Course 5.5.1. Introduction to Hiëro-analysis. (174 p.)
1981-1982

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The study of religion lapses into two types of scientific approaches:
(a) the subject-scientific (= positive) either nature- or human-science method**; (b)** the philosophical-theological method.

Fr. Pinard de la Boullaye shares the study of the differential der:
1. supernatural (= divine),
2. extra-natural (= magical, paranormal) and
3. natural (= secular-earthly) aspects of the religion(s) into two layers:

(i) a the hiërografy (empirical),
(i) b the hiërology (comparative);
(ii) hiërosphy (philosophical-theological).

The study of the causal (factorial) side, which is, if need be, experimental, of the religious phenomena deserves 'a study apart, which we call hiëro-analysis. This side of the study is the main subject of this course: hence the title.

Situation: informational philosophy:
1. epistemology (+ theory of interpretation), **2.** theory of thought, **3.** theory of method) allows, during the three years, the following major forms of thought (morphological) to be studied.

The archaic (ancient) religion,
i.e. the relationship with the 'hiëron', (sacred), which has come down to us from pre- and protohistory, still lives on today:

a. in the archaic religions,
especially present in exotic (including primitive) civilizations, object of cultural anthropology (ethnology) and primitivology,

b. in the evolved ('higher') religions
(esp. Hinduism, Buddhism, Chinese Universalism, - more so: Judaism, Christianity, Islam).
Sub culturally, archaic religion lives on in evolved midst;
a. in folklore **and b.** in initiatory societies.

Religion is a form of thought, which is:
(i) informative (through knowledge, thought, method),
(ii)a. metaphysical (involving the pre-constitutive side of reality) and
(ii)b. 'physical' (involving the constitutive side (= nature) of reality),
(iii)a. ethical (involving individual conduct) and
(iii)b. politically (socially) coming to terms with the universe (and nature), with life and with society.

The (predominantly Greek) philosophy signifies a strengthening and grounding or secularization of thought: After the archaic (= prehistoric-primitive) culture phase, in the

ancient empires (imperia) with their city civilization, the 'urbanized' middle of life arises, which gradually, until our days, on a planetary scale, replaces the ancient 'nature' middle by the current environment.

Therein develops a contact with the world (universe) and life, which elaborates the first forms of professional science; both natural science and human science (natural philosophy and (proto)sophistry) determine, from then on, more and more the problems and the method of the philosophical, i.e. 'wisdom' (the old or archaic term for 'familiarity with the "holy"', though now in an earthly sense and alienated from religion (as the saving power in life)) seeking knowledge and thinking life.

Modern-contemporary exact science, improved by modern-contemporary human understanding, which either opposes each other, yes, is hostile to each other, or works hand in hand to repress, yes, combat, in the name of linking logical-mathematical accuracy to experimental urge to attack, sometimes more in the line of Galilei and Descartes ('more idealistic') then again more in the line of Fr. Bacon and Th. Hobbes ('more empirical') where a human science since Gb. Vico (1668/ 1744), first philological, then German-idealist (Hegel), acts either as a corrective or as an extension; life and the universe are now interpreted from that threefold angle.

Part I. The Theory of Method.
On 26.11.1970 the study center for religious studies from an "integral and interferential" viewpoint on "the essential components (of religion, particularly its historical, philosophical, psychological and sociological impact" (according to the textual announcement) started at the State University of Ghent, at the instigation of Professors Leo Apostel, Gabriël Sanders and Roger Thibau, in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy.

At this faculty, which claims to go big on religious scholars of international repute like Franz Cumont and Joseph Bidez, the logic of religious thought, the psychology of religious experience, the history of religion approach to the religious phenomenon, the sociology of religious experience, linguistics related to religion, were thus treated, successively, in "interdisciplinary spirit", during 1970/1971.

One could speak with P. Kurtz, *Decision and the Condition of Man*, Seattle, 1965, pp. 19/84 (cfr. ME. 2), of 'the logic of "coduction", i.e. of the systematic bringing together of different professional sciences, when seeing this wonderful range of viewpoints.
It is in this same coductive (and neither purely reductionist nor purely holistic-instinctive) spirit that we briefly outline, here in these simple pages, the methodological doctrine of hiëro-analysis.

Bibliogr. sample. - *C. Bleeker, Het geheim van de godsdienst*, (The Secret of Religion), Wassenaar, 1973, 3, gives 'an introduction to history, sociology, psychology and above all, phenomenology of religion (with bibliography both by subjects and by religions);

H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., L' étude comparée des religions, (The comparative study of religions), Paris, 1929/ 1931.

I Son histoire dans le monde occidental: splendid introductory survey starting from antiquity; (Its history in the Western world: a splendid introductory survey from antiquity)

II Ses méthodes: (Its methods).

a. comparative method, i.e. comparing, diachronically (across time periods) and synchronically (comparing concurrent religions with one another), religions and forms of religion,-as a method present in all other methods;

b1. historical,

b2. philological,

b3. older and more recent 'anthropological' (ethnological),

b4. psychological,

b5. sociological methods;

III (Tables alphabétiques):

'n little gold mine of personal and case names); -

J.-E. Hocking, *Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse*, (The principles of method in religious philosophy), in Rev. d. Mét. Et d. Mor., 29 (1922): 4 (oct – déc), pp. 431/ 453

Of the psychic and social role, which religion plays, the proposer seeks the necessary conditions of possibility (psychologism, sociologism concerning religion are insufficient for explanation; difficulty in explaining the functioning of religion, because there is a part perception and a part interpretation at work).

It should be noted that we adhere here to CS Peirce's pragmaticist method (see Me., 5vv.). This is all the more so since Peirce himself notes that (cf. Lo., 87) it is "very closely associated with Biblical representations"; "By their fruits ye shall know them!". We give a bibliographic sample for the main methods, yet consider them as partial methods of the one pragamatic method.

A.   The phenomenological method.

Bibl. Sample:

-- G. van der Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, (Phenomenology of religion), Tubingen, 1956-2. Object (the 'power' or 'the sacred') and subject (the religious man, in the religious community, esp. seen according to the 'soul'), are central, and this in view of their effect on each other (in the external and internal religious act) and in the 'world', (as religious mankind sees it); p. 768/798 gives explanation concerning the method (see Me. 12).

-- P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, (Textbook of the history of religion), 1887, is the first work to give, with strong psychological slant, 'phenomenon description' of religion.

-- C. Bleeker, *De structuur van de godsdienst,* (The Structure of Religion), The Hague, s.d. (gives the outlines of the phenomenology of religion, and this in the Husserlian sense:

a. synchronically: the essence of the sacred phenomena such as 'sacred', 'sacrifice', etc., and, also, the 'structure', i.e., the general features of these phenomena;

b. diachronic: the logical progression in the evolution of these phenomena and their structure; as with van der Leeuw, here too 'intentionality', i.e. the duality 'object/subject', is central.

In doing so, one puts the real existence (phenomenological 'reduction' or 'setting in brackets') and, also, the accidental (non-essential) aspects (eidetic reduction) in brackets, so as to leave only the 'essential' (the 'eidos' or 'being') insofar as it shows itself as a phenomenon.

Phenomenology is therefore not 'bellettrie', not historiography or psychology, not even philosophy or theology as v.d. Leeuw, o.c., 3. 781/788 says, for all these subjects go beyond pure phenomenon description

On the contrary, as J.-P. Sartre says in L. Tas/ H. Bouman, transl./ inl., J.-P. Sartre, *Magie en emotie* ((Schets van een theorie van de gemoedsbewegingen)), (Magic and emotion), Sketch of a theory of the movements of the mind), Meppel/ Amsterdam, 1981: "The facts are only classifiable and investigable by means of the essences".

For example, one should first describe the religious phenomena merely as they appear (i.e., phenomenologically); only after that descriptive part can 'positive' (i.e., further advanced professional scientific or philosophical and theological) research begin methodologically with clarity.

-- W.Br. Kristensen, *The Meaning of Religion (Lectures in the Phenomenology of Religion),* The Hague, 1968;
-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' herméneutique),* (The conflict of interpretations (Essays in hermeneutics),), Paris, '1969, pp. 371/486 (*Religion et foi*), (Religion and faith), gives phenomenology but 'hermeneutically' (cf. Me, 12vv.), i.e. phenomenon-describing with insertion of sign-interpretation and even (Diltheyan) 'understanding' method.
-- F. Ortegat, *Intuition et religion (Le problème existentialiste),* (Intuition and religion (The existentialist problem),), Louvain/ Paris, 1947 (criticism of the 'existential' phenomenon description concerning religion (Sartre, Marcel, Chestov).
-- The purely understanding method can be found in H. Van Straelen, SVD,*Aziatisch dagboek*, (Asian Diary), Voorhout/ Bruges, 1959 (see Me. 14/15).

It should be noted that phenomenology, hermeneutics, and understanding method run together to some extent.

One more article: J. Brenton Stearns, *Mediated Immediacy: A Search for Models, in Intern,* Journal for Phil. of Religion, III: 4 (winter 1972), pp. 195/211

Indeed, the question is whether in phenomenology (intentional, hermeneutic, understanding) the sacred (God e.g.) is grasped immediately, i.e. directly and without any interpretation, or not (see Du., 3vv.). On the other hand: if we do not in any way grasp ('behold') the object immediately or directly, then we cannot, without more, speak of interpretation, for he who realizes that he is interpreting proves that, in addition to his interpretation, he also directly 'grasps', 'contacts' the thing itself (the object, as it presents itself to consciousness) (albeit in the midst of interpretations))

(B)Ia. The logical, resp. logistic method.
Bibl. sample: M.Bochenski, *The Logic of Religion*, New York, 1965 (after an introduction on logics, the author deals with religion primarily as 'discourse', (language) reason

(direct and lateral reason of the religious man), and its logistic 'Justification' justification where he assumes a differential "irrational leap/ irrational and rational justification/ perfectly rational justification".

He further distinguishes in the irrational-rational justification both direct and indirect justification. In direct justification one arrives e.g. at a theoretical insight, based on direct experiential viewing of the sacred; or at a 'theory of trust', based on direct trust in a sacred person e.g.) The indirect justification can be based on deductive and/or reductive reasoning.

Under the 'reductive' justification, he classifies the theory of authority (one is 'religious' on the basis of authority (e.g. the authority of the word of God in the Bible)) and the theory of religious presupposition (whoever does not respect certain sacred data ('hypothesis'), will unfailingly fall victim to the consequences of that 'irreligion' (prediction). Which can then be verified (verification).

One sees that the methodology of Bochenski, *Wijsgerige methoden in de wetenschap* (Philosophical Methods in Science) (cf. Lo.,. 6vv.), is applied here; that, further, Lukasiewicz's dichotomy of 'de- and reduction' (Lo., 73/74) is the basis of the indirect classification of methods.

It is a pity that Bochenski says nothing about the insight theory and so little about the 'blind jump' theory. According to him, it seems that the insight theory "does not merit consideration". If this is correct, then religious man possesses no insight (either sensory or ideal) into 'sacred' or 'sacred' realities. Which in turn implies that he is at the mercy of the (so-called 'direct') theory of trust: he puts his trust in God as 'revelator', - which is not possible anyway, if one has no 'insight' into God as reliable revelator.

Or, implying the same thing, religious man is up to indirect justification, which without a minimum of insight (direct) is also not possible. Yet what is 'deduction' or authority argument in sacred matters without the hypothesis-prediction-verification theory? (Peirce's critique here would be 'cutting'!")

-- M. Gluckman, *The Logic of African Science and witchcraft*, in J. Jennings/ E. Adamson Hoebel, *Headings in Anthropology*, New York, 1966-2, pp. 246/253, - article following Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande of the Sudan*.
-- G. Frey, *Logische Modelle der Tabu-Sprachen*, (Logical models of taboo language), in A. Menne et al., *Logik und Sprache*, (Logic and language), Bern/Munich, 1974, s. 142/158 (both the latter articles now deal with the so-called lower or nature religions).

(B) Ib. The semiotic or language analytic method.
Bibl. sample:
-- I. Ramsey, *Religious Language*, New York, '1957;

-- J.Ladrière*, Langage auto-implicatif et langage biblique selon Evans*, (Self-explanatory language and biblical language according to Evans), in Tijdschrift voor filosofie., 28 (1966): 3 (Sept), pp. 441/494 (on The Logic of Self-involvement, by Evans);

-- A. de Jong, *Een wijsbegeerte van het woord (Een godsdienstwijsgerige studie over de taalbeschouwing van Martin Heidegger),* (A Philosophy of the Word (A religious study of Martin Heidegger's conception of language)), Amsterdam, 1966;

-- L. Monden, S.J., *Een taal waarin wij God verstaan*, (A language in which we understand God), DDB', 1970. The subtitle *'Over de dankbaarheid van het christelijk geloven,* '(On the gratitude of Christian faith') covers a 'fundamental' theology, conceived phenomenologically; it includes, among other things, a 'faithful hermeneutics'.

One comment on this last book: on p. 98v. the author says that the 'myth' resolves 'being'-to-death (Heidegger is in the background with his *'Sein zum Tode'* ('Being to death'), as a characteristic of man) or, in Dutch, being doomed, by 'repristination'. This is a kind of "return" to the mythical primeval age, indicated in religion by the words "In the beginning" (e.g., "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"), in order to draw from it fresh strength for periodic renewal.

The author, in this on a par with all secularizing myth interpreters, conceives of such a thing as becoming "sacred" (understand: "unhistorical") in a kind of (incidentally contrived) un- or super-temporaneity, "outside" history" as conceived by modern thinkers (Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, etc.).

That is one possible (and in my opinion very questionable) interpretation of myth, in that it is not magical; whoever thinks that myth is not magical condemns himself to such an erroneous interpretation; but that will be discussed in another chapter.

-- M. Van Esbroeck, *Herméneutique, structuralisme et exégèse (Essai de logique kérygmatique),* (Hermeneutics, structuralism and exegesis (Essay on kerygmatic logic)), Paris, 1968 ('n attempt to reconcile Ricoeur and Levi-Strauss through de Lubac's hermeneutics with its four meanings of e.g. the Bible (*Exègèse médiévale*,), 4 t., 1959 / 1963).

-- Don E. Marietta, *Is Talk of God Talk of Anything*?, in Int. Journ. for Phil. of Religion, iv:) (Fall 1573), pp. 186/195 (A. Flew, *following in the footsteps of the logical empiricist A. Ayer*, *Language, Truth and Logic*, New York, 1552).

Ayer claimed that 'theological' statements are not fundamentally true statements (judgments of truth or falsity), in that one can never prove them to be false (they are formulated in such a way that one cannot 'verify' them).
Consequence: theological statements such as "God loves us like a father" are 'meaningless' (in the logical-empirical sense) the article goes on to say.

-- G. Stanley Kane, *God-language and Secular Experience*, in Int. Journ. f. Phil. of Rel., ii: 2 (Summer 1971), pp. 78/95 (is about L. Gilkey, *Naming the whirlwind (The renewal of God-Language),* Indianapolis/ New York, 1969, a work of 'secular' theology which, starting from logical empiricism, adapts religion to that logical-empirical view of language, which, like Ayer above, claims that religious statements are not seriously verifiable. Consequence: Gilkey, under logical-empirical pressure (language analysis), lets slip the traditional God view "as no longer of our time"; the article goes on to say.

-- Br. Garside, *Language and the Interpretation of Mystical Experience*, in Int. Journ. f .Phil. of Rel., iii: 2 (Summer 1972), pp. 93/102. For Garside, 'mysticism', is strikingly similar in all religions and all times, R. Otto and R. Zaehner also concur.

Both of the latter claim that "mysticism" is not everywhere and always identical as experience, but only different in interpretation (which depends on the culture, in which the mystic - e.g. our Flemish Ruusbroec - lives).

-- J. Bindley, *The Logic of misticism*, in *Religious Studies*, 2, pp. 145/162).

-- Very worth reading is J. Harris, Jr., *The epistemic status of apological language*, in Int. Journ. for Phil. of Rel., I:4 (winter 1970), pp. 211 / 219.
It is claimed, especially in theological circles, that speaking of God is analogically possible (e.g., "God is my shepherd") - cfr. Lo, 27/33: "God stands to me, as the shepherd (to his sheep)," which is proportional analogy (metaphorical speaking).

The author, now, asks the question, "On what direct (and therefore non-analogical) knowledge does the believer know that God really behaves toward himself, as the shepherd does toward his flock? In other words, without a minimum of direct experience of God (the phenomenologists would say 'contemplation'; Bochensky would say 'insight') one does not even know whether this 'language about God' is correct and corresponds to anything at all. In other words, without 'literal' experience; no analogical language about God.

Conclusion: there are mainly two ways of analysing language, the logical-positive and the 'hermeneutic'. In both variants one finds critics of religious language (which they write off as "invalid speech" (in the name of professional science above all) - reductionists thus, to use Kurtz's language - and instauratives (holists), who religiously engage in language analysis and semiotics.

It should be noted that with the logicians-positives logistics always plays a role, whereas with the hermeneuticians phenomenology (understanding, existential analysis) is the basis. Always the two 'cultures' of P.G. Snow!

(B)IIa1. The psychological method.
Bibl. sample:
-- W. James, *Varianten van religieuze beleving (Een onderzoek naar de menselijke aard)*, Zeist Arnhem/Antwerp, 1963 (transl. of the seminal work: *The Varieties of Religious Experience (A study in human Nature)*, lectures delivered by the brilliant pragmatist psychologist at Edinburgh in 1902 and 1903. The following are discussed: the reality of the invisible, religious optimism, illness, conversion, holiness, mysticism, etc.. The book is still worth reading.

-- G. St. Spinks, *Psychologie en godsdienst*, (Psychology and Religion), Utr./ Antw., 1966 (history of the psychology of religion, theories of religion, depth psychology (Freud, Jung) and religion, religious practices (including prayer, worship, religious experience);

-- A. Vergote, *Psychologie religieuse*, (Religious psychology), Bruxelles, 1966 (religious experience, motivation; religious 'desire' and 'father religion'; religious 'attitude, atheism, genetic .psychology, (childhood, adolescence));

-- From the 'humanistic', understand: existential, psychology: A. Maurer, *Children's conceptions of God*, in J. Bugental et al, *Challenges of humanistic psychology*, New York, 1967, pp. 173/178 (children's statements indicate a variety of God experiences: creator, protector, punisher, friend and combinations thereof).

-- J. Clark, *Toward a Theory and practice of Religious experiencing*, in J. Bugental, o.c., pp. 253/258.

- In 1974 a journal appeared which, in the wake of the Movement for the Human Potential (an offshoot of humanistic psychology), draws attention to the vast religious, semi-religious and pseudo-religious 'groups'; Question de spiritualité, tradition, littératures (Paris).

-- For the more theoretical basis: H. Cohen, *Psychology als Science Fiction*, (*Psychology as Science Fiction*), Meppel, 1971, in which, briefly, the so-called A(ltered) S(tates) of C(onsciousness), the altered states of consciousness, which so often coincide with sacred and religious experiences, are indicated (dreams, meditation, hypnosis, psychedelic experiments, etc.).

-- A fascinating and thorough overview offers J. M. Schiff, *La ruée vers l' âme*, (The rush to the soul), in "Question de sp., tr., litt., No.10 (janv-fév/ 1976), pp. 65/84. The author distinguishes three transcendence forms of the Movement for Human Potential, viz:
(i) schools for consciousness expansion,
(ii) a groups for religious-external initiation (initiatory groups),
(ii) b groups for "cosmic" consciousness (it should be noted that the distinction between "religious-paranormal" and "cosmic" is almost impossible to delineate clearly.

J. Moreno, one of the fathers of that movement, even says that, in view of the crisis and loss of authority of traditional religions, one would do well to speak of 'cosmic' instead of 'religious' or 'ecclesiastical', which, in his case at least, runs into 'therapeutic'. And this because, according to Moreno, the traditional religions and churches had a consciousness of misery which far surpassed the narrow interpretation of human problems as seen by economic liberalism and Soviet socialism, i.e. one-sidedly 'economic', an attitude and insight which Moreno considers essential with regard to group dynamics.

-- G. Frei, *Magie und Psychologie*, (Magic and psychology), in Schweizer Rundschau, 48:8/9 (Sonderausgabe 'Psychologie'), S. 680/688 (situates 'magic' d. i. the manipulation of 'subtle' or 'rarefied' or 'etheric-astral' matter (matter particles), psychologically rites, on the one hand, the 'grossly physical' body (which we all know from biólogy e.g.) and, on the other hand, the 'spiritual' soul-top (i.e., the purely incorporeal personal core, at least in humans)."

He adds, "This intermediate layer can also be called the 'unconscious' and the psychology of the unconscious has also had to deal with magical processes, of course."

-- In the same sense, but magically much more thorough: Dr. Geley, *L'être subconscient*, (The subconscious being), Paris, 1899.

-- Also : A. De Rochas, *L' extériorisation de la sensibilité*, (The externalization of the sensitivity), Paris, 1909 -6 (still solid works, rescuing 'depth psychology' from the narrowness of the psychoanalysis of Freud and his disciples (Jung especially).

-- Two more chapters on psychology of religion:

(i) The experience of the 'Holy'.

See Kl. Welker, *Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher*, (Schleiermacher's fundamental assessment of the history of religion), Leiden/Köln, 1965, esp. s. 164/208 (*Ausblick und Zusammenfassender Vergleich mit R. Ottos Anschauungen*), ((Outlook and summary comparison with R. Otto's views).

a. On the one hand, the human-descriptive method of Schleiermacher and Otto is not a 'psychologism', i.e. a reductionism, which conceives of the sacred as purely psychological (e.g. a sense of reverence that 'sacralizes' unholy things and processes, i.e. surrounds them with a haze and delusion of inviolability) (o.c., s. 169);

b. On the other hand, "with Otto, as with Schleiermacher, (...) the question is not asked 'how God, considered in Himself, 'is', (...) but in what way the religious 'mind' responds to Him (...); it is asked (...) about the very nature of the religious life.' (o.c., 185). Which then again is clearly a kind of psychologism.

In his commentary on H. Otto, *Das Heilige* (ueber das Irrationale in der idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen), (The sacred (about the irrational in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational)), Munich, s.d., (30th ed.), M. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*, (For a science of religions), Paris, 1973, pp. 68/76, says that Otto was definitively solidified in his Protestant-Cantian religious feeling in 1911, during his journey in India, where he was "seduced by the Hindu doctrine concerning a salvation that is due not to the 'works' (i.e., the working out in practical deeds of sacred insights), but to the 'quality' of the 'spiritual' life" (o.c., 69).

Also, that, further, Otto in the *Rig-Vedas* and the *Upanishads* (the oldest religious literature of India) gained his "proper understanding" of the Divine as "das ganz Andere" (as the wholly different), i.e. something Holy that does not bear a "name," no "predicate," and, therefore, comes to differ thoroughly from the Biblical concept of "holy" (o.c., 69).

In other words, Otto, following Schleiermacher's lead, radically defends an irreducibly 'holy reality' (and is thus holistic), yet in an equally radical psychologizing manner. The objective 'sacred' is in itself unknowable ('knowledge' has no grip on it) , but it is, in the pious mind, lived in threefold mind-reaction:
a/ as tremendum (frightening),
b/ as fascinans (enchanting) and
c/ above all as augustum, i.e. as a 'value' existing in itself through which psychologism, just in the nick of time, is overcome again.

(ii) The mystical experience.

See A. Michel : *Plus personne pour comprendre les mystiques*?, (No one to understand the mystics anymore?), in Question de, No. 2 (1er trim. 1974), pp. 43/56;

R. Ruyer, *La gnose de Princeton* (Des savants à la recherche d'une religion), (The gnosis of Princeton (Scholars in search of a religion), Paris. 1974 (a fusion of scientism and vague mysticism at its eastern best).

Further: A. Tanquerey, *Précis de théologie ascétique et mystique*, (Précis of ascetic and mystic theology), Paris, 1923 - 5 (in addition to the 'principles', an exposition of the three stages of 'mysticism' in the Catholic sense, namely, purification, 'enlightenment' and 'unification')

-- J. Tyciak, *Mörgenländische Mystik*, Dusseldorf, 1945 (mysticism in the 'orthodox' churches);

-- R. Puligandla/ K. Puhakka, *Holiness in Indian and western Traditions*, in Int. Journ. f. Phil. of Relig., iii: 3 (Fall 1972), pp. 191/175 (in India and related ones, 'holiness', incidentally conceived very mystically, is undividedly peculiar to the Transcendent' (Brahman) and the 'immanent' (Atman").

(B) IIa2. The sociological method.
Bibl. sample :
-- L. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions,* (For a science of religions), Paris, 1573, pp. 56/67 (*Sociétés et religion*) (Societies and religion), from ± 1825 onwards, under the influence of A. Compte (1798/1875), the father of sociological positivism, a new science of religion emerged, emphasizing the social bondage of every religion, at least in its traditional forms.
-- E. Durkheim (1858/1917), *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, (The elementary forms of religious life), 1912, works pioneering (although violently opposed by the "animists" on religion-origin (Erazer))
-- L. Lévy-Bruhl (1875/1939), *Les fonctions mentales des sociétés inférieures*,(The mental functions of the lower societies), - 1910.
-- id., *Le surnaturel et la nature dans la mentalité primitive*, (The supernatural and nature in the primitive mentality), 1931.
-- id., *La mythologie primitive*, (Primitive mythology), 1935. This book provides the first (unconscious) structural analysis of community life, including and especially in the religious field (the primitive 'classifies' human and non-human realities according to a system of 'participation' i.e. a kind of identity between the distinct things and processes in nature and in society).
-- M. Mauss (1872/1950), more in the line of Durkheim and to a great extent opposed to Lévy-Bruhl, studies the 'totality' of society according to a concept of convergence (see Lo., 57; 66) in structuralist style: psychology, sociology, ethnology, history all have to do in their own way with one and the same structure which expresses itself in different domains of life: "As language, so also the social fact comes to realize itself into an independent whole" (o.c., 63).

See also o.c., pp. 170/194: *L'analyse structuraliste et le sacré*: (Structuralist analysis and the sacred), myths, symbols, rites (the 'languages' in which man 'expresses' the sacred) are, just as with Lévy-Bruhl and Mauss, but taking into account both logistics and systems theory, studied 'structurally' (with a clear residue of sociologism, by the way).

-- Pioneering is CL. Lévy-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurelle (*Structural anthropology), Paris, 1958.
-- id. *La pensée sauvage*, (The wild thought), Paris, 1962.
-- id *Le totémisme aujourd'hui*, (Totemism today), Paris, 1962.
-- id, *Mythologiques*, (Mythological), 4 t., Paris, 1964/197.
-- M.Meslin o.c. pp. 81/112 (*Les données sociales du phénomène religieux*) (The social data of the religious phenomenon), outlines in another type of sociology of religion, viz. its purely positive and separately elaborated form, at least under 'a number of points of view:

a/ doctrinal formulas, **b**/ rites, **c/** forms of organization, **d**/ interaction between religious and non-religious forms of society (cf. J. Wach, *Sociology of Religion*, Chicago, 1944); cf. M. Weber, *Die Protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus*, (Protestant Ethics and the 'Spirit' of Capitalism), in Archiv f. Sozialwissenschaft u. Sozialpolitik, 20, 21, 1904/1905, assuming a 'taseological' (see Lo, pp. 57/59 (tense doctrine)) view of man and life, studies the relations tss. puritan Calvinism (esp. in the USA) and economics.

-- E. Troeltsch, *Die Sociallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, (The social teachings of Christian churches and groups,), Tubingen, 1912, talks about the relationship between social facts and "Christian" views of social order;

-- J. Wach (1898/1955) is the first who, sharply defined, wants to found a science of religion within sociology (with three aspects: **a/** hermeneutics, **b/** religious experience, **c/** sociology of religion)

-- G. Le Bras, made famous for his typology of "participation" in the liturgy: aloof, conformists, seasonal practitioners, regulars, pious,-present in all surveys.

-- Bryan Wilson distinguished seven types of "sect": conversionist (on (converting from)), revolutionist, pietist (pious), manipulationist, thaumaturgic (favoring miracles), reformist, utopian.

-- A third main type of sociology of religion is the "comparatism" of G. Dumézil, *La religion romaine archaïque*, (The archaic Roman religion), Paris, 1966;
-- id., *Mythe et épopée*, (Myth and epic), 3 t., Paris, 1968/1973.
-- id., *Idées romaines*, (Roman ideas), Paris, 1969;.
-- id., *Heurs et malheurs du guerrier*, (Fortunes and misfortunes of the warrior,), Paris, 1969.
-- M. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*., (For a science of religions), pp. 156/169, summarizes its main thesis:
a/ comparatism (cfr. Lo., 31/33: comparative method grounded in analogy, i.e. part-identical realities);
b/ tripartite social ideology (cfr. Ep., 17/22: critique of ideology): the Indo-European peoples, long before the emergence of Rome, betrayed in their myths, rites, doctrines of the gods and epics, a social tripartite:
(i) the magico-legal rule,
(ii) the physical force geared to "war" and "resistance",
(iii) the fertility subject to the previous one (as its 'source of power'; Rome stands out from most other Indo-Europeans in that the Roman mentality, out of 'effectivism', i.e. out of concern for the success of every human action (ideology of result), the deities and their strongly distinguished 'role' (function deities) are put in the service of earthly, purely human activity and its result in a businesslike, indeed profane, manner.

Thus Rome, in contrast to most other places, produces a rational theology which 'sacralizes' the class relations, i.e. gives them a 'sacred appearance', and instead of the sacred myth, presents the deconsecrated national epic ancestors, who are venerated as paragons of the daily actions calculated to achieve their goals.

"By an exceptional anthropocentric view, without parallel in the Indo-European world, but sometimes rather akin to the ancient Chinese view, the Latins have attributed to their own ancestors the foundation of their city, their social, legal and religious institutions.

However, in this epic of national sovereign legends, which encloses the deities forever in a distant solitude, we find the same cultural schemes as in the Indian, Celtic, Germanic, yes, Greek myths, whose role is precisely to justify the rites, the morals and the laws.

Thus Roman religious thought turns out to be 'an anthropology, making it the model for a broad department of the science of religion. As early as thirty years ago, G. Dumézil drew attention to the fact that the essence of the epic tales of Rome is human in nature, that the action takes place among men, "in calculated cuckolds and precise achievements, similar to what will be told later about the Scipiones or the Gracchi, about Sulla or Caesar." (M. Meslin, o.c., pp. 167/168).

Indeed, the secularization or secularization (if one wants: the humanization and petrification of what the sacred myths offer) is one of the great themata of hierrology.

A fourth main type of sociology of religion is the dialectical one: M. Meslin, o.c., 64/ 68, says that, in 1845, in his Thesises concerning Feuerbach, K. Marx wrote down his opinion on the origin of religion.

The starting point is the dialectic, i.e. the interaction within the same set of opposites, indeed of antagonisms, - see Lo, 20/21 (Hegel's dialectic) - see also the sharp logical critique of I. Bochenski, *The Logic of Religion*, New York, 1965, pp. 48/51 (On dialectics and its use in logic of religion: the methodological ('suggestive'), psychological, ontological and semantic scope of 'dialectics'-).

This dialectical method is applied to the systechy 'capitalist exploiter/ proletarian exploited' (for the 'systechy' see Lo, 33). Indeed, religion 'knows' the 'misery': "Religious misery (understand: misery, as religion interprets it) is, on the one hand, the expression of the real misery and, on the other hand, the protest against the real misery. Religion is the sigh of the tormented creature, the spirit of a heartless world, as it is the "spirit" of "spiritless" states. She is the opium of the people. The removal of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand of its real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions concerning its condition is the demand to give up a condition that needs illusion. The critique of religion is therefore the germinal critique of the valley of tears, of which religion is the halo." (K. Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung*).

In short: religion, by creating illusions about its 'redeeming' power, shows that it is aware of misery, but does not attack the socio-economic cause of it; consequently:

a/ To the possessing class it gives a "good conscience", by teaching them charity" and "good works" for heavenly salvation (without having to touch the economic basis of the misery);

b/ To the proletariat, it promises a view "into another world" (without, in this secular world, improving one's lot).

Summa summarum: religion 'sacralizes' the established social order with its misery.

See also: P.Schebesta, *Oorsprong van de godsdienst*, (Origin of Religion), Tielt/ The Hague, "1962, 197/210 (*The Marxist Answer*); 248/254 (*Civil Evolutionism and Marxism*);

-- Ch. Wackenheim, *La faillite de la religion d' après Karl Marx*, (The bankruptcy of religion according to Karl Marx), Paris, l963.

-- H. Desroche, *Marxisme et religions*, (Marxism and religions), Paris, 1962;

--- Some more titles: -- Th. O'Dea, *Godsdienstsociologie*, (Sociology of religion), Utr./ Antw., 1968 (functionalist method, -- religious experience, institutionalization, conflicts (secularization), etc.).

-- H. Bredemeyer/ R. Stephenson, *The Analysis of Social Systems*, New York, 1962, pp. 249/275 (*Belief-Systems: Magic and Science*, -- 'an attempt, without knowledge of paranormal phenomena, to define, in a purely secular way, "magic" (which is simply externalism and therefore questionable); pp. 276/317 (Belief-Systems: *religion and Ideology*; "Religion may be understood, with fruit, as a mixture of theology, magic, fatalism, morality, activism and passivity, the emphasis varying from religion to religion." (o.c., 316}

-- R. Robertson. ed., *Sociology of Religion*, Harmondsworth, 1971-2 (twenty-five articles by specialists, covering "a rich range of sociologically viewed topics, concerning both the 'lower' natural religions and the 'higher' ones").

-- Fr. Hsu, *Clan, Caste and Club*, New York, 1963 (the book's hypothesis: the Chinese family (esp.) is situationally centered, Hindu society is otherworldly centered, American individual centered; - 'a fascinating study of society in the three great cultures)

-- A word about pedagogy in this context: one work: J. Butler, *Four Philosophies and their Practice in Education and Religion*, New York, 1968, 3, (naturalism, idealism, realism, pragmatism, existentialism, and language-analytic philosophy each educate in a different way and, at once, have a different disposition in the religious field.

We have seen these tendencies, so far, at work in all the previous methods as invisible determinants; - each method covers 'an ideology, each social system likewise, structuralism, notwithstanding its critique of ideology, also.

(B)IIb. The "biological-pathological methods.
Bibliogr. sample:

-- H. Pinard d.l. Boullaye, *L'étude comp*., I (son histoire), pp. 459, 465) (this method engages in the 'experimental psychology' of last century, which was strongly psycho-physiological (cfr. o.c., pp. 450/456), as well as strongly medical-psychiatric, - something which continues to our days:

(a) comparatism ('n comparative study between Religious (mystical) and profane, especially pathological pheromones),

(b) reductionism (see Me. 2: Kurtz) (although Christian mystics are not scrupulants, abolitionists (willy-nilly), "impulsives" of a pathological nature as well as not hysterics, although hysteria may be added to it, yet Leuba considers that the "faces" (visions) and the "supernatural words" (which they hear) psychologically speaking, are merely sight or hearing hallucinations (delusional perceptions) and that their "transports" (ecstasies) are merely a form of unconsciousness, characterized by a-ideism, d. i. perceiving 'nothing', which, according to Leuba, is the same as perceiving the 'Divine Nothingness' (= the 'Totally Indeterminate').

All these 'religious' or 'mystical' phenomena spring from the needs of the organism, noting that "our mystics, differing in degree, are 'erotomaniacs' (i.e. have a strong need for erotic satisfaction), - that they have a need for the solution of their questions put to them by their thinking, whether by unification or reduction of the data, - that they have a need for 'feeling loved' or for 'fellow humanity'.

In the Rev. Phil., 1902 (Liv), p. 35, Leuba writes: "The fact of religion implies the presence of needs and desires: need for food, desire for power, need for dignity, etc. Yet there are no religious needs or desires per se. A need becomes 'religious' (...), when its alleviation is conceived as depending on a power of psychic nature, which, usually, is personal."

Which suggests that Leuba, with many to this day, understands religion emotionalistically and reduces 'emotions' to biological needs. Talk about reductionism!).

Note. - This does not mean that the experimental method is not absolutely recommendable in the field of hiero-analysis, on the contrary.

One reads e.g. a book like H. Cohen, *Psychologie als science fiction* (Psychology as science fiction), (New findings about dreams, meditation, hypnosis and LSD), Meppel, 1971, where, briefly, some natural scientific experimental methods are mentioned, but in a holistic-instantial (i.e. non-reductionist) sense.

Contemporary biology has refined methods, which are, to a certain extent, valid. Not biology (as a method), but biologism (as an ideology) is wrong.

Note.- Br. Walinowski, *Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, (A scientific theory of culture), Paris, 1968 (Eng.: A Scientific Theory of Culture, 1944), pp. 66/73, discusses the 'biological foundations' (Malinowski calls these 'human nature',-which is to take 'nature' in the very narrow sense) of culture:

"By 'human nature' I mean the biological determinism (coercive behavior), which obliges every civilization and every individual to deal with somatic (= physical) 'functions' such as breathing, sleep, rest, nutrition, bowel movements and reproduction."

That religious culture and the individual must 'yield' to all these 'determinisms' or 'functions' is obvious, but religion consists among other things in overcoming precisely these 'determinisms' if need be, or trading them as an expression of religious experience: there are magicians and saints who, from the point of view of all these biological functions, differ greatly from the ordinary mortal. They can do without food; they can overcome sleep; their breathing reflects their actual "religious" state, etc. Or one thinks of shamanism in Siberia with its separate 'somatic-biological' phenomena).

Leuba et al. suck themselves up to pathological phenomena (hence the 'medical or doctor-materialism' as William James once pithily put it); more than that: they sin against any sense of system or coherence: even pathological phenomena belong in the whole of the religious man (magician, mystic, shaman) who displays them.

It is a false comparatism to put these phenomena forward as perfectly identical in insane or nervous persons, on the one hand, and magicians, mystics or shamans, on the other.

"The confusion between partial identity and total identity (see Lo. 27 (analogous arrangement of data)), springs from the fact that (these specialists) compare détail with détail rather than whole with whole" That is the basic methodological error here. (Pinard, o.c., p.455).

The détail that a madman does not eat is not the detail that Jesus does not eat for forty days in the desert: the same detail belongs in a different system! That détail therefore has a partially different meaning (even if there is a partially equal meaning). This basic error is, however, only exposed if one, instead of starting from elements, starts from structures, i.e. elements provided with a collective coherence. Healthy systems theory, then!

(B)IIc. The culturological method.
Since Kolb and Klemm, in 1843, each published their cultural history, a general concept of culture, stripped of every 'humanist-elitist' meaning, has been developed: not only the 'higher' (humane) activities (art, science, philosophy, etc.), but also the 'lower' or 'common' (vulgar) ones (such as agriculture, technology, etc.) are included.

Cf. J. Goudsblom, *Nihilisme en cultuur,* (Nihilism and Culture), Amsterdam, 1960, pp. 55/103 (Culture);

-- H. Pinard, *Et. comp.*, I, pp. 419/444 (*Le movement historique en ethnologie*,-meaning the cultural-historical method either diffusionist (diffusion norm) or convergenceist (convergence method) in England, France, Germany (Kölner Schule: Gräbner, Ankermann), Austria (Wiener Schule: Schmidt, Koppers), Spain, USA (Fr. Boas, Wissler, Swanton, Lowie, Kroeber, Goldenweiser));

-- Bronislaw Malinowski, *Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, (A scientific theory of culture), Paris, 1968 (Eng.:1944), takes its cue from J. G. Frazer, the founder of (cultural) anthropology, which he interprets in a 'functionalist' sense. 'Function' is "the alleviation of a need by means of a working activity, in which people act in common, handle objects and consume goods"(o.c., 38).

Well, in order to act in this way, man needs an organization: the elementary form of organization is: 'institution'. Consequence: the functional (need satisfaction) side and the institutional side make up culture (o.c., 39). Culture occurs where, by means of institutions, needs are satisfied with a view to life and survival.

One compares with A. Friedrich, *Die Forschungen über das frühzeitliche Jägertum*, (The researches about the early hunter's life), in Paideuma, II (1941/43), S. 20/43

-- Also in C. A. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, (Ethnology of Religion), Frankf. a. M., 1964, s. 206: "Culture is, reduced to a crude formula, the sum of all the expressions of life of a people"

Above all, the concept of culture was theorized by the culturalist school in the USA: S. Clapier Valladon, *Panorama du culturalisme*, (Panorama of culturalism), Paris, 1976.

Culturalism sprang from Fr. Boas and Edw. Sapir and is particularly interested in the differences between the various cultures (pluralism) and views them with a strong psychological, indeed psychoanalytical, eye. One speaks of "personalism" or psychological method and holism, in the sense of Malinowski (culture is always a whole).

In this the American culturalist resembles M.Mauss ('le fait social total') and the structuralist Lévi-Strauss ('Social life is a system, the aspects of which are organically connected') and relies, at least in part, on K. Lewin (field theory of social life).

Ruth Benedict, Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton, Margaret Mead are the four major figures of culturalism.

-- cf. R.Linton, *The Study of Man*, New York, 1936.

-- id., *The Cultural Background of Personality*, London , 1947-1 (society, personality and culture are one triad).

-- A. Kroeber/ Cl.Kluckhohn, *Culture (A critical Review of concepts and definitions)* Cambridge (Mass.), 1952, is a landmark.

-- Z. Barbu, *Samenleving, cultuur en persoonlijkheid*, Society, culture and personality, Utr./ Antw., 1971, is analogously conceived.

Culturalism either diffusionist or psycho-cultural is less sociological than the functionalism of 'n Radcliffe-Brown. Furthermore, it should be noted with regard to cultural analysis that a distinction can be made between two strands:

(a) the rather quantitative-minutilistic analysis, which piles up an enormous amount of details (evolutionism concerning culture, the esp. American diffusionism, part of functionalism);

(b) the rather qualitative-holistic analysis which proceeds in a more surveyable manner (E. Sapir, Malinowski's functionalism, the psycho-cultural or (as briefly sketched above) 'culturalist' school in the USA (and elsewhere), (cultural) dynamism (since world war II, for example one pays attention to the dynamic side of culture, which expresses itself in changes, conflicts, tensions), structuralism (in its own way)).

Culture' can be defined, among other things, as the set and system of ways of thinking (ideas) and ways of behaving (norms) which 'inform' (i.e. inform and guide) the way of life of a certain group (= sociological side) and, for the members of that group, become visible in exemplary personalities (psychological side); - 'popular culture' is then the same, though limited to those members (and subgroups) who only grasp the essentials (e.g. post-school youth, working-class people).

The historical method of ideas starts from a part of the total culture: it does not lose itself in separate facts, but pays attention to the founding ('informing') ideas either special (ideas of the time period: cosmopolitanism in the XVIIIth century; the Christian state in the Middle Ages; spirit and soul in archaic culture; technocracy today) or general (the idea of 'community', 'salvation', 'freedom', etc.).

This method runs in tandem with the problem-historical one, which pays attention to the problems, which either dominate a period or the whole of history culturally (e.g., the economic crisis today, decolonization). It is crushingly obvious that the culturological method is applicable to religion.

"After all that has been said, can it still be a surprise that even between the ethical-religious field and the actual material-economic conditions there is a certain similarity? (...).

Day after day we hear the constant complaints about the disastrous moral-religious consequences inherent in the modern capitalist economic situation and the resulting economic needs. Is there not a priori a reason to assume something similar for the earlier stages of human cultural development?

Which makes further investigation quickly unquestionable". (J. Koppers, *Die materiell-wirtschaftliche Seite der Kulturentwicklung*, (The material-economic side of cultural development), in Settiuana Internazionale di Etnologia Religiosa, Paris, 1926, S 102/116 (S. 110), where the proposer, building on E. Grosse (1862/1927) and on W. Schmidt, argues in a nuanced (certainly not Marxist or Marxizing) way that "economic activity is the life center of every cultural whole and, in the most profound and irresistible way, conditions the other cultural factors." (E. Grosse, Die Anfänge der Kunst, Freiburg i.Br., 1894; also E. Grosse, *Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der wirthschaf*t, (The material-economic side of cultural developmen).Fr. i. Br. 1896.

One calls this the 'Grosse'-sche principle; in which Koppers sees a valuable heuristic principle (a.c., 105)). This implies the principle of the 'correspondence', the being attuned to - each other, of the 'forms' of culture (the economy form 'corresponds' to the other 'forms, art forms, family forms, etc.). (a.c., 107).

This 'structurism', i.e. this form of having an eye for the formative coherence of the various forms of culture, we shall further establish without having to appeal to Marxism or structuralism, whose ideology we do not accept (Marxism: economic determinism; structuralism; logistic relativism).

Applications: Th. Ziegler, *Godsdienst en godsdiensten*, (Religion and religions), Amsterdam, 1918, treats, apart from typical religious phenomena such as 'spiritual ground' of religion, religious feeling, religious representations, religious faith, also (i) believing and knowing, (ii) religion and art, (iii) religion and morality, (iv) church and state, etc.;

G. Gordh, *Christian Faith and its cultural Expression*, Pentice-hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, deals with:
(i) the basic understandings of creation, humanity, redemption,
(ii) man's attitudes towards nature, fellow men (individuals and groups) and himself,
(iii) the expressions of both (insight and attitude) in individual and collective worship, in art (e.g. architecture), poetry, 'action', etc.

Both works speak of the coherence of cultural forms yet such that they are 'expressions' of religion, - rather than the other cultural forms expressing themselves in religion.

A series of ethnological insights, which rather show the opposite coherence, i.e. the non-religious (esp. economic) culture forms act upon the religion form.

L. Lévy-Bruhl, *les fonctions mentales dans les sociétes inférieures*, (mental functions in inferior societies), Paris, 1912, does not speak of the individual but of the collective 'representations' of the 'primitives', which only become comprehensible if one starts from one axiom, 'la loi de participation' (the law of participation); Lévy-Bruhl supports o. m. on K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentralbrasiliens,* (Among the primitive peoples of central Brazil,), and on Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, London, 1899.

Von den Steinen was quite surprised when the Bororos 'coldly' informed him that they 'were' araras and the Trumais that they 'were' aquatic animals.

The issue here is the (what Lévi-Bruhl calls) 'mystical' (i.e. sacred-hidden) partial identity between the individual, the living man or woman, and
(i) one or another ancestor, who was either human or half-human 'in the beginning',
(ii) as well as some animal or plant which are 'totems' of the tribe or the individual; in other words, totem, ancestor and living human being share each other's being; they 'participate' in one common 'being' of a mysterious nature.

It is evident that the form of culture - and specifically the economic form of culture - plays a decisive role here, as Grosse's principle of agreement provides for it. in the establishment of religion in its totemism (totem worship) and pro(to)go-nism (ancestor worship, manism).

One has only to read C.A. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, (Ethnology of Religion), Frankfurt a.m., 1964, to see that almost all articles immediately link one or another (strongly economically determined) form of culture with a form of religion.

-- **a/** W. Schmidt, *Natur, Eigenschaften und Kult des Hochgottes der Urkultur*, (Nature, characteristics and cult of the high god of the primitive culture), in o.c., S. 65/84: a kind of 'Supreme Being' or 'Supreme Being' (gifted with eternal existence, omniscience.., goodness, moral high ground, omnipotence, creative power) is assumed by extremely archaic cultures (such as those of most Pygmies, of Firelanders, of primeval bushmen, of Kurnai, Kulin and Yuin in southeastern Australia, of most Arctic peoples (except the korjaks), of most primeval populations of North America).

--**b/** A. Jensen, *Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit*, (High God and Dema Deity), in o.c., 85/118: the Supreme Being (as Lang and Schmidt saw it) goes into hiding during a period, which Jensen refers to as the "early" or "old" planter culture, to make room, at least in part, for the "dema," i.e., the ancestor, with creative power, who, at the end of the mythical primeval period, is killed in order to "resurrect" in the plants (often tubers or trees) and thus become "salvation bringer" (cultural heros or hero) for the later ordinary people.

"We are convinced that the demas of ancient planters, very much later, experienced a resurrection in the polytheistic religions of archaic high cultures." (a. c., 116). Whereas, according to Jensen, the later culture of grain farmers and cattle breeders (on a large scale) again shows a return to 'Supreme Being' worship, if necessary mixed with dema views (a.c., 90). By 'early planters' Jensen understands a form of culture spread almost across all tropical regions, in which a/ tuber cultivation (based on fire grubbing) and b/ the utilization of tree fruits is the basis of the form of economy.

The later fertilization and ploughing, large-scale cattle breeding and megaliths (and presumably corn culture) were not yet familiar to them. We are dealing here with the oldest form of tropical plantation". The bearers of this culture agree not only in important aspects of material culture, but also in important aspects of spiritual culture". (a.c., 92).

As examples Jensen cites: the Wemale (Ceram, Indonesia), the Narind-Anim and the Kiwai (southern coast of New Guinea), the Uitoto (South America), the southern Californian Indians (N.-Am.), further melanesian (Pacific) and Central African peoples. In each case the supreme being (earlier) reappears ('deus otiosus'), the spirits and the ancestors (spirit worship and progonism) come to the fore with the demas, who are clearly distinguished from spirits and ancestors by their founding creative power through death (if necessary human sacrifice, headlong learning and human eating), sexual rites and eating rites.

-- c/ A. Friedrich, *Die Forschung über das frühzeitliche Jägertum*, (The research on the early hunters), in o.c., S. 196/ 218: already Leo Fobenius, Die reifere Menscheit, Hannover, 1902, and *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*, (Cultural history of Africa), Zürich, 1933, established a similarity (comparative method) going to some details between a/ the prehistoric data b/ the Siberian and c/ the African hunter culture - and forms of religion, namely in the worship of the great hunting animal.

Friedrich says that "the idea of 'an archaic cultural community extending across all continents'" is imposing itself (a.c. 217). A number of historical facts, which are similar in every detail, point to a gigantic cultural circle, which, in later times, was differentiated by other cultural factors, including the ancestor worship (progonism) that flourished in more southern regions.

For instance, the vampire (soul eater) is known in Siberia and in Africa, but in Africa it is conceived in a 'subachistic' way, i.e. interwoven with ancestor belief (not in Siberia); but North Asians and Africans, as far as hunters, start from:
a/ the 'participation' (partial identity on fluidity) between man (single and sibbe) and animal,
b/ the common origin and the life-similarity of man and animal,
c/ the reincarnation of the (hunted) animal from its skeleton(soul) and soul.

-- M. Eliade, *Traité d'histoire des religions (Morphologie du sacré),* (Treatise on the history of religions (Morphology of the sacred), Paris, 1953, pp. 211/231: the title*: De aarde, de vrouwen de vruchtbaarheid*' (The earth, women's fertility), betrays the connection between agricultural fertility (both arable and livestock) and woman. "One readily accepts that agriculture was a female discovery. (...) Woman (...), aided in this by her sense of perception, which is limited but keen, had the opportunity to check the natural phenomena of sowing and germination and to reproduce them artificially.

On the other hand, by being in solidarity with the other centers of cosmic fertility, namely the earth and the moon, the woman, in her turn, acquired the prestige of being able to influence fertility and to distribute it.

This explains the predominant role played by women in the early days of agriculture - at a time when this technique was still the work of women -, role which they still play in certain civilizations (cfc. U. Pesta-lozza, *L'aratro e la donna*, (The plow and the woman), p. 324, in Rendiconti, Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Cl. di Lettere, 76: 2 (1942-1943), PP. 321/330).

Thus, in Uganda, 'a barren woman is considered dangerous to the vegetable garden; her husband, on the basis of this economic motive alone, can file for divorce (Briffaut, The Mothers, London, 1927, III, 55).

One encounters the same belief concerning the danger of female infertility to arable farming in the Bhantu tribe, in India (Lévy-Bruhl *, L' expérience mystique*, (The mystical experience), 254). "' (o. c., 225).

Apparently the planted 'participates' in the life force of the planter, the woman. Economy form and religion form, according to Grosse's principle, go hand in hand. The structure, not the detail torn out of its frame (system), provides insight, according to the school of Grosse, Schmidt and Koppers.

- R. F. Wallace, *Revitalisationsbewegungen*, (Revitalization movements), in CA. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Frankf. a.M, 1964, S 404/427 (American Anthropologist, 58 (1956), pp. 264/281): 'nativist' movements (i.e. movements, which seek to revive or perpetuate certain aspects of a culture (cfr. R. Linton, *Nativistische Bewegungen*, in CA. Schmitz, o.c., S. 390/403 in American Anthropologist, 45 (1943), pp 230/242), 'reform movements', 'cargo-cult', religious 'revival' (réveil), 'messianic movement', 'utopian community', 'sect formation', 'mass movement', 'revolution' (e.g. the Jesus revolution in the sixties), 'charismatic movement', pentekostal movement.) etc. are forms of revitalization movements.

Thousands of (old and) contemporary such movements typify neo-sacralism' (renewal of ancient sacred religions), as it is to be found in all world religions: one thinks of L. Rochedieu, *Der Schintoismus und die neuen Religionen Japans*, (Shintoism and the New Religions of Japan), Genf, 1973 (esp. s. 209/247, where the traits of the new religions are discussed).

'Revitalization' is a considered, organized and conscious attempt by members of a society to build a more satisfying culture, which takes place abruptly and in a short period of time. The 'magical' nativisms of R. Linton fall under this, in part.

Its members believe that, by doing so, they are rectifying the present situation so that it represents a restoration of the 'good time' of their ancestors (revitalizing) or continuing the existing good culture (perpetuating).

Messianic and Millennarist movements can be interpreted in this way: the extra- and supernatural plays a large role in them, as in the nativist, yet, in the nativist the "good" future is conceived after a past model (a.c. ,393) .

Bibl. Sample.:
-- J. Needleman, *De nieuwe godsdiensten*, (The new religions,) Amsterdam, 1975 (California Zen, Meher Baba, Subud, Transcendental -meditation and other Eastern religion forms, which typify the counterculture);

-- A. Pollak-Eltz, *Afro-Amerikaanse godsdiensten en Kulten* (Afro-American Religions and Cults), Roermond, 1970 (Candomblé, Batuque, Xango, Macumba, Pagelança, Catimbo, Umbanda, - in Brazil; Shango, Shouteribaptism, Myalism, Obeah, Convince, Vodoen, Santeria, in the Antilles; Maria-Lionza,- in Venezuela; Surinamese religions) are two books that provide insights into "revitalization religions" in both the Americas, where either the East or Africa acts as a revitalization source to escape the unbearable pressures of modern Western society.

Here with us, too, in Western Europe, these 'ways out' have an undeniable appeal. Religious people are trying to find, in our form of culture, a form of religion which provides viability where the established churches apparently cannot (or do not even realize it).

Always the Grosse'sche Prinzip, elaborated by Schmidt and Koppers: the structure of the culture has an effect on that of religion and vice versa.

See also: J. Middleton, ed*., Gods and rituals (Readings in Religious Beliefs and practices*, Austin/London, 1967, especially from pp. 307 ff. (Including L. Mair, *Independent Religious Movernents in Three Continents*, in which the author deals with the Spirit Dance of the Indians of N.W. America, the 'cargo' cults of peoples in Melanesia, and Bantu reduplications of missionaries' Christianity, - indicating the continental vitality of religions).

Bibliogr. sample.: the reports of the international week for religious ethnology at Mödling (1920), Tilburg (1922), Trier (1923) Milan (1925) and later remain, for Catholics, fascinating.

It should be noted that, at Milan, the archbishop himself, Kard. Tosi, advocated a science of religions, practiced by Catholics; that H.H. Pope Pius XI himself insisted Mödling (Vienna) in 1923) that the Week take place in Milan, which had been underway since 1911.

And also that "field research" (Philippines, (Negritos), Rwanda (Pygmies), Malacca (Semang and Senoipygmies), Sumatra (Kubus)) took place by specialists, with the Pope himself helping to make them possible.

"They are human documents, which one must not let perish" said H.H. the Pope to Fr. W. Schmidt on the occasion of the Vatican Mission Exhibition) (cfr. G. Schmidt, *Travaux faits et travaux à faire,* (Work done and work to be done), in Settimana lnternazionale di Etnologia Religiosa, IVa Sessione, Paris, 1926, p. 28).

The Catholics themselves have not always attested to such broad-mindedness! Ethnology or cultural anthropology provides us, religiously, with a huge masa of data, from which a few samples:

-- A. Lefèvre, *La religion*, Paris, 1921 (this outdated but still well-organized and orderly work of 'an atheist gives an overview of the theories before him and divides the aspects of religion as follows: zoölatry (animal worship), phytolatry (plant worship), litholatry (stone worship), litholatry (water worship), litholatry (water worship), litholatry (water worship), litholatry (stone worship), litholatry (stone worship), and so on.), hydrolatry (water and spring worship), pyrolatry (fire worship), - generational worship ('culte de la génération': sexual forms of religion),- animism (soul religion and spirit and ancestor worship), atmosphere-god worship (rain, wind, thunder and lightning god worship), astrolatry (sun, moon,. constellation religion), cosmic god worship (with its mythologies: heaven and earth, Titans),- conceptual deification (hypostasis of abstract ideas into "divine" beings, sacred history, symbolism),- liturgy (priesthood, sacrifice, prayer).

From this abundant material, the proposer draws the following definition of religion: "Religion is an illusion that sees intentions, wills, and persons in:
a/ the things, creatures and phenomena of nature and
b/ in the visions, actions, faculties and concepts of man (o.c., p. 570). One sees that the proposer is scientist and assumes that religion disappears as science increases).

-- C. Welter, *les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paleopsychologie),* (primitive beliefs and their survivals (Précis of paleopsychologie),), Paris, 1960 (this fine little book is a primitivology with an eye to superstitions (testimonial remains) in our cultures: thought, social order, religious views (animism, magic, tabooism, blood religion, totemism, fetishism, divination, number religion) and folklore of the primitives are orderly set forth with much factual material).

-- W. Howells, *De godsdiensten der primitieve volkeren*, (The Religion of the Primitive Peoples), Utr./ Antw. 1963 (in the same vein as Welter, though less folkloric),

-- P. Schebesta, *Oorsprong van de godsdienst*, (Origin of religion), Tielt/ Den Haag, 1962 (a broadly conceived and by various specialists presented overview of phenomena (God, gods, magic, animism, manism, fetishism, shamanism, totemism) expressions (faith, worship, prayer, sacrifice, myth) of religion, as well as the theories concerning the origin and evolution of religion.

This is in the spirit of the Vienna School of W. Schmidt: as a definition here: "Religion is a conscious, actual recognition of an absolute (sacred) reality, on which man is existentially dependent." (o.c., 51).

In the field of anthologies:

-- C.A. Schmitz, *Religionsetnologie*, (Etnology of Religion), Frankf.a.M., 1964 (seventeen specialists deal with basic themes from the cultural anthropology of religion: animism (N. Söderblom), 'aandeel' ('participation': L. Lévi-Bruhl), dynamism (power-belief: G. van der Leeuw), belief in the Supreme Being (several times, against the proposer, called 'primal monotheism': W. Schmidt), dema-deity (A. Jensen), myth (K.Preuss), saga (Cl. Lévi-Strauss), hunter religion (A. Friedrich) cult-totemism (H. Petri), soul concept and death concept (I. Paulson) shamanism (L. Vajda, D. Schroeder), death magic (CA. Schmitz), rites of passage (A. van Gennep), nativism (R. Linton), revitalization (R. Wallace).

In passing: as a definition of religion gives; CA. Schmitz: "Religion is the sum of all representations and actions, which belong to be understood as a response to 'numinous' experience" (o.c., 1). This refers to H. Otto: the 'holy' is the numen, numinosum).

-- J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals (Readings in Religious beliefs and Practices),* Austin/ London, 1967 (sixteen specialists from the Anglo-Saxon world on religion.

Noted: the introducer says there are two periods in the ethnology of religion:
a/ The first, mainly psychological (Tylor, Frazer, Muller) or sociological (Durkheim, Robertson Smith, Mauss, Levy-Bruhl), which ended with the fieldwork of Radcliffe-Brown (Andaman Islanders) and Malinowski (Trobriand Islanders).
b/ The second got underway a few years ago, characterized by a "rigorous sociological method (some texts of it are included in the anthology). The work has been supplemented by *Myth and Cosmos and Witchcraft and Curing* ; --.

-- M. Augé, prés., *Anthropologie religieuse (Les dieux et les rites),* (Religious anthropology (Gods and rites)), Paris, 1974. A translation of ten of the sixteen articles in Middleton's anthology, with a typically French critical discussion of the flaws of the English work (Middleton wants to thematize "problems" but only gets as far as themes; which leads Augé to criticize the theories of magic as an example:

a/ the specular or mirror theory (the social system reflects itself in the 'speaking' of magic),
b/ the culturalist (psycho-cultural: the magic of one group is considered to reflect the socio-economic order, but strongly psychologizing),
c/ the (hyper)functionalist (the magic's 'function' is to bring the members of a group to respect for community norms e.g.

-- In the field of theories and methods; W. Schmidt, *Origine et évolution de la religion*, (Origin and evolution of religion), Paris, 1931 (splendid survey by the leader of the Vienna school).

-- M. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*, (For a science of religions), Paris, '1973 (complements Schmidt, as well as Pinard de la Boullaye, *L' ét. comp. d. rel*., II (Ses méthodes), Paris, 1925).

-- Another note on the structural method: Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale*, (Structural anthropology), Paris, 1958 (esp. pp. 181/266: *Magie et religion*, (Magic and religion), with a.o. the magician and his magic; the 'symbolic' effectiveness (explanation of Psychosomatic- psychoanalytic nature of the magic, mixed with logistic structural analysis); structure of the myths (with linguistic basis); -- for discussion of Lèvi-Strauss.

-- J. Broekman, *Structuralism* (Moscow- Prague- Paris), Amsterdam, 1973, pp. 122/129 (anthropology of L.-Str.).

-- Rodney Needham, *Structure and Sentiment* (A Test Case in Social Anthropology), Chicago/ London, 'I962 (a critique of G. Homans/ D. Schneider, Marriage, Authority and final Causes (A Sudy of Unilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage), Glencoe, Ill, 1955, which is itself a critique of Cl. Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Paris, 1949,-- methodological).

-- A note on psychanalysis concerning ethnology (der religion o.a.): Géza Roheim, *Psychanalyse et anthropologie (Culture- Personnalité- inconscient),* (Psychoanalysis and anthropology (Culture - Personality - Unconscious),), Paris, 1967 (in which the culturalists, pluralist as they are, emphasize the distinction of cultures (religions), Roheim lays emphasis on the comparison of isolated details, present in different cultures (religions (o.a. psychanalyse de la culture australienne (o.c., pp. 74/193)). In this he claims to be as much a Freudian as the culturalists).

-- On natural religion (do not confuse with 'natural' (i.e. rational) religion of freethinkers): K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, (Right and limit of natural religion), Zürich, 1954 (the theme, religion based, since Herder (1771 ff.) and Schleiermacher (1799), on the vitalism of romanticism, viewed from a biblical standpoint, - in such a way, however, that an appreciative, instead of contemptuous, attitude is adopted; which opens the way, from biblical theology, to a positive appreciation of the nature-religions, so numerous in all peoples and their culture).

(C). The historical or historical method.
-- H.Pinard d.l. Boullaye, *L' etude comparée des rel*., II (Ses méthodes), Paris, 1929- 3, PP. 88/152 (Méthode historique), says, after having praised the comparative method as obviously useful - we will return to comparatism -, that "it presupposes an exact knowledge of the facts concerning each religion", - "that to make out these facts is the very task of historiography" (o.c., 88).

The beginning of the scientific approach to the history of religion sees the author in Otfried Müller, *Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie*, (Prolegomena to a scientific mythology), Göttingen, 1825: the sense of the intricacy of the data and the scrupulous objectivity concerning religion is a very recent phenomenon (o.c.,151). 'Historical documents' are more than texts, traditions, archaeological monuments:

(i) the philological method studies, since J. Grimm, Max Müller (in the wake of Adalbert Kuhn the testimony remains in the language of religious facts from the (deepest) past ('natural mythological school'), a.o. on the basis of often questionable etymologies (one example: the Latin 'religio' comes from re-lego, I reverence scrupulously (theosebeia), opposed to neg-ligo, I neglect; the derivation from re-linquo (I make reservation), re-eligo (I choose again, - according to S. Augustine), re-ligo (I bind) is each time linguistically erroneous);-- cfr. Pinard, o.c., pp. 153 / 194; W. Schmidt, *Origine*, pp. 59 / 64;

(ii) the "anthropological" (understand: cultural-anthropological or ethnological) method studies the testimony, as found among the non-Western peoples, the "savages" (as it was once said), the natural peoples": here the culturological and the historical method partially run into each other, of course; Pinard clearly sees two periods:

(ii)a. the evolutionist or evolutionary ethnology assumes two axiomata:

a/ culture (and immediately religion) evolves from the imperfect (savage) to the perfect (civilized),

b/ that culture-and-religion evolution is unified and rigidly lawlike (Pinard, o. c., pp. 195/242 (*Méthode anthropologique ancienne*)); criticism was unleashed, however, because this method was arbitrary, misunderstood the difference (non-uniformity) between the many cultures and religions, and underestimated the exchanges between them.

(ii)b. the 'new' anthropology initially called itself the 'historical' ethnology, because it applied, instead of the evolutionary thought schemata, the cultural-historical method (see above p. 16 (Pinard, o.c., 243/304 (*Méthode anthropologique nouvelle*), in which instead of evolution, 'history' was central; the axiomata are:
a/ Positive study, any apriorism (ideology) exclusively;
b/ Comparatism, seeking similarities regarding rites, ideas, etc.;
c/ Historical study, based on the convergence method (which sees what is initially divergent eventually converge (see Lo., 57; 66 (convergence of indications, which point in the same direction, though from different angles)).

Thus, the testimonial or superstition of past religions are reached in the cultures and religions of the present;

(iii) The folkloric or folkloric (laographic) method studies surviving beliefs, institutions, customs among 'ordinary people' (among the educated, if necessary), which, although dating from an earlier period, have continued to exist relatively unchanged, notwithstanding the new cultural context;

The word "folklore" was first introduced, in English, by W. Thoms (ps.: Ambrose Merton) in a letter in Atheneum, 1846 (Aug.); the interest in unaltered superstitions (testamentary remains) is very old: already Herodotos had an eye for it; J. and W. Grimm, in Germany, as well as Mannhardt (one thinks of his *Antike Wald und Feldkulte aus Nordeuropäischer Ueberlieferung erläutert,* (Ancient forest and field cults from northern European tradition explained, Berlin, 1877), founded scientific folklore, around 1804 (according to S. Reinach, *Cultes, mythes et religions*, IV, Paris, 1912, where the Caylus, a Count, and the French Celtomans are named as pioneers.

J. Grimm worked at Paris in 1805 and knew the Académie celtique, which took an interest in megaliths and Celtic literature in Scotland, Wales, and Brittany).

Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 1871, saw the rational value of folk customs or superstitions: "The senseless customs are survivals, which 1/ have ever had 'a practical object and 2/ at least the character of a ceremony then and there, when and where they were originally instituted."

In other words, they are 'invested reason' to speak with Hegel: there was once a rational reason for instituting them; J. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 1890-1, 1900-2, 1907-3 ... saw folklore **1/** rural and **2/** 'wild' (i.e. among the natural peoples).

An extremely fascinating work on the subject is Fern. Nicolay, *Histoire des croyances, superstitions, mœurs et coutumes (selon le plan du décalogue),* (History of beliefs, superstitions, manners and customs (according to the plan of the Decalogue),), 3 t., s.d. (about 1900), in which this Catholic lawyer, well versed in the science of religion, gives abundant material; -- it is to be noted that the intellectuals, of course, should first have an eye for popular religion: That this is not so obvious, even in ecclesiastical circles, is shown with overwhelming force by the Latin-American bishops' synod of 1974, at which it was suddenly realized that the IInd Vatican Council, until then, had been an elitist affair of intellectuals, professors, sophisticated artists (the so-called 'intelligentsia') and that it was not a matter of a personal choice. intelligentsia) and not the people.

At Medellin in 1968, paradoxically, the Latin American bishops had resolved "to identify with the popular mass" (sic), yet discovered in 1974 that, in addition to" 'liberation(stheology), and 'basic communities' of an 'enlightened' nature, popular religion was important.
"Now a bunch of bishops are listening to the little voices of the people" (wrote Church and Mission, 197 (1975): March). Cfr. Collationes (Vl. Tijdschr. v. Theol. and Past.), 1975 Oct. (P. De Haes, - *People's Catholicism*; P. Wolfs, Is there people's Catholicism with us too?; J.Craeynest, The Lourdes Pilgrimage as a People's Retreat).

; M.P. Nilsson, *La religion populaire dans la Grèce antique*, (Popular religion in ancient Greece), Paris, 1954 (the country houses and the celebrations there; Eleusis; house and family; the cities; legalism; superstition; oracles and fortune-telling); A. Dieterich, *Mutter Erde (Ein Versuch über Volksreligion)*, (Mother Earth (An Experiment on Folk Religion), Leipzig, 1913-2.

All this does not mean that folk religion and folklore are the same, but that they are partial: W. Crooke, *Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, Oxford, 1926.

-- L. Knappert, *De betekenis van de folklore voor de godsdienstgeschiedenis onderzocht en aan de Holda-mythen getoetst,* (The significance of folklore to the history of religion examined and tested against the Holda myths), 1887;

-- R. Hertz, *Sociologie religieuse et folklore*, (Sociology of religion and folklore), Paris, 1928-1 1970-2 (preface by Marcel Mauss; esp. Saint Besse (Etude d 'un culte alpestre), o.c., pp. 110/160, is a very fascinating study of Saint Bessus, celebrated on 10 harvest each year, in the Italian Alps).

-- More in the sense of "superstitions" as a superstitious form: E. Eaple, *Superstition and the Superstitious*, New York, 1971 (with bibliography pp. 191/192.

-- Douglas Hill, *Magic and Superstition*, London, 1968.

-- the ecclesiastical 'sacramentals' are a domain where archaic religion flourishes; one model: X, *Notes sur la bénédiction, la vertu et le rôle social de la cloche*, (Notes on the blessing, virtue and social role of the bell), Périgueux, 1897 (demon belief, as well as magical 'power belief' (which clearly shines through in the title 'vertu', i.e. fluidic power) form here a synthesis with straightforward Catholicism).

-- Noteworthy as a testimonial study are Kräpelin, *Die Wahnwelten*, (The delusion worlds), Frankf. a.M., 1963-2 (1920-1) (the nervous and soul diseases concern the roots of the inner life; the child, the natural man, yes, the animal go together here, somewhat: the question Kräpelin poses is "to what extent in the disease states do attenuated conditions from the prehistory of personal and tribal development revive";

-- K. Japers, *Strindbergh und van Gogh*, Bremen, 1949, S. 182: schizophrenics walk, among us, around as despised minus habentes; perhaps it has ever been otherwise ?

-- Perhaps, among us, schizophrenia is a condition of authenticity regarding domains, which, in the past, could be truly contacted even without schizophrenia; i.e., so-called transcultural psychiatry poses the question of the authenticity of the domain. In other words, so-called transcultural psychiatry asks the question to what extent identical diseases in different cultures display different symptoms (morphology or pathoplasty of the disease), - to what extent are diseases generated or inhibited by cultural living conditions (pathogenesis), - to what extent were diseases that we now see as diseases, in a different or earlier culture (transcultural), conceived as non-diseases (interpretation); cfr. J. *Zutt, Einführung*, (Introduction), in J. Zutt, Hrsg., *Ergriffenheit und Besessenheit (Ein interdisziplinäres Gespräch über transkulturell-anthropologische und psychiatrische Fragen),* (Ergriffenheit und Besessenheit (An Interdisciplinary Conversation on Transcultural Anthropological and Psychiatric Issues)), Bern/ Munich, 1972, S. 7/9 m.a., not only folklore, but also 'disease' is, if need be, a witness residue; yes, according to Dr Pfeiffer, diabetes may once have been a means of survival in a prehistoric society, where survival required, among other things, diabetic traits (Pfeiffer, Die Pathogenese des Diabetes mellitus, in Deutsches Medizinisches Journal, 21 (1966), S. 601).

(iv) the general historical science of religion is, of course, the comprehensive subject science: -prehistorical: A. Leroi-Gourhan, *Les religions de la préhistoire (Paléolithique),* (The religions of prehistory (Paleolithic),), Paris, 1976-3 (the period before -40,000/-30. 000 is virtually unknown in terms of religion; the Late Palaeolithic, however, provides numerous facts, which show that decoration, art, housing, techniques and religion were there as later (we recognize ourselves in them); but caution regarding comparatism between prehistoric people and present-day primitives is called for.

Thus magic, totemism, cannibalism are unprovable (unless vague indications); certainly a richly elaborated complementary system, in which man and woman (each with their own animals) appear in art; also the veneration of bones (in connection with funeral rites) is clear).

Dieux et religions antiques dans les Alpes de la préhistoire au moyen-âge, in Histoire et archéologie, (Dieux et religions antiques dans les Alpes de la préhistoire au moyen-âge, in Histoire et archéologie), 48 (1980/1981): déc.-janv.;

-- Historical: R. Berthelot, *La pensée de l'Asie et l' astrobiologie*, (Asian thought and astrobiology), Paris, 1972 (1938-1) (tss. celestial body movement, on the one hand, and, on the other, the course of earthly life forms (plant kingdom, agriculture and animal husbandry, health and disease, etc., exists in circular interactions and parallelism, which are even mathematically precisely calculable; hence the name 'astro.bio.logie'. This phase is prepared by a bio-astral phase: the life observed on earth was projected into the heavenly bodies and their orbit, without measurement and numerical mathematics).

Chaldea is the cradle of this); cfr. G. Gusdorf, *Science et foi au milieu du XXe siècle (Un débat de conscience de l'occidental moderne*), (Science and Faith in the Mid-Twentieth Century (A Debate of Conscience of the Modern Westerner), Paris, s.d. pp. 6/15: La conciliation mythique et la conciliation astrobiologique), (The mythical conciliation and the astrobiological conciliation).

-- W. Schmidt; *Origine at évolution d.l. rel*., pp. 125/137 (La mythologie astrale et le panbabylonisme) (in 1906 this school of religious history founded in Berlin the Gesellschaft für vergeleichende Mythenforschung, seeking to redirect the above-mentioned 'philological school'; which was Indo-European in orientation)
-- More in the phenomenological direction: A. Bertholet, Hrsg., *Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch,* (History of Religion Reader), Tubingen, 1926-2 (seventeen cahiers of anthologies, unusually fascinating, concerning the most particular world religions).

-- A. Bertholet/ E Lehmann, Hrsg., Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, (Textbook of the history of religion), Leipzig, 1935-4.

-- M. Eliade, *Traité d' histoire des religions (Morphologie du sacré),* (Treaty of history of religions (Morphology of the sacred),), Paris, 1953 (actually 'a phenomenology of the principal 'forms' of religion; see M. Meslin, *Pour une science d. rel*, pp. 142/152 for the assessment of, among other things, Eliade's primitivism, in which he conceives of myth, core part of religion according to him (which is highly debatable), as (not merely the presentiment of, but as) the return to a so-called 'primeval time' in the irreversible sense (so that, as 'history' progresses, the 'power' of this primeval time, through secularization, diminishes).

On the other hand, as a phenomenologist of the history of religion, C. Bleeker, *De structuur van de godsdienst*, (The structure of religion), The Hague, s.d., can be put forward, who takes a much more nuanced view of the 'en.tel.echeia' (i.e. the development scheme) of religion(s). In fact, Eliade's supertitle is completely deceptive, unless one takes 'histoire' in the Ancient Greek sense of 'research'.

-- Fr. Heiler, *Die Religionen der Menscheit in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, (The religions of mankind in the past and present), Stuttgart, 1959 (fascinating bibliography S. 891/956;

-- J. Asmussen/ J.Leese/ C. Colpe, *Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, (Handbook of the history of religion), 3 Bde, Göttingen, 1971/1975;

-- K. Bellon, inl., J. Huby, *Christus (Handboek voor de geschiedenis der godsdiensten)*, (Christus (Handbook of the History of Religions)), Utr. / Brussels, 1949;

-- C. Van Rijsinge, transl., *De grote godsdiensten*, (The great religions), The Hague, 1957;

-- J. Sperna Weiland, ed*., Antwoord (Gestalten van geloof in de wereld van nu),* (Answer (Gestalts of faith in today's world)), Amsterdam, 1975 (an attempt to provide as complete an overview as possible and also to be actual);

-- E. Mercier/ J. Barraud, ed., *Les hommes et leurs dieux*, (Men and their gods), Paris, 1981 (goes up to the Renaissance);

-- *Encyclopedia of World Religions*, London, 1975-2 ('a typically Anglo-Saxon 'comparative religion');
-- Necessary to fill up a crying void in as good as all religious history books: Merlin Stone, *Eens was God als vrouw belichaamd* (Once God was embodied as a woman), Servire, 1979 (the religions in which not a 'Father' or a 'Man' is the central deity, but, a 'Queen of Heaven' ('Mother Goddess', 'Great Goddess'), are discussed here, unfortunately in a feminist-contradictory sense);

H. Von Glasenapp, *De niet- christelijke godsdiensten*, (The Non-Christian Religions), Antw. / Utr., 1967 (known for his openness to non-Christian religions, which is already evident from his definition: "Religion is the belief (expressed in thought, feeling, will and action) in the presence of supernatural personal and impersonal powers, whereby:
(i) man feels dependent, **(ii)** or employs the attempt to win them over, **(iii)** or employs the attempt to elevate himself to them." (o.c., 11/12);

-- R. De Becker, préf., *Les grandes aventures spirituelles*, (The great spiritual adventures), Paris, 1967 (Akhenaton, Zarathoestra, Lao-Tseu, Buddha, Orpheus and Puthagoras, Platon, S. Augustine, S. Francis of Assisi).

Finally: R. Zaehner, ed. *Zo zoekt de mens zijn God*, (Thus man seeks his God), Rotterdam, 196O (with the well-known dichotomy of the great religions: a) the prophetic (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, - with a personal God and his prophets),
b) the wisdom reliogies (Hinduism, Dzhainism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, with their 'sapiential' bais).

(D). The structural - Comparative method.
Bibl. Sample:
-- H. Pinard d.l.Boullaye, *L' ét. comp. d. rel.,* II (les méthodes), pp. 40/87 (Méthode comparative).

-- J. Viet, rapp., *Les sciences de l' homme en France (Tendances et organisation de la recherche)*, (Human sciences in France (Trends and organisation of research), Paris/ The Hague, 1966, pp. 149/175 (Méthodes et techniques);

-- G.-G. Granger, *Pensée formelle et sciences de l' homme*, (Formal thought and human sciences), pp. 109/113 (Différence et similitude)

-- G. Wijvekate, *Methoden van onderzoek*, (Methods of research), Utr./ Antw., 1971, pp.103/131 (classification); pp. 77/102 (structures).

-- H. Störig, *Geschiedenis van de geesteswetenschappen in de XIX-de eeuw*, (History of the Humanities in the XIXth Century), Utr./ Antw., 1967, p.119/120 (The mathematical school in economic science: "A special peculiarity of the mathematical school is that it substitutes everywhere a functional mode of consideration for simple causality."). We refer here to Lo., 40/59 (philosophical theory of collections: the distributive, i.e., purely comparative, and the collective, i.e., systemic structure, are the two bases, philosophically speaking, of the doubly structured basic method, which we now briefly outline.

(D)a1. The comparative method or 'comparatism'.
Bibl. sample :
-- H. Pinard, o.c., 40ss.; J. Viet, o.c., pp. 166/168 (the typological method, which draws up types or kinds, on the basis of statistical research or on the basis of 'understanding' (Max Weber e.g., who puts forward 'ideal paragons'), rests, according to Viet, on the comparative method).

-- M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel*., pp. 153/169 (Le comparatisme (with G. Dumézil, among others, as an application)).

-- Other domains: L. Millet/ Br. Nagnin, *Les sciences humaines aujourdhui*, (The humanities today), Paris, 1972, p. 87 (the comparative psychology).

-- J. Bourdon, *La démographie comparée, Base de l'histoire de la population*, (Comparative Demography, Basis of Population History), in Journal de la Société Statistique de Paris, 4/6 (1951: avril-juin, pp. 103/108).

-- Religious paragons: S. Nadel, *Two Nuba Religions (An Essay in Comparison),* in J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals*, pp. 77/102 (from The American Anthropologist, 57 (4), 1955 PP. 661/679).

-- A. Jensen, *Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit, in Mythos und Kult bei den Naturvölkern*, (High god and dema deity, in myth and cult among primitive peoples), Wiesbaden, 1960-2 (comparing Scmidt's Supreme Being or 'High God' with his own 'dema' saint).

This extremely short bibliography sufficiently points out how fundamental comparing data is.

In religious science, comparatism was introduced in a scientifically sound sense (i) by the evolutionist religious scientists (they found, e.g., fetishism in Africa Australia and America, among the 'cultureless' ('a typical XIX-th' century misconception) peoples; on the basis of the rigid evolutionary scheme they drew the conclusion that all 'cultureless' peoples had started out fetishist in the religious field); (ii) by the philological religion-scientists (one thinks of Ad. Kuhn, Max Müller), who avoided this evolutionist ideology, relying on comparative speech (of the Indo-European languages); they compared the names of gods, the myths, the rites; later Dr. Gräbner (and J. Schmidt in his wake) introduced the cultural-historical variant of comparatism, while G.Foucart introduced the sampling process.(Cfr. Pinard, o.c., pp. 44/49).

Note. E. Hamy (1842/1908) and especially A. de Quatrefages (1810/1892) implemented comparatism interdisciplinarily: the "proof based on convergence of indications" (Lo., 57) was ordered as follows:
(i) A principal science, e.g., religious science establishes something;
(ii) Connexional or auxiliary sciences verify, possibly reinforce that determination by determining the same thing in its own way (e.g., comparative linguistics, ethnology).

-- Cfr. H. Pinard d.l. Boullaye, *Le movement historique en ethnologie*, (The historical movement in ethnology), in Settimana Intern. di Etnologia Religiosa, Paris, 1926, p. 38;

-- J. Viet, o.c., pp. 53/88 (Relations interdisciplinaires), pp. 254/256 (bibliogr.: F. Braudel, *Unité et diversités des sciences de l'homme*, (Unity and diversity of human sciences), in Revue de l' Enseignement supérieur, 1 (1960): janv.- march, pp. 17/22.

-- A. Moles, *La linguistique, méthode de découverte interdisciplinaire*, (Linguistics as a method of interdisciplinary discovery), in Revue philosophique, 3 (1966): juil.-sept., pp. 375 / 390;-- this poses, of course, the problem of a minimal and essential unitary science, inter alia, concerning hieroanalysis.

At present, two are readily apparent, viz. **(a)** Heideggerian hermeneutics, i.e. philosophical anthropology or anthropology (for the foundations see O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., *Hermeneutische Philosophie,* Munich, 1972, esp. S. 252/273 (P. Ricoeur)).

-- P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' herméneutique),* Paris, 1989, - the main work o.i.), for application to hierarchical analysis

-- M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel*., pp. 253/262 (De l' anthropologie religieuse): Meslin, following Heidegger and Ricoeur, argues:
a/ that the humanities cannot grasp the 'supernatural' itself (in this similar to Bochenski, who did not see 'insight', direct insight, in his *logic of Religion*) ;
b/ that they can only grasp the 'sacred' through the 'languages' (here in the sense of systems of human expression: rites 'say' something, signs 'say' something, concepts 'say' something); well, the 'languages' (sign systems) are human works, which inform us about man himself; Consequence: also the study of religion understood as human science is in the end human science.
(b)2 Saussurian linguistics, i.e. the systems technology or systems science of the phonologically (sound) conceived study of signs,

(e.g. 'e', 'z', '1') which, in isolation and on their own, mean 'nothing', yet, combined in a system with its language structures, only acquire meaning (e.g. 'ezel', at least in the Dutch language system, means two things: (animalistically) a long-eared quadruped, (artistically) a support for painters; - metaphorically (prop. analogy) 'a dunce').

This method has been transferred, especially in recent years, in structuralist circles, to other human sciences; e.g. myth analysis, religion and magic (for the foundations see: besides the work of Broekman, G. Schiwy, *Der französische Strukturalismus*, (French structuralism), Reinbek b. Hamb., 1969.

-- O. Ducrot et al, *Qu' est-ce que le structuralisme*?, (What is structuralism), Paris, 1968;

-- R. Kwant, *Structuralisten en structuralisme* (Structuralists and structuralism), Alphen a.d. Rijn, 1978; applied to religion:

-- Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale*, Paris, 1958, pp. 181/266 (Magie et religion; La structure des myths), (Magic and religion; The structure of myths).

The most striking difference between the Heideggerian hermeneutics of signifiers, myths, rites, conceptions and that of Lévy-Strauss, with his structuralism, lies in the life-like and deeply religious (however vaguely), in the hermeneuticists, and the atheistic-nihilistic logico-mathematical of the structuralists. See also M. Meslin, *Pour u. sc. d. rel*., pp. 170/194.

-- H. Pinard d.l. B., o.c., pp. 47/57, applies comparatism to the three stages of hierrology, as he conceives them: a/ hieroglyphics, i. e. purely empirical factual description b/ hieroglyphics, i. inductive or generalizing, law-seeking study of bet religious phenomenon; c/ hierosophy, i. epistemologically and axiologically evaluative (if one will: evaluative) stance on truth and life value, esp. God involvement of religion; we return to this.

O.c., pp. 58/87 Pinard dwells on the axiomata of sound comparatism concerning religion: the axiom of natural uniformity is nothing but a theory of collections (distributive structure); the axiom of organic unity (with the axiom of dependence) is nothing but a theory of systems (collective structure).

(D)a2. The systems theory method.
Bibliogr. sample:
-- J. Viet, o.c., pp. 163ss. (Analyse des données), (Data analysis) -, esp. p. 167: the typological or classifying method, based on the comparative, leads to the structuring method, i.e. when typology pays attention to the inner arrangement or structure of the data and compares them as possessing structure (whether 'understanding' (verstehend, compréhensiviste) à la Max Weber or 'logistic-mathematical' à la Lévi-Strauss);

Cl. Lévi- Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale*, pp. 227ss. (La structure des myths) lucidly explains the structuralist systems view);

It should be said emphatically that the system-technological manipulation of signs, comparable with tinkering (mythical thinking, for example, is comparable with 'le bricolage', tinkering" (cf. Meslin, o.c., 174)), also implies its limitations: actual life, certainly religious life as 'religio', as a contact with that with which one, in its seriousness and inviolability, never tinkers just like that, means that such a structuralism can at most be a partial method.

Furthermore: to see culture first of all as a system of communication is also highly questionable; man is first and foremost 'en situation', situated and should process the accomplished facts as living and surviving; semiotically (i.e. sign-theoretically) this means that, with Peirce, it should be said emphatically that the sign refers first and foremost to the situation and its aspects ('a First', a 'First' or 'Quality' says Peirce, i.e. the given in its qualitative immediacy, - immediately followed by 'a Second', a 'second' or 'Relation', i.e., the qualitative given is element of a collection and system, it is 'in relation to'); only after the situation becomes a thinking, speaking and writing sign, is 'culture' communication with others, - at least epistemologically.

Therefore we prefer to start from a theory of systems and structures as it is extremely briefly outlined by Pinard, o.c., pp. 47/48. He distinguishes:

(a) The internal or internal comparison: the constitutive elements of something - take a religion, totemism - are searched for (i.e. both the elements and the common properties (especially in a collective sense) are exposed by analysis.

Afterwards they are specified both functionally (i. e. their role within the coherence) and processually (i. the development within the process in question: kinetic or processual structure). Particular attention is paid to the 'factor change' or 'cause-effect dyad' (i.e. one investigates which causes (factors, i.e. partial causes) do or do not imply changes (i.e. effects, consequences) in the phenomenon under investigation.

All of this, this 'ana.lysing', 'dis.membership' is repeatedly done comparatively (comparing element with element, element with role or function; -element or function with factor (cause)).

Two comparisons in particular are fundamental: the processual analysis examines the sequence of phases (phaseological structure) by comparing them; the causal (factorial) analysis compares the factors (influences, causes) with the begotten changes (effects). This is the experimental comparison. Those who experiment compare the effect of their experiment with what was present before their experiment; this is the experimental structure.

(b) The external or external comparison:

The system under investigation is now situated in its framework (supersystem): again, the subsystems (which are here the 'elements' of the overarching whole or super.system) are examined according to their common properties.

Functions (role, dependence), sequences (phases), factors (influences with their effects), these especially experimental, are dissected, while comparing always, either synchronically ('static' says Pinard) or diachronically ('genetic', 'dynamic; according to Pinard). In other words, by means of structures (distributive, collective, kinetic, - individual-concrete) the unity of common properties (partial identities) is sought in the multiplicity of elements (total identities). See Lo., 27, 42, 48,59,79 / 80. This we call structurism.

-- Applications. - N. Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion),* (The Becoming of the Belief in God (Studies on the Beginnings of Religion),), Leipzig, 1926-2, distinguishes as 'constitutive elements' (recurrent aspects, common properties-complex) of religious phenomena as such: a/ animism, d. i. belief in life and inspiration, b/ dynamism, i.e. belief in power or force, c/ causal belief, i.e. belief in beings of highest or very high rank, who cause reality or interesting parts of it.

Thus he says, e.g., 25: "No key can open all the locks: a/ animism cannot explain everything in the world of the primitives; b/ not even the recently much discussed 'mana', i.e., the half or wholly impersonal 'power', c/ not even the high origin beings of the primitive view." This shows Söderblom's comparatism: all phenomena and all coherence in those phenomena only 'saves' the analysis.

M. Augé, in *Anthropologie religieuse*, Paris, 1974, pp. 20/22, discusses Elkin's four types of totemism:
a/ individual totemism**, b/** social totemism (with variants: sex-linked, half-linked, area-linked, sub-area-linked, (patrilineal or matrilineal) clan-linked), **c/** cultural (patrilineal or conceptual) totemism, d/ dream totemism (either individual or social).

"We shall find that, if the various forms of totemism noted - at least if they are different types of the same reality - never exist together in the same society, the 'structured whole' of which Elkin speaks is not to be found in any private society - except perhaps in the northeast of South Australia.

In other words, the 'ideological coherence' that Elkin seeks to demonstrate is the ideological coherence of no society. This observation goes hand in hand with Lévy-Strauss's remark, which accuses Elkin (...) of having preserved 'a concept, while the existence of several heterogeneous (non-similar) and irreducible totemisms was confirmed by him."

Lévi-Strauss, in other words, would suggest dropping the concept of totemism because it does not represent a common characteristic.

The notion of ideological coherence is also raised by Augé, at o.c., pp. 22ss, in reference to J. Harner's study of the Jivaros of the equator: the Jivaros have four related belief systems ('ideologies'), namely concerning the soul(s), the harvest spirits, sorcery and kinship: the question arises whether the Jivaro mentality does not possess an implicit (rather than a conscious-rational) coherence between these four seemingly independent 'systems'.

Cl. Lévy-Strauss, Anthr. str., pp. 183ss., speaks of the magician and his magic:
a/ there is no reason to doubt the efficiency of magic in some of its practices;
b/ that "efficiency" implies belief in magic under three complementary points of view:
    (i) the magician's belief in his own techniques,
    (ii) the belief of the sick person he cares for or of the victim he persecutes, in the 'power' of the magician,
    (iii) the confidence and demands of collective opinion, which again and again determine the climate concerning the magician and those worked by him. (o.c., pp. 184, 197 (*'le complex shamaniste'*), because it is here about the shamanic form of magic), 200 (sorcerer, sick (victim), public), 203 (group, sick, sorcerer).

We are faced here with a cohesive triad, which, with Lévi-Strauss, is of course, 'linguistic' and psychological (psychosomatic and psychoanalytic); the ideology, peculiar to Lévi-Strauss, appears from the fact that he does not think for a moment of merely placing himself in the world of the three bodies involved (without the external psychosomatics and equally external psychoanalysis) in order, starting from the axiomata proper to that triad, to test its effectiveness by experiment on the magical (and not the psychoanalytic, resp. psychosomatic) plane.

A curious form of 'hineininterpretieren' (externalism characteristic of the modern 'rationalist' who in principle does not believe in the magic of the primitives and starts from his own axiomata, - which is erroneous from a systems viewpoint). Cfr. J. Kamstra , *Structuralism and the Science of Religion*, in Tijdschr. v. Phil., 31 (1969): 4 (Dec), pp. 700/731 where the proposer says that, he Lévi-Strauss, religion is the humanization of nature and magic is the naturalization of human action, to the exclusion of the sacred ('horizontalism') (a.c., 728/750).

Th. van Baaren, *Doolhof der goden*, Amsterdam, 1960, p. 6, points out that "understanding" is "to a great extent a matter of comparison," yet strongly typological, natural.

Conclusion: "The comparative spirit is the truly scientific spirit of our time; or rather: of all times". (*Address at the International Congress of Orientalists*, 14/21, Sept 1874, in Chips - 2, t. IV, p. 343). Understood as set forth above, on the basis of Pinard's ideas, this is absolutely correct.

(D)b1. The mathematical-logistic method.

'Analysis' is comparison of equal and consistent data: this data comes through in refined form in applied logistics and mathematics.

Bibl. sample:

-- J. Maître, *Représentations logarithmiques de phénomènes religieux*, (Logarithmic representations of religious phenomena), in Rev. franç. de Sociologie, IV (1963):1, pp. 22 / 36; id., Langage mathématique et sciences religieuses, in ISHR, pp. 201/215 (*Instruction aux sciences humaines des religions*, (Instruction in the humanities of religions), Paris, Symposium,- edited by H. Desroche/ J. Seguy);

-- id., *Les prénoms de baptême (Rite de dénomination et statistique linguistique, in Année sociologique* – (The first names of baptism, (Rite of naming and linguistic statistics), in Année sociologique, 3, 1964, pp. 31/74;

-- R. Goldman, *Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence*, London, 1964 (Guttman method (scaling) as a mode of presentation).

-- Rein mathematical: M. Barbut, *Mathématiques des sciences humaines*, (Mathematics of the Humanities), I (Combinatorics and Algebra), Paris, 1967; II (Numbers and Measures), ibid., 1970.-

We refer, for the elementary foundations of the logistic-mathematical method, to Lo., pp. 92/96 (mathematics, esp. p. 93 (rule of three)), 97/103 (logist, Esp. p. 100 (order of sciences): It is clear that logistic-mathematical methods refine distributive and collective comparison, not only through presentation, but also because structures suddenly become clear, if religious phenomena are 'viewed', 'analyzed' logistically; cf. J. Viet, *Les sc. de l' homme*, pp. 153/166, where the proposer points out that the new mathematics, thanks to its structuralism, gives rise to model construction, among other things (cf. Lo, pp. 12/15 (the idea as model), i.e. deterministic or stochastic (coincidence-sensitive) models; synchronic and diachronic models, etc., which depict systemic coherence. Statistical models, preferably structurally interpreted, also play, of course, an important role.

(D)b2. The informatic method.
Bibl. sample : J. Viet, *Les sc. de l' homme*, pp. 163/64 (the electronic calculators: a/ make complicated logistic-mathematical operations transparent and possible, b/ make possible the simulation method (imitation of real things or processes). Cfr. Du., 32/35 (computer science); also pp. 15/21 (clarity).

This technical side of the refinement of analysis 'saves' several times from the tendency to vagueness concerning religious research. More than once religion goes together with a kind of primitivism, which rejects modern techniques: which is a misconception.

(E) The Hierosophic Method.
Bibl. sample:
-- H. Pinard d.I. B., *L'étude comp. d. rel*, II (Ses méthodes), pp. 14/27. Three stages of work: hierography, hierology, - hierosophy, Pinard refers to F. Réthoré hierography, hierology, - philosophy of religion, (1896), Goblet d'Alviella (Transactions of the Third Internat. Congress for the History of Religions, Oxford, 1908, t. II, 9, pp. 365 ss.)).

In footnote, p. 15, Pinard says: "This threefold division (...) answers strictly to the threefold:
(i)a. 'history' (apparently in the semi-antique sense of 'historia' (inquisitio, investigation) of the religions,
(i)b. science of the religions,
(ii) philosophy of religions." He adds that "hieros" is broad enough to represent all that is "sacré," "sacred," resp. "consecrated.")

-- M. Buber, *Schriften zur Bibel*, (Writings on the Bible), Munich/Heidelberg, 1964 (see Wort und Wahrheit, 19 (1964): 11 (Nov), S. 712/713) (E. Biser, Positionen statt Gespräch (Positions instead of tal)) speaks of three 'planes', on which he moves:
(i) the basal plane (philological and religious-historical data),
(ii)a the interpretive or theological plane,
(ii)b the applicable plane (concluding from what goes before),-i.e. with other language the same distinction.

-- W. Schmidt, (*Or. et év. d.l. rel*., Paris, 1931, pp. 16/18, distinguishes, of course, scientific and philosophical approaches to religion, noting however that d'Alviella's triad has much going for it, yet does not distinguish history and psychology of religion and that 'religion' is an old and standard word (and thus preferable to 'hieros').

The suspicion arises that Schmidt, who stubbornly defines 'religion' as 'worship of the Supreme Being' (Supreme Being) - in the strict scholastic-Catholic sense (something which is unmistakably a partial truth) -, finds it difficult to include the second fundamental side, the worship of 'power' (van der Leeuw's dynamism) in the definition, - where Pinard does this very fluently.

So much for the epistemological levels (planes, stages): for philosophy does not confine itself to axioms which are hypothetically formulated (and with which one works in mere professional science); it investigates, moreover, whether these axioms fit into (the whole of) 'being' (ontological), i.e. whether the total reality (and not just a capriciously chosen partial reality, as professional science does) 'endures' these axioms, i.e. is represented in them (model).

Two hierosophical methods.
M. Meslin, *Pour une sience des rel*., pp. 13/14, says: science of religion (understood by him as the human science of religions) differs from theology or theology, which examines religion, usually a single or at least a group, for its true and in conscience binding character. In other words, theology, like religious philosophy, is a hierosophical subject.

The question arises: what then is the distinction between theology and philosophy of religion?

-- That theology, as Th. van Baaren, *Doolhof der goden*, (Maze of the gods), A'm, 1960, p. 7, says, determines which religion is "the true one" ("whereby it is only unfortunate that different religions - and even different directions within one religion - all come up with their own answer, for which they claim equal authority"), is already apparent from the arrangement of the theological sub-subjects: any theology worthy of the name, i. e. sufficiently critical of its own axiomata, begins with the "fundamental" or "apologetic" (defending the faith), and ends with the "fundamental" or "apologetic" (defending the faith). i. sufficiently critical of its own axioms, begins with 'fundamental' or also 'apologetic' (defending faith) theology, on which all other sub-currents are built up as sufficiently critical.

One thinks of historical, dogmatic, moral, sacramental theology, etc., - not to mention recent liberation theology or 'African', 'South American', etc. theologies).

Yet to assert with Meslin, o.c., p. 1.3, that theology essentially stands or falls with demonstrating that one religion (group) is the only true and beatific one, is to forget that - it must be emphasized: 'a sufficiently self-conscious theology always begins with (at least the methodical) doubt of the unique dignity and validity of one's own religion, precisely in its foundational examination, called 'fundamental' or faith-defining theology.

The great Fathers of the Church, Gregory of Nussa and Augustine of Tagaste, in their praxis of methodical doubt, are there to testify to this self-criticism of theology, long before Descartes' 'doute methodique' Cfr. Ep., 28/30, where it appears that, from the beginning, the order of the 'enkuklios paideia' (formative system of comprehensive nature) at Alexandria, since Clemens of Alexandria, reflected this antique-pagan self-criticism. So serious were the Church Fathers-theologians about the critical formation of the students of theology or, as they said then, (divine) wisdom, that they built it into the order of the subjects, as it were.

O. Willmann therefore rightly emphasizes the double slogan: "Theology is the teaching of Christian truth; philosophy the Christian teaching of truth". In other words, however "dear" church and Christianity are, were they not "true," they would not (be allowed to) be "dear"! They would be based on an irrational foundation!

This implies that true theology begins by being a mere philosophy of religion, but in such a way that, on (supposed or real) rational grounds (justification, 'justification' (Bochensky)), it decides to put forward one religion as the only true one or, at least, fundamentally true. Then it becomes what it was not at first: theology. Thus it appears that there can be one and yet two hierosophical methods.

Hierophilia, according to S. Thompson, *A Modern Philosophy of Religion*, Chicago, 1955, pp. 137/149, does not merely analyze the axiomata of one or more religions and its verification in those one or more religions: rather, it analyzes the ken and life value of those axiomata in general.

Bibl. sample: except Pinard, o.c., pp. 56/57:

a/ Elaboration from which natural, extra-natural (miracles, prophecies, revelations) and/or supernatural factors a religion consists: what we call the differential object (natural, extra-natural, supernatural.)

b/ real definition of religion with its similar (magic, spiritualism) and opposite (atheism) accompanying phenomena (again the differential, but purer: religious, parareligious, non- or anti-religious.);

c/ comparative value judgments about in- and external elements and structures of religion;

d/ history of religion, this time examined from a philosophical point of view;

e/ of course, basic research of the sub-sciences of religion (logic and language analysis, psychology, sociology, culturology, history of religion)).

-- A.M. Frazier, *Issues in religion (A Book of Reading),* Cincinnati, 1969 (Human Condition: Dostoievsky, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Rilke; - Origins of Religious Life : Freud, Feuerbach (psych.); Durkheim (sociol.); Campbell (mythol.), R.Otto, Suzuki (transcend.);- Modes of Rel. Life: Zimwer, Campbell (Or.-Occid.); Zimmer, Baillie, Fromm (salvation/reconciliation); Tillich, Wilson (symbol., language); Aquinas, Flew (knowledge);- Doctrine of God: Anselm, Aquinas, Kant, Oman, Kierkegaard (theism); M. Otto, Sartre (atheism); Nietzsche, Altizer ('Death of God ')).

-- D. Walhout, *Interpreting Religion*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963 (three-volume:

a/ general: nature of religion (R. Otto, GH. Glark), truth (S.Thompson, JC. Bennett) faith (St. Gilson, P.Tillich), religion and science (WE Hocking, B. Ramm), religious language (R. Bultmann, W. Sourdough);

b/ theistic (i.e., god-believing viewpoint) : reality of God (W. Kaufmann, LH. Dewolf), nature of God (W. Temple, Ch. Hartshorne), religious nature of man (M. Buber, E. Brunner), religious destiny of man (ES. Brightman, Reinhold Niebuhr), prayer and worship; (D. Steere, R. Calhoun);

c/ Christian: the concept of revelation (H.Richard Niebuhr, JI. Packer), biblical interpretation (exegesis) (B. Anderson, EJ. CarneIl), Christ interpretation (CS. Lewis, W. Spurrier), church (K. Barth, G. Weigel), Christian beliefs (R. Knox, H.Smith), other religions (H. Kraemer, Arn. Toynbee).

-- CJ. Ducasse, *A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion,* New York, 1953 (three main points: definition, functions and justification of religion(s).

It can be seen that hierophilia covers a wide range of problems. But let us dwell on one main issue: the justification of religion (already touched upon when there was talk of its 'logic' (see p. 04ff.)).

- The Structure of Justification.

Of decisive importance is to know what precisely one wants to justify in religion: rightly Pinard combines natural, extra-natural and supernatural elements and structures into one (differential) whole.

Thus e.g. S. Thompson, o.c., claims that "the tests of (the truth and life value of) a (religious) doctrine lie in the 'fruits' of faith as found in (life) attitude ('attitude') and actions."

The author refers, among other things, to Gal. 5: 16/25: The works of the 'flesh' (i.e. poor humanity) are known: fornication, uncleanness and licentiousness; idolatry and sorcery; enmity, strife, envy, wrath, partisanship, dissension, schisms and envy; drunkenness, brassery and the like; ... But the fruit of the 'spirit' is: love, joy and peace; patience, goodwill and goodness; trustworthiness, gentleness and moderation.")

Cf. also Col 3:12 / 15; 1 Cor 13; 2 Cor 3:5; 6: 4/7, etc. S. Paul formulates a criterion (means of discernment), based on the systechie "flesh/spirit" (i.e. man bound to pre-Christian nature, external and supernatural, versus man, participating in the "spirit", i.e. external and especially supernatural "power", as it springs from Jesus (and his resurrection glory and mission of the Holy Spirit)).

This criterion is twofold: a/ simply moral and b/ supernatural-charismatic. Cfr. 1 Cor 12 (the special gifts (charismata) of the Holy Spirit (word of wisdom, word of knowledge, 'faith' (apparently in the charismatic degree), healing, miracles, prophecy, discernment of 'spirits' (i.e. of 'forces' and 'agencies' active in the unconscious), languages, language interpretation: 1 Cor 12: 8/10; see also ibid, 12: 27/ 30 (apostle, prophet, teacher; miracle-worker, healer, helper, administrator, languagespeaker, interpreter)).

Not that these two expressions of "spirit" should be separate; quite the contrary: Paul emphasizes that the supernatural and charismatic gifts constitute one system with the moral (and the theological: faith, hope, love).

J. Thompson pokes fun at a sect that advocates as a test of faith the unharmed endurance of snakebites (in the USA): however, Jesus himself says that "these miracles will accompany those who have believed: in my name they will cast out devils; foreign languages they will speak; snakes they will take up; though they drink deadly poison, it will not harm them; sick people they will lay hands on, and they will be healed." (Mk 16: 17/18).

Consequence: when Paul speaks of the supernatural phenomena as 'signs' of religious truth, Jesus did this before him. Thus, one should not eliminate this side of the justification of religion a-priori. The more so that such phenomena abound in almost all religions (except the completely secularized ones).

P. Saint-yves, *Le discernement du miracle*, Paris, 1909, pp. 253/347 (Le miracle et la théologie positive), esp. pp. 284/296 (The miracles of healing in all religions; - the Phoenician, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, the Buddhist and Hindu, the Islamic religions, - they all know their firmly proven, extending over centuries and tracts of land clearly 'miracles').

-- J. de Bonniot, S.J., *Le miracle et ses contrefaçons*, (The miracle and its counterfeits), Paris, 1895-5 (esp. pp. 425/ 457: Les démons aux premiers siècles de l' Eglise), (Demons in the early centuries of the Churc); -- add, to these two now obsolete but still solid sources of information, the overwhelming ethnological literature (which goes on to discuss), in which extraterrestrial phenomena (the Christian charismata (socially useful gifts of grace) have a very similar structure) are commonplace to see how charismatic religion has been everywhere and always (except, to reiterate, today's totally alienated, secularized, "secularized" "religion").

-- *The structure of the test of religious justification.*
In summary, every (unless secular) religion justifies itself with:
a/ theological (i. e. the Supreme Being, Supreme Being, 'Hochgott', concerning),
b/ moral (virtues concerning) and, especially,
c/ 'charismatic' (supernatural) arguments. How can these arguments be tested for their value in terms of knowledge and salvation?

Testing depends on the informative system one puts forward: the stricter, now, an epistemological-logical system is, the less one can prove in it.

'Soft' science starts from a 'softer' informational system: it makes fewer demands on a. the observation, b. the explanation and c. the testing of it.

'Hard' science hyper-strings the conditions of acceptance of a. observation and b. explanation and c. its testing.

This refers to the infamous 'demarcation problem': meaningful statements are made in experimental science when both the observation and the test of the explanation are publicly, i.e. by every human being (at least in principle), repeatable; all other meaningful statements, which do not pass this strict informational 'scrutiny', are at best possibly meaningful (i.e. until the day an experimental proof is found for them, they are 'meaningless').

All positive (empirical) philosophies introduce that hyper-strict informational system into philosophy (and theology).

Consequence: nothing is left of religious statements; they are 'cognitively' (understand: cognitively in that very rigorous system) meaningless. The more recent positivism, resp. empiricism is more careful with such a 'drastic' declaration of meaninglessness of all religious judgments.

But it preserves - and too rightly so - the radical distinction between experimentally-verifiable judgments, as conceived by empiricism (positivism), and experimentally-verifiable judgments, as conceived by religions.

Bibliographic sample:
-- S.J. Doorman, *Amerikaanse analytische filosofie (filosofie als logisch-pragmatisch reconstructionisme*), (American analytic philosophy (philosophy as logical-pragmatic reconstructionism)), in Tijdschr. v. Fil., 28, 1966), pp. 418/440. Since the rise of logistics, the demarcation problem (the distinction between experimentally meaningful and -sensible judgments) has been reformulated to "make sense" of logistics: cf. Wiener Kreis, Berliner Kreis, Harvard (W. Quine, M. White);.

-- G. Nuchelmans, *Overzicht van de analytische wijsbegeerte*, (Survey of analytic philosophy), Utr./ Ant., 1969 (esp. pp. 240/241: Philosophical theology (Since Wittgenstein's remark that there is more than one use of language, analytic philosophers have become more cautious about semiotics of religious statements, of course).

-- L. Vax: *L' empirisme logique*, (Logical empiricism), Paris, 1970, pp. 117/119. Vax argues, rightly, that according to the empiricist, the rigorous observation and testing of 'hard' science of the effect of prayer and magic is desirable:
a. the unbeliever finds this test of the sum useless (especially if he is convinced that it will turn out negative anyway, which is ideology rather than science);
b. the believer thinks it is sacrilegious (in that he confuses sense of the "sacred" and scrupulosity).

-- More directly on the relationship between religion and (hard resp. soft) science: G. Schlesinger, *Religion and Scientific method*, Dordrecht, 1977. Theism, i.e. belief in the Supreme Being, is treated here as a 'scientific' hypothesis; the existence of misery in creation and (human) freedom are tested for their atheistic impression; theism, though not verified (hard science), is nevertheless 'confirmed' (soft science) ('confirmation').

-- HG. Hubbeling, *The Logic of Perfection, and other Essays* in Neo-Classical Metaphysics, La Salle, 1962,

-- id*., Logica en ervaring in Spinoza's en Ruusbroecs mystiek*,(Logic and experience in Spinoza's and Ruusbroec's mysticism), Leiden, 1973;.

-- id., *The meaningfulness of Metaphysics within Certain Systems,* in Synthese, 1975, pp. 593/409 (proposer discusses, among other things, the distinction between hard-scientific (verific) and soft-scientific (confirmatory) informational systems).

-- Older works on the subject: G. Sortais, *La providence et le miracle devant la science moderne*, (Providence and the miracle before modern science), Paris, 1905. Ch. Renouvier, criticizing Renan, the positivist scientist on religion, says that Renan did not sufficiently realize the limits of the experimental method: experimental science, precisely because of its ultrastrict information system, denies itself access to other than public experiments, if not, it becomes an ideology, i.e. 'a method that fancies itself as the only valid one (o. c., p. 151),

-- A. Harges , *La crise de la certitude (Etude des bases de la connaissance et de la croyance),* (The crisis of certainty (Study of the bases of knowledge and belief),), Paris, (pp. 193/225 (The human testimony); pp. 226/267 (The divine testimony); esp. pp. 312/337 (The supreme reason for certainty: the evidence).

Conclusion: if one first, a-prioristically, i.e. purely axiomatically, presupposes that only the experimental method, as the exact Galilean natural science, as it has developed until now, conceives it, is valid criterion of truth, i.e. of truth concerning religion, then one does not start from the object, i.e. religion, but from something else (e.g. heat phenomena, chemical reactions, etc.) than religion.

One proceeds externalistically, i.e. outside direct and evidential contact with the object. In the words of St. Augustine: 'bene currunt, sed extra viam' (They walk well, but outside the career)! Only internalism, i.e. that method which first takes contact with the object itself ("Zu den Sachen selbst", exclaimed Husserl, as a phenomenologist at the time) in order to design a method based on the inherent nature and laws of that object, can ever grasp religion 'objectively', i.e. from the object itself.

The religious structure of testing.
Religion has, since time immemorial, its own method of testing its validity (cognitively and/or axiologically), namely, the method of the result of its own actions.

The method is called, since centuries, "judgment of God". We will now examine the structure of the judgment of God, as conceived by Homer (IX- th century BC) in the word 'atè'. Semasiologically, 'atè' means:

(i) the reaction of a deity to a 'fault', a 'sin' which is always the stimulus to which a deity responds;

(ii)a1. the deity begins by blinding and confusing the mind (thinking faculty) (consequence delusion, madness) (II. 8: 237; 16: 805; Od. 4: 261);

(ii)a2 consequence: a new 'error', 'sin' is committed; this too is called 'atè' (II 6: 356); consequence: disaster, misery, ruin are the result or outgrowth of that (new): error (II, 24: 480; Od. 4: 261), which is also called 'atè'.

(ii)b. The deity, who executes this sanction, is called, also, 'atè' (II. 19/91). One sees that the Latins also knew this structure of judgment, when one hears them say, "Quos Jupiter vult perdere, dementat" (Whoever wants to drive Jupiter to ruin, he robs them of their power of thought;-which answers (ii)a1 above.

It goes without saying that this structure of divine judgment is commonplace among Herodotos (historiography) and among the tragedians (esp. Aischulos and Sophocles) (tragedy or tragedy play).

We now examine the same structure in the Bible. The purest applicative model is probably -1 Kon 22: 1/38 (Kron 18: 1/3): the characters in question are (the prince of) Aram and his opponent (the prince of) Israel.

At a certain moment (the prince of) Judah joins Israel against Aram; but, as was very common then (and still is, but more hypocritical), one first consults the 'seers': in this case the 'prophets' (who fall into two types:

a. the ecstatic, not completely jahwistic ones (here numbering about four hundred and fifty) and

b. the fully Yahwistic (here Mikajehoe (Mikeas)), this at the behest of Jehoshaphat, the Sovereign of Judah: the half-Yahwistic group (Sidkiah at its head (22:11; 22:24) predicts happiness "in the name of Yahweh" (they think); the Yahwistic Mikajehoe, however, responds mediumistically in two ways:

a/ first, he mocks the prince of Israel by saying : "Draw near; you will surely succeed" (22:15),-which the prince immediately understands and demands the real truth;

b/ thereupon Mikajehoe becomes serious (22:17f): '(...)' I saw all Israel scattered over the mountains like sheep without a shepherd, and Yahweh spoke, 'They have no lord; let them return home peacefully.' At that the prince of Israel said to Jehoshaphat, 'Have I not told you? He never foretells me anything good, always evil.' ' But Mikajehoe said, 'That is untrue. Nevertheless, listen to the word of Yahweh: I saw Yahweh on His throne, with the heavenly host (i.e., the angels) surrounding Him. He asked, "Who will persuade Ahab (the prince of Israel) to go up to Ramah in Gilad to die there?" One (angel) said this, the other said that. Thereupon a spirit (who inspires prophets) stepped forward, stood before Yahweh and said, "I want to persuade him! Yahweh asked him, "How? The spirit answered, 'I am going to become a lying spirit in the mouth of all his (i.e. Ahab's transporting) prophets (= the about four hundred and fifty).'" Then Yahweh said, "You may work on him and you will succeed. Go and do it"! Well, now Yahweh has put a spirit of lie in the mouth of all your prophets, because Yahweh has decreed your destruction".

One can clearly see that, in Yahweh's context, identically the same ate structure (error, blindness, new error, destruction) is at work: the 'spirit' that stepped forward is nothing but the inspiration principle that Yahweh creates wherever mediumistic people want to 'work' (prophesy, 'see') with it, but this 'spirit' (life force emanating from Yahweh) is two-faced: in true friends of God it works truth, in false friends or opponents of God it works falsehood (this duality is precisely the shifting character, immanent to 'spirit' of God).

The so-called 'stepping forward', etc., is mere imagery (and one should certainly not confuse this 'spirit' with the 'angels' around God).

Cf. A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten Testaments,* Tubingen., 1932, S. 56 (where reference is made to other judgments of God).

Continuing the Bible story.

Sidkiah, one of hundreds of half-Jahwite prophets (22:11), punches Mikajehoe in the face (in protest against the claim; that the "spirit" of Yahweh has left him). (22: 24)) Mikajehoe now formulates the experimental nature of his faces and his predictions, "This you shall see (= induction), when you shall flee from house to house to hide." (22:25) An event is predicted (note that, in experimental science, by deduction from an explanatory hypothesis (abduction), an inductive event is predicted).

This makes possible control over the truth and life-value of the faces and words the prophet hears; more to the point, this control is explicitly provided for in the system (= collective structure) of prophecy and 'seeing' and 'hearing'.

As to date, even then the person concerned could not come to 'an objective', calm attitude. Apart from Sidkiah, who reacts with violence (the 'normal'(?) response to a prophecy of doom), Ahab, Israel's ruler, has the prophet imprisoned and "given bad food and drink" (22:27).

Mikajehoe again formulates the experimental nature of his action: If thou return unharmed (viz. contrary to prophecy), Yahweh hath not spoken through me." (22:28).

The diagnostic structure of divine judgment.

We can now gradually uncover a structure: the divine judgement is diagnostic, i.e. a clarification based on an operation, -- clarification namely of a statement concerning present and future facts. What we now outline very briefly.

(a)i. *The affirmative-predictive aspect.*
Two main examples:

1/ a kerugmatic (proclaiming) type (e.g. 1 Kon 18:1 / 46, -19: 1/18, where the Yahwistic prophet Elijah(s) challenges the Baal prophets as a prophet of Yahweh ("Show today that thou art God and that I am thy servant" (18: 36); cf. W. Quintens, *De wondere Elia*, in Collationes, 1971:1, p. 43vv. (The polemic with the cult of Baal));
2/ a Juridical type (viz. the oath in a sacred sense; cfr. F.Nicolay, *Histoire des croyances*, Paris, s.d., t. I, pp. 309ss. (The oath in ancient societies): there is a solemn affirmation of a truth with a promise.

(a)ii. *The imprecative aspect.*
Wishing oneself good (salvation, happiness) or evil (misery, calamity, unhappiness) is inherent in the divine judgment:
1/ the proclaimer, e.g. Elijah, takes it to mean that, if he speaks falsehood, the sanction (punishment, misery) will not, indeed, must not fail;
2/ The one who swears an oath does the same thing: if he swears falsehood, he wishes himself calamity..

("If I deliberately deceive, that then Jupiter cast me out of the city (Rome) and its fortress, where there is safety, as I cast (away) this stone" (Nicolay, o.c., pp. 311)).

This pragmatic (based on result of operation) aspect refers first of all to the committed, proclaimer or oath-taker, himself, - to his soul, his deeper 'I' and his 'dunamis', 'virtus', life-force, which he puts forward as commitment. In this sense, there is soul diagnosis.

(b)1. *The invocative aspect.*
In order to make the affirmation (affirmative aspect) and the commitment (imperative aspect) sacred, the proclaimer, resp. In order to make the affirmation (affirmative aspect) and the commitment (imperative aspect) sacred, the proclaimer, respectively the oath-taker, makes an appeal (invocation) to the extra- and/or supernatural ('holy') bodies and forces, as well as to its ethics and its lawfulness: the ancestors (pro(to)gonistic variant), the natural elements and their spirits (naturistic variant), the deities (the polytheistic, polydemonistic variant: one thinks of Jupiter in the Roman oath),- to the Supreme Being ((mono)theistic type).

Cfr. Nicolay, o.c., t. III, p. 173; in the Iliad 3: after plumping wine, the oath-taker says: "Make their brains and those of their children to flow away over the earth, like this wine, and their wives to be subject to the stranger" (the 'element' wine has its lawfulness, which is depicted in the destiny wished for); - in the jahwistic variant, 'n' a 'spirit' (as above) or an angel (1 Cor 10: 1/22 (the pernicious angel exterminates twenty-three thousand people)) is employed as the executor of God's rulings.

P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité*, II (The symbolism of evil), Paris, 1960, pp. 199 /217, mentions the 'evil deity', who, treacherously, acts in a blinding way (de.mentatio), but also in the Adam myth the 'serpent' appears, with Yahweh 's knowledge, (as a troublemaker). In short: the 'holy' is called upon - Jesus himself executes the judgment against Judas, ritually.

(b)2 *The judicative-sanctific aspect.*
The sacred, in one of its forms, is deployed in a special function, viz. passing judgment (judicative) and working out the consequences (sanctitive) of that judgment. In this way the deity c.s. purges the 'good' and the 'bad'. The so-called Matthew effect comes into play here: "He that hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have abundance. But he who does not have will be deprived of what he has" (Mt. 15:12); "Jesus said, 'For this judgment (krima) I have come into this world: that the blind may see, and the seeing may be blind'"(Jo 9;39).

So that the judgment of God is also dagnostic with regard to the sacred: it exposes the extra- and supernatural agencies and forces (krato-fanie; theo-fanie). Not only the soul of the invoker, but also the invoked reveals itself in their relationship.

The experimental structure of the judgment of God.

Twofold diagnostically (with regard to the God-relationship of the person in question) the God-judgment in its full form is also experimental, test.experimentally: the test of the 'sum' (i.e. the predictions) belongs to the judgment system. We will now explain this in more detail.

The four hundred or so false prophets claim: "The campaign succeeds"; the one true prophet claims: "The campaign fails".

A digression:

-- G. Daniëls, *Religieus-historische studie over Herodotus* (Religious-historical study on Herodotus), Antw./ Nijmegen, 1946, e.g. p. 174, claims that, in Herodotos' scheme of divine judgment, after what S. Freud called the Lustprinzip (the principle of lust), e.g. land-hunger of a prince) with 'hubris' (border crossing) resulting from it, a third aspect emerges (at the same time a third phase'), namely the 'sumbouleutès' (i.e. the counsellor, better: wiser, 'truth'-shyer). Well, here, in the midst of more than four hundred false 'warners', is just one 'holy rest', namely Mikajehoe, the true adviser. This is still the case today: among hundreds of commuters, card readers and other 'seers', there is often only one true God-fearing admonisher.

But let's look at what Herodotos calls the teleutè, the outcome, of the whole God-fearing event: 1 Kings 22: 29/38 tells us how, notwithstanding special precautions (clothing), the prince of Israel, by "someone who aims his bow at random", is hit between the seams of his armor: "But, because the battle was at its most fierce at that time, the prince had to remain upright in his chariot, although the blood from his wound sank into the body of the chariot. By evening, however, he had died. (...)

When the chariot was washed out by the pool of Samaria, where light kings were bathing, the dogs licked up his blood. Thus the word that Yahweh had spoken was fulfilled (1 Kings 22: 35/38).

It should be noted that *La Bible de Jérusalem* translates, "The dogs licked the blood and the 'prostitutes' bathed in it, according to the word that Yahweh had spoken. (One notes that this is a glosse, i.e., an addendum ("interpolation") that indicates what the base text is telling us: in this case, this glosse is very significant for those who know magic.)

The legal form of the divine judgment differs, experimentally, from the existential-historical form, described above, in that it is dramatically staged as a spectacle with audience and judges, who judge according to the outcome (the 'teleutè' of Herodotos).

Bibl. sample.: P. Nicolay, *Histoire des croyances*, t. III, Paris, s.d., pp. 173/229 (Les 'jugements de Dieu': description des différentes sortes d'ordalies).

-- G. Welter, *Les croyances primitives*, pp. 187/188 (saying that 'ordalie' comes from the Old Germanic 'or.dal', judgment, jugement);

-- A. Erler, *Der Ursprung der Gottesurteile*, (The origin of the judgments of God,), 1941;

-- B. Hermesdorf, *De herkomst der ordalia* (The origin of ordalia), in Tijdschr. v. Rechtsgeschiedenis, IX (1929), p. 271vv.;

-- Gert Chesi, *Vaudou (Force secrète de l'Afrique)*, (Voodoo (Secret force of Africa)), Paris, 1980 (= Voodoo, Wörgl, 1979), pp. 183/186 (Le jugement de Dieu; pp. 189/191: photos).

The ordinances (i.e., judicial judgments of God) were twofold:
a/ the strict ordinances by means of the elements (viz. fire trial, water trial (Nicolay, o.c., pp. 178/183), oil trial (ibid.),
b/ the two-fight (duel) d.m.v. the weapons (Nicolay, o.c., pp. 199/229 (Of the proof by the judicial fight or duel).

Nicolay, o.c., p. 173, calls both forms "superstitious practices" and, too rightly, notes however their very universal occurrence among all peoples of a certain culture type, as well as the "graciousness" with which even someone like Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, (Esprit des lois), in full XVIIIth century, writes about them: "The laws concerning judicial combat, concerning the glowing iron and the boiling water, were so in accordance with morals that these laws gave rise to fewer injustices than the degree to which they themselves were unjust,-that their effects were more innocent than their causes."

The judicial structure of the divine judgment may be outlined as follows:
(i) when judges were in doubt about (a) the guilt of defendants or (b) the legal basis;
(ii) the judges decided on a judicial trial or experiment **(a)** through the elements or **(b)** through the weapons so that 1/ the invocatio (invocation), i.e. taking as witnesses i/ the elements, ii/ the spirits, iii/ God, 2/ the imprecatio, i.e. using either the inanity (partial) or the life (total) of one's own flesh and blood, made it a decision of higher authority (sacred).

Nicolay, o.c., pp. 188ss. cites exotic topical examples, quoting Dr. Barret, *Afrique occidentale* (West Africa): "Whether in criminal or civil trials in the principality of Benin, the judgment of God is allowed whenever one of the parties makes the request. I am here, says Barret, using the expression "divine judgment" (jugement de Dieu) because it accurately captures the meaning of this usage and because this legal proof has also existed in our (Western) common law. The comparison between Negro-African and Western customary law, however alienating, does not surprise anyone who has traveled much: I have personally encountered this customary law in Abyssynia, among the natives in the Congo, and in the ancient law of all Asian populations."

Two comments:
(1) often the trial is only a sham god judgment (deception);
(2) from a magical standpoint, it is clear that deception can be made even greater.

Note - As every scribe knows, the Bible teems with examples of divine judgment in all its forms. But one should not think that this is exclusively biblical: all religions, even the so-called speculative eastern ones, have in time and again freed themselves from "the swam of speculations (i.e. mere hypotheses)" in order to "put in its place a teaching whose value and practical usefulness could still be tested in this life." (I. Horner, *Buddhism:* the Theravada, in R. Zaehner, ed., *Zo zoekt de mens zijn god* (This is how man seeks his God), Rotterdam, 1960, pp. 280/281 (even using the Pauline doctrine of the sowing-harvesting law (Gal., 6:7/8) in Buddhist version: "As the seed that is sown, so is the fruit that is reaped: the doer of good reaps good fruit and that of evil, bad." (o.c., 286)).

Note: There is 'a third form of divine judgment, to which we will refer very briefly, the liturgical one. St. Paul, 1 Cor 11: 27/32, describes it in relation to the Eucharist: "Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the chalice of the Lord in an unworthy manner, profanes himself of the body and blood of the Lord. Let each one therefore examine himself and only then eat of the bread and drink of the chalice. For, whoever eats and drinks, eats and drinks himself a judgment: if he does not value the body (of the Lord). Because of this (i) there are among you so many weak and sick, and **(ii)** so many have died." Immediately St. Paul introduces a precious distinction: "If we had judged ourselves truthfully, we would not be judged; well, if we are judged by the Lord, this is a lesson for us, not to be judged with the world."

In other words, there is "a warning judgment, which gives the opportunity for repentance (warning: cfr. Herodotus), and there is a condemnation "with the world" (which lies in evil), which is irrevocable, which means that, in the judgment of Yahweh, degrees are, as a process, which, over time, becomes irreversible.

That, for unreligious and for sleep-deprived religious people, this judgement-process runs so silently, is not the smallest aspect of the tragedy of our time: since German Idealism (Kant, - Hegel, Schelling, Marx), with its offshoots (e.g. existentialism and even structuralism), there has been so much talk of criticism of consciousness and criticism of ideology. Well, here St.-Paul offers an example of religious criticism of consciousness and ideology: "Whoever therefore thinks he is standing, see that he does not fall" (1 Cor 10:12).

W.E.Hocking, *Les principes de la méthode en philosophie religieuse*, (The principles of method in religious philosophy), in Rev. d. Mét. et d. Mor., 29 (1922): 4, p. 453, says: "It is not religion, - it is irreligion (non-religion) which is credulous towards natural phenomena. Religion is the invincible Unbelief (...) in the face of what seemingly shows itself".

The understanding structure of diagnostic-experimental method.

Scripture is thus clearly, like all religions, (diagnostically-)experimental. And yet: we have, deliberately, put one or rather the basic aspect in brackets (for the sake of clarity of description), viz. the 'intentional' (Du, 3: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, see consciousness as the 'orientation' of attention, 'intentio') and 'hermeneutic' (Me, 12/15: Dilthey's 'verstehende methode' as an interpretation of the expressions of one's fellow man) structure, which is at work whenever one dissects sacred facts.

Deut. 29: 1/5 puts its finger on the 'wound': "Now Moses called all Israel together and said to them, Ye yourselves have seen all that Yahweh has done before your eyes in Egypt to Pharaoh, his servants, and all his land: the great calamities, the signs and mighty wonders, which ye have beheld with your own eyes. -- but Yahweh has not given you a heart to understand, an eye to see, an ear to hear, until now." This means that there is more than one mode of encounter (intentio) with sacred facts.

Jo. 12: 37/45 puts the same finger on the same "wound": "Now though (Jesus) had wrought before their eyes so many signs, yet they believed not in him. This in order that the word spoken by the prophet Isaiah (Isaias) (Is. 53:1; 6:10) might be fulfilled: 'Lord, who has believed our preaching'? Who is the arm (i. e. mighty action) of the Lord revealed?" Therefore, they could not even believe: for Isaiah still said, "He has blinded their eyes, petrified their hearts. This is so that they would not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts; - so that they would not repent and I would heal them! These words spoke Isaiah when he had beheld His glory and spoken of Him".

This means that physical seeing, hearing, touching (perceiving) is a first step concerning religious experience; that understanding (the diagnostic aspect: discerning the extra- and especially the supernatural (divine) in the natural experimental event) is a second step, - depending on (a) the human being himself, with his limited freedom, (b) the extra- and supernatural operative body (spirit, Godhead, Supreme Being), who 'gives' you to understand (to 'see' in the second degree), who, if necessary, stultifying (see above pp. 44/45 (atè (Homer), spirit of lies (I Kings)) can work (which makes the second 'seeing', the actual understanding, even more difficult); - which means that both one's own effort (research) and 'grace' (it is given) go hand in hand here.

In other words, if, in and through the experimental sacred event, the direct contact with the outer and supernatural is not also present, there is no actual understanding of such, transempirical (E. Reichenbach) data. (Cfr. also Jer 5:21; Ezek 12:2).

For the 'stultifying' aspect (in the Old Testament) see G. Von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments,* Munich, 1960-2,II, S. 162/166 (Von Rad says that Isaiah, concerning the judgment of God, whereby He 'blinds, 'petrifies', 'stultifies' (and thus eliminates) man, was an heir of an insight, which, in Israel, yes, in the whole of antiquity, had an undisputed basis' (S. 164;-- yet precisely that 'angry god' aspect (P.Ricoeur) proves how human effort (autonomy) intertwines with grace).

For the 'mystical' (direct contacting) aspect: see G. von Rad, o.c., s. 314/321 (the 'apocalyptic' is a deepening of the direct contact between outer and supernatural, on the one hand, and, on the other, the one who establishes and (sees through) facts: the apocalyptic books (especially since the prophet Daniel) differ from the priestly ('historical'), the prophetic and the sapiëntial books from that point of view, in that paranormal faculties come more clearly into play.

See also H. Pinard d.l. B., *L' ét. comp. d. rel.,* I, pp. 463/471: since H. Delacroix, *Études d 'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme*, (Studies in the history and psychology of mysticism), Paris, 1908, the mystics, who have direct contact with outer and supernatural forces, have been in the spotlight, religiously speaking.

Pinard emphasizes understanding (verstehende method, Dilthey): "(...) The common 'law' of all friendship: one loves, one gives oneself in the measure that one is loved. If, therefore, the mystical life is an intimate converse of mind between Creator and creature, then its development depends on the growing purification of the heart, on the progress regarding generosity of soul." (o.c., p. 465).

Id., *Les analogies psychologiques*, (Psychological analogies), in Settimana Int. di Etnologia Rel., Paris, 1926, pp. 76/90 (Pinard distinguishes striking, ordinary and profound phenomena in mystical experience);

-- H. Bremond, *Falsche und echte Mystik* (False and real mysticism), (Jeanne des Anges und Marie de l'lncarnation), (Joan of the Angels and Mary of the Incarnation), Regensburg, 1955;

-- R. Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane* (An Inquiry into some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience, Oxford, 1957 (Zaehner sharply distinguishes between non-theistic mysticism (nature mysticism, pantheistic mysticism (often manic aspect of manic-depressive psychosis, he claims)) and theistic mysticism, which involves a personal-living deity; also addresses the so-called psychedelic drug mysticism);

-- Gerda Walther, *Phänomenologie der Mystik*, (Phenomenology of mysticism), Olten/ Freib. i.Br. 1955 (a very fascinating work by a phenomenologist, pupil of Pfänder; in the process she is aware of modern paranormology, - which is rare);

-- MM. Davy, dir., *Encyclopédie des mystiques orientales*, (Encyclopedia of Oriental Mystics), Paris, 1975 (ancient Egypt, Sumer and Hittite culture, Assyria and Babylonia, ancient Iran, India (Hinduism), Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, Yi-King-

mysticism, Confucian mysticism, Taoism, Chinese Ch'an, Vietnamese mysticism, Shinto, Japanese Buddhism, Zen).

-- A. Poulain, *Des grâces d' oraison (Traité de théologie mystique)*, (Graces of prayer (Treatise on mystical theology), Paris, 1901 (remains a classic; e.g. pp. 285/536 (Révélations et visions, - with the question of the distinction of spirits (i.e. the fluidic agencies at work in visions, revelations, etc.)).

-- A. Stolz, *Théolgie de la mystique*, (Theology of mysticism), Chevetogne, 1947-2 (Biblical-Christianity conceived).

-- J. Tyciak, *Morgenländische Mystik,* (Eastern Mysticism), Düsseldorf, 1949 (particularly fascinating introduction to Eastern church-fatherly-liturgical mysticism).

-- M. Buber, *Ekstatische Konfessionen*, (Ecstatic Confessions), Berlin, s.d. (anthology from Indian, Islamic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic and Christian mystics).

Two comments:
(i) P. Saintyves, *Le discernement du miracle*, (The discernment of the miracle), Paris, 1909 (a 'critical' book, which, among other things, forgets that 'miracles' without the direct cognitive contact side are 'critically' obscure), p. 293, briefly emphasizes the world flight of the 'mystical contemplatives', whom he contrasts, and rightly so, with the faithful who flock to the holy city of Lourdes, to live, to be healthy, etc..

Indeed, a certain tradition has turned direct contact with the outside and the supernatural into contemplation (one withdraws in order to 'contemplate' God (or what is He?), to 'enjoy', strange in relation to the misery which all the archaic religions both saw and tried to remedy with their miraculous magics). This does not prevent that real, life-bound, direct contact with outer and supernatural nature is at the core of all religious experience (and experiment).

(ii) The great problem is that of the distinction of 'spirits': "Beloved, do not believe every 'spirit', but examine whether the 'spirits' are from God. For many false prophets have gone out into the world". (1 Jo.4/1).- "The fruit of light consists in all kinds of goodness, righteousness and truth. Examine what is pleasing to the Lord." (Eph. 5: 9/10).
"Do not extinguish the 'spirit'; do not despise the prophecies. But examine everything and keep what is good." (1 Thess. 5:19).

Indeed, St. John gives a criterion (something by which one recognizes something): "He who keeps Jesus' commandments abides in him and He in him. By this, now, we recognize that He abides in us: by the 'Spirit' which He gave us." (1 Jn 3:24).

Indeed, if, in and through natural phenomena, by direct cognitive contact (understanding method), we are to 'see', then the distinction of 'spirits', i.e. of 'forces' (fluids, subtle substances), is decisive. This we shall discuss further in the course.

The pragmatist structure of experimental method.

The term 'pragmatism' originates from CS Peirce, who wanted to use it to oppose ordinary pragmatism (of e.g. W. James and others). - Pragmatism evaluates logical entities (ideas, judgments and reasonings) on the basis of the result, which results from applying them.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, evaluates logical entities on the basis of the result of their application, without calling into question their intellectual, thought-contentious character, on the contrary: Peirce is a conceptual realist; yet his theory of ideas is always applicable in self-experimentation. Both, the anti-idealist and the idealist pragmatism, are not only application-oriented, but take into account the well-being or unwellness that application or result entail. This means that they do not just think applicable-active, but evaluative- vital: if the result creates life, promotes life, only then is a logical entity (idea, judgment, reasoning) valuable.

This is the axiological-soteriological aspect of both kinds of pragmatism.
(i) Axiology means 'theory of value';
(ii) soteriology means salvation theory (salvation theory). In 1878, Peirce noted that his method "of making ideas ready" (see K.O. Apel, Hrsg., CH.S. Peirce, *Schriften*, (Writings) I, Frankf.a.M., 1967, S. 355) was the application "of the one principle of logic, recommended by Jesus, 'By their fruits ye shall know them'" and that it was "very closely connected with Biblical representations.

Peirce asserts that the rule of conduct, whereby one tests ideas by self-work-dadily constructed experiments, through abduction and deduction to inductive control en, a gradual process, by which man, in all his pitiful insignificance, is gradually more apprehended by the spirit of God, of which nature and history are filled.

We are convinced that Peirce is saying pure truth here. The
a/ experimental and
b/ 'understanding' character of religious justification (confirmation, verification) is always also salvific. If a religious experience increases the misery in creation, however brilliant it may be, it is negative; if, however, it reduces the misery (the 'evil' in the world), it has a good chance of being not only extra-, but also supernatural, i.e. strictly divine, in the sense of emanating from the Supreme Being - in the Catholic sense, from the Holy Trinity. This brings us back to our starting point (see above pp. 41/42: natural good (moral virtue),- extra-natural good (charismatic virtue),- yes, but above all theological. (Supreme Being-involved, supernatural) virtue only are evidential.

We now explain this in more detail.
Bibl. sample:
-- P. Saintyves, *Le discernement du miracle.* Paris, 1909, pp. 253 / 347, especially pp. 263ss., describes the 'miracle' in the religions ('power miracles' (cosmic in nature) in the Old Testament and in the non-Jewish religions; 'life miracles' especially resurrections of the dead in the New Testament; 'healing miracles' in all religions).

Then the work gives 'a criteriology' of the miracle: the history of religions gives us:
1/ the miracle as the work of inspiration or mission (by deities, Holy Trinity e.g.),

2/ the miracle as the 'operation' ('prestige') of initiates (with two types:
 a/ the temple priestly physicality with its optical, acoustic, mechanical (deus ex machina), chemical 'miracle-making',
 b/ the 'theöergia', i.e. the control of nature spirits ('deities' usually called), good as well as bad, by means of proper 'liturgical performances'),

3/ the miracle as the work of 'saints' (popular saints, that is).

-- RP. Guillot, *Les miracles du Christ*, in Historia (Les miracles), No. 394 bis, Paris, 1979, pp. 8/20, situates Jesus' miracle power in the ancient framework, in which the miracle was a universal fact (Hellas, the Semites), takes stock: thirty-two miracles in the whole; in that universal collection four subsets:

a/ fifteen physical healings ("concerning the most various ailments, the eternal 'miseries' of mankind", lame, limping, dumb, deaf, dropsy, someone with a withered hand, etc.);
b/ six incantations or exorcisms (an epileptic child, a hunchbacked woman, a syrophenic girl, dumb people, etc.);
c/ resurrections of the dead or rather resurrections (Lazarus, the son of the widow of Naim, the girl of Jairus, Jesus' own resurrection);
d/ natural control miracles (a/ the transformation of water into wine (Cana), two bread multiplications; b/ the miraculous catch of fish; c/ the 'going' on the sea, the stilling of the storm).

Of that total collection, e.g., ten are recounted by all three synoptists, one (the first bread multiplication) by all four evangelists, two by only three evangelists, five by only two evangelists, twelve by only one evangelist.

A. De Groot, *De Bijbel over het wonder*, (The Bible on the miracle), Roermond/Maaseik, 1961, p. 32 "All documents (...) unanimously indicate that Jesus a/ healed the sick, b/ raised the dead, c/ delivered those possessed of demons, d/ controlled nature in an omnipotent way. About twenty texts from the Gospels broadly mention that he performed many miracles. But in addition, a number of precisely described cases have been preserved".

W. Trilling, *Fragen zur Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, (Questions about the historicity of Jesus), Düsseldorf, 1966 (Dutch.: De historiciteit van Jesus, Bilthoven, 1968, especially S. 96/105 (Die Frage der Wunder);

Id, Christus' *Verkündigung in den synoptischen Evangelien* (Beispiele gattunssgemäszer Auslegung), (Proclamation in the synoptic gospels (examples of interpretation according to the genre),), Munich, 1969 (especially 146/164) (The signs of the Messiah's time: Mk 10: 46/52 (the healing of no blind people); - an example of a healing miracle' (not a natural miracle):

"Healing" indicates in any case something essential to Jesus' activity: (i) the saving encounter with Jesus of an individual, liberated from the "evil" in all its forms (ii) as an eschatological (= end-time) gift of God's kingdom. Jesus himself says of it: "Go and tell this 'fox' (meaning King Horod), Behold I cast out demons and perform healings, today and tomorrow (...) (Lk 13: 32)". (o.c., 153/154); further o.c., S. 165/190 (Judgment on the false lsraël), (Mt 21: 33/46), an example of 'masjal' (parable, parabolè)).

For the time frame in which Jesus is situated, as well as the first church: J. Danielou, *Théologie du Judéo-Christianisme*, (Theology of Judeo-Christianity), Paris, 1958 (the period between +33 and +200, so far poorly known, shows us a Christianity that remains thoroughly Jewish (and at the same time Semitic), dominated by the apocalyptic, - this before Christianity becomes fully Hellenistic (of which St. Paul's letters already testify)).

-- R. Schnackenburg, *La Théologie du Nouveau Testament (État de la question),* (Theology of the New Testament (State of the question)), DDB, 1961 (especially pp, 67/70; 'history of salvation', see also o.c., pp. 29/30.

-- J. von Hofmann, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Biblical Theology of the New Testament), (W.Volck), 1886, is the first to conceive of history as salvation or soteriological history in an absolutely biblical, indeed truly Jesus-meaning sense: one thinks also of O. Cullmann, *Christus und die Zeit (Die urchristliche zeit- und Geschichtsauffassung)*, (Christ and Time (The Original Christian Conception of Time and History), Zollikon/ Zurich, 1948).

Further description of pragmaticism.
Summarized again in clear terms: 'pragmaticist' means:
(a) ideas (concepts), if necessary expressed in statements (judgments, reasonings), - i.e. the doctrinal or doctrinal aspect, ('didachè' (Greek for doctrina);
(b)1/ tested by its result either the applicable life or the applicable experiment) (liturgical, legal, etc.),
(b)2/ judged at the same time by the quality of the result, i.e., sanctifying or unsanctifying.

We now explain this in more detail. = (a) The doctrinal aspect.
L. Ceriaux, *Jésus aux origines de la tradition*, (Jesus at the origins of the tradition), DDB, 1968 A. Descamps, Préface, in o.c., p. 11 emphasizes that Jesus' action is twofold: (i) in Galilee (proclamation of the Good News addressed to the multitude, which fails and results in Jesus' proclamation being limited to a limited circle (and even then in the form of a parable);

(ii) at Jerusalem (Passes of the Cross followed by Resurrection Passes); consequence: Christianity is a/ a doctrine and b/ a redemptive event; both points are carefully elaborated by Cerfaux.

W. Trilling, *Christus' Verkündigung i.d. synopt. Ev*., s. 40 / 63 (The message of the kingdom of God (Mk 1: 14/15: 'Repent, for the kingdom of God is at hand'); - "It is a theological editorial in particularly pregnant form" (o.c., s. 49),- i.e. here we are dealing with real, handed down doctrine, i.e. intellectually meaningful and in conscience binding contents of knowledge and thought o.c., S. 64/145 (promise of salvation and ethic-politics of the disciple (Mt 5: 3/12), a beatitude; (makarismos); the new and true righteousness (Mt 5 : 20/22), an apodictic and casuistic maxim of the law (with an ipsissima vox Jesu, a true Jesus word); God's mercy (Lk 15: 1/10), a parable (of the lost sheep), criticizing purely Pharisaic morality and politics; detachment t. v. property, as well as imitation of Jesus (Lk 18: 18/30), a doctrinal or doctrinal discussion, which includes three apocalyptic statements ("Verily I say unto you, a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven") and an apoftegma (oracle spell), as a conclusion).

It is clear that a/ all religions, b/ the old testament and c/ the whole new are doctrinal in the first instance (one thinks of the extensive mythologies of archaic cultures, especially in the rites), yet at the same time that we do not need to justify this further,-- so evident is it, except for the adherents of the 'irrational leap' (and even then: that irrational is unconsciously, very logico-teachingly founded).

-- **(b)1.** *The either existential-historical or strictly 'experimental' character of that doctrine.*
Bibl. sample: in addition to the texts cited above (salvific nature of history, therapeutic nature of most Jesus miracles, etc.), this: A. De Groot, *De Bijbel over het wonder*, (The Bible on the Miracle), p. 37, where he says, "In summary, the New Testament is unanimous in its view that the power to perform miracles;
1/ is not limited to the time of the public life of Jesus,
2/ but that this gift continues to operate in the church as well."

It is notable, however, that it is not given to every believer to perform miracles (1 Cor 10:29). This gift belongs to those who are very especially inspired by the Spirit, i.e.:
1/ the apostles and 'prophets' and **2/** those whom the Spirit still selects at random.

It should also be emphasized that the miracle **1/** is not merely confirmation and ratification of the 'ministry', **2/** but an essential moment of the preaching of the Gospel, (which aims to awaken faith in the saving revelation of God's power."

In other words: doctrine and miracle go intimately hand in hand:
1/ Whoever, therefore, preaches a doctrine without at least a minimum of "signs," and indeed signs of a miraculous nature, falls short of the gospel requirements of proclamation;
2/ More than that: he who writes off the miracles as "myths" (Bultmann et a.) or as popular fables (Marx et al.) is thereby in direct opposition to God's action in Jesus.

The inner coherence between ideas (= teaching) and its applicability appears not only from Jesus' teaching) and its immediately applicable nature, but also from the pagan religions, at least insofar as they are what one calls 'magical', 'dynamistic'.

A splendid example of this is Bolos of Mendes (+ -200), (who in his *Fusika dunamera*, i.e. not theoretically, but 'dynamist-magically' conceived physically, opposes the mere 'theoria', the purely speculative-philosophical study of nature, introduced in Hellas since the Ionic physicalists (natural philosophers) and particularly emphasized since Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastos.

Father Festugière, *La révélation d' Hermès Trismégiste*, I (L' astrologie et les sciences occultes), (The revelation of Hermes Trismegistus, I (Astrology and occult sciences),), Paris, 1944, p. 194, says: "This utility criterion is decisive. It best marks the boundary where two worlds diverge".

The three 'realms' - the inorganic (rocks, metals), the vegetable and the animal-human - are not approached as 'forms', present in matter and the object of theoretical considerations (as with Aristotle e.g.), but as power-bearing forms, in order to cause salvation (or in the case of 'black' magic or, also, negative divine judgement (see above p. 44/4;); Jesus also applies this procedure to Judas, the traitor: Jo 13: 26/30), calamity) with them.

But, besides these intellectual magics (neo-Pythagorean, neo-Platonic) of late antiquity, there are the ancient folk magics, with which even today the 'intellectuals' think they have to make fun, but about which the liberal Catholic P. Saintyves, *Le discernement du miracle,* Paris, 1909, pp. 293s, wrote: "All those sick people who go to Lourdes by train (...) do not go there driven by some idea of mystical contemplation; no: the thirst of life scorches their hearts, which are visited by sickness and disease. What, after all, can one do with a body that is weak and wretched, with which one cannot even earn one's daily bread? The sick have learned to detach themselves from many things; their feelings are weakened. But one feeling comes through more strongly from day to day; it takes possession of the last energies of their being: healed, still alive!

They were told that the Virgin Mary had saved incurables; they heard of many miraculous healings. And then: on a clean day, the will to life, supported by such stories, created confidence; a sense of hope burrowed into the hearts of their giving forces: they got ready and left." The 'enlightened' mind, which thinks it has to make fun of such life situations, even if it were in the name of (God knows what pseudo) science or (ideological) faith (as the pure anti-magical and anti-mythical minded theologians call their 'faith' instead of - magic-and-myth fideism).

- **(b)2** *The salvific character of doctrine.*

As Festugière says, the usefulness of doctrine is decisive. But not the usability without more: the salvific usability only decides.

We now make this clear briefly with regard to Jesus' performance. A. De Groot, *De bijbel over het wonder,* (The bible on the miracle), 1961, p. 32/61 (The miracle and the proclamation of God's sovereignty in the New Testament), develops basic ideas, which we will briefly summarize. We can record this in two schemata:

(i) First schema: the judgment schema.

The miracle-hand-in-hand with the teaching is a stimulus, to which the spectator can respond in more than one way (ambiguity; see Du., 24/31 (ambiguity doctrine): miracle --- = response (+) or response (-). See o.c., 55/ 61: "Clearly it is taught by Christ that the signs given by Him are enough for those who bring the willingness to believe. Whoever lacks this willingness and stubbornly resists, for him the miracle is of no avail." (o.c., 59).

More clearly, one cannot express the shear nature of Jesus teaching-and-miracle.-- This implies that the public-intrusive nature of experimental professional science is absent here, and it is wanted: to ensure the radical freedom of the observer; (see: EP, 12/15 (The Structure of Experimental or Hard Science).

However, this does not imply that there is no experimental (and therefore 'hard') aspect to Jesus' performance: "Experimentation is the art of provoking the showing of the phenomenon ... and of dissecting it into its elements." Thus CI. Bernard, Introduction à l' étude de la médecine expérimentale, 1865.

-- L.Millet/Br. Magnin, *Les sciences humaines aujourd 'hui*, (The humanities today), Paris, 1972, typifies professional science clearly and distinctly:

(i) science is 'positive' insofar as it describes publicly repeatable experiences without ideological or philosophical claim (see EP. 17/22 (Ideology Criticism); 23/27 (Philosophy); 28/30 (Theology)).

(ii) science is 'objective' insofar as it reflects the object, independent of subjective interpretation (cf. Peirce 's 'external permanence');

(iii) (a) science is observational, merely perceptive, insofar as it perceives, describes, compares (distributive , collective);

     (b) science is experimental, empirical, in so far as, starting from abduction (hypothesis), it arrives, via deduction (deriving experiments from that hypothesis), at induction (experiment with result pro or contra the abduction). (o.c., p.32).

It is clear that the critically-minded miracle spectator is
1/ can begin 'positively' (phenomenologically), **2/** seeks to see 'objectively',
3/ 'perceive' and, if necessary, 2/ 'experiment'.
Yet also the critically formed spectator of doctrine-and-wonder is 'judged', i.e. he is taken at his ethical-political behavior, that, hereby, causally (originally) operates and,

as a consequence, has salvation or calamity. As a result, there is a thorough difference between scientific perception and possible experimentation, on the one hand, and, on the other, religious perception and possible experimentation.

The 'atè' the judgment of God (see again and again supra pp. 44/45 especially) runs in tandem with the cognitive process, which fundamentally (as a knowledge event) is identical with it, but as a judgment process differs from it again seriously. Faith is not science, however scientific it may be! Faith is again and again also judgment. And thus more and different from, pure science.

Note A. De Groot, o.c., notes that "the miracles of the New Testament are not limited to Jesus" (p. 35). This implies repeatability (albeit to a certain extent now; but even scientific experiments are not infinitely repeatable).

(a) *Jesus clearly states them as repeatable himself.*
"When He had assembled His twelve disciples, He gave them power to:
(1) cast out unclean spirits (exorcism) and
(2) heal all sicknesses and diseases (therapeutic side) (Mt 10:1) Not only does Jesus give the "exousia," the power,-the disciples also exercise it: "Now he went around the villages in the surrounding area while learning. Now he went about the surrounding villages teaching them, and called together the twelve, sent them out two by two, and gave them power over the unclean spirits ...

They went and (i) preached that people should repent (doctrinal). They cast out many devils, anointed many sick people with oil and healed them (miraculously)." Again, the typical pragmatic unity of doctrine and effectiveness of that doctrine (all truth is causal). (Mk. 6: 6b/12.)

More to the point, John said to Jesus, "Master, we have seen one who does not follow us casting out devils in your name: we have forbidden him, because he does not join us! -- but Jesus said, 'Do not forbid him; for there is no one who performs a miracle in my name, and immediately thereupon can reproach me: he who is not against us is for us'" (Mk. 9: 37/39).

Compare this with Acts 19:13/18: the seven sons of a Jewish chief priest, Skevas (itinerant exorcists), once "tried" (experimental character) to call on the name of the Lord Jesus over those possessed by evil spirits, saying "I beseech thee by Jesus, whom Paul preaches: but the evil spirit answered them, "I know Jesus; I also know Paul. ' and the man with the evil spirit leaped upon them, overpowered them and mistreated them, so that they fled from the house without clothes and hurt."

Here one clearly sees the judgmental character: in some, the exorcism establishes salvation, in others, mischief.

The (unconscious) soul of the one who conjures plays a part. When his "dunamis" (life force) - Lk 5:17; 8:46 - is insufficient (for various reasons, especially friendship with God), such an experiment becomes fatal. All occultists know this perfectly well.

(b) *Jesus makes the teaching - and - sign power repeatable after his resurrection.*
"The following 'signs' ('miracles') will accompany those who have believed" says Jesus, at his Ascension (Mk 16: 17/18; again: exorcist, therapeutic, but now also cosmic (snake venom, poison is harmless) and 'charismatic' (speaking languages)). Again: not only does Jesus give the power; one sees the Church exercising it:

a/ apostles (Peter: Acts 9:36/43 (Dorkas); 9:33/35 (Aineias); accompanied by ear-dealing power: Acts 5:1/11 (Ananias and Safira die!). Paul: Acts 19:11 (hands, sweatcloths and girdles work exorcistically, therapeutically); Acts 14:8/20 (Lustra); Acts 28:1/6 (the viper does not poison Paul, as Jesus predicted); ibid. 28:8/9 (therapeutically); guided by ear-dealing power: Acts 13:6/12 (Elumas the magician is disempowered).

b/ Deacons (Stefanos (Acts 6:8 great miracles and signs); Philip (Acts 8:6/ 8; 8:26/40 (exorcist, therapeutic). See also Heb 2: 2/4 (emphasizing the judgmental character) -- One has in the Church, doctrinally faithful, believed Jesus' word on the subject; from that one has deduced the applicability (deduction to experiment); already living or already acting ritually one has experimented (induction); from the results one has experienced until today, if at least one still pragmatically takes up the Jesus message (and does not let it be absorbed in mere devotion, mystical contemplation, academism, concept play e. d.m.).

In this way one lives also today in this doctrinal-miraculous tradition and one can judge from what is still experienceable today, what two thousand year old texts say about Jesus and the primitive church (without much erudition about biblical texts). No better exegesis than this doctrinal miracle!

(ii) *Second scheme: the process scheme.*
So far we have considered the doctrinal-miraculous unit (= system) as judgment. Now the inner structure. A. De Groot, o.c., p. 38vv, rightly says that three names recur concerning miracle: **(1)** 'miracle' **(2)** with always either (miracle)sign or (miracle)power. The term 'miracle' shows the singular or, better, the extra- and supernatural character.

The notion of miracle (sign) signifies its informational-doctrinal character. The notion of (miracle) power denotes its effective-dynamic character. The miracle is a process, which explains itself (information) and creates effects (effect).

(I) The informative character.

(i) The miracle shows us Christ's being:

He is sent by God to establish the kingdom, the kingdom of God. Jesus comes to "baptize" with Holy Spirit and with fire: he "judges"; with the wan in his hand, he gathers wheat, while he burns the chaff (shifting).

"Judgment and Salvation are both preached: thereby judgment has a present character and Salvation is thought to be future." (A. De Groot, o.c., 51). "Seeing now his miracles, as the fulfillment of the messianic-eschatological prophecies, Christ holds out to John (the Baptist) that **(i)** healings, **(ii)** exorcisms of devils, and **(iii)** resurrections of the dead belong to the breakthrough of the kingdom of God." (o.c., 53).

"The miracle thus becomes the visible expression of a total restoration, - a sign that sin is beginning to lose ground" (o.c., 54). "(Jesus') word works itself, in miracle, redemption-producing. His miracles are kingdom of God in action. For Jesus not only proclaims the kingdom, but presents it in his actions." (o.c., 55).

In other words, the miracles belong intrinsically to what Jesus' task is: to establish God's Kingdom. They are not a superfluous thing: where they are not there (any more), there simply the Kingdom no longer begins, Jesus is misunderstood in his works. The misery, i.e. the reign of demons (demonic misery), the wildness of the natural elements (cosmic misery) bear witness to God's absence: however, the fact that Jesus "went about benefiting and healing all those who were possessed by the devil, because God was with them" (Acts 10: 38; Lk 4: 18/19), precisely proves (the beginning of) God's active presence, the exercise of his sovereign power in the person and work of Jesus.

Behind the leper, the possessed, the dead, Jesus discerns the enemy. The reading on the healing of the leper (Mk 1:14) is typical of this: "Jesus, moved by compassion ('fil.anthropia' says the Eastern liturgy), stretched out his hand to heal" or "Jesus, grim, wroth, stretched out his hand".

Both belong together: the pity of the bound man and the wrath of the destroying power,-a pity and wrath, which moves Jesus to tears (Jo 11: 33/38)." (o.c., 40).

(ii) *Concerning The Exorcism:*

Because of the emphasis placed on the exorcisms, it is not right to regard them as pure healings of the mentally ill. (...) To regard the mention of demons as the result of inadequate knowledge (i.e. of modern medicine) (...) does not do justice to the purpose of Scripture. When Christ addresses the evil spirit in a sick person, he starts from a different point of view than that of a physician or psychiatrist. He points out what lies behind the naturally observable. He recognizes, under the physical torment, the power of the evil one: Satan. This is not verifiable for science (...) He works through the natural and adapts to it (o.c., 48).

(iii) *Concerning the existential-historical miracle of Jesus' Incarnation.*
And this not without its cross and resurrection passages:

(A)1 *Jesus destroyed death by his death on the cross.*
They referred to the ancient Roman liturgy where it says that Jesus "destroyed death by dying (himself) and restored life by resurrecting (himself)": every magician knows what that formula means: after all, only by redoing a process oneself can one master that process (magically speaking at least).

a) Jesus is incarnated. I.e. he has repeated his earthly life, although he was the second person of the Holy Trinity.
b1) Jesus applied the word 'suffering servant of the Lord' (especially Isaiah (= Is) 49: 1 ff (Second and Third Song of the 'Ebed Yahweh')), at least according to the content of the text: He repeated the suffering, the misery, himself, especially in his steps on the cross:
(b2) Jesus applied the word 'Son of Man' (Dan 7:13: 'I "saw" in the night vision. Behold, coming on the clouds of heaven a.k.a. a son of man (i.e. one who belongs to the species of 'man')) applied to himself: he performed the resurrection, himself, in his own person.

c) Equally 'magical' is the solidarity between, on the one hand, humanity and, on the other hand, Jesus as suffering servant, who becomes glorified man(s): a magical exchange takes place. The 'experiment' of being human in misery (ebed Yahweh) grows into the 'experiment' of being human in glory, both for Jesus and for humanity in fluid solidarity with him.
On Easter Sunday the Byzantine liturgy, which reflects the archaic religion better than the Roman (with its secular juridicalism) cf. G. Dumézil)) says: "Yesterday I was buried with You, Christ; today (the 'hodie' of the Roman liturgy) I was raised from the dead with You who rose. Yesterday I was crucified with Thee: Thou, Thyself, let me partake of Thy glory in Thy kingdom, savior." (Paschal Canon of John of Damaskos, Ode 3).

(A)2 *Jesus' descent into hell.*
Jesus himself even repeated the 'nekuia', the descent into hell, which is characteristic of the misery of unredeemed humanity: "With the body you were in the grave, with the soul in the 'hades' (hell, underworld of unredeemed souls), as God. With the robber (i.e., the 'good' murderer) thou wast in paradise, while thou, Christ, art on the throne with the Father and the Spirit, filling all things, itself infinite." (From the troparia).
We therefore say in our Roman Creed every Sunday "who descended into hell", hopefully still knowing what that expression meant in the archaic-magical world.

Conclusion: the greatest miracle is the resurrection from the dead in glory, prepared by solidarity in misery, which is also intended by solidarity. Note: the resurrection of Jesus (and ours immediately) is not simply becoming alive again (in a miserable - earthly

way); it is different, glorified, becoming alive again. - Behold the miracle as sign, i.e. as message, know - and think content, centered around Jesus.

(II) *The effective character.*

A. De Groot, o.c., 42, notes, rightly so, that the four evangelists, though placing different emphases, yet all also emphasize "that God's power is at work in Christ," "that this is also expressed in the miracle stories." De Groot states as follows:

(a) The healing follows a word of power, a will.

(b) Jesus drives out devils with the commandment. "Be silent, and depart from him" (Mk 1:24; cf. 5:8; 9:25).

(c) He calms the storm by the power of His word (Mk 4:39). With a single word He heals a blind man (Mk 10:52), a withered hand (Mk 3:5), a leper (Mk 1:40; cf. Mt 8:16). Of course, the action, the gesture, are not lacking in the miracle either. Christ makes the sick person extend His hand (Mk 1:41); He sometimes touches the spot to be healed (Mk 7:32; Mt 9:29) and even uses saliva and ooze (Mk 7/33; 8:23). This has nothing to do with healing technique or magical manipulation, but is a characteristic underlining of the word and sometimes has a symbolic meaning. The healing, however, is not done by the gesture, but by the word". (o.c., 42/43).

With the latter we radically disagree: if the word or the gesture can be miraculously effective, it is thanks to the power ('might') in and through that gesture or word or the two together. After all, there are also 'empty' words and equally 'empty' deeds (gestures), i.e. non-powerful. These empty words and/or gestures can, moreover, underline (which is not yet an effective-miraculous phenomenon, but merely psycho-social). They can be purely symbolic (which is not yet a power-loadedness at all, but analogy in a psycho-social framework).

A false 'spiritualism', dating from late antiquity (neo-platonistic tendencies), always leads to minimize the incarnation, i.e. the incarnation of Jesus: Jesus also over-performed the magical-dynamic acts, while giving them a glorifying or resurrection sense, which they could not, indeed, have in the **(a)** folk magics**, (b)** temple physical magics and theurgies, because they are usually practiced outside the system of the kingdom of God. Yet nothing prevents Jesus who did transcend and glorify suffering and dying, from also transcending and redeeming the magics.

Why repeatedly speak disdainfully of what archaic humanity has mistaken as typical of a) the Supreme Being, b1) the gods, b2) the fairies and other nature spirits, insofar as

(i) these are 'force-laden', 'mana' (Polynesian term) or, as people like van der Leeuw (*Phänomenologie der Religion*) like to say, 'power'-charged and

(ii) employ this force or power, external and/or, if necessary, supernatural (i.e., in unity with the Supreme Being), to relieve misery (and thereby anticipate the Kingdom of God)? 'Only radical unfamiliarity with magic is the cause of this 'spiritualist' life and incarnation alienation here.

Incidentally: De Groot himself, o.c., 43, contradicts himself where he writes: "the power of Jesus' word reveals his participation in the creative power of God's word, through which the world came into being and is preserved (Gen 1:3, 6, 9; Ps 33:6, 9; 147: 18). Christ's work thus takes on the character of a new creation."

But that is exactly what all magicians mean, even the so-called initiatic (temple physicians or theurgists), as far as they do not practice 'black', i.e. anti-God magic. Once and for all one does not confuse 'magic' (universal) with 'unscrupulous' magic (private)!

"For many magical practices parapsychology may provide a better explanation than religious history or philosophy of religion. If the magician (medicine man) derives his power from God, perhaps magic acquires something like a religious character.

Father Placied Temples, *Bantu Philosophy*, Antwerp, 1946, writes that his Baloeba could not understand why the missionaries wanted to forbid them magic. 'Surely it cannot be wrong to make use of the means which God had given man to maintain and strengthen his life force'! (P. Schebesta, Origin of Religion, Tielt/ The Hague, 1962, p. 63).

A little earlier, speaking about the (otherwise radical and directly related to God's judgement) distinction between 'white' (conscientious) and 'black' (unscrupulous) magic, i.e. among the great mass of exotic (and among other primitive) archaic cultures, Schebesta says: "The life force comes from the highest being, who himself possesses the most 'power', thus is also the greatest magician and can do anything. (o. c., 59).

That in Israel - and indeed in Jahwist midst, - there was identically the same conception, proves Isa. (= Is) 44: 25/26 (and this in the form of the shifting of the God's judgment): "It is I who thwarts (d. i. makes ineffective), makes the predictors (soothsayers) work like madmen, makes the 'wise' (those who (magically) 'know') recoil by making their 'science' incomprehensible" (o.c.,25).

Up to there the god alien yes, god hostile magicians (in some of their functions: 1/ miracle power, 2/ foresight, 3/ law insight); And now the god friendly magicians: But who confirms the word (magical understanding) of his servants, makes the counsels of his messengers succeed" (26).

This is the true distinction of 'spirits': "Beloved, do not believe every 'spirit', but examine whether the 'spirits' are from God; for many false prophets have gone out into the world." (1 Jo 4:1). 'Spirit' means first of all exterior and (in a Biblical context) especially supernatural power (not until very late in the New Testament does this word mean the third person of the Trinity, incidentally the person par excellence of 'power') "This Spirit of God now controls the whole life of Christ." (De Groot, o.c., 47).

Yet in this two 'phases' can be distinguished:

(i) by doing over the misery itself, in the 'weakness of the flesh', from his conception in Mary's womb up to and including his hell-raising (viz, the end of crosses) - ancient, especially archaic man thought 'telluric' (and hell's journey is a 'telluric' phenomenon) - the 'spirit', i.e. the power of his divine nature (as the second person of the Trinity) was 'repressed', yes, 'suppressed' (though not entirely), as his miracles show);

(ii) by, however, overcoming the misery of the "flesh" in himself (as the prototype of a new creation and thus "for us" (pro nobis)), the "spirit", i.e. the power of the divine glory, as it appeared on the mountain (Thabor) in the transformation from its repressed and oppressedness for a moment, emerged in its full force in the resurrection. St. Paul brilliantly articulated this miraculous turnaround: "(Jesus is), a/ according to the flesh, descended from David's seed and, b/ according to the spirit of holiness, as the son of God, empowered by his resurrection from the dead." (Rom 1:4;2 Cor 13:4; Phil 2:7/11).

That Jesus accomplished this prototypically, as the founder of a new humanity joined to him, is what St. Paul's wonderful theology of baptism says: "With (Jesus) you are buried - through baptism. With Him you have also risen, through faith in the omnipotence of God, who raised Him from the dead. Even you, who were dead because of your sins and uncircumcised flesh, He has made alive together with Him." (Col 2:12/13).

It is therefore not surprising that the Church declares "Holy" those people who, before or after their death, produce miracles in which their extra- and supernatural "power" ("spirit" which they received from Jesus, especially as a result of their baptism) shows itself.

Jesus' teaching and miracle power ('spirit', 'strength', in which He, while beneficent, went about healing all those who were controlled by the devil, because God was with Him (Acts 10:38; cf. Lk. 4:18/19)) is visible and tangible-experimental in its way-in the 'saints' i.e. those who prove their life force in their miracles.

Cf. H. Delehaye, "*Sanctus*" in *Analecta Bollandiana*, t. 38, p. 175; id, *Les origines du culte des martyrs,* (The origins of the cult of the martyrs), Bruxelles, 1912 (in both works Father Delahaye, in a masterly analysis, (cf. N. Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, Leipzig, 1926-2, S. 56f., 180f.) exposes the semasiological history of the word 'sanctus' (holy), which, gradually more, means mere ethico-political exemplarism instead of miraculous power-ladenness). Cfr. N. Söderblom, o.c., s. 157/ 157 (*Religion und Magie*).

Conclusion: the pragmatic method (p. 54/66: doctrine of ideas, testable by its result) gives a conclusion about truth and life-value of that doctrine of ideas, here e.g. the doctrine (with praxis) of a religion.

The scheme is:

(a) doctrine is taken (abductively) as a hypothesis (i.e., as an explanation of the result of that religion);

(b) with a view to redoing that result, conclusions are drawn (deductively) from that doctrine, which are experimental-applicable;

(c) the experiment (either existential-historical (in full life: one lives by that doctrine) or ritualistic (in separate short magical experiments of liturgical, legal (ordinal), therapeutic, etc. nature)) is set in motion: its result gives a conclusion (inductively) about epistemological (= truth) and axiological-soteriological (= life) value of that doctrine.

Briefly repeated: **(a)** the doctrine (= ideas in judgments and reasoning) before the experiment (testing); **(b)** the doctrine (= conclusions look experimentally intended) before the experiment; **(c)** the doctrine in the experiment (the testing itself as judgment); **(c) bis** the doctrine after the experiment (the conclusions or inductive results).

Bibl. Sample regarding some aspects of the pragmaticist method.
(A) The misery doctrine.
-- (i) Psychological-sociological starting point:
The understanding method, about which higher (and in the methology), is the pre-eminent condition for being able to work religiously internalist, i.e. as an insider, insider; with regard to human care see C. van Peursen/ S Kwee, *Wegwijs in de wetenschappen*, (Wayfinding in the sciences), Rotterdam, 1966, p. 70:

-- Gendlin, *Schizophrenia (Problems and Methods of Psychotherapy),* 1964, departing from Roger's method of 'empathy', i.e. understanding and empathizing with the patient (who is stimulated to grow in personality), found that schizophrenics are 'silent' in a very peculiar way. The result: a deeper, much more profound 'empathy' or 'empathy' was needed; it is this deeper empathy, much needed in religious matters, that 'clairvoyants', 'sensitives' (what other names are there for the same cognitive processes?) possess.

-- Fr. Kallenberg, *Offenbarungen des siderischen Pendels (Die Leben ausströmende Photographie und Handschrift),* (Revelations of the sidereal pendulum (The life emanating photograph and manuscript),), Diessen v. M, 1921 (old but still excellent as an introduction to 'commuting', i.e. dangling objects. It is not because so many (unformed (and therefore idea-poor) commuters) spoil an excellent cognitive process, that its principle should be ridiculed.

-- R. Thetter, *Magnetismus, (das Urheilmittel),* (Magnetism, (the primordial remedy),), The Hague s.d.,-an excellent little work than begins with a long quotation from J.W. v. Goethe: "Magnetism is a universally acting force. Everyone possesses it except for some individual difference. Its workings extend over everything and over all cases. The magnetic force of man covers all men, covers animals and plants. Yes, man does not know what he is nor what he possesses nor what he is capable of. Because of this he is so miserable, so powerless and so clumsy".

This 'magnetic force' is nothing but one of the many forms of '(holy) spirit' (about which above): it is not only:

(i) it is empathic ('einfüllend' understanding), because, thanks to it, fusion takes place between the soul-body of the 'radiating' (of the magnetic force) and that of the met human being (plant, animal, object, landscape, etc.).

(ii) It is 'diagnostic' both of misery and of assistance;

(iii) it is saving 'pneuma' (as the ancient Greeks said), 'spirit', i.e. power, which destroys misery (effective side); concerning both commuting and magnetizing, however, all the rules of the game as briefly sketched above regarding the judgement of God (which is forgotten, indeed denied, in almost all manuals and systems of instruction without books, because people, unconsciously or consciously, present commuting and magnetizing as an art that is just learned like other techniques of a purely profane nature): outside the kingdom of God ushered in by Jesus, one does not know what one is doing, when one commutes or magnetizes;

-- W. Tenhaeff, *Auszergewöhnliche Heilkräfte (Magnetiseure, Sensitive, gesundbeter),* (Exceptional healing powers (magnetizers, sensitives, healthy-prayers)), Olten/ Freiburg i. Br., 1957: An erudite work, worthy of recommendation under very many points of view (except one; the judgment of God, which permeates all fluidic work, is not discussed).

-- C. Von Reichenbach, *der sensitive Mensch*, (the sensitive person), 2 Bde, Stuttgart, 1854/1855 is one of the first methodical works describing the 'sensitive' type of man. We will take this opportunity to briefly outline this actual and extremely thorough method:

(a) 'sensitive' is, in the first place, the person who feels more and differently than the non-sensitive: comic situations often betray this God-given gift (one cannot sit in any chair in church without uneasiness, if need be discomfort and nausea, e.g.); but pleasant situations also betray them (one feels comfortable in the vicinity of pleasantly radiating people, e.g.);

(b) the 'see(st)er' is, secondly, the sensitive who, in addition to the sensations just referred to above, also 'sees' 'things, processes', supposedly in his imagination (psychologists like to call this 'associations' or 'hallucinations' even, if these 'faces' appear as perceptions).

These are called 'hallucinations' when one does not oneself (internalistically) know these perceptual processes according to their cognitive value, albeit with always the same reservation, namely the realization that whoever 'sees', resp. wants to 'see' is directly confronted with the sphere of God's judgement: if God or his emissary, under whose authority the 'seen' falls, does not want one to see it according to his truth and (un)salvation, this will not succeed either (see above p. 44/45 (1 Kings 22: 1/38: more than four hundred (professional) seers actually 'see' only their own trickery of vision; one true seer, Mikajehoe, 'sees' the God-willed truth and Unholiness.

The ability noted in magnetizer Meyer's booklet (1825) to 'see' 'the fluid' (= 'spirit', 'pneuma', etc., also 'radiance' flowing from the magnetizer's fingertips, is only a first, very vague form of 'seeing' the 'aura' (i.e., the outgrowth of a person's life force).

The actual 'seeing' of salvation and calamity (= misery), the actual religious 'seeing' lies much deeper: only there does God's judgement make itself felt; this implies that Kilner- or Kirlian-photographs for example are just as superficial as the smooth 'aura' seeing noted by Meyer; religion is not a surface phenomenon, it is said once and for all.

This is called 'association' if one considers the connection (structure) between the physically visible and tangible things and processes and what, in the imagination (mind) of the 'seeer' emerges of unexpected (seemingly logical 'crazy' things, processes; seemingly morally 'reprehensible' things), interpreted purely in the mentality of Hume's 'associationist 'psychology', there where exactly God's 'enlightenment' should become active, which only provides the true interpretation of the relationship between those two, the empirical and the transempirical (so-called merely imagined) given.

Take e.g. someone is seriously ill:
(i) the academic physician analyzes the 'case' according to his 'books' and 'clinical experience' and 'heals';

(ii) the psychoanalyst analyzes according to *Freud's Traumdeutung* and other (meta- and in-depth) basic psychological therapeutic concepts (Oidipus complex, 'aggression', (repressed, resp. repressed) eroticism, etc.) and 'treats';

(iii) the commuter bends over the case: he 'sees' such and such diagnostic elements and 'treats'; or the magnetizer does according to his own method: what these three-four 'specialists' repeatedly forget, is e.g. what the Church (since St.- Paul onwards) is called 'original sin' (what the Hindu-reincarnists call 'karma'), namely an original guilt, contracted in another culture, in another earthly or extraterrestrial life, which still, according to God's ideas of guilt and atonement, has to be repaired by suffering the same punishment that was inflicted on others (remember what Jesus says: 'He who blasphemes against the Holy Spirit (i. i. God-given life force), does not receive forgiveness in eternity (Mk. 3:29) - understood as: 'but should atone with identically the same truth-restoring life attitude').

This is an application of what A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten testaments*, S. 8 /9 calls 'similia similibus' (replacing something by its equal). He gives the example of Num. 21: 6/9 (Yahweh has Moses, in order to be freed from snake bites, make a copper snake).

Let us return to our patient:
Supposedly he has ever done what Ezek. 13: 17/23 brilliantly, i.e. 'captured' the 'soul' (i.e. the bearer of one's holy spirit of creation), i.e. appropriated it in a black-magical rite (e.g. in order not to have to give his own life for a crime). Only when the victim does this with God - forgives him, he can remove his guilt, which he carries with him until the victim meets him and forgives him, he will be cured of his deadly (i.e. exhausting his new life-soul) disease.

If this 'recovery' (cf. the steering principle) does not take place as described above, then all possible healers will establish (the academic one most certainly) that for some mysterious reason (that's how it is called) the therapy does not succeed where, in other cases, it did succeed (and this inductively regularly even).

The reason lies in God's strict justice: whoever 'steals' someone's soul of life (however: black-magically by crime), will unerringly certain, at the time of his 'final' judgment of God, to restore it by the same (similibus). Reason: a sin against the Holy Spirit i.e. against the dunamis or life force, bestowed by God, for the security of life and the happiness of life, - something that is rife in all archaic religions, - is not forgiven either in this world or in the coming one without the co-forgiveness of the victim by the giver of life, God.

One does not play with the sacred, which, in the same archaic religions, is felt as destroying misery, yes, preventing it and bringing happiness (just as in the Bible): rightly N. Söderblom, *Das werden des Gottesglaubens*, s. 162, protests against Durkheim's misconception that the "sacred" (in Buddhism namely) is to be found in the four truths about "suffering" (i.e. the felt misery). No, says Söderblom, in the three escapes, "which are sharply opposed to the suffering inherent in existence and to misery."

Well, back to our sick, who does not heal:
A "see(st)er", who confronted with him, suddenly "as an association", "sees" behind him a face, where she "sees" him committing a murder in a Zairean jungle, are in the truth concerning the primordial guilt (which becomes "hereditary guilt" with the conception).

Only, baptism takes away the principle of guilt, though not, say the ancient theologians, its 'consequences'. Indeed, these 'consequences' must first be 'seen' and restored before the sick person can be healed.

The so-called 'association' is the key to the diagnosis. However, one can either simply not 'see' it, or one can 'see' it but not correctly, i.e. interpret it as the key of the divine judgment if one is not authorized to do so by Yahweh. That is 'charisma' (in the archaic sense, - not in the secularized sense of e.g. 'n Max Weber, who makes a purely sociological category of it).

Charism", however, is itself a spiritual, i.e. God-given life force made functional in the service of our suffering fellow man. That is why St. Paul emphasizes the charisms, gifts of grace at the service of mankind, at the same time as the ordinary moral gifts and, above all, as theological gifts, i.e. gifts of grace directly related to God.

Clarification by C. v. Reichenbach, o.c., 1854/1855: Tenhaeff, o.c., 27, notes that, if sensitives, for some hours, in perfect darkness, look around, all objects 'see' 'light'. This subjective 'seeing' merges with the objective 'lighting' within the intentionality of the charismatic's encounter with that which he 'lights through'.

However, whereas Tenhaeff draws attention to the blue color of the right hand that is oozing out and the yellowish-red color of the left hand, the charismatic who works within the Kingdom of God founded by Jesus sees much more, and this with the correct interpretation.

He sees first of all the fleshly soul with its usually yellow ribbons (what the acupuncturists call 'meridians') over the whole fleshy area, provided with luminous nodes (the energy centers), but also, almost always with splits (where injuries once occurred) and dark spots, which betray the removed energies.

When 'looking' deeper, the charismatic also sees the bone soul: this usually appears as a 'collection of cubes' where the bones are in the bone system (the color can vary from deep gold to stinking 'black', - the latter 'stinks', because, with the 'seeing', also the paranormal olfactory organ comes into action; this is unfailingly demonic).

Furthermore, the charismatic 'sees' the 'flames' of the brain's life force (what in India is called 'kundalini' or snake energy and which, in yoga meditation, is mobilized) which departs between the tailbone and the genitals. This 'blossoms', indeed, as Hindus have 'seen' since centuries, gradually opens in the neck in the form of one or another flower, which, at its root and lower stem, 'fights' with a dirty-gray mass, the vivifying 'force', which hostile people and/or spirits 'beam' into the life center of their victims.

Further, this brain life force stream, usually yellow-orange-red flaming (in this case of God-fear), exhibits seven (sometimes more sometimes less obvious) spinal channels ('shakram' called in India since centuries). Around the whole biological-physical body the charismatic also 'sees' the spirit exchange, usually called 'aura', with its various parts.

(i) First of all, the body-soul (so called because this form of 'spirit' is identical with the coarse material body form. After death it can 'appear' or show itself as a reflection in a mirror as a lifelike 'phantom', by which one recognizes the former earthly bearer.

(ii) Then follow the various 'radiation spheres', capricious and tawny in form (think of the kirlian pictures of e.g. healthy and diseased plants, which also possess such auras), by which the bearer both expresses himself and takes 'feeling' with the world surrounding him. Indeed, the aura or soul effusion draws in the environment: in the objects (especially the utensils and decorative objects), in the home, in the fellow man (especially the beloved or hated, for example: feelings 'invest' fluid (life force) in the objects intended by the feeling, which, in turn, influence the aura and the entire soul body (which can be seen, among other things, in the identical colors).

It should be noted that especially gendered feelings penetrate very deeply both into the desired object and just as deeply absorb the desired object into the aura and the 'gendered soul' of the person concerned. A charismatic seer, for instance, sees very well the fluid stamp of a sexual intercourse; the sexual soul or magnetism is one big radiating force field, the center of which is situated, approximately, either in the clitoris (in the woman) or in the glans (in the man) and shines (like the tip of the so-called magic wand of the fairies).

C.v. Reichenbach calls the whole of the matter of which all these partial souls of a subtle (rarefied) nature are composed 'od'. This word has a religious-historical meaning. He derived the word from the Old Germanic 'wodan' (or 'wuodin', 'odin', 'odan'), i.e. all-pervading force ('fluïdum', the Latin for 'flowing' (through everything)' is an excellent translation).

One compares this word with e.g. what G. Van der Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, s. 6, writes: "The 'dema' of the Marind-Anim (a tribe on N. Guinea). (...). 'Anything can be 'dema,' - any human being, any thing (...)! Dema are also the ancestors". The most famous internationalized word, however, is still the increasingly misused 'mana', a Melanesian term (V.d.L., o.c. 4: "It is a power or an action, non-physical and in a certain sense supernatural (here in the sense of extra-natural)...It manifests itself, however, in bodily force or in any power or ability, a human being's own.

Well, misery (i.e., informational (knowing and thinking) misery, the basis of preconstitutive (situated before the origin of earthly life) and constitutive misery, as well as of ethical-political misery) is clearly readable in the 'od' or life force, especially in the form of black-dark spots, which, of course, represent the exposed 'gaps' of the odic life force.

Normally the life soul (= odic life force or spirit) has a 'full' form, with colors that look good (orange, 'pleasant' red, blue, green, etc., yes, especially gold); once hurt, exhausted, drained, it shows 'pale', if necessary dirty-black or simply dark (difficult to 'see') colors, which, of course, need to be correctly interpreted.

This interpretation proceeds in phases:
The first stage is the feeling (the sense of value), - e.g. a pale spot feels unpleasant, if not unpleasant; or, even worse, especially in the case of hyper-sensitives, who are very charged and therefore very 'open' and mediumistic, this pale spot in the 'soul' of someone awakens phenomena of possession (i.e. when that spot is a natural spirit). when that sallow spot sends out nature spirits, which, having entered the hypersensitive, rob it of its normal self-control and induce (instead of latent) patent possession).

The second phase is that of the idealistic (comprehensible) interpretation: a pale grey spot, for example, is the result of a covetous erotic glance at a lady, who (what the ancient Greeks call) emits "empoesai" ("empoesen"); an "empousa" is a woman-shaped shadow of a fluidic nature, emanating from a vampirizing (i.e. the blood fluid or, as the Old Testament says, sucking out the blood soul) person.

So much for "a sampling" of the inner-soul gaps (misery symptoms). There are also the extra-soulful misery symptoms, namely the phantoms of evil beings. These decay into two types, among others:

a/ souls of the deceased, who linger in the aura of the living, e.g. to suck out their life force;
b/ 'spirits' from the world of nature beings, which the Church usually calls devils (which fall into different types: e.g. small nature spirits that have been satanized (though not so bad in themselves) and large 'evil' spirits, of which Satan is the first, though by no means the only one (or certainly not the most dangerous) in the line and which are 'misery-creators' by 'profession' (through their cynical egotism).

It should be noted that **a/** feeling (undergoing with feeling) and **b/** 'seeing' (the clear degree of sensitivity), whether or not accompanied by comprehensible interpretation, is not safe, indeed very dangerous, outside the framework of the kingdom of God, as founded by Jesus and as it was in an initial stage both in the God-friendly (theologically awakened) archaic religion and in the Old Testament, anticipating ('ex praevisis meritis', in virtue of merits (of Jesus as suffering Yahweh servant (Jes = Is) and of god-friendly suffering Yahweh servants)) on the New Testament spiritual mission with its charismata.

After all, evil forces and agencies, once one "feels" them, "sees" them, and, above all, understandably interprets them, strike back without mercy. Whoever, therefore, is not equipped by God to do so, should stay out of it.

-- (ii) *The theodicy,*

Since Leibniz, theodicy is that branch of theology (resp. philosophy of religion) which deals with the relationship between God and the "misery" in universe and humanity.

Bibl. sample:

-- RF. Sertillanges, *Le problème du mal (L 'Histoire),* (The problem of evil (The History), Paris, 1948 (a survey of the 'explanations' given to 'evil' in world cultures, from prehistory to the existentialists).

-- Nelson Pike, ed., *God and Evil*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964 (anthology : Pike, F. Dostoevsky, D. Hume, J .St. Mill., J. Mackie, H. McCloskey, N. Pike (Hume on Evil), N. Smart,-with bibliography).

-- P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité (I (L'homme faillible),* (Finitude and guilt (I (The fallible man),), II (The symbolism of evil (the most interesting part on the order 'stain/ sin/ guilt' and on the myths concerning misery (creation drama, tragedy, Biblical view, exiled-soul myth)), III (Le volontaire et l'involontaire (The voluntary and the involuntary), (a.o. pp. 350/384 (L'inconscient,-i.v.) Freud)), typically Protestant), Paris, 1960/1967.

-- G. Maertens, *God and Suffering*, in Collationes (Vl. Tijdschr. v. Th. and Past.), 1973: 4 (Dec), pp. 459/486 (neutralization attempts by means of certain attitudes (objectification, flight, defense); speculative meanings; valorization).

It should be noted dal such theodical reflections, while fascinating, depend heavily on the author's personal involvement in misery (his misery consciousness). One thinks of Bertrand Russell, who through contact with a suffering human being, i.e. A.N. Whitehead's wife, slips from a serene, academic tranquillity into emotionally chargedness! Only the direct method, with its 'understanding' of the miserable fellow human being as a 'me again' (Schopenhauer: Ich-noch-einmal) and this in God's realm, gives the correct 'theodicy'!

-- (iii) *The more direct misery-meanings.*

The consciousness of misery shows itself in certain religious interpretations of current movements : R. Michiels, *De materialistische Bijbellezing*, (The materialistic Bible reading), in Collationes, 10 (1980): 4 (dec), p. 442/465 (the Marxist-coloured Bible reading, advocated among others by the 'Christians for Socialism', has an eye for the economic-social basis of misery (and stands for political solutions).

-- Related: G. De Schrijver, *Bevrijdingstheologie in Europa*, (Liberation theology in Europe), in Streven, 49 (1982): 7 (Apr), p. 587/598 (the - socio-critical - analysis of the economic-social misery ánd in the Third World ánd in Europe, advocated among others by the basic movements).

-- Y. Spiegel, Hrsg., *Psychoanalytische Interpretationen biblischer Texte*, (Psychoanalytical interpretations of biblical texts), München, 1972 (articles by early and later depth psychologists)

-- Fr. Dolto, *L' évangile au risque de la psychanalyse,* (The Gospel at the risk of psychoanalysis), Paris, 1974,

-- A. Uleyn, *Exegese en psychanalyse* (Exegesis and psychanalysis), in Collationes 10 (1980): 4 (Dec), pp. 405/425 (with bibliography).

Already K. Marx saw the connection between misery and religion: "Religious misery is, on the one hand, the expression of real misery and, on the other, the protest against real misery. Religion is the complaint of the despairing creature, the mind of 'a heartless world.'" (*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einl.*), (On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction).

Immediately afterwards, Marx stigmatizes religion as the opium of the people, speaking from his materialist ideology; this does not prevent him from seeing that religion possessed misery consciousness.

Freud, as a materialist, of course writes off religion as (neurotic) illusion, although he also saw that religion possessed misery consciousness.

As a result, the starting point of the misery doctrine of Marxist dialecticians and psychoanalysts is only partially valid, also and especially where they, Christianized, engage in Bible reading and 'theology' (their secularism especially mutilated the right 'seeing').

Yet they have more 'sense' of misery than, e.g., the traditional historical -critics (A. Denaux/P. Beetles, *De historisch-kritische method*e (The historical-critical method), in Collationes 10 (1980): 4 (Dec.), pp. 387/404 (with the three stages: source-criticism, form-criticism and editorial history of the texts) and the text scholars in structuralist style (H. Servotte/L. Verbeek, *De structuralistische Bijbellezing* (The structuralist Bible reading), in Collationes 10 (1980):4 (Dec), pp. 426/441, with bibliography): both the latter are text-scientists, strong and irreplaceable, but often misery-averse, where dialecticians and depth psychologists, from the outset, read texts with misery awareness as 'glasses'; meaning either social or psychological misery.

Yet J. Moreno, *Who shall survive*?, New York, 1953-2; id., *Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama*, (Group psychotherapy and psychodrama), Stuttgart, 1973-2, e.g. S. 3, feels more thoroughly, to some extent:

"Man is a cosmic being. He is more than a biological, psychological, sociological or cultural being. To confine man's responsibility to the merely biological, psychological, or social sphere of life is to make him an outcast. Either he is co-responsible for the entire universe, for all forms of "being" and for all values or his responsibility means absolutely nothing. The existence of the universe is important: it is, in fact, the only thing of significance; it is more important than life and death of man as an individual, as a private civilization or as a species.

Following Schopenhauer's "will to life," Nietzsche's "will to power," Weiniger's "will to value," I postulated a "supreme will to value," which all beings perceive and which truly unites them. I therefore postulated the hypothesis that the becoming cosmos is the first and last existence and the highest value. Only that cosmos-in-formation can

give meaning and significance to the life of some particle of it in the universe - be it man or a protozoan.

Science and experimental methods, if they have any claim to veracity, must be applicable to cosmology. The therapeutic group, therefore, is not merely a branch of medicine and a form of society; it is at once the first step into the cosmos."

In terms of method, Moreno seeks a deeper approach: "However important language may be in the development of the individual and the group, it is always only the logicalized and syntactic form of communication" (o.c., 3). "A method was therefore needed to rejoin these experiences, the magma, the total, the 'surplus realities' peculiar to the super-language and the pre-language world, from which the linguistic world isolated itself as a part, with language in a synthesis.

The psychodramatic method attempted to fill this gap by developing a depth psychotherapy of the group (o.c., 4). Immediately following this, Moreno says: "The essential nature of modern group therapy introduces, into the group, problems which formerly belonged to the domain of religion" (o.c.,4).-- Above all, there is Moreno's thorough criticism of Marx and Freud:

"Marx saw the situation of man merely as a member of society; he saw the struggle in the womb of society as his final fate. Freud saw the place of man as that of a pilgrim between birth and death. It did not include the further cosmos.

It is our task in the XXth century to give man again his place in the universe." (o.c., 3). The triple root of Moreno's method is therefore:

(i) sociology (cf. his *Grundlagen der Soziometrie*, (Basics of sociometry), Köln, '1954);
(ii) medicine. His group is a psychotherapeutic group;-in sharp contrast to Freud's individualistic therapy and his method of conversation, Moreno's therapy was, already in 1914, psychodramatic, after archaic-religious models (o.c., 14 (where Moreno outlines the story of an ethnologist, who tells a therapy of Pomo-Indians));
(iii) religion: Moreno observes that churches and religions lose their grip through secularization and replaces them with a kind of universist religion (o.c., 2/3); this religious institution leads him to deepen the concept of misery; hence his thorough criticism of the purely socio-economic conceptions, namely the communist and the capitalist, which sometimes exaggerate the collective then again the individual side as the cause of the radical health of man:

"The oldest proletariat (...) consists of the victims of an intolerable, un-therapeutic order: it is the therapeutic proletariat. It consists of persons suffering from some form of misery: psychological misery, social misery, economic misery, political misery, racial misery or religious misery.(...).

The therapeutic proletariat cannot be "redeemed" by economic revolutions: it existed in primitive and pre-capitalist societies. It exists in capitalist and it exists in socialist societies. Marxism is an idea of the last century. The war of communism is an aftermath of the XIXth into the XXth century. It is the struggle for an idea, which has ceased to reflect the decisive conditions of life and problems of our time." (o.c., 7/8).-

Here is certainly a realization of misery which we make our own, except on one point: the universal religion of Moreno is all too unclear in relation to the concept of the kingdom of God sketched above. Also: the group psychodramatic method has gaps in its praxis, which, incidentally, Moreno also saw well. Only the charismatic form of that group psychodrama can succeed.

More religious methods are:
-- C. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, (Ancient incubation and modern psychotherapy,), Zurich, 1949 (the section on ancient temple medicine is solid; the Jungian symbolism is questionable);

-- Dr. J. Guilhot, *La psychiatrie morale et le problème de Dieu (Le renouvellement des methodes d' approche, du problème de Dieu)*, (Moral psychiatry and the problem of God (The renewal of the methods of approach, of the problem of God), Paris/La Haye, 1957 (including pp. 123 ss. on the tsedek psychiatry of Dr. H. Baruk).

-- W. Daim, *Tiefenpsychologie und Erlösung*, (Depth psychology and redemption), Wien/München, 1954 (the method is a/ phenomenological-hermeneutic, b/ yet deepened by depth psychology ('understanding the accurately grasped phenomena in their unconscious grounds' (o.c. 20/21)), c/ within the framework of an existentially deduced religious doctrine of salvation.

-- In this connection reference should be made to B. Bartmann, *Verlossing, zonde, verzoening* (Redemption, sin, atonement), Voorhout, 1934, especially pp. 109/115 (Modern errors concerning the redemption), Although obsolete, still topical: 'people' today are so eager to debunk both the idea of 'sin' and the idea of atonement. Daim practically does not make this mistake; that is the signpost of his too unbiblical and above all unarchaic book, which is much more 'therapeutic' than that of Dr. Guilhot, who constructs 'theory'.

(B) *The doctrine of salvation.*
We dwell very briefly on two types of way out of the 'therapeutic' misery, typified above by Moreno.

- (a) *On an extra-biblical basis:*
A. Gatti, *Bapuka*, Zürich, 1963 (Gatti is a physical anthropologist, has travelled through Africa on behalf of governments, but with an open eye and heart for Negro-African culture. One day he rescues Sakaimunga, who, out of gratitude, takes him to his native region (in Zambia and surrounding areas), Skaimunga's father is the 'priest' of Bapuka, a love and life goddess of a very gifted and high nature.

Gatti and his wife experience, thereupon, for years, that they enjoy both exceptionally effective guidance and protection and radiate morally-politically exalted influences, until, with the death of his wife, the goddess statue cracks and falls. - Something that is proof of the fact that, without charisma in God's realm, these arch-good beings utterly exhaust themselves in their life force ('dunamis') and thus, disempowered, fall into the hands of the 'high' (i.e. exceptionally cynically-powerful) evil demons.

Such deities (especially goddesses or highly gifted women from the world of nature spirits) are, after all, only safe if, within God's realm, they help people on this earth. (This only happens with extraterrestrials, who, like Bapoeka, are not sufficiently prepared for the type of man that has passed through both the Greek philosophies and the higher religions (more explanation in the coming year).

Michaela Denis, *Un léopard sur les genoux*, (A leopard on your knees), Paris, 1956 (book written by an actress who, together with her husband, caught the travel fever, especially in Africa: she allows herself, one day, in Central Africa, to be initiated into a secret society of dancing Negro-African women: she, with her husband, experience, thereafter, for years, the beneficent-protective and uplifting influence of this initiation, even though it is considered, by Catholic nuns, somewhere on N. Guinea, to be a 'pagan'. Guinea, as 'pagan' (heathen) (to which the same sisters immediately say that she 'lived much better than many Catholics'), but, again, the same: without a Godly framework such a thing continues until the death of one of those involved).

- (b) *On a Biblical basis:*
B. Bro, *De theologische activiteiten van Theresia van Lisieux*, (The Theological Activities of Therese of Lisieux), in Collationes 1973: 4 (Dec) pp. 502/526 (proposer points out the characteristic of the testimony of the 'little' Therese, viz. "She experiences her faith not only on the plan of 'life' (note here in the secular sense), (...) but as an anticipation of glory. (...). It is therefore very significant that some of our Orthodox brethren have identified with it.

Faith is about much more than humanism (...) No, through faith man is invited to come to a 'plus', - to be a child of God, to find a new status,- that of deification." (a.c., 514).

Cfr. I. Görres, *The Hidden Face (Sketch to a Life Picture of Thérèse of Lisieux)*, (The Hidden Face (Sketch to a Life Image of Thérèse of Lisieux)), Utrecht/Brussels, 1950).

(C) The judgment of God.
One work can be recommended: G. Daniëls, *Religieus-historische studie over Herodotus,* (Religious-historical study on Herodotus), Antw./ Nijm., 1946 (Herodotos' historiography is structured according to his understanding of the intervention of the gods, which is typically 'judgment-of-God structure').

For a quick orientation concerning biblical 'judgment' (or 'judgment', as one now likes to say in Dutch) see B. Alfrink et al., *Bijbels woordenboek*, (Biblical Dictionary), Roermond, 1941, p. 1169/1171, where 'judgment' is discussed under the two main points of view:

a/ the 'special' (understand: individual) judgment, which each person undergoes individually (e.g. Judas after the administration of the baptized bread at the Last Supper), - something which never happens totally individually and is therefore always 'private', i.e. concerns a small group of people around the person concerned (who are co-judged;

b/ the 'general' (universal) judgment, which 'the nations' and the entire population of the earth undergo; usually the time in which this planetary judgment takes place is called the 'day of Yahweh' (Is 2:12; 13:6, 9; Joel 4:14), whereby two aspects stand out, which correspond to the shepherding character of every judgment of Yahweh, viz. b/1 an entire destruction, accompanied by cosmic terrors;

b/2 a remnant, which survives and participates in the 'messianic or end-time miracles (a.o. the glorification of the resurrection); -- surprisingly, both 'judgment' and 'judgment' in B. Reicke/ L. Rost, *Biblical Dictionary*, Utr./ Antw., 1969, indicate as good as a few vague generalities.

(E)Bis *The apocalyptic method.*

The apocalyptic or revelatory method ('apo.kalupsis' = blotting out, revealing) consists in the fact that what the priests (in the mainly 'historical' or priestly books), the prophets (prophetic books) and the wise men (in the wisdom or sapiential books) - each species in its own way - bring up, is seen by the revelators:

1. on the basis of paranormal methods of knowledge (quite often 'visions', though also other forms of knowing),

2. In the context of divine judgment as it has been at work since prehistoric times until the end times, - and this both on this earth and in the 'other world', with a particular eye on the genesis (origination), development and outcome of misery (the 'evil');

3. both preceding points are always situated in the context of the Kingdom of God (see above pp. 54 (at bottom: supernatural), 56 (end-time gift of the Kingdom of God), 62 (conflict Kingdom of God/Satan), especially pp. 64ff. and 68 (situating paranormal methods of knowing within the Kingdom of God and the God judgment), 70/71 (charisma as theological psychic ability), 78 (doctrine of salvation)).

Bibliogr. sample:
-- S. AaIen, *Apokalyptiek en Apokalyptische boeken* (Apocalypticism and Apocalyptic books), in B.Reicke/ L. Rost, *Biblical Dictionary*, I, 94/97.

-- A. Robert/ A. Tricot, *Les genres*, (The genres,), in A. Robert A. Tricot, *Initiation biblique,* Paris, 1939, pp. 185189; 217 / 221 (L'apocalyptique).

-- DS. Russell, *Apocalyptic Literature*, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, 1967, 2, pp. 112/115 (where Daniel (O.T.) and revelation of Joh.(N.T.) are emphasized for the diachronic side).

-- Especially G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments,* II (The Theology of the Prophetic Traditions), Munich, 1961, S. 314/321 (Die Apokalyptik), 322 / 328 (Daniel); but, for a solid understanding of what von Rad says about apocalypticism, one should first read I (The Theology of the Historical Traditions of Israel), S. 415/438 (The wisdom of Israel's experience) and 439/451 (The Theological Wisdom of Israel),:

'Wisdom' is **a.** based on experience **b**. practically intended **c**. knowing concerning the laws (order-structures) inherent in the world and in the life of a society (o.c., 415); "empirical-speaking wisdom proceeds from the 'stubborn' premise that there is a secret order at work in things and processes, which, admittedly, only on the basis of great patience and through all kinds of painful experiences, becomes known and that this order is beneficent and just" (o.c., 419); "as the 'word' for the prophet is the very form into which he pours his speech, so the 'instruction' is this for the priest and the 'counsel(ing)' for the wise" (o.c., 428, where von Rad quotes Jer 18:18 verbatim).

Over time, in Israel, this gnomic-empirical wisdom developed into a didactic and theological system (o.c., 449); -- but its final growth is apocalypticism: "A final broadening of this sapiential theology occurred through its fusion with apocalypticism: one only perceives this change clearly in the most recent book of the Hebrew canon, the book of Daniel. The wise man also masters the secrets of the future. Thus this later wisdom is a phenomenon of amazing complexity". (o.c., 450). "Daniel is raised to be a 'sage' (Dan 1:3f.) and is therefore classed among the 'wise' (Dan 2:48); charismatic wisdom makes him fit for his dreaming (Dan 2:30; 5:11) and his book, which contains an 'almost crushing slant of scholarship' (O. Eiszfeldt (1956), culminates precisely in an apotheosis of wisdom teachers (Dan 12:3)" (v. Rad, II, S. 319).

In other words: the substructure of apocalypticism, since Daniel, is sapiential. The peculiarities of the apocalypticism of that time, such as symbolic language, secrecy concerning one's own identity, etc., are outgrowths of an unexplained psychic and contemporary type of man.

Transferred to our present time, apocalypticism can become a true method of hierosophy:
a) the pragmatic method (see above) is the sapiential foundation;
b) the psychic method of knowing, charismatically practiced, is the second layer in such a hierosophy.

Part II. The systematic account of archaic religion.
The concept of archaic religion.

Fundamentally, all religions (present and past) are divisible into two types, which are themselves only the expression of two sides of each religious phenomenon, namely:

- The 'empirical' or public-earthly side, which is accessible to just about everyone (the actual object of hieroglyphics in the strict sense, i.e. the description of the phenomenal or immediately given to everyone of religion);

- The 'transempirical' or hidden side, which is not so immediately accessible to the average believer or even the average hierophant; objectively speaking, the transempirical side decays into two thoroughly distinguishable aspects, viz:

(a) the idealistic (often called 'logical' or also 'structural' (structural) side), which, indeed, exposes the in-depth structures, i.e. the similarities and coherences that only come to light after logical-comparative analysis (see Lo. on the distributive (= collection) structure and the collective (= system) structure);

(b) the 'otherworldly' (also called 'sacred' or 'sacred') realities, as there are:
i/ the self-conscious spirits or 'intelligences' (nature spirits, souls of the departed, deities (gods, goddesses), fairies, monads,-the Supreme Being);
ii/ the 'power' or 'dunamis' (Luke's Gospel), which is the medium of magic and is rightly called 'magical power' ('power' (van der Leeuw));
iii/ the 'life', as the religions, at least the archaic-magical ones, conceive it, namely as the unfolding of intelligence and magical powers.

Thus one does not confuse the ideal with the sacred realities, as so often do the modern (and yes, even archaic already present) materialists, who identify other-worldly and ideal (understandable).

The archaic nature of a religion hinges on its 'sacred' or sacred aspect: those who intelligentsia, magical power, 'livingness':
a/ directly perceives them (as the 'seers' (visionaries) in any truly archaic religion do) or
b/ seriously incorporates into the mentality of those 'seers' who 'is' 'archaic' concerning religion.

Those who, however, only the empirical (public, earthly, inner-worldly) side:
a/ sees and
b/ takes seriously, with or without the ideal-logical side (that depends on the intellectual level), is typically 'secular' concerning religion.

Consequence: with great clarity, there is the right to classify religions into two main types, namely, the archaic-sacred and the secular-desacralized.

Since the scientific (hieroglyphic, hieroglyphic) methods mentioned above are in principle concerned only with the publicly accessible, the most essential data concerning secular religion have already been gone over.

However, the archaic data have already been dealt with too little (or secularly interpreted, i.e. misunderstood for too long). Hence this one-sided emphasis on the 'sacred' side.

Desacralization.

Before we address this, we very briefly specify the desecration - or deconsecration process that separates both types (sides) of religion.

Bibl. sample:

-- R.J. Werblowski, *Beyond Tradition and modernity*, London, 1976 (the demythologization (often synonymous with desecration) resulting in both secularization and politicization (one thinks of the purely socio-critical interpretations of religion e.g.) are dissected both melioratively and pejoratively).

-- Alasdair MacIntyre, *The Religious Significance of Atheism*, Columbia Un. Press, 1969 (the question here is:

a/ modernization, since the XVIII th, with its 'Enlightenment' (Lumières, Enlightenment, Aufklärung), implies scientism (science triumphalism),- as well as physical materialism (the denial of any reality except the grossly material-sensory one);

b/ this leads to agnosticism (not declaring oneself competent to acquire certainty concerning sacred realities) or atheism (disavowal of God);

c/ the question remains: is this naturalistic-rationalistic attitude to life of the Enlightenment such that religion is no longer possible or does it make a new type of religion necessary?").

-- Leroy S. Rouner, ed., *Philosophy, Religion, and Coming World Civilization* (Essays in Honor of E. Hocking), The Hague, 1966 (Prof Hocking, at Harvard until 1943, says: "It is time for the West to be reminded that man always has priority,-not machines, not money, not 'things'").

-- Ph. Ashby, *History and Future of Religious Thought (Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam),* Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963 (What are the vital and enduring elements in the world's religions?).

-- P. Berber, *Het hemels baldakijn*, (The heavenly canopy), Utrecht, 1969 (sociological).

-- Dr. Sperna Weiland, *Oriëntatie (Nieuwe wegen in de theologie).* (Orientation (New directions in theology)). 'An attempt, to make the inspiration speak for people for whom the traditional representations of the faith have become unclear or have disappeared altogether), Baarn, 1966-1;

-- id., *Voortgezette oriëntatie (Nieuwe wegen ...),* (Continuing Orientation (New Ways ...)), Baarn, 1971 (Paul Van Buren, Harvey Cox, Dorothee Sölle, Richard Shaull, JB. Metz, J. Moltmann, the neo-Marxist interpretation);

-- id., *Het einde van de religie (Verder op het spoor van Bonhöffer),* (The End of Religion (Further on the Trail of Bonhöffer)), Baarn, 1970 (Sp. Weiland is pretty much the Bible of the secularizing or even just secularist tendency, which, if it retains something of religion, calls this residual part: 'faith' (opposed to 'religion').

This runs in tandem with 'demythologizing' theology (R. Bultmann), 'honest' theology (J. Robinson) and the notorious God-is-dead theology (Altizer, Hamilton, Vahanian, Van Buren, Keen, - also called 'radical' theology),-not to mention 'political' theology (Moltmann e.g., for whom the essence of religion is a kind of social critique). In this respect the criticisms of religion are very diverse: religion is 'irrational' (Hume, Kant), 'unsocial' (Kant, Marx: 'opium'), 'infantile' (Freud), etc. (1) On the subject of religion, the following conclusions can be drawn

(1) *Concerning de- or demythologization:*
-- J. De Vries, *Forschungsgeschichte der Mythologie*, (History of research of mythology), Munich/ Freiburg, 1961 (general history of interpretation); Kerygma und Hythos (A theological conversation), I, Hamburg-Bergstedt, 1948-1, 1967-5.

-- R. Bultmann, the most notorious demythologizer, assumes that the New Testament worldview is a "mythical" worldview: "The world passes for interlocked in three levels: in the middle the earth, above it the heavens, below it the underworld. Heaven is God's dwelling place and that of the angels; hell is in the underworld as a place of torture; but the earth is not 'earthly': it is the sphere of activity of supernatural and extraterrestrial powers."
It should be noted that Bultmann here typifies the catechism-like and extremely simplistic popular form of religion: anyone who is really, internalistically, concerned with religion knows how 'simple' this three-storey conception is.

(2) *Concerning the metaphysics crisis:*
-- Max Müller, *Crise de la métaphysique,*(Crisis of the metaphysics,), DDB, 1953. Müller is a Heideggerian, but strongly scholastic: cf. B. Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, (What is metaphysics), Frankfurt a.M., 1949, in which the great fundamental-ontologist and existentialist interprets 'metaphysics' in his own unique way, i.e. very time-bound and very 'rational' and interwoven with theology).
Myth was once one of the formulators of archaic man (stories of deities and spirits, recounted in ritual settings or otherwise, concerning the salvation history of man). The awakening, in Greece (but also in India, China, etc.), of "reason" i.e., the critical faculty whereby man discovers laws (structures), preferably in the visible and tangible world, caused the "myths" to fade and to replace a metaphysics which was still strongly influenced by myth and theology.

Well, in the desacralization (also already at work in Greece in the Protosophical tradition, but especially in the XVIIIth century Enlightenment) the crisis of foundations, both of (theological-mythical) metaphysics and of mythology, means that the common root, the contact with the external and supernatural world, of metaphysics and myth is extinguished. Thus sacralization becomes antonymous with respect to religion.

It should be noted that, in addition to this corporate (concerning reality as a whole) and theological (concerning the deity) meaning, 'desacralization' also has a social meaning: transfer to the layman of what was peculiar to the clergy (e.g., secularization of church property).

(3) Concerning natural religion,

as the liberals, especially since the English Enlightenment, introduced them into Europe.

-- K. Leese*, Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion,*(right and limit of natural religion), Zurich, 1954, S. 15/44 (Die natürliche Religion von der Stoa bis zur Aufklärung).

-- RC. Zaehner, *Concordant Discord (The lnterdependence of Faiths),* Leiden, 1970 (the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, delivered at St. Andrews 1967/1969).

-- RT. Carroll, *The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edw. Stillingfleet* (1635/1699), The Hague, 1975 (the Cartesian idealism of innate ideas with its penchant for 'clear and distinct representations' and, somewhat later, the commonsensical empiricism that is: after the scholastic middle ages (with their theology mainly from the monasteries), revised the relationship 'religion' - 'reason' (reason now understood in a Cartesian and/or Lockian sense). It is clear that the fundamental crisis of the European-American religions with such a 'natural' (= rational) type of 'religion', in which miracles and mysteries, visions and transports are considered questionable, is fully at work.

The fact that the ancient Stoa with its physical and political theologies can be a model for this, proves that already in antiquity this fundamental crisis was at work).

(4) *Concerning the nihilistic degree of that crisis of foundations:*

-- D. Arendt, *(Die Anfänge des) Nihilismus*, ((The beginnings of) nihilism), Köln, 1970 From Jacobi to Nietzsche the mainly German intelligentsia draws the conclusion that, if God does not exist, nothing has absolute value anymore (and, in that narrow axiological sense, is 'holy', i.e. in principle inviolable) and founds ethics and politics. Instead of a fullness of high (transcendent) ideas, ideals and values now comes the 'great void' of a 'nothing' concerning ideas, ideals and values). Here God, the Supreme Being is seen only as the foundation of ethics and politics (which is a partial truth).

-- M. Heidegger, *Der europäische Nihilismus*, (The European Nihilism), Pfullingen, 1967.

-- J. Godsblom, *Nihilisme en cultuur*, (Nihilism and culture), Amsterdam; 1960 (culturological interpretation of nihilism).

-- V. Soloviev, *Crise de la philosophie occidentale*, (Crisis of the Western philosophy), Paris, 1947. Soloviev dwells on the positivist ideology, which, after the theological and metaphysical stage, which rationally articulate the traditional foundation of religion, sees lawfully growing a third and final stage, namely, the positive or strictly scientific,-which is one of the ways in which desacralization is captured in a theory.

Conclusion: desacralization has:

(i) it has undergone a certain development in relation to rational thought (philosophical and scientific);

(ii) it has taken different forms, the most striking of which we briefly describe bibliographically.

The core of it still remains what E. Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, (Life of Jesus), 1879-16 p. v/ vi, says: the "critical" (i.e., testing texts, "historical" authenticity and reliability, etc., for their value) study of the life of Jesus proceeds axiomatically:

(i) The miracles of the gospel are invented (mythical, fabulous, parabolic) stories;

(ii) the texts are not inspired by the Holy Spirit, but mere human editing (tradition-history). "These two denials are not, in our work, the result of biblical research; they precede it; they are the fruit of an experience which knows no lie: miracles are those things which never happen (...). No intervention of the deity either in the creation of a book or in any event has ever been proved." (o.c., vi).

The French (naive) clarity with which Renan, the skeptic, here posits his own secular (miracle-less and uninspired) "experience" as the only "critical one" and forges an axiom out of it, is quite damning! This is how the secularist reasons, if he dares to formulate his axomata.

(iii) Secularization has, over time, taken an aggressive form: G. Szcezny, *Die Zukunft des Unglubens*, (The Future of Unbelief), Munich, 1958 , ('unbelief' here means: a. the establishment of de-Christianization, b. professed or denominational atheism as an anti-Christian confession, which claims that the 'future' belongs to unbelief. It is already the case that a percentage of Western people, especially scientifically and technologically educated people, perceive the "mysteries as an annoyance" (which already St.- The post-Christian irreligion sees the theological religions or the scientific and political 'Erzatsreligions' (ideologies) as equally absurd in a completely materialistic universe, in which man is completely intertwined, yet with an adaptability that exceeds that of infrahuman beings (irreligious humanism).

-- G. Szcezny, *Religies antwoorden op eenendertig vragen van G. Szcezny* (Religions answers to thirty-one questions by G. Szcezny), Amsterdam/Hilversum, 1966 (Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, - though with the intention of underlining the diversity of the answers).

-- H. Schleite, *Skeptische Religionsphilosophie* (*Zur Kritik der Pietät*), (Skeptical Philosophy of Religion (On the Critique of Piety)), Freiburg, 1972 (those who take into account the Enlightenment, the religious criticism of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Sartre, the 'evil' in our epoch, must be 'skeptical').

-- B. de Lubac, *Le drame de l'humanisme athée*, (The drama of atheistic humanism,), Paris, 1945 (Feuerbach, Nietzsche,- Kierkegaard,- Comte,- Dostoievski).

-- H. Arvon, *L'athéisme*, Paris, 1967 (materialist and humanist atheism, especially philosophical -- soundly described).

So much for the essentials concerning desacralization.

Neo-sacralism. Bibliogr. sample:

-- M. Eliade, *La poursuite de l' absolu*, (The pursuit of the absolute), in l,'Express (01.09.1979, pp. 64/70), interview, in which Eliade discusses the recent hankering for things like yoga, zen, alchemy, myths, etc. Eliade discusses the recent 'hermeneutic' (i.e. searching for the 'meaning' of religious phenomena), points to the 'counter-culture' which is emerging within our scientific-industrial (or: post-industrial) society formed by the Enlightenment.

-- M. Eliade, *Méphistophélès et l' androgyne*, (Mephistopheles and the androgyne), Paris, 1962 (in the introduction, the author states that: **1/** the discovery of the archaic and exotic cultures (orientalism, ethnology, religious science) and

2/ the discovery of the un(der)conscious (depth psychology) are forcing traditional humanism in the West to undergo a thorough revision (broadening); among other things, he says: "It is not excluded that our epoch will go down in history as the first to rediscover the various religious experiences, abolished by Christianity when it triumphed" (o.c., 10).

-- M.Eliade, *Occultisme, sorcellerie et modes culturelles*, (Occultism, witchcraft and cultural trends), Paris, 1978, broadens what was said in the foregoing little work to include the "eruption of occultism (esotericism")" in the sixties (o.c., 79ss.); among other things, he says: "The historian of religion that I am, does not escape the astonishment aroused by the astonishing popularity of witchcraft in the culture and subcultures of the modern West" (o.c., 93). -- This leads us to conclude the dual notion of counterculture and neo-sacralism.

Counterculture:

This is that culture which, within the dominant enlightened, technological culture, taps into other than technological sources of knowledge and life.

-- Cfr. Th. Roszak, *Opkomst van een tegencultuur (Bespiegelingen over de technocratische maatschappij en haar jeugdige bestrijders),* (Rise of a counterculture (Reflections on the technocratic society and its youthful combatants)), Amsterlam, 1971 (Allen Ginsberg, Alan Watts (Orientalism), psychedelic experience, P. Goodman, etc.).

-- CA. Reich, *Bloemen in beton*; (Flowers in Concrete (The Greening of America: how the revolution of the young is trying to make America livable)), Bloemendaal, 1971 (including the pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial era; consciousness I, II, III).

-- *Politics or mysticism*?, in Tijdschrift v. Theology, DDB (Emmaus), 1973 (a social critical response).

Neo-Sacralism:

This is the resurgence, within the "enlightened" technocratic culture, of sacred experiences of a very diverse nature (see above Eliade's expressions and works), which, while tying in with archaic traditions, are, overall, innovative and incorporate modernity in a sacred sense.

Bibl. sample:

-- M. Choisy*, L' être et le silence*, (The being and the silence), Geneva, 1964 (a synthesis of psychanalysis and teilhardism, interpreted taking into account primitive and eastern religions);

-- J. Needham, *De nieuwe godsdiensten*, (The New Religions), Amsterdam, 1975 (nods to the 'California eruption': Hinduism, Buddhism, Sufism, Zen Buddhism, Meher Baba, Subud, transcendental meditation, Krishnamurti, Tibetan Buddhism, Gurdjeff, etc. are discussed (doctrines, organizations, leaders)).

-- J. Jongedijk, *Wat gelooft uw buurman?* (What Does Your Neighbor Believe?), Wageningen, s.d. (Quakers, Salvationists, Moral Rearmamentists, Free Catholics, Christian Community members, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Sufis, Spiritists, etc.). (exposition, conversation)).

-- Private: A. Pollak-Eltz, *Afro-Amerikaanse godsdiensten en culten* (Afro-American religions and cults), Roermond, 1970 (the West African religions (a/ Gold Coast (Ashanti), Dahomey (Ewe, Fon), Nigeria (Yoruba); b/ Congo - Angola (Bantu) are the root of the Afro- American neo-religions in South America (Brazil: batuque, candomblé, umbanda, xango, casa de minas, pagelança, macumba), Antilles (santeria, convince cult, myalism, vodoen, shango shouters), Venezuela (maria lionza), Suriname (bosnegers)) and in North America (Negro churches, hoodoo);

-- A. Gatti, *Bapuka*, Zurich, 1963 (an ethnologist comes into contact, seemingly by accident, with worshippers of Bapuka, a goddess of love and fertility; over time, the increased livability in harsh situations becomes apparent,-- In typical form of neo-sacralism (see also his *Tamtams in the night*, Antwerp, 1944 (more loosely written, but accurately describing African religious life).

-- S. and R. Leacock*, Spirits of the Deep* (Drums, Mediums and Trance in a Brazilian City), New York, 1972 (on the batuque in Belém, Braz.; the batuque, like the other African-American neo-sacralisms, is a typically medial (mediumistic) religion, where rapture, led by deities and spirits, is central.

-- S. Bramly, *Macumba* (Forces noires du Brésil), (Black Forces of Brazil), Paris, 1981 (an excellent little work, which reproduces interviews and allows a 'mother of the gods' (leader of the macumba ceremonies) to express herself unhindered,-which many ethnologists, with their axiomatic approach, do not do and which causes them to take an externalist approach).

-- G. Playfair, *Le pouvoir de l'invisible*, (The power of the invisible), Paris, 1975 (fascinating description of what is alive in Brazil in terms of psychics, especially in the midst of kardecist spiritualists).

-- J. Kerboull, *Le vaudou (Magie ou religion),* (Voodoo (Magic or religion)), Paris, 1973.
-- id., *Vaudou et pratiques magiques*, (Voodoo and magical practices), Paris, 1977 (missionary, who carefully studied the vodoe of the outdoors)

-- E. Rochedieu, *Der Schintoismus und die neuen Religionen* (Shintoism and the New Religions), Japans, Geneva, 1973 (8. 209/247: solid overview on the essentials of the more than three hundred registered neo-sacralisms in Japan).

-- D. Logan, *America bewitched* (The Rise of Black Magic and Spiritism), New York, 1973 (dwells on sunny, but even more on pejorative sides of North American neo-sacralism).

So much for a sample from a cluttered mass of data.

Conclusion of Overview.
Without a doubt, there exist two different sides of religion and, related to them, two diametrically opposed types of religion, the archaic-sacred and the modern-secular.

The bibliography indicated above already proves this without going into it. Before starting the study of archaic-sacred religion, a small word about the real reason for this discord: the structure of the God-judgment (not only, yes, especially not juridical), recognized as the structure without more of the religious process (see above), contains the reason.

After all:
a. the sowing-harvesting law (Gal. 6: 7/9; Ekkli (= Sir) 15:11/20) governs all causation, including religious,- namely, an inner retribution (immanent sanction) is at work in every part of creation and in creation as a whole. This makes the effect of the cause bear witness, that the cause in its effect undergoes its 'judgment', and that 'judgment' which it has itself caused.

b. The shifting, i.e. 'crisis', as the New Testament Greek language says, takes place on the basis of that immanent lawful sequence 'cause/ effect'.

c. God does not reveal Himself unambiguously, but univocally; that is to say, on His part there is complete unambiguity, but, on the part of the recipient of His message, there is the possibility of misunderstanding or of a correct understanding of that message. That is why all accurate thinking minds have the impression that 'religion is so 'dark', 'mysterious', 'cryptic', etc., but they have only grasped the earthly-secular side: the divine-transcendental side is unambiguous for those who 'have a heart to 'see' (as Moses said to the Israelites) (see above).

d. this implies that that decipherable message, by virtue of its plurality, more than adequately indicated above, is an on-the-top-shelf of the one to whom God (or his emissaries, who are plurality) is addressing. God puts "heart (conscious side) and kidneys (unconscious side)" to the test. He fathoms them, according to Acts 1: 24, where, in choosing the replacement for Judas, the traitor:

(i) relies on the fact that the candidates were indeed with the disciples, "beginning with the baptism of John until the day when (Jesus) was taken from us (= Ascension)" (ib., 21/22),

(ii) yet realizing that while that condition was individually necessary, it was sufficient only with one other together, namely, that God makes the choice and does so as a thoroughbred of heart and mind. Thus God lays bare the innermost nature of the creature, and the God judgment which separates sacrals from secals is one (perhaps the chief) form of God judgment,- fearful in its consequences.

After all, in addition to the general-religious components present in just about all religions (God, angels, demons, heaven, hell, purgatory (underworld distinct from hell proper), illuminations (visionary, auditory) and miracles (healings, exorcisms, nature control) there are the specifically-Christian components:

a. The divine pre-existence of Jesus as the second person of the Trinity,
b. The virgin birth, divine and also messianic self-consciousness of Jesus, his miraculous and prophetic activity in the framework of the Godhead, foreseen by the Old Testament prophets before the end of time, the divinely willed passing of the cross together with the historical fact of his glorification in resurrection and ascension (resurrection passes), his historical return at the end of time in 'power'.

These two types of sacred data are eliminated in modern-secular interpretation, even if one then tries to reintroduce or "save" them, in one form or another, usually symbol-fideistic (i.e., the religion-free "faith" (fideism) sees in them "symbolic references to purely earthly realities" (symbolism)).
The German faithful said that Bultmann was not doing 'Interpretation' but 'liquidation'!

II A. The encounter with the sacred.
This little chapter deals with two aspects: the method and the object.

IIA.1. The epistemology of the sacred.
We first explain the method or subjective approach by means of two comprehensible applicative models.

Model I.
L. Chochod, *Huê la mystérieuse*, (Mysterious Hue), Paris, 1943, pp. 295ss., gives a splendid example of hieratic experience following his account of the An-Hôi pagoda at Annam. Steller refuses "to believe that the deities of which he has just spoken only 'really' existed in the imagination of the Annamites."

He specifies: "When an Annamite has a dream, which for some reason causes him to regard it as really unnatural, or when a somewhat extraordinary incident happens to him, he builds a small straw temple where, according to his feeling, the occult power has revealed itself, and he celebrates a sacrifice there.

The event becomes public, acquires significance and generates a tradition, which is supplemented and develops in smaller or greater modifications. More is not needed to create a new deity or, more precisely, a new symbol of 'supernatural power'. Hence the titles 'Ngoc Fhu Nhan', 'Chua Ngoc', 'Thiên Fhi Ngoc Nu' (also a goddess name: o.c., 293), 'Duc Thanh Me', etc., which determine nothing 'accurately' and are applicable to a crowd of genii, demons or demigods."

One sees that the author thinks strongly occultist (and in that sense is open to a sacred experience), but is just as much Western 'accurate' and, at once, tends to understand what the Annamite 'sees', 'experiences', as a 'sense' of a vague concept of 'Supernatural night' (in a dynamist-magical sense).

He is, however, honest when he states that not only a dream, but a motive which makes that dream to be extra- and/or supernatural is decisive (dream, 'reason' are separately necessary, jointly sufficient conditions).

The same: an occurrence in itself is not sufficient; there is 'something' more needed for that occurrence to pass for 'out of the ordinary' (occurrence, 'something more' are separately necessary, jointly sufficient conditions).

It should be noted that the author is correct in conceiving of the imagination as the organ of perception of the sacred in the Annamites: however, one should not confuse imagination with in.imagination;

All people with solid sacred experience (**a.** life force, **b1.** sensitivity, **b2.** seeing and **b3.** interpreting; see above p. 67/69) know that extra- and supernatural realities and processes come through in the imagination, which is the organ of those things. If sufficiently critically trained or, failing that, if sufficiently acquainted with the consequences of their 'perception', they will make a sharp distinction between imagining, i.e. 'visualizing' (eidetic capacity) (the working of) extra- and or supernatural realities, which are sensed, and imagining, i.e. the totally self-willed creation of imaginary data without real contact with extra-subjective realities. Every magician in particular knows this distinction.

Model II.
Mt 2:1/12: "When Jesus was born at Bethlehem (Judah) in. the days of King Herod, behold: then there came magi (magoi) from the East at Jerusalem. They said, 'Where is the prince of the Jews, who must have just been born? For we have seen his star in the east and have come to worship him.

Now when King Herod heard this, he was dismayed, and all Jerusalem with him. He called together all the chief priests and Scribes and asked them where the Christ would be born. These said, "In Bethlehem of Judan for thus it is written by the prophet (Mik 5:1), "And thou, Bethlehem, land of Judah,-thou art certainly not the least among the 'chief places' (clans) of Judah;-for out of thee shall come forth a prince,-who shall lead m a nation of Israel."

Then Herod secretly summoned the magi and questioned them closely about the time when the star had appeared to them. He sent them to Bethlehem, saying, "Go and inquire diligently about the Child, and when you have found it, report it to me, so that I too may worship it: When they had heard the king, they went away. -- And behold the star which they had seen in the east went before them until it came above the place where the Child was, and there it remained standing.

When they saw the star, they rejoiced exceedingly. And, when they had entered the house, they found the Child with His mother, Mary. They fell down on the ground and worshipped it. They opened their treasures and offered it gifts of gold, frankincense and myrrh. As they had been warned in a dream not to return to Herod, they went to their country by another route.

For an externalist, both the (appearing) star, which they had 'seen', and the 'dream' with the warning will have existed only in the imagination, as just before for Chochod what the Annamites had 'seen', 'felt', as extraordinary or non-natural. Renan, the skeptic, says that "miracles" and "inspirations" (the two key phenomena according to him concerning religion) "do not exist.

Let us leave aside the dream.warning (for the sake of the lack of data). For an internalist, Matthew's text is instructive; after all, the pragmatic-experimental structure of an evolved sacred experience is briefly indicated in it. The persons involved are 'wise men' ('witches', those who 'know') or more accurately translated 'magicians', i.e. Eastern soothsayers (who bore as their name the name of a tribe of the Medes, known for its sacred functions) (Jer 39: 13; Dan 2:48; 4: 6; 5: 11); in the days of Jesus star wizards (Is 47: 13) and 'chaldeans' (Dan 2:2) were considered to be scholars (here the 'wise men' from the East. One distinguished somewhat from these the magicians in the proper sense (Simon (Samaria: Acts 8:9, 11) and Barjezus (Cyprus: Acts 13:6,8)).

Now, these astrological scholars: **(i)** 'see' a star, which 'appears'; this 'eidetic' experience, in the imagination as experiencing an objective reality, in contrast with a subjective imaginative one is **(ii)** accompanied by an interpretation: that star 'is' the 'sign' that a prince of the Jews has been born and, what is more, a command (to go and see and worship him).

Apparently the threefold structure of the miracle is present here: a. miracle, b1 sign, b2 power. Something paradoxical is striking here: these pagan astrological scholars, know before 'Jerusalem' and its ruler Herod, that something extraordinary has occurred!

On the basis of this face-experience-with-indication, they undertake the journey: the confirmations do not fail to come.

a. The prophetic writings of the Jews confirm something like 'the birth of a prince over Israel' in Bethlehem (cf. 2 Petr 1:16/21, where the transformation corresponds to prophecy);

b. the eidetic experience repeats on the spot (Mt 2:9) to their very great joy;

c. the finding of Mary with her child "confirms" in the physical order.

In other words: the "first sight" (ordinary-sensory seeing) confirms the preceding "second sight" (second sight, zweites Gesicht).

Conclusion: Freely the magicians entered into the miracle sign; their departure has, epistemologically, the character of an experiment that deploys:

(i) on the basis of a first observation (with induction), namely the 'seeing' of the star, with the interpretation (abduction),

(ii) they decide (deductively) to venture to the Jewish Land;

(iii) once the journey was completed, they encountered three confirmations (the second observation, i.e. the experimental one, together with its induction or result).

It should be noted - what Chochod neglects - that also in Annam people reason in this way: they quickly sense whether at the place where the straw hut temple is erected, there are further signs. This is why we spoke of an expanded sacred experience: many so-called "critics" simply do not deal with the further sacred experiences which follow the initial sacred experience (if professional scientists only dealt with the observational or perceptual stage without the experimental stage, the same criticisms would apply).

To be noted here is the distinction between purely symbolic phenomenon (viz. the star as the star of the birth of a monarch) and truly sacred phenomenon (viz. a miraculous or extra- and/or supernatural power, which possesses a sign character (is informative)): 'signification' is the mere reference in the mind (mentality) of the magicians; 'power' which is more-than-natural and has sign value' is an extramental reality, which is testable on more than one plane (eidetic, prophetic, physical). The secularists simply confuse these two radically different types of reality. For internalists, this distinction is primordial.

It should be noted that the Patristics understood the Matthew text more or less in this spirit: "(An unusual star appears; thereby) the One who gave that sign also gave the insight"; "and, what He made to see, He also made to seek, and, once sought, He also made to be found". (Pope Leo the Great (*Sermo 1 de Epiphania*)).

Now we briefly consider the regulative structure (model) of those two applicative models, mainly through a bibliographic sampling (for lack of time).
-- MM. Moncrief, *The Clairvoyant Theory of Perception*, London, 1951:

a/ the traditional, versta, secular interpretation of perception.
This assumes ordinary sensory experience:
1. a physical-physiological process conditions the arising;
2. from that process arises, however, a representation of the perceived in us;
3. once to that point, the perceiver comes to consciousness of it;

Three main difficulties:

(i) The transition from mere physical-physiological to proposed and conscious order;

(ii) The pictorial character or one-sentence relationship between the thing and/or process outside us (extramental) and the conscious representation within us (intramental).

(iii)a. The direct or, as the Austrian school (Brentano, Meinong, - Husserl) called it the 'intentional' or encounter character of perception ('I see you coming' is a direct experience, even though it is divisible and analyzable into aspects and phases);

(iii)b. the occult or, in a softened sense, the paranormal perception (e.g., clairvoyance is a proven fact, denied only by ideologues and biases).

These three-four difficulties remain, in the traditional interpretation, a Fremdkörper', i.e. one has to go beyond them in order to be able to 'integrate' them, which means that the axioms of the classical explanation are necessary but not sufficient; up to there the psychophysiological explanation as inadequate, together with extensions of it;

b/ the 'clear', 'paranormal' view.

This departs from both an immediate (intentional, phenomenological) and a paranormal structure in order to 'explain' both ordinary, non-paranormal and paranormal perception (i.e. to put forward as axioms the separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions).

Moncrieff's precursors are

(i) HH. Price, the introducer of the work;

(ii) H. Bergson (who moved away from the mere theory of images);

(iii) Hans Driesch, *Alltagsrätsel der Seele* (Everyday riddles of the soul), (1938) ("The I, according to its capacity, is and remains fundamentally universally clairvoyant; its topical clear 'seeing', however, was curtailed and bound to states of that part of its body called 'brain', in that the I could not otherwise live because of the overabundance of 'faces'.

Occasionally, of course, in the paranormal, the original universal form of grasping the other breaks through." (o.c., 38).

With Moncrieff, the lucid (paranormal) degree of perception is the first and ever-present form of perception: it is immediate (encounter, being directly with things and processes, 'compresence') and is not caused by the physical-physiological process; this process is selectively limiting, - especially attuned to the biological needs of all days.

It goes without saying that Moncrieff here casts into modern form an ancient insight that occurs to all religious and magical experiencers as evident.

-- J.P. Vernant et al, *Divination et rationalité*, Paris, 1974: divination is far from being anti-positive; it is the first form of subjective scientific thinking (which is clarified

using data from the Chinese, ancient Mesopotamian, Greek, Roman and African cultures and carries Moncrieff's thesis through to the epistemological level.

Regarding paranormology proper:
-- H. Driesch, *Parapsychologie* (Die Wissenschaft von den 'okkulten' Erscheinungen (Methodik und Theorie)), (The science of 'occult' phenomena (methodology and theory)). Zurich, 1952-2: In preface to JB. Rhine, a study by H. Bender (paranormology from 1930 to 1950),-- then Methodik (recognizing deception and error; recognizing the irreducible phenomena) and Theory (role and structure of a necessary and sufficient 'theory'; overview and criticism of existing theories).

-- B. Visser, *Parapsychology* (feiten en hypothese), (Facts and Hypotheses), Maaseik,: two chapters: **a.** the paragnostic phenomena (paragnosia = paranormal knowledge); **b.** the parergic phenomena (parergy = paranormal event).

-- G. Murphy, *Parapsychology*, Utr/ Antw., 1963 (spontaneous and experimental cases; clairvoyance; foreshadowing (precognition); psychokinesis (= parergy, paranormal physical observable event; afterlife; interpretation).

-- J. Feldmann, *Okkulte verschijnselen*, (Occult phenomena), Brussels, 1938 (a still solid work, which distinguishes between psychic and physical phenomena,- discusses the general theories (bedrog hypothesis); animistic (= psychophysical and purely psychic) hypothesis; spiritistic hypothesis; demonic explanation); comprehensive, also culture-historically conceived study of **1.** telepathy and clairvoyance (the two cognitive processes) and **2.** spirit apparitions and ghostly phenomena (two parergic processes).

-- Y. Castellan, *La métapsychique*, (The metapsychic), Paris, 1955 (historical review: a. the precursors (Mesmer, Reichenbach);

b1 the Anglo-Saxon school (Crookes, Gurney, Myers, with the two associations: Society for Psychical Research (Eng.) and American Society for Psychical Research, and the first quantitative experimentation);
b2. the classical-European school (Flammarion, Maxwell, A. de Rochas, Boirac, Dr. Geley, Dr. Osty, Richet).
b3. Dr. Grasset (the metapsychika (= paranormology) and the general epistemology).
b4. the (then) metaphysics (Rhine, Carington; polyzoism and polypsychism; 'fourth' dimension; physiological hypotheses on telepathy; CG. Jung).

-- J. Björkhem, *Die verborgene Kraft (Probleme der Parapsychologie),* (The Hidden Power (Problems of Parapsychology),), Olten/ Freib. i.Br., 1954 (parapsychology epistemological; telepathy and clairvoyance; psychometry (clairvoyantly indicating something while groping); spiritual healing and miracle curing; hypnosis and crime; English spiritualism; 'automatic' (transported) writing and language speaking; telekinesis and materialization (materialization is the sudden

weakening and sudden physical presence of objects); explanations; the second part contains experiments and documents).

    -- R. Ashby, *The Guidebook for the Study of Psychical Research*, London, 1972 (solid little encyclopedia, with foreword by Renée Haynes);

    -- S. Smith, *ESP (Buitenzintuiglijke waarneming)*, (Extrasensory Perception), The Hague, 1974 (ESP = Extra. Sensory Perception or extrasensory perception; the booklet deals with paragnosia as distinct from PK (Psycho-Kinesis)).

    -- A. von Schrenck-Notzing, *Grundfragen der Parapsychologie*, (Basic questions of parapsychology), Stuttgart, 1962 (republished by G. Walther: a. psychic phenomena, b. physical mediumism (materialization phenomena, etc.), c. ghost phenomena, d. necrologies (Liégeois, A. von KeIler, G. Geley, K. Gruber);-still fascinating).

    -- Lyall Watson, *Natuurlijk of bovennatuurlijk (Een nieuwe, originele benadering van vreemde verschijnselen en hun plaats in de natuur),* Natural or Supernatural (A new, original approach to strange phenomena and their place in nature), Baarn, 1974 (a. the cosmos, b. matter, c. mind, d. time, indicating a new view, compared to ordinary parapsychological books).

    -- Concerning the Soviet Union (and Eastern Bloc countries): Sh. Ostrander/Lynn Schroeder, *Parapsychological discoveries behind the Iron Curtain*, (Parapsychological Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain), Haarlem, 1972 (Russia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have done pioneering work in the paranormological field, albeit from a Marxist-materialist hypothesis).

    -- H. Gris/W. Dick *Les nouveaux sorciers du Kremlin (Deux enquêteurs américains font le point sur la parapsychologie en URSS)*, (The new wizards of the Kremlin (Two American investigators report on parapsychology in the USSR),), Paris, 1979 (completes previous work).

    -- In addition to the Eastern Bloc, Brazil also provides groundbreaking work: G. Playfair, *Le pouvoir de l'invisible*, (The power of the invisible), Paris, 1976 (especially in the medial (= mediumistic, mediumnic, mediumistic) field, under the influence of kardecist spiritualism (Allan Kardec, *Le livre des esprits*, (The book of spirits), 1857, is the inspiration of a spiritualism that is very social (clinics, orphanages, homes for the elderly, vocational training centers, schools, care of the poor)); in 1939, the Spiritist Federation of the State of Sao Paulo was founded; with the giant spiritualist center of Rio de Janeiro (Tupyara), it is impressive as a medical achievement);

    -- At last one sample from the recent experimental direction:
    -- J. et Chr. Dierkens, *Manuel expérimental de parapsychologie*, (Experimental manual of parapsychology), Tournay, 1978 (the book runs in tandem with the Movement for Human Potential and its offshoots; it is encyclopedic).

    -- *Parapsychologie: Schijn en werkelijkheid*, (appearance and reality), Dossier, in Cultural Life 45 (1978): 10 (Dec), pp. 866/920 (disparate set of articles, the most fascinating of which is J. Walgrave, *Verklaringsmodellen van de parapsychologische fenomenen* 'Explanatory models of parapsychological phenomena) (a.c., 901/911)).

    Note. **(i)** It is worth noting that, in 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, a fierce struggle arose between the depth psychological (and physiological-psychological)

explanations (called 'animism' by Aksakof), which placed the root of paranormal phenomena in the individual or (as Jung put it) in the 'cosmic' (also: 'collective') unconscious, on the one hand, and, on the other, the spiritualists (Du Prel, von Aksakof), who attributed them to souls of deceased persons.

(ii) One distinguishes well the following subjects of epistemological nature:

a/ from the psychology of consciousness to the psychology of the un(der)conscious (others also distinguish a superconscious) there is a step; the depth psychologist starts from conscious phenomena - e.g., slipping up, neurotic symptoms like a vague anxiety, etc. - to, from there, infer (deductively) to un(der)- or superconscious 'factors' (variables), without seeing, feeling, hearing, etc., himself.

b/ From depth psychology to parapsychology there is again a gulf, epistemologically speaking: many depth psychologists don't accept what parapsychologists do accept, namely in so far as the parapsychologist doesn't start from ordinary psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry, but from occultism, as it has been living since time immemorial (but especially since the Renaissance, in Western Europe).

The parapsychologist wants to isolate, from occultism (methodically interpreted as non-scientific), those phenomena (and their explanation) which go with either a strict natural scientific (preferably experimental) or human scientific method.

The rest - that which of occult phenomena is scientifically inaccessible (including the non-public side) and inexplicable - is banished as negligible; - but here too deductively, i.e., from observable and/or experimentable, public (accessible to all) phenomena, conclude to no longer phenomenally given 'factors' (changeable ones).

If, accidentally for him, the parapsychologist himself were to see, hear, touch, etc., these phenomena, his colleagues-scientists would write him off as no longer 'scientific'; reason or cause: science as public is secular, earthly, 'diesseitig'.

Conclusion: Religion and magic (and occultism) are too direct as cognitive-practical data to be public-scientific; only the indirect externalist method is 'scientific' tenable. Both depth psychology and parapsychology escape this 'sin', but, because of it, they condemn themselves to the indirect method, i.e. externalism.

(iii) Reference should be made to Dr. Phil. Encausse, *Sciences occultes et déséquilibre mental*, (Occult sciences and mental imbalance), Paris, 1958 (The method of transport, as often practiced by spiritists, and magic, as it is in fact often, lead to mental and/or physical ailments. The meliorative use of religion, magic, etc. should not make one forget that there is often a pejorative use. This implies that religion and magic in the sacred sense are not without dangers; this is one of the reasons for secularization.

Without the framework of the kingdom of God, it does not always go, and then a profound degree of kingdom of God! I.e. one banishes from this God Realm all elements that do not belong in it!

In this pejorative context, two systechies should be noted: 'ana.normal/ kata. normal, and 'trans.a.scendent/ trans.de.scendent'. If 'normal' corresponds to what corresponds to the goal orientation, then 'ab.normal' is that which deviates from that goal orientation and 'para.normal' is that which does deviate but higher than normal' (ana.normal) or lower than normal' (kata. normal), which is said with Latin words, 'trans.a.scendent' (ana) or 'trans.de.scendent' (kata).

If one dwells, for a moment, on the causes of catanormal occult or religious processes one comes across 'soul-capture' ('prendre au piège les âmes' says la Bible de Jérusalem), as is so accurately outlined in Ezek 13: 17/23.

Soul-capture' means that one, consciously or, what happens much more, unconsciously exhausts or even sucks out the 'soul', i.e. in this case the 'dunamis' (Luke), the life force (the magnetism) ('to suck out' is to empty to the bottom, so that one can speak, as religious historians like to say, of 'lost soul' or 'loss of soul' (o. m. Ivar Paulson, *Seelenvorstellungen und Totenglaube bei nordeurasischen Völkern,* (Concepts of the Soul and Belief in the Dead among North Eurasian Peoples), Ethnos 1960, H. 1/2, S. 84/118)).

Such "soul-searching" (an Egyptian term) is the typical work of:
(i) black, i.e. abused magic,
(ii) which is itself inspired mostly by satan (or 'demonia' in the pejorative sense). If one looks at this process purely externalistically, then one sees either black-magic bloodletting rites ('red magic') or equally black-magic sex rites ('sexual magic'). The reason is that the partial soul (private magnetism) which is either in the blood-vessel system or in the erotic-sexual system (the oral, anal and especially genital parts of the body constitute its three main zones) 'works' most powerfully, i.e. is efficient, 'effective'. But about that later.

If one looks at the matter differently again, this time psychologically (again externally), then what is called "seizure" or "possession" (Ergriffenheit, Besessenheit) arises, i.e., some degree of disintegration, "Selbst.ent.fremdung", "aliénation".

Even such innocent-looking practices as (self)hypnosis, purely by the fact that the person involved either dominates or is controlled to such a degree that the controlled 'is no longer himself' (the typical de-selfing phenomenon), are radically satanic and/or black-magic.

The same with the 'mediumistic' religions in e.g. Negro-African or Afro-American milieus: the mediums are 'ridden' (chevauché(e)s) by 'spirits', 'deities' who suck, only then to release what they 'want' (authoritatively) to communicate in the way of healing, advice, clairvoyance.

Consequence: First they make their 'mediums' 'manic' (agitated) and then they leave them exhausted and thus 'depressed'.

This also applies to spiritualism, insofar as it makes use of medially gifted people who must allow themselves to be 'ridden' (as the Flemish folk say of the 'mare' or nightmare).

Equally pejorative work the psychotherapies, which allow either the famous 'aggression' ('thanatos') or the equally famous 'eros' free rein: there the manic-depressive seizure (possession) proceeds at the expense of the quiet self-possession, so to speak because, in the disassociation and anti. culture (*Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*), through which the pleasure principle escapes the reality principle, seemingly more 'self' than 'under the pressure of civilization', the hidden, un(der)- or superconscious 'truth' concerning the true 'being' (the 'self' or whatever one calls it), comes to the surface.

Certainly where one 'handles' 'eros' not in a Freudian-psychic sense, but in a Reichian-energetic sense, one falls into all the patterns of medial demonism. We shall return to this.

Epistemological conclusion:
All these 'techniques' ('methods'):
(i) Reveal, 'reveal' (apocalupsis) indeed ánd truths concerning the self implied in it ánd truths 'for others' or 'for the situation', in which that self finds itself;
(ii) conceal, like the transported sibylle (at Delfoi and elsewhere in the oracle sites investigated by Herodotos (to the number of sixteen), to deceive, at least in part and not to release the 'hold' on that same I.

Rightly wrote Kostas Axelos, *Le Logos fondateur de la dialectique*, (The founding Logos of the dialectic), in A. Marc et al, Aspects de la dialectique, Paris, 1956, pp. 125ss. (The bright and dark future): "Héraclite d'Ephèse - créateur du terme même filosofos (fr. 35) – is the first great hero of the philosophical tragedy. And he writes: "The Sibyl who, with her delirious mouth pronounces serious things without adornment and without make-up crosses (...) thousands of years (animated by the Divinity (...). The Master, whose oracle is in Delphi, does not speak, does not conceal: he means". (D. 92, 93). The final words bear out, "The Lord (Apollon), whose oracle (divine speech) is at Delfoi, does not conceal without more, nor does he reveal without more: he gives 'sign'."

One is familiar with the biting criticisms of logicians like Bochenski of the dialectic (of Hegel and Marx) as being a completely logically invalid form of language.

Well, the same (no other) criticism also applies to the above-mentioned 'methods' of approaching 'occult' (unconscious, superconscious) and/or sacred phenomena: whoever goes that way, goes the endless, never-finishable way of the dialectic at work in such techniques as **1.** (self)hypnosis, **2**. 'mediumnism', **3.** free - associative and at the same time anti-cultural therapies.

Note: Semasiological: one often says 'parapsychology'; much better would be 'paranormology', for paranormal phenomena are paraphysical, parachemic, parabiological, parapsychological, parasociological, etc. The term 'metapsychica' is not to be confused with Freudian 'metapsychology' (which brings up such instances as 'Ueber-Ich', etc.); especially in Anglo-Saxon midstates one speaks much of 'psychical', 'psi', to denote 'paranormal, 'paranormal force(expression)'.

The specifically hierophantic scope.
All these paranormal things come up for discussion here for the sake of their religious significance: a sacred experience is always paranormal. if it is sufficiently 'lucid' i.e. as perception and experiment more than merely secular,.

Bibl. Sample:
(i) Cultural history one work among many: C. van Os, *Moa-Moa, Het moderne denken en de primitieve wijsheid,* (Modern Thought and Primitive Wisdom), Amsterdam, s.d. (+1951) (this professor of mathematics sees but salvation in a kind of return to the preternatural primordial man. We should patent again what has become latent in us in terms of 'archaic' without neglecting the modern-rational-scientific.

Reason: modern rational behavior and archaic, so-called 'irrational' behavior belong together in a complementary way; the proposer is therefore not an 'irrationalist' like e.g. Klages or Dacqué);

(ii) Philosophically also one work: P. Boutang, *Ontologie du secret*, (Ontology of the secret,), Paris, 1973 (peculiar and difficult to read, which in a few pages, touches on our problem).

(iii) Religion and paranormology: R. Haynes, *The Hidden Springs* (An Inquiry into Extra-Sensory Perception), London, 1961 (very thorough; particularly important: pp. 198ff., where this Catholic English expert discusses the ideas of Prosper Lambertini, the later Pope Benedict XIV, who thoroughly studied the relationship between 'religion/parapsychology'.

-- Canon J. Pearce-Higgins/Rev. G. Stanley Whitby. Ed., Life, *Death and Psychical Research* (Studies on behalf of The Churches' Fellowship for Psychical and Spiritual Studies) London, 1973. These wonderful Anglican-non-Anglican studies deal with:
a. the nature and purposefulness of paranormal phenomena (telepathy, physical phenomena, psychokinesis, transport mediumism, out-of-body experiences and survival after death, paranormal healing);
b. the Bible and paranormal phenomena (the so-called Biblical taboos on paranormological research (a matter-of-fact analysis of what the Bible actually says)) the Biblical miracles, ghostly phenomena, possession);
c. inferences (philosophy and paranormology, the nature of life after death, theology and paranormology, God's nearness).
-- Simpler: Van Willigen Van der Veen, *Parapsychologie en haar betekenis voor het christelijk geloof,* (Parapsychology and Its Significance for the Christian Faith),

Leiden, 1947 (ties in with the Theologians' Day, held in Amsterdam in January 1946, organized by the Study Society for Psychical Research).

(iv) *Epistemology, yes culturology and paranormology:*
-- S. Kicken, *Alternatieve wetenschap, (op het spoor van nieuwe paradigma's,* (Alternative science (on the trail of new paradigms)), Antw./ Amsterd., 1975 (natural sciences, (para-) psychology, sociology, medicine, engineering are 'in shift' towards new', i.e., wholly different paradigms).

-- L. Pauwels/J. bergier, *Le matin des magiciens* (Introduction au réalisme fantastique), (The morning of the magicians (Introduction to fantastic realism)), Paris, 1960 (book, which, with Planète and others, created a stir, because it tapped into an existing "need" that crushed its authors; not without reason did Le Dossier de la Quinzaine, through G. Baguet, ask the question, "Planète: Phénomène religieux?").
-- L. Wijnsberg/P. Warnaar, *Religieuze ervaring in de spiegel van het bewustzijn,* (Religious Experience in the Mirror of Consciousness), Apeldoorn, 1974 (dozens of interviews with Protestants, Roman Catholics, non-religious; interpretation of a physician-psychologist regarding the gauges of consciousness).
-- Stuart Holroyd, *PSI and the explosion of consciousness*, Baarn, 1977 (situating the paranormal side).

-- R. Ruyer, *La gnose de Princeton* (Des savants à la recherche d' une religion), (The gnosis of Princeton (Scholars in search of a religion),), Paris, 1974. At a very high professional scientific level, scientists of world renown have quietly outgrown flat and sophisticated materialism, to advocate a kind of 'gnosis', revival of the gnosis of antiquity, but modern-scientific substantiated, as a solution on an epistemological level.

Conclusion: 'Faith' - now not secularly interpreted as opposed to 'religion', but sacred, as it is understood e.g. in the Bible throughout - is the breaking through of the first face, into a by God's grace 'given' second face (or, at least, what shares in it): "What (...) has been visible (conspicuous) to our Savior (Jesus) (namely, during his earthly action), has passed into the 'mysteries' (sacramenta)". (Leo the Great, Sermo 2 de ascensione Dni.).

In other words, in the sacraments of the Church, Jesus is:
(i) First visible' (in the pomp or simplicity of liturgies throughout the world),
(ii) Yet He only becomes 'visible' (in the second degree, viz.) in (the 'second face' of) faith.

The whole traditional-sacred theology of faith stands or falls with this double way of 'seeing', already expressed by Moses. Cf. higher p. 51 (the 'understanding' structure given by God's grace): "Yourself you have 'seen' (first sight) all that Yahweh has done before your eyes in Egypt ... the great calamities, the signs and mighty wonders, which you have beheld with your own eyes. But Yahweh has not given you a heart to understand until now (second sight)". So it is with Jesus and what is (first) "visible" to him.

IIA2. *The sacred (the "sacred").*

Bibl. sample:
-- R. Otto, *Het heilige (Een verhandeling over het irrationele in de idee van het goddelijke en de verhouding ervan tot het rationele),* (The Sacred (A treatise on the irrational in the idea of the divine and its relation to the rational), Hilversum, 1963 (the Dutch translation of the famous German-Protestant book, published in 1917. The subtitle is significant: on p. 12 Otto even claims that the "sacred" (the numinous) is "an arrèton, an ineffabile (something unspeakable), in so far as it is completely inaccessible to abstract understanding. This claim hinges on one well-defined conception of 'abstract understanding', which, for purely logical-epistemological reasons, we do not accept).

-- M. Eliade, *Het gewijde en het profane, (Een studie over de religieuze essentie),* (The sacred and the profane, (A study of religious essence)), Hilversum, 1962. Contents: a. consecrated space and the sacralization of the world; b. sacred time and myths; c. natural sanctity and cosmic religion; d. human existence and sanctification of life. "For the religious man, space is not homogeneous: it has cracks and fractures; there are parts of space, which are qualitatively different from the others. "Do not come near," said the Lord to Moses, "Take off your shoes, for the place on which you stand is holy ground" (Ex 3:5) (o.c., 9).

Like space, time for the religious man is not homogeneous and stable: on the one hand, there are the intervals of sacred time (largely periodic feasts) and, on the other hand, there is profane time, the ordinary length of time, within which events without religious significance take place." (o.c., 36).

"For the religious man, nature is never exclusively natural": it is always full of religious meaning" (o.c. , 63). "(...) Familiar (...) with the folklore of the European peoples: in their religious representations and mores, their attitude towards life and death, many archaic 'religious situations' are still recognizable" (o.c., 89). Behold the four invocations of the four dimensions of the sacred, as outlined by M. Eliade, one of the world's greatest hierologists.

-- R. Caillois, *L' homme et le sacré*, (Man and the sacred), Paris, 1950 (sociological work).

Essence determination.
With despair, the sociologist Caillois introduces his little work on *Het heilige (gewijde)* The Sacred (the holy): "Basically, he says, (...) the only thing one can say with validity about the 'sacred' in general, is contained in the very definition of the term: namely, it is opposed to the profane." (o.c., 11).

-- N. Söderblom, *Das werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion),* (The Becoming of the Belief in God (Investigations on the Beginnings of Religion)), Leipzig, 1926- 2, S. 179, says: "(According to that) the best definition of personal religion will be: 'Pious is he who holds something to be sacred,'

and the main feature of institutional religion is the distinction between the sacred and the profane. No linguistic word is, for religion so characteristic as 'taboo' (holy)."

(1) In godly piety, 'holiness' is the divine attribute before all others. 'Holy' and 'divine' (or 'God-pleasing') become synonymous concepts. 'Holy' was, in its origin, a religious, not a moral concept. (...). Even today a religious meaning of 'holy' cannot be separated. Sacred" means "supernatural" and, since in the Revelation religions the supernatural is recognized as a personal deity, "divinity".

(2) 'Sacred' rests, further, on that in which one seeks the supernatural, divine.
(i) That may be a miracle (then the canonical commission asks about signs and wonders (....).
(ii) Or it may lie in moral heroism (then the memory of saints-with-power clings to their love of man and their pursuit of purity). To the same extent that religion and god-belief developed in the moral, the word "holy" was filled with moral-ideal value, but never turned into an exposed moral term (...). All Protestant moralizing notwithstanding, the word 'holy' retains, even with Kant and still in current language usage, a supernatural and mystically charged meaning. (.....)" (o.c., 179/180).

The great hiërosopher continues, "Just simply 'good', 'moral', the word 'holy' cannot mean. For it contains a relation to religion" (o.c., 181). Thus the semasiology of 'holy' has begun. However, this now needs to be thoroughly addressed.

The typically sacred essence clause.
A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten Testaments*, (The religion of the Old Testament), Tubingen, 1932, s. 7, footnote d, writes: "Holiness means 'increased power-ladenness'." This genius footnote is going to serve us as a phenomenological guide. We do say 'phenomenological' guide, but in two parts; and this according to the basis of all sacred phenomenology indicated above (pp. 51, 100), which reveals what it is possible to contact in the 'seeing' (the eidetic view, says Husserl), i.e. what shows itself in the direct encounter with something sacred, structurally (structurally) if need be, i.e. through many changes) revealing is its task.

(A) The content of the sacred.
In the bibliographical survey above, M. Eliade in particular has explained to us the "extent" (extensio, the scholastics say; denotation, the logicians say, among others) of the idea of the sacred (space and time; nature and existence).

This still belongs to the first 'seeing' of phenomenology; what N. Söderblom just said takes it a step further. The 'content' (comprehensio, connotatio) of the idea 'sacred' was given briefly but pointedly:
i. distinct from profane,
ii. supernatural (divine), in the theistic sense (theologian)
iii a. miraculous (miraculous, sign, power sign);
iii b. moral.

Th. Munson, *Religious Consciousness and Experience*, The Hague, 1975, notes that as the demand for logical clarity and empirical accuracy increases among theologians, religious symbolism declines.

We would like to endorse this: after all, a symbol is that which refers to something else; a sacred reality does not refer (unless in the second instance): it 'is' the sacred - present, yet defined (in time and space); it is only this defined character that can be interpreted as a symbol.

An example: by reference to Judges 4: 4/5, where it is said that Deborah, a prophetess, the wife of Lapidoth, exercised the office of judge over Israel and, in doing so, sat under the Deborah palm, between Ramah and Bethel in the Ephraim mountains, A. Bertholet, o.c., 30, that "the original (i.e. archaic) belief prevails, that from the tree (spirit) the inspiration (inspiration) pours out upon the one who is within the scope of that tree."
He refers to 1 Sam 22:6; Gen 12:6 (the prescriptive oak); Jud 9:37 (the oak of soothsayers). Apparently that palm tree is a we.tree or "holy" tree.

Hierologists like M. Meslin, *Pour une science des religions*, (For a science of religions), Paris, 1973, pp. 197/222 (Religious symbolism) will call such a tree a (religious) symbol or signifier. But listen to Meslin's definition: "Every signifier is a/ a visible and active sign, b/ which proves to be the bearer of psychological and social forces." (o.c., 197). The question is: where is the typically religious now?

People like Durand, *L'imagination symbolique*, (The symbolic imagination), Paris, 1964, distinguish:
a/ reductionist conceptions (Freud, Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss),
b/ instaurative conceptions (E.Cassirer, CG. Jung, G. Bachelard) and
c/ synthetic (P. Ricoeur, who introduces both a reductive and an instaurative side in his approach).

What is missing in all these human-scientific and in essence still very externalistic views, is the sacred experience in the second face.

The same mutatis mutandis is true of myth and rite, which, very often, are treated in the context of the sense. Meslin, o.c., 222/251 (Des mythes), says: "The analysis of the signifier evokes that of the myth to the extent that the myth is a signifying exploration of man's relations with beings as with the divine." (o.c., 222). He adds: myth is a kind of 'language', not the product of pure imagination (as arid rationalism thought), but the expression of a reality intuitively perceived by man.

So is the sacred symbol: in that symbol the religious man perceives 'something' 'intuitively'. Unfortunately, one always remains guilty of the precisions: what right and what kind of perception right?

As for the sense (See Durand), so for myth: F. Schelling, *Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie* (Introduction to the philosophy of mythology), (1856), notes three attitudes:

a/ negative (cf. reductionist), which writes off myth as a story without truth (Fontenelle, Lessing, Herder, Heine, Humboldt, Hume, Comte);

b/ more positive (cf. between reductionist and instaurative interpretation), who conceive of myth as a purely pictorial framing of a cryptic (hidden) truth of a non-mythical nature (discoverable by allegorical hermeneutics) (this opinion was already at work in late antiquity);

c/ positive, who sees in myth a truth grasped by immediate intuition (cf. the instaurative view; this of the latter Schelling himself); see also M. Eliade, *De mythe van de eeuwige terugkeer (Archetypen en hun herhaling),* (The myth of the eternal return (Archetypes and their repetition)), Hilversum, 1964; Dan Sperber, *Le structuralisme en antropologie*, (Structuralism in anthropology), in *Qu' est-ce que le structuralisme*? (What is structuralism), Paris, 1968, pp. 192/208, divides myth analysis into two types: a/ the symbolic explanation of the German School (Fr. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, Leipzig, 1810/1812, etc.); b. the functionalist explanation (Br. Malinowki, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, London, 1922; Radcliffe Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, London,1963, etc.). The structuralist critique of:

a. the ethnocentrism of both schools (which fail to see the planetary distribution and mutual similarity of myths);

b. like the symbolist, the structuralist does not seek the meaning of the myth outside (functional) but within its text (textuology), by seeing in it a system of 'myths' (= elements of myth), constructed according to linguistic-logistic rules).

One sees: division again! Cfr. also H. Diephuis, *Mythologie der Grieken*, (Mythology of the Greeks), Den Haag/ Antw., s.d., p. 529/547 (Being and origin of mythology: three interpretations are distinguished: a. zero-truth (the myth contains only imagination), b. indirect truth (the myth is a concealment of a truth; allegory), c. direct truth (the myth expresses a truth which can only be expressed mythically),-- one recognizes Schelling's threefoldness.

Curious, from a sacred point of view, are the opinions of K. TH. Preuss (magical opv.), A. Jensen*, Mythos und Kult bei den Naturvölkern* (Myth and cult among primitive peoples), (1951) (the mystery-religious opv.) and of Raff. Pettazzoni, *Die Wahrheit des Mythos*, (The truth of the myth), in Paideuma, 4 (1950) (the initiatic-magical opv.).

The fact is that myths, among the peoples who still think mythically, are themselves ambiguous: there are purely ludic myths (for the pleasure of storytelling and listening: myths contain elements of fables, sagas and fairy tales, which also have a ludic effect);

there are aitiological (= explicative) myths (to explain something in the form of a story; there are ritual myths (to give a rite its expression).

There are fluidic (purely magical) myths (in which 'force' is processed).

-- J. Cazeneuve, *Sociologie du rite*, (Sociology of the rite), Paris, 1971, has the subtitle 'Tabou, magie, sacré', which indicates that there is something sacred in ritual. His definition is as follows: the rite is an act, individual or collective, which, through all kinds of changes, remains faithful to certain rules which, precisely, constitute the ritual within it (o.c., 12).

So the unchanging and the repeating of precedents is the characteristic: a gesture, a word, which would not repeat something, he says, could be, if need be, a magical or a religious act, but not a rite. This is the reductionist view. One finds it among ethologists (the mating behavior of birds, for example, they call it "rite"), among psychiatrists (the obsessive behavior of neurotics they call "rite"). Ethnologists transfer this lean meaning to magical and religious forms of behavior (e.g., liturgies consist of rites).

-- F. Buytendijk, *Zur Phänomenologie der Begegnung*, (On the phenomenology of the encounter), in Eranos-Jahrbuch (1950), Bd XIX (Mensch und Ritus), Zürich, 1951, S. 431/486, situates the rite in the framework of the 'encounter', but starts from a much more instaurational position: "In the rite of magical and religious acts, man seeks and finds encounter and communion with a reality, which, in the phenomena, is suspected with fear or reverence. In the for us opaque sphere of the primitive and in the enlightened climate of the differentiated spiritual life, the rite and the ceremonial are the necessary conditions for the representation of a reality which speaks to man in a decisive way (...).

Only the ritual acts and words formed in the tradition of the community, stylized forms and gestures, have the power to make the hidden experiencable and to transform the encounter with people, objects of nature and culture into real encounters". (a.c., 431).

It is evident that here a more realistic view of the rite is achieved (more instaurated), but limiting the encounter with the sacred to this is not the case: also in new gestures, words, etc. (symbolic acts) the encounter with the sacred is not limited to the sacred. (symbolic acts) one meets the sacred! The stylized (unchanging-repeating) is a non-essential aspect of rite: a symbolic act is already, stereotypically or not, a rite.

Mystical Rites and Rituals, London, 1975, would call such allusive acts 'ceremonial' acts (o.c., 17), while 'ceremonial' acts, are those in which the persons acting "have no concept of the occult powers implied in them" (ibid.); the book distinguishes **a**. rites of passage, **b**. life-circle rites (e.g. fertility rites), **c.** religious rites, **d**. playful rites (dance, drama, masks, games); e. magical rites (grimoires (magic manuals), incantation, oaths, sign play, freemasonry), thus enumerating the scope rather than the content of the rite.

Joint conclusion: The signifier (symbol), the myth and the rite are ambiguous (profane, sacred; reductive, instaurative) they are related to the sacred, but are not necessarily so; the sacred shows itself, if need be, in them - in the magical-religious use of signifiers, myths and rites viz. It is depicted in them, pronounced, if need be; nothing more. One therefore fails to understand the great importance that many hieroglyphs attach to it. They do not possess a second view of these three realities and, immediately, of the sacred itself.

(B) *The second view of the sacred.*
We tie in with A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. Alt. Test.*, S.45/46 , to. He first quotes Isa. (= Is) 63:7/11 (a piece from the psalm): Yahweh is praised for his direct intervention (63:9); "but (the Israelites) rebelled; they grieved his holy spirit; thereupon he became their enemy. (...).

Where is the one who put in him (Moses, Israel) his Holy Spirit, who made his mighty arm act at Moses' right hand, who caused the waters, before their feet, to part? (...) The Spirit of Yahweh led them to rest." At 63: 10 (they grieved his holy spirit) Bertholet notes that the word "holy spirit" denotes the organ of God embodied in the leadership of the people of Israel in some sense.

He then quotes Ps 51:12/13: "Create in me a pure heart, God, and give me again, in my inner being, a firm spirit. Do not reject me from before you, nor take away your holy spirit from me."

Here Bertholet notes that "in older times (archaic thus) the spirit is more of a physical agent, which elevates man, in terms of strength, above himself (cfr. Law 14:6).

Conclusion: Holy spirit either in a group (Israel here) or in a single person (Ps. 51) is a force, which raises them above themselves; that force is physical (rather) and situated in community or person; it emanates from God (His mighty arm).

To sum up: this force, which emanates from God, is both transcendent and immanent (above and at the same time in community or person). Well, this characterization corresponds to what "seers" call fluid, rarefied or fine matter, "subtle" matter. This subtle matter is omnipresent, but not univocal, but analogous:

a. theologically, it is sacred in the sense of 'divine' (as Söderblom notes);

b. creaturely, it is miraculous (Söderblom) or ethical (heroic virtue producing (Söderblom; - see above p. 102).

Structural model of subtle substance.

It is insufficient to see that 'sacred' is co-extensive (equally encompassing) with 'subtle'. To be cognitively and experimentally operational, a model should be designed. Here are the main features, which, will be further clarified.

J. Prieur, *L' aura et le corps immortel,* (The aura and the immortal body,), Paris, 1979, p. 247, says: "Atomism and monadology both accept single 'entities' (being), particles consisting of indivisible matter, final element of all that exists". Better would be instead of attributing monadology to Leibniz in the first place, to attribute it to Puthagoras of Samos (-540/-497): the 'number' (better 'number structure' (arithmos) that constitutes the essence of the universe consists of a number of concrete, extended points, according to Puthagoras. "The One is the Monad (monas), which constitutes the perfect and original number, just as the arithmetic unity is the 'principle' of all numbers." (I. Gobry, *Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie*, (Pythagoras or the birth of philosophy), Paris, 1973, pp. 44/45).

In other words: the deity is the Monad (capital letter), source of all the rest; the monads (small letter) or units make up the numbers from two onwards.

Frans Mercurius of Helmont (1614/1699),
He was the son of Joh. Bapt. van Helmont (1577/1644) created a monadology: each creature consists of monads, which are guided by the central monad, and has as its life goal the attainment of perfection by means of 'merging into the Monad of God'. Leibniz had a favorable opinion of his doctrine. (*Winkler Prince Enc.*, 1951, 10, p. 528).

G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716)
This one claims that all bodies are a force, in their deepest essence (dynamism),
- force, which is material in its effects, but immaterial in its essence;
- That in every body is a bundle of "primitive" forces, called monads, which, as mathematical points, have no extensiveness and, as physical points, have objective reality;
- That plant, animal, man are a bundle of monads such that one monad governs the others (the soul(monad));
- That each monad, though separated, is nevertheless a microcosm, a universe representation.
It is known that Leukippos of Miletos (V-th e.) had as a disciple Demokritos of Abdeira (-460/-370); his teaching boils down to this:

a. reality consists of 'atoma' (indivisible units), which move purely mechanically;
b. reality consists of more than one kind of atoma: the evil eye, benign or malignant daimones, - dream and telepathy images are of a different nature from the gross material ones (eidola doctrine), allowing us to 'see' them (apparently with second sight).

With this statement, atomistics does not belong to coarse-matter materialism, as non-accurate readers think, but to pluralistic materialism, which assumes more than one kind of matter (the coarse-matter and the subtle or fine-matter).

The adoption of a plurality of materiality is called 'hylic' (= material, involving the substance) pluralism. Cfr. J. Poortman, *Ochêma* (Geschiedenis en zin van het hylische pluralisme)), (History and meaning of hylic pluralism), Assen, 1954.

A nuanced conception of a model of the subtle substance eclectically chooses both from the monadologies (from Puthagoras to Leibniz) and from the atomistics (since Leukippos).

She sees them theocentrically (like Pythagoras, Leibniz, etc.), avoids one-sided atomism (which accepts no Supreme Being, but gods, except in the Stoa (at least some Stoics)). An analogy theory is the key. Created reality consists of monads (atoma), which combinatorically ('numerically' the Pÿthagoreans would say, i.e. structurally) construct the whole of reality. Behold the basic insight that will guide the rest of the course as a working hypothesis.

Applicative model: - A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. A.T.*, S. 7, quotes Ezek 44:19, (23) : "If (the priests) go to the outer court, to the people, they must take off their service clothes and put on other robes; if not, they sanctify the people with their robes. (...) (they must teach my people the distinction between 'holy' and 'profane' and between 'clean' and 'unclean')."

Bertholet refers to Lev 16:23v. (Aaron), Deut 21:13 (prisoners of war/women).-- The axiom of this text is that there is a kind of 'contagion', better: transitivity' (transitive) between service clothes and non-holy clothes and persons or things; as Bertholet rightly says, 'holy' here is 'particularly power-laden'.

The seers 'see' this as a flow of 'particles' (monads), which overflow into less charged realities and penetrate them. This process is called 'sanctification' of profane(er) realities. This proves that the archaic people 'saw' (or at least 'felt') this (i) force (ii) which is transitive, as a kind of substance flowing through the coarse material realities and thus 'fluid'.

Applicative model: Luk 8: 43/48 gives a New Testament example: "Now there was a woman who had suffered from hemorrhaging for twelve years and had spent her whole fortune on physicians, but no one could cure her. She went behind (Jesus) and touched the hem of his robe: immediately her hemorrhaging stopped. Jesus said, "Who touched me?" All denied it and Peter said, "Master, the crowd surrounds you and urges you on"! But Jesus said, "Someone has touched me, for I have known (egnon) a power to go forth from me!"

When the woman saw that she had been discovered, she stepped forward trembling, fell on His foot, and recounted before all the people why she had touched Him and how she was immediately healed. But He said, "Daughter, your faith has saved you."

(i) Jesus Himself (Luk 4:18/19) had pointed out that He knew "the Spirit of the Lord" rested upon Himself to proclaim healing to the blind, among other things (to take away misery in God's sight); well, the dunamos (power, virtus) was directed to healings (Luk 5:17), which were in Jesus' power.

(ii) The people understood this situation: "There was also a numerous group of his disciples and a large crowd of people ... who had come
    (i) to hear Him and
    (ii) to be healed of their afflictions. All who were tormented by unclean spirits were healed (this shows that 'healed' is broad according to character content). And all the people sought to touch him; for there went forth a power from him which healed all".

The transitivity of that power
This was apparently known in this archaic culture: its contactual (one also says 'contagious') character is evident. The woman with the haemorrhage is in front of these axioms: not only is the dunamis transmissible; it is also directable, controllable (cybernetic): both from Jesus (whose fight against misery went hand in hand with the Kingdom of God and directed his dunamis) and from e.g. this woman, who wanted to be healed by means of this transmissible and directable force.

She starts (abduction) from this hypothesis; deduces that she only has to touch him (not only his body, which is the physical source of this force, but, by touching (very intimately), his clothes are 'force-laden') (deduction) to risk the effect (experiment) resulting (induction) in her instantaneous healing.

(iii) Jesus 'egnon' (knew), 'felt', that power was passing: this shows that Jesus was sensitive. See above p. 67vv. His words, which include 'touching' and 'power going out', do not lie. He even knew that someone had touched the hem of his robe. The woman herself experienced the physical, secular ascertainable fact.

(iv) That this power is directable is shown by the fact that Jesus says, "Your faith has saved you." Without faith, of course, power passes (we saw this in Ezek 19, where the service clothes automatically, automatically "sanctify").

But Jesus' power is not so simple: it does pass without being addressed, but it still presupposes faith in his mission and power, etc. The active cooperation of the patient is even, according to Him, decisive. Fluidity is indeed subject to the ideas and choices of men (even if not completely so).

Note: That the ideas and the will play a possibly decisive role in processes of sanctification is shown in Mk 6:5: "(Jesus) could not perform a miracle ('dunamis') there (i.e. in his father city, among his relatives and in his family), except to heal some sick people by laying hands on them. And He marveled at their unbelief (apistia)".

In passing, Mark, reflecting Peter's teaching, places strong emphasis on the contact aspect of sanctification: "Wherever (Jesus) came - in villages, towns or hamlets - they laid the sick down in the squares and prayed to him that they might touch only the hem of his garment. And all who touched him were healed. (Mk 6:56).

The transitive-contact sanctification process becomes even clearer when one considers certain modifications:
(i) Mk 7:31/37: (in the Dekapolis area) "Then one brought a deaf and dumb man (...) and begged (Jesus) to lay hands on him (laying hands is touching). He took him aside - outside the circle of the crowd -, put his fingers in his ears, spit and touched his tongue with it. He looked up to the sky and said to him, "Effeta" (i.e., "open up"). And immediately his ears were opened and the band of his tongue was loosened and he spoke well".

Notice how there are 'dry' (the fingers in the ears) and 'moist' (the saliva of Jesus on the tongue) touches: all magnetizers, healers, etc. know that the body parts differ and possess specific 'dunamis', pneuma (spirit), 'sanctification'.

A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. A.T.*, S. 1/ 9, cites Bible texts, which show how archaic man knew the special degree of power-charged (sanctifying): hair, eye, hand,- blood, saliva,- breath (blowing),- word (blessing and cursing),- name (function, being),- clothes, adornment, staff, implements, weapons,- d. i. man, his body and what comes into contact with it, are 'besonders krafhaltig' ('particularly powerful'), (Bertholet), 'holy', but also water, fire, minerals, plants, - objects, - writing, etc. appear in the Bible texts to be subtly charged, power-carrying. See also Acts 19: 11/12 (the hands, but also the cloths and girdles of Paul).

(ii) Mk. 8: 22/25: (at Bethsaida) "Then a blind man was brought to [Jesus] and asked to touch him. He took the blind man by the hand and led him outside the village:

(a) He put saliva on his eyes, laid hands on him and asked him, 'Do you see anything?' The blind man began to look and said, "I see people like trees I see them going.

(b) Then He again laid His hands on his eyes: now he saw more clearly. He was healed, so that he saw everything clearly". - Here we see beautifully the process character, the phaseology (phase succession) in transitive sanctification.
Cf. Jn 9:6 (Jesus spits on the ground and makes mud to heal).

(iii) Mk 10:13/16 (Jesus is in Galilee) "Now one brought children to him that he might touch them. -- but the disciples rejected them. When Jesus saw this, he was disturbed (èganaktèsen, indigne tulit) and said to them, "Let the children come to me, and do not hold them back; for the kingdom of God is for those who are like them. Verily, I say unto you : whosoever shall not accept the kingdom as a child shall not enter into it." And He embraced them, laid hands on them, and blessed them".

Those who are still a little 'human' understand this text immediately, without comment. However, one should note that **(i)** embrace, **(ii)** laying on of hands**, (iii)** blessing (the word of Jesus is power money) are three forms of the same touch.

The Jesus acts 'through the pure word' tempts a/ immaterialists and b/ puritans to confuse this with purely 'spiritual' (immaterial) action: they forget that the word (blessing or cursing) is one form of radiance, sanctification, as transitive-contactual as the rest, but, for those who only 'see' secularly (and have no heart to 'see' what works behind, in the visible and tangible surface), this does indeed look 'spiritual'. Only penetrated hiero-analysis breaks through that appearance, that deceptive view.

One more remark, an argument in authority: La Bible de Jérusalem, Paris, 1956, p. 1336, n.a., says, after Mk 5:30 (the blood-losing woman, of whom Jesus 'knows' that she has touched his spirit, power, holiness, eaten away a. w.): "This one, I think, is the one who is in the way. h.w.): "This power is understood as a physical efflux that works the healings, cf. Lk 6:19 - through touch - cf. Mk 1:41; 3:10; 6:56; 8:22." From this note one can see that honest exegesis clearly sees the same thing. What matters is that a number of people unconsciously think immaterialistically and/or Puritanically and, starting from those immaterialist-puritan axiomata, 'hineininterpretieren' their opinions as the Germans say.

Centric structural model of the subtle substance.
'Centric' is that which is related to or resembles a center point (one thinks of ex- and concentric). 'Centric' is in one systechy (pair of opposites) with 'peripheral'.

Up to now, the following have been discussed:
(i) the granular (unit) structure (monadic, 'atomic') and

(ii) the transitive, resp. fluidic structure (like a stream of monads the subtlety flows through the coarse material reality so much so that it gives the impression of being purely 'immaterial', 'spiritual'). Both structural aspects betray, by hiero-analysis, a

(iii) third aspect structure, i.e. they are subject to ideas (contents of knowledge and thought), whether or not linked to wills and minds (belief/disbelief e.g.).

(vi) Now a fourth structural aspect comes into play, the centric-peripheral.

With this we enter a whole new and different dimension of the "sacred. Fr. Heiler, *Das Gebet (Eine religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische Untersuchung),* (Prayer (A Study in the History and Psychology of Religion)), Munich,1921,8. 109/131, speaks of 'die im Gebet angerufenen höheren Wesen', the 'higher' beings invoked in prayer.

We briefly analyze this extremely fascinating and well-furnished with evidence chapter of this excellent hierosopher, who is Heiler:

a.1. *The nature spirits and nature gods* (S. 109/116);
Among them, in fact, are fetishes (S. 111) i.e. at least two 'sanctities' (of two 'centers'), encapsulated in a physical shell (e.g. a packet of herbs), provided ipso facto with a nature spirit as mediator between the two 'centers', i.e. e.g. two persons, the healer(s) and the patient(s), soul substances (S. 111), i.e. the image - radiation of a soul (plant, animal, human soul e.g.), turned into a new 'center' and seen as a 'moving being' by 'seers' (the so-called radiated soul but then with an umbilical cord connected to its first 'center'), workaholic and guardian gods (S. 111/113), i.e. centers' of 'holiness' (subtle matter, rarefied matter), which have attained a higher level of independence than the soul substances mentioned above (encapsulated and therefore fetishized, possessing an 'unfriendly' character, as they say in Siberia) or free (ordinary soul substance)), but which do not possess a human sense of self, but a purely goal-oriented consciousness'.

They are, after all, 'created' by either God Himself or high God-fearing '(arch)angels' or human beings or satanic demons with a very precisely defined purpose, which they, as it were, embody. They are called 'gods' but in a strongly improper sense (what is true is that especially the satanic sanctity centers of that level or level can give themselves a deity appearance of a subtle nature to 'impress' seers).

Local 'gods' (theoi poli.ouchoi, theoi en.chorioi said the ancient Greeks; S. 113), i.e. workaholic and protective spirits, which instead of free to move about, are place-bound, yes, earth-bound, and, from their place, 'radiate' (transitive-fluidic activity) what their 'creator' (God, archangel, man, demon) imposed upon them, tribal, folk, nation, family, and individual 'gods' (better: spirits) (S. 113 /116), i.e. non-locally bound, but human-bound centers of power ('spirits', 'genii' (male), iunones' (female)), provided by their creators for (blind) protection and damage (protection: their protectors; damage: the enemies of their protectors);

a.2. *The ancestral souls or spirits (or even gods)* (S. 116/118),
i.e., the souls, centers of power, that survive death;

b.1 *High, transcendent deities* (A. Lang);

We refer here to e.g. AE. Jensen, *Hochgott und Dema-Gottheit*, (High God and Dema Deity), from his *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölkern*, (Myth and cult among primitive peoples), Wiesbaden, 1960-2 (printed in CA. Schmitz, Religionsethnologie, Frankf.a.M., 1964, S. 85/118, in which Jensen sharply defined the distinction between the actual gods of poly.theism, which is usually indistinguishable from poly-demonism) and the Supreme Being, such as A. Lang and especially W. Schmidt, SVD, with its 'Ur.mono.theismus' (primordial monotheism), on a purely ethnological, non-Biblical basis -- this fundamental distinction apparently Heiler, in 1921, did not yet make as sharply as is possible after Jensen, e.g.

b.2 *The actually strictly Biblical* (and post-Biblical, e.g. Islamic) *Supreme Being*, 'God', 'Yahweh', as we, Catholics, know Him from upbringing (S. 118/ 126).

For this we refer to two Bible texts: Dan 7:1/28 Daniel has a dream with faces:

a. symbolic, but actually centric beings, called 'animals', (beasts), who are function gods of empires, empires (one remembers that Satan, during Jesus' temptation, offers Him all the empires of the earth),

b. the 'Supreme Being', i.e. the subtle 'angel', i.e. the apparition of God, who, in himself, is incorporeal and therefore invisible both to the gross (first sight) and subtle (second sight) eye, but who, in order to communicate with seers, creates a new 'center' which, of course, adapts itself to the mentality and situation of the seer, here the prophet-apocalyptist Daniel;

c. the Son of Man, i.e., that 'center' of subtle-substantial holiness, which subtly portrays 'man as such' (and, in that very defined sense, is allusive, which is not to say that it is not a subtle-substantial 'being' (= center). One knows that Jesus, together with its antithesis, the suffering Servant of the Lord (Jes = Is), 'applied' this sentient-centered figure to himself, i.e. identified himself with it as its realization and did so on earth in a human existence.

It should be noted, in passing, now that we read in Daniel, that the word 'god' in the non-strictly monotheistic sense is common in the Bible; thus Dan 5:10/16, speaking of Daniel as a highly gifted seer-duster, says: "There is a man in your kingdom (Belshazzar i.e.), who is filled with the spirit of the gods and in whom - in the days of your father - insight, sagacity, almost divine wisdom were found.

King Nabukodonozor, your father, appointed him leader of seers, soothsayers, magicians and star wizards. For the king, your father, had found in Daniel (...) an extraordinary mind, with knowledge and insight in explaining dreams, solving riddles and untangling knots.

(...) When therefore Daniel was brought before the prince, the latter said to him, 'Thou art Daniel (...)? I have heard of thee that the spirit of the gods rests upon thee, and that insight, sagacity, and extraordinary wisdom are found in thee".

In short, a striking (mana, orenda, dema, etc. would say the those terms understanding cultures) degree of intelligence-in the practical sense-is the sign of it that Daniel possesses the 'spirit' i.e. the fluid of the 'gods', i.e. superior beings, centers of power. See higher, but on a primal monotheistic level, p. 106 (the organ of subtle-transitive nature of God in the leadership of Moses and/or his people).

Thus Daniel is a kind of fluid-transitive extension, the 'medium' (but in the non-transported sense) of some 'god', at least in the eyes of the not sufficiently sharply discerning seer's eye of the Chaldean magi, etc., who, however, 'see' ('feel' of course also) that Daniel possesses an aura, a halo, which makes him appear 'almost divine'. One should not think that all such texts should be 'mythologized' (in the secular sense) just like that; on the contrary, it is high time that exegesis learns to interpret internalistically, i.e. within the system of sacred texts (i.e. first learns to 'see' with understanding).

The second text which, to some extent, contrasts the Supreme Being with the rest of the sacred is Rev 1:1/18: in it one distinguishes:
a. Him who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty (Rev. 1:4,8);

b. Jesus, the glorified Son of Man (Rev. 1:1,5 (the True Witness, the Firstborn of the dead, the Chiefest of all the princes of the earth, etc.), 6b/7 (cf. He comes with the clouds);

c. the 'angel' of Jesus, i.e. the radiance of Jesus (his organ), charged with the writing task for John (Rev. 1:1);

d. the 'seven' (i.e. the ideal collection) spirits before the throne of God (Op. 1:4b), which are the seven 'organs' of God, i.e. fluidic-centric function centers, charged with the mission of the 'seven' (the ideal collection) churches (local centers of Christianity).

Behold in Dan and in Rev, two 'faces', two 'apokalupseis', 'revelations', 'revelations', which give an idea of the center without more of the holiness without more. It is not to be thought that this was not felt, yes, somewhat 'seen', among peoples outside the Bible, but, as all ethnologists observe, primordial monotheism is a primordial monotheism of a deus otiosus, a fatherly God, who is 'on vacation', more distant than present, at least fluidically transitive.

So much for the centric-peripheral side of the structure of 'the' sacred, which is both impersonal-granular and personal; or, at least, centric, for e.g. nature spirits are not persons but function centers, which look like 'persons'.

Ontological structural model of the subtle substance.
'Sacred' means:
a. monadic-atomic and at the same time centric,
b. subject to idea and mind, resp. will,
c. ontologically-metaphysically structured. This we now explain very briefly.

O. Willmann, *Abrisz der Philosophie (Phil. Propädeutik),* Wien, 1959-5, 357, dealing with the onomastikon (glossary) of Aristotle, says that, for Aristotle, 'ousia', essentia, being(s), can semasiologically have the following meanings:

a1 The 'being' of something can be earth, water, fire, i.e., the substance (hulè, materia) of which something is composed (the first Milesian thinkers looked in that direction)

Applied to the idea 'sacred' this is correct: something that is 'sacred' is 'material' though not in the nature of earth, water, air, fire, but much more subtle, namely the monads, atoms, of the transitive-fluidic flow, briefly sketched above (which clarifies with time);

a2. The 'being' of something can be 1. life (in De anima Aristotle says that "where it concerns living beings (zoa), their 'being' (= being) is life"); yet 2. the 'being' of a body can also be 'daimonion', viz. the fact that a body is 'animated' by a daimon, daimonion (diminutive of daimon); then the being of that body is its daimon, resp. daimonion; in the language of Aristotle 'daimonios' does not mean devilish (Catholic sense), but something divine which is in (enters into) something ungodly (e.g. a human soul or an animal body).

b1 The 'being' of something can, finally, also be the immanent principle of existence, life, etc. in something - e.g. the 'soul' in a living being, which, once without soul, is dead; in this sense it coincides, according to the case, not according to the word, with 1 above (life is possible only on the ground of be-soul-ness); but that is not really what is at issue here.

Aristotle means what he calls the word 'ti èn', the 'before' of something; for him the before of something comes into play in the definition of something; the being-definition, after all, says what something is (man is a living being endowed with reason, e.g.), by, within the definition of something, the 'before' of something. v.), by designating, within the broader set, a subset (the species difference: **(i)** universal set is here 'living being'; **(ii)** subset o.g. species difference is here 'reason-gifted')).

With Aristotle, as with Platon and the whole archaic tradition, that which is something is always predetermined, pre-existent, relative to what one is here and now, taken concretely. This mentality has been called, philosophically historically, always 'doctrine of ideas'. Well, 'holy' is always idea, which precedes its materialization. This will become clearer and clearer with time.

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id., I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus),* (History of Idealism, I (Prehistory and History of Ancient Idealism),)), Braunschweig, 1907-2 s.548, says: "That which constitutes things informs the knowing mind (intellect). The thought-content (ideal) in the objects makes up the objective in the thoughts. Identically the same content:
(i) gives things their 'being',
(ii) gives thought its truth".

This says the most essential thing about the sacred in things:
(i) the 'holy' gives things 'reality' ('being')
(ii) but the sacred in things is also the knowability and thinkability of them (that we can know them and order them knowingly in collections and systems (systems), is only possible because that "sacred" in things is through and through idea, understandable).

In other words, the sacred is through and through structure, i.e. identity in the midst of non-identity, unity in the midst of multiplicity, order in the midst of disorder. Indeed, in themselves the monads are orderless, chaotic.

But they are not like that: their 'being' (their 'being') is at the same time possible orderlessness (pure mobility, pure changeableness, - pure 'materia' (said the antique-scholastic thinkers)) and pure orderliness.

1. Orderliness, **2**. which, in fact, is always given some form of order (whether (i) elemental (earth, water, air, - fire) or (ii) soul, (iii) center of subtle substance (i.e. 'spirit', 'demon' in Aristotle's antique-meliorative sense (i.e. three examples of 'ousia', essence, beingness)).

De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), Antwerpen, 1967, p. 114, says: "The view according to which the ideas (he speaks of Platon) are the thoughts of God, goes (...) not back to Platon, but only to the so-called Middle Platonism: we find it worked out for the first time with Albinos."

Well, Albinos (-/ +150) situates himself in Neo-Platonism. This then is the theological aspect of the sacred seen in its idealistic side. This does not mean, however, that, as immaterialists and/or puritans always claim, the sacred in its subtlety (fineness) is not created directly out of God (God himself is immaterial, radically incorporeal, but source, -- creative -- free origin of subtle matter with its monads).

The two together - subtle matter, which in principle is susceptible to order(s), although out of itself pure disorder (the "primal chaos" says M. Eliade), and at the same time order, i.e. structure, i.e. system of ideas, (not one idea in itself, but the whole system of partial ideas, which, separately necessary, but together sufficient, constitute God's idea concerning his presence in creation) - these two aspects together are the sacred justly understood. This is the axiom of hiero-analysis.

b2. The being of something can thus be divided into at least two broad categories: as Aristotle, in the verbiage of 'ousia' (being(ion)), still well preserved, it is:

(i) hylic (= material) - earth, water, etc. and/or soul, daimon, daimonion, etc., - noting that soul and daimon(ion) are still subtle or rarefied realities or

(ii) ideal, conceptual, comprehensible ('eidetic', as the husserlians like to say), - which is always of a collection character and therefore summarizing (and therefore immaterial): the idea 'horse(heid)', says Plato, includes all horses, the actual and the possible, and is single (in one idea all possible horses, specimens, applicative models, are summarized in a supratemporal insight, which is at the same time supratemporal). This immaterial side is the 'before', the 'before' (ti èn, said Aristotle, though no longer a Platonic in the full sense).

b3. This basic dyad shows itself religiously historically in the two great types of 'centers' of subtlety. To understand this, one should start from the worldview of the sacred-archaic man, susceptible to sacred (subtle) realities as systemic components. "The Pygmy believes that God 'closes the jungle,' i.e., gives no more game, if the people refuse to offer the firstfruits sacrifice. Somewhere the primitive still sees his sacrifice in connection with the whole world system. The Semang dwarf is convinced that a catastrophe would break out over all the peoples if he stopped offering in his forests". (P. Schebesta, *Origins* (...), p. 94).

This cosmic-wide view is essential if we are to understand the true extent of the sacred, not only ideally immaterially, but also and above all subtly immaterially.

Vl. Soloviev, *La justification du bien*, (Justification of the good), Paris, 1939, p. 206, adds another dimension, or rather two at once: speaking of person and community, he says: "Those who had the opportunity to descend into the underworld ('hell') or to ascend into heaven, like e.g. Dante and Swedenborg, did not (...) find there individuals in isolation, but only groups and social circles".

As Ch.M. Des Granges, *Les littératures étrangères*, (Foreign literature)Paris, 1946-2, pp. 11ss., says, Dante and Swedenborg have had predecessors, viz. Homer (*Odusseia*,11 (nekuia = (sacrifice in view of) death call)) and Virgil, as well as the mid-century mystics; Des Granges then forgets 1 Sam 28:3/25 (the death caller at En-Dor, to whom King Saul consults, "sees" a spirit (the soul of the prophet Samuel) rising from the earth"),-at least as far as the "hell's journey" is concerned.

Of course, the secular externalists "smile" superiorly at such data : it becomes more serious, however, when one knows that we, Catholics in our Creed, "testify" and "proclaim" of Jesus that he **(i)** went through a " the journey to hell " ("who descended into hell", i.e. the underworld) and **(ii)** had a heaven ascension, viz. as two phases in his resurrection steps.

M. Eliade, *Images et symboles*, (Images and symbols); Paris, 1952, p. 218, asks the question, "Do we have the right to regard Orpheus as a shaman and to compare Christ's descent into hell with similar descents of shamans in rapture?"

M. Choisy, *L'être et le silence*, (The being and the silence), Genève. 1964, pp. 276 (Le héros), 284/285 (Le descente aux enfers; (The descent into hell;), Herakles myth), 314/317 (Orpheus myth), also deals with these motifs. Indeed, Orpheus was also considered to have gone through a journey to hell (cf. Virgil, Georgica, in fine).

The true explanation is not mythic (unless myth is practiced magically), but 'centric': apart from the function beings (subtlety centers), about which higher p. 112, as more or less independent 'beings' (with an inchoate (= initial) 'personality', created with a view to one function (function gods, -spirits), in themselves, it should be added that these function beings or centers also have their own sphere or region (regional structure aspect).

Thus, the underworld is the sphere, fluidic and intercentric environment of the earth-bound 'spirits' (holiness centers); thus, the 'heavens' are distinguishable in a clear and distinct manner from what was called on p. 114 'the center-without-more-of-holy-without-more', viz. the throne sphere of God) the sphere or region of the function centers attuned to the ideal, usually (in Catholic circles) called 'angels', - which - it must be explicitly repeated - are merely 'centers' and not fully human, i.e. fully 'personal' (intellectually awakened and gifted with full accountability), beings! It is because of this that they are as one-sided as the underworld centers, but in a different way, i.e. 'heavenly', i.e. primal.

A. Lefèvre, *La religion*, (Religion), Paris, 1921, pp. 145/168 (Le culte de la génération), defines 'chtonism' (also called earth religion or telluric religion) - chthon = tellus earth - as earth worship (with lunar (lunar) aspect, as well as an elemental aspect (the moist) and a genesisic or begetting aspect (sexual magic, but with female-lesbian dominance: fertility religion in the same sense)) and 'primal anism' (ouranos = coelum = sky) (also called celestial or solar religion) (with solar (sun) aspect, as well as an elemental aspect (the fire) and a genesis aspect (sexual magic, but with male-homosexual dominant; fertility religion in the same sense).

Notwithstanding his utter incomprehension - he is not alone - Lefèvre is objective enough to see that not so much the female or male gender, but, as he says very precisely, the female or male principle ('principle'), as well as the ditto energy are central to these 'lower' religions.

In the balanced 'lower' religions it comes to a complementary worship of both the earthbound and the heaven bound aspect (region, function centers, subtle or ideal).

One thinks of the 'fusion' of Dionysian and apollonian religions in Hellas; one thinks of the primordial pair religions (= pro(to)gonistic begetting aspect).

"The name Iuno probably has the same root as that of Jupiter. Since Jupiter is the king of the heavens and the 'gods' - apparently here the 'Olympian' gods, as distinguished from the chthonic 'gods' (centers) - Iuno is venerated at Rome as the queen of the heavens and the wife of Jupiter.

As the protector of women, she accompanies them throughout their lives, from birth to death: she fulfills the role of a kind of double agent, since every woman has her Iuono, as every man possessed his genius. For, each decisive stage in the life of a woman, she has a nickname: at marriage she is called iugalis. The women giving birth invoke her assistance under the name Iuno lucena. The children who are born are placed under her protection. In fact, even more than the goddess of spouses, she is the supreme mistress of housewives, the Iuno matronalia. Nor is her political role to be neglected. (...).

The Roman Iuno, less important but closer to mortals than the Greek Hera, with whom she is identified, testifies above all to the fertile power of women." (J. Schmidt, Greek and Roman Mythology, Helmond, 1968, p. 151).

The role of Iupiter, the male function god, is correspondingly similar, yet, instead of 'begetting' an Iuno, i.e. a female structured sanctity center, at the conception of a girl (of course!), he begets (generates) a genius, a male structured sanctity center, at the conception of a boy. From this rare accurate description by a connoisseur like Schmidt one can still deduce that 'gods', 'first pairs of gods', - 'angels', etc. are not fully personal beings, but function sanctities, fluid centers-with their working spheres, - like Yahweh (Is 63:7/11; Ps 51:12/13 (see above page 106) 'poured out' his 'holy spirit' both in individuals and in groups.

That is why we did not speak of 'person', 'personification', 'hypostasis', as so many religious scientists do with vague concepts, but of (function) centers.

b4. The basic dyad, spoken of here, also reflects itself in philosophy.
(i) K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, (Right and limit of natural religion), Zürich, 1954, clearly distinguishes two conceptions of the word 'fusis' = natura = nature: the first reaches from the stoa to the Enlightenment (rationalist) and is 'primal-ideal'.

I.e., the word 'nature' means the same thing as being in the idealistic, conceptual, comprehensible sense (the being of the horse is the nature, essence) of the horse); antique-medieval and modern-contemporary rationalism stands or falls with it; -- hand in hand with it, of course, 'natural' religion (o.c., 15/41).

(ii) id., S. 41ff.. discusses the second concept of 'nature', introduced or, rather, restored in honor by Herder (1771/1776: Herder's time in Bückeburg; cf. H. Stephan, *Herder in Bückeburg*, Tubingen, 1905, and by Schleiermacher (*Reden über die Religion*, 1799), in a rather vitalist-romantic sense. Not the pure, abstract idea, not a "natural" (understand: rational) religion, but a sensitively "seeing" religion is central. This gradually takes shape, through the remnants of bourgeois sentimentalism, a typically modern deviation from sensitivity: matter, body, - woman, sexuality and eros, - so scorned by the 'higher' religions - regain their 'sacred' meaning, - at first cloudy, confused with all sorts of deviations or cultural-historical misrepresentations, - later, in the revived occultism again very much demonized, but more purely 'sacred'.

"The experience of nature, apart from the fact that it is really experience of nature, is at the same time religious experience: (...) The divine is, through the life of nature, sensed. (o.c., 195).

Of course, here the time-honored debate between Biblical and "natural" (understand: nature-honoring) religion resurfaces in all its ferocity. K. Leese, o.c., S. 288/ 368 (*Naturfrörnmigkeit und christliche Glaubenshaltung*), (Piety to nature and Christian attitude of faith), as a theologian, dwells on it at length and in detail, well documented.

It should be noted that the primordial biblical Yahweh religion is itself one possible form of nature religion. Two features, after all, betray that nature.

a/ On the one hand, the Yahweh of the Old Testament, in its oldest layers, at least, (and even in Judaism) is a desert god characterized by a terrifying nature determination: he is namely a vulcanic god (fire deity). Cfr. A. Bertholet, *Die Rel.d. A.T.*, S. 39ff. (Ex 19: 16/19 (the Sinai revelation), 20:18; Deut 4:11; Mikea 1: ; Deut 32:22; Ps 104:32).

b/ On the other hand, the Yahweh of the pre-prophetic Israelite religion, however he may be warrior god (Ex 15:20/ 21;17: 14/16; 1 Sam 4:5/7; 4:19b/22; 5:2/7; Josue 6:21, 24 (the curse on Jericho); Deut 13:17 (curse); 1 Sam 15: 18/22, 32/33 (id.), is a god of piety and moral excellence (A. Bertholet, o.c., S. 56/59) and center of worship (o.c., S. 60/68), in which all the extravagances of "pagan" worship are strictly eradicated, as the primordial population can handle. Of course, this, with the prophets will change thoroughly.

b5. *To sum up:*
The "being" of something (its "nature") is always, as Aristotle remembered, double:
a. Material (fluidic to begin with,-which he no longer knows, apparently, unless purely speculative in the notion of 'protè hulè', materia prima, 'first, purely idle matter), then psychic (soul) and, finally daimonic (be-spiritual, enthoesiastical);
b. Ideational (in the mentality of socratic philosophy: comprehensible-moralistic).

These two cohesive aspects constitute the essence, in the integral sense, of something. Occultists, paranormologists, - religious scientists, religious philosophers, theologians, exegetes, who do not take this into account, this dyad, commit misconception of 'sacred' or 'sacred' data.

The taboo character.
Hitherto
(i) the granular (punctual, monadic-atomic and transitive-fluidic structure of the 'sacred',
(ii) as well as the centric-personal (and at the same time peripheral) structure;
(iii) then the 'ontological-ideal' and at the same time 'ontological-material' (dyadic) structure of nature or being, to which the predetermined subjectivity of ideas (in unison with institutions of mind and will, - about which further) can be ascribed;
(iv) now the 'dangerous' (risky) character (taboo character) comes into play.

H. Webster *Le tabou* (Etude sociologique), (The taboo (Sociological study),), Paris 1952, is a detailed study: the nature of the taboo; its applications to biological (reproductive), sexological (separation, relations concerning), nekuological (death, deceased concerning), ethnic (especially. Aliens),-- 'foreign' things concerning, 'sacred' (consecrated persons concerning, as well as ditto matters concerning), ethical (sin stain concerning), economic and, finally, -- to make it complete! - societal phenomena.

One may ask whether there is anything that cannot be dangerous! However, let us take the scope, to check the conceptual content.

The author distinguishes three types of prohibitions:
a. purely *social* (which pose no problem : we know them too; e.g. driving through no red lights);
b. extra-social, which he divides into two:
b1. *'Animistic'*, i.e. prohibitions which concern the judgment of God ('animistic' called by the ethnologists, in that the word 'animism', a misnomer of considerable size, designates all that is 'soul', 'spirit', 'daimon', etc., - whereby the radical distinction between a mere center (see above p. 112v.) and a real 'person' (personality) has been totally lost): whoever violates 'animistic' - understand: godly (see above p. 44v.) prohibitions, inflames the anger of extraterrestrial and supernatural beings (according to the author);

b2. *tabooistic:* here again the structure 'cause/effect' is at work, as in its godlike form (whoever violates a prohibition introduced by a center or an extraterrestrial or supernatural person, suffers, immediately or after centuries (see Herodotos' historiography about this: after centuries the descendants still 'pay' for the violations of their first or their common ancestors (protogonistic: concerning first parents; progonistic: concerning common ancestors)).

But in the taboo transgression and its immanent sanction (i.e., its consequence inherent in its cause), neither a fluidic center (e.g., a nature spirit) nor a deity of personal level intervenes: "transgressions provided with an overall 'impersonal' (understand this in Webster's sense, of course) sanction" (o.c., 12) are taboo transgressions.

"In the last instance we are dealing with prohibitions, which are as 'impersonal' (same note) as their sanctions"

(ibid.). *Consequence*: "from their violation results automatically, for the 'guilty' an extremely serious condition, for he becomes taboo-laden (...); well, this condition is simply ritual impotence, dangerous for himself and often for the others." (o.c., 12). If he is not exorcised, then, sooner or later, as in the judgment of God, a form of misery (sickness, death, in the worst cases) is going to come upon him (and, if need be, the others. (ibid.).

Semasiological note: the word "taboo" comes from the XVIII-th century captain-explorer Cook, who uses the word in his third and final travelogue of his world voyage, during which he visited the Tonga Islands region in 1777.

Webster sees two word explanations:
(i) taboo is composed of two parts: ta, to mark, to give a mark, and pu, very (intense),- thus "strongly marked", "very marked";
(ii) taboo comes from pu, whooping trumpet, and ta, beating, striking, also: marking,- thus 'marking with the whooping trumpet'. (o.c., 13).

Captain. J. King, Cook's successor in 1779, notes that the Sandwich Islanders use the word 'taboo' for many things and processes: things, people are qualified by it; it could also mean sacred, excellent, set apart by a promise,- proving that, on closer examination, the sacred basis shines through to the language use, even when the language users seem to have forgotten its original archaic.

Such extensions of meaning, based on proportional (metaphorical) or attributive (metonymy) analogy, are, linguistically, ultra-frequent, a-fortiori in the case of a structure as universally applicable as the causal taboo structure.

H. Dubois, S.J., *La morale chez les malgaches*, (The morals of the Malagasy people), in Settimana Intern. di Ethn. Rel., Paris, 1926, similar to Webster's work, though smaller in scope, exhibits very similar classification: the ethical-political principles of Madagascar's inhabitants are, according to him:

(i) practical 'wisdom' directed to clan needs, - similar to Webster's purely social rules;

(ii) tradition-bound pro(to)gonistic rules of behavior, intertwined with pneumatological rules of behavior ('pneuma' = spiritus = center of holiness) resulting in "an unmistakable attitude of fear regarding possible contacts with the inhabitants of the other world: 1. ancestors (pro(to)gonism), 2. God" (a.c., 183);

(iii) the moral-soteriological sense of an 'instinctive' retribution or, according to Dubois, who lived at Tananarive for more than twenty years as a Catholic missionary with a keen observer's eye, tabooism: guilt, blemish (stain), one incurs as a result of violating the countless 'fady', i.e. taboos.

"In the thousands of fady's (taboos) - (...) - the native sees only the fear of the unfortunate consequences, fear based either on the will of the ancestors (pro(to)gonistic tabooism) or on the law of the clan (clanal tabooism) or on the prescriptions of the witches ('sorciers', apparently in the pejorative sense of black-magicians: magical tabooism) or on childish associations' (purely associative tabooism, often seemingly childish, in fact sometimes very responsible, which Dubois does not see) (a. c., 182).

"In all that concerns rites of purification (afana), as concerning faults (ota, tsiny), that which the native brings forward is the 'material' and automatic character both of the transgression and of its reparation" (ibid.).

Going a little further, Dubois, breaking through his narrow western axiomata in his analysis, touches on the core of tabooism: "The repeated recourse to a 'theory', which exonerates the native from looking for another sanction for the evil: the theory of the immanent justice of things, the theory of the return shock or of the 'choc en retour' (French magical expression), so clearly expressed in the constantly repeated maxim. "One needs no countermeasures: what one has done comes back to the offender'" (a.c., 183).

Conclusion: without realizing it, Dubois formulates the magical basis of tabooism. Mistakes can happen consciously, but much more unconsciously . Which proves, - if a proof were still needed, after all that has already been cited, - that tabooism is only indirectly a moral-political matter: tabooism is first and foremost a sacred matter', a matter of fluidity and the laws of fine matter-legalities inherent in and its energetic and ideational-cybernetic character. Which brings us directly into dynamistic magism (about which further).

P. Ricoeur. *Finitude et culpabilité (II, La symbolique du mal),* (Finitude and guilt (II, The symbolism of evil)), Paris, 1960, pp. 9/ 150, deals with the triad 'blemish (stain), sin, guilt: "Wash me spotless clean from my guilt and cleanse me from my sin, for I am m aint aware of a crime and my sin is always before me." (Ps 51 (50): 4/5).

Ricoeur, woefully, considers this triad to be a diachronic triad, - where it is synchronic: the archaic man:

(i) feels, yes 'sees' (in himself and/or in the other) the blemish (stain) of a subtle nature that forms as soon as he even thinks (and begins to want) to do the evil he is about to do; it is thus, again, not a sense, but a material-ideal, (= fluidic reality, a reality of a 'sacred' nature;

(ii) feels, yes 'sees' (with his second sight), in himself and in others, what Ricoeur calls the 'ontological' condition called 'sin'. I.e. the crime done e.g. contaminates, stains, thoroughly the 'being', the 'being' itself of the man in question: he is sinful (separated) in his deepest 'being' (ontological) and

(iii) knows, himself(self) conscious, that he is, at least to some extent, accountable, i.e. guilty.

It is therefore not appropriate to complete these three as a diachronic sequence! This is how the typical modern thinker acts, who no longer 'feels' and/or 'sees' (with his second sight) what is happening on the 'sacred' terrain. He 'rescues' the 'phenomena' with a kind of symbolic idealism: the diachronic scheme comes from Vico in the interpretation of A. Comte (loi des trois stades), (law of the three stage).

Ezek 22:26 gives a Yahwistic interpretation of tabooism, which, among the 'heathen' does hesitantly shine through, insofar as they possess primal theism, but still too little comes through: "The word of Yahweh was spoken to me: 'Son of man, say to the (blood city): 'You are a country (...). Its rulers devour living people like a roaring, preying lion.
What is beautiful and precious they take away and increase the number of widows. His priests rape My law and de.wij.den what is holy to Me. Between 'holy' and 'profane' they make no distinction; between 'pure' and 'unclean' they learn no difference, and to my sabbaths they keep their eyes closed. so I, in their midst dis.honor.ed ".

Ezek 44: 15/27 further specifies this, "The Levite priests must teach my people the distinction between 'holy' and 'profane' and teach them to distinguish between 'clean' and 'unclean! (...). They may not come near the corpse of a person; if not, they defile themselves; only at the corpse of father or mother, son or daughter, brother or unmarried sister may they defile themselves.

If then (the levitical priest) has become unclean, then he must let seven days elapse, and, when he re-enters the sanctuary and the inner court, to serve, in the sanctuary, he must bring a sin.sacrifice. Speaks Yahweh, the Lord".

'Modern' thinkers are, of course, going to sovereignly monkishly express themselves about these seeming taboos, but 'sighted' ones, at least sufficiently Yahwehian sighted ones, will judge 'cautiously', i.e. taboo-consciously: still, in full twentieth century, it is the case that the 'sanctity' of a corpse there is a very negative, pejorative one.

In short: whoever does not live fluidly and very strongly, yes, closely linked to the Supreme Being, has, for example, after a funeral of at least ten minutes (here too mathematical precision is at work: one only has to check it out experimentally), been 'emptied' (as the sensitives say), i.e. lost his 'sanctity' (dunamis (Luke), life force) to that corpse and his former 'soul' in the 'other world'.

One can find these reflections unpleasant, even ballad-like, but they are a truth of experience and experimentation, at least for those who do not impose their own idiosyncratic axiomata on "sacred" phenomena, as so often happens. So one does not scoff too easily at this Ezekiel text, which, in the developmental history of Israel, can already pass as 'advanced'.

One only has to read the title of, for example, a haphazardly chosen article: M.D. Bromet, *Het gevaar van het 'bovennatuurlijke'*, (The danger of the "supernatural"), in Bres-Planète 11 (March 1968), p. 54/59 (note: "supernatural" is to be understood here as paranormal, better were: "holy", because paranormal things are only the striking degree of "holiness"; that is why they are so much more dangerous than non paranormal ones).

Cf. also G. v. Rad, Theol. d. AT., I, S. 271ff (leprosy, corpse; sex, blood), A. Bertholet, Die Rel. d. A.T., S. 7 (Transferability of the power: Lev 6: 20/21; 16: 20/22a; 14: 3b/7; Deut 21: 1/9a); G. v.d. Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Rel.*, S. 27ff.; F. Nicolay, *Hist. des croyances*, Paris, s.d., t. I, pp. 16 (fetishism), 17 (Manitou beliefs).

Sympathy and antipathy.
Semasiologically, a twofold meaning has been attached to these words:
(i) the time-honored, "sacred" or fluidic one: the merging or not of more than one radiating "center" (function spirit, full fluidic person);

(ii) the more recent psychosocial: the intelligible or non-intelligible between more than two people. Here, of course, we are concerned with the archaic-fluidic sense (which, in passing, was clearly at work in the ancient stoa, among others): Dr. Seligmann, *Die Zauberkraft des Auges und das Berufen*, (The magic power of the eye and calling), The Hague, s.d., (1921-1), S. 463, says that Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (XVIIth e.) makes the observation that all (living) beings radiate an atmosphere and do so reciprocally (which he vehemently emphasizes).

This reciprocity (symmetry) is the core of the taboo phenomenon: when two or more fluidic emanations are 'discordant' (antipathetic. opposite), then there is 'taboo': the other, precisely insofar as it is antipathetic, is 'taboo', to be avoided! H. Holzer, Witches and Demons, Helmond/ Antw., 1975, p. 154, gives a splendid example of the mere mutuality of taboo: the lizard thorn is, in the house, ominous, but, in the right place, salutary.

Par. Yogananda, *Autobiography of a Yogi*, Deventer, 1966, pp. 161/163, deals with the Sama Veda (the oldest Hindu scripture on musicology); the deeper intention is to include music, with or without chanting, in the so-called 'cosmic' (i.e., the meaning of the word 'cosmic'). The basis of this is the ragas (established musical patterns, in the number of six (with one hundred and twenty-six raginis and poetras, i.e. derived ragas).

Now, each of the six basic ragas has a sympathy (concordance, agreement) on a fluidic level, i.e., subtle) with:
a. (diachronically) a season of the year and an hour of the day (that is precisely the time when one should hold sankirtan, if one does not want to transgress a taboo, i.e. suffer fluidity loss, 'loss of soul' (expression of the peoples, the ethnologists) and
b. (synchronically) a leading 'deity' (understand: a function center), which gives special 'power' to it, precisely because of the concordance.
These laws of sound sympathy were discovered, according to the Indian tradition, by the archaic rishis (sages, i.e. holiness or fluidity experts) whom one so easily, in secularized circles, wears out for half-wits, neurotics or infantiles.

In the same way each tone (of the seven fundamental tones) of the octave is, in mythology (see above p. 104/105), at least insofar as mythology is the work of the 'wise', the experts on sanctification, 'connected' with a color and/or the call of an animal or bird (e.g. do with green and peacock, re with red and lark, mi with golden color and goat, fa with white-yellow and heron, sol with black and nightingale, la with yellow and horse, si with a mixture of all colors and elephant.

These taboo-inhibiting energetic process models - for the sympathies of that nature are - can be verified by sensitives and/or 'seers' still today experimentally, especially with hypersensitives, who a. feel comfortable when the taboos are respected and b. show symptoms of possession (with or without ghostly phenomena) when one violates those vocal-musical and instrumental-musical prohibitions.

The evil eye (the evil look).
Dr. S. Seligmann, *Die Zauberkraft des Auges und das Berufen* (A chapter from the history of superstition), 1921-1, speaks of the good' and the 'evil' gaze, which, if need be, starts from the very same things and processes to which the taboos are attached.

The author briefly-suggestively recounts the 'evil' (understand: taboo) gaze, which emanates from Yahweh, when Moses, in the burning bush, which creates 'holy' ground (with as taboo 'prohibition of footwear'), did not dare to look up to Him: after all, the taboo said that no one could 'see' Yahweh and remain alive.

It may seem improbably crazy, but that is still the case: whoever is not in the right sympathetic condition ('in a state of 'sanctifying' grace, said the archaic theologians) and 'sees' Yahweh (the supreme being) (with the so-called second sight, that is), will not survive long with his physical-biological (because with his fluid life force) life.

For such an unfit person, such an encounter is the great or final judgment, which takes place not only collectively at the end of time, but continuously individually in the course of "profane" history, which is never purely profane, but always, continuously taboo, - for those in a state of "mortal" sin, As the archaic theologians said (and rightly so, for, at the first opportunity, when they encounter a man sent by God, to whom He has entrusted the great or final judgment within history, at least insofar as it takes place on earth (one thinks of the vengeful sins, of the sins against the Holy Spirit), they are not in a position to judge the sins of the world. In the end, these God-fearing people die (mainly because of their original sin) within the shortest possible time.)

'God does not allow himself to be mocked', says S. Paul (Gal 6: 7/9): whatever man sows, he will also reap'. St.-Paul, like all ancient 'wise men', is talking about a causal process.

The conflictual aspect of the evil gaze
(and at the same time of mutuality) was established, e.g. by Howitt in his ethnography of the Iroquois: every thing, plant, animal, man; according to the Iroquois 'sages' possesses 'orenda' so that life consists of an uninterrupted, mysterious competition between the different (understand: antipathic) ordas.

Something - a human-scientific misrepresentation of enormous stature (given the large readership behind it) - comes of this competition, namely the antipathic-taboo competition, discussed in R. Girard's mimetic-antagonistic ideology, which anti-Cartesian-freudian axiomata, without distinction of level on epistemological level (modern human-scientific 'cognition' (that's what it's called now) is not archaic-sensitive 'cognition'!), applied to sacral-social phenomena. (Cfr. N. Söderblom, *Das Werden d. G.*, s. 55 regarding the Iroquois).

Conclusion: the whole chapter on the taboos stands or falls with the dyad 'particulate energy/ideal steering' (see above p. 117). Fluid reality is energy, i.e. effective; it is idea, i.e. normed-informed (and thus cybernetic). More on that later. Magic, after all, is the self intervening in that process of ideal energy.

Hiërozoïsm.

'Hieros = sacred; 'zoe' = life: the fact that sacredness, fluidity, is not only 'power' (energy, effectiveness) but moreover life, is expressed in that technical term. Heuristic, for our point of view, are:

- **(i)** EB. Tylor, *Researches into the Early History of mankind*, London, 1865-1; id., *Primitive Culture* (Researches into the Development of Mythology, *Philosophy, Religion, Art and Custom*, London, 1871, in which the term 'animism' (animism) is used for the first time in a religious-historical sense: starting from:

a. the difference between living and dead bodies, one concludes to 'life' 'in' that body,

b. the 'appearance' in dreams and second visions of phantoms, one decides on a second type of being, namely the phantom;

Both, life and phantom, were felt to be one reality, yet with different function; such is the core of Tylor's world-famous 'animism';

(ii) the twofold reinterpretation, which the animistic theory underwent;

(ii) a. W. Wundt. *Völkerpsychologie (Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte)*, (Peoples' Psychology (A Study of the Developmental Laws of Language, Myth, and Custom)), Leipzig, 1900-1 (in several volumes); vrl. Bd IV (Mythus und Religion) says that the 'mythological apperception' does not yet distinguish between subject and object and, on an imaginary basis, ascribes 'feeling' and 'life' to all things - which again includes a typical-modern misunderstanding of sensitivity and/or 'seeing'.

Further that there is a dual origin of the soul concept:

1/ the 'Körperseele' body soul, resides in one or more parts of the body;

2/ the 'Freiseele', 'freie Seele', 'Psyche', the free. soul, which, to a lesser or greater extent, can move freely, independently, indeed, outside the body.

Wundt, the great experimental and peoples' psychologist, with enormous erudition, found that the concept of 'free soul' is most frequently present, among the peoples, in the concept of 'breath soul' and the idea of 'phantom'; the Australians, at Cape Bedford e.g. call 'wau-woe' the invisible in a person and in a thing (onomatopoetic term, which phonetically imitates breath); the Zulu say, e.g., of a person, who commands reverence and fear, that "he possesses phantom"; the souls of the dead are called, with us, 'phantoms', when they appear (cf. N. Söderblom, Das Werden d. G., S. 10.

-- I. Paulson, *Seelenvorstellungen und Totenglaube bei nordeurasischen Völkern*, (Concepts of the Soul and Belief in the Dead among North Eurasian Peoples), in CA. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Frankf.a.M., 1964, S. 238 (Arbman (1926/1927), Hultkranz (1953), Paulson himself preserving that dual view, but with refinements);

(ii) b. RR. Marett, *Pre-animistic Religion*, in Folk-Lore, 1900, t. XI, pp. 162/182;

-- id., The Threshold of Religion, London, 1914.

-- following in the footsteps of J. King, *The Supernatural (Its Origin, Nature and Evolution)*, London, 1892, who, first, held a magical-dynamic conception of life;

-- In line with J. Guyau, *L'irréligion de l' avenir*, (The irreligion of the future), Paris, 1887, who instead of ascribing to everything an actual 'soul', ascribed only a kind of 'will' (= pan(en)theism. panvitalism), in the mentality of archaic man, who, in everything, including 'dead' things and precesses, 'saw' a 'will', 'an intention'.

-- Similar also to A. Réville. *Prolégomènes de l'histoire des Religions*. (Prolegomena to the History of Religions), 1881, 1886-4, who, in the archaic mentality, established the close contact, through and in nature, with the 'spirits', their presence and intentions, and spoke of 'naturism' (without precisely presupposing a strict 'soul', again) (cfr. Pinard d.l.B., *Et. comp*., I (Son histoire), pp. 389s.).

-- Marett et al. inaugurate pre-animism or, better, animatism, living belief (in one of three variants: pan(en)theistic (Guyau), naturistic (Réville;, magical (King, Marett); Marett himself was prompted to do so by RH. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, who had established that the Melanesians were called 'mana' the:

(i) impersonal force in itself, capable of producing striking effects (e.g., fruitful husbandry or plant cultivation, successful combat, etc.); and **(ii)** always associated with one or the other of these forces,

(ii) always connected with some high beingness, which (in itself, impersonal) in that relative, genetic sense, seemingly, is nevertheless 'personal' (we would say either centric (mere) or personal-centric). This latter aspect has been previously misunderstood by quite a few 'dynamists' ('magists'). Codrington defines what is 'mana' (force-charged) as not a 'soul' or 'animated' in the strict sense, but as 'a kind of communicable energy, 'a force, distinct from physical force, at work in all kinds of set up for good or for evil!

Marett saw in Codrington's mana a confirmation of his opinion that archaic man regarded even dead things as 'animated', in the sense of 'somewhere alive' and gifted with purpose and feeling, without an actual soul, in so far as there is unusual, sacred power in them. Hence the name animatism (liveliness).

It may, however, be noted that already GB. Vico, *Scienza nuova,* designed an evolutionary scheme in which, in the infancy phase of a culture, man 'looks upon all things as animated'. Tylor et al. were thus not so new!

J. Monod, *Le hasard et la nécessité (Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne),* (Chance and necessity (Essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology),), Paris, 1970, pp. 35/55 (Vitalismes et animismes), is a work that also advocates Vico's interpretation: childlike man, averse to all strangeness of nature with respect to himself, projects substantiality with him in nature, inorganic and organic;

(i) 'vitalism' he defines as accepting purposefulness within the biosphere (excluding the inanimate),- 'metaphysical' (H. Bergson, 'scientistic' (H. Driesch,- Elsässer, Polanyi) (o.c., 39/42).

(ii) 'animism' is defined as the acceptance of purpose not only in the biosphere, but cosmically-universally: Marxism, which instead of the 'soul' places the dialectical movement at the heart of all matter (in the mentality of Hegel) and Teilhardism, which i. p.v. the 'soul' places the 'energy' in all matter, are both anthropocentric, animistic ways of thinking, characteristic of XIXth century scientistic progressism (o.c., 43/52).

On pp. 52/55, Monod is annoyed that animism, vitalist or cosmic, persists so stubbornly: one wants, after all, at the beginning of the universe or life, a goal-directing 'force', 'soul', 'God' or whatever. For Monod, this is an 'illusion' (o.c., 53: *'l' illusion anthropocentriste'*), (the "anthropocentric illusion), a projection of man into the world that surrounds him.

That not all professional scientists agree with this is shown e.g. by H. Jans, *Mens en Kosmos: een nieuwe bepaling*?, (Man and Cosmos: a new determination?), in Streven 49 (1982): 5 (Feb), pp. 442/453 (B. Carter's cosmology and others).

It goes without saying that Monod et al. posit their own axiomata (determinism, mechanicism, exclusion a-priori of all experience other than the non-naturalistic) and, deductively, design all their biological experiments in that axiomatic sense. Of course, the inductive result is then also non-animistic! Every axiomatics deduces, on its basis, experiments and gives ditto inductive results. Seen on its hierosophical plane, Monod is externalist: he positions himself, outside the system of religion.

Hierosophism, internalist.
How is it that sensitives and/or seers so easily 'see' intentions, life, 'spirits', 'feel' in nature, etc.? The reason is simple: the sacredness, the fluid, is, on thorough analysis, itself alive and inspired!

Very solid seers, like the birds of prey, who 'see' a mouse running from an improbable height, willfully magnify - either unconsciously (usually) or consciously-experimentally - the 'points', 'monads', (atoms) of holiness (see above p. 107v.).

What do they see then? Coupled nature spirits! These nature-spirits, which look like head-feet, usually anyway, appear, in the non-enlarging seer's perspective, as points, granular masses of points. Let us look more closely at this couple phenomenon: they are, apparently, sexed (male and female), always engaged in some kind of elementary love game (unless they are abused in opposition to the First Person of the Holy Trinity and to Mary: or, even, satanically reoriented so that, quasi-hypnotized, they readily submit to unholy ends). This may seem strange, but one repeats the experiment, and one will observe the same phenomenon over and over again ('external permanency' said Peirce of objective realities!).

This is the explanation of the fact that archaic man feels, yes, sees, 'everything' 'alive'. This is the ground of animatism, - better called 'hierozoism'. Only a true hieroanalysis exposes this, and it is structured as follows.

a. Without a genuine bond of sanctifying grace with the first person of the Holy Trinity, who is commonly called God the Father, one cannot gain access to these primordial couples; more so, without an androgynous conception of the personality of God the father, who is thus mother-father to these nature spirits - monads, one will never get to see these couples; for they are so structured as to be taboo, d. i. dangerous (yes, deadly after short or long term; godly), for those who are not ánd in a state of grace with the First Person ánd who feel, yes, see Him as an androgynous.

b. Even more: this first condition is separately necessary, yet insufficient: only a created female being, who is both in a state of immaculate conception like Mary, the mother of God, or like Jesus, who have been received without original sin (the one 'ex praevisis meritis', i.e. because of the future redemptive grace of her Son, Jesus; the other because of his divine nature as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity) and provided with the necessary force field ('H. Spirit' said the Old Testament; see above page 106: the fluid organ, with which a super- and/or extraterrestrial being can only act within this world and its misery) and finally, provided with a mediumistic, mediating earthly human being, who fulfils very strict conditions, -- only such a female being can enable a visionary to see these monadic pairs, without perishing.

This is the mysterious reason why the Church (and all God-fearing religion systems or figures) so emphatically advised against all occultism (which is essentially holiness contact and/or manipulation).

They were, mostly unconsciously, but on the contrary guided by God's mercy, of the taboo character of the monads keenly 'aware' - or rather superconsciously (to use now this alienating word for 'inspired' by God, the Supreme Being Himself), the basis of the - today - and always, for that matter - infallibility so vexing many people, which archaic people have attributed not only to the Pope, but to all 'sages' of the real kind.

Not that these 'sages' (holiness experts) considered infallible in themselves deserve such a thing: no, God himself, as responsible for a humanity, which does not 'see', protects this humanity by safeguarding its religious leaders.

c. Finally, apart from the two previous individually necessary but collectively insufficient conditions (God the Father (as male-female) and Our Lady), it is necessary to correctly sense, yes correctly see, the relationship between God the Son (not as incarnated) and God the Holy Spirit sensed and seen by the monad pairs. The First Person appears as a fluidic hermaphroditic 'center' (which is the organ of the Kingdom of God in the midst of these monadic pairs), then, of course, for these pairs points, God the Son appears as male-female (dominant male) and God the Holy Spirit appears as female-male (dominant female), mutually dependent, and this as a representation in two distinct divine Persons of the First, the basic androgynous Person.

I am excused for having to give such a gendered representation of the deity: this is a natural-spiritual (and not a human) idea of the Trinity. Centers are not full persons: nature spirits are, as has been said (see above p. 112v.), merely infrahuman, subhuman beings without higher immaterial consciousness.

God, the three persons, reveal themselves to mere centers (nature- and function-spirits) under a radically different guise (phantom) than to human beings; their 'organ' of fluidic nature (see higher p. 106: 'holy spirit') to communicate and interact with nature-spirits is therefore correspondingly.

One great aura (radiant sphere), centered around a either dominantly male or dominantly female androgine 'phantom', which the center pairs feel, yes, see, as God-for-him. More than that: their activity consists in imitating this God-for-him as the Father-Mother and as the image (Son/ Spirit), in order to pass on to higher centers and persons the fluidic organ through which the Trinity communicates and interacts with them, the nature spirits.

In other words, God builds creation from the bottom up: the higher beings cannot build or develop themselves without the basic holiness that makes up the monad pairs.

The lower, the stronger and more indestructible; the higher, the more vulnerable and dependent on lower beings. This basic truth is the genius truth that the so-called nature religions, which focus on nothing but center worship as nature religions, have left as their legacy to us.

Are they stuck in mere naturism (i.e. center worship) - which is immature religion and fatal in the long run, as will be shown further on, -, the so-called higher religions act wrongly and against God's order of creation, when they do not appreciate the nature spirits in the right, God-willed way.

Structural diagram of the androgine monad: upper male; lower female.

Remark. The hat is like a shell, in which the double point (indicated by 1 and 2) sends out a radiating sphere (aureola) to the partner whereby the 1 surrounds the 2, as it were: the 1 is much more powerful than the 2. This explains why the female beings are much more 'holy' (power-charged) than the male ones, also with the higher beings..

Note: The large dot, where 1 and at 2 the 'cap' (hat) begins, is the so-called sex organ (at the micro-level, of course), with which the androgiencies, together, scan the entire universe. In both directions - outward (projective) and inward (introjective) - rays go back and forth, in a manner constituting a two-way breathing system.

Leibniz says that the monad is attuned to the universe and that the universe, as in a microcosm, is represented in the monad.

M. Eliade, *Traité d' h. d. rel*., Paris, 1953, p. 385, says: "In the end, an object, which becomes 'signified' (i.e., 'sacred'), tends to coincide with the universe, just as, incidentally, hierophany (i.e., the fact that the sacred shows itself in a signified) tends to incorporate the sacred into its totality, - it tends to exhaust only all the revelations of sacredness.

The first vedic (= Old Indian) altar stone, by becoming Prajapati, tends to identify the entire universe with itself. Likewise, every local goddess tends to become the Great Goddess and, ultimately, to incorporate all available sacredness."

This splendid sketch of the macro-microcosmic structure by the genius hiero-sophist who is Eliade here is, in the last analysis, based on the smallest hiero-phany (revelation of sanctity) possible, namely the androgynous monad, which Leibniz saw only as a dot in his mind, but of which he nevertheless saw through the macrocosmic character.

The macrocosmic-microcosmic structure is, by the way, a theme that occurs in all cultures (think of the Pygmy, in the jungle, who by means of sacrifices to the forest (i.e. the sacred forest 'center', with its radiating wreath to the universe), feels responsible for the universe).

Note: 'Hylozoism' is an ancient doctrine (the Stoa reiterated it in her own way as well as Cüdworth, the modern English Neo-Platonist), which postulates that all matter is alive in itself or animated by a world soul.

Such a thing is a global (but for that very reason all too vague) philosophical translation of the hierosanic nature of the sacred.

Note : G. Gusdorf, *Science et foi au milieu du Xxe siècle (Un débat de conscience de l' Occidenta1 moderne. Du nouveau sur l'affaire Galilée)*, (Science and faith in the mid-twentieth century (A debate of conscience in the modern West. An update on the Galileo case), Paris, s.d., p. 9s., says that, a first reversal (with respect to the prehistoric-primitive views) occurs during the third millennium B.C., in Egypt, Mesopotamia and China: the first real systematic thinking which he and Berthelot call the 'astro-bio-logy'. Astrobiology 'explains' (abducts) in a perfectly transparent way, says Gusdorf, earthly events on the basis of astral influences.

This astrobiological mentality makes itself felt, centuries later, with Puthagoras, Ptolemaios, Platon and Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, etc., says always Gusdorf (o.c., 12/17), - until when the Renaissance, with its disintegration of the antique-middle-class world- and life-view (Galilei), causes "the glorious system of security" (o.c.,12) to be attenuated for what Pascal calls "the frightening eternal silence of boundless spaces."

R. Berthelot, *La pensée de l'Asie et l 'astrobiologie*, (Asian thought and astrobiology), Paris, 1938-1, 1972-2, pp. 47/ 54 vrl., says that, before that astro.bio.1ogical system, there was a bio.astral thinking at work, which has less law-like, less mathematical and experimental, but more life- and earth-like features, but which anticipates astrobiology.

Bio-astral (even bio.solar) thinking, says Berthelot, is a generalized vitalism, which assumes that all being (even more or less conscious) are living beings, and as a system (i.e. all (living) beings are in communication and interaction): a. fire, implements, places, b. social relations are 'vital' realities, (of a sacred nature, by the way, which Berthelot, with his scientistic mentality, misunderstands too much); c. souls, phantoms, d. heavenly bodies (sun, planets, stars, moon), - all this runs vitally together in that bio-astral thinking, in which Berthelot, by the way, thinks to discover two layers, viz. the animal type (hunters vrl.) and the vegetative type (farmers).

The bio-astral type of thinking, a. instead of starting from the heavenly bodies, to "calculate" everything from there, as the later astrobiology does, b. remains more earthbound.

It should be noted that either in bio-astral or in astrobiological thought, the living nature of the sham matter is central. Which only confirms our hierozoism.

In Scripture, for example, there is one sample of such correlations: Aggeüs (Haggai) 1:1; 2:22 in its entirety is evidence of the fact that the disregard of the sanctity of Yahweh's temple is taboo, catastrophically "working" right down to the bioastral. Cf. A. Van Hoonacker, Les douze petits prophètes, Paris, 1908, pp. 551/558.

Hieromancy, Theological (Theocentric)

St.- John, Apok 22: 1/5, describes the fact that he "saw a stream of the water of life, clear as crystal, springing up from the throne of God and the Lamb (= Jesus as a suffering Yahweh servant, who is the glorified son of man)" that "in the middle of the square (of the new Jerusalem, viz. the Kingdom of God on earth), surrounded on both sides by the (aforementioned) stream, stood the tree of life, which bears fruit twelve times and gives its fruit every month; - "that the leaves of the trees are for the healing of the nations and that there shall be no more curse."

This is a clear rejoinder to the Book of Genesis (creation story)! Including Gen 3: 22b ("Now if only (man) will not stretch out his hand to pluck and eat from the tree of life, so that he may also live forever!"), where the overall creation culminates in the tree of life plucked by man, made possible by God's life on earth.

St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two orders or degrees of Life: the natural-external life and the strictly supernatural life. It is clearly a greyed-out form of Scripture, where it speaks of both a first, ordinary life and a second, higher life subject to conditions by God.

Both levels of life spring from the Supreme Being, who Himself is all 'life': "I am alive and all the earth is filled with the glory of Yahweh" (Num 14:20) says Yahweh to Israel! 'Glory' (kabod) is what provides someone with 'stature', 'weight-(iness)', function; what provides someone or something with 'luster' (aura) or 'radiance', i.e., seen, conspicuous holiness! Or still 'Holy Spirit', i.e., throughout Scripture, Old and New Testament, a power, which creates some form of life:
a1. ordinary life (Gen 1:2; Ezek 37:1/14);

a2. extraordinary life (Law 11:29 (Jesse); 23: 3,5 (Nazirate); 14:6 (Samson) (16:9); also ministerial-exceptional: Num 11:17,25; 1 Sam 16:13 (David, once anointed) or noble-exceptional (Isa = Is 11:1/6 (the moral spiritual gifts of the messianic prince); Ps 51: 12/14 (pinnacle of Old Testament morality);

b. End-time life (Mt 3:11(= Luk 3:16), where the Messiah with holy spirit and fire carries out the end-time purification; Acts 1:8 (Pentecost; 1 Cor 6:11 (in the baptized as sanctifying power); Jn 3:5/8 (in the baptized as 'principle' i.e. as life-soul , yet now of eternal life), etc..

This apparently in very close connection with:
a. the third person of the Holy Trinity: Jo 16:8, etc.
b. but at least as much with the second person: 1 Cor 15:45 ('The first man Adam became a living soul; the last Adam (= Jesus) became a vivifying spirit), viz. since his glorification (resurrection passages); again that radical trinitarian being of 'power' to life!

Note.- That the theological character has also penetrated beyond the biblical revelation is shown, e.g., by what P. Schebesta, *Origin of the religion*, p. 59, speaking of the magical-religious mentality, says: "the life-force comes from the highest being, who himself possesses the most power, therefore is also the greatest magician and can do everything."

The role of pro(to)gonism (first- and ancestor worship) in this sounds like this: "the life force passes from the progenitor to the descendants and always reproduces itself".

Apparently the 'protogonoi', the first parents, are the link between the Supreme Being and the descendants. This is the genealogical side of holiness, which, in its 'first' cause, is divine in the strictest sense, i.e. Supreme Being property. Which the Bible also says!

"From this view," says Schebesta immediately afterwards, "all sorts of things are to be explained, which, at first sight (apparently not for the 'second' sight" we insert between his words), seem naive and nonsensical:

a. all healing practices, **b.** in part also the legal system, yes, the whole social order is built on this 'philosophy'. (...) A Negro, who is robbed or insulted, does not demand compensation or punishment for the offender, but restoration of life force." (ibid.). Whatever Pl. Temples*, La philosophie bantoue*, pp. 36/39, agrees: "L'être est force" (The 'being' is 'force').

Note:.- The theological character of the life force is also evident, extra-biblically again, from A. Vorbichler, *Das Opfer auf den ältesten uns erreichbaren Stufen der Menschheitsgeschichte*, (The sacrifice on the oldest stages of human history accessible to us), Wien (Mödling), 1956: in the sacrifice, man expresses his utter dependence on God by offering the life right of the created realities to the Supreme Being; life itself, not the material value of the object sacrificed, is the real sacrifice. Indeed, life is the central concept in the mentality of the most primitive humanity.

After all, survival is the day-to-day task in such a culture: therefore, the sacred underpinnings of mock banal life come more clearly to the fore than in "safe" cultures like ours. The Pygmies, the Samoyeds, the Korjaks and other primitive primitives sacrifice - by burning, for example (Pygmies), by abandonment (Samoyeds, Korjaks) - what is necessary for their life or even delicacy (heart, liver, stomach of an antelope, bone marrow).

Yet that is the first sight. The second view 'sees' in those offerings, among other things, the seat of life, which, in the last instance, belongs only to the supreme being.

A. Bertholet, *Die Rel. d. A.T.,* S. 2, gives us the biblical-archaic explanation: "The soul (nèfesh') of the flesh is in the blood. Because of this I (Yahweh) have granted it to you as an altar offering, to make atonement for your souls. For the blood atones, insofar as it contains soul (i.e. life). Therefore I commanded the Israelites, 'No man among you shall consume blood' (cf. 17:14),.

As Schebesta, o.c., 92, says: "From this standpoint all kinds of sacrifices can be explained:

(a) the firstfruits sacrifice;

(b) the animal sacrifice; -- for these two see, e.g., Gen 4:3 (Cain: fruits); Gen 4:4 (Abel: firstborn of the flock);

(c) the atoning sacrifice of one's own blood (1 Cor 11:25: "This is the chalice of the new covenant in my blood" says Jesus at the last supper);

(d) the eccentric ritual of strangling an animal or breaking its backbone without shedding blood: for with this blood, life itself might escape (we may add: the bleeding is internal)."

Conclusion: the fluid, often called 'soul' (like nefesh in the O.T,), is the holiness of something - here: of the sacrificed: all holiness comes, in the last instance, from the Supreme Being; in the sacrifice one offers the holiness of the sacrificed to its exalted origin.

Total conclusion.- The second view of the sacred understood as fluid (106) was clarified, successively as follows:

(a) The basic structural model: the sacred is punctual (granular, monadological - atomic), i.e. a collection and/or system of ultra-small particles, which have

i/ transitivity and

ii/ amenable to idea, mind and/or will (pp. 107/111).

(b) Further structural features, at least the universal ones or as good as, all exhibit the duality 'supreme being/creature': on a divinity-created holiness as infrastructure, creation builds a superstructure (superstructure) (pp. 111/ 136).

(b)1. The holiness exhibits 'centers' (at a certain level 'personal' centers), which are provided with a fine material periphery (in different layers, even then, about which more elsewhere); these centers are:

(a) nature-spiritual, ancestral, and high divine;

(b) supreme (p. 111 / 114) .

(b)2. Holiness, viewed ontologically (i.e., as being), is dyadic: on the one hand, material energy (efficacy); on the other, idealistic directionality (double nature'-concept) (pp. 115/121).

(b)3. Holiness has a 'taboo'-structure, i.e. it is risky (both as cause and effect it is, in principle, only accessible to sufficiently sighted and powerful people) not only psycho-socio-cultural, but in itself, as holiness, provided with a cause-effect chain, which is the same as that of the divine judgement (see above p. 44/50); this takes place on the basis of mutuality (symp.: mutual reinforcement; antip.: mutual weakening) (p. 121/127).

(b)4. The holiness is, living on all levels (animatism; vitalism; animism; better: hierophilia) (pp. 128/136).

II B. *The encounter with the sacred in the fetish*. (138/157)

This chapter, for lack of time, limits itself to one applicative model of hieroanalysis, namely, fetishism or fetish belief.

IIB.1. *The scope description of the phenomenon of 'fetish'* (138/145)

Semasiological note:- The 'word' itself is bearer of meaning, usually socially produced, - and this on account of the two kinds of people, language-creators and language-users: those who possess only the first face and those who also possess 'belief', i.e. the second face.

The word meaning, taken so average, is therefore ambiguous and an uncertain basis. Yet it is heuristically interesting. What we are going to establish.

S. Reinach, *Cultes, myths et religions*, IV, Paris, 1912, pp. 8 / 9, talks about CH. De Brossen, *Du culte des dieux fétiches*, (Of the cult of the fetish gods), 1757, 1760-2, the book that definitively westernized the word 'fetish', 'fetishism'. However, this French magistrate had, apparently, observed the phenomenon very accurately (much more accurately than his writers).

According to Reinach, who quotes De Brosses, he defines 'fetishism' as "the honor shown to inanimate things, which one regards as provided with life". Tylor sees in this the discovery of his 'animism' (see above p. 128), but, according to Reinach, this was incorrect: "De Brosses, he says, o.c., 9, recognized that the 'savage' (i.e., the fetish believer) made a spirit reside in that fetish".

In other words, the material object - in which is only the first sight! Living in that fetish comes because a spirit (center that is) is banished into it. Like Tylor, A. Comte, *Système de philosophie positive* (Treatise on sociology instituting the religion of humanity), Paris, 1851/1854, also understood De Brosses animistically and even, transcending De Brosses, called the sun, the moon and the earth (!) 'les grands fétiches' (the high fetishes) (which De Brosses did not do).

For Comte, with his law of the three stages, fetishism is situated in the infant stage, the poetic-theological stage, in the line drawn by GB Vico (1688/1744; *Principii di una scienza nuova,* 1725-1, 1744-3). It begins with fetishism, from which developed (true to the axiom of evolution) and polytheism and, later, of course, monotheism.

After Comte, J. Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man*, London, 1870, reinterprets fetishism on an ethnological basis. Much theorizing characterizes the positivist Comte and the ethnologist Lubbock. Result: few followers.

As a word, 'fetish' would come from Lt. 'factitius' (related to 'fac.titare', habitually make, manufacture) or from Portuguese 'feitiço' (i/ fetish, ii/ destiny casting, (black-magic) spell); feitiçeira = i/ sorceress, ii/ fairy; feitiçaria = magic, magic), which then amounts to an artificial power-using object.

C. Bleeker*, Encyclopedie van de godsdiensten, kerken. sekten* (Encyclopedia of Religions, Churches. Sects), Amsterd./ Bruss., 1978, pp. 129/130, defines "fetish" as "object, manufactured (think factitius) and 'effectively' thought in the magical field.

"Such fetishes are not objects, in which a spirit dwells. They are not revered, for they are simply skillfully crafted. Each fetish has a particular function. That is where the Portuguese meaning of magically powerful and crafted object comes through. However, it immediately appears that Bleeker here holds a purely dynamic (= magistic) view of fetishes. In itself this is correct, but apparently incomplete. What will further become apparent.

G. v.d. Leeuw, *Phänomenol*. d. Rel., Tubingen, 1956-2, S. 19/27 (Ding und Macht) says: "The older analysis assumed that the power of a fetish is always an indwelling spirit. Today one tends to the opposite view. It seems, however, that the way power is imagined is secondary to the structure of fetishism. The power of the ark of the covenant (1 Sam 4:3) comes from Yahweh; the power of a tjurunga (note: an Australian native object, representing for an individual the connection with the totemism of the tribe) comes from a totem.
Of course, the power of a fetish is very often simply assumed without any idea of spirits or gods being contained within it, purely 'dynamic' therefore." (o.c., 21).

As one can see, the word usage is fluid, like all average language regarding religion and/or magic. However, the remark that the word 'fetish' (worship) comes from Godefridus Carolinus, *Het hedendaagsche heidendom* (Description of the Religion of the Heathen), 1661, who would have used it first, is interesting; as well as that Horace, *Carmina* 2:18 ('the great landowner, greedy, sends his' cliëns away 'in sinu ferens deos' (with, in himself, his' gods')) would deserve a fetishist interpretation. (o.c., 20, footnote 1; 21).

Indeed, rightly v.d. Leeuw, o.c., 20, notes that the feeling of being able to carry the power on oneself is characteristic of fetishism; given a.o. the fact that a fetish is not large, - as opposed to idols (idols) e.g...

But again: some idols are extremely small and, indeed, are worn by themselves, and, in West Africa, large statues, natural objects, etc. are nevertheless labeled 'fetishes'! Mere language analysis gets caught up in contradictory word usage!

Alb. Schweitzer, *Histoires de la forêt vierge*, (Stories from the rainforest), Paris, 1941, p. 82, insinuates a magical conception: "To produce an effective 'fetish' against a man, according to the belief of the primitives, a particle of his body, however small, is one of the essential ingredients.

Fearing that he might fall into the hands of a sorcerer for malicious use, the primitives carefully scrape up all debris when cutting nails, to destroy him. The destiny roll, performed on a small particle of the body, spreads its effect over the whole man, - so they believe."

Except for the word 'fetish', there is nothing here that testifies to real fetishism: all terms are pure black-magic (a part of the whole, but then fluidly understood, so a part of the soul-body (= body-hood), affects the black-magic, indeed; but that is for another chapter).

Fr. Olbrechts, *Maskers en dansers in de Ivoorkust,* (Masks and dancers in the Ivory Coast), Leuven, 1940, p. 157vv, beautifully situates the use of fetishes. At Fanyabli, Dawa, and at Toelepleu (on the border of Liberia) especially the author has seen acrobat groups at work (a kind of variety art' he says). "When the performance begins, a mat or cloth is spread out, on which the 'gri-gri' (note: these are ingredients of fetis en) of the group is laid (usually an animal skin, from which the male actors go to draw new 'strength' after each handgrip or tour de force)." (o.c., 159). Here it is clear that the animal skin is 'force-giving', but distinct from the group gri-gri!

Conclusion: for the fetishist himself there is distinction, which must have its sufficient reason! But look at the 'powerful' position of the actors:

(i) behind the gri-grimat (or more correctly: the mat with the group grigri on it; that has its reason) the three-four drummers are positioned (Olbrechts says that they 'simply belong here, like policemen or ice-cream men, in Europe': what a baffling error for an ethnologist of Olbrechts' calibre! But, yes, he 'sees' only with sense first sight).

(ii) for the mat with gri-gri the three to seven male acrobats ('dancers', magnificent athletes) and

(iii) in front of them three to eight black girls (from three to eight years old), light and lithe.

The display begins with drumming, accompanied by on-the-spot movement of the men, while the girls until the end of the display "hold their hands, palms forward, beside the face, which is continually shaken from side to side at a rapid pace, so that it resembles more a trembling or quivering than a shaking." (o.c., 159)

Sometimes the hands of the girls are also suspended: they are then thrown continuously and alternately from top to bottom, to the rhythm of the drum. In the process the girls stamp their feet continuously on the spot, rhythmically alternating between lifting one foot and raising the other (ibid.). That is the starting action.

Then two of the men step forward with a few dance steps and position themselves diagonally one over the other. Two girls, at a hint, each walk towards a man.

Then it begins: the athletes seize the girls in full stride by the wrists, swing them vertically or horizontally through the air, release the grip: the girl threatens to fall down, but, just as her head is still a hand away from the ground, the athlete grabs the ankle and the air-swinging resumes, - sometimes feigning to miss the grip with one hand, - which the other promptly recovers, causing the spectators to scream with fear.

But now listen carefully how archaic-religious people practice seemingly profane art: "Now the girls are let back down to earth: they trot to their places, where they triumph again, shaking their heads and stamping their feet, as if nothing had happened. The athletes, with a modesty that does not exclude a touch of self-consciousness, make their way to the gri-gri spread on the mat, over which they briefly brush their hands "to renew their strength."

Then each athlete goes to his little female partner to communicate to her the renewed 'strength': he grasps her left wrist with the right hand and quickly slides his left hand along the child's arm to her shoulder, then mutatis mutandis the same with the child's right arm." (o.c., 160).

We refer to the granular fine substance, which constitutes the sacred and its transitive and pliable nature according to idea, mind and/or will (see above p. 108 ff.: 'sanctification'). (For the use of the mat, braided or not, see Olbrechts, o.c., 129).

Amadou Hampaté Ba, *Animisme en savane Africaine*, (Animism in the African savannah), in *Les religions africaines traditionnelles*, (Traditional African religions), Paris, 1965, pp. 33., says: "The fetishes - in bambara 'boli', 'siri', 'tafo' and in pod 'kongol', 'dabaré', tîmgal' - are neither deities nor even demigods. They are simply sacred objects, which allow people to speak with God, - Masa Dambali (at the Bambara), Guéno Doundari (at the pod).

This being is of such loftiness (transcendence) that even those in authority would not be able to approach Him. Out of reverence, they do not call upon Him directly. Masa Dambali is a force, which is hidden from what it is not itself: it - this inaccessible force - (...) is at the same time (meanwhile) cause and mover of the contingent (accidentally existing) creation.

It was she who placed spirits in all the beings of the universe. In animism the common form of the religion of the non-evolved people, in the Western sense of that word (non-evolved), then the concept of 'fetish' is a more widespread mentality than one would like to have known."

The author, ambassador of Mali and director of the Institut des Sciences Humaines of Bamako (Mali), who is also a convinced Muslim, then explains how the Negro, in order to communicate with high-ranking people, uses intermediaries: "From this need - and only from this need - the notion of 'fetish' with the task of transmitting complaints to Masa Dambali or receiving orders from him, has arisen". (o.c., 34).

Fetishes are therefore, in A.H. Ba's view, sacred objects for communication (and interaction): "They are never more than intermediary agents without inner power." (ibid.). Thus we have a purebred Negro African who now claims - albeit as a convinced Islam supporter, - which, of course, given the aggressive monotheism of the Muslims, as of the Jews and Christians, is decisive - that the fetish is anything but power-laden. Behold to what mere semasiology (language analysis) leads us again.

It is true that our ambassador to Mali says on the next page, "To return to fetishism: if - apart from that great worship (of which he has just spoken) - fetishism is also the belief in the guarantees which the possession of a 'given' object can give in order to ward off misery or to acquire happiness, how many people, who believe in revelatory confessions, are not frantic fetishists?" (o.c.,35).

Which then amounts to adopting two radically different fetisisms, one Supreme and one animistic' (to use Ba's vocabulary)! A curious form of eclecticism in the sense that in such a case one uses two incoherent conceptualizations as yet somewhere coherent.

Vl. Soloviev, *La justification du bien*, (Justification of the good), Paris, 1939, p. 187, has a very different, otherwise extremely hierosophical angle of view. In footnote 3 he says, in response to the sentence: "The stone exists; the plant exists and lives; the animal (exists and) lives and is aware of its life in its various states; man (exists, lives, is aware of that life and) understands the meaning of life according to his ideas; the children of God (exist, live, are aware of both their life and its meaning - understanding and) work actively to realize that meaning of life, i.e. the perfect ethical order in all things until the end.

"I speak here of the stone as an example of the most characteristic and concrete thing about inorganic bodies in general. Such a body in itself possesses no real life of its own.

Something completely different is the 'metaphysical' question of the life of nature in general or the presence of a soul in the more or less complex aggregates of nature such as the sea, the rivers, the streams, the mountains, the forests.

Meanwhile, isolated inorganic bodies such as e.g. stones, although deprived of their own life, can serve as solid means for the living activity, localized in them, of spiritual beings: so e.g. there were the sacred stones, the bethel's (bethil's), 'houses of god', associated either with the appearance and action of angels or of divine forces, which seem to dwell in those stones".

Clearly, here, for the first time, we have a comprehensive philosophy of life both purely secular (see the order of precedence in the basic text cited) and transempirical - sacred, - the latter understood biblically (the children of God).

On this integral background we understand that Soloviev, who, with Comte, defines fetishism as "the deification of either natural (stone, tree) or artificial objects", says: "The germs or remains of such material worship are undoubtedly always and in all religions to be found". (O.c.,84).

His very personal critique of Comte et al. on fetish worship assumes that man, who worships e.g. stones, should already beforehand possess a different and more thorough sacred experience. Soloviev finds this basic experience of a highest being, based on his own childhood memories, which he claims to have seen repeatedly confirmed by others with a few exceptions, in the mother's experience of the baby.

"According to my own recollections, the first impression of the starry sky, as far as I remember, is situated at the age of six (impression, awakened by a truly striking cause, the comet of 1859). In contrast, the series of memories connected with family life begins very clearly from the age of four. Neither in real life nor in literature have I encountered the slightest indication of a child's development that demonstrates a reverse evolution. And, if a child became known to us of three years of age, with a special interest in astronomical phenomena, then, I think, we would be somewhat alarmed." (o.c., 85: Comte, as higher p. 138 said, extended the concept of fetish to the celestial bodies).

We also cite this text to point out that, with regard to parental relationships among infants and toddlers, there are other than oedipal (Freud's hobbyhorse) impressions and 'complexes' (including not only negative ones, as appears to be the case with Freud), also because Soloviev, who was apparently nurtured and raised by his mother, finally (!) also puts forward something other than phallocracy with regard to religious child-development psychology.

One more remark: Soloviev lives, here, from the liturgy of the Russian Orthodox churches: those who want to understand more of this than what in the West sometimes penetrates, should read:
-- Dr. J. Gasper, *Weltverklärung im liturgischen Geiste der Ostkirche*, (World Enlightenment in the Liturgical Spirit of the Eastern Church), Freiburg i.B., 1939.

-- J. Tyciak, *Die Liturgie als Quelle östlicher Frömmigkeit*, (The Liturgy as a Source of Eastern Piety), Freib. i.B., 1937 (vrl. S. 114f, 119ff.);

-- id., *Heilige Theophanie (Kultgedanken des Morgenlandes),* (Holy Theophany (cult thoughts of the Orient),), Trier, 1959. In it the ideas of Soloviev are clearly expressed as common to our brethren in the faith, who still know the real but Biblically-derived hierophany .

Note: Of course 'fetish(isme)' also has profane meanings: e.g. 'fetishism' in relation to someone can mean having 'an exaggerated veneration' for him (this also applies to objects (Marx spoke of "Fetish character of the True", fetish character of merchandise); also there is the sexological meaning: exaggerated sexual veneration with related for objects belonging to someone, remembering, etc.); and also the fetishism of the fetish.

-- J.B. Pontalis, *Objecte des fetischismus* (Objecte of fetishism), (Dt by Eva Moldenhauer), Frankfurt, 1972, distinguishes (i) an ethnological concept, (ii) a psychoanalytic, a Marxist and an ideology-critical 'fetish(ism)' concept. Yet these belong, largely at least, in epistemology. See EP. 17 / 22.

Note. J.E. De Mirville, *Pneumatologie (Des esprits et de leurs manifestations diverses; Mémoires adressés aux Académies),* (Pneumatology (Of spirits and their various manifestations; Memoirs addressed to the Academies),), Paris; 1863-4 (1853-1),- t. I (First Memory: Fluidic manifestations in front of modern science,) pp. 294/335 (Transcendent facts of magnetism or spirit intervention demonstrated by facts), deals with magnetism in the magical sense (think Du Potet et al.; 'magnetism' is holiness in the living man who counsels and/or heals, etc.).

Well, in this significant context, De Mirville deals with the 'magnetic aids' which he defines as 'objects, which, once magnetized, serve as vehicles for the occult influence poured out upon them by the magnetizer' (O.c., p. 296, n. 3).

De Mirville, who investigated the matter thoroughly both eruditionally (by very wide reading) and in the field (by visits to e.g. haunted houses on the spot, among which the presbytery of Cideville (Dép. d.l. Seine-Inférieure), where, from the beginning of March 1849, the priest and others could observe the most strong ghostly phenomena either individually or in groups; o.c., pp. 339/ 368 (*Le presbytère de Cideville en 1851 ou les esprits au village*), (The presbytery of Cideville in 1851 or the spirits in the village), the magnetic objects testify, again and again and universally ascertainable, both to an executive power and, in that execution, either to an immanent intelligence (information) or to a 'spiritus rector', a governing spirit, which has the execution in its hands.

De Mirville accepts only such types of abduction as both necessary and sufficient to 'explain' the constantly repeatable facts of 'magnetism'.

He concludes: the so-called magnetic object is the talisman of the ancients (ibid.). These objects, called talismans, are destined for one or more well-defined persons, who have asked the magnetizer for them, who puts into them both a task (e.g. healing, protecting, inspiring, relieving fear, etc.) and a remotely accurate executive power.

Admittedly, this is very close to the fetish as it is 'made' in West Africa in particular, but everywhere else in the world.

But immediately we have surpassed the semiotic-semasiological research: the 'talisman', the 'magnetic object' (- tool) is not 'called' 'fetish', even if it is one type of 'fetish' without any doubt, especially if we take the texts of Bleeker, Van der Leeuw, Schweitser (even Olbrechts' gri-gri does not come out of it), A.H. Ba (the animistic type considered very widespread) as a guide of experimental research.

Only De Brosses, Van der leeuw (in part) and De Mirville (hesitatingly, because he does not 'see' enough) define 'fetish' as a certain magical, but also 'eager' material object, the result of real 'fabrication', as all apparently (except the natural fetishes) presuppose as essential.

This is what language analysis, the inevitable starting point of all research, including and even especially experimental research, provides us with: a Babel-like confusion of tongues, which will perhaps experience its 'Pentecost' (as a restoration of the unity of speech) in the following pages. Now we have at least a heuristic idea of the possible scope of the phenomenon of 'fetish'.

'Content' says what something 'is'. We are going to try, true to Moses' words, to see with the 'heart (and kidneys)' to really 'understand', with 'eyes' to really see (second sight on the same as what the first sight has long seen without 'really' 'seeing'), with 'ears' to really hear what the texts, especially those of 'see(st)ers', tell us about what the 'fetish' (and its worship) really 'is' for them now. (See above p. 51).

IIB.2 *The content description of the phenomenon of 'fetish'. (145/157) Phenomenological guideline.*

As a guide to our research we take N. Söderblom, *Das Werden d. Gottesgl.*, S. 54: "Edgar Reuterskiöld and Uno Holmberg tell of 'power' (the dynamist basic idea) among the Finns and the Lapps. 'Vaki' can mean 'people' and was, in the past, excised from the small mythical inhabitants of earth, water, - fire (we reorder the order), etc . Now Holmberg recognizes the Power in it.

As a variant, 'voima' (power) can be used to speak of the 'power' of the earth, water,- thunder, - forest, etc . (we reorder the order). The magicians 'know' how to use 'vahi' or 'voima' for their purposes".

In other words: Magical power and small nature beings (centers) would, originally, be identical. The magicians know this and employ this knowledge, nothing more. Thus, whoever controls the nature spirits, with or against their will, can "do magic".

(I) *D. Fortune: the revenge demon* (145/154)
Dion Fortune (= Violet M. Firth), *Psychische zelfverdediging (Een studie in occulte pathologie en criminaliteit)*, (Psychic Self-Defense (A Study in Occult Pathology and Crime)), Amsterdam, 1937, pp. 72/76, gives us an experimental (though accidental) example of the identity of magical power and the smallest of nature spirits (below the centric level of the fairy, namely.)

First a word about the distinction between the thought-form and the artificial elemental.

(i) The thought-form, better called 'ideal form', is that which arises when a personal center presents itself with an idea sufficiently clearly and distinctly, especially if this idea also appeals to the person's mind and will, and this in the fine matter (fluidity, holiness), where, at least when it comes to created persons (the divine idea is immaterial), forever ('stat sacrum, dum volvitur saeculum': 'Eternal is the sacred, impermanent the secular') a form (with color, sound vibration, fragrance, if necessary perfume, d. i. fairy perfume, etc.), visible to the second sight, is 'received' (conceptus = understanding) in the life center of the person in question.

There is no creaturely idea which is not thus 'visible' and - emphasis added - eternal. Consequence: man is responsible for the world of ideas about which Platon 'creates', better 'begets' (for it is always--like everything in the fluidic world--a begetting or generative process) and which, inevitably, given the transitive (transitive) character of 'holiness' (fluid), he spreads around him.

A healthy Platonism is indispensable, when it comes to conceptions-in-the-sacred!

(ii) The artificial elemental arises analogously to the thought-form (ideal form). 'Element' sticks in the adjective 'elemental', i.e. what is drawn from the sphere of an element (in the empedoclean sense (Empedokles of Akragas (Agrigenturn)) a.k.a. as a constituent. There are three ordinary 'elements' (fluidic aggregate states), namely earth, water (moisture) and gas ('air' usually called).

Not the chemically - pure form of water and gas (air), but the actual composition is meant, at least its fluidic or sacred representation in layer-subtle matter. 'Low-subtile' differs from 'high-subtile' (we avoid the terms 'etheric' and 'astral '(theosophical terms) because they give rise to misinterpretation) according to structure.

1. The highly subtle matter is, in its very finest form, identical with the coupled 'points' (atoms, monads) - see above page 133 -.

2. Compounds of such monads give rise to more complex and/or more complicated 'monads' (rightly called 'monads' because one monad builds up a configuration or ordered system (system) around itself and thus becomes a compound monad, until that type of fineness is reached which, if further configured, gives rise to the coarse matter)

3. Those types of fine matter which, in man, animal, plant, stone, etc., are at work immediately or at least very immediately before the 'materialization' (i.e. coarsening), is the low-subtle ('etheric' (theosf.)) matter, more properly called 'holiness'.

Now, earth (i.e. all "rocks" of a soft, semi-soft or hard nature), water, air (as just described) have an aura (sphere of radiation), which emanates from the "soul", i.e. its low-subtle double.

This low-subtle double is precisely what is meant when one uses the word "element" (stoicheion), in the pseudo-medieval sense (Empedokles mixed the two planes, the coarse and the fine) in hiero-analytical context. This therefore has absolutely no bearing on the present table of Mendelejef, which merely dissects the secularly attainable intra-atomic structure.

We can now move on to the concerned account of D. Fortune's magic-hyperpractice experience, which, for us, is studyable as an experiment. The essence of an artificial 'elemental', better 'nature-spirit' (word, which we will use from now on) 'situated in one of the three layer-subtle double spheres (earth, water, air)', is its thought-form, better: 'ideal core'.

As mentioned above (p. 116), energy of a sacred nature, better called fluid (i.e. transcendental holiness, flowing through coarse matter), is always at the same time 'idea' (i.e. clear and definite conceptualization standing for thought: beings who think only vaguely are totally unsuitable for the formation of an artificial natural spirit).

This idea can be either uplifting or destroying: its ethical and political nature depends on this (see above p. 67 ff.) (which we will discuss in another context). We emphasize that the taboo-character (see above p. 121/127) of a human created spirit of nature is such that its creator undergoes his judgment faultlessly certain. We shall not return to this.

After this introduction with its two basic concepts, 'ideal form' and 'created natural spirit', we can follow D. Fortune's story closely (if necessary interrupted either by explanations in hiero-analytical framework (which is not hers, unless partially) or by excerpts from her works). She gives, in more than one place in Psychic (understand: occult, psychic) self-defense, the "formula," i.e., the idea in abbreviated form (forma, formula), of the artificial natural spirit. It distinguishes three aspects:

(i) the sharply defined representation (ideal form);

(ii) the inspiration with something from the creator's being, i.e. the generating or generative energy (holiness as source) present in the creator's life center,- center, which is his basic monad (his genius) (if male), his iuno (if female; - see above pp. 118/119; 130vv. (coupled nature-spirits)); when this ánd sexed - vital ánd nature-spirited - hermaphroditic 'source' (generating power) is not or not sufficiently active, then the creation of a nature-spirit by the earthly human being goes wrong, and this to his disadvantage.

The reason: earthly man, once engaged in creation, works with his central monad (genius, iuno) insofar as it is both image and (especially) intelligible communication with the other monads of the entire creation - microcosm.

(iii) The realization of the image animated by genius or iuno in the appropriate natural force, i.e. in one of the three elements (earth, water, air), and this according to its low-subtle double; for the monads of earth, water, air are essential to life as the 'living center' of the natural spirit, whether created naturally (i.e. by God himself (Trinitarian) angelic, demonic, -satanic)) or artificially-human.

After all, this sphere of nature (earth, water, air) is also vital to man. Well, what is vital for the creator, it is also for that ideal form of him, which is the natural spirit created by him. This spirit of nature created by himself, after all, takes part (participation) in the basic monad (both as image and as intelligible communication).

On p. 200 (o.c.) Fortune, in the context of the creation of a "curse" (i.e. an artificial nature-spirit, which has to work a curse on someone or something), explains a bit more the invocative side of the magical-nature-spiritual operation.

She says, "The curser says, 'I curse you at ... and ....'" . By these magic-bearing words (see above p. 110), after all, the already existing number of the natural spirits to be created, as referred to by the creator now and here, become as it were 'awake', i.e., they take and/or get (simultaneously) contact and image character with regard to the natural spirit to be created, which is like their 'brother' ('sister') (for these natural spirits too have a either female or male or whether or not dominantly male hermaphroditic gender).

Once in agreement (i.e. with the 'purpose' (e.g. a curse, a blessing) given to the work by the maker here and now) and in contact (rapport) with the nature spirit to be made, all the kindred, attuned - contacted, can cooperate. This cooperation is absolutely necessary if the 'operation' (as occultists like to say, 'imitating scientific language') is to succeed.

For, if all the like-minded do not cooperate, then this has a paralyzing effect on the here and now starting spirit of nature, with the result that its creator has to generate power over and over again (with his basic monad in unity with all the monads of the whole universe: always keeping that ontologically-wide structural coherence of the created 'being' in mind is absolutely necessary).

In passing, two other aspects of this operation should also be noted, viz.

a/ as the magician-natural spirit creator strengthens the nature spirit through the e- and invocative contact with his peers,

b/ so he strengthens his genius resp. iuno with that of the group, whose cooperation he (she) obtains if necessary;

c/ more so - one thinks of CG. Jung's archetypes. i.e. in the highest sphere of the sacred (the highest degree of its high-subtle sphere) there is the 'cosmos noètos' (mundus intellegibilis, system of knowledge and thought), the so-called world of ideas, which crowns the 'akasha' (constitutes its highest layer).

Now, by concentrating (i.e., just paying close attention to his or her consciousness) on this highly subtle world of ideas (selectively, of course, according to the concrete goal which the creator of the nature spirit has set for himself here and now), the 'akashia' is a system which is the highest layer of it. It is not about those sickly or half or total sickly eastern or western techniques of thinking), the creator connects (associative processing) his ideal form, center of his nature-mind (see above p. 146/147), with all analogous or identical ideas in the universe and, in particular, on earth.

Conclusion: there are three aspects: ideal form, inspiration (genius, iuno) and situating in the sphere of nature. There are three reinforcements: archetypal (ideasworldly), groupal (congenii, coniuonones) and invocative (fellow nature spirits). Behold the regulative model of what will now follow, as one possible applicative model.

Praxeology.
Praxeology' is the description of a praxis, practice, action, such that
a/ and its synchronical and its diachronic framework
b/ as well as its phaseology becomes clear.
This double structure contributes to the intrinsic value of what the magician-natural-spirit creator wants to achieve: the more praxelogical (in the sense described above), the clearer and more distinct his idea concerning the nature-spirit idea, his own monad (genius, iuno) and the sphere of nature (earth, water, air) and its three possible reinforcements.

Ad.a. Fortune situates the incident
(for it is not an actual experiment) in her own life as an occultist. Diachronically, therefore, the narrative is vague. Synchronically, there is only one détail: she had been greatly wronged by someone she had helped financially at the cost of great sacrifice. At least she thought so, - because, by hiero-analysis, it appears that, in a former earthly life, - reincarnation as a mere working hypothesis does not formally contradict the dogmatic position of the Church on the subject, since we are working purely experimentally (- and not dogmatically-religious to the full) in these pages - she had done this man a great injustice. It is precisely this détail that escaped her otherwise sharp analytical mentality, in that she had to redress this harsh injustice.

Ad.b. *Now, phase-wise, we dwell on the event.*

(i) -- Fortune, one afternoon, resting on his bed, seeks revenge, but falls into pre-sleep. Halfway between the waking and sleeping states, man is more accessible than in the full waking state to paranormal (understand: sacred) experiences, yes, manipulations.

"At that very moment, the thought occurred to me to abandon all self-limitation and strike out. In my imagination the old Norse myths (Edda's) rose up: I thought of Fenris, the horrible Norse wolf".

"Immediately afterwards I had the peculiar feeling that, at the level of my 'plexus solaris' (= bundle of nerves in and around the stomach), something went out of my body: next to me, on the bed, a big wolf was materializing. (...) Just like Z. (on p. 69, o.c., Fortune recounts the materialization of a dog, which emanated from Z., a man, who worked on her) this form looked gray and colorless and, as with the former, I felt the pressure of its weight." (o.c., 73).

Note: **(a)** 'Materialization' is the formation of a fluidic form in such a way that it becomes not only highly subtle but also lowly subtle and even grossly material (then it becomes perceptible with the ordinary senses, of course);

(b) That natural spirit formation can go as far as this is a widespread belief: the author of *The Occult and the Supernatural*, London, s.d., p. 97, says that magic, if sufficiently developed:

(b)1. creates living beings (one thinks of the homunculus or human) and/or

(b)2. animates images or statues with life (cfr. P. Saintyves, *Le discernement du miracle,* Paris, 1909, pp. 304ss. (The prestiges of the priests; the physics of the temples: "the art of making 'gods', fabricating statues, which predicted the future and interpreted dreams" (o.c. ,307)).

The Talmud e.g. also mentions such phenomena: the 'golem' was a real creature, which served its master (its creator) by performing minion tasks;- thereby Ps 139:16 (Thy eyes have beheld my shapeless members) was taken as a model.

(c) Also in our country several people experience the half or whole nature spirit formation, as described by Fortune: often they are simply laughed at by the incomprehensible (doctors, psychotherapists, family members), who do not 'see' and have no interpretation system.

(ii) - Fortune, unfamiliar with that praxis, knows enough about such monsters: if she does not panic, she can control that wolf with her will (imagination too: see o.c., 279): the materialization "growled and showed its teeth".

But she pushes him off the bed: he then changes into a dog (metamorphic aspect), to her reassurance, by the way. Thereupon the northern corner of her room 'swells' into nothingness (= the materialisation) and Fenris, now a dog, swells through that 'opening'.

Yet Fortune has the 'feeling' (always the first, sensitive degree of 'seeing') that this was not the end of it. This 'hypothesis' (of her sensitivity) was confirmed the following morning. A housemate, after a restless sleep, with dreams of wolves (the dream may have sensitiveness value), had awakened and, then, in the dark, had seen "the firing eyes of a wild animal in a corner of the room" (o.c.,74).

Note: Seeing only the eyes of an 'apparition' is, in this sense, normal in that the eyes are pre-eminently the accumulation of 'holiness' (energy, and that is fire energy, about which more later), with the result that a waning materialization is, in time, only 'eyes'.

(iii) - Fortune consults, worried, her magician-master. This one says that the wolf, resp. dog is a "part of herself that has gone out" and that, at all costs, she had to call him back by "taking him (back) into herself"; (o.c., 75). This, according to her teacher, went only when she removed her resentment and plans for revenge from herself.

On this Fortune herself writes that "she found herself at a crossroads", i.e., if she pursued those grudges and plans for revenge, she would go the way of black, i.e., hostile, magic: "If I gave myself the opportunity to satisfy my desire for revenge, then the wolf form would be born to an independent existence and then the devil would be unleashed, both literally and figuratively.

I got the impression, clearly, - and in 'psychic' (understand: occult, sacred) matters impressions are very important - (cfr. supra pp. 68/69) - that, if the wolf - impulse had once been expressed in some act, the wolf would tear itself loose from the psychic (understand: sacred) umbilical cord that bound it to my 'plexus solaris',- after which it would no longer be possible for me to take it back into me. (o.c.,75).

Fortune's task was thus double:
a. in her heart (consciousness) to let her vengeance shoot, i.e. to repent (meta.noia, penitentia) (the ethical-political side)

b. in her 'kidneys' un(der)consciousness) absorb the wolf form again instead of sending it to the 'enemy' (or - we add this to Fortune's incomplete enumeration of possibilities - have it absorbed in something else (stone, plant, animal, other fellow human being, nature spirit, demon, satanic spirit). Most "exorcists," for example, do not act like Fortune (who originally possessed a residue of Biblical Christianity, i.e., Christian Scientist -healing), but simply "move" the form, which they "see" (?) as a satanic spirit to be shunned, which must be punished, scolded (see the texts of the Rituale Romanum), etc.

This exorcism-praxis, widespread, moderately exacerbates the "power" of the artificial spirit of nature.

These processes of displacement (instead of absorption) - plural because of the multiplicity of types of people who carry them out (most of them unconsciously, but all the more effectively; the rare ones - real insiders - very consciously) - are seen in: **(i)** physicians, **(ii)** psychiatrists, **(iii)** psychotherapists, **(iv)** nurses, **(v)** educators, etc. - in a word: all directly or indirectly human caregivers - at work.

"I decided (...) to let the opportunity for revenge slip away and, at dusk, called the 'creature' back. It entered my room from the northern corner (later I learned that the ancients considered the north an evil quarter) and, in a friendly and even tame attitude, stood on the rug. I obtained in the semi-darkness, an excellent materialization and would have sworn that an Alsatian dog was watching me. It was a tangible apparition and even the scent of the Great Dane was not missing.

From me to the guise ran a shadowy ectoplasmic line, one end of which was attached to my plexus solaris' (solar plexus; in and around the stomach region), while the other, at the level of its belly, disappeared into its shaggy coat (but I could not see the exact point of attachment)."

Note: the fact that Mrs. Dion Fortune could not "see" the correct point of attachment is due to the fact that she does not "see" the monads (and its hermaphroditic structure).

"By an effort of my will and imagination, I began, along the silver thread, to 'suck' the life out of him (not with the mouth, she casually added to Fortune's account, but with the basic monad, her 'iuno') (...). The wolf began to fade; the thread became thicker and more substantial.

In my inner self a fierce emotional storm started up: I felt the most furious impulses to go out and tear apart everything and everyone that came in my way (...). With a great effort I overcame those impulses, - after which the storm calmed down.

The wolf form had now languished into a formless gray mist: I swallowed it up in me along the silver thread. The tension eased. Finally, I was myself again, - only bathed in sweat.

As far as I know, this is the end of history. (...) Particularly curious also was the fact that, precisely during the brief life of the thing (i.e., the artificial spirit of nature) (twenty-four hours), an opportunity for a formidable revenge presented itself." (o.c., 75/76).

Behold the description of the origin of the possession: the fluidic penetration (indwelling in the human being; who, thereby becomes 'fetish' (spirit house)) - in the kidneys (the unconscious) - begets (generatively: via the iuno/ genius)) the emotionally - willed ferocity of the animal in the otherwise calm human being (in the heart).

Immediately one sees, thanks to her final determination concerning 'synchronicity' (which was so noted by CG. Jung), that, - when on lower (i.e. natural-spiritual) plane - 'in the kidneys' says the Bible - an intrusion (think of the transitivity) of a purely fluidic being ('intelligence' some occultists wrongly say) has succeeded, -- on the higher this time really ideal-directed plane, with which the fate of the creatures of creation is determined (God works as the main determiner), - One thinks of the expression 'casting of lots', high satanic spirits, renegade 'angels', this time from the personal level (no mere centers), regulating the situations (steering aspect) in such a way that the natural spirit possessed in the depths of the latent is given the opportunity to work itself out.

Who, in this case, like Freud and most psychoanalysts, thinks that working out (das lustprinzip) is the norm of 'liberation' from 'tensions' ('stress', etc.), commits an unforgivable error, which is not immediately apparent.

On the contrary, the person in question feels 'good', 'liberated', etc., on a purely emotional-conscious level), but later, when no one thinks anymore of the effects produced by this second effect (viz. The first effect already took place in both the high satanic angels and in the foolish man who practices black-magic destiny), only then does what Freud calls: Realiteitsprinzip, - what the Bible and all religions call: the violated taboo (see above p. 121v.) or divine judgement (see above p. 121v.) come into play. 121f.) or divine judgment - emerges, namely, in the fact that, once out of man-victim, the nature spirit, being without fetish or 'dwelling' ('ban'), seeks the company of its kind, finds them (through its iuno or genius) and, strengthened, returns : "When the unclean spirit has gone out from someone, it wanders around in barren places (see Tobias = Tobit 8:3). He seeks 'rest', 'anapausis', 'requies') and does not find it." (Luk 11:24).

Of course, the nature spirit does not find 'rest': nature spirits are not persons, but mere 'centers' (see above p. 111v.) , i.e., to a certain extent 'independent', but, through some 'silver cord', (the Biblical name), connected either to the creator-and-the-satanic-angel-inspirer or to the victim (at least when it comes to an unclean nature spirit; 'pure' nature spirits (centers) have a god-like or even divine origin, of course).

A nature spirit, pure or impure, needs a silver cord being, i.e. a fetish. That is the sacred definition of "fetish. Whether that fetish is an object, a plant, an animal, a human being, an alien, yes, God, only matters to the one who created it.

But, once created, - for that is the only correct word for 'generate' (beget via iuno, ge nius) - the 'spirit', 'pneuma', spiritus, needs a home, in which it can 'dwell', i.e. feed on 'spirit' (pneuma, spiritus), i.e. life force (holiness).

a. *Pneumatology* is theory of mind (see above p. l44 : De Mirville, vrl. p. 112/113: Heiler's list): it is one of the basic aspects of fetishism.

b. The other side is the indwelling aspect especially noted by observers (ethnological, tourist) : in Fortune's story it was remarkably thoroughly expressed (possession).

Conclusion : in Fortune's story with commentary, the structure of naturalistic religions has been exposed, with the emergence, appearance, containment and elimination of spirits.

(II) *Macumba: he had played with 'the doll'* (154/157)

True to our phenomenological guideline, we have already exposed one aspect of it (see above p. 145), namely the nature spirits (natural or artificial). For the sake of readiness and to explain the dangerous taboo of the naturisms (nature-spirits worship; see above p. 129 (Réville's naturism, parallel with Guyau's pan-vitalism (pan(en)thelism) and with Marett's animatism)) invading more and more into our Western culture, as well as to already start with the second aspect of our phenomenological guideline, viz. the identity of magical power and nature-spirits control, we briefly dwell on P. Grégor, *Dans la jungle des nombreuses morts*, (In the jungle of the many deaths), Paris, 1962, pp. 131 / 189, where the author, a former woodcutter, entrepreneur and work leader in the jungle of Brazil, gives a touristic but accurate (free from all ethnological prejudices) description of the macumba, which also penetrates our country, in Belgium, like so many other "cults", i.e. nature spirit religions.

Well prepared by D. Fortune's explained story, let us listen to the text: "After one of those disgusting duels with the chopper (the tool of his in the fifty jungle workers), the end of which is always fatal, I tried to discover the motive of the murder.

Epaminondas, the old mateiro (guide) had made a disparaging gesture toward the corpse with the smashed skull: 'He had played too much with the doll,' he had said. (...). By the way, I immediately realized that the motive for the murder had something to do with one of our three 'cooks' (i.e. food preparers). (...). I set myself up, on a full moon night. (...).

I discovered a young caboclo (hired worker). (...). He looked sternly at the moon. (...) Osorio, a poor boy, toothless, very ugly and very timid. In his right hand he held a cylindrical object, (...), one of those roots which, by a quirk of nature, imitate the shape of the human body.

Several minutes passed: (i)a. Looking tightly into the moon, (i)b. Osorio slowly stroked the root, (ii) while his' lips mouthed inaudible words. (Steller then describes the jungle night).

Suddenly, a shadow of the itaperi (shared living) came loose: I recognized Aparecida, the slimmest and the stealthiest of our three cooks. With the shaky step of a sleepwalker, she approached Osorio.

When she was with him, I clearly distinguished her countenance. I had to suppress a cry of surprise, even dismay: I had seldom seen such a frightening face. It was at once alive and dead. The eyes of the girl were wide open, but had no focus. One saw only the whites of her eyes; she was in rapture.

Osorio rose gently, took hold of her: she was startled awake. I heard Osorio say, "Quietinha! (Quiet!),- softly, but with an energy and an authority that I did not know in him. Thereupon he pulled her along behind the bamboo hedge". (o.c., 132/135).

Before starting the commentary: the author notes on p. 158 (the nocturnal macumba rapture of the three young women), 179 (idem), that this twisting of the eyes is typical also when the women, who are subdued by black (= immoral) magic, get into dancing ecstasy.

The 'trance' (rapture) is practiced in almost all naturisms (nature spirit worships). It is common in our (self) hypnosis. Already above we pointed out the submissive nature of such self-awareness, whether it be:

a/ naturistical,

b/ pentekostal-charismatic (even in those circles, rapture is noted, yes, often taken as a 'good sign' of Holy Spirit activity) or

c/ (auto)hypnotically practiced or evoked. It is and remains loss of self-possession and, to that end, alienation, 'selbstentfremdung' (Hegel would say, after him, economistically redubbed Marx).

One sees something like this less and less in Old Testament Yahweh religion and sporadically in New Testament charismatic phenomena (see 1 Cor 14, where Paul, with all due respect to "phenomena" ("prophesying" (14:3) is preferable, because intelligible; "glossolalia" (speaking in tongues) in spirit (rapture) (14: 2, 4) is not bad, but to be avoided, when Paul dares to speak through; the same with (i) praying with the spirit (rapture) and (ii) praying with the mind (nous) (14: 14/15; where nous (mind) is considered superior to pneuma (spirit (rapture)).

Let us consider the structure of magic (here woefully 'black' (immoral, yes, demonic-satanic". Osorio has (see above pp. 146,147),

A. a sharply thought idealistic form (viz. sexual intercourse with that girl in ritual form (macumba) to be sure that she is

    a. from her sleep remotely awakened comes to him

    b. remains completely silent afterwards);

B. a spirit of nature at his disposal as macumba, viz. as a we man during the liturgies (o.c., 157), but he strengthens him by his personal creation that lunar night: he evokes (see above p. 148 (realization in the answering force of nature), which is double here.

a: the softened sunlight (= moonlight), which all true magicians know to be much more efficient than the full sunlight, which contains too strong 'fire' - element (the fire as element, i.e. as double aura and - life force (holiness) in and behind what we call plasma, with a contemporary word, d. i. intra-atomic transformation (transformation) of existing substances, is not that which we know as fire in day-to-day experience, unless, insofar as intra-atomic processes are also going on in that fire (which accounts for its naming in the past)).

Thus it is understood that, until now, we have always kept the three (earth, water and air) elements well separated from the so-called fourth in the series (which is distributively false), which is in fact completely outside the series, as an aggregate state.

b. The woefully unnamed biological root : here one law side of magic, namely resemblance (imitative, mimetic magic; cfr.
-- J. Frazer, *The golden bough*, London, 1890-1, 1907/1913-3 (12 vols.).

-- CA. Schmitz, *Todeszauber in Nordost-Guinea*, (Death Spells in Northeast Guinea), in CA Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Fr. a.M., 1964, S. 335ff., for the further attempts to structure the magics on a purely (or as good as) ethnological-cultural basis,--which has not succeeded very well until Schmitz).

After all, the resemblance is no different from what the ideal form, the idea of the nature spirit (or center) to be created, is in grossly material form: the root, applied here and now, is the girl, as bodily pleasure, one more time (cf. the 'verstehende' method, which conceives of the fellow man as I one more time).

It is even certain that, as a good magician, Osorio licked the root, (apparently) also caressed it, while identifying that root, fetishistically, though now in the sexological sense (see above p. 144), with Aparecida's body to be enjoyed and emptied in its sanctity.

Indeed: identification is the cognitive and at the same time effective - pragmatic instrument of any real magic worthy of the name.

The discussions around contagious (understand : contactual) and imitative magic start from the 'seeing' in the first form; those who 'see' magic in the second form (belief) see that imitation and contact merge.

The sexual-fetishist instinctively senses a basic phenomenon of all magical knowing and acting, yet:
a/ shifted to the merely psychological-sociological-cultural plane and,
b/ moreover, narrowed down to one phenomenon, the erotic-sexual.

Yet who acts as a contact imitation (or rather, pre-imitation)? The natural spirit newly created by Osorio! He arises both from the moonlight fluid and from the root fluid at the same time (earth and moonlight).

C. The inspiration of this nature spirit with something from the very being of Osorio (see above p. 147), - which is abundantly clear here, i.e. sexual magic, as it is practiced in the jungle macumba, which can differ greatly from the more civilized city and especially tourist macumba (since civilization sheds many rough edges, such as e.g. the sexual subjugation), is practiced (this is further described in Grégor' s book accurately with an outsider's eye very detached but 'erlebt' (loaded with experience), which makes his book, like all non-specialist descriptions, a truly understanding (Dilthey: 'Verstehen') approach.

After this second explained reading we are able to describe and structurally interpret the common fetishisms fluently. What we are going to do now, on the basis of mainly West African material (II 157).

But first a word about totemism, now not in the ethnological or culturological sense, but sacred. Hieroanalytically totemism is one (and indeed the most striking) form of fetishism: a stone, if necessary an artifact (man-made natural product), - a plant (system), an animal (system), a human (system), - all this can be totem, i.e. the reproduction (once-only relationship), of either a single person or a collection, or a system (group) of individuals.

Bibl. sample:

-- M.Besson, *Le totémisme*, Paris, 1929 (well documented account both of the phenomenon and of the theoretical-culturological interpretations).

-- Cl. Lévi-Strauss, *Le totémisme aujourd' hui,* (Totemism today), Paris, 1969 (the structural pulverization of all existing conceptions of culturological totemism).

-- N. Bancroft-Hunt, *Les peuples du totem*, (The peoples of the totem), Paris, 1979 (on totem worship on the N.-W. coast of N.-America).

-- S. Reinach, *Cultes, myths et religions*, Paris, 1922-3, t. I, pp. 9/85 (several articles on totemism)

-- J. Frazer, *L'homme, dieu et l 'immortalité*, (Man, God and immortality), Paris, 1928 (pp. 51/144 (L 'homme en société: the classical interpretation of totemism, purely sociological, vrl. as a marriage system,-which is but an offshoot of it, which, hiero-analytically, is without bearing).

-- Cl. Lévi Strauss, *La pensée sauvage*, (The wild thought), Paris, 1962, pp. 48/99 (The logic of totemic classifications:a purely distributive-logistic analysis); pp. 144/177 (Totem et caste).

Behold, a snatch of a cluttered mass. What causes these boundless interpretations and reduplications? Because the analysts do not "see" with the second sight!

We will not return to this. The reason: in the long run it becomes a sawmill, but hopefully the reader will now know the reason for the limitless confusion of concepts, which results from not doing phenomenology with the second sight.

The culturological extent of fetishism. (157-169)

Fetishism in the strict semasiological sense, is West African; but in the hieranalytical sense, i.e. "seen" with the second sight (faith), it is planetary. Briefly, it looks as follows (sample wise):

(i) N.-Siberia, Filnand, etc.:

-- D.K. Zelenin, *De ongonenverering in Siberië (Academie der wetenschappen van Leningrad),* (The ongon worship in Siberia (Leningrad Academy of Sciences)), Moscow/Leningrad, 1936 (Russian), of which A. Friedrich, *Die Forschungen über das frühzeitliche Jägertum*, (The researches about the early hunter's life), in CA. Schmitz, Religionsethnologie, Fr. a.M., 1964, S. 206ff., provides a summary account.

An ongon is, vlg. Zelenin, banning ('Festsetzung') of a spirit in a 'lekan'. A lekan is a small, roughly finished depiction of animals (aquatic fauna, poultry, quadrupeds), as well as people, usually made of wood, bark, but also leather, fur, stone, metal. Function: medical (illness healing), economic (hunting luck, stock breeding luck). Among the ancient Finns, the haltias and tadebeyos inhabit objects (Nicolay, o.c., 21).

(ii) Japan: the shintai is a well-defined object (stone, sabre, mirror), in which an invisible 'deity' (we are gradually understanding that this word means mainly nature-spirit in this context) 'embodies' (i.e. is embedded); cfr. M. Eliseev, *Mythologie du Japon*, (Mythology of Japan), in P. Couchoud, *Mythologie asiatique illustrée*, (Asian Mythology Illustrated), Paris, 1928, p. 379. The go-sjintai (venerable god-body') is a phallic deity' (!) in polished hard stone, framed, normally, in a small wooden shrine.

(iii) *Polynesia*: the tiki is a small 'deity' (!), at least in an individual or family sense, which usually has animal appearance (totemic side of fetishism) - which, of course, can also be enshrined in an object (Nicolay, o.c.,20).

Behold three haphazard touches to orient the reader somewhat and hastily.

The hiero-analytical content of fetishism. (158/159)

Major A. Glyn, *The Lower Niger and its Tribes*, London, 1906, says: Not to those objects themselves do we address our prayers, sacrifices, tributes, but to those objects as allusions, which carry within them, mount or present the deified ancestors of the family, the clan, the tribe.

In this way Glyn reproduces the language of the fetishists he met. The rendering can even count as a definition, provided that instead of 'deified ancestors', simply 'spirits' (a.k.a. of ancestors) is placed.

-- J. Van wing, *Etudes Bakongo* (Sociologie, religion et magie), (Sociology, religion and magic), DDB, 1959, pp. 382/425 (Les nkisi), says that a nkisi is an artificial object, inhabited or influenced by a spirit, provided with a superhuman ability, but controlled by a human being; he has the impression that it is usually a soul of a deceased person, who, after his death, has taken on a 'body' adapted to his new way of being; but also an 'independent' spirit can live in a nkisi.

To be brief : pneumatologically (spiritually) Heiler's list (see above p. 112) is sufficient to know who can inhabit a fetish, lekan, shintai, go-sjintai, nkisi, tiki, etc. (the names differ, the matter is identical) to dwell, better: to be indwelt (for 'fetish' differs from 'indwelt' in that 'fetish' means indwelt dwelling),-except for the 'soul substances' mentioned by Heiler, which are not spirits but mists, on the way to spirit or centering.

What is true is that 'soul substance' (i.e. the inspiration with 'something' (the radiance of the iuno (Eve) and/or the genius (Adam) and of the magician-fetish maker and of the beings involved in the fetish-making) is present in every fetish (see above p. 147).

Idolism (idol worship, idol worship),

Eidolon', idolum, idolatrous image, can be a form of fetishism, namely if the image is magically-pneumatologically worked in such a way that an 'organ' (see above p. 106: holy spirit as organ in individuals, people, etc.) of the deity contacted in and through it is of a personal level (thus no mere infrapersonal center).

1. See above e.g. p. 141v. (A.H. Ba).

2. Olbrechts, *Maskers en dansers in de Ivoorkust* (Masks and dancers in the Ivory Coast), Leuven, 1940, p. 126/142 (We have an interview with the Glee spirit), says that, in addition to ordinary spirit worship, the Glee religion (originated in 1928 (Ivory Coast), especially in the Geree area, has a fetishism that identifies the resident "deity" (center) with Nyon-Swa, the High God, the Creator (which Olbrechts himself observed on the spot in 1933 and 1938).

Olbrechts describes a fetish as follows: "Some matter or conglomeration of matter ritually worked by a 'fetish man (-woman) so that 'power' and 'effect' reside in and emanate from it, especially when 'treated'." This is the typical ethnological-culturological description, of course, but it is particularly delicate.

3. A. Gatti, *Bapuka*, Zurich, 1963, S. 53ff., masterfully describes true to life the idol of Bapuka, the goddess of life and love,- idol, of which he and his equally developed wife (Gatti was an ethnologist) experienced daily the benign-protective 'effect' for years,- proving that even non-fetish believers, if sufficiently open, can establish the 'effect' of an idol fetish.

Of course, the Biblical (and supremely theological) caveat about the deepest nature of that apparent working remains. But that has already been addressed elsewhere.

Cf. Book of Wisdom 13:10; 14:11 (J.-J. Weber, Le livre de la sagesse, Paris, 1949, PP. 300/308).

Of course: the ark of the covenant (O.T.) was, not to mention, an idol fetish but Yahwist! (see V.d. Leeuw, Phänomenologie).

Summary description: so far we have identified two basic aspects:

(i) The banishment (more broadly: the indwelling, i.e. when no magical-pneumatological intervention by an earthly human has taken place);

(ii) Totemism (i.e., the understanding-magical fusion between a natural or cultural reality and one or more human beings). That totemism (understood hieroglyphically) is integral to fetishism (even culturologically) is evident from the list of 'sense-images' (natural and cultural realities), which the fetish believer considers fetish capable (cfr Nicolay, o.c., pp. 11s.):

(a) *Dead fetishes:*
    (a)1. white boulders,- pieces of metal, pieces of plate and pottery;
    (a)2. pearls, pieces of ivory, plumes, horns of animals, claws of wild animals, pigs' brushes, snakes' heads, cow tails, etc;
    (a)3. pieces of wood, grains, - in a word plant remains;

(b)1. *The Mpongwe*, a tribe in Gabon, have 'a very special fetish', i.e. okundu, which is apparently a necyofetish (nekuo = pertaining to dead people); the grigri ingredients are: a. eccentrically shaped stones, b. antelope horns, house snail shells, c. corpse-relics of graves: human hair, teeth, bones, gashed human flesh preserved in a bag (this grave aspect makes okundu an extremely taboo - fetish);

(b)2. *The Mpongwe* (Gabon) have fetishes and/or idols (idol fetishes) into which some particles of human relics are imbibed (from then on, they claim, the summoned spirit dwells in their patronage).

(c)1. *living fetishes*: caymans, badgers, cats, foxes, - in Dahomey (Vodoo country) : leopard, snake (in the city of Weida, one testifies, there was a 'temple' with more than a thousand snakes).

(c)2. *Ipori*, the third protective spirit of man, so claims Father Baudin, La Guinée (Nicolay, o.c.,237 This spirit is in the worst shape, fluidically speaking, for it is seldom sacrificed (i.e., fluidically nourished through food, which is allowed to decay, etc.); what does happen - and with this, Ipori - is that the spirit is not sacrificed. What does happen - and this brings us to fetishism as a cult - is that, when a negro-african is about to leave on a journey (a big journey), he 'fetishizes' (i.e. acts fetishistically) his toe with a little chicken blood and oil so that the spirit is satisfied and favorably disposed.

Again: that chicken's blood and oil are viewed sacrally (fluidly); the 'soul' (understand: nature-spirit, which during the 'sacrifice' (= nature-spirit formation; see above p. 147/148) of ánd the negro-african (his iuno, genius) ánd of the killed chicken and the vegetable or animal oil together arises from it), - the nature-spirit, thus, is meant (not the coarse material blood, oil, etc.).

Well, all these dead or living fetish symbols are equally totems, insofar as they are considered to be "brothers, sisters" (the totem believer-again)

In other words: the fetish (nature spirit) is a.i.w. of the same fluidic 'tribe', 'family', with the result that the totem worshipper treats him (her) as 'brother' ('sister').

Indeed, they share in precisely the same genius (iuno). Nicolay, o.c., 32, gives us a close-up view of life: the goddess of water (here: center of power) is Olosa; the caiman (alligator) is her 'angel' (messenger) and is, to that title, worshipped:

"At Porto-Novo (Guinea) there is, near the mission house, a fetid cayman, who is very accessible. As soon as he hears the fetish wives ('féticheuses') come singing and dancing, he comes out of the water and crawls towards them. The fetish wives, always at a respectful distance, throw him, as a gift, an exquisite food (a cake, poultry). Near the water, there is an enclosure of bamboo sticks and palm leaves, which serve him as a 'holy' (sacred) refuge."

Such, for us Westerners, nonsensical cult is in fact identical with the use of the ark of the covenant of the O.T.: both ban or habitation mounts the organ (see above p.106) of either a pagan but benign function goddess (mere center, which is the collective totem of the local group of worshippers) or of Yahweh.

This is not so ridiculous if one knows that 'emblems' - e.g. the national flag of a country - seen from a second glance, of course, contain just as much a nature spirit, fusion of genii and iunones and of e.g. the flax (if the flag consists of flax fabric) and of the 'worshippers' of that flag: the 'ritual' ceremonies (flag hoisting e.g.) are the more covered up fetish cult!

(I) *The religious or fetish tattooing* (161/165)
Nicolay, o.c., 54/55, gives another type of fetishizing: "The religious or fetish tattooing was common among the pagans of Guinea (only the Islam believers do not participate in it). In Benin, among the coastal inhabitants, a native, who did not bear this tribal or even family sign, was very rare. The tattoo marks ('uê' in dahomean language) are applied to the children of eight to ten years old. The people qualified to do so are called 'uê.gboto'.

(i) The incision is made by means of an iron rod (like our pen knife).
(ii) Then the uê-gboto cover the lines of the incision with an ointment (the main ingredients are soot and palm oil). The tattoos are very diverse according to the people, rank or profession.
Fetish men and fetish women in particular make frequent use of it: the drawings consist of the figures of a caiman, a turtle, a lizard. These drawings are taboo, because they are 'fetish' (sacred)". (Thus Father M. Cordioux; missionary on the coast of Benin).

Here one sees, in the accurate account of a missionary how **(i)** sacred**, (ii)** fetish and **(iii)** totem go together.

Immediately, it is also apparent that fetishism is, if need be, functional: even the profession gives rise to it. Rightly Nicolay, o.c., 47, not realizing how precisely he is describing: " Le totem ou porte-bonheur (the totem or salvation founder).

L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, (Mental functions in inferior societies), Paris, 1910-1; 1928-9, pp. 61ss., says: "An Ashanti (native of Gold Coast):
(i) had acquired a fetish (...);
(ii) he hastens to make an experiment with it:
(iii) he is hurt by a rifle bullet, which shatters him the bone of the arm.

The fetish wizard explains the event, to everyone's satisfaction, by saying that the offended fetish had just revealed to him the reason for that failure (it was about an invulnerable fetish): the young man had had sexual intercourse with his wife on a "forbidden" (taboo) day. The injured person confessed that it was true. The Ashanti have lost nothing of their faith".

Apart from the primitive pragmatism which is evident here, - see above p. 54v., there is the explanation of the fetish man: this explanation arouses, of course, in non-sighted people, sepsis, yes, mockery. However, one should be very careful, especially with sexual taboos: one should not forget:
a/ that the genitals (and all erotically sensitive areas) are very closely involved in the generative aspect of holiness (see above pp. 117/119) (as well as pp. 130/133).
b/ that love-play (within marriage) always works generatively-sacrally (the sacramental grace),
c/ that (see above pp. 147/148: the 'inspiration' of the artificial nature-spirit takes place via and in the genius (adam) ánd the iuno (eve)) every erotic-sexual act (gesture, word, idea) has a generative sacred effect (which explains the very strict control ethics and politics in the civilized countries in this field; which makes one suspect what disastrous consequences the breakdown of erotic self-control and social brakes generates today in the sacred field).
All people who "see" with the second sight become acutely aware of the taboo nature (godlike character) of eroticism and sexuality.

Of course: whether here this asjanti idea is valid, is another question: we only wanted to point out the general sacred foundation of what the fetishist believes, with his' tribal fellows, collectively, apparently supported by ancient, archaic (ancestral, yes, protogonistic) insights) - not without very serious reason we, just now, had the word genius translated by adam and iuno by eva, or rather: precised.

The adam, eva (genius, iuno) is what the first mankind passed on to us, namely the hierozoic principle of life. Once that is touched, through wrong eroticism and sexuality, the generative aspect of the sacred is violated. This is emphasized in passing.

Nicolay, o.c., 15, points out another aspect of fetish belief: "In Daluni (Kilimandjaro travel story) one encounters fetishes just about everywhere".

(A) "For example, a hut, worked out in a tree hollow, intended for the mzimu, the wandering shadow of some ancestor (Progonism - ancestor worship; by ethnologists, since Herb. Spencer (1820/1903), follower of A. Comte, the father of French positivism, 'manism' (actually called 'shadow worship') (cfr. W. Schmidt, *Origine et évolution d. l. rel.*, Paris, 1931, pp. 89/104).

The genius resp. iuno principle is actually venerated in the ancestor phantom. There is no need to explain this now, though. It is not the ancestor soul, but the ancestor phantom (or rather one of the many 'phantoms') that is the strict object of manism.

Pro(to)gonism is broader: it includes earthly-secular ancestor- and first-parent-worship. Doch manism is always embedded in pro(to)gonism).

Now see how manism is done: "In order that the phantom (mzimu) might come to 'rest' there, one **(a)** sacrifices to her a corn ear and **(b)** plies her in honor sorghum beer." (See above p. 161).

(ii) "At the crossroads of the roads one sees a curd of straw attached to poles containing a clutch of grain for the wandering spirits."

Here too the question arises, as in the case of the nkisi (see above p. 158), whether in addition to the ancestor spirits, ordinary nature spirits are also worshipped. Actually, speaking fluidly, the question does not make much sense: the ancestor ghost can be strictly distinguished from the real soul of the ancestor.

One compares:
a/ the protogonistic worship services (first-parent belief), distinguished from ancestor belief (cfr. AE. Jensen e.g., where he speaks of the dema-divinities, who, according to the mythology of the demaists, only "work" at the end of the paradise period).

b/ cfr. Ezek 32: 17/32 (the infernal journey; a.o. distinguished from the fate structure of the heroes: heroism is a form of pro(to)gonism;

c/ cfr. 168, finally the apotheosis (deification): the later Roman emperors (cult of deification) allowed themselves to be deified in this way; Cicero is famous, who, after the death of his beloved daughter Tulliola, tried to obtain divine honors for her (Nicolay, o.c., 102, 106): thus the three striking forms of soul worship.

(B) It is true that exorcism, performed by fetishists, proves that beings other than souls or even ancestral shadows are worshipped, viz. the disease-nature spirits, for example, which, once without a 'place of banishment' (fetish), are dangerous as long as they wander. 'Wandering' is fetishless life, if such may be called 'life', for it is the certain 'death' (fluidity) of the fetishless, merely out- and unrestrained spirit (whether nature spirit or ancestor spirit). The liberation of a sick person or a possessed person (actually the same thing) is done according to the principle of 'Similia similibus' (homeomagia).

"(...) A healing Spirit (center) is, by the laying on of hands of the magic -healer transferred or, also, that spirit is (by the same) in e.g. a potion 'banished' (= first fetish phase) to be, from there, 'banished' into the sick person (=second fetish phase). It is precisely because of this (see mutuality principle: pp. 125/127 supra (// 164: attunement): sympathy and antipathy) that the pathogenic spirit (center) is: **(i)** opposed, **(ii)** expelled or **(iii)** rendered powerless. (...).

The fetishists believe that the diseased spirit, after that eradication, goes to "live":

(i) in the body of an animal (a chicken e.g.), which is 'sacrificed' for that purpose by the magic healer and thrown very far from the hut (of both the magic healer and the sick person) lost.

(ii) In a 'keti', i.e., a void thing, - a nail, glass trinkets, a rag, etc., what matters is that one gives a habit (fetish) to the spirit and prevents it from 'going astray', i.e., becoming a danger to all." (Nicolay, o.c., 7).

"In other cases, the (magic healer) will make a statue, which depicts the sick person, and act on that statue protective forces. He will place the lips on the painful region of the body and 'suck in the diseased spirit,' which will hide (se blottir, make itself cringe) in a pebble or a piece of wood (inner-mouth fetish), which the healer places in the mouth beforehand, to make it, henceforth, the residence of the spirit. (...). Then one buries the boulder, burns the piece of wood". (ibid., 9).

On p. 14, o.c., Nicolay does not explain, but mentions the fact that Gabonese fetish men, if they deem it necessary, "have to appease the 'god' (center) by bloodshed, fulfill the role of sacrificer. We add that again 'similia similibus' (the same by the same: reciprocity principle) is at play: one reaches the spirit only if one, homeopathically a.k.a., i.e. in the possession of the same fluidum (with 1/ the ideal form attached, 2/ as well as the same 'soul' (here the soul (heart) of a cruel being), with which one fills the ideal form (from genius, iuno)) and 3/ also the same 'element' (see above pp. 147/148)) that spirit, which is to be fought, is approached.

Whoever, whether as a magician or healer (with a pendulum, with the laying on of hands, 'charismatically, medicamentally, with herbs, etc.: all these 'acts' with or without instruments are fetishistic acts, even if one does not believe in fetishism, for its essence is pneumatological, that is to say natural-spiritual) or as an 'ecclesiastical or non-religious' exorcist does not respect this principle of mutuality, fails and involves the client in his own failure as well.

That is the true (fetishistic) reason, why, in 1976, in England and Germany, two people died ecclesiastically exorcised. The exorcists did not respect the mutuality principle, crossed a taboo, which became deadly for the people to be helped.

One would do much better by thoroughly studying fetishism than by devouring thick books on demonology, exorcism in a purely rational Western sense, (without involving the paranormal aspect), etc.!

The magician-healer-exorcist, which every good fetishist is, knows a lot more about it and above all proceeds much more rationally than the 'empiricists' (in the sense of 'haphazard experimenters', which pretty much all highly religious magicians-healers-exorcists in fact are.

One takes as a small example the diagnosis.
Nicolay, o. c., 13/14, writes: "Among the Negro-African population of Gabon, the sacred fetish man form a separate caste. (...) They claim to be attuned ('en correspondance': one thinks, in passing, once again of the principle of mutuality) to the 'imbuiri' (the spirits) and to the 'ibambo' (abambo) (the 'souls' (op.: 'phantoms') of the dead).

They command them, and claim them, to 'resurrect' at will "by calling up their shadows (weather glow) on the surface of e.g. a mirror or of clear water." (Dr. Barret, *Afrique occidentale*, (West Africa), II, 166)." The diagnosis of a spirit work (under its triple aspect: idea, inspiration, (rg. 147/148) (heart and element) is possible only when the magician-healer-exorcist himself:
a/ sufficiently power-charged (magnetism),
b/ sensitive (feeling) and
c/ "seeing" (eidetism or, in weakened form, gray (white-black) "seeing" with the mere mind-and-imagination), with
d/ a tested interpretation system equipped (see above p. 73 (67 ff.)).

However ridiculous Western rationals may find this surface vision, it is sometimes the only means of making hasty, energetic contact with the adversary, namely with the one or more (Jesus speaks of one, strengthened, possibly with 'seven', i.e. the 'ideal' number according to the spirit mentality (Lk 11: 26) or even of 'legion', many (Mk 5: 9) spirits that inflict misery on the victim.

Whoever does not a. feel, b. see and c. interpret the nature and number of the opponent(s), thanks to his 'power' (magnetism), will unerringly and surely violate a taboo and suffer his 'judgment' (see above pp. 125/127).

(II): *Excursus: the fire element.* (165/166)
Higher (p. 156) we have touched on this theme briefly. To prove how cleverly 'lower' religions have formed their adherents, the following extract from Nicolay, o.c., 301/302: "In 1886, at Grand-popo (Guinea, Slave Coast), a woman was frozen to death near the wall of a dwelling, against which she was sheltering, during a thunderstorm. Immediately, after long and noisy preparations, fetish men and fetish women approached the corpse and dragged it with a rope for hours through the streets of the city." In the evening, at sunset, amid shouts and screams, the body was brought to the beach and divided into as many pieces as there were we men and we women of the

fetish. Everyone greedily and without preparation devoured their share of this repulsive favorite dish, the bones of which were carefully preserved.

We recently saw one of the fetish women at Grand-Popo who had taken part in this meal: suspended from her neck, among other amulets, she wore the bones of the first two joints of a human finger, in memory of the wild ceremony just mentioned". (RP Baudin, *La Guinée*).

For comment:
(i) This appropriation of fire spirits (of small size, by the way) is, unfortunately, in tandem with the vampiric method, spread practically all over the globe, which consists in confusing the gross body with the subtle.

'Vampirism', said in passing, has three main meanings:
a. The behavior of the bat-like bird;
b. The criminal behavior, repeatedly identified by jurists, in which usually a man bites a woman, after rape, as well as killing, his' victim (usually in the left neck).
c. The sacral criminal behavior, of which above, in Guinea, an applicative model.
The reason for this frenzied behavior (think of the hours of dragging) is the appropriation in group of the fire spirits.

(ii) The fire spirit appropriation via the victim of blindness, whether or not mixed with subtle (sacred) vampirism, in all cases begets frenzy (think D. Fortune, above p. 152). Well, the clever thing about ancient magics, such as this one in Guinea, is to create a tradition so that first the frenzy is extinguished (in the dragging for hours, with noise, shouting, dancing, etc.); when this frenzy (in the dragging for hours, with noise, shouting, etc.) is extinguished, the tradition is extinguished.); when this frenzy (real patent possession) has run its course so that the fire spirits exhaust themselves, insofar as they are frenzied, only then do they eat this horrible-ballad death meal (think of our own medieval song 'Heer Halewijn': "Daer was held a banquet, - The head was put on the table".), by which once and for all all sadistic-masochistic excitements are indulged, more or less according to the 'lustprinzip' of Freud et al, but with, after the death of these sadistic-masochistic fetishists, the divine judgement on this criminal act.

In other words, the artifice of this satanized form of fire spirit appropriation tradition lies in keeping the possession (man as a fetish of a spirit is latently or patently possessed by that spirit) latent, at least in its mode of transportation, or in its later, preternaturally cynical-now execution mode. Is it any wonder, then, that a genius depth psychologist like Freud, notwithstanding his atheistic materialism, exposes aggression everywhere, in the kidneys (un(der)consciously)? Yes, aggression mixed with 'eros' in its rawest forms?

(III) *Rite of initiation to sacred man* (167/169)

Nicolay, o.c., 15, gives us the abbreviated rendering (RP. Baudin, *La Guinée*) of the rite of initiation to sacred man: "The candidate (heir under that point of view of his/her genealogical predecessors) is usually a child of eight to fifteen.

(i) One begins with (bloody) sacrifices to the Spirits, whose minister he must be. One washes the neophyte with a decoction of 'hundred and one' plants, girdles him the loins with a young palm tree shoot. He follows, with the fetid men, a procession around the sacred grove.

(ii) Thereafter follows the principal ceremony, during which one seeks to know whether or not the fetish accepts the candidate presented to him (*note*: The word 'fetish' is analogous: it means:

(a) the kind of reality-which (see above continuing),
(b) the nature spirit or ancestral shadow itself, which inhabits.

P. Baudin says only at the end how one forces the fetish (= spirit) to bring its opinion to public: one makes a fetish (object-whole) and brings this object in contact (physically) with the candidate, until the end of the ceremony.

We now further translate, "Here is how one consults the Spirit (mantic = consultative):

a. The child takes his seat on the fetish chair" (*note*: since every transmission of 'spirits' takes place along the 'foundation' (one thinks of the French expression: 'le fondement'), i.e. the lower body, the candidate is placed with that foundation, i.e. If, as a result of this, the 'foundation' of the 'child-candidate' is not replaced by the 'foundation' of his predecessors, who sat on the same 'holy' (= power-laden) seat, the 'child-candidate' is placed on the same sacred seat where his predecessors received the same power.

b. "Again the fetishists wash his head with the decoction of herbs and loudly invoke the fetish (...) three times (*note*: always in honor of the Holy Trinity, although these fetishists do not know it; see above pp. 131/132: the monads, who also play the leading part here, act but in response to triadic signals, reflecting both the androgynous Father and the androgynous (but dominant male) Son and the androgynous (but dominant female) Spirit).

They resume their cries, while simultaneously dancing and hopping around the neophyte. (*Note*: dancing and hopping is, consciously or unconsciously, imitating the behavior of the monads; the point spirits of holiness then, by resonance, also begin to intensify their 'love dance', no longer resulting in her normal 'power production' (charge, 'sanctification' (see above p. 108; 111), which is described in the classical aretalogy). Meanwhile, the drums and all kinds of old iron make an infernal noise". (*Note*: Producing this noise reinforces, through vibration on a physical plane, the influence of the monads). "For, among the Negro Africans, the more hellish the noise, the more solemn is the celebration."

c. The coming out of its latency (and thus 'becoming patent') possessed by the fetish (spirit) of the candidate, who, once 'fetish', i.e. the dwelling or spell of the spirit, becomes, precisely because of this, either latently or patently possessed.

"Gradually the candidate, who must show to all that the spirit overwhelms him, begins to tremble: his body trembles; his eyes become wild (see above, mentioned in passing, p. 155 (Aparecida)) (...).

Soon such excitement overcomes him that one often has to hold him down or tie him up to prevent him from hurting himself or others. (See, in passing, above pp. 151/152 (D. Fortune's possession).

d. The apotheosis ('apothe(i)osis' = deificatio = god declaration, deification; see above p. 163,-which, here, is present in more veiled, but at least as strongly meant form): "Thereupon all present acclaim the Fetish with cries of joy - one gathers, in passing, the acclamationes to the late Roman emperors, who allowed themselves to be deified - 'Orisja Ô'! (It is the Fetish!) Orisjagun Ô! (The Fetish takes possession of him)'.

e. The thinning out of the celebration. 'Expansion' the celebration must occur if it is not to degenerate, afterwards, into the craziest and cruelest manifestations of collective possession (see above p. 166). "Then, after a few hours of noise and frenzy, one pulls away the fetish object that had been brought into contact with the whipped candidate (see above p. 110): he gradually regains consciousness.

His frenzy ceases to give way to exhaustion". (o.c., 15). - Already above (p. 97) we have pointed out the **(i)** manic (agitated) and **(ii)** depressive (dejected) character of such transporting religions, whether Catholic - charismatic or pagan, they remain subject to St. Paul's urgent counsel (and order of assembly) in 1 Cor 14:26vv. : "How then, brothers and sisters? At your meetings each one may have something (he means the frenzied and the controlled). (...) but everything must be done for the sake of the foundation." -- Which, here, in this fetish dedication does not happen.

Nicolay, o.c., 14/15, also gives, greatly abbreviated (unfortunately) the initiation formula of a fetish woman: "Sometimes the functions of fetish man are entrusted to women. According to Dr. Lestrille, in Revue Coloniale, the woman who aspires to this envied role must distinguish herself from her fellows by exceptional qualities. Once nominated, one covers her with ribbons and bells and colors her with magical colors. (Note: color is light; light is vibration; vibration (of any kind, sonic or optical) acts on the monads). -- Then, for several weeks, she isolates herself from the profane in order to attune herself, so they say, to the spirits. (Note: see above the mutuality principle; p. 164).

After she has submitted herself to a regime of feverish ecstasy (exaltation), which makes her a real 'neuroticess' (note: it is a physician who is speaking and who uses his language -, for lack of hieroanalytic terms, which would speak of 'taking in the evil (misery) to be fought by her in the future, in the form of the corresponding spirits of all kinds (again: mutuality principle)', the wife leaves her place of seclusion (opm. think of our places of reflection and 'retreat') under a drum roll and she surrenders, in respect of all, to the delirium of the pythonissa".

The Pythonissa, a phenomenon which existed both now and in classical antiquity (one thinks of the seer of Delfoi on her 'sacred chair' in rapture over a crevice in the earth, which was emitting gases, consulted by all the empire-greats and high thinkers and mystics of her time), - which actually, originally (archaically) meant 'snake-woman', 'python-woman' more correctly, - is acceptable only when she proves that she:

a. in 'understanding' relationship with the spirits, - see mutuality principle, to hammer it in again and again,-

b. is possessed again and again without afterwards finding any miserable form of it and in herself (both physically-earthly and socially-communicative (i.e. infecting the others) and in her home, conveniences, etc. This is the typical-female type of misery-control: in contrast to the fire spirit eaters (see above p. 166; there, after death, misery became patent, among other things through ghostly phenomena, immediately after the death of these subachists (subtle-vampirists) or even extending over years, see also just above: p. 168), insofar as they act in a purely masculine way, we women can:

a. at least if they live in deep and real friendship with the Trinity (state of sanctifying grace: see above) - even if they do not consciously know the Trinity (baptism of desire)

b1. to first preliminarily assimilate the misery in themselves

b2. in order to assimilate this identical misery again afterwards (and if necessary minimally imitate it, which is normal when the misery deeply affects her iuno (because that is patent possession, actually)) in a.o. 'to sweat it out' (the patient(s), whom she treats, reacts, as the psychoanalysts say, her misery on her healer ('abreaktion' says Freud), by which the healer herself can show the minimal symptoms).

Conclusion. Behold a hiero-analysis of fetishism. Perhaps now the fetish believer will come across as less 'crazy', 'infantile' or whatever erudite abusive terms were spent on it by our professional scientists without having cashed in on the phenomenon themselves.

Deo trino gratias maxima!

*Contents : **Introduction to Hierarchical Analysis**. (1981-1982)*

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