

4.4. Introduction to Current Philosophy.
HIVO Antwerp 1980-1981 (228 p.)

4.4.2. part II, p. 101 to 228

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which come from the things (objects, persons), when one looks at them or, more broadly, perceives them, for there are also hearing images, taste images, smell images, etc.), as coming from the things in a movement and penetrating the inner consciousness, apparently through the imagination (one thinks of the name ‘phantasma’, shadow, still used by Hobbes himself to denote the ‘empusa’ which is theology!).

For Hobbes, as for Balth. Bekker, the Cartesian (see above p. 87), the ‘*qualitates occultae*’ (the occult properties) are of no value whatsoever: one should, he says, ‘simply’ substitute for them the “simple movement, caused, rather ‘produced’, by the objects of perception in the matter which surrounds them”. (A. Weber, o.c., 277).

This “movement” continues its way via the “sensitive” nerves (again, an occult expression, but here, again, for the umpteenth time, “mechanized” to sustain the machine model instead of the sensitive-vital model of even e.g. Demokritos) into the brain, this in turn purely machine-like conceived. That mechanism of experience Hobbes learned, in later life, from Descartes and his’ environment (Gassendi especially). So that between the bodily part of the innates and the same bodily part of the empiricist-sensists, in the end, there is no or practically no difference. This as a consequence of the dualism (ange/ machine, angel/ machine) which, before the Renaissance, was already at work in Thomism (see above p. 89) and which will continue beyond Kant (see *ibidem*).

Hobbes gives, as ‘proof’ of the merely ‘subjective’ and at the same time ‘mechanical’ being of perception (mediatistically always conceived: see above p. 71), the following event:

Suppose that our eye receives a purely mechanical but rather brutal ‘shock’ (blow) (e.g. by someone striking our face), then we see flashes of light” (‘little stars’, says the popular man), just as we, without a blow to the eye, receive light (and colors) while looking at the sun or at something that flickers. From this one fact (and its analogous repetitions in the field of all other types of perception (hearing, taste, smell, etc.)) Hobbes concludes, like all mechanists of perception, the “fallacious” character of all sensory experience (and of the related rationality).

In a word, our “consciousness” is illusory, deluded. - Lange, o.c., II, S. 22, notes that this so-called purely “phenomenal world” (i.e., the totality of all sensory impressions and associated mental representations) can be found with the Indian and Ancient Greek thinkers as “nur das getrübe Abbild einer anderen Welt der wahren objekte” (only the clouded image of another world of true objects).

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But he notes at the same time that the true relation between the spatial ('mechanical'), movement, on the one hand, and the representation (either the sensory ('phantasma') or the intellectual ('idea', understanding) on the other hand) is 'unerklärlich' (inexplicable) (one notes that Lange does not say 'as yet unexplained', but 'inexplicable',-which according to Peirce (see above p. 78) is doing as Descartes).

Indeed, within the angelic-mechanical model, the transition from mere mechanical action or causality to "thinking," i.e., representations of consciousness, is inexplicable. (Lange, II, S. 24).

He triumphs: "The whole of materialism, with the acceptance of the judgment that all natural processes are inexplicable, is lost forever." (ibidem, 24). After all, with Hume, Lange extends the inexplicability of the process of knowing through sense-organs to the inexplicability of all action of cause on effect or effect. If one knows, now, the central thesis of casualism or effectivism in Anglo-Saxon empiricism-sensism, then one measures the abdication on "explaining by rational means" by its massive and massive scope.

As an intermediary between the abdiquitous Hume and the self-confident Hobbes, Weber, o.c., 277/278, cites Berkeley, the immaterialist: "Hobbes reasons as Berkeley will reason, but Berkeley will go to the extreme and, starting from sens(ual)istic premises, arrive at the denial of bodies and at subjective idealism. *Hobbes*, however, remains halfway: the reality of matter remains, in his eyes (*Human Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policy*, London, 1650, pp. 9ss.), 'an unassailable dogma'.

Indeed, as Lange notes for Demokritos of Abdera in Antiquity, Hobbes commits the following inconsistency.

(i) On the one hand, the sens(ual)ism of Locke (and Hume) is already present with him in germ:

(a) the movements of physical things are communicated - through the air as a medium - to our senses and, via these senses, to the brain and, via this, to the 'heart' (in a kind of chain reaction from object to consciousness, - chain reaction of causal effects). That is the one direction.

(b) the other, opposite, proceeds as follows (and here something of the Leibnizian dynamism comes through): the law of "work and rework" (action and reaction), at work in the whole of bodily nature, has here its sensuous application.

Hobbes derives perception from the principle of counter-movement: not the immediate reaction of the external organ, but only the (counter)movement emanating from the 'heart' and, via the brain, returning from the external organ, is perception.

Consequence: between the impression (from outside) and the perception (from inside) there is always a noticeable time lag. From this recurrent counter-movement - which he describes as a "conatus" (attempt, effort, striving) cf. Leibniz, Maine de Biran

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(pp. 79, 94 supra) - from the 'heart', against the corporeal objects, the projection (throwing outward) of the perceptual conceptions (= phantasmata), emanating from the 'heart' to the perceived objects, becomes intelligible (Lange, II, 332).

Now pay close attention:

(a) the perception is identical with the perceptual conceptions or phantasmata;

b/ these are, in turn, identical with the conatus movement against the objects (and, by no means, 'veranlaszt', says Lange (ibidem), i.e. the perception-characteristic does not have as its cause the objects alone: that cause is that against which the 'heart' reacts with 'a characteristic image). Done repeated:

(a) the object that gives rise to the counter-movement of the "heart" is the bodily-causal thing outside of consciousness;

(b) the subject, reacting with his heart in the counter-movement, is the human being, body between bodies, yet gifted with perceptive consciousness;

(c) the phantasmata or ken images, i.e. the sensory properties (of things, so to speak), are not the object itself, but a "movement" (to stay in mechanics) originating in the "thinking heart" of man himself:

(a1) no light emanates from the luminous bodies,

(a2) of the sounding bodies no sound,

(b) no, of those luminous or sound-emitting bodies only go

forms of movement (light is one kind of movement; sound is another). Light, sound, smell, etc. are perceptions ('ideas', Locke will say, consciousness-contents of an empirical nature) and they only arise as such, i.e. as consciousness-contents, in our inner being as recurrent but from the thinking 'heart' proceeding (counter)-movements. "From this results the sens(ual)istic inference: all so-called 'sensory properties' (sound, color, smell, etc.) are not inherent in the (physical) things (outside our consciousness); no, they arise in us ('heart') as such." (Cf. Lange, I, 333).

(ii) On the other hand - and now Lange makes the inconsistency clearly felt: - Hobbes is a dogmatic materialist! After all, in his eyes human perception is nothing but the movement of bodily parts, triggered by the movement of things outside of consciousness! Just like Demokritos in antiquity, Hobbes did not succeed in being consistent in his sensism (think of Berkeley who did: esse est percipi, 'being' (i.e. the impressions of reality) is (i.e. coincides with) being perceived!):

(a) on the one hand, he proceeded from the mathematical-physical conception of things present outside consciousness and was therefore a materialist;

b) on the other hand, he claimed that the sensory qualities, including sensory reality, were merely subjective counter-movements emanating from the thinking "heart". - Lange says: either one is sensist (i.e., subjectivist of sense) - and then "matter" is only a subjective impression or one is materialist, yet, then one belongs to what exists outside of consciousness,

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not as a mere sensory impression, produced from the 'heart' by counter-movement, but as more than that: something actual, something that is 'being', as understood by the Antique-Scholastic theory of ideas or realism - they are both conceptual realism in the moderate sense. For, when Hobbes claims that Aristotle has made the word 'being' into a 'thing,' i.e. an actual (outside of consciousness) comprehensible but as a bodily thing conceived or rather misconceived reality, he is annoyingly misunderstanding Aristotle:

(a) Aristoteles never, ever, imagined the chimera that Hobbes imagines under the word 'being'.

(b) Even Platon, in his extreme conceptualism, never conceived of an idea as an "object existing in nature". This much historical honesty should be shown towards both ontologists of antiquity. Marx would have said 'Verdinglichung', i.e. turn into a thing of physical nature, to which one then attaches a fetishistic 'belief': Hobbes misinterprets conceptual realism as Verdinglichung, because he identifies 'being' and 'body'. Even the ultra-realism of Platon, who situated his ideas in the world of thought, is still far from being "reification" (to render the French "chosisme"). One compares this with 'réification'.

Apart from the transition from merely mechanical motion (and "causality") to truly human perception, as the first main error of thought, Hobbes' ethics and politics now need to be unmasked.

(A) The distinction between man and animal was clear to the innatists (Descartes: 'ange gouvernant une machine', -that is man; the animal is 'une machine') for reasons of dualism, although incorrect for the animal (even 'an animal is more and different from 'an apparatus-like event)

(B) For the sensible empiricists, we will now listen to Hobbes:

(i) "By 'spirit' ('soul') I understand 'a physical body of a thinness (not to be confused with the delicacy) of the Antique Middle Ages or Renaissance - thinkers who were still themselves sensitive enough not to confuse mechanical thinness with subtle-vital delicacy) sufficient to be beyond the senses.'" Thus Hobbes himself: after all, there is no disembodied "mind," not even in the Bible. Both, human and animal, are corporeal; only there is:

(a) 'a degree difference in thinness of fabric and, especially

(b) man is privileged by language over the languageless animal. Which is similar to Descartes' philosophy of language (see above pp. 86/87).

(ii) The lower creatures know no freedom of will, led as they are, whole and entire, by their instincts: so does man, except that he 'rationalizes' the instinct. Hypocritical as Hobbes is, he dares to say: 'sufficient reason', i.e. necessity, destiny understood as fate, 'the will of God' (if one prefers to hear such a thing)

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- which is blatantly ridiculing the God faith, cynically, by identifying “a free-willed being like God with “necessity” -, governs every “creature,” man included.

Consequence: ethical good is the pleasant; ethical evil is the unpleasant. Hedonism, understood as lust ethics, rather than moralism. The ‘supreme judge’ (one hears the mockery of the deity as supreme judge through it) both in morality and in all other domains of life, that is the interest one has in the matter (‘existential’, in the sense of being personally involved in it, it is; though without the high ethical attitude to life that Kierkegaard and the existentialists put into that word). The ‘absolute’ good, the ‘unconditional’ good, resp. evil, - such is the product of the *empusa* called theology and of its by-product, the Scholastic unscientific metaphysics.

Now what does such an ethic become, when translated into political terms? The sufficient reason or necessity of movement is cause-effect chain: also that movement which is the political movement is cause-effect process. Yet without First Mover (God in Aristotle’s finalism) or Trinity (in the Christian interpretation).

(a) Hobbes: founder of the absolutist theory of government

“As is well known,” Lange says, “I, 325, Hobbes is considered the founder of the absolutist theory of the state, which he deduces from the necessity of neutralizing the war of all against all (‘Bellum omnium contra omnes’) by a supreme will.

i) To begin with, Hobbes denies what Aristotle took as the starting point of his political, namely, that man, like the ant or the bee, is a state-founding living being (zoön politikon, animal civile).

ii) In Hobbes’ case, state life comes only on the basis of fear and the rationalization of fear. Lange tries to excuse Hobbes somewhat, but he too must admit, in all honesty: “The egoism of Hobbes’ state founders is a pure, complete and unaffected egoism, precisely in the sense that ‘egoism’ means the contradiction between

(a) the personal interests and

(b) the alien and the common”. Higher ethical-political basic insights, according to Lange (o.c., 326), from a materialistic starting point, were thus radically excluded. - It is true that Hobbes, through his ‘natural philosophy’ (just like Macchiavelli’s physical of the Italian republics of his time) concerning ‘civil affairs’ is ‘auszerordentlich aufklärend’ (extraordinarily ‘enlightening’).

(b) The state form of the absolute will

One hears through it Ockham’s and Duns Scotus’ nominalistic, ‘absolutely’ value-giving will of God, bound to no ‘essence’ or essence norm (laid down in the nature of being), is monarchical or not, hereditary or not, the ‘state’ must have absolute power, not relative. If there is no absolute ‘being’, then there is still an absolute ‘will’ and even then that of a created power.

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Influence of Hobbes.

(A) At first sight, Hobbes' influence in England is not far-reaching. Reason: the Platonic School of Cambridge temporarily and, incidentally, mixed with rationalist elements, curtailed that influence (Ralph Cudworth (1617/ 1688), John Smith (1618/1652), Henry More (1614/1687). Cf. O. Willmann, III, S. 92/101): "The exposure of the truths of natural religion (understood in the Platonizing sense, not in the modern-rationalist sense) to counteract the atheism of Hobbes is 'a chief preoccupation of Cudworth's detective work, for which he finds the leads in (i) myth and (ii) in archaic philosophy (the Kabbalah included)'" (o.c., 94). Augustinianism also favorably influenced the Cambridger Platonists (o.c., 94)

(B) Yet Lange, I, S. 264. is correct when he asserts

a) that Descartes reaches, over Spinoza and Leibniz, Kant and Fichte, to the (former) Schelling and Hegel - and we add: to Husserl and Chomsky today,

b) while Hobbes and Locke co-determine the French materialism of the XVIIIth century, the German materialism of the XIXth century, yes, we add, to this day, all materialism in one respect or another. *G. Veraldi, Materialism*, in *Bres-Planète*, 17 (May 1969), p. 129, writes after Lange: "Although modern materialism was undoubtedly elevated to a system for the first time in France, England is in no less degree the classic birthplace of materialism.

Almost a hundred years ago Lange made this remark and to this day it has retained its validity. All civilized countries have participated in the debate: in no country, however, has it been so deeply and persistently conducted as in the United Kingdom."

(III) *Survey of other rational philosophies of the XVIIIth century.*

These philosophies can be reduced to the following scheme.

(i) *The scholastic.*

The Thomists, Skotists, Suarezians (represented respectively mainly by Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits), free Aristotelians (among the Jesuits) are concerned with

i/ exegesis of Thomas, Duns Scotus, Suarez, Aristotle- cf. pp; 14, 54/55,

ii/ systematic and partial explanations,

iii/ history of philosophy, - no small amount also

iv/ processing of

(a) modern mathematical and experimental science and

(b) Cartesianism and the beginning of empiricism and materialism (Mersenne for instance, mentioned above (p. 96/97)). One should not forget that in the universities scholasticism was still dominant, with a few exceptions, where it remained a feared interlocutor.

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(ii) *The anti-Cartesians,*

Voetius (+1676) and Huët (+1721) - especially Bl. Pascal (1623/1662) - who, like Huet, was a rational skeptic, a fideist as a believer, emphasizing the “heart,” which assumes more than the merely proven.

(iii)a *Pierre Bayle* (1647/1706).

Bayle, the controversialist par excellence, exhibits (according to *H. Arvon, l'athéisme*, Paris, 1967) ‘a Janus face (analogous to Hobbes’ two-truth system (see above pp. 97/98)):

(i) the problem of Catholic and Protestant theologies he preserves;

(ii) the stance of ‘an outsider he interprets in the sly thesis that atheism is better than superstition (by which he means contemporary fanaticism and occultism at the same time).

This is explained, yet with emphasis on the turnaround in the philosophy of history - reason why we compare him here with G. Vico as with the second philosopher of history yet diametrically in view -, in *J. Solé, Les mythes chrétiens, (De la Renaissance aux Lumières)*, (Christian myths, (From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment)), Paris, 1979, especially pp. 239/268: “The success of Bayle’s work on the mentality of the XVIIIth century came from his concern to consider the theology of history as of no use” (o.c., 239). The radical doubt of Descartes with a view to acquiring ‘a radical new point of certainty, Bayle applies to history, especially that of religious disputes (theological discussions included).

He is the first who claims in a clear-cut manner **(a)** that an atheist can be virtuous (as an example: Lucillo Vanini, who, in 1619, on the ground of atheism, at Toulouse, before the stake, had his tongue pulled out; one may compare Jean Fontanier, at Paris, in 1621, on the ground of atheism, was burned by the Inquisition),

(b) this while superstition (understand: the religious fanaticism, that showed its immoral side in the merciless religious wars) can be immoral (example: Louis XI and Cathérine de Médicis (known for her poison mixing and black magic; cf. a.o. *L. Pauwels/ G. Breton, Histoires magiques de l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1977, pp. 89/99 (*L'extraordinaire vision de Cath. de Médicis*)).

K. Marx, Die heilige Familie, 6, does not characterize Bayle badly: “The man, who theoretically brought the metaphysics of the XVIIth century and all metaphysics to its credit, was Pierre Bayle. His weapon was skepticism, forged from the metaphysical magic formulas themselves: he started, to begin with, from Cartesian metaphysics. (...) (Bayle) was driven by religious doubt to the doubt of metaphysics, which underpins (religious) faith. Therefore he subjected metaphysics to criticism in its entire historical course. He became its historian, to write its death history. Preferably he refuted Spinoza and Leibniz. (...) He announced the atheistic society, which would soon begin to exist, by proving

(i) That “a society of mere atheists can exist.

(ii) that an atheist can be an honorable person,

(iii) that man is degraded not by atheism but by superstition”.

And Marx ends, “Bayle was the last of the metaphysicians in the sense of the XVIIth century and the first of the philosophers in the sense of the XVIIIth century.

Influence. - Bayle's after-effects, direct and indirect, can be situated in the whole history of atheistic thought in its materialistic form; Bayle's influence joins that of Hobbes. Together they prepare the full materialism of the XVIIIth century as it will permeate England and France. Cf. *H.Arvon, L'athéisme*, pp. 35/68. In the XIXth century, atheistic materialism will split into two forms:

(i) German materialist atheism (o.c., 69/76 (K. Vogt, (1817/1895), J. Moleschot (1822/1893), L. Büchner (1824/ 1899): science and technology triumph and seem to prove materialism right);

(ii)a. humanizing or "humanistic" atheism, peculiar to Marxism, which with Feuerbach posits man(s) instead of God, up to and including Soviet atheism;

(ii)b. Nietzschean atheism, which puts man in the place of God, through in nihilism (Gott ist tot; Wir haben ihn getötet), - the second humanistic variant of atheism;

(ii)c. Existentialist atheism, which, humanist likewise, puts free and fully responsible man in God's place) (with Camus (1913/956), J.P.Sartre (1905/1979))

-- cf. o.c., 77/122; *H. de Lubac, Le drame de l'humanisme athée*, Paris, 1945 (Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Comte, Dostoevsky ('If God did not exist, then everything would be (in principle) permitted),

-- L. Zander, *Dostoevsky (Le problème du Bien)*, Paris, 1946. One does not forget Freud nor "the death of God": *J. Hillis Miller, The disappearance of God (Five 19th-Century Writers: De Quincey, Browning, Brontë, Arnold, Manley Hopkins)*, New York, 1963;

-- *P. van Buren, The secular Meaning of the Gospel*, London, 1963-1;

-- *Th. Altizer/ W. Hamilton, Radical theology and the death of God*, Utrecht, (after) 1966;

-- *S. Keen, Apology of Wonder*, New York, 1969;

-- *G. Szczesny, The future of unbelief (Current reflections of a non-Christian)*, Amsterdam 1960.

(iii)b. **Gianbatista Vico** (1668/1744).

"In G. Vico the Italian Renaissance, as founded by Ficinus and Picus (see above p. 55; (20/22)), lives once more and takes a stand against the aims of the Enlightenment." (O. Willmann, III, 181/182). Raised in Suarezian and Skotian ideas, influenced by S. Augustine (in the version of Campanella and Malebranche), *Vico* goes his own way against rationalism (especially the innatists, but also the empiricists) with his *Scienza nuova*, his new science.

a/ Was Descartes impressed by Galilei's mathematical physical,

b/ Vico valorizes the classical philology of the humanists and does so in order to develop it philosophically - scientifically (just as Descartes developed the mathematical physical of Galilei philosophically - scientifically).

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1/ The philosophers, Nico says, are unilaterally concerned with the ideal and the eternal and reasoning;

2/ the philosophers with the facts in their social reality; both miss the other: philosophical philology, worked out as scientifically as possible, is Vico's intention. "Already at that time Vico admired above all scholars two thinkers, Platon and Tacitus: with an incomparable metaphysical mind

a/ considers Tacticus (the Roman historian) man as he actually is,

b/ while Platon regards him as he ought to be. (...). Vico's admiration for this double aspect, which is complementary, of the thought of these two writers led him to sketch an outline, which he later elaborated, of an ideal history, which would constitute the structure of the universal history of all time." (*J. Chaix-Ruy, Vie de J.B. Vico*, Paris, 1943, pp. 58/59). Thus one sees that Vico wants "a philosophy of history, like Bayle, but in a very different spirit.

What is "philology" according to Vico?

a/ "Philosophy considers 'reason' (i.e., the eternal principle that governs things and their processes), - reason, from which the science of the true arises;

b/ philology studies the acts of human freedom: it relies on its authority and from there comes the sense of the certain; thus under the name of "philologists" we understand all those grammarians, historians, critics, who

a/ cease with the knowledge of languages and

b/ with the knowledge of facts, both the inner (national) facts of the history of nations - such as laws and customs - and the outer (international) facts - such as wars peace treaties, covenant treaties, trade, travel." (*R. Lavollé, La morale dans l'histoire (Etude sur les principaux systèmes de Philoso-phié de l'histoire*, Paris, 1892, p. 140).

Among the facts, which Vico notes very particularly, three types emerge:

(i) religion as an omnipresent institution (based on a first axiom, the existence of a divine providence, by which Vico contrasts himself with the Stoics and Epicureans of his time, who, some ascribe to fate, others to chance, the "reason" of all human history);

(ii) marriage as a universal institution (based on a second axiom, namely, the ethical necessity of controlling the passion of love and forging a virtue out of it, which sets Vico against the Stoics who want to eradicate the drift and against the Epicureans who want to indulge it, as a maxim of morality);

(iii) the funeral as a universal institution (based on the axiom that the human soul is immortal, thus setting Vico against the Epicureans who claim that the soul dies with the body). Cf. Lavollée, o.c., 141. All cultures, Vico argues, have conceived of these three institutions - religion, marriage, funeral - as sacred, as *humanitas commercia*, manners that testify to *humanitas*, to *paideia*, to human education and dignity (he borrows the expression from Tacitus) or, even more cleanly, as *foedera generis humani*, institutions typical of the human family as such (as distinguished from the animal).

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One measures the enormous distance between the Aufklärer Bayle, who advocates an atheistic system, and *Vico*, who tries to make a providential system true with his *Scienza nuova*: where the one finds purely human products, there finds the other

a/ that the “history is

(i) the work by providence

(ii) carried out by human freedom”,

b1/ yes, an ideal history, of which God - here speaks the Platonist that *Vico* fundamentally is - “in the beginning” imagined the rules and the structural course, at least in its basic outlines, not in its detailed elaboration (one compares with A.N. Whitehead’s process theology, which says that God creates the possibilities, which he makes available to creation),

b2/ while the actual “facts,” recorded in the “languages” of philology, are the realization of that “historical idea.

Indeed, *Vico* (for the first time clearly) gives Platonism its truly historical dimension by conceiving of the concrete course, especially the concrete development, of the facts of history as a divine idea. With this we encounter, for the umpteenth time, Platonism, but evolved Platonism :

a/ Galilei (following in Viète’s footsteps: one thinks of the letter calculus as an application of the Platonic analysis) extends Platonism;

b/ Bacon (without realizing it of course, through his experimental ‘analysis’ based on inductive probing of nature; see above pp. 30 (Vieta, Galilei), 38/39 (Bacon)) extends Platonism through causal induction and

c/ *Vico* extends Bacon, whom he admired and of whom he claimed that Rome or Hellas had never had such a thinker, to history, yet he did this “axiomatically”, i.e. He did this ‘axiomatically’, i.e. analytically, - which Bacon did not want to do in order to escape, so to speak, from the purely theoretically useless or ‘effectless’ (as an effectivist, he did not see the ideal structure which the chain ‘cause/effect’ latently contains; - something which Peirce, who was both a scholastic realist and a more pragmatic one, did see). Immediately we understand that Whitehead once claimed that the history of thought of the Occident was only a series of footnotes on Platon (below:

a/ his analyses based on lemma, his lemmatic-analytical method,

b/ not for the reason of his overly high ideas alone) was.

The “historical idea” of Vico.

This idea he called the structure of ‘corso’ and ‘ricorso’.

1/ The ancient Egyptians boasted of three stages: **a/** the time of the gods, **b/** the time of the heroes, **c/** the time of the people (with three language types:

a/ hieroglyphic (= sacred) language (peculiar to ‘gods’ in the ancient sense of psychics, that is),

b/ symbolic (= heroic) language (peculiar to ‘heroes’ in the ancient sense of ‘situated between ‘gods’ and men’ people),

c/ mean language (peculiar to neither psychic nor heroic people). Thus claims Herodotos speaking of the ancient Egyptians.

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2/ M.T. Varro (-116/- 26), *Antiquitatum*, mentions the following classification of past centuries:

(i) the dark ages which, according to Vico, corresponds to the divine times ter Egyptians;

(ii) the fabulous time (corresponding to the heroic time) and

(iii) historical time (// human time) - *tempus tenebrosum, fabulosum, historicum* - (cf. Lavollée, o.c., 139). Cf. *J.B. Vico, Principes de la Philosophie de l'histoire*, Paris, 1963 (reissue of the work published by Mixhelet in 1827, I, axiom 28/30 (Egyptian, Homeric and Varro's historical periodization); for Varro's work *Antiquitatum*, see *S. Augustine, De civitate Dei*, VI: 3).

3/ Vico also refers to *Homer*, who writes in 'heroic' language (*Iliad* and *Odusseia* are, indeed, heroic poems, epic-heroic in style), yet, according to Vico, speaks in five different places of an even older language (which would then be analogous to the style of the gods). - What Vico adds to this is twofold:

a/ modern scientific philology, which becomes both linguistics and literature and history and criticism of sources, from the Renaissance onwards; - it serves as a supply of positive-scientific material that exposes the lemma (i.e. the divine directive of the facts), in the analysis the data, and its factual structure, which does not necessarily have to coincide with the ideal;

b/ the modernization of the antique, indeed archaic triad 'divine/heroic/human': indeed, psychologizing Augustinianism is at work in Vico, reinforced by modern subjectivism (Descartes, Hobbes, Locke); this can be seen from the fact that the archaic interpretation of the triad, which revolved around the soul body and the typology associated with it, has disappeared from Vico's mentality

a/ 'divine' was once that which, by virtue of psychic ability, approaches the high deity;

b/ "heroic" is the profane and military application of that psychic ability in a distinct aristocratic class and profession, chivalry;

c/ 'humane', better 'vulgar' or 'mean' ... not in the sociological sense (expressing contempt), but in the magic-fluid sense of 'not or not sufficiently psychically gifted (or not yet so gifted) that one can handle divine or heroic tasks'. It should be noted that this antique succession (periodisation) already betrays the virus of misunderstanding in the socio-psychological sense; the reason is simple: society essentially consists of simultaneity and not of the succession of these three levels of existence.

This does not prevent the existence of a succession: the decline of society essentially consists in the fact that the leadership of society shifts from a unilateral control by "divine" (understand: superior psychics), over an equally unilateral leadership by "heroes" (understand: military superiors), to a third equally unilateral leadership by neither "divine" nor "heroically" gifted.

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Analysis of the “scienza nuova” (published in 1725)

The “*Scienza Nuova*” is divided into 5 books.

(1) 1st book:

a. chronological table **b.** axiomata **c.** three basic principles.

(a) The principles or tenets indicate that Vico is a Platonist (Renaissance influence). There are 22 general propositions and 92 private propositions, i.e. 114 in total. (Vico anticipates the axiomatic method)

(b) We take a look at axiomata 28-30 (from the 92 private) Ax: 28: dual Egyptian history view: This is about an Egyptian wisdom (along Herodotos) concerning the order of cultural history.

There are three time periods:

(1) gods (divine) **(2)** heroes (heroic) **(3)** people (human)

To this three languages respond:

(1) sacred or sacred language (hieroglyphic)

(2) heroic or symbolic language (heroic)

(3) Ordinary language (vulgar): ordinary subjects.

Ax: 29: Greek conception of history nods to Homer: He writes in heroic language. Homer himself speaks in five different places of “an even older language” (= that of the gods; // Egyptian classification)

Ax: 30: Varro (Roman poet), *Antiquitatum rerum hum. et divin. Libri XLI* (-47) (antique and classical work): it deals with the connection between the gods and men.

Varro’s classification:

(1) tempus tenebrosus (darkness) // divine period

(2) tempus fabulosus (epic) // heroic period

(3) tempus humanum (historical) // human period: everywhere religion (religio) is the beginning of social life.

(c) Ax: 31: vv. then give the axiomata of what Vico calls “practical theology”: Explanation: **1:** Those three great divisions are the first great principle of the new science (ax.28 - 30);

2: That thesis is explained from ax. 31. The peoples are feral through violence, use of weapons. Human laws remain without effect: *stato es lege* (lawless state). One powerful means, religion (cf. etymologically: *neg-ligo*: I neglect, *re-ligo*: I take seriously. One compares “*de-spicere*” (disdain) and “*re-spicere*” (// *respectus*) respect.

Vico thinks: a/ from the archaic tradition (primitives, antiques, classics). The gods, through terror, order the wild man hero, and yet

b/ also modern contemporary. Modern: (// Voltaire: “*Dieu, le grand gendarme*”, reasoning // with Vico)); Contemporary.

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(d) The transition gods heroes → people → (= secularization) is that shift from “gods” to “people” world (i.e., a two-fold transformation).

(e) “The social world is the work of man himself” is one of Vico’s great theses (//typically modern and contemporary thesis) (= nature (work of God)).

Ch. 3: “Principles” or “principles

Chapter 3 of the first book talks about the so-called “principles” or “principles” (foundations of civilization). These are in the number of three:

- (1) God belief (belief in a providence)
- (2) Marriage as a sacred institution (control of urges)
- (3) Sacred funeral of the people (belief in the immortality of the soul).

The human world cannot be without sanctification (“sacralization”) nor the world as a whole (1: providence) nor the world in its parts (2.marriage, funeral3.)

(f) The last chapter of Book I deals with method issues.

(2) **2nd book: the poetic wisdom** (aligned with practice).

It is not yet a science (given its authority and tradition). Poets (and tgl. theologians) were the first thinkers. Vico then goes over in an ordered fashion a kind of encyclopedia of primitive peoples.

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. poetic metaphysics | 6. poetic physics |
| 2. poetic logic | 7. poetic cosmography |
| 3. poetic morality | 8. poetic astronomy |
| 4. poetic family science (econ.) | 9. poetic chronology |
| 5. poetic politics | 10. poetic geography. |

This book deals with the gods and heroes era.

(3) **3rd book: research on Homer** (Greek poetic wisdom).

(4) **4th book:** on the course (evolution) of the history (development in three stages) of peoples. In the introduction he sketches this course, or development, which he sees as the foundation of history.

(a) **First set of sequences:**

1. Nature of Man:

- (1) Poetic (creative or divine)
- (2) heroic and
- (3) Human (and intellectual) natures.

2. Types of morals:

- (1) Vroom
- (2) Honorable
- (3) Duty-sensitive

3. Types of natural law:

- (1) Divine right (direct intervention of the gods)
- (2) Heroic (right of the strongest) Duel e.g.)

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(3) Human reason (consultation)

(1) Theocracy: patriarchs, judges, kings (oracle)

(2) Aristocracy: optimates. Noblemen (the “strong”, the “mighty” rule)

(3) human governance (democracy; equality of intellectual nature (basic)).

(b) Second set of sequences:

1. Languages:

(1) Divine (mental): cf. religious ritual with its mute religious signs (e.g., trading without words), its sacred obligation of silence and stillness (reverence overtakes reasoning).

(2) Heroic: “the weapons speak” (cf. the language and vocabulary of military discipline).

(3) Articulated: human language.

2. Letters (alphabet):

(1) Sacral (hieroglyphic characters). cf. Chinese characters (idea characters).

(2) Heroic characters.

(3) Human (vulgar = common); introduction of small number of letters (the actual alphabet), accessible to all.

(c) Third set of sequences:

1. Jurisdiction:

(1) Divine (// mystical theology: oracle interpretation is central).

(2) Heroic (very precise and strict rules are central).

(3) Human (the facts and their conformity to the truth are central).

2. Authority: civil/political

(1) Divine (does not tolerate explanation or criticism: obedience) // political authority, the owners by divine right.

(2) Aristocratic (solemn legal formulas) // political authority: the ‘senate’ of nobles.

(3) Democratic (the competent people have authority) // pol. authority: consultative bodies of the people.

3. Decision factors, reason for law (raison d’ état):

(1) Divine ‘reason’: a ‘divine’ communication, respectively, prompting; e.g. auspices (examining the entrails of birds) (divine judgment)

(2) Aristocratic reason: ‘la raison d’ état’ (a small leading group, nobles see this reason)

(3) Democratic reason: the understanding of the people (where everyone is equal before the law).

(d) Fourth type sequence:

Verdict:

- (1) Divine judgment (duel).
- (2) Heroic (strict formulas).
- (3) Human (the facts).

(5) Fifth book:

is about the cycle of history: it resumes each time peoples rise from their decline, “corso e ricorso” (i.e. course and re-course of the cycle).

(a) The pre-medieval world had these three stages. But Western European humanity has had to start over in its own way: the Middle Ages was the return of the divine and heroic epoch. Late Roman Empire was in the beginning of the third stage. The invasion of the barbarians marked the return to 1st and 2nd stages.

(b) Thus Vico’s Platonism becomes clear: the cycle “divine, heroic, human” is the guiding idea, the ground plan, the God-willed organization of cultural history. Since the biblical God is central, we are faced here with a Christian Platonism. The cycle, in its threefold order,

a/ is ante rem (// Platon);

b/ That is precisely why he (//Aristotle) is recovered in re by the historical examination of the material and data and

c/ he is established post rem (// nominalism: Protagoras) in the human mind and the historical research it carries out. Cf. preconstitutive (ante, before), constitutive (in), informative (epistemological) and normative (ethical-political, after).

Bibl.

1. *J.-B.Vico, Principes de la philosophie de l’histoire*, - Paris, Colin, 1963, (reissue of the translation by Michelet published in Paris in 1827).

2. *René Lavollée, La morale dans l’histoire (Etude sur les principaux systèmes de philosophie de l’histoire depuis l’antiquité jusqu’ à nos jours)*, Paris, Plon, 1892, pp.129/168 (an old but solid and still very useful work).

Note.-- Vico’s historical triad has found imitators:

(i) L. Feuerbach (1804/1872) says “God was my first thought; reason my second; men my third”. This regarding his own developmental progression.

(ii) A. Comte (1798/1857) distinguishes, in human development, three stages: the “theological” (imagination and sense of community), the “metaphysical” (abstract thought and anarchy), the “positive” (sense of “facts” and new sense of community). Cf. C.S. Peirce’s **(a)** stubbornness and authority method, **(b)** a-priori method (of metaphysicians), **(c)** scientific method.

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After this detailed analysis for the reason of its great importance for later - be the type of conception of history of Vico briefly situated in broader context.

Fr. Engel-Janosi, Weltgeschichte im Grenzen (Universalhistorische Versuche von Vico bis Spengler), (World History within Boundaries (Universal Historical Attempts from Vico to Spengler)), in Wort und Wahrheit XIX (164): 11 (Nov.), S. 685/697, writes that, in the West, there are fundamentally three structures of history coming bare:

(i) the cyclical (circular) one, as with Polubios (-203/-120; 43 supra; Polubios is the first to consciously practice universal history as the framework of private histories) and with Machiavelli (cf. p. 43 supra), as well as with Vico (though more religiously): a succession of necessarily proceeding phases repeats itself in the course of total history;

(ii) the progressist, as with the informationists (including Kant): the perfectibility of the human species is indeterminate; there is indefinite, linear, irreversible progress and development;

(iii) the particularizing one, as with von Ranke, who sees each epoch as a reality in itself and as having value in itself (the individual of his epoch, - view akin to romanticism).

a/ One blames the cyclical for its stagnation and anti-progressism;

b/ one accuses the progressist of underestimating the enduring values of the past;

c/ the particularist that it undervalues the global-planetary view. Finally, they complement each other.

Natural science and humanities (humanities).

K. Vorländer, History of Philosophy, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1971, 3 (New Age to Kant), p. 187vv; notes that Vico,

A/ for Herder (1744/1803) and Hegel (1770/1831), was a philosopher of history - and therefore went against Descartes, who saw in history science no science - and, especially

B/ developed his own epistemology, by which he, in opposition to natural science, with its

a/ either causal inductionism (Bacon)

b/ or mathematism (Galileo, Descartes), did not produce or did not sufficiently understand human facts, founded the humanities. Basis of Vico's epistemology is: the 'verum' (the true) is the 'factum' (the produced, accomplished). Causality (already noted by Bacon) is central: 'knowing' is 'knowing causes' (an old proposition); Vico translates this old proposition into the modern sense: we know - like every knowing being, incidentally (including God) - only what we ourselves have made, produced, caused: our own causality is at once the basis of knowledge.

Consequence

(i) Galilean-Cartesian geometry (and all that is mathematical) is a man-made, constructed set of objects and operations (of a fictitious nature); therefore, man knows numbers and figures.

(ii) Yet concrete reality differs from those mathematical entities:

(ii)a. the cosmos surrounding us is not man-made;

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a) only the Creator, God, is able to know nature, man, himself only a creature, cannot therefore boast of a maker's knowledge: nature is opaque. Descartes claims to have founded a science of nature (in the line of Galileo); yet:

1) only the 'res extensa', the extended body (and even then in its machine-like structure), is really accessible to reason;

2) as far as consciousness is concerned, says Vico, Descartes achieves only the formal side, not the real 'intelligere', the 'insight', which penetrates into the structure itself. Thus, he rather achieves "a twofold formal knowing.

(a) the mathematical-physical and

(b) the introspective-axiomatic;

(ii)b. human reality - and this then understood as philological science

(a) of languages of literatures and, along these,

(b) of customs, laws, institutions, conceptions, etc. - cannot be approached with Cartesian science or philosophy: the common nature of peoples - Vico thinks what people do, essentially socially and not individually like Descartes et al - is something that escapes methodical doubt! Why? Because we have made that nature of nations ourselves and are still experiencing it. Beyond all doubt is the fact that the "history of nations" was created, caused by people like us. This co-causality is the fixed and certain knowledge base.

"The New Science, according to (Vico), is 'a philosophy and at the same time a history of humanity; and it is possible, since the nature of men and of peoples is itself human and historical. It is not given once and for all, in advance, by its physical condition, but the 'natura' of man has become what it is, 'nascendo' (by coming into being, being born) by the historical law of its equally natural and providential development." (K. Löwith, *World History (philosophically and biblically speaking)*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1960 (// Dt: *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen*), p. 111).

In summary: a/ man can only be sure of what he himself causes;

b/ consequence:

(1) Nature outside of man is either knowable as mathematics or as mathematized physical (Descartes).

(2) history, culture, as caused by man, is really knowable (not irrational but the historical world of culture is more real than the points, lines, planes and numbers and symbols of mathematics, although they are both cultural products. Cf. K. Löwith, *Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen*, (World history and salvation events), in *Anteile M. Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag*, Frankf. a. M., 1950, S. 106/108.

It should be noted that, like Descartes, Vico depends on *S. Augustine (De civitate Dei*; see above p. 8), if only because Vico

a) as Augustine, exceeds the narrow framework of 'political' history of Herodotos, Thoeukudides and Polubios and, also

b) possesses the modern understanding that man not only has history, but actively makes it, including through the control of nature.

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Impact

K. Löwith, *World History*, p. 106, summarizes Vico's influence:

- (i)a. regarding mythology (myth analysis), he was ahead of Schelling and Bachofen,
- (i)b. on Homer knowledge on Wolf's theory of Homer, on Roman history on Niebuhr and Mommsen, on knowledge of ancient life on *Fustel de Coulanges (La cité antique)* and on reconstruction through Grimm's etymology,
- (ii)a. on von Savigny's historical interpretation of law, on the class struggle doctrine of K. Marx and G. Sorel,
- (ii)b. on the philosophy of history (historiology) of Herder, Hegel, Dilthey, Spengler;

(iii) to be added here is the fact that the distinction between natural and spiritual science (Dilthey) and between natural and cultural science (Rickert, of the Badener Schule) is clearly present with Vico (and without the historicism or scientism present with the XIX-d'centuryers).

Here we add that Pascal, as Descartes critic,

- (i) had studied nature as an object of exact science (experimental and mathematical),
- (ii) had deepened human reality in observation and analysis of soul life in its "misery" and "leap" into God's arms: thus he paved a parallel path to human reality and human science, yet very introspective and individual, - thus gaining "authority" in contemporary existentialism.

(iv) A word will be said about the linguistic side of Vico; here's this more:

- (a) Descartes saw the individual-creative of speech and language;
- (b) Vico sees the socio-historical: the *sapientia volgare*, the *sensus communis*, the popular spirit expresses itself immediately in language, which is the utterance of the understanding of reality (Romanticism and the historical school will work out this insight).

(iv) The so-called 'contemporaries of Leibniz'.

Just to be mentioned are Amos Comenius (1592/1670) - cf. above p. 49 (Rosicrucianism) -, the well-known educator and didacticist; Angelus Silesius (= J. Scheffler (1624/1677)) the mystic; Tschirnhaus (1651/1709), who advocates a kind of mental hygiene (*Medicina mentis*), i.e. logic as heuristic (art of finding).

(v) The English 'Natural Philosophy'. -As one knows, 'natural philosophy' is

(a) both positive science of nature

(b) as a philosophy of nature. Two figures can be named here.

J. Rosmorduc, *Histoire de la physique et de la chimie (De Thalès à Einstein)*, Paris/ Montréal, 1979, pp. 21/22, says that, after the scientific revolution (Galilei, Bacon), in the Renaissance, the modern type of (professional) science emerges:

(i) science is becoming more and more independent of theology and even of philosophy (which does not prevent Descartes, Leibniz, Pascal et al. from being philosophers at the same time): "the sciences have become autonomous matters and are no longer part of philosophy" (o.c., 22);

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(ii) scientific progress becomes more and more bound to technique: since the Renaissance technique has begun to play an essential role in the scientific revolution (see above p. 31/32; one thinks of the instruments of theoreticians who want to experiment and in particular to measure, weigh etc.);

There is more: science itself, as an act of man, is somewhere in essence 'technocracy' i.e. that basic attitude towards being (both nature and mankind which is all

(a) 'rational' (mainly mathematical and experimental,

(b) but also wants to approach it more broadly, "causally" ("effectivist"); the "rational" person feels reality is controllable through theoretical and practical techniques.

J. Rosmorduc notes that

(a) in the Renaissance, astronomy and mathematics (especially geometry) were time-honored sciences, which, for centuries, had paved its way.

(b) Galilei founded mechanics.

(c) The other sciences will now, after a groping empirical phase, arise one by one.

Robert Boyle (1622/1691) founded chemistry: he introduced an atomistic theory but placed it in a teleological or finalistic philosophy of nature (with him, the four "roots" of Empedokles - earth, water, air, fire - were definitively abandoned).

Isaac Newton (1642/1727), with his famous "*Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*" (1682) founded the theory of gravitation. This completes the worldview of the Renaissance. - Newton understands space in a more or less theosophical sense: it is 'absolute' (one can compare it with Einstein's 'relative' space); it is the infinite 'sensorium Dei', God's all-pervading presence, through which He sees ('ipsas res') things from within ('intime cernit'), surveys them completely and includes Himself. God is omnipresent not only through his virtus, power, but also through his substance (his independent essence itself), because there can be no 'power' without 'substance'.

With this is related the *actio in distans*, the action at a distance, so characteristic of Newton (already conceived by Alexander of Aphrodisias, incidentally), from one body to another.

Also notable is the tendency to hypostasize the laws of the universe, enthroned, eternal and unchanging, above all phenomena, which change (to make something like high, unapproachable 'ideas' à la Platon).

These laws govern the structura, the construction, of the planetary system, in which one sees God at work as the purpose-directing Creator who gives the machine the initial pulse (analogous teleology as with Boyle). There is something of the Cambridger Platonists in Newton (cf. p. 106) The teleological philosophy of nature will emerge from that finalism (William Derham: "physico-theology"; Samuel Glarke: *God Proofs*). Cf. O. Willmann, III, S. 97/101. - Newton, Boyle are 'baroque' thinkers, not yet Aufklärer. Only the XVIIIth e. (one thinks of Voltaire) will convert Newton et al.

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This is all the more evident when one knows that

(i) R. Boyle is known for his test of rebirth ('palingenesis' also called in occult circles: which consists in precipitating the soul shadow of plant, animal or even man (called homunculus) in a processed substance: Boyle himself reports that he had copper causticized with 'wine spirit'; he had this copper dissolved with many particles of wine spirit; the solution thus obtained he mixed with snow and salt; these three together he allowed to freeze; result: on the ice he observed small grapevines.

(ii) I. Newton 's fame as a scientist does not prevent it from being established that he was a passionate lover of "alchemy. Don't be alarmed. Well, alchemy at the time was inevitably intertwined with astrology. He occupied himself with 'a history of the origins of the world, as was common in his day (anything but purely scientific); yes, he wrote about the predictions of the Old Testament and the Apocalypse.

All of this is, of course, "reasonably" concealed by the "official," "rationalist" historiography.

(IV) *The so-called irrational or non-rationalist philosophies.*

We are going to be brief about that.

(A) First of all this: 'A count of the very explicit or partly explicitly occultist books, published in the XVII th century, gives 'a percent of 11,3 or something in that sense. Add to this the other works that explicitly incorporate occult data or secretly adhere to them, and one can form an accurate judgment of the still large presence of occultism in all its forms (magic, spiritualism, demonism, reincarnation).

(B) Dr. *L.Büchner*, the great German materialist, in his '*n Feiten en theorieën uit de natuurwetenschappelijke wereld van de tegenwoordige tijd*, (Facts and theories from the natural science world of the present day) Amsterdam, s.d., p. 183, refers to the Brussels native and chemist J.-B. van Helmont (1579/1644) as the inventor of the 'archeüs' (= spirit of life; cf. Paracelsus supra 57/58): according to Büchner, who is unsuspecting on this point, "van Helmont (with that subtle phantom or archeüs) performed well-successful healings".

Büchner is mistaken: van Helmont was a follower of Paracelsus, who already spoke of the "archeüs" and connected it to an "animal" (actually "living", - because the plant phantom or archeüs also radiates) magnetism (similar to mineral magnetism).

Büchner, o.c., 177, mentions that the name "animal magnetism" comes from the polyhistor A. Kircher, S. J. (1602/1680) and that the famous Mesmer, in the XVIIIth e., conceals it. Kircher,--that is the full XVIIth century! And he is far from alone with his 'n experiments in all fields of occultism.

(C) Cf. *J. Godwin, A. Kircher (Un homme de la Renaissance à la quête du savoir perdu)*, (A Renaissance man in search of lost knowledge), Paris, 1980 (// Eng. 1979) The Cambridger Platonists incorporated these occult notions into their contemporary system, as O. Willmann, III, S. 94, not without dissatisfaction, says.

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Current philosophy (XVIIIth / XXth century.).

A) The Enlightenment.

It may surprise you to learn that contemporary philosophy begins with the Enlightenment (Aufklärung, Enlightenment, Lumières); but one should not forget that, with the Enlightenment, the undercurrent called “Preromancy” also comes into play.

(A) In this we rely on A. Bolckmans, *Overzicht der wijsgerige stromingen in de wereldliteratuur (Survey of philosophical movements in world literature)*, Ghent, 1972, II, p. 1/24 (it is striking that the work begins its second deel with the XVIIIth e.).

The reason: to this day (a) we either live by the Enlightenment and Preromancy (b) or we live against it (c) or we are in its crisis; - in any case: these two cultural powers, for those who have eyes, make themselves felt daily in all areas of life, 1) both among the intelligentsia and the educated, 2) and among the people.

(B) A second reason why we let the present begin now is exposed when we read Th. Geiger, *The Creative Vanguard (On the Social Functions of the intelligentsia)*, Rotterdam/Antwerp, 1970, p. 74:

“The economic changes which, as a result of the Crusades, took place, favored the growth of cities; in the cities a high level of prosperity developed; here a proud citizenry developed, whose field of vision widened with the range of its economic relations.

On this basis

a/ on the one hand, the territorial state;

b/ on the other hand, a profane representative culture can develop here, for the benefit of which a prosperous society exempts a small part of its members (...): the intelligentsia”. A bit higher, Geiger says: “The intelligentsia as well as the territorial state belong to the industrial and urban civilization.” (ibid.)

(C) Well, E. Jünger, *Der Arbeiter*, Hamburg, 1932, sees preromancy and romanticism as an attempt to break through the urban-rational limitation of life within its security, in order to come into contact with the “other” and its “other space of life,” which Jünger likes to call “elementar” (relating to the elements of nature).

(D) The feeling of the compact iceberg under which the regulated and ‘reasonable’ civilian existence is suffocating in labor and calculation - one thinks of today’s Swiss youth, who are gaining analogous impressions in the over-regulated welfare country that Switzerland still is today - prompts one to ‘de-border’, and to do so in two degrees:

(i) the romantic-irrational, which opposes the overnormalization of the repressed and repressed “instincts,” i.e., the tendencies of the subconscious “life” and “desire” toward paradises of free indulgence in offensive urges and eros;

(ii) the naturalistic, more rational yet “businesslike” degreening, which asserts that there is only causal, merely mindless “natural law,” which means no moral-political norming, but determinism, fate, fatality; i.e., the rational man renounces the independent and free rational decision,

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to let themselves float on the wild but merciless sea of “nature” and its “laws,” which represent pure necessity, - yes, the result of the hypostasis that Newton et al. were already, in the XVII-th century spirit.

As F. Boerwinkel, *The Philosophy of Life of Marcellus Emants (A contribution to the knowledge of the autonomous citizen of the Nineteenth Century)*, (The Philosophy of Life of Marcellus Emants (A contribution to the knowledge of the autonomous citizen of the Nineteenth Century)), Amsterdam, 1943, p. 9, maintains (and with supporting argumentation), “between (Romanticism and Naturalism) too absolute a distinction is often made, while no attention is paid to what is common in them (...): the urge to free oneself from the compulsion of objective norms. The means of achieving this end is different:

- (a) the romantic goes the way of irrationalism,
- (b) the naturalist that of rationalism”.

As an example of this, the proposer cites E. Zola: “In a figure like Zola, we see the change of path, while keeping the same goal (...).

a) In his youth he was a typical romantic; **b)** around 1867 he was “converted” to the scientific path, but, in essence, his goal changed nothing. Before and after, it remains: to control the world, to be a creator himself. In this context it is also remarkable that Zola sometimes speaks of Rousseau as a romantic, then again he classifies him with the great naturalists”. (o.c. 10/11).

(E) As a final witness, mention should be made of A. Van Rooy, *O.P. Origine et expansion du spiritisme*, (Origin and expansion of spiritualism,), Liège, 1930, p. 1, where he says that man possesses an innate sense of the uncanny; then he continues, “In the XVIIIth e. **a)** had banished reborn materialism (that sense of mystery) from souls.

(b) These, however, preserved her openness to the other world. The means of satisfying this openness was the caricature of mystery, the attraction of the miraculous. Do we not see the miraculous as an expression of the invisible? And superstition: isn't this an imitation of faith, replacing lost faith?

Here are a few testimonies to show that the choice which consists in starting contemporary philosophy at the beginning of the XVIIIth century is not without heavy arguments.

Note.- E. Benz, *Ergriffenheit und Besessenheit als Grundform religiöser Erfahrung*, (Grasping and possession as a basic form of religious experience,), in the book of the same title, Bern/München, 1972, s. 125ff., notes - metabletically as, in our own case, people like J. R. van den Berg (*Metabletica or doctrine of changes*, 1956) or S. Parabirsing (*The metabletic method (An analysis of- the doctrine of J.H. v.d. Berg, with ten theses headed by Dr. P.J. Thung*, Meppel, 1976)) - both related to views with Th. Kuhn or M. Foucault - Benz, therefore, notes that

(a) Ergriffenheit (seized, inspiration, inspirational state, eagerness, inspiration) and **(b)** Besessenheit (possession, bondage) are ancient in religious experience, yes, can be found as far back as the most archaic times.

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(A) But now listen carefully: “The differentiation of enthusiasm and possession (at least in German) - according to the mentality, there is at least in principle no difference between the Dutch and German contemporary word usage - I insert this here in the text by Benz in order not to reap the reproach that I mix up the word usage of the languages without reason - is in any case of more recent origin and can be dated linguistically to the XVIIth century. Since then

(i) inspiration’ - at least in contemporary parlance - encounter with the divine in its beatific, healing, renewing form, while

(ii) Possession means an overpowering in the sense of possession by a demonic or diabolical or evil spirit, which in a harmful, more destructive way allows itself to be perceived in the range of a human personality.

(B) a/ In the older layers of religious terminology concerning experience in the religious sphere, the two concepts are still fairly close to each other and are partly interchangeable: they mean two changeable aspects of the zeal (enthusiasm), i.e. of being seized, filled, possessed by a god or demon or spirit.

b/ The modern psychological meaning of being seized by a feeling or a piece of theater or music, a poem, a painting or even a landscape (...) only refers to the psychologization of the older mystical concepts which can be found in the language of Pietism of the XVIIIth century; this language is at the same time that language which has strongly influenced German Classics.

Both categories - seizure and possession - refer to the fact that the religious experience - whether the “transcendent” (i.e., the external and supra-terrestrial) is perceived in the form of a person or of an impersonal power has no importance - is perceived by man as an undergoing, an intervention of the “transcendent” from above, from below, from outside or within.

From here it becomes understandable why mystic psychology treats religious experience (perception) as a ‘gôt liden’, as a ‘pati deo’ (Master Eckhart, - cf. supra p. 16: Late Middle Ages mysticism), who lives 1260/1327 and who is the founder of purely speculative mysticism in the West, d. i. who deploys the intellectual processing of the mystical experiences, and this in Neoplatonic mentality, i. e. with strongly pantheistic, i. e. God and man merging neo-liberalism. i. who initiated the intellectual processing of mystical experiences, and who is referred to in Neoplatonic mentality, i. e. with strongly pantheistic, i. e. God and man merging into each other).

This basic attitude of man towards the ‘transcendent’ - one notices Benz’ tendency to use neutra, neuter quality words to refer to God, spirits, souls etc. (including the nature spirits) - which has been increasing since the Neo-Platonization of the religious experience (one thinks of what Plotinos in the III th introduced into ancient theosophy, so to speak, in order to push Greek intellectualism into the ‘comprehensionless confusion’ of the theosophism of the Late Old World) - is the result of the fact that the Greek theosophist has not been able to understand the nature of the spirit world. A.D. introduced neutra, neuter words, into ancient theosophy, so to speak, in order to carry Greek intellectualism through into the “conceptless confusion” of Late Antiquity theosophism)

HW 124

This basic attitude, then, toward the ‘transcendent’ as nothing but object of divine intervention is perhaps “most clearly expressed in *Luther’s* work ‘*De serve arbitrio*’ (On the slavish will).

In contrast to the Humanist concept of freedom of Erasmus of Rotterdam, who attributed to man, also towards God, a modest right of self-determination, Luther emphasized man’s absolute dependence towards God (...) (o.c., 125).

Conclusion of this comment.

(1) The psychologization of not at all psychologically-subjective or intersubjective realities has its origin already in the intellectualist-rationalist philosophies of Late Antiquity, in particular Neoplatonism (which, under the guise of objective contents of thought

(a) radical pantheism and

(b) immediately, psychologizes, rather, subjectivizes (cf. Descartes and Hobbes’ subjectivism (pp. 69vv, 100vv supra) are, under that point of view, as traditional-Greek as it gets !).

(2) The Middle Ages, (and not only Descartes or Hobbes; also not Galileo or Bacon or later Vico (see p. 111, where the sociologization of obviously non-sociological concepts and realities is the false historicization or rather periodization, as with Descartes, among others and especially of S. Augustine comes - Augustine, who Neoplatonized to Christianity),- the Middle Ages have already begun to ‘subjectivize’,- the ‘Middle Ages’, i.e. the Scholastic, also where it more emphatically condemns dogmatic pantheism or equally dogmatic reincarnation or similar ‘errors’ as anti-Church doctrine!

One thinks of what Poortman has made clear to us about that one point, angelic dualism, which both with Thomas (hylemorphically obscured) and with Descartes (dualistically brutal) and with Kant (critically softened) - cf. p. 88ff - forms one big dominant Western tradition, against the archaic-objective religious-mystical-magical experience (what Poortman tries to make clear, although he too is still Neo-Platonizing).

“Significant is the fact that an ecclesiastical opposition to exorcism - understand: the traditional Catholic exorcism of the devil - only began in conjunction with the progress of Aufklärung, which, during the XVIIIth century, also spread in Roman Catholic theology. At that time, a fierce rejection (resentment) of exorcism was expressed:

(a) not only because of some modernist (see page 60 supra) Roman Catholic theologians

(b) but, above all, because of those bishops and cardinals who had been ‘seized’ by the new educational wave of the German Aufklärung.” (Benz, o.c., 144). The history of Gassner and Mesmer needs to be briefly but substantially set forth here in order to typify the spirit of the XVIIIth century.

HW 125

(A) we begin with a correction, which Büchner, o.c., 183, deserves: he claims that in Bavaria and Swabia, since 1775, the former Jesuit and devil banner Fr. Gassner, worked under astonishing admittance and gave rise to a flood of dissensions for and against him. Let us now hear what really happened:

(i) As early as 1755, it was proposed that Dr Mesmer be commissioned with the analysis of Gassner's devil's advocacy;

(ii) Already in 1766 Dom F. Sterzinger, monk of the theatre in Munich, gave in the Academy of Sciences there a fierce speech against witches and devil-beliefs in connection with Gassner and he did not hesitate to publish the confidential correspondence of Kard. von Rodt, bishop of Meersburg and adherent of the new aufgeklärte (enlightened) school of thought, against Gassner's exorcisms;

(iii) In the summer of 1774, Gassner received permission from his bishop in Chur to make a grand healing tour along the Rhine - this because of the great results Gassner achieved with his time-honored means; He chose Meersburg, von Rodt's residence city, as his first station, where "generals, provosts, cathedral lords, barons and baronesses of Constance, other ordinary priests, and people were already waiting for almost the tenth day" (according to the somewhat disconcerted secretary of the bishop).

Compare these accurate data with what the "scientist-materialist" Büchner insinuates, in the brief sentence, regarding Gassner!

(B) However, let us examine further. *H. Grassl, Aufbruch zur Romantik (Bayerns Beitrag zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte 1765/1785)*, (The Dawn of Romanticism (Bavaria's Contribution to German Intellectual History 1765/1785) Munich, 1968, S. 131/ 153, gives, according to Benz, the realities of history, from which we extract the essential.

(i) Gassner's method:

a/ Usually Gassner relied on the formulas of the *Rituale Romanum* ("great exorcism"); sometimes he resorted to short formulas;

b/ diagnosis:

(i) **he** himself had arrived at the point of exorcism when, as a parish priest (°1727), he fell ill and found that all medical means were ineffective; in desperation he started from the working hypothesis that his ailment was of satanic origin and, consequently, he used the *Rituale Romanum* (which had served as an exorcist's manual for centuries in the Catholic Church but, in his time, was no longer used - which is typical of the metabletic nature of the Catholic Church); Result: Astonishing in himself and, later, in others;

(ii) decisive for his intervention was the evidence that what was presented to him was not 'natural' (according to the notions of 'natural' disease or illness of any kind at that time), but manifestly 'demonic' (possession): therefore

1) he questioned the afflicted;

2) as a second diagnostic, he laid hands on them or shook the demonized

3) above all, as a third means of characterization or criterion, he commanded the devil(s) in the name of Jesus that they should make themselves known:

HW 126

(1) This command, after then repetition and ten times shaking, did not work, Gassner assumed that the evil was “natural.”

(2) If, however, symptoms of a demonic nature, such as convulsions, being thrown to the ground, tremors in the finger, etc., showed the possession, he would incant, either at length (*Rituale romanum*) or briefly (e.g., “In the name of var Jesus I command you to depart from me at once, damned hell spirit! Jesus! Jesus! Jesus!”), during which Gassner often called or even shouted in a loud voice to Satan, who had brought the tormented person into possession, in order to strengthen the effect of the exorcist formula.

(iii) *The elimination of Gassner.*

In July and August 1775, one year after Gasner, Dr Mesmer, the famous magnetizer who worked with so-called “animal” (better: vital) magnetism, arrived in Meersburg. This Austrian doctor (1734/1815) actually came from Zell (Swabia), had studied in Vienna and obtained Austrian nationality; his thesis was entitled “*The development of diseases according to planetary influences*”, the title of his doctoral thesis proving that in the full XVIIIth century astrology was anything but taboo at the Vienna University!

P. Mariel, Magiciens et sorciers (Les dessous sataniques de l’histoire), (Magicians and sorcerers (The satanic underside of history), Verviers, 1974 (published in 1961 under the title ‘*Le diable dans l’ histoire*), p. 162, says that Mesmer had succeeded in medicine in Germany, Switzerland, Austria “thanks to ‘a method which he kept strictly secret.”

K. Seligmann, Le miroir de la magie (Histoire de la magie dans le monde occidental), (The mirror of magic (History of magic in the western world), Paris, 1961, p. 359, describes Mesmer’s system of ideas as follows: his starting point was the Brusseler J. -B. van Helmont (+1644), follower of Paracelsus, the Swiss physician and occultist, who already in the XVIth e. (1493/1541) knew the so-called (later called by Kircher “animal”) magnetism under the name of “archeüs” (archaios, which is the archè or principle); these archeüs

(a) first of all formed the fine material astral) soul body of the living being, to which he belonged (plant, animal, human) to

(b) along the soul body, to prepare the form model of the gross material body (the soul body formed by the archeüs is called by Paracelsus “*idea corporis elementaris*”, “thought model of the physical body composed of the four elements, i.e. the ordinary physical body we all know from biology”). van Helmont understood the archeüs as *forma vitalis*, *forma animalis* (form of life, “animal” form). Also M. Marci of Kronlandr, physician in Prague, city, like Lyon, known for its occultist tradition (+1655), understood the archeüs as power and capacity of the soul (...) to act in a life-like way.

R. Cudworth, the leader of the Cambridger Platonists, situated the archeüs between, on the one hand, the idea of God concerning a living being, and, on the other, the living individual itself (as an intermediary therefore between the purely ideal and the material individual being).

HW 127

Mesmer, like van Helmont (see above p. 120), who performed successful healings based on the archeüs concept as a principle of health, applied magnetization therapeutically instead of speculatively, like e.g. Cudworth.

(a) All living bodies - how different from Descartes' corps-machine! -, according to Mesmer, emit 'material' (understand: subtle) rays and/or undulations (i.e. avant la lettre a piece of microphysics) which are controlled by the souls of those material bodies (the soul as cybernetic principle, i.e. that causality which lets its consequence work back on itself, restoring if necessary, - what is now called feedback or feed back).

The people who possess a strong degree of archeüs etc., can, according to Seligmann, o.c., on Mesmer's ideas, p. 359, pass on these radiations as health-giving forces to less fortunate people, if they know how to direct them: they can 'direct' them either by the laying on of hands (or any other contact; cf. the contactual side of archaic magic) or through 'an iron rod which serves as a 'conductor'.

(b) It should be noted, with Seligmann, that Mesmer considers magnetic energy, which is essentially 'vital' (and thus emerges from biological bodies), nevertheless dependent on the celestial bodies (and their sympathy or attraction

1) relative to the human being or living being being treated and

2) with respect to the treating transmitter); yes, he presents it as if the 'archeüs' draws life spirit (i.e. magnetic life force or radiation) from 'heaven' (understand: from the firmament). Which, in view of the time-honored doctrine of the "archeüs" as microcosm, i.e., as image in the subtle of the macrocosm, - one thinks of Leibniz's monad (see above p. 94), which represents the smallest type of archeüs, - about the smallest nature spirits of ordinary magic -, is not surprising.

(c) The rest - a magnetizer barrel, music, sumptuous interiors, etc. - is incidental to Mesmer's method and may have been publicity and disguise - doesn't Mariel say he hid his resultant method? - is incidental to Mesmer's method and may have been intended as publicity and disguise - doesn't Mariel say that he concealed his resultant method? - intended.

Mariel, o.c., pp. 165/166, maintains that the method was actually the secret of the Rosicrucians, who kept it strictly secret, but that, for some reason, High Freemasonry and Rosicrucianism gave the consigne to which Mesmer adhered very strictly.

After all, he was a member of Vienna's Freemasonry and in contact with all "adepts," i.e., initiates of a high degree. Mesmer was indisputably, Mariel says, protected by the Rosicrucians. This publishing consigne has its counterpart in the spiritualist method, worked out by J.-B. Willermoz (Lyon) and ready to be disseminated to the public around 1775, i.e. somewhat later than magnetism. Which does not prevent spiritualism from making the front pages only around 1847 and following. Was there an occultist plan to initiate mankind broadly?

HW 128

Note - To anticipate for a moment: Mesmer arrived in Paris on 10.02.1778, where he achieved a brilliant success, but also the double interpretation as everywhere before (the Académie de Médecine was hostile to him; Louis XVI protected him);

In addition to this public activity, Mesmer founded, in April 1783, the Société de l' Harmonie, a lodge of Freemasons, blindly subject to himself: Montesquieu - yes, himself! - La Fayette, Noailles and others were initiated into magnetism. This secret society soon had branches in Lyon, Bordeaux, Bayonne, Dijon, Macon, Quimper, Nantes. Especially the nobility was initiated.

Mariel suspects that Mesmer wanted to magically arm the nobility against the storm that would break out against him a few years later. "The Société de l' Harmonie had ties with other initiatic societies (cf. supra pp. 48/49, about the secret societies), especially with Le Régime Rectifié, - of which Willermoz was in charge at a given time -, society which at that time grouped almost all the princes of Central Europe. But also with the Rit Primitif de Narbonne - which had its seat in Paris - (...).

Well, the Rit Primitif de Narbonne 'encompassed' all pre-revolutionary secret societies. This society was with certainty (...) the thinking brain for the illuminati, initiates, adepts of this strange epoch. The Rit Primitif de Narbonne had its adepts among such notable as seemingly conflicting personalities as Joseph de Maistre and Cagliostro, Talleyrand and Danton, the Rabbi Falck and the Hereditary Prince of Sweden." (Mariel, o.c., 172/173). For details see, e.g., (among the incalculable literature).

-- *J. Chauveau, La conjuration de Satan*, (The conjuration of Satan), Paris, 1969 (on the religious persecution organized by the secret societies under the French Revolution);

-- *P. Mariel, dir., Dictionnaire des Sociétés Secrètes en Occident*, Paris, 1971 (characters, groups). All this to give a sense of the true background of what took place, in Germany, with Gassner from the Church.

So, in 1775, this Mesmer, just outlined (even if some of the correctly given information is before or after that date, they are part of the figure), arrives at Meersburs to explain his magnetism: von Rodt, acquainted with the Episcopal family of the Mesmers, has proposed to him to travel to Munich to eliminate, in the name of "science," Gassner's activities.

Mesmer gave "convincing" evidence that such things (as Gassner did them) were neither always deceit nor supernatural miracles, but that they were due to "nature" - the fundamental concept of the XVIIIth century - in some cases of illness. Both the Elector of Bavaria and the Munich Academy of Science were promptly convinced: Gassner's exorcisms were banned in Bavaria and by Emperor Joseph II (well known to us Belgians) throughout the "Römer Reich Deutscher Nation" (i.e. the rest of the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages);

HW 129

Even the Pope, Pius VI, banned Gassner's writings and the archbishops of Salzburg and even of Prague published pastoral letters against "the 'Gaukeleien' (magic) by touching with the hands the limbs of the sick without distinction of sex, by pressure, touch, shaking" (sic);

But for Mesmer, the time of glory arrived: he was elected a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences then even by the Academy itself! "Science smiled upon itself with satisfaction because it could begin its triumph over demonology and its therapeutic method, exorcism." Thus Benz himself, in his concluding remark (o.c., 145)

(A) Indeed, nosology or disease science entered its 'aufgeklärte' phase: still *J. H. van Meurs, Kritische psychiatrie*, in Streven, jrg. 26 (1973): 9 (June), pp. 835/842, makes a strong case when he speaks of what he calls the 'theistic' model of disease, starting from the arch-unintelligible proposition that "God imposes the disease" (sic) and giving as an example "possession by a demon", just as if God - which God? - that of the Bible or that of the Ancient Greeks e.g. ?

One should not give the most elementary clarifications, as a man of science, signs when it comes to discrediting religion, or what one wants to wear for it, in its therapies in favor of so-called "scientific models of disease", of which everyone experiences daily how precarious they are in their results, especially when it comes to "psychic" ailments - just as if God, in his high responsibility, imposes disease in the form of possession!

Other models are brought up:

(a) ***the moral model*** (Aristotle is said to have claimed that one misuses reason only willfully and, in that 'Aristotelian' line, Heinroth, German psychiatrist around 1800, is credited with claiming that all mental illness arises from guilt and sin, with the inference: mentally ill people are criminals);

(b) ***the 'medical', understand physical-medical model*** (the mental illness is 'real' (!) disease, i.e. physically caused, lawfully progressing, pathologically-anatomically underpinned, amenable to a particular treatment; as an example: Kräpelin (+/- 1800);

(c) ***the psychogenic model*** (Breuer, Freud: mental illness has psychic causes (so does conduct disorder); this +/- 1900);

(d) ***the sociogenic model*** (deviants such as alcoholics, thieves, hippies, conscientious objectors, are 'Entfremdete' (to use Marx's term), i.e. victims of the existing system which is either micro-social (family, school) or macro-social (society with environmental decay, overpopulation, aggression, bureaucratisation, etc.) in a state of decay and disease; the present-day mainly New Left psychiatry). According to van Meurs, combinations are also possible: e.g., the Staphorst diagnosis, called 'theological-moralistic' by van Meurs (polio epidemic was not considered amenable to scientific treatment because of prejudices which thought partly 'theistic' (first model) partly moral (so-called Aristotelian model)).

HW 130

(B) One could add to this scientific species theory the Pavlovian model:

-- W. Schmidbauer, *From magic to psychotherapy*, Haarlem, 1973 (//Dt: *Psychotherapie (Ihr Weg von der Magie zur Wissenschaft)*, Munich, 1971), p. 41vv.. There steller mentions the “ecstatic worship services of our time” (p. 40vv.) and says:

“One should not underestimate the therapeutic value of these practices.” (o.c.,41) And he mentions that in Rio de Janeiro, for example, +/- 40% of the nominally Catholic population (nine million inhabitants) are spiritualists and that the number of Macumba and Candomblé adherents may represent an even higher percentage.

-- Cf. A. Pollak-Eltz, *Afro-American Religions and Cults*, Roermond, 1970 (fascinating study of the syncretism of Christianity and (Native American and/or) African religions in N., M. and S.-America);

-- G. Playfair, *Le pouvoir de l' invisible*, (The power of the invisible), Paris, 1975 (// Eng.: *The Flying Cow*, London, 1975) and

-- C. Pettiward, *Exorcism (Plea for a New Approach to Possession)*, Haarlem, 1977 (Eng: *The Case for Possession*, 1975) (both works give an insight into the spiritoid approach, as practiced especially in Brazil by the followers of Kardecist spiritualism, which can be called an “enlightened” and “social” phenomenon, at least in its genre).

When one hears Schmidbauer claiming that, for him, O.G. Jung (who once started out as a spiritualist - one thinks of Elly Preiswerk, his niece, who served as a guinea pig!) and Pavlov, the Russian reflexologist (see above pp. 85/86 about Descartes' reflex theory), “for the purpose of gaining psychological insight into these ‘ecstasy phenomena’ (the Brazilian religious therapies repeatedly, though not always, show rapture as mediation), one is reminded of the fact that the psychologist is a man of the world. Descartes' reflex theory), “for the acquisition of a psychological insight into these ‘ecstasy-phenomena’ (the Brazilian religious therapies repeatedly but not always show ecstasy as a medial or mediumistic method of healing)” provide “useful theories” (cfr. o.c., 41) and comparing these with the works cited above, one finds that the ‘psychologization’ or ‘sociologization’ (the two are distinct but not separate) which Benz, above, spoke of as a phenomenon that began in the XVIIth century, is still continuing and active.

The basic error of all such medicalizing, psychologizing, sociologizing or whatever - izing interpretations of religion and its therapies is that they proceed ‘externalistically’, i.e. they first plant themselves well in a perspective (preferably as established - scientific and ‘aufgeklärt’ as possible, to, from that fortress (safe-holiness) as a spectator-behaviorist (behaviorist) to ‘interpret’ religion and its therapies in prepared basic concepts.

Internalistically, however, one apparently does not dare: after all, religion is only Cartesianly attainable:

HW 131

She is “viewed” from **1)** the interior **2)** in a body **3)** between bodies (**1/** psychological, **2/** physical **3/** human), while

(**a**) the particulate or (stricto sensum) agische),

(**b**) the spiritoide (or spirit(s) concerning: either demons or souls of deceased persons or nature spirits of all levels of power concerning fluid),

(**c**) the satanic (strictly “demonic,” among which “vampiric” or blood-soul eating and zoophilic or sexually-sodomite evil spirits are the main types) and, diachronically,

(**d**) the hereditary (or, in a pre-Christian sense, reincarnate) factors of the evil to be fought simply do not qualify.

Why not? Because once and for all ‘autonomous reason’ has ranked all such factors among the ‘irrational’ (understand: imagined, infantile, ‘mythical’ or however branded) pretend realities! All that does not belong to the narrow rationalist set of **1)** consciousness interiority (psychology), **2)** body (physics; biology) and **3)** fellow humanity (sociology, social psychology),

(**a**) is virtually non-existent or (**b**) is relegated to the great garbage heap that has been called ‘the unconscious or preconscious’ since Freud and the rationalist depth psychologists.

1/ Didn’t Freud swear that he would “erklären” paranormal phenomena psychologically?

2/ And on that point, isn’t Jung pretty much as much of a “reductionist” (i.e., re-leader of paranormal phenomena into “synchronic” psychic realities), i.e., as externalist as Freud, even though he wanted to do paranormal phenomena more justice than Freud?

3/ Also Adler reduces the paranormal to a more or less Nietzscheanizing will to power!

Externalism, i.e., not venturing into the specifically religious by the appropriate means, is always reductive, i.e., reduces, while “interpreting” (understand: misinterpreting), that which is “other” to that which is “one’s own,” projects the rationalistic “true” (**1/** interiority, **2/** body, **3/** other interiorities in bodies: **1)** psycho-, **2)** bio- and physico- and **3)** sociologization) into the extra-rational.

Externalism, reductionism and projection go together!

Schmidbauer now, o.c., 41vv., says that **a)** the collective unconscious and **b)** the conditioned reflex complement each other very well: from the triad

1) ‘inwardness, **2)** body, **3)** fellow human inwardness in other body’ (typically Cartesian and Hobbesian: cf. supra p. 82vv. (Descartes as introspective anatomist and physiologist), p. 100vv. (Hobbes as sensist materialist)) it cannot be otherwise according to ‘an (un)conscious logic peculiar to the rationalist.

‘n Word on Ivan Pavlov’s ‘transmarginal inhibition’ as a solution to ‘religious psychological’ problems:

1) dogs, as a result of flooding at S. Petersburg, tired a under constant danger of death swimming for hours in narrow cages; consequence: they forget their dressage (‘what has been learned so far’) and fall back on their ‘instincts’.

HW 132

They undergo ‘an overload or ‘stress’ until above (varying from individual to individual) ‘breaking point’, where they temporarily ‘collapse’ (leaving what they have learned up to that point behind) and react ‘instinctively’ (exposing new, unsuspected strengths and insights)

2) Likewise, the dancing Brazilian spiritualist who, for hours, dances strenuously, to monotonous-rhythmic music and under the “influence” of narcotics: - he temporarily “collapses” and forgets what he has learned in order to give new powers and insights to the best of his ability.

The sum, better the structure, of the learning processes he, until then, ‘underwent’ (the right expression, for all dynamism is out of the question), which make the adaptation and the survival of the individual, under not overloaded (‘inframarginal’) circumstances, possible, collapses! From where then comes this unsuspected creativity, characteristic of the Brazilian healers for example, that is ‘the instinct’, ‘the unconscious’ (whether or not furnished with individual (one should not forget that one healer shows other findings than the other) or collective ‘structures’, ‘archetypes’, etc.), as said, the great ‘garbage heap’ where all the irrational is ‘collected’!

It is clear: one sees Pavlov, with Cartesian or Hobbesian ‘gaze’ (Heidegger emphasizes this), looking, as an externalist (outsider), at such ‘instinctive’, ‘transmarginal’ phenomena and his triad of 1) ‘inwardness, 2) body, 3) other body with inwardness’ interpreting them.

Th. Geiger, The Creative Vanguard, p. 100, writes: “Since then (since rationalism), the theory of knowledge has taught us that the concept of ‘truth’ loses its meaning and right when the will ‘speaks’ into it. Some statements are not truth statements but statements of the will with the appearance of ‘truth’:

“In front of an audience that looks up to reason as the highest authority in all matters, the speaker tries to give prestige to his (...) goals or postulates by rationalizing them, i.e., by explaining them in the form of reasonable judgments and giving them seemingly logical grounds. Such a train of thought is commonly referred to as (...) ideology”.

By the fact that the rationalist reduces non-rational phenomena, projects his own presuppositions (here the triad “interiority/body/ fellow human interiority in body”) into them, he goes ideological.

We have seen this in Gassner’s case:

- (a) whether he is still doing so much good is secondary;
- b) he does not act according to “reason” (of the time, that is); he does not start from “nature” (the all-enlightening principle of the Enlighteners) - which Mesmer apparently does at least! That is why the ‘aufgeklärte’ Church condemns him - ideologically!

Which will not prevent Mesmer himself, at Paris, from collapsing and fleeing, after Gébelin’s death, to Berlin to die poor, embittered and abandoned in 1815.

HW 133

We have seen so far, with Geiger, that the Enlightenment is characterized by one basic factor, the bourgeoisie with its urban and industrial society.

(A) *The territorial state,*

with the enlightened absolutist monarch at its head (in the story and discussion of Gassner's exorcism we see Joseph II at work, for example), on the one hand, and the new enlightened intelligentsia, on the other, as an independent social stratum - in addition to the Church, which still plays its role, albeit also involved in a deep crisis of foundations (Gassner's exorcism).), on the one hand, and the new enlightened intelligentsia, on the other, as an independent social stratum - alongside the Church, which still plays its role, albeit also involved in a deep crisis of foundations (Gassner's case, with its elimination by his own Church and that concerning a typically Church praxis, the exorcism, proves it) -, the territorial state of Machiavelli and Hobbes, also of De Groot (Grotius), thus, and the now mainly rational-scientific - much more than musical (art, poetry) - intelligentsia 'belong' (according to Geiger with good reason) to the bourgeoisie and its civilization.

Civilization which is first and foremost a rational civilization, where religion and art, resp. poetry, occupy only a second place. "Only now is the intelligentsia in all its branches complete. The name 'intelligentsia' itself underscores the supremacy of the rational mind in the culture of the new age, for which the foundations were laid in the era of the Baroque.

The name "intelligentsia" clearly refers, first and foremost, to those who perform scientific and technical creative work, but also includes, in a broader context, the fine arts. The rational mind is thus indicative of the whole layer of creative minds. This is consistent with its supremacy in the culture of the new age." (*Th. Geiger, The Creative Vanguard*, p. 73). In the story of Gassner we have seen this at work in Munich (Academie der Wissenschaft) and in Paris (Académie de Médecine) with force of decision, both against Gassner and, later, but at least as effectively, against Mesmer (both, after all, were working extra-rationally; only 'one aspect differed): even though they both did much good, - the one ecclesiastical, the other as a Rosicrucian -, still they could not get through, rationally speaking.

That is why we have discussed the Gassner case at such length, - because the great powers - state and absolute monarch, academies of science, Church - were involved in it in the style of our epoch. And yet: pre-rational humanity was not dead, far from it! Gassner, even Mesmer were proof of that; also the Church and the lodges; finally their success with all layers of the people (clergy, nobility, scientists, common people, developed ones).

(B) We chose *the example of Gassner and Mesmer* above all because for once it did not concern nature around us but man: Vico had already sought a way out

(a) from the one-sidedness mathematical-logistic and

(b) out of the one-sided mathematical-physical natural science (and its mathematical-mechanical application to man) by designing 'a human-historical philology as 'nuova scienza', as a new science:

HW 134

next to **a)** the mathesis (Viète) and **b)** the mathematical-physical (Galilei, Descartes), inductive (Bacon) exact science of nature; in Gassner's and Mesmer's performance a second type of non-scientific but human approach of man comes into its own, namely the sensitive.

a/ It stands, at least from a narrow rationalist perspective, against the three great rationalizing approaches **(1)** Viète, **(2)** Galilei and Bacon, **(3)** Vico)

(b) but she is "human" just like Vico's philological method. It will, from that time of Gassner and Mesmer, pave its way in two ways,

1/ 'a rationalizing one that runs to depth psychology and "the groups," and

2/ 'a magic-occult, which runs to paranormology (often misunderstood as 'parapsychology') and occultism (in the present sense).

This leads to a new concept of 'science', as it is designed in *S. Kicken, Alternatieve wetenschap (Op het spoor van nieuwe paradigma's)*, Antwerp/ Amsterdam, 1975 (alternatives in natural science, but also and especially in the human sciences (psychology, sociology, medicine) and in technology are brought up there in a new epistemology that breaks open the constriction of the Renaissance-Baroque epoch.

(1) With regard to depth psychology cf.

-- *J. van den Berg, Depth psychology*, Nijkerk, 1979, especially p. 123vv. (*Preliminary history of depth psychology*);

-- *Dr. L. Regnier, Hypnotisme et croyances anciennes*, Paris, 1891 (on Gassner (pp. 114/115 (one-sided hypnotist view)); *De Mesmer à Braid* (pp. 116/146) *De Braid* (English physician who interpreted Mesmerism as hypnosis i.e. nerve fatigue, in 1841) à *Charcot* (pp. 146/208);

-- *J. Mousseau/ P.F. Moreau, dir., L'inconscient (De Freud aux groupes)*, Paris, 1976 (Freud, Adler, Jung, Moreno, group techniques, child psychoanalysis, language psychoanalysis, social psychoanalysis, antipsychoanalysis);

(2) for the occult (and paranormological side, which is only the professional scientific - and thus actually again 'rationalizing' - approach to occult phenomena) see e.g.

-- *P. Andreas/ C. Kilian, PSI*, Deventer, 1974;

-- *J. Feldmann, Occult Phenomena*, Brussels, 1938 (still instructive for the reason of its broad view);

-- *J.D. Pearce-Higgins/ G. Stanley Whitby, ed., Life, Death and Psychical Research (Studies on behalf of The Churches' Fellowship for Psychical and Spiritual Studies)*, London, 1973 (excellent work done by an Anglican committee;

-- *S. Ostrander/ L. Schroeder, Parapsychological Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain*, Haarlem, 1972 (Eng.: *Psychic Discoveries behind the Iron Curtain*, 1970; sensationalized by the fact that it suddenly became clear that the Soviets were pioneering).

-- *F. Ribadeau, Histoire de la magie*, Paris, 1976 (especially from pp. 465ss.);

-- *C. MacIntosh, Eliphas Lévi and the French Occult Revival*, London, 1972;

The number of works is incalculable;

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1/ -- *J. Lantier, le spiritisme*, Paris, 1971, and

-- *W. Tenhaeff, Spiritism*, 's-Gravenhage, 1971-5, can be recommended;

-- also *C. Lancelin, L' évocation des morts*, Paris, 1925 (seven methods of necromancy are discussed);

2/ *Grant/ Kelsey, More than one life*, Deventer, 1972;

-- *Zeitschrift für Religionsgeschichte und Geistesgeschichte*, Jrg IX (1957): 2 (*Sonderheft: Reinkarnation*) - is very solid and among other things fascinating because of *E. Benz, Die Reinkarnationslehre in Dichtung und Philosophie der deutschen Klassik und Romantik*, S. 150/175 (Lessing, Kant, Goethe, Schlosser were deeply interested in the reincarnation doctrine, not on a Hindu or Buddhist basis but on as much as possible a Christian basis: not the curse of 'karma' (the Hindu analogue of our concept of original sin) but the historical-andragogical positive interpretation prevails);

-- *JJ. Poortman, Raakvlakken tussen Oosterse en Westerse filosofie*, Assen/ Amsterdam, 1976, pp. 1/19 (*on pre-existence and survival, soul movement and soul journey*);

-- *R. van Holte tot Echten, Reincarnation (Historical, ethical, philosophical and scientific consideration)*, Bussum, 1921 (still fascinating, though critical);

-- *P. Langedijk, Reincarnation, psychotherapy and education (Techniques and examples of past life memories)*, Deventer, 1980;

On the curious plant palingenesia see *G. Gessmann, Die Pflanzen im Zauberglauben*, The Hague, s.d. (reissue), S. 160/171 (there is also an animal and mineral palingenesia; how this proceeds R. Boyle has shown yet: see above p. 120; although palingenesia is not reincarnation, the phenomenon is instructive then as an analogue);

3/ **About mediumnism** (medial, mediumistic giftedness):

-- *J. Verweyn, Die Probleme des Mediumismus*, Stuttgart, 1928 ('n thorough work by 'n neo-idealist who hooks up with Fichte);

-- *E. Froment, comm., Ces médiums qui ont vaincu la matière*, Paris, 1977 (fascinating documentation on 'mediums' (don't confuse spiritualism with medium(n)ism!) with phenomena such as paranormal plant growth, moving tables (the sensational in the XIXth e.), levitation (opposite to gravitation), mummification, poltergeist etc.);

4/ **on demonology** (and satanism), 'n especially Biblical and a.o. Catholic interpretation of "possession":

-- *E. von Petersdorff, Daemonologie (I, Daemonen im Weltenplan; II, Daemonen am Werk)*, Munich, 1957 (steller was secret chamberlain of the Pope);

-- *A. Rodewyk, Die dämonische Besessenheit in der Sicht des Rituale Romanum*, Aschaffenburg, 1963;

-- *W.C. Van Dam, Dämonen und Besessene (Die Dämonen in Geschichte und gegenwart und ihre Austreibung)*, Aschaffenburg, 1970 (Van Dam is a Reformed pastor and exorcist);

-- *id., Demons (Out, in Jesus' name)*, Kampen, 1973;

-- *W.P. Blatty, The Exorcist*, Amsterdam, 1971 (// *The Exorcist*, New York, 1971, - the basis of the world-famous film of that name;

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-- id., *I'll Tell Them: I Remember You*, New York, 1974);

-- C. Neill-Smith, *The Exorcist and the Possessed*, New York, 1974 (Neill-Smith, like Van Dam, is a practicing exorcist;

-- L. Critiani, *Présence de Satan dans le monde moderne*, Paris, 1959 (Eng. transl.: *Evidences of Satan in the Modern World*, New York. 1962);

-- *Satan, Etudes Carmélitaines*, Paris, 1948 (existence, history, aspects, oppression, therapeutics, formations, god murder are the themes elaborated by specialists);

5/ necromancy (= spiritualism), reincarnation (Catholic: original sin doctrine), demonism (Satanism),-these are three main domains of occultism; basic domain, however, which makes the three previous ones understandable and accessible, is magic:

-- J. Maxwell, *La magie*, Paris, 1922 (this work by this physician is still valid;

a/ In evocative or summoning magic, the magician works with an alien being, - angel, demon, god(s), soul, nature spirit;

b/ in natural magic, the magician acts directly with and on the forces in the cosmos (o.c., 25);

-- Baron du Potet, *La magie dévoilée*, Paris, 1977 (reprinting the work of Mesmer's apprentice magnetizer du Potet);

-- D. Fortune (= Violet M. Firth), *Psychic Self-Defense (A Study in Occult Pathology and Crime)*, Amsterdam, 1937 (// Eng.: *Psychic Self-defence*, New York, 1930-1, 1974) one of the best introductions to the essence of black or unscrupulous magic and 'psychic' (understand: occult) self-defense);

-- Ph. Alfonsi/ P. Pesnot, *L'oeil du sorcier*, Paris, 1973 (masterly phenomenology or description of the phenomenal side of black magic, on the basis of the diary of a veterinarian, who, unsuspecting and incredulous, nevertheless becomes the victim of black magic, without, however, finding the occult solution);-

-- Dr. Ph. Encausse, *Sciences occultes et déséquilibre mental* (Préface du Prof. Laignel-Lavastine), Paris, 1959 (1935¹) (necessary book, especially on our days, where the gates of the occult are thrown wide open, without valid initiation systems: failed occult workmanship runs,

(1) in the worst case, out to (a) sudden death, (b) insanity, or (c) slow decay,

(2) in less serious cases, on the most diverse ailments and / or miscalculations: the book of Encausse, the son of a notorious occultist, is only a medical introduction; the ailments are much worse than this naive medical book suggests);

Remark on the disastrous effect of 'black' magic: of the worst evils founded, apparently the type quoted by D. Fortune, o.c., 145/147, namely through the elementals (i.e. nature spirits who are related to one or more of the Empedoclean 'elements' - earth, water, air, especially fire ('fire' here meaning the microphysical degree of subtle energy or fluid)), elementals who produce the famous 'green ray' or 'green energy', whenever one or more magically gifted women, erotically stimulated, together with at least one man, in this so-called 'sexual magic', produce some herb or other. sexual magic, involve some creeping animal (earthworm, snake, lizard, toad,

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etc.).

The 'Occult Review (1930: Jan) published the history of a victim of the green energy or ray, miss N. Fornario: the naked body, according to D. Fortune, o.c., 145v., was found on a hillside in one of the lonely Ionian islands; around her neck hung, on a silver chain, a cross; close to her was found a large knife which had been used to carve a large cross into the earth and her corpse lay on that bottom cross, - corpse which showed several scratches;

D. Fortune had known them, up to three years before her tragic death, as an intimate collaborator, yet, when she became involved with contact with the Green Radiant Elementals, shunned her, wary as she was of nervousness (in miss Fornario's proximity especially); -- this nervousness still occurs to people who, ignorant or not, come into contact with the Green Energy in its misuse for criminal purposes; in a worse degree itchiness, and, even more strongly, falling sickness emerge;

The ethnological view of magic:

-- M. Marwick, *Witchcraft and Sorcery*, Penguin 1970 (orientational texts; ethnographic anthology; theories form from the hand of specialists, the engaging content);

-- Cora DuBois, *The People of Alor (A Social-Psychological Study of an East Indian Island)*, II (13/22)

-- A. Kardiner, *Kolmani the Seeres*, pp. 501/547 (*Character Structure*);

(a) regarding the relationship between the depth psychic and occult interpretations of the sensitive or divination approach:

-- Dr. Gebhard Frei, *magie und Psychologie*, in *Schweizer Rundschau* 48: 8/9 (*Sonderausgabe 'Psychologie'*), S. 680/ 688 (steller says: "If all this (i.e. what the specialists quoted by him concerning magic, claim) is so, then the new insights force to assume, between the gross-physical body and the spiritual soul-top, intermediate degrees, 'a layer of the fine material. (...)

a/ Seen from the scholastic standpoint, it must be said that the basic assumptions of scholastic psychology are in no way changed by the newer insights, but are merely filled with new, more lively contents. The spiritual soul remains the substantial "form" (in the Aristotelian sense of guiding principle) of man, the principle of vegetative, sensitive and spiritual life (cf. *Rätsel der Seele*, Olten, 1946, s. 91).

This substantial 'form' also 'informs' (i.e. governs with its thought-content nature) this intermediate layer. It is 'a serious incorporation of the old division into 'soma' (coarse material body), 'psuchè' (fine material or subtle soul body) and 'pneuma' (higher degree of soul body or even purely spiritual soul).

b/ This intermediate layer can also be called the unconscious, and the psychology of the unconscious has also had to deal with magical processes, of course. Yet the a.k.a. official psychology of the unconscious - particularly the psychoanalytic - speaks for itself,

as far as we can see, does not settle the question of whether, in this unconscious (to use metaphor, at the border of body and spiritual soul) this subtle layer plays a role.

How this layer is signified in concrete terms does not concern us here. The Egyptians called them 'Ka' and had a very profound knowledge of them (...). The Indians spoke of 'Linga-Sharira' (= 'ether body') and 'Sukshma-Sarira' (= astral body). Paracelsus spoke of the 'archeüs'. The moderns partly take over earlier terminologies and classifications, partly they (the archeüs) are called 'subtle body', 'double' etc.).

i). Such is a postulate both from the standpoint of magic and parapsychology, dowsing or whole-magnetism. Also from the point of view of the "double" (proud of the thorough work of *Dr. Menninger, Der eigene Doppelgänger*, Bern, Huber, 1946). Further, from the standpoint of ghost phenomena.

(ii) For those, however, with the 'sixth' sense, the clairvoyants, the fine material layer is more than a postulate." (a.c., 687)). *Dr. Geley* (1865/1924), *L'être subconscient*, Paris, 1899 (treats explicitly and with great expertise the relationship between unconscious and fluid normal and abnormal phenomena; remains thorough work (without the materialistic narrow-mindedness of Freud et al;)

A. de Rochas., *L'extériorisation de la sensibilité*, Paris, 1894-1, 1909⁶ (increasingly solid work by the famous colonel)

4) The depth psychic and the occult streak

The two, the depth psychic and the occult, tendencies have merged in what has been called, since 1958, The Movement for Human Potential (following *Gardner Murphy, Human Potentialities*, London, 1958; Ned.: *The Spiritual Evolution of Man*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1961):

R. Descartes, Les Olympiques, said that man possessed faculties as yet untouched which could allow him to be the equal of the Olympic gods (cf. *L. Pauwels/ G. Breton, Histoires magiques de l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1977 p. 128); well, from that thought - 'an ancient theiosis - or deificatioge thought - the Movement for Human Potential is animated:

(a) interpreting things such as 'sensitivity Training' (*R.Siroka, Sensitivity Training (Group techniques treated by Rogers, Moreno, Glueck et al.)*, Rotterdam, 1972) and 'Biofeedback' (*S.Bakker, Biofeedback (Psychophysiological Processes and Learning Theoretical Aspects)*, Deventer, 1978), as well as in general, group dynamics (*J. Remerswaal, Inleiding tot de groepsdynamica*, Bloemendaal, 1975), i.e. the interaction that members of 'groups' exercise among themselves,

(b) relied on infrastrucural techniques of a time-honored nature (silence, fasting, meditation, dance, daydreaming, poetry, etc.) and of a machine nature (alpha machines, electrometers, sensory transducers, parapsychological devices), on physical methods (relaxing, gymnastic, bioenergetic) and on emotional methods (psychoanalysis, psychodrama)

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is the Human Potential Movement, later on, grew into two branches that are therefore not totally separate), namely the schools of consciousness and the religious initiation groups:

J.M. Schiff, La ruée vers l' âme, in *Question de spiritualité, tradition, littératures*, No. 10 (Jan-Feb. 1976), pp. 65/84, outlines the history and names

(i) among the consciousness-expanding strains, Scientology, Actualism, Sophrology, Erhard Seminar training, Transcendental Meditation, Arica;

(ii) Among the initiation groups, Schiff distinguishes

(a) the Eastern gurus or wisdom teachers (since +/- 1960) - Theosophy, Gurdjeff, Meher Baba, etc. and

(b) the Western esoteric traditions (since +/- 1970) - Rosicrucians, Freemasonry, Steinerian Anthroposophy, spiritualist groups, occultisms-, which more often than not merge to some extent, even cf. also

(i) for the human-potential movement - *J. Howard, Touches - moi, s' il vous plaît (A la recherche du corps perdu: Récit de mon odyssée à travers les groupes de rencontre et le mouvement du potentiel humain)*, Paris, 1976 (// *Eng. Please, Touch!*, New York, 1970) - the title refers to the major role that touch and the body plays in the 'groups'.

(ii) For the broadened human-potential movement: *H. Cohen, Psychology as Science Fiction (New findings on dreams, meditation, hypnosis and lsd)*, Meppel, 1971; *id., The Free Man*, The Hague, 1975.

Note.-- In all this, 'a new humanism has emerged: *C.Bühler/M. Allen, Introduction to humanistic psychology*, Bilthoven, 1974 in which it is shown that, nevertheless

(a) purely subject matter experimental psychology and

(b) depth psychology,

c) a "third" type of psychology has emerged, the "humanist", (1962) which is an existentialist interpretation of Renaissance humanism (see above pp. 20/22) - which shows that Vico's reaction against the scientific way of thinking (Descartes: cf. pp. 108/118) is related to it-, but with clearly andragogic and therapeutic intentions and based on group dynamics; cf.

-- *J. Bugental, Challenges of Humanistic Psychology*, New York, 1967;

-- *Th.Hugenholtz, De psychagogie (Educatieve behandelingsw.)*, Lochem, 1946;

-- *B. Kouwer, Existential psychology*, Meppel, 1973;

-- *J. Hondius, Consciousness and peak experience in Hinduism, Buddhism and existentialism*, Deventer, 1974. The great man of humanistic humanism is Abr. Maslow.

Note - A new concept of nature is also implied in this movement. We have already pointed this out higher

1) p. 72 (dynamism, finalism, and vitalism presuppose more in nature in and around us, especially in living nature, than pure mechanicism);

2) p. 65: M. Ambacher, who opposes the concept of nature of the i) mathematical-physical, ii) naturalists (biologists) and iii) positivists, to the concept of nature of organically thinking, anti-mathematical-physical, emphasizing the qualitative (see above p. 53):

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(i) in the XVIIth e. Leibniz paves the way (New system of nature, contrary to mechanicism, in agreement with the Aristotelian tradition),

(ii) in the XVIIIth century, there is Berkeley (struggle against the machine model of mathematical-physical scope from a sensism, a sensory experience, which emphasizes the qualitative in nature),

(iii) in the XIXth century we have German Romanticism (philosophically expressed in: (a) German idealism (Hegel, who gives to 'qualitative natural philosophy' a dialectical place between logic and philosophy of mind) ,

(b) German "positive" philosophy (Schelling, who gives to qualitative natural philosophy a remarkable place),

(c) German voluntarism (i.e., urge-and-will philosophy: Schopenhauer (1788/1860), for whom the cosmos as urge-and-will is - preconstitutionally - the origin of everything), - noting that the three named thinkers have pantheistic God views, and),

(iv) in the XXth century, according to Ambacher, there is Bergson (who uses the word 'metaphysics' instead of the word 'natural philosophy' discredited by some Scholastics and Romantics and who thinks 'vital' (vitalist), d.i. as thinking everything around and in 'life' centered) ; 3) p. 53 also we have pointed to *J. Dastre, la vie et la mort*, 1920: what Ambacher neglects is the concept of 'life' in qualitative natural philosophy:

(a) the mechanicians equate, essentially, inorganic nature, organic nature (plants, animals, human beings as biological beings) and, if, as mechanicians, they are also radical materialists, the so-called immaterial mind or consciousness (unicism - monism: all being-matter, life, mind-exist from one type of reality which is machine-like);

(b) the vitalists distinguish two levels, - that of the machine and that of life, which in turn is distinguished from the thinking consciousness: thus, in the eighteenth century, the school of Montpellier, which did further develop the concept of reflexes and studied the biological tissue, but held on to the fact that life is more than machine, namely 'life principle', 'life force' or (with an Aristotelian word - Aristotle was 'vitalist') 'entelechy'.

(c) but G.E. Stahl (1660/1734), who adhered to a medical doctrine, which claimed that, in man, the soul - rational and reasonable by nature - directly 'controls' the body and its organs (see also *J. van den Berg, De Reflex*, Nijkerk, 1973, p. 27/28 (v.d. Berg does not distinguish between animism and vitalism concerning biology, which Dastre does and with good reason), thus comes into the category of animism, which identifies soul and life, both schools, the 'vitalism' and the 'vitalism'. Berg makes no distinction between animism and vitalism concerning biology, which Dastre does and with good reason), thus falls into the category of animism, which identifies soul and life, both schools, vitalism and animism, are clearly opposed to mechanicism (whether dualistic, as with Descartes, or monistic, as with Hobbes). One cannot separate life and nature.

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4) A new point of view is raised by *J. Vuillemin, La signification de l'humanisme athée chez Feuerbach et l'idée de nature*, in *Deucalion, 4 (Le diurne et le nocturne dans la nature, dans l'art et dans l'acte)*, Neuchatel / Paris, 1952 (oct), pp. 17/46: the proposer claims that, in addition to

- (a) mathematical-physical nature (Galilei) and
- (b) romantic nature (the landscape and the intimate relationship of a prereflexive nature that the romantic has with it), or
- (c) the Darwinian-Marxist is

1) within the overall nature, life evolves in its forms (thus bringing out the false eternity (understand: immutability) of nature and its life forms)

2) but there is more: the work of man, in the course of history, changes nature as an environment, which is, as it were, potentially 'workable';

Conclusion: there are two concepts of nature, the evolutionary and the cultural and labor-historical concept of nature, which are different from the romantic one. Whether, as Vuillemin claims without valid arguments, only the atheist could found the evolutionary and labor-historical concept of nature is something we leave him to answer positively and for his own account.

Reason: by denying God and creatively conceiving of matter, resp. nature without God, one shifts the basis of religion into matter itself (matter- and nature- and especially history-godification).

5) *K. Leese, Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, Zürich, 1954: instead of the 'natural religion' - 'a product mainly derived from the Stoa and one-sidedly rationalistic' - the proposer stands for 'a natural religion, which, besides the rational, also does justice to its pre- and extra-rational aspects: he refers to Herder (Bückeburgertijd: 1771/1776) and Schleiermacher (*Reden über die Religion*: 1799) - so still in the famous rationalist XVIII century - as founders of the modern and contemporary religion of nature, 'a reduplication of the archaic-primitive and folk natural religion.

Revelation of deity is more than mere verbal-rational revelation: nature, in man (the prerational and extra-rational) and around him (the biological, yes, the inorganic), is bearer of deity as a revealing power in the course of cultural history. Steller puts a rather one-sided emphasis on

(i) body, sex, blood, race, (ii) instinct, life instinct, drive (iii) sense, (iv) affect (o.c., 185/186). He especially criticizes the Stoa and neo-Platonism because these philosophies killed these four human dimensions in asceticism and rationality, so to speak.

The nature-or better, cosmosis-theory of *J. Moreno, Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama*, Stuttgart, 1973, S 2/8 - He begins by saying that group psychotherapy

- (i) is medical (physician work, but including other skilled),
- (ii) sociological also discussion, dialogue, dramatization, environment), because more than the purely individual methods (Freud et al. et al. with the divan method),

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(iii) religious also, i.e., in Moreno 's opinion, cosmic (i.e. taking into account the whole universe in which humanity situates itself, willy-nilly).

(i) He imagines that group psychotherapy can be practiced Christian-Catholic or Indian-Buddhist though,

(ii) but, starting from secularization (see above p. 21: the earthly disposition of Humanism and the like), which he calls 'Entgötterung' (degodification) and which he lets start from Spinoza, who equates God with this world, to end in an irreversible process to Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, who think through secularization or worldliness (degeneration) radically, under the influence of rationalistic materialism (think of Hobbes as a pioneer),

1) the first in its economic analysis,

2) the second in its 'Umwertung' (reverse valuation or value assessment) of religious-moral 'values' and

3) the third in his atheistic materialist psychoanalysis (calling religion 'an infantilism and a neurosis), Moreno concludes that there is only one way out: taking the current atheist situation as his starting point; historicist to the core, he substitutes the current cosmos of science for the deity and the extraterrestrial powers of the past. From that position he criticizes:

(i) Marx, who situated the situation of humanity in the class struggle, socio economic,

(ii) Freud, who saw man only psychologically as a "pilgrim from the cradle to the grave.

Moreno says: "Man is a cosmic being: he is more than a biological, psychological, social or cultural being. By limiting man's responsibility to the purely biological, psychological or social sphere, one makes him an 'Verstossenen' (outcast). Either he is co-responsible for the whole universe, for all forms of being and for all values or his responsibility is simply nothing." (o.c., 3).

One sees that Moreno here breaks through the rationalist scheme, which we, higher pp. 130/132 (the triad 'inwardness/body/other body (and if need be other inwardness), unmasked as ideology. In the line of Nietzsche (Wille zur Macht), Schopenhauer (Wille), Weininger (Wille zum wert) he posits as a postulate the 'Wille zum höchsten Wert', the will to valorize the highest value.

His hypothesis is that the becoming cosmos is the first and the last and thus the highest value: "Only the cosmos can give meaning to the life of any particle of the universe - be it man or a protozoan." (o.c.,3).

One sees that God as the first cause has disappeared from the horizon and that the cosmos takes its place. "The therapeutic group is therefore not only a branch of medicine and a form of society, but also the first step into the cosmos."

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The cosmic communication of Moreno 's cosmism.

Moreno claims that humans have two types of communication or communication:

(i) the 'vorsprachliche', the prelinguistic or pre-languages, peculiar to the early stages of humanity and to the first phase of being a child. The deep conflicts of childhood are rooted in the experiences of his first world, his identity with this world, his clinging to mother figures, to objects, to his environment". o.c., 3);

(ii) the linguistic communication, which comes after the pre-language communication and is only the logicized and syntactic form of it, "a great social invention admittedly", but which never lives up to and represents the whole soul.

Well, psychodrama deliberately transcends purely linguistic-verbal communication in order to communicate also pre-language and super-language (o.c., 4). - One can compare this with *M. Lietaert Peerbolte, Kosmisch bewustzijn*, Amsterdam, 1973, who starts from 'oceanic' (like an ocean melting into one) feelings to come to an expansion of consciousness (what is called 'oceanic' here, can be called 'cosmic' in Moreno's language).

Moreno 's ideology critique.

(A) *Two great ideologies vie for the favor of today's man:*

(i) the communist, which, therapeutically, makes the health of the individual dependent on that of the collective, - to which Moreno replies that the facts prove that "a healthy group can contain sick individuals.

(ii) the democratic, which, therapeutically, allows the health of the collective to result from the health of the individuals, - upon which Moreno argues that, in fact, groups can be insane where all individuals are not.

"In other words, there are, within a group some dynamic factors at work that are not noticed and appreciated either in a communist or in a democratic worldview." (o.c.,6). Therefore, in and also above the communist-democratic view, he advocates a third - 'higher' encompassing the two - view of life, the therapeutic one.

The Marxist side has pointed to the economic proletariat, he says (o.c.,7), but the oldest and most numerous proletariat of human society consists of the victims of an unbearable, non-therapeutic world order: "Es ist das therapeutische Proletariat"! It is composed of persons suffering from one form or another of 'Elend' (misery): psychological misery, social misery, economic misery, political misery, racial misery, religious misery.

The therapeutic proletariat cannot be "redeemed" by economic revolutions: it existed in primitive and pre-capitalist societies, but it also exists in capitalist and socialist societies. Marxism in particular, he says, has ceased to reflect the central living conditions and problems of our time: the new values are of a 'cosmo-dynamic nature' (o.c., 8)

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(B) *The major religions*

These have also lost a large part of their initiative in the matter, according to Moreno, o.c., 6 : his therapeutics are always characterized in three ways:

a/ medical, **b/** sociological (group character) and **c/** neo-religious. “The group therapy) is the only movement among all psychotherapies, which deals with groups of persons, resembling in this - at least in principle - a powerful religious movement.” (o.c., 7).

Naive Moreno is not: he points out that “in psychodramatic sessions, the danger of ‘trauma,’ i.e., a failed group experience, is particularly high”(o.c., 4).

Why? Because trauma is at the center of therapy and the cooperation of others in it encourages transfer of trauma. This means that the ‘misery’ that is fought psychotherapeutically, can exactly be replaced or increased by a psychotherapeutic misery!

Yet he considers the risk worth the walk. He labels his therapy the third revolution in therapy:

(a) the 1st is that of Pinel, who saved psychiatric patients from incarceration;

b) the 2nd is that of Freud, who introduced psychotherapy as part of the previously one-sided physical medicine but remained too individual and too unc cosmic;

(c) the third is that of Moreno who introduces group therapy (psychodrama, sociometry and sociatry).

Between 1925 and 1940 the foundations were created. During and after world war 11 (1940/1945) came the time of diffusion. Concerning Freud, Moreno notes that, in 1914, not one but two correctives to Freud’s psychotherapy were pending in Vienna:

(i) the corrective of the group (against the overly individual) and

(ii) the corrective of action (against the one-sided verbal or verbal of Freud’s method): the psychodrama came instead of the divan.

And Moreno cites a primitive model: among the Pomo Indians (California), an apparently dying Indian was brought into the village one day. Immediately the healer was called in:

(i) this one first informs himself: the Indian had encountered a wild turkey cock, for the first time in his life, and had, as a result, fallen into fear;

(ii) the healer retreats and, after a while, always returns with his helpers: together the group, under his guidance, portrays the shock of the ‘dying’ person in a dramatization that is as close as possible to the event; the healer plays the turkey in the midst of friends and neighbors, circles the sick person like a wild bird flapping its wings, but in such a way that the person involved can see how harmless he is. Result: the startled person visibly recovered (o.c., 14).

Conclusion: what a difference from the church and the science academy in the case of Gassner in the XVIII- th e.

Note - S. Kicken, *Alternative Science*, Antwerp / Amsterdam, 1975, pp. 98/103, elaborates on what Moreno calls ‘cosmic’: after humanistic psychology, Maslow, in 1969, ‘a year before his death, introduced the transpersonal

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psychology, which elaborates on one aspect of its humanistic nature, namely, the “peak experiences,” in which ordinary day-to-day consciousness “expands” and reaches a “peak. These are also called A(ltered) S(tates) (or) C(onsciousness), altered states of consciousness.

- 1) Trance (rapture, - cf. transitio, transition)
- 2) hypnosis (see above p. 134) or slept-in diurnal consciousness,
- 3) drug use (“LSD” and other “consciousness enhancers,” “psychedelics”),
- 4) biofeedback,
- 5) meditation and
- 6) yoga (cf. *E. Ruchpaul, Philosophie et pratique du yoga*, Paris, 1971, - fascinating historical study)
- 7) Paranormal experiences (clairvoyance, telepathy; telekinesis (moving material things at a distance), materialization (appearing or causing to fade into gross material form: ‘apport’ of the spiritualists));
- 8) mystical experiences (God-sighting);
- 9) Prophetic experiences, etc ... are ASCs studied by the “transcendental” or transpersonal psychology, which can control these phenomena in the E(electio-) E(ncefalo-) G(ram).

Very remarkably, R. Ornstein, *Psychology of Consciousness*, - Ned: *The Human Consciousness*, Rotterdam, 1971, -, the human brain is bi-functional:

(i) the left hemisphere (which controls the right part of the body) is specialized, in an inclusive manner, in order creation by means of logical thinking, linguistic behavior, mathematical formulation, in situating in space and time, in depiction;

(ii) the right hemisphere of the brain is, including, i.e. not the left hemisphere exclusively, specialized in “intuition,” the sensing that lies beyond the ordering logical, linguistic, mathematical function.

This is strikingly similar to what Moreno calls the ‘cosmic’ ability. And Peerbolte the ‘oceanic’. - This is the holistic aspect of our brain (holos = whole, integral, all-sided). - This is apparently the sensitive side of magicians.

According to Ornstein both functions are complementary, but our Western civilization developed the left half excessively (rationalism), while the East worked the other way around. The ideal would be a balanced ‘consciousness’. Yet pay attention: *Mouni Sadhu, Concentration*, - Dt: *Konzentration und verwirklichung*, Bern, 1974, S. 9, says that throughout his life, devoted to research, he has found that few things that the great Eastern sages know are not also familiar to Western thought. What can cure the ‘orientalmania’ that has been engulfing us for some years now.

Conclusion: *M. Eliade, Occultisme, sorcellerie et modes culturelles*, (Occultism, witchcraft and cultural trends,), Paris, 1978; id. *Méphistophélès et l’ androgyne*, Paris, 1962, exposing the religio-historical backgrounds of today’s “irrationalism. The West has discovered archaic and exotic civilizations in recent centuries; it has discovered depth psychology: it is now processing them.

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(A) I The actual Enlightenment philosophy.

In 1972, a Centre for the Study of the Enlightenment was established at the Free University of Brussels (Institute of Sociology). Its purpose: the critical, historical and literary study of currents, parties and movements that make up the Enlightenment phenomenon. We give a brief summary:

(i) idealism, but also naturalism and materialism, - which is normal after the foregoing about Descartes and Hobbes (and what has been said thereby about their after-effects;

(ii) Spinozism, deism, atheism, - which clearly refers to the Enlightenment concept of God in its three interpretations:

a/ pantheism, which J. Moreno (p. 142 supra) considers to be the stake of the secularist interpretation of life and the world (and rightly so: if God coincides with nature, He is no longer a separate, i.e., a reality):

b/ deism, i.e., that interpretation of God which claims that God is a personal and creative being, yet without further influence on the world (thus maintaining the creatures and cooperating with them; also any supernatural revelation and miracles which must give credibility to that revelation);

(a) originated in England in the XVIth e,

(b) led deism in the middle of the XVIII th in France, to the materialist-atheist 'Lumières' and

(c) it penetrated, also in the middle of the XVIIIth century in Germany, to a number of adherents.

Both forms of thought are merely non-consequential forms of "liberal" theology, which holds three main axioms

(1) the primacy of the individual thinking, independent of tradition and authority,

(2) the confidence in human 'reason' (= rationalism), to which meliorism, both theoretical and practical as well as technical, adheres (i.e. not optimism, which claims that pessimism, which claims the opposite; 'melior' in Latin means 'better': world-improvement belief)

(3) the "religious" (i.e., on religious grounds) immanentism, that God, if he exists, is to be situated purely in (and not above) the world, - which denies any "transcendence" (i.e., being above creation) of God; - the great periods of liberal theology are:

(a) classical liberal theology (1650/1770), especially in England; forerunner: J/ Locke (1632/1704), about which more later, given his decisive influence;

(b) romantic theology (1770/1850), especially this time in romantic Germany, forerunner, the great hermeneuticist D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), who liquidates the notion of "salvation" which is and remains a key concept in all true religion, and replaces it with "idealism" in the Lockian sense, but with German romantic accent, i.e., "unlimited confidence in the powers of man and in his self-regulating mechanism (without objective norms)

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(iii) Hegelianism, Marxism, Socialism

This triad apparently refers to XIX-th' century forms of Enlightenment: **a/** Hegel and Marx are dialecticians, **b/** both belong to socialism, one of the social ideologies that begins to emerge in the XVIII-th e., only to flourish in the XIX-th e;

(iv) Freemasonry, Rosicrucians, heretics and freethinkers,

These, as it were, belong together under the point of view of 'dissident' to the pattern of thought imposed by the church and the Sovereign;

a) for the first two: cf. above pp. 48/49 (secret societies), 127/128 (Mesmer's relationship to the secret societies and their role);

b) for the heretics and the freethinkers, it is the freethinking behavior vis-à-vis the established way of thinking that interests the Enlightener;

(v) Superstition in its various forms

(card reading, astrology, spiritualism),-apparently the antithesis of the Enlightenment, which feels sky-high beyond and above so-called superstition from "reason" and its science;

These five chapters are studied in Brussels from a particular point of view, namely the relationship between the Enlightenment on the one hand, and on the other hand **a/** Utopia, **b/** Ideology and **c/** Criticism. Indeed, the relationship between these four is both contemporary and XVIIIth-century!

One does not forget *P. Hazard, la crise de la conscience européenne* (1680/1715) pp; 420/421, points out the basic feeling of the enlightened man, uneasiness, which he, with P. Coste, the translator of J. Locke, who uses the word to express the depths of the citizen's feelings, translated in French by 'inquiétude', well somewhat related to Freud's word 'Unbehagen in der Kultur', cultural uneasiness.

Doesn't *Locke* say, in 1690, in his *essay on Human Understanding*, II: 20: "Uneasiness is the chief, if not the only stimulus, which drives industriousness and industriousness of men forward". Well, utopians, ideologues, critics and other do-gooders (meliorists) are characterized by uneasiness, uneasiness towards what is now called the 'establishment', the established order.

Hazard characterizes o.c., v, the contrast between the XVIIth and the XVIIIth e.: "Rank order, discipline, order, the maintenance of which is entrusted to the authority, the dogmas that firmly regulate life: these are the things that the people of the XVIIth liked. The forms of coercion, the authority, the dogmas: these are what the people of the XVIIIth century despised (...).

The first are Christians, the others are "Antichrists"; the first believe in divine law, the others in natural law; the first live easily in a society divided into unequal classes, the others do nothing but dream of equality. (...) The majority of French people thought like Bossuet; suddenly the French think like Voltaire: it is a reversal."

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What is true for France is also true for Belgium: *J. Kuntziger, Essai historique sur la propagande des Encyclopédistes Français en Belgique au XVIII-me siècle*, Bruxelles, 1879, summarizes this as follows:

“The XVIII th was, in all the countries of Europe, the most fruitful epoch as regards the development of the human mind. It is the century which brought forth Voltaire and Rousseau, Diderot and d’Alembert, and which saw an unprecedented revolution take place, thanks to the action of reason in morals and ideas. It is true that enlightened men have felt the need for a reform, an intellectual and social rebirth, for a long time, since the 16th century (the Renaissance). (...).

But this movement had scarcely stirred the masses, in which prejudice, ignorance, superstition, and fanaticism always prevailed. It was not until the XVIIIth e. that the new doctrines, which had hitherto been the exclusive possession of a few élite men, finally spread to all classes of society.” (o.c., 3).

The question arises: from where did the French intelligentsia get its doctrine? *Chr. Dawson, Crisis of Western Education*, Tielt/ Den Haag, 1963, p. 62, says: “Bacon’s inductive method may not have been remotely like Descartes’ ideal of a single universal pure theory of quantity, from which nature could be derived in its entirety, but they both made an essential contribution to the development of the modern scientific attitude of mind. The bringing together of these two traditions by the introduction of English ideas into France and the blending of English empiricism with French (innatist) rationalism ushered in the century of Enlightenment.”

What else: “Thus, the connection of the (innatist) rationalism of Descartes, the physics of Newton and the empiricism of Locke formed a highly explosive mixture, which, in the second half of the XVIII century, exploded and almost destroyed the traditional order of Christendom - Church and state and study.

A) In England where the Cartesian ingredient was absent, the progress of science had a much less revolutionary effect. English deism was a transitory phase. Science remained faithful to the fideistic traditions of Bacon and Newton. The most important changes took place in the field of technology.

B) In France, however, science became a philosophy, a creed, a religion. The partisans of the new ideas organized themselves as a militant sect, and, under the leadership of d’Alembert, Voltaire, and Diderot, unleashed one of the most sophisticated and skillful ideological propaganda campaigns ever undertaken.” (o.c., 64.

From Russia to Portugal, French was spoken: one understands what role the Encyclopédie (1750/1765) played in Europe!

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Two interpretations of the phenomenon 'XVIIIth century'.

We now have

(i) pp. 122/145 the phenomenon of seizures and of possession and the reactions to them (with the elaborations of one part of them) discussed at length and

(ii) p. 145/148 the other part very briefly - too briefly in relation to part (i) - outlined, with the intention of dealing with it more extensively in the overview of the relationships later on;

The question arises: what lies behind these contradictions, which for the time being we have designated with the common name "Enlightenment", but which would be better called "the XVIIIth century" without further ado? Let us listen to two German-speaking thinkers who have studied the XVIIIth century, Hegel and K.Barth.

G.F.W Hegel (1770/1831) himself still lived 'a piece in XVIII-d' century Europe (he traveled) and can therefore act as an eyewitness. H. Arvon, *Le marxisme*, Paris, 1960, pp. 11ss., outlines the concept of dialectics, saying, "The Hegelian dialectic stands on the threshold of the Marxist worldview."

In 1844 (manuscript published only in 1932, dealing with political economy and philosophy) Marx comments on *Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1806), and does so with preference for the passus on the "Herr" and the "Servant" (cf. G.Bolland, Hrsg., *G.F.W. Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes*, Leiden, 1907, S. 158ff.), i.e. where Hegel describes the struggle between noble and common consciousness. H. Arvon emphasizes that Marx says that "all the elements of criticism are locked up in it and often even prepared and worked out in such a way that Hegel's view is far surpassed in it." (o.c., 11).

Yet Arvon notes against this that Hegel himself has already exposed the social, political, and religious applications of the "dialectic" (i. e., the mutual and advance agitation) of lord and servant, in his discussion of the XVIIIth century.

(a)1. The gentleman is, in his own eyes, twice "free" or "self-conscious

(a) on the one hand, he is free in the consciousness of the servant who recognizes him as lord,

b) on the other hand he rules over nature thanks to the effort (labor) of the servant who transforms matter, for his lord, into an object of pleasure. The innate slavery of man is broken by the lord both towards the servant (who is his potential lord) and towards nature (which is 'wild and untamed', culture-threatening).

The gentleman, says Hegel (o.c., 159) has, between himself and nature (the 'object'), the servant, slid, like 'an intermediate term, 'a medium; this, while the servant has immediate contact with raw and 'hostile' nature. - One thinks of E.Jüngers description of the 'entrenchedness' of the citizen!

(a)2. The servant, on the other hand, is twice "servant," unfree, without self-consciousness: **a)** toward the lord whom he serves and **b)** toward nature which, once made enjoyable by him, is taken away from him before he enjoys it himself.

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(b)1. Under and behind and in the “self-consciousness” (freedom, lordship) of the lord there is another reality, for, in fact, the lord has a false (self)consciousness - one thinks of the word “ideology,” with Marx meaning the false consciousness expressed in speech language -: the “freedom” of the lord depends radically on

(i) the (self-)consciousness of the servant (who is ‘a potential rebel and revolutionary) and

(ii) - the labor, which the brute - hostile nature makes enjoyable for the lord but which is performed by the servant. In this sense, the lord is twice dependent and thus, potentially, servant in turn (dialectic).

(b)2. the way out according to Hegel is conceivable in two ways:

a/ a rebellion with a favorable consequence of the servant, does change the abstract structure filling (viz. then there is again a lord and a servant; only the persons change roles), but - in that sense - lord and servant are doomed to swap roles forever according to the ‘positions of power’.

b/ In order to arrive at ‘true’ (undefiled) freedom (self-consciousness, emancipation), one should, according to Hegel, avoid that role change as meaningless. This is curiously reminiscent of what the current French ‘new philosophers’ (since 1977) have been saying, namely that the revolution is ‘meaningless’ and ‘only’ a role change, not a system change.

This proves that what Hegel considered applicable to the 18th century - with shades, of course: no historical situation is ever completely identical with the other - is also applicable, as a scheme of thought (‘model of thought’ is what we like to say now, since model theory), to our situation. This means that “history” - a term which Marxists and other historical thinkers like to use as a sort of “hypostasis” - has progressed very little since the days of Hegel, in spite of the eighteenth century frenzy of progress.

Now listen carefully to Hegel’s ‘dialectical’ reasoning; if the servant, aware that he is potentially a lord, still submits to the ‘authoritarian’ will of the lord - how topical does ‘authoritarian’ sound! - it is because he fears death, fears for his life.

The servant is not (fully or certainly not always) aware of what is actually leading him - one thinks of what Marx (unconscious substructure), Nietzsche (unconscious life demands) and Freud (unconscious eros and death drives) say about (self)consciousness not being ‘itself’, ‘entfremdet’, ‘dismayed’ (from its central position, - ‘a saying of today’s structuralists)!

The servant, too, has a false consciousness, though now seen from an even deeper perspective, namely’ his’ addiction to this earthly life. The way out that Hegel indicates, for the servant, is that the servant detaches himself in an ascetic way as the stoic from every earthly life.

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bondage and coincidence, to be himself alone in an inner life that has value in itself, - inner life that is “aut.arkisch”, self-satisfied to such an extent that even the conscious submission to the authority of the lord still remains an inner-free act of himself - and not a fear reflex forced upon his inner being (theme that one finds back in Nietzsche, though in a Dionysian sense).

Yet this inner self-liberation from the primal state of “slavery” is

(a) both to fellow human beings

(b) as to nature not complete, with the servant, if not also his labor, viz. his’ nature- and thing-processing and object-conversion (one’ think of Marx’s theory of value), entails a freedom: This lies in the fact that, although the servant does not enjoy the enriched object of nature, he nevertheless possesses the joy of work and that his processing of the objects of thing-nature testifies to his ‘lordship’ over this nature, which reveals itself to him as the matter in the hands of the form and even the interpreter of meaning or action, - a theme which is taken up again in Peirce’s hermeneutics and theory of interpretation, but in a purely informational-theoretical sense.

Conclusion: the servant, properly looked at, reveals the secret of ‘true’, unreal freedom and ‘recognition-self-consciousness’ - here the Stoa has served as a model, reconciling lord and servant, in a synthesis, by directing control towards itself and accepting servanthood as a destiny endorsed and freely chosen internally. A bondage to which, after all, one freely agrees is, in a sense, no longer bondage, but a kind of freedom from comfort. Seen in this way, the lord and the servant are the foundation, of which the stalwart is the summit, encompassing both in himself at a higher level:

(i) usually called the lord the thesis, the servant the antithesis, and the stoic the synthesis;

(ii) yet these three “moments” or levers of motion bear, with Hegel, other - meaningful - names, which we now explain separately to better demonstrate the applicability (the applicative richness) of these (regulative) concepts:

1- Affirmation, affirmation: the ‘lord’ is one application of the affirmative lever of the dialectic, i. e. of the starting point of the movement and exchange that is the dialectic; - the ‘lord’ here is ‘a conservative socially spoken; dialectically he is passive: his immobility serves as a ‘fait accompli’ (essential concept for the existential description of existence) whereby the

2- Negation, denial, rises up as a protest against the immobilism of affirmation, which, in this case, is the “servant,” which, in itself, again, would only be “affirmation,” if not the

3- Negation der Negation, the negation of the negation, intervened, in this case the stoic, who “ignores” both the lord’s and the servant’s unfreedom, i.e. does not dwell on it.

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That not remaining still is the core of the 'movement', which constitutes the driving force of the dialectic. The XVIIIth century is beautifully typified in that 'negativity', (i.e. that quality) by which one 'does not stand still at', but 'designs' something new, as existential thinkers tend to say, with Heidegger, who calls 'existing' an 'Entwurf' ('project', with Sartre) or design). The core of the dialectically conceived movement or change (kinèsis, motus) is the negation in first and second degrees.

The "Entfremdung".

The alienation or estrangement Hegel defines as follows: (a) the lord no longer recognizes himself in the servant, whom he nonetheless potentially is (his starting condition was after all, just like that of the servant, addiction to nature and all too primitive humanity)

(b) Expressed technically-dialectically: the affirmation (thesis) no longer recognizes itself in the denial, which is however only an amplified form of the affirmation; indeed, the servant is in a stronger degree 'servant' both to nature, which he needs for his economic existence, and to his fellow-man, whom he needs, at least for the time being, socially, in order to exist as an acknowledged member of the community, since he only possesses 'rights' in so far as he is servant of the lord, who, in Hegel's time (and in the Ancien - Regime states) had all rights (or at least almost all).

In other words, when the lord considers his' servant, he sees someone who is socially 'other' (not to mention his' physical: the servant's calloused hands, his' shabby family, his' poor housing etc., which characterize him as 'but servant', show him in his' otherness', his' ever potential lordship in masked condition, in which the lord does not see through him).

Das unglückliche Bewusstsein, (the unhappy consciousness).

(a) The destiny of the servant involves 'suffering', 'misery', 'suffering' - one of the most profound concepts used by religions to characterize the true state of man, lord or servant; - a concept that Moreno plays off against both contemporary capitalism and contemporary communism (see above p. 143, where he puts his 'therapeutic perspective' to work, a perspective that is certainly more profound than Hegel's when he 'comforts' the servant with Stoicism and the purely human condition. 143, where Moreno puts his 'therapeutic perspective' to work, a perspective which is certainly more thorough than Hegel's when he 'comforts' the servant with Stoicism and its pure inner freedom amidst all possible 'bonds' of unfreedom)

(b) Yet, seen deeply enough, i.e. from a more thorough 'negation' or 'denial' (antithesis), the lord too possesses' an unhappy consciousness, though usually latent: he must not think of the servants as a booth committing rebellion, or he sees himself locked into their role; this 'fear' - or at least uncertainty, socially speaking; - is his mode of 'unhappy consciousness'.

"I am the struggle" (Hegel).

Like Herakleitos of Ephesos, Hegel sees all 'theses' (confirmations) or - in existential language: accomplished facts ('facticity', - word that Fichte already used for our existentials and which means 'factuality' as something that concerns us)

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Hegel, therefore, sees all “affirmations” as inwardly in conflict with themselves (Kontradiktion), contradiction, - word that here, with Hegel and all dialectically influenced thinkers, is used in a non-logical or -logistic sense of “impossible at the same time true” but historically understood) the suffering, the “misery” e.g. is something that, at least in a dialectical consciousness, calls for elimination.

That ‘stirring for elimination’, i.e. redemptive intervention by the one who sees misery as misery, is the inner ‘contradiction’ or ‘struggle’ that misery carries. It is ‘screaming’, ‘unbearable’, at least for someone who understands it, i.e. not as an unmoved outsider-behaviorist, merely professional-scientist looking on - merely ‘describes without emotional involvement’.

No, Hegel only knows the concrete ‘description’, - that description which we now (with an Anglo-Saxon word) would call ‘participating observation’. It is in this sense that all purely logical or purely logistic thinking people are irritated to death by Hegel’s ‘word-juggling’, but they do not realize that:

a) besides rationalism in its ancient-medieval and modern versions - see above pp. 61/68 -, Hegel

b) has also incorporated German Romanticism with its sense of ‘participation’, involvement (committedness) in its universal synthesis, and too rightly so. After all, it is all too clear, at least to those whose humanity has not shriveled into what May 1968 and McLuhan (see p. 52 above) christened ‘vakidiotie’, that thinking is more than a mere spectatorial description (however much more precise this may be compared to the more sketchy way of thinking of the ‘concrete’ thinker). What the ‘concrete’ thinker loses in precision, he gains in humanity’.

The Aufhebung, the dissolution.

With Hegel, “dissolution” possesses three meanings that enclose each other: the Stoic, for example, in its synthesis (negation of negation), dissolves the lord in his being a lord and the servant in his being a servant:

(i) after all, the aliasing of the two is included on a higher level in the unity or reconciliation that is the synthesis;

(ii) this reconciliation is to be thought of as follows, viz.

1) the aliasing is ‘elevated’, viz. on a higher plane (at least in Hegel’s consolation dialectic; something which the real religions, which still know redemption, will reject as false consciousness with Hegel; which also someone like Moreno will not accept from his ‘therapeutic-medical’ point of view: here one sees that one may never ‘dwell’ on a consolation solution if one does not want to fall into mere ‘fait accompli’ (mere ‘facticity’), but act ‘negatively’ (antithetical); all this to make clear to the reader the dialectical way of thinking -)

2) that exaltation lifts the struggle, i.e. makes it cease (second meaning);

3) it preserves the essentials of the thesis and antithesis.

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Note.-- To show that really our time is being touched here, see here: *G. De Schrijver, The tradition summoned (Tradition Hermeneutics from Gadamer to Habermas)*, in *Streven*, jrg., 48 (1981): Jan., pp. 291/302, says:

“Authority has declined. At some point (and we have reached that point) we know: many answers and handed-down values that used to be handed down have ebbed away (...). They have not succeeded - and succeed less and less - in adequately addressing the actual questions that occupy the average person today. Suddenly and almost irreversibly, traditional values and their frames of reference have entered crisis. What was once normative and surrounded by a halo of inviolability seems to have been knocked off its pedestal for good. (...) Such a situation is not new: its roots reach back to the Aufklärung. What is new is only that one is dealing with a second Aufklärung (cf. *H. Zahrnt, Gott kann nicht sterben (Wider falsche Alternativen in Theologie und Gesellschaft)*, (God Cannot Die (Against False Alternatives in Theology and Society)), Munich, 1973, S. 27).

What once seemed to be the privilege of a small group of new-lighters has now become almost commonplace. The youngest generations have slowly become accustomed to being guided by the ever new questions of society and the world. They have lost the reflex to seek guidance in what has always been. It is no longer tradition that is normative, but their own honest search in confrontation with the new. If this generation already looks back, then at the most to give a possible, creative re-translation of the tradition. For that re-translation of tradition two paths can be discerned.

a) The first is moderately polemical, seeks rather harmonious reconciliation. It is the path mapped out by the cultural philosopher Gadamer:

b) The second, that of the Frankfurter Schule is negatively unmasking. For this reason he is perhaps more lucid about the bloody values that are at stake when one allows oneself to be bandaged by the inertia of the ‘past’. We will discuss both paths in such a way that each time the repercussions on church and religion become clear”.

So much for this lengthy excerpt that attempts to characterize the polarizing crisis of the post-Second Vatican Council through

(i) the strongly conciliatory, i.e., gifted with a strong sense of the value of tradition, position of H.-G. Gadamer (1900/2002), *Wahrheit und Methode* (Truth and method); (1961) on the one hand, and

(ii) the strongly ‘negative’ dialectic of J. Habermas (1929/...), former assistant of Th. Adorno (1903/1969), who in 1966 had his *Die negative Dialektik* published, in which he discusses the “roots” of totalitarianism, but in such a way that Hegel’s concept of totality of a purely spiritual-rational nature can be held responsible for totalitarianism in the political field, because Hegel did not see the “state” as a purely “confirming”, i.e. accomplished power which imposes freedom.

HW 155

People like Habermas fear that if one defends tradition-however well-meaning, with however many real reasons-it will serve the established inhuman powers at work in our economy, our politics, and in all of society; indeed, that they will “manipulate” our opinion, i.e., influence it without our being aware of it, with a disinterested appearance, but with well-defined selfish ends.

The relation to tradition (established values, established order) is not a simple problem. Witness: *W.E. Hocking* (professor at Harvard until 1943), *Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse*, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, (Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*), 29 (1922): 4, pp. 431/453, begins his article with an apt remark:

“When one casts a glance at the judgments that our time makes about religion, one discovers a contradiction, peculiar to our time: on the one hand, the fact that it does not go without religion; on the other, the fact that one does not know how to keep it alive. Well, - that is the problem of all ‘negativity’ that criticizes fundamental values, whether it is the XVIIIth century or ours.

However, this is a fundamental aspect of all dialectics. Nl. the total character of the dialectic and of the criticism (negation) present in it. *G. van den Bergh van Eysinga, Hegel*, The Hague, s.d., p. 67vv, describes what Hegel in his ‘dialectic calls ‘deduction’.

(a) Already in his time Hegel was accused of ‘deducing’ all things from a-priori (preconceived) principles (which lay in thought itself; cf. Descartes’ innatism). A certain Herr Krug even challenged Hegel to ‘deduce’ the existence of every dog and cat, yes, of his penholder, from the concept

(b) In 1802 Hegel replied to this (How ordinary human reason conceives philosophy): ‘to deduce something’ is, for Hegel, to show that it is

(i) cannot exist and

(ii) cannot be thought outside of broader dialectical coherence.

a) Hegel always starts from the whole and the collection:- each element, each part is thought within the collection, within the system in which it belongs. This is the law of totality, peculiar to true dialectics.

b) But this totality (= collection, whole), in which each given fact is situated, is a living totality. Living means that an affirmation (thesis) is denied (turning from thesis into antithesis) and, if necessary, denied again (synthesis). That is what Hegel calls ‘the understanding’: to ‘deduce’ from that understanding (i.e. the living whole) the place and meaning of something (element, part) is something entirely different from proving (in a naive rationalistic way, incidentally, in his eyes) its naked existence! It is precisely Hegel’s reproach to classical rationalism that it thinks ‘fact’ and ‘reason’ too much apart and separately. Thinking concretely!

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Applied to the 'tradition'/'innovation' relationship (negation)

(a) the law of totality works as follows: it demands that one does not unquestioningly neglect one aspect (moment) of totality, in this case tradition

(b) the law of the living totality demands that one sees the element or part as moment, i.e. in motion, i.e. deniable (antithetical) and yet again deniable (synthetic). - This is precisely why Hegel is open to two interpretations:

(i) 'a tradition-monger (which he was to a large extent himself) and

(ii) 'a revolutionary one (which is what the Left Hegelians did, including Marx).

This is also why the XVIIIth century is bipartisan:

a) One had the revolutionary encyclopédie, **b)** but one also had the conservationist establishment. As R. Serreau, *Hegel et l' hégélianisme*, Paris, 1965, p. 5, says, it is mainly the religious and the political part of Hegel's system that broke up the Hegelian school.

Cf. also P. Foulqtié, *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949. 'n Date in the history of dialectics is J.-P. Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, I, Paris, 1960. In 1961 a discussion was held in Paris on dialectics (Sartre and Hyppolite, on the one hand; Garaudy and Vigier, - Marxists, on the other): more than six thousand young people attended this confrontation! *Marxisme et existentialisme (Controverse sur la dialectique)*, Paris, 1962). Which proves that dialectics is more than an academic finesse.

Epistemological conclusion.

E.O. Apel, *Szientistik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik (Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnisanthropologischer Hinsicht)*, in K.-O. Apel et al, *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, (Scientistics, Hermeneutics, Criticism of Ideology (Draft of a Theory of Science in Epistemological Anthropological Perspective)), Frankfurt, 1971, s. 7/44, distinguishes, inter alia following psychotherapy, three approaches:

(i) the scientific (exact) which he christens 'scientistics';-the psychotherapist then 'looks at' the client coolly as 'a case of ailment;

(ii) hermeneutics, which involves and sympathizes with the client as a fellow human being in dialogue (style Schleiermacher, Dilthey ('Verstehen' as something different from scientific 'Erklären')

(iii) the critique of ideology which subjects both, scientistics and hermeneutics, to a 'negation' as Habermas (Frankfurter Schule) does with his critique of society: both approaches (hermeneutical 'understanding' and scientific explanation) are 'suspected' of being **a)** manipulated or **b)** manipulated in relation to addictive powers. This means that Vico's attempt to design, next to mathematics and the mathematical and/or empirical physical, a human philological method is further pursued here (see above p. 102vv).

This also means that here we should now make a comparison with the "cosmic" approach (sensitive-depth-psychological) of Moreno et al. (see above pp. 139vv. (humanistic method), 141vv. (cosmic communication of a non-wordly nature)), - which Apel does not see; Unless he calls 'cosmic' approach ('a form of) hermeneutic understanding.

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Indeed, in the psychagogic or psychotherapeutic group, one ‘understands’ each other (perhaps in part precisely, given the minimal scientific training, yet) especially ‘sensitively’ (the formation of sensitivity is not without reason a basic aspect of the ‘groups’) or, if one prefers Moreno’s term, ‘cosmically’. Such is a real ‘understanding’, as distinct from the scientific ‘explanation’ (Dilthey).

Yet there is another aspect, namely a dialectic of its own, usually described by the austere name ‘(bio)-feedback’.

(i) *S. Bakker, Biofeedback (psychophysiological and learning theoretical aspects)*, Deventer, 1978, p. 17,

(a) says that biofeedback is a steering or cybernetic term, indicating the fact that an organism (e.g. a human being), which, under the influence of external stimuli, reacts with internal, physiological, answers (respons(ie)s), undergoes the feedback thereof via an artificial) external way (e.g. a device that ‘displays’ its reactions in a mechanical way). The psychotherapeutic applications show us e.g. electronic devices which ‘measure’ the reactions of the organism during drug use or meditation (showing and thus acting, - working backwards, adjusting, on the subject who is under drug use or meditating)

(b) It is as if the device is the negation (antithesis) or critique, at least in some cases, of the “affirmation” (thesis), i.e., the drug licker or meditator, who then, in turn, responds to the device.

(ii) More broadly, “feedback” is used in “human relations

(a) there, ‘feedback’ is any information (thought content) about one’s own behavior, provided by another, who is involved in that behavior (‘an interlocutor, ‘a parent and/or child, ‘a teacher and or student’ ‘a spouse, ‘a fiancé,’ etc.).

i) This is more than ‘criticism’ in the passive or purely behavioral sense: in that case, one expresses a value judgment (evaluation) without personal involvement (opinion e.g.), without even expecting a reaction to it.

(ii) feedback is just that: responding to someone’s behavior but with the expectation that they will respond in turn.

(b) One sees it: there is, latently, a dialectic in it. This is not surprising: in all dialectics there is a steering aspect:

(1) the negation “corrects” the affirmation and

(2) the negation of the negation in its turn the negation in first degree). The purposive aspect and of cybernetics and of dialectics makes them both that corrective aspect possess in the interaction from moment to moment.

Decision:

(a) the XVIIIth e. is the century of dialectics not in theory (it is retrospectively, provided by German idealism) through her critical spirit

(b) It is, moreover, to a strong degree ‘an anti-authoritarian dialectic that recalls

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K. Barth (+1968), *the great 'dialectical' theologian*

Cf. A. Dekker/ G.Puchinger, *The old Barth (as we heard him in lectures and conversations)*, Kampen, 1969;

-- J. Groot, *Karl Barth and the theological problem of knowledge*, Heiloo, 1946),
he

a) who, with Brunner and Gogarten, responds to classical liberal (1650/1770), romantic (1770/1850), and modernist (1850/1919: Loisy) theologies,

b) responds, of course, also against the XVIIIth century with its abductivism, rationalism, meliorism, and above all its (religious, i.e., God-related) immanentism in *Die protestantische Theologie im XIXten Jahrhundert*, Zurich, 1947, volume I (translated by P. Godet, *Karl Barth, Images du XVIIIe siècle*, Neuchâtel / Paris, 1949).

Barth's neo-orthodox theology emphasizes

(i) the transcendent God of the Bible and his Word addressed to man in his sin (against immanentism, which means secularization),

(ii) faith (against autonomous reason, - not against theological reason, which wants to found 'a real science called "theology"'),

(iii) the pessimism (der Reformation) which expresses itself in crisis theology (against meliorism). Especially Schleiermacher and Ritschl have to suffer (the two great German Protestant theologians of the XIXth e.).

Barth's theses on the XVIIIth century.

a) Barth emphasizes the complicated character of the XVIIIth century, which we cannot identify with the Enlightenment. Sturm und Drang, Romanticism, German Idealism, Goethe, - they have dealt with the XVIIIth century, but have unilaterally targeted rationalism.

W. Goetze, in his treatment (1931) of the XVIIIth century, characterizes it as the century of absolutism, i.e. the state structure under Louis XIV, Frederick the Great and Joseph II. Barth starts from there: the political order, he says, is always the expression of life over the general ideal, namely, the unconscious belief in the omnipotence of human ability.

This confidence, - overconfidently going big on one's own ability as a human being, Barth calls "the XVIIIth-century absolutism" (which is thus a general cultural term here). Man discovers or, at least experiences himself, as self-sufficient (autarkic in the sense of independent, autonomous, subject to no agency outside him).

Relying solely on himself, not accepting responsibility for anyone, the absolutist man works out his "power" in all directions, whether he is Voltaire or Louis XIV or a petty bourgeois from a provincial town or a revolutionary or a man of letters or whatever. He may be an "enlightened mind," but this is not necessary. Certainly not in the narrow rationalistic sense of the word. Man as a miracle, as miraculous power and ability, - that is his belief. In this sense 'absolutism' is Hegel's 'self-consciousness' and can be called 'humanism'.

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Barth then exemplifies.

1) So e.g. the world conquest and the universe conquest (Columbus, Copernicus) is 'an expression of the will to subject the universe and the earth to himself, to consider it his possession (which in colonial imperialism must have become clear to the 'other' peoples in bloody seriousness).

2) The slave trade - and this by Christians bent on "black labor" - is typical: in Europe be pious or practice rational science or reason criticism; in the conquered territories track down and sell or addict Negroes! (o.c., 23)!

3) The same sense of self-power manifests itself in the mathesis universalis, perception, and subject science as three main instruments of absolute (autonomous) power (o.c., 24);.

4) The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) shows the same 'absolutist' tendency, but now in revolutionary form instead of in kingly form (36ss.). Within the revolution one can be conservative or radical, yet in either case act 'absolutely' (o.c. , 41).

5) The design (one would now say) is also typical: the will to impose its own form on the external or internal reality testifies to the feeling of power. Nature, now not as a scientific object but as an aesthetic one (e.g. a garden, the landscape), is given a rational or romantic interpretation. Architecture reflects this desire for design (one likes plaster because of its pliability). Fashion too, dance, hairstyle, games, politeness, - all this is ordered according to the conceived pattern. (o.c., 47).

History is judged by the yardstick of the 18th century: what does not, in the past, correspond to a man full of self-confidence, free and even liberal, conquering, design-loving, moralizing, is scorned, self-serving and "superior" (o.c., 48). History, after all, is also a subject matter that one imposes a design on!

Pedagogy is, of course, 'a dreamed of domain of formation, imposition of form' (o.c., 53). The breaking down of the 'ordo' (natural, not chosen society) in favor of the 'societas,' (the self-chosen, voluntarily accepted and -established society) is expression of the same 'absolute' self-assertion (o.c., 54ss.).

The theory of the social contract ('contrat social') as a basis of society comes from the same will to design (o.c., 56). The desire to found a form of society itself, outside the 'natural' one, freely determined and 'different' from the natural one, shows itself in the secret societies) (o.c., 57ss.). The emergence of the word 'art' (artificial, word art, etc.) underscores the 'can' as a will to power (o.c., 61). Barth finds in Leibniz the most universal type of 'absolute' man (o.c., 73ss.). Late antique man (Stoic, Epicurean) seems to Barth to be the absolute man most attracted to - pre-Christian, non-Christian. Pelagian, unbaptized. In this sense, the XVIII century is 'a Renaissance once more!

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(A) II Survey of XVIII-d' century philosophy.

The Enlighteners liked to call their century “the century of philosophy. This term ‘philosophy’ applied to them exhibits two main characteristics:

(i) the tendency to popularize philosophy (they felt they were educators of the people and the developed);

(ii) as *K. Marx/ F. Engels, Die heilige Familie*, 6, says, the French Enlightenment was ‘an open, outspoken struggle against

a/ the metaphysics,

b/ especially those of the XVIIth century (Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz): “Philosophy” was opposed to “metaphysics”. What, therefore, since antiquity, had always been an integral part, indeed the basis, of philosophy, except among the ancient Skeptics, metaphysics and its theology, is banished.

as one understands *O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung*, Kempten/ Munich, 1909, S. 88: “The mode of thought which dominated the XVIIIth e. was termed by its spokesmen as ‘Aufklärung,’ i.e., ‘an expression derived from a cleared sky.’ As expelled clouds were the so-called ‘prejudices’, i.e. traditional beliefs of a religious, social, philosophical nature, which the critical raisonnement considered inadequate. The Aufklärung was the attempt to make man, insofar as he is ‘an individual being gifted with reason, a ruler over all’ (*J.Erdmann, Grundrisz der Gesch. d. Phil.*, II-2, 293).”

Rightly so, says Willmann, one can compare the Enlightenment with ancient Protestantism from the point of view of subjective individualism, which breaks with historical tradition. This, while he, in his *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, III, S. 346ff. (*Die falschen Ideale der Aufklärung*), says that,

a) in addition to the influences of the ‘virtuosi’ of the XVIIth e. (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (who were fought against as metaphysicians, but praised as rationalists),- Bacon, Hobbes, Newton),

(b) also and especially the influence of (the liberal elements in) Protestantism, which set the subject free to judge the Holy Scriptures, the laws of the state, the authority of historical lore, can be established in the Enlightenment. (o.c., 349ff.).

(i) In the place of actual things, met with immediacy in perception, the Enlightener puts the presuppositions (= the ‘thinking’ or ‘consciousness’): “Being becomes a thought; yes, thinking merges with imagining something, and being without more thus becomes the purely proposed.” (*O.Willmann, Aus der Werkstatt der Philosophie*, (From the workshop of philosophy), 1912, S. 117/17S)

(ii) Immediately, he also says there, the physical really becomes the “first philosophy” (term Aristotle gave to metaphysics) and, at the same time, the last. (o.c., 177).

Indeed, naturalism, i.e., that philosophy which declares nature to be the only reality, stands out: “The philosophy of the XVIIth century is, in a certain sense, theological; it could be argued that that of the XVIIIth century is ‘physical’.” (*R. Lavollée, La morale*, p.128)

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(iii) Being in itself and the one were interchangeable in metaphysics (i.e. reality is always both collection of elements and system of parts: the multiplicity of elements and/or parts is thus made one: 'one' is henceforth what the autonomous subject imagines to be 'one' (collection, system are merely subjective labels without objective reality)

(iv) The true (i.e. the fact that reality corresponds to thought-content; being is 'intelligibel', thinkable, thought-content) was in metaphysics 'a property of being existing in itself: for the modern-rational subject, in its consciousness immanence, the true is the correspondence of the 'presuppositions' among themselves and, only in the second instance, 'realism', i.e. the fact that 'presuppositions', 'consciousness-content' somewhere touch reality.

(v) For metaphysics, the 'good' (i.e., the inherently valuable, the 'value') was essentially 'a property of being in itself': for the 'clarified' mentality, 'valuable' is primarily 'useful' (in the broad sense of what is 'useful' for the autonomous purposes and needs of the subject: 'utili(tari)sme').

Conclusion: the four great domains of metaphysics-preconstitutive (the origin of being, the primordial), constitutive (the nature of being), informative (epistemological: what gives insight or information about being) and normative (deontic: What 'applies', regulates actions - ethical, political, technical) - all of this is in need of a major turnaround in the 'dialectical' (understand: critical) and 'absolute' (understand: autonomous) 'philosophy' of the 18th century.

(A) IIa. *The XVIII-d' century Scholastic.*

Only the Church and her thinking hold their ground massively in the crisis of foundations:

a/ free Aristotelians: L. Losada, Compton Carlton, Mayr;

b/ confrontation with the 'clarification': one tries to 'reconcile' Aristotelian metaphysics with enlightened 'naturalism': one takes e.g. hylemorphism (which claims that all sensible beings consist of both (potential) matter and (actual) 'form') with the atomism of the physical (of Newton) as reconcilable; one tries to introduce the mathematical method (Descartes, Spinoza) in Scholasticism;

Consequence: partial pricing of truly scholastic doctrines;

- Benedictines: Ulrich Weis~(+1763); B. Vogl;

- Franciscans: Karl Joseph a S. Floriano, Fortunatus a Brixia;

- Jesuits: Roger Boscovich (1711/1787): dynamic atomism (*Philosophiae naturalis theoria* (1759)); B. Hausei; *J. Zallinger, Interpretatio naturae* (1773/1775: according to Newtonian method); Berthier; *B. Stattler, Philosophia methodo scientiis propria explanata* (1769: Philosophy expounded according to the method peculiar to the "sciences, Anti-Kant (1788);

- Dominicans; S. Roselli (*Summa philosophica*, 1717);

- Other: Amort; Mutschelle; S. Storchenau; Gerdil.

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(A)IIb. *The three Illuminations.*

(pp. 162-176) The English Enlightenment.

(1). *English empiricism.* (162/175)

Cf. above p. 68, supra; 96vv. (Hobbes).

John Locke (1632/1704), the founder of the Enlightenment - His main work: *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Locke had a great influence on Voltaire.

(A) Through study of medicine

(a) he came to scorn the Scholastics. But also Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists (*R. Cudworth* (1617/1688; + main work: *The true intellectual system of the universe* (1678) refutes Hobbes from a Christianized Platonism with Cartesian bias) have to endure his criticism: innatism is the cause of research - observation and experiment concerning nature - being neglected and replaced by meditation, a-priori - speculation and pure reasoning. Something Descartes lapses into by closing his senses except when doing anatomy and physiology. Closing the eyes, hiding the ears, abstracting from the real, sensory world (which here means "isolating" from the perceptible), this is what is done in monasteries and universities (with its Scholastics).

(B) The only thing possible: in order to open their eyes, it is necessary to prove that our 'ideas' (ideas in the subjective-mediated sense) arise only from the senses - external and internal. This is the purpose of the *Essay*, which appeared in French, translated by Coste, already in 1700, augmented by important additions made by Locke himself. Three tasks:

(i) account for the origin of our 'ideas';

(ii)a demonstrate the limits of our knowledge regarding certainty, apparentness, and domain and

(ii)b thus forcing philosophy (Scholasticism, Cartesianism, Cambridge - Platonism) to renounce crossing those cognitive boundaries. - What already Bacon and especially Hobbes had attempted and what Kant will finish (criticism).

The source of our ideas is double:

(i) the 'sensation', the external perception of the senses and

(ii) the 'reflexion', the inner perception. However - note - the 'ideas' are the product of the soul. Of course not as a source of innate ideas (Descartes): the secondary qualities - color, sound, smell - are not 'copies' (pictures) of objective properties in the objects outside consciousness; they are our own soul states, nothing more. In this sense, Locke is 'sens(ual)ist' (philosopher of the senses). Yet he does not push sensism that far: the primary qualities - size, shape, location, - movement, number - are real, real (they represent something objective in things).

(a) The universale, i.e., the Scholastic-Aristotelian concept of collection, is for Locke, "a useful generic name (and concept), nothing more.

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The mind, incapable of knowing the inner “essence” of things (although Locke assumes that there is an *essentia realis*, an “essence” present in objective reality), does nothing but combine, in this case, individual or singular “representations”.

(b) Similarly, Locke treats the notion of “substance” (in Scholastic the word for system, coherent set of parts and aspects): what we call the “substance” (independence) of this tree is nothing more than a bundling, by our mind, of (primary or secondary) properties; the iron and gold workers know more about iron or gold than the philosophers with their blather about the “form” or “substance” of the iron or gold.

Curious is Locke’s remark about matter: God is able to make pure matter produce ‘ideas’! So that matter and spirit do not exist far apart in Locke’s eyes: it is godless to claim that a thinking matter is impossible. After all, God is the absolute lord over the essence of matter! Utterance that will please Voltaire.

Ethics/Politics:

The “gentleman” is the goal of education, while Christianity should be “rational” (natural religion). In his letter on tolerance he advocates tolerance - an enlightened hobbyhorse - but Catholics and atheists remain excluded.

The state - as for Hobbes, but without the raw “realism” and the Leviathan conception - serves to found universal freedom and equality.- The basic conception is: human nature, thanks to its faculties, its self-regulation and its urges, founds by itself (autarky), thought: cf. K. Barth supra pp. 158/159; - naturalism: cf. Willmann, - Lavollée supra p. 160) ‘a moral and political world.

a) Locke in particular founds morality effectivistically (see above p. 37 on causal induction (Bacon); pp. 99, 105 (Hobbes’ effectivism) the consequences (effectual aspect) of our actions are either unpleasant or pleasant, making them repulsive or attractive (cybernetic inducing).

(b) He also founds them socially: ‘good’ is what serves the common good.

After-effects:

(1) apart from the general-enlightenment influence, which is very great, **(2)** Locke is further indicated:

(i) materialist: Hartley (+1757) who adheres to the psychology of association and connects soul and body very closely; J.Priestley (1733/1804), who fully identifies soul and body yet continues to label the soul as immortal;

(ii) Burthogge, Collier (+1732), especially G. Berkeley (1685/1753), *Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge* (1710): immaterialist interpretation of Locke (akosmic idealism) Cf. p. 102 (pervasive sensism that becomes modern understanding ‘idealism’ (philosophy of representations); p. 140 (non-mechanistic understanding of nature).

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(iii) deistic interpretation: since J. Bodin (cf. supra p. 56 (philosophy of religion) in France and Herbert of Cherbury (id.) in England - the precursors of deism (cf. supra p. 146), which up to and including Hume, about which we will discuss later, remains the 'natural' (i.e. purely rationally-empirically useful) religion of thinking and of bourgeois personalities -, the following 'axiomata' are adopted

a/ 'A supreme being exists,

b/ human nature should worship It,

c/ natural-rational worship or "liturgy" is limited to pious virtue,

d/ The natural man is morally good and averse to moral evil (ethical optimism), yes, if guilty, instinctively inclined to repentance and penance,

e/ natural reason believes in the existence of an afterlife and retribution for good and evil; - which led Louis de Bonald to wrongly say that a deist is a person who, during his short life, did not have enough time to become an atheist; - which does not mean, however, that there is no similarity between atheism and deism, viz. the specifically Christian 'mysteries' are simply dismissed by both ways of thinking as 'superfluous', 'fantasy'; - in Locke's line the Freethinkers, Freethinkers, i.e. English postlockian deists, think:

J. Toland (1670/1722), who radically opposes any "positive," i.e., revelation-based, religion; addresses in his *Christianity no mysterious* (1696), which accuses priests associated with civil government of "keeping the people in error" and "inventing dogmas to foundation their position of power.

Anthony Collins (1676/1729): the entire English XVIIth century was deistic or covered atheistic (materialistic, 'mortalistic'), after the Revolution of 1688 Freethinking shows itself openly and in 1713 its 'bible' appears, viz, *Collins' A discours of free thinking occasioned by the Rise and the Growth of a Sect, called Freethinkers*, - book with great success, translated into French the following year: *Discours sur la liberté de penser écrit à l'occasion d' une nouvelle Secte d' Esprits Forts ou de Gens qui pensent librement (Traduit de l' anglais et augmenté d' une lettre d' un Médecin arabe* (Discourse on the freedom of thought written on the occasion of a new Sect of Strong Minds or Free Thinkers (Translated from English and supplemented by a letter from an Arab Physician), (that Islam attack on Christianity was very much to the liking of the contemporaries!); Tindal (+ 1733); Bolingbroke (+1751);

(iv) moralistic interpretation:

Earl Shaftesbury (1671/1713), pupil of Locke, arrived, via the Cambridge-Platonics, at an English version of Greek religiosity: instead of fear, indeed the fear of the deity, Shaftesbury puts joy - his 'good humor' he considers the basis of 'true' religion, while melancholy is the sign of 'untrue' religion -, indeed, the traditional asceticism with its sour desire for mortification he replaces by

(i) enthusiasm for the clean and

(ii) inclination to the good - one thinks of kalokaigathia (the sense of the beautiful and the good) of antique Greek aristocrats).

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Consequence: the ecclesiastical enmity of the Freethinkers found this new ecclesiastical type “sympathetic” (Fielding: Joseph Andrews, 1740, depicts such a Freethinker-flavored Father Adams, who, however, no longer has much to do with authentic Christianity (that type will, in the XIXth century, provoke the fierce criticism of Sören Kierkegaard, the father of Existentialism; in his Danish version, Bishop Mynster namely, Kierkegaard criticizes the

(i) aestheticism - similar to Father Adams’ “good-humor aestheticism” - and
(ii) the godless moralism and reproaches it especially
(iii) the flight from personal confrontation with the transcendent God who, in Jesus as our “contemporary, calls us to the “leap of faith.

K.Barth - see above pp. 158/159 - will look with Kierkegaardian eyes at the “absolute” man of the XVIIIth century);

(a) supporters of Shaftesbury: Butler (+1752); Hutcheson (+1746); (b) influence: very great in

(i) France: Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau and especially the French materialists, and
(ii) Germany: the German Classics and Romanticism; - further Mandeville (+1733: egoism similar to Hobbes); S.Clarke (1675/1729) the only adherent of ‘an objective morality: ‘good’ is that action which is in accordance with its object; Paley (+1805): ‘good’ is that which promotes universal bliss (‘an antique - Greek idea);

(v) sentimental interpretation:

Adam Smith (1723/1790), the brilliant Scot, friend of Hume, founder of so-called classical (understand: liberal) economics:

(a) ethics is founded on sympathy (*Theory of moral sentiment*, London, 1759);

(b) his liberal economics is also founded on it, apart from its own laws of the economic life of the time (*Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*, I and II, London, 1776);

(vi) aesthetic interpretation:

except Shaftesbury (above) Burke (+1797), the great English statesman (‘an Irishman born in Dublin of a Protestant father and a Catholic mother, confronted at school by a Quaker), known for his’ conservationist attitude evoked by the French Revolution; .

(vii) Critical interpretation:

David Hume (1711/ 1776)

(A) who, out of radical pessimism, denotes the universe of the Christians and of the Deists as a garbage dump; O. Willmann, III, S. 187, 330, says that fable of the apple (i) which a lucky finder (ii) had to pass on to a stronger one, who, biting into the apple, (iii) bumps into the worm which laughs at him: ‘This apple is mine’, is applicable to Locke (finder), Berkeley (stronger one) and Hume (worm) according to Father Kent O.S.B. (Lublin Review 1897); Hume radically doubts Berkeley’s God and soul existence and conceives of the link between cause and effect as pure succession by association.

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Moreover, he radically doubts the foundations of Freethinkerdeism in his *Dialogs concerning natural religion* (1751(?), 1779), once called “the great book of criticism of religion of the eighteenth century” (Demea (“positive” religion), Kleanthes (“natural” religion) and Philon (skeptical-unconcerned guise of Hume himself, who maintains that the “superstitious” religion (= the positive, i.e. Christianity) and the “philosophical” religion (= the rational deist) are both, in essence, identical, viz. Christianity) and the ‘philosophical’ religion (= the rational deistic one) are both, in essence, identical, viz. in their cosmic teleology (= the universe betrays ‘a providential plan)). However

(B) note: the ‘negation’ (antithesis, in Hegel’s language) that Hume represents vis-à-vis the ‘affirmations’ (theses, in dialectic language), is followed by ‘a negation of the negation’ (synthesis in Hegelian dialectic).

We explain this in more detail, because she represents one of the great “positive, i.e. way out, solutions of the Enlightenment, i.e. what was later called, in France, with Auste Comte (1798/1857) the “positive” (positivist) solution.

From the ‘ideology critique’ of Fr. Bacon (see above pp. 39/40) and the two-truth position of Hobbes (id., pp. 96/98) what Hume calls ‘criticism’ is at work. What is ‘criticism’?

(a) She attacks

(i) the science alien theology (Hobbes’ empusa) and

(ii) Scholastic metaphysics as a superstition that provides itself with a view of “philosophy” through an unintelligible jargon in the eyes of superficial minds.

b) It sets itself up against this (‘antithetical’) as its replacement: it is the scientific study of human cognition. And its ‘operations’ (operations of the data of external and internal experience).

(a) Model stands Newton ‘s mathematical physicality: it exposes with certainty and supported by experience and calculation the structure (static and dynamic) of the solar system and the universe, at least to an incipient degree:

(b) so does (knowledge) criticism, which exposes the structure, static and dynamic, of our knowing with certainty and supported by “positive” (Comte would later say), “empirical” (says Hume) data.- Thus, Hume explains in two stages how our knowing

a) starts from ‘impressions’ (perceptions of the hearing, the eyes, the sense of touch, as well as love and hate, desire and will, etc.; one thinks of Descartes’ idées or data of consciousness), which show a certain ‘emphasis’, ‘force’, ‘vividness’,

b) to culminate, in the second, weaker degree, in ‘ideas’ which are the faded imprints (‘copies’) of the first vivid impressions. In other words, our soul processes both impressions of experience and ideas (e.g. those of ‘God’, ‘soul’ etc.) according to strict static and dynamic laws, viz.

(i) the similarity (collection) and the contiguity (apposition in space and time: systemic coherence) and

(ii) cause-effect chain (effectivism) as deterministically conceived link between cause and effect.

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In other words, Hume's critique of knowledge - the substitute, in his eyes, for traditional theology and metaphysics

(a) starts from the phenomena, i.e. the phenomena of our consciousness; but that phenomenal consciousness Hume does not trust: it is deformed by experience and 'habit', habit, concerning the 'simple elements' of which the phenomena consist;

(b) under the confused appearance of complexity and interpenetration lie 'simple elements'. The analysis - always that Platonic word (lemmatic-analytical method (see above pp. 30, 38/39, 110) exposes the 'simple elements' of experience thanks to the law of association, which connects them, 'combines' them, according to similarity, coherence (contiguity and causal determinism (necessary connection 'cause/effect')).

That law of association, which is the pedant of the law of gravitation (Newton), but for our inner world, gives the combinatorics (art of connection through those principles (similarity, coherence, cause/effect)).

According to Hume, that central law of association - the core of Hume's associationism - is in turn also just a faded impression of the senses, an idea (where Kant will argue that those principles are "a-priori," innate: the difference between sensism and innatism).

Hume's phenomenism.

His analysis of causality typifies Hume's entire worldview:

(i) The precritical and pre-analytical consciousness, deformed, yes, deformed by repetition and habit formation (one sees so often in one's life that heat makes water boil e.g.) thinks that the "cause" as a mysterious force produces the effect;

(ii) critical analysis, however, exposes, under that appearance, that

a) our senses only see this phenomenon followed by that phenomenon (and not produced); our internal sense (or consciousness) sees poorly, that our act of will is followed by our act of arm (but not that that will "causes" that act of arm);

(b) our reasoning which is entirely absorbed in identities, tautologies sees no identity between cause and effect. The causal process is merely phenomenal and composed of elements.

Hume's science classification.

Science arises from universal and necessary principles. Consequence:

(i) the mathesis is such a science (which, in Hume's phenomenism, finds no real justification; yet here he is inconsistent);

(ii) the other sciences do not provide us with universal and necessary propositions: only through our organizing consciousness, through repetition and habit, combined 'elements; which we 'deem' (interpret) similar, coherent or causally connected. No wonder Hume was called a skeptic!

Ethics and politics is based on feeling: when an act, private or public, arouses sympathy and approval in the beholder, it is "good."

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But one can't go wrong: in 1754/1763 his *History of England from the invasion of Julius Caesar* was published, which turned him from an unread, yes, shunned writer into a celebrated man, who, in 1763, became a fashion success as secretary of state in Paris. The 'haute société française' wanted the historian Hume at all its receptions and in all its theater lodges: "la haute aristocratie, fêta Hume; les grandes dames n' étaient satisfaites que si elles pouvaient montrer 'le gros David'". (E. Lenoble, *Hume*, in *Dict. Prat. des conaiss. relig.*, Paris, 1926, III, p. 822). English effectivism,

a1) without a-priority basis (no innatism) and

a2) without any real sense basis (causality is 'an association!),'

b) remains, nevertheless, both in ethics and in the polis in a purely deterministic sense: all human acts are acts of necessity!

It is universally recognized that, among all peoples and throughout all ages, human actions exhibit 'a great uniformity: (human) 'nature' - always the basic word in this naturalistic or physical century - does not deviate, so far from its principles and the same motives cause always the same forms of behavior. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, also friendship, generosity, patriotism -. all drives - remain the same and cause the same consequences, the historical facts! Nothing new! Nothing singular! Only one great demonstration of an invariant and universal human nature. That is precisely the 'usefulness' (!) of history.

(a) The ordinary pre-critical-analytical man sees only irregularities in the historical facts

(b) the "philosophers" also allow themselves to be caught at first by this superficial impression, but, analyzing, they see that every cause always produced the same effects in people and in their behavior. The human will is governed by laws just like extra-human nature.

Physical necessity (law) and ethical political necessity ('moral laws') are two different names, yet their nature is identical: with Hobbes and Spinoza, as pioneers of absolute determinism concerning ethics and politics (history), Hume is both the founder of human science as 'empirical' (Comte will say 'positive') science and the founder of 'empirical' historiography. Compare this with Vico (p. 108vv.: philological method) and you see the enormous difference between Vico's Spiritual Science and Hume's (human -) natural science (cf. Descartes (p. 82vv. supra).

Conclusion: "In his intention (Hume) does not want to renounce philosophy (or even 'metaphysics), but to give to this science another direction and another object, to turn it away from hopeless reflections and to base it on the solid and factual ground of experience." (A. Wéber, *Hist. d.l. ph.*, Paris, 1914, p. 384).

A kindred spirit of Hume was A. Smith, the founder of economic science (see above).

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The after-effects of Hume.

J. Halleux, *Les principes du positivisme contemporain (Exposé et critique)*, Louvain, 1895, p. 77:

“David Hume and I. Kant laid the foundations (of positivism). Auguste Comte gave it its final device. Herbert Spencer and Stuart Mill, in England. Littré and Taine, in France, were, in his wake, its most brilliant representatives.” *Joh. Fischl, Materialismus und Positivismus der Gegenwart (Ein Beitrag zur Aussprache über die Weltanschauung des modernen Menschen)*, (Materialism and Positivism of the Present (A Contribution to the Debate on the Worldview of Modern Man)), Graz/ Wien/ Altötting, 1953, S. 125:

“Positivism set in motion, around the middle of the 19th century, a movement which led to a general transformation of natural science and philosophy. Its influence was so profound that we are still under its spell today. Positivism goes back historically to Locke and Hume; if sensory experience is the sole source of our entire science, then everything that can no longer be traced back to that experience should be banned from pure science. This applies to the whole of metaphysics. Thus Hume is the father of positivism. Though,

(a) while Hume was still content to banish metaphysics

(b) modern Positivism wants to expose precisely that scientific method by which, out of observed phenomena, we can build up a solid, experiential science: it changes from ‘Negativism’ (i.e. Hume’s rejection of metaphysics) into a real ‘Positivism’ (i.e. building up science).”

The positivist triad.

Halleux says that positive philosophy is the systematization of positive thinking, which, through ‘a positive method, leads to positive knowledge (o.c., 10). The positivist splits the modes of thought into two:

(i) the speculative, which analyzes as its object abstract concepts (i.e., general truths), through reflexion and reasoning;

(ii) the positive, which takes a truth to be certain only insofar as it finds its application in the facts (inductive method, which encounters private and universal truths).

As a philosophy, positivism is very exclusive: “There is only legitimate certainty in so far as it is based on facts. Such is the principle formulated by Bacon, laid down by A. Comte as the basis of his theories and taken up as a source of inspiration by every positivist philosopher”. (o.c.,26).

Characteristic of positivism.

(a) Knowledge critique: only inductive sensory experience is scientific (empiricism), yes, sensism);

(b)1 The analysis of facts reveals only singular facts (nominalism);

(b)2 the object, accessible to the senses, is nature (naturalism), which is mechanically explicable (mechanicism); extra- or supernatural “phenomena” - are by definition unscientific (soul, consciousness, metaphysics) and indistinguishable (agnosticism: unknowability belief);

(b)3 movement and nothing but that show the facts (mobilism);

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There are no “absolutes” or “immutable” beings, values, norms (relativism, indeed, nihilism (i.e., the radical questioning of metaphysical ideas, ideals, and values)).

A. Comte (1798/1857). Father, at Montpellier, was a monarchist; mother an ardent Catholic. Superb studies, literary and scientific. 1818: encounter with Saint-Simon (1760/1824), student of d' Alembert (Encyclopédie) - Saint-Simon was étatist, i.e. state socialist. - After the split, he taught a course in “positive” philosophy, but in 1826 he suffered an attack of insanity and was imprisoned by the famous Esquirol. Recovered, he enters the Ecole polytechnique, where he is later excluded and ends up in misery (Littré and friends give him “une subside positiviste”!

Cours de philosophie positive (I/VI, 1830/1242).

The critique of knowledge, so typical of empiricism, acquires, in the spirit of the XIXth century, which knows histori(ci)sm, the discovery of history, unlike Hume or Voltaire, more romantic, as well as evolutionism (Darwin), with Comte, a cultural and especially a knowledge-historical form. Comte sees his time as a confrontation between a theological-military social order, which is dying away, and a scientific-industrial order, which is emerging.

Basic idea: human unity! The species “man” is one, everywhere subject to the same historical process, determined by the same social laws, directed toward a uniform future (cf. Hume’s determinism):

Consequence: ‘la loi des trois états’ (the law of the three stages):

(i) the theological stage: infant stage, which sees in everything ‘animated beings and which has three sub-stages (fetishism which, later, is called ‘animism’; polytheism; monotheism); cognitively backward, this stage is very social: religion binds all together into a social unit;

(ii) the metaphysical stage: juvenile stage, which, behind the phenomena no longer seeks “beings” but “concepts” that reflects “a nature in the phenomena, which is active; - the community in the theological stage was controlled by theologians and military, the metaphysical is controlled by metaphysicians and jurists; it is, socially, rather anarchic;

(iii) the positive stage: one renounces ‘absolute’ knowledge (hang of the first two stages) in order to acquire only ‘positive’, i.e. relative, yet scientific knowledge (scientism); the leading classes or creative vanguard is now the scientists and industrialists.

Science classification. Comte distinguishes six basic sciences:

(1) The mathesis - he himself was a mathematician -, the general instrument of science;

(2) then follow, according to decreasing generality yet increasing intricacy, astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology; in his time one to be worked out is social physics or sociology.

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Comte is not a reductionist: every more complex science does depend on the less complex, but e.g. the organic facts, however dependent on the physico-chemical facts and their lawfulness, are still higher by 'an irreducible character, 'le consensus vital'.

Conclusion: like Hume, Comte assumed as laws of association, which govern the relations of facts, the similarity and the succession.- Applied to sociology, this gives the social statics, which studies the social order, and the social dynamics, which has as its object the social progress. Thus for the latter, the positive mentality should be spread, through the education of the proletariat, the only class not corrupted by the theological-metaphysical mind. The crisis, since 1789, caused by the useless struggle between conservatives and progressives, will thus cease.

After-effects.- Profound to the present day. Especially, in unity with Kantian critical philosophy, Comte strongly promoted epistemology (science theory) (scientistics).

Around 1880, however, a narrowed positivism, "scientism," emerged, which, in France, was the reaction of

- 1) Bergsonian vitalism and
- 2) will provoke existentialism and, even
- 3) Structuralism, which accuses positivism of reducing (social) reality to "nature" (without language and its structures). -

Yet positivism remains, next to Hegel's system (dialectical), the system which really breathes philosophical spirit and has decisively promoted and influenced the human sciences - especially the social sciences - yes, it has given rise to "sociologism", (i.e. that ideology which, going beyond the limits of the sociological method, reduces man to the social and intersubjective dimension).

E. Taine (1828/1893); *E. Renan* (1823/1892) with his *Vie de Jésus* (1863);- *de Gobineau* (1816/1882), *Sur l' inégalité des races* (1853/1855), the philosophy of race (H. Chamberlain (1855/1927: Aryan philosophy; A. Rosenberg (1893/1946: *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, bible of National Socialism)); - J. Stuart Mill (1806/ 1873: follower of Hume's empiricism, juxtaposed with the Comtians in England); - C. Opzoomer (1821/1892): as many Comtians.

Second Comtism; around 1844 Comte, separated from his wife, comes into contact with Clotilde de Vaux (seventeen years younger than he), with whom he falls radiantly in love, but who, a year later, dies: from that date on

a) Comte founds the positivist religion, strongly sentimental and altruistic ('Vis pour autrui'), centered around that deceased miss, yet with three themes, 'Le grand Fétiche', the earth, from which 'Le grand Etre' mankind, has emerged and which itself is situated in 'le Grand Milieu', the universe and its space, all objects of cult;

b) he also loses himself in a future utopia, of which Littré says "cette triste décadence d' un grand esprit" (which was not without delusions of grandeur). Of this religious-utopian phase, a cult still lives on in Brazil.

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Logical empiricism.

L Vax, L'empirisme logique (De Bertrand Russel à Nelson Goodman), Paris, 1970, gives an overview:

(i) **Logical Atomism** to which *G. Nuchelmans, Overzicht van de analytische wijsbegeerte (Survey of Analytical Philosophy)*, Utrecht/ Antwerp, 1969, p. 61/129, connects the names of G. Moore, B. Russell (the father of logical atomism stricto sensu), *L. Wittgenstein (Tractatus logico-philosophicus)*, Broad, Stebbing, Wisdom, Ramsey e.a. : they all represent the first phase of the so-called analytic (i.e. language and logico-analytic) philosophy. Indeed, the name and the named (that to which one ascribes the name) and the concepts, judgements and reasonings used in language are central to this empiricism of the Cambridge School, where Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, all three closely associated with Trinity College, rose up against Spinozism and Hegelianism around 1900 by means of language analysis;

(a) Moore analytically defends the language of manners and non-artificial language (and ordinary human reason)

(b) B. Russell, with Wittgenstein, analyzes scientific, logical-mathematical language;

(ii) **the Logic. or Neo- or Languagepositivism of the Wiener Kreis:**

1) prepared in the 1920s, 2) the Vienna Circle unfolded between 1930 and 1936, 3) and then disintegrated;

The name Positivism is somewhat misleading, because Comte did not have such a strong influence, directly: the Vienna Circle is 'a fusion of

(i) English empiricism, from Ockham to Russell, and (ii) the mathematical-logical tradition, from Leibniz (and even Desartes, with his mathesis universalis) to Poincaré and Duhem; he maintains relations with

1) the Cambridge language analysts (above), 2) the remarkable Polish School (Kotarbinski, I,ukasiewicz, Lesniewski, Tarski) and with 3) Hans Reichenbach Berliner Kreis); world congresses were held: the first took place in Paris (1935). All these groups had in common

(i) the aversion to "unsophisticated" language (the philosophers use terms and carry out reasoning that is beside the point),

(ii) the strict sense of science (scientistics); especially logistics, newly emerged, plays a major role, whether or not connected with mathesis, also in need of thorough expansion;

Digression: the logistics (symbolic logic, calculus)

(1) arises ± 1847: the English mathematician G. Boole (1815/1864) publishes 'a logical algebra, as well as A. de Morgan (1806/1878); - concepts, judgments (propositions) are worked out as algebraic operations of symbols;

B. Peirce (1809/1880) and E. Schroeder (1841/1902) develop, later, a class algebra and a propositional or statement algebra, parallel to Boole and de Morgan; this is still the older logic, but algebraized;

(2) At the end of the XIXth century, G. Frege (1848/1925), G. Peano (1858/1932), E. Schröder (supra) re-established Aristotelian logic and gave birth to logistics proper; their work is crowned by the monumental A. Whitehead (1861/1947)/

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Bertr. Russell, *Principia mathematica* (1910/1913), which formalizes (i.e., builds axiomatically-deductively, pretty much in the style of Euklides's geometry, but even more rigorously) the logic of Aristotle and the stoa; its best name is therefore formalized logic or logics; with Whitehead and Russell, all of mathematics is formalized as a part of the logics (“a wish of the logicians on mathematics”);

(3) Around 1920, ‘n, third period begins:

(i) non-Aristotelian and non-stoic understandings are formalized;

(ii) metalogics (better: metalogistics) arises: the basic research on logistics is, as it were, ‘a logistics of logistics itself (meta-language is language about language in which, among other things, model theory plays a role);

(4) Around 1950, applicative or applied logistics emerged:

1) computer science (informatics), 2) linguistics: 3) neurology, etc. give rise to what *D. Nauta, Logica en model*, Bussum, 1970, p. 25, called “a stormy development”; cf. also *H. Scholz, Abrisz der Geschichte der Logik*, Freiburg/Munich, 1931-1, 1959-2 (*Fr.: Esquisse d' une histoire de la logique*, Paris, 1968, pp. 80ss. (Leibniz, the logician); R. Feys, *Results and possibilities of formalized logic*, in *Tijdschr. v. Phil.*, 12 (1950): 2, pp. 227/244;

Main characters: Rudolf Carnap (1891/1970), M.Schlick (1882/1951, murdered by ‘an insane student), O.Neurath (1882/1945), H. Hahn (1880/1934); the Wenerkring, as mentioned, fell apart after 1936, especially after the Anschluss of Austria to Nazi Germany in 1938: Most adherents went to the Anglo-Saxon countries; but Neo-Positivism gained influence in the USA, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, also some France (Rougier, Boll); in the USA, in addition to Reichenbach, Carnap, Hempel, natives like Nagel, Quine, Goodman are also influential (they relax neo-positivism o.m. from their own tradition which goes back to C.S. Peirce);

R. Carnap

(a) started from an extreme positivism, which, following the logics (*Principia mathematica*), conceived this exact logic form as the (otherwise artificial) language of both mathematics and the experiential sciences; with the definitive exclusion of theology and metaphysics (*Logische Syntax der Welt*); for science is

1) first, a collection of protocol statements (simple determinations),

2) which, then, are given ‘meaning’ in preferably logistic-mathematical language

(b) later, under’ Tarski ‘s influence (School of Warsaw), Carnap got eye,

1) except for the syntax,

2) for semantics, which studies the sign in its relation to the object, and

3) even for pragmatics (the sign as instrument of communication (speaker/hearer));

the three aspects together are called ‘semiotics’: philosophy then becomes, instead of syntax, semiotic analysis of the language of science and even of ordinary language. This is “a broadened neo-positivism. Cf. p. 185 infra.

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Note.-- I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utrecht / Antwerp, 1961 (// Dt *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethode*n), pp. 45/124, gives ‘a solid exposition of the different aspects of the ‘semiotic’ or language analytic methods (especially p. 47vv.: general justification of language analysis).

(iii) The Oxford School is the third wave of language analysis: it is most reminiscent of the Moore mentioned above and is called ‘philosophy of ordinary language’.

Often its representatives - the later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and others - are considered the language analysts par excellence. Above all, the notion of analysis was broadened with respect to the two previous schools (Cambridge and Wiener circle), viz. in Moore’s sense especially. Cf. Nuchelmans, o.c., 168/234, for further explanation.

Conclusion

(1) “The phenomenologically minded researchers - Bochenski means the intentional phenomenologists style Husserl, who believe that the analysis of a word or a sentence ‘touches the being in its real thought-content nature (Platon’s idea) - assume that the axioms of logics are verifiable by a mental insight - something like a beholding of beings.

(2) The empiricists, on the other hand, hold such statements to be ‘empty’ - admittedly not quite ‘meaningless’ - viz. the ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ (idea) of Husserl and the phenomenologists is here meant by the empiricists - but nevertheless independent of the general rules for the semantically meaningful.” (Bochenski, o.c., 80). In other words, the ancient and mid-century debate between Protosofistics (nominalism) and Socratic (conceptual realism) - see above p. 13 (universalism), p. 18/19 (Late mid-century nominalism (Ockham et al.) - continues to the present day.

“However one may motivate (this modern universalism question) theoretically, in any case the fact remains today that (the) logistic statements - one thinks of mathematical logic and its formalized texts - are sensually (i.e. empirically) unverifiable; herein lies a fundamental distinction between

(a) the current methodology and

(b) the older insights of Mill and Comte (ibid., 80).

However, one comment must be made

(a) I agree, the formulas of an axiomatic system are in themselves series of signs or symbols, strung together according to rules, starting from axiomata, from which one strictly deducts methodically

(b) but they are model-theoretical, i.e. they are applicable at a certain moment either to other symbols and their combinations or - especially - to empirically existing realities: didn’t one first construct the four-dimensional geometry ‘a-priori’, i.e. axiomatic, in order to 1) encounter realities in physics which are precisely determined by this so-called meaningless symbol game, and 2) to be able to make a theoretical choice for the four-dimensional geometry? axiomatic, constructed - as a kind of 1) calculated and 2) methodical symbolic game - to bump up one day in physics to realities which became comprehensible precisely by these so-called meaningless, i.e. ‘provisionally inapplicable’, formulas (Einstein’s space)?

Here we refer for the last time to Platon's lemmatical-analytical method: is there anything more Platonic than the strictly regulated and methodical deductive 'analysis' of the relations between 'symbols' (understand: possible ideas, mental contents)? The lemma is exactly that 'emptiness' of the empiricists: one really doesn't know what one manipulates logically, yet one pretends' it is susceptible to operations that are always relations. Well, such a thing would have been called an idea by Platon! Cf. *C. van Peursen, Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy*, Hilversum/ Amsterdam, 1968; cf. also *Bochenski, o.c.*, p. 27vv. (*The phenomenological method*).

(2). Scottish Philosophy.

Opponents of Hume's critique of knowledge (and the metaphysics-denying skepticism in it) were the Common-Sense philosophers, who assumed "the common sense" of men, - precisely that which Hume called "consciousness" and found insidious.

Precursor: *Cl. Buffior SJ, Traité des premières vérités* (1717). Principal representative: *Th. Reid (1710/1796), An Inquiry into the Human mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764).

For all philosophical or scientific awareness and still without it, common sense, without rationalism, possesses insights that show 'an immediacy (pp.71, 79, higher) of grasping reality beyond conscious awareness. Three types are distinguishable:

- (i) a-priori truths (as: 'three times three is nine');
- (ii) posterior or empirical truths (e.g., 'yellow differs from red')
- (iii) fundamental contingencies (factualities) - and these erode the basis of the whole of Modern rationalism as consciencialism (immanentism which is mediate concerning experience and perception) - :

a/ the real (independent of the self and its closed consciousness) existence of the clearly perceived ('we see here before our eyes that man passing there') or the clearly remembered ('I truly remember very well how he got angry at that!');

b/ the real existence of one's own changeable consciousness contents ('I am sad'; 'I am going to do this immediately'), yet also of one's own I-identity, which remains unchanging, through the flow of consciousness contents ('I have changed a lot, yet I am still who I am!'), especially the I as a source of decisions ('I have it on my conscience and that gnaws at me');

c/ the real existence, independent of my consciousness and its actual or past contents, of tendencies which, in their turn, communicate with me, not through the peephole of a reasoning which, through my body (and especially speech), concludes my I, but immediately knowing and feeling (yes, telepathically "feeling" me). Thus the 'Scots' also defended ethics.- Other representatives: Oswald; *J. Beattie (1735/1803): Theory of the Language* (1778); *D. Steward (1753/1828)*, who were good psychologists, but not strong in metaphysics.

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After-effects.

Scottish philosophy has influenced F. Jacobi, the founder of German Glaubensphilosophie, which is the immediate or immediate certainty of the real existence of

- (i) the outside world around us
- (ii) included the so-called transcendental world and emphasized language as present before the reason of rationalists and as present in God's revelation which, linguistically and linguistically, addresses itself to us. - Th. Brown (+1820), J. Mackintosh (+1832) are also to be mentioned.

The French Lumières. (176/213)

“As the national spirit of the English betrays a tendency towards materialism, so the favourite philosophy of the French was evidently originally Scepticism. (...) So powerful remained the influence of the Septic movement (...) that still, among the materialists of the eighteenth century, even those who are called the most extreme and resolute in degree are far removed from the closed system of a Hobbes and seem to use their materialism almost merely to checkmate religious faith by means of him”. (A. Lange, *Gesch. d. Mat.*, Leipzig, I, 397).

What Lange says, on closer examination, turns out to be true, but one-sided: to understand the XVIIIth century in France - and one only understands it, if one sees it culminating in the French Revolution - one should listen to F. Engels, where, in his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, I, halfway through, he writes:

“Just as the bourgeoisie, through big industry, competition, and the world market, practically volatilizes all ancient and venerable institutions, so this dialectical philosophy - Engels speaks of Hegel's dialectic as pure mobilism, i.e., a thinking that sees everything in motion (Cf. supra p. 151) - blots out all representations of definitive absolute truth and absolute human states corresponding to it.

For that philosophy there is nothing definitive, absolute, sacred: it shows impermanence of everything and to everything, and nothing exists for it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and decaying, of endlessly ascending from the lower to the higher, of which it itself in the thinking brain is the bare reflection.

It does have a conservative side: it recognizes the justification of certain stages of knowledge and society within their time and conditions, but also only so far. The conservatism of this view is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute, - the only absolute it asserts.”

The reason why we - higher pp. 147 (Hegelianism, Marxism as belonging, according to the Vub Center, to the Enlightenment), 149 (its justification in Arvon's text on the Lord-Knecht dialectic and his interpretation of it) - made the analysis of the Lord-Knecht dialectic for so long is now exposed.

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K. Marx/ F. Engels, Die heilige Familie, 6, says about the practical effect of life in France, in the XVIIIth century in particular: “This life was directed to the immediate now, to worldly pleasures and interests, to the earthly world. To its antitheological, antimetaphysical, its materialistic praxis had to answer antitheological, antimetaphysical, materialistic theories. Metaphysics had lost practically all credit”.

What the materialists Marx and Engel are asserting here, the idealist J. G. Fichte had already clearly stated years before: What kind of philosophy one chooses depends on what kind of man you are, because a philosophical system is not a dead set of household goods, which one can simply discard or put on at will, but it is animated by the soul of the man who inhabits it.” (1845).

This means that by the middle of the last century Fichte was already clearly “relativizing” philosophy - what is now called - and doing so depth psychologically: from the largely unconscious soul one chooses the system of thought that suits that (un)conscious soul (cf. the structuralists, the depth psychologists).

We saw - higher p. 151 - that dialectics is a matter of standpoints which, one after the other, “ignore” each other, i.e. value-judging relativism, and that of ever new standpoints appearing (hence the endlessness of the dialectical movement). Well, this is what we see at work in France par excellence (without the German need to translate this process into ideas, except superficially).

(a) Secularization - see above pp. 20/21 - is now the position, along with

(b) the social relations (strongly recalling the lord-servant dialectic (which Arvon found applicable to the XVIIIth century, socially, politically, and religiously (p. 149)) that the French “thinkers” occupy.

To understand this properly socio-psychologically. one should start from Nietzsche’s description of resentment.

‘Ressentiment’ is a French word, which the dictionaries describe as

(i) faint aftertaste of an evil or sorrow that one once underwent (se ressentir encore de),

(ii) memory of an injustice with the desire to avenge it (our word “resentment” is close to that).

Max Scheler, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen (in *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, (Resentment in the construction of morals (in *The Overthrow of Values*), I, 1919, S. 43/236), speaks of “psychic self-poisoning” with certain causes and consequences. In particular, the inability to avenge oneself immediately, the procrastination, is typical along with the pent up waiting for revenge (“Just wait!”).

Repressed resentment, - such, in short, is the psychology of resentment; - *H. Girard, La violence et le sacré*, Paris, 1972, has taught us that mimetism, imitation, plays a leading role in the genesis of violence: when too many covetous beings for too few desirable objects begin to compare (comparative aspect, then the struggle (competitive aspect) for possession

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(possessive or possessive aspect) of the objects to be scarce (scarcity or economic aspect). Well, one takes into account these four basic aspects of French life, and one understands the theories and the facts, which give rise to the French Revolution.

Br. Tierney et al, ed., Great Issues in Western Civilization, II (From the Scientific Revolution through the Cold War), New York, 1967, pp. 73/148, talks about the origins of the French Revolution:

“The preeminent cataclysm in modern European history was the French Revolution. Neither Europe nor the rest of the world would ever be the same again. It is not surprising that, in examining the purpose and importance of the French Revolution, interpretations have been so varied.

Furthermore, it is not a purely academic debate: the history of Europe and the world since 1789 has been one of almost uninterrupted revolution. Therefore, an understanding of the origins of the French Revolution can provide guidelines for understanding contemporary revolutions.” (o.c., 77).

Proposers ask themselves the question: was it

(1) starvation and despair or thwarted ambitions - which is tellingly similar to the possessive, competitive, comparative and scarcity - aspect of so - even? Or

(2) new theories? Or were all these “forces” at work at the same time?

The answer is:

(i) theories that do not touch the “soul” do not revolutionize against the existing order;

(ii) Starvation and despair have always been there, but they give rise to revolution only in certain circumstances: in themselves they are never a revolutionary motive or drive;

(iii) even the fact of being excluded from the culture and its benefits is never in itself revolutionary.

However, there are studies that we are going to cite here, viz. *Abbé A. Barruel, -B Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du jacobinisme*, (Memoirs to serve the history of Jacobinism,), Paris, 1974, 2 t., attributes the revolution to a threefold conspiracy:

a/ the secularizing (the unbelievers want to eradicate Christianity, - which leaves no doubt)

b/ the actually revolutionary (republicans and freemasons want to replace the absolute monarch with an equally absolute state power, yet who plays into their hands, to put it vulgarly but correctly: here the possessive element or “moment” (dialectic) works, because there is only one state power (desirable object) for more than one power taker (covetous being)),

c/ the anarchic (the Illuminates, some infidels and other anarchists want the nihilistic’ revolution: not only religion or morality, but also and especially every authority (anti-authoritarian aspect) and every property in the liberal-private sense (communist aspect) must be destroyed).

Overview. - One can list the thinkers and writers pretty much as follows:

except for the Scholastic J. Boscovich (p. 161) and G. Lesage (+1801), already mentioned, known at the time for an attempt to explain gravitation, all the names belong to the preparation of the French Revolution (except perhaps a few secondary ones); therefore we follow Barru's classification).

(a) *The secular-antichrist trend:* (179/210)

F. Voltaire (1694/1778), typical representative of the Lumières Transition

- 1) From optimism to pessimism,
- 2) from indeterminism to determinism (think Spinoza, think Hume),
- 3) From rational to skeptical living and thinking,
- 4) from traditional faith (he was raised with the Jesuits) to class faith

a) the "canaille" (i.e., the common people he despised) had to be frightened and therefore (and therefore only) had to believe in a God (gendarme), especially as a protector of liberal-private property rights;

b) the "enlightened" midst were worked with "rage" against the Church and Jesus (whom he blamed for converting the world with twelve apostles (ressentiment: the fox says the grapes are too green!)) ;

Curious is his modern-positive-scientific historical sense: his *Histoire de Charles XII* (1731) is comparable to *Hume's History of England* (see p. 168 supra) (equally well documented); with that work he is the first modern French historian of lasting value. - Influenced by P. Bayle (see p. 107: the atheistic conception of history) and with as a kindred spirit P. de Maupertus (1689/1759), 'a French deist, who made Newton known in France (see pp. 119/120), Voltaire introduced plenty of English-empirical ideas into his country, especially J. Locke, the founder of the English Enlightenment, where he deliberately misunderstands and misinterprets Descartes and Pascal, conceives Newton narrowly, virtually does not understand or know Leibniz and Spinoza but does ridicule them (*L. Jules, Voltaire, in Dict. prat. d. conn. rel.*, Paris, 1928, VI, p. 947).

According to Barruel, Voltaire is the instigator of the secular conspiracy and the thinking head inheritance.

As an aside: other Anglophile enlighteners besides Voltaire and those mentioned are *Montesquieu* (1689/1755), whose *Esprit des lois* (1748) introduces the empirically enlightened political ideas from England into France (the enlightened concept of freedom is central); *La Rochefoucauld* (+1680), *La Bruyère* (*Les 'caractères*, 1687, emphasizes self-love as the motive of all actions; further two critics of knowledge (cf. Hume's critique of knowledge p. 166vv): *Ch. Bonnet* (1720/1793), *Essai analytique des facultés de l'âme*, and *Vauvenargues* (1715/1747), *Introduction à la connaissance de l'esprit humain*.

Barruel says that Voltaire surrounded himself with truly talented thinkers such as J. L. d'Alembert (1717/1783), co-editor of the famous *Encyclopédie*, of which he provides the *Discours préliminaire* (1751); his 'n *Essai sur les éléments de philosophie* is a transformation of the then strongly emerging French mechanistic materialism into genuine French Positivism (cf. p. 169vv: Comte et al.)

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With regard to French materialism see above

(a) p. 41 (Bacon),

(b) 82vv. (Descartes (esp. 83, 84/85 (materialist Kartesians,

(c) 98vv. (Hobbes' materialism and Leviathan doctrine on state absolutism).

For more detail, see *H. Arvon, L'athéisme*, Paris, 1967, pp. 48/68 (around 1730, under the influence of the flowering of natural sciences, French materialism gets off the ground).

R. Desneprés., Les materialistes français de 1750 à 1800, Paris, 1965, situates French materialism between 1751 (first volume of the *Encyclopédie*) and 1802 (*Le Génie du Christianisme*, emblematic of the religious revival) and indirectly makes clear why the Prepositivism of d'Alembert, in that atmosphere, was able to mature:

(i) 'thesis' are the traditional religious values

(ii) 'antithesis' is its negation,

(iii) 'synthesis' the materialistic society, which, on remnants of the past, will achieve 'a scientific elaboration of the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity.' (o.c., 7).

The antithesis is thorough:

(i) apart from the God of Christianity, the

(ii) also the 'God' of Pantheism (one thinks of the Cartesian Spinoza and his very great influence on the whole of the European XVIIIth century) and

(iii) the 'Maître Horloger' of Descartes and of the Deists (who set the bodies of the universe in motion with 'a tap') in a radically atheistic way 'ignored' (o.c., 11).

"Collectively, the French materialists reject both Deism and Pantheism. They are atheists. And, in the history of ideas, their originality lies largely in their militant atheism." (o.c., 11).

In other words, the name "materialism" should not create illusions: Arvon rightly treats such materialism in his little work on atheism! Desne's work is therefore clear in its overview:

(i) the reckoning with God, the immortal soul, and religion take precedence as a terrain clearing;

(ii) the rehabilitation of "nature" (naturalism, physicisism is a main trait) as omnipotent, constantly moving, indeed living and thinking matter, which contains both good and salvation and evil and mischief (duality) follows;

(iii)a the rehabilitation of man, extension of that of 'Nature' (to be written with a capital letter!), includes the emphasis on sensory experience, rising from 'Nature' and from developing 'reflexion', - both instruments of happiness, which, however, must pass through virtue or vice;

(iii)b the rehabilitation of society is the crowning achievement of militant atheism: 'éduquer' (Barth emphasized that the 'absolute' man is possessed of 'shaping': p. 158 supra), 'réformer' (always that rational-artificial 'shaping') and above all 'transformer' (the strongest degree of 'negation' and reform).

HW 181

One of the most incisive spokespersons of aggressive atheistic materialism and positivism - the two continually intertwine - 'is a man who is never mentioned in "distinguished" books on the history of culture and ideas, *Le marquis de Sade* (1740/1814), who, for reasons of his immoral (ie: sexual and aggressive) scandals, spent more than twenty-seven years in various prisons, but wrote works which, although strictly forbidden and persecuted by Churches and states, were everywhere read and passed on (and again and again printed in secret, especially in luxury editions) and who can present the following list of **1)** appreciators, **2)** influencers, **3)** decomposers, which is revealing:

(i) Sainte-Beuve, Baudelaire and Swinburne,

(ii) Lamartine, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Lautréamont,- Dostoïevski, Kafka,

(iii) H. Heine, J. Paulhan, N. Blanchot, M.Nadeau, last but not least S. de Beauvoir, the existentialist and Sartriane; more so G.Apollinaire and the Surrealists in general did a lot to rehabilitate him. Well, listen for a moment to 'a few excerpts, which perfectly reflect the XVIII-d' century atmosphere:

"My friends," says Durand, "the more we study nature, the more we extract its secrets, the better we know its energy, and the more we become convinced of the uselessness of a God. The erection of this idol is, of all chimeras, the most odious, the most ridiculous, the most dangerous, the most despicable. This unworthy fable, born in all men of fear and hope, is the last effect of human folly. Once again, it is to misunderstand Nature to suppose that it has an author; it is to blind oneself to all the effects of this First Power, to admit one who directs it". (R. Desne, o.c., 88/89).

And listen to this text, which is nihilistic in the pure French-materialist style (Nietzsche, Heidegger, with their old-school complaints -, about 'nihilism', are nothing like it):

"We repeat incessantly: never will a 'wise' nation have the idea of condemning murder as a crime. For murder to be a crime, one would have to assume the possibility of destruction; and we saw a moment ago that this is unacceptable. I repeat: murder is only a change of form, in which neither the law of the realms (plants, animals, men) nor the law of nature lose anything at all, but in which both laws, on the contrary, gain enormously.

Why, then, punish a man for having given something back to the natural elements in the past - namely, by murdering someone, the criminal hastens the decay of his body - a portion of matter - a man, like all natural bodies, is materialistically a portion of 'matter', nothing more - a portion of matter which, after all, necessarily returns to the natural elements and which they use, once it has returned to them, to compose new forms out of it? Is a fly worth more than a pasha or a Capuchin monk?" (o.c., 237).

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Note - For a Catholic but thorough study of both mechanistic and dialectical materialism as materialism opposed to classical metaphysics, honored by Patristics and Scholastics, see *J. Fischl, Materialismus und Positivismus der Gegenwart (Ein Beitrag zur Aussprache über die Weltanschauung des modernen Menschen)*, Graz, 1953).

The 'theological' trailblazers are *D. Strausz* (1808/1874) (*Das Leben Jesu*, Tübingen, 1835, was 'a materialist best-seller in Germany, where in the Hegelian dialectic was exegetically applied) and *L. Feuerbach*, (1804/1872), also Hegelian-materialist dialectician. *K. Vogt*, *J. Moleschott*, *L. Büchner* (already cited supra p. 125) are the radical German materialists.

Max Stirner (1806/1856), with his *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, Leipzig, 1845, wrote the true German counterpart to de Sade, yet more constructive in that he eliminated crime above all in its brutal practical form, though not theoretically: his anarchism was at once:

1) selfish (cf. Hobbes' Selfish Humanity, supra p. 105) and

2) nihilistic: the "bindings" of the free self are:

(1) God, on the one hand, yet, on the other,

(2a) the morals and

(2b) the laws of the community - which leads him to the glorification of the criminal: "Thou art not so great as a criminal, thou, - misdoes nothing!" exclaims Stirner, - something in which Nietzsche follows him, at least in a kind of romantic egoistic materialism - ; further "bonds" of the free individual are

(3a) The community: Stirner lives, for example, in the family as long as it is to his advantage and he no longer works for his parents if he can get a better deal elsewhere - which many young people today do not "think" and "say" but "do"! - Also the by Hegel idolized

(3b) state has to suffer: "Therefore both of us, the state and I, are enemies. I, the egoist, am not concerned with the welfare of this human society. I sacrifice nothing to it; I merely draw the benefit from it."; also

(4) property has to take the rap for it: the owner is the one who has the 'power' to make this happen; but Stirner is not a communist: the communist still believes like a naive child in the fantasy which is called 'community' or something like that. Ultimately, Stirner is a nihilist in the Heideggerian sense: life has no 'meaning'; planning, efficiency, ideals, they are all chimeras! And, when people bring up to him that, in order to write books like he does or to have conversations, he must 'recognize' people he says: "*Euch gebrauche ich dazu, weil Ich, - Ohren brauche*", (I use you for this, because I, - need ears).

Of that egoistic materialism is the dialectical-historical materialism of *K. Marx*, *Lenin* (1870/1924) and all that has emerged from that communist. Anti-anarchist materialism has emerged up to and including e.g. *Che Guevarra* and *Fidel castro*, the social yet not total antagonist.

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Another Catholic work gives us, in broad outline the sequel, viz. *J. Parain-Vial, Tendances nouvelles de la philosophie*, Paris, 1978, pp. 9ss. The first part bears the title: “Après Nietzsche, Marx et Freud”. This means that, in France, but partly everywhere else, we are faced with the legacy of the three great so-called “critical” atheistic materialists, whom we now briefly sketch in their “negation” of the great metaphysical-theological tradition, on which civilization has hitherto relied.

S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy, Bilthoven, 1975, pp. 116/118, exposes the reading key that makes us read the ‘texts’ of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. The three, each in his own way, have provided us with ‘a new way of reading the philosophical texts, black on white expressions of the philosophical language speech or discourse (often carelessly translated with the French ‘discours’). How that? *P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’herméneutique)*, Paris, 1969, pp. 148/151, tells us:

“The sage, formed in the school of Descartes,

(A) knows that the things (les choses, i.e. the bodies; cf. supra p. 81 (the methodical doubt, alone, providing access to self-consciousness), 86vv. (the language in the body - machine of the fellow man as ‘proof’ of his self-consciousness)) - that bodily things, therefore, are doubtful, that they are not as they appear,

(B) yet this same sage-Cartesian has no doubt that consciousness is real as it appears to itself: in consciousness, ‘sens’ (i.e. meaning) and ‘conscience du sens’ (i.e. sense consciousness) coincide, so to speak.

(C) Since Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, we have doubted precisely this: after the doubt concerning the thing-body, the doubt concerning consciousness has fallen upon us.”

Ricoeur then explains that many readers of the three great critics of (self)-consciousness misread them: the reason is that none of them is a pure skeptic (if such a thing ever exists!); on the contrary, caught, Ricoeur says, in the prejudices of their time, they have well-defined dogmatic positions that spoil their critique of consciousness:

(i) Marx conceives of consciousness as a reflection of the object of knowledge and explains this reflection as “economistic”, i.e. from the economic states, which create a so-called false consciousness;

(ii) Nietzsche, biologicistic in point of departure, declares (self)consciousness falsified by the cunning of the will to power, which ‘right or wrong’ (say the English), i.e. lawful or not, honest or not, achieves its goal, by hiding especially from unsuspecting self-consciousness;

(iii) Freud, psychologistic as a psychiatrist and pansexualist, sees consciousness misled by the urges (eros and, later, after World War I, thanatos).

Yet they have developed “a technique of interpretation,” Ricoeur says, which is instructive: especially that expression of (self-)consciousness called “philosophy.”

HW 184

reduce the three great materialist critics of consciousness to some form of eloquence or “rhetoric” as IJsseling, o. c. 117, says.

(i) Nietzsche, according to IJsseling, is no longer a ‘philosopher’ but rather a philologist

(or a textuologist, i.e. text reader and reader of texts): he reads philosophical texts in a new way, i.e. extremely sensitive to the linguistic and stylistic characteristics which betray the persuasive and thus rhetorical character (and then especially, according to IJsseling, the power structures which escape the unconsciously critical eye; - ‘power’ meaning here the will to live, in its perseverance, and which shows certain ways of working cunningly to achieve its goal (the effectiveness of the will to power)).

Philosophy is a human product and he treats it “genealogically,” i.e., its mainly power-willed genesis. The philosopher, in Nietzsche’s eyes, is always the Platonizing metaphysician, who speaks of the other world,-other world that Nietzsche, as a true materialist, considers an illusion, indeed a betrayal of man’s only task, to be an earthly and “diesseitig” being,

(1) ‘A well-known Enlightenment theorem, by the way,

(2) but **a)** romantically-egocentrically articulated and **b)** ‘vitalist’, i.e. with as its basic concept ‘life’, i.e. first and foremost biological life, as the XIXth century understood it, as ‘struggle for life’! This struggle for power is at work in each one of us, so that, in Nietzsche’s eyes, our ‘life’, our speaking and acting, that:

1) ostensibly emanates from ourselves, as a Cartesian believes,

2) in fact emanates from the will to life and power in us and we are therefore not ourselves. The life in us is also speaking in the thinker, who believes that it is about objective truth, - where, in fact, he too, with all his objectivity, defends propositions a-priori that express his’ position in life. All speech, including philosophical speech, is somewhere fundamentally rhetorical.

(ii) Marx and Freud, are even further removed from philosophy:

Marx, at a certain point, renounces Feuerbach and, in him, all philosophy without more; for him, philosophy is henceforth ‘ideology. It should be noted that the word ‘idéologie’ first appears with Destutt de Tracy (1754/1836), a sensualist materialist, who introduces this neologism to replace the word ‘psychology’ (which always reminds one of ‘psyché’, soul) with a word that is perfectly Cartesian, namely, science of ideas (idea = consciousness content); this study of ideas or consciousness is then still mainly directed towards the origin (genealogy, Nietzsche would say) of those ideas.

Napoleon used the word “ideology” in a pejorative sense: “Ce sont des idéologues”, i.e. they are engaged in chimeras!

This pejorative meaning, reworded, is found in Marx: an ideology is a system of representations (‘ideas’) concerning religion, morality, politics, economics, science, philosophy, etc., **a)** with a rational view, **b)** but with, under that appearance of coherent knowledge, the absence of sufficient awareness of the true origin of those representations (in other words with a non-rational origin).

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The consciousness of the ideologue is a false consciousness of reality, which cloaks itself in a pseudo-rational form, but, in fact, interprets the socio-economic position of the ideologue: it is not the ideologue who is speaking, but he who speaks the language of his class (the proletarian speaks according to his economic position; the capitalist speaks the language of his class interests).

Freud, as a psychoanalyst, discovered an analogous phenomenon: posed a subject, who for his ideas of upbringing or environment gives offence ('annoys'), by an attitude, act, thought, feeling - e.g. erotic dreams or 'phantasms', which in fact are 'symptoms', reactions, compulsions, which spring from unconscious factors (called drives instead of conscious motives);

The accountability needs of that subject

a) will provide as coherent a rational explanation as possible for that offensive behavior (think of the worst case scenario: someone who performs a post-hypnotic command and is asked for an explanation) and also put forward an ethico-politically acceptable pretense

b) notwithstanding the real determinants ('causes') escape him and remain unconscious. Such is what Freud called "rationalization. (Cf. *E. Jones, Rationalization in Everyday Life*, 1908). Philosophy is a form of rationalization!

Note.- Cf. supra p. 173: the speaking of someone

1) can be looked at syntactically (then one pays attention to his 's concatenation of words and sentences according to grammatical rules);

2) it can be viewed semantically (then one pays attention to the meanings that those concatenated words and phrases communicate (usually according to the dictionary))

3) speaking can also be viewed pragmatically: then one pays attention to the use value of the words in the mutual understandings between speaker and hearer.

Rhetoric

(a) first of all, pay attention to pragmatics: what goal, what effect is the speaker aiming for (effectivism)?

b) Yet, here, in the three cases - philological (Nietzsche), ideology-critical (Marx), psychoanalytical (Freud) - one pays particular attention to the unconscious factors at work (whether vital (N.) socio-economic (M.) or depth-psychic-instinctive (Fr.)).

Note - The structuralists, all of whom in one way or another focus on language as a structured system of signs, note that the rules of speech are applied unconsciously - 'a child e.g.

1) enters into his/her native language without explicit learning of grammar,

2) it empathizes with the ideas of that mother tongue, without conceiving them: thus, when it speaks, it speaks from "the" language (outside of itself). The linguists thus establish something analogous to the three materialists.

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The structuralists, more, yes, much more than all their rationalist predecessors from the Enlightenment onward, ignore the “subject” in “man.

(1) We already saw this clearly in the reactions of ‘n Vico against the naturalism (natural science) of Descartes and Hobbes (p. 108 supra), (see also the summary remark p. 139vv. (new humanism of humanistic psychology, reacting against Freud et al.; new conception of nature)

(2) We saw it even more clearly in Hume’s (p. 168) and Comte’s conceptions of man (p. 170v.). Yet consciousness was still much more or even without more hold and center: the “subject”, the “man” - synonyms for “consciousness” - however, disappear strongly or almost entirely in their independent, from unconscious determining factors sufficiently detached reality:

1/ the economic class

2/ the vital drive for power,

3/ the instinctive eros and thanatos, - they are the bearers of behavior, not the “man” himself or the “subject” as a self(self)-conscious “I-power” that decides freely. This has been called the ‘death of man’ (M. Foucault in particular gave rise to this) or the death of ‘humanism’ (where ‘humanism’ means precisely the fact that one starts from the self-conscious man: in this sense Cartesian philosophy, as a reflexive or introspective philosophy of consciousness, is most certainly ‘a humanism’!).

As far as

1) the structuralists, through their emphasis on the unconscious structures that govern language, and

2) the Marxists, by their emphasis on the infrastructure (economy, social situations) which dominates the supra-infrastructure (politics, philosophy, religion), have made us all say - without realizing it: such is the penetration of that “structural” mentality into our language of every day: “the structures, not the man, should be changed,” we already think, under the pressure of that ideology, a-humanistic.

Recent epistemology applies this critique of consciousness - not to philosophy but - to science itself: the question arises to what extent even ‘science’ - under the guise of ‘objectivity’ - in fact lives unconsciously on presuppositions which are ostensibly rational but in fact irresponsible and ‘irrational’. One can call this, as the structuralists like to do, the ‘philosophy’, i.e., in their language, the ideology hiding in science.

For example: to what extent does so-called objective science serve the objectives of the environment in which it lives? Is our present-day science not one big instrument of technocracy? Cf. *Fr. Guéry, L’épistémologie (Une théorie des sciences)*, in *La philosophie*, Paris, 1969¹, 1972², I, pp. 135/178. In that case one practices externalism, i.e. one situates science in its extra-scientific framework and examines the influence that this framework has on the (false) consciousness of the scientist, especially the human scientist.

HW. 187

Note.- P. Ricoeur, o.c.,149, gives ‘a joint name to **1**) Nietzschean ‘philology’ (how different from Vico’s), **2**) Marxian ideology criticism and **3**) Freudian psychoanalysis, i.e. hermeneutics.

(1). Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics was originally an auxiliary science of especially theology and jurisprudence: there was the need to reconcile ancient texts (legal texts, dogmatic formulas, scriptural texts) with current situations as a result of historical evolution. For example, how should the text “Go and teach all nations” be interpreted in our century?

The hermeneutician is the one who “interprets” such a text and hermeneutics is the science of interpretation. Especially in some cases one had recourse to the so-called allegorical exegesis or text commentary: one sees this at work in the parables, which, once stripped of their imagery, must be translated, interpreted in appropriate language.

(2)a. D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834) is the first who broadened hermeneutics from an auxiliary science to a theory of knowledge: **1**) all knowing was interpreting something; **2**) above all he conceived the interpreting of texts in a life-related way and thus introduced an extra-scientific and human or rather spiritual-scientific element in hermeneutics: the “true” meaning of a text, according to Schleiermacher, is only known to the extent that one experiences that text practically, makes it a living element. Cf. his *Dialektik*, 1839 (posthumous).

(2)b This is strikingly similar to C.S. Peirce (1839/1914), who conceived of all knowing as sign indication and labelled man as an interpreter (thus he conceived of science as the work of the interpretant community; cf. above pp. 79/80); only Peirce was much more scientifically minded than the romantic Schleiermacher.

(3) The so-called “historical school” (founder F. von Savigny (1779/1861); cf. also J. Eichhorn, W.Grimm, L.von Ranke (1795/1886) - see above p. 116 -) practiced hermeneutics as a research method: empathizing with the past (restitution) by means of careful detailed research, provides the historian with a valid knowledge of the past.

(4) W. Dilthey (1833/1911) understands hermeneutics even more broadly, i.e. as a method of the humanities (to demarcate them from the natural sciences, which did not do enough justice to man and his culture). the natural sciences which did not do enough justice to man and his culture: the Verstehen - not the natural scientific Erklären - is the core of the hermeneutic approach to everything that concerns man and his (cultural) history (in this sense a modernisation of Vico’s philological method (see above p.109)).

Conclusion.

(a) In the four types of hermeneutics (Peirce excluded, for now), history - and as a time difference - is central (the text belongs to a different epoch than the interpretant).

(b) The three materialists are hermeneutics in that they seek a hidden meaning

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now no longer in a text but in one's own consciousness. Consequence: the distance taken by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud is now not primarily a time difference (historical distance) but a critical distance. They no longer trust the impressions of their own or other people's awareness of things and events; they are essentially 'suspects' of everything that is 'consciousness' and 'belief in consciousness' (since Augustine and Descartes especially with their introspective and reflexive method).

Not that they turn off the consciousness of things and processes. No one can do this - unless the one who allows himself to be hypnotized or someone who comes into ecstasy (trance, transitio), - and even then!

1) Descartes overcomes the doubt raised by the bodily thing, thanks to the readiness of its own consciousness.

2) (Nietzsche, - Marx, Freud) overcome the doubt of consciousness thanks to an exegesis of the "sense" (meaning). Since their days, understanding has become hermeneutics: looking for meaning is, from now on, not expressing the consciousness of that meaning, but deciphering the expressions of that meaning". (P. Ricoeur, o.c.149); The way in which they did this is open to criticism, says Ricoeur:

Nietzsche attributes the distortion of consciousness to the will to power at work in it and attempts to resolve it "perspectivistically" (the urge to increase life takes on different perspectives, one after another);

Marx attributes the deformation of consciousness to the socio-economic structure, i.e. the class division above all, which is at work in the (false) consciousness and which creates 'a (false) reflection in the brain of humanity trapped in class system (this 'reflection' - theory is open to severe criticism);

Freud attributes the distortion of the awareness of the situation to the unconscious and its mechanisms (repression/oppression) censorship, which inhibits the repressed; I, super-I and 'it'(id): things which Freud himself admits are 'compartmentalized' from uncompartimentalized things):

Yet these errors of thought and experience, Ricoeur argues, do not prevent the intent of the three materialists from being valid:

(1) the unreliability of the first, naïve (self) consciousness

(2) improve (corrective, i. e. steering structure) thanks to a science, which is mediate (mediate, i. e. does not simply assume), where uncritical (self)-consciousness is immediate (immediately, i. simply assumes the obvious immediately, without shifting).

That analytical - again, that Platonic word (lemmatic-analytical method; from Platon) - science examines the relations between

a/ the obvious (that which is immediate in consciousness, that which shows itself, the phenomenon) and

b/ the hidden (the work of the deforming factors 1) will to power, 2) class structure, 3) instinctive mechanisms).

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The 'work' of deformity overtakes critical analysis to make the initial, 'entfremdete' (Hegel, Marx) consciousness come to itself (= in its full self-possession).

In other words, consciousness, **a**) first 'humiliated (because suspicious), **b**) comes out purer (i.e. more conscious). Consciousness-critical analysis is one big awareness:

(1) Nietzsche wants to achieve the 'ideal' of the Uebermensch, i. e. the more-than-(ordinary, slavish, democratic, not yet 'noble') - 'man' through his 'philological genealogy' (origin tracing) of its failure.

(2)**a** Marx wants to secure (revolutionary) praxis through 'an awareness of the conditions (but the real and not the imagined) of that praxis;

(2)**b** Freud wants the neurotic, narrowed in his' symptoms, to acquire, through psychoanalysis, a broadened and deepened (self)consciousness.

Not for nothing is Marx the founder of scientific (though dialectical) socialism and Freud of scientific psychoanalytic neurosis treatment.

The scientism of the 19th century triumphed with them, as it did in the 18th century, e.g. in the natural sciences but also in the human sciences (Hume, Voltaire, especially historiography) (for the 18th century, think also of d'Alembert, who applied the geometrical method of Descartes not broadly, but to detailed problems, but in an effectivist spirit, i. e. to produce an effect; in this sense he is an example of what E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, claims, viz. to cause an effect; in this sense he is an example of what *E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, claims, i. e. that reason, for the Enlightener, is above all a cause of an effect to be achieved, a "force").

The scientism of +/- 1880 is but a narrowing of a thorough and broad movement, which does not conceive of rational knowledge as theoretical or theoretical only, but as problem-solving, "effective" (calculated for effect): Marx wants to solve the social misery, Freud the neurotic misery, and ... analysis of consciousness without exposing the errors of consciousness (either ideologically critical or psychoanalytically) remains "theory", not causing effect. That purely theoretical was the basic error of the romanticizing idealistic philosophies and ditto sciences. In this the materialists were surplus to requirements.

The Shadow Side

"Undoubtedly, it was precisely natural science that gave XIX-th century materialism its decisiveness (...). It is not by chance that this materialism was essentially unfolded precisely by natural scientists (...)". (*J. Fischl, Materialismus und Positivismus der Gegenwart*, S.7). But as in the XVIIIth century, the (natural) scientific discoveries, which are indisputable, were transformed in an ideological sense: weapons were forged from them in order to kill (1) religion and (2) theology and metaphysics. It is so to this day.

- (a) The existence of God and the whole supernatural order,
- (b) the existence of the soul and its soul-soul side,
- (c) the existence of the (nevertheless by the great materialisms of antiquity

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recognized) fine-material reality (fluid, magnetism et al.) as well as

d) all the ethical-political consequences of these three basic facts of the archaic-religious and metaphysical traditions (taking into account extraterrestrial influences, the hereafter, etc.), - all this was either haughtily ridiculed or repressed, in any case never honestly investigated according to the internalistic method which these phenomena rightly claim for themselves: nevertheless, there has not been a lack of honest investigation, which was internalistic, even in the full XVIIIth and XIXth centuries! One thinks of what *R. Haynes, The Hidden Springs (An Enquiry into Extra-Sensory Perception)*, London, 1961,

(a) pp. 180/208 (*The Enlightenment*) a.o. on the brilliant Prosper Lambertini (1675/1759), the later *Pope Benedict XIV*, though also acquainted with R. Boyle and B. Spinoza, did mind-scientific analysis of paranormal phenomena (which did not prevent Voltaire and Walpole, after his death, from paying tribute to him!) Haynes, o.c., 208ss

(b) also deals briefly with the XIXth century concerning research into paranormal phenomena.- The ‘natural science’ understood: the ideology in it - to apply now the language of our structuralists to themselves! - has thought it necessary to ‘ignore’ all this, i.e., typically for the outsider, to remain externalistically alone without internalism, i.e. without all the conditions for really knowing the supernatural and extraneous, namely by standing in it, - something which in turn

(a) ‘a humanities hermeneutics à la Schleiermacher and Dilthey, -

(b) but supplemented with natural scientific matter-of-factness (so as not to end up in gefühle and Schwärmerei) presupposes, of course.

Decision.-

a) Both the knowledge of the ‘mind’, i.e. consciousness and all that is related to it, in so far as it escapes the (not appropriate) natural scientific methods,

b) as the knowledge of religion (theologies and metaphysics included) fall, in part and to their most essential side, outside of pure natural science, as the narrow-minded materialists and/or positivists and/or evolutionists (about which much could also be said concerning reduction of the higher to the lower, - reduction so typical of all these ideologies!) have conceived them.

The XXth century on materialism.

J. Parain-Vial, o.c., 29ss., resumes:

(a) *The Neo-Marxists:*

Marxism of *Marx*, with:

1) z ‘n atheistic and “humanistic” (understand: earthy, anthropocentric; cf. Barth’s “absolute” man supra pp. 158/159) metaphysical sense of life,

2) his outline of a scientific economy (*Das Kapital*) and

3) his’ n method of analysis aimed at a takeover of power (dictatorship of the proletariat), is pluralized:

(i) Soviet communist, (“Marxism vulgar” called by the French critics of dogmatic communism style Eastern Bloc countries and their Western European cronies);

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(ii)a. ‘metaphysical’ (in the sense of ‘a kind of substitute metaphysics): the Frankfurter Schule (Adorno, H. Marcuse e.g. and also Bloch, the man of the ‘Utopia’), which emphasizes the sense of cosmic unity destroyed by today’s industrial society and wants to restore the ‘unity’ between humanity, including the over-industrialized, and nature (and the cosmos), represents this thrust;

(ii)b. scientific-structuralist: L. Althusser, who killed his wife in 1980 after a depression, does not see in Marxism a “humanism” but a “science”, which, in order to make the “Revolution” succeed, exposes the structures and its effective character, yet is particularly dogmatic, i.e. (a) anti-empiric and (b) scientific.) to succeed, exposes the structures and its effective character, yet particularly dogmatic, i.e. **(a)** anti-empiric and **(b)** convinced that Marx has discovered the final economic truth, so true that it does not even have to wait for the facts as confirmation of economic theory! The brains of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse Toeng have definitively lifted economics from the ideological (understand: professional science stage)!

(b) Neo-Freudism:

two types, briefly referred to.

(1) Marxo-Freudism (especially Fromm, Marcuse and Reich), in which

(a) *H. Marcuse* (The one-dimensional human being, - one of the books of the 1968 *meirévolte*) attributes to the ‘Revolution’ (!) the task of liberating the eros (Freud) in our civilization at work but disappointed by **a/** the capitalist oppression and **b/** even the ideology of sciences and techniques prevailing in it (Marx)

(b) while for W. Reich, one of the inspirers of the Movement for the Human Potential (see above p. 138yv.), sexuality (eros) is as good as everything (the function of the orgasm), yet not without a Marxization of society; on the contrary, Marxism is only itself in and through the orgasmic life that is achieved,- which, of course, annoyed Communists at the time.

(2) Lacan, the structuralist, has given Freud a structural interpretation of a very personal nature; because of his authority among the Nouveaux Philosophes (who have mainly emerged since 1978: cf. G. Schiwy, *Les Nouveaux Philosophes (Le retour de la métaphysique)*, Paris, 1979, pp. 41ss.), who admire in him *le discours subversif*, together with thousands of young people and interested people, just a sketch, which does him an injustice but indicates a direction, in which should be searched to understand him: one could call his psychoanalytic interpretation with the word ‘discursisme’ because

(a) the direct and lateral speech of language (discourse)

b) as well as that what Lacan designates with that same yet strongly broadened word (such as e.g. dreams, neuroses and other: Freudian phenomena) is central to Lacan’s interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis.

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'Psychoanalysis' is, for Lacan, the uncovering of those speech forms or 'discourse' (described above), in which *le moi*, the I makes itself known, - 'I' which is itself 'discursus'. That radical discursion of I and 'symptoms' has, however, formal laws, similar to those of Saussurian linguistics, - formal laws, which, in psychoanalytic treatment, will restore the diseased structure of the I (corrective nature).

Since May 1968 and the Post-Structuralism that emerged from it, in response to the problems of the 'révolution culturelle' (cultural revolution, intended by Neo-Marxism as a broadening and deepening of the one-sided economism of Paleo-Marxism), Lacan emphasizes the role of the father figure in the emergence of the 'I' from the chaos of the 'Es' (id, the unconscious), as well as the deformations that spring from that authoritarian side of instinctual existence. The analytical exposure of those authoritarian distortions of reason or discourse by the 'discours de l' autre', i.e. the discourse of the father figure (i.e. first of all the family father or mother figures, but also all authority structures in society), is precisely Lacan's 'subversive', i.e. revolt-building (not therefore revolution-building) speech.

(c) *Neo-Nietzscheism.*

Derrida and Deleuze (and Guattari) leave

(a) of "destruction," i.e., the utter "negation" of Sartre's existentialist humanism (i.e., centralizing the subject as a free decisive being in Kierkegaardism (cf. above p. 165)),

b) yes, from the 'destruction' of the entire Western and even planetary mode of thought, philosophy first, to themselves! Only three thinkers escape the 'immeasurable alienation' (see page 152 supra) of thought, i.e. ideology, namely Nietzsche, Marx and Freud! Whereby Freud still commits the mistake of not 'liberating' enough, in their eyes, the libido or desire.

Convinced of their absolute originality (cf. pp. 155/156: relationship to tradition), they claim to be the first in the history of mankind to "think" or, at least, "à rendre possible la pensée" (to make thinking possible), (which also untranslated, yes, preferably untranslated for the sake of word fidelity concerning such conceit without a shred of shame, speaks volumes about the Aufklärungsgeist that still exists in full XXth century, notwithstanding the manifest failures of the ideals of that same Aufklärung in the eyes even of its epigones).

Derrida (1) *La Grammatologie*; **(2)** *La dissémination*; **(3)** *La voix et le phénomène*) thinks essentially exegetically, i.e. practices a 'negative' commentary on difficulties which he discovers **1)** in Rousseau and Saussure, **2)** in Platon, **3)** in Husserl, in order to destroy 'philosophy' as the pre-eminent alienation. - This text commentary is essentially 'intertextual' in the absolute sense of that word: man never has contact with reality, but only with texts.

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Overall conclusion.

When we now, from Voltaire up to and including Guattari, survey (pre)positivism and materialism as a whole, we understand why *J. Rivière, Rationalisme, système qui exagère le rôle de la raison aux dépens de la foi*, (A system that exaggerates the role of reason at the expense of faith,), in *Dict. d. conn. relig.*, Paris, 1927, V, p. 1015, says:

“This doctrine, which at the time was called by the generic name of ‘naturalism’ because it implies the elimination of the supernatural - and we may safely add the supernatural, notwithstanding Rivière does not speak of it - is called, in a more appropriate sense, ‘rationalism’, for the reason of the exclusive confidence it gives to reason - and we add: to reason, yes, but as the rationalist naturalists, who affirmed only the visible and tangible ‘nature’, understood it very narrowly, too narrowly.”

To this day, some rationalist contemporaries still do “reason” an injustice in this inexplicable way (cf. supra p. 133v.). After all, reason is not inconsistent with the extra- and supernatural, on the contrary.

We now resume the account of the role played by the naturalists in the preparation of the French Revolution (at the same time giving the overview of the main figures and tendencies and linking to page 180 supra, line 2 at the top.

Apart from d’Alembert (supra p. 179), Prepositivism includes one figure who does not fit into this framework except as a Prepositivist, A. Turgot (1727/1781), who “ignores” (i.e. refuses to accept) the cultural pessimistic views of Bayle and Voltaire and upholds a moderate meliorism (see supra p. 147 a.o.), i.e. Turgot accepts, with his optimistic contemporaries but moderately, the fact that in the course of history mankind improves “à pas lents” (he says) in the midst of a great deal of failure.

Immediately, Turgot is the first scientific economist (cf. in England: A. Smith), creating, in rationalist midst, yet another science.

He is also a pioneering historian who relies first and foremost on the facts and not just on one-sided theorizing about the philosophy of history.

As a historiologist, he recaptures Bossuet, the last Christian Augustinian (see p. 8: the die stages of Rome), continues the Montesquieu to be named later, and anticipates Herder and Condorcet (cfr. R. Lavollée, o.c., pp. 194ss.),

Apart from Turgot (the one already mentioned on p. 179) Montesquieu, but here now, in this cultural-historical framework, a little more about him: although empiricist - or perhaps because he was - he remains faithful to Bossuet, Leibniz and especially Vico (p. 108vv.), where he further defines the Platonic concept of analysis, as he sees it: “All beings have their laws, - both the deity and the material world, the higher ‘intelligences’ (i.e. angels) (...), the animals and man himself. (...).

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There is an original (meaning absolute origin) “reason” (i.e. the divine creative mind, which imposes laws on creation). (...) The laws are the relations between, on the one hand, divine reason and, on the other hand, the different beings; these laws are also the relations between these different beings themselves.

God stands in relation to the universe as creator and sustainer: the laws according to which He created are those according to which He sustains. He acts according to those rules because He knows them. He knows them because He made them. He made them because they are related to His wisdom and power.” (Esprit des lois).

‘Analysis’ here is analysis of relations, but fixed relations or - what is called in Dutch - relationships.

(a) According to Plato, analysis was investigation of the relations between ideas;

(b) here is analysis investigation of relations between facts (1/ divine fact, 2/ created and maintained facts)”. One sees the enormous difference from e.g. Hume’s determinism (see p. 168). See: “We are far from having the reason-gifted world as well governed as the physical world.

Reason: although the reasonable world also has (naturally unchangeable) laws, yet it does not always follow them as the physical world follows its own”. (ibid.).

Montesquieu, unlike Hume, (and all determinists or even the later (especially German) dialecticians and (especially French) positivists, is convinced of the fundamental freedom of the human “subject” (and is, in this sense “humanist”).

Conclusion: Turgot and Montesquieu, although both very empirical and/or positive and scientific of their time, contrast sharply with the flat naturalism which we have examined at greater length on pages 180/193. One more proof that the same ‘reason’, standing opposite the same ‘nature’, is nevertheless multi - interpretative or ambiguous as especially Peirce once underlined, with so many other broad-minded people.

In addition to d’Alembert, according to *Barruel, Mémoires*, Voltaire also recruited D.Diderot (1713/1784). Diderot is the founder and leader of the Encyclopedia. Notwithstanding all its shortcomings and inaccuracies, the Encyclopédie was ‘a brilliant success, which made its mark on the era. It gave the civilized world a summa of the new spirit: a detailed survey of the entire field of science, technology and industry. The sections devoted to industry, the work of Diderot (...) were by no means the least important.

They show that the developed were indeed aware of the dawning of the age of the machine and of the place of factory and workshop in the culture of the West. Thus the new philosophy prepared the way for the triumph of the Industrial Revolution even before it had begun.

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Science and industry were the two wings of the army of “progress,” which had to be coordinated and united by a reformed system of “rational” education. (...)

Therefore, the first step to the liberation of mankind is to deliver the unsullied spirit from the tyranny of priests and school foxes. However, it was impossible to take this step before the power of **a)** the Church, **b)** the teaching orders and **c)** the universities was broken. This was “an enormous task, which the philosophers could never have accomplished on their own.

But the old régime was divided within itself: the justices against the clergy, the Gallicans against the Ultramortans, and the Jansenists against the Jesuits.

Consequence: the “philosophers” could use their far-reaching influence at the highest authorities to exploit these mutual feuds. Thus it happened that the Society of Jesus, the greatest of all educational orders and, for two centuries, the most important tool of Catholic culture, fell victim to dark parties and their intrigues and to the propaganda of the rationalist minority.

Since the Jesuits had controlled most of the colleges and high schools - not only in France but in all of Catholic Europe - their fall disrupted and rendered defenseless the entire educational system. But the “philosophers” were not ready to take their chance. As we can see from their correspondence and from *d' Alembert's* pamphlet ‘*Sur la destruction des Jésuites en France*’, they were surprised by this sudden and overall victory. However, a number of reform proposals were drawn up, notably by Caradeuc de la Chalotais, one of the leaders of the anti-Jesuit campaign, who advocated a civil and secular system of modern languages and modern scientific studies. (...).

When the revolution came, the old institutions of formation found no defenders. (...) Never before - not even at the time of the Reform; or the Russian Revolution - has such a mass slaughter been committed among educational institutions. Thus was removed every obstacle which stood in the way of a general reorganization of the whole national educational system.” (*Chr. Dawson, Crisis of Western Education*, Tiel/The Hague, 1963, pp. 64/67).

This long text from the hand of a connoisseur inevitably makes an impression on a Catholic's mind: the faults and errors of religion have themselves founded the success of religious criticism, which we have outlined above on many a page (and also denounced as narrow-minded)!

Another aspect of Diderot's enterprise and of what has resulted from it is the concept of “energy”: it is the English physicalists, and first and foremost the electricity engineers in England, who, in technology, have introduced that term as a basic concept.

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(a) Whether the theoretical introduction dates from Leibniz (cf. p. 94/95: dynamism) or from Newton (cf. p. 119: Newton's third law of motion, i.e., the law of the equality of "work and counterwork" (action and reaction), from which Helmholtz, in 1847, learned to derive the principle of energy conservation),

b) whether the experimental confirmation of that theoretical concept dates from Colding (Copenhagen) or Joule (Manchester) or from Robert Mayer or Seguin, its extremely large scope was first understood by R. Mayer, a physician at Heilbronn (Wurtemberg) in 1842 (and his publications in 1845/1851).

Helmholtz, later in his publication, brought them out of obscurity and, along with all of his predecessors, laid the foundation of energetics or energy theory (of which thermodynamics is only 'one part).

The basic insight is the following: the phenomena of "nature" - the basic concept of Enlightenment philosophy and science - deploy only two modes of being or "elements" (in the very broad sense), namely matter and energy. Ostwald, Mach, Duhem have taken this further.

In short, the energetic conception of nature comes down to this: matter itself, without the energy, would simply be non-existent, in that it is, in one form or another, always energy. The kinetic conception of matter and of the universe which claims that nature is nothing but matter in motion (heat, sound, light, etc. are perfectly describable in terms of mechanics (cf. Galilei supra p. 32)) has, via the concept of force, led to the doctrine of energy. Yet in the end energy has proven to be multiform: mechanical (as hitherto), thermal (heat energy), chemical, etc..

Since Ostwald, Le Châtelier and others, energetics has especially found that energy is transformable from one form into another and seems to be, as it were, an unchanging substrate which supports all natural phenomena. One only has to open a work like *J. Fast, Energy from atomic nuclei*, Maastricht, 1980, to form a picture of this basic idea.

The same author, *Matter and Life (The Cohesion of the Natural Sciences)*, Heerlen, 1972, p. 60, points at the evolution theory as the unifier of all life forms: the so-called fall of vitalism, says Fast, o.c., 58, started in 1828, when Wöhler, for the first time in the laboratory, prepared an organic compound, namely urea, a well-known constituent of mammalian urine. Since then, the number of carbon compounds that have been prepared artificially - and thus not 'vital' (which, according to the naive vitalists, at the time, was only possible) - has been enormous. Fast, o.c., 157, adds that 'a sharp transition between dead and living matter does not exist: the virus, for example, is 'a questionable transitional case. Yet three characteristics would be peculiar to the 'vital' energy:

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(i) It is a complex system - notice that the notion of “system”, i.e. unity in multiplicity (since the ancient Greek the main concept of all possible philosophy) is still at work here - with macromolecular substances (nucleic acids, proteins) as its most essential constituents,

(ii) system that exchanges energy, matter - and (let us add) information, which Fast forgets, seemingly

(iii) system, which, while multiplying, whether or not through interaction with conspecifics, produces similar systems that are alive;

The concept of systems has, in recent years especially, become “in. *L. von Bertalanffy, Robots, Men and Minds*, New York, 1967, pp. 69, elaborates on general systems theory, defining the concept of a system’ as follows: ‘a conjunction of constituents in interaction. He adds that, as he writes, there is no comprehensive systems theory (o.c., 71). Still, a comprehensive systems theory is repeatedly mentioned in all possible scientific texts and announcements: one cannot read e.g. the two above-mentioned works of Fast without constantly being confronted with a well-defined but nowhere clearly justified systems theory.

This seemingly illogical detour about the structure of living systems has the following meaning: life too is energy, but in a not purely ‘dead’ form - what a tautology! (one will say) -, yet nobody doubts that ‘life’ is an extension of the molecular reality which is all matter (via the first macromolecules namely). So that, by, especially during the XVIIIth century,

(a) come first to matter as an atomic structure and

b) immediately, and above all mechanically, stumbling upon the concept of ‘energy’, mankind - and above all rationalistic mankind: this should be noted very clearly - has traced the intimate structure of ‘nature’!

(1) not speculative only, as before, in archaic, ancient, or mid-century mentalities,

(2) but ‘effectively’, i.e. to deal with it immediately more than theoretically, i.e. henceforth ‘technically’. Yet another triumph of what *E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, said: reason as a ‘force’, i.e. as a capacity which itself acts on ‘force’, i.e. work capacity or energy, is the main attraction of the XVIIIth century.

J. Rossmarduc, De Thalès à Einstein (Histoire de la physique et de la chimie, Paris, 1979, pp. 19/20, writes: “In Europe, the XIIIth century was particularly productive.

1/ Universities are set up (Bologna, Montpellier, Paris, Oxford, etc.).

2/ Scholasticism, relying on Aristotle’s teachings, revised by Thomas Aquinas, gets off the ground;

3/ Noteworthy are the progress of mathematics, the renewal of thoughts on light, the first experiments with magnetism and the publication of encyclopedias.

4) All this is accompanied by an equivalent advance in the technical field,-

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From the XIth to the XIIIth centuries, Western Europe experienced a period of intense technological activity and, in terms of inventions, this period is one of the most fruitful in human history. This period should have been called ‘the first industrial revolution’, were it not for the fact that the English (industrial) Revolution of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries was already endowed with the same name.”

We know that almost immediately, still in the Middle Ages, Scholasticism was questioned as a renewed Aristotelianism in the natural sciences: think of N. Oresme and J. Buridan, already in the 14th century. This critical movement continued in the 15th century to become, in the 16th century, one of the main components of the famous scientific revolution (see above p. 25 ff.: both mystical occultism and mechanism).

R. van Cauteren, Origin and Meaning of Today’s Prosperity, in Our Alma Mater, 35 (1979): 1, pp. 28/41, writes: “The two main (...) factors that have brought about the present prosperity of the Western world and also contain the only hope (...) of making the ‘misery in the Third World disappear, are without possible doubt the two following historical events:

- (i) The emergence of experimental science in the XVI- th. century (1501/ 1600);
- (ii) the translation of this science into technology, which, since 1750, gave rise to the period of ‘technical progress’ and under which not only mechanical engineering but also medicine and agriculture must be understood.” (a.c., 29).

What’s more: “Experimental science did not in itself contribute to the increase of prosperity, but it has nevertheless been the sine qua non of modern technology.” (ib., 31).

As an example, the proposer cites: “Louis XIV (1635/1715) could not afford to buy a car, radio, television set, movie camera, etc. (...), whereas now servants and workers can.” (ib.,33).

Further: “The price of wheat, expressed in terms of wages for an hour of labor, has, since 1870, fallen from fifty to one, thanks to the invention of the combine harvester, scientific soil testing and crop research, etc. One may speak here of the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves”. (ib., 33). Steller gives examples by the plethora. This, to show what the effective treatment of nature has changed in our daily lives, - where the purely mystical - theoretical view of nature left the real “misery” (cf. p. 143: Moreno) unchanged.

Technique (technology). - *M. Mauss, Les techniques et la technologie, in Journal de Psychologie, 1948-1, defines technology as follows “the study of infrastructure (especially machines, but also other ‘instruments’ of e.g. physical, chemical or biological or even mental or fluidic nature)*

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and of the operations using the infrastructure, and this, in the service of a goal to be achieved but with a minimization of both instruments and operations. Indeed, as stated above (p. 62: del Vecchio with his economic definition of rational behavior): technology is rationalization, the pursuit of profit in matter, energy and especially in information. Effectively expressed: minimal causality to achieve maximum consequence. Or still: minimum means, maximum end.(= result or achieved goal).

The word “technology” can have more than one meaning:

(i) lexicological: the study of subject terms concerning sciences, crafts, arts;
(ii) system historical: cf. supra p. 93: Guérault’s system technology, i.e. coherence analysis:);

(iii)a. reflective: the study of ex- or internalist nature of all that is technique and technology; e.g. *G. Simondon, Du mode d’ existence des objets techniques*, (On the mode of existence of technical objects), Paris, 1958; *A. Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter*, (The soul in the technical age), Hamburg, 1957.

(ii)b. applicative: the theory of processing raw materials and art products (together with the manufacturing model or process) in industry.

Praxio- or better praxeologically speaking,

i.e. starting from a theory of action, which describes the act in its structure, technique can also be called an action, i.e. an intense form of living and working, labor if you will. What has just been said about technique in terms of instruments or infrastructure also applies, of course, to the praxeological side: situated in the ‘subject’, ‘technique’ is called ‘skill’ i.e. mastery of the instruments and operations connected with these instruments. In this sense skill or technical ability in the human being, the subject, can also belong to the infrastructure of other objectives.

One understands, in the perspective of the dialectic ‘lord/slave’ (see above p. 149vv.: Hegel) that man who becomes infrastructurally ‘useful’ or ‘effective’ will have to be able to undergo authoritarian structures, denounced by e.g. Neo-Marxism (p. 190), Neo-Freudism (p. 149v.) or Neo-Nietzscheism (p. 192), - not least concerning linguistic phenomena.

Refer to *Dr. M. Zeegers, Sexual Offenders* (Forensic-Psychiatric Research), Amsterdam, 1966, p. 14:

“Moral standards may be difficult to establish, one asks the psychiatrist for standards in his field. Here questions arise about the boundary between ‘sick’ and ‘healthy’, between ‘normal’ behavior and deviance. But only now does it become difficult”.

Now, if one puts aside *M. Eliade, Occultism ...* and id., *Méphistophélès ...*, who considers sexual witchcraft cults morally justified, at least in their traditional and especially archaic forms, what about so-called “sexual crimes”?

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In a chapter entitled '*Microphysique du pouvoir* (Michel Foucault), G.Schiwy, *Les Nouveaux philosophes (Le retour de la métaphysique)*, Paris, 1979, PP.- 29/41, outlines these language authoritarian 'structures':

M. Foucault e.g. comments on the case of "Mme Rose", who is a psychiatrist in the prison of Toul. In 1972, she spoke openly about the brutalization of those treated in this institution: "Society does everything possible to avert the gaze from all the events that betray the true balance of power.

a) Those in authority speak only in terms of 'tableaux', 'statistiques' and 'courbes' (curves representing 'a course')

(b) Syndicates talk about working conditions, balance sheets, investments and work opportunities.

On both sides, one insists on attacking evil at its root: i.e., where no one sees or feels it, far from the event, from the play of forces involved and from the act of ruling.

But the psychiatrist of Toul has spoken: Mme Rose has "violated the rule of the game and broken the great taboo. She who was included in the system of power, she has not criticized the functioning of it: she has mentioned by name the things that happened - on that and that day, in that place, in those circumstances." (o.c., 30).

The speaking and language game (cf. Wittgenstein) of Mme Rose is now, 'n this case, 'subversive'. However, there is an authoritarian language game: e.g. when, in purely areligious, yes, anti-religious mentality ('ideology' if one prefers to hear it) the sexual magic of primitives is 'labeled' (literally:) as 'delinquency'.

This one striking example, which has been seen in many mission countries, proves that language is anything but a neutral phenomenon, beyond all social and ideological criticism. Especially not, where, in a rationalist sense, language is as an instrument of speech or thought - listen carefully: 'instrument' that is: 'a thing belonging to the infrastructure'. We give this language-critical model in order to give one example of technique-criticism: all techniques are possibly 'lord/ servant phenomena'! (cf. higher p. 145 below: Eliade).

Note -- How extensively our praxeology is permeated by technique is shown by the distinction between work and play techniques: there are e.g. piano techniques, sports techniques, etc.! There are even religious techniques, i.e. purely infrastructural phenomena, which have more than once been misunderstood as ends: fasting, reciting prayers, meditating, etc., which one can interpret both as such, 'as a work of art' (think of the Chinese fasters, of the Indian 'meditators') and as means (multi-interpretability is, of course, also inherent in technique!).

It should be noted in passing that our vocabulary is increasingly technical: so e.g. minimization, optimization, etc.

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History of technology.

G. Simondon, *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques*, Paris, 1958, outlines the development as follows:

(i) the XVIIIth century has what it calls 'technical elements': the workhouse exhibits implements that are either directly handled or by means of elementary mechanisms, such as cogs, clockwork ministries etc. or also instruments that refine man's powers of perception (weighing machines, timepieces, spectacles); - man is still at the center of 'progress': he masters instrumentation; he personally works with it in more effective ways; this, Simondon says, is reflected in the optimism of the Encyclopedists, who are absorbed with joy in the mutual perfecting of professional science and technology

(ii) The 19th century sees the continuation of this first - including the mid-century: second - industrial-technical revolution (from 1770 on in particular): instead of 'technical elements' there are now 'des individus techniques', i.e. machines or appliances, which are distinguished from the tools not so much by their complexity as by their relative independence. machines or appliances, which are distinguished from the tools not so much by their complexity as by their relative independence; after all, a machine only marches, it 'functions', while a tool must be handled; thus the steam engine, later the explosion engine and the electric dynamo or motor, which

a/ develop greater energy (!) than humans or animals (beasts of burden e.g.) can produce and

b/ substantiate tools themselves (the steam engine e.g. pulls loads but lifts hammers, etc.); - the workers now react to these individuals, i.e. autonomous technology, with suspicion:

(a) they don't just help the worker;

b) they replace him without further ado: man, in casu the worker, is no longer the center, but the machine which, once it has started, no longer needs man except for maintenance; the workers saw in it a competitor, not a helper; cf. *de Vigny, la Maison du Berger* (1844);

(iii) The XXth century sees the second - including the Middle Ages: the third industrial revolution, namely that of automation, i.e. no longer elements or individuals but collections; not the independence of the machine stands out but interdependence of the machine, whose functioning is now controlled and regulated: the system phase.


One examines the following systems: the electricity distribution network, the telephone network, the railroad network, etc., which are real 'systems' (see above page 197), in which each part (element and/or individual) depends on all the others (or on many others) in its function.

Here we come up against what has been called, with a curious word, the organismic view. Indeed, such networks resemble organisms, characterized by at least partial interdependence in function.

The simplest form of this is the servo mechanism: the sphere controller in Watt 's steam engine keeps motion constant between minimal deviations (the cybernetic principle);

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The thermostat does the same with the temperature (corrective principle); - biologically, there are models: the homeostasis in the body, long discovered, keeps the temperature at +/- 37 deg. C. amidst the exchanges relative to the environment. The scheme is grosso modo describable as follows:



The ancients would have spoken of steering or directional power, whereby the effect acts on its cause correctively, i.e. taking into account a set goal.

This self-improving structure or cybernetic structure is now the characteristic of the new, mainly technical, meaning of the word 'system', which is essentially conceived as 'effectivist', i.e. calculated to achieve a goal (efficiency). Cf. Bacon's inductive logic, which, with respect to the Aristotelian-Stoic and Medieval, is causal, i.e. causal or 'effective' (p. 37vv; 45: Macchiavelli's Realpolitik as an 'effective' view yet applied to human collective systems; p. 105 (Hobbes' state effectivism); p. 168 (Hume's conception of history)).

The meaning of the word "machine" evolves immediately:

a) 'machine' used to be mechanical device **b)** now it becomes 'purposeful' - better: 'effectively conceived - system'. The purely mechanical machine is only one type: actually, formally-effectively speaking-e.g., a church building (or a department store or a clinic or a state apparatus or the UNO) also 'functions' as a purposive system ('machine').

The 'organismic' view thus sees wholes, 'machines', 'organisms', (purposeful) systems everywhere, of which the modern effectivist theory or 'systemology' (better Greek: systematology) tries to build 'a model'.

The man who first saw such techno-mathematics, in collaboration, of course, with others, is *N. Wiener* (1894/1964), *Cybernetics (Control and Communication in the Animal and the machine)*, The Technology Press of M.I.T., New York- 1948-1).

Wiener, Rosenblüth, Rachewski, Mc Cullock compared technical artifacts with biological organisms under point of view of self-regulation (autocorrection). The key concept that now emerges, after that of matter and that of energy, is information, intelligence: it was as if the effects, enlightened as to the objective to be achieved (effectiveness), "informed" their causes, warned them and this by feedback (cf. p. 138 (sensitivity training, biofeedback; 157: human relations) feedback of an informative nature. The triad - actually dyad, because matter is solidified energy - 'matter/energy/information' is one of the basic insights of both the natural sciences and the humanities (since 1948).

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Note - One of the most remarkable ancient models of effective or autocorrective system is to be found in the kuklos - or circuitous thought (Herodotos, but also many other ancient thinkers).

A. Virieux-Reymond, *l' épistémologie*, Paris, 1966, pp. 46/47; 67, Aristotelian formulates the cybernetic 'cause' (understand: existence factor, being aspect) as the connection of the target cause (goal) with the working cause (efficient cause). Which is only partially correct, without the backlash! Much better, yes, antiquely understood, correct would be 'cyclic' cause'.

Opm.-- The "functional cause".

Now to speak again with Aristotle's causes - or existence factors! The word 'function' (think of the functioning of a clinic or a machine) is ambiguous:

(i) Brentano, Husserl use it in the sense of 'disposition' (functional or 'act psychology');

(ii) Heymans, the characterologist (1857/1930), indicates the psychological after-effects, better: processing afterwards (think of the 'achteraffect') with it (E(motionality), A(ctivity), P(rietary) or S(ecudary) function);

(iii) in mathematics: $y = f(x)$, i.e. y depends on x;

(iv) the Chicago School (Dewey's functionalism and other e.g. ethnological or sociological functionalisms) (Claparède also) uses the word in the sense of 'role', 'task' with the emphasis of its usefulness or 'meaning' (to speak German Idealist!) for the others or the whole especially (then) e.g. to Malinowski's ethnological functionalism or emphasis on the 'role' in the society of ethnies).

The so-called "functional" causality theory;

H. Störig, *History of the Sciences in the XIXth Century, (The Humanities)*, Utr./Antw., 1967, pp. 119/120 (*The Romanticism (Historical School)*);

J. Stuart Mill (1806/1873) - cf. p. 169 (*positivism*) - who saw that the price on the market was determined by both supply and demand; the Austrian school (Gossen (1810/1859), Menger, von Böhm-Bawerk, von Wiese) with its frontier utility theory of economics; up to and including especially the economic "function" theory, which is nothing other than the self-regulating mechanism in the formation of prices, e.g., or other economic phenomena (the "laissez faire laissez passer" theory is, explicitly, a "functionalism": it is assumed that, without state intervention, e.g., the price would be lower than the price of the product).v. or other economic phenomena (the 'laissez faire laissez passer' theory is, unspoken, a functionalism: one counts on the fact that, without state intervention e.g., 'the market' will 'regulate' itself).

The mathematical school of economics has therefore sought mathematical formulas by replacing the order' cause/effect by a more appropriate scheme of thought or (Platonic: idea), namely, supply and demand on the market interact according to an interaction: cause effect → cause → effect →, etc. (Cournot (1801/1877), Cassel, Pareto).

Max Verworn, *Kausale und konditionale Weltanschauung*, 1928, even replaces 'cause' (in the modern sense of efficient or working (better: causative) 'cause') with 'collection of conditions' to denote the complicated and interacting ('overdetermined' phenomena e.g.)

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Note - 1954: Foundation of the Society for General Systems Research by von Bertalanffy (1901/1972), Boulding, Gerard, Rapoport. This was an end point of decades of awareness of the concept of “system”, which e.g. was already clearly formulated by v. Bertalanffy in 1937 in his lectures. Otherwise, biologists know that Cl. Bernard (1813/1872), the great physiologist and critic of science, was one of the first to bring up the effective or autocorrective (better) concept of “system” when he spoke of “la fixité du milieu intérieur” (the relative immutability of the interior of a biological organism).

Bibl sample.- P.Delattre, *Système, structure, fonction, évolution (Essai d'analyse épistémologique)*, Paris, 1971, emphasizes the fact that, with the notion of ‘system’ also the notions of ‘structure ‘ (D. Nauta, *Logica en model, Bussum, 1970, defines:*

“A system is a collection with a structure as well as ‘function’ (see above) and even ‘evolution’ (there are evolving systems and, as an activity, ‘evolves’ ‘a functional system continuously’) go together; Delattre himself defines ‘system’ as follows:

“Un ensemble d’ éléments qui interagissent entre eux” (o.c., 47).

Von Bertalanffy has, e.g., in *Robots, Men and Minds (Psychology in the modern world, New York, 1967)*, emphasized that “a certain ‘cybernetism’ does not make an essential distinction between

- (a) real physical and technical systems, on the one hand, and
- b) on the other hand, living, psychic, thinking “systems”: this view is a subtle and current ideology, which uses systems theory, which is current, to substantiate its naturalism, i.e. its reduction of man especially, but even of animals and plants, to purely physical systems, however cybernetically flexible, with questionable practices.

Also noteworthy is the triad cited by J.Piaget, *Le structuralisme*, Paris, 1968, p. 6: “A structure includes the three characteristics, namely totality, transformation and self-regulation. This leads us to the intimate relationship between systems thinking and current structuralism. Indeed, as G. G. Granger, *Pensée formelle et sciences de l’ homme*, Paris, 1967, pp. 1/6, excellently explains, current structuralism has three origins, which, indeed, repeatedly bring out the notion of structure (and of system, which cannot be separated from it).

(i) B. de Courthenay and especially F. de Saussure

a/ isolate language from its context (historical, diachronic especially: convinced that the diachronic or histori(cisti)c view of language is wrong) to consider it as an independent phenomenon, purely internalist;

b/ that isolated phenomenon becomes ‘system-technological’ (see p. 93: Guérolt’s study of Descartes’ system of thought) especially paying attention to the linking of words: literalism/ geometry; literary/ literature; etc. where ‘syntagma’ (coherence) and ‘paradigm (= association) are central;

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It should be noted that Saussure himself does not use the word 'paradigm' for similarity structure, but the colorless 'association' (cf. *F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale* (C. Bally, A. Sècheyne, A. Riedlinger), Paris, 1931, pp. 170ss. (*Rapports syntagmatiques et rapports associatifs*), - where instead of 'association' one now uses 'paradigm' to denote the model character as similarity.

Thus, e.g., in *Communications* No. 4: *Recherches sémiologiques*, Paris, 1964-, where, to complicate matters further, R. Barthes (famous for his influence on the nouveaux philosophes and this, because of his inaugural address at the Collège de France (Le Monde 09/10.01.1977) on 'la langue est faciste') - cf. G. Schiwy; *Les nouveaux philosophes*, pp. 24/29, who summarizes the contents as 'a kind of program statement of Post-Structuralism, which disgraces language as an authoritarian instrument of alienation (cf. p. 199v. supra: Foucault; p. 191 supra: Lacan).

R. Barthes, thus uses the pairing 'syntagma'/'system' (apparently as a substitute for 'syntagma/ paradigm'). For Saussure, o.c., pp. 33s., the frame of thought of linguistics as he conceives it is what he calls: 'semiology', i.e. "a science, which studies the life of signs in the lap of social life".

One compares this semiology with the Neo-Positist semiotics (see above pp. 173/174), as elaborated by Ch. Morris, in a Peircian line, yet without the broadness of spirit of Peirce, far from it. Conclusion: "Any attempt to know something 'objective' that concerns man must, according to Structuralism, pass through a reduction (reductive interpretation of experience to a system of correlative features" (Granger, o.c., 2). 'Correlative' refers to the continuous coupling (see above the pairwise examples).

(ii) *Bourbaki, Éléments de mathématique*, 1934,

is one of the since the middle of the last century mainly emerging systems engineering conception of mathematics, starting from the notion of collection. See above b1z. 172v. (logistics).

The mathematical entities are no longer treated as 'objects' in isolation but as contained in a structure of operations: it is here first of all a question of operative systems technology (understandable, because mathematics is first and foremost, since Viète (cf. p. 30 supra), an operational science whose work is not static but dynamic: processing 'mental matters' (spatial or literary or numerical).

The notion of structure as above p. 204 for Piaget typically, cited, is such an operative or operational notion, in which the 'middle term means 'transformation' or transformation, the transformation of 'a set of well-structured operations (e.g. +, -, :, x), transformed e.g. into 'an analogous system (e.g. \wedge , \vee , \rightarrow ; or \leftarrow something similar).

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It is clear that, for example, *Cl. Lévi-Strauss* (Brussels 1908/2009), since 1959 professor of social anthropology at the Collège de France, applies e.g. in his famous *Les structures élémentaires de la parenté*, etc., the mathematical-logistical set theory and the transformation groups, prevalent therein, to ethnological data; which he also does in his consideration of the relationship between nature and culture. The notion of exchange, communication of goods, people etc. reminds us of the semiology of Saussure e.g. (women circulate as words in the bosom of a society according to structural rules of behavior e.g.).

(iii.) Martial Guérout, *Descartes selon l'ordre des raisons*, 1953,

cf. supra p. 93 - has become a third type of inspiration for Structuralism, independent of the linguistic and mathematical.

Decision.- In any case a) Structuralism is closely related to well-defined rationalist tendencies in the West, especially since Viète, Descartes and Leibniz, etc. b) but also and especially influenced by so-called technical thinking which operates systematically in the effective sense (see above p. 202), as cybernetics shows.

Bibliography:

-- G. Schiwy, *Der französische Strukturalismus (Mode, Methode, Ideologie)*, Hamburg, 1969;

-- id., *Neue Aspekte des Strukturalismus*, Munich, 1971, offer "a good and sufficient critical introduction.

-- Peirce and Structuralism: *M. Bense, Semiotik (Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen)*, Baden-Baden, 1967, offers a good introduction to Peirce's real, now emerging theory of signs, as it becomes applicable in ontology, epistemology, linguistics and text theory.

It should also be noted that the lemmatic-analytic method is latently at work also in the effectively conceived notion of a system (cf. above pp. 38/39; the notion of a black box); see above p. 202.

Conclusion.

"Structuralism is 'a reflection of a society, which has entered the age of cybernetics and informatics (i.e., the application of cybernetics to information-processing machines, from the simplest to the telematic (i.e., chip-containing) types).'" (*C. Bertels, M. Foucault, in Philosophers of the XX-st Century*, Amsterdam/ Brussels, 1972, p. 212).

1) Rational analysis (for the umpteenth time this Platonic word),

2) especially of human culture as a whole (parallel to Freud's cultural psychoanalysis),

3) but with the emphasis on the signs in the womb of society (= either real or realities conceived as signs.);-

4) mathematics and logistics as the basic language (// Neo-Positivism) of all sciences; see main object and method;

(A) Through its emphasis on the lack of freedom of man, who is immersed in structures, and through its method (see above), structuralism opposes existentialism (see p. 73 (Böhm, Heidegger)- p. 139 (psychagogy, existentialism and 'humanism')).

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psychology), 152 (“facticity,” analogous to “thrownness” or (Hegelian:) to “Affirmation” (thesis, as a prelude to design), especially pp. 165 (Kierkegaard) and certainly pp. 158/159 (K. Barth as existential theologian in Kierkegaard’s line)).

(B) Through its method of systems technology of human culture (according to the Saussurian, Bourbakian or Guéroutian model) yet first much more in keeping with the cybernetic revolution and, then, conceived in a radically ideology-critical way, - through the insight that human culture is multifaceted, and - through the emphasis on the poverty of physicalism (i. e. the reduction of all cultural data to material i. e. time-space data (here, now, earth), inherent in Neopositivism, Structuralism (and certainly Neopositivism) sets out to make the human condition a reality. i. the reduction of all cultural data to material i.e. time-spatial data (here, now, earthly)), peculiar to Neopositivism, Structuralism (and certainly Poststructuralism) overwhelmingly sets itself against NeoPositivism (which has too much

(a) purely classical Humans

(b) remained intermingled with Leibnizianism).

c) By the emphasis just mentioned - on the many facets of culture and their looser relations and ambiguity, as well as by the emphasis on the relativistic meaninglessness of all human endeavour (which the real Structuralists reduce to transformations of always the same factors of culture, both archaic mankind and present-day mankind do nothing but combinatorics, i.e. Cultural data - as if they were symbols of mathematics or reasoning (logistics) - move among themselves within ever-changing configurations (see first-year course on configuration theory)), - thus, by these two traits, Structuralism opposes Marxism, which it sees as a humanistic (i.i. in the role of the human being as, though collectively, yet actively intervening and autonomous subject (cf. pp. 149 (Marx on the lord-servant dialectic as key), 189 (consciousness as misery-solution), revolutionary will, etc.). (e.g. 183: economism)) believing world view branded and this on the basis of his ‘theory’ (dialectical and positive-scientific) .

Total concludes on structuralism as the current offshoot of what Diderot (see p. 194, the beginning of the technical-industrial second, third-Revolution) in full XVIIIth century already foresaw and already helped to fully establish:

(i) structuralism, nevens

(ii) materialism (see pp. 180/193) and

(iii) Empiricism (see pp. 162/175), is the third late offshoot of what people like Voltaire and those with whom he surrounded himself deployed, sometimes with astonishing foresight.

This is why we have followed the very unusual method of exposition (i.e. speaking about Voltaire and his intentions and interrupting this exposition at length three times by successively examining three historical lines and traditions ((**i**) technical industrial thought, (**ii**) Materialism and Empiricism) up to the present).

The technocratic ideology.

H.A. Burnier/ Fr. Bon, *Les idées politiques (Philosophie et société)* in *La philosophie*, Paris, 1972, 2, pp. 300/335, especially pp. 309ss., describe ‘a real social ideology, which they conveniently call the ‘technocratic’ (and with great reason). ‘A word about it.

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Historical growth.

The pupil of d'Alembert, H. Saint-Simon (1760/1824), teacher himself of A. Comte, was state socialist (1824: *Système industriel*) is the announcer.- Later, when

1) capitalism organizes and

2) the state begins to intervene directly, then (the technocracy gets off the ground.

a/ World War I (1914/1918) and the period immediately after (think of Rathenau (Germany) and especially the now so controversial Lord Keynes (the man of macroeconomic analysis: note again the Platonic word 'analysis')) makes one give up the so-called fiction of pure and simple competition between firms as meaningless and accept the intervention of the state.

b/ Around the great economic crisis of 1929, first in the USA, then in Europe, the actual Neo-Capitalist doctrine (e.g. 1924: *School of the Trend of Economics*) emerges: *laissez faire*, *lasser passer* is given up (i.e. the totally free market economy) and control of the market mechanisms (by analysis leading to intervention on the basis of science and political considerations) is put first, without therefore lapsing into e.g. a Marxist totally led and thus so-called 'market'-less economy. The old Liberal ideologues were, of course, against it! But Roosevelt's New Deal (after the crisis of 1929) and the Volksfront-socialist leaders already applied this Neo-Capitalist doctrine to some extent.

c/ After WW II (1940/1945) this doctrine is predominantly applied, in Europe especially from 1953/1954 (the American automaton literature even floods the European and other Social Democrats and Reformists (i.e. two shades of freedom loving Marxism). Cf. 'automatism' higher p. 201v.: technical thinking and politics and economics flow, in part, into one! The words 'industrial society', 'abundance society', 'consumer society', 'managerial epoch' form the basic concepts.

Cf. R. Aron, M. Dabré, J.K. Galbraith, the journals on enterprise or 'economic expansion'! The technocratic ideology chooses:

(a) For cyclical renewal through industrial renewal,

(b) for technical knowledge (know how) over finance,

(c) for the interests of the nation over those of the "plutocrats" and

(d) for a real economic policy.

Two main traits emerge:

(i) the economy and its expansion override all other political issues;

(ii) technical expertise overrides all other expertise: society is a machine (see p. 202) that "technocrats" (actually "systems technologists": see pp. 93 (Guérault on Descartes), 72, 83, 84/85 (machine conception among the Cartesians, though not yet purely cybernetic, nevertheless already present) especially p. 202

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(the systemtechnological meaning of 'machine'). - Society is a machine which the technocrats (better: system technologists) alone can see through and thus, to its pure benefit, govern as well as possible. Technical competence prevails over the old party ideologues and over (naive) moral 'idealism'.

For the technocrat the opposition 'capitalism/socialism (Marxism)' is an outdated one. Counts for everything: control (see above page 202: *Wiener's control and communication in the animal and in the machine!*), not nationalization e.g.!

Hegelian put: Neo-capitalism is the negation of negation or synthesis! (see above p. 151vv.).

Conclusion: the XVIII century is at the origin of Technical-Industrial thinking: we are still living in it to the full.

Note (A) The preeminent antipodean, so far, of Technical-Industrialism is the higher equally touched Frankfurter Schule. Cf. pp. 154 (Habermas's negative tradition-criticism), 191 (Neo-Marxism, Neo-Freudism (H. Marcuse belongs to the two)). See also *B. van Steenbergen*, on Jürgen Habermas, in *Philosophers of the XXth Century*, Assen, 1972, vrl. p. 183vv. (*Technology as ideology*).

(B) An existential position represents e.g. *D. Ihde, Technics and Praxis (A Philosophy of Technology)*, Dordrecht, 1979: of course here the view is 'hermeneutic' (see above p. 187vv: Ricoeur's interpretation (of hermeneutic standpoint) of the three critical materialists) and the emphasis is placed on the change, in the 'experience' (typical existential word for the empirical 'experience' by means of the external or especially the internal senses); the book draws inspiration from Heidegger, the existential ontologist, H. Jonas, P. Ricoeur et al. the experience of the world has been changed by technology on the subjective-emotional level especially (the life anxiety of man,

1) already ever present - see above 150v. (the life anxiety of the 'servant', described by Hegel is a true existential theme) -

2) takes on an altered form in the suffocating, all 'beingness' killing technocracy). Faithful to our paradoxical method of exposition, we resume, p. 194 (after 179/180), the survey of the XVIII century.

Voltaire 1) with a view to the revolution of culture, as sketched on p. 194v, and 2) with the intention of undermining the Ancien régime among the intelligentsia, surrounded himself with people like d' Alembert and Diderot, as well as with the influence, of their mentality peers, namely *Lamettrie* (1709/1751: *L' Homme machine* (cf. p. 84), which appeared in 1748; *Baron d' Holbach* (1723/1789; *Système de la nature* (1770), the pre-eminent work of the French materialism and atheism outlined above; *Helvétius* (1715/1771: *De l' esprit* (1758); *E. de Condillac* (1715/1780) known for his *Traité des sensations*, in which he

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in the line of Hobbes (see above p. 101, where Hobbes' sensism is explained at length) but utterly consistently as Berkeley (see above pp. 102,163) elaborates sensism (= sensualism, philosophy of the senses, which assumes nothing but sensory, external and internal, experience (without objective, extrasensory reality: mediatism, therefore) (he then also assumes an immaterial soul, like Berkeley).

In addition to this typical "creative vanguard" (Th. Geiger), systematically edited

(i) the "absolute" monarchs: Frederick II (Prussia) with whom Voltaire stayed (but from where, extremely embittered by the fact that the sly fox of a monarch simply put him in front of his chariot, he returned!); Joseph II (Austria) - see above p. 128 (Gassner case); Catherine II (Russia); Kristiaan VIII (Denmark); Gustaaf III, (Sweden); Poniatowski (King of Poland);

(ii) the ministers, great lords and magistrates: d'Argenson, Choiseul, Malesherbe, Maurepas, Brienne, Necker, Maupeou, Turgot (see hoser p. 193), Lamoignon;

(iii) literati: Rousseau (about which later), *Buffon* (1707/1788), the 'naturalist' (= biologist avant la lettre), known for his *Histoire naturelle* (1749/1789), in which he betrays the intuitive feeling of the later evolutionism (transformation of the species of living beings, - a blow dealt to the fixism, which Platon et al. have left us, by confusing the immutability of ideas with the immutability of our 'conceptions', which are but a tentative approach to God, or in any case transcendent ideas); *Condorcet* (1743/1794), mathematician, economist, politician, philosopher of history, known for his *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, (Sketch of a historical picture of the progress of the human mind), which he wrote between 1793 (year of his warrant) and 1794 (in March he poisoned himself to escape effective arrest) in his enforced seclusion, in two volumes:

1: The origin and evolutionary stages of the human mind, from its beginnings to the founding of the French republic (which he saw as a crowning achievement of his own ideas!);

2: 'a prognosis - 'prospective' science begins with him - of the coming forms of progress (= optimism), - both parts being thereby carried by the idea of the 'perfectibilité infinie' of humanity.

Behold a very limited list of high officials (there were many more), who were "worked on" with (i) discreet actions, aimed at reversing the royal policy and (ii) subversive writings, which reached the whole people.

(b) *The anti-monarchist tendency* (see p. 178 supra). - This second side of one and the same subversive spirit emanated first of all from the Freemasons, according to l'Abbé Barruel. Indeed, the 'philosophers' in the typical XVIII - d' century sense are always more or less freemasons i.e. members of secret societies (see supra pp. 48/49, i.e. the classical, yes, the Renaissance period).

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“A powerful association, casting its net over the whole of Europe, favors in an exceptional way the gathering of the ‘forces’ of rationalism: Freemasonry.” (*E. Vacandard, Rationalisme (Son histoire avant la Révolution Française)* (Rationalism (Its history before the French Revolution), in *Dict. prat. des conn. relig.*, Paris, 1927, V, p. 1022). Steller recalls that historians usually assume 1717 as the birth of the so-called “speculative” (understand: “philosophical,” in the subversive-dialectic sense) Freemasonry, and this was at the Freemasons in London. “From there the sect spread throughout the principal states of Europe. One finds it in Holland (1725), Spain (1726), Portugal (1727), - Sweden (1736), - Switzerland (1737), Italy (1739): no wonder that still today, May 1981, a Christian-Democratic government is falling over Propaganda 2 (“a secret society”), exposed by the communists, with a list of more than nine hundred members in all the distinguished and influential strata of Italy).

The greatest mystery hangs over the introduction time (of the lodge) in Austria: one only knows that it stood there in great turmoil in 1797. In France, the Duke d’ Antin, son of the Marquis de Gondrin and of Marie-Victorine de Noailles, was the first Grand Master, elected the 24th of June, 1738.” (a.c., ib.). Regarding France, Barruel provides “a detailed analysis of the roots, rites, adepts, number, secrets, means, and influence of XVIII-d’century Freemasonry. He relies on unmistakably genuine documents such as:

- 1/ letters that were in circulation between the conspirators (and that still exist today),
- 2/ subversive literature of the time,
- 3/ Confessions of participants in the conspiracy tortured by remorse,
- 4/ confidential communications made to him.
- 5/ Furthermore, he compares the practical results achieved by the Freemasons and their objectives, such as decrees and laws that were in their favor.

The Republican “philosophers”.

Barruel says that the Montesquieu mentioned above (p. 179,1393f.) stands at the origin of the monarchomachy (see above p. 45 (the Christian ones, including *Bellarminus*, differ thoroughly; from the ‘philosophical’ monarchomachies). Z’ n *Esprit des lois* ‘ignores’ (in the Hegelian-dialectical sense) the established régime. Barruel says that Rousseau (1712/1778) (resumed this republican monarchomachy - ‘a pure case of ‘hermeneutics’ or ‘interpretation’, i.e. internalization; - and took it to an extreme: according to him,

- (a) both the monarchy,
- b) as the aristocratic régime advocated by Montesquieu are radically rejected: he desires ‘a democratic system, born of the will of ‘le peuple souverain’.

Rousseau is sometimes labeled as the ‘conclusion and victory of the French Lumières’. It remains to be seen how one understands this, for, if there is anyone who is truly ‘enlightened’, across the board, it is Rousseau!

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It is not because he defends ‘the rights of feeling and imagination’ against those of ‘reason’ that he is already outside the Enlightenment! Enlightenment is certainly rationalism, but a figure like Shaftesbury (see above p. 164v.) Adam Smith (ib.: sympathy -ethics and -politics and even -economics!) or Edm. Burke (ib.) is the living proof that rationalism’ and ‘romanticism’ (better preromanticism, of course, but then in a more thorough sense than what ordinary literary history understands by it) go together perfectly.

The life of Rousseau gives ‘Verstehen ‘ concerning his’ psyché: so to begin with:

- (i) his’ mother dies in the crib;
- (ii) his father’s only paternal education is to give him only reading of novels;
- (iii) everywhere one ‘places’ Rousseau, he does things that cause him to be sent away (merely reading novels instead of doing real duty, theft, etc.), if he does not run away himself! Especially the ‘love’ he conceives for ‘une espèce de voyou’ from Geneva, with whom he practices vagrancy, only to suddenly drop him again! At Freiburg, Lausanne, Vevey, Neuchatel, Bern, Soleure, Annecy, Lyon one finds him with some half ‘bohème’ or hustler! Only music interests him.

In 1741. He arrived in Paris, where he became acquainted with Fontenelle (1657/1757), the great vulgarizer of the rationalizing “scientific” method, applied among other things to Mythology and the science of oracles, conceived almost in Bayle’s mentality), with Mably, Marivaux, Diderot, Grimm, as well as with some aristocratic ladies.

He collaborates on the Encyclopédie (music). He then lives, willed against any marital bond, with Thérèse Levasseur, with whom he had five children, whom he unmercifully referred to the “Enfants-Trouvés”! “Je n’ ai même pas gardé la date de leur naissance,” he says to Mad. de Luxembourg.

In 1749, he was lucky: the Academy of Dijon held a competition: “Has the founding of arts and sciences contributed to the purification of morals?”. Rousseau answers: far from purifying morals, the arts and sciences owe their existence to our vices and they serve no purpose other than to reinforce them.

Reason: they remove us from ‘nature’ (there she is again, that ‘nature’!), but now understood in a Rousseauian way, namely as the starting point of humanity, guiltless and happy as a child. Only high spirits like Bacon, Descartes, Newton escape the degrading influence of arts and sciences! Written in a ressentimental (see above pages 176/177: bourgeois dialectic; Nietzsche’s ressentiment-analysis), but rhetorical style, which one had not read since Bossuet, Rousseau’s answer in 1751 achieves the prize: he was famous!

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This totally resentimental cultural critique opens him the way to *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1762), in which one reads Rousseau's political philosophy, - *Emile ou sur l'éducation*, (with the famous Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard (1762): "Pas d'entraves morales pour l'enfant!").

Meanwhile, in 1761, *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (1/ nature feeling, 2/ but also passionate love) had an unprecedented success, but provoked disagreement (already started since his *Lettre à d'Alembert* on the theater, which he almost Jansenistically condemned!) with the typical "philosophers", - disagreement, which came to join that of the Calvinists, who could not cope with his rationalism. After a stay in England, he returned to France (Ermenonville) where, given over to melancholy, he gradually began to suffer from persecution mania. He may have died by suicide. Barruel adds that Voltaire too, fashionable as ever, becomes monarchomach. And Diderot says openly, "When will I see the last king strangled with the gut strings of the last priest?" Founding because of the man of the encyclopédie!

(c) *The anarchist tendency.*

Barruel says that a third conspiracy aspect is attached to the doctrine and lodge of Johannes Weishaupt, who founded in Bavaria, at Ingolstadt, in 1775, the society of the Illuminati, which was already banned by the state in 1785, but which in France infiltrates the lodges of freemasonry.

The Illuminati are nihilistic anarchists:

1/ As Rousseau surpassed Montesquieu, 2/ so the Illuminati far surpass Rousseau! They 'ignore' (Hegelian!) not only the church or religion, but every morality as well as every authority; (always that anti-authoritarian tendency) and every right of ownership.- What was later called the 'Terror', in the Revolution years, as well as the hate phenomena that shocked so many people, Barruel blames on Weishaupt's philosophy and lodge. Jacobinism continued this afterwards. And this tradition is still obscurely at work even in our days.

The German Aufklärung.

"From Paris (...) the philosophy of the XVIIIth century spread throughout Europe". (a.c., 1022). Paris was visited by strangers. The correspondence went all over Europe. One thinks of Grimm's example on the subject. "In Germany Lessing depends on Bayle, as well as on Voltaire and Diderot; Schiller and Kant owe much to Rousseau. In Italy Goldoni imitates Molière, Alfieri Voltaire. And Condillac is instructor to the Prince of Parma. Along Naples relations with Spain are easily established". (ib.).

(1) *Chr. Wolff* (1679/1754).

This very influential figure, in Germany at least but also outside Germany, represents what one might call the 'Scholastic' interpretation of the Enlightenment (especially of Leibniz (see above p. 94/95)), but also of all other Enlightenment forms.

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Indeed, the German Aufklärung can be treated briefly, since it is mainly a systematization in true Scholastic style of classical ontology, yet in an aufgeklärte atmosphere, to which the title of many of its works recalls: “Vernünftige gedanken über...” (rational thoughts about ...). Also, like the great example of German Aufklärung, Wolff is very moderately rationalistic, if only because Wolff always writes with moral intent (“edifying”) and acts as a professor.

From him dates (especially to be noted, by the way) the now classic tripartite general theory of being or ontology:

- (i) Theology,
- (ii) cosmology and
- (iii) (rational) psychology,

cf. *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (1719).

Adherents: Bilfinger (+1750); Gottsched (+1766); Knutzen (+1751); A. Baumgarten (1714/1762), the founder of German aesthetics (cf. higher, in England nl p. 164/165, and especially Rousseau, in France, p. 211vv.): the word ‘aisthèsis’ means perception; so that ‘aesthetics’ meant theory of perception; yet, with Leibniz, Baumgarten sees beauty, the basic concept of modern aesthetics, in the sensuous, d.i. incapacitated (see p. 79 above on Leibniz’s unconscious incapacitated sensations and Maine de Biran’s, to be compared with sensitive perceptions) experiences of that which, in itself, is rationally perfect; consequently, ‘aesthetics’ (experiential theory) becomes ‘theory of beauty’.

Opponents of Wolff .- Gh. Crusius (+1775); L. Buler (1707/17833), famous mathematician, who developed a contemporary space- and ‘ether’-theory which still up to our days, though in a purely occult sense, is adhered to by a number of occultists, but which, purely scientifically, has long been conquered, G. Plouquet (+1790), who prepared the mathesis universalis (see above pp. 65/66: Descartes’ theory of order, which is non-mechanistic; 172/173 on modern logistics, in the Leibniz line) by his first attempts at logical calculation; - *J. Lambert* (1728/1777), physicist and philosopher, who wrote a critique of knowledge in a pre-Cantian sense: *Neues Organon* (1764; cf. Bacon ‘s Organon p. 37vv.); he was also in correspondence with Kant. He created the word ‘Phenomenology’ (which will afterwards (Hegel, Husserl, Teilhard de Chardin) undergo several interpretations).

(2) *Other Aufklärer. - Reimarius* (+1768),

the German deist (see above p. 146, 164 Freethinkers)) known for his’ n *Wolfenbütteler Fragmente* (he debunked the dogma of the resurrection of Jesus, totally in the spirit of the current demythologization (see above p. 5/7), - which proves that the current crisis of foundations in the post-conciliar Church is Aufklärungsfenomen;

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Moses Mendelssohn (+1786); Wieland (+1813); Frederick the Great (1712/1786), once the host of several French illuminators, among whom in the first place Voltaire, who, afterwards, hated him because of his Machiavellian politics, of which Voltaire was “a mere ‘means’, wrote “*Anti-machiavelli*”, (!), as well as, in the aufgeklärte French language, “a work whose title speaks volumes for those who have read all the previous ones: *De la superstition et de la religion*; further: *Essai sur l’ amour-propre* (self-love); Ch. Garve (+1788); Lessing (1729/1781), known, besides for *Laokoon* and *Hamburgische Dramaturgie*, for *Erziehung des Menschengeschlecht* - (Education of the human race), (1780),- book worth reading:

(i) Lessing examines the stages mankind passes through on the way to the Absolute Good, yet this time the philosophical theme of history is andragogically conceived in a deeply religious sense which directly recalls the Wisdom Books of the Old and New Testaments; indeed, the improvement of mankind is accompanied by as many successive revelations - an old theosophical idea, yet here Biblical-Christian (though still very aufgeklärt) elaborated -;

(ii) what is the education for the individual man, that is the revelation for the overall humanity (...)

(1) Education does not give man anything he does not possess of himself, but it gives him it both quickly and easily.

(2) Likewise, revelation gives nothing to mankind that, with its reason, not aided by God or anything else, it cannot attain for itself, but it has given to mankind and gives it more quickly the most important things (among those which it can itself attain rationally).” (o.c.).

This is the principled empowerment of religious humanity, as also formulated by the Wisdom and Apocalyptic books of especially the Old Testament; cf. A. Gelin, *The Outlines of the Old Testament*, Antwerp 1962, vrl. pp. 33; 60; 85; G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, I and II (*Die Theologie der prophetischen Ueberlieferungen*), Munich, 1961, S. 314ff (*Die Apokalyptik*), - which becomes vrl. clear, if one reads this on the extension of I (*Die Theologie des geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen*), S. 415ff. (*Die Erfahrungsweisheit Israels, viz. on the sapiential books*).

(iii) Starting from this principle, Lessing distinguishes three fundamental revelations in human history:

a/ the primordial revelation, by which the “first” man - what a difference from the “Primitive” of Rousseau, of whom Lessing is said to have “influenced” (!) - was equipped with the pure monotheistic concept of God - which anticipates W. Schmidt and the Viennese Religious Historical School (purely speculative, with Lessing this becomes empirical-monotheistic in the Urmonotheism thought of the Vienna School);

b/ the Jewish revelation, which once again clarifies the God idea that has been obscured everywhere;

c/ the Evangelical revelation, which, in addition to the idea of God, also imparted soul mortality, afterlife and judgment

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- things, Lessing said, who had narrowly designated the “Old Testament.

Further Aufklärer: J. Tetens (1736/1807), whose main work: *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* (Philosophical experiments on human nature and its development), (1777) , - book that launches the word ‘development’ (Herder will use it ‘mit Bewusstsein und Vorliebe’ he says, instead of the word ‘Auswicklung’), word that indeed ‘a whole world and life view that will break through in the XIXth century on a large scale and in different fields (philosophy of history, biology (Darwin));

a) had already Wolff (see p. 214 (distinguishing rational psychology from empirical, - distinction introduced by Wolff)) worked out the “rational,” meaning: philosophical psychology, foundation of what is now called philosophical humanities (anthropology)

b) Tetens starts with empirical psychology, which, in our days, plays such a large role: Tetens introduces the threefold psychology of capacity, which, besides reason and will, also gives feeling (gefühl in German has something that our word does not) a real place (and thus launches a Romantic word in professional science);- Tetens also gets ahead of Kant where he claims, as unscholastically as can be, that through sensory perception, the ‘substance’ and, through reason, as a spontaneous capacity (i. e. of itself, innate), the ‘form’ of knowledge comes into being (whereby the ‘form’ of knowledge is the ‘form’ of the human being).i. from itself, innate), the ‘form’ of knowledge comes into being (where the antique-medieval tradition both substance and form are already present in sensory experience, but in a pre-intellectual and pre-rational mode of being); further: J. Sulzer (1720/1779), who brings up the psychology of artistic creation; J. Basedow (+1790), ‘a pedagogue.

(3) J.H. Pestalozzi (1746/1827),

who transforms the Enlightenment in its German version in the pedagogical field, by the fact that he processes Rousseau in a very independent way: *Meine Nachforschungen über den Gang der Natur in der Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts* (My research on the course of nature in the development of the human race), (1797) and *Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt* (1801); this Swiss Deist humanitarians,

a) overcomes indeed the Cartesianism of the learning process (which replaced a purely verbal knowledge by clear and unambiguous intuitions (see above p. 76, br. 81 and 93)) by the education which connects the family life and the social life with the school life (education which takes precedence over the purely rational knowledge,- however useful and necessary);

b) he also overcomes Cartesian-rationalist education by emphasizing the love of the child (both at home and at school). Pestalozzi thus becomes the precursor of the New education which is child-centered where the “classical” adult-centered (cf. Herbart), and which, secondly, is non-authoritarian.

Note:-- Rhetorical thought, during the rationalist era, is touched upon briefly by S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy*, Bilthoven, 1975, p. 77vv. (Bacon, Descartes, Pascal (Art de persuader); The consecrated eloquence; Kant and the Enlightenment.

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(B) I. Kant (1724/1804) and the epoch of German Idealism.

Kant and the famous German Idealism belong both to the Aufklärung and to the Post Aufklärung era. The periodization is therefore different:

(a) where the XVIIIth century is situated grosso modo, of course, between 1700 and 1781,

(b) there situate Kant and German idealism between 1781 and 1854 - (date of Schelling's death; - date in which the 'reaction' against German idealism, in **(a)** Materialism, mechanistic or dialectical (see p. 182vv.),

(b) Positivism or empiricism (see p. 169vv.),

(c) Empiriocriticism (Avenarius (1843/1896), Mach (1838/1916), Ostwald (1853/ 1932)),

(d) Pragmati(ci)sme (Peirce (1839/1914) - already mentioned several times, e.g. and vrl. pp. 77/80 (critique of Kartesianism), also 206) (semiotics) -, W. James (1859/1910), J. Dewey (1859/1952), F. Schiller (1864/1937))

e) As if-philosophy (H. Vaihinger (1852/1933) continues in full force: - then establishes 'a Neo-Idealist counter-movement: Neo-Kantism

a/ in the narrower sense: **(i)** Marburger school (H. Cohen (1842/1918), P. Natorp (1854/1924), E. Cassirer (1874/1945; already cited for his book on the philosophy of the Aufklärung), B. Ovinck (1862/1944)); **(ii)** Badener school (W. Windelband (1848/1915), H. Rickert (1863/1936), B. Bauch (1877/1942), M. Weber (1864/1921; already cited on Protestantism and Capitalism p. 25), H. Münsterberg (1863/1916));

b/ realistic Neo-Kantism (overcoming idealism towards the object): A. Riehl (1844/1924), J. Volkelt (1848/1930);

c/ Neo-Kantism interpreted psychologically: L. Nelson (1892/1927), Rudolf Otto (1869/1937: known for his indeed very psychological interpretation of the 'sacred' as mysterium tremendum et fascinatum);

Neo-Hegelianism:

1) Germany (A. Lasson (1832/1917), G. Lasson (1862/1932), R. Kroner (1884/),

2) England (J. Hutchison Stirling (1820/1909), Th. Hill Green (1836/1882), E. Caird (1835/1908), J. H. Muirhead (1855/1940), F. Bradley (1846/1924), B. Bosanquet (1848/ 1923), J. M. Taggart (1866/1925)),

3) Italy (B. Croce (1866/1952), G. Gentile (1875/1944)),

4) The Netherlands (G. Bolland (1854/1922)).

Which suggests that German Idealism had a long and widespread influence on Western thought. If one knows that this influence was partly rationalist and enlightened ('philosophical' but to a large extent also anti-rationalist - 'philosophical', this confirms what we claimed p. 121vv, viz. that even in the XIXth century, where it reacts against the XVIIIth century, we still live aufgeklärt, even if it was through 'a syncretism between Aufklärung and Anti-Aufklärung, such as we see **a)** in Kant and Fichte, **b)** but even more in Hegel and **c)** most certainly in Schelling.

The non-XVIIIth century currents in the XIXth century. Again note: non-rationalist usually means that rationalism is taken as a 'thesis' (starting point of beaming and of 'negation' (criticism):

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a/ Traditionalism and ‘ontologism’: L. de Bonald (1754/1840) F. de la Mennais (1792/1854), - the French anti-French revolutionary movement; A. Rosmini - Serbati (1797/1855), V. Gioberti (1801/1852), C. Ubaghs (1800/1875 (see above pp. 95/96);

b/ Spiritualism: Maine de Biran (1766/1824: see above p. 79 (reflexive yet empirically-immediate position); - V. Cousin (1792/1867 (‘n eclectic idealism); F. Ravaisson-Mollien (1813/1900), L. Ollé-Laprune (1839/1899), J. Lachelier (1832/1918), E. Boutroux (1845/1921), - up to there for France which, in its typical way, is rather independent t.to German Idealism and Spiritualism and also more Cartesian, reacting against the tidal wave of the Lumières; R. Eucken (1846/1926; cf. p. 70); - Kantian-Criticist oriented spiritualism: Ch. Renouvier (1815/1903), O. Hamelin (1856/1907), L. Brunschwig (1869/1944);

c/ French criticism of science: H. Poincaré (1854/1912), P. Duhem (1861/1916), E. Meyerson (1859/1933), - ‘a not too positivist-rationalist epistemology is emerging;

d/ natural science Kantism: G. Fechner (1801/1887), H. Lotze (1817/ 1881), E. von Hartmann (1842/1906);

e/ syncretism: adhering to some positive science:

- Psychology: J. Wundt (1832/1920), Th. Lipps (1851/1914);
- Sociologism : E. Durkheim (1858/1917), L. Lévy - Bruhl (1857/1939);
- Biological (Vitalism): H. Driesch (1867/1941), J. von Uexküll (1864/1944)
- Historicism: W. Dilthey (1833/1912), E. Troeltsch (1865/1923) (cf. above p. 5/7 (historically applied to the Christian mystery of the Holy Trinity revelation, whether or not demythologisable), - from which one sees the great importance of the externalist position that such partial positivisms or, better, scientisms inevitably take with regard to what lies outside their specialist field. One sees from the above list how strongly the (broadly conceived) ‘scientism’ (i.e. belief in science) of the Enlightenment has its effect to such an extent that the whole of philosophy simply tries to use the basic concepts of one or other specialisation.

(f) Irrationalism: usually distinguishes between:

- vitalist (biological) irrationalism: F. Nietzsche (1844/1900), about whom more than enough above (pp. 182 (Stirner’s model), 183vv. (the three great critical materialists), J. Guyau (1854/1888), and

- spiritualist irrationalism: S. Kierkegaard (1813/1855) (see p. 165).

Yet *H. Arvon, La Philosophie Allemande*, Paris, 1970, pp. 17/67, notes the very great after-effects of J. Schelling (1775/1854), the most romantic among the three ‘Absolute Idealists’ (nevens Fichte and Hegel), to note **(1/** Schopenhauer, **2/** Kierkegaard (who met him in Berlin), **3/** Nietzsche, **4/** Neo-Idealism **5/** Neo-Romanticism (Klages e.g.), **6/** Neo-Vitalism, **7/** National Socialism

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and also in what he termed “Philosophical Anthropology (M. Scheler, H. Plessner, A. Gehlen, H. Lipps, E. Rothacker, H. Marcuse). Indeed,

(A) especially the later *Schelling*, who, from 1809 (*Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) to 1815,

a) from what he then begins to call “negative,” i.e., philosophy oriented purely to the abstract or even to the somewhat concretely conceived idea, as Hegel in particular was still innovating in Kantian, indeed Cartesian, style

b) to advocate what he then calls “a positive” philosophy, which

a) does not dwell on the ‘what’ (das Was), the pure possible essentialness of things (however historically and life-narrative Hegel conceived it, e.g.)

b) but das Daz, the ‘that’, i.e. its actual existence emphasized and allowed to prevail in reflexion and living thought.

(B) Contrary to the a- and even anti-religious tendency of the German Aufklärung, which would have rather mocked revelation and especially the stage before it, myth, Schelling, as the basis of his positive philosophy, gives priority to both myth and revelation. And even, notwithstanding his pantheistic tendency, which he never completely discarded, with preference or at least understanding for the theistic, i.e. the personally conceived God as the origin of myth and revelation.

(C) That he, thereby, conceives of God in the line of J. Böme (see above p. 57), as a ‘ground’, which ‘wills’, but then unconsciously (at least in the first movement) with a ‘will’ (better; an urge to) which initiates the eternal process of becoming, and in such a way that both good and evil emerge from that one Godhead-as-‘will’ simultaneously and necessarily, - we leave that for a legacy of a pantheistic or even fully pantheistic concept of God; - which, however, does not detract from the ‘positive’, i. e. much more real, tendency of such a thinking which takes root not in the creative, but in the increasingly critical, process of becoming. This is: much more realistic tendency of such a thinking which takes root not in the creative, but always critical - designing reason -- as the Aufklärer practiced it--, but in a truly cultural-historical reason, of a sensitive rather than an overly rational nature.

As to the great influence of Schelling, the following should be noted, with Arvon: in 1841 Schelling becomes a prof at Berlin; his lessons are followed, among others, by Bakunin (1814/1870), Russian anarchist oriented socialist, by Fr. Engels (Marx’s friend); dialectical materialist and socialist, by S.Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, and by J. Burckhart (1818/1897), the historian of the Renaissance. Among others and especially runs Schelling,

a) with its emphasis on Daz, existence as pure facticity, i.e. accomplished facticity,

b) reason for that human freedom (later called ‘design’) to ‘ignore’ that factuality, i.e. to go beyond it in a design of world and life. Which Heidegger will conceive of as the ground structure of human existence.

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Note- Existentialism, a rising star for several decades, particularly in continental Europe, has been on the rise for +/- twenty years or even more:

(i) the Hegelian-Marxian, who thinks “dialectically” (see above p. 149v.: the lord-servant dialectic as a world-famous and repeatedly applied basic dialectical model since Marx) and who,

(A) mainly and with Hegel as well as with the Right and especially the Left Hegelians, (D.Strausz, Br.Bauer, L.Feuerbach, - Max Stirner (see above page 182: Strausz, Feuerbach, the theological pioneers; M.Stirner, the anarchist - nihilist, and Marx, resp. Engels, the socialist - communist interpretations) has developed, last century

(B)I to unfold again in the XXth century, suddenly and in Neo-Hegelian and in Neo-Marxist and in neo-Anarchist sense (see above pp. 190/191 (‘metaphysical’ Frankfurter Schule; scientist-structuralist (Althusser),

(B)II not to forget also the already mentioned, in theological circles strongly influencing *Ernst Bloch* (1885/1977), known for his *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (1954/1957) and also the independent but deeply influential *Georg Lukacz* (1885/1971), who with his *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (1923) influenced a.o. existentialism and especially Marxizing dialecticians; for anarchist interpretations see p. 192 (Neo-Nietzscheism).For the anarchist interpretations see page 192 (Neo-Nietzscheism));

(ii) the system-technological streak, set out at greater length above, has almost dealt a final blow to existentialism, were it not that, as an anti-rational undercurrent, it nevertheless repeatedly,

a) both in the USA (in the humanistic psychologies and even, however miraculously, in the humanistic sociologies) and in Europe and even on a world scale, finds very convinced adherents, who express one of the following tendencies the common method is a ‘synthesis’ of 1) S. Kierkegaard’s description of existence 2) W. Dilthey’s hermeneutics 3) with, whether or not Husserl’s intention (not to be confused with the other). Kierkegaard’s description of existence 2) W. Dilthey’s hermeneutics (see above p. 187v.) 3) with Husserl’s intentional (not his transcendental-idealistic) phenomenology - about which a little more later-;

(b)1. the Heideggerian ‘fundamental’ or radical ontology (which both revalorizes the classical ontology or theory of being (think of Aristotle’s corrective to Platon’s theory of ideas, which is the core of the classical ontology (up to and including that of Chr. Wolff; cf. p. 213v.) and ‘radically’ criticizes it because of its lack of historical sense (think of 1/ the rationalistic and 2/ the evolutionary, but especially of the 3/ romantic-idealistic history studies in the course of the early XIXth century);

(b)2 the thrust represented by K. Jaspers, which is rather strongly psychological (also more Kierkegaard-like, except for a vague concept of God, which has remained too rationalistic);

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(b)3. the Catholic existentialisms, of which G. Marcel (1889/1973) and L. Lavelle (1883/1951), with his' kindred spirit R. Le Senne (1882/1954) one of the two representatives of 'la Philosophie de l'esprit', are the two pioneers;

(b)4. the absurdist direction of A. Camus (1913/1960), which emphasizes the senseless or absurd, as it is expressed especially in modern society, but also in traditional political and social life;

(b)5. so-called French existentialism, of which J.P. Sartre (1905/1980), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908/1961) and the 'sartreuse' Simone de Beauvoir (1908/1986) are the most notorious or controversial representatives, who, immediately after W.W. II, have dominated Paris and the whole mental life in Western Europe (until both Neo-Hegelianism and Techno-industrial system-technological Structuralism have been superseded, incidentally, together with Hermeneutics P. Ponty). II Paris and the whole mental life of Western Europe (until both Neo-Hegelianism and Technical-Industrial System-technological Structuralism superseded it (together, by the way, with the Hermeneuticist P. Ricoeur (see above p. 187f.) and M. Dufrenne, his kindred spirit));

Central to Sartre's thinking in particular is Heidegger, but redubbed from the scholastic conceptual pairing of "essence/existence" d.i.

(a) the concept as a pure content of thought, which is purely possible, Schelling's 'Was' approximately

(b) has set against pure factual existence); but the existentialists à la Sartre treat the scholastic couple dialectically (see above p. 149v.) and as follows:

a) "thesis" or affirmation is the "world of essence," as, from Platon to XVIII- d' century Rationalism, Western so-called "essentialist" thought, in its religious yearning for "another, transcendental world," has honored it as the rule for thought and action;

b) that precisely 'ignore' (antithesis) people like Sartre in the name of the so-called now merely humanly conceived 'existence': indeed, 'exist', in the existentialist language, does not mean as in the Scholastic 'existence-without-more', but (merely situated in the course of nature, but especially cultural history) human existence: this human existence

a) is essentially bound up with the brutal facts, viz. it is "thrown" into the world, full of meaninglessness (cf. Camus et al.)

b) to make of it what it can (= le project, the design, the free interpretation of the accomplished fact that is the 'thrownness' (facticity).

It should be noted that Sartre has tried a purely existential interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis and thus, in fact, should also be mentioned in Neo-Freudism (see p. 191v.) with his existential psychoanalysis (which is certainly worthwhile, next to Ricoeur's interpretation). For more precisions with regard to the basic insights of the whole existentialist direction (except the Humanist-American one) see the excellent work of *H. Redeker, Existentialism*, Amsterdam, 1949 (p. 194ff. on the "origins" of existentialism in German idealism).

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Note.-- Here reference should be made very briefly to the American counterpart of European existentialism (which therefore does not yet coincide with French Existentialism: *Th. Roszak, Rise of a Counterculture* (Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opponents, Amsterdam, 1971-1, 1973-4-, - from which one sentence:

“While art and literature of our time tell us with increasing despair that the disease of our time is alienation, to which our time is sinking, the sciences in their adamant pursuit carry to its apotheosis as our only means of constructing a valid reality. Objective consciousness is the alienated life elevated to the honorable status of scientific method” (o.c., 199).

Notice here again the dialectic language (see above p. 152 (Entfremdung) See also: -- *Ch. Reich, Flowers in Concrete* (How the revolution of the young tries to make America livable), Bloemendaal, - 1971 (//: Eng.: *The Greening of America*);

-- *J.F. Revel, Ni Marx, nu Jésus* (*De la seconde révolution américaine à la seconde révolution mondiale*), Paris, 1970;

-- *I. Howe/ M. Harrington, The Seventies* (Problems and Proposals), New York; 1972 (which exposes a wide range of America's links). One thinks of the cultural revolution since May 1968. Then one understands that existential thinking, but then more than catheter-existentialism, of course addresses a real Aufklärungproblem, namely the dehumanizing technocracy as we have briefly sketched it above pages 208/209. So much for irrationalism (begun p. 218 supra, ad f. And that essentially has to do with the great “positive” idealist Schelling, - which is overlooked in most history books.

The “absolute” Idealism.

After having sketched (on p. 217) Idealism in its representatives and in its “waves” (a/ early-nineteenth century, b/ late-nineteenth century), in order to prove with names and dates that this rationalism-criticism movement is more than pure air, but, in fact, a very profound offshoot of the mainly Leibnizian Aufklärung, which, as *O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten phil. Fachausdrücke*, Kempten/Munich, 1909, s. 91, emphasizes (the German Aufklärung was preserved from the absurdities (of the French especially, but also of the English Enlightenments), because it had a foothold in Leibniz's philosophy, he says) from the very beginning it possessed a much more constructive and constructive, but also a more historical (i.e., more traditional) spirit.

For a moment, we outline the major figures.

(i) I. Kant (1724/1804).

Kant's philosophy he himself calls criticalism as a refusal and of Humean skepticism (concerning classical metaphysics and theology) and of Wolffian dogmatism (see above p. 213v.). Kant, in his own words, awoke from the dogmatic sleep (of Wolff's metaphysics) by the shock that Hume and the English empiricist-skeptical Enlightenment gave him.

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The question of causality-whether it is more and something else than pure succession of phenomena, by 'habit,' habit formation 'associated'

(a) was resolved by Scottish common-sense philosophy through an appeal to average common sense and reason.

(b) Kant considers this insufficient: Hume too had common sense, Kant said! The *sensus communis* regularly makes 'mistakes'; consequently: if one wants to save the foundations of the traditional European culture concerning science and, if possible, philosophy and metaphysics (and theology), one should change the course taken by Hume. Cf. pp. 168/169.

(A) Kant found its prelude in the already mentioned (p. 214) Lambert, one of Wolff's opponents, by the way: Lambert introduced 'a distinction between "experience" (empirical i.e. sensory knowledge) and - what he called - "experience-free" knowledge. As Tetens (see above p. 216) isolated the purely empirical substance from the purely 'spontaneous' (i.e. experience-free) 'form', so Lambert analogously isolated the empirical from the 'spontaneous' knowledge- or, as Kant likes to say, (the aposterioric (posterior) and the aprioric (anterior) forms of knowledge. From this the one root of German Idealism is born.

(B) The other root is the dialectical problems, viz. from Kant onwards, the German absolute Idealists want to

(a) synthesize Leibnizian Wolffian innatism with Humian-Anglo-Saxon empiricism, i.e., in 'a higher summary; 'lift' (i.e., 1/ dissolve and at the same time 2/ bring to a higher level of thought; see p.153: *Aufhebung*): "Thoughts without content (Kant means sensory content of experiential data) are empty. (Sense) perceptions without concepts (which come from the 'spontaneous' mind or reason) are blind." The one-sidedness of his predecessors is very strikingly typified by Kant: "Leibniz intellectuized (!) - i.e. understood them in a one-sided 'intellectual' (here: innatist) way - the phenomena, as Locke (see above p. 162v.: the father of the Enlightenment and his radical sensist empiricism) senses the concepts of reason".

'Criticism'. - In his critical period, *Kant* entitles a number of works (e.g., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781-1, 1787², the date on which German absolute Idealism deploys) with the name "critique. What does this mean? This: what counts as transcendental objects and what is ascribed to pure (= experience-free) reason as something known, namely words such as 'soul', 'world' (as the whole of reality, understood ontologically), 'God', these are concepts which transcend experience (transcendent, he says), which are both necessary to become worldly and directly verifiable in any experience.

Consequence:

(1) Wolff's rational psychology, cosmology, and theology are sham sciences. They are dogmatic products.

(2) Only the mathematical physical is science.

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Note -- cf. pp. 40 (Bacon's classification of science); 98 (Hobbes' classification of science); 167 (Hume's classification of science): there one sees how little Kant, in reality, overcomes empiricism; on the contrary, he makes it, as it were, final by positing, alongside empirical, sense knowledge 'a nonsense knowledge!

The entire XIXth and XXth centuries will still be wrestling with this dichotomy of 'aprioric/ aposterioric' dating from Lambert and Tetens - very unscholastic by the way (for the scholastics one should never separate the two!). Both the Marxizing dialecticians, for example, and the idealizing existentialists suffer from this dichotomy.

(ii) Fichte (1762/1814), **Hegel** (1770/1831).

The problem of these two is reality in itself (called the Absolute with a pantheistic term: they do not distinguish between

1) absolute being, i.e. the totality of reality which, inevitably, has nothing outside it and is therefore 'absolute', on the one hand, and

2) on the other hand, the Absolute God, who indeed even but in His infinite way has "nothing" (Divine) outside of Himself, yes, is the root and origin of all being (of the absolute in the universal sense).

Fichte posits first that the I (i. e. God, insofar as it reveals itself in all of us little 'I' for a very brief moment) 'produces' the phenomenal world, which we all experience, in an unconscious and involuntary 'creation' (see above p. 57 (J. Böhme's will), in order to 'overcome' that phenomenal world, later (at least later in the purely logical sense, for temporally this is not - determinable) thanks to 'a conscious and arbitrary effort.

Hegel (A) opposes Fichte: the I and Nature (the phenomenal world around us) both have a common origin which - in contrast to Schelling's view, which places that common origin both above and before the I and Nature and gradually identifies that same origin more and more with Nature (which is not quite right according to Hegel) - cannot be situated before and above but in both terms, I and Nature.

(B) In this it goes even more dialectically (see above page 151): God, who from the start is both I and Nature, unfolds, in the course of the history of Nature and Mind or I, first the Nature-side in him, then the I-side in him. God (thesis) literally becomes what He is in two times or better facets (for it is a logical and not a temporal process (which does not go well together), namely first Nature, then Spirit (i.e. first antithesis, then synthesis).

Hegel's Mobilism. What lies behind this abstract but not so stupid conceptual dialectic? What *M. Foucault*, *Les mots et les choses*, Paris, 1966, pp. 229ss. calls 'l'âge de l'histoire'. At that time, i.e. beginning XIXth century, discovered:

- 1) Bopp the linguistic language structure,
- 2) Cuvier the biological "function" (see above p. 203

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(functional causality) and this becomes with him classification principle of life forms and

3) Ricardo measures money by labor instead of almost the other way around (i.e., the economic value of “goods” is thought in labor value).

The so-called Historical school overcomes all these very searching tendencies by doubly improving the rationalist a-historical and a-social mentality.

(i) nominalism gives rise, in the field of society, to either innatism (innate yet experience-free thought contents) or empiricism (sensism) (only experience-acquired thought contents);

(ii) this implies that the individual takes precedence over the set and that the part takes precedence over the whole; reason, at least supposed reason: set and whole (system) are merely either innate but experientially without thought or they are merely sense singular or at most private thought-contents, become out of purely singular cases;

Applying this to community life one can say that the individual takes precedence over the collection which is the community and over its cohesion! In that sphere one understands both Anglo-Saxon individualism and French revolutionary thinking which led to the French Revolution (think of Rousseau’s - ultra-individualism, e.g. as a particular source of inspiration). See supra p. 211 e.g. the nominalistic equality dream: all people are ‘equal’ i.e. as numbers in a (non-existent) collection; they are ‘loose’ thought, isolated elements of a shadowy ‘community’ or ‘society’.

Consequence: the ease with which rationalists replace the traditionally (or, as German Romantic-Idealist thinkers like to say the historically) grown with the arbitrarily-individual. Cf. Barth’s critique of the XVIII-d’ century “absolute” (i.e., separated thinking and living but highly effective mind) man (p. 158v.).

(iii) The so-called historical (better : historical-social school (not in the ordinary sense, but in the broad sense) thinks the relations the other way round: it is organicist, i.e. traditional (= historical) - social. And this double:

(a) ‘An organism has a purposeful structure (see above p. 197; 201vv..) that acts as a telos (purpose): the collection goes before the member of it; the whole goes before the part of it! Thus one understands:

1) and the penchant of the German Absolute Idealists to think and work with comprehensive and moving wholes and collections,

2) as well as the analogous penchant of the Left Hegelians (the Marxists in the first place), who except for the anarchist figures like Stirner et al - subject the individual (as a Person or as a private group) to the great encompassing ‘society’. Marx’s entire critique of the existing system of exploitation of the proletarians by the possessing classes stands or falls with this historical-social understanding theory.

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(b) The same historical-social or organicist school has, however, a mitigating side: it develops a special concern for the intermediate term between the individual on the one hand and the all-embracing, crushingly large society on the other, i.e. the private intermediate communities, e.g. the village as a community of life or the region in which man feels at home, etc.

Nineteenth century nationalism (think e.g. Austria-Hungary with its nationalities; think Napoleon's empire). The whole ideology of nationality (whether it is based on common language and culture (Herder, Fichte, Romanticism in Germany) or on common history (Renan, with more emphasis on the freely chosen nature of the national)) is in fact based on all the facets of a social theory of collections and systems!
- Look at this range:

singular partikulier ← universal → - collective

and you can derive the main social ideologies almost mathematically-logically (cf. Viète's diagram p. 30, but by letter):

(a) liberalism (see the whole of French Lumières e.g. But also A. Smith's conception of economy), which the philosophes as in Fr. Montesquieu and even more intensely Rousseau (see p. 211) and in the USA Jefferson, advocated, is individualistic (separate from the collection or whole, called "collective"); Locke thought this to be political, A. Smith economy; - We still live from this in all kinds of forms (such as e.g. the libertarian ideology in the USA, which thinks of the individual as very liberal-anarchic and represents an extreme form of it);

b) Socialism takes the historical-social side (organicism, whether or not dialectically conceived): the word, 'socialism' appears, in England, around 1826 (in the circle around Robert Owen) and, in France, from 1832 (in the milieu of Saint-Simon, the étatist - system technologist in the industrial field); here, too, pure Enlightenment thinking is at work, but, i.p.v. the 'loose' (read: nominalistic) idea of equality, now comes the 'ultra-realistic' (see above p. 10; vrl. 15 (Universalism and also 18 (Late School nominalism)) justice idea, especially the distributive but also the commutative or exchange justice idea, instead of the "every man for himself" of the social-nominalist, now comes solidarity in the heavy sense of the social-ultrarealist;

Expressed in class terms: instead of the intellectually supported individualism of the powerful bourgeoisie, there is now the "elementary" (Jüngerian understanding) sense of community and belonging of the proletarians, who experienced the "misery" (see above, p. 152: Hegel, Marx and Moreno are three interpretations of the "misery") of "enlightened" industrial society most acutely and who "enslaved" themselves to it. 152: Hegel, Marx and Moreno are the three interpretations of "misery") of the "enlightened" industrial society experienced most acutely and feel themselves to be "servants" in relation to "gentlemen" (see above p. 149: Hegel's gentleman-servant dialectic, socially interpreted by Marx)

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(c) anarchism, unless, as mentioned above, under 'liberalism' (libertarian ideology), is ultra-individualized, takes the private intermediate as the ideal form of society:

1) Robert Owen e.g. represents small communities as socio-economic entities;

2) Proudhon has it in for the syndicates (syndicalism);

3) the original 'communism' stands for the commune (hence the name, by the way: - in the time before 1848 at least (before 'communism' starts to become 'a name for dictatorial and étatist Marxism: the pinnacle comes with the Leninist-Stalinist interpretation, of course, after 1917 (Russian Revolution));

(a) or it must be added, as an improvement, that Marx sees the realization of his scientifically conceived socialism (in distinction to the so-called utopian, i.e. pre-scientific, i.e. non-aufgeklärte, socialists (so many anarchists e.g.) in two ways: first socialism, then communism;

(b) one knows in abundance how Marx's ideology proved to be ambiguous in retrospect (Bolsheviks or real communists and Mensheviks or social democrats); how,

1) in Russia, Leninism, Stalinism, Khrushchevism (+/- 1956) and,

2) outside of it, (Eastern European Communism, Western European Communism (again divided into Pro-Russian and Eurocommunism) - the latter especially only since the last few years -; how a Third World communism came into being (a.o. Guevarism (Castroism)); - this to say nothing of the ordinary Western social democracy (Sweden e.g. was the model for a long time, namely until the "misery" of welfare socialism prevailed there as well).

(iii) *The Christian-Solidarist or -Personalist streak,*

This is a third way; in the spirit of scholasticism (see p. 17) this 'synthetic' interpretation of the social synthesis avoids

1) both individualist nominalism 2) and socialist ultrarealism: not the individual prevails or the community (the collective) prevails; no, they are essentially thought in balance with two main concepts:

(i) the subsidiarity idea, which says that either individual or intermediate community must first act selfactively (self-activity principle) before a higher authority intervenes;

(ii) the intermediate communities are given 'a much greater emphasis than the total society; -- this has always been the doctrine of the Pontifical Social Encyclicals.

Note on the philosophy of language. H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, gives, for Germany, a short but substantial overview. He starts from J. Hamann (1730/1788), so emerging in the full XVIIIth century - who as a Christian (but strongly theological oriented) thinker takes a stand against the Aufklärung and a.o. against Kant and linguistic rationalism, which conceives language purely instrumental (as an expression of thought) i.e. not organicistic, i.e. traditional or historical - social: not individual reason creates language, but, conversely, all thinking with reason is from the outset situated in a vernacular; it is the Volksgeist,

1) for Hamann still founded by God's revelatory word,

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2) for others, an autonomous collective identity in itself (ultrarealism);- Herder (1744/1803), still in the full XVIIIth century, also defends the mainly cultural and educational historical idea of language as the cradle, indeed, the bed of thought:

“(...) We usually think with, in and according to language”. It is this theory of the collective folk soul as the creator of language that prompted Herder (and, in his wake, the German Romantics) to take an interest in, among other things, the national anthem, which, in its still unaffected and original fusion, reflects both the sound of nature and the poetry of man.

The main figure, meanwhile, remains Wilh. von Humboldt (1767/1835), again a figure still deeply rooted in the XVIII century. Humboldt, the founder of the University of Berlin, a classical humanist, founded, or rather laid the foundations for, his “humanism” on language and linguistics, which he established as a philosophical and positive scientific activity.

(a) Hamann and Herder had departed from global language,

b) Humboldt, truly romantic-particular in this, starts from the private languages, each expressing in itself the national or local folk spirit. Not only the sounds and their combinatorics differ, he says, but also the conceptions of life and the world, and a child or a language learner learns, with the sounds and all their combinations, to know and to appropriate the conceptions and world of the respective group.

More than that: Humboldt holds what might be called the thought-constitutive view of language: language does not passively represent the world; it truly creatively creates that world. In this sense there is something Absolute-Idealistic in Humboldt’s philosophy of language: the collective Mind (the great I of Fichte and Hegel e.g.) creates, first unconsciously and involuntarily (see above p. 57 (J. Böhme’s will), then consciously and arbitrarily the (living) world in which it is situated.- Cf. Cf. also p. 86vv. where we echoed Chomski’s emphasis on Cartesian linguistics: he sees Descartes’ influence reaching up to and including the German-Idealist era (Humboldt included, strong differences notwithstanding). Regarding the system-technological side of language, very clearly noted by Humboldt, we refer to above p. 172 (logical empiricism or better: analytic philosophy), but especially to the system-technological view of the structuralists on pp. 204v., 206 (Lévi-Strauss’ exchange view as a model of applicative nature).

Finally, reference should be made to Hegel’s conception of language (*J. Taminioux, Le langage selon les écrits d’Iena, in Tijdschr. v. Fil., 31 (1969), pp. 363/377*).

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