

From which La Durand concludes: "The more one is convinced of the uselessness of "a God". The creation of that idol is, among all chimeras, the most hateful, the most ridiculous, the most despicable. This disgusting fable, born in all people weighed down by the feeling of fear, is the utmost that human madness can achieve.

I repeat: to attribute a creator to nature is to disregard it. To assume that 'cette première puissance', this first power, this primordial power, is guided by another power, is tantamount to blinding oneself to all that this primordial power, nature, can work out."

Behold the creed - for it sounds like a preacher's creed pronounced with insistence and rage - of the free, atheistically disempowered woman.

B.I.b.-- *Energetic Ethics.*

D'Astorg, o.c., 30: "The term 'energy' de Sade has used throughout in the most modern sense of 'élan vital' life drive, i.e. the dynamism that propels humanity toward its brutal self-development and self-exaltation."

CF/CS 178.
Two models of "energy".
The term "energy" shows itself in what follows.

1.-- *Permissive ethics.*

The term "permissive" (allowing everything) is contrasted with "repressive" (suppressing everything).-- *Justine or the Adversity of Virtue*, Amsterdam, 1978-11, 318vv..

"At the same time, this libertine pulled up my skirts" (o.c., 318).-- "Gurgling like a dying man, this incorrigible libertine thereby uttered terrible blasphemies"(o.c., 321).

"My buttocks serve for some as a lustful spectacle, for others as the target of their cruelty: our two libertines (...) finally withdraw (...)" (o.c., 323).

"The two libertines grabbed me" (o.c., 326).

One sees that Sadian ethics is libertarian through and through. And this is as an expression of 'energy'. Note the two defining features of sadism: lust and cruelty.

2. *Permissive ethics.*
Theft.

A theft - according to de Sade - is one expression of energy! "The person who is so negligent that he / she allows himself / herself to be robbed should be punished."

Charity.

"Being charitable is to be condemned because it accustoms the poor person to a series of relief efforts that damage his energy." If that is not anarchism or libertarianism!

B.11.-- *Social Studies.*

Ethics founds the "politics," understand society's view.

B.II.a.-- *The laws*

D' Astorg, o.c., 23.- "Society - in order to maintain its fragile rule - has invented legislation on it. Laws, therefore, are in perpetual contradiction with the individual interest, which, it is true, is always in contradiction with "the general interest." The laws that are "good" (for society) are "very bad" (for the individual who is a member of it). The reason: for that one time when the laws protect the individual, they hinder him,-- constrain him during the three quarters of his life." Thus de Sade.-- Again: if that is not anarchism or libertarianism!

B.II.b.-- *The crime.*

Les 120 journées de Sodome.-- "Though it is true that crime does not possess the high nobility found in virtue, yet is it not always the loftiest?

CF/CS 179.

Does not crime continually display the traits of the grand ('grandeur') and the sublime ('sublimité')? Does it not therefore prevail - and will it not always prevail - over the monotonous and effeminate ('efféminés') charms of virtue?".

Note.-- The free, libertine free man is mortally bored in the context of a conscientious society and seeks sensation, orgasmic breakthroughs! And this is of a typically male nature.

Note -- According to Ludwig Feuerbach (1804/1872; left Hegelian), the atheist (cfr. *CF/CS 109*: *French radicalism*) does reject God as a person but retains the holiness (greatness, exaltation) of God. This is precisely what de Sade does: the characteristics that the great theistic tradition attributes to God as a person - greatness, majesty - he attributes to the crime thus sacralized as "mysterium tremdum et fascinosum". It is true that this involves only the mere sense of the great and the sublime,--not the great and sublime themselves, in themselves (which for the nihilist de Sade are in themselves "nothing").

B.II.c.-- *The murder.*

R. Dasne, o.c., 237, cites.-- "Never will it occur to any 'wise' nation to condemn murder as a crime.

For murder to be a crime, destruction would have to be considered possible. Well, we have just seen that this proposition is unacceptable -- I repeat: murder is only a change of form in which neither the laws proper to the biological realms (plants, animals, men) nor the laws of nature lose anything. On the contrary: both laws gain enormously". Cf. *CF/ CS 171* (form), where the term "change of form" becomes clear.

De Sade continues.

"So why punish a human being just because he/she gave back to the natural elements what used to be a portion of matter? In particular: by murdering someone, the criminal hastens the rotting process of his/her body.-- Materialistically, even a human being -- like all bodies of nature -- is a portion of matter. Nothing more.

Moreover, this portion of matter returns to the elements of nature as a matter of necessity. These elements of nature, once they have returned to them, use this portion of matter to compose new forms out of it. Now is a fly worth more than a pasha or a capuchin monk?".

Note.-- The living principles move from one form of life to another.

Note.-- This is how XVIII- d' century French materialists claimed.

CF/CS 180
Sample 64.-- Scholars and libertinism.
Bibl. sample : *Claartje Hülsenbeck/ Jan Louman/ Anton Oskamp, The little red book for schoolchildren*, Utrecht, 1970-1; 1971-8.

"Contemporary teachers-who call themselves 'critical' teachers-in collaboration with their students" reason in the booklet in such a way that their nominalism regarding virtue and vice is "vindicated.

Basic axiom is a four-pronged critique that boils down to the question of "more justice."
1. the parents manipulate the children;
2. teachers manipulate students;
3. the "bosses" manipulate the workaholics;
4. the caregivers manipulate the elderly.
Where the tacit premise is that the subordinates are virtually perfect and pose no problem.

Among other things, sexual morality is inculcated within that framework.-- For example, every "critical" school should have a class for sex games.

We dwell on one example.-- "When it says in the newspaper that someone has committed a sex crime, it sounds worse than it is. It then refers to someone who can 'only' cum in a certain, unusual way."

One sees reductionism: sexual behaviors are reduced to empirical facts that are explained with a constructionist conceptualization and thus become amenable to experimentation.

"**1.** When you read that someone has acted lewdly, he has usually opened his pants and shown his penis. He is then "called" "exhibitionist.
2. Do you read that a man or a woman committed fornication with minors,. then this person masturbated in front of children.
3. If you read about a voyeur (peeping tom), then it is about a man or a woman who likes to watch others do it : this one spies on lovemaking couples who think they are alone.--Once in a while it happens that these people are panicked. This is due to the way others react to their behavior. They then no longer know what they are doing and sometimes it comes to violence". (O.c., 100).

Note -- In other words, "the others" are in error. The "deviants" are particular innocent. Not to mention the skewed portrayal of the three facts as they are multiple times in reality.

How de Sade and the libertine rationalist would jubilate at such a critique of society.

CF/CS 181
Sample 65.-- Political philosophy. (181).
Bibl. sample ;
-- *Cl. Lefort, L'invention démocratique*, (The democratic invention), Paris, 1981;--. id., *Essais sur le politique* (*XIXe-XXe siècles*), Paris, 1986;
-- *A. Vandeputte, Power and society* (*Cl. Lefort on democracy and totalitarianism*) in: *Tijdschr. v. Filos*. 49 (1987), 395/433;
-- *Ph. Van Haute, Claude Lefort, The political significance of human rights*, in: *Strive*;
-- *Alfr. Dufour, Droits de l'homme, droit naturel et histoire*, (Human rights, natural law and history), PUF.

1.-- *The princely "absolutism*
However despotic this system may have acted, the absolute monarch before the French Revolution did not establish law. He was merely the human interpreter and executor of the idea of "law" in God's mind. If he went beyond that role, then the people had the duty and thus the right to decide on "justifiable revolt."

Dufour says that the school of natural law in the XVIIth century (Grotius, Pufendorf) put the rights of (individual) human beings first.

2.1.-- *Democracy.*
Democracy stands or falls, at least in current views, with "human rights" but these in a nominalistic sense. In particular, the community, people and leadership, is autonomous. It defines, in its own right, what is right and what is wrong.-- In this, "public opinion" plays a leading role.

Arlette Farge, Dire et mal dire (*L'opinion publique au XVIIIe siècle* (To say and not to say (Public opinion in the 18th century), (Seuil), even claims that what the man of the street said, in the XVIIIth century, could carry political weight. And J. Habermas, in 1962, showed that "opinion" in the XVIIth 'century, meant the uncertain opinion, to be set off against the "eternal truths" -- ideas, essences --, and that "opinion", -- especially "public opinion", in the XVIIIth century meant the nominalist opinion: autonomous reason debated "freely".

In today's democracies, no one possesses "the truth" anymore and "the will of the autonomous people" expresses itself in endless debates that make governing very difficult as Lefort underlines.

2.2.-- *The totalitarian state.*
Equally autonomous more differently structured: the abuses and excesses of democratic discussions and "questioning" provoke a dictatorial reaction that starts from precisely the same group dynamics as that of democracy but pushes through leaders the "true opinion". As Nazism and Communism showed us.

CF/CS 182

Sample 66.-- Religious education. (182)

In 1922, *W.-E. Hocking* (1873/1966; prof at Harvard Univ.) that the "opinions" of his time concerning religion "exhibited a contradiction: on the one hand, one cannot do without religion; on the other, one does not know how to keep them alive. Cfr. his *Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse*, in: *Rev. d. Métaphysique et de Morale* 1922: 4, 431.

Today, in our Catholic schools, "religious doctrine" exhibits three types:
a. the waning traditional style that inculcates dogma and breeds morality;
b. the predominant critical streak that "opinions" bring up;
c. the 'new-age' style, timidly appearing here and there, which tries to evoke experiences.

We now give a text "Readers write", without any reference so as not to compromise anyone and to get into the pure problem. He characterizes critical religious doctrine.-- (...)

What the bishop has debated in your paper in terms of noncommittal platitudes draws the malaise that has permeated even the highest echelons of the Church.

Non-commitment that obliges to nothing and especially does not invite a structured approach in which the bishops should take the lead.

However, by their attitude which is unclear, the bishops leave the ways open for:
a. experiments,
b. individual infill, or
c. even denial of faith points in the "Catholic" schools.

They should go and see for themselves how the profession of religion has degenerated into cosy chattering classes, full of:
a. personal testimonials and
b. "I think" theories, which very often knock down the very essence: faith.
c. Not to mention how the institution of the 'Church' and its highest representative (the Pope) are treated by numerous horizontalist thinking teachers. (...)".

One sees it: the nominalism that perceives purely empirically (and thus sees no extra- or supernatural facts), incorporates constructionist concepts (and thus does not even grasp basic religious concepts), and experiments on that narrow, secular basis, draws itself very clearly in the picture that the traditional believer catches when he hears his children at home recounting the conceptions -- opinions -- gained during the lesson on "religion.

Sample 67.-- The sufficient reason for discussion (1). (183)

We again tie in directly with *CF/CS 93/95* (*Principle of sufficient cause*),-- esp. *94* (*The Unprovable*). But we now turn in relative detail to the disputes surrounding the principle that is the artery of every rationalism (*CF/CS 96*: Rationalism) along with the principle or axiom of identity (*CF/CS 93; 148*).

These discussions have flared up all the worse since already *G.E. Moore* (1873/1958; Anglo-Saxon language analyst thinker) - among others in his *The Nature and Reality of Perception* (1905) - posed the problem: "how do we know that p?".

'P' is a judgment (proposition, sentence, statement). Not the (psychological and genetic) question "How does p arise in my mind?" but rather the epistemological-logical question "How do I know/prove that p?" was the problem Moore posed.

In other words, "what sufficient reason or ground does p have?" -- Immediately indirectly posed by Moore is the problem of "fundatio(na)lism" (*CF/CS 97: Fundationism/ fundamentalism/ integrism*), namely, whether we, as rational human beings, can prove everything or not. Whether we, as beings looking for a sufficient ground for our statements and our behavior ("acting in the name of"), actually find that sufficient ground.

The nominalist approach.

Nominalism - distinct from conceptual realism (abstractive or ideational) - confined to empirical observation (*CF/CS 143*), conceptual construction (*CF/CS 145*), experimentation on that dual, narrow, "earthy" and secular basis (*CF/CS 146*)

The artery is empiricism, which is sensualistic, i.e. limited to what our average senses grasp of reality within us and outside us.

This very empiricism separates nominalism (conceptualism, terminism) from abstraction which rests on a perception that grasps the very being of the observed, albeit partially, there especially from ideation which rests on a perception of the being-and-of the higher-idea-and-value in the given present. Cfr *CF/CS 148* (*Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas*), where we have briefly explained especially ideation.

As an aside, *Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung* (Logic of research), (1934), revisits Moore's problem of 'justification', justification, 'proof' from his point of view.

Sample 68. -- The sufficient reason **(2)** (184/186)

Bibl. sample :

-- *E. Oger, Literature review (Rationality, its foundation and its samples)*, in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos*. 54 (1992): 1 (March), 87/106;

-- *H. Parret, ed., In all reasonableness* (*Views on the thinking, speaking and acting of reasonable man*), Meppel/ Amsterdam, 1990 (*on "the reason" of reason*);

-- *M. Fleischer, Wahrheit und Wahrheitsgrund* (*Zum Wahrheitsproblem und zu seiner Geschichte*), (Truth and Truth Ground (On the Problem of Truth and its History)), (Berlin/ New York,1984 (*correspondence theory*);

-- *Forum Philosophie Bed Hamburg, Hrsg., Philosophie und Begründung*, FrankF. a.M., 1987 (*ten writers on justification* (*sufficient reason*)).

Oger sees essentially four positions. We go over them briefly.

Critical rationalism.

Karl Popper (1902/1994). In his wake W. W. Bartley, H. Albert, H. Lenk, G. Radnitzky, J. Watkins, who nuance Popper's position.

As an aside, Popper clearly situates himself in Kant's Aufklärung.

By the way: J. Habermas, K.-O. Apel (about whom more later),-- M. Foucault (at least the later Foucault), J. Derrida (about whom more later also) can be understood in the line of enlightened rationalism but with shades, of course.

Note: *J. Agassie/ I.C. Jarvin, Rationality* (*The Critical View*), Dordrecht, 1986, which attempts to answer the question "is rationality definable?".

This includes a discussion of the rationality of both the human sciences and the natural sciences. Questions such as "rationalism/magic," "rationalism/ dogmatism," and "rationalism/ irrationalism" are also discussed. Popper and his students (W.W. Bartley) come through strongly.

A.-- *The irrationalism.*

'Irrationalism' is "rebellion against reason" (K. Popper). This expression appears in *Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 vols., London, 1945/1966. The ancient Greeks are the ones who essentially taught us the concept of "open society": "from swords to words" (instead of swords to kill and exclude those who are different, move on to words, i.e. discussion on the basis of critical reason)! The work is directed against the totalitarian systems (Nazism, communism) which uphold a "closed society" and are dismissed by Popper as "irrationalisms".

CF/CS 185.

Popper and his fellow thinkers see in today's cultural life "a proliferation of irrationalism." - Science theorists like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, a (post)-structuralist like Michel Foucault, a deconstructionist like Jacques Derrida count as "irrationalists" in their eyes.

One can see that Popper and his followers espouse a more traditional rationalism, with a great emphasis on scientism in the very strict - falsificationist - sense.

B.-- *The uncritical (justificationist) rationalism.*

This kind of rationalism states first and foremost as an axiom: "If and only if a judgment (proposition) is fully supported either by experience (empiricism) or by reasoning (conceptualism) or by both together (e.g., experimentation) (experimentalism), it can be called 'rationally justified' (vindicated, justified)."

Poppers' rebuttal.

1. The premise of all rationalism is that "all truly rational assertions presuppose a sufficient reason or ground."

2. Well, that presupposition itself, logically speaking (in nominalist thinking), has no sufficient reason.

After all, how does one prove that this axiom is correct? How does one know/how does one prove it? One would have to demonstrate on rigorously proven grounds that there are absolutely no 'irrational' (= without reason) facts! Who can do that? Nobody!

More than that: in order to "prove" that axiom in the strict sense, one must preface it as "proven"! Thus one can begin an endless series of postulates of the axiom but never finish it. To deduce the axiom as a postulates from prepositions that have already been proved is thus impossible.

Conclusion.-- Popper radically rejects such an uncritical rationalism: not everything can be proven.

Popper's fideistic decisionism.

1. Those who wish to prove already have as an axiom faith ('fides' = belief; *CF/CS 152*) in reason at the forefront. Only then can there be "rational proof".

2. Faith is not so much reasonable insight as decision.

Conclusion.-- A rationalistic life depends on a prior 'irrational' conclusion that believes in it. This is 'critical' (aware of its limits) rationalism.

Note -- Neo-Protestant theologians respond, "Thou, rationalist, neither provest all things as we Bible believers do. Our faith is therefore equally "critically rational."

CF/CS 186.
Ethical choice.
Enlightened rationalism is thus a decision to believe in it. It is also an ethical choice. We already saw that it was a political choice (*CF/CS 184: "open society"*).

Again, Popper is a decisionist: "In contrast, to questions of fact, questions of values do not allow for a 'rational' discussion. Arguments by themselves cannot determine a fundamentally moral decision." (Oger, a.c., 91).

Note.-- For matters of conscience - and generally for value determinations of all kinds - no compelling logical proof is possible. In German: 'Sein' (understand: to be actual) and 'Sollen' (understand: to belong, to have as a duty) are separated. Cfr *CF 48* (*Lotze's axiology*). This means that, as far as culture contains values, it is logically strictly unprovable and involves a choice.

Conclusion.-- Rational arguments cannot prove the rationalist foundationalism. They can, however, help to do so without enforcing rationalism.-- In contrast to conceptual realism, which does consider reason capable of 'rational' (= abstract or ideative) foundations (which is metaphysics), nominalist reason in virtue of (secular and 'earthly') empiricism is incapable of doing so.

Note -- Constructivism.
This name refers to the Erlanger Schule whose main figure is *P. Lorenzen*, known for his *Normative Logic and Ethics*, Mannheim/ Zurich, 1969. Also situated here - but at a distance - is *F. Kambartel, Philosophie der humanen Welt* (*Abhandlungen*), (Philosophy of the Human World (Treatises)), Frankfurt, 1989.

Oger, a.c., 91; 105.-- P. Lorenzen e.g. also speaks of "an act of faith" when it comes to the "foundation" of true judgments. Faith' in the sense of "putting forward something for which no justification is available". 'Faith' thus has a typically nominalistic meaning here.

Note.-- In his *Objective Knowledge* (*An Evolutionary Approach*), Oxford, 1972, *Popper* espouses a kind of "evolutionism" regarding objective knowledge:

"The most appropriate theory concerning the facts survives in the battle of opinions." "Our work is fallible (fallibilism).

Constantly we commit errors and there are objective standards of truth, content, validity and so on that we cannot cope with." That's Popper.

Sample 69.-- The sufficient reason **(3).** (187)
Re-found critical rationalism. A few Popperians are discussed.

1.-- *WW. Bartley*.

Among other things, in his *Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality*.-- Bartley calls Popper's fideism irresponsible. He then radicalizes Popper's critical rationalism. To a comprehensivist (encompassing) rationalism. Or to -- as he later says -- a pan-critical (overall critical) rationalism. With as axiom: "If and only if a judgment is open to criticism (understand: is in some way 'refutable' (falsifiable)), is it rational."

J. Watkins and J. Post refute this: "To express the axiom in such a way sounds like it is not even open to criticism"! Which amounts to a dogma that is above all criticism.

2.-- *H. Albert.*

O.m. *Traktat über kritische Vernunft* (Treatise on Critical Reason), (1969),-- *Die Wissenschaft und die Fehlbarkeit der vernunft* (Science and the fallibility of reason), (1982).

The principle of sufficient reason rational proof poses a trilemma.
1. Either every preposition must in turn have a preposition ("regressus in infinitum"). Which is an impracticable foundation.
2. Either every preposition must either have itself as a preposition or presuppose some other preposition yet to be founded ("circulus vitiosus"). Which is a zero foundation.
3. Either man in 1 and 2 above stumbles upon an undoubted intuition that acts as a preposition. Which is an arbitrary or even 'dogmatic' foundation.-
Conclusion.-- three times irrational!

Albert's way out.
One axiom of his own he puts first:
a. a justification (justification) is unnecessary;
b. a criticisability (principled refutability) is sufficient.
In other words, "If and only if a judgment - including the axiom itself - is 'criticizable (falsifiable, refutable), is it a rational judgment.'" In colloquial language, "in principle, every judgment should be testable with the intention of refuting it, including the principle itself."

Note.-- Either Albert states that the axiom is intuitively grasped (*CF/ CS 94*; Dilthey/ Wundt) or he states that it is logically proven in prefatory and postfatory sentences.

The intuition that, for any reasoning in prefatory and postfatory terms, "grasps" the axiom as valid is close to conceptual realism (abstractive or ideative).

***Sample 70.-- The sufficient reason* (4).** (188)

Do we now dwell on a language-based rationalism.

Lady Welby's significa,-- Saussure's semiology and Peirce's semiotics put the language act, i.e., acting as speaking, at the center.

1.-- "It is sunny today" is a syntactically well-constructed sentence. After all, the parts of the sentence fit together linguistically well.

2.-- "It is sunny today" reflects the fact that it is indeed sunny weather. The sentence has semantic "meaning.

3.-- "It's sunny today" excites my wife to "get out there." The sentence has a pragmatic "meaning," as it seeks to build rapport around a "project" (a trip).

Communication-and-interaction.
Traditional rhetoric was concerned with the word as a pragmatic tool.

The neo-rhetoric refounded them.-- This is sometimes referred to as "the linguistic turn," the emphasis on the linguistic or rather "linguistic" aspect. And this is in the context of our rational society.

Re -1.-- When I say "It is sunny today", I have a reason or ground for doing so. I am expressing a sentence within the Dutch language system that respects the rules of syntax - speechwise and logically - of it. The reason why I order the words in this way is the grammar.

Re 2.-- The sentence "It is sunny today" I pronounce as a representation of a fact or phenomenon. The reason or ground is that it "is so" (*CF/CS 94: Dilthey/ Wundt*: "*direct experience*") o.g. the identity axiom of traditional and present formalized logic.

Re 3.-- The sentence "It's sunny today" has a communicative and - interactive reason or ground: e.g. I know that my wife likes to go out then. I encourage them to do so.

Conclusion.-- The signs of our significa or semiotics (semiology) are carried through and through by sufficient reasons or grounds. As a result, they are "rational. Justifiable or at least justifiable. Justified or justifiable. Logical, yes, but also ethical.

Let the three types of reason or ground fall away: my act of language becomes unconscionable: i.e., no longer justifiable(b) in conscience. In that case I am speaking "against my better judgment".

CF/ CS 189.
Sample 71. -- The sufficient reason (5). 189/191
The critical theory.
The Frankfurter Schule was founded by Th.W. Adorno (1903/1969) under the name "Institut für Sozialforschung" In 1923.

J. Habermas (1929) belongs to "the second generation." He is o. m. Known for his *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, I (*Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), II (Theory of Communicative Action, I (Rationality of Action and Social Rationalization),), (*Zur Kritik der Funktionalistischen Vernunft*), (On the Critique of Functionalist Reason),), 1981;-- his *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (*Zwölf Vorlesungen*), (The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Twelve Lectures)), Francf.a.M., 1985.

Karl-Otto Apel (1924), second figure of "Critical Theory": known among other things for his *Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie*, (Language pragmatics and philosophy), Francf.a.M., 1976 (strongly influenced by Ch.S. Peirce's semiotics.

Thesis.
Human communicative and interactive action (knowledge, language, action) necessarily involves rationality in its praxis.
a. The acts of language that e.g. semiotics talks about already presuppose (the principle of) sufficient reason.
b. But the language about language acts (meta-language) -- which semiotics (significa, semiology) essentially is -- also already presupposes (the principle of sufficient reason. If acts of language and theory about acts of language want to be rational at least.-- Read the previous chapter for this.

1. -- *Jurgen Habermas.* He states.
a. *Negative.*
The axiom of sufficient reason is o.g. Purely logical reasoning (prepositions/postpositions) - as Popper and especially Albert et al. demonstrate - unprovable.
b. *Positive*
Rationality, i.e., the presupposition and observational application of the axiom in question is presupposed in the very praxis of knowing, language, and (communicative and interactive) action.

It is therefore not a free choice (as Popper and others want to maintain decisionistically). Oger, a.c., 95.-- "From the very first words we stammer out as children, reason begins to exert an unobtrusive, tough, unrelenting "compulsionless compulsion." (....).
1. Reason exerts (...) a compulsion in that it incessantly orients our speech and actions.
2. At the same time, this reason is without constraint, since it is not an external body, foreign and alien to us (...). It lies implied in the pragmatics of every linguistic act".

CF/CS 190.

Explanation.-- Habermas, in order to make his prereflective (i.e. situated before any 'reflection' or conscious thinking) 'choice', performed by "language" uses a metaphor. What does this metaphor really amount to?

On the fact that, in so far as our use of language and in a broader sense our use of signs is really rational, i.e. justifiable(ish), this use of language contains the axiom of sufficient reason. And more than merely pragmatic, as we *CF/CS 188*) concluded: both syntactically and semantically and pragmatically there is a rational, reasoned language use.

That "the language as results-oriented (= pragmatic) action
a. chooses for us (i.e. chooses in our place and
b. chooses before us (i.e., before we consciously think about it)" is and remains a metaphor and thus figurative language in Habermas's texts.
In doing so, the language is recited as a personified figure with the traits of a conscious person.

"That is the human thing about human beings as rational beings" says Habermas". -- "We have always made the rational choice". The pragmatics of "language" has already decided in our place, so to speak, i.e. as a figure of speech, in an immemorial time (note: what is that right?). Which implies that the term "decide" is used here in a metaphorical, improper sense.-- Which is weak as a "rational" proof.

Yet, according to Habermas, Popper is right somewhere.
a. Habermas accuses Popper of an "Anglo-Saxon liberal language." Popper is liberal. Habermas socialist. -- On the subject of science and the critique of reason, Popper reasons -- according to Habermas -- as a free citizen who puts himself before free choices in a free country.-- This form of behavior of a political nature Popper transfers to the free choice between rationality or irrationality.

b. Habermas, however, must also agree with Popper. For often the actual man attempts to evade rationality,-- from what shows itself (semantic language) -- by lying e.g. -- For often the actual man cherishes aims -- pragmatically -- which are not justified or justifiable.

That then is an unreasonable and what is more immoral, unscrupulous choice, where "choice" is now not used metaphorically.

CF/CS 191.
2.-- *Karl-OttoAapel.*
Leibniz was the first among the moderns to introduce the axiom of sufficient reason into "logic.

Apel remains leibnizian: he posits it as an obviousness to which real, lived doubt is impossible. It is thus a foundation.-- But he situates it in a pragmatics of language (which he calls 'transcendental' (not 'transcendental') because this pragmatics goes hand in hand with the thinking and especially pragmatically acting subject).(The presupposition of) the sufficient reason has always been presupposed in all our acts of language, and it has been presupposed as undeniable. But this presupposition itself is not 'founded' in anything else. Apel attempts to show this by means of a number of reasonings (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant). Cfr. *CF/CS 94* (*Dilthey and Wundt*).

Criticism.
Cfr *CF/CS 187*: Watkins and Post refute Bartley (the axiom itself is beyond criticism). Similarly, Apel challenges Albert (ibid.) who, in his view, has not avoided all justificationism!

More to the point, Apel shows that the "axiom of unlimited criticism," as Albert puts it, contains a paradox. According to Oger, a.c.,93/94, a paradox that closely resembles the paradox of the liar.

Note -- *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Antw./ Nijmeg.,1944, 78/92 (*Eristics and Skepticism*), puts it as follows.-- "One asks someone, 'If you claim that you are lying, are you really lying or are you speaking the truth?' If he answers, "I lie," then the questioner:
"If thou art claiming that thou art lying, and thou art really lying, then thou art speaking the truth. So thy answer is false. If he answers, "I speak the truth," then the questioner: "If thou claimest that thou liest and thou speakest the truth, then thou liest."

Note -- If you assert this, then what you refute follows from it! Each of the two answers is conducted "ad absurdum," the incongruous.

According to *I.M. Bochenski, Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./ Antw., 1961, 71v., the liar's language is "semantic nonsense." Which becomes clear, if one considers that he speaks about his language, in a meta-language, in an unscrupulous way.

So when an adherent of unlimited criticisability says that he adheres to this axiom, what is he saying about his own statement? For he cannot question his own statement.

CF/CS 192.
Sample 72.-- The sufficient reason, (6). (192/193)
Deconstructionism.

Cfr. *CF 42/45* (*The deconstructionist interpretation*). *J. Derrida* (1930) has written a work that perhaps expresses his basic position, i.e. *De la grammatologie*, (About grammatology,), Paris, 1967 (which claims that we and all fellow humans are 'written' somewhere (he says, "in our very existence")).

By way of introduction.

J. Derrida et autres*, La faculté de juger,* (The ability to judge), Paris, 1985, is a book in which six writers talk about our capacity to judge in scientific, artistic and aesthetic, ethical and political fields, within the framework of our culture-in-crisis. In our time one searches desperately for "new values" from which and for which all can live. But what is striking is how nobody identifies "the truth" with their own opinion,--truth on which our culture could rely as sufficient reason to make a "justifiable" judgment! In other words, crisis of foundations. Cfr. *CF/CS 81/85*.

Heideggerian.

Derrida claims that his notion of "déconstruction" hooks up with *M. Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund* (The theorem of the reason), (1957) and *Vom Wesen des Gründes* (From the essence of the foundation), (1949), as well as with Heidegger's notion of "Destruktion.

"Following in the footsteps of Fr. Nietzsche, some see the whole of Western culture as an unbroken tradition that was on the wrong track from its inception. Not only the modern phase but already the 'ontotheological' synthesis of the classical Greek thinkers has put European culture on the wrong track of a problematic rationalism.

Martin Heidegger and, in our day, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty share with Nietzsche this view of thinking after Socrates." (*G. Vanheeswijck, The many forms of modernity*, in: *Streven* 61(1994): 11 (Dec.), 1009v.).

In other words: with Derrida, we are in the company of Postmodernism, which subjects the entire rationalist tradition, - the metaphysical (ancient/middle ages) and the nominalist (modernitet) to a basic examination.

Logically, then, postmodernists should make the artery of rational life, the axiom of sufficient reason, the target of their criticism. With the danger, of course, that their own judgments and particularly their critique of the axiom of sufficient reason (basis of every rational judgment) would also be called into question! Which would be a reissue of the paradox.

CF/CS 193.

1.-- *Derrida vs. Popper.*

As seen *CF/CS 185,* Popper rejects "justificationism. So does, given his contribution on the foundation of any judgment about which briefly above, Derrida. But thoroughly differently.

The West, from Platon to the present, is too 'logocentric' for him, too much either the metaphysical ideas or abstract concepts or the nominalistic terms. This - these traditions - he radically dismantles, knowing full well that he will never actually get rid of them. To think away reason, in its metaphysical or nominalistic versions, itself turns out to be an avenue of sacking: The axiom of sufficient reason remains the foundation.

As an aside, it is the essence of our entire culture, especially at the university level, as he asserts in his *Les pupilles de l'université* (*Le principe de raison et l'idée de l'université*), (The wards of the university (The principle of reason and the idea of the university)).

2.-- *Derrida and Albert.*

CF/CS 187.-- H. Albert saw a trilemma (impracticable proof/ zero proof/ 'dogmatic' proof). The impracticable proof is called 'abyss!

Derrida holds to a dilemma. -- Either circular reasoning (= zero proof) - the second case with Albert - or an 'abyss' - the first case with Albert (impracticable proof).

In middle Latin: either "circulus vitiosus" or "regressus in infinitum".

The axiom of reason or ground
a. demands a ground for everything (including all judgments)
b. but is itself unprovable and in that sense ungroundable.
In the poeticizing language of Derrida : "It is groundless and therefore abyssal".

(Dis)obedience.

a. We do not "disobey" (i.e., the axiom), because we do not want to "subvert" it. Reason: we would fall into irrationalism!

b. But neither are we slavishly obedient, for then one falls into some form of traditional rationalism that is "logocentric"!

Note -- The 'disobedience' is in fact "critical attitude". Which then is and remains 'rationalistic' anyway.

The axiom of sufficient reason is "self-evident

(indicating 'evidentiality' (*CF/CS 187*: *Albert's unquestionable intuition*). But not reason itself can "settle" ("prove") it. One must step outside reason to find "the origin" of the axiom.

CF/CS 194.

Sample 73.-- the cultural vanguard ("intelligentsia"). (194)

Popper, Bartley, Albert,-- Habermas, Apel,-- Derrida: they are "intellectuals. Together with countless others" they make up the vanguard". But - as we saw - "they use their own reason ('dialectics') to constantly contradict each other and pull apart everything that approaches them" (*Platon, The State vii:* 539b).

Th. Geiger, The Creative Vanguard (*On the Social Functions of the Intelligentsia*), Rotterdam/Antwerp, 1970, 73: "The name 'intelligentsia' itself underscores the supremacy of the rational mind in the culture of the modern age, for which the foundations were laid in the age of the baroque (*op.:* XVIIth century). The name 'intelligentsia' clearly refers first and foremost to those who carry out scientific and technical creative work,--including, however, in a wider context, the fine arts.

The rational mind is thus namesake for the whole layer of creative minds." -- This is confirmed e.g. by *P. Rabinow, French Modern* (*Norms and Forms of the Social Environment*), Cambridge (Mass.), 1989.

"Modern rationality" in France, from Napoleon to WWII (1939/1945), embodied itself not only in artists and pure theorists but, above all, in soldiers, builders, engineers, social reformers - called "planners" - who controlled society in the name of "the sciences," "in the name of techniques," "in the name, above all, of their own expertise.

In passing: says *Stephen Hawking*: "The only thing that seems limitless is the power of reason" (in: *The (un)bounded universe*)!

But things can change.

G. Groot, Intellectuals allow themselves to be misled, says, following P. *Hollander, Political Pilgrims* (*Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba* 1928/ 1978), Oxford Univ. Press, New York/ Oxford, 1981: on the one hand, many intellectuals were highly critical of their own societies, on the other, they lapsed into "uncritical idolatry" toward "socialist" societies (Soviet Union, China, Cuba).

Hollander's consistent and even "persistent" review is - says Groot "highly disturbing. It is apparently time to subject the term "intelligentsia" to a radical re-evaluation. According to Hollander.

CF/CS 195.
Sample 74.-- postmodernity/postmodernism. (195/198)

1870: Salon painter J. Watkins Chapman, in England, wants to paint "postmodern" with his contemporaries to surpass the impressionists of the time.

1934 (F. de Oniz), 1942 (O.Fitts), 1947 (A.Toynbee (CF 10)),-- 1917 (*Rudolf Pannwitz, Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur*', (The Crisis of European Culture), in which the "postmodern man" comes up,-- after all the aggravating images of man,-- in Nietzsche's wake): again and again the term "postmodern" appears.

After WW II (1939/1945) he becomes a common term. -- In philosophy he appears definitively: 1979.-- So e.g. *J.-Fr.Lyotard, La condition postmoderne* (The postmodern condition), (1979). So Julia Kristeva in 1980.

J. Derrida uses the term 'a-modernism' (deconstructionist). R. Rorty uses the term "sur-modernism. Again and again the term means "what comes after the end of modernity". In other words: some form of - what Americans call - 'endism' is always at work. Not without "a radicalization of modern culture."

A definition.
G. Vanheeswijck, The many forms of modernity, in: *Streven* 61 (1994): 11 (Dec.), 1009, defines.

A.-- *Modern*
Modern is believing in an all-embracing (ontological, metaphysical) knowledge - called 'totalitarian' knowledge -, in a "great story" (*CF/CS 160*: *Hegel's dialectical belief in progress*), like e.g. the sacred history of the Bible but rationally interpreted, in a reason that is capable, on a planetary scale, of transforming, 'modernizing' (the social engineering of the world) the biotope of mankind through all kinds of techniques.

B. -- *postmodern*
is no longer to believe in modernization. The postmodernist(s) unmasks rationality as all-encompassing - and - at once - valid knowledge, as the inventor of grand narratives, as the source of the boundless social engineering of man and the world.-- Vanheeswijck mentions one more characteristic: accepting the 'other' as different would be a characteristic of postmodernity. What modernity would not do.

He distinguishes two types.
a. Nietzsche,-- Heidegger, Derrida, Rorty believe that modern rationality has been present since Platon;

b. Hans Blumenberg, Eric Voegelin, Alasdair Maclntyre,-- Louis Dupré think that modern rationality only starts since humanism (renaissance) and continues in the middle of the XVIIth century. Milan Kundera and Stephen Toulmin are also of this opinion.

CF/CS 196.

Vanheeswijck emphasizes, in relation to the development of humanism to full enlightenment, the role of nominalism.

Nominalism undermines the notion of God as simultaneously omnipotent and wise and present in this world, i.e. accessible through natural (and extra-natural) reason (in the more abstract and ideational sense)."

"Henceforth God is located in a supernatural sphere, clearly separated from nature. In such a nature, man, empirically perceiving, conceptually constructing and experimenting within those narrow - secular or 'earthly' - boundaries, becomes "the interpreting agency, the sole source of values and meanings." (A.c., 1011).

Which, in the wake of *Otto Willmann*'s three-volume *Geschichte des Idealismus*, we have tried to show in all the previous pages. - Cfr. *CF/CS 108* (*The Death of God*).

Derrida's postmodernism.
Bibl. sample : *D. De Schutter, Derrida on the End of Philosophy* (*The Frontier as Task*), in: *Streven* 60 (1993): 2 (Feb.), 148/156.-- The "logocentrism" which, according to Derrida, is peculiar to philosophy, consists in the fact that cultural history is, ultimately, the history of philosophy.

That is certainly Hegelian. But whether it can be attributed to the whole of Western philosophy is highly questionable.

Hegel, supporting himself on that thus formulated logocentrism, tried to give everything, ethics, politics, art and religion and the whole rest of culture, a place within his "system" which he conceived as ontological - all-encompassing.

To which Derrida attempts to gnaw off such a comprehensive "system.
He points to the notion of 'mimèsis' (imitation), 'chora', which in Platon's language means both 'space' and 'separation',---the notions of 'the sublime' (sublime) and 'parergon' in Kant,-- the notion of "Gedächtnis" with Hegel,--the notion of "writing" with Rousseau, -- the notions of "tympanum" and "the colossal" in architecture, -- to show that these notions do not appear to be simply absorbable into "tradition," d.i. can be assigned a precise place in a comprehensive "system.

He points to "forgotten traditions" (concepts, currents in the course of history) that were not (sufficiently) thought of to "incorporate" them into "the system." Thus the relationship between the thinkers before Platon and his metaphysics and so on.

CF/CS 197.

"In this way, Derrida seeks domains that essentially evade philosophical rationality." (a.c., 151).

Note -- In doing so, Derrida defines the concept of "philosophical rationality" narrowly enough so that he can find forgotten elements that fall outside it! Cfr. *CF 11*, where already Aristotle, the great father of classical metaphysics, points to two rationalities:

a. the comprehensive but vague concept of being, from which nothing escapes either,

b. the interpretations (interpretations, -- which are, in a narrower sense, 'metaphysical') that are less or not vague but non-comprehensive.

They are in fact subjective or objective inductions, i.e. samples, o.g. axioms peculiar to a person or a group of people or peculiar to some data. - This is very clear from Socrates and Platon onwards. - This does not prevent that, from these limited samples, in which the totality of all that was, is, will be, is represented to a certain degree, a limited view of the totality of reality appears possible.

Feminist postmodernism.

'Postmodernism' is ambiguous. *Kristien Hemmerechts, Feminism and Literature* (*Women read the Tradition*), in: Streven 54 (1986): 12 (Dec.), 237/246, says what follows.

French feminism is the child of May 1968 (the révolte against the establishment and, among other things, against sexism). - The existing order (...) is critically observed and analyzed. Or (...) deconstructed". (A.c., 243).

The writings of the spokeswomen -- Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Monique Wittig, Annie Leclerc, Claudine Hermann et al -- are steeped in Marx,-- Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, -- Lacan, Macherey, Foucault.

Thus that French feminism is "political, radical and subversive."-- "The liberal humanist 'subject', that is, the individual, was always a man. (...). The woman is defined "in-her-relation-to-the-man" (...) whereby the female pole is always the subordinate one." (A.c., 244).

Note -- The woman as, by right and (sufficient) reason, different from the man, did not, or not sufficiently, come into her 'own' in the tradition. That tradition is thus being demolished, 'deconstructed' as 'sexist'.

Which is indeed a variant of postmodernism. But a postmodernism that clings to mainly one aspect of traditional rationality, sexism.

CF/CS 198.

Note -- Degrading is already questionable. But a Derrida, by his unrepentant radicalism, has provoked an anarchist interpretation of his position (which, incidentally, he resists). French feminism calls itself "subversive" (inflammatory).

Which leads *A. Finkielkraut, The Decline of Thought*, Amsterdam, 1990, to conclude that the relativization of "eternal truths" (metaphysics) implies that all cultures are equivalent without question,--that every "sacred house" can be demolished,--that everything is merely time-bound. In our time, postmodernism, among others -- so says Finkielkraut -- is adopting this relativizing attitude.

Christian postmodernism.
G. Vanheeswijck, Girard confesses color, in: *Strive*, draws attention to another variant of postmodernity.

René Girard (1923)-- *La violence et le sacré* (1972)-- is a postmodernist theorist who undermines modern autonomy, making man "alone" (*CF/CS 110* (Sartre)) and "vulnerable. But unlike most of today's leading postmodern thinkers, he assumes that "a better world" without God -- autonomous, that is -- is simply impossible, i.e., unachievable.

"In this he is not alone. George Steiner, Leszek Kolakowski, Charles Taylor, Vaclav Havel are the best-known representatives of a current I would call 'an alternative form of postmodernism.' All human thinking about the deeper meaning of life circles around three concepts that have been called the "metaphysical trinity": God, man and the world." (A "c., 397).

Vanheeswijck.-- "The modern Western cultural project that gradually took hold from the XVth century onward provided well-defined definitions

Note -- Axiomata - of these three notions: man is autonomous; the world is a complicated mechanism (*CF/CS 166*: machine); God is a hypothesis we no longer need (*CF/ CS 109*: Morale laïque).

What can be observed is that Vladimir Soloviev (1853/1900) and with him the Russian "Christian realists" (who reject nominalism) like F. Dostoevsky, N. Berdiaev, S.Boulgakov and others, are and postmodern and (platonizing) believers, yes, Christians.

Sample 75.-- Anarchism (libertarianism). (199/200)

Already more than once the term came up. The last time in relation to Derrida (*CF/CS 178*) and a part of his colleagues. Before that in relation to de Sade (*CF/CS 178*) and libertinism (*CF/CS 169*). Therefore a word about them.

Bibl. sample : *D.Guérin, Ni Dieu ni Maître* (*Anthologie de l 'anarchisme*), (Neither God nor Master (Anthology of Anarchism)), I (*Les pionniers : Stirner/ Proudhon/ Bakounine*), Paris, 1976;

-- *Un proscrit, L' inévitable révolution*, (The inevitable revolution) Paris, 1903 (esp. o.c., 303/307: *Déclaration des anarchistes accusés devant le tribunal de Lyon* (Declaration of the accused anarchists before the court of Lyon), 1883));

-- *G. Sorman, Les vrais penseurs de notre temps*, (The true thinkers of our time), Fayard, 1989 (o.c., 253/262: *Murray Rothbard* (*L'état, c'est le vol*)), (The state is theft).

History.

Guérin, o.c., 9, says he begins with *Max Stirner* (1806/1856; *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*), (The only one and his property), whose libertarian works date from 1842/1844,--the time when *P. J. Proudhon* (1809/1865) published his *Qu'est-ce que la propriété*? (What is property?), (1840) was publishing.

Further to be named are: M. A. Bakunin (1814/1876), Peter Kropotkin (1842/ 1921), Elisée Reclus (1830/1905). Also known is *Sergei Netshaiv* with his "*Revolutionaire Katechismus*", in which he preached "the propaganda of the deed" ("direct action") or "Pandestruktion" and cultivated as thinkers the Russian nihilists.

Definition.

Anarchism can count as a kind of socialism by ultraliberal means. - They want "utter justice" but against any organized form of authority.

"The anarchists are citizens who, in a century in which freedom of opinion is preached everywhere, believe that it is their duty to advocate unlimited freedom" (said the anarchists at Lyons in 1883). They want "absolute freedom, nothing but freedom, total freedom," i.e. the ability of each person "to do what he/she thinks is right and not to do what he/she does not think is right." "The anarchists are therefore going to teach the people to live without government as it is already beginning to learn to live without God. It will likewise learn to live without owners". (Un proscrit, o.c., 303;305)

More to the point, "The evil does not lie in one government or another. The evil lies in the very idea of 'government' It lies in the principle of 'authority' which must be replaced by 'le libre contrat', the freely entered into contract which can be revised and broken at any time." (ibid.).

CF/CS 200.

In other words: without God, which is autonomous, leads to without government, without owners, which is also autonomous. The modern nominalist basic idea! "Unlimited freedom"!

The current anarchist atmosphere.
Bibl. sample :
-- *J. Moulaert, Red and Black* (*The anarchist movement in Belgium* 1880/ 1914), Leuven, 1995.
-- *J. De Maere, Anarchism*, in: *Streven* 62 (1995): 10 (Nov.), 937/940, devotes a discussion to Moulaert's work.

'Definition'.
With Proudhon, Moulaert defines "anarchism" as "the absence of all authority or government. Lösche defines, "the voluntary association of empowered, emancipated individuals." All that 'hinders', -- state, bureaucracy, party, parliament, church, etc., must be phased out. -- The anarchists themselves refuse any "definition" as a kind of "coercion" and bondage that hinders the absolute definitional freedom that anarchism advocates!

"Our answer must be: a stubborn and irreconcilable struggle which cannot end except with the entire destruction of the 'dirty gang,' viz. throne, purse and altar." (1887).

One sees that religion, intertwined with royalty and capitalism, is always there.

Social democracy (ordinary socialism,--let us say) was not considered radical enough by the liber-tarians. Although they had a great deal in common with this variant of socialism. This common ground is shown by the fact that the far left social democrats became anarchists.-- Sometimes the Belgian anarchists had "allies": for example, E. Reclus, a geographer, who was appointed to the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and the *Flemish-minded youth* around *Van Nu en Straks*.

Conclusion -- "Implicitly Moulaert shows how much anarchism lives without the use of its name. In post-modernism which rejects all hierarchies (*note:* forms of authority) and has put away the "grand narratives" (*CF/CS 160* (*Hegel*); *195*). In many young people for whom "ni Dieu ni Maître" is a matter of course without knowing its historical roots." (A.c., 9 40).

J. De Maere, a.c., 937: "*A ghost haunts Europe: the ghost of anarchism.*" The anarchist ideology is very much alive as consciously anti-authoritarian and anti-organizational,--insusceptible and haunting.

CF/ CS 201.
Study notes.

Purely philosophical, i.e. abstracted from cultural philosophy per se, pages 148/150 (Nominalism/ abstractionism/ theory of ideas) - with pages 196 (God/nature/human) and 198 (God/nature/human) - are central. For here the minds break down into two - three basic choices, which, in passing, point to three or at least two types of personality.

1. *The nominalist* (one model of which is p. 142 (Apostle's loss of sense of reality)) pays attention only to what this earth provides to see and experience. After all, his perception does not extend beyond that.

2. *The ideative* (follower of the platonic or platonizing theory of ideas which puts forward 'essences' (value laden concepts), called 'ideas') pays attention both to this earth and what it has to offer, and immediately, through what this earth reveals, to what ... for the nominalist is invisible, intangible, unreal but for him, as an ideative, 'real' and therefore already 'given'.

Thus the transcendentalities (being(s), truth and sufficient reason, value, unity (= likeness/coherence). Thus God and numinous beings (spirits, souls). So paranormal data (fluid e.g., as p. 168 clearly shows us where nominalist materialism is confronted with "hylic pluralism"). This is: pretty much all of New Age.

3. *In between is situated the aristotelian abstractive.*

He does grasp as 'real' the abstract notions but he does not see them as ideas or 'essences' (here in the sense of higher because value-laden notions) independent of every concrete realization

The transcendentalisms already constitute a serious difficulty for the Aristotelian abstractionist: they cannot simply be "abstracted" from our sensory experiences by comparison and the omission of individual features of knowledge! Yet they are put forward as a residue of Platonic theory of ideas.

God and numinous beings, subtlety, all that is now called New Age, remains, fundamentally, for an Aristotelian abstractive "a rather closed book."

Historically, it is certain that, in later antiquity, the Aristotelians, rather skeptical as they were, thought and lived very secularist, toward this earth.

Immediately *pages 136/138* (*Constructionism/ essentialism*) become abundantly clear! Deo trino et uno gratias maximas.

01/03.-- Statement/ solution. - Information/ method. - Common/ common sense. 04.-- Regulative model: if, then. Applicative models.

05/09.-- direct knowledge (experience) / indirect knowledge (reasoning).

To describe what shows itself immediately (= phenomenon).

That which does not show itself directly, by reasoning demonstrate,-- to this end put on the road by signs.-- That which shows itself. is always the beginning.

Note -- The phenomeno.logical method is a descriptive method: to represent the pure phenomenon or directly given thing (phenom. reduction) in such a way that (especially) the species name (eidet. reduction) is worked out.

Appl. mod. M. Scheler's phenomenology of (Catholic lived) repentance.

Note -- In the description, the requested is to represent the given as. In the reasoning, the given is different from the requested.

10.-- *Structure of traditional logic.*

Based on concepts (concept theory) incorporated into judgments (judgment theory the reasoning articulates an if, then - sentence. Concepts that are as well-defined as possible are central. This is why one speaks of a logic of concepts, which decays into the theory of concepts, the theory of judgments and the theory of reasoning.

A.-- *the ontology as a basis.*

Logic is ontology articulated in if-then sentences. In particular : if reality (**1**= being or something 1), then reality **2** (= being or something 2). It comes down to ontologically distinguishing the concept of reality from a (sometimes very sloppy) day-to-day or even scientific use of language in this regard.

'*reality*'(= *being, something*).-- If one can say whether something is and what it is, then one has defined the reality of it. Do concentration camps exist and, if they exist, what are concentration camps? Or: how real are concentration camps and how are they real? In middle Latin; existence/ essence. Note that these always go together.

Appl. models.-- Let everyday or even scientific language say that a (day or night) dream, science fiction, lust feeling, the signs of logistics and of mathematics,-- become etc. are "not real", for ontology and traditional logic they are kinds or types of reality. If only something is "something: "not - nothing",!

Note -- Hegelian concept of "really". -- 'Wirklich' with Hegel means "all that solves its problems". A teacher who does her job well is called Hegel 'real'. A 'worn out' teacher(s) becomes unreal.

Syntax Of Signs.-- Axiomatic - deductive reasoning.-- Both as models of 'realities' and connections between realities! After all, a sign is not - nothing, but something in itself. Mathematics and logistics work with it in a strictly logical way. If a sign were totally unreal, then such operations would be meaningless.

Study notes   02.

A.I ... -- *The two basic insights of ontology and thus of logic.*
1.-- *The Identity Act.*
-- "If a, then a". The identity, understood ontologically, is the existence / essence of a. And this is the total identity of a with itself. In other words: something totally coincides with itself.

Contradiction principle.-- If a, then a and not non-a.

Principle of excluded third (saying).-- If. a, then only a and not - a: a third saying is excluded. For it is either a or not - a. There is no third possible phrase. Parmenides on the subject.

2.-- *The law of necessary and/ or sufficient reason (ground).*
If sufficient reason or ground, then understandable, sensible.-- In other words: all that is has either in itself or outside itself a (sufficient) reason or ground. Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximines on the subject.-- All this 16/20.

A.II.-- *The identitive or ordering (harmological) ontology. -* (21/32).

Identity theory.-- This expresses itself in a basic differential: total identity of something with itself (a=a); partial identity (=analogy) of something with something else (a = partial identity with e.g. b); total non-identity of something with its opposite (a = contradictory with not - a). Or: a and b are possible together but a and not - a are not. -- This differential governs the entire logic.

II.A.-- *Topology as applied identitive logic.*
A trope amounts to thinking of being (something) as including something else and defining that something in terms of that other something and thus speaking of it metaphorically.

Transitive speech is possible only if that other something either resembles the first something or is related to the first something.

Metaphor.-- That woman is a reed.-- collection.-- All specimens of a collection resemble each other in terms of at least one common characteristic (here: reeds are pliable; the woman is pliable in her way). One speaks of the woman in terms of reeds.

Metonymy.-- Apples are healthy.-- System or system.-- All parts (aspects) of a system are related by at least one common characteristic, i.e. together they make up the same whole, (here: apples cause health; health is caused by apples). One speaks of apples in terms of health.

Metaphorical sign: the map (equals).

Metonymic sign: the signpost (relates to).

Applications.

(1) The ontological term 'being' expresses both metaphor (likeness) and metonymy (coherence), i.e. partial identity (analogy). The same ontological term at once expresses encomium (if, then) or implication: "If that woman, then cane" and "If apples, then health".

(2) Tropological psychological-sociological behavior (Th. Ribot).

(3) model theory.-- Called "model" all that provides information about something, i.e., the original. Relation "subject (original)/sentence (model)".

The total model (a=a) shows up in the definition. The partial model is either metaphorical model (if Jantje, then he is first, just like a rooster with his chickens) or metonymic model (if smoke, then fire). One also says proportional model (cockerel-chickens) and attributive model (fire).

II.B.-- ***Tropology as applied identitarian logic.***

The synecdoche. -- About one, specimen one speaks *in terms of* the whole collection (and vice versa). About one part one speaks in terms of the whole system (and vice versa).-- One soldier is all the soldiers. The threshold is the whole house. "One soldier" is metaphorical; "the threshold" is metonymical.

Induction Theory.-- Traditional induction theory is depicted in the synecdochs. -To induce is to take samples.

Generalization.-- If at least one copy, then all copies.

'Whole-isation' or Globalization.-- If at least one part, then all parts.

This water boils at 100° C.-- This sample provides information, -partial information, about all water.-- The Meir and the port of Antwerp as examined.-- This dual sample provides partial information about all of Antwerp.

B.-- ***Order (n) doctrine or relation doctrine (harmological ontology).*** (28/32).

All that precedes on ontology (laws, identities) allows us to order the data. Basis of correct or valid reasoning.

28.-- Platon's stoicheiosis (theory of order): ordering letters.

29.-- Harmological ontology: combinatorics (configuration theory). Assigning something a place within a set of places (configuration).

30. Appl..-- 27 x 35. -- Systechy and differential as sets of places or configurations.

31.-- ***Basic differentials***.-- Totalidentical/partialidentical/contradictory.

Logical square (all or some do / all or some not). -- The middle ages on the distributive concept (totum logicum), which collects, and the collective concept (totum physicum), which disperses.—In other words : all and whole (= all together).-- J,. Royce.

32.-- Unity theory or henology.-- Identity establishes, "is," unity in a multitude. In virtue of similarity or in virtue of coherence.

So much for the pedestal of traditional logic.

....

Comprehension.-- 33/55.

33/34.-- Definition.-- Being as far as in our mind. Terms (different from words) as a linguistic form of concepts.

The concept content defines (depicts, displays, stores) the concept scope or -domain.-- "All that (something) is." -- "Something" is content. "All that ...is" is scope.-- Porfurios' tree diagram.

35.-- Tekstuology.-- A text is a term consisting of many words. 36.-- Magnitude types.-- Singular- distributive/ collective-transcendental (= ontological) concept.

37.-- ***Classification: size types***.-- Classification is enumeration of distinct or separated data (distributive or collective).

38/39.-- ***Classification/definition***: a text as a model. 40.-- Categories (distributive). Five in number.

41.-- Categories (collective). Ten in number.

42.-- Thematic: a material object / more than a formal object.--

The concept of ambiguity (poly-interpretability).

43.-- Thematics: words as themes (word/relation/judgment). 44/45.-- chreia, a developed and responsible definition. -- definition doctrine.-- Follows now a typology.

47.-- Partial (verbatim) and overall (business) definition.

48.-- Semiotic and non-semiotic definition. --

49.-- Locke's conceptual nominalism and Willmann's conceptual realism.

50.-- Definition of "culture" (existential definition).

51.-- Praxeological definition: algorithm.

52.-- Kitchen definition (algorithmic).

53.-- Incremental (cumulative) definition: 'treasure hunt!

54.-- Judicial definition: stories and logic.

55.-- Definition of the singular (idiographic definition).

....

Judgmental Teachings.-- 56/68.

Note that traditional logic does not work with concepts but with defined concepts! A judgment that works with undefined concepts does not know what it is saying!

56.-- Definition: "Of something (subject (original)) assert something (saying (model)).

57.-- Quantity (sing./ distrib.+ collect./ transcendental) and quality (affirmative / with reservation (restrictive) / negative) of judgment.

58: ***The comparative method*** (compare/identify), i.e. to check similarity/coherence as well as difference/gap.-- In- and out- and quant. (measurement model) and qual. Compare.

59.-- Comparison as the basis of judgment.

60.-- Negative predicate ('not'): correlative/ contraire/ privative/ contradictory.

61.-- The ***incongruous*** (***absurd***) is absolutely nothing (square circle).

62.-- Relating judgment.-- Traditional logic does not work with words but with terms ("greater than," "part of") because it is logic of concepts (and of well-defined concepts at that).

63.-- The semiotic sufficient reason for a judgment (It's sunny today : syntactic, semantic, pragmatic).

64.-- Text and context of a judgment: (the saying) (Hilde walks).

65.-- The sufficient reason within the judgment:

1. The crisis of modern rationalism concerning the principle of sufficient reason (cfr CS 56);**2** . Leibniz: analytic judgment (dissection of the definition) and synthetic judgment (testing against the scope, i.e. the data).

66. - The sufficient reason v/e value judgment (If someone can be mistaken about the value of something, this value is something objective and not a mere creation of a subject) .

67.-- Subject/proverb/provisions (grammatical modalities such as realis, potentialis, irrealis etc. : "A girl appears on the beach"; as well as concessivus, dubitativus, conditionalis).

68.-- Exactitude, yes, but also akribeia or ordinary accuracy.-- The term 'being' or 'being' is not polynomial but identitive .

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Reasoning Theory.-- 69/92.

69.-- *The conditional sentence*,-- eventual kon- or disjunctive.-- if, then. Logic in the traditionally strict sense.

70.-- *Logical modalities.-- necessary/not necessary (possible)/necessary not (impossible).* - Within judgment. Within reasoning.-- *Deduction*: if A, then B; well, A; therefore necessary B.-- *Reduction*: if A, then B; well, B; therefore possible A.

A.-- *The immediate derivation*.-- 71/77.-- This apparently consists of two sentences (where an axiomatic sentence is omitted, unsaid).

71. -- Models: "Three is bigger than two. So two is smaller than three". Or : "I think. So I am" (Descartes' basic sentence).

Note -- The minor term 'therefore' hypothetically replaces "if, then".

72.-- Mathematical induction ("If one number, then all numbers") and summative induction ("if each element separately, then all together""-- which is summative induction).

73.-- A-fortiori-reasening.-- "One would already be for less regarding sufficient reason)". - Under mean: "All the more for greater".

74.-- Analogical induction.-- From less similarity/coherence to more similarity/coherence : "The planet Earth has an atmosphere. So the planet Mars also has an atmosphere". Comparative Science.

75. -- Contrary Judgment - - "If all people who do not 'think' are superstitious, then all people who do 'think' are not superstitious."

76.-- Inverted judgment.-- Rule: "Though one may infer from all some, yet one may not infer from some all."

B.-- *The indirect derivation(capstone, syllogism)*.-- 77/92.

77.-- From "I think; therefore I am" to "VZ 1. All that thinks, is. Well, VZ 2, I think. NZ So I am". This is: from regulative model to applicative model.-- two basic types (since Platon) : sunthesis (= deduction) and analusis (= reduction).

78.-- *Deduction* (If A, then B. Well, A. So B), whose proof from the incongruent is one form (Platon).

Reduction (If A, then B. Well, B. So A), of which the lemmatic-analytic proof is one form (Platon).

79.-- Concept content and concept scope depicted within reasoning.- Three concepts: deductive: Tyra Banks/ top model/ star. Deductive: Tyra Banks/ star/ top model.

80.-- *two types of reduction.--* Peirce's bean example.-- deduction.-- reduction: induction (generalization (sampling) and hypothesis (generalization) .

The donkey or donkey's bridge.-- 80.

1.-- Thanks to distributive summative induction, we form the notion of collection of copies ('elements').-- If A (collection), then B(subset). Well, A (collection). So B (subset).

Deduction.-- All the beans in this bag are white.

Well, these beans come from this bag. So these beans are white.

From all to these!-- This is a distributive - deductive syllogism

Induction.-- These beans come from this bag.

Well, these beans are white.

So all the beans in this bag are white.

From these to all! Generalization.

II.-- Thanks to collective summative induction, we form the notion of system (system) of parts.-- If A (system), then B (part system or part). Well, B (partial system). So A (system).

Hypothesis.-- All the beans in this bag are white.

Well, these beans are white.

So these beans come from this bag. (non-emergency).

From This (part) to "this bag", (system). Generalization.

Note -- Peirce's models are not whole and ready. The reason is that one sentence is missing, namely, "All white beans come from this bag." For there is missing the collective -- deductive syllogism as e.g.

Deduction.-- All white beans come from this bag.

Well, these beans are white.

So these beans come from this bag. (necessary).

From all white (system) to this (part) generalization.

81.-- The single concluding sentence includes three terms.-- Chain reasoning (polysylogism) and accumulation (sorites) confirm this rule. 82.-- 4 X 64 = 256 'forms' Of syllogism, of which 19 are valid and 5 to 6 are common.

83.-- Eulerian geometric models as a proof of the identitarian nature of any reasoning.

85.-- **Collective syllogism**.-- "If a triangle exhibits two equal sides, it necessarily exhibits two equal angles. The consistency -- not the similarity -- counts. -- He is lawful. To see him as lawful is aristotelically termed) "abstraction" or (platonically termed) "ideation.

86/87.-- the authority argument,-- Deductive or Reduction.-- from the conceptual content (expertise) to the conceptual scope (authority domain).

88.-- Epicheirèma (concluding speech with embedded proofs).-- Mathematical and legal model.

89. -- Dilemmatic closing speech.-- Same or dual afterthoughts.

90.-- **Proof from the Incongruous**. -- If the counter model is asserted, then what follows is what refutes (makes absurd) that counter model.

91/92. - - Lemmatic - analytic reasoning. -- "If X (lemma), then B. Well, B. So X". "Look Miss. a feather!". A collective model: from a part (a feather) to the whole bird. The requested thing is unknown but one enters a sign X and sticks it on the requested thing as if it were already known.- Compare with Peirce's hypothesis.

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Applied logic or method theory.-- In capita selecta.

I. *Mathematical thinking* (02/14).

II *logistic thinking* (15/17).

III *experiential science thinking* (18/36),-- in which the amplificative induction (20/30).

IV. *Subjective thinking* (37/76).

V. *Rhetorical thinking* (77/80).

01 -- *methodology*.-- Method is applied logic.-- science or Epistemology.

1.-- *Mathematical Thinking* (02/14).-- Some features or sampling.

02.-- Quantitative (number and space mathematical aspect.

03.-- Aggregation theory as a definition of mathematics.

04.-- Differentiate: mathematical and non-mathematical (jumps).

05.-- Combinatorial nature of mathematical operations.

07.-- Formalism.-- Syntax: mere terms governed by syntactic rules. Logical syntax.

08.-- Fr. Viète: analysis.-- From (operative but non-universal) number arithmetic to (operative but universal) letter arithmetic as an application of the platonic lemmatic - analytic method.

10.-- Genetic" (= constructive) definition.-- "Reasoning from a known 1/5 to the unknown 5/5". As a definition of an unknown.

11.-- *Axiomatic definition*.-- Older language: general axiom and private axiom or 'postulate!

12.-- *Axiomatic definition of a concept (positive integer).-* G.Peano.-- 5 axioms of which the last is exclusive. This is the second donkey or donkey-inner bridge.

13.-- Axiomatics is a collective concept.--

1. Each axiom is distinct but not separate from the rest.

2. Its conceptual content refers to the entire size of positive integers and only to those integers. Magnitude.

14.-- Structure of axiomatics.-- It is a system of a finite number of basic concepts and basic judgments.

11.-- *Thinking logically* (15/17).-- A few traits.

15.-- J. Royce : logical algebra of actions (doing nothing,-- doing something and doing something else,-- implications).

16.-- The three waves of the history of logic. Situation of logistics therein.

17.-- Logic is symbolic, mathematical but especially formalized logic.-- Whitehead Russell, principia mathematica (1910/1913).

III.-- experiential science thinking (18/36).-- Main features.

18.-- Mathematical (exact) and non-mathematical (non - exact) proofs.

19.-- The empirical cycle.-- 1. Observation.-- 2. Hypothesis (lemma).

-- 4. Testing v/d hypothesis.-- value judgment.(analysis). This is the third donkey or donkey's bridge. The amplificative induction (20/30).-- The summative was summative. The she is knowledge-expanding.

20.-- amplificative induction.-- From the tested (summative summarized to the testable specimens reasoning.

21.-- Induction platonic.-- name/definition/exemplar ('image') as the basis of 'knowledge' that spends on the 'idea' ideation)~- Beholding education as its application.

22.-- Universal and statistical induction.-- Universal: 0% or 100%. Causal induction (23/26).-- Examine a dynamic system for its causal relationship.

23.-- Causal induction.-- Anaxagoras.-- Fr. Bacon's experimentalism. Testing empiricism and concept against experiments.

24.-- Causal induction.-- L. Pasteur: "If living cause, then (origin of) life".

The rules of experimentation of Fr. Bacon and J. St. Mill "the Bible of the experimental method". This is the fourth donkey or easel bridge.

25.-- Causal induction vlg. J. st. Mill.-- Similarity/difference and intensity.-- Precise of the foregoing.

26.-- The sequence "omen / sequel". -- Only the necessary and sufficient condition is the cause in its completeness.--

The order "day/night".

27.-- The dialogical induction.-- The antique-Greek democratic method with Herodotos, Socrates - Platon. It is generalization.

28.-- The biological induction.-- "To reason from individual living things through analogical induction to types or kinds of living things.

Humanities (29/32).-- Man is one type of living being.

29.-- humanistic induction.-- W. Dilthey's hermeneutics: "From individual people/cultures via analogical induction to types of people/cultures reasoning" thanks to the triad of "survival, insofar as expressed in behavior, 'understanding' ('verstehen').

30.-- "Thesis / hypothesis" (J. of Salisbury).-- Situational thinking.-- "Is marriage 1. for Anneke (individual), 2. for 'man' (species) duty?". Situational Morality.

31.-- the human sciences.-- 1. Antique: moral and social sciences" 2.1. Modern: Hume. 2.2. Recent : 1950+ (gamma - sciences: see CS /63).

32.-- The human sciences again ethical - political (moral - social).-W.Lepenias: the crisis since 1989 (economics) in the gamma sciences.

33.-- "new philosophy". -- ±. l910: H. Bergson: "life that gradually becomes aware of itself." -- But already G. Hegel and Marx, S. Kierkegaard and Fr. Nietzsche anticipated this.

34.-- Historical reasoning.-- "It had to come". (Common sense). Thoukudides of Athens: "If the portents, then the persecutions (inferable)".

35.-- Hegelian 'deduction!-- "On the basis of the understanding of the living whole (= all that was, is, will be) assign each fact its place and meaning" is Hegelian combinatorics.

36.-- Peirce's "pragmatic rule". -- "By their fruits one shall know them" (Jesus). The testing of a concept reveals to it its content and extent thanks to the effects that are observed.

IV.--Subjective *thinking*.-- 37/76.-- Thinking is always the thinking life of a person (in group within a culture).

37.-- the law of identity -- thanks to honor, reverence, conscience -- by the subject, the human being, assimilated (or misunderstood).-- basis of morality.

38.-- Meaning = view of meaning or sense of meaning.-- Hermeneutics.-- Man is a sense giver / sense giver.

39.-- intentionality.-- The Scholastics and in their wake Fr. Brentano put consciousness as intentionality at the center: our consciousness "gives out on", "is directed toward", data.-- Thus: **1.** Understanding: something is understood by someone (subject). **2**. Judgment: of something is asserted by someone.**3** . Reasoning: something is reasoned about by someone.

This is the fifth donkey or donkey's bridge.

40.-- Ellis Sagarin : healthy and neurotic mind.-- If A (disappointing fact) and B (common sense), then A "not tragic". - If A (disappointing fact) and B (neurotic mind), then A "tragic. The after sentence summarizes theorists with the letter C. From there: the ABC - theory of personality.

Kübler - Ross : denial/ anger/ things/ dejection acceptance as application of ABC - theory n.a. approaching death.

41.-- Method and ideology.-- A. Lange.-- Materialism as method, yes; materialism as ideology: no! The same material object (= given) provokes more than one formal object (interpretation).

42.-- axiomatic perception and judgment.-- Method. materialism: "There are material presuppositions". Ideological materialism: "There are only material presuppositions". Exclusion axiom.

43.-- Axiomatic theory or understanding help.-- A. hearing voices, B. denoted by established (rationalist) psychology, C. leads to misunderstanding and helplessness. But A. hearing voices, B. interpreted by a psychology closely related to the data (A), C. leads to understanding and helping.-- Pragmatic maxim!

The prejudices of Galileo and Bekker.-:- Astrology, yes, all extrasensory facts are, rationalistically interpreted, superstitions.

46.-- Galileo's true merits.-- "Though Scripture is infallible, some interpreters of it are fallible." (Pope John-Paul). "Science and theology must act in the fullest autonomy." (Id) -- Galileo did not prove heliocentrism but did found dynamics, part of physics. -Was not tortured.

47.-- Ch. Peirce.-- idiosyncratic/ straightforward/ preferential and scientific opinions.

48.-- Straightforward method: revenge as "heroic morality".

49.-- Straightforward method: established scientists declare revolutionary colleagues as heretics (BBC), heretics.

50.-- History of science is history of destiny and therefore, notwithstanding the 'rational' (logical) character of science, unpredictable to a certain extent.-- J. Zinck : "I think you have given them diabetes".

51.-- History of science, cf. P. Feyerabend: "Anything goes," mutual untranslatability, limited soundness of science, limited validity of "non-scientific ways of thinking."

52.-- History of science : a psychologist's blind spot.-- Torey Hayden, world-renowned child psychologist, confesses **1.**Ignorance on Satanism, **2**. Blindness, Exclusivism,**3.4** . Career Concerns. She neglects some of the facts a-priori.

54.-- axiomatic induction.-- No one possesses all possible axiomata such that he / she can deduce all possible facts from prepositions.-- All factual axiomata exhibit a finite number of axioms,-- with or without an added exclusive axiom. They make intelligible only portions of total reality.

This is the sixth donkey or donkey's bridge.

55.-- To put forward the unproven as if it were proven.-- petitio principii and circulus vitiosus.-- Port-Royal : to infer correct (incorrect) inferences from incorrect (correct) premises. (Hyper)critical thinking (56/60).

56.-- Rationalism that establishes lack of really sufficient reason: H. Albert : "There is no final sufficient reason. Then pretend with provisional sufficient reasons. Irrational basis of such rationalism.

57.-- Lack of really sufficient reasons.-- Zenon of Elea: eristics (reasoning, counter-reasoning, counter-reasoning). Consequence: neither thou nor I (have a final sufficient reason).

58.-- The bubble of experiential reason (constructionism).

59.-- E.W. Beth : dogmatic (something positive) and skeptical (criticism and deconstructionism) reasoning.

60.-- Psychological deconstruction of Platon.-- Psychoanalysts explain his thinking from the Oedipus complex: Platon is said to be neurotic and his logical method merely "rationalizing" his "unprocessed" disturbance.

61.-- undecidability.-- "That girl over there". -- The lie is not nonsense but an undecidable statement as long as one cannot test it.

Alpha. Beta. Gamma - sciences (62/70).

62.-- Alpha and beta sciences.-- P.C. Snow, The Two Cultures (1959).

Humanities and Sciences "living together apart".

63.-- Alpha and gamma -sciences.-- 1950+.-- Humanities/ Social sciences/ Sciences.-- Tp.-- The current chaology: chaos, determinism, predictability (probability theory),-- complexity, turbulence and its misrepresentations in the alpha and gamma - cultures.

Note.-- Steering Thinking (67/70).

67.-- Stewardship thinking in alpha - culture.-- "If order and deviation from that order, then restoration of that order". The ancient Greeks.

68.-- Stewardship in alpha - culture.-- The Bible: "The vengeance of God as restoration of violated order". Fr. Kafka: "The mysterious X, 'odradeck' the deviation, behind our cultural world that has (deviated)."

68.-- Steering science in the beta and gamma sciences.-- N. Wiener, Cybernetics, Paris, 1948.-- In self-regulating systems, goal orientation/ deviation/ feedback occurs.-- Regulator,-- homeostasis/ reflex,-- intentional behavior as models and levels.

Note -- computer thinking (71/76).

71.-- Definition.-- Machine that processes information in a purposeful way (dynamic system) using algorithmic thinking.-- Equipment (hardware) and software (software) together.

72.-- comparison.-- Automatic washing machine (very pre-programmed) and computer (much less pre-programmed).

73.-- Computational thinking is applied logic.-- Five insights.

74.-- Programming is logically constructing an algorithm (iteratively, sequentially, selectively).

75.-- Neuron network.-- esp. 1985+ : human brain as a model.

76.-- lhasa - computer.-- E. Corey (Nobel Prize 1990) : synthesis, retrosynthesis, total synthesis in chemical processes.

V.-- *Rhetorical thinking* (77/80).

77.-- The enthymeme as rhetorical, i.e. persuasive reasoning.

78.-- Rhetorical philosophy.-- "Corporate philosphy" and counseling philosophy.

79.-- the world of sophia.-- Philosophy as education for children.-1974 : Matthew Lipman : philosophizing based on Stories read and discussed together from a logical standpoint.

80.-- Literary rhetoric.-- P. Mertens, Une paix royale (1995).-- Anonymous, Primary Colars (1996).-- Free speech permissively interpreted but contested.

Note.-- One paid close attention to the six donkey and donkey-like bridges that salvage distinguished basic insights.

Third year of philosophy 1995/1996
Elements of cultural philosophy