

### **4.3. Introduction to Greek philosophy; Hivo 1979/1980 Second year.**

#### **4.3.1. part I (pages 1 to 150).**

##### ***Preface and situation.***

##### **1. Cultural-historical situating.**

One can classify the history of mankind in more than one way. A first classification is made from an industrial point of view: since C. Thomson (1816/1819; 1788/1865) and J. Lubbock (1834/1913) one speaks of stone, bronze and iron age, whereby the first, since Lubbock (1865), is divided into Old Stone Age (Paleo-lithic) and New Stone Age (Neolithic). A second classification is made from a socio-economic perspective: since S. Nilssen (1787/1883) one speaks of

1/ wild,

2/ pastoral-nomadic,

3/ sedentary-agricultural and

4/ civilized epoch, where pastoral-nomadism and sedentary agriculture (arable and livestock) are considered transitional between 'wild' (uncivilized) and 'civilized'. - In parallel, E.B. Taylor (1832/1917) and Lewis Morgan (1818/1881) designed and three-phase scheme:

1/ wild,

2/ barbaric,

3/ civilized.

Karl Marx (1818/1883) and Friedr. Engels (1820/1895), the founders of dialectical materialism, followed this three-phase scheme. One senses the tone of superiority that the 18th and 19th centuries held toward the past. A much more nuanced scheme distinguishes the following five stages.

##### ***(a) The archaic stage. -***

Archè" (Gr.) means "beginning" (later also "principle"). The initial stage of humanity, insofar as it can still be traced in terms of conceptions and general culture, is revealed by mainly three subject sciences:

(i) prehistory, which reveals the past of scriptless cultures (especially through antiquities or archaeology);

(ii)a. primitivology, which studies contemporary scriptless or at least evolved peoples, 'primitives' ('primus' meaning 'first'; hence primitivus):

(ii)b. Folklore or folklore, which has as its object of study the testimony remains (now subculturalized, but formerly culture-dominant) of archaic mentality within evolved civilizations.

##### ***(b) the antique stage. -***

'Antiquus' (Lat.) means 'ancient'. Antiquity, as distinguished from the ancient or archaic time before it, is characterized by a larger scale: instead of tribalism, a city-civilization with an empire was formed (thus the modern Empire, the Persian Empire, also called the Empire) within which, against an archaic mass of people, an elite of classical people developed, i.e. people with a strong personal individual consciousness (one thinks of Socrates as the prototype). The foci or centers of ancient culture, which give us:

1. Mesopotamia ( two-current land: Tgris and Euphrates) - +/-5000 ACN (even earlier); cf. A. Parrot, *Supplément Sumer - Assur (Mise à jour 1969)*, Paris, 1969; Sumer, later Akkad, still later neo-Sumer, Babylonian, Kassite empire, Assyria, Achemenian empire (up to -323 );
2. Egypt (Nile Valley) - +/- 4000;
3. Indus Valley - +/- 4000;
4. China (Heango and Jangtse - Kian valleys) - +/- 2200.

These great centers of culture, which directly affect us Westerners - the pre-Columbian Indian cultures do not directly affect us, - rise from the hunter-gatherer economies because they have an agrarian or agricultural society (arable and livestock: one thinks of the fertile crescent). Around these hotbeds of ancient culture, regions are established on which they radiate: e.g. China and Japan; Mesopotamia and Canaan and Anatolia etc..

**Note:** Today ‘Near East’ means the area from Egypt to Iraq (the border of Iran); ‘Middle East’ covers Iran to Burma; ‘Far East’ begins beyond Burma.

In ancient history, however, it is partly different: the ancient Near East includes the present Near East and the present Western Middle East. The ancient Near East includes

1/ the ‘south’ (think of the Queen of the South, in the Bible), i.e. present-day Ethiopia; via the Nile Valley (Egypt) and the Palestinian-Syrian Passage (Canaan) continues into the Mesopotamia;

2/ it further includes the deserts of Syria and Arabia (S.Paul resided in ‘Arabia’)

3/ and also the high plains of Asia Minor (Anatolia), Armenia and Iran (Persia).

**Note:** The discovering goes on and on: in 1963, 1968, in Syria e.g. the civilization of Ebla (Eblaitian culture) was discovered, destroyed in -2250 by Naram-Sin, an Akkadian prince (Tell Marbith).

A solid overview offers, J. Hawkes, *archeologisch panorama, (Wat gebeurde er tegelijk met wat, in de wereld van 35.000 voor Christus / 500 na Christus, ‘archeological panorama, (What happened at the same time as what, in the world of 35,000 BC / 500 AD), 1977, Amerongen, Gaade, 1977, - a recommendable book. Fascinating and thorough is also R.E. Leaky / R. Lewin, *Nieuwe inzichten in oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de mens, (New insights into the origin and development of man), Wageningen, Zomer/Keuning, 1978.**

**Note:** Urban civilization in the Americas is limited to Mexico, Central America and part of the South Sea coast of South America: the Aztecs (Mexico), the Maya (South Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras) and the Incas (Peru). Thus, D. et P Whitehouse, *Atlas archéologique universel*, Paris, 1978, pp. 240/241; an otherwise excellent work.

**(c) The medieval stage.**

Extending from Ireland to Japan,

the medieval stage constitutes both a decline ( a regression of ‘barbarian’ peoples to a pre - ancient stage) and a reprocessing (a ‘renaissance’: one thinks of the Carolingian, the Ottoman renaissances here at home).

**(d) *The modern stage.***

The scale increases again: Western mankind discovers both the New World (America) and the rest of the Old World (insofar as it was still undiscovered: think of Sub-Saharan Africa; of Australasia).

The exact science, synthesis of mathematics and experimental research (Galileo), is the new achievement: it lays the foundation of modern technocracy.

The Italian Renaissance, with its strong individualism and its “humanistic” return to antiquity, creates the new creative type, which approaches the same antiquity differently from the intellectuals of the medieval renaissances. -

Some distinguish, from the late 19th century, and early 20th century a so-called ‘contemporary’ epoch, distinguished from the ‘modern’ by the fact that the great principles of the modern period enter into a crisis: one can do this but one can just as easily conceive of the crisis as a continuation of the modern era.

**Note** - Eastern Orthodox Christians date from late antiquity, as do Catholics, but they did not know (or at least much less know) our Western Middle Ages; the Catholic Church worked out its assumptions in medieval scholasticism on an antique basis; Protestant Christians are a typically modern product.

Any economic rapprochement will have to take into account the three different cultural-historical phases at work in the three variants of the same Christianity. The mentality (archaic, antique (early antique, late antique), medieval, modern, contemporary) largely decides the interpretation of the same religion.

***II. Greek Historical Situation.***

Hellenic philosophy is not a segregated fact: it covers the last 1200 years of Hellenic history. Therefore, that brief overview.

The pre-Hellenic inhabitants of Hellas and its surroundings were called Pelasgoi, Pelasgen (Mediterranean type with celestial queen religion ).

(1) Early Helladic (- 100/-1900 ). The Hellenes, in the earlier Bronze Age seep in. They are Nordic people, Indo-Europeans.

(2) Middle Helladic. - (-1900/-1000). The Hellenes, in their raids, act destructively. They were called, Achaioi, Achaians, and include mainly two tribes, the Aiolians (Eolians) and Ionians.

(3) Late Helladic (-1000/- 1100). - Cretan-Mikean culture weakened by natural catastrophes (especially +/- 1500 ACN: the Santorini catastrophe; cf. R. Schiller, *De explosie die de historie een andere loop gaf*, (The explosion that changed the course of history), in reader's digest, *Onze monumentale en mysterieuze natuur*, (Our monumental and mysterious nature), Amsterdam/Brussels, 1973, pp. 64/68, - following the hypothesis of Prof. Galanopoulos (1956)). It was also weakened by the tribes encroaching from the north (Epeiros). -

It should be noted that the Trojan War, sung about by Homer, is situated around -1200.

(4) The Dorian migration of the people. (-1150/-550 ). Two colonization's.

(4)a. The first colonization (Ionian migration, under the pressure of the Dorians): -1150/-800.

(4)b. The second colonization: -750/-550. These 'dark Middle Ages' see the emergence of the polis, the city (state), on the Anatolian coast and Homer (-900/-800) poems the two epics, the Iliad and the Odusseia, which sing the praises of the lost greatness of the Mucasian era. Around -800 a turning point occurs: the "dark ages" end and this gives rise to the Hellenic history proper.

(5) Unification in time: -800/-500 Sparta (Doric) and Athens (democratic- Ionian) are the great poleis (city-states). Language, religion and archaic art acquire unifying character. Natural philosophy emerges in Ionia (Anatolian coast) at Miletos (Miletus), around -600.

(6) The classical age: -500/-336. - The Persian wars (which had stakes: either Eastern turannia or Hellenic democratia), the Golden Age (Perikles), political decline and cultural aftermath.

(7) The Hellenistic period: -336/-146. Alexandros the Great (reckoning with the Persian empire).

(8) The Roman era: -146/ +600. Rome conquers Hellas and incorporates it into the Roman empire. The so-called "Late Antiquity" (with its infusion of Eastern religions, including Christianity), begins.

This means that Hellenic philosophy has existed for about 1200 years. We will now give a summary of those 1200 years.

**Note:** The second colonization shows a fanning out on a large scale. See Msgr. P. Scalardi, *Marseille la Grecque (Son empire et Rome)*, 1974.

Marseille was founded in -599 by inhabitants of Fokaia (in Ionia, Anatolia). Reference should be made to Greater Greece (= Southern Italy) and Sicily as centers of colonization.

Naukratis (in Egypt) is also a Hellenic colony. Colonization also took place around the Black Sea: Byzantium was founded in -660 (Naukratia in -650).

## ***Hellenic Philosophy.***

### ***Introduction.***

- Hellenic philosophy comprises three major periods, characterized by three types of philosophical work.

#### ***(I) The philosophy of nature. (-600/-350).***

The basic concept is *physis*, *natura*, nature. The evolving and developing reality to which the Hellenic philosophers knew themselves to belong, together with its origin, is central: it is summed up as a whole (the collection of all that is) and attempts are made to trace its essence (nature; but in the sense of being, nature) or, even better - which amounts to the same thing - its guiding principle ('*archè*', *principium*).

This period is also called "the age of cosmology": according to Diogenes Laërtios (8: 48), the expression "cosmos" (*mundus*, world as ornament) comes from Pythagoras (-580/-500), to denote the celestial vault closes (apparently because of the harmony in the entire physical movements).

With Herakleitos (-535/-465), who 'polemically' (*polemos*, *bellum*, struggle) interprets the world, 'cosmos' means ordered whole. If you will: *cosmologia* is the study of nature but with the Pythagorean emphasis on the harmonious order character of nature.

#### ***(II) The classical conceptual ethical philosophy. (-450/-200).***

Socrates (-469/-399), without eliminating natural philosophy, shifts attention to the ethical (moral, moral) or, what is the same with the ancient Hellenes, the political (civil, civil) realm - something that all natural philosophers also did, - namely, consider conscientious behavior in the context of the polis according to its "principle" of governing nature, - but Socrates does this in a new way: he does it conceptually (comprehensively).

Socrates establishes a theory of concepts, not so much general as ethical-political: the guiding concepts of 'good', 'righteous', and 'pious' (morality, law, and religion as the basis of both) attracted attention in the midst of the crisis in which he lived. - One-sided or incorporated into a broad whole (as with Platon and Aristotle, his "great disciples"), the ethical-political sphere of understanding dominated Hellenic thought for centuries.

#### ***(III) The Theosophical Philosophy. (+250/+600). -***

Attention is now drawn to the 'light-darkness'-dyad or duality. The divine primordial light, uncontaminated, salutary and conscientious, on the one hand, the ungodly, dark, tainted, unholy and conscientious, on the other, form the interval in which man, having of the two, is situated. Thereby in:

1/ the pure incorporeal spirit the light,

2/ the substance or matter the darkness (with body and sexuality included in it). To break free from the dark, tainted matter, - to ascend to the Primal Light is the task of man.

Ammonios Sakkas (175/242) was the founder of the main type of Theosophy, Neo-Platonism: he was first a Christian but afterwards converted to the Hellenic religion.

**Note:** - What the three great schools of thought have in common is that they all seek unity in the given multiplicity: sometimes this unity (which shows the way and is therefore guiding) is fisis, nature (as a principle in the material-spiritual world), sometimes it is understanding (as a synthesizing principle in the midst of many sensory data) or it is divine reality which, as the One, governs the material and tainted multiplicity. - More than that: these three interpretations of unity that gives direction in multiplicity can go together and complement each other.

### ***I. The philosophers of nature . (-600/-350).***

**Starting point.** - The concept of fisis, natura, nature, is the central intuition, the one making point of view (perspective). What does 'fisis' mean? As Werner Jaeger, *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les Présocratiques)*, Paris, 1966 (// The theology of the early Greek Philosophers, Oxford, 1947) - Jaeger does it even more precisely in his *Paideia*, - says: 'fisis' has two basic meanings:

1/ the genesis and development and

2/ the origin of that becoming and development. Thus, o.c. pp. 27/28, - "fisis ton onton, generatio entium", origin, resp. genesis and development of his.

Thus Homer (*Iliad* 14: 201) says: "(Hera, wishing to approach her husband Zeus, cunningly, in conversation with her daughter Aphrodite, says:) for I am on my way to see the limits of the earth, which nourishes many beings, Okeanos, the genesis, the origin, of the gods and Thetus, the (gods') mother, who both nourished and guarded me well in their palace." (Okéanon te génesin thoon).

And (*Iliad* 14: 246): Hera asks Hupnos, the sleep(god), to make Zeus sleepy, but the latter confesses his impotence and says:)

"Every other among the ever living goddesses I did put to sleep easily, even the stream of water of Okeanos, who is the genesis, the origin, of everything.

Zeus, however, the kronied (note.: son of Kronos), him alone I could never approach nor put to sleep, if he himself did not command it. " (Okayanou, hos par génesis pantessi tétuktai).

As an aside: Here one sees how Homer also conceives of the gods as become, brought forth, just like humans and everything (pantesai) that exists; indicating a very different concept of God than the (primal) monotheistic one.

"Since Homer already people with singular gifts are called 'divine' and, in the sixth century, some sages and ecstatic seers are also considered related to the gods."

Thus W. Den Boer, *De godsdienst der Grieken*, (The religion of the Greeks), Den Haag, 1965, p. 125. The word 'theogonia', gods arising (antropogonia, kosmogonia) clearly points to the all-encompassing character of fisis or genesis.

Why do we cite both of these Homeric texts, which do not even contain the word ‘fusus’? Because, as Jaeger says, o.c., 27/28, “genesis” has the same double meaning as “fusus”: it is synonymous with it.

It is immediately clear that the claim, made several times today, that the Hellenistic philosophers did not know any movement (in the broad philosophical sense of change - kinesis, motus) is based on ignorance: for the ancient Hellenist reality around him and within him is, from the outset, ‘genesis’, origin and ‘phthora’, perishing - in other words, change is constant.

Does Herodotus (eighth century) not write a theogonia, gods origin story (gonia, genesis are from the same root; think of ‘gennétikos’, genetic, which with Aristotle is labelled as the standpoint par excellence of thinking, - which still lives on in an expression like ‘genetic psychology’)?

Everything (not just the gods) has a ‘genesis’, according to already the Homeric Hellenes. It is therefore not surprising that W. Jaeger, this time in his famous work *Paideia*, I, S. 54-3, writes that “die Forschung nach der Physis oder Genesis, dem ‘Ursprung’, um der ‘Theoria’ willen selbst betrieben wird” (that the investigation of the fusus or genesis, the origin, for the sake of the theory (i.e. the contemplation) itself is practiced), in addition to the Ionic poetry, since Archilochos of Paos (-735/-716), and the Solonian poetry (Solon: -640/-560), by the so-called fusikoi, physicists, natural philosophers.

But here it begins: the origin of the movement and that movement of decay and creation is viewed by the fusionists in a special way: they want to determine the ‘fusus’, natura, being or nature (essence) of that origin and of the movement that emerges from it. This gives a third meaning of ‘fusus’: the being (of something). -

When then the total collection of becoming and decay, together with its origin, is called ‘the’ fusus, nature, then a fourth meaning of ‘fusus’ arises, namely nature as (distributive and/or collective) collection of all things and their movement events.

Indeed, since Anaximandros (Anaximander: -610/-547), who uses the word ‘archè’, principium, principle, for the first time, Milesian naturalists have been searching for the principle of movement (and its origin).

What does ‘principle’ mean? It means governing power that controls (if need be the origin and certainly) the movement or fusus, resp. genesis, gives a direction (think of the kinetic or topological structure from logic). The ‘being’ of something is precisely that ‘principle’!

As Kurt Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, (Right and limit of natural religion), Zürich, 1954, e.g. S. 28, 41/44, and, for that matter, throughout the book, shows, the word 'fusus', natura, nature, possesses a fifth and, at once, a sixth meaning.

The fifth meaning springs from the chthonic or telluric religion of archaic culture: nature, in and outside man, insofar as it escapes from purely intellectualist- rationalist forms of consciousness; it is called "irrational" nature. Opposite this is the so-called rational-intellectual nature of what exists in and outside man. -

Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), one of the great so-called 'critical' materialists, at the same time an irrationalist like no other (or vitalist), distinguishes between Dionysian and Apollonian nature: the god Dionusos was the chthonic irrational deity; Apollon, the primal rational deity. -

Well, the ancient Hellenes distinguished very sharply those two shades of fusus: E.W. Dodds, *The Greek and the Irrational*, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1966, and also his *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, Oxford, Un. Press, 1973, have demonstrated this convincingly. One only has to read Platon, 'the' intellectualist among the Hellenic philosophers, namely there where he can no longer cope with comprehensible language and resorts to mythical language.

See also G.Verbeke, *Mythen sterven niet (Bezinning over de Griekse mythologie en het begin van het Westerse denken)*, (Myths do not die (Reflections on Greek mythology and the beginnings of Western thought)), in our Alma Mater, 1972 : 3 (p. 135/152: "For Plato myth is not synonymous with error; on the other hand myth is not an allegorical rendition of philosophical insights.

According to him, it has its own original truth-value provided that it is transposed to the level of philosophical reflection: then it becomes the revelation of insights that cannot be reached nor justified by purely rational means." (a.c.; 151).

Something that the German philosopher Schelling, *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie*, (Introduction to the philosophy of mythology), 1856, already saw clearly.

The Greeks strongly developed the rational meaning of fusus: the steering 'being' (the essence) becomes their hobbyhorse. And this, in the midst of a mobilistic climate (mobilis, kinètikos, movable) that is always confronted with creation and decay, will represent an immobilistic accent.

Which does not mean, however, that dowsing and rapture have no appreciation, though they are not the appreciation of archaic religions.

The 'being' (the steering principle) represents the one in the many: a multitude of types, of parts, of possible changes (distributive being; collective being; steering being) is controlled - rationally - and summed up in the one being!

**Overview** - The bibliography can be found in such works as G. Varet, *Manuel de bibliographie philosophique, I (Les philosophes classiques)*, (Handbook of philosophical bibliography, I (Classical philosophers), et II (*Les sciences philosophiques*), (Philosophical sciences), Paris, PUF, 1956. - From the incalculable mass of books and articles on the pre-Socratic scholars, mention should be made of the text editions: H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Griechisch und Deutsch)*, (The Fragments of the Presocratics (Greek and German)), Berlin, 1903-1, 1922-6; W. Kranz' reissue: Berlin, 1951/ 1952; C.J. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* (A collection of texts), Vol. 15 (*Thales to Plato*), Leiden 1950.

**Three types of books deal with the pre-Socratics:**

(1) philosophical, such as A. Vloemans, *De voorsocratici*, (The presocratics), The Hague, 1961;

(2) theological, such as W. Jaeger, *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les présocratiques)*, (At the birth of theology (Essay on the pre-Socratics)), Paris, 1966;

(3) professional: natural scientific, as Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, 1971; spiritual or human scientific, as W. Jaeger, *Paideia (Die Formung des Griechischen Menschen)*, (Paideia (The Formation of the Greek Man)), 3 Bde, Berlin, 1934/1936, 1936/1947<sup>2</sup>; paranormological or occultist, such as E. Dodds, *The Greek and the Irrational*, Berkeley Los Angeles, 1966; E. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich München, 1977 (Eng.: *The ancient Concept of Progress*, 1972).

The reason is that philosophy, from its inception, thinks in as all-sided a way as possible to avoid "subject idiosyncrasy" (i.e., being unilaterally enclosed by one's own scientific specialization). Theology, philosophy and professional science are not "stages" (as has been claimed since Comte), but aspects which are present simultaneously.

Philosophy is, in this sense, 'fundamental', i.e. concerning the foundations and implications. The agological or educational value of philosophy goes hand in hand with this.

**More precise overview of philosophy. -**

They are called *fusikoi*, physicists, physicalists or, also, *fusiologoi*, physiologi, physiologists. Note that the Hellenic word 'fusio.logos' means: one who brings up nature (*fusis*) (*logos*, *logia*), while this word now, together with anatomy, designates a part of modern biology.

**(I) The mythical theologians. -**

Homer (-900/-800) with his *Iliad* and his *Odyssey*, - much more clearly, Hesodios of Askra (-800/-700), with his *Theogonia* and his *Works and Days*, stand at the cradle of Hellenic thought.

Later (Plato, Aristotle) they are called *theologoi*, theologians, because man in his history does provide the foreground of their world of life and thought, but

(1) deities,

(2) daimones (divine spirits) and  
(3) heroes (heroes) constitute the living background of human work. Epic or didactic poetry is a literary genre. Its core is myth.

“Already in Homer are found approaches to a world-view interpretation of myths, (W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 98). “The experience of life is for the poet Hesiod rooted in the enduring laws of world order, which the thinker Hesiod recognizes in the religious representation of myth.”(Ibid., I, 98).

In other words, mythic contemplation, without any formative element of logos - i.e. the rational - reasonable reasoning of logic - is still blind and logical comprehension, without any living core of original mythic contemplation, becomes empty. This is how one could say, in a meaningful transformation of a Kant statement.

From this point of view one should regard the history of the philosophy of the Greeks as the process of the progressive rationalization of the original religious world-view present in the myth.” Thus again W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 543. As already Otto Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, (History of Idealism, I (Prehistory and History of Ancient Idealism)), Braunschweig, 1907-2, brilliantly demonstrated, the history of philosophy begins in the archaic religions and, among others, in mythic thought.

Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-424) says that the poets Hesiodos and Homer gave the Hellenes their theogony: they gave the gods their names, places of honor (Gr.: timas, honores, honorary offices), assigned them their roles (technas, artes, skills), determined their appearances (modes of appearance).

But Willmann points out that in Homer, and Hesiod, also according to the same Herodotos, primordial prehomeric and prehesiodic understandings are present, such as e.g. the nekuiai, descensus ad inferos, hell’s journey (two in the Odusseia) and the hieros gamos, sacrum matrimonium, sacred marriage (Iliad: Zeus and Hera; Odusseia: Ares and Afrodite). Cf. *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 139/140. The text of Herodotos comes from his *Historiai*, 11, 49/53.

### ***(II) The natural philosophers.-***

Sophia’, sapientia, wisdom, means knowledge of the order of life, with all that this knowledge implies in its background (as e.g. human and divine affairs). Filos’, amicus, friend.

Both together mean, since Pythagoras of Samos (-580/-500), philosophy, to distinguish the word from wisdom (which always quietly. possesses, problem-free knowing means): the sage seeks the truth, unlike the ‘sage’, who does not develop the rational - reasonable.

### ***A/ The older Milesians.-***

Also called the “older Ionian physicalists,” they proceed from the fysis and understood it as hylis, material, material principle (which, however, does not mean that

they consider it exclusively as material: the distinction between material and incorporeal spirit did not yet exist in their days; Attic philosophy will make that clear.

### ***The mythical theologians***

They also sought, as far as they were worldly and philosophical, the genesis resp. fisis, the nature of things, but their attention went more to the deities, without excluding earthly things, far from it!

The philosophers put much more emphasis on earthly things themselves: the coming into being and passing away of things has its principle in itself rather than in a transcendent world of gods: they think more immanently. - The couple “transcendent / immanent” means “rising above and beyond something / abiding in something”.

#### **- *Thales of Miletos* (-624/-545),**

As far as we know anything with certainty about him, seems to have put ‘water’ first as a principle; which becomes understandable if one recalls the texts of Homer, above p. 6, about Okeanos (and Tethys) as the ‘genesis’ of all things, the gods included.

#### **- *Anaximandros of Miletos* (-610/-547)**

He is the first thinker of whom we have a philosophical fragment; he uses the word ‘archè’, principium, principle, apparently, philosophical, and says that the principle of all things is in their arising and passing away, ‘a.peiron’, in.finitum, the unbounded (i.e. that which knows neither forward (without beginning) nor backward (without end) nor in any direction (without any boundary) pole or barrier).

From it everything arises; in it, when it perishes, everything comes to an end. It is starting point and ending point without more.” It is single. It is immortal, imperishable.

In other words, the unbounded is something like a divine primordial ground from which everything arises and in which everything perishes. It encompasses everything and, he says, it “governs everything” (steering sense).

#### **- *Anaximenes of Miletos* (-588/-524)**

He further defines the living and thinking, soulful character of the primal principle: “As our soul (psuchè) holds us together (sunkratei), so (peri.echei) breath (pneuma, spiritus) and aër (air) encompass the whole cosmos (world, universe).”

That the primal principle is called ‘air’ is not surprising if one knows that Anaximenes says: “hè psuchè hèmetera aèr ousa sunkratei hèmas” (our soul, which is air (breath), holds us together).

The word “air” means what possesses psychic life. This means that the universe-principle is something soulful; which represents an advance over Thales (oceanic water as a source of life of a divine nature) and Anaximandros (the limitless that sends all-pervasive), who thought too little of soul life in the universe. “Holon ton kósmon pneuma kai aèr peri.echei”: “all the cosmos includes breath and air” (subject is ‘breath and air’; I translate literally).

### ***We dig in***

The Narkissos myth - 'Muthos', fabula, story, means, in Greek:

(1) the spoken word (in all its variants: speech, rumor, maintenance, command, decision);

(2) since Homer: fable, legend. Today it means the wisdom tale that accompanies a rite (with all the variations of meaning present in it). -

'Numfè', nympha. nymph, means

(1) veiled woman, so e.g. bride;

(2) feminine deity or spirit of nature (Nereids: sea nymphs; naiads: nymphs inhabiting all running waters (rivers); Dryaden: oak wood nymphs; Alseids: bush nymphs; - Hamadryaden: forest nymphs; Meliads: ash tree nymphs, -- Napaiai: valley nymphs; Oreaden: mountain nymphs; etc.). Cf. our fairies.

(i) a1. Narkissos (Lt: Narcissus) is the son of a stream god, Kefisos (Lt. Cephisus; a stream in Fokis) and a ninf, Liriope. -- One sees the "divine" descent, interpreted by the Orphics as exile of the divine soul in the earthly.

(i)a2. The blind seer Teiresias had said of Narkissos, "Narkissos lives as long as he does not see his own image." This prediction lays bare the structure of his life and death. Let us see how it materializes concretely.

(i)a3. Knot. - The drama, summed up in Teiresias' statement, begins with the fact that Narkissos becomes a young man of exceptional beauty, - something with which he commits "hubris," superbia, boundary-breaking - and that means, steerage-wise, deviation from the rule.

He bathes regularly in the stream, thereby - metamorphic aspect - regularly changing his appearance. The nymphs see him and all fall more or less in love with him. Narkissos complacently rejects them.

(i)b. The nymph Echo (echo), stupidly in love with him but despised by him in her 'eros', amor, minne, is terribly disappointed (frustration). In one version, Echo dies of grief and her sisters turn to Nemesis; in the other version, Echo herself turns to Nemesis.-

Nemesis (word meaning in common Hellenic, distributive (distributive) justice) was, originally an ancient Attic goddess; later she was widely venerated in Hellas.

Her role (and skill upon which that role rests) is: to reduce people who commit hubris, transgress boundaries. unconsciously or consciously (haughtily) to their proper measure (e.g., by humiliating them); - which steeringly means a restoration.

Yes, she was even identified with zealotry (envy, jealousy), - which was attributed to 'the gods' in general (remember how Yahweh is also zealous) and so Nemesis had something of the so-called 'evil eye' (ofthalmos baskanos, calamity), i.e. casting an evil fate on someone one cannot stand in one's happiness. The latter - zealotry and evil gaze - is a demonic trait.

Echo thus asks the goddess of avenging (distributive) justice that Narkissos should suffer the same fate that he made her suffer: one sees here the “law of weatherbots” of magic at work, namely, the evil that one does to someone, returns - if the wrongdoer is more powerful, to the evil-doer and - like a boomerang - strikes himself. -

At the same time, this is a typical judgment of God. - Nemesis allows it. With that, the execution of the backlash is open. -

**(ii)a.** As in a god-judgment rule, so here: Nemesis acts all that P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté, II (Finitude et culpabilité)*, (Philosophy of the Will, II, Finitude and guilt), 2 (*La symbolique du mal*), (The symbolism of evil), Paris, 1960, PP. 199/217, labels ‘le dieu méchant’ (the naughty god) - the tragic poets, Aischulos, Sophocles, Euripides, incorporate this into their dramas; - rather, as an insidious deity.

They reinforce, by (him unconscious) prompting, the evil he commits, so as to impose measure and force awareness, if still possible. Think of the serpent who ‘inspires’ Eve to pluck from the ‘forbidden tree’, but here the treacherousness is not directly laid in Yahweh. -

As always, Narkissos walks in the forest and hunts. He gets thirsty. He finds a clear spring in an open space in the forest. At Nemesis’ prompting, he bends down and - Teiresias’ prophecy is fulfilled - unknowingly for him - he sees his image for the first time in the water mirror image. -

The weatherbolt is fulfilled; - he falls deadly in love with himself, with his mirror image (Nemesis takes him by his self-righteousness). By reaching for his mirror image, he distorts it and makes it disfiguring and ugly, again and again.

**(ii)b.** After these episodes, the denouement. - As in tragedy (tragic irony), Narkissos suddenly understands what is happening, too late and vaguely.

In the grip of Nemesis’s destiny throes, he neglects eating and drinking. Metamorphic: he takes root, like a plant, at the foot of the spring and gradually transforms into a flower, the narkissos or death flower, which, in the spring, reflects in the water to die, in the fall. -

In the Demetermyth, e.g., Korè, the daughter of Demeter and Zeus, with the Okeaniden (Okeanos daughters, water nymphs), gathers spring flowers in a meadow.

When she plucks the death flower, the earth suddenly opens up (cf. the ‘Mother’ Earth, from which everything originates and in which everything perishes again): Hades, the ruler of the underworld, rises up and robs Korè. To him the daffodil is “sacred.

-- In 1910, S. Freud, for the first time, ‘narcissism’: the homosexuals seek young men who resemble them; they take, in them, - themselves as objects of lust, to ‘love’ them as their mother ‘loved’ them. This then is a typical psychoanalytic interpretation of the myth.

**-- Digression: The natural wisdom scope of myth. -**

Anaximandros is known for his fragment which Libbe Van der Wal, *Het objectiviteit-beginsel in de oudste Griekse ethiek*, (The Objectivity Principle in the Oldest Greek Ethics), Groningen, 1934 (a work which studies the ethics in Anaximandros, Herakleitos and Demokritos). p. 16, cites:

“That out of which things (ta onta) are born (hè genesis), therein also they perish (ftora), as is necessary. For they pay penance (tisis) for their iniquity (a.dikia) to each other according to the order of time (káta tèn tou chronou taxin).”

From which the being is the genesis (fusic), therein is also their ftora (perishing) according to necessity: it is here about the ‘archè’, the unlimited. This limitlessness resembles the Earth Mother, from whom everything originates and in whom everything perishes. Or on Okeanos, the genesis of everything (Homer).

One sees how myth paves the way through personification (hypostasis is the presentation as a person of a ‘power’ with a certain name (e.g. earth, distributive justice), but then with god-like features).

Already with Homer ‘theos tis’ (a god) or ‘theoi’ (gods) is the same as ‘daimon’ (i.e. the power proper to a deity). Later one also says ‘to theion’ (the divine) to call that ‘power’, a god’s own.

In fact, this is abstract thinking but ‘theological’, i.e. one calls ‘gods’ what is actually a power attribute (office, skill) of them. It amounts to moving an immanent reality (present in nature, in things themselves), into the transcendent (the beyond and rising above it) realm. The sage does the opposite: he places the transcendent in the immanent.

In the Narkissos myth, there is an immanent aspect:

1/ Narkissos, even without god-intervention, even without nemesis-intervention, by virtue of his immoderate complacency, prepares himself a knot, i.e. an entanglement unfavorable to him.

2/ In the divine judgment, the goddess does not create the restoration of the deviation: she merely reinforces what is already present in Narkissos’ soul and behavior. This means that immanent aspect (what is at work in Narkissos, without Nemesis; his fusic or nature, understood as nature of being and rule that acts steeringly) and transcendent aspect (the intervention from the world of the gods) are simultaneously present and intertwined. This means that the myth, in its way, already describes the fusic, the nature, of the event. Something the natural sages will do, hylically (material-principle bound).

Incidentally, both in myth and in philosophy the steering structure is at work, - here as an internal justice which regulates creation and decay (eunomia and cosmos are what the Hellenes call it). Cf. W.Jaeger, *A la naissance*, p. 43. It is also called sociomorphic (society-like) physical (E. Beth, *Natuurphilosophie* (Nature Philosophy), p.36).

### ***B/1. The natural wisdom theologians -***

The religious middle classes of the sixth century realized that the time-honored religion was in crisis if the Milesians told the truth. Consequence: they rethought their religion. Thus a new type of theology emerged.

### ***The new theogonies, especially the Orphic. -***

The mystery religions (Demeter, Dionusos, - Orphism), without leaving the myth, still rethink the myth and they do this influenced by the natural wisdom. Mousaios, Onomakritos, ferekudes of Suros (+/- -550) are mentioned here, but one knows bitterly little about them.

Orpheus, described as a magician, a descendant of hell, a ruler of wild animals and a singer, is a vague figure (about whom very little is known) but who is, in any case, the center of a new mystery religion (of which the figures just mentioned are the spokesmen). The Dionus myth is central to that religion (and its theo-, cosmo- and anthropo.gony). Cf. A. Provoost, ed., *Orpheus (Ontstaan, groei en nawerking van een antieke mythe in de literatuur, beeldende kunsten, muziek en film)*, (Orpheus (Origin, growth and after-effects of an ancient myth in literature, visual arts, music and film), Leuven, 1974.

### ***-- Digression. -***

In order to give an idea of this theogony, which is both Hesiodic and philosophical of nature, here is a summary of what H. Jeanmaire, *Dionysos (Histoire du culte de Bacchus)*, (Dionysus (History of the cult of Bacchus),), Paris, 1978, p. 384, says about the Dionus myth at its core. -

It is a story of suffering: Dionusos is the son of Zeus, the Alfather, and Semele, the daughter of Kadmos, the founder of Thebes, and of Harmonia.

Dionusos is killed, and as a child (divine child). He is the victim of the Earth Sons or Titans (who are the traditional enemies of the new divine order established by the Olympian gods, under Zeus' leadership).

The Earth Sons ambush the child by means of various objects (which count as toys: spinning top, lozenge, crescents (bones); a mirror).-

These two types of objects are - it should be said in passing - also used as sumbola, symbols, in some mysteries (i.e. initiation rites). -

The child is killed. The body is torn apart, but the 'thinking heart' ('noèrèn kradièn') is saved by the goddess Athene.

The remaining pieces of the corpse are collected and boiled in a cauldron (reminiscent of a magical cure for rejuvenation and immortality).

Thereupon the Earth Sons are punished by Zeus: "Zeus no longer restrained his power - according to an ancient so-called Homeric hymn. An utter rage seized his heart: he showed his whole power. From heaven and from Mount Olumpos he hurled his lightning. He begat terrifying weather-lights: thunder. and lightning sprang rumbling from his right hand.

Shuddering for the sake of the din, the life-giving earth begins to burn;

The unbounded forest crackles all around. All the earth, the waves of the ocean and the barren sea are already boiling. The glowing hot vapors rained down on the Titans, the Earth Sons.

Countless flames rose up, meeting the luminous aither (skyspace). By the flickering light of the lightning and of the thunderstone, the wildest Titans were struck with blindness.” (Cf. A. Eliot, *L' univers fantastique des mythes*, Paris, 1976 (Eng.: *Myths*, Maidenhead, 1976), p. 82). -

However, true to the spirit of the mystery religions, the Passion is followed by the Resurrection: with the help of several goddesses (Athena who is the daughter of Zeus, the Alfather, and the goddess Metis; Rhea, a daughter of Gaia and Ouranos; Demeter, daughter of Kronos and Rhea and central figure of the Eleusinian mysteries, the oldest Greek mysteries) and starting from the heart saved by Athena that thinks, revives Dionusos, who is not a primordial (celestial) god, but a chthonic or underworld god, but still a benevolent God who works mainly through intoxication and rapture (Platon's mania). According to Jeanmaire, o.c., p. 22, he originally belonged to the Anatolian Heaven-queen religion.

**-- Digression. -**

Onomakritos, the Orphic, says that Zeus made men out of the ashes of the Earth's sons (titans): thus it is that man is a twofold being:

- (1) he is ungodly because he is “titanic” (darkness; earth);
- (2) he is divine in that, through the Titanic axis, he carries within him Dionusos (his immortal soul, which is light). The so-called ‘dualism’ (i.e. the conviction that man is immortal in his soul; moreover, that he embodies himself more than once in objects, plants, animals and human bodies (the latter especially)) is therefore an old Hellenic movement, which introduced the concept of soul for the first time into philosophical - though still strongly mythical - thinking.

With that soul concept, the concept of God (in the Greek sense) is also reestablished. This will have a strong after-effect in later Hellenic philosophy. The fuis, nature of man is more than oceanic water, unlimitedness or air (inspiration, breath) - think of what the Milesians thought - : it is godlike soul. In other words, the study of man and the doctrine of God are led here into new areas.

Xenophanes of Kolofon (-580/ -490). -

This poet and enlightened spirit, impressed by the Milesians, fiercely criticizes the mythical concept of God: “all the ‘scandals’ (theft, adultery, mutual deceit) Homer and Hesiod ascribed to their gods and goddesses.” Xenophanes' concept of God in it is different: there is only one God, calm - unmoved, whole and all seeing, hearing, yes, thinking; thinking, he controls and governs the universe.

But Xenophanes does not yet know the concept of creation. He does pray to the one, morally high God.

Xenophanes vulgarizes the Milesians and makes a public attack on the paideia (educational ideal) of Homer and Hesiod: the 'aretè', virtus, virtue, is not chivalry (Homer) e.g. but 'sophia', wisdom, i.e. Milesian natural philosophy.

The Homeric prowess, the Hesiodic pensive justice expire; presophistication with its philosophically enlightened education is there.

Platon will later hold the same ideal of education (but modified).

### **-- We dig in-**

We stand with the Orphicists (mythical concept of God (many gods) but more rational than before and with Xenophanes (natural-philosophical concept of God (one unique being)) for a twofold concept of deity. -

We also find this in the Bible. In Jo 10: 34/35 ("Is it not written in your law, 'I said, Ye are gods'? Now when the Scriptures call them gods to whom God's word was addressed (... )?") Jesus makes an allusion to a text; from Ps. 82 (81): "God stands up in the divine council, in the midst of the judges he judges. (... ) I had said :You are gods, sons of the Most High, all of you, but you will die like men."

Sovereigns and judges are equated with "gods," "sons of the Most High," who are the members of God's court.

Ps. 58 (57) also deals with unjust judges: "Is it true, divine beings, that you spoke justice, that you judged according to the law of the sons of men?"

Cf. Ex 21:6 ("God" is the "judge"); 22:7; Deut 19:17; Ps. 45 (44): 7 (the ruler is "God"), etc. -

The title 'god' is given in the Bible, to the angels (Ps. 8: 6), to princes and judges, to Moses (Ex 4:16; 7:1), to the shadow of Samuel (1 Sam 28:13), to David's house (Zech. 12:8), to the Messiah (Isa. 9:5). -

The divine courtship is vividly described in Job 1:6: "It happened on a certain day that the sons of God appeared before God, and Satan was also among them."

In all such cases it is about beings who are higher (in essence or in activity) than the (ordinary) earthly man, e.g. because they also exercise God's functions on earth or in heaven (such as justice). -

### **Conclusion:**

Also the Bible knows the double concept of God (higher people, the one Supreme God), - of course, within its frame of thinking.

This lives on in the Greek church, where the goal of life is called "theiosis," deificatio, deification (and in the first sense of: "to become participants in God's royal exercise of power, higher than the poor average person").

This means that we can appreciate both the Orphic and the Xenophanic concept of God, if corrected.

***B/2. The three major nature-wise doctrines. -***

Not only the religious middle classes see that the Milesians have done something valuable (and dangerous): really philosophical natures see that their hylic principle was too simple, however ingenious. Especially the intellectual-reasonable aspect they emphasize, each in his own way: Pythagoras called it mathèsis, learning process (concerning mathematics) or mathematical thinking; Parmenides, noèsis, thinking in essence; Herakleitos, fronèsis, reflection (pensive thinking).

In other words, the aspect of 'logos', making things orderly, in three variants, comes in place of 'muthos'. Demythization continues; intellectualization and rationalization continue.

***-- 2a. Pythagoras (Puthagoras) of Samos (-580/-500) and the Old Pythagoreans.***

The physical of the Pythagoreans is both Orphic (godlike soul, which 'moves') and mathematical. Creation and decay of the being is thus understood twofold. I.Gobry, *Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie (Présentation, choix de textes, biographie)*, (Pythagoras or the birth of philosophy (Presentation, selection of texts, biography), Paris, 1973, p. 41, writes:

"Orphism is a spontaneous and secret religion: therefore, it is first-ranking to Dionusos. The Pythagorean religion is a reason-led religion: it therefore assigns a first-order role to Apollon.

Yet Pythagoreanism, faithful to the principle of general harmony which manifests itself first of all in the divine world, does not set Apollon against Dionusos: it unites them in its worship (...) according to a principle of subordination which subordinates the unreasonable to the reasonable."

Pythagoreanism, according to Gobry, seeks the essence of the gods and men and the nature of their relations: Apollonian rationalism lies at the origin of Pythagorean physics.

***Deeply religious is the worldview:***

"In the first place, revere the immortal gods as they have been given an honorary office by the law."

Thus the Golden Words begin: indeed, the gods are but creations of the supreme, the father Zeus, who subjected them to an eternal law, assigned them their place and role. "Hold also the oath in honor. The oath is the initiation oath sworn by the disciples of Pythagoras, in imitation of the immortal gods (Hesiod, Theogonia 784) who swore allegiance to Zeus.

"Thereafter: honor the glorious heroes and the earthly 'daimones' (spirits), by carrying out what is law."

Between the supreme god, who is worshipped in silence, and earthly man, there are three kinds of beings: gods, heroes, 'daimones'. One has here a kind of light-dark worldview (somewhat dualistic).


With this as a background the arithmetic, the configuration arithmetic, of the Pythagoreans should be understood.

### ***The number form theory (arithmology) of Pythagoreanism. -***

Starting point is what W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 221, says: the lyre is the paragon extended to the whole universe. Well, let us dissect the lyre:

(i) it contains ‘a number of strings (the logismos aspect: computatio, calculation; cf. what Matila Ghyka, *Philosophie et mystique du nombre*, (Philosophy and mysticism of number), Paris, 1978 (//1952-1), pp. 10/11, says about the ‘concrete’ or usual numbers (logistikè, arithmetic)): a set of data (things, here: strings) reflected in a number, amenable to operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, - which were practiced even before Pythagoras;

(ii) the lyre exhibits a gamma, constructio, construction: the lines formed by the strings:



This aspect of numberform is apparently no longer just mathematical, like the logistical aspect of just now, but spatially mathematical (geometrical, that is why we have to translate ‘arithmos’ by number FORM or number configuration, to render it correctly;

(iii) The same lyre should not only be viewed dissectively;

1/ it is also listened to: that is the aspect akousma, auditio, audibility;

2/ only the so-called appropriate relation between the strings, only the appropriate plucking by the player give a harmonious sound coherence (sustèma, system or system); as W. Jaegert *Paideia*, I, 325, says: rhythm, measure, proportion, - harmony and ‘cosmos’ (ordered proportion) are exposed here and give what we now call the aesthetic or beauty aspect. Therefore, ‘arithmos’ should be translated by number-form harmony. So it is the unity of the three aspects (logistical, grammatical (geometrical) and acoustic-musical) that gives the correct understanding of the Pythagorean nature.

The three aspects existed separately in the time before Pythagoras: to see them in one mathèsis, disciplina, teaching (learning process) is the uniqueness of this original wisdom. Theano, the wife of Pythagoras, from whom fragments of text still survive, said, “He (Pyth.) said, not that everything arose from the number-form harmony, but that everything was formed according to the arithmos.”

### ***The basic operation of arithmology. -***

This is exposed in the word ‘su. stoichia’. This means, opposite to ‘anti.stoichia’, the placing on the same rank or line of more than one, a.k.a. two data. One can translate: pair of opposites. The Pythagoreans had types like this: (i) arithmetic:

1/ knowable / unknowable; definite / indefinite; ordered / disordered;

2/ regular / deviated; equal / unequal: fixed / variable;

3/ straight / crooked; even / odd; 4/ square / rectangular;

(ii) physical: light/dark; male/female;  
 (iii) ethical-political: good/evil; just/unjust, etc. - In other words, comparison is the basis of detecting relationships or relations. The couple ‘similarity/difference’ provides the basis for this.

***The arithmetic physical. -***

The Pythagoreans, in their order or community, which they founded in southern Italy (Greater Greece) - it resembles a kind of monastic order - introduced as teaching subjects or mathèmata arithmàtikè (arithmetic), geometriá, (geometry) and mousikè, (music theory). Which corresponds to the analysis performed above. - But they also elaborated a fusikè understood in a Milesian sense: the lyre model was applied and extended to the celestial body system, as they knew it at that time:

i -- i -- i -- . -- i -- i - i

(point = center; rest = planetary and solar orbits).

The earth as the center of the universe, the cosmos, to use the word of the arithmologists, with at “appropriate” (harmonious) distances, the sun and the planets, is a picture of the lyre model but adapted to the knowledge of the time. The “harmony of the spheres” was attributed to the number form of the celestial space. Thus arose, as physics, astronomia as the fourth mathèma or subject of learning.

In addition to this general physical, the Pythagoreans also had special physicals: thus e.g. marriage was called an arithmos (it had an arithmos of its own or, as W Jaeger correctly says: “qualitative being” (*Paideia*, I, 222)); for the married are:

1/ a couple (number / number), 2/ in a certain sustoichia or belonging opposition (the analogue of gramna), 3/ called to marital harmony (the analogue of akousma or mousikè).

***The arithmological ethics - political. -***

Justice is an arithmos in the sense that it presupposes (i) more than one given (number/number), (ii) a relationship (expressible in numbers if need be; think of the exchange justice or the distributive), (iii) with an appropriate note (the musical representing the pleasantness of a just situation). - The polis is an arithmos, i.e. its structure is

1/ numerical,

2/ proportional and

3/ harmonious.

***The arithmological theology. -***

The word “unity” is, even now in our language, multifarious. In arithmetic it means the element from which the series of numbers (whole) is built. In another context, “unity” means the similarity, coherence, and immutability of a multitude of data: e.g., in that party there is no unity, but division. The second meaning refers to the collection, not to the element.

In *Paideia*, I, 220, W. Jaeger notes that Pythagoras, later, lives on in Hellenic memory as a “scientific discoverer, politician, educator, order-maker, religionist and miracle-worker.” According to E. Dodds, *The Greek Shamans and Puritanism*, in *The Greeks and the Irrational*, pp. 146, he should be situated in a religious current coming from two sides:

(1) from Skuthia (the land of the Skythians, in Asia), via the Hellespont, to Anatolian Hellas. Perhaps also from Thrace (p. 147: Orpheus’ image corresponds to that of Pythagoras grandly);

(2) from Crete (with its Minoan traditions). This current ends up in Greater Greece (Pythagoras goes there) and Sicily (Empedokles).

The soul, called theos or daimon, because of its gifts, - intellectual, fellow human and psychic, is central

1/ not coincident with the body.

2/ bearer of sin and sin debt that demands expiation,

3/ if necessary in more than one earthly life).

The blood soul; also in animals, should be respected: hence vegetarianism. Behold, also according to Dodds, the core of that shamanistic religion, in which the soul - out of body experience, in or outside the night dream, is the final piece.

That, see W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 325, the after-effects of the

1/ numerical and

2/ geometric or relative

3/ harmony ‘incalculable’,

has been on all sides of Hellenic life, since Pythagoras, is evident to those who know the visual and building arts, poetry and eloquence, ethics and religion of Hellas, both in classical and Hellenistic times. Without Pythagoras, Hellas was not Hellas.

### -- 2b1. *Parmenides of Elea (-540/...) and the Eleates.* -

The original founder of ontological interpretation. Still attracts attention: J. Beaufret, *Le poème de Parménide*, (Parmenides’ poem), Paris, 1955, gives an introduction and the text (Greek/ French, transl. Riniéri); Cl. Ramnoux, *Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats*, (Parmenides and his immediate successors), Paris, 1979 (Zenon of Elea, Melissos of Samos are treated, pp. 149 ss.). -

We start from the following little fragment from Diels’ work already cited (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Griechisch und Deutsch*, 5): “To gar auto noein te kai einai” (transl. : because the (being) itself thinking and being are the same thing), as well as from e.g. (Diels, 4): “outo gar an gnoiès to ge mèn eon (ou. Gar anuston) oute frasais” (because the non-being Thou canst neither know (gnoiès) (it is impracticable) nor utter). Two things: (i) thinking, resp. knowing, and speaking go together (D., 4); (2) “being” and thinking, resp. knowing, also go together. Thus, e.g., (Diels, 8: 34/35), “Thinking (noein) and the object of thought (noèma) are the same; for not without the being in which it finds itself expressed will you find thinking. For there is nothing and there

will be nothing else beyond being, since Moira, Fate (the Goddess of Fate), has bound it to be undivided and unmoving.” ‘Moira’ means:

(i) part, share (e.g., by attribution: destiny); - in the religious language of myths: the personified’ and made into hypostasis (= situated in higher sphere) destiny; Fate Goddess.

(ii) Later, this destiny-defining ‘power’ is taken to be threefold: the Moiren are then Klotho, Lachesis and Atrapos, three Sisters of Zeus, the Alfather, and either Themis (the Goddess of established order and her just laws) or Nux (the night).

This Goddess(triad) controls the course of man’s life (beginning, episodes, end) like a thread that is spun. This mythical aspect of Parmenides’ ontological interpretation of creation and decay in nature is only one detail of the fact that, taking Hesiod’s poem as a model, he conceives his poem as a message of truth heard from the ‘daimon’, the Goddess, just like a prophet. Cf. W.Jaeger, *A la. naiss.*, 103. For Hesiod gives to the word ‘alètheia’, veritas, truth, the precise philosophical sense, which is also to be found with Parmenides. -

### **Conclusion:**

If we give Parmenides’ text a structure, it amounts to this:

(i) a theory of thought (noèsis, noèma, etc.) hand in hand with a theory of language (speaking, saying);

(ii) a theory of being (‘eon’), but not without a physics, i.e. the second part of his poem which deals with becoming and far-reaching - and in his eyes non-being - fuis or nature-things;

(iii) an ethics, which puts man before a fork in the road concerning conscience (cf. Hesiod, *Werken en Dagen* (Works and Days), 286ff: the narrow way of the aretè, virtue, and the broad way of misery), viz. One way of searching (research, formation; hodos dizèsios), that of truth, and another way of searching, that of false opinion (doxa), yes, error (which clings to what is not, or to confusion of what is and what is not).

-- That Hesiod possibly set him on this ontological road can be seen from the proem of Hesiod’s *Theogonia: the Muses* (the daughters of Zeus, the Godfather, and Mnèmosunè (the Memory), first three, then nine in number, control (‘steer’) the art of poetry in all its forms) have given Hesiod an assignment, viz. to bring up: ‘ta t’eonta, ta t’ essomena, pro t’ eonta’ (the being, the future being, the past being, - literally translated), - an expression that, in his language, tries to express the past, present and future of the universe.

### **- The dual physics,**

1/ the one that truthfully brings up the one, immutable, eternal (knowing neither creation nor decay), solid being in a noetic (knowing intellect) way,

2/ the other which discusses the many, changeable, arising and decaying, unreliable being in the

brings up as we experience it sensually (with eyes, ears, etc.). -

That dual physics of being and change sets the stage for a tough problem, viz.

1) the distrust of sensory data, on the one hand, and

2) the identification of 'being' with "eternal, unchanging being".

One will inspire future relativists and skeptics, the other will drive ontology into immobilism.

**- The expression: "in itself".**

It first appears in Parmenides and will dominate ontology for a long time. It is noted by Silvio Senn, *An sich (Skizze zu einer Begriffsgeschichte)*, (In itself, Sketch for a history of concepts), in *Philosophica Gandensia*, New Series, No. 10 (1972), pp. 80/96.

On p. 81, the author says: "Indeed, already Parmenides determines being already as: 'the same and in the same it is permanent according to itself it lies'. " 'Kath' heauto', secundum seipsum, according to itself, i.e. its own being faithfully, as it is from its own nature".

Senn adds, " 'in itself' means, as a fundamental concept of philosophy, the noëmatic correlate (i.e. the counterpart (on the side of the knowing object or noëma) of the noësis or knowing) of theoretical knowing, i.e. a knowing which, in principle, states and considers the thing to be known or the reality as independent of the one who knows and of knowing itself.

As such it determines the concept of being and in the thus determined concept of being, the basic difficulties of the metaphysics which springs from the ideal of theoretical knowing, take root." Cf. Diels Fr. 8:29.

Cf. W.Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 96. There Parmenides, like Herakleitos and Empedokles, attests to familiarity with the soul views of Orphism, - proving that the mystery religion weighs through on thinking.

**-- Zenon von Elea (± -500),**

Zenon is the disciple of Parmenides, is the distant precursor of Sophistic dialectics (reasoning) and of Megarian eristics (contention).

Like Parmenides, Zenon splits physics into a truth and an appearance (being and non-being).

The becoming, developing fisis of Milesians is appearance. But elaborating the logically strict spirit of his teacher, Zenon designs reasoning's, which have to prove the pseudo character of the movement (= creation, decay, and development in between).

An example: thesis: Achilleus, the swift-footed one, will never catch up with the tortoise, the slowest animal, once it has a certain head start. -

Proof: in order for the slowest of the two to be overtaken by the fastest, the difference in distance between the two must be overcome. -

Well, each time Achilleus reduces the distance, the tortoise increases the same distance; -

something that must again be reduced by Achilles, while the turtle again negates this reduction. -

Consequence: this happening “reduce/multiply” goes on endlessly so that the lead of the turtle reduces but never becomes zero. Achilles approaches the turtle, but never catches up with him.

Already Aristotle, Phys. 6:9 (cf. Cl. Ramnoux, *Parménide*, 162/165), criticizes Zenon’s paralogism. - Zenon, unknowingly, as a rebuttal to the Parmenides’ rebuttals, founds the later infinitesimal calculus (with its boundary or limit concept, - here a distance or interval that decreases but never becomes zero).

But, in fact, Zenon confuses between two kinds of motion as distance division: the division into equal parts (two halves, two fours, etc.) and division into proportional parts (two parts; each of them, in turn, into two parts (halves e.g.), etc.), as an approximation to limit value. -

Further, “As long as the tortoise is ahead,” it is, indeed, not overtaken; but it will be overtaken, if one admits that the distance to be run through is a finite distance.” Thus Aristotle, Phys. 6:9.

-- Behind Zenon’s reasonings (there are more: all address themselves to multiplicity and to motion) a proof from the incongruous sticks out:

- (i) if things are either many or moving,
- (ii) then they imply contradictory inferences (incongruity)
- (iii) which proves that the preposition (“if”) is untenable.

-- Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 166, puts the finger on the wound:

1) by reasoning ontologically with Parmenides, one then detached the physical from the ontology (which considers being a being cath’ heauto, as such, according to himself).

2) By constructing proofs from the incongruous with Zenon, one then detached both the physical and the ontology from formal-mathematical thinking. -

Physics, ontology, mathematics were still intertwined, for those beginning thinkers; hence their confusion. Yet they began to dissect and distinguish the physical, the ontology, and the mathematics, three very important acquisitions of the Western mind.

### **-- 2b2. Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465) and mobilism. -**

Here the theory of knowledge is no longer centered around noein and noëois, thinking, thinking-content, representing being in its “being,” as with Parmenides, but that same thinking is now called “fronein” (fronèsis), at least in preference. As W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 123, observes, this means right thinking, supported by a real-world contemplation, - which is also noësis; - yet consciously directed to man’s practical behavior. Among other things, fronein is the moderation of hubris, of self-aggrandizement.

“Reflection (to fronein) is greatest virtue (aretè). And wisdom is saying true things (alèthea) and proceeding (poiein) according to nature (kata fusin), while listening.” (Diels, Fr. 112).

***The ‘fusus’, nature is twofold.***

Twofold was nature for the Pythagoreans (ánd hylic (material) ánd mathematical); for the Eleates nature was twofold (and appearance and being: physical and ontological);

dual nature is also for Herakleitos: “Fusus kruptesthni filei”. (Nature likes to hide). Consequence: “Eyes are bad witnesses to men; likewise ears of those who have barbarous souls.” (Diels, Fr. 107).

In other words, Herakleitos sees nature with the eyes of the technè hermèneutikè, the art of interpretation, of the oracle and miracle-readers (cf. P.Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations, Essais d’ herméneutique*, (The conflict of interpretations, Essays in hermeneutics), Paris, 1969), where there is an allusion to the distant religious origin of hermeneutics, but not in the broad sense of Aristotle’s peri hermeneias, the interpretation (which is about every judgment)).

And, indeed: “The Sibylle, who with transported (mainomenoi stomati) mouths unspeakable and unblemished and unperfumed things, reaches with her voice through a thousand years thanks to the god” (Diels, Fr. 92). The Sibylle or fortune-teller a.o. at Delfoi (Delphi) is, for Herakleitos, a sign: “The Ruler, whose oracle (divine speech) is at Delfoi, does not pronounce (plainly), nor does he hide (plainly), but gives a sign (sèmainei).” (Diels, Fr. 93).

The language of the seer-steracles, like the whole fusus, is neither speaking clearly nor hiding without more but between the two: the signs (the words) expose, yet in a pluriform sense, so that the man who interprets them has, for the time being, more than one interpretation; until the end brings closure. In other words, there is

- (i) an obvious foreground to the fusus,
- (ii) but, behind it, hides a background that can only be uncovered by reflection. Contemplation in deciphering a code, - the code of nature. Let us clarify this.

***The foreground. -***

(1) What stands out is: “strife (polemos) is the father of everything, the prince (basileus) of everything. And the some he made appear (edeixe) as gods, the others as men, - the some as slaves, the others as freemen.” (Diels, Fr. 53). Yet that polemical interpretation of nature, not simply opposing them is presupposed: “They do not understand that what differs (diapheromena), corresponds to itself (homologeï): (palintropos harmoniè) a harmony turned in opposite directions, like that of the bow and the lyre.” (Diels, Fr. 51). The polemical impression (polemon) hides harmony, in its contradiction of things.

(2) What is also striking is the metamorphic character of multiplicity and change: “The god is day/night, winter/summer, war/peace, abundance/hunger. (...) He changes like the fire, which, when

it is mixed with incense, is given a name according to the sense of each (of the incense(s) mixed in it)." (Diels, Fr. 67).

Yet this metamorphic interpretation (the change of form) is not simply multitude of change: "Hesiod is the teacher of most: they are convinced that he knew most, - one who did not know day and night; for it is one (esti gar them)" (Diels, Fr. 57).

In other words, that the opposites, day and night, are one, Hesiod in his *theogonia* did not know. This unity of opposites - which may be precisely why they could merge into each other (metamorphism) - is emphasized by Cl. Ramanoux, *Héraclite (L'homme entre les choses et les mots)*, (Heraclitus (Man between things and words)), Paris, 1968, pp. 1/29 (Introduction), as the leitmotif: "(...) a characteristic syntax, namely: 'one' pronounced as the common characteristic of two opposites".

Ramanoux states truth where she distinguishes the two vocabularies:

1/ that of the archaic cosmo and theogony ('day' and 'night', of which Hesiod speaks in his *Theogonia*: the first set of gods are Gaia (Earth), Eros (lover god) and Ta Tartara (the underworlds); from the Tartara arise Erebus (Darkness), Nux (Night) and Aithér (Daylight), chaotic beings), and

2/ that of the new Milesian physical.

Diels, Fr. 32 again illuminates this tendency differently: "One, the only wise, does not want and (does) want to be called by the name of Zeus." Or Fr. 48: "The name of the arch is life; his work death." "How can we understand this polemical-metamorphic unity doctrine?"

The background. - It is as if two themes provide an answer: the fire and the logos. Fr. 30: "This world order (cosmos), the same for all being, neither made anyone among the gods nor among men, but it always was and is and will be eternal living fire, flaring up by measure and extinguishing by measure."

That fire - which appears to Parmenides (in his sham description), as a light/night counterpoint pair, (cf. W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 113) - undergoes changes (tropai): "the changes of fire are first sea (thalassa); half of the sea is earth, half fire glow (Diels, Fr. 31)." "Exchange of fire against all being and (exchange) of all being against fire, just as of gold against goods and of goods against gold." (Fr. 90)

In other words, fire is "one" and can be exchanged against "all" and vice versa. But this fire is a passive "one": there is a more active "one", namely the logos, the world law. "For this world-activity which always exists, people do not bring about understanding, either before they hear about it or as soon as they hear about it. Everything is done according to this world law." (Diels, Fr. 1). "Although the world-legality is community property, Yet most of them live as if they were engaged in an idiosyncratic contemplation."

(*Fr. 1*). The expression “the most” - which recalls M. Heidegger ‘s “das Man” - also appears in *Fr. 29*: “The best (hoi aristoi) prefer one (thing) to all, eternal fame to mortal things. Most, however, (hoi polloi) lie there, fattened like cattle.” There is a certain - not to be misunderstood - elitism or spiritual aristocracy in Herakleitos’s aphorisms, - which one should not knock down with today’s new-left egalitarianism; quite the contrary.

The choice that Herakleitos advocates are those who do not obfuscate the logos, world law (maturity), in principle the property of all, by ‘idia fronèsis’, idiosyncratic ‘reflection’, - who:

1/ through the deceptive polemical-metamorphic foreground,

2/ the one logos which, through fire, (the invisible energy or soul substance emanating from the logos) ‘steers’ all things and all changes (steering principle: “(...) The fire is turned into water by the universe-controlling logos or god, through air” (*Fr. 31*)), perceives as background.

-- J. Rehmke / F. Schneider, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (History of Philosophy), Wiesbaden, 1959, speaking of Herakleitos, uses two catchwords, hylozoism and pantheism. -

### ***Hylozoism***

Hylozoism (hule = substance; zoè = life) means, according to A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire*, Paris, 1968, 426, that philosophical view which claims that all substance lives, either in itself (of itself) or in so far as it participates in the life of e.g. a world-soul or so. - Rehmke claims that the primal substance ‘fire’ by condensation (hodos kato, the way down) or by dilution (hodos ano, the way up) becomes water, earth or reversed from earth becomes water and so becomes fire. Fire is power, living power, in the dynamistic sense of what moves of itself (the opposite of slow or inert, i.e., what moves from without): in this sense Herakleitos is Milesian, as Anaximandros or Anaximenes, who were also hylozoists. -

### ***Pantheism***

Pantheism means the fact of assuming deity but a sole deity that somehow makes up one single reality with the universe.

“One has, says Rehmke, also called the Heraklitean world view ‘pantheism’ because it views in everything the one which is at once fire and logos (‘Geist’ he says).”

Whether Herakleitos was a pantheist cannot be determined from the fragments (theological thought was only beginning to come into its own).

The fact is that the Stoics adopt both hylozoism and the doctrine of logos, - that Philon the Jew tries to interpret them biblically and that John the Evangelist calls Jesus as eternal wisdom from the Father also Logos (unfortunately translated by ‘word’), i.e. divine wisdom, ‘Aya Sofia’.

In *Fr. 80* Herakleitos says: One ought to know that strife (polemon) is the common (thus as the logos) and that righteousness (dikè) strife

(eris) is and that all things come into being (ginomena) according to strife and necessity.”

Here one would say that strife (polemos, eris, - necessity) is a.k.a. logos, world law(maturity), itself and thus also ‘genesis’ (cf. ginomena) of all being, - so deeply does ‘strife’ lie in the genesis of things.

Briefly, ‘logos’, like ‘eris’, etc. still seem to be strongly archaic terms, - hypostases, elevated to (more or less personal) divine principles of thought. -

What do these thought-contents represent here in this case? E. Beth, *Philosophy of Nature*, Gorinchem, 1948, p. 35ff., speaks of “sociomorphic cosmology,” i.e., a bringing up (logy) of the cosmos as a reality that assumes the form (morph) of a human community (socio) or, perhaps better put, of a polis (poliomorph).

“The cosmic society is governed by a divine law, from which human laws derive their legal force. Heraclitus expresses this as follows: “All human laws feed on the one divine law.” (Fr. 114) -

This divine law now includes:

(i) a rule for the normal course of things;

(ii) a rule which, for every deviation from the normal course of things, lays down a compensation.

This law of compensation (...) guarantees cosmic harmony.” For W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, 1:12, this is a basis for pedagogy as a conscious event. -

Not only does logos represent a xunon, something common in the sense just indicated of a world law underlying all human laws, but something spiritual:

“The boundaries of the soul (psuchè) could not be traced even if one walked down every street: it has such a deep logos”. (Fr. 45).

“A logos that multiplies itself is property of the soul.” (Fr. 115).

The Orphicists had fitted a doctrine of soul into the Milesian physical (i.e., the “divine,” god-like soul, which, in the midst of arising and passing away, persists and reifies itself). Herakleitos fits the soul into the apeiron, the one all-encompassing, and its cosmic order (logos): the soul thus acquires an all-encompassing cosmic meaning and turns the physical into a human science with educational leanings (think of his elitism). - Logos

(1) is, of course: (i) more than one term; that quantity of terms or elements exhibits unity (similarity, coherence, direction); (iii) this unity in a multitude can be expressed in words or numbers (structures). Such is the conceptual content of logos.

(2) But with Herakleitos, logos acquires a cosmic scope which is at the same time human: (sociomorphic, soulful), and not without a divine haze. Cosmology, anthropology and theology are thus founded, - still intertwined and yet already there.

What W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 247, rightly observes as Herakleitos’ operation.

**-- Concluding remark. -**

The account of Herakleitos has turned out to be rather long. The reason is its antiquity, but even more its modern after-effects. P. Foulqu , *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949, p. 6, divides dialectics into two kinds:

(i) the so-called old dialectic, i.e., reasoning (if need be identical with logic, in any case similar to it; supported by the principle of contradiction ('The same thing cannot be and not be at the same time')).

(ii) the so-called new dialectics, i.e. ontology or theory of reality which builds the 'struggle' (in modern language called 'contradiction') both into things and into thought itself. Hegel (1770/1831), Marx (1817/1883) and Engels (1820/1895), but then in a materialistic-historical sense, founded this new dialectic. Among the precursors of this theory of reality and thought is, as the oldest, Herakleitos. -

Referring to P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilit *, II (*La symbolique du mal*), Paris, 1960, pp. 167/198 (The drama of creation and the 'ritual' interpretation of the world): "It is precisely because of this that the theogony is 'epic': the original enemy is finally conquered through war and killing." (o.c., 170) Herakleitos's life and world view exhibits Homeric and Hesiodic traits (the Titans' struggle).

**- The concept of fire. -**

Fr. Krafft, *Gesch. der Naturwissenschaft*, I (*Die Begr ndung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen*, Freiburg, 1971, s; 342, says, speaking of mathematical natural science with Platon, that, in Paton's language, 'earth' denotes the solid and hard, 'water' the liquid, 'air' the gaseous and 'fire' the luminous-volatile.

The three Milesians (Thales, Anaxirnandros, Anaximines), the three great thinkers (Puthagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitos) use these 'element' names ('aggregate states' would sound modern, but it was fluid and touchy in those days).

One feels that we should put our modern physical-chemical science in brackets, if we do not want to commit a naive error of interpretation and misunderstand those pre-Socratics.

- Now to the point: "fire" is conceived by Herakleitos as an intermediate between "god", "Zeus", "logos", on the one hand, and the visible and tangible foreground, on the other. It is, as it were, the transformable primordial matter and energy from which everything arises and in which everything perishes (typically Milesian). It appears to be closely connected with the logos (which is called 'god', yes, 'Zeus', if necessary). - Mysterious to our modern mentality!

But listen to the following prayer from the Byzantine liturgy (7th Sunday after Easter, Stichera Idiomela to Ps. 148): "The Holy Spirit is light and life and living spiritual source: Spirit of wisdom, Spirit of insight; the good, right, spiritual, guiding, error-purifying Spirit. God and deifying



**Fire is he who emerges from fire.** He speaks and works and hands out the charismata (gifts of grace). Through him all the prophets and apostles of God were adorned with wreaths along with the blood witnesses. A new message, a new spectacle: a fire spreading for the purpose of distributing the charismata". So much for the third sticheron.

The second says among other things: "Life is he (= the Holy Spirit) and life he creates. He is light and a transmitter of light. He himself is the good one (= solid) and the source of 'goodness'.

One sees: centuries after Herakleios

1/ The lyricist of the Byzantine liturgy speaks a language which closely connects, yes, identifies life, light, 'goodness', fire and 'deity'.

2/ What is more: that fire (light, life, goodness, divinity) is the source of charismata, psychic gifts. In other words, Pentecost is described in the language of the pre-Socratics, at least according to its basic structure: between the Holy Trinity and creation, the (Pentecostal) fire functions as an intermediate term, just as, with Herakleitos, the fire functioned as an intermediate term between the logos (god, Zeus) and the phenomena which come into being and which perish (the so-called fuis).

**-- Remark:**

As a bilan, it may be noted, among other things, that

- 1) the Old Pythagoreans the arithmetic, geometria, musica, astronomia,
- 2) the Eleates the ontology and reasoning mathematics,
- 3) the Heraklitians introduced the triad cosmology (physics), anthropology, theology. These are either professional sciences or philosophical subjects, which were integrated into our Western education system. What a distance from the archaic religions! And yet: what continuity at the same time.

By the way: the difference between the mathematics of the Pythagoreans and the mathematics of the Eleates (Zenon founded reasoning, without taking into account the visible and tangible fuis in the least, which the Pythagoreans, at least from their origin, did not do so easily).

See for this F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, *Die Ber.*, S. 295/356, who rightly opens an eye to the role that Parmenides, via Zenon, played in the establishment of a purely deductive and axiomatic mathematics, in which the thinking formulation of Elea could reason purely, without empirical correctives.

The Pythagoreans, however, apparently worked out this Eleatic axiomatization. Krafft, o.c., 318, mentions Hippokrates of Cios (-470/-400), the first to publish a *Stoicheia geometrias*, *Elementa geometriae*, *Elements of geometry*.

Also, at the time of Platon, Leon and Theudios of Magnesia, closely associated with Platon's Academy; they improved and broadened Hippokrates' *Stoicheia*. Of course Platon himself. Follows then Eukleides of Alexandria (+/- -300), famous for his *Stoicheia (Elementa)* of geometry, from which one can still, to some extent, distill the older parts.

### ***B3/ The mechanistic natural wisdom.-***

Let us first delineate accurately the concept of mechani(ci)sme.

1/ Mèchanè (Gr.), machina (Lt.), machine, refers to any collection of elements so interconnected (collective structure) and working in such a way (kinetic structure) that a certain result emerges from it (e.g. field artillery, boat, chariot, etc.).

2/ The words 'mechanical', 'mechanism', mean a machine which merely performs movement without any 'force' or 'purpose', -- i.e. without adopting dynamism or teleology.

Dynamism and finalism (teleology) are thus opposed to mechanicism (which is sometimes called 'mechanism' for short, -- which is to be avoided, for the sake of conceptual confusion): mechanicism is any conception that relies purely on mechanical movement, without any reference to:

- 1) purposefulness or
- 2) force acting from within, to explain multiplicity and movement. -

Thus the older Milesians - Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes - are hylozoists (animated hulè, materia, substance, assuming) and thus dynamists: multiplicity and change spring from more than mere mechanical 'movement'.

Thus Herakleitos in particular is dynamist: the logos through the fire, is the working principle that governs the conflict and the turning (polemos: one against the other; amoibè: one turning into the other (metamorphic)). -

The dynamists, resp. finalists (teleologists) assume that movement (change: arising and passing away of things from the primal principle and back into it) 1) takes place from within and 2) presupposes qualitative distinctions (multiplicity).

#### ***-- The mechani(ci)sts: motion is external --***

1) Empedokles, Anaxagoras; 2) certainly the atomists Leukippos and Demokritos (who radically implemented mechanicism) - they declare any movement (change: arising, decaying in the fuis) to be purely external; the hulè, materia, substance, is, of course. i.e. of itself (in its being), inert or sluggish and moves only by externally acting 'force' (not by dynamistically conceived inner force); at once any qualitative distinction is superfluous, - at least in principle. For,

1) Empedokles and Anaxagoras are only moderate mechanicians: they assume, in addition to mechanics, qualitatively distinct 'elements'.

2) Leukippos and Demokritos, on the other hand, radicalize mechanicism: an unlimited multitude of purely quantitative 'atoma' atoms, make up the principle of fuis, without qualitative distinction.

#### ***Parmenidean premise. -***

As F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, S. 235 ff. makes clear, one understands

- 1) the mechanicians, as well as
- 2) the mathemationists of the same time, but, if one knows well what Parmenides and Zenon of Elea say precisely about the fuis, which they noëtically-ontically

(i.e. relying on pure thinking mind, and denoting as mere 'being' (not nothing), such that being is pure thinking content and thinking content is pure being; cf. simile simili cognoscitur, the same is known by the same).

This means that, for the Eleates, nature, in its noetic and ontic, character, is invisibly or, at least, hiddenly present.

Which is not to say incorporeal or incorporeal: the philosophy of the time was not yet ready for that distinction; it mixed material (spatial) and incorporeal (incorporeal).

Parmenides' being is thus at once hidden (from the senses) and yet material-spatial. Even more so: the conceptual being is, in its spatiality, uniform (homogeneous): it 'fills' reality everywhere and always in exactly the same way.

There is therefore only one (single, because all-encompassing, - numerical, uniform, because omnipresent in an identical way, - qualitative) being that is thinkable and articulate. It is also adjacent, contiguous and thus in that third sense 'one'-it is 'a.tomon', incommensurable (indivisible).

This threefold 'one'-ness of being (thinkability and sayability) is so radically advocated that the manifest multiplicity, multiplicity and divisibility, which the fusis exhibits and which the Milesians and especially Herakleitos emphasize, for Parmenides and Zenon, are only appearances, non-being, -- thus emptiness instead of fullness.

More so: in a fourth sense, "being" is "one": individual being (singulars, singulars) are also emptiness and semblance, for their isolation conflicts with the indivisibility and uniformity of being, thinkable and sayable.

Individual beings are therefore unthinkable and unsayable. If one nevertheless thinks about them and speaks about them, then this is done in an incongruous, contradictory, full of contradictions (think of Zenon's proofs from the incongruous. -

The clash of the Milesian-Heraklitean multiplicity (synchronic: multiplicity; diachronic: change, creation and decay) with the Eleatic unity (synchronic: unity, uniformity, indivisibility; diachronic: immutability, eternity) is solved by the mathematicians and the mechanicians in a typical manner which we will now briefly sketch.

### ***B3a. The mathematical solution.***

- The *Stoicheia (Elements)* of Eukleides of Alexandria ( $\pm 300$ ) contain thirteen books (1/ rectilinear bounded planes; 2/ geometric algebra (algebraic equations); 3-4/ circle or circle theory; 6/ proportionality theory (proportio); 7-9/ arithmetic; 10/ irrational quantities; 11-13/ bodies).

The essentials for book 7-9 (Number Mathematics) are first of all:

-- "Unity is that according to which each of the being is called,";

-- "Number, however, is the collection which consists of units" (monas - unit; plèthos = collection; arithmos = number).

“The Alexandrian mathematician Theon of Smurna - a Platonist (-115/-40) - declares (...): if the unity is divided in the sphere of visible things, it is indeed, as a body, reduced, and broken up into parts smaller than that body itself, but, as a number, it is enlarged, for where the ‘one’ is, many things take its place.” (F. Kraft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 320).

In other words, the unity is not a number. Only ‘more than one’ (two, three, etc.) are ‘arithmoi’ or numbers, i.e. collections (‘plèthos’) of units (‘monads’).

This implies that fractional numbers, in early Greek mathematics, under Eleatic pressure, do not occur, but ratios within sets (‘numbers’); e.g.  $2/3$  is not a unit division but a ratio within the set (‘number’) three (proportion theory). One does not ‘divide’ the unit (= Eleatic: the one being indivisible one); but one determines, notwithstanding, the number (more than one, sets as a multiplicity of units: which sins against the Eleatic ontology, but only by determining (as a reasoning beginning) ‘number’.

Thus arithmetic is only a mere reasoning aggregate in itself, without direct reality claim (based on an incongruity (think Zenon)), viz., which presupposes a multiplicity of units (or ‘arithmos’) as a mere agreed definition to make possible observations in nature or in art (what man makes). (o.c., 322/323). Thus arithmetic was “saved”!

### ***B3b. The mechanistic solution. -***

The conflict situation, between Eleatic unitary ontology and non-Eleatic (Milesian, especially Heraklitean) multiplicity physics, is resolved by the mechanists by stating

- 1/ that the unit of matter is indivisible and

- 2/ that multiplicity, in nature and in art (maturity), consists of indivisible units. Arising and passing away can be explained in this way, but still with prize-giving of the original “hardness” of Parmenides’ propositions. Parmenides’ singleness is reinterpreted as simultaneous uniformity (sameness) of units (understood as constituents) of nature as substance. (o.c., 241).

### ***b1. The moderate mechanists.***

#### ***Empedokles of Akragas (Agrigentum, Sicily: -485/-425) -***

‘Puritan shamanism’ (see above, p. 21), as E. Dodds calls it, - ‘chthonism’ would be at least as good a designation, - is called the streak from which Empedokles came, like Pythagoras: itinerant orator, rhapsodos (singer of poems), healer, conciliator, magician, he got from Sicily to Greater Greece and even into Hellas (Peloponnese). In this sense he is characteristic of the religious revival of the VIth century

which, according to J. Pollard, *Seers, Shrines and Sirens (The Greek Religious Revolution in the Sixth Century B.C.)*, London, 1965, p.15, consists of three movements:

(i) seers (seeresses) inspired by gods and goddesses, including shamans, Sibylle, Pythias, bakchanten (Dionusos celebrants), Orphics;

(ii) state worship services, including the Eleusinian mysteries and heroic or heroic mysteries, visible in temples and shrines;

(iii) the attention (and portrayal) of monsters such as sphinxes and sirens in art, W. Jaeger, *A la naissance*, 141 emphasizes that the legacy of Empedokles is double - as with Pythagoras e.g. and his' school -

1/ 'On Nature', a Milesian-like poem on fisis, and,

2/ *katharmoi* (Cleansings), an Orphic poem (a soul doctrine with pre-existence and soul-transfer; a vegetarianism).

Hesiod, Parmenides are models. His solution is: given that Elea is right (under arising and passing away there is unchanging and one being), there can be no full change (arising and passing away) but only mixture and separation of 'stoicheia', elementa, elements, which, in themselves, are unchanging. Thus Herakleitos is also correct.

The single 'apeiron', resp. air (soul) - of Anaximandros and Anaximenes is split up into particles and elements and their mixtures: the universe is a fullness (fullness, non-emptiness) in which four rhizomata, radices, roots, namely fire, air, water and earth. Many present-day occultists still operate on this quadrilateral!

These mingle and separate under the influence of two mythical appearing (see above: the new theo-, kosmo and anthropogonies (p. 12/13 supra)) hypostases' (higher powers), namely filia, resp. eros (i.e. friendship, love, on a mythical-chthonical level especially) and neikos (i.e. fight, quarrel, on the same level). struggle, strife, on the same plane), which, each, alternately according to their epoch of domination, now unite (mix), then again dissolve (divide, separate) the little particles of matter which our eye does not see but which make up the four rhizomata or his roots (and which, in themselves, are final, indivisible units).

The four qualitatively distinct particle types or "elements" come from Hesiod, where he lists the "panton pègai" (the sources of all being): "There are the (of all being after each other) sources and boundaries, - of the black earth and the misty tartaros, of the restlessly undulating sea, and of the starry sky." (*Theogony* 736/738). Cf. P. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Rat.* I, 251).

In passing, Empedokles also explains the soul as arising from mixture of its roots and their indivisible particles of dust.

#### -- *Anaxagoras of Klazomenai*

Anaxagoras is Ionian (-500/-428).- He is the first world-advanced universe student: the purpose of life, according to him, was "to contemplate the heavens and the order of the universe."

An anecdote even makes him the first “kosmo.politès”, the first “cosmos.citizen” (not to be confused with what we now call cosmopolitan or world citizen, in the sense of “at home in all countries”): “Up there is my fatherland” (he is said to have said, when he was reproached for not fulfilling his civic duties). -

Anaxagoras is the first named thinker to visit Athens, where Pericles was at the head of a thriving democracy. Protagoras, the sophist, Herodotos, the father of land and ethnology, also came there. Also Demokritos, the atomist.

Anaxagoras became friends with the “enlightened” (in the sense of rationally-intellectually-minded) minds (including Themistokles, Perikles, Euripides), and that in an Athens that was still predominantly traditional - religious.

The anti-democratic and traditionally-believing aristocrats, in touch with Sparta, conspired against Perikles and his “enlightened” circle. Thus Anaxagoras was put on trial. But he went to Lampsakos (on the Bosporos between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean), where he founded a school and died greatly honored.

**-- Excerpt. -**

The mechanics are also called “the Younger Ionian philosophers. Indeed, W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 168ss, observes that Anaxagoras thinks Milesian, i.e. starting from the visible and tangible phenomena of becoming and passing away, thinking through the “archè”, the primal principle.

However, with a remarkable difference: Anaxagoras spends his effort on the observation of private, yes, singular and rare phenomena, instead of investigating “the fuis in its entirety at once” (Paideia, I, 460).

F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 269, gives an example: “The sluggish earth-matter cannot change into motile star-matter; both cannot be qualitatively different forms of one and the same primeval substance, but must consist of the same, immutable substance and this permanently.

Anaxagoras gives as proof the meteor that crashed in Aigospotamoi at the Hellespont in the year -468, which was locally venerated as a fetish of divine origin.

He was, said Anaxagoras, virtually returned to the earth, a lump of earth which, having once become detached from the aither vertebra, had got into a comparatively quiet region of the aither, where its reversal could no longer preserve it from falling down.”

Based on the same singular observation, Anaxagoras concluded that the sun was a burning stone. W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 168, calls this method (of drawing general-physical conclusions, based on private or singular observations) Ionic empiricism.

Medicine was pioneering here: Alkmeon of Kroton (+/- -500), pupil of Pythagoras, physician and professional scientist, Heraklitean influenced, already spoke of ‘mixture’ and ‘separation’ on the basis of medical experience regarding diet and nutrition (o.c., 169).

Indeed, -- cf. p. 34 supra-, already Empedokles, healer, yes, physician, spoke of mixture (krasis, mixis) and separation of the particles of the four species of matter. But with Anaxagoras this is more purely methodical (not Orphic-mythical as with Empedokles) “Opsis ton a.dèlon ta fainomena” (Seeing the invisible things (is in) the phenomena, - literally: the showing things).

This Anaxagorean methodical principle which was applied but not formulated for him - was adopted by the atomist Demokritos. It is Milesian! -

### ***The homoiomereiai. -***

Homoiomereia (enk.) means the similarity of the parts of a whole. Anaxagoras uses ‘homoiomeres’, formed of equal or similar (analogous) parts.

Aristotle’s term for Anaxagoras’ conception of matter is ‘homoiomereiai’ (plural). - Like Empedoklos, Anaxagoras, instead of the one being of Parmenides, assumes a multiplicity of eternal, disordered and imperishable, unchangeable ‘being’, which, notwithstanding their uniformity, nevertheless account for the multiplicity and change of the emergent and distant fasis.

He also assumes small, immutable particles (with mixing and separation). However, instead of accepting four basic types of particles, he says that “All is in all”. - His basic Ionic-empirical observation seems to be the feeding, metabolic and growth process in the biological world:

(i) leaves, wood, bark, (ii) shells, (iii) muscles, bones, marrow, blood, all of which seem to emerge from the ingested food (that food contains all the constituents which then work themselves out differently in kind); further: hair, nails, veins, arteries, tendons, bones, all of which emerge, over time, from one seed (which thus, somewhere, seems to contain them all, from the beginning).

Besides this natural-processual aspect, there is the artificial one: the painter paints people, animals, plants, objects, with the same colors. Zenon of Elea, with his dichotomia (dividing into two) of bodies, planes, and durations, and this to infinity, prompts Anaxagoras to assume particles divisible and shared to infinity.

### ***-- De Nous. -***

Like Empedoklos, he assumed that, in the beginning, everything was mixed through to such an extent that nothing was distinguishable. Moist and dry, cold and hot, bright and dark, i.e. all qualities (qualitatively distinct) - were indistinguishable in that primordial mixture. Since

(i) everything is in everything, present and

(ii) everything through mixed

was indistinguishable, initially, Empedoclean hypostases like filia (eros) and neikos e.g. cannot make out that in gold there are predominantly gold particles, in flesh predominantly flesh particles: ‘cosmos’ (i.e. a

ordered nature) arises, in those hypotheses only after long filia-time and transient (which Empedokles calls the god Sphairos, whose rest, by neikos, disappears again).

Nay, Anaxagoras states that the ordering-goal-oriented and purposeful Nous, Intellectus, Spirit (understood as mind) by “krinein” (crisis), shifting, orders the primordial mixture into cosmos.

Thus arises all that 1/ the universe and 2/ human culture gives us to see. W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 167ss., therefore calls Anaxagoras (with Diogenes of Apollonia, o.c., pp. 177ss.) a teleological or finalist (finis in the Lt. is goal(end)) thinker. How the pure mechanism breaks through!

Immediately we have the first clear attempt of a Hellenic thinker to describe immateriality: “The other being has part in every substance. The Spirit, however, is something infinite and self-sovereign, and he is mixed with nothing. For if he were not alone but mixed with something else, he would have a share in all being,-if he were mixed with something. For in every being there is a share of every being (as I have explained above).

In that case the substances mingled with Him would only hinder Him, with the result that He would rule over nothing in the same way as if He existed for Himself alone. For He is the finest and purest of all being, and He possesses of every being every knowledge, and He has the greatest power. And all that contains soul, the greater and the lesser - over all that the Spirit has power.

Also over the overall whirl movement the Spirit possesses power such that, in the beginning, it began to revolve. And, to begin with, this movement began to revolve from a certain small point; however, it grasps still farther around itself and will grasp still more around itself. And all the being that mingled and separated and separated from one another, all of them the Spirit knew.

And how everything (i) was to be - future - and how everything (ii) was - (which is now no longer available) past - and how everything (iii) is now - present -, all this the Spirit ordered, - also that whirl movement which now the stars and sun and moon perform, as well as the air and aither, which emerged from it. It was that very whirl movement that worked their separated emergence. And from the thin separated the dense, from the cold the warm, from the dark the bright, and from the moist the dry,” (F. Krafft, o.c., 275/276).

### ***Conclusion. -***

As F. Krafft notes, Empedokles and Anaxagoras exhibit a duality: 1/ a working principle (filia, resp. eros and neikos nous) which, as a moving cause or principle, is directing; 2/ a suffering principle which is corporeal-material (hylic). Already Hesiod had described the cosmos as a man in the big (macro cosmos or makranthropos) who is a 1/ animated 2/ body. Also Anaximenes (cf. p. 11 supra).

**-b2. The atomistic or radical mechanics.**

Leukippos of Miletos (fifth century) Ionian, moves to Elea, where he becomes a pupil of Zenon of Elea. Around - 450 he founds his own philosophical school in Thrace (in the city of Abdera). The theses of Empedokles and Anaxagoras were known to him. He is usually mentioned in the same breath as Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370).

**'A.tomos',**

In.divisus, indivisible (undivided) was as an adjective an old Hellenic word. 'To Atomon', the a.toom, as a noun arises in the fifth century as terminus technicus. Change, movement;

1/ either as arising and decaying, growing and growing old,

2/ or as qualitatively changing from warm to cold, clear to dark, damp to dry, etc. - such is the Milesian theme of fisis. Parmenides, Zenon, had seen this as unthinking and unsayable and therefore unreal, non-being; only being 'was' and 'is' and 'will be'. The atomist assumes this.

Empedokles and Anaxagoras - analogous the mathematicians, - had conceived of that Eleatic 'one'-ness of being as uniformity, unity, and so 'saved' it, but with a multiplicity (number, plèthos) in that unity (think of the numbers from which the mathematicians made two and more exist as sets of one). Behold the Empedoclean-Anaxagorean corrective on Elea. The atomist also proceeds from this, to make multiplicity (quantitative, qualitative) and change 'thinkable' (possible).

But the last 'particle' is conceived as slow (moved from the outside) and without quality:

(i) by their shape or form ('Gestalt'), as the letters N and B;

(ii) by their combinatorics or arrangement, as the letters NB and BN;

(iii) by their turn (rotation, axial turn), as N and Z.

To these three Leukippean distinctions Demokritos adds a fourth: the extent or size; as z and Z. Like a text: from such stoicheia, i.e. letters (later: particle or constituent or 'element') or constituents, all being, all change, all qualitative distinction consists. This 'reductive' view is called "radical or atomistic" mechanicism.

But the dicho.tomia or dichotomy (Zenon, Anaxagoras) was rejected by Leukippos, because, according to him, it would lead to a void between ever smaller particles, such that nothing 'full' (filled) would remain.

Thus, the constituents of the fisis

1/ no longer 'elements' and element particles (Empedokles),

2/ certainly no longer boundlessly divisible homoiomeraiai (Anaxacoras),

3/ but a.toma, atoms.

With this, atomistics was born, which, until our century, would continue to have an effect. Excluding ordering principle (filia / noikos; nous): chance governs the atoma.

Immediately the first ancient "materialism" was born. Without an active guiding principle, except for gravity,

a/ change as 1/ creation or decay and 2/ quality change (from e.g. warm to cold, from winter to summer; cf. Herakleitos supra), as well as

b/ the permanence in all its natural and cultural forms “explained”. If such a thing can still be called an explanation (making it intelligible in a logical way).

**- Hylic pluralism.**

That one should be very careful with the word ‘materialism’ in the case of Voorsokratiekers, is shown by the ‘eidola’ doctrine of Leukippos and Demokritos. *Eidolon*”, simulacrum, depiction, means, in general, depiction of something (e.g. phantom, portrait, effigy, (idolatrour) image, reflection (in water, mirror), imagination, idea).

According to both atomistic mechanics, perception (aisthèsis) and insight (noèsis) occur as follows: images, coming from outside, penetrate into the observer or knower.

1/ psychological phenomena such as (night) dreaming and telepathy,

2/ occult (extra-natural) as the evil eye and

3/ religious as benign gods or daimones, the atomists explain by means of images (eidola, sometimes rendered idols).

This means that *hylè*, materia, substance, is thought by these thinkers as by all Voorsokratiekers - in multiple ways:

(i) there are first the things which we commonly call sight, touch, hearing and feeling;

(ii) there are rarer or, at least, non-general perceptible beings, which are nevertheless of a material nature and which are visible, tactile, audible and palpable in their own way. This is called hylic pluralism, i.e. assuming a multiplicity in terms of substance.

This is opposed to the hylic monism of our modern physics and chemistry and of our modern materialists who follow them. G. et L. Gérardin, *La magie (Un savoir en action)*, (Magic (Knowledge in Action)), Paris, 1974, pp. 71/ 83, talk about “*Démocrite et ses correspondances*”. They label Demokritos’ thesis as “magical rationalism.”

There is truth in it: the study of *fusis*, deployed “empirically” by the Milesians, here receives its paranormological completion. The phenomena like dream-faces: telepathy, the evil eye and apparitions of gods, goddesses, have

1/ as part of becoming and perishing,

2/ as qualitatively different from other phenomena from the (general) *fusis*, their own ‘nature’ in the (third; cf. p. 7 supra) sense (of being, beingness, own nature) and this (cf. fifth and sixth sense; cf. p. 7/8 supra) in the so-called ‘irrational’ sense of non-generalizable (and therefore problematic) things from the *fusis*. - All beings of the *fusis*, according to our atomists, emit images which then, according to the case, come through in the observer as

1/ night dream images or telepathic impressions,

2/ as malignant, noxious images sent by zealots who are “evil eye”,

3/ as apparitions of gods or daimonos.

Western materialism feeds on atomistic mechanism. Karl Marx's doctoral thesis, *differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen naturphilosophie* (distinction between demokritosche and epikureische natural philosophy), Berlin, 1841, e.g., proves it: "French and English materialism always remained in close relation to Demokritos and Epikoeros." (S. 47).

Marx sees in Demokritos "an enlightened (intellectual-rational) thinker of ancient democracy. He criticizes his mechanicism: Demokritos sees only necessity, i.e., the inexorable natural compulsion of atomistics. Epikoeros, on the other hand, assigns roles to both necessity and freedom.

In Marx's perspective, this is necessary; without freedom, no "action" (revolutionary and otherwise) is possible. To Epikoeros, Marx reproaches that while he sees the two, freedom and necessity, he does not see them 'dialectically' (this time in the Hegelian sense of 'interaction').

After all, Marx is not simply materialist, certainly not mechanistic materialist, but 'dialectical' materialist. - Marx glosses over Demokritos's hylic pluralism, of course!

#### **-- To wit.**

Demokritos also proclaimed moral education wisdom in archaic style, - proving Demokritos' incoherence. Thus e.g. (Diels, *vorsokratiker*, Fr. 33): "nature (fysis) and the process of learning (didachè) are something similar. For the learning process transforms man (metarhuseis), but, while it transforms, it creates nature (fusiopoioi)."

This text shows, for the umpteenth time, the use to which the concept of nature came over time: indeed, education creates, as it were, a "second" nature, an "acquired" nature.

#### **-- Presofistics. -**

Fr. 125: "By virtue of nomos (agreement, habit) is color, by virtue of nomos is sweetness, by virtue of nomos is bitterness. By virtue of truth (etèi), however, are atoms and empty space (konon)."

Thus Demokritos expresses his distrust of sensory experience (always that eleatic trait, but mechanistically hinted at: the qualitative distinctions are conventional, but the particles of dust and their lego interstices are real, "being"). -

But now listen to the senses saying to the mind, "poor mind (frèn), from us (i.e. aisthèseis, perceptions) you take your credentials (pisteis, 'proofs') to bring us down with them. Thy victory, however, is thy fall.

#### **B4. Neo-Milesian physicalists.-**

W. Jaeger, *à la naiss.*, 35, 177, says that, +/- -450, Melissos of Samos, an eleate by birth, prefigures the unbounded (a.peiron) of Anaximandros as the only principle, while Diogenes of Apollonia renews the hylozoism of Anaximenes (aër, air, as 'soul' of once and universe) and proclaims 'aër', animating breath, as the only fysis principle. Thus the Milesian unity-physics revives.

### **(III) The natural wisdom professional scientists.**

- On page 30 supra we pointed out the wealth of subject sciences which, hand in hand with the physical, arose. Not that they did not exist before. But they are now guided by the new concept of nature (in all its meanings).

#### **-- 'Histor', eyewitness,**

This is someone who acquires knowledge (eidenai) through his own seeing (idein); the same word 'histor' also means referee, i.e. someone who, through the examination of the reports of eyewitnesses, acquires knowledge. Already Hesiod uses the word *Werken en dagen* (Works and days), 790. 'Historeo', I seek to know (Herod., 1:61), I inquire, I investigate; I question; I know; I narrate what I know, occurs independently in historia, inquisitio, (Herod., 2:118; hence history (Herod., 1:1), i.e. by one's own seeing (aut.opsis) or inquiry, investigation, won communication of actual facts. -

#### **- The Milesians -**

Thales, Anaximandros (the first to make a map; cf. F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 92/120; 141/199), Anaximenes, have the historia, the inquiry,

**a/** to the fusiis, nature, as a whole **1/** of creation and decay, **2/** of changes of all kinds, and thereby

**b/** to the archè, resp. archai, the principles, sought (the why). But the Milesians were unitary physicists: they were concerned with nature as a whole. - Now the particular or special physical comes into play.

#### **A. The land and ethnology.**

Hekataios of Miletos (-560/-480) is, according to W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 479, "the first who transferred to the inhabited earth the study of the fusiis as a whole in a special way, which until then had been treated only as a part of the cosmos and in its most general surface articulation."

This logografos, logographer, i.e. prose writer (different from the epic and other poets), also historian, beautifully expresses the Milesian personal research: "Hekataios the Milesian speaks thus: I write down as it appears to me as true; for the stories of the Hellenes, as they appear to me, are numerous and ridiculous."

He aligns with the geometric-symmetric worldview of Anaximandros. Cf. F. Krafft, o.c., 168/199 (*Das geometrische Erdbild des Hekataios von Milet*), (The Geometric Earth Image of Hecataeus of Miletu).

By not receiving the truth from the Muses themselves as Hesiod did, but by tracing it himself through 'historiè', research, Hekataios founded geography, understood as knowledge of the inhabited earth.

#### **-- Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-424)**

This one takes the next step: he preserves the unity of land- and ethnology as Hekataios, but he puts man at the center and is thus the precursor of true historiography (the "father of history").

He knew Anatolia, Egypt, Hellas and described the confrontation between East and West in the empirical spirit of the Milesians.

The map that Hekataios, following Anaximandros, made, Herodotos criticizes:

1/ the empirical side he improves and

2/ the geometric-symmetrical design he rejects insofar as it applies in the large, but preserves insofar as it concerns small-scale landscapes (cf. Herod., Hist., 2:15ff.; 4:36ff., on the vastness of Egypt, on the division of the earth into parts; see F. Krafft, o.c., 168f.)

G. Daniëls, *Religieus-historische studie over Herodotus* (Religious-historical study on Herodotus), Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946, shows us up close how, according to Herodotos, the “nature” (third meaning: being) of the countries and peoples is ordered:

1/ the many gods (sometimes the god, the divine) work according to one plan;

2/ this plan follows as a principle the kuklos (loop, cycle): all events originate and perish, turn from happiness into misfortune, etc. (the ‘fusus’ of the Miles). (That fact is, in itself, already ‘aitia’, culpa guilt (if necessary unconscious guilt); this is followed by ‘sumbouliè’ (warning); this is followed, in due course, by ‘tisis’, punishment (penance, reparation).

That punishment, resp. reparation of punishment, consists first and foremost in levelling, smoothing (‘ison’, equality); that then is the ‘teleutè’, ending, of the kuklos or cycle, whereby the gods steer every deviation, especially by levelling, to repair;

3/ The gods exert this kuklos influence in the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, but, in particular, in individual life and in the life of nations and peoples.

This is the world order (o.c., 56), which constitutes the ‘logos’, i.e. the narrative structure, of the book. -

As examples Herodotos gives Kroisos, Kuros, Kambuses, Xerxes, Polukrates: The hunger for land (territorial expansion, imperialism) leads, in time, to hubris (crossing borders); notwithstanding warnings, blindness comes, which manifests itself in the neglect of warnings and in the interpretation of oracles of the gods (sixteen oracle sites are named by Herodotos), where the person concerned, hastily, sees only the interpretation that is good for him, without noticing that the divine judgment also contains an imprecise interpretation.

Misdemeanors (murder, unreasonable plunder, corpse violations) work off this blindness, which leads to doom and ruin, whereby the “guilt” is atoned for. -

The gods, after all, insist on evenness and order in nature, through the wise distribution of happiness; but also in the lives of men they draw certain boundaries, whose violation they do not tolerate.

If this does happen, man encounters the “ftonos theon”, (the zeal of the gods) or also, the “nemesis ek theou” (the restorative intervention of God). Cf. p. 12 supra; also 14 (Anaximandros’ fragment, but there it is the one archè (primal principle), not the gods).

***Digression:***

***The oracle interpretation.***

- On page 25 supra we spoke of Herakleitos' *technè hermeneutike*, art of interpretation. The oracle (divine speech) plays an important role in Hellenic life. Herodotos also gives it a central place in the *kuklos* of

- 1/ creation and decay and
- 2/ turning from salvation into calamity ('*fusis*'). -

An example (Her., Hist., 1:66): the Spartans become, after Lukoergos' legislation, a powerful people, but they are not satisfied with that; they ask the oracle at Delfoi about the land of the Arkadians. The motive is: they are dissatisfied with what they own and covet Arkadia, not partially but completely. That is *hubris*.

The oracle promises a part of Arkadia (as conquering booty) there and says that the Spartans '*orchèsiathai*'. This ambiguous oracle they interpret in their blindness, naively, as "will dance" (of joy), yet do not think that this divine judgment mentally conceals another meaning of '*orchèsthai*', namely, to work in the *orchos*, garden, row of vines, (as prisoners of war). The outcome confirms the second interpretation: their border crossing the gods punish by defeat. Thus the judgment of God takes place. -

The ancient Roman Breviary, eleventh Sunday after Pentecost (1st and 2nd *nokturn*) gives, in connection with 4 Kings 20: 1/11, a text of St. Jerome, *In Isaiem prophetam*, 11, 38: "non Deo mutante sententiam sed provocante humanum genus ad notitiam sui" (not that God changes His mind, but He forces humanity to self-knowledge). This proves that the Old Testament also knew such ambiguous divine statements, accompanied by the same judgment structure, which, via, misunderstanding, leads to the "opening of the eyes" (awareness) in the one who deals with the oracle. Cf. Daniel, o.c., 71/72.-

This indicates that oracles should first of all be understood pragmatically, i.e. starting from the outcome (the result), and not in a naive 'theoretical' (what the semioticians now call semantic) way. Cf. Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication (A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism)*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1957-1, 1966<sup>2</sup>, pp. 219ss. (Welby's *significa*; Morris's semiotics (syntactics, semantics, pragmatics), as well as: B. Toussaint, *Qu'est-ce que la semiologie?*, Toulouse, 1978.

It is too obvious that a *significa*, a semiotics, a semiology - whatever variant of sign theory one prefers now is secondary - lies at the basis of Herodotos' (and Herakleitos') oracle interpretation. The oracle, as divine judgment, presupposes a hearer (consultor) who is not in *hubristic* condition, if not his capacity for interpretation is deranged: the oracle:

- (i) does not say ready,
- (ii) also does not hide without down,
- (iii) but gives a hint, a sign in between. Every hermeneutic should take this into account.

***Ionic and/or Milesian empiricism. -***

That Herodotos, as F. Krafft, says, follows the Thaletic mode, is evident from following text (*Hist.*,7; G. Daniels, o.c.,93/94):

“Thou seest how God’s lightning strikes the highest creatures and does not tolerate that they exalt themselves in their haughtiness, this, while the small does not strike him. Thou seest how his strokes always strike down the largest buildings and the largest trees. For it is God’s rule of conduct to strike down everything that staggers.

Thus also a large army is defeated by a small one, in the following manner: namely, when the zealous god sows panic in the army or makes a thunder rumble, causing it to perish in a manner unworthy of him. For God does not tolerate that anyone besides Him is arrogant.

Everything that is done haughtily, however, brings failures, which usually result in heavy damage; prudence, however, brings something good, even if it does not look so at the time, but one only establishes it with time.” Krafft claims that Thales of Miletos did not conceive of a comprehensive unitary physics, but connected phenomenon with phenomenon, reasoning, as cause and effect, as principle and change.

What all Milesians do. What Herodotus also does, as the above excerpt shows: he has established that lightning indeed strikes the tallest buildings, the tallest plants, preferably. By analogy with this and relying on years of oracle interpretation (his uncle was teratioskopos, i.e., miracle-worker, paranormologist (we would now say), and it was with him that Herodotos learned the analysis of divinatory spells), he sees the same structure at work in the human domain. Thus phenomenon with phenomenon is connected in a rational way, but for that reason not religionless, on the contrary. Cf. J. Feix, transl., *Herodot*, Historien, Wiesbaden, s.d., S. 446. -

But also the Anaximandrian way of thinking works here: even that justice has time to (obliterate) the adikia, the iniquity, by tisis, debt forgiveness, reparation, is evident here from the word ‘at that time’ and ‘with time’. For this again see p. 14: ‘according to the order of time’ (in Anaximandros’ fragment). -

That aspect of time was also familiar to the Old Testament: “The fathers eat unripe grapes, and the teeth of the children become stony with them.” (Jerem. 31s29; see also Ezek. 18:1). This, however, emphasizes the genealogical (offspring) aspect, but the deferral of punishment is also provided and expressed in it,-of course in Biblical context. Cf. also H. Klees, *Die Eigenart des griechischen Glaubens an Orakel und Seher (Ein Vergleich zwischen griechischer und nichtgriechischer Mantik bei Herodot)*, (The Peculiarity of Greek Belief in Oracles and Seers (A Comparison of Greek and Non-Greek Manticism in Herodotus)), Stuttgart, s.d..

The study of nature has been elaborated in the logographers to human research, aspect countries and peoples.

### ***B. Medicine. -***

W. Jaeger, - *A la naiss.*, 168, says that the private, yes, singular empiricism of Anaxagoras is typical of the Milesians of the V-th century. Herodotos (land and ethnology) and Hippokrates' school, he says, are its main representatives. But F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, S. 76/91, shows that already Thales harbored that private (if necessary singular) empiricism, connecting phenomenon with phenomenon in a logical way. Jaeger, however, rightly points to the physicians, who, confronted with human suffering and life, had to practice such empiricism particularly emphatically. More to the point, there has been a dormant interaction between the physical and medicine, from then on.

#### ***-- Alkmeon of Kroton (+/- -500),***

Pythagorean, scientist and physician, Heraklitean influenced, dietitian, already explained the fisis, the nature of being (third meaning of fisis), by speaking of mixture and separation of food ingredients. This is a mechanistic idea: 1/ small components 2/ which, by mixing and separating, 3/ clarify the principle of nutrition (a fisis aspect: origin, development, if necessary its reversal, i.e. decay, languishing).

#### ***- Hippocrates of Kos (V-th e.). -***

Contemporary of Socrates (-469/-399), he is virtually unknown in terms of biography. His works are lost, but his method and teachings are grossly known: he is the founder of Platonically conceived medicine. Platon says that he conceived the body, in its nature, as the nature of a whole. Only if one sees a whole in it can one know what acts on it or on what it acts, Since Platon's time he was recognized and famous.

#### ***- Corpus Hippocraticum. -***

This disparate collection of medical works, mostly nameless, dates from the V th and IV th centuries BC. It is not even certain which part is by Hippocrates, but it bears his name, conveniently.

#### ***- The two major types of medicine. -***

Throughout antiquity, 1/ animistic-dynamic - medicine (improperly called 'irrational' medicine, since archaic religion too has its logic) and 2/ from the -500s, physical (Milesian mentality reflecting) medicine, continued to exist side by side, - or were linked, as already appears in Herodotos, *Histories*, III (J. Feix, transl., *Herod.*, *Hist.*, S. 199 and elsewhere), about Kambuses' falling or 'holy' disease. Cf. W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 170, 255, where it appears that Herodotos interweaves the two types.

-- Hippocrates is called the 'Asklepiaad' of Kos, this means that he belonged to a very ancient family and guild of physicians, which drew its origin from a physician Asklep(i)os, who underwent apothe(i)osis,

i.e., who, in the VIIIth century, is still described as human, but, in the VIth and Vth centuries, is elevated to the position of ancestor of families of physicians, yea, of ancestral deity (Aesculapios, Lt.) (apotheosis).

-- C.J. Singer, *Medicine*, in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1949-1, 1950<sup>2</sup>, p. 548, says that traces of science can be found in the medical praxis of the Homeric poems.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 13/14 says that Egyptian medicine too was more than lower archaic art, to a certain extent, but that Milesian natural philosophy transferred the *historia fusikè*, *inquisitio naturalis*, the study of nature, from the *fusis* as the whole of the universe to the private of man, to viz. the *fusis anthropine*, *natura humana*, human nature.

This has its rules, prescribed by its being; the theoretical knowledge - in this the physical medicine of the Hellenes in Milesia exceeds that of the Egyptians - of the human *fusis* governs man's way of life in a healthy and in a sick state. Here the concept of "human *fusis*" arises in the sense of a physical organism with its own "nature" i.e. essence (third meaning of *fusis*).

- 1/ In *Paideia*, II, 41, Jaeger, from "Epidemics," quotes a phrase: *A.paideutos / Eu.paideutos* (there are two versions) *hè fusis hekousa ou mathousa to deonta poiei*" (uneducated/good raised performed nature, by itself, without learning what belongs). Here one sees man's nature as a cybernetic "force" (*dunsmis*) or principle (*archè*) working from within (*dynamism*; - not *mechanicism*), which, unconsciously regulating purpose.

- 2/ Cf. E. Beth, *Natuurphilosophie* (Philosophy of Nature), 1948, p. 56: "The law of compensation - the term is Emerson's - is also alluded to by Plato, *Timaeus* 52A: 'All these things become the cause of diseases, when the blood does not sustain itself from food and drink, but gains its weight from wrong things against the laws of nature. "(...) Disease is here the sanction, entered with necessity, of a violation of cosmic law."

- C.J. Singer, a.c., quotes 'De *heilige ziekte*' (The Sacred Disease), (a book from Corp. Hippocr.): "This disease has the same *profasis* (cause) as other (diseases) which come and go in the body - cold, sun, varying restlessness of *pneumata* (winds). -

These are *theia* (divine). There is no reason to classify this disease in a special class as more divine than other (diseases): all diseases are divine and all *anthropina* (human). Each has its own *fusis* (nature) and *dunamis* (power)." The terms 'pneuma', 'fusis', Singer says, recur again and again in Hellenic medical literature: they are untranslatable, he says. He discovers three ways to discover the divine aspect:

(i) 'divine' is that which points to no immediately discoverable cause (principle); the rest is natural' (i.e., there are two domains that have pathological effects on man); the book *Decorum, Corp. Hipp.*, thinks so;

(ii) 'divine' and 'human' ('natural') run together; the book 'The Holy Disease' (see text above) thinks so;

(iii) 'divine', 'human' and 'natural' are three (rather than two) types of disease phenomena or principles; so thinks *Prognostics, Women's Diseases, Corp. Hipp.*; not to mention those parts of *Corp. Hipp.* that mix the three previous opinions. In other words, Hellenic medical science had more than one philosophical streak.

**Note** - Simon of Athens (V-de e.) with Xenophon (- 430/-354), founder of Hipparchikos and *Peri Hippikès*, are known as precursors of the hippiatroi, veterinarians (*Hippiatrici*). This too is 'fusus'.

### **C. Social Studies. -**

Solon of Athens (-640/35/-561/60), a much travelled man, clearly Milesian influenced, applies general - physical and private - medical insights to another part of total *fusus*, namely social life.

Part-whole relationship, cause (principle) - effect relationship Milesian thought he sees

(i) in the physical life of man (see medicine, supra, which influenced him) and

(ii) in social life: crises in the polis he sees as similar to diseases in the body (health disturbances in the social body). Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 14. -- In this sense, Solon is "organicist," i.e., he designates society "organic" (as a bodily organism).

-- More than that: Solon tries to reduce the laws of medical or social nature mathematically to numerical proportions. Cf. the poem on the rhythmic regularity of the succession of human periods of life (*Paideia*, II, 14).

This thought is still alive today: G.S. Thomsen, *Biorhythmes (Guide des bons et des mauvais jours)*, (Biorhythms (Guide to good and bad days), Paris, 1976, links to H. Swoboda (Vienna, 1875/1965), W. Fliess (Berlin, 1859/1928), the friend of Sigm. Freud, who supported him in that biorhythmics; - behavior, birth, sex, disease, death, etc. would obey rhythms. R. Guillot, *Les crimes dans la pleine lune*, (Crime in the full moon), Paris, 1979, points out the lunar rhythm, which, incidentally, is well known in occultist circles.

Solon, of noble birth, complained about his own position (although he also knew its qualities) in the struggle between *demos*, the people, and *turannis*, the monarchy. From Solon onward, Athens acquires a system of society that is not too bound as Sparta and not too loose as Ionia, a golden mean. Any rape of the law is a breakdown of the polis as a body: sound law prevents such. (*Paideia*, I, 118/ 194).

For the first time Solon articulates the causal connection between injustice and disturbance of society, not like Hesiod, who calls Dikè (Justice) and Eunomia (Good Lawfulness), in his Theogony, 902, sisters and conceives of them as transcendently acting hypostases, but already Milesian “natural,” d. i. immanent, operating in the nature of the polis itself as a guiding principle, - without therefore excluding a transcendent, divine side, for (*Paideia*, I, 218) justice does not depend on human and earthly jurisdiction, though neither is it without more divine intervention.

On the contrary, human justice is subject, if at least responsibly, to eunomia, order of law, situated in the very nature of social relations, - nature which is not thought ungodly, as W. Den Boer, *De godsdienst der Grieken*, (The religion of the Greeks), 1965, p. 65/66, excellently states: “(To see in the curse of the generations - see p. 42, bottom, supra -) also the hand of the gods, is not inconsistent with the consciousness of one’s own responsibility.

But let us not speak of phases of religious consciousness in which there would be either personal guilt or guilt of the sexes. And beware of using the concept of development and putting the first (i.e. personal guilt) later than the latter and giving it more importance. Den Boer reacts, too rightly, against Solon’s evolutionist interpretation.

-- *Note - The Sophists (see later) and Thøekudides (+/- -470 or 455/-396)*

They will privately interpret the general physical of the Milesians in a new way:

### **1/ the Sophistics (-450/-350)**

Sophistics understands “human nature” more broadly than medicine, viz. they see the whole of body and soul, with an emphasis on the inwardness of man, - this as the basis of their educational theory, they also see the social aspect in their way, not Solonic, physical-religious. but with strong emphasis on thesis, proposition (positive aspect), nomos, habit (conventional aspect) and techne, art (artificial aspect), which weaken the concept of nature;--

### **2/ Thøekudides,**

The brilliant pragmatist historian and quiet thinker, who described the deep crisis of the Peloponnesian War (-431/ -404), does the same as Sophistics but emphasizes the social and moral nature of man.

He also limited the horizon of historiography to the polis (the battle between Athens and Sparta), where Herodotos covered the worldwide horizon of countries and peoples (*Paideia*, I, 387f.).

-- We thus see the exceptional fruitfulness and expansion of the concept of nature thanks to Milesian natural philosophy. One remembers the universal-philosophical and the private-scientific perspectives, - distinct, but not separate.

#### **(IV) *The lyrical and dramatic poetry.* -**

It may seem strange: lyricism and drama belong to natural wisdom thinking. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 180, says: "Thought does not avoid the questions of the life of man, as the traditional treatment of this epoch in the history of philosophy might make it seem: it usually confines itself to the cosmological side. It conquers the poetry which since ancient times has been the bearer of ethical thought, and breathes into it its spirit."

In other words, physical thought permeates poetry;

1/ not only because e.g. a Parmenides expresses his ontology in verse or a Herakleitos uses aphorisms as an expression of his mobilism

2/ no, "the poet acts as philosopher of life for his hearers" (o.c., 180). Thus Simonides of Samos (Amorgos) - +/- -650 gives in his poems "pure lectures on a certain subject" and Mimnermos of Kolofon (-630/-560) likewise takes a thinking-philosophical approach in his poetry. The spirit of the Milesians - Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes - is also expressed here. These poets think personally; they give a new direction to Hellenic life.

#### ***A/ Hedonic - Hedona, pleasure experience;***

Hedonic" is therefore what has to do with the experience of pleasure (collective structure) or is similar to it (distributive structure), "hedonic" is to bring up or experience the hedonic, "hedonist" is he who makes pleasure the main thing in life.

- The Homeric epics, *Iliad* and *Odusseia*, are again pioneering: in the last song of the *Iliad*, for example, Achilles calls for food and drink (he refers to Niobe) and says: "We are all only human!"

Jaeger, o.c., 165, speaks here of the "human - all too - human" (located in the ordinary enjoyment) as opposed to the strict-aristocratic heroism (heroism) that is the overriding ideal of Homer. The hero too is only human and therefore hedonic. This means, Hellenically expressed, that the 'kalon', the heroic noble type of behavior, also has a hèdu, an ordinary pleasure element, as its corrective.

Precisely that hèdu, that moment of pleasure, will, in the breakthrough of the individual (vg1. supra p. 39, Hekataios' personal thought and research) into ethics and politics (city-state life), play a key role: the pleasurable (hèdu) in the life of the individual has to settle, with the ancient Hellenes, with high duty (kalon).

Ionian poetry, since Archilochos of Paros, a Cyklad, (+/- -650), but especially since Simonides and Mimnermos, who do it systematically, gives full justice to the human desire for joy of life and conscious enjoyment.

***Listen to this excerpt from Archilochos:***

“In possession of a myrtle branch and a beautiful flower of the rose, she enjoyed. The hair fell to her like a dark shadow on shoulders and neck.” (Horst Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker (Griechisch und Deutsch)*, Zürich, 1949, 70/71).

Or still: (Gugès, Ludic prince, -685/ -652 (reigning time), named by Herodotos, was proverbially rich; listen how Archilochos responds:)

“I care nothing for what Gugès possesses with his many gold. Neither envy nor zeal for deeds (heroic deeds) have me in their grip.

Great turannis (autocratic rule) I do not desire, for such a thing is far from my (desiring) eyes.” Here (what would be called with a current word “counterculture” is expressed) wealth acquisition, heroic “gods” deeds (think Homer’s epic) or acquisition of power as an autocrat (turannos) were commonplace in heroism. “Ou moi”, “not for me!” says Archilochos! The ‘success, the ‘telos’ or purpose of life lies, apparently, for him not in it. The purposefulness of human fisis comes into play here.

***Or listen to Gimonides’ fragment on the death of the Skopades,***

that is a gentlemanly family from Thessaly; in the city of Krannon they were killed by the collapse of a hall:

“Man as thou art, never pronounce what will happen tomorrow nor, seeing a man happy, how long he will be; for so fast is the weakening (meta.stasis) of the long-winged gnat not even.”

Jaeger says, “Simonides is basically already ‘a typical sophist’ (cf. Platon, *Protag.*, 339A)” (Paid. I, 375); listen: “The power of people is not much. Never done their worries. In a short life one trouble after another. Yet inescapably death threatens. Of herison (as great) the share for those who are good as for those who are bad.”

Fusis is, originally, becoming and perishing, “turning over” (Herakleitos would say) something into its opposite: here perishing is emphasized!

-- The tension between nobility in conduct and pleasure becomes, in Sophistics, to open conflict between the two. Attic philosophy,

1/ with Sokrates and Platon, subjects the experience of pleasure to the intellectual-reasonable pursuit of virtue (aretè) as a duty,

2/ yet, with Aristotle, with his eudemonism, she achieves harmony of the two. (*Paid.* I, 179).

The Aiolian lyricism of Sapfo of Mutilènè (Lesvos) (-630/-560) and Alkaios of Mutilènè (+/- -620) runs parallel to the Ionian, which, with her, in its free pronunciation of the individual, differs from the Doric-aristocratic poetry of a Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/ -438), which, incidentally, is Orphic influenced. On Lesbos, the inner life is discussed.

***Listen to Sappho's fragment (which may as well be a folk song):***

“Dear mother, I can't stand this weaving any more, overwhelmed by desire for the lad by the slender Aphrodite,”

Or: “As the honey apple becomes red at the extreme top, the extreme at the extreme (of the apple). The apple-pickers forgot him.

Or rather they did not forget him. They could not reach him”.

Or: “As shepherds trample down the hyacinth on the mountains with their feet, so the purple flower lies (dying).”

Or: “Evening star, you bring back what the shining Morning Star took away, - you bring back the sheep, you bring back the goat, you bring back the child to its mother.

Or still: “All around, cool dew flows along the branches of the apple trees; while the leaves tremble, deep slumber flows down.”

This leads W. Jaeger to ask: “Where, until Goethe, is anything to be found in Western art that can be compared with it?” (*Paid.*, I, 186).

In contrast to the metaphysical transcendence of the ascending desire of the Platonic soul for the idea, says Jaeger, the Sapphic eros is always sensuous.

What both have in common, however, is that their souls are deeply involved in eros, be it Sapphic love or Platonic love (o.c., 135).

“Some say that soldiers on horseback, others, footmen, others again, ships, on the dark earth are the most beautiful (kalliston) I however (ego de), what someone loving desires(...). Thus I am now full of Anaktoria, however far it may be. I preferred her beloved steps. And I preferred to see the luminous gleam of her countenance than the chariots of the Ludians and their footmen in arms.” -- “To me belongs a girl, with a view (morphà) of golden flowers like, Kleïs, the beloved: for her I chase neither the whole of Ludia nor the lovely Lesbos.” “He chases my insides, Eros, like a wind which, in the mountains, pours itself upon oaks.” -- “Eros, the sleeper, he will not let go of me, he, the bittersweet, unholy beast that creeps upon me.” “Sunk is the moon, sunk the Pleiades: it is the middle of the night. The hour passes, but I lie alone.”

Unlike modern Romanticism, influenced by biblical Christianity, with its tension ‘nature/art’, ‘nature/culture’, / ‘nature/human’, - reminiscent of Sophism and Skepticism, - Ancient Greek lyricism is nature-bound: “unbroken and seamless emerges from the fuis” (H. Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker*, (Greek lyric poets), 1949, 15).

This poetry that only through stylized language, rhythm, music (lyre or double flute (aulos)) and dance pours into nobler form what the fuis experience naively. This is also the case with Alkaios, although the political situation is more evident in his poetry. In his case, too, there is no sophisticatedly technical wordcraft.

***Sapphic eros is not Lesbian love in our modern sense. -***

As H. Rüdiger says, o.c. 28, there is “culturally determined Aiolian - Oriental morality” involved. This means that the archaic religion is still speaking here, but articulated by someone who thinks Milesian-personally instead of merging as a nameless being into the collectivity. - The Sapphic eros is educational at once.

***Sappho taught in***

**A/** musical arts, i.e. **1/** recitation of lyrical poetry, **2/** music (lyre and obo-like double flute), which accompanied the recitative of the words, **3/** dance and, immediately

**B/** noble forms of politeness. In her ‘House of Muses’, Eros, the lover god, but even more so the (though traditionally cultivated on Lesbos) Aphrodite worship that was fusionist and beauty-loving, - a chthonic religion around a heavenly queen, - is the basis of the educational relationship between her and the girls.

Aphrodite, says Rüdiger, o.c., 26, was the patroness of maturing girls and of marriage. The girls stayed with Sappho until they married. Which is something else than so-called lesbian love in our sense. Only later, after the Sophist crisis, the coquettish, immoral and skeptically-lucid eroticism emerged: since then she is also referred to as the foundress of the common Lesbian love. -

Listen to the prayer to Aphrodite, who, as a Cypriot, is apparently in direct connection with the Eastern Queen of Heaven Astarte and the like.

“Immortal Aphrodite with the variegated flowers, crafty spinning daughter of Zeus, to thee I cry: never break my heart with woe and distress, celestial ruler, but come to me, thou who hast already on other occasions heard the far cry of my voice, left thy Father’s house, mounted the golden chariot, appeared to me. Beautiful glittering birds accompanied you in swarms over the fields of the dark earth, swooping down from heaven with heavy wings through the aither. In flight they came to me.

But you, blissful one (makaira), played a smile on the immortal face, when you asked me why I called you again, what was troubling me, what my heart, in its rapture, so longed for: “Who will persuade the power of the flattering recruitment of your love? Sapfo, who will wrong you? Soon the one who flees you will seek you out; the one who despised your gifts will bring you gifts; soon the one who loves you will love you against your will.” Now come to me also: deliver me from the heavy sorrow; give my heart all that it longs for; thou, be to me an ally in the fight.” -

One should not forget that filia, friendship, which always includes archaic eros, fusis - but even more god(s) connected - as a sphere of education, yes, of fellow humanity, was a Hellenic given of distinguished rank, which Platon also agrees with.

As P. Lévêque, *L'aventure grecque*, (The Greek adventure), Paris, 1964, p. 224, confirms: In fact, archaic lyricism goes far beyond a mundane *carpe diem* (enjoy the day).

One may, in a first approach, be sensitive to the ceaseless evocation of spring, flowers, light, and love, which are, without doubt, the admirable and splendid background of the first lyricism. But, gnomic (i.e. taking the form of a proverb) or not, this poetry is entirely directed towards a wisdom which, alone, is able to bring about the full development of the individual, a wisdom which consists of measure, which sings of a new virtue, which already appears in Hesiod and reaches its full development in Pindaros: justice.

Indeed, apart from the pleasure aspect, the lyric also expresses the class struggle: Archilochos, Alkaios, Theognis, Solon, sometimes aristocratic, sometimes democratic, sometimes one-sided, sometimes with a sense of Pythagorean balance, express the charged feelings of the class struggle.

Class struggle that is not so far removed from hedonism: everyone fights for his or her share of what this earth has to offer in terms of possessions, power - and the pleasures they provide. -

Listen to Alkaios of Mutilene (Lesbos) (+/- - 620), younger than Sapfo, who, as an aristocrat, with his brother, took a stand against Nursilos, who became *turannos*, autocrat, and the *sofos*, sapiens, sage, P(h)ittakos, the son of an immigrant from Thrace and a Lesbian commoner: "... P(h)ittakos, of mean descent, appointed men of a lukewarm and unsavoury city as *turannos*, while they, closely united, wished him happiness."

### ***B/ Drama.-***

'Drama' is a Dorian word. It means 'act'. What is certain, according to P. Lévêque, o.c., 224, is that the literary forms of drama -

1/ tragedy,

2/ satire,

3/ comedy - have evolved from purely religious rites.

But how, is controversial.

1/ However, Aristotle (*Poetics*) says that tragedy was born from the *dithurambos*: this was, originally, a Dionusos liturgy, celebrated by choirs dancing in circles around an altar, in collective mania (enthusiasm) and secluded from the audience, with a choirmaster starting a song, improvising, perhaps drunk on wine.

2/ In the same sense, the Satyr's choir performed.

3/ The *cosmos* was a *bakchi* (Dionysian) procession, celebrated by peasants, at the end of the harvest, who called each other burnt jokes and the like, ignoring all taboos (think of the *Saturnalia* in Rome; think of carnival, today). -

Shortly before -550 *Thespiis* of Ikaria, next to the choir, introduced the first *hupokritès*, answering person, who answered the choir and thus spoke intelligently - reasonably.

### ***The Attic tragedians***

Aischulos of Eleusis (-525/-456), Sophocles of Colonos (-496/-406), - the two traditional-religious dramatists; Euripides of Salamis (-485/-406), - the Sophistically influenced, strongly irrationalizing of the big three.

According to W. Jaeger, *Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956 (// Humanism and Theology, Marquette University Press (USA), 1943), the theme and problem of the tragedians revolves around the divine guidance of history:

(i) Aischulos, deeply religious and prophetic, believes that the divine Sophia, sapientia, wisdom, guides all that the fuisis, nature, offers us, notwithstanding the tragedy;

(ii) Sophocles, less theological, highlights the balance between gods and men, while stressing the greatness of suffering man; -

(iii) Euripides, however, like Protagoras, the Sophist, breaks with the religious interpretation of nature as governed by divine guidance and deploys anthropocentrism, not, however, as Dodds (*The Concept of Progress*) amelioratingly observes, without mystic skepticism, surpassing both ancient physicalism and newer sophistry.

We refer with emphasis to what has been said (supra pp. 42/44) about Herodotos' conception of history; only:

1/ the judgement of the gods or the deity as a collective unity of a steering nature concerning the coming into being and the passing away of things in the fuisis, as already explained by the myth (see supra pages 11bis/11quater), can

2/ together with the oracular laws of interpretation (see above; Herakleitos' interpretation, p. 27: hermeneutics; Herodotos' interpretation, pp. 43/44), give an insight into the structure of the drama of Aischulos and Sophocles.

- When P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité*, (Finitude and guilt), Paris, 1960, pp. 199/217, speaks of “*le dieu méchant et la vision ‘tragique’ de ‘l’existence’*“, (the evil god and the ‘tragic’ view of ‘existence’), he says that all the elements of the tragic are:

(i) divine (i.e. divinely-induced) blindness, daimon, destiny;

(ii) zealotry (‘jealousy’) and boundary-breaking.

“It is the tragedy of Aischulos that has gathered these themata and added to them the quid proprium (the typical) that constitutes the tragedy of tragedy.” (o.c., 205).

The confluence of being predestined to evil with heroic greatness (heroism), of fate and freedom, gives rise to the fobos, the fear, which is the tragic experience par excellence. -

Ricoeur distinguishes, not entirely wrongly:

1/ the tragic interpretation of evil (physical and ethical - political understanding) from

2/ that of the drama of creation (Gilgamesh - epic in Babylon), from

3/ that of the Fall of Man (Adam's myth in Israel) and of

4/ that of the Orphic banishment - soul myth (see p. 15/16 supra (new theogonies), p. 10/21 (shamanism)); he searches for a unifying vision: this is in our view the judgement of God (see course 1).

### ***C/ Hymnology. -***

W. Jaeger, *A la naiss.*, 37/38, notes that, from Anaximandros (speaking of the apeiron, the infinite, as archè, beginning, and teleutè, end, of all creation and decay) to Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia, the physicalists use a language akin to humnos, the hymn, with its liturgical-sacred repetition: “unspawned, imperishable”, “all encompassing, all governing”.

That too is poetry! And in the heart of the Milesian philosophy of nature! When the primal principle - bearing a striking resemblance to the Earth Mother, from whom everything originates, in whom everything perishes, of the chthonic religion - is discussed, lyricism emerges.

### ***Note: The word ‘paideia***

**1/** which first appears in Aischulos and means child care and education,

**2/** acquires, in Sophocles’ time, for the first time, the meaning of the highest human aretè virtue, formation ideal (understood as kalokaigathia).

For Isokrates, Platon and their time the word ‘paideia’ already has this established meaning (which Rome, later, will translate by humanitas). Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia, I*, 343ff.

**Note:** - U. von Wilamowitz - Ebllendorff, *Einleitung in die Griechische Tragödie*, (Introduction to Greek Tragedy), Berlin, 1910, S. 124, says that, according to Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385), the only comedy poet whose works remained available, in *‘The Frogs’* (Batrachoi (-405), the works of the tragedians are in the hands of the public as published books: “*Die ersten wirklichen Bücher sind die Attischen Tragödien gewesen*” (The first real books were the Attic Tragedies), o.c., 121). Before that, texts were circulating but not published as a book with title.

### ***-- Elaboration on the myth of Oedipus. -***

This digression has its place here because:

**1/** In tragedy (e.g. Sophocles’ tetralogy Laios, Oedipus, Seven against Thebes and (the satyr play) The Sphinx - performed in -467,

**2/** in poetry (e.g. Pindaros, who reports that he practised paiderastia and wrote an ode to his ‘eromenos’ (i.e. protector) Theoxenos),

**3/** In the legislation (e.g. Solon, who, shortly after -500, reformed the Athenian society and provided rules of conduct for the paiderastia (which he held in high esteem)), the paiderastia, boy love played a remarkable role, which, for us moderns, is incomprehensible.

And also because the Oedipus myth has played a key role in depth psychology since S. Freud’s psychoanalysis at the beginning of this century.

Th. Vangaard, *Phallos (Symbol und Kult in Europa)*, (Phallos (symbol and cult in Europe), - Vorwort v. Alex. Mitscherlich, Munich, 1971 (Danish ed.: Copenhagen, 1969), S. 22, says that, from +/- -750 to +/- -300, the paiderastia, was a (mainly Doric) established institution, which has little in common with the present concept of pederasty, except its purely behavioristic form.

**-- Rock inscriptions.**

Vanggaard gives an example: “Invoking the Delphic Apollon, I, Krimon, performed the act of love here with a boy, the son of Bathukles.”

Written in Dorian dialect, this text can be read on the rock wall, next to the temple of Apollon Karneios, on the island of Thera (Santorin) in the Aegean Sea. Date: the VIIth century before Christ. Apollon Karneios is a Doric deity. The Doric word ‘ofein’ (to perform the act of love), coire (Lt), also means to have sexual intercourse with women. -

Thus there are many similar inscriptions, which, according to Vanggaard, contain the public proclamation by a man of his anal coitus with a boy as a liturgical-cultural act, and not as lewd, lascivious sensuality. - Thus there are numerous literary accounts (Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, Platon’s works, etc.). -

The paiderastia is not only practiced under the protection of gods: the gods and heroes themselves, in an exemplary manner, practice the paiderastia. “According to Bethe, the Thera - inscription, which proclaims Krimon’s copula with the son of Bathukles in the sanctuary of Apollon, means that thereby the lad was culturally conferred noble manhood or, as one says in Greek, ‘aretè’ (virtue(iness)).” (o.c., 31). Aretè, virtue, is the set of qualities that makes a man ‘virtuous’ in view of his role in life and the happiness attached to it, both physical and spiritual.

The “erastès” (guardian) was a mature man; the “eromenos” (beloved boy) was an infant boy, without a beard, before his sexual maturity. The patron should, for the rest of his life, act as ‘godfather’ to his boy-lover: find a good wife, start a proper marriage, uphold a man’s ideal - these were the things he should help the boy with. If not, he was punishable by law. -- With this in mind, the myth can now be understood as. It must be understood if one is to proceed correctly in terms of cultural history.

**-- The heroic passage. -**

Poseidon, the god of the Mediterranean, had as his eromenos Pelops, the hero (hero), after whom the Peloponnese is named and who was married to Hippodameia. He had a son with her, Crisippos. One day Laios, king of Thebes and husband of Iokaste, visited Pelops. Laios taught Crisippos how to ride a four-horse harness. He fell in love with it “with insatiable eros”. He kidnaps the boy, without informing his father, who was his host (double hubris or border crossing).

**Result:** conflict between Pelops and Laios. Pelops, offended and furious, curses Laios and his family (genealogical curse; cf. 12 above, p. 42 also). -- The effect; of this curse is as follows: Laios is killed by his son Oidipus (both do this without knowingly, unconsciously) both do this without unconsciously) on the road from Thebes to Delfoi. Oedipus then marries the widow Iokaste (he and his mother do this unconsciously).

Unconscious parricide and unconscious incest are thus the effects of the magic curse, not because of the love of the sapling but because the sacred rights of father and host were violated. -

From this Freud distilled the Oedipus complex: the son's zeal for his father who, with his mother, occupies a place he envies. Envy exists when that place has already been taken; envy, when that place has not yet been taken. Envy - in the narrower sense is that zeal (either envy or envy) which does not endure the power, fame, honor that someone possesses or may possess in others. Although "envy" usually coincides with zealotry. -

R. Girard, *La violence et le sacré*, (Violence and the sacred), Paris, 1972; -, *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde*, (Things hidden from the foundation of the world), Paris, 1978, has, in this connection, pointed out the zealous mimèsis or imitation: the son imitates the father in one and the same person, namely the mother, whom he, like his father, wants to possess for himself (conflictual imitation, different from the Platonic which wants exemplarity without conflict about the same thing). -

One feels how far, as for the Narkissos myth, psychoanalysis or related is from the original myth. Which proves how ambiguous it is! Especially that the unconscious behavior of Oedipus, Laios and Iokaste is magically determined is, psychoanalytically, replaced by the "mechanisms of the unconscious": a kind of mechanics replaces magical-fluidic structures.

#### **- Phallic cult. -**

In order to understand boyish love to some extent, one should read works like J.-A. Dulaure, *Les divinités génératrices (Le culte du phallus chez les anciens et les modernes)*, (The generative deities (The cult of the phallus in ancient and modern times)), 1805-1, Marabout, 1974; J. Marcireau, *Le culte du Phallus*, (The Phallus Cult), Nice, 1979; and also e.g. J. Conrad, *Le culte du taureau (De la préhistoire aux corridors espagnoles)*, (The cult of the bull (From prehistory to the Spanish corridors)), Paris, 1978, but not without including the chthonic background.

#### **(V) The technique.**

- One example may be quoted: Hippodamos of Miletos, a generation younger than Hekataios of Miletos (-560/-480; see p. 39 supra), transferred the geometrical image of the earth of Hekataios to urban planning, in the line, incidentally, of earlier Ionic city planning; which followed chessboard model, to allocate land to settlers. In 479, for example, he spatially planned the city of Miletos, which had been destroyed in a revolt. In -446 he also arranged the harbor of Pireüs (Athens) spatially, at the request of Pericles. In -444/ -443: Thurioi (Gulf of Taranto). Characteristic: his city plans are

- 1/ chessboards (rectangular intersecting streets),
- 2/ oriented, mostly, according to the directions of the sky,
- 3/ Modeled on the mathematical regularity of the fuis in large, but small detail.

## **II A. Attic philosophy (-450/-320).**

Attica is the region around Athens. Ionia, Greater Greece and Sicily were central until now, although not unique as philosophical centers. Athens now becomes central. Hence the name. -

The spirit of Ionia was pure *theoria* (W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 405); physical and *historia*, comprehensive understanding of nature and private study of nature, occurred theoretically, in the first place.

The Attic mentality is “durch und durch tätig und politisch” (through and through active and political) o.c., 405 even the theoretical observation of nature and investigation of nature. -

The Sophists helped to bridge this contradiction between the Ionian mentality and the Attic mentality: they made Ionian knowledge, physical and historical, available for Attic education to become active-political education.

### ***Bibliographical note.* -**

J.-P. Dumont, *Les sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, (The sophists (Fragments and testimonies)), Paris, 1969, a pearl of a booklet, that provides basic data; at least as far as the Protosophistics are concerned, from -450 to -350; for there is a second or Deuterosophistics, under the so-called “good emperors” (from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius, viz. +96/+180): see for instance O. Schönberger, Herausg., *Philostratos, Die Bilder (Griechisch - Deutsch)*, (Philostratos, The Images (Greek - German)), Munich, 1968, S. 7/10: - further on Prophilosophy: E.R. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, (The idea of progress in antiquity), Zürich / Munich, 1977, S. 113/129, on the Sophist movement as the failure of Hellenic liberalism,

### ***Topicality of sophistry.*-**

J. Parrain - Vital, *Tendances nouvelles de la philosophie*, (New Trends in Philosophy), Paris, 1978, writes a book that surveys current philosophy since Marx, Nietzsche and Freud; writer divides the contemporaries into

1/ sophists (Sartre, Derrida, Deleuze) and

2/ philosophers (Christian humanists: Thibon, Weil, etc.; phenomenologists: Marcel; existential-phenomenologists: Heidegger, Jaspers, Merleau - Ponty; aftereffects of the two previous ones: Boutang (especially)); for the author, ‘sophist’ is a theorist who, “à partir de la sophistique antique”, (from the ancient sophist), logically gives rise to practical nihilism (violence and antihumanism) despite the fact that ‘man’ is proclaimed to be the measure of all things somewhere.

B.J.H. Ovink, *Philosophie und Sophistik*, (Philosophy and Sophisticà, ‘s Gravenhage, 1940, studies, as a Kant supporter, the sophist as a type of thinker who, starting from Thales of Miletos and Anaximandros of Miletos, moving away from “common sense”, uses concepts and judgements which, in their application to concrete things, are nowhere verifiable, but are nevertheless proclaimed with much eloquence, as personal thinking; thereby Ovink polemicizes fiercely against Aristotle (he is convinced that the study of Hellenic philosophy is indispensable)

IJ.-W. Lapierre, *Qu' est-ce qu 'une ideologie?*, (What is an ideology), in *Les ideologies dans le monde actuel*, (Ideologies in today's world), DDB, 1971, pp.11/32, says that an ideology is a logically coherent way of speaking which interprets the wishful thinking of a social group as if it had scientific or philosophical value.

Distinguished (...) from myth and utopia, (ideology) is already present in the lessons of the Greek sophists and the speeches of Cicero, but it characterizes modern times above all. It is bound up with the rise, then the triumph of rationalism and scientism.” (a.c., 18). We will see later which ideology or, rather, which ideologies Sophistics covers.

**Conclusion:** from three different points of view it appears that Sophistic either lives on or is useful somewhere, anyway.

**Vocabulary.** - Sophos, sapiens, sage, means one who acts with deliberation; since the emergence of the physical and the historia in Milesia, this word also means 'sage' (Pythagoras emphasized the 'divine' character of wisdom, as the quiet possession of knowledge concerning divine and human things and processes directed towards right action, and therefore he only spoke of philo.sophia, of wisdom instead of wisdom).

Sophistès', sophista, teacher of wisdom, means someone who is an educator, who is intellectual but still calculated to be politically useful.

Sophisma', fallacy, is 'sophistry' or wrong reasoning, practiced deliberately. Something that some sophists do not shy away from.

Orthoëpia, the right word, is a striking feature of the Sophist paideia, since rhetoric (political eloquence) was so central. That is why "Sophist" always includes the eloquence element, in addition to being a teacher - he is always a word artist in many forms. - Wisdom, the art of reasoning, the art of words - these are the three characteristics.

### **- I - Cultural and historical context.**

This is twofold: the external factors, which determine the crisis of Hellenic freedom, and the intellectual factors, which lay in the inner growth of the physical.

#### **(a) The crisis of freedom.-**

Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke* S. 124/125, describes Sophistic as a "liberal" movement, showing the same typical features as liberal thought in the 18th and 19th centuries: the same individualism, the same humanism, the same secularism, the same self-confident denunciation of tradition before the court of reason, the same great confidence in applied reason as the key to boundless progress.

A great era of intellectual, social and political emancipation lay potentially within it: 'But we know it was not to be', says Dodds (o.c., 125). Sophism is a failed liberalism.

W. Peremans, *De Griekse vrijheid (Boodschap en waarschuwing)*, (Greek freedom (Message and warning)), Hasselt, 1978, sketches the development of the eleutheria, libertas, in Hellas.

**(i) A first phase expresses itself, in the beginning of the VIth century, in two ways:**

**a/** Solon, already mentioned (p. 47/48 supra), is one of the first statesmen in Europe who solved the problem of large landowners (i.e. the conflict situation between the large landowners who enslaved debtors with wife and children, and the rebellious masses) “with a strong hand, combining violence with justice”;

**b/** the turannis, the autocratic rule, was if necessary settled by turannos murder, especially the Ionian free thinking climate created the atmosphere favorable for Hellenic freedom; but also externally the Hellenes opposed themselves and the Eastern systems of subordination, in the Persian wars (beginning of V th), as Herodotos (see above) described them, - as Aischulos, *The Persians*, put it.- (ii) A second phase is the one in which the Hellenes, the Hellenes and the Ionians, were in a position to determine their own future.

**(ii) A second phase is that of the independent city-states (poleis),**

Think of Athens (+/- 30.000 inhabitants), Sparta, Corinth, Miletus, with their direct (parliamentless) democracy and unremunerated state offices, - at least as far as the Periphrastic type, which is not Spartan, goes:

“Its name is popular government, because influence on state affairs is with us not a privilege of the few but of the many” (according to Thukudides).

Yet, however free, even carelessly free, the nomos, the law, is surrounded by deep awe. Freedom and respect for the law are - Pythagorean - in harmony.

W. Schilling, *Religion und Recht*, (Religion and law), Urban Bücher, 1957, S. 15ff, says that, originally, gods are founders, guardians and avengers of law; that Hesiod says that Zeus, the Allfather of the present order of law and of the universe, did not violate the law as the noblest gift to animals but to men.

The polytheistic folk religion of the Hellenes speaks in Xenophon, *Memories of Socrates*, IV: 3,16: “But do not be downhearted, Euthudemos,” he said, “for you know that the god of Delphi, if someone asks him how to please the gods, answers: ‘According to the law of the city-state (nomoi poleos)’”. (cf. E. Jaerisch, herausg., *Xenophon, Erinnerungen an Sokrates*, (Memories of Sokrates), Munich, 1962, S. 278/279).

This religious spirit dominated the Hellenes: religion and polis are indistinguishable.

**(iii) The third phase is called “crisis in a free world”;**

The holy fear of the nomos, the law, dies out between -431 and -420, for the Peloponnesian War, 431/404, plunges the polis into a cultural crisis and prepares the way for the Sophists, who

**1/** the youth

**2/** but especially convert the political elite to the power-state. Liberal” sophistry gives a different content to the concept of freedom: individualistic, free from “obstructive” principles, laws.

Platon, *The State* 294a, describes the situation: “Leaders who have nothing, and subjects who have everything to say: that is the parole.

(...) The father gets used to putting himself on a par with his son and being afraid of his children; the son considers himself as good as the father and neither spares nor fears his parents, because he wants to be free! (...)

In such a state it is the teacher who fears and flatters the pupils, while the high learners look down on their teachers from on high and the home teachers are no better. Young elements place themselves on a completely equal footing with the elderly and oppose them in word and deed; and the elderly adapt themselves to the young and indulge in jokes and pranks: in order not to give the impression of sulky and bossy at any price, they even come to imitate the young"! It is not without reason that one thinks of the Little Red Book for schoolchildren! -

The question of strong leaders occupied the Sophists; but non-Sophists like Platon and Aristotle also look forward to a "royal man" (*The Statesman* 294a), to a strong leader e.g. in Macedonia 's Philip.

Indeed, this one overcomes the Hellenes at Chaironeia (-338), is murdered (-336) and is succeeded by Alexandros, raised by Aristotle, who ushers in the Hellenistic era.

**(b) *The skeptical relativism of the Sophists.* -**

"Some sceptics," says Diogenes Laërtios, "consider Homer to be the forerunner of their tendency because, more than anyone else, he interprets the same subjects in different opinions, without ever determining or explicitly confirming anything." Splendidly does the author characterize the skeptical relativism which, among the Hellenes, is an old sorrow.

**-- *Vocabulary***

Skepticism, enquiry, skepticism, - these terms have more than one meaning. - Doubt can be a phenomenon of inertia: one does not judge, suspends judgment out of inability. Doubt can be a sign of resourcefulness: one reacts afresh to old situations, which one doubts. So much for prereflexive doubt. -

***Reflexive or deliberately implemented doubt***

This is possible in two degrees:

(i) one suspends, cautiously, one's judgement (theoretical, practical or technical) for fear of being mistaken (i.e. consciousness of fallibility or fallibilism);

(ii) not only does one doubt; not only does one doubt consciously (= reflexively knowing that one doubts); one doubts consciously on account of reasoned motives: this second fallibilism is inherent in all true professional science and philosophy (methodical doubt); - even in the borderline case where someone asserts that nothing is true, he still acts as a certainty in that affirmation and is not yet a true sceptic. -

Skepticism is:

1/ doubt,

2/ to doubt deliberately, and for general reasons,

3/ to doubt everything except phenomena (as the only truth)

4/ to limit oneself to these.

In short, according to V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, (The Greek sceptics), 1887-1, Paris, 1969<sup>3</sup>, p. 2, there are three degrees:

1/ conscious doubting of several truths,  
2/ consciously doubting all truth (the borderline case),  
3/ consciously not knowing whether something is true and not affirming anything except the phenomena, ta fainomena, so that judgment suspension (not knowing whether anything is true) and phenomenism (adhering only to the phenomena, to that which shows itself) are typical of skepticism. A dichotomy is carried out in the fuisis:

1/ the phenomena (which make unmistakable impressions and are true in that sense),  
2/ the rest, ta adèla, the non-phenomena, where judgment is suspended.

### **- *Relativism.* -**

Relative, relative is that which is not unless in relation to something else; - the opposite of absolute, absolute, which means unrelatable. - The relativist is the one who regards all truth as relative or relative, i.e. dependent on something other than pure truth, especially on the knowing and thinking man himself, so that human truth is central.

### **- *Skeptical relativism***

This consists in a tendency to skepticism (i.e. phenomenism) without becoming it fully - skeptical bias - and to regard all truth statements or claims to truth as relative, i.e. dependent on and limited by the person who makes them.

This leads to the assertion of all claims as equally valid alongside one another, without taking a position. Think of Homer's multiplicity of opinions on one and the same theme. This was, roughly speaking, the position of sophistry, which thus opened the way to later, full-blown skepticism.

The real sceptic does not even get involved in practical or technical matters, because he is so insecure, so suspended in his life.

### ***Wayfarers.***

1/ The first Milesians (Thales, Anaximandros and Anaximenes) or the Paleo- or Old Pythagoreans are never mentioned as pioneers of the sceptically inclined relativism of philosophy. Their naive-archaic absorption in the fuisis itself prevents them from any skepticism. Or their Orphic religion.

2/ Different with Xenophanes, the enlightened, God-faithful with his criticism of popular belief, with the Eleates and the Heraklites and with the thinkers, mathematicians or mechanics who since Elea and Herakleitos tried to solve the contradiction between unity and multiplicity thinking. -

Parmenides' distinction between thinking (noësis) of being and (sensory) experience of non-being (which he opposes as alètheia, truth, and doxa, appearance (opinion)), Herakleitos' contrast between 'the most' who know idiosyncratic contemplation and 'the best' who practice pure contemplation (fronèsis)

on the interpretation of nature (hermeneutics), refutes the sense experience and saves thinking (either as *noësis*, (Parmenides), or as *fronësis*, (Herakleitos).

Distrust in sensory experience is the entry point for philosophical-scientific skepticism.

The conflict between pure syn- and diachronic unity and ditto multiplicity, since Parmenides and Herakleitos, which made the unity appear as true and the multiplicity as false or vice versa - and which gives rise to doubt - is expressed by the mechanists, moderate (Empedokles, Anaxagoras) or radical (Atomistics), solved by assuming a multiplicity of one (not according to number but according to type, degree of presence and so on) principles (elements, homoiomies, atoms), which the senses do not see but which, fortunately, are discovered by reasoning reason.

Thus Demokritos distinguishes between *skotiè*, dark knowledge of the senses, and *gnësiè*, legitimate knowledge of reason. If these thinkers are skeptical about the senses, they are invariably convinced and thus 'dogmatic' (as they will say later) about reason.

But the contradictions between their respective "rational" (and thus supposedly certain) positions forces doubt, now not on the senses but on that discordant reason itself. Thus skepticism is present in fusal thinking itself, against its will.

**Conclusion.** - A sense of ambiguity (multi-interpretability) lies behind this thinking: one theme, many opinions, without decision.

O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, I, 135, says that  
1/ isolated thinking, i.e. without a sense of community,  
2/ absence of preconceived ideas ('Voraussetzungslosigkeit', i.e. without any preconceived principles, without any prejudice, thinking) and  
3/ critique of transmitted beliefs determine the 'aufgeklärt' or 'enlightened' (i.e., reason-informed) character of Sophistics, as of the modern rationalism of the XVIIth century.

**-- Main characters. - Two men dominate, Protagoras and Gorgias.**

(a) Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410).

Successful sophist, who preached the *aretè*, virtue, i.e. the virtue of attaining the goal in life, i.e. happiness in the polis.

He understood this to be very effective. Respected as he was, he was asked, at the foundation of Thurioi (-444) by the Athenians, to draw up a constitution for the colony.

Platon, *Kratulos* 385th, says that he asserted that man was the *metron*, mensura, measure (staff) or rule of all: "As things appear to me, so they are to me; as they appear to you, so they are to you." (J.-P. Dumont, *Les sophistes*, p. 34),

Determination and judge (decider) of things is man, on the one hand, concerning the sensible things in their existence, on the other hand, concerning the non-sensible things in their non-existence (o.c., p. 35).

According to Sextus Empiricus, Protagoras maintains that matter, in so far as it depends on it, can be all things that come to all as a representation; that people, on the basis of the differences in their condition, perceive sometimes this and sometimes that: the normal man perceives the things that are in matter in the normal way; the non-normal man in the non-normal way, morbidly.

It is the same with old age, waking state or sleep and so on. Thus man becomes the measure, metron, of all things -

If Protagoras expresses himself correctly, it may be deduced from this that every judgement - whether it be that of a normal or an insane person, for example - always corresponds to some truth, but then, to use Nietzsche's word, a perspectival truth, i.e. something real but seen through the perception of man who, according to Herakleitos, who is the model for Protagoras, is always changing according to his subjective state. So there is something phenomenistic in his theory of knowledge, but it is not pure phenomenism.

What is 'true' in this way (perspectively true), can now also be good, useful or bad, useless in the same perspectival way: is 'good' what is true for that person in his condition (which changes from moment to moment and from subjective to subjective)?

1/ from moment to moment and

2/ from one human being to another, - always that Herakliteism) is 'good' (perspectively good).

Wisdom is therefore for Protagoras to choose from many possibilities according to your 'perspective

1/ subjective state

2/ instantaneous state). That is a kind of pragmatism.

**(b) Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/ -375).**

This Sicilian was not only a sophist but also an orator (-427 in Athens famous for his eloquence). In his lost "On Nature or on the Non-ness" the influence of Zenon of Elea can be seen, the reasoning Eleate (proof from the absurd) three propositions ('thesis') characterize his position, viz.

(i) there is nothing,

(ii) if there was something, it was unknowable

(iii) if something was knowable, it was unknowable.

One sees the triad of 'being, knowing (noësis), expressibility' of Parmenides and Zenon. -

What do these theses mean? The title is '*On the fisis*'. For Parmenides, the fisis of our senses is 'non-being', semblance, opinion: perhaps Gorgias, reasoning Zenonically, spun on this.

In any case, these three propositions have been called 'nihilistic' (nihil, Lt, nothing) propositions; but, in the 19th and 20th centuries, 'nihilism' means something different from sophistry, which is not to say that from sophistry and its relativism (perspectivism) no nihilism can arise. In any case, Gorgias would have claimed that the physical was for him not science (epistèmè) but only persuasion (peitho): one feels the rhetor.

***To sum up:***

a double 'turning point' ('tropè', Herakleitos would say (Fr 31) because,

1/ Herakleitos emphasises the logos (common sense, - law) common to all, to the detriment of idiosyncratic reflection. Protagoras reverses the emphasis (he emphasizes the individuality of most) and,

2/ Parmenides emphasizes the being (as knowable and explicable, to the detriment of the non-being fuisis (as unknowable and ineffable), Gorgias shifts and reverses the emphasis (he emphasizes the non-being, non-knowable and not sayable or communicable even of being - which proves how ambiguous a philosophical doctrine can be.

**- II - Sophistic teaching.**

**(A) *The physical.***

From the time of the Sophists fusikoi (naturalists or researchers) have existed side by side with Sophistai, but, as Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsged.*, 115/116, says, both types of thinkers were concerned both with the fuisis as a whole and with some part or other, especially the human fuisis. Even more, the fuisis, universal or singular, is now increasingly seen not in isolation but in pairs of opposites. We explain this.

**(A)1. *The sustoichia (pair of opposites) 'fuisis/thesis (nomos,technè)'*.**

**1a/ *The opposition 'natural / firm (positive)'*.**

Thesis, positio, proposition (thesis) is the positioning of something; thetikos, positivus, positive, definite, is the adjective.

1/ Parmenides is the first who considers something 'kath' heauto, secundum seipsum, according to itself (in itself, as it is itself) and thus founds the ontology; he who is naively absorbed in the fuisis like the fusikoi (and the poets who lived near nature), is absorbed in the fuisis in itself (in its 'being'); he who speaks from this attitude, speaks fusikos, naturaliter, naturally;

2/ But he who speaks from himself as a knowing, perceiving, attributing being, speaks thetikos, positive, firm, i.e. he attributes something to a being, WITHOUT this attributed possibly being present in nature in itself.

When e.g. the normal man says that what the physician prescribes is "good", but the non-normal of the same physician, and the same prescription says, that it is "bad", then each speaks from his "perspective" ("condition" says Protagoras), but one of the two must be wrong "kath" heauto", i.e. objectively seen, although subjectively both speak sincerely (and in that sense "true"). -

This distinction lives on in the distinction 'natural law/positive law': everyone lives somewhere on the basis of an unwritten law (e.g. one does not kill without sufficient reason, because life 'is' (kath'heauto, in itself) inviolable), but also obeys the constitution of his polis (which is human work and therefore 'definite', 'granted').

This is of linguistic interest: the words, judgements can be double

understood: either they have meaning by themselves, fusei, natura, by virtue of their nature, for any human intervention, or they have meaning thesei, positione, by virtue of proposition (attribution as human intervention). In the first case they represent etumon, the real being (kath'heauto); in the second, a phenomenon or perspective. -

Moreover, when the objective (fusus) does not exist or is not valid, then every use of words (utterance of something about something) is not fusei, by nature, but only thesei, mere attribution, for then the things of fusis have no meaning by themselves but only by attribution on the part of man.

**1b/ The opposition 'nature/ nomos'.**

Nomos, morality, custom, law, i.e. that which is commonly accepted as a rule of conduct. But beware,

1/ Before the crisis of liberty and Sofia, nomos, custom, law, was understood as an inheritance, of more or less divine origin and therefore sacred, inviolable.

2/ In the days of Protagoras and Gorgias, however, laws were constantly being changed and one could compare them because one travelled; consequently, their relativity (mutability, both synchronically and diachronically) was striking; immediately their 'certain' character became clear: the group had conceived, articulated and enforced the law - by attribution to the community, but a group or social attribution (so that nomos ultimately means social thesis). Human intervention could thus intervene in a changing way - which weakened the inviolability.

**1c/ The pair 'fusis / technè (nature / art(maturity)). -**

As Dodds, *Fortschrittsgl.*, 19, says, 'technè', ars, art, means the systematic application of human reason and intellect to some activity and its field. Technè, art, is finally culture, opposite to nature: creative human activity, human intervention in nature, yet, nomos is the same but with the emphasis on common agreement, technè emphasizes the ability.

**Conclusion:** the three (proposition, agreement, art) mean, in essence, the same thing but from different points of view:

1/ attribution,

2/ agree: mutual attribution,

3/ be able to grant.

The human intervention is central: man is metron, measure.

**(A)2. The firmness of nature. -**

Not only is there pair: there is interpenetration (fusion). See supra p. 40 (Demokritos' fragment): "The nature and the learning process (didachè) are something similar; for the learning process transforms man, but, as it does so, fusiopoei, it creates nature."

This is the educational belief, which is also held by Sophistics. It is based on the malleability, changeability, certainty (agreedness, artificiality) of the fuisis, especially the human fuisis.

**(B) *The physical of man.***

The Sophists have reinterpreted the fuisis twice:

1/ By linking them with thesis, indeed identifying them;

2/ by considering them as primarily human (and in this sense narrowing them down).

This reminds us of L. Feuerbach (1804/1872), one of Marx's inspirers, who called anthropology the heart of philosophy.

**(B)1. *The medical side.* -**

The Sophists, according to W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 387/ 388, were influenced by the then emerging medicine, which combined physical and historia (research):

"In those circles of scientific medicine arose the concept of 'human fuisis', which we so often find with the Sophists and their contemporaries." The physicians regarded nature as "doing its duty" (ta deonta poiei) of its own accord. But they also raised the question "Fuisis or nomos?" For, are disease and health caused by disposition (fuisis) or by habit (nomos), e.g. eating habits, exercise habits, etc.?

In any case, G. Racer, *Hypnoses sophrologie et médecine*, (Hypnosis sophrology and medicine), Paris, 1973, pp. 180/181, notes the medical concern: Antifon of Athens (-480/ -411), rhetor, aristocrat, opened a room in Corinth that gave out on the agora (market) and had leaflets circulated stating that he had the means to cure people through language and that it was enough for the sick to confide their ailments to him according to their causes so that he could cure them. Later he gave up this practice because he found the task too difficult. He became an orator. - He was also a dream interpreter. He must have had a deep psychological tendency.

**(B)2. *The psychological side.* -**

Antiphon's healing method through words points to the rhetoric, which will be discussed later. It is already psychology. However, psychologism (i.e. the tendency to view fuisional data more purely or mainly psychologically) refers first of all to man's logical and mathematical capacity.

Indeed, by taking as a principle: one theme, more than one proposition (opinion), without deciding, reasoning is viewed psychologically and thinking is a psychological (and not purely logical) phenomenon.

Logic becomes eristics; i.e. logic of contention. This manifests itself in the so-called iso.stheneia, equality of two opposing opinions on a subject (pro and contra, leading to undecidability).

The Dissoi logoi or Dialexeis (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*, 1922, II, S. 334ff.; J. Dumont, *Les sophistes*, pp. 232ss) give examples of this. Good and evil are either non-identical (and thus language difference indicates difference of reality: the thesis of language rests on the fuisis) or identical (sometimes good/evil for one, sometimes evil/good for the other (in reality they are indistinguishable (fuisis); the difference is merely thesis (language difference), nothing more).



### ***Gorgias (defender of identity)***

He asserts e.g. that man is concerned about food, drink, love; well, these three are an evil for the sick but a good for the healthy; the disease is an evil for the sick but a good for the physician. Hippias (defender of the distinction) claims e.g. "Tell me, have your parents ever given you goods? -

Yes, and many and important ones. -- So you are indebted to your parents for many and important bad things. Reason: good and evil are identical." (Note: Hippias reasons from the incongruous, for he starts from his opponent's thesis and deduces incongruities from it; cf. Zenon v. Elea). -

Such psychological logic leads

1/ the eikos, the probable, 2/ the doxa, the opinion, and 3/ the tekmerion, the indication as a substitute for:

1/ the true, 2/ the science and 3/ the proof (of e.g. Pythagorean mathematics). Axiomatics becomes rhetoric, yes, eristics.

### **- Rhetoric (eloquence). -**

Rhetor, orator; rhètorikè (technè), ars oratoria, eloquence. -- The psychology, but also the sociology (see also: political doctrine of the Sophists) of Sophistics shows itself in rhetoric. Therefore a short overview.

K. Fuhr (C. Rehdenz F. Blass), *Demosthenes (Ausgewählte Reden)*, I (Demosthenes (Selected Speeches)), *Die neun Philippischen Reden*, (The Nine Philippine Speeches), Leipzig / Berlin, 1909, S.-18ff., says that rhetoric as a subject (mathèma) came into use during the Peloponnesian War, after Gorgias of Leontinoi (-427) had astonished the Athenians by his art of speech, of which the lexis, elocutio, pronunciation, was particularly refined. Thus he led there, apart from

1/ the popular (assembly) speech (which had its place in the ekklesia or popular assembly, thus political) and

2/ the court robe (which had its place in the court of justice, i.e. legally),

3/ the ostentation, showy or festive speech. -

The psychological side is exposed in the so-called platitudes (topoi): Trasmachos of Chalkedon e.g. mentions compassion, incitement, resp. calming of the minds, suspicion (of the opponent and his arguments), justification. -

The order (taxis, dispositio) of the parts of a speech were arranged by the above-mentioned Antiphon as follows: (i) introduction; (ii) description of the circumstances, of the facts; - arguments and proofs; (iii) conclusion.

### ***Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338),***

He was an orator, studied with Prodikos of Keos, contemporary of Socrates and a sophist, and with Protagoras and visited Gorgias (in Sicily). He divided as follows:

(i) introduction (to arouse benevolence);

(ii) narrative (the narratio, diègèsis, to persuade); thesis (the thesis that is defended) with the proof (apodeixis) or the making credible (if one cannot provide strict proof); if necessary the refutation (of the opposite opinion or thesis);

(iii) summary (anakephalaiosis, recapitulatio); the conclusion (anger or pity).

**Note:** Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), the later thinker, by no means a sophist, but interested in rhetoric, distinguishes three aspects in the genesis (creation of reason: 1/ heuresis, inventio, finding (tracing of thought content), 2/ taxis, dispositio, and 3/ lexis, elocutio), design.

-- W. Jaeger, *Paid.* I, 368, notes that the purpose of the Sophists was not popular education, but leadership formation (elite): they wanted to form a politikos, a statesman, who could lead the polis. That was the aretè, quality ('virtue', usefulness) par excellence. To this end, the educator had to have the 'gift of the word' at his disposal. Consequence: rhetor means practical, more political.

### **(B)3. The sociological side. -**

The polis was 'everything'. We already know that. The laws of the polis are its code. But these laws are connected with morality and religion. Hence the human treatment of morality and religion. -

We must distinguish between two kinds of sophists in the field of politics (law, morality, religion), 1. the aristocratic (Thrasumachos of Chalkedon (just mentioned), Kallikles (the guest of Gorgias at Athens), Kritias (the uncle of Platon)) and 2. the democratic (Antiphon, - see above).

### **3a/ The aristocratic sophists (pupils). -**

They apply the sophist theory of fisis to the polis and its people (fisis / thesis; man = measure). -

**Thrasumachos of Chalkedon.-** : 'Righteous' is 'that which is useful to the stronger', for he continues his power and is thus the happy one; the turannos is the ideal of this. -

**Kallikles**, Gorgias' guest, thinks this noble idea of power through physically: he reverses Hesiod's point of view (who says: "Fish and land animals and flying birds must devour each other, for they lack the right. To men, however, (Zeus) gave the right which remains the noblest gift") and what Hesiod ascribes to the predators, in their lawlessness, Kallikles transfers to (law-abiding) man! The fisis of predators and birds is one of the 'right' of the strongest. The fusiform, 'natural' life is a life of domination of the others. What 1/ the animal world shows, is also at work in 2/ the city-states and in 3/ the suppressed thinking of the individuals, namely a network of predatory relationships, as a rule of conduct. The nomos, law, of fisis is violence, overpowerment.

**Menon**, an associate of Kallikles, claims, according to Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2:6, 22, that moral objections are a sign of wrong education. -

**Thukudides**, the decaying writer, has the Athenians say (to the Melians), "We believe that men clearly (and presumably gods), obeying a law of nature, rule over that over which they take possession." (5:105). That is the immoralist physical.

This immoralistic interpretation of nature (and of culture) is reminiscent of F. Nietzsche (1844/1900), who called the sophists ‘realists’, in the sense of N. Machiavelli, namely, “they possess the courage which all strong minds possess, namely, to be aware of their immorality (lack of conscience)”. He, too, was an aristocratic materialist.

-- Kallikles draws two conclusions from his physical:

(i) the laws are the product (‘thesis’) of the powerless, but these in their unity (which makes power); they secure themselves by legislation (which is therefore also a means of power); as mere ‘stilted’ attributions in group, they disregard much of what is of ‘nature’ (Kallikles’ a- and immoral fuisis, of course) ‘good’ and ‘righteous’;

(ii) Like Thrasymachos, Kallikles also attaches a philosophy of happiness to his physical: doing what one loves (lustfully, - hēdu; cf. p. 49ff. supra: hedonics), doing what one, powerful as one is, can do, hence real “freedom”, real “lordship” over all others, at the same time real hēdonè, real enjoyment (i.e., to live out all lust and desire); consequently, the turannos (p. 53 supra) is the happy one.

Anakreon of Teos (-572/ -487), lyric poet (Teos is Ionian Anatolia),

1/ from -530 at the court of Polukrates, an Eastern despot on Samos, just like Anakreon fond of beautiful young men and girls,

2/ after -520 in Athens, at the invitation of Hipparchos, (one of the sons of the turannos Peisistratos (-560/-527)), in -514 murdered by the turannoï murderers Harmodios and Aristogeiton, as hedonistic as Anakreon. -

Anakreon is considered the founder of deconsecrated eroticism, which conceived of love as idle play and enjoyment together with a group of effeminate peers. Cf. H. Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker*, 1949, S. 33/57. The erotic decay, announced in Anakreon, continues under the sophist immoralist physical: people in power slip into Anakreontic eroticism, another form of hedonism and lust morality. Here every divine inspiration, every chthonic religion is absent; here the desacralized eros applies. Cf. p. 50 above. Cf. the Attic comedy, the Roman elegy and the anakreontika.

### **3b/ The democratic Sophists (pupils). -**

With Antiphon of Athens as leader, with Protagoras as predecessor, the opposition “fuisis/thesis” and anthropocentrism (man = metron) are elaborated differently.

Antifon was more pragmatic: a law is tested (structured in this way by the fuisis) for its value in terms of the benefit or damage caused by obedience to it or deviation from it.

Consequence: a whole series of propositions are worthless; the reason: the involvement of it or the deviation from it brings only effective harm or benefit, not by nature but if the transgression or the obedience is noticed and publicly known.

In this sense, such positive laws are merely 'bands', counter-natural ballast.

Antiphon draws conclusions from this:

(i) "By nature we are all equal. This is shown by an examination of the natural conditions of life, which are necessary for all people. (...) Surely we all breathe through mouth and nose (...) and all eat with our hands."

(ii) That is the rule; now the applications:

a/ Antiphon attacks the privileges of the incumbent and powerful class;

b/ He attacks the national self-conceit of the Hellenes who consider themselves superior to the "barbaroi".

-- In such a democratic climate of thought grows an internationalism, which from the beginning was reinforced by the fact that sophists were itinerant teachers, moving from city to city, engaged in comparative culturology, willy-nilly. -

What we would now call "social sensitivity" also came into being: the equality of peasants and nobility, of bastard and real child, of woman and man, of slave and free, necessitated political equalization.

Behind all this the appreciation of the individual (individualism), as Dodds, *Fortschrittsged.*, 124, notes.

Behind all this, also, what Jaeger, *Paid.* I, 379/380, notes, Protagoras' pronounced 'humanism' which, apart from

1/ the Promethean gift (fire as the basis of purely technical civilization) and

2/ the Dikè gift (the right as basis of 'right'-just relations), also

3/ the political technè as higher than the two previous ones: the true politikos considers human formation (agological humanism) higher than mere technical knowledge and mere legal judgements.

**Note:** - The democratic sophists (disciples) are in touch with what the earlier Hellenic people called 'iso.nomia', distributive or distributive justice: to repay equally with equals; to give back in equal measure what was received; to repair damage with equal compensation, - this was Dikè, justice, according to Jaeger, *Paid.* I, 145/ 146. But the traditionally religious shudder had gone out of it, with the Sophists.

- **Commune.** -

This topical word - which forms the original core of the XIXth century word 'communism' - applies to one type of sophist sociology, namely that which advocated women's and children's communion. A thought that both Platon (for the military class) and the Kunics, following in Socrates' footsteps, will cherish (antique communism).

- **Human rights.** -

The rationally developed doctrine of natural law of the French Revolution is credited with having advocated the "*droits de l'homme*", (human rights). However, its beginnings can already be found even within archaic religions (right of asylum for example) and its foundation is certainly the discovery of human nature, pre-sophisticated and sophisticated.

#### **(B)4. The agological (educational) side. -**

As W. Jaeger, *Paid.* I, 206, says: only in the history of education can the sophists be fully appreciated; for the leading role in the formation of the Hellenic people shifts from poets (Homer, Hesiod, lyricists), legislators (Solon) and statesmen to sophistai, wisdom teachers.

For the aretè, qualification, of man they base first on knowing - in this sense they are rationalists but this is reversed in two ways:

(i) it becomes polumathia, because the sophist wants to be an expert in everything and to have an answer to everything, - an ideal formulated by Hippias of Elis, a young contemporary of Protagoras, teacher of history (of the heroic age), mathematics, astronomy, grammar, poetry, music and all kinds of professional techniques (cf. Dumont, *Les sophistes*, pp. 18/19);

(ii) it becomes what would now be called 'strategy', sophisma, sophisteia, viz. The sophist wants to be sophos in the new sense of 'expert', if necessary wise, but always clever man, if necessary cunningly acting pragmatist for whom the result counts (previously, sophos was sacred, bathed in archaic sacred atmosphere); he wants to be beltion, 'better' in the sense of more powerful, more effective, more clever, more cunning than the others; cf. J. Dumont, *Les soph.*, vocabulary, pp. 247ss.

This encyclopedic and purposeful knowing is 'ethical-political' in its conception, as the sociological section shows. It is also what Jaeger calls (*Paid.* I, 371/72) 'formal', i.e. verbal, which gives rise to three new subjects: "In alliance with grammar and dialectics, rhetoric has become the foundation of the formal education of the Occident" (o.c., 399).

"Together they form the trivium which has been called since late antiquity, which was fused with the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometria, musika, astronomia) to form the system of the seven liberal arts and have, in this school form, survived all the luster of antique culture and art." (o.c., 400).

The Sophists themselves did not know the seven as such, but the inclusion of the mathèmata in higher education "is really the work of the Sophists" (o.c., 400).

Hippias played a great pioneering role in this (i.e. by adding the Pythagorean arithmologia and geometria to the sophist trivium, which the further sophists finished). This fusion of Pythagorean and sophist mathèmata is called the enkuklios paideia at Alexandria (Hellenistic times), but then more theosophically (mystically-platonic). In any case: number form and word are the two poles of education.

#### **-- The scientific side. -**

The comprehensive and goal-oriented knowledge, 1/ organized in word subjects and, a little later, 2/ in number form subjects, with political technics as its goal, is only one aspect of the spirit of the times at that time, which divided life up into a number of theoretically-purposeful mathèmata, disciplinae, learning subjects, specializations.

The specialist tendency manifests itself in persons and writings for the mathematical 'technai' (the theoretical knowledge, introduced by the Ionians, the fuisis,

universal or partial, expressed in its principle(s), should be communicable and practically-technically applicable: from mathèma it becomes technè), for medicine, gymnastics, musicology, theatre art, etc. Even the visual artists, according to Jaeger, o.c., 379, are beginning to write theoretically about their craft.

It should of course be noted here that the sophists conceive of 'science' in a highly mechanistic way (combining elements, which are not seen in their 'being' but in their associability (taxeologically thus) and in their behavior (behaviorist or purely functional).

This is in so far as they function) is the main thing). Especially the atomists stood here as a model, but then applied to human sciences (what Demokritos' pedagogy already insinuated). -

These elements do not come from pure reason but from sensory experience: the sophists therefore understand "science" to be sens(ual)istic -- sensus, Lt, is sense -- and empiristic (empeirikos, Gr, which is related to experience).

In this sense they are not intellectualist (intellectus, nous, reason, as distinguished from dianoia, ratio, reason: intellect is intuitive, beholding; reason is disclosing, combining), but rationalist: reason merely 'orders' the sensory data, combinatorically. -

Mechanism, sens(ual)ism (empiricism), but also materialism: up to now, even with Parmenides, matter was reality, although that matter was conceived in many different ways (hylic pluralism: e.g. Anaxagoras who calls the 'nous' (World Understanding) 'very fine' matter.

Think of Demokritos' parapsychological eidola doctrine); the sophists deconsecrated that matter and, by that desacralization process, came much closer to modern physical materialism. Cf. J. Dumont, *Les sophistes*, pp. 10/13 especially.

This materialist and mechanistic sens(ual)ism gives rise to empirical mathematics with Protagoras, who claims that the object of geometry does not exist ('existence', for him, is sensory-material existence, of course).

No line, curved circle or straight line (line straight), is, in fact, as the geometrician defines it (i.e., pure straight, pure circular); the sensible circle is not cut by a tangent (tangent) in one (ideal) point, but in many (sensible, sense) points. In other words, pure mental contents of an immaterial nature do not exist. -

So much for the epistemology or science of the Sophists, which is still observed, e.g., modernized, in G. Klaus, Herausg. Bonnot de Condillac, *Die Logik oder Die Anfänge der Kunst des Denkens - Die Sprache des Rechnens*, (Logic or The Beginnings of the Art of Thinking - The Language of Calculation), Berlin, 1959, in which an attempt is made to reduce logical-mathematical thinking to sensory impressions.

“die doch die einzige Quelle alles Wissens bilden” (“which are the only source of all knowledge), (according to the flap around the book, which is the German translation of *La logique* (*Les premiers développements de l’art de penser*) (Logic (The first developments in the art of thinking)), and *La langue des calculs* (The language of math), by the French illuminé Condillac (1715/1780) by East German Marxist materialists).

**-- The religious side.**

The fusikoi (fusiologi) of Miletos were concerned with fisis or genesis (nature, becoming) and its origin or principle.

The name ‘physical’ (‘genetics’ would be just as good) is therefore the correct description of the whole cultural movement that started in the VIth century. This was always twofold:

(i) on the one hand, what we would now call ‘meta-physical’ (since the works of Aristotle were so ordered, after him), i.e. the thoughtful consideration of nature and its process (movement of creation and decay) as a whole (universal nature or genesis);

(ii) on the other hand, what we would now call rational physical science with all its sub-sciences (the private, indeed singular phenomena of nature and creation), the so-called historia. -

The universal physical has focused on the origin, the principle, which transcends sensory experience (and is thus, in this sense, metaphysical or trans-physical).

The private historia has always dealt with subfields, which were more sensually accessible (‘ta onta’, the being in the plural, in the sense of “available things”, standing in opposition to “the one being” of a Parmenides, yes, in opposition to the one “unlimited” of Anaximandros). -

Well, 1/ with Leukippisch-Domokriteische atomistics, 2/ with Sophistics, the historia, the private physical, separates itself more clearly than ever before from the universal, so-called metaphysical natural.

**-- The theology of Sophistics. -**

The theology of sophists clearly exposes the secular (i.e., earthward-looking) tendency: instead of a theology, with them comes, in essence, religious science as part of the study of human fisis, for it is not the deity as such but the religious nature of man (or rather his religious thesis, nomos, technè) which is under discussion. This, in various shades.

(a) **Agnosticism.** -- ‘A.gnosis’ (knowledge) indicates ‘absence of knowledge’, here concerning deity. Protagoras says: “Of the gods I cannot know whether they are there or not, nor what they are like. Much prevents me from knowing this, including the fact that they are never seen and the brevity of human life.” His agnosticism is sensual (sensualism: rarely do people see ‘gods’ and, if they do, this remains one theme followed by many opinions, whether undecidable or not).

(b) **Atheism** - ‘A.theos’, ‘god-free’, indicates ‘emancipation from the grip of deity’. This can be understood psychologically or sociologically or even ethically.

**(b)1 Prodikos of Keos,**

contemporary of Socrates, known for his diplomatic missions, his orthoiepeia, his use of the right word and his high honoraria for education, views the belief of the gods psychologically.

The psychic fisis of man is such that useful and beneficial things, which promote human existence, are ‘nomisthènai’ (regarded; - the word ‘nomos’ sticks in it) as gods by the so-called first people (a civilization development or culture genesis is formulated here):

**a/** things of nature like the sun and the moon, the lakes, rivers and springs, the meadows (a.o. in connection with nymphs),

**b/** but also things of art like fire (Hephaestus), water used (Poseidon), wine (Dionusos), bread (Demeter), are used,

**ad a,** either deified (the(i)osis, apotheosis, if one will, or hypostasis) or,

**ad b,** or consecrated to gods or goddesses; thus the concept of the deity ‘came into being’ (fisis = genesis i.e. origin); cf. Euripides’ Bakchanton.

**(b)2 Kritias of Athens,**

Kritias is a contemporary of Prodikos, Platon’s uncle, who turned out to be an unscrupulous political adventurer, despite his beautiful cultural-historical analyses on “the disappearance of justice in the world”, lacks the psychological seriousness of Prodikos and is a fictionalist (i.e. adherent to the proposition that cultural values are pure ‘fictions’, inventions, but with some utility).

His work *Sisufos*, in the line of Demokritos, Protagoras and Prodikos by the way, claims that the belief in gods ‘came into being’ (genesis = fisis) within the framework of the primal horde, i.e. the barbarian ‘first’ people who did not yet possess a polis.

A cunning politikos invented gods to ensure peace and order in the polis. After all, what those in authority do not see or cannot control, that very thing is still seen and controlled by a daimon, a god, immortal and all-seeing, all-hearing, as the silent, invisible witness to our conscience.

Thus that cunning politician has bound his citizens by their naïve belief in a daimon both criminally and religiously in an authoritarian system; but, apart from that pure thesis, nomos and technè, nothing corresponds, in fisis, to anything like gods: they are a purely habitual lie.

**(b)3 Diagoras of Helos,**

contemporary of the previous, so second half V-th century, lyrical poet, could not understand that the gods did not punish in a visible way a man who, in his reach, broke his oath, therefore became ‘a.theos’, godless, but aggressive: he pulled down the mysteries and was even sentenced to death but fled.

“All shades of religious liberality” (according to Windelband, *Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, (History of Ancient Philosophy), 1888, S. 73), agnostic, psychological, political or ethical, are represented by Sophistics. With them “humanism” (the “anthropology”) becomes areligious, “a.theos”.

### - III - Value judgement on the First Sophistic.

H.J. Blackham, *Humanism*, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 9, says “Humanism is the enduring exchange solution for religion” and, in a Christianized Europe, according to the proposer, consists in “a rejection of Christianity” because “humanism stems from a premise that man exists in himself and that this life is everything and a premise of responsibility for one’s own life and for the life of mankind.” (o.c. 13).

J. Alleman, *De leidende grondgedachte van het moderne a-religieuze humanisme en hun onderlinge samenhang*, (The guiding principles of modern a-religious humanism and their interrelationships), in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 21:4 (1959), p. 615/680; 22/1 (1960), p. 13/76, translates these thoughts into Dutch.

Blackham, o.c., 103ss., speaks of the Greek enlightenment, which reached its climax in the V-th century, the Athene of Pericles.

1/ Starting with Homer, as heroic form of ‘humanism’, i.e. excellence in all human achievements (athletics, theatre, architecture, sculpture, eloquence, politics, thinking, living) where Blackham conceals that Homer has a divine background which is very vivid and does not conflict with a humanism, -, going on

2/ on Thukudides’ *Geschiedenis van de Peloponnesische Oorlog* (History of the Peloponnesian War) (especially Pericles’ speech),

3/ the *Corpus Hippocraticum* (the library of the Hippocratic school, which the author calls an unsurpassable example of humanism, we know (p. 44/45 above) how this medicine was not exclusive to divine reality either, - which the author again fails to mention) -, 4/ Demokritos, the great philosopher of the Peloponnesian War (the great philosopher of the Peloponnesian War).

4/ Demokritos, the atomist (“a naturalistic view”, i.e. a view that reduces the supernatural and extra-natural to the natural)

5/ Protagoras, “the man who first proclaimed the regnum hominis (kingdom of man)”, praises the “humanistic” nature of the Greeks and their culture. For Demokritos (subject to his hylian pluralism) and Protagoras this is true, - and then again: the exclusive, indeed aggressive, attitude towards religion is to be found not so much with him as with other sophists. - Dodds, *Fortschr.*, 125, who is nevertheless sympathetic to sophistry, is less enthusiastic: “(Sophism) should have ushered in a great era of intellectual, social and political emancipation. What it actually started was

1/ First, an era of civil war and war between cities, fought with a deliberate joy of brutality - brutality which, until recently, had hardly ever been surpassed among peoples of a high cultural level;

2/ And then a period of dictatorships (the so-called “second turannis”), for which Dionusios of Surakousai was an example. (...) In the world of thought there appeared

a/ for the first time, on the one hand, the theory of the Uebermensch, that political immoralism which Kallikles brings out so brilliantly in Platon’s *Gorgias* and

b/ on the other hand, Platon himself, whose philosophy

Crossman has rightly described as ‘the most heinous and thorough attack on liberal ideas known to history’.”

-- W. Jaeger, *Paid.* II, treats, after Sophistic, of three figures, whom we shall mention briefly: Euripides, Aristofanes and Thokudides.

**(a) Euripides of Salamis (-485/-406),**  
about which we will speak later on;

**(b) Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385),**

He was the only representative of the ‘old comedy’, i.e. that form of comedy which goes back to +/- -400, of whom integral works have been preserved. -

The origin is: 1/ on the one hand, (cf. p. 51 supra), the cosmos, the exuberant Dionysian village song, 2/ but, on the other hand, the Ionian burlesque-folk novella, as Homer’s *Odyssey* tells it in Demodokos, the Faiakian narrator, when he tells about the adultery of Aphrodite with Ares, the warrior god, who deceives Hephaistos, the forging god (cf. J. Werner, *Erzählungen der Antike*, (Tales of Antiquity), Birsfelden / Basel, s.d., S. VII). Demodokos makes the common people at the agora laugh, nothing more, and thus contrasts with the aristocratic aoidos, singer, which he, incidentally, also is.

Via **a/** Italic fluakes, **b/** Sicilian comedy and mimos, it comes to the famous Attic comedy, especially since -486, with Kratinos (-520/ -423), Eupolis (somewhat younger) and Aristophanes.

Aristocratic and conservative, Aristophanes criticizes democratization and every innovation, strives for peace and criticizes Athenian imperialism, but, in all this, he represents the current mood of the people in Athens (cf. E. von Tunk, *Kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Literatur*, (History of Ancient Greek Literature), Einsiedeln / Cologne, 1942, S.29).

Political subjects are commonplace, but so are philosophical ones: in “*De Wolken*” (The Clouds) he caricatures the already ugly figure of Socrates as, unfortunately, the Athenian public confuses him, superficially, with a sophist. Cf. G. G. Toudouze, pres., *Aristophane*, Les Guêpes, Paris, 1943, PP. 5/10. -

**(c) Thukudides of Athens (-460/455 /-359/396),**

In the spirit of sophistry, he describes the Peloponnesian War. He distinguishes between cause and real root cause of political events, always, in every polis, seeing power as the essential thing at work, as well as, eliminating all ethically founding concerns, as Machiavelli (Ital. Renaissance), merely brings out the later technically useful (ktèma te es aei, achievement for ever, in the pragmatic sense) as a physical process, but not in the extra-human fuis but in the political fuis.

Coolly objective, as a behavioral writer, looking from the outside in, he records the decay of Athenian democracy as if it were a natural event, proceeding according to its own nature, lawfully. Hence its topicality: a/ neutrality of weak cities in the struggle of the great poleis, b/ national unity in cities that were divided, c/ peace based on victory or reconciliation, d/ political immoralism, are central. (Tunk, o.c.35/ 36).

## ***IIB. Classical Attic Philosophy: Socratic (-450 / -320).***

### ***Introduction.***

*Volkenkundige Encyclopedie*, (Ethnographic Encyclopaedia), Zeist / Ghent, 1962, p. 27v., divides, according to G. Tarde's mimetism in the social field, the cultures in

- 1/ primitive (gods are examples)
- 2/ ancient (heroes are examples) and
- 3/ Classical (people are examples).

"Greek, Roman, Indian and Chinese culture clearly have an antique basis. Homer is an antique, Socrates a classical figure. (...)

Socrates and Plato were radical innovators. The culture was predominantly ancient. Herodotus professes his kinship with the Egyptians. (...) What Kristensen (in "Life from Death") calls "the enlightened circles" were the classical thinkers of Hellas. In many respects they stood outside the ancient world. The judgment of Socrates can only be understood from the ancient world. (...) From the ancient conception, Socrates did indeed undermine the official religion. (...) It is a historical fact that classical thought has always undermined religion. (o.c., pp. 28/29).

In fact, there are two types of 'classical',

(1) the sophist type, liberal, and

(2) the Socratic type, religious. Dodds, *Fortschrittsged.*, S. 98, says that 'rationalism' encompasses three contents of thought:

- (i) reason is - logically - the tool which detects truth;
- (ii) the deep nature of fisis, reality, is 'reason'-physical;
- (iii) reason is - ethico-politically - the means of (personal) salvation.

a/ Pre-socratic philosophy is the breaking loose, says Dodds, from the old hylozoism (the fisis is matter and it 'lives'), from the rationalism that culminates in Sophistics:

b/ The figure, however, who thinks explicitly and incisively 'rationalist' is Socrates. Indeed, "ho an.ex.etastos bios ou biotos anthropoi", "the unexamined life is not worth living for man". Attic philosophy, with its rational and/or intellectual anthropocentrism, is, in fact, at the heart of the rationalism advocated by Dodds.

Classical' man is rational and/or intellectual; he is, therefore, detached from archaic religion and cannot be thought of separately from the disease of philosophy which is 'Attic', 'classical', namely doubt, skepticism, as we saw with Sophism, as we shall see with Socratic c. s.

Immediately a second corrective should be added to the word 'classical': as already mentioned on p. 8, in the line of K. Leese, with his 'irrational', better 'transrational', concept of fisis, and as brilliantly demonstrated in Dodds, *Fortschrittsged.*, 97/112, Euripides as Irrationalist, there is a concept of nature which is neither 'philosophical' (physical as with the predecessors of the Sophists) nor 'Sophistic', nor 'Socratic'. It is 'sofron a.pistia', enlightened disbelief and mysticism at the same time. So with Euripides, so with Platon even, though very different.

**-- Euripides of Salamis (-485/-406).**

K. Kuiper, *Wijsbegeerte en religie in het drama van Euripides (Bijdrage tot de kennis van het godsdienstig leven der Atheneners ten tijde van Pericles)*, (Philosophy and religion in Euripides' drama (Contribution to the knowledge of the religious life of the Athenians at the time of Pericles)), Haarlem, 1888, - still a fascinating and thorough work, says that the criticism of the polytheistic religion makes Euripides a Bellerofontes, the doubter, whom he made into the central figure in one of his dramas (o.c., 247/249):

“It is true. It is said that in heaven there are gods. - I tell you: No, there are not. Unless man in slow folly wants to rely on ancient authority. See for yourselves: I do not require you to judge by what I say!

I see how the will of a prince plunders most of its citizens or takes their lives.

I see how perjury leads states (poleis) to ruin, and those who act in this way are happier, indeed, than he who, quietly, spends his days in piety.

I see small towns, worshipping God, enslaved by larger states where wickedness reigns, enslaved by force of arms.” (Fr. 288).

Added to this misery is the lack of any reliable revelation of the gods, who are either supposed to be perfectly moral or simply non-existent (which means that the mythical gods do not exist).

Consequence of this radical crisis of faith, since the Sophistic:

(i) the mantis, i.e. the gift of seeing, is not divine revelation but psychic ability in man himself (for Euripides believes in psychic abilities: Cassandra, Kalchas, Teiresias are proof of this in his works; o.c., 234v.);

(ii) the physical and the sophistical are his new life-bases: Anaxagoras (the theological mechanic), Protagoras and Prodikos (the sophists) and Socrates are his friends. Apart from Anaxagoras, he is especially known to Herakleitos with his idea of exchange. But

1/ Scepticism has a strong influence: thinking gets bogged down in uncertainty (logical);

2/ Nature is ruled by ‘powers’ (impersonal and irrational thought) such as Kupris (=Aphrodite) and Artemis, but these not as goddesses but as goddess names for eternal cosmic powers or poles between which life oscillates to and fro, thoroughly orgiastic (E. Dodds, *Fortschritts. ged.*, 108), not rational, not to be conceived traditionally either, mysterious; compared to that irrational power which, contradictorily, pervades the fisis, is

a/ what the Sophist thinks is ‘foolishness’ and

b/ what the philosopher (be he more physical or Socratic) thinks, is only groping insight (physical irrationalism)

3/ consequence: human behavior in the polis is disturbed by dark evil urges (and certainly not intellectually as with Socrates). -

“A mixture of destructive skepticism with a no less destructive mysticism”, says Dodds, o.c., 111, of Euripides' thinking, which anticipates later mystical ways of thinking, which push back classical rationalism and intellectualism. This wisdom is especially

proclaimed by female figures (Medeia, Hekouba, Elektra are almost the only thinking figures). This, according to Dodds, o.c., 112, makes Euripides for our generation one of the most sympathetic figures in the whole of antique literature.

-- *A. di Nola, La prière (Anthologie des prières de tous les temps et de tous les peuples)*, (Prayer (Anthology of prayers of all times and peoples)), Paris, 1958, pp. 348/349, offers an extract from Euripides' *The Cretans*, in which the Orphic liturgy is discussed:

“O thou born of a Tyrian, son of Europa (the daughter of Foinix and Zeus), O king of Crete with its hundred cities, I come, having left this divine temple, which the cypress trees of the island, cut by the steel axe, cover with beams, artfully joined and accurately adapted one to another.

Purity has been the law of my life since the day I was initiated into the secrets (mysteries) of Zeus of the Ida Mountains.

After having participated in the (h)omofagiae (i.e. the rite of eating raw meat in order to become one with the deity), according to the rule of Zagreus (i.e. the name of Dionusos before he was devoured by the Earth Sons or Titans; see page 15/16 supra), which the deities of the world have been called to perform. 15/16 supra), who is the friend of the nightly processions, and, in honor of the Great Mother, having waved the torch from the mountain, I there (i.e. in those mysteries) received in a sacred way the double name of Cooreet and Bakchant (taking part in the procession).

Covered with robes of perfect whiteness, I flee the birth of mortals, my hand does not approach the corpse that is buried, and among my food I tolerate nothing that has lived.”

-- *E. Eybon, De religieuze beleving van de jongeman tijdens de Romeinse oudheid*, (The Religious Experience of the Young Man in Roman Antiquity), in *Onze Alma Mater* (Louvain), vol. 27 (1973): 3 (pp. 172/188), mentions the figure of Hippolutos, who, at about eighteen years of age, refuses to honor the goddess of the mines Aphrodite and devotes himself to Artemis, the virgin goddess of the hunt, who becomes the lady of his thoughts and life and constantly speaks to him and accompanies him, just like Athena to Odysseus in Homer's *Odyssey*.

Hippolutos falls victim to the contradictory powers of Artemis and Aphrodite - in the Euripidean way. But this religious model appears, later, in the Hellenistic era, to have had imitators among the youth.

**Conclusion:** in the full classical fifth century Euripides is anything but a pure rational thinker. He is neither physicalist nor sophist nor sociologist:

“All life is sorrow and there is no end to sorrow. But the other - whatever that may be - is more precious than life: it hides the enveloping darkness in clouds. A nameless thing that gives light over the world: clearly we are sick of longing for it (Hippolutos).

### ***Socrates of Athens (-469/-399). -***

Ch. Bühler / M. Allen, *Inleiding tot de humanistische psychologie* (Introduction to humanistic psychology), Bilthoven, 1972, deals with that soul science which, in 1962, under the direction of Abraham Maslow, chose the name 'humanistic psychology', to oppose

1/ behavioral psychology and 2/ psychoanalysis, 3/ as a 'third' power.

It is that psychology which fits in with the Human Potentialities Movement in the USA and Sensitivity Training. One of its historical roots is Socrates (o.c., 24), yet existentialistically interpreted (o.c., 27ff).

Indeed, the philosophy of G. Marcel, the Catholic existentialist, was once characterized as 'socratism'. This proves the topicality of this conceptual ethicist, the founder of high intellectualism.

Since Fr. D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), the problem has been that of the Xenophonic Socrates who is a bourgeois 'goody-goody' (cf. E. Järisch, ed., *Xenophon, Erinnerungen an Sokrates (Griechisch - Deutsch)*, Munich, 1962) and the Platonic who is a high, genial spirit.

Another duality concerning Socrates is his conceptualism (thinking in terms of concepts: Nietzsche brands him as a "schoolmaster-like man of concepts") and his ethicism (his moral concern).

Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paid.* II, 69ff. -- The condemnation to death of Socrates by the court of five hundred citizens is based on

(i) corruption of youth, (ii) neglect of the gods and (iii) introduction of new daimonia, as accusatory titles.

Which rests 1/ on the misconceptions of the Athenian public (see Aristophanes supra p. 75), as well as 2/ on malicious legal trickery (which can always make someone who is innocent, guilty in an unscrupulous way). This points to the problem posed by H. Kesters, *Kérygmes de Socrate (Essai sur la formation du message socratique)*, (Kerygma of Socrates (Essay on the formation of the Socratic message)), i.e. the correct transmission of a philosophical message to the public. One thinks of the outspoken hostility of Platon's uncle Kritias (the sophist) who, being anti-democratic, did everything to silence Sokrates.

### ***- Socrates and Sophistics.***

"That Socrates was the first to fight the Sophists on their own ground with their own weapons makes up his fame" (O. Willmann, *Geschichte d. Ideal.* I, 359).

Also V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, 1969<sup>3</sup>, p. 20ss., says that Socrates is 'fundamentally dogmatic', but with 'skeptical disposition'. Which Willmann also underlines. Science' for him is not physical ("That is beyond human understanding. God takes that away from our eyes") but ethical, but in such a way that the practical interest is greater than the theoretical (which is typically sophist). His method, to build this ethical science, is

(i) irony ("What I know best is that I know nothing") and

(ii) what Platon later called dialectics, i.e. discussing and dissecting concepts, - which Socrates often does in a hair-raising and rhetorical way.

Again, a sophistical trait.

### **(A) Teleology. -**

Teleology is the bringing up of telos, finis, goal. Well, in the line of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (p. 34 supra) and Diogenes of Apollonia (the Neo-milesian, who under Anaxagoras' influence conceived the air (soul), which is the principle of all being, as gifted with purposive reason; cf. p. 40 supra), Socrates puts the telos or goal (destiny) of life at the center.

1/ Anaxagoras and Diogenes claimed that the fasis as a whole was (universally) purposeful through the nous or Universe Mind;

2/ Socrates says that the human fasis (individual), with its body and its soul, is furnished by a divine pronoia, providence, and so purposeful.

### **- Socrates' physical. -**

Socrates, like the Sophists, was very much a physical person. Yet, like the Sophists, he too has a physicality: the world, he believes, is arranged in such a way that everything serves the benefit and well-being of man, and does so through a divine mind. His physical does not go much further than that, but it is something essential, namely, that teleology, that finalism, which conflicts with Demokritos who sees the atoma as 'steered' (if that is still steering science!) by mere chance (p. 36/37 supra).

### **- Socrates' ethics - politics. -**

He defines man's destiny in negative and positive terms.

(i) Negative. - Counter-culturally inclined, he preaches an ideal of autarkeia, complacency. His fellow-citizens strive for possession, prestige and enjoyment of life. He, on the other hand, once arrives at the agora with its wealth of merchandise and exclaims: "How much is there that I do not need!". This had an irritating effect on his fellow citizens.

(ii) Positive. - Man should use all his powers for:

a/ ethical aims: the soul in him, its interiority and its purposefulness, is decisive; with that soul the aretè, virtue, virtue, not Homeric or sophistical but ethical, namely the behavior which is faithful to objective norms and which should become the acquired property of the soul; that virtue(ility), i.e. aptitude to acquire happiness(bliss), is threefold :

1/ pure ethical (conscientious) - and then it is moral goodness;

2/ legal (juridical) - and then it is justice;

3/ religious (believing in God) - and then it is piety; the deontology or doctrine of duties of Socrates flows from this triad;

b/ political objectives: only such a virtuous man is fit to be a city-citizen, for he alone obeys the positive laws (nomos) of the polis and establishes polis-harmony. -- That ethical-political message (kerugma) was the result of Socrates' '*Gefühl einer Mission*' (Sense of a mission), (Nietzsche).

### **- Theology.**

Max Scheler (1874/1928) in his conformity system said that philosophical thinking is not the basis of religion but in its results can be 'conform' (isomorphic, similar, corresponding) to religion. Unlike Sophistics, Socratic is religious: deeper

than the positive laws of the polis, which are the work of man (thesis), there are the unwritten and thus in the fuis or essence itself situated divine laws, which govern the universe and man in it in a purposeful way.

Already Herakleitos (p. 28 supra), yes, all the physicalists, in essence, in their socio- or poleomorphic conception of nature, suppressed those deeper situated divine laws (which are only the philosophical formulation of what Homer and Hesiod mythically proclaimed as the order of the universe founded by Zeus, the Allfather). - What the Sophists who thought non-conformistly neglected.

**(B) Theory of method. -**

Teleology, ethically understood, is the end.

**1/ The means:**

Dialectics, which with its eironeia, irony, tries to provide the convincing proof of the fact that man (Socrates, his interlocutors) are ignorant: a/ both the established knowledge of the Hellenic tradition b/ and the new knowledge of Sophistics are for him false knowledge, from which the dialexis, the dialogue, delivers, thanks to doubt. This socratic doubt was genuine: "I only trustingly seek with you what we have in mind, because I myself do not know." (Charmides). -

In the crisis atmosphere of those days, this methodical doubt must have led to misunderstanding. "Socrates destroyed the Greek man's shining instinctive certainty about life and its order", says F. Nietzsche. This is only very partially correct, for a/ the divisions of the philosophers and especially b/ the relativization of the sophists had already thoroughly eroded that instinctive certainty.

**2/ The means**, this time positive, in that dialexis is the maieutics (midwifery art) which is the epagoge, inductio, inductive reasoning, aimed at conceptualisation and conceptual definition. This is the conceptualism of Socrates.

**-- Maieutic method.**

This heuristic (the art of finding) lets the interlocutor join in the search himself (the midwife is only a facilitator), and this according to a regularly recurring scheme: the ironic not-knowing is the starting point; inductively one goes

1/ either from concrete example (applicative model) to abstract definition (regulative model) 2/ or vice versa. Indeed,

**a/** methodically not knowing, Socrates questions the other:

**b/** if the latter answers with a general definition, Socrates tests it against concrete cases; if he answers with a concrete case, he loosens the general concept.

**1/ Epistemology**, 'Science' is a/ sensory experience b/ true opinion c/ justifiable true judgment (Theaitetos).

**2/ Ethics:**

'Virtue' is a/ good city government (male), b/ sound domestic art (female), c/ something else (child, elder), with the only all-embracing virtue not discussed (Menon).

- 'Justice' is a/ respecting the existing law of Athens (reflexively), b/ the right

The concept (horos, conceptus) of 'justice' can therefore be summarized in an essence or nature clause (horismos, definitio, definition) as follows: 'justice is the right in the polis either to respect or to cause to be respected' (self = reciprocal or reflexive; the others = transitive).

### **3/ Religion: -**

The Platonic dialogue *Euthyfron* shows us situationally how the dialectic took place: Socrates is accused of *asebeia*, impiety. In Athens now there is a soothsayer Euthyfron: every day he works, with great certainty, with concepts such as *eu.sebàs / a.sebès* (pious / impious), *hosios/an.(h)osios* (permitted / forbidden).

Socrates, for whom all inherited unexamined words are pseudo-science, asks Euthyfron what these words actually mean.

The soothsayer says that he is accusing his own father of murder, - to which Socrates, ironically, asks if he is so sure that he is acting piously; what is 'piety'?

Euthyfron's first answer is "To do as I do, that is, after mythical example". Indeed, in Hesiod's theogonia, Kronos, son of Ouranos, rebels against his father. Zeus, son of Kronos, in turn, rebels against his father: Euthyfron acts according to this divine 'nomos' (law, rule of conduct). Socrates shows the error in Euthyfron's answer: it is only one type of piety.

Second answer: "Piety is that which is pleasing to the gods", - which indeed contains a general content of thought applicable to all possible cases. - Is this general provision now valid? Euthyfron answers, "that all the gods agree that unlawful killing requires punishment".

Socrates shifts the question: Euthyfron's answer is correct in this general sense; the question is, "What killing is unlawful?". To which Euthyfron replies that the answer is unprovable in few words.

Socrates admits this, but he goes on to say 'pious' and corrects the clause: "Pious is that which is pleasing to ALL gods". This, in order to eliminate the Hellenistic popular belief and its coincidences (one god disagreeing with another).

Again, Socrates corrects the stipulation: the fact that one falls into the taste of the gods (agreeableness) is not the essence (*ousia, essentia; nature*) but only *pathos, accidens, incidental*. The theophilus, beneficent, is not the *hosios, pious*.

Piety is a kind of *dikaion, iustum, lawfulness*: lawful is, among other things, piety, but it is more than that (cf. later Aristotle's distinction between *gender* (lawful) and *kind* (pious) on the basis of a species difference).

This leads to a third clause: "Piety is that part of morality which has to do with *therapeia, servitium, service, of the gods*". Now what is 'service'? Euthyfron does not know. Which leads to Socrates' suggestion: "Piety is knowledge, and that of asking and giving to the gods." At the end, Euthyfron runs out of time. Socrates is disappointed.

One sees that Socrates strictly distinguishes the full, i.e. the singular and/or private, from the one, i.e. the general or universal:

1. e.g. where Euthufron refers to his own example of piety as an answer to the question of being;

2/ where Socrates calls the pious (private) a 'part' (pars, meros) of the moral (dikaion, rightful).

Immediately it is clear that the ep.agogè, inductio, generalization, concerning good, righteous, pious, does not lead to the same kind of generality as concerning purely physical realities:

1/ a natural law, outside of man, strictly encompasses all that is private and singular;

2/ The moral law, in the polis, also includes all that is private and singular, but here the universal does not so closely govern the private and singular, because 1/ ignorance and 2/ unwillingness (which for Socrates' intellectualism is reducible to ignorance) cause deviations. -

This implies that the dissection of behavior (that of Euthufron, for example, or of the gods) reveals the universal only approximately. In other words:

a/ if all men acted according to the moral law, the analysis of human behavior would be pure induction, as in extra-human nature;

b/ but, as the Sophists had made clear, human nature contains thesis, (collective;) nomos, (productive:) technè, which entail deviation. -

If Aristotle writes: "(Socrates) regarded moral things with disregard for nature as a whole. In those moral things he sought to catholou, the general, and directed his thinking to definitions of concepts," (*Met I: 6*), then this neglect of nature is evidently based on the insight that extra-human nature and human nature differ by the own contribution; (thesis, nomos, technè) of the knowing and willing man himself. -

If the dialexis, a maieutic dialogue, repeatedly ends in an unsatisfactory answer, it is the fallibilism or fallibility of human action that works:

(i) people deviate from the moral law;

(ii) research deviates from the truth. This is what improvement and educativeness as cybernetic correctives respond to.

**Conclusion:** "This Socratic 'intellectualism' is characteristic of the whole of the rest of antique ethics: when e.g. later, in the doctrine of the Stoics, the characteristics of the good, the just, the pious, are ascribed to the 'wise' (knowing) without further ado, then this is ultimately based on Socrates' view that virtue is knowing." (E. Järisch, ed., Xenophon, *Erinnerungen an Sokrates*, Munich, 1962, S. 346).

**Note:** - If the metron, mensura, measure (staff) or norm, for Protagoras is man, for Socrates 1/ is man-oriented, 2/ is the good, righteous and pious in itself, i.e. independent of man. That good (ethical), lawful (political) and - pious (religious) in itself is something divine.

**Note - Socratic mysticism. -**

Euripides is transrational, yes, irrational (in that he emphasizes the nonsensical in the fufis, as well as the mantic); Socrates is also transrational, but not irrational (for him the fufis is purposeful by the deity). Here the question of the daimonion arises.

**A/ According to Xenophon,**

*Herinn.* I: 2, Socrates sacrificed to the gods, often at his home, often at the public altars of the polis. Nor did he hide the fact that he was engaged in mantic, signification, for he used to say that to daimonion, the daimonion, gave him sèmainein, signs. He contrasted this with the praxis of responding to bird's-eye, divine-speech, signs and sacrifices, because the interpreters themselves know that it is the gods who give directions through these external signs. In *IV: 8, 5*, it says that Socrates found that the daimonion was against it when, once accused in court, he considered his defense. - Socrates always uses the singular, and this 1/ in the sense of 'the divine', 2/ but in such a way that this divine, in his inner self, makes itself heard paranormally through a personal daimonion that gives signs.

**B/ According to Platon,**

*Apologia* 31d, this is described as follows: "Something may seem strange. How is it that, while advising everyone individually here and there, occupying myself with just about everything, I do not dare to act publicly, to speak to the people or to give advice to the polis?"

This is because, as you have heard me explain many times and in many places, something divine like a daimonion has come to me. It is something that has stayed with me since childhood, a voice which, when the time comes, always prevents me from doing what I would like to do, but never prompts me to do anything. That is what prevents me from doing political things.

In other words, throughout his life, thanks to a heavenly favor, an ominous inner voice was heard, which, according to Platon, only gives hindering directions, but according to Xenophon also encourages.

This means that Socratic intellectualism is anything but exclusively opposed to mysticism.

What is striking, however, is that this mysticism is 'classical': for 1/ the Pythia of Delphi is enraptured when she transmits divine speech, 2/ whereas Socrates, very calmly, self-controlled, transport-free, hears what the voice tells him. These are two different types of inspiration; archaic and classical.

**Note:** - There is an old saying among the Hellenes: "Health is the highest good for the mortal man; the second is beauty; the third is honest wealth; the fourth, to spend life with his fellow men in joy."

When one sees what Socrates stood for, he is, in essence, no less revolutionary than the Sophists, but different.

***The little Socratics (Socratici minores).***

Socrates has two kinds of disciples, one-sided and many-sided. First the one-sided ones. These fall into two strains as a result of the two aspects of his thinking.

**(A) *The dialecticians. - Two tendencies.***

**(A)1. *The Megarics (School of Megara).***

Eukleides of Megara (+/- -400) continues the tradition of Parmenides and Gorgias (Eleatic immobilism): the senses grasp only what is not; the mind grasps, reliably, what is. - Eukleides, following Socrates (and Platon), accepts concepts (ideas); he highlights especially the so-called transcendental or ontological concepts: the one and the true of Puthagoras, the being and the good of Platon; - which means the following: being (which is all-embracing or transcendental) is one (d. i. it hangs together like a system), true (i. it corresponds to mental contents that are true to reality), good (i. it is valuable, sound).

Eukleides, as Eleaat, discredits, in Zenon's sense, the non-essential or sensible, by reasoning from the absurd. This leads to two peculiar forms of thinking:

**(a) *Euboulides of Miletos***

Euboulides founded the refined form of dialexis, the eristics or argumentation. The most famous example is ho pseudomenos, mentiens, the liar: "Epimenides claims that all Cretans are liars. Well, Epimenides is himself a Cretan. If Epimenides is lying, then his claim: "The Cretans are all liars" is also a lie. So all Cretans are not liars. --But if this is true, then Epimenides is not a liar either. But then his statement "All Cretans are liars" is true. Etc." One sees that this Megarian reasoning confuses an afterthought with the essence.

**(b) *Philon, the Megarian,***

Philon establishes a non-aristotelian art of reasoning ("Megaric logic"). G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung*, (Logisticians' claims on logic and its historiography), Stuttgart, 1962, S. 77/88, gives the so-called 'values' table that comes from Philon the Megarieker:

- 1/ When it is day, the sun shines (preface: true; postthesis: true);
- 2/ When the earth flies, the earth has wings (f.: false; n.: false);
- 3/ When the earth flies, the earth exists (vz.: false; nz.: true);
- 4/ When the earth exists, the earth flies (fn.: true; nz.: false).

The 'implication' at work here is profoundly different from that of the Aristotelian syllogism:

1/ with Aristotle the formulation is analytic (if, then), based on the conceptual contents and their relations;

2/ With Philon the Megaric, the formulation is rhetorical: a kind of induction that pays attention to true or false character of judgements (not of concepts) and this without theory. - The Stoics took their inspiration from this. Modern logicians too.

**To sum up:** the Megarian philosophy comprises (i) a rhetorical logic, indeed a sophisticated eristics, besides a theory of concepts in Socrates' spirit, but Eleatic; (ii) an Eleatic physics; (iii) a Socratic ethics.

**(A)2. *The Elisch - Eretric school.* -**

Faidon of Elis (-417/...), later Menedemos of Eretria (-319/-265). They founded a kind of dialectical criticism.

**(B) *The ethicists. - Two tendencies.***

**(B)1. *The Paleoconics (Elder School).***

**1/ *Antisthenes of Athens (-455/-360),***

Antisthenes was a pupil of Gorgias, the sophist, and Socrates, subjecting science (dialectics, physical) to ethics.

(i) Logic: "The horse walks" is a judgement which, according to Antisthenes, is preposterous, for "being a horse" and "walking" differ too much. Later, Stilpon the Artificer will repeat this.

(ii) Physical: Eleatic (being is true; non - being (i.e. sense world) is false.

(iii) Ethics: Socrates' countercultural ideal of complacency is carried through into cultural pessimism. This is shown, for example, in his statement to Kuros, the Persian monarch: "Have you not heard, Kuros, that it is the king's fate to act well and yet be badly famed?": - He applies the distinction "according to nature (kata fusin)/ according to law (kata nomon)" to theology: according to nature there is only one god, according to law (customary law of popular religion) there are many gods.

**2/ *Diogenes of Sinope (-400/-325)***

Diogenes radically continues this counter-cultural aspect. His father and he were once accused of coin forgery (with exile). He lived in utter poverty, - in this comparable to the hippies. His ethics-policy is remarkable: it is based on the sophisticated distinction "fusus/thesis". The fusis (the natural in man and the polis) is minimal; the thesis (the introduced by man) is maximal.

The definition of happiness stems from this: happiness consists of ONLY meeting one's natural needs and does so according to the principle of economy or thrift. That is why the economic infrastructure should be as minimal as possible (Socrates' complacency). That is why askesis, asceticism (mortification), i.e. to accustom the body to minimal needs. Also minimize effort: comfort ethics. "Poverty teaches. It involuntarily educates to philosophy, for poverty compels by the power of what is in fact, that which philosophy seeks to achieve by words." Thus Diogenes.

An.aideia- or shamelessness theory- "What is natural can never be shameless". Hence his nickname 'kuon', the dog (an animal despised by the Hellenes).

Consequence: all benevolence is pure thesis, human invention, because nothing is 'unclean' and therefore everything that is fusis may be done in public.

### ***Communism.*** -.

The established order of the polis was radically conceived as a thesis, arbitrary human work. Consequence:

1/ eros became free love and marriage and the family in the commune (with women's and children's community) - see also Platon - dissolved (think of the hippy culture among days; of its precursors);

2/ The polis became a libertarian (putting individual shameless freedom first) collection, both inwardly (commune) and outwardly (cosmopolitanism). -

Three cultural movements developed out of kunism (Lt. cynicism):

1/ the hedonic kuniks, from Bion of Borustenes (-300/-250) onwards;

2/ the Stoa (from -300);

3/ the Neo-Christians, under the Roman emperors, who, as itinerant preachers (rhetors), with staff and pouch, unshaven and in rags, found much resonance and following, - this from the first century to the sixth century AD (mendicant philosophers - rhetors).

### **(B)2. *The Cureans***

Hitherto Elea, through Gorgias and Socrates, was influential. But now also Herakleitos via Protagoras and Socrates: Aristippos of Kurene (-435/-360) defines happiness hedonically (p. 49 above). "The telos, goal, is every simple sensation of lust.

The sum of them, whether they are past or yet to come, makes up happiness. The simplest experience of lust is in itself worth striving for; happiness (as salvation), however, is not. (...) If we perceive lust, we seek no further, and we avoid nothing so much as its opposite, unlove." In logic, Aristippos is sens(ual)ist: only sensory experience provides knowledge. Which of course contradicts the conceptual intellectualism of his teacher Sokrates.

#### **-- *Theodoros the Curean***

Theodoros carries this through to permissive ethics. Permissive' means 'allowing everything', under given conditions there is nothing that is not permitted, for an act is measured by its consequences (hedonic pragmatism: understanding the result as pleasure or displeasure counts). Of course, for Theodoros, deity, gods are non-existent.

Two cultural movements develop from Cureanism:

1/ In the school founded at Kurene, Aristippos has many followers;

2/ Epicureanism develops the aphrodisiac.

**Review.** - V. Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs*, (The Greek sceptics), Paris, 1969, p. 20, criticizes Hegel (1770/1831) who thinks that Socrates did not spring up like a mushroom, but remained in perfect touch with his time, which was a sophist one.

Like a sophist, says Hegel, he neglects the physical and places himself on a subjective standpoint. - Brochard finds this exaggerated, indeed untrue. And yet there is something, viz.

1/ The misunderstanding that Socrates, even among his disciples, founded.

2/ Not to mention the ambiguity of every thinker. This double reason explains the mutual contradiction of Socratic thinkers.

## *The great Socraticians (Socratici maiores): Platon, Aristotle.*

### *Platon and the oldest Platonism (the Older Academy).*

Platon of Athens (-427/-348/7) was born of an old, rich, politically influential family of aristocratic position. The kalokaigathia, the beautiful and virtuous qualities, which the ancient Homeric paideia developed in the young aristocrat, were therefore for him  
1/ gymnastic with game and hunting included, and  
2/ musically (which included knowledge of Homer and Hediodos and other older poets as well as flute-playing and singing).

#### *His philosophical education*

**a/** includes contact with Heraklitean (through his teacher Kratulos) and Eleatic physical and with Pythagorean mathematism. **b/** But also Sophistics, of course, became known to him: think of Kritias, his relative. **c/** The third and decisive thinker influence is, in -407, his meeting with Socrates, the anti-sophist and a-physician, through which the right way of life in the polis, for Platon, became central (Socrates was then 37 years old).

This first part of Platon's life ends in -399 with the death of his teacher by the poison cup. Whereupon Platon leaves Athens and goes to Megara, to a student of Socrates, namely Eukleides the Megarian (cf. p. 87 above).

The second part of his life begins with journeys to Egypt and Kurene (the latter, the country of Theodoros of Kurene, mathematician (-470/60/ -390/80), who worked in Athens and who is the tutor of Platon's friend,

Theaitetos of Athens (-415/-368). In -388/7, Platon travels to Greater Greece and Sicily: there he meets Archutas of Taranton (Tarentum) and Philolaos of Kroton, Pythagoreans, as well as Dionusios I, turannos of Surakoesai (Syrakuse; -405/-367).

The brother-in-law of the autocrat, Dion, became a convinced adherent of Platon's philosophy. By the way, the tyrant surrounded himself with scientists and technicians, so that many Pythagoreans were at his court, one of whom invented the first effective artillery that was used against the Carthaginians.

In -367 Dionusios II, urged on by Dion, summoned Platon as an advisor, which failed because of Platon's philosophical and, among other things, communist political proposals (which are included in his Politeia). This ends in a dispute in which Dion is banished and Platon becomes an unwelcome guest. This does not prevent that in 361 Dionusios II, Platon for the second time summoned, while Dion remains banished.

Meanwhile, in -387 Platon founded the Akademeia, academia, somewhat on the model of the Pythagorean communities. The name comes from Akademos, a heros who was culturally honoured there.

There, propaideutic subjects were taught (arithmetic, geometry, harmony (music) and astronomy, as well as the sophistry subjects). These led to philosophy, which was practiced in a conversational and strongly aporetic manner (leading to questions). Leon and Theudios of Magnesia, Eudoxos of Knidos, Theaitetos

They did research and taught there.

1/ In the line of Hippocrates of Chios (-470/-410) see p. 28,31 supra - who writes a book; 'Stoicheia' (Elementa, Elements),

2/ also Leon and Theudios of Magnesia, in Platon's time, in close connection with the Academy, write 'Stoicheia' i.e. a textbook of mathematics. It is assumed that when, later, Aristotle quotes mathematical statements, they come from the textbook of Theudios, which was published between fifty and seventy years

3/ before the 'Stoicheia' of Eukleides of Alexandria (+/- -300) was written and from which he borrowed, as well as from that of his predecessors. On pp. 30/31 supra, it has been said that the post-elevated physicists (Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Leukippos and Demokritos, who went the way of mechanics) and mathematicians had as a starting point: "The unit (Parmenidean conceived) is indivisible; the multiplicity (Heraklitean conceived) is the sum of more than one units".

However, in order for the latter to hold up against Parmenides' ontological monism (i.e. the assertion that there is only one being, while every multiplicity is false), there was at the time only one way out: to accept the unity as *fusis* (and being); to conceive of the multiplicity as a thesis, pure "proposition", premise; and thus to do mathematics purely "thetically" (positively, and that is, purely reasoning without regard to reality, in a purely mathematical "world", - something Zenon of Elea had set in motion by his purely reasoning).

Cf. F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 322, 326, 330. Platon and his Academy contributed much to that purely reasoning mathematics (which therefore differed greatly from the ancient Pythagorean which was physical). -

In any case, apart from mathematicians, the Academy has produced many philosophers and politicians. It was closed in +529 by the Emperor Justinian (and thus existed for more than nine hundred years).

- E. Horneffer once asserted that Platon is that thinker who, equal to Atlas, carries the whole of European thought. A. Whitehead described the entire Western philosophical tradition as "a series of footnotes to Plato". E. Gilson has said that one philosophises to the extent that one Platonizes.

- **Platonism.** a/ Platon's doctrine is problematic: as Konrad Gaiser, *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre (Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissensehaften in der platonischen Schule)*, (Plato's Unwritten Doctrine (Studies on the Systematic and Historical Justification of Knowledge in the Platonic School), says, Platon in his dialogues does not proclaim a philosophical doctrine *stricto sensu* (he is skeptical about the word, at least the written one); he only passed on his doctrine orally:

b/ Yet C. de Vogel, *Plato (The philosopher of the transcendent)*, Antwerp, 1968, rightly outlines its main features: (i) - the doctrine of ideas, in connection, incidentally, with the anamnesis -or theory of remembrance (the soul has once, before its life in this world of change (creation/decay), directly beheld the ideas) and the doctrine of the soul (immortality, rebirth, love); (ii) the profound

the introduction of the theory of classification and types of being (so-called descriptive Platonism), in which the ideas are dissected (analysis) as a network of thought contents, - the polis theory and a kind of physical (of the Timaios).

**- Platonism and Orphism, resp. Zoroastrianism.**

1/ E. Dodds, *Fortschrittsg.*, 147/150, holds that it is indisputable that certain religious traditions associated with Orphism (and Pythagorism) have substantially influenced Platon's religion and, through it, his philosophical thinking. Dodds is even convinced that Platon (as already advocated by von Wilamowitz), in the period when he wrote his dialogue 'Gorgias', lived through a kind of religious conversion (+/- -393/2).

2/ Whether (as Jaeger, Reitzenstein, Bidez, Cumont claim) Platon, later on, got acquainted with Persian Zoroastrianism, - which would mean a second religious conversion, - Dodds answers as follows:

There are solid grounds to believe that some information about the Persian religion of Zarathoestra (Gr. Zoroaster) were accessible to Platon, because, on the one hand, the name of a Chaldean appears on the list of the pupils of the Academy (when Platon was already old) and, on the other hand, there is Platon's friend, Eudoxos of Knidos (-408/-355), the brilliant mathematician, astronomer and geographer, who valued Zoroastrianism as "the most valuable among the philosophical schools" and who perhaps considered Platon as a reincarnation of Zoroaster. In any case:

a/ Zoroaster is mentioned in the dialogue *The Great Alkibiades* (122a);

b/ Aristotle and other academics were interested in Zoroaster. - Two aspects of Platonism are similar to Eastern religion:

1/ the dualism and 2/ the astrotheology (the great significance of sun and heavenly bodies). **ad 1/** But Platon's dualism is never Zoroastrian: Platon does not assume, as antagonist of the Good (God), a kind of antigod or daimon, who deliberately chooses the evil (ethical, eudemonic);

**ad 2/** Celestial worship is not specifically Chaldean:

(1) Sophocles (the dramatist) mentions philosophers who call the sun "originator of gods and father of all";

(2) Socrates worshipped the sun; this

(3) while e.g. Anaxagoras was prosecuted for calling the sun a (fire)stone.

(4) Yes; Alkmaion of Kroton (see supra p. 45; +/- -500), the Pythagorean and physician, had claimed that the stars, because they are constantly moving, must be alive and, as living beings, were gods.

In other words, Platon did not need 'barbarian' (non-Greek) sources for this. - What Dodds does claim is that Platon opened the door for astrology. But that Platon was a Zoroastrian seems thoroughly unproven. -

About Zoroaster: cf. P. du Breuil, *Zarathoustra et la transfiguration du monde*, (Zarathustra and the transfiguration of the world), Paris, 1978, which explains the recent state of affairs (du Breuil is by the way an admirer of Zoroaster).

But that does not answer the question completely. M. Vermaseren, *Mithra, ce dieu mysterieux*, (Mithra, the mysterious god), Paris / Bruxelles, 1960, p. 16, writes: “Zarathoestra was a magician.

**a/** The word ‘magician’ should not (...) evoke the thought of mysterious magical practices, of which some (e.g. Pliny) have already accused magicians. The word ‘magu’, according to the iranologist G. Messina S.J., describes the one who partakes of the ‘gifts’ (maga), i.e. of the religious doctrine of Ahura-Mazda. Originally, therefore, the word ‘magu’ meant nothing more than a worshipper of Ahura Mazda. Zoroaster is the first magu, for to him the Lord of Wisdom (i.e. Ahura Mazda) taught his doctrine.”

**b/** Gradually the meaning of the word faded and broadened to, ordinary, priest (educator a.o. of the hereditary princes in Iran), according to Herodotos chosen from one of the six Median tribes (*Hist. I: 101*). With the expansion of the Persian empire, the magicians got in touch with the priestly castes, especially with the Chaldeans, in that empire, as well as with the Hellenic culture (thus Ostanès is said to have spread the Iranian doctrine in Hellas). Thus, Hellenic philosophy came into contact with the magicians: “Among them there is one who teaches the mageia, magic, which belongs to Zoroaster, the son of Homazès (the Greek

- 1/ for Ahura-Mazda, the Supreme God of the Persians,
- 2/ or for the possible ‘father’ of Zarathoestra).

This is theon therapeia, idolatry.” Thus Platon, Alkibiades 122a. But Vermaseren, o.c., 18, points out that, with Sophocles for example, the more popular conception of magic is mentioned (in which mageia is synonymous with goèteia). The Chaldeans introduced astro(theo)logy into magic (Vermaseren, o.c., 18). Gh. et L. Gérardin, *Savoir et magie*, (Knowledge and magic), Paris, 1974, pp. 85/97, point out that Platon does not hold to the Demokritean eidola explanation (although S. Seligmann, *Die Zauberkraft des Auges and das Berufen (Ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte des Aberglaubens)*, (The Magic Power of the Eye and Calling (A Chapter in the History of Superstition)), The Hague, 1921-1, S. 503, 507, pointing out that, according to Platon, the eyes emit mildly luminous rays which meet the rays of the object), but the daimonological view and refers to *Sumposion* ff. 22/29, where the speaker recounts how the magicianess Diotima explained to him that a daimon is a meson, medium, intermediary being, between the actual gods and humans.

The daimonic task is to interpret and transmit:

- 1/ to the gods what comes from men and, vice versa,
- 2/ to the people what comes from the gods (prayers, sacrifices, commands, retribution of sacrifices).

(1) Any truth,  
(2) the art of the priests concerning sacrifice, ordinations, spells - (3) prediction and prophecy.

(3) prophecy and  
(4) magic, - all that goes through the daimones; “for a god does not deal (directly) with the people”, but through the mediation of daimones, as well concerning sleeping

as concerning waking people (*Sump.* 23). Thus the daimon Eros is to be understood: an intermediary being, he is.

**To sum up:**

- 1/ Platon thinks of magic as divination;
- 2/ this is done through daimones (lower gods and/or elemental spirits and/or soul bodies that become soul beings, - this remains undecided). The word 'magic' comes from Medias; but the reality is universal. -

**Conclusion:** also concerning that aspect (viz. 1/ the magic side, distinguished from 2/ the Chaldean - astrological side and from 2/ the dualistic side) Platon doesn't have to go to Eastern sources; however a certain influence remains a fact.

The expression 'divine service'

a/ seems first of all to be understood from the archaic concept of service as W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, p. 201/229, understands it: representation on earth of (chthonic) deities with a view to the salvation of the people (as e.g. the slaves and especially the slave women were before the classical 'deconsecration' of this 'service').

b/ In *The State* and *The Laws*, Platon mentions the influence of gods by means of certain rites (which then suggests the opposite, i.e. the submission of the gods to human will), - which he condemns unconditionally (cf. Dodds, *Fortschrittsg.*, 142).

**Conclusion:** Platon's statements on magic are incoherent on that point, as, for that matter, are those of all classical thinkers; reason: their intellectualism, resp. rationalism (since Sophistics, yes, since Milesians, especially since Xenophanes) has as it were cut off from real contact with the mythical-archaic substratum, - which e.g. has the consequence that Platon is clairvoyant. which leads Platon to call clairvoyance a faculty of the non-rational, infra-rational soul (which Euripides also does in essence); - which then has the consequence that the beneficial and intellectually valid results of such an infra-intellectual event come across as 'incomprehensible' and in that sense 'irrational'.

**- Platonic mysticism.-**

"The only disciple of Socrates who did not elaborate the teaching of his master in a one-sided rationalistic direction, but, prompted by Pythagorean influence, gave it a mystical - religious turn in depth, is Platon. In this, as in his powerful artistic talent, lies the reason for his far surpassing philosophical and literary importance in the circle of the Socratics and in world literature. Thus Christ-Schmid. In what sense precisely is there talk of 'mysticism' here?

1/ As Dodds says, in Platon's work - as in every classical, non-sophisticated writer - there is a dichotomy between intellectual-rational, 'dialectical' thinking, on the one hand, and, on the other, religious, mythical, archaic thinking, which is closer to the ancient popular belief (o.c., 145).

2/ But there is a second mystical aspect: the method recommended in the *Faidon* which consists in withdrawing mentally (with the intellectual soul, that is) from the world of creation and decay to the ('other') world of ideas.

In the *Faidon* in particular, this ‘mysticism’ is discussed: “If (the soul) purely disengages itself and does not take anything from the body, because it already had nothing in common with it voluntarily in this life but fled the (body) and was absorbed in itself and always wanted (to achieve) this, - which means nothing else than that it just philosophized and thought about dying lightly.” (Fr. Schleiermacher, Uebers., *Platons Phädon (Gesprach über die Seele)*, (Talk about the soul), Leipzig, 1977, S. 47 (h.29).

Platon compares this ‘life’ with that spoken of by the initiated, so that philosophy becomes a kind of initiation on the intellectual level. In the *Timaios*, Platon says that the penetration of the (higher) soul in this way to the numerical forms and especially to the still higher ‘principles’ (ideas) is only

1/ God himself and 2/ the one who loves God (he felt himself to be the darling of the gods). E. Dodds, *Fortschr.* 143, rightly says that the mystical thinking of Plotinos (+203/+269), the great theosophical neo-Platonic, springs from this. About which later. This mysticism is indeed not ‘irrational’ in the sense that it is not archaically sensitive.

### ***The sources of Platon’s inspiration***

Diogenes Laertios (tss. +200 and +250), *History of Philosophy*, 3:8, writes: “(Platon) worked out a mixis, fusion, of Heraklitean, Pythagorean and Socratic systems of learning: 1/ the sensory things he thought (ephiilosophhei) after Herakleitos, 2/ the thought-content after Puthagoras, 3/ the political after Socrates.”

Also Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1.6: 1/4, says that Platon

1/ with Herakleitos thought that the sensible things were not ‘knowable’ (because of its changeability),

2/ with Socrates that concepts and definitions did not refer to sense data but to the general,

3/ with Puthagoras that the sensory things are based on mimèsis, imitation, of number forms, - which Platon transformed into methexis, participation, of the sensory in its idea.

Cf. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 370ff. -- But a versatile mind like Platon contains more: A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, S. 122/127, - still a solid work as far as a balanced and accurate overview of Platonism is concerned - explains how, in the *Parmenides* (dialogue), Platon does away with Eleatism. The too Eleatic conception of ideas (world) leads to inconsistencies.

**A/** A human being e.g. is **a/** if he is compared to other human beings **a/** a unity (i.e. he belongs to the same class, indeed to the same cohesion);

**b/** if, however, he is considered in his own right in all his parts and aspects, he is a multiplicity (he consists of more than one part and aspect). That concerning the Eleatic method.

**B/** But as to the Eleatic axiom (being one), Platon remarks the following: (i) sophistry is the art of imitating, in words, a deceptive appearance, (ii) politics is the art of imitating human, i.e. (Heraklitean) changeable

(iii) philosophy is, always but especially in contrast with philosophy, not the same as the real good or beauty and/or the measure(s).

a/ to Sophistics, not

b/ politics however, science which, in pure thinking, is concerned with true being. -

How are these three possible? (Condition of possibility).

1/ The sophist can only be spoken of if, apart from being, there is a non-being; reason: without non-being, there is no deceptive appearance:

2/ One can only speak of politikos if the changeable being (i.e. the polis and its states) exists in view of the real being (i.e. the good, the beautiful and the measure or standard of polis life).

3/ One can only speak of philosophy if, apart from the static, immobile and one being of Parmenides, there is also a multiplicity of being which has mutual relations: -

Elea's main mistake is to misunderstand the ambiguity of words: if one pronounces "being" from the subject of a sentence, this does not imply that one totally identifies that saying ("being") with the subject of "being" and "being" is two.

1/ Thus one can rightly say of change (arising and passing away) that it 'is' (represents a reality), as one can say (with Parmenides this time) of unchanging being that it 'is' (represents a reality, though of a different type). There are types of being. So much for the changeable domain of the politician.

2/ As far as the domain of the sophist is concerned: the deceitfulness of the sophist is, in his way, also being. Opposite 'being', there is not only (in a contradictory way) absolute nothingness (non-being), but (in a purely opposite, but therefore not yet contradictory way) relative nothingness, which makes up the illusionary world of the sophist and which he tries to conjure up with the art of words.

### - *Platon and Rhetoric*

S. IJsseling, *Retoriek en filosofie (Wat gebeurt er wanneer er gesproken wordt?)*, (Rhetoric and Philosophy (What happens when one speaks?)), Bilthoven, 1975, p. 13/25, discusses Platon's (and immediately Socrates') attitude towards rhetoric: "his attitude towards rhetoric was clearly dismissive and negative and in many respects even distinctly hostile" (o.c., 13).

1/ The *Gorgias*, 2/ much more varied: the *Faidros* bear witness to that rejection which has dominated the whole philosophical tradition since then and which is now, under the influence of structural interpretation of K. Marx, F. Nietzsche and S. Freud, being revised, in my opinion with questionable results, to a certain extent. "As the Sophists were aware of the power of the word, so Plato is aware of the fundamental ambiguity of the word. The word can lead man, but it can also seduce and mislead (...).

The word of the orator, according to Plato, relates only to the probable." (o.c., 21). Platon - and all philosophers in his nature - are very wary of any form of violence; well, the orator

in its sophistical version, does violence to objective truth: one of the main tasks of Platonic philosophy is to unmask violence in all its forms (o.c., 22).

Indeed,

1/ Philosophy is first of all to discuss the arguments, within the framework of the friendly dialogue in which each of the interlocutors expresses himself inwardly, and only then to express the resulting thesis as the result of honest thought, if necessary with the necessary uncertainty, as so often in Socrates' performance and in Paton's dialogues,

2/ Rhetoric, however, is to advocate a proposition and to make it 'true', probable, with all possible arguments in order to persuade, even if there is no strict proof. 1/ Philosophy is logic; 2/ Sophistry is rhetoric.

This implies that Platon always thinks 'in conformity' (M. Scheler), i.e. in connection to and in accordance with the ancient tradition, the rhetorical sophist on the other hand 'not - in conformity', representing a break with the ancient tradition. Thus Platon says, with regard to the main idea of his thinking: "As a gift of the gods, as I am convinced, from a divine source, through the mediation of an unknown Prometheus, in shining fire, the message has come down - and the ancestors (hoi palaioi), better than us and the gods closer, have handed down to us this revelation (fêmè), namely that which we call reality,

a/ Not only arises from the one and the many,

b/ but also contains definiteness (pèras) and indefiniteness (a.peiria), fused in itself (xum.futon), and that, in view of this nature of things, we ought to look for an idea, a model, for every being and, since such a thing is in him, we shall also find it."

This text of the *Filebos*, after having said that these ideai, models, are determinable as numerical forms, continues: "The gods, therefore, as I say, have handed down to us this mode of searching, of acquiring knowledge and of communicating knowledge." Cf. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.* I, 2/3, where this text is undoubtedly the basic text for all idealism.

### ***The death of Socrates and Platonism. -***

Platon, Willmann says, is said to have said, in mystery language, that "philosophy is the detachment of the soul from the body". R. Guardini, the Catholic existential thinker, in his *Der Tod des Sokrates (Eine Interpretation der platonischen Schriften Euthyphron, Apologie, Kriton und Phaidon)*, (The Death of Socrates (An Interpretation of the Platonic Writings Euthyphron, Apology, Criton and Phaidon)), Bern, 1945, makes us feel how the death of Socrates weighs on Platonism, also as thinking. How could it be otherwise.

"After (Socrates) had taken a bath, his children were brought to him (he had two small sons and a large son) and the women of his kinship came too. (...) And the setting of the sun was at hand." The poisoner comes, by order of the Elf. "With that

He handed Socrates the (poisonous) cup. And he took it, and he did so in a totally cheerful manner, without trembling or changing his colour or facial features. On the contrary, he looked the man, as was his custom, straight in the eyes and said: "What do you think? Is it permissible to give some of this drink to someone? Is it permitted or not?" - "We prepare only so much, Socrates," replied the man, "as, in our opinion, the measure contains for one drink." - "I understand" said (Socrates). "But praying to the gods is certainly allowed and should be done so that the journey from here to there may be a happy one. Therefore I also pray and may it be so".

No sooner had (Socrates) said this, than he began to drink the poison, very cheerfully and resignedly. Most of us had hitherto been able to control ourselves; but when we saw how he drank, and afterwards, how he had drunk, we could no longer control ourselves: I, too, against my will, had tears streaming from my eyes, so that I threw myself away and wept; for it was not (Socrates) but my own fate that I wished to wipe out, for I would henceforth miss such a friend (...) Socrates, however, said: "What are you doing, you wonderful people? For this very reason I have sent the women, that they may not utter such foolishness. For I have heard that one must die in holy silence. So be quiet and firm".

Afterwards Socrates lay down and experienced in full consciousness that his body, from the feet upwards, became cold and stiff: "Already, in his lower body he had become very cold, and behold, he turned to us (for he had kept quiet) and said his last words: 'Kriton we owe Asklepios a cock. Sacrifice him to (the god Asklepios) and do not fail'. "Truly, it must be so," answered Kriton. "But look, wilt thou say something else?"

(Socrates) did not answer the question, but shortly afterwards he began to convulse. He was covered, for his eyes were broken. When Kriton saw this, he closed Socrates' mouth and eyes. Thus ended our friend, a man who, of all his contemporaries, of all those whom we have known, may be said to have been the best and certainly the most insightful and just. (o.c., 237/241).

Thus one understands much, much better what Dodds, *Fortschr.*, 147, but without sensing the sacred atmosphere - Dodds comes across as rather sophisticatedly inclined:

We should always be mindful of the ancient and sacred doctrines which reveal to us (mènuousin) that the soul is immortal'. (Seventh letter following the death of Dion, his Sicilian pupil-friend, so many years later). -

Heidegger says somewhere that man is 'ein Sein zum Tode', a way of being which, consciously or unconsciously, is mindful of death. Platonism is borne out of this apparently current thought.

But in its contemporary context, this death is particularly telling: in a sophist-rhetorical way, Socrates was brought before a court with false accusations that was equally sophist - rhetorical, i.e. with the probable and 'true' 'made' (thesis, mere human creation) instead of relying on objective and proven (strictly logically proven) truth! It is understandable that Platonism and sophist rhetoric were so contrary!

### ***The Platonic dualism.***

Xenocrates of Chalkedon, third leader of the Academy (-339/-514), probably divided Platonic philosophy into dialectics, physicality and ethics. However good, this division is misleading, for to the division 'dialectical/physical' in world view corresponds the same division in philosophy of life. -

### ***Dualism' is ambiguous:***

(i) if one takes two 'physical' principles, viz. 1/ the material (i.e. the indeterminacy, a.peiria, of p. 97 supra) or hylic (material) and 2/ the spiritual (i.e. the definiteness, peras,-), one is not obliged to take into account the physical (i.e. the material) and the spiritual (i.e. the material). If one prefers the spiritual (i.e. the determinate, peras,-see above) or the intellectual-rational or immaterial, then one is embracing a dualism, which was already present, in its germ, in Puthagoras (substance/number form), Parmenides (apparent/ essential; sensory/ mental (noetic)), Herakleitos self-willed /reflective; foreground/ background (which is fire-Logos): (a) the fuis as a whole (universal) is then both material and immaterial; (b) in particular the human fuis is then a special case: it is both body and soul;

(ii) however, if one introduces ethical qualifications and speaks of 1/ evil, impure, polluted material and 2/ good, pure, uncontaminated material, then this is a different dualism than that of Platon;

If one identifies 1/ the evil material with ungodly and 2/ the good immaterial with divine, then one adds a theological dimension (one thinks of the later Hellenistic mystics or theosophists): this is not Platonic either.

Yet one can easily interpret Platonism in this way. The second kind of dualism (ethical-theological) is rather Zoroastrian (see above).

People like Anaxagoras made the mistake of taking the Nous (Universe understanding that has an ordering effect on the mechanical processes of rotation (dinos) in the dust particles) as an explanation of the order in the world without saying how correct.

Platon does not make that mistake: from the one origin the multiplicity of things and processes arises, but that multiplicity is precise, for, between the one and the many, he situates the ideai, the ideas or contents of thought which give the many its own nature.

The same Xenocrates of Chalkedon defined the idea as follows: "the exemplary cause (the tone or exemplary principle) of what by nature permanently exists" (aitia paradeigmatikè ton kata fusein aei sunestoton).

Indeed, in the *Timaios* Platon presents the creation of the universe, up to and including the emergence of man as its crowning achievement (teleology), as follows:

1/ on the one hand, there is the Godhead (which he posits without being able to say very clearly how and what, but, nevertheless, it is there, mythically as in popular belief); this Godhead is the One as the origin of everything (universal, indeed transcendental origin);

2/ with one coherent network of ideas in mind, this deity orders the (eternal, uncreated) matter (indeterminacy, *a.peiria*) until an orderly 'cosmos' (nicely ordered world) emerges from it;

3/ That substance (indefiniteness) consists, as with Empedokles, of four elements (fire, air, water, earth) - Platon again does not say how such a thing comes about, for substance is by itself indefinite, i.e. neither fire / nor air / nor water / nor earth / nor any other 'form' is naturally present in it -; like everything else, that substance (indefiniteness) is also due to an idea, a basic immaterial concept of 'substance', which is present in the sensory substance.

In any case, at a given moment "there remains for God's intervention only the task of giving these elements their careful determination and differentiation among themselves 'according to ideas and numerical forms'" (A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 134).

#### **(A). *Worldview dualism. (98/109) -***

a/ The dialectic is the theory of ideas. Since the idea (idea, also *eidos* in Greek) is to ontos on, the being in a being way, the real being, the dialectic is actually ontology or the theory of being.

b/ The physical then is the doctrine of the sense forms of those ideas. -- Let us describe that idea in more detail.

A/ Knowing, according to Socrates, is based on concepts (conceptualism); that knowing (that science) does not originate from concrete cases, although it starts from them inductively - heuristically; in other words, sense experience is insufficient for the origin of concepts in the "nous", intellectus, mind of man.

Reason: the concept expresses "to katholou", universale, the general, i.e. that which is inherent in all possible cases; well, all possible cases never occur in the sense *fusus*; only the human mind possesses the concept of it.

B/ What does this become with Platon? V.Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon (Structure et méthode dialectique)*, (Plato's dialogues (Structure and dialectical method)), Paris, 1947, describes, in the introduction (pp. 1/12), basing himself on the Seventh Letter, the Aha-Erlebnis that, with Platon, underlies the theory of ideas. *Platon, Der siebente Brief an die Verwandten und Freunde des Dion zu Syrakus*, (Plato, The Seventh Letter to the Relatives and Friends of Dion at Syracuse), Stuttgart, 1948, S. 36, says: "To each of the things three aspects can be distinguished, by which, according to eternal order(s), the complete spiritual knowledge is gradually brought about; the fourth (aspect) is (that spiritual knowledge) itself; as the fifth, the object (the idea) is to be stated,-which can only be known

which only becomes knowable thanks to the depth of the mind and is the true original idea of the thing. -

The first of these aspects is the name;  
the second is the conception expressed in words;  
the third the 'image' (picture) perceptible by the physical senses;  
the fourth is the full-blown spiritual knowledge. -

Now if one wishes to understand more clearly what has been expressed here in general terms, then one understands it by means of a special example, and then thinks of that state of affairs as valid for all things without more.

(i) 'Circle' for example is a particularly designated thing, which has precisely the name we have just given.

(ii) The second of these things would be the verbal definition, consisting of subject and clause, i.e. "the equally distant from its extremes to its center (center, kentron) everywhere", - this would be the definition of the essence of that thing which bears the name 'round', circle.

(iii) The third is the 'image' (picture), which is corporeal and subject to the external senses, - e.g. that which the draughtsman and the turner (maker of turnings) make, - something which is afterwards subject to erasure and destruction, - fates to which the idea, the original idea, of the circle in itself, with which all masters are concerned, is not subject, since that (circle) is something else and altogether different.

(iv) The fourth is **1/** the scientific knowing, **2/** the message (information), heard by the reasonably thinking mind, **3/** the reality true representation of such things. -

This whole activity is to be understood as a unity, since it takes place **1/** not in external linguistic sounds, **2/** not in the forms accessible to bodily perception **3/** but in the soul itself. And, by this internal character, this scientific knowledge distinguishes itself, first of all, from the original circle in itself and, secondly, also from the three knowledge aspects mentioned above.

Among these aspects of knowledge, that of the internal intelligence is closest to the fifth aspect concerning kinship and resemblance; the other (aspects) - namely the first three - however, go far back. -

What has been said here by way of example about the circle now applies, of course, without question: both of the rectilinear figure and drawing and of the circle-shaped one; of the concept of the good and of that of the beautiful and righteous; of all that is corporeal -- be it a product of art or of nature -- of fire and water and all such elements; of every creature in the entire animal world as well as of every individual human soul; of all causes and effects. -

For, if one does not have the four first aspects of knowledge of knowable objects in some way within him, then one cannot fully participate in the fifth aspect.

**- Light metaphysical commentary on this basic text of Platon. -**

'Light (meta)physics' is that philosophical doctrine (1/ theory of knowledge, 2/ theory of nature, 3/ theory of morals) according to which that which is called 'light',

1/ and is the cognitive principle of being (logical)

2/ and is the principle of existence or fisis or genesis (physical - because of the super material also called 'meta'-physical)

3/ and the moral-political principle (ethical). -

Insofar as the 'light' is knowledge principle, light (meta)physical is also called enlightenment doctrine (fotismos, illuminatio, illumination). -

Insofar as 'light' is opposed to 'darkness', as an antithesis (su.stoichia, couple), one also speaks - and in a sense, better - of "light/darkness (meta)physical", - term in which dualism is better expressed, not as a gap but as a duality.

(a) Light metaphysics always has a transcendent aspect: thus *Platon's Seventh Letter* speaks of "a higher being" who instills in Hipparinos a high and good disposition toward political activity (o.c., 7), of "a 'destiny', one of the higher powers that led Platon to Surakousai (this is what it looked like)" (o.c., 11), about "a higher power which advocates the better for the polis" (o.c., 19) and to whom one prays in silence, about "men filled with the holy spirit" (o.c., 26), about "the blessing of heaven" in one's attempt (o.c.,27), about "some higher hand which gives man in the world a right understanding" (o.c., 27), about "a destiny beyond the power of men" as opposed to "the blessing of heaven and the intervention of a divine order (c.f., 29) in attempts, about "a gift to the God of salvation" in his third journey to Sicily (c.f., 32). O.Willmann calls this the "mystical" aspect.

(b) Light metaphysics speaks, always about 'soul'; that in man which, of the two sides of being, does not strive for the sensuous side of things, but for the essential being (o.c., 38); the 'noble human soul', object of education (o.c., 42); that "soul" is - according to the ancient principle - expressed in the proverb "simile simili" (the same through the same) - related to the eternal object of philosophy (o.c., 39); it possesses this kinship from birth (o.c., 39), for if this is not the case - which often happens - then there is not much to be done with such a person for the time being (o.c., 39/40).

(c) Light metaphysics speaks, in that soul, of the mind and, immediately, of reason (which expresses what the mind sees): "to spend one's life in righteousness with the thinking mind" (cf. o.c., 26) is the vocation; the true philosopher possesses "a mind related to the eternal and, in that mind, a spark of the divinity" (cf. o.c., 33). - One sees that here mythicism and the intellectual-rational aspect (as O.Willmann puts it) are very closely intertwined. It is here that the Enlightenment or Illuminati doctrine has its breakthrough point: "There is indeed of my hand ,

About those points (i.e. Platon's political philosophy) there is no written text and there will be none. For in certain verbatim school expressions one is not allowed to pronounce on this (as on other points of learning) at all.

But from repeated conversation precisely on that subject as well as from intimate living together, suddenly that idea emerges in the soul, like from a spark of fire the light that has been kindled, and then itself paves its way further." (o.c., 35).

Here we are reminded of the parable of the sun and its role in relation to the visible things of this world, as Platon explains it elsewhere.

One pays attention 1/ to the suddenness, 2/ to the light as point of comparison (one is referred to the sensitive experience: it too gropes first (floating attention in response to a problem) to suddenly "see", "feel" and thus acquire light in relation to the problem). One also paid attention

1/ The repeated talking to each other,

2/ to the intimate living together (which also occurs in sensitive experiences: doing sensitivity together, (thanks to 'group dynamics', as it is now called), only gives the quick and real result; which indicates 'mysticism' in the archaic sense, and that in the very heart of Platon's intellectual AhaErlebnis). -

A little further, Platon says: "If (...)

a/ names,

b/ defining descriptions by means of words,

c/ sensory perceptions and observations with regard to statements about the nature of things are notified in an informative way, and if we follow the correct dialectical method without passionate pedantry, only then does the light of pure spiritual perception and of a pure rational grasp of the inner nature of things shine". (o.c., 40). -

d/ light metaphysics speaks, in the end - and certainly with Platon - of light as the good that, in acting and making, illuminates: "Without immortality (of the soul) no anamnesis, memory, - without memory, no world of ideas, - without world of ideas no certain knowledge and without certain knowledge no sound acting and no bliss either for the individual or for the city-state". (A. Gödeckemeyer, Platon, S. 92). About which a little more later. This then is the ethical-political aspect of the light/dark-nismetaphysics.

#### **- Further explanation.-**

V. Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon*, (Plato's dialogue), p.. 6, specifies.

(i) To onoma, the name, is something agreed upon (thesis, nomos, - not fisis); he is therefore only a poor mere verbal approximation of the pure being of e.g. ho kuklos, circulus, the circle.

With this Platon opposes his teacher, the Heraklitean Kratulos, who claimed that one could reach the true being of things through language, because the oldest people had assigned to each thing the (its fisis, nature, future) name (original name which is still preserved in the so-called primeval words, through many changes).

Platon, on the other hand, says: “Nothing prevents what is now called ‘straight’ from being called ‘circular’ and vice versa.” This, to underline the conventional (artificial) character of the naming, yet he adds: “Its solidity will be the same, notwithstanding this change and this reverse naming.”

To quote J. Royce, *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1961 (1912-1), p. 53:

**a/** classification is always postulatoric, i.e., ‘an act of will (and, in this sense, arbitrary (‘right’ can be exchanged for ‘circular’))

**b/** but the (initially unconscious) law (the system itself) which governs that classification (in the naming) is not arbitrary but rule-bound (once one introduces ‘right’ arbitrarily, what corresponds to ‘right’ may no longer be called ‘circular’):

“Any arbitrariness of individual classification notwithstanding, the general laws of logic possess an absoluteness, from which, thinking, one cannot escape, and underlie all order system and all theory.” (o.c., 53).

Royce, as a Platonist, thus expresses well the “fixedness” of which Platon speaks, - fixedness in change. What Royce (and Platon before him) wants to say is: that the individual name (so to speak of divine origin and reflecting the fisis, the nature of being) means nothing without the system of language and ideas in which it belongs. Something our current structuralists emphasize, and too rightly so. Kratulos is therefore too rightly rejected.

**(ii)** Ho horismos, definitio, the essence (definition), consisting of names and verbs, - Platon first discovers the sentence structure

**1/** noma, nomen, noun, on the one hand, and

**2/** rhema, verbum, verb, on the other hand (one thinks of N. Chomsky’s noun and verb constituents of the sentence)) -, shares, according to Platon, in the mutability of its constituents, namely the words (as names). -

In the name of Archutas of Taranton (-400 / -365), Pythagorean friend of Platon, there are the following creaturely provisions (-definitions): “Wind stillness is calmness in the air mass”; “sea stillness is the calming of wave movement”. -

Later, Aristotle will analytically divide the definition into

**(i)** genos, genus, genus, to which, in the theory of collections of Georg Cantor (1845/1918), the universal collection corresponds, and

**(ii)** diafora eido.pois, differentia speci.fica, species distinction, to which, in Cantor’s Mengenlehre, corresponds the private collection, part of the general or universal.

**Applied:** ‘windlessness’ (noun, subject) is **1/** ‘air mass’, **2/** yet not universal (all possible air mass) but private (‘one kind of air mass’), viz. airmass ‘at rest’; ‘sea-silence’ (noun, subject) is **1/** ‘wave motion’, - **2/** which - Heraklitisch - turns into its opposite and becomes ‘bedaring of wave motion’, where ‘waves’ (universal) decays into two subsets (types), ‘motion’ and ‘bedaring’ (verb, proverb).

1/ The Pythagoreans did definition in the context of their mathematics.

2/ Socrates did it in the context of his ethical-political concern with understanding. Thus Platon was prepared from two sides for definition work. Platon was averse to word-by-word approaches to reality. As S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy*, p. 21, notes, he opposed 'a twofold paideia:

(i) against the musical paideia, in which the mythical-thinking poets Homer and Hesiod, with their fantasies about gods and the like, were central;

(ii) against the sophists with their utilitarianism (pragmatism) concerning the use of words, in rhetoric and dialexis (conversational art): - Platon is a Socratist: Socrates used dialexis, the art of conversation, as a means of arriving at correct understanding, nothing more.

But Platon sees Socrates' great flaw: he stops, like Kratulos, at individual definitions of words as names;

Platon sees them as parts of a system or network of relations (one definition evoking another), as a *zoion noèton*, an animal intellegibile, a thought-content organism (system).

(iii) To *eikos horomenon*, *imago visibilis*, the visible image, is the concrete thing in which the idea (*eidos*) is realized, indeed embodied. Here two kinds can be distinguished:

a/ the natural 'images' (or approximate realizations) of the ideal being; thus, for the circle (round, spherical, circular), the *kuklas*, the *cyklad*; thus, around the island of Delos, is a circle of islands, which 1/ together form 'a *kuklas* and, 2/ separately, are *kuklades*, *cyklades*;

b/ the artificial: so the circle drawing or objects drawn or elaborated by the draughtsman or turner (one thinks of the geometrists).

As the existing words can be, arbitrarily, changed (if necessary into their opposite, Heraklitean), so can the natural or artificial:

1/ the *cyklads* can, in 'a nature catastrophe perish;

2/ the geometrician wipes out the circle he has drawn: such a thing is impossible with the idea of circle! She 'is' eternal, unchanging there.

The fifth aspect, which exists only in the fourth, the knowledge in the soul itself, as light breaking through in the *Aha-Erlebnis*, is Parmenidean in this sense: single, unchanging, yes, divine. - Diogenes of Sinope, the Canon, objects to Platon that he can see the table (*trapeza*, *tabula*) and the cup (*kuathos*, *calix*), but not the principle, the trapezoids, the tableness, the table in itself, or the *kuathotès*, the cupness.

Indeed, Platon will say, Diogenes is stuck in the empirical *aisthèsis*, sense perception, which gives only *doxa*, *opinio*, opinion, as a cognitive result; but, besides the sense eye, there is the 'spiritual' eye, the *nous*, *intellectus*, the mind, which sees the idea - table, cup without more, valid for all possible tables and cups, - and gives *epistèmè*, *scientia*, science as a cognitive result. One sees the dualism.

As mentioned above (p. 73), Protagoras, like Diogenes the Kunician, stood on a purely empirical plane: he also conceived mathematics empirically.

I.e. he stuck to the applicative models, the merely concrete examples, called by Platon 'parables' (because he sees them as pictures, applications of the regulative models or ideas),

1/ the circle in itself has, e.g., only one tangent (and with that circle and that tangent work, exclusively, the geometrists),

2/ while the drawn or natural circle has always, more than one point of contact with a tangent. This means that the similarities' ('images') - the applicative models - obscure the purity of the regulative idea. This is the darkness as a counterpart of the light.

(iv) a/ The epistèmè, scientia, Science, - b/ the nous, intellectus, intellect, - c/ the doxa alèthes, opinio vera, true opinion,- insofar as they adhere to 'a hypothesis, suppositio, assumption, presupposition (one thinks of the verbal determinations and postulates or axioms of the geometrists), and thus of e.g. the definition of the kuklos, circle, depart, remain stuck in the still dark area of the sensible words or things: one can work out deductive derivations from those definitions and postulates, yet without the illumination, the Aha-Erlebnis of the idea (here of 'the' circle), this will remain a 'dark' approach. -

One could compare this with the student who "learns by heart" without penetrating to the essence of geometry: he remains in the transitory realm of

1/ its genesis (he learns it) and

2/ its reversal, its decay (he forgets it): No,

a/ ho teleos epistèmè, scientia plena, the full science, -

b/ ho pleos nous, intellectus plenus, the full mind,-

c/ huh fronèsis, thinking, and huh sophia, sapientia, wisdom, are more than that obscure 'outside' approach.

They are theoria, speculatio, contemplation, i.e., penetrating with the thinking mind to the direct beholding of the idea (regulative reality or example, archetypos). Knowing from without and beholding are two things.

(v) The fifth aspect, the idea, is described by O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus*, I, 382: in opposition to the constantly changing, the idea is the real being; in opposition to the transitory, it is eternal; in opposition to the mixed forms, it is the pure, the unmixed form; in opposition to the many (of the applicative models), it is the one (of the regulative model valid for all possible applicative models), - which corresponds to Georg Cantor's concept of the set: idea and collection are identical; opposite the multiform she is the uniform; opposite the relative and concrete (interwoven) she is the absolute (absolute) and independent (and abstract); opposite the formless (indefinite and unlimited) she is form (definiteness, limitation); opposite the individual she is the species (resp. gender); opposite the imperfect and deficient, is "paradeigma," exemplum, forerunner and paragon, the perfect.. In other words, the whole theory of being revolves around the idea.

**- Platonism and model theory. -**

Model theory, as e.g. H. Bertels / D. Nauta, *Inleiding tot het modelbegrip*, (Introduction to the model concept), Bussum, 1969, elaborates it topically, i. e. logistically and mathematically, has its starting point, philosophically, in Platonism. Platon, *Politeia* 10, distinguishes, in art creation,

(i) a sensory 'model', e.g. the Hellenic girl who is the model for the chiselling of a statue of the goddess,

(ii) a sensory experienceable and, moreover, manufacturable 'model', i.e. the image he carves;

(iii) the conceptual ('noetic') 'model' which the chiseller has in his mind ('a kind of ideal model'). - To all this belongs

(iv) the pure, pre-existent or pre-existent 'model' that is present before but also in the three previous ones, namely 'the' young girl as goddess. - This way of thinking has been called 'exemplarism'.

This exemplarism, which conceives the model first of all as the idea

1/ exists in itself and 2/ can be copied and realized, has two dimensions:

(i) 'a Pythagorean one, i.e. demimèsis, imitatio, imitation, image: the sensible or empirically experienced is 'a representation on a finite plane, in the world of becoming and of its reversal, decay;

(ii) an equally Pythagorean, but less filling, methexis, participatio, participation, presence: the sense or empirical experience is the presence of the transempirical, the idea, in which it 'participates'. - Both aspects are ancient:

1/ The ancient magic worked with the couple 'participation/imitation' (contact/similarity),

2/ This works through Orphism into Pythagoreanism. -- Both aspects run in one with what O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, III, S. 1031/1037, *Zur Terminologie der: "Geschichte des Idealismus"*, (On the terminology of: "History of Idealism") a gem of a vocabulary, says about 'transcendent/ immanent' (S. 1036):

a/ choristèn, transcendens. Transcendent beyond and / or transcending (said)

1/ of the deity with respect to the creation but also

2/ of the human soul with respect to the body,

3/ of the idea with respect to the 'likeness' ('image', the sensually realized thereof),

4/ of the same idea vis-à-vis the mind and/or the action connected with it), on the one hand, and

b/ on the other hand, en.up.achon, immanent, indwelling, in ... present: what is said of the very same being: God, soul, idea, insofar as they are not separated by a gap (which is all too often true in the present-day 'two worlds' concept), but by a tension, (epèktasis would St. Gregory of Nussa say). Gregory of Nussa says, of the principle and that which is governed by the principle) of 1/ the finite creation, 2/ the body or 3/ the sensible realization or 4/ the mind and/or the action are not separated in the absolute sense, but rather in the relative sense, however distinct they may be from it.

### ***The Platonic dialectic. -***

Platon develops from the Socratic dialexis, which has two logical operations, the induction and the definition, his:

**a1.** the inductively constructed definitions of concepts (Socratic);

**a2.** the situating of those defined concepts in the cosmos noëtos, mundus intelligibilis, world of thought (some decades ago by the French existentialist J.P. Sartre (1905/1980), in his book *l' existentialisme est un humanisme*, (existentialism is a humanism -), ridiculed as “le ciel intelligible”, (“the intelligible sky”), whereby it should be noted that Sartre is talking about a caricature, designed by a sophist, and not about Platon’s conceptual cosmos); this situating within a systematic coherence of ideas occurs, according to J. B. Rieffert, *Logik (Eine Kritik an der Geschichte ihrer Idee)*, (Logic (A Critique of the History of its Idea)), in N. Dessoir, *Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, (Philosophy in its individual fields), Berlin, 1925, S. 3/294, especially S. 13/24, In two times:

**a2a.** the formation of contradiction-free (contradiction-free) concepts (sunagogè):

**a/** ‘a group of words from the vernacular, e.g. ‘clean’, said;

**1/** of a female appearance, **2/** of music, **3/** of a poem,

**4/** of ‘a lofty deed, etc., is captured, in one summarizing idea (cf. Platon Republ. 10: 155);

**b/** from this grows, Socratically, ‘a definition such as e.g. beauty is always sensually experienced; it provides a sense of pleasure, etc.; after this preliminary stage follows the testing of: 1/ the summary concept and 2/ its definition: what A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 39, 46, calls ‘hypothetics’; - what O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959 (1904-1, 1912-4), S. 137, calls ‘analytic’, better ‘lemmatic-analytic method’, is applied here;

**a/** the lemma, the provisional assumption (pure working hypothesis), is the starting point (e.g. if one provisionally assumes that beauty always concerns sensory experience, what then?); in other words, one assumes known, what actually is not (firmly) known, but only conjectured;

**b/** from this, in an analytical manner, one deduces inferences, which either turn out to be true (and then the starting point, the lemma, is true) or false (hè eis adunaton apagogè, demonstratio ad absurdum ducens, proof from the absurd, - cf. Zenon of Elea) (and then the lemma is false);

**a2b.** The formation of non-contradictory notions and ditto definitions includes a second aspect, the diairesis, divisio, division, e.g. a/ the beautiful is that form in the sensible which gives a feeling of lust; this definition is valid as genus (universal collection of ‘the’ beautiful in itself, without more; b/ this generic definition is divided into human, musical, poetic, moral beauty (the species, species, according to a specific difference);

**b.** the doctrine of judgment (which is applied in the definition, among other things: subject; proverb);

the doctrine of judgment is central to Platonism: “Thought and reason (in the sense of verbalized thoughts) are the same except in one point, namely, that the soul’s internal conversation with itself (which proceeds without an (external voice) is called by us ‘thought’, while the extension of that thought, on the other hand, by means of the sound through the mouth, is called reason (language, verbalization).” (Platon, *Sophistes* 263rd; cf. J. Rieffert, o.c., 15); to think, for Platon, is to formulate judgments in one’s innermost being, pure phraseology;

**c. the doctrine of reasoning,**

Here, it appears that Platon, apart from the Socratic induction, also knows deduction (as a lemmatical-analytical method that is), (the negative form that Zenon of Elea, with his proofs from the absurd, introduced, Platon also knows, but completes this);

**Conclusion:** concept, judgement and reasoning (the core of later Aristotelian logic), together with definition and classification (which belong together as content and scope of the concept), form the main elements of what one could call with a contemporary word “the Platonic language-analysis”; cf. Guy Nuchelmans, *Overzicht van de analytische wijsbegeerte* (Survey of analytical philosophy), Utrecht/Antwerp, 1969:

**a/** the name and what is named by that name,

**b/** the concepts, judgements and reasonings,

**c/** the phenomena of language and speech are

**1/** by the Cambridge - school (Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein),

**2/** the logical positivisme (especially Carnap and the Wiener Kreis) and

**3/** the analysis of ordinary language (Wittgenstein II, Ryle, Austin, Strawson)

particularly studied.

In this Platonism has played a role, indeed Platonism is one form of language analysis, viz. the as much as possible non-sophisticated one. -

**Platon’s physical. -**

One can already deduce from the above how Platon sees the Milesian fisis. L. Brisson, *Le Même et l’Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon*. (The Same and the Other in the ontological structure of Plato’s Timaeus), Paris, 1974, discusses, in the Timaios (the name of a certain Timaios of Lokroi, a Pythagorean), the unity conception that includes all being (gods, tussendaimones, humans; heavens and planets; animals and plants; natural elements, minerals), o.g. the pair “same/other”. The demiurge (i.e., world-orderer), the shaping God, representative of the Good, the highest and all-supporting idea, mixes a/ the ideas and b/ the spatial middle (matter) in such a way that the universe emerges from them. In doing so, Platon attaches growing importance to the Pythagorean number forms, which, according to Brisson, are threefold

**(i)** the pure number forms, perfect paragons of the thought content;

**(ii)** the geometrical figures (governed by the number forms of the pure level);

**(iii)** the number forms perceptible in sensory things; - whereby the geometrical number forms are intermediate terms, in connection with a kind of world-soul (Platonic hylozoism), -- F. Krafft, *Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 311, describes the cultural-historical scope of Platon’s vision:

This conception of mathematism and the possibility, with the help of that mathematism, to grasp natural history and natural forms, along the detour of ideas, so that only ‘a general form is known, which in the sense-perceptible is not reached and, in principle, is not attainable.

This conception constitutes the necessary end point of a development whose beginning we have met at:

1/ Anaximandros and, in his wake, Hekataios and Herodotos, as regards geographical forms;

2/ as well as with the Pythagoreans and other thinkers and artists of the fifth century.” Indeed, Anaximandros the Milesian, elaborated a worldview that a/ united both the reasoned view of Thales the Milesian (with his explanation of individual terrestrial phenomena) - cf. 41; 44 (Milesian empiricism) - b/ and the systematic (and indeed genealogical, i.e., lineage-based) view of Hesiod on the universe and the earth in:

1/ a general physical (the summary of which is on p. 11 supra) and

2/ a map of the heavens and also of the earth, which ushered in a kind of mathematical geography and cartography. (cf. F. Krafft, (o.c., 112/113): a1/ Numbers and their proportions, geometrical forms, among which the symmetrical especially, b/ strongly a-priori (i.e. not based on actual measurements, but ‘pure’) construed, form the arrangement scheme. These mathematical ‘forms’ were then read into the fysis. -

But something new had come along: the insight that the mathematical constitutes a separate domain of the fysis, as explained briefly above on pp. 20, 33, especially 91, namely the in Zenon’s style pure reasoning mathematics (which then reached its climax in the separate domain of concepts or, rather, ideas). -

Notwithstanding the obvious obsolescence of Platonic mathematics, the fact remains that that Hellenic mathematical view of the fysis, in renewed forms (logistic, set theory), dominates natural and even human science up to our days:

“It is fitting, I believe, to see mathematics less as an integral part of natural philosophy in the proper sense than as, since Descartes and Newton, the true foundation of the whole of this (natural) philosophy, although it is, to be precise, both part and foundation of it.” Thus A. Comte (1798/1857), in his *Cours de philosophie positive* (Positive philosophy course), (1839). What the father of positivism already established in 1839, is still valid today. The beginning of it lies with Anaximandros; the continuation with Platon, in Pythagorean line. -

How precisely modern mathematical thought elaborated Platon’s lemmatic-analytical principle in the letter arithmetic (algebra, etc. t./m. logistic), O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus*, III, S. 48ff., explains (especially Viète (Vieta)).

Cf. course, first year, logic (exact thinking). (Mathematical) idealism lives on in modern mathematism, which (as Whitehead said) is also a footnote on Platon.

E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie (Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie)*, (The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy)), The Hague, 1962, S. 20, says: “Before Platonism the real had a more or less perfect methexis (participation, share) in the ideal (....).

In the mathematization of nature initiated by Galileo, nature itself, under the guidance of the new mathematics, is idealized: it becomes - in modern terms - itself a mathematical multiplicity.” In other words, the universe is conceived as a reality that can be mathematized through and through, - something the Hellenes had prepared for, but had never done themselves. After Comte, Husserl is convinced of this mathematisation.

**Note: - Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and Platonism. -**

E. Husserl (1859/1939) discovered, under Bolzano's influence, as well as that of Brentano, his teacher, in his research into the foundations of mathematics, that the laws of logic are “ideal” and “a- priori” (given in advance for every empirical fact).

He also took inspiration from a Platonic word “eidos” (Platon's alternate expression for idea) to call these logical “entities”. Hence the name ‘eidetic’ (i.e. focusing on the idea of eidos) description of phenomena. Without being a Platonist, Husserl nevertheless has a Platonizing streak, which is very profound.

**(B) - Philosophical dualism. (109/114) -**

“Platon was convinced, with Socrates, that knowing is something fixed and unchangeable, and (...) that it could only be so if the representations, by attachment to its ground drawn from the soul of man himself, are confirmed.” (A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, S. 45).

That, in its turn, presupposes 1/ “that there exists a world `in which there is no change and no transience””, 2/ that “in that world the original dwelling place of the immortal soul” is to be seen, 3/ that “by memory nothing is to be understood but the memory of that which the soul, in its former existence, has beheld of that transcendental and only comprehensible world, with the eye of the mind.” (Ibid., 46).

On this reincarnation, which Platon, among other things, took from Orphism, we will not go any further. Only this: the immortality of the soul, in the sense of pre-existence and post-existence, i.e. before the conception and after death, is, for Platon, the condition of the knowledge of ideas, the basis of a fixed knowledge, as opposed to the false knowledge of musical poets and especially of sophisticians. (o.c., 49).

In other words, the doctrine of soul and the doctrine of ideas go hand in hand. - Now we can give the description of the philosopher, opposite to the sophist (and, somewhat, to the musical poet): he is the man (not the woman !), who, from his youth, seized by eros, love, to the ideas considered in a former existence, possesses a knowledge, which, more and different from 1/ all unstable opinion and even 2/ the ordinary right representation, grasps the true “being”.

with that knowledge of true 'being' (the ideas), the philosopher also possesses true virtue (// Socratic intellectualism); more so: the philosopher, as such, is, moreover, experienced in all things of practical life, especially political life, and, thus, ready and able to elaborate the earthly realm of emergence and of its transformation, its decay, according to the model of the idea, as value and good, informing life, or, if one wishes, to model human beings on the divine model. (cf. A. Gödeckemayer, o.c., 85).

Only then, in that ethic-political sphere, is the philosopher defined as a philosopher. One therefore does not confuse Platon with idly watching philosophers. On the contrary. Teleology (goal-oriented belief) also pervades life and, with it, the world of ideas. Too often Platonism is worn out by people who never read Platon themselves, as inactive contemplation.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 206, says that Platon, being the first, saw the essence of philosophy in the education of a "new man. The philosopher is the legislator who, on the basis of truth, establishes a new society, not autonomous (i.e. a.theos, godless) but with God as the supreme "metron" (standard), in contrast to Protagoras.

Where is the dualism "light/darkness" to be found here in the ethical field? J. Rehmke / Schneider, *Gesch. d. Phil.*, S. 39/41, typifies very well the basic dualism: in the *Philolaos* Platon himself says that "the best life is made of 1/ the honey of the experience of lust and 2/ the healthy, sober, pure water of insight"; i.e. the mixture, not the gap, of intellectual knowledge and lust-sensitive absorption in becoming and far-reaching things, only, is the 'best' life.

***In other words:***

**a/** the purely contemplative life and the ascetic avoidance of earthly desires that goes with it is only one side of the Platonic life as a philosopher;

**b/** the other side is the commitment to a polis in which justice reigns, yes, is the experience of lust connected to this earth, but then subject to the solid knowledge of virtue.

That is the mixed life, - something **a/** which anticipates Aristotle's golden mean and **b/** which builds on the harmony of soul and body, thanks to gymnastics and musical activity, in the ancient paideia.

Yes, as W. Jaeger, *Paid.*, says, Platon's paideia aims (*Politeia*. 3, 549b) at the 'mesa', media, the reconciling intermediate terms between extremes which are a/ the nous, the intellect, and b/ the 'irrational' side in human nature; that mesa work harmony. We are, especially with the older Platon, far from worldliness.

This is all the more true since life after death, for Platon as for so many initiates especially the Orphicists, did not mean bliss without question: Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438), the great Dorian-minded poet, in his *To Thèron of Akragas*, ff. 56vv, says the great

judgment on the souls: "(...) if, moreover, the possessor of wealth knows what awaits him, namely, that, among those who have died here on earth, the poor spirits pay off their debts immediately, that someone judges the iniquities committed here in the realm of Zeus, in judgments under the earth, on the ground of hostile necessity.

Yet the noble spirits, in possession of the sun, by ever equal nights, by equal days, pass through a burden-free life, without traversing the earth or the sea water with the force of hand for the sake of questionable gain.

But all those who honored their oaths, by the honored gods, come to a tearless space, while the others have to deal with a burden that does not endure a sight.

But those who, up to three times, were able to keep the whole soul free from injustice, along the road of Zeus, reach the fortress of Kronos: there the breezes of the (world) ocean blow around the island of the blessed, the flowers shine with gold, sometimes of luminous trees on the shore, sometimes of trees felled by the water. " (Cf. H. Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker*, Zurich, 1949, S. 170/173).

Theron, perhaps to some extent also Pindaros, were initiated into the religion of the mysteries: here speaks a little of the teaching which they, under oath, had learned about eschatology, i.e. the teaching about the life essences of the soul. -

Well, - cf. supra p.90 - Platon knew the mysteries and, as A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, S. 60, says: "Only he who serves the memory of the ideas correctly, will, with the highest (in)ordinations (in)ordained, be truly perfect."

This means that Platon also critically examines the transmitted mysteries 1/ without rejecting them. Indeed, two improvements he introduces: (i) only the doctrine of ideas and the philosophy that imparts the ideas, is the real - intellectual consecration; (ii) notwithstanding that he hears muscular descriptions of the afterlife with suspicion, he nevertheless holds firmly to the judgmental doctrine as the handed down soul teachings recite it (and as they have been cited e.g. at Pindaros). This means that the afterlife can never incite world flight, for that is merely displacement of the ethical-political problem, not a solution. -

More to the point: for its reembodiment, the soul itself - not god or gods - chooses its future earthly life.

**Consequence:** "The more a soul devotes itself on earth to understanding and righteousness - in other words, the more it has applied itself to philosophy - the better it will be able to distinguish and choose, among the ways of life, whose models are presented to it for consideration in the other world, at the beginning of a new life, that which does not bear the false appearance of brilliance, but, holding the middle between the extremes, brings happiness: the way of life of righteousness. (A. Gödeckemeyer, o.c., 112). (Note: see GW. 100).

***Digression. - The two-world theory,***

As expounded by J. Sperna Weiland, *Het einde van de religie (Verder op het spoor van Bonhöffer)*, (The End of Religion (Continuing on Bonhöffer's Track)), Baarn, 1970, p. 115/124, is not a correct representation either of religion as it, in essence, is or of platonic religion, but a caricature designed by a secularist mentality, as already designed by Sophistic.

***It is based on a simplistic dichotomy:***

(i) responsibility for the world and for the future of the world (by 'world' is meant this earth), typical for the secular man (scientist, philosopher theologian or whatever he is) who, humanistically, emphasizes this earth;

(ii) ultimate irresponsibility of religion, secularly understood as flight from this world into the other, where, at once, 'metaphysics' is understood as the intellectual degree of religion (the two-world doctrine converted into philosophical concepts).

The only true thing that sticks out in the caricature is that, in fact, some religious people have interpreted and experienced 'religion' in a degenerate, and, indeed, earthly responsibilities flighty way, nothing more.

Cf. also Sperna Weiland, *Oriëntatie (Nieuwe wegen in de theologie)*, (Orientation (New Ways in Theology)), Baarn, 1966, as well as *Continued Orientation*, Baarn, 1971: one understands this "new theology" only, if one starts from the misunderstanding of religion and (meta)physics. Certainly Platon falls outside that caricature: both his words (think of the Seventh Letter) and his undertakings and commitment contradict it. Which does not prevent some passages from giving rise to misrepresentations. But that is inherent in every fact or word. The surprise that the word "political theology" arouses in many contemporaries, for example, is only understandable in people who do not even suspect the thoroughly political attitude of all the Hellenic philosophers, but certainly of Socrates and the great Socratics.

***Digression.- Praxeology and ethico-politics. -***

P. Antoine, *Ethiek en decision-making* (Ethics and decision-making), in *Streven*, jrg 23: 8 (May 1970), pp. 780/789, criticizes the 'exemplarism' concerning ethics, i.e. that view of morality which sees the good or value to be attained 1/ as 'an ideal (and 1outer ideal) reality existing in itself (outside our earthly situation), -- 2/ which is presented as attainable by copulatory mimeticism.

The author speaks of an "impasse" (the slop) of exemplarism. He doubts universal models which are both universal (valid for all people) and efficient (adapted to the situations). Therefore he argues for a theory of decision - making which is praxeological (i.e. which is in line with the theory of praxis), i.e. which a/ addresses ethical problems b/ pragmatically (i.e. taking into account the operational or workable, doable side). -

Platon did nothing throughout his life but 1/ designed theory and, 2/ subjected theory to analysis (together with interlocutors) as well as to experiment,- hence his

evolution, constantly, - but an evolution that did not become sophist relativism. Even more: the thorough respect for the unwritten law(s), from the earliest thinkers (Herakleitos a.o.), as having priority over the written ones, prevents Platon from lapsing into so-called “law morality”, which reduces ethical-political questions to legal quibbling and casuistry (i.e. the examination of concrete cases or moral-political situations on a purely law-related basis).

**Note:** - With Platon, of course, there are, quite a few details that are simply culture- and time-bound, - to which we will not comment further. - One, point: the slave treatment. He assigns the cultivation, particularly the labor in the field, to slaves. He wants to know nothing of “natural” slaves, but he considers slavery as an institution indispensable in his Kallipolis (as he calls his ideal state). But - and here his intellectual - ethical disposition shows itself - “the true and not hypocritical respect for the law shows itself only in the relation to those whom one can, without danger, wrong” (A. Gödeckemeyer, o.c., 184)

**a1.** because they are powerless. Even current Christians or new-leftists can learn something on this point from the aristocratic, Sparta-loving, conservationist (that is how he is worn) Platon. Platon called the slave ‘a *‘chalepon ktèma’* (‘a difficult possession to handle’), as W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, pp. 201/229 (The ancient conception of servitude), says.

Like his student Aristotle, who goes even further and calls the slave ‘a possession of the lord like any other possession, the distance being as that between body and soul or between man(lord) and animal(slave) cf. Pol. 1:4 -, Platon regarding slavery - view is ‘a typically classical mind: since sophistry and its desecration of social life, one defines the slave, purely negatively, as standing outside the law.

For the sophist enlightenment, the slave, because of his restriction of personal freedom, was one kind (and the utmost) of “dear,” yet in the sacred sense: he was devoted to the gods of the underworld. He was their servant and, as such, an essential contributor to the ‘salvation’ of the whole people. We have already met this ‘*theon therapeia*’ (religion) on p. 93 supra (the definition of magic). -

Incidentally: already with Platon the so-called ‘dialectic (interaction and/or reversal of two opposites) of the lord and the slave’ is anticipated (cf. G.Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, (Phenomenology of the mind), Leiden, 1907(1832-1), S. 151ff.).

Platon shifts the emphasis to psychology concerning politics: **1/** timocracy (honor),- **2/** oligarchy (possession), **3/** democracy (desire), **4/** tyranny (lust for power) testify to the fact that the thinking mind is unfree (slave), while, in the aristocrat (philosopher), the thinking mind subdues desire, as the truly ‘free’, non-servile man.

On the correct views of Hegel and Marx's interpretation of them cf. H. Arvon, *Le marxisme*, Paris, 1960, pp. 11ss.; as well as P. Vittinghoff, *Die Theorie des historischen Materialismus über den antiken 'Sklavenhalterstaat' (Probleme des Alten Geschichte bei den 'Klassikern' des Marxismus und in der modernen sowjetischen Forschung)*, (The Theory of Historical Materialism on the Ancient 'Slaveholding State' (Problems of Ancient History in the 'Classics' of Marxism and in Modern Soviet Research)), in *Saeculum*, Munich, Bd. 11 (Jrg. 1960), S. 89/131.

When one reads the latter, it penetrates to what degree the historical errors of Marx and Engels go, e.g. Engels calculated, for the fifth century, in Attica, eighteen slaves for each adult male citizen, -- where present calculations obtain perhaps two slaves per ditto citizen. The data on which Marx and Engels relied are, says the author, "erbarmungslos antiquiert" i.e. hopelessly out of date. (a.c., 93/94). -

**Conclusion:** if Platon's texts and views are time-bound, so are those of some erbarmungslos antiquiert critics.

**(C) (114/119) - The Platonic Love.-**

Douglas N. Norgan, *Love, Plato, the Bible and Freud*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 174ff., treats this sensitive theme at length. For us, it comes down to a moment's consideration of Platon's appreciation (and its development) of eros, 'minne', love, desire.

Many Dutch words are needed to render eros and related: therefore, as so often, we use the Hellenic words themselves. As always, the dualism returns here as well: 1/ On the one hand, a higher, intellectual (ideas-linked) eros or mania, 2/ on the other hand, a lower, desire-linked eros or mania, 3/ with, as a conclusion, the mixis, mixtura, mixture, of the two in which man is situated and which bridges the 'gap' somewhere (Platon always searched for that connection, until his death).

**(a) The four great forms of mania, inspiration, in the *Faidros* (244/245).**

Socrates is the speaker; he starts from the question whether one should prefer the *sofrosunè*, the self-controlled way of thinking and acting, or the mania, the fluid way of thinking and acting.

Socrates believes that the answer would be simple, were it not for the fact that "among our goods, the greatest are those that accrue to us by means of mania, fluid behavior, at least insofar as it rests on divine gift" (244a). In support, Socrates cites four types of floating behavior, which is at once be'geest'-ering (behavior borne by a spirit).

**Note:-** F. Farwerck, *De mysteriën der oudheid en hun inwijdingsriten* (The Mysteries of Antiquity and their Rites of Initiation), Hilversum, 1960, pp. 102/108, summarizes them under the title of "ecstasy" in the mystery context.

**(a)1. The prediction mania.-**

Under inspiration of the god Apollon. The 'sacred' woman of Delfoi, the priestesses of Dodona, the Sibylla (Sibylle), inspired by 'a god (entheos mantikè), in enthousiasmos thus, are the effectors of innumerable undeniable benefits, public and private.

These benefits were possible for her insofar as she was in a state of mania (fluid 'consciousness'), while in a controlled state she performed "little or nothing". - It should be noted that these women - a typical remnant of an earlier telluric-religious stage - only entered mania under the influence of a god (entheos, enthousiasmos; which carries within itself deity, condition appropriate to it), in 'spirit'-drift (// floating state of consciousness or floating consciousness, because the 'spirit' or 'god' acts through its meson, medium or intermediary), possessed the conscious prophetic ability, - which is one application of the theon therapeia, the divine service, about which on p. 91 (Zoroastrian magic) and 113 (ancient slavery) supra, is. They are therapnè, ancilla, servant (which parallels the Lt. incola, residence). This is also true of the three following maniai.

**(a)2. *The initiatory mania.* -**

Under inspiration of Dionusos. "Even more, says Platon, as to the greatest diseases and trials, which, as a result of ancient (inducements to) resentments, weigh somewhere on some members of some genera (i.e. genealogical societies): the passing through and leading to seership mania (clairvoyance), in those members of it who are fit to do so, found the means to reverse such fate (...).

Based on this, this mania was able, if it underwent purification rites and initiations, to make the person it gifted immune both at the moment itself and afterwards, because it knew how to find deliverance from ailments at the moment itself for the person who is in mania in the right way or has been seized by it."

For proper understanding, please refer 1/ to pp. 12/14 (Nemesis exercising vengeance (// resentment), 2/ especially to p. 42 (corrective cycle), 3/ even more to pp. 56/57 (genealogical or genealogical curse and its after-effects, as assumed here by Platon.

Ancient resentment of gods (and men) weighs somewhere on someone of a lineage on which that curse which springs from that resentment weighs; - one compares with our Christian original sin evil, which "weighs somewhere on every individual of Adam's lineage").

Apparently the thought is: not just earth- and culturebound rational thinking but mania, floating scanning consciousness finds the right original and genealogical evil that manifests itself in sickness and distress, because only mania can see into the alou-de past. -

One phrase was skipped in the text: mania found the means to reverse such fate "by resorting to prayers (euchas) and service (latreias) with respect to the gods." Here, again, the "servitude to the gods" comes through!

**(a)3. *The dichtmania.* -**

"The third kind is the obsession and mania, springing from the Muses, which takes possession of a tender and unspoiled soul, awakens it and brings it outside itself with rapture in the form of odes and all kinds of poetry: it shows the brilliance of

numerous achievements of the ancients and thus raises their descendants. But whoever, without Muzenmania, presents himself at the gates of poetry, believing that he will be a suitable poet thanks to “technè” skill), is a failed poet and the poetry of those who work rationally is below that of those who possess Muzenmania. - This is the great number of splendid achievements (and I still have them in stock) of the mania that springs from the gods.” -

This text is clear after the above. - Yet one appendix: Bakchulides of Ioulis (island of Keos) (+/- -510/-450), in his seal song for Hieron of Surakousai mentions the Charites (Lt: Gratiae, - according to Hesiod, Aglaia, Eufrosunè and Thalia are the feminine trio of grace and beauty), associated with the Muses, poetic Olympian figures, who assist him; yes, he calls himself the “glorious servant (therapon) of the golden diademed Ourania”. Again that servitude to gods.

**(a)4. - The eros or love mania. -**

The fourth mania proceeds under the inspiration of Aphrodite and eros. Among all forms of “enthusiasm” (enthousiasis), the best and consisting of the best constituents, both for those who have it in themselves and for those who have a share in it, is the eros, which,

1/ dwells with eyes on the beauty on this earth

2/ remembers the true beauty in the transcendental world, the “eternal beauty, uncreated and imperishable, not subject to increase or decrease, a beauty to which all things beautiful somehow share (methexis)” (according to Platon, *Sumposion* 29).

This ideal beauty gives pre-eminent value to human life, yes, it makes one forget things ‘below’ (on earth, that is): it is therefore a mania.-

“The presence of this enthusiasm, in the lover of beautiful things, makes him called ‘erastès’ lover (of boys)”.

To understand this, see pp. 55/56 supra (paiderastia). Platon says in *Sumposion*, 178c/d, “Would I (Faidros, who is speaking) then know a greater good than to be to the lad a faithful lover and to the lover a faithful lover? For that which guides a man throughout life to a beautiful goal, that which neither kinship nor honor nor wealth can take its place: nothing can do so much as eros”.

As an example is cited, “Would a lover, in watching his beloved, leave the order of battle (in the army) or throw away his weapons? No other look would so strike him and rather he would die more than once.”

In other words, the sense of honor in the eros towards the boy and, conversely, the sense of honor in the eros towards the protector, is so strong that, as a soldier for example, one would not dare to commit a cowardly act. But in this there is precisely a kind of no longer (sober, selfish) reasoning, but mania.” Abandoning his beloved, not assisting him in danger, - so bad is no one that he is not, carried by eros, coveted capable of noble deed, becomes equal to him whom nature made a hero.”

The Faidros mentions soldiers who, as pairs of paiderastia fought in the army: the “holy scissors” e.g. were the backbone of the Theban army; they consisted of love couples who fought side by side (e.g. Epameinondas, erastès, with Kefisodoros, his eromenos); they remained unconquered until -338 at Chaironeia, where Philip of Macedonia defeated them, pair by pair. Cf. Th. Vanggaard, *Phallos (Kult und Symbol in Europa)*, (Phallos (cult and symbol in Europe), Munich, 1971, pp. 39/40.

Platon is convinced that the eros prompted by the gods for the lover and the beloved means ‘ofeleia’, importance; yes, that they mean the ‘eutuchia megistè’, the greatest happiness (good fortune) in bestowing such a mania. - But the ambiguity of this was already a divisive issue for the minds: “The proof of this will seem implausible to the ‘deinoi’, the enlightened minds, but credible to the ‘sofoi’, the wise” (Faidros 245c). For one should have insight into the ‘fisis’ (nature of being) of the soul, both divine and human.

**(b) *The Platonic love.* -**

Having explained the frame of mind in which it can be understood, we would like to make one more remark: Platon makes a strict distinction between

- 1/ ‘enthusiastic’ (god-inspired) mania and
- 2/ purely human, which, for him, is either pathological (pathological) or immoral (immoral).

***‘Platonic love’ has two basic meanings:***

(i) endearing, reverent erotic relationship between two persons without any physical manifestation of a sexual nature coming between them; - that is the ongoing meaning (the nicely naive is striking, though);

(ii) that love between two persons which consists in loving the partner in order to achieve the high idea of ‘beauty’. As stated above (p. 118); one discovers in the beloved the ideal and ideal beauty as an idea, so that the beloved is, in fact, but ‘one occasion to experience the ‘light’ of eternal beauty - through e.g. ‘a beautiful young man; cf. G. Bastin, *Dictionnaire de la psychologie sexuelle*, Bruxelles, 1970, p. 302.

As, o.c., 53, noted, the two aforementioned variants of Platonic love are quite common in young people (e.g., in first kisses) or in idealistic natures. -- Within the framework of the second variant (for the sake of the idea) is situated the paiderastia, which, as Bastin, o.c., 288, rightly observes, possessed a very different socio-pedagogical nature than our “pederasty” (mutilation), which is its sophisticatedly deconsecrated form; it came down (for the Greeks and Platon) to,

- 1/ First of all to cultivate eroticism in its most ennobled forms,
- 2/ to pass on, from master to pupil, an ideal of physical and ethico-political beauty, in the context of philosophical research into the truth and the good,
- 3/ in which physical relations were not excluded.

In this sense, one better understands the Platonic maxim: “In conversation alone, the spark of truth leaps into the soul unexpectedly” (maxim which, a few years ago, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft ‘Weltgespräch’ (Herder, Freiburg), took as its motto, to break through the ‘dialogue - euphoria’ of our days). - **1.** Conversation (dialogue), **2.** friendship, **3.** paiderastia, **4.** doctrine of ideas, **5.** memory of previously beheld world of ideas, - all this, in the real Platonic eros, runs together.

To this Bastin passes, fundamentally, out of reaction against Platonism as dualism. Especially the younger Platon was convinced that only eros (in the aforementioned sense) could bring the ideas, out of its hiding place in the unconscious of the embodied man, and bring them to memory, i.e. make them conscious again. A whole depth psychology is involved here, but not so much the Freudian one, but a really Platonic, reincarnate one, which conceives the immortal soul as an unconscious depository of ideas (repressed by incarnation).

### ***Sublimation. -***

S. Freud, starting **1/** from the ‘sublime’ in the fine arts, on the one hand, and **2/** from ‘sublimation’ in chemistry (process in which something solid turns into gas), applies the notion of ‘sublimation’ to **a/** the sexual urge **b/** in so far as it, as it were forgetting itself, attaches itself to non-sexual objects and purposes; - intellectual work and artistic creation in particular are used as examples. -

One sees immediately that the philosophical eros of Platon is similar to this, yet from the framework of mania (which places **1/** prophetesses, **2/** mystics and **3/** poets next to **4/** eros-bearers).

“Platonic love is **1/** ‘a disciplinary, **2/** passionate commitment to all that is good and true and beautiful, and, through these things, to the goodness, truth, and beauty that makes all this so.” (D.N. Morgan, Love, p.5), with the author noting that this is in line with Hesiod’s eros. Yet the bodily so-called “lower” basis is the eros, which Platon spiritualizes (elevates, sublimates) where it could be grossly sensual with the Hellenes.

### ***Psychosomatics with Platon. -***

Since N. Dongier, *Névroses et troubles psychosomatiques*, (Neuroses and psychosomatic disorders), Bruxelles, 1966, one can,

**a/** generally, psychosomatics as that medicine which, refusing a certain dualism ‘soul/body’, takes for each illness and its treatment, the whole, psychic and somatic, as starting point, and

**b/** in particular, as that medicine which, in that perspective, concerns itself with those kinds of diseases that originate in the psychè and, if need be, express themselves organically-bodily. Well, G.R. Rager, *Hypnosis, sophrologie et médecine*, (Hypnosis, sophrology and medicine), Paris, 1973, pp. 181/182, draws attention to Charmides, in which word psychotherapy is discussed.

Charmides suffers from a severe headache; Socrates knows, in order to take care of him, a certain plant as medicine, to which one should add an epoidè, incantatio, magic word; he learned this method from a Thracian physician, disciple of king Zalmoxis (probably an invention of Platon), in the army.

The principle was: “The whole (i.e., the soul that controls the whole) is greater than the parts (i.e., e.g., the head, the eyes, etc.),” - incidentally, a principle that, with Platon, carries strong weight in his politics (there, the individual sometimes seems to perish in the totality of the polis). From the soul come all goods, but also all evils for the body and the whole man. -

In medical terms, one should not heal the eyes without curing the head, nor the head without curing the soul (which is the principle of unity). -- Now “the soul is taken care of by epoidai, incantationes, magic words (*Gharmides* 156/7)”. These consist of logoi kaloi, literally “beautiful words”, i.e. appropriate words said with reverence (therein different from the rhetorical-(merely) psychological or sociological words of the healing sophist Antiphon of Athens (p. 67 supra).

Only such words edify in the soul sophia, sapientia, wisdom. -- Methodically applied to Charmides:

(i) he ought to have volkonen confidence (fides fiducialis, faith confidence) in the logos kalos (the beautiful word);

(ii) should give something of himself to Socrates, that the latter may know precisely what his soul and the other data are (a kind of exchange from soul to soul).

Platon explains how the “terpnos logos”, the enchanting (pleasing, beneficent) word, or “logos kalos”, softly, monotonously and single-stringed pronounced, acts on the thumos, the deeper mind, principle of will and courage, and thus awakens sofrosunè, i.e. a state of calm, inner peace and mindfulness, - sign of higher, intellectual self-control. -

It is immediately clear that with Platon there is a well-defined but real psychosomatics, which, in all dualism (or rather: because of the duality ‘soul/body’), has the unity of soul and body as its starting point, also and among other things in disease diagnosis and treatment.

**Conclusion. -**

**a/** From soul (and world of ideas) to body and

**b/** From body (and earthly environment) the interaction is, notwithstanding a certain gap, unmistakable, towards the soul. In this sense, there is “psychosomatic dualism.

**(D) - Platonic theology, (119/119bis) especially astrotheology.**

Theology. - After the crisis of archaic-mythical religion, in Sophistics, Socrates, Platon and Aristotle restore God (and gods) as the fundamental principle(s), yet in the archaic-intellectual and -rational sense. The word ‘theologia’, as indicating the tracing of the fuis, nature, of God and gods, appears in *Politeia* II/ 379 a. Folk religion (archaic-mythic) had no ‘dogmata’; intellectual religion did. This didachè or doctrina aspect (doctrinal side) will come to full development later.

**a/** The cosmos is seen anthropocentrically by Socrates, Platon and Aristotle;

**b/** yet God is central to the human world. St.-Augustine will say (*De Civ. Dei* 8: 4), “Platon is the father of theology .....

### ***Astral theology (astrotheology) -***

Theory of God and/or gods focuses, with Platon, at one point, on the heavenly bodies. In view of their great importance, later, in Hellenistic times, a word about them. We already know - cf. p. 90 supra - that worship of heavenly bodies was a Hellenic tradition. Platon and, in his wake, Aristotle linked themselves to this tradition (cf. p. 146 infra).

**(A)** As Father Festugière, *La révélation d' Hermès Trismégiste*, (The revelation of Hermes Trismegistus), II (*Le Dieu cosmique*), (The Cosmic God), Paris, 1949, p. 210, says, the Faidros, the Timaios, and the Laws set forth celestial body worship:

**(i)** the heavens, especially the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, 'stars') are gods, not the Supreme Being, of course, but gods of second rank (o.c., XIV), within the beauty-laden order of the universe;

**(ii)** the soul, in the midst of the emergent and far-reaching things and expired, is a being(s) of higher rank, akin to the astral gods;

**(iii)** the ordered regularity of the celestial bodies' movements betrays number, the arithmos, numerus, - e.g. the succession of day and night in connection with the cycle of the sun, the phases of the moon, the relative positions of the celestial bodies among themselves,- all that is measurable, countable and comparable in numbers, so that arithmetic gives us access to the cosmos, d. i. the solid and beauty-laden order-(ning), of the heavens and its divine inhabitants, the "stars," which are visible gods.

**(B)** In the *Epinomis*, a work that forms an appendix to *The Laws*, Platon goes a step further: with this astronomical science he opposes the mythical religion of the poets (Homer, Hesiod, who conceived the behaviour of the gods as immoral), yes, even the political religion of the city-states citizens, who show little or no effective veneration for the physical religion of the 'stars'.

Platon foresees a legally regulated cult of the "stars" (which then becomes ipso facto a political religion, of course). Even more: he wants to get out of the crisis of the mythical and political religion by advocating this astral religion, as a philosophically and scientifically sound religion, as the, ultimately, only true and lasting one.

In the cosmos there are four spheres corresponding to the four elements: the world soul, supported by the vision of ideas, creates living beings which, thanks to the predominance of one of the elements, belong to the particular sphere of that element.

**(i)** The sphere of fire contains the "stars" (celestial bodies), visible gods;

**(ii)** the spheres of (aithèr and) air are the invisible daimones, intermediate beings between the gods and men;

**(iii)** the water sphere contains the class of sometimes invisible sometimes visible demigodal beings;

**(iv)** the terrestrial sphere contains the human beings.

Contact with these beings, according to Platon's *Epinomis*, is made through dreams (in sleep) or through communications (in revelations and oracle, whether in sick or in healthy condition. Xenophon's memorabilia Socrates and Aristotle's *Peri filosofias* mention this.

- *Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338 (a few days after the battle of Chaironeia)).* -

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 367, mentions Platon, Isokrates and Xenophon (of Athens: -430/-354) in the same breath as educators of classical Hellas. H.-I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948, after the innovative contribution of First Sophistics (pp. 81/98 discusses what he calls "the masters of the classical tradition":

(i) Platon, with his "esprit de géométrie" as a philosopher (pp. 99/120) and  
(ii) Isokrates with his "esprit de finesse" as a rhetor (pp. 121ss.). Marrou sees in both the founders of the two main types of education (o.c.. 135).

- As already stated p. 68 supra. Isokrates stems from Sophistics, but in his *On the Sophists* it appears how he severely criticizes the subversion of the high calling of sophists, wisdom teachers, in the older, venerable sense. This high calling he considered his own:

(i) belletrism he did not want, though he spoke and wrote with strict care, even in the expression of thought;

(ii) he did not want eristics either, for that he was too much of an educator;

(iii) high and strict philosophical reflection, as with Platon, he avoided as too inaccessible for the average man and intellectual;

(iv) jurisprudential eloquence was not his actual intention: for that his rhetoric was too strictly political;

(v) political education in the full sense, - that was his intention; he had a general Hellenic paideia in mind that put an end to the feuds between the great poleis: he does not hesitate, already in -346, to appeal to Philip of Macedonia to achieve peace and unity of all Hellenes (he had the good fortune to survive Chaironeia for a few days to congratulate Philip).

### **Conclusion:**

Isokrates is a sophist in the meliorative sense. Therefore, rhetoric: "Rhetoric is inherently a means of political expediency, but it becomes the bearer of a political education only through its ability to set out purposes for politics.

This insight grew in Isokrates in the confrontation with philosophy. For, what attacks Platonic criticism most sharply is the moral indifference of rhetoric and its pure formalism, which forged from it "a pure tool in the unscrupulous struggle of public life. Therefore philosophy, in Platon's eyes is the only true rhetoric. (cf. pp. 96/97 supra).

Isokrates sees that the advantage of philosophy lies in the possession of a supreme goal." (W. Jaeger, *Paideia* III, 131/132). Therefore, Isokrates gave his rhetorical sophistry "a pure political purpose that was edifying. As Marrou says, Isokrates, not Platon, became, for the broad intellectual circles, the educator par excellence of Hellas and all antiquity. In his paideia, however, philosophy is subordinate to rhetoric: the rhetor should know all kinds of things, including philosophy. A kind of general development, therefore, typified Isokrates' rhetorical sophist.

### ***Aristotle and the oldest Peripatetism.-***

Aristotéles (Lt: Aristotle) of Stageira (-384/-322), or the Stagirite, is the son of Nikomachos, the body physician of King Amuntas of Makedonia (the father of King Philip, himself father of Alexandros the Great). With that we are in Thrace. He was orphaned prematurely and taken in by Proxenos, ‘a friend of the family at Atarneus (Musia; Lt: Mysia, in Anatolia).

In -367 he is seventeen and starts studying in Athens with Platon, who is sixty by then: it is no longer the young Platon (of the philosophical eros which awakens the memory of the ideas once considered), but the older one who, returning to Socratic sobriety, analyzes the ideas as a network, yes, going far beyond the Socratic problems, in particular in the Pythagorean sense, designs a universe image, - without however rejecting his youthful thoughts.

Thus Aristotle first learns concept analysis at the Academy. However, especially the *Filebos* with the aim of elaborating philosophy as mathematism of the fisis (pp. 107/109 supra) or the *Parmenides* with the aim of subjecting the ideas to a thorough examination (pp. 93/94) have impressed and formed the young, not mystically inclined Aristotle who thereby pursued ‘thinking’ and ‘thinking analysis’ of the fisis of the Milesias as the highest happiness.

### ***-- Theoria; - speculatio, contemplation. -***

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 11/12, says that the Hellenes developed as their “greatest miracle” philosophy, i.e., that attention to things, in becoming and decaying, which is the clear view of the permanent structure in arising, developing and decaying, both in nature and in the human world. This theoria, this contemplative dwelling on the orderly in becoming and passing away, is, according to Jaeger,

**a/** intellectual and rational,

**b/** but also contemplative and, in this sense, related to artistic creation and expression. The other peoples have produced great minds, but Hellas has produced contemplative minds that reveal the lawfulness in the fisis and its parts. Well, in this both Platon and Aristotle, for all the difference of temperament, are alike.

**c/** Yes, they unite, as *Paideia* I, 151; 402, says, theoria and educative concern: it concerns them through and through agological theoria. Hence their distinction, indeed separation from:

**1/** dwelling on things ‘in themselves’ (theoretically) and

**2/** examining and intending the usefulness of contents of thoughts and things. Platon, for example, considers the righteous life “in itself” in order, afterwards, in isolation, to consider the righteous life “in its consequences”; likewise he considers the kinds of constitutions (in themselves and as causes of reward, or punishment); he also considers rhetoric in this way (its “truth” set against its usefulness) - cf. A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, S. 83, 111, 156 - This separation prevents, fundamentally, the connection of the two, 1/ objective truth 2/ and practical-technical utility, of Peirce’s pragmatism

Kl. Oehler, ed., *Ch.S. Peirce, Ueber die Klarheit der Gedanken*, (Ch.S. Peirce, On the Clarity of Thought), Frankfurt a. M., 1968, says that Peirce (1839/1914) called his pragmatism “the true idealism.”

This means two things:

(i) the logical truth which is the agreement of (our) thoughts with the reality that is knowable (epistemological idealism);

(ii) the physical (sometimes called ontological) truth which is the agreement of reality with (our or God’s or whoever’s) thoughts (metaphysical idealism). Cf. o.c., 12/14.

A third form of truth can be added - as O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, sees very well :

(iii) the ethical-political, yes, the technical truth, which is the conformity of every behavior (moral act, technically-sound operation) with its own norm or thought content as its principle or rule, - the basis of steering science. Well:

a/ the all too pure conception of theoria, with Platon, has the effect of underestimating the effect, reward or punishment, utility or useless salvation or calamity, of the idea, insofar as it is already applied actingly (the altruism being pushed through, to avoid the sophistical profiteering like the plague):

b/ And yet:”

1/ the constant testing of the doctrine of ideas, as well as

2/ the constant agological (meaning ethics and politics as education) effort, in Platon’s case, with positive or negative results, proves that pragmatism was latent in it, yet repressed, yes, deliberately suppressed, out of reaction against vulgar pragmatism (“The end justifies the means”).

This is the tragedy of Hellenic philosophy at its zenith, with Platon and also with Aristotle: they have remained rigid, conservative and purely theoretical, instead of experimental in the sense of C.S. Peirce, viz. 1/ conceiving ideas 2/ but i. instead of systematizing them immediately, separated from reality, as a means of education, testing them against reality in order to know whether reality in itself corresponds to these conceived ideas or notions. That only is true idealism, as Peirce, gropingly, saw very well.

See also W. B. Gallie, *Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, 196 as well as J. Royce, *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1961 (1912-1), where on p. 50 it says: “In this sense the act of defining, at least of some norms or principles of classification, is an act whose logical value is not only pragmatic (i.e., oriented toward a result) but also absolute.”

In other words, for all the arbitrariness of purpose and will to achieve a result, there is, in the universe and in man who wills, an order which, independent of him, compels him to succeed or fail as he acts in accordance with reality or not. -

Plato, however convinced he was, had to conclude that “the young men, once they have tasted the dialectic, abuse it or make a game out of it and use it to argue incessantly” (*Politeia* 7: 539b), i.e. the reverse of what he did, yet with disastrous results where he failed at most because of the al to

theoretical approach or the unwillingness of those with whom, as e.g. in Surakousai, he only seemingly shared “the same ethical-political creed” (*Seventh Letter*, introduction), yet by whom he was simply sophistically deceived.

One thinks of the harrowing contents of that Seventh Letter. “I came to Italy and Sicily with this thought in mind (i.e., as a result of a divine decree to devote myself thoroughly to philosophy in its practical effects) when I went there for the first time. However, what displeased me here again, at my first appearance, to the highest degree, was the ‘life of happiness’ called for there (note: - one thinks of today’s (“la dolce vita”), which consists of the Italian and Sicilian revelry, in the habit of having two sumptuous meals during the day, of lying in bed at night and, without fail, of practicing the eroticism associated with such a life.

For no man under heaven is capable, by such morals, if he lives in them from childhood, of growing into a thinking and wise man, still less will it occur to such a person to aspire to the skill of living a sensible and moderate life under any point of view. (...) Furthermore, no polis, even with the best constitution, can attain the happiness of internal peace, if its citizens, on the one hand, believe they have to spend everything in mindless waste, if, on the other hand, they consider it normal not to make any physical or mental effort, except to show themselves at lascivious feasts of food and drink and in the bed of lust.

Such poleisians fall now under absolute turannos, then again under the rule of the money aristocracy or even under the rule of the rabble; they never come out of such changes of power; their rulers cannot even hear the name “constitution,” which, on the basis of general law and equality in the law, guarantees freedom.

If the critics of idealism who, today, are so entrenched in Platon and the high theory of ideas, would carefully consider the “real” situations with which the so-called “floating, unreal” Platon is confronted, then perhaps - it is not even certain - they would be a little less inclined to blow their “realistic” horns.

Reason: they themselves would not even take up the fight with such a ‘realistic’ morality, simply for lack of better life base. How could the Italian and Sicilian ‘system’ (the so-called established power of the time) ever change without an idealistic life reversal in some Socratic-Platonic-Aristotelian style?

In other words, our criticism of the mere “theoria” only applies to the connection between idea (concept, form), on the one hand, and, on the other, the thought experiment based on idea, but not to the high ethical-political educational institution. This has been made clear once and for all.

E.R. Lehmann - Leander, *Aristotle, Analytiker der Wirklichkeit*, (Aristotle, analyst of reality), Wiesbaden / Berlin, s.d., S. 20, says: “(...) To the impermanence of life - still becoming and perishing of Milesians - the share in the eternal by thinking is opposed: thinking makes the ‘naturally unhappy life’ worth living; Yes, it is something so beautiful to be able to think, ‘that man, in comparison with the other living beings seems to be ‘a god.’”

The author is talking about a youthwork, the *Protrentikos*, by Aristotle, when he was still fully a Platonist. In it, the young Aristotle says: “(...) There is, for man, nothing divine and blissful, except that which, alone, is worthwhile, namely, that which is in us of power of thought and reason. For, among all that we have, this alone seems to be imperishable and divine. Although our life is therefore by nature (*fusei*) unhappy and heavy, it is nevertheless, in view of our ability to share in such power, so beautifully arranged that man, compared to the other living creatures, seems to be a god. For our spirit is god - whoever said this, Hermodimos or Anaxagoras - and the mortal also possesses a part of god.

**Consequence:** one should either practice philosophy or say goodbye to life and go, since everything else is nullities and farces.” (o.c., 21).-

“What Aristotle actually paints is his own attitude, that of ‘a scientific philosopher, to whom, apart from the pursuit of knowledge, no other good applies. Yes, he very definitely rejects the “practical application” of knowledge; as the following quotation shows: “To conclude that, from every knowledge, something else arises, in that it allows itself to be used as useful, is possible only for those who do not have the slightest idea of how great is the distinction between ‘the good’ and ‘the necessary’; for this distinction is very great.” (o.c., 22).

Aristotle’s *Protrentikos* then explains that “good” is that which is wanted for its own sake, even if nothing else emerges in the process, and that “necessary” (and “co-cause”) is that which one values for the sake of something else and without which one cannot live.

“It is therefore ridiculous at all costs of all things to seek a utility that lies outside the thing itself, and to ask, ‘What purpose does it bring us?’ and ‘To what end can one need it?’ For, as has been said, such a man has in fact nothing in common with the one who knows what is clean and good, nor with the one who can distinguish cause from co-cause. That what we are saying here is the very truth, will perhaps be understood if, for example, we move in thought to the islands of the blessed: for there is no need and from nothing one draws benefit: only thinking and beholding remain, - that form of life viz. of which we now assert that it is that of the free man.” (O.c., 22/23).

Apart from 1/ the Orphic aversion to the bodily-earthly side of life and, 2/ the Platonizing attitude towards it (as a ‘shadow world’),

which, both, are later replaced in Aristotle by a truly Milesian urge for research which, in all the works of the fisis, saw something miraculous, the thinking attitude of Aristotle has remained the same. -- R. Böhm, *Kritik der Grundlagen des Zeitalters*, (Critique of the foundations of the age), The Hague, 1974 holds, with regard to Aristotle's conception of 'knowing(schap)', the following proposition:

- (i) disinterested knowing, for its own sake, is the best way to serve humanity;
- (ii) argument: thereby man elevates himself to a godlike existence;
- (iii) Böhm's criticism: such a knowing is necessarily an "objective knowing;" "objective" here means "directed to and bound, yes, subject to the non-human fisis in its lawfulness and ordering," consequence: man reduces himself precisely thereby to a "subject;" "subject" here means "subordinate, subject, dominated" (i.e. to non-human lawfulness, "nature");
- (iv) argument: Western history, especially modern history, has shown us that such 'objective' knowing, through modern science and its technical application, especially to the humane world, has led to today's 'technocracy' which produces for the sake of production itself, without taking human needs into account (cf. Marx's essence determination of capitalism); - leading to 'inefficient - inhuman societies'.

**R. Böhm:**

1/ is mere 'beholding' (= theoretical knowing) necessarily 'subject' knowing, viz. to non-human nature, enslavement (manifesting itself in our technocratic capitalism). Immediately Böhm 2/ is radically (Nietzschean) allergic to every notion of deification, in the name of the thesis: "human finitude (i.e. non-godliness) is creative, i.e. it is the creative basis of all our possibilities" Consequence: one does not have to look for those possibilities in a higher, godlike human existence, because this road runs dead in suffocating Western civilization. -- It goes without saying that Böhm's two main propositions are unproven:

(i) the connection between Aristotle's *theoria* and *pragmateia* (*speculatio*) and our technocracy of today is much more complicated than Böhm simplistically reasoning it through.

(ii) Böhm caricatures godlike existence into what it is not, in that he is, simply, unconsciously, allergic to the(i)osis, *deificatio*, *deification*, and cannot, from his unconsciousness, even approach them with the necessary benevolence: precisely because of this, he inverts 'finitude' into (disguised) 'infinity' which creates all possibilities. -

In other words, what he puts out as godlike existence, he brings back in as (all possibility-creating) finitude, as if with this change of language ('godlike' becomes "finitude as creating") everything is ready and waiting.

Böhm can do this, but then he forgets that the realities remain the same through the words indicated: every finite knowing, human or whatever, exceeds itself but by more than what it is, infinity.

-- In -348/7 Platon dies; Speusippos becomes leader of the Academy. Aristotle leaves for Assos (Anatolia): with Xenokrates, his fellow student at the Academy, he founds his own school there. Assos had been given as a gift by Atarneus' king Hermeias to the two Platonists Erastès and Koriskos: thus there was a favorable atmosphere.

There Aristotle begins his zoological research and designs his own philosophical system that does not see ideas before, above and after the fusions and processes (the 'chorismos' or dualism), but in the fusions themselves and as morphe, forma, form.

At Assos he married Puthias, niece and adopted daughter of Hermeias of Atarneus, the prince of the region. In -343 he leaves for Mutilene (Lesbos). There King Philip of Macedonia (actually Philip II, King -359/-336), the founder of Macedonia as an empire, calls Aristotle to raise his son, Alexandros III, the Great (-356/-323).

Something similar had been done by Platon, when he followed Dion to Surakousai at the time to assist Dionusios as a counselor. Aristotle thus departs -343 to Pella at court. Hellas itself was divided vis-à-vis Macedonia:

(i) Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322), the most famous rhetor of antiquity, like Platon a convinced polis advocate, sees in Philip 'a deadly danger to the Hellenic freedom of the polis;

(ii) Isokrates of Athens (see p. 123 above) as well as Aristotle, though no friend of Isokrates (because of his unwise allure?), see in the same Philip the savior from discord of the polis and the fighter of the Persian danger that reached Anatolia. Which does not prevent both from rejecting the deification of the prince of the Macedonian figures:

(1) Fillipos e.g. rejected Alexandros' mother Olumpias, married Kleopatra at Aigai and, at that wedding, had his own image carried in the procession among the twelve statues of the Olympian gods.

(2) Alexandros,

(3) his successors, the Diadochoi, i.e. the six principal army chiefs after him who divided his empire

(4) the Roman emperors, later, will deny the Hellenic culture on that point (the divine ruler), reinforced in it by Eastern ways of thinking. -- In -336 Philip dies; in -334 Alexandros with an army of about 40,000 men, crosses the Hellespont to liberate the Hellenic cities of Anatolia from the Persians to have, so much later, at the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indus, the eastern border of his empire, a boundary stone ('an altar like) chiseled with the inscription:

"To Herakles and the Samothrace Kabeiroi". - It should be noted that the Kabeiroi, Cabiri, the Kabirs, were chthonic gods, whom the Hellenes also called 'Megaloi theoi', the great gods, or still, the Samothrakian gods (Axiokerses and his son Kadmilos; Axiokersa and Axiëros, both goddesses). Samothrakè was the center and phallic rites as well as seafaring protection and asylum were attached to the Kabirs in their mysteries. They were worshipped in Makedonia. They are non-Hellenic.

They were considered a legacy of the pre-Hellenic Pelasgians. They are related to Demeter and Dionysos. Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385) cf. p. 75-, in his *Peace*, hints that, long before, there were initiates in the Samothracian Mysteries at Athens and Demosthenes also alludes to this.

According to Plutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), forerunner of Neo-Platonism and Hellenistic theosophical mysticism, King Philip and also Olympias, the later queen, were initiated into the Samothracean Mysteries as children. Aristotle himself was born at Stageira, "a city opposite Samothrace." "In Aristotle's philosophy, fertility, procreation, creation, come to the fore. No doubt he and Alexander held conversations about the Samothracian gods." Thus P. van Schilfhaarde, *Aristotle*, The Hague, 1965, p. 11.

So that, in addition to Orphism, the Samothracian mysteries also left one mark on the great thinker. Does not W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, 208, say that we find "primordial mythology" at the very core of Aristotle's thought: thus the "love" of things for the unmoved mover (who is God). For the umpteenth time we encounter prelogical, the pre-wisdom approaches in the so logical and theoretical-speculative thinking of Hellas! One has, **1/** out of so-called 'rational' considerations, concealed this too much and, what is more, **2/** based it too much on Eastern influences.

#### **-- Alexandros**

He took a whole staff of Hellenic scientists and historians with him on his conquest of the East. Aristotle reaped the results of this. This was all the more so because the ruler continually provided him with rich resources for his research, especially in the natural sciences: the animal parks, bird cages and fish ponds of the ruler were available to him.

This proves that the Macedonians, even though they were not Hellenes, still valued Hellenic culture highly. In -335 Aristotle rents at Athens, near a small forest that was dedicated to Apollon Lukeios and the Muses, an empty gymnasium. Such a place was used for sports and physical exercises, such as ball games, horse races, running, wrestling; the buildings contained dressing rooms, baths, games rooms, wrestling halls as well as, covered colonnades (peripatoi). Hence the name "peripatetic" for Aristotelian. For there Aristotle founded the Lykeion, lyceum, which, in Platon's style, was a closed order, i.e. a community with fixed rules of life, common meals and monthly symposion (conversation with celebration).

The Pythagoreans had already practiced such a thing. Scientific research on a large scale in the areas of polis institutions, botany, zoology, oreology, medicine (his father was an Asklepiad), music, history (of philosophy); the establishment of a library (manuscripts, maps), biological museum, such were the activities of the Lykeion.

The libraries of the Hellenistic schools were conceived according to that model.

**- King Hermeias of Atarneus**

The latter supported Pilippos, but he was ambushed by the Persian monarch. During the torture he asked for a final mercy, to be allowed to send a message to the Academicians whom he knew as follows: "Report to my friends and comrades that I have done nothing unworthy of philosophy or untenable."

Aristotle was deeply impressed by his Socrates-like friend; he pens the following humnos: "Thou, difficult by the human race to attain virtue, most beautiful goal of life! For love of thee, lovely maiden, even to tolerate death and continually exhausting ailments, is considered a precious share in Hellas. For such an imperishable fruit thou bearest for that spirit which is nobler than gold, nobler also than nobility or sleep with weakened lustre. For love of thee Heracles and the sons of Leda, descended from Zeus; accomplishing heroic deeds, they lusted after strength. Desire for thee drove Achilles and Ajas into Hades' dwelling. For love of thy sweet form the descendant of Atarneus left the sun's rays. Song should celebrate his heroism; the Muses should call him 'immortal,' the daughters of Mnemosune, who praise the reverence of Zeus, the guest's devotee, and honor faithful friendship."

For thirteen years Aristotle, from whom this deeply human document stems, headed the lukeion, yet Athens, after the death of Alexandros, -323, under the pressure of the antimacedonian party, put him on trial "for immorality," (like Socrates), relying among other things on the humnos.

Aristotle is said to have said that he would not let the Athenians offend philosophically a second time (remember Socrates' death) and went to Chalkis (Euboia), where his family owned an estate. Quickly he died there in -322, where his mother was born. In his will he made careful arrangements for his next of kin and ... also slaves. Which sheds a humane light on the "slaveholding" of Hellas.

In that same year Demosthenes also died. The year before, Alexandros the Great, his pupil, had died, leaving behind an empire that reached as far as the Indus and included Egypt. A new era could begin, the Hellenistic one. Platon, his teacher, had been dead for twenty-five years: how quickly and thoroughly the world had changed in that short time.

**-- Aristotelianism. -**

According to E. R. Lehmann - Leander, *Aristotle*, s.d., S. 30, Aristotle focused on two main problems:

- (i) genetics, hèn gennètikè, the becoming of things, -typically Milesian
- (ii) hylemorphism, i.e. the dichotomy 'substance (hulè, materia) / form (morfè, forma)' that characterizes the fusis. -

We are going to make the first point visible by means of Aristotle's problem, i.e. the way in which he draws up a status quaestionis, a state of affairs, when he answers a question.

The second we will briefly outline.

-- (I) *The gen(n)etic principle.*

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, III, 1034, says that the ideal (ideal) principles, - number forms, ideas, forms, therein similar to the principle of life in organisms, are to be conceived as immanent, i.e. working from within, principles. This is what he calls "organic explanation of the world," thus denoting the organic side of idealism, which was seen and expressed especially by Aristotle. Very early on this was seen in pre-Socratic philosophy:

(i) hylozoism (matter, as a whole (universal) or as a part (particular), is sensed as a living organism);

(ii) Herakliteism (matter, through fire and Logos in it, is 'dynamic', i.e. moving of its own accord; - one sees the very great difference from pure mechanism, in which inertia, in.ertia, prevails),

(iii) moderate mechanism (Empedokles, Anaxagoras mixing mechanical inertia with hylozoic dynamics), -- all three anticipate Aristotle's gennetic view, which we now clarify by means of his way of drawing up a problem, i.e., a question file, and at once a theme, i.e., a subject description.

- (I) a. *The general structure.* -

There is an informative aspect to Aristotle's doxography or description of opinions and a critical or managerial aspect.

a1/ He attaches great importance to what predecessors and contemporaries think about a theme: ta indoxa, opinionones, the existing past and present opinions of others, are for him always the beginning of research; at once his sense of tradition is clear, however personally inquisitive and corrective he may be; in other words he is not a neologist or a newcomer, who thinks that all the others had it wrong (Platon did something like that).

But he is also true to his basic insight here: the methodos gennètikè, via et ratio genetica, the gen(n)etic method, is one application of the fact that, in the fuis, everything germinates and seeds, grows and blossoms, and this in a purposeful movement, - for the 'eros' (love) to the unmoved mover who stands in and behind all change, immediately directs the seed or germ to a theme, e.g. the constitution of a polity, the law of the land, the law of the land, the law of the people. v. the constitution of a polis, is like a seed: it arises, develops through all kinds of movements, also through deviations, thus *Politika* 2, 1273a (= 5:5),

a/ where it is said that most of the points that can be criticized as par.ek.baseis, deviations, deviations, are common to all the constitutional systems he had discussed until then;

b/ the norma, canon, rule, in which case it is called hupothesis tès aristokratias kai tès politeias, the basic principle of the (mixed aristocracy or politeia (i.e. here 'mixed constitution', which consists of 1/ pure aristocracy (merit), 2/ Oligarchy (wealth) and 3/ democracy (number) in mixture state). Vrl. J. Aubonnet, *Aristote, Politique*, Paris, 1960, pp. 89 (text), 168 (commentary).

So that, in summary, three moments (i.e. movement aspects) emerge:

(i) the hypothesis, the basic principle (premise,-better still: ‘undergirding’), which is ‘rule’, canon;

(ii) the par.ek.basis, literally: ‘the step beside and away from’, the deviation from the hypothesis or regulating being;

(iii) the ep.an.orthosis, correctio, recovery; - as O. Willmann notes, also: rhuthmosis (from rhuthmoo; I provide ‘a regular movement; // rhuthmizo, which means the same thing), indicating (recovered) right direction. This is the steering aspect of Aristotle’s genetics.

As J. Aubonnet, o.c., p. 107, observes, this genetic view is at the same time, analytical, i.e., dissecting the suntheton, the whole, in its a.suntheta, its constituents or elements: “If someone watches how things grow (fuomena) from their origin (archè), he considers them in the best way, as in the other cases, also in this case (i.e., in the case of the polis).” (*Politica* 1252a (2: 1)).

Aristotle begins, indeed, with the household, which has in mind the ethical ordering of three couples,

(i) the lord/slave relationship; (ii) the male/female relationship and (iii) the parent/child relationship, - ‘a triad that seems to date from Socrates and which Platon retook, as well as the Kuniokers (especially Diogenes of Sinope).

Platon also proceeded in this way; and yet: there is a difference. Aristotle re-instituted the Platonism of his master: “It is characteristic of philosophy that it occupies itself with that which “has been sought from of old and now and always” (Net 1028b).

1/ But this does not mean that, with that, for Aristotle, the truth present in the beginning and the origin is still the whole truth, to be, afterwards, in the course of philosophy, since the taking over of the mythical tradition by the first philosophers and on the way from them to philosophy, now more and more lost, as Platon considers it, when he calls the ancients those who were “stronger” than we are and “dwelt nearer to the gods” (Filebos 16c):

2/ On the other hand, for Aristotle, the continuity of spirit in that the old and initial only comes to its fruition in progress.” (J. Ritter, ‘Politik’ und ‘Ethik’ in der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles, (Politics’ and ‘ethics’ in Aristotle’s practical philosophy), in O. Pöggeler, ed., *Hermeneutische Philosophie*, Munich, 1972, 2. 163/164).

“Practical philosophy turns out to be philosophy of the end, not of the origin and beginning.” (o.c., 166). The reason is: “Nature is telos, finis, purpose(end). For, howsoever every being is after its origin (genesis) has come to an end, such, we assert, is the nature (fisis) of every being, so e.g. of ‘a man, ‘a horse, ‘a house.” Thus Aristotle.

Hegel recalls this when he regards “das Resultat”, the result of becoming, as decisive. This means that the (sophist) belief in progress is stronger with Aristotle than with Plato.

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id*, I, 461, says: "If Puthagoras undertook the intellectual formulation of the ancient doctrine concerning measure, number and harmony as the principle of things, - if Platon speculatively elaborated the doctrine concerning the world seals, - then Aristotle gave the intuition concerning the transcendental seeds and germs of beings, its philosophical translation and, along there, his doctrine of principles is in contact with archaic thought, - something that is no less directional for it than the connection to gene equally archaic theologems (d. i. insights of theologians) for its predecessors." -

In other words, if Aristotle takes such care in drawing up a state of affairs each time he takes up a theme, he does so as if that theme in his truth (that piece of truth, e.g. a solid constitution) were a seed that comes into being, grows, develops and reaches maturity. Thereby it is so that only then, in the end, one knows which is the right fuis or nature (way of being) of that theme in its truth.

-- (I)b. *Two examples.*

- Shall we now proceed to give the two great doctrines of Aristotelianism according to that genetic method.

-- (I)b1. *The problem of "being / becoming". -*

We know from the foregoing the aporia (the intellectual inhibition) which has weighed on philosophy since Parmenides and Herakleitos: before the conceptualism of the Hellenes, before Socrates already, "being" and "becoming" seemed to be contradictory (either something becomes (and, by reversal, decays) or is something, but not both at the same time), and this interlocked with "one" (in all senses: 1/ in number (unique) 2/ in kind (singular, uniform); 3/ in coherence (one system)) and 'many' (also in various meanings): either something is one and not many or vice versa, though not simultaneously one and many.

-- (I)b1a. *Parmenides,*

Parmenides, the first purely abstract thinker, conceives of 'being' as un.finite, un.become and un.perishable, however so strictly that the manifest finiteness, becoming and demise that the fuis gives us to see even as not yet being or as no longer being, becomes only apparent. "Being 'is' or it 'is' not," he says.

With this, once and for all, the decision has been made:

1/ the one way (i.e., of arising/decaying being) is, as unthinkable and unsayable, to be rejected; it is not the true way;

2/ the other however is to be chosen as the only right one. How therefore would 'being' be (only) in the future? How would it ever have come into being? For if it ever became, it does not 'exist'; however, it also does not 'exist' if it were ever in the future. Thus it is finished with becoming and is finished with perishing." (Fr. 8).-

Herakleitos says: "One and the same thing shows itself, in things, as living and dead, as waking and asleep, as young and old. For this, after its reversal, that and that, changed again, this." The opposites coincide, meta.morf.

As E. Lehmann-Leander, o.c. 33/35, says, one cannot comprehensively capture singular being, the single or individual being, starting from one of these two views.

-- (I)b1b. *The successors of Parmenides and Herakleitos*

These, we have seen higher up, struggled, mathematically and physically - ethically, with the dilemma of "being/being - perishing".

For Aristotle this dilemma remains unresolved, even in the two extreme solutions before him, that of Demokritos, the materialist, and that of Platon, the immaterialist. -

Atomistics (Leukippos, Demokritos) emphasizes the becoming; while it atomizes and mechanizes the being: with this system of concepts it grasped only the dead and inert (slow) substance and its idle changes from the outside, but the rest of the fuis escaped from it and remained unexplained. -

Platon rather emphasized 'being', while situating that 'being' in the world of ideas, yet rather neglecting the material side of the fuis, except in later life, when, in the *Timaios*, he constructs 'a physical, strongly Pythagorean-mathematical, to create in the eternal substance (indeterminacy) 'cosmos', order, the demiourgos, the world-maker, - who is a personification of the Supreme Idea, the Good, as ordering power, - creates the world-soul (analogous to hylozoism), from a mixture of 'tauton', the identical (the same) and the 'heteron', the other (not-similar),

a/ to conjure up such a picture of the high world of ideas in the sphere of becoming and perishing.

b/ "Platon derives the coherence of natural philosophy with the ethical-political insights from the idea that man (or more correctly: the man) is the constituent of the polis, by attempting to paint the genesis of the world up to the emergence of man. Here, too, the ethical-political viewpoint remains decisive. The whole world-building concerns Platon only, in the last instance, for the sake of its highest operation, for the sake of man and of the polis he has founded." (A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 130).

In other words, a/ dualism (of world of ideas and world of images) and b/ teleology (purposefulness of the universe towards man in his polis) seem to Platon to be the solutions. -although with Platon all this remains too alien to life and reality to be fully satisfactory for an Aristotle, who is much more lenient towards a Demokritos e.g. and the experiential world of the Milesians.

-- (I)b1c. *Aristotle's solution.*

This is twofold: (i) logical and (ii) ontological (physical-ethical).

-Ad (i) *Logical:*

Parmenides oscillates between two extremes, the being that is, exclusive, and the non-being that is, just, nothing unless semblance (z w z (Red.: last z with horizontal dash above it: the negate of z)) - dilemmatic;

Herakleitos also shuttles between two extremes, but of a qualitative nature (life/death; wake/sleep; young/old) and mutually opposed; these are situated in the same being (this becomes that, i.e. its opposite)

(this ^ that), - metamorphic. Aristotle will introduce the so-called modal logic: this works not with two values (here understood are logical values like e.g. “necessary” and “necessary-not”, in symbolic language “n and n-”, or this and not-this (= that), in symbolic language: “a and a (negate)”, but with three main values: 1/ necessary, 2/ not-necessary (possible) and 3/ necessary-not (impossible).

Parmenides knows only two values  $z = n$  and  $z$  (negate)  $n-$ , while Herakleitos also knows only two values, namely  $n$  and  $n-$ , but these are metamorphic instead of dilemmatic (something is simultaneously, in its depth,  $n$  and  $n-$ ,  $n$  and  $n$  (negate),  $a$  and  $a$  (negate))

**Ad (ii) physical-ethical:**

“The Parmenidean ontology knows only ‘being’ as ‘presence’, enduring presence; the Aristotelian ontology accomplishes against it the modal distinction “‘dunamis/energeia’, and, at once, the first groping explanation of the phenomenon of ‘historical time’ “. Thus O.Becker, *Zur Logik der Modalitäten*, (On the logic of modalities), in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, herausgegeben von E. Husserl, Halle, 1930, S. 540. See also J. Stallmach, *Dynamis und Energeia (Untersuchungen am Werk des Aristoteles zur Problemgeschichte von ‘Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit’*, (Dynamis and Energeia (Investigations on the Work of Aristotle on the Problem History of ‘Possibility and Reality’), Meisenheim am Glan, 1959, who emphasizes that the ‘dunamis/energeia’ doctrine is the cornerstone of scholastic-medieval philosophy, which to this day, lives on in the Thomism honored by the Roman Catholic Church (from S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274) as the official ecclesiastical philosophy.

He criticizes his teacher Nicolai Hartmann (1882/1950), who reintroduced the modalities “real and possible” and necessary in the theory of being but in a Megarian, purely logical sense (see supra p. 87); at the same time he emphasizes that the energeia, i.e. at the same time he emphasizes that the energeia, i.e. the fully realized reality, always has priority over the dunamis, i.e. the disposition to reality, - which appears in the (meta)physical or theologica of Aristotle, i.e. there is necessarily one first reality which makes all the possible possible (a merely possible universe never comes off the ground).

It goes without saying that the couple “real/possible”, whether or not supplemented with “necessary/necessary-not”, plays a leading role:

1/ both in the pragmatism of C.S. Peirce and its offshoots (e.g. ordinary pragmatism (W.James, J.Dewey), operationalism) - the abduction which, starting from a hypothesis, verifies it in an experiment, in a laborious way, for its truth, presupposes “a world in the making”, a world which is “in the making” through human effort -

2/ as in existentialism (Heidegger’s *Möglichkeit als Existenzial* (possibility of being as a human characteristic - cf. *Sein und Zeit I*, 143/144) man has history, yet he also makes it (through his “design” he exceeds his “givenness”) - and

3/ Marxism (“The philosophers have merely interpreted the world differently; the point, however, is to change it”, cf.

K. Marx in his *Thesen über Feuerbach*, (Theses about Feuerbach), 11: the ‘change’ takes place in the praxis; i.e. the intervention which man, designing himself, carries out in society).

However, just as clearly, if not more clearly, the couple “real/possible” is expressed in the “Human, Potential Movement”, in the U.S.A. getting off the ground +/- 1946 (training group), +/- 1955 (Esalen) and +/- 1958 (Synanon); Group dynamics, bio-energy, gestalt therapy, in the climate of the counter culture (early seventies) with its communes, drug culture, music culture and political youth movement, merge into one comprehensive “Movement of Human Possibilities” to further flourish in a/ schools for consciousness expansion, b/ groups for initiatory either religious or extraterrestrial possibilities or for ‘cosmic consciousness’, in our days.

Cf. J.-M. Schiff, *La ruée vers l’âme*, (The rush to the soul), in *Question de spiritualité, tradition, littérature* (Paris), No. 10 (Janv./fev. 1976); R.W. Siroka, ed., *Sensitivity Training*, Rotterdam, 1972; H. Cohen, *De vrije mens*, Brasschaat / ‘s-Gravenhage, 1975; J. Mousseau / P.-F. Moreau, *L’ inconscient de Freud aux techniques de groupe*, (The unconscious from Freud to group techniques), Paris, 1976. It is clear: the title “potential” and “human possibilities” betrays the dynamis which, in man, from the pre- and transrational, is activated so that man “realizes” himself, to speak with A. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 1954 (humanistic psychology; cf. also supra p. 79).

A leading role is also played by the “real/possible” couple in St. Lupasco’s current philosophy of natural science. Thus, in his *La tragedie de l’ énergie (Philosophie et sciences du XXe siècle)*, Tournai, 1970, p. 49: “Energy obeys inner necessities. Nothing is possible without a possibility which is in fact a disposition (potentialité), i.e. a possibility which carries within itself the possible realization (actualization); nothing is possible without such a possibility, built into the very nature of energy.”

In *Qu’ est-ce qu’ une structure?*, (What is a structure), Paris, 1967, pp. 51ss. he also discusses this. - Also on the higher than the non-organic level, i.e. the biological and the human-artistic level, this duality “creation/actualisation” (potentialité/ actualisation) returns: see his *L’ énergie et la matière vivant (Antagonisme constructeur et logique de l’ hétérogène)*, (Energy and living matter (Constructing antagonism and logic of the heterogeneous), Paris, 1962, pp. 193ss., as well as his *Science et art abstrait*, (Science and abstract art), Paris, 1963.- Conclusion: still today, both from the point of view of the nature itself and from the point of view of the nature itself, this duality returns in the form of a potentiality/actualisation.

**Conclusion:** Even today, both from the point of view of the bêta sciences (= natural sciences) -- see Lupasco - and from that of the alpha sciences (= humanities), the Aristotelic couple “energeia / dynamis” (creation / disposition), in Lt. ‘actus / potentia’, proves to be useful as a basis for thinking.

**Note:** - ‘Energeia’ is also called ‘en.tel.ch.eia’, entelechy, by Aristotle: this word expresses the goal orientation better (telos). The disposition is directed towards the realization, which is the goal, telos, of it.

Indeed, the germ or seed is potentially the mature plant, which, from the germ (seed), is the realization: in the germ already sticks out, somewhat, potentialiter, potential, -- 'dunamei', the whole plant; the germ is oriented towards maturity, for in that maturity it is only fully itself. Cf. O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie* (Philosophische Pröpadetik), Herder, 1959 (191/1914, 3/4), S. 409/433 (*Latentes und entwickeltes Sein*), (Latent and developed being), where there are detailed explanations, especially S. 413/414.-

Vitalism is a biological philosophy, originating, on the one hand, from Hippocrates of Kos (p. 45 supra), and, on the other, Aristotle, yet continuing to the present day, which asserts that a/ apart from the physical substrate (which physics and chemistry reveal), 'life' b/ requires a specific principle, called 'life principle', 'life force' or 'entelechy', to be conceivable. This is against the current mechanistic biological philosophers, of course. One thinks of the Montpellier School which, in the XVIIIth century, started from this vitalist biology philosophy. Think of H. Bergson, (1859/1941) with his vitalistic spiritualism, revolving around 'l'élan vital' (life's journey) which runs through the universe.

So that Aristotle still lives on today in philosophical biology, especially through Hans Driesch (1867/1941) and his neo-vitalism. It should be noted that the universe, for Aristotle, below, in the "first or basic matter", is pure creation, and, above, in god, whom he calls the unmoved mover, is pure realization. In between, everything is mixed: i.e. it consists of ánd dunamis ánd energeia (entelecheia), i.e. elements plants, animals, human beings (sub-mundane, sublunary), divine stars (astrotheology, super-mundane). The universe is, as it were, an interval with extremes and middles, expressible in terms of potency and act.

-- (I)b2. *The problem of 'substance / form' (hylomorphism).* -

'Hulè', materia, substance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 'morphe', forma, form (Gestalt, shape being), are the constituents of the word hylomorphism. Again, Aristotle makes the doxography (description of opinions) to include predecessors and contemporaries at that delicate point in the question. Here again he sees that what the first Milesians said, was indeed stammering, but the core of a truth, 1/ which, like a seed, carried its further development in it (like an entelecheia), 2/ which sought its way through all sorts of deviations and corrections (the steering structure of Genesis). Let us examine this with him.

-- (I)b2a. *Thales (perhaps), (certainly) Anaximandros and Anaximenes,*

Supported by private experience, they sought for the boundless multiplicity of being in the fuis a unifying principle which they conceived as primordial matter or primordial matter (Okeanoswator, unlimited matter, breath); yet from the beginning it was clear that they conceived the 'archè' not exclusively material but inclusive (their hylozoism testifies to this).

Thereby it was clear that, from that one all-embracing principle, the diversity of beings and their movements could not be explained: what made, for example, that from Okeanos water (unlimited, breath) this stone emerges with its magnetism, while other 'substances' do not have that magnetism (the qualitative distinction between 'magnetic' and 'non-magnetic')?

Or what made Hellas so cold in winter and so hot in summer? (the qualitative change from cold to warm climate)? Without qualitative form, pure substance - no matter how rich and multiform in principle - never comes to the variety, synchronically and diachronically (i.e. the unity of substance never comes to the multiplicity of forms). The Hellenes especially, so sensitive to what they called 'cosmos', orderly-clean world, had to look for a principle of form. -

Parmenides, who saw everything as "being" in one form, made the quantity of form blurred because, in his way of thinking, it was only apparent. That ontology offered no way out either, it was as if the one (= unified, unique, coherent) being only conjured up a multiform, multiple, divergent fusion line. Herakleitos saw the solution in a universal principle, which governed fire and its transformations, namely the universality of reason.

Basically this was only a rational interpretation of Hylozoism, which, in spite of all materiality, still saw living matter everywhere (but again much too general to explain the multiplicity of forms). -

Empedokles with his filia and neikos (love and discord) and Anaxagoras, just with his nous, universe-ordering mind, tried, in the one matter with its many particles (moderate mechanism), to introduce a principle of form-abundance, yet, like Hylozoism and Herakleitos, too universal to be able to 'explain' the private and singular form-abundance. -

With all of them it remained too much: here matter, above it form-principle (breath, logos, being-in-shine, filia/neikos, nous) without both aspects of reality meeting each other, penetrating each other! The principle of form remained too vague, especially for the empirical mind of Milesians. -

**Conclusion:** Leukippos and Demokritos drew the vague conclusion. They dropped all the aforementioned 'principles' (breath, logos, semblance, filia/neikos or nous), in order to be left with only purely mechanical factors: the 1/ done several, 2/ arranged several and 3/ turning atoms were moved from the outside (= inertia or inertia). -

But by what force? By which purposeful force, which namely from emptiness (concerning quantity of forms) brought forth a cosmos, an 1/ ordered universe, 2/ with its boundless forms? Also this materialistic solution did not satisfy a sharp questioning mind!

**-- (I)b2b. *The other side of the pre-aristotelian philosophy***

This did not start from the hylic or substance principle, but from the form principle.  
-- Pythagoras' arithmology, in Orphic-mystical framework of thought, clearly saw the number-form harmony as an explanation for the existence of 'a limitless wealth of species (private) and individuals (singular) in the (universal) fuisis.

Reason: **1/** this being here (singular) with **2/** its species properties (private) is **1/** this here and **2/** of that species in that it possesses its own **(i)** number (arithmetical), **(ii)** form (geometrical) and **(iii)** harmony (musical), in the framework of the universe (astronomical, with a universal numberform harmony).

Yet this was, to Aristotle's taste, too 'constructive', i.e. too mathematically reasoning, rather than empirically Milesian. -

Socrates discovered in the concept (conceptualism) the principle of the specific difference of 'good' (ethical), 'righteous' (political-legal) and 'pious' (religious), while, in the concept, science was grasped in its specific difference with the rest of the fuisis. However, Socrates stuck too much to the conceptual-ethical part of the universal fuisis and neglected the rest (e.g., what the Pythagoreans saw, the numberform harmony). -

Platon, as a universal mind, clearly saw the problem (see pp. 97/99 supra: the one (and indeterminate) / the many (and determinate) with as intermediate term the idea or high content of thought): the ideas are that which explains the specific (private) multiplicity of things in the midst of the (universal) fuisis.

*Incidentally*, idea is related to 'eidos', i.e. form, shape, 'Gestalt' (being with its own nature). The universal idea becomes private, yes, singular, thanks to the substance in which the idea represents itself in a finite and imperfect but real way. However, like the Orphic-mystic Pythagoreans, Platon too was inclined, but with much less sense of empirical fuisis than the Pythagoreans, to emphasize the constructive, i. e. merely thinking-reasoning, and to put forward a high cosmos noëtos, mundus intelligibilis, thinking-world.

**--(I)b2c. *Aristotle and the strains that preceded him.***

Aristotle felt that both the materializing and immaterializing strains fell short for him. With his sense of the right middle (i.e., the application of the archaic principle "Meden agan", ne quid nimis, nothing excessive (positively expressed in French: "mesure dure", - see above p. 12 (nemesis as distributive measure); p. 42 (Herodotos' kuklos restoring hubris as a measure excess) he summarizes both Demokritos (whom he approaches much more positively where Platon does not even mention him) and Platon in the synthesis of hylemorphism, i.e. that view which **1/** recognizes in every individual being **2/** the species (morphe) and **3/** as we shall touch on shortly - summarizes all individuals and their species in his concept of being (universal). All things of the fuisis are not substance, nor (immaterial) form, but formed substance: the substance, as 'unlimited', is the substrate of the form.

“The substance itself - ‘the so-called “hupokeimenon,” (subiectum, substratum, substrate in which the form develops - is a being only “according to possibility” (dunamei, potential); only through the creation of form does the substance become an actual being.

This being is, by virtue of the immanent form “put to work” (as the expression ‘energeia’ (actuality) chosen by Aristotle reads in verbatim translation). The self-realization of the being in the sensible substance-form appearance is called ‘entelechy’, “realization of the purpose lying in it”. The entelechy idea, the central concept of Aristotelian philosophy, was not developed from biology, where it does become particularly important, but clearly from the striving, to overcome the dualism between matter and form by ‘a mutual relationship of both.” (E. Lehmann-Leander, o.c. S. 32/33).

**-- Artificialism.**

One of the titles, if not reproaches, that one attributes to Aristotelianism is “artificialism,” i.e., the tendency to interpret being as a result, not of “nature” but of “art.

Indeed, Aristotle gives almost more examples of his teaching taken from the world of crafts and arts than from the sphere of biology (which was nevertheless his favorite subject). -

The famous four-cause theory is situated here. Aitia, causa, cause, sometimes also archè, principium, principle, - is to be understood here as ‘factor’ that makes things understandable (and not as ‘cause’ in our current vernacular).

(i) A piece of marble, ore, wood, e.g., is available; this is the hylic or material or substance cause (material ‘factor’), the material from which.

(ii) The appearance or existence which that substance acquires, through the working of e.g. the craftsman or the sculptor, is the formal or form-cause (formal causa formalis): this was only dunamei, potentia, potentially, present in that ‘unbounded’, i.e. formless or formless substance; but it is realized from it, in it also, by human intervention (technei, arte, artificial). Both, substance and form, after the operation, are sunolon, concretum, the concrete result, the concrete work of art.

(iii) The worker is the cause of the work (causa efficiens); the organon, instrumentum, tool, which he employs in the process, is the tool or instrumental cause (understand: tool ‘factor’).

(iv) The finished image, e.g., is the intended result or goal (goal-cause, causa finalis; the teleological of factors).

Compared with Platon’s mimetism (model theory, -see supra p. 107), what is striking here is that the model cause (causa exemplaris or exemplary factor) is submerged in the goal cause, as well as in the form cause. It is the entelechy.

Thus genetics and hylemorphism come to flow together: the ‘being’ of being is that which comes into being in becoming; in this the entelechy is central from potential to actual.

### ***The preliminary victory over materialism. -***

D. Dubarle, *Concept de la matière et discours sur le matérialisme*, (Concept of matter and discourse on materialism,), in F. Russo et al., *Science et matérialisme*, Paris, 1962, pp. 37/70, notes, “Reality, according to Platon, is not and cannot be merely 1/ that which the physicalists have claimed of it: 2/ it is also and above all soul and, to that end 3/ ‘a corollary of the deity.’” (o.c., 39).

In other words, Platon’s theological view makes him see the matter of fisis 1/ as, on the one hand, pure possibility (unlimitedness), yet, on the other hand 2/ as ‘idea’, (eidos, i.e. form, Gestalt) and, precisely because of this 3/ something divine. As Dubarle says in this most curious article: Demokritos on the one hand, and, on the other hand Platon, represent, henceforth, the polarization (i.e., the breaking up into opposites) of materialism and spiritualism (immaterialism).

Platon posits the idea in matter as a piece of deity in fisis. “To this also Aristotle will want to do justice by calling nature both form and soul and matter and body.” (o.c., 39). Indeed, 1/ on the one hand, there is the substance cause (which is Plato’s unbounded), pure matter, and, 2/ on the other hand, there is the threefold form- work- and purpose cause a.k.a. in one(s), and 3/ these as representing the unmoved, yes, unmoving mover, who is “god. –

### ***Dual ‘substance’ concept. -***

Both with Platon and with Aristotle - and Dubarle notes this (o.c., 41) purely - there is a twofold concept of substance.

#### **(i) *Substance in the everyday sense.***

Do we look, e.g., at marble, wood, etc., and at the substance in the everyday sense? (nota bene: hulè, similar to Lt. silva, means first of all forest, wood drawn from the forest and which is workable; materia (Lt) originally also meant wood drawn from the tree (Fr.: madrier) and workable); this tangible and visible substance is already itself, in itself 1/ ‘substance’ (in the second sense, i.e. content), and 2/ form: the a/ inorganic, b/ organic and c/ human substance (corporeality) is its stratification.

#### **(ii) *Substance in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense.***

Then she is pure susceptibility either to idea or to “form” (the so-called pure substance or dunamis (disposition, possibility)). -

The scholastics will call 1/ the omnipresent ‘substance’ materia secunia (second substance) and 2/ the philosophical substance materia prima (first substance). -- Dubarle notes (o.c., 44) that Aristotle already sees very well what (Demokriteic) materialism, understood as mechanicism, is:

(i) be deleted: a/ cause of purpose, b/ cause of form: c/ as well as cause of substance in the ‘first’ sense, the philosophical viz. (of pure substance or disposition);

(ii) are retained: a/ the ‘second’ substance, in the circumstantial sense (which is not pure disposition, but already formed substance, to speak Aristotelian), b/ ‘a certain working cause. Through the Platonic-Aristotelian critiques of Demokritos’ materialism, the latter is more or less ‘overcome’ by theological immaterialism, yet Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271) and Lucretius Carus (-96/-55) in particular will continue it.

**-- The Aristotelian doctrine of souls. -**

The first who philosophically brings up the soul is -- see p. 11 supra -- Anaximenes (with him the soul is that which 'holds together' the body; at once he broadens 'soul' to 'universe soul' soul' which holds together the whole cosmos, as the principle of life for the whole fisis).

Platon - see pages 112/113 supra - sees, true to Orphic mysticism, just like Pythagoras, the soul as a heavenly being which, on the basis of a choice, embodies itself in the body, yet forgets neither the previous embodiments nor the experience of ideas in the transcendental world (theory of memory or anamnesis).

With Aristotle the soul is the body's own entelechy: the body is *hupokeimenon*, substrate, of the form (i.e. the soul). Both, body as substance and soul as form, are inseparable (*sunolon*, *concretum*, something fused). Thus Aristotle "overcomes" Platonic dualism.

1/ But not without raising heavy questions. As I. Van Den Berg, *Aristoteles verhandelning over de ziel*, (Aristotle's Treatise on the Soul), Utrecht/ Nijmegen, 1953, p. 13, says, the relationship "soul/body" remains for the thinker "an unsolved mystery." "The possibility, Nuyens thinks, that the soul can be both: *án* cause of the human body *án* immaterial *op*-self-existing thought-begin-sel (...) has not been considered by Aristotle." (o.c., 13). After all, if man's soul is merely 'entelechy' (form of corporeal matter), what if man dies? Does the form (i.e. in this case the soul) die with it? If so, then man is non-immortal. If not, then she is more than and different from mere form of body.

2/ But there is more: the duality which was already present with Platon becomes with his pupil the duality "soul/intellect" ("*psuche/ nous*"; *anima/ intellectus*). Only the latter, the *nous* or intellect, is incorporeal and immortal. "It is Platonic heritage if Aristotle counts the upper region of the soul as 'another kind of soul'." (E. Lehmann-Leander, o.c., 38). In Aristotle's soul multiplicity unmistakably reflects a dualistic remainder, which then raises questions that he does not answer.

**-- The logical basis of Aristotelianism. -**

In the place of memory, Aristotle puts 'abstraction' (*af.airesis*, literally: to take away from (something); subtraction). In this sense, he repeats Socrates: this singular being, that singular being, that other again, - they all exhibit one and the same general 'being' formulated in the concept.

It is the *nous*, *intellectus*, *intellect(mind)* which, thanks to its light shed on the singular specimens, sees that universal in the singular (and private) and, as it were, isolates it from it (*abs.tractio*, - isolation operation).

This is possible because the singular is potentially universal; it becomes universal in reality thanks to the *nous*, spirit, which gives it its full intellectual reality.

-- (I)c1 *The happiness(bliss)problem.* -

We have, on the basis of the two main examples, seen how Aristotle, **1/** in the world of creation and decay, **2/** searches for fixed insights into beings (not high reasoning (and ‘constructive’)) like Platon, but, with a modern word, ‘phenomenological’, i.e. (1) describing the sensory perceptible data (2) on their ‘forms’ (beingnesses)). - **3/** He does this by systematically describing the *éndoxa*, the opinions, in front of and around him as a truth core striving for the full development of truth. -- Also for ethics - politics he does this in this way.

**A/** Puthagoras with his ancient scheme of order which classifies people and communities threefold, is the starting point: **(i)** the contemplative (theoretical, contemplative) life, **(ii)** the acting (practical, active) life and **(iii)** the enjoying life form the range of happiness possibilities.

**B/** The choice of Aristotle links up with an old current, namely Homeric poetry which, in addition to the high and strict *kalokaigathia* of the nobility, also states ordinary - human enjoyment.

The lyric poets connect to this duality (see pages 49/53: Archilochos, Sapfo and others). Heroic and hedonic have, each, its attraction.

Sophistics (cf. p. 6 ff. supra) has sharply articulated the conflict between lust-sensitive and duty-sensitive behavior (especially through the aristocratic sophists.

Socrates, more reluctantly (consider the *eros* in Platonism, - cf. pp. 112vv, 116v) and Platon strongly prioritized high duty over lust.

Aristotle, with his high sense of measure and balance, is an ethical eudemonist. *Eudaimonia*, a/ originally ‘having a good daimon’, i.e. indwelling ‘god’ (if need be character, because the daimon directs behavior), b/ later happiness(bliss), is, according to Aristotle, the *telos*, goal, of man.

This does not exclude enjoyment, - on the contrary; but enjoyment is laid in the theoretical life (*vita contemplativa*) which, immediately, becomes *praxis*: the highest good for the real man is the intellectual life which includes thought and action.

The *arête*, *virtus*, “virtue(iness)” of man therefore consists in making himself fit for thinking action. Cf. pp. 127/128 supra (the young Aristotle).

Possession, longevity, health, physical beauty, noble birth, friendship, children’s wealth - all these are valuable but not essential to happiness.

Man is a *zoion logon echon*, animal rationale, a reason-possessing living being, and his self-fulfillment consists first of all in thinking, pure or practical and/or technical (*poietic*).

Of course, as already mentioned, the *aurea mediocritas* (Horace), the balance between untenable extremes, characterizes, next to intellectualism, Aristotle’s ethics.

One should not confuse this with mediocrity: it is about avoiding too much or too little (e.g., waste/curiosity; cowardice/overconfidence; small-mindedness/self-exaggeration).

-- (I)c2. *The problem of ethics and politics.*--

Let us begin with an observation: the German universities, from the 16th to the second half of the 18th century, following the Middle Ages Scholasticism, had professorships which, still in the Aristotelian manner, taught the three practical subjects, ethics, economics and politics, in their unity.

Chr. Wolff, the great eclectic rationalist illuminator in Germany (1679/1754), still held, around 1750, to the triad of *philosophia moralis* (ethics), *oeconomica*, *philosophia civilis* (politics). Apart from the proof of long-lasting after-effects, a problem lies before us: what connection is there between ethics and politics?

- Let us begin with the distinction between products of art and craft, on the one hand, and, on the other, life:

(1) the principle of form (*morphea*, *entelecheia*) comes, in the first case, from the cause of work, the arranger of matter;

(2) in life, however, that form or *entelecheia* lies in the living itself. Well, *ethos*, habit (as distinguished from *èthos*, morality, though, for Aristotle (and many a Greek) intertwined) and *praxis*, action, as well as *bios*, *vita*, life, are that in which the living shows itself as accomplishment (*energeia*, *entelecheia*, act).

When the acorn germinates, grows and becomes a tree,- when the foal is received, given birth and matures into a horse, only then does the form (oak, horse) show itself not only in disposition, but in realization. The *fusis*, nature, of oak and horse is such that life (*bios*), *ethos* (habit), *praxis* (action), from *natura*, *fusei*, *natura*, emerges from it, nature itself is the executor of the possible to the real.

(3) But with man this is different: virtue (i.e. fitness for life) is, with man, by nature, only a possibility, not a reality; true virtue, as a naturally given disposition, only becomes real, with us men, thanks to ourselves as actualizers. So that there are three levels of transition from *dunamis* to *energeia*: (i) artisanal - artistic, (ii) biological, (iii) human.

This is where the polis is situated: without the institutions of the polis, the ethical behavior of the individual is only *dunamis*; only in polis context is realization possible. The human being “in the state of nature” (for each policy) is only potentially human: his logical nature does not come into its own.

He who can live without a polis is either less than a human being (i.e. an animal) or more than a human being (i.e. a *theos*, a god). Thus it is understood that man is by nature a “*zoion politikon*”, an animal *civile*, a political being: this means that he is, like the animals living in communion, but more than that, namely thanks to his *logos*, ratio, reason (i.e. thinking expressed in speech).

This is why Aristotle understands the phenomenology of prior and concurrent *politeiai*, legislative systems (see p. 132 *supra*) to extract the ‘form’.

Here, too, the ‘measure’ comes to the fore: “The poleis, too, have a certain measure of size, as do all other beings, animals, plants, tools. None of them may be too small or too large; if not, in the first case it will be deprived of its essential properties, - in the second, be useless.” Always the aurea mediocritas. Cf. J. Ritter, *‘Politik’ und ‘Ethik’ in der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles*, (‘Politics’ and ‘Ethics’ in Aristotle’s practical philosophy.), S.153/176.

- A. Zijderveld, *Institutionalisering (Een studie over het methodologische dilemma der sociale wetenschappen)*, (Institutionalization (A study of the methodological dilemma of the social sciences)), Hilversum/Antwerp, 1966, thematizes ‘a dichotomy that somewhat connects to Aristotle’s unity of ethics, economics and politics. The dichotomy ties in with the two founders of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim (1858/1917) and Max Weber (1864/1920).

Durkheim, positively descriptive, shows how all-encompassing, how pervasive the social framework determines the individual in all the joints of his personality. Weber, understanding hermeneutics, empathizes with individual action (if necessary, to his “charismatic” degree, becoming an “anti-institutional” power), to show that society as a structure is not all-determining. -

This ambiguity of sociological method is reflected in social philosophy, in the person of A. Gehlen (1904/ 1976) and that of K. Marx (1818/1883). Gehlen states that man, in order to be a free individual, must live in a network of institutions (religion, “family, etc.) in order to acquire “order”, solidity and security. Marx, however, argues that the state, church, capital, marriage, property, etc. alienate and enslave free action, called praxis, which, if necessary, becomes revolution, especially because the work product (e.g. a chair), the result of creative labor, becomes a ‘thing’ and merely a ‘commodity’ in the system of sale and exchange (commodity fetishism, thingification).

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Zijderveld denounces the one-sidedness and thinks that a ‘dialectical (i.e. based on the interaction of two one-sidednesses) viewpoint / method thinks and acts in a non-one-sided and complementary way.

Aristotle would, we think, advance his ‘measure’ (neither too much nor too little, not one or the other but one and the other) in order to dissolve this one-sidedness. One knows that he starts from the free citizen (politès, civis), but even if the polis is a community of “free men” who reject all despotic power, it is nevertheless a community of free men “who exist for their own sake” within the ethical institutions of the polis, together with parents and children, with strangers and fellow citizens, with women and men, with slaves and free men.

All that the polis takes away from freedom serves to make possible the ethical blissful lives of free people. In the polis, the individual ‘lives’ (bios), acts (praxis), ‘becomes real’ (energeia). -- Which includes the rejection of sophist politics.

-- **(II) *The philosophical ground plan (subject classification).***

- Aristotle's interest was "encyclopedic. We give an overview. "Not long after his death in -322 his manuscripts were arranged by publishers so that they formed the present corpus of his works." Thus J. Warrington, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, London/New York, 1956-1, 1961, p. viii. Thus, thanks to the diaskeuists (organizing publishers), the following scheme emerged.

**A. *The organon (the dialectical-analytical works) i.e. theory of thought.***

The organon, thinking theory, includes two types of works:

**(i)** dialectical, which mean thought formation (note Aristotle uses 'dialectic' in the non-Platonic sense, as e.g. with Socrates and the Sophists, viz. in the sense of

**(a)** starting from common opinions (ta endoxa) and weighing its pros and cons,

**(b)** acquainting oneself with the problem in this way and

**(c)** practicing scientific thinking):

**(i)a.** ta topika, the topics, which deals with the locations (topoi, loci) of thoughts.

**(i)b.** peri sophistikou elenchou, about sophisms or fallacies; - in connection with dialectical work: rhetoric, a subject that teaches how to act on feelings and wills by means of reason (subject that, because of its objective, belongs to ethics - politics;

**(ii)** analytic, which treats of knowledge, ta analutika, name coming from analysis, i.e., decomposition of knowledge into its constituents, i.e., definitions and proofs; these constituents consist, in turn, of other constituents

**1/** definitions (horismoi) consist of concepts (horoi) and have the form of a judgment (apophantikos logos); **2/** proofs consist of conclusion (sullogismoi); classification:

**(ii)a.** peri katêgorion, about the categories, deals with the concepts, starting from the word meanings (Aristotle's theory of thought, like Platon's (see above pp. 108/109), is linguistic analysis, which studies thought contents through word meanings, from the vernacular especially); in this booklet he talks about the basic concepts such as independence (substance), concomitance (such as quality, quantity, relation etc.);

**(ii)b.** peri hermeneias, de interpretatione, about the interpretation or thought-expression, i.e. the judgement (and immediately the sense in which a judgement is expressed); these are two preparatory booklets; now follow the two main ones:

**(ii)c1.** the analutika protera, analytica priora, the first analytics, dealing with the syllogisms (especially the deductive and the inductive conclusive reason);

**(ii)c2.** analutika hastera, analytica posteriora, the second analytics, dealing 1/ with the proof, 2/ with the notion (definition) and classification (i.e. substantive and comprehensive aspect of a content or concept) and 3/ with the axiomata, the principles of thought (e.g. 1/ what is, is; 2/ what is not, is not; 3/ something cannot be and not be at the same time).

**Note:-** 'Logic' as a name, appeared only after Aristotle, in the Lukeion to designate the theory of thought.

**B. The systematic works (theoretical, practical, poietic).**

“All intellectual workmanship is either practical or poietic (productive) or theoretical (speculative),” Aristotle, *Metaph.* E.

“In a poietic (productive) science, the principle of motion is in the producer, not in the product (it is ‘an ability (‘art’, skill) or other ability). In a practical science, the movement principle is in the acting being, not in what is done.”(Ibid. k. 7). Cf. J. Warrington, Ar., *Metaphysics*, pp. 153, 155. According to *Metaf. E*, 1 (o.c., 153/156), there are three “theoretical or speculative” sciences.

**Ba1. The physical (physics).** - This deals with the changeable but independent being, the supra-mundane and the sub-mundane. This is the most Milesian part:

- (i) cosmology (On origin and decay, On the heavens, Meteorology, etc.),
- (ii) life theory (On the life of animals, Parva Naturalia, On the soul (‘soul’ is principle of life both in plant, animal and man).

**Ba2. Mathematics (mathematics).** - This deals with immutable but non-independent being (Aristotle is convinced that the numbers do not exist ‘in themselves’ (independently) but are quantitative aspect of the being). This is Pythagorean-Zenonic.

**Ba3. ‘Theology’** (now usually called ‘metaphysics’). - This deals with both unchanging and independent being which is the highest in the universe. The “being as being” is the object of it, i.e., in Aristotle’s interpretation of “being,” “God”; hence the name “theology” or “theologia. --

1/ As a science with absolute priority it is called “wisdom” (sophia; - a Pythagorean word), “doctrine of principles” (archè; - a Milesian word), “first philosophy” (Pythagorean saying, because God as Monas, first and only being, is foundation of all others).

2/ As distinguished from mathematism and physical, it is called ‘theology’ (‘n Platonic term; see p. 119 supra):

3/ As an all-embracing science, it is called ‘theology of being’ (later ‘ontology’; this is ‘a Parmenidean inheritance); indeed, the concept of being(s) is the most universal (transcendental) concept, in which all others are situated. -

**Note:** - The name ‘metaphysics’ arose by a coincidence: a number of booklets, which Aristotle, in the course of years, in his search for insights, compiled, “not a dogmatic system”, says D. Ross (not a dogmatic system), were placed immediately after physics by the diaskeuists. Well, “meta ta fusika” in Greek, is, translated “after physics”. ‘After’ was afterwards denoted as “higher than”: thus ‘metaphysics’ became the name for that subject which treats of what has precedence in reality.

**Bb1.** Ethics (moral conception), especially Nikomachean ethics.

**Bb2.** Economics (household conception).

**Bb3.** Politics (conception of society). -

These are the practical works.

**Bc. *The poietic (productive) works.* -**

To manufacture/make something is only one form of ‘praxis’ (i.e. reasoned action). Perhaps one can see, in this part of Aristotle’s works, ‘a remnant of the (in Homeric times) demiurgen (demi.ourgos, i.e. who works for the common good,-similar, somewhat, to charisma, social grace, -) and artisans.

Demiurgeons are, archaically, e.g. seers, healers, singers, carpenters god interpreters, heralds etc. For more details see E. Mireaux, *Zo leefden de Grieken ten tijde van Homerus*, (This is how the Greeks lived at the time of Homer), Baarn, 1979 (Fr.: *La vie quotidienne au temps d’ Homère*, 1958), pp. 135/154. -

With Aristotle, of course, the demiurge and the artisan are almost entirely desacralized (Sophistics, in particular, has continued the deserialization). -

The poetics (on poetry) is a poetic work, as well as rhetoric. In the poet and the orator the “dèmiourgia”, the service to the community, still comes to the surface.

**-- *Note: on Aristotelian metaphysics.***

We pause for a moment at an excerpt from “On the constituents (limbs) of animals”, a physical work. In my opinion it clearly typifies the rest of (Platonic, yes, Orphic light metaphysics - see above pages 102/103 - which is present in Aristotle’s philosophy.

As someone once said, “Aristotelian metaphysics occurs as a laborious conquest of independent insights vis-à-vis the Platonic perspective and vocabulary.” In other words, his metaphysics is a Milesian idealism. -

“Among the beings which exist by nature, some are uncreated and imperishable - Aristotle means the stars which, astrotheologically, he regards as divine - ; the others, however, have part in becoming and perishing. We are now granted a truly modest glimpse of these exalted and divine beings, for what they reveal to the senses, as the basis of their research and of what we want to know about them, is hopelessly little.

With regard to the perishable plants and animals, however, we are, from the point of view of knowledge, happier, for they are our fellow-creatures and, if one cares enough, one can, with each species, collect a great deal of factual material. -

The two have their magic. For, though we grasp but little of those eternal beings (the stars), yet, in view of the loftiness of the object of inquiry, this gives us much more pleasure than the knowledge of all the beings around us.

It is like the knowledge of a small accidental part, detected from a beloved being, which gives us more joy than the still so complete and accurate consideration of many other things. On the other hand, the possibility of a greater and more frequent knowledge of earthly beings offers its advantage. Thereby the feeling that these beings are nearer to us and more akin in nature, in a certain sense, outweighs again the precedence of gene wisdom of the divine being.”

Aristotle’s physical sees “heaven” as a perfect sphere of which the earth is the center. The fisis, nature, is all that, in that sphere, is either motionless or moving. Main

object of that physical is the movement which emanates from the First Cause, the immobile Mover, God, on all second causes, viz:

- 1/ the immutably moving, the heavens, and
- 2/ the impermanently moving (netherworld), in which we, human beings, live.

That impermanent moving is the “ordinary” fisis, starting point of Milesian empiricism (cf. p. 44 supra). Admire the high philosophical spirit of the following excerpt, which immediately connects with the preceding one:

“Since we have laid down our views (on the divine beings, the stars (heavens)), (viz. in the work ‘*On the Heavens*’), it remains for us to speak of animal nature and, as far as possible, to omit nothing, whether it seems of greater or lesser importance. For even in those things which present themselves to our senses as less pleasant, creative nature guarantees immeasurable joys to those who are at least capable of knowing the causes and who have the right philosophical disposition.

It would be absurd and strange, on the one hand, to delight in contemplating the pure images of nature, since we see in them the art which created them - e.g. the skill of the painter or sculptor - but, on the other hand, not to love the original creations of nature even more, at least if we can understand their causes.

Therefore, one should not have a childish aversion to the contemplation of the lower living beings, because in all the works of nature there is something wonderful (...). We should, in examining each animal, approach it calmly and not turn up our noses. For in everything there is something natural and beautiful. For the non-accidental and purposeful are found above all in the works of nature; but the purpose for which they exist and were created has its place in the realm of beauty. If, in the meantime, one were to regard the contemplation of other animals as inferior, one should hold the same opinion of oneself. After all, one is not capable, without great reluctance, of contemplating the parts which make up man - think of blood, flesh, bones, veins and the like.

To this should be added the following consideration: whoever speaks of any one of these parts or vessels, does not have as his intention the examination of the substance, nor as the goal of his examination, but his goal is the entire form. A house is not considered for the sake of the tiles, the loam or the beams: the naturalist, likewise, should direct his eye more to the coherence of the whole creature (of nature) and not to that which never exists in isolation from the whole being.”

In these last words, the sense of “Gestalt,” the entire appearance, emerges.