

### **5.6.1. Introduction to Greek Philosophy. (1982/1983) (vol. 1, pp. 1 to 101)**

(GW 01)

**Preface. - Wisdom theory (Sofio analysis) (01/17)**

**(A) Semasiological note (01/03):**

G.J. Vogel, *Greek Philosophy, I, (Thales to Plato)*, Leiden, 1950, 2, says that 'philo.sophia' (wisdom mind) has two meanings:

**a. a broad one**, which involves being out to acquire "wisdom," as already primitives do, but evolved ones in a more systematic way; so *Herodotos of Hallikarnassos* (-484/-424), *Hist.*, I:30; also *Thukudides of Athens* (-460/-399), *Pel. Oorl.*, II: 40; later Isokrates of Athens (--436/-338), -- one might speak here of "general development" insofar as it corresponds to the contemporary demands of culture;

**b. a narrow**, technical one', which will be the subject of this course, so, for the first time (cf. Diogenes L., I: 12), at Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500).

De Vogel notes, o.c., 3, that wisdom preceded philosophizing. She briefly mentions the "seven sages" of Hellas (including Thales of Miletos and Solon of Athens), among whom Thales of Miletos is also considered a sage later at least. She cites proverbial examples of those sages.

R. Schärer, *l,'homme devant ses choix dans la tradition Grecque*, (the man in front of his choices in the Greek tradition), Louvain,1972, mentions that Greek man had as his problem-solving models the hero, the sage and the philosopher, who reduce a concrete situation, each in his own way, to an exchange solution (alternative), i.e. a choice for or against; they decide on this and, in making this choice, they appeal to norms (i. e. governing values), so that, if the choice violates these norms, this means 'hubris' (transgression of the limits), followed sooner or later by corrective consequences (this is governing values), in such a way, however, that if the choice violates those norms, this means 'hubris' (crossing the border), followed, sooner or later, by the corrective consequences ('nemesis') of that wrong choice; one thinks of God's judgment in the *Bible*.

Schaerer gives us a description of wisdom that is broader than proverbial wisdom. It is thereby that, well understood, both the hero and, the sage represent only one type of wisdom and that 'sage' is the broadest word by scope. Wisdom' is, after all, through the many semasiological variants of meaning, always detecting a problem in a situation and solving it, rationally, in whatever way. Proverbs, proverbs, are only flashes of wisdom, nothing more. Wisdom is always more than that.

**(Near) Eastern Wisdom.**

W.I. Irwin, *Wisdom Literature*, in *Enc. Brit.*, Chicago, 1967, 23: 601, gives an overview of the wisdom of the ancient Near East (Ethiopia, Egypt, Canaan, Mesopotamia, Armenia Iran (which, in contemporary geography already belongs to the Middle East), Arabia, Syria, Asia Minor (= Anatolia, Mikrasia)).

(GW 02) **a. Mesopotamia (from -2900) with Sumer**

Mesopotamia has wisdom literature; see *SN. Kramer, L'histoire commence à Sumer*, (The story begins in Sumer, ), Paris, 1975 (book giving splendid examples); then Akkad (Babylonia and Assyria); see *G. Contenau, Thus lived and Babylonians and Assyrians at the time of Nebuchadnezzar*, Baarn, 1979 (O.m. 'wisdom literature' in the narrow sense: o.c., 205vv. (teaching poems, psalms, fables);

**b. Egypt (from -2770),**

where 'wisdom' (rather in the narrower sense, with Imhotep) is the oldest literary genre; famous (around -2400) is Ptahhotep, a vizier, with his collection of proverbs of an ethical-political nature about the 'good life', its practicability by the group of people for whom it is intended;

**c. Canaan**

(before the Israelites entered Palestine) and Edom (Arab territory earlier), which was famous for its "wise men.

**d. Israel (from -1200 (with the judges));**

One thinks of the princes Solomon and David (-1000/-950), known as sages. If we look at these impressive data, it shows how late Hellas came to awaken and how it inevitably had Eastern teachers (including through trade relations).

*F. Wendel et al, Les sagesses de Proche-Orient ancien*, (Wisdoms of the Ancient Near East,), Paris, 1963, is a volume of reports of the Strasbourg Colloquium (May 17/19, 1962), devoted by specialists to ancient Oriental wisdom in Egypt (eight studies), Mesopotamia (one study), Israel (three studies).

It should be noted that *A. Volten, Der begriff der Maat in den Aegyptischen Weisheitstexten*, (The concept of Maat in the Egyptian wisdom texts), o.c., 73/101, elaborates on the hylozoism among the first Greek thinkers (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes, Puthagoras, Herakleitos, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia); Maat is, after all, 'soul matter' of which the gods live (connected with the Milky Way); it 'governs' everything. In itself, this is a most curious sapiential (= wisdom) theme.

*W. Bieder, Wisdom Literature*, in *B. Reicke/L. Rost, Biblical Historical Dictionary*, Utr./Antw., 1970, VI: 65/70, goes over, in a broad and narrow sense, the wisdom books and texts in the Bible. *CA Keller, Wisdom*, ibidem, 63/65, specifies that "wisdom" is, in modern scientific spoke, the summary term for ancient Eastern humanism (paideia, ideal of education), *CA Keller, Wisdom*, ibidem, 70/71, defines "wise" with "stout, able, experienced, wise"; elaborate : developed, living according to the norms, wise and conscientious, playing his social role with results. Again the broad idea!

(GW 03) *N.J. Suggs, Book of wisdom, in Enc Brit. Chicago, 1967, 23: 600/601*, deals with The Book of Wisdom, (O.T.), to be situated between -150 and +50) and underlines the theme, i.e., "wisdom" as bridging pagan philosophy (narrow and broad) and Biblical revelation (theme, which Philon, the rabbis and, later, the Church Fathers will elaborate. Regarding the relationship between Greek philosophical work and Eastern wisdom, the author says, "Greek philosophy was the heiress and, to some extent, the disciple of the ancient contemplation of the East." (a.c., 600). -- So that we may, at some point, speak of interaction.

*O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, (History of Idealism, I Prehistory and History of Ancient Idealism)), Braunschweig, 1997-2, points out that the Chaldean wisdom (60/72) and the Egyptian (48/59) belong to the prehistory of philosophy; yet he too already starts from the broad concept of wisdom, for the Appolinian and (Dionysian) mystery wisdom (19/47), the Magi doctrine, the Veda, the Old testament have all made their contribution to philosophy; esp. he emphasizes that the theology of the ancients (Veda and Vedanta, Torah and Kabbalah (Eastern); physical and political theology (Hellenic) (o.c., 137/254)) has been the foundation of philosophy.

In particular Willmann emphasises that the physical (born of physical theology) and the ethical-political (born of ethical-political theology) together structure both pre-philosophical wisdom and philosophy. We consider this to be the basic insight par excellence in sophio-analysis as well as in philosophy, next to Schaerer's structural insight outlined above.

**(B) Sofio analysis (03/05).**

'Sophia' (sapientia, wisdom) can be object of 'analysis, dissection, investigation (Platonic term); hence sophio-analysis. It includes following aspects and stages:

**a. *sophiography*:** this includes describing, unpretentiously, sapiential phenomena, e.g. didactic literature (take the parables of Jesus, in which he communicates wisdom comprehensively); it shows us esp. the extent of the concept of wisdom;

**b. *the sophiology*:** this deals with the structure (see above Schärer and Willmann), - distributive and collective, as well as kinetic (diachronic) of wisdom; here esp. the content of the idea 'wisdom' is discussed;

**c. *philosophy*:** philosophy is, above all, one phenomenon among many sapiential phenomena with their own structure; yet, at a certain point, a value judgment (axiological) and especially an epistemological judgment (the value of wisdom) come into play; to discuss the value of life and knowledge thoroughly and responsibly is philosophical work, prepared by the two preceding phases of analysis

(GW 04) But, conversely, philosophy is itself situated in a broader framework by labeling it as one kind of wisdom; this is all the more necessary since the philosophers, in the course of the centuries, have themselves always linked non-strictly philosophical activities with their work:

1. they were always doing natural and/or human sciences;
2. they almost always took a rhetorical approach, even when, like Parmenides, Platon, Aristotle and others, they wanted to do strictly objective-scientific philosophy;
3. they were engaged in theology, either conformably or critically;
4. above all: with every philosopher, his pre-philosophical choice (as the existentialists have taught us to see; see. e.g. Sartre on Descartes) quickly comes to light, when one studies him attentively; - which amounts to saying that, in order to understand him properly, one must situate him sofio-analytically.

The relationship is thus one of interaction: sophio-analysis comes to full awareness of itself in strict philosophy; strict philosophy understands itself fully when it submits to sophio-analysis and learns to see itself as only one type of wisdom among other possible types of it. Above all, philosophy must not forget that it grew out of pre-philosophical wisdom and, fundamentally, is still rooted in pre-philosophical insights.

#### ***Applicative model of sofio-analysis.***

G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, (Old Testament Theology), Munich, 1961, has it in I (*Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen Israëls*), ((The Theology of the Historical Traditions of Israel)), S. 415/439:

#### **(1) *On the experiential wisdom of Israel:***

"Like all peoples, Israel understood by 'wisdom' a thoroughly practical, experience-based knowledge of the laws of the world and of life." (415) "Empirical-gnomic wisdom starts from a stubborn assumption, that in things, in processes, there is a secret order; but one must pry it out of things and processes with great patience and through all kinds of painful experiences: But this order is now (...) not systematically investigated. (...) That would be the philosophical-systematic method.

Yet the world to which gnomic (= proverbial) thinking directs its attention cannot, as Jolles says, be grasped by comprehensible thinking." (149) ;

#### **(2) *On the theological wisdom of Israel:***

Israel, therefore, knew 'a humane, profane wisdom, like all peoples; it works out, starting from sacred elements and aspects in it, a second type of wisdom, after the exile viz., where 'wisdom' is now understood as the intermediary between Yahweh and the peoples, esp. Israel; that 'wisdom' is the great educator of the nations (in this sense she is Yahweh 's holy spirit though now not so much dynamically (understood as divine life force, but as ordering principle).

(GW 05) Even more: that divine wisdom, says v. Rad, is the divine principle, present in creation from the beginning (in this sense it can be compared to the 'archè' (principium, universe principle) of the Milesians (water, 'a.peiron, air/breath)). This insight dominated the whole of late Jewish theological thought, which as a whole can therefore be called 'sapiential', 'sophiological' (439);

**(3) *On apocalyptic wisdom.***

A final expansion of understanding underwent sapiential theology through its fusion with apocalypticism." (450): wisdom becomes paranormal: it covers the whole history of mankind from the beginning to the end times; it fathoms especially the lawful development of evil and misery toward exceeding the measure (cf. Greek hubris), mainly in the world empires; see also v. Rad, *II (Die Theologie der prophetischen Ueberlieferungen)*, (The Theology of the Prophetic Traditions), S. 314/ 328 (Daniel und die Apokalyphtik)

**(4) *On the skeptical wisdom* (in Qohelet = Ecclesiastes = Ekklesiastes)**

Wisdom thinking runs aground in the utterly mysterious course of God's ways and struggles with the question of the meaning or perhaps the meaninglessness (absurdity) of life and the world: what is striking is that Qohelet thinks utterly secularly (454), unlike Daniel and the apocalyptists, who find a paranormal solution to get out of that absurdity.

One sees that von Rad does not lose himself in the literary genre in itself (didactic literature) but studies wisdom in terms of content.

***Applicative models of more recent sophist thought.***

Two models being briefly cited :

**(i) *Saint Louis Marie Grignon de Montfort* (1637/1716),**

He is the founder of the Montfortan Order and of the Daughters of Wisdom (this name is typical!), is the designer of Marian worship as part of the "love of Eternal Wisdom" (which is very often forgotten); de Montfort was sophist through and through;

**(ii) *Vladimir Sergeievich Soloviev* (1853/1900)**

He is an outspoken sophiologist, like de Montfort, in the line of biblical sophiology (esp. theological and apocalyptic), yet: "The philosophy of the Russians - meant Skovorda, Florensky, Soloviev, Khomyakov, Berdyaev, Bulgakov - lives from Divine Wisdom. This philosophy wants to be "sophian" (wisdom-minded). That is why the Russians reject Western mechanized logic. Bulgakov calls them a 'mania Hegeliana' (Hegelian madness)." (*J. Tyciak, Die Liturgie als Quelle östlicher Frömmigkeit*, (Liturgy as a source of Eastern piety), Freiburg i. Br., 1937, 112; see also o.c., 120/123 (Soloviev's wisdom theory).

(GW 06) (C) *The structure of wisdom.*

The question arises: is there a fixed structure discoverable behind the many sophiographic models? We answer this typically sophiological question using an applicative model of myth analysis, namely the myth of Narkissos (Narcissus). We do this all the more gravely since S. Freud, in his psychoanalysis, reinterprets this myth in his sense.

It should immediately be noted that, with this myth, we are in the chthonic (= telluric) sphere, i.e., the sphere of the underworld or earth gods.

(a) *The story of myth.*

The story of a myth is never unique: variants always exist; yet, taking into account the chthonic atmosphere, we can uncover the basic story as follows.

(a)1. Narkissos is the son of the stream Kèfisos (in Fokis), an earth god, and the nymph Leiriopè (a nymph is a smaller chthonic deity, who has her "fetish" (her fluidic dwelling) in and around water). The blind seer Teiresias, in response to the question of the fate of Narkissos, said that he would live until he saw his own image. In every case he was of exceptional, to the Greeks, divine beauty. This entailed a form of hubris, boundary crossing; for he was very self-effacing.

(a)2. When he goes to bathe in the stream, the nymphs fall in love with him, especially the nymph Echo. -- The nymph has a myth of her own: whenever Zeus, the supreme god, cheated on his lawful wife, Hera, with beautiful female mortals, she had the habit of diverting Hèra's attention by babbling incessantly.

Until one day Hèra saw through the ruse: she punishes the nymph by saying, "Always thou shalt have the last word, yet never shalt thou speak first. Laden with this destiny, Echo falls in love with Narkissus. The latter calls Echo, but she could only repeat her lover's last words. Narkissos, tired of this reverberation, left her to her fate.

Narkissos, self-righteous as he is, also neglects the other nymphs. One of them, in her resentment, turns to Nemesis, the daughter of the night (= chthonic deity, at least originally), the goddess of indignation for hubris and of punitive justice (who, however, differs from the Erinyes in that, unlike those other goddesses of destiny, she never punishes blindly). Nemesis places a curse, i.e., a negative destiny, on Narkissos: he walks in the forest hunting; gets thirsty; finds a bright spring in a clearing in the forest. At the prompting of Nemesis, he bends down to drink: for the first time in his life he sees himself in the reflection in the water. He falls deadly in love with his reflection, grabs the beautiful figure (his beloved), but distorts it into a miscreant.

(GW 07) Again and again he grabs for that beloved creature in vain. In the grip of his fate he neglects food and drink; dies. Like a plant, he takes root at the foot of the spring and turns into the narkissos flower, which renews itself, in the spring, to mirror itself in the water (= resurrection from the underworld of life), to, in the autumn, die again (= death as the end point of chthonic life).

Since then the narkisso flower has been considered the flower of death: e.g. Korè (the daughter of Zeus, the supreme god, and Dèmètèr, the great earth goddess), with the Okeaniden (= the daughters of Okeanos; they are spring nymphs), is picking spring flowers in a meadow. Until she - executing her destiny - plucks the narkissos flower: suddenly the Earth (= the place of underworld life and of chthonic deities) opens up, Hadès (the underworld) rises and 'robs' Kore (she dies into the underworld).

**(b) *The interpretation of myth.***

One can, of course, interpret this story in more than one way.

**(b)1. *The hieroanalytical* (= religion-historical) *interpretation.***

The best book, to accomplish that interpretation, is

-- W.B. Kristensen, *Collected contributions to knowledge of ancient religions*, Amsterdam, 1947.

-- Also A. Daniélou, *Shiva et Dionysos (La religion de la Nature et de l' Eros, de la préhistoire à l'avenir)*, Paris, 1979;

-- C.J. Bleeker, *The mother goddess in antiquity*, The Hague, 1960;

-- F. Flückiger, *Gesch. des Naturrechts, I (Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Ältertum und im Frühmittelalter)*, (History of Natural Law, I (The History of the European Idea of Law in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages) ), Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 9/51 (*Sakral-rechtliche Grundlagen des Naturrechtes*), (Sacred-legal foundations of natural law), are recommended amidst many other readings.

-- Also A. Bertholet, *Die Religion des Alten Testaments*, (The Religion of the Old Testament), Tübingen, 1932, 1/71, is very readable, though Biblical.

**A. *Fate deities.***

Fate, i.e. the mostly unconscious factors controlling life (and the death inherent in it), is in the hands of deities, - who live either just above the earth (epichthonic) or below the earth's surface (hypochthonic). These deities are beings, who live free-associative lives, i.e., they live and let live according to non-ethical-political and non-rational standards (Kristensen, 247; 272); that is why the religious scholars call them 'demonic' deities, i.e., unpredictable, double-hearted beings (ibid., 272vv.): they deny, by their actions, the order they themselves founded, and the laws they themselves established. Their 'justice' and 'wisdom' there is a balladsque, i.e. it is cause for fear, yes, for anxiety (i.e. fear of something that cannot be determined or calculated, as in the ballads). Consequently, the 'harmony' they establish in the universe is one of opposites, life-and-death.

(GW 08) So much for Kristensen's description, which places a very heavy emphasis on the chthonic (and mystery) deities. -- As a corrective, it should be added -- which Kristensen, of course, also knows -- that, in addition to chthonic or earth deities, Hellas also knew primal or celestial deities, the so-called 'Olympic' deities. This religion, in Hellas, is younger in date and has appropriated the chthonic deities to a greater or lesser extent. Not the night and the darkness, not the earth and what is inside it, is the living space ('fetish') of the Olympians, but the day and the light, the space above us, the firmament and its phenomena (the sun, the lightning, etc.).

Yet these primordial beings are also lotsetters, though different from the earth deities: more reasoned, more logical and more ethical - more political. The idea of destiny dominates both the primordial and chthonic religions: one looks at Nemesis in the Narkissos myth; although in a different style than the chthonic Erinyes, yet she too determines the fate of the hubris-suffering Narkissos.

In polytheism, the deities are the destiners par excellence of humanity, yes, of all life (including the extraterrestrial: we know, in the process, that everything is "alive" somewhere (animatism, hylozoism)). More to the point, the primordial deities are also destinies; like the telluric deities, they are also, to some extent, demonic. They, too, invalidate the legal order which they themselves founded; their 'harmony' too is one of fear, yes, anxiety, though more lightly and less oppressively ballad-like. Yes, the primordial deities are, as it were, dependent on the telluric, even though they are situated higher: it is as if they too fear the 'elementary' power of the infrastructure of life (and death), which the chthonic deities constitute, and cannot cope with when it comes to it. Light-connected as they are, there remains, in that light-connectedness, something of deep vulnerability from below, from within the chthonic infrastructure, of which they are merely the supra-structure.

*Note.--* If both, the primordial as well as the chthonic, powers are demonic, this *does not at all* mean 'wild' (as F. Flückiger, o. c. 10/11, 29,48, says). 'Demonism', 'polytheism', does mean to some extent incalculable and double-minded (working with double standards), but not 'kuklopic'.

In the *Odusseia* (9: 275vv.) Homer depicts the Kuklopen (Cyclopes): Polufèmos e.g., to whom Odusseus and his traveling companions beg for hospitality, does not honor the deities and does not heed their signs; he is a "savage," who mocks the gods, breaks his word, kills his guest, and eats human flesh; he "no 'man': hubris and violence characterize him. (Cf. *Hesiod, Erga* 225vv.) . The 'titanic' deities (the older layer) and the Olympians are not kuklopen.



(GW 09) So that, in summary, there are three layers in and around the earth: the lower, the kuklopic or, as the Church calls them, the Satanic,-the middle, the 'Titanic' (the sphere of aggressive and erotomanic spirits, as well as of archprimitive souls) and the 'Olympic' (the sphere of puritanical-looking deities of light, among whom Apollon is the most characteristic). The latter are also still very 'Titanic': the proof lies in the morality of their mythology.

### **B. Loose structure.**

Fate analysis (term borrowed from the Hungarian psychiatrist and Freudian *Leopold Szondi* (*Schicksalsanalyse* (1944)), who saw a kind of coercive, usually unconsciously directing familial 'power' at work in the choice of marriage partner, friend(s), profession) is the actual subject of the Narkissos myth: two basic facts govern the 'story' (the 'logos' here understood as story structure), viz.

(i) his' genealogy (Kèfisos, Leiriopè), for the child shares in the destinies of his' parents (which Szondi still establishes in his psychiatrist's praxis) and

(ii) the prediction of the seer Teiresias, who, as always, has the outcome (what Herotos calls 'teleutè',) in view;

(iii) the confluence of (i) descent and (ii) prefiguration is the phenomenon of hubris (boundary crossing), actually crossing a taboo, a divine boundary which, once crossed (= deviation from the god-willed rule or purposefulness), implies an immanent (internally determined) sanction (= restoration of the rule).

*Cicero, De republica* 3:11:19, writes: "Puthagoras and Empedokles assert that for all living beings there is one and the same order of law; ... that to them, by whose hand a living being has been violated, unspeakable penalties hang over their heads." Both thinkers, Puthagoras and Empedokles, formulate one application of that general cybernetic or steering structure, which determines the behavior of the deities, outlined above, and which is described by *E.W. Beth, Nature Philosophy*, Gorinchem, 1948, 36, in the line of *H. Kelsen, Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzes aus dem Vergeltungsprinzip*, (The Emergence of the Causal Law from the Principle of Retribution), in *Erkenntnis* 8 (1939), as follows: the divine law includes:

(a) a rule for the normal course, of things and

(b) In rule for its deviation, viz. the restorative compensation (or feedback); both rules together make up the systechy that guarantees cosmic harmony. This harmony of opposites (rule, rule deviation) is the core of ancient hylozoism (the substance is somewhere animated, inspired, -living). they see, if one re-reads the story now, that Nemesis is the deity who personally guards and works out the cosmic harmony of all that lives (and that is everything).

In other words: the deities do not replace the nature of things: they pay attention to their harmonious (as outlined above) course.

(GW 10) Or: nature (all that lives,-in the ground everything) has two sides:

### **1. a 'natural'**

(better: intrinsic, internal, proper and irreplaceable), which is already clearly known and especially recognized in the mythical stage, but in the philosophia of the Greeks will be worked out separately and even unilaterally (physical, natural philosophy), as a reaction against the exaggerations of the mythologists, and

### **2. a "harmonious"**

or, better understood, a directional (teleological) one, which is the specialty of the deities and which is exposed in the destiny analysis that is every true mythology. It is also because of this that the mantic (seership, clairvoyance) ) and the magic (art of destiny) play such a large (often too large) role in religion and its mythology.

After all, the 'seeing' (perceiving, experiencing, noticing, - the awakening) of destiny and the 'intervening' (manipulating) in that destiny does not take place through the knowledge and control of the processes of nature in themselves, in their own and irreplaceable being (that will be done by natural philosophy and the sciences of nature and man which arise from it); no, only the mantis and magic can do that. Thus 'punishes' (i.e. throws up a (fate)) Hèra Echo; so 'punishes' (an analogous fate throw) Nemesis Narkissos; so Korè walks unsuspectingly (because not sufficiently mantic 'seeing' and magically 'powerful') into her fate (the fateful plucking of the narkissos flower) as a result of a fate determination; -- therefore, both the genealogy (insofar as it is ': (emergency) destiny-bearer, no further) as well as the preview (which is destiny-bearer) is paramount; -- seen with CS. Peirce's eyes, are á pedigree destiny á foresight (which views that pedigree destiny individually) the abduction, i.e. the working hypothesis, from which, if one is sufficiently destiny-analytically powerful, one can deduce the continuation of the story (= muthos, fabula) and inductively verify or falsify it.

Pedigree and individual destiny, after all, are the cause of the effect (here the fate of Narkissos).

The causality (cause-effect relationship) of nature is twofold:

(i) 'natural', inherent and irreplaceable (about this the myth as destiny analysis talks only indirectly, but science talks directly) and

(ii) mantic-magical, i.e. sacred or, as it is now said, occult (hidden, unconscious, i.e. for those who see only their own and irreplaceable nature and not the fate that intervenes in that own structure to make them succeed (good fate) or fail (fate)). The actual story or muthos is the inductive testing of the introduction (genealogy and preview), which is its working hypothesis

*Note.-- J. Broekman, Russian formalism, Marxism, structuralism, in Tijdschr. v. Fil. , 33 (1971): 1 (Mar.), 5/40, briefly describes the current forms of destiny analysis, especially viewed according to their structural models. Peirce has given us at least an equivalent understanding of structure.*

(GW 11) **C. Methods**

With regard to myth in particular, reference should be made to *Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif*, in *Communications*, 4 (1964), pp. 4/32, where it is linked to the morphological method of *Propp, The Morphology of the Popular Fairy Tale*, Leningrad, 1928; as well as to *Dan Sperber, Le structuralisme en antropologie*, in *O. Ducrot et al., Qu' est-ce que le structuralisme?* Paris, 1968, pp. 192/208 (*Les myths*, - where it is shown how the structural method connects to the symbolist (by being a text study: the text is a set of symbols) and to the functionalist (by practicing systems analysis), yet logist-mathematically indicating). These methods are fascinating but almost totally ignore the hieroanalytical sense and meaning of the myth.

A much more sensible method is that of Peirce, though hiero-analytically elaborated. Here, too, a systechy dominates the data, namely 'taboo', i.e. 'sacred' as limit of hubris (in the broadest sense, i.e. of lust that unbends itself), on the one hand, and transgression, border crossing, on the other hand, - both terms encompassed by the correctly understood concept of 'harmony' (of border and border crossing). One takes, for example, *Hutton Webster, Le tabou (Etude sociologique)*, Paris, 1952: although purely sociological, the Ancient Greek system of 'harmony' of opposites, namely sacred and profaned, dominates the content of this book, which extends to all areas of life:

(a) death and the dead, not to mention the spirits of nature, which are always associated with the souls and shadows of the dead (the typical chthonic aspect in its strongest form);

(b) the aliens (who are equivalent to the dead);

(c) the sacred persons (chiefs princes, magicians, priests, members of secret societies, - for the reason of their relation to the chthonic sphere);

(d) "sacred" or "consecrated" things (-places, temples, tombs, cult objects, etc.,-for the same reason);

And now the second part, that of life:

(e) sexual relations;

(f) Pregnancy and childbearing;

(g) separation of the sexes;

(h) food products;

(i) possession.

In other words, all of life and what comes after it is "taboo" either by the express will of deities or "automatically" (i.e., by virtue of fluidic relationships).

The myth, now, has it about all these domains and as events of 'effective' (= causal) nature: whoever does not respect its 'sacred' character by hubris (consciously or unconsciously), gets caught up in a network of cause and effect, which disposes of salvation (life) or calamity (death).

Its structure is that of Peirce's triad: 'abduction' (if the taboo is exceeded by hubris), deduction (then one can expect the outworkings ('result', consequence, effect)), induction (which then in fact in the story (the actual myth)) so comes out.

(GW 12) *Note -- Mythical wisdom.*

W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 227/228, observes that the Delphic religion unites (without becoming petty bourgeois, however) a "Dionysian" aspect, which disturbs all bourgeois "eu.kosmia" (orderliness), through hubris, and an "Appolinic" side, which advocates self-knowledge ("Know thyself") and border consciousness ("söfrosunè" = respect for one's (own) borders), d.i. harmonizes (again and again that harmony of opposites); - which, according to Jaeger, also typifies Herakleitos (with his emphasis on 'fronein', 'fronimos'; contemplation, prudent).

Well, according to Jaeger as well, the Delphic religion was central in Hellas (and had high educational influence, even far beyond Hellas): the Seven Sages (including Thales and Solon), princes (VI-the e.), Pindaros, Herodotos (V-the e.) recognize the oracle as the highest authority. One senses the myth in the background.

**(b).2. *The psycho-analytic interpretation of the Narkissos myth.* (12/13)**

One bibliographic sample: G. Bally, *The psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud*, Utr./Antw., 1963. Freud, who paid very great attention to religion and especially myth, made the Narkissos figure a truly psychological instance. We explain this briefly.

**a. *The systechy of "lust" and "reality."***

Central, in Freud's psychoanalysis, is the systechy 'lust(principle)' comparable to borderline or hubris, and 'reality(principle)', comparable to (the) borderline(awareness); yes, the whole psychoanalysis is one big attempt to bring those two opposites to 'harmony'. In this the unconscious plays a basic role, - which is also comparable to the occult (which merges with the unconscious) from myth and religion. In this background, 'narci(ssi)sme' must be seen.

**b. *The systechy: 'narcissistic'/'objective'***

Central to this is another systechy: 'narcissistic'/'objective'; psychoanalysis calls 'object' all that is non-I, the things and the persons outside the I (o.c., 36/37; 57/58); 'objective' is therefore what is directed at the non-I; - the I is primarily the I-center but also the own body as integrated into the I or ego.

The "energy," i.e., the attention (esp. aggressive and/or erotic) devoted (invested) in something (i.e., it is an intentional energy) can be either narcissistic, i.e., directed toward the self and its belongings) or objective, i.e., directed toward the non-self.

Narcissism, then, is, psychologically speaking, self-indulgence: the intentional energy (attention) goes to e.g. praise, flattery, every appreciation and affirmation of the self, which reciprocally, i.e. loopily, valorizes itself; in its maximum form, such a thing is e.g. egocentrism (solipsism), - a form of fixation, i.e. exclusive orientation of the energy to oneself as subject.-- :Freud, however, also sees this genetically:

(GW 13) (i) *The 'primary' or primal narcissism*

Freud situates this with the infant of the first two months, who does not yet distinguish, Freud says, between his I and the world (as nonI understood; only from the third to the sixth month does the nurturing person (mother, nourisher) assume a vaguely separate form in the infant's intentional energy (attention) and, hesitatingly, an "object" (a nonI) emerges; before that, the infant is whole and self-consciously lustful or unenthusiastic;

(ii) *a remainder*

Of that primal narcissism, of course, a remnant remains: either the healthy sense of self or a narcissism, which is regressive and in which, the self, for one reason or another (not being able to process something from "reality," i.e. reality insofar as it antagonizes hedonism (lust ethics), and these flee), returns to the infantile or childish stage of energy (o.c., 150/153); this slow or inert reaction to the unpleasant is a relapse.

One sees that the Narkissos figure is stripped of its destiny-analytical framework (the harmony of the contradictions of fate) and reduced to a purely psychological (albeit still depth-psychological) data. A form of secularization (i.e. demythologization), which sees the myth as allegorical, i.e. as the veiled form of purely psychological data, which one just has to translate.

For more details, see *Colloque de la Société Psychanalytique de Paris* (Colloquium of the Psychoanalytical Society of Paris), (Artigny, 7/8.03.1964), *Le narcissisme*, in *Revue Française de Psychanalyse*, 29 (1965): 5/6 (Sept/Dec), 471/618, which shows how outrageously complicated the manipulation of the concept of narcissism has become in psychoanalysis, as Freud introduces a concept without defining it in order to make it acquire all kinds of meanings afterwards.

*Note -- "Taboo.*

In *Totem und taboe*, Freud says that 'taboo' has two opposite meanings: (i) sacred, consecrated; (ii) disquieting, dangerous, forbidden, unclean. He adds that, in Polynesian, the opposite of taboo is called 'noa' (common, accessible to all). Psychology (and especially psychoanalysis) has also taken possession of this hieroanalytical concept, again by demythologizing and desacralizing it: the projection (attribution) of inner conflicts among others turns what is taboo into something unclean; or even more: the taboo is conceived as a stage for the moral awakening of the contact with the divine. Whereby the psychologizing of the sacred is already evident.

The fact that the "taboo" is an objective boundary within a religious order of cosmos and life, which determines destiny, is at best still in the distant background, if not simply denied.

(GW 14) ***Conclusion on the structure of wisdom.***

This structure, clarified by means of a mythical model, can be typified fourfold :

***a. informative***

(i.e. regarding information concerning reality: epistemological, logical, methodological): a conception of knowledge is inherent in wisdom; wisdom is truth, i.e. correspondence of the depiction of reality (in the mind) with that reality itself; i.e. our knowing, however immanent (= internal) to our awareness, transcends our inwardness (i.e. has direct contact with what is outside our awareness); thus the myth above is the depiction of something;

***b. constitutive***

(i.e. concerning the constitution, essential nature, of reality): wisdom is the representation (see ad a, informative) of the 'wise' structure, present and active in reality itself; thus the myth of Narkissos is the representation of a structure, viz. This cybernetic-harmonious structure is itself 'wise', i.e. 'reasoned', a representation of insight and order(s); this is the constitutive wisdom;

***c. preconstitutive***

(i.e. as regards that which precedes the constitution or structure of things and processes, is preexistent to them); indeed, if reality itself, in itself, is 'wise', i.e. ordered and 'reasonable', then it is the representation of a wisdom, which was at work, before things and processes were actually there; this preexistent or pre-existent wisdom, is preconstitutive, preexistent, and it is something different from the informative wisdom (in man, who knows the truth, this is, the constitutive, present in things, wisdom) and the constitutive wisdom (at work in reality); thus the cosmic and human order, which makes beings purposeful (i.e. on measure, limit, directed) and that deviation from it, is punished, is the work of preexistent, divine beings and forces, which are in themselves bearers of wisdom (preconstitutive wisdom then);

***d. ethical-political,***

normative, deontic (i.e. concerning the regulation, direction of behavior): once informed about order (constitutive, physical wisdom) and the order-establishing power (preconstitutive wisdom), man (all that lives, by the way) can act orderly (i.e. wise); this practical wisdom is the reproduction of the three previous ones: thus, learned by the model of Narkissos, man can learn to respect measure, limit, and become conscientious (ethical, moral) and social (political, civil), by wisely taking into account an order founded by higher powers, which he has come to know.

(GW 15) These four points of view, however, are interrelated: ontological (or also metaphysical) wisdom encompasses all four; for it is concerned with reality as reality (as such or suchlike), whether informative, constitutive (physical, situated in nature itself), preconstitutive ('meta.physical' in the second sense of that word) or normative; wisdom is always sense of whole, i.e. the collection and coherence of everything; it is always situating itself within the whole; the totality of all being. In this sense wisdom is also the consciousness of limits, of the awareness of boundaries: cf. *Ernst Benz et al, Die Grenze der machbaren Welt*, (The limit of the feasible world, ), Leiden, 1975, in which *H.-J. Klimkeit, Das Phänomen der Grenze im mythischen Denken*, (The phenomenon of the border in mythical thought), stands out. To situate oneself in a sensible (wise) entity, founded by sensible (wise) powers, can also be found outside the Near East and Hellas.

### 'Universalism'

This is how the Dutch sinologist (China expert) J.J.M. de Groot, who died in 1921, called the common spiritual basis of the Chinese conceptions of the world, ethics, state and sciences. Universism - from 'universe', universe - is a doctrine, at the center of which stands the universe with all its parts and phenomena, and which seeks to foreground the harmony of heaven, earth and man." (*H. von Glasenapp, The Non-Christian Religions*, Antw./ Utr., 1967, 61);

"According to the conception of Hindus, the cosmos is an ordered whole in both large and small. It is governed by a world law ('Dharma'), which manifests itself in both natural and moral life." (*H. von Glasenapp, Brahmanism or Hinduism*, "The Hague, 1971, 16).

The Bible, too, lives from such an orderly universe, founded by the pre-existent Yahweh (or Trinity), which works itself out in the sowing-harvesting law: "Do not be deceived: God does not allow Himself to be mocked. Whatever man sows, he will also reap: Whoever sows in the flesh (= poor deviation from God's order in creation), will reap destruction from the flesh; but whoever sows in the spirit (= blissful conformity to God's order in Christ), will reap eternal life from the spirit." (*Gal, 6:7/8*).

In other words, God's judgment is situated in the order of creation itself, in which man acts freely, but situated in a 'harmony' of opposites which is such that 'carnal' action brings destruction and 'spiritual' action implies 'eternal' life on the basis of causality: man himself is the cause of his consequences.

So that we can conclude to a global, planetary wisdom structure. In that structure is situated Greek philosophy, which inevitably, exhibits an analogous structure.

(GW 16) *The Egyptian maät.*

A particularly clear example of wisdom structure is the Egyptian Maät.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- H.v. Glasenapp, *The non-Christian religions*, Antw./Utr., 1967, 94;

-- W. Schilling, *Religion und Recht*, Schorndorf, 1957, 176/177;

-- A. Erman, *Die Religion der Egypter*, 1934, 57;

-- esp. A. Volten, *Der Begriff der Maät in den Egyptischen Weisheitstexten*, (The Concept of Maät in the Egyptian Wisdom Texts.), in *Fr. Wendel et al, Les sagesses du Proche Orient ancien*, (Wisdoms of the Ancient Near East), Paris, 1963, 86/99.

In summary, what these specialists say in this regard amounts to the following:

(i) By the same word, the ancient Egyptians expressed a multitude of interrelated wisdom ideas:

a. informative understanding is Maät truth;

b. constitutive is she (physical) world and universe order(s);

c. preconstitutionally she means the founding divine power, often personally thought of as the goddess of truth and world order;

d. normatively (ethico-politically esp.), she is justice, i.e. behavior that does justice to the predetermined order of things and processes.

(ii) H. Brunner, *Der freie Wille Gottes in der Aegyptischen Weisheit*, in *Fr. Wendel*, (The Free Will of God in Egyptian Wisdom), *ibid.*, 104/ 120, examines the proper relationship between, on the one hand, the free, if need be gracious, will of God, resp. deities, and, on the other, of the somewhat automatic-looking, indeed, sometimes too mechanically conceived Maät.

"Has God (either as Supreme Being or as deity quantity) bound himself to his own world order to such an extent that a maät-hostile act is necessarily followed by a curse and a misfortune (so that Maät works as a natural law), or can it occur - albeit also only as an exception - that God (= Supreme Being, deity quantity) not only delays the repercussion of an act on its perpetrator, but intercepts against Maät the deserved blessing or curse?" (103/104).

The author notes that Maät is nowhere painted as automatic, even where a lawful order of "cause-effect" is spoken of. It is true that, as Egyptian culture progresses, there is increasing emphasis on a divine self-powerful, non-Maätic action, especially where skepticism emphasizes the disorderly in the universe and humanity.

(iii) A. Volten a.c. 86ff, claims, on the basis of texts, that the Maät must be understood astrologically to some extent: like the Mesopotamians, ancient Egyptians thought that the fate of the world and of man is governed by the heavenly bodies, especially the Milky Way, where the deities of destiny are situated (= astro.theo.-logical aspect),-themes to which, later Platon and, after him, many ancient thinkers adhere; above all, the Milky Way is pre-eminently the center of life fluid (a.c.,92), which flows through deities, humans, animals, plants, yes, matter (which is also sensed as "living").



(GW 17) "The whole world, by this fluid, which shows itself in its highest form in the heavenly bodies, is governed according to eternal, unchanging laws." (92)

"The Babylonians (...) had precisely the same ideas about the Milky Way as a cradle of destiny as the Egyptians. "The Milky Way (...) may be (...) god or goddess of destiny, and revolves the heavens as a potter's wheel, on which the souls with its various characters are created." (93).

We note that Volten, by using the word "fluid" (rarefied or fine matter, as distinguished from the coarse matter only noticed by the science of modernity), introduces a hylic pluralism (a multiplicity of types of matter).

Exactly that, namely that fluid (of the Milky Way especially), Volten calls the core of Egyptian hylozoism (the view that matter, i.e. all visible and tangible nature, is 'alive' (zoe, vita, life)). The doctrine of that soul substance (99: 'Stoff der Seele), centered in the Milky Way and flowing through the universe, especially all that lives, is the doctrine of Maät: "In addition to the ethical conception of justice, Maät, the Egyptians had a physical conception: the Maat is the substance of the soul, from which the deities live and out of which they exist. She is the Milky Way, from which the sun and the dead drink and with which the soul unites." (99).

It should be noted that, in contrast to what is apparently said above on page 7/8, the emphasis here is on the primeval deities (= the Supreme God, resp. the Supreme Being, through the celestial deities at work, centered in the Milky Way); but also the dead (essentially a chthonic aspect) come through.

**(iv) Summary:**

Egyptian polytheism is borne of a dynamism, viz. that belief in power which, diffused throughout the universe; sees a kind of tenuous or fine substance (the power-bearing substance, kratophany) (fluid as dunamis).

It is precisely this fluid substance (also called 'subtle' substance) that determines destiny. It is called determining destiny because destiny stands or falls with the supply of (soul) substance or fluid which, embedded in the universe, someone has at his disposal.

Insofar as this fluid is centered in the star world, such a polytheistic dynamism is astrology, resp. astrotheology. Insofar as the matter of the universe, which is dead to us Westerners, is permeated precisely by that fluid, such a view is called 'hylozoism' (hierophysics).

"It is at any rate ready," says Volten, a.c., 94, "that the so-called hylozoism of the Pre-Socratics is Egyptian-inspired, as already seen in antiquity."

It is precisely this that we will use as a guide in our survey of Greek philosophy.

(GW 18) ***Introduction. The Cultural History Framework (18/22).***

Wisdom, and among other things philosophy, professional science and rhetoric, are situated in the whole (the system) of culture. Therefore very briefly a bibliographic sample.

(a) - *J. Hawkes, Archaeological Panorama (What happened at the same time as what, in the world from -35,000 to +500?), Amerongen, 1977* (wonderful book that situates the ancient world in the broad stream of prehistoric and historical development);

-- *RE. Leakey / R. Lewin, New insights into the origin and development of man, Wageningen, 1978; RE. Leakey, On the trail of man, Utr./Antw., 1981* (esp. pp. 198/217: *A new way of life*);

-- *HRH. Pr. Claus der Nederlanden et al, De evolutie van de mens (De speurtocht naar de ontbreken schakels), (The evolution of man (The quest for the missing links)), Maastricht / Brussels, 1981* (esp. *DC. Johanson, The finds in the triangle of Afar, o.c., 132/157: the Australopithecus afarensis probably fills the gap between three and four million years and can probably be counted among the most primitive group of recognizable humanoids*),-- a work containing fascinating articles;

-- *J. Northon Leonard et al, Les premiers cultivateurs, (The first farmers), Time-Life International (Netherlands), 1977-3* (on the "agricultural revolution" +/- -7,000 in the Near East).

***Summary:***

**i.** For at least two million years, prehistoric humans (and the remains of them today) led a nomadic existence of hunting, fishing and gathering (picking)

**ii.** About -28,000 the first traces occur at various points of the globe, of the agricultural revolution: here and there arable farming and/or animal husbandry (= agriculture) emerge.

About -7,000 arises in the fertile crescent or half-moon, situated between the Persian Gulf, the Taurus Mountains (S.E. Turkey) and the Dead Sea, a whole series of agricultural villages.

From there the agrarian revolution fanned out, among other things, in the direction of Anatolia (= Asia Minor, Mikrasia), towards Hellas.

***Immediately, the ancient cultures could take off.***

**(i)** Biologists estimate that, +/- -8,000, the total world population was between five and ten million; within eight thousand years it rose to three hundred million (population explosion);

**(ii)** Twenty-five gatherers needed +/- 640 Km<sup>2</sup> of area to survive; one hundred and fifty people in an agricultural village needed only 15 Km<sup>2</sup> (economy principle)

**(iii)** From now on children and elders were no longer ballast, but were useful people in the agrarian society (agrarian phase of family life).

(GW 19) **(iv)** *O. Brunner, Bürger und Bourgeois*, in *Wort und Wahrheit*, VIII (1953): Juni, 419/426, points out that, since the agrarian revolution, essentially three types of cities have emerged: **a.** the Oriental city, **b.** the ancient city, **c.** the mid-century-modern city; in other words, from the first agrarian villages the first cities emerge:

**(v)** *T. Nuy, New forms of community life*, in *Cultural Life*, 39 (1972): 9 (Nov), 828/838, mentions that, among the nomads, the small group was characteristic, while in rural culture, besides micro-structures, also meso-structures such as the twelve tribes of Israel, the Pythagorean communities, the Essene sect, and macro-structures, such as the whole people of Israel, the Greeks as a people, etc., came into being. emerged; immediately the way was open to the formation of "empires" (the Persian Empire, the Macedonian Empire, the Roman Empire or Imperium with its typical imperialism).

**(vi)** *G. Dumézil, Mythe et épopée (L'idéologie des trois fonctions dans les épopées des peuples indo-européens)*, (Myth and epic (The ideology of the three functions in the epics of Indo-European peoples)), Paris, 1968, shows how, within the agrarian culture, division of labor (specialization) and class emerges: some pray (prayer people), others fight (war people), on the one hand, and, on the other, still others labor (work people); - that trifunctional scheme lasts until the middle ages until when, +/- 1200 and later, the three "states" come to replace those three ancient Indo-European "functions."

**(vii)** What Kristensen calls the 'enlightened' circles arise in the antique living framework outlined above: the intellectually disenfranchised man, within the old' culture, signs off as 'different', indeed subversive, through his personal thinking and research; the philosophers, the professional scientists and the rhetors very easily belong to that type, which could be called the 'intelligentsia'.

The "foci" of ancient culture, with "enlightened" circles in them, are Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, China, Native American society (Aztecs (Mexico), Mayans (south), Incas (Peru))

**Note.--** It is sometimes difficult to empathize with an ancient culture: in ancient Rome, people averaged about twenty-three years of age; around 1900, they averaged thirty-five; today, sixty-five and more! The word "mortal," which in the mouth of ancient man serves to designate man, was based on reality!

**Conclusion:** Three cultural stages emerge:

- (i)** primitive (nomadic hunting and gathering) - see primitivology, folklore (folk) and prehistory -;
- (ii)** antiques;
- (iii)** classical (enlightened, disempowered).

(GW 20) *Note.-- (i) C. Thomsen* (1816/1819; - 1788/1865) and *J. Lubbock* (1834/1913) relying on an industrious perspective, which is very one-sided, distinguished stone, bronze and iron epochs;- Lubbock, in 1865, divided the stone epoch into paleo- and neolithic; yet, today, it is agreed that the break between paleo- and neolithic is the agricultural revolution, d.i. the cereal crops (arable farming) and the domestic animals (animal husbandry).

**(ii)** *EB. Tylor* (1832/1917) and Lewis Morgan (1818/1881), general culturalists, design a three-phase scheme: wild**1.**, barbaric**2.**, **3.** civilized.

K. Marx (1818/1883) and Fr. Engels (1820/1895), the founders of "scientific socialism" (dialectical materialism), adopted this scheme. One senses in that scheme the tone of superiority, which was still prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with regard to non-enlightened cultures.

**(iii)** *S. Nilsson* (1787/1883), mixing general cultural and economic points of view, designs a four-stage scheme: **1.** Wild,**2** . pastoral-nomadic, sedentary-agricultural**3.**, civilized**4.**.

From a Greek point of view one can point to *W. De Burgh, Nalatenschap der Oudheid*, (Legacy of Antiquity, I en II, Utr./Antw., 1959 (Hellas is to be situated in the whole of 'Antiquity', in which the Ancient Near East (including Israel) and Rome also play a prominent role as focal points);

-- *P. Lévêque, L' aventure grecque*, Paris, 1964-3 (an excellent history of Hellas);

-- *M. Finley, Les premiers temps de la Grèce (L' âge du bronze et l' époque archaïque)*, Paris, 1980-2 ( **1.**the Bronze Age period starts +/- -3,000; **2.** the 'dark ages' +/- -1200; the **3.**'archaic' period (' an art-historical term) +/- -800; -- but, beware, archaeological finds reach back to +/- -40,000, namely at Kokkinopilos (o.c., 18; see also *D. et R. Whitehouse, Atlas archéologique universel*, Paris, 1978, 53), where traces of human occupation were found); *J. Hawkes, Dawn of the Gods, London*, 1968 (work that,

**1.** Cycladic culture (-3,200+), especially however

**2.** the Monoic (= Cretan) culture, o.c.,37/160, which flourished immediately after the Cykladic culture and, together with it, can be called the cradle of European culture,

**3.** The Mukeenian (= Mycenaean) culture, o.c., 161/242,

**4.** the Dark Ages and the Greek revival after it, o.c., 243/289), especially in the religious field.

Continental Hellas, with the Cyklades (islands), Cyprus and Crete, as well as the Asia Minor coast, forms the Aegean (Aigaian) complex (Finley, 17). As a result, a Helladic, a Minoan (= Cretan), and Cykladic era were designed by scholars, with all kinds of subdivisions (ibid., 24).

(GW 21) The populations of the Aegean complex are varied: on Crete there are dolichocephalians (long-shouldered); on the Cyclades and in Asia Minor there are brachycephalians (short-shouldered), which slowly but surely dominate the dolichocephalians (which, incidentally, are also found in Egypt, Libya and the Western Mediterranean coasts); on continental Hellas there are people, related to the Danubian population.

All of these prehistoric populations the later Greeks called Pelasgians (to which were also Karians, Dryopes, etc.). The Pelasgians are not Indo-Europeans (or Aryans).

Around -2,500 the 'Oldhelladic' period II (= Oldminoïsch II, Keros - Syros, Troija II) begins, lasting until -1,900. Well, around -2100 thus still in the early Bronze Age, - the Indo-Europeans, called Achaiers, invade, from the North, and destroy at least part of the Pelasgian culture (esp. in Argolis). Later the Ionians and the Eolians (Aiolians) follow; still later the Dorians, - all also Indo-Europeans. The Dorians destroy, viz. in the course of -1,200/-1,100, the culture built up by the Achaiers, Ionians and Eolians. Thus the 'Dark Ages' set in.

Around -1,700 the Cretans - Minoan culture type - set foot in Argolis (between Sparta and Corinth on the Peloponesos) at Asinè: the meeting of Minoan and Achaean culture resulted in the Mukeen (Mucenean) culture (so called because at Mukene (Mycenae), capital of Argolis, it is the most prominent). The so-called Trojan War is part of the Mycenaean expansion. The Mycenaean civilization, as mentioned, is destroyed by the Indo-European Dorians.

The "Dark Age" ("Dark Ages"), as a result of the Dorian invasions, lasts from -1,200 to +/- -800.

Colonization lapses into two times:

(i) -775/-675 (Chalkidikè and southern Italy and Sicily (Sikelia) are invaded by starving, agriculture-seeking Hellenes;

(ii) -675/-550 (S. Italy (= Greater Greece) and Sicily, Gaul (Massalia, Marseille e.g. is founded in -599 by inhabitants of Fokaia (Ionia in Kl.-Asia); cf. P. Scolardi, Marseille la Grecque, 1974), Iberia (Spain), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Black Sea coasts (Propontis, Maiotis included; e.g. Buzantion (Byzantium) is founded in -660) and Egypt (Naukratis e.g. is founded in -650). Cf. P. Lévêque, o.c., 197/198.

The major dialects are:

(i) Ionian-Attic (Attica, Euboea, Cyclades, Ionia);

(ii) the Aeolian (Thessaly, Biotia, Eolis (Aiolis));

(iii) Doric (Peloponnese, Crete, Greater - Greece, Sicily). These ethnic linguistic differences weigh through from -800 and later.

(GW 21a)



(GW 22) ***Classification of Greek History.***

Because philosophy, professional science and rhetoric are situated between -625 and +600, it makes sense to go over Greek general history very briefly.

**(i) *The "dark ages"*** (-1200/-800)

(Finley, 89/1013).-- The ancient Greeks did not realize this break with Minoan-Mycenaean times, but modern archaeology has exposed those times. General poverty and mediocrity of the artworks stand out.

**(ii) *The 'archaic age'*** (-800/-500)

(Finley, 109/172).-- "Two phenomena characterize archaic times:

**a.** the emergence and slow development of the "polis" (city-state, - which is a not very correct translation), which constitutes the structure characteristic of the Greek world;

**b.** the wide extension of Hellas which, at two centuries approximately, stretched from the shores of the Black Sea to the vicinity of the Atlantic. o.c., 109). One thinks indeed of the double wave of colonization .-- The Greek revival (Hawkes, 243ss) sees e.g. -776 the first Olympic Games, -750 the Iliad, -725 the Odusseia, the two Homeric epics.

The Milesians. (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes), Puthagoras, Xenophanes, Paleo-Orphism, Parmenides, Herakleitos, etc. belong to the end of the archaic period.

**(iii) *The "classical" era*** (-500/-338)

(Lévêque, 249/390) including the 'Century of Pericles' (-495/-429). -- In -338 Philip of Macedon and his son Alexandros (Alexander the Great) defeat the Athenians and the Boiotians, bringing the whole of Hellas under Macedonian rule, at Chaironeia.

**(iv) *The Macedonian era*** (-338/-146)

(Lévêque, 391/523) (*Cl. Préaux, Le monde hellénistique (La Grèce et l' Orient)*, (The Hellenistic world (Greece and the East)), Paris, I et 11, 1978).- Greek independence is lost, but Greek culture spread throughout the (near) east, even to the Indus.

**(v) *The Roman period*** (-146/+...).

In +476, the Western Roman Empire ends (with the deposition of Romulus Augustulus by Odoaker, while the Eastern Roman Empire continues. From +632, the first caliphs of Islam gradually conquer portions of the Eastern Roman Empire until, in +1453, with the fall of Constantinople, the Eastern Roman Empire comes to an end.

**Note.--** *Abschied von der Antike? (Eine Enquête über die Rolle des griechisch - lateinischen Geisteserbes in der Bildungsgesellschaft von Morgen)*, (Farewell to Antiquity? (An enquête on the role of the Greek - Latin intellectual heritage in the educational society of tomorrow)), in *wort und wahrheit*, 19 (1964): 1 (Jan), 9/42; 19 (1964): 2 (Feb), 103/145 gives the opinion of many intellectuals about classical humanism today (incidentally in full crisis).

(GW 23) **Note: - *The methodology of wisdom study.***

Philosophy, like wisdom, is as all-sided as possible: professional idiocy, i.e. the one-sided enclosure of one's own specialization, is contrary to wisdom and philosophy. Theology, philosophy, professional science, e.g., are not stages, as A. Comte (and with him, the positivists) claimed, but ever-present facets of one wisdom. Rhetoric and science are not stages, but always synchronous aspects of wisdom.

One can already see this in a bibliography such as that of G. Varet, *Manuel de bibliographie philosophique*, I (*Les philosophies classiques*); II (*Les sciences philosophiques*), Paris, 1956.

**(A) Global (planetary) method.**

***Bibl. Sample.***

- J. Plott/ P. Mays, *Sarva Darsana-Sangraham (A Bibliographical Guide to the Global History of Philosophy)*, Leiden, 1969, situates before - 550 in China: the pre-Confucian classics and the Codex of the Law; in India: the earliest Veda's (+/- -2.000) and the Brahmana's (+/- -1,000); in the Near East: Zoroaster (= Zarathoestra) (-660/-583) Moses, Deuteronomy (+/- -625); in Europe: the Homeric Hymns (-740+), etc.

If previous work is a reaction against ethnocentrism, then Chr. Delacampagne, *La philosophie ailleurs*, (Philosophy elsewhere), in C. Delacampagne/ R Maggiori, *Philosopher (Les interrogations contemporaines)*, Paris, 1980, 473/482, even further: he briefly discusses Amer-Indian, Negro-African, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist philosophies; the primitives, apparently, already have some kind of "philosophy"; yet one would, in that case, better speak of "wisdom.

***Opm.--*** K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, (Of the origin and goal of history,) Frunkf./Hamburg, 1955 (32ff., 75ff.: *Schema der Weltgeschichte*; 58ff.: *Die Achsenzeit und ihre Folgen*), develops the concept of an "axial rotation period" (Achsenzeit), i.e., a period of profound cultural upheaval.

This begins, according to Jaspers, in the eighth century, reaches a peak at +/- 600 and, in its wake, gives rise to large political formations which determine history up to our days, the so-called empires or empires. Great figures such as Buddha, Zarathoestra, the prophet Daniel and Socrates are situated in this 'age'. Greek philosophy arises, indeed, in that period.

***Gianbatista Vico*** (1668/1744),

*Principii di una scienza nuova* (1725) sees something along these lines, relying on Herodotos and Varro, namely, the development of a gods' or theocratic, a heroic or heroic, and a human or human epoch; *Tarde*, the sociologist, took this as a guide for his mimetism (man imitates models).



(GW 24) **Note.**-- Among the many works yet these two:

-- P. Raju, *Oriental and Western Philosophy* (Eng.: *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*), Utr./Ant. 1966 (Western philosophy places importance on the external reality, the Chinese on man, and the Indian on the interiority);

-- HJ. Störig, *History of Philosophy*, 1 and 2, Utr./Antw., 1972 (*the Old Indian, Old Chinese, Greek and Western phil.*);

-- further: W. Totok, *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, (Handbook of the history of philosophy.), 3 Bde, Frankf. a. Main, 1964ff. (Bd 1 deals with *Indian and Chinese philosophy among others*, Bd 2 with *Islamic and Jewish philosophy among others*).

### **Note -- Comparative or comparative method**

In addition to Raju's work mentioned above (the English title '*Comparative Philosophy*' is abundantly clear), Plott and Mays' work cited above, Sarva, is also comparatively conceived (esp. pp. 1/24 cites 'generally comparative' studies).

Comparative and global methods are not the same, but they easily go hand in hand. Both methods broaden the view of the student(s), who, precisely by breaking through the narrow view, becomes all the more wise.

### **(B) The externalist methods of sophioanalysis (Greek - Western).**

#### **1. The anthological or anthology method.**

-- H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Griechisch und Deutsch), Berlin, 1903-1, 1922-6;

-- W. Kranz' reissue: Berlin, 1951/1952;

-- for the whole of Greek philosophy: CJ. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, I (*Thales to Plato*), II (*Aristotle, The Early Peripatetic School and the Early Academy*), III (*The Hellenistic-Roman Period*), Leiden, 1950/1959;

-- W. Weischedel, *Philosophy by the back door*, De Bilt, 1976.

#### **2. The literatological (literature) method.**

-- F. Böhl et al, *Algemene literatuurgeschiedenis* (*Gesch. v.d. belangrijkste figuren en currents in world literature*), I (*De Oudheid*), Utr./Antw., s.d., contains a.o.

-- A. van Groningen/H. Wagenvoort, *The teaching poem* (131/147) (*Hesiod: Theogony*; id., *Works and Days*; *Parmenides: On Nature*; *Aratus: Celestial Phenomena*; *Later didactics*);

-- F. Sassen/ H. Wagenvoort, *The philosophical argument* (369/395);

-- A.v. Groningen/H. Wagenvoort, *The scientific treatise* (396/402) (*Science and literature: Hippocrates* (397) *Aristotle* (397/398) *Euklides*, *Aristarchus*, *Galenus*, *Ptolemy* (398/399)).

#### **Note.-- The rhetoric or theory of eloquence,**

blossomed in recent years, moves in the same literatological sphere: H. Weller / G. Stuiveling, *Modern Eloquence*, Amst./Bruss., 1968 (38/48: *Political Reason in Antiquity* (Perikles, the Sophists, Demosthenes)); Ch. Perelman, *Rhetoric and Argumentation*, Baarn, 1979 (deals with rhetorical discourse), esp. 149/157 (*Rhetoric and philosophy*);

-- S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and philosophy* (*What happens when one speaks*), Bilthoven, 1975.

(GW 25) It is evident that, since antiquity, the educational or didactic text, whether in the form of a teaching poem, a philosophical or rhetorical discourse, or a scientific treatise, has its own structure compared to the lyrical or epic text. Sages, philosophers have used the didactic text to express and communicate themselves.

*S. IJsseling*, 116/129 (*Marx, Nietzsche and Freud*), Points out how Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, although different from each other, have launched a philology or textuology (textual view), which fires up the esp. modern, but also the whole wisdom and especially the philosophical wisdom:

for Marx e.g., philosophy is "ideology" (a form of consciousness peculiar to a particular society and esp. economy);

for Nietzsche, philosophy is one kind of text among other kinds of text, with strong rhetorical bias;

for *Freud*, philosophy is a phenomenon of consciousness, dependent on unconscious and subconscious factors.

In other words, these three materialist critics of philosophy have developed sophio-analysis by situating philosophy in a broader framework, which we, in this course, call sophio-analysis. Unfortunately, none of the three has drawn on the antique concept of wisdom, which has the necessary scope to situate philosophy, incidentally also to situate science and eloquence; they have each engaged in sophio-analysis from the basis of their own ideology (materialism, anti-establishment attitude, etc.).

Well, the literalogical (philological, textual) method is an extremely useful sophio-analytical tool.

It is evident that the lyric and the epic text, like all works of art, also proclaim a "message," a "wisdom": the existential thinkers, by using theater (Marcel, Sartre) or novel (Sartre),-the mid-century cathedrals, by "proclaiming" in stained glass and plastic forms of all kinds, a Christian wisdom, fall under the concept of "wisdom," respectively "philosophy."

**Note.--** The anthological method and the literary method go hand in hand: one places importance on the content of the excerpt, the other on the literary genre (text type, literature type).

### **3. The psychological method**

Instead of the text (or the means of communication), in which wisdom and philosophy circulate, one can look at the person, who deals with wisdom and philosophy:

**a. J.-F. Vernant**, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Etudes de psychologie historique)*, (Myth and thought among the Greeks (Studies in Historical Psychology)), 1 et 2, Paris, 1971, treats e. g. 'mnèmosunè' (the process of becoming conscious) (1, 80/123)

(GW 26) **b. D. Anzieu et.a., *psychanalyse et culture grecque***, (psychoanalysis and Greek culture.), Paris, 1980, treats mythical wisdom - which always reverberates in philosophy - from a depth psychological point of view; -- we refer e.g. to *H. Lang, Zum Verhältnis von Strukturalismus, Philosophie und Psychoanalyse,- konkretisiert am Phänomen der Subjektivität*, (On the relationship between structuralism, philosophy and psychoanalysis,- concretized on the phenomenon of subjectivity.), in *Tijdschr. V. Filos.* 38 (1976): 4 (Dec.), 559/573, where the 'rhetoric' of the unconscious, from various points of view (psychoanalysis, linguistic analysis, (neo)Marxism, structuralism), is discussed, especially with regard to its influence on the philosopher and his insights; -- it should be noted that Vernant (under a. above) proceeds structurally (according to Dumézil's model), i.e. sees the same humane structure at work in society in various forms,-- the unconscious nature of which is evident on several occasions;

**c. W. Bröcker, *Dialektik, Positivismus, Mythologie***, Frankf.a.M., 1958, develops the idea that man's concrete presence in the world, conceived here Heideggerian and designated by the unqualified word "mythology," is already present for every conversation (dialectic), for every positive science, for every metaphysics (philosophy) and remains present in it;-- this is a kind of phenomenological psychology (of the I-in-the-world).

It is without question that every sage, every sage, etc. have their own personality (and 'psyché') and reflect that in their thinking.

This recalls K. Jaspers, who claims that "metaphysics" is only possible on the basis of "world orientation" (positive science) and "existence illumination" (human science).

#### **4. The sociological method.**

I.p.v. the psyché (consciousness, unconscious, world presence, existence) one can look at the social framework :

**a. M. Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft***, (The forms of knowledge and society), Bern / Munich, 1960 (*Ges. Werke, Bd. 8*), deals with sociology of knowledge: if not reason itself, at least its forms of thought are constantly in the process of formation and do so in the context of a societal structure; -- phenomenological standpoint is at work here;

**b. G. Thomson, *Les premiers philosophes***, (The first philosophers), Paris, 1973, attempts to prove, on the basis of Marxism (historical dialectics), that all "philosophical" works (by which he means, apart from Platon 's dialogues, also Greek tragedy) is only "superstructure" (supra-structure) of a substructure (infrastructure), viz. a society, the main feature of which is slavery; - which is vehemently disputed by striking "Hellenists".

Clearly, any wisdom reflects its social framework, although that does not make it the way Marxists see it.

(GW 27) **Note.**-- A curious example of sociological structure is checked in:

-- F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechts, I (Die Gesch. der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter)*, (History of Natural Law, I (The History of the European Idea of Law in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages)), Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 13/14 (the agora as an army collection of a sacred nature);

-- J.-F. Vernant, *o.c.*, *L'organisation de l'espace* (1, 124/229; esp. 176ss. on the agora in the polis (city) : the free speech (isègoria) prevailing in the agora, center of the city, influenced the whole world-view of the Greeks).

### **5. The culturological method.**

Instead of looking at the psyche or the living framework, one can look at the culture:

-- W. Kluback / M. Weinbaurn, *Dilthey 's Philosophy of existence*, London, 1960, contains the translation of *Dilthey's Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen* (The types of the world view and their formation in the metaphysical systems), (1911), in which naturalism, freedom idealism, and objective idealism are seen as phases in human mental history (i.e., culture reflects itself in a metaphysical system);

-- R. Stock, *The Greek drama and the Western man*, Desclée De Brouwer, 1959, discusses among other things the Attic tragedy and its repercussions on Voorsocratic philosophy, - theme, to which K. Popma, *De kennis omtrent de antieke cultuur*, (The knowledge regarding ancient culture), in *Tijdschr. v. Phil.* , 22 (1960): 3, 441/476, connects, esp. from the theological point of view.

**Note.**-- The psychological, sociological and culturological methods go together: as Z. Barbu, *Society, Culture and Personality*, Utr./ Antw., 1973, in the line of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, explains, by the way, being human proceeds in that threefold way.

### **6. The historical method.**

So far we have gone over the synchronic methods; the diachronic or historical approach situates wisdom in the evolution of total history:

**a.** P. Lévêque, *l'aventure grecque*, Paris, /1964-3, situates e.g. Homer and Hesiod in the "geometrical" period (103/106), Thales and the Ionian thinkers in the economic prosperity of Ionia (226/229), Protosofistics in the crisis period from -430 (304/313), etc.;

**b.** Cl. Préaux, *Le monde hellénistique*, 1 et 2, Paris, 1978, treats in 2, 602/636, philosophy and morality, as well as professional science under the Macedonian rulers (which Lévêque does o. c., 446/483).

It should be noted that the development or evolution being examined here is not internal, but external. - By the way, the methods discussed above are 'externalist' methods: they situate wisdom in some framework, in a totality, which makes its relativity apparent. When the Macedonian rulers change the living framework, for example, philosophy evolves through external influences.

(GW 28) (C) ***The internalist method of sophioanalysis.***

One can also study wisdom and especially philosophy as an 'insider', i.e. as someone who puts the own, intrinsic structure of wisdom first and takes it as the norm of his approach. We refer to pages 14/17 above. This structure is three- or fourfold, depending on whether or not one takes 'physical' and 'metaphysical' (= constitutive and preconstitutive aspect) together.

***One bibliographic example:***

G. Nuchelmans, *Metaphysics and Ethics in Analytic Philosophy*, in *Tijdschr. v. Phil.*, 28 (1966): 3 (Sept.), 399/417, where the author says : "What is meant is the invariably recurring tripartite division into what might be called metaphysics, normative philosophy and the critical agency of logic and epistemology ( ...). The target of the logical and knowledge-theoretical critique is not reality in the first instance, as it exists outside symbolism (i.e., its formulation), but rather statements about that reality, including those of metaphysics and normative philosophy"; (402/403).

Also J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies and their Practice in Education and Religion*, New York/ Evanston/ London, 1968-3, repeatedly distinguishes four "subjects" (parts of the one wisdom structure): metaphysics, epistemology (theory of knowledge) and logic, axiology (theory of values) where informational philosophy is split into logic and theory of knowledge.

**Note.--** TH. Hobbes (1588/1679) classifies philosophy into:

**a.** theory of knowledge (in which he assesses the value of theology among other things),

**b.** 'philosophia naturalis' (the study of the bodies of nature),

**c.** 'philosophia civilis' (the study of artificial bodies, including morality and politics).

This materialist thus adheres to the time-honored idealist-spiritualist division: see e.g. O. Willmann, *Gesch. des Idealismus*, I (*Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, S. 255/265, where he maintains that in Pythagoreanism the '*Vereinigung von Physik und Ethik im Idealismus*' (the synthesis of physics and ethics in idealism) took place for the first time, with a run-up to informational philosophy in number theory, which contains a kind of theory of thought. This, in the wake of prescient wisdom (see o.c., 195/216: Politische und physische Theologie).

***Xenocrates of Chalkedon*** (-339/ -314)

He was the leader of the Platonic Academy and continues as the first to divide Philosophy into **a.** dialectics (informative), **b.** physical, and **c.** ethics. Of course a theory of ideas will be the idea:

**a.** informative (in our knowing),

**b.** preconstitutive (pre-existing idea e.g. in God or in the thought-content world),

**c.** constitutive (in the things and processes themselves) and

**d.** see normatively (in action), - which the materialist does not do now.

(GW 29) **Note.--** Ontology constitutes the unity of the three or four main viewpoints of wisdom. Aristotle, the founder, if not one of the greatest founders of ontology or the theory of being, says that the "first philosophy" (= ontology) is not a practical-productive knowledge which deals with concrete tasks; - that it is also not a theoretical knowledge, in the Platonic sense, viz. which, in the concrete, reveals the universal (the idea, the concept); no: it transcends both forms of knowledge in that it means the being without more (of which the practical-productive and the merely theoretical universal know only aspects, parts, sees) or the totality of all that 'is'.

***The transcendental (= all-encompassing, ontological) concepts.***

Eukleides of Megara (+/- -400), the Lesser-Socrat, leader of the Megarian school (with its dialectical streak), formulated the four great "transcendentals": from Puthagoras he learned the one and the true; from Platon the being and the good. What does this mean?

**a.** Being is what exists in itself, independent of the knowing subject;

**b1.** that being is one, i.e., susceptible to collection and system, which bring about unity in the multitude either by resemblance (common property) or by coherence (different being having one common bond);

**b2.** being true, i.e. amenable to rational and reasonable treatment (analysis); minimal rationalism and intellectualism is founded here; absolute irrationalism is unacceptable;

**b3.** being is good, i.e., amenable to appreciation (mood, striving), i.e., a theory of value (axiology) and salvation (soteriology) is minimally present in the ontology; negatively expressed : being is non-absurd, non-meaningless, yet valuable no matter what.

**Note.--** One bibliographic example: *C. Schoonbrood, The Absolute (Philosophical Texts)*, Arnhem, 1967 (*logical analysis, naturalism and spiritualism, God's existence , mystical experience, morality, evil*). 'Absolute' i.e. totally independent, non-relative, is:

**(i)** being, in that it is the last ground of collection, system, intelligibility and where the;

**(ii)** God, in that He, among the being, is the highest Being and as such, "ground" (necessary and sufficient reason) of the transcendentals, namely as Creator. In other words, the ontological and theological absolutes are connected but not the same.

**Note.--** The bibliography regarding the components of the wisdom structure will be further incorporated into the text. except then following sample of works.

**(a) Informational philosophy (29/31)**

*RH. Claeys, Overview of the evolution of logical theories from antiquity to the present*, Leuven, 1974, esp. 61/135.

(GW 30) (i) Zenon of Elea (+/- -460), Socrates, Platon, Aristotle lead to the so-called classical logic (in which the concepts ('terms') are central);

(ii) Protosofistics (+/- -450+), Eukleides of Megara (+/- -400), Diodoros Chronos, Philon of Megara lead to Megarian logic;

(iii) Zenon of Kition (-336/-264), Chrusippos of Soloi lead to the Stoic school;

Only since CS Peirce (+/- 1896), Reymond (+/- 1929) and decisively since Lukasiewicz (1927) did it become clear that Megarian-Stoic logic was a calculus of judgment (propositional calculus) with its own validity alongside the Aristotelian view.

-- T. Kotarbinski, *Leçons sur l'histoire de la logique*, Paris, 1964, esp. 3/79 (*Aristotle; Megarian-Stoian logic; Porfurios*), 320/329 (the induction or generalization: Socrates, Aristotle, the Empiricist physicists, the Epikorean school (especially Philodemos of Gadara (-110/-35)).

**Note.-- The dialectic or refined art of discussion, also called 'eristics'.**

See Claeys, o.c. 63 *Zenon of Elea* and further: *Aristotle (Topics: the dialectical argument or argument)*;

-- P. Foulquié, *la dialectique*, Paris, 1949: in addition to the "old" dialectic, departing from the reasoning nips of Zenon of Elea, there is the "new" dialectic, which takes its cue from Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), runs through the Neo-Platonists to Hegel and Marx, etc., and in which tension (taseology) and "harmony" of opposites are central.

**Opm.-- The Math.**

It is evident that mathematics has something to do with informational philosophy:

-- L. Brunschvicg, *Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique*, Paris, 1947-3 (*arithmetic: Pythagoreanism (33/42); geometry: Platonics (43/70); Aristotle's formal logic (71/83); euclidean geometry (84/98); infinitesimal calculus: Zenon of Elea, Aristotle, Archimedes (153/159) );*

-- EW. Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antw./Nijmegen, 1944 (The Voorsocratiekers, Platon, Aristotle, Eristics and Scepticism (11/92);

-- Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I, The foundation of a science of nature by the Greeks), Freiburg, 1971 (*Physische Mathematik im fünften vorchristlichen Jahrhundert (200/234); Die Rolle der Mathematik in der platonischen Wissenschaft (295/327); Die mathematische Naturwissenschaft Patons (328/356)*).

**Note.-- The lemma (lemmatic analysis).**

The abductive reasoning or hypothesis (lemma) is treated in L. Brunschwick, o.c., 439/55 (already Hippocrates of Chios, the mathematician, and Socrates had made use of the hypothesis, one mathematically, the other ethically; Platon elaborates that method);

(GW 31) -- J.B. Rieffert, *Logik (Eine Kritik an der Geschte ihrer Idee)*, (Logic (A Critique of the History of its Idea)), in *Max Dessoir, Lehrbuch der Philosophie, I (Die Phil. in Einzelgebieten)*, Berlin, 1925, 15) notes that Platon applies the lemmatic-analytic method, among other things, in his dialectic, namely in the 'sunagogé' (building up contradiction-free concepts):

(i) the lèmma, sumptio, presupposition (assumption): e.g., "the idea 'justice,' is the fact that one gives his due to everyone, including the gods" (= abduction);

(ii) the analysis, dissection; "if such is true, what follows therefrom (deduction)?" , - with the working out and testing of that deduction (induction) to see whether it holds or not; -

One knows the dire fruitfulness of this (lemmatic) analytic method in modern mathematics and logistics: *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2, 46/58 (Einfluss des Pythagoreismus auf Mathematik und Astronomie; a.o. Vieta (+1603)).

-- Incidentally, *M. I. Meyerson, Le temps, la mémoire, l' histoire*, (Time, memory, history), in *Journal de Psychologie*, 1956, 340, notes that Mme. de Romily claims that the story of a battle at Thoeukudides is a theory (i.e. the victory therein, is a verified reasoning, - which is the same as ab- de- and induction on historical grounds.

Greek medics also assumed the same scheme:

(i) the physician assumes (lemma, prolepsis, hypothesis) that the ailment is of this and that nature;

(ii) he deduces from this that and that treatment and

(iii) verifies to the result inductively whether the assumption is correct or not.

**Note -- Summarized:**

a. whether by purely logical or rhetorical (dialectical, eristic, 'sophistical') methods or by mathematical methods,

b. about deductive method (as in Euklidian geometry conceived axiomatically) or about inductive method (as in Socrates, Aristotle or in the empiricist physicians) or about abductive method (as in the lemmatic- analytic method),

c. whether it is about 'dialectics' in the new, modern sense (as with Herakleitos) with its harmony of tensions, - again and again the epistemological distinction between 'fanera' (the visible things) and 'afanè' (= adèla', the invisible things) occurs: the visible things are accessible to 'empeiria', sensory experiences; the invisible to 'logismos', reasoning or 'theoria'; or also to 'enthousiasmos' or 'enthousiasis', enthusiasm caused by deities, or also 'mania', out-of-body experience, rapture.

The proper relationship between the two terms of that epistemological duality (and the methods of approach that go with it) has always been a problem: see *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, (Myth and thought), II, 44/64 (technical thinking).



(GW 32) (b) **Pre- or extraconstitutive** (also called "metaphysical") **philosophy**.

W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, Oxford, 1947; Fr.: *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les présocratiques)*, Paris 1966;

Platon was the first to use the word "theologia" (god(s) learned) and to introduce the subject as such; however, this must be properly understood, for all Greek philosophers were theologians, from the Voorsocratieers onward.

In addition, according to Jaeger, o.c., 11, all Greek philosophical systems - with one exception, that of the Skeptics - end in a theology: we can speak of a Platonic, Aristotelian, Epistotelian, Stoic, Neopythagorean and Neo-Platonic theology". Result: Aristotle calls his 'first philosophy' or 'science of first principles', the basic subject of his thinking, 'theology' - such is the Greeks' godly and learned way of working. And a student of Aristotle, *Eudèmos of Rhodes*, wrote the first history of theology (*Ton peri to theion historia*), the basis of all later histories of theology.

This does not prevent e.g. *Aristotle, Metaph B 4, 1000 a9*, from contrasting the 'theologoi' (Hesiodos, Ferekudes,-yes, Homeros) with the 'philosophoi' or 'fusikoi' like e.g. Thales of Miletos, among other things because those theologoi acted only with rhetorical and not with 'scientific' arguments (he means among other things the fact that those ancient theologians thought mythically).

### ***The merging of god(s) taught and wisdom, respectively, philosophy***

This is based, among other things, on what might be called a "unity wisdom": polytheism - we saw above p. 17 - is carried by dynamism, which is both hylozoic (matter is alive), yes, chthonic (the earth is alive, divine), and astro(theo)logical (the heavenly bodies are alive, divine).

The mystery deities are at home in the earth e.g. and "from there they make the cosmic and human life go up" says *WB. Kristensen, Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions*, Amsterd.,1947, 249; o.c., 273, Kristensen says that the concepts of 'wisdom', 'justice', law(s)', etc. were indeed human, for the ancient peoples, but also 'cosmic' and 'divine'. Always on the basis of that ancient polytheistic-sacred mentality, let us say: on the basis of 'theological' mentality (to use Platon's and Aristotle's term).

A. Daniélou, *Shiva et Dionysos*, Paris, 1979, 15, confirms all this: "The mineral, plant, animal and human worlds and the subtle (fine material) world of spirits and of gods exist one through the other, one for the other. No true approach to the divine, - a search for the divine, a science, a religion, a mysticism, is possible which does not take into account this profound unity of the created."

(GW 33) The "enlightenment" (in the sense of secularism, naturalism), from Xenophanes of Kolofon onward (-550/-490), readily rejects that unity of polytheistic dynamism. That problem is addressed by:

-- W. Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology*, Marquette University Press (USA), 1943; Fr.: *Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956;

-- M. Nilsson, *Les croyances religieuses de la Grèce antique*, (The religious beliefs of ancient Greece), Paris, 1955 (esp. 86/107, in which Nilsson claims that Greek religion had two crises:

- (i) in the V-th century by the criticism of the physicalists (Anaxagoras, Perikles' friend being the high point) and of the protosophists, i.e. under philosophical influence;
- (ii) in the III century, when, through the Makedonians, the East opened up).

**However, the "enlightenment" is multiple.**

**(i) The first type is monotheistic:**

Xenophanes of Kolofon says : "A single God, the greatest among the gods and men, not resembling men either in form or in thought" (Nilsson, o.c.,134s.; philosophical monotheism)

With Xenophanes, there is still a polytheistic background (which does not exist, e.g., in Israel, where Yahweh is strictly one and only "god"), as *DesPlaces, La religion Grecque*, Paris, 1969, 184, notes; -- so that there is a twofold concept of god:

**a.** the monotheism, strict or otherwise, which designates the supreme being (and which, apart from the Bible, is also advocated by Zoroaster (Zarathoestra) and Ekhnaton (in Egypt) and here since Xenophanes (see Lang and Schmidt (primordial monotheism));

**b.** the polytheistic, which pretty much means a being gifted with psychic abilities (mantis, magic).

It should be noted that this double concept of god is also present in the Bible; e.g., *Dan 2:11; 5:11* ("There is a man in your kingdom who is filled with the spirit of the holy gods"); *5:14*; the title "god" is given to angels (*Ps. 8:6*), to the shadow of King Samuel (*1 Sam 28:13*), to Moses, (*Ex 4:16; 7:1*), to princes and judges (*Sack 12:8*: David's house; *Ps. 82 (81): 1 and 6; Ps. 58 (57)*, end, where God acts as judge, as in *Ex 21:6; 22:7; Deut. 19:17*); so that, also in the Bible, God and the "gods" (who share in his power and wisdom) go together (see *Job 1:6*; see also *Jn. 10:34/35*, where Jesus uses the word);

**(ii) The secularist is the second type of enlightenment.**

In its extremist form, it is advocated for Hellas by *HJ. Blackham, Humanism*, Penguin Books,1968, 9, where the following is asserted:

(GW 34)

1. 'Humanism' is the enduring exchange solution for religion;
2. 'humanism' is
  - a. negatively determined, a rejection of Christendom and
  - b. positively, an axiom that man exists in isolation, i.e., has no higher being above him, and, therefore, is totally responsible for his own life and that of all humanity;
3. 'humanism' is, further, negative, the axiom that this life is all, i.e. there is no 'other' world and therefore no 'hereafter'.

**Summary:**

Absolute autonomy and radical earthly finitude are the two presuppositions of humanism in that extreme, religionist sense.

See J. Alleman, *The guiding tenets of modern a-religious humanism and their interrelationships*, in *Tijdschr. v. Phil.*, 21 (1959): 4, 615/ 680; 22 (1960): 1, 13/76.

Well, Blackham, o.c., 103ss. talks about the 'Greek enlightenment', which, in the Athens of Perikles, in the V-th e., reaches its climax, - so he says. As a run-up to that 'humanistic' triumph of 'enlightenment' Blackham sees:

a. Homer, which is called the heroic form of humanism, i.e. excellence in all human performance (athletics, drama, architecture, sculpture, eloquence, politics, thought, life),-- forgetting that in Homer's works those human performances take place through and through on a background of gods and that a religious man too can excel in such human performances;

b. Thokudides (his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, in which especially Perikles' speech, which, indeed, is strongly protosophistic in conception); the *corpus Hippocratium*, i.e., a collection of very diverse medical writings, which Blackham' calls an unbeatable example of humanism',- forgetting that even Hippocratic medicine was not exclusively opposed to religion and that some texts are even distinctly religious;

Democritus, the atomist, who advocates a naturalistic view, i.e., excludes the supernatural and extra-natural,-- forgetting Blackham that Demokritos, in addition to gross material, also assumes subtle or fine material realities, such as the soul, the evil eye and so on;

Protagoras, the sophist, of whom Blackham says he is "the man who first proclaimed the regnum hominis (the kingdom of man)," -- noting that Protagoras was agnostic, i.e., did not pronounce on deities, rather than being an aggressive "humanist.

**Conclusion:** Blackham's extreme humanist view contains a grain of truth (Greek philosophy, for example, worked in a desacralizing and secular way), yet, on many points, it needs to be toned down.

(GW 35)

*Fr. Krafft, Gesch. d. Naturwissenschaft*, I, 59, says: "(...) that the Greeks conceived of the whole natural world - and for them this always meant that it included the world

of the gods or of God - (...) as a unity of an organic nature, which is built up everywhere according to the same principles - in the small as in the large. (...) All forms of what appears must be explained by means of the same principles: what later became theology, philosophy, natural science, is originally a unity. They differ from each other, even later, among the Greeks, only by a different emphasis. The same is also true of natural science: cosmogony gave rise to cosmology (astronomy) and physics and to the biological sciences, namely medicine, zoology and botany (...). They all merely emphasize a different form of life each time. (...) This occurs at the beginning of the fourth century. - Before that, and also with Platon and Aristotle or with Poseidonios and Epikouros, philosophy still comprises all these domains in equal measure: it is really a natural science, understood as a science of nature; (...) germ cell (...) were the theogonies." One can see how thoroughly and for a long time polytheistic dynamism has worked after! What Krafft writes proves the one-sidedness of Blackham's humanistic interpretation.

That Blackham contains a kernel of truth is shown by JB. Kristensen, *The Life from the Dead*, /1926-1, 194 -2, in which the proposer distinguishes between the antique, i.e. prehomeric religion, which is strongly chthonic (= telluric) and which continues to live in the people, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the classical religion, formed since Homer, which is found mainly in literature and is more Olympian (= primal). Cf. *W. den Boer, The Religion of the Greeks*, The Hague, 1965, 20/28 (The Earth), etc.

**Note -- On the paranormoloic or occult side**

And this from the pre- and extra-constitutive philosophy.

*E. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1966; id., *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, 1972; Dt: *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich / Munich, 1977 (esp. 188/ 239: Paranormale Phänomene in der Antike);

-- *R. Kanters / R. Amadou, Anthologie littéraire de l' occultisme*, (Literary anthology of occultism), Paris, 1975-2 (17/40: Hesiod, Puthagoras, Platon);

-- *R. Bloch, Les prodiges dans l'antiquité* (The prodigies in antiquity), *Grèce, Etrurie et Rome*, Paris, 1963;

**Special domains:**

**a. The mantic (the cognitive aspect): (35/37)**

-- *JP. Vernant et al, Divination et rationalité*, (Divination and rationality), Paris, 1974 (201/263: Hellas);

-- *R. Flacelière, Devins et oracles Grecs*, (Diviners and Greek oracles,), Paris, 1965 (including 103/118: *Divination et philosophie*, in which the author briefly outlines the attitudes of the main thinkers toward manticism (divination));

-- *H. Klees, Die Eigenart des griechischen Glaubens an Orakel und Seher*, (The peculiarity of Greek belief in oracles and seers,), Stuttgart, s.d. (Herodotean);

-- *Ph. Vandenberg, The Oracles*, Amsterdam/Brussels, 1980

(GW 36)

-- *Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Aesthetik, I (Die Aesthetik der Antike)*, (History of Aesthetics, I (The Aesthetics of Antiquity)), Basel / Stuttgart, 1979, 35/43 (*Die Anfänge der Dichtung*), explains how the oldest Greeks knew only two art groups :

**a. The choreia,**

i.e. the art of dance, which merged with music and poetry and was earlier associated with chthonic religion (a.o. It meant 'mimèsis', expression of what goes on in the dancer (do not confuse with the later meaning of 'mimèsis', imitation of reality) and aimed at 'katharsis', purification, as a result; it was conceived by inspiration, enthousiasmos, inspiration by spirits and deities and was, in this title, related to what the seer (mantis) does; in this sense it fits into the paranormal side of the religion.

**b. The visual arts,**

i.e. architecture, which merged with sculpture and painting; it rather went together with the younger, since Homer and Hesiod valid, ouranic or Olympic religion (living e.g. in the Apollonian center Delphi), viz. It was the work of the *dèmiourgos*, the public craftsman: the "tekton" is the builder and the "archi.tekton" is the master builder, who learned their "skill" from their ancestors (and not on the basis of inspiration and inspiration, as in the choreia); it was especially attuned to "theoria", vision.

It was 'technè', art, skill of producing something that, taking into account general rules, is based on knowing; in this sense, architecture was a technè, a skill, like the art of carpentry or weaving.

**Critical note:** *E. Mireaux, This is how the Greeks lived at the time of Homer*, Baarn, 1979-3, 133/54 (*Demiurgees and craftsmen*), notes that *dèmiourgos*, *demiurge*, means 'worker for public benefit'; that seers, healers, carpenters, *aèdes* (singers) are *demiurgees*, as well as the heralds; that seers, physicians, and *aèden* are involved in religious ceremonies; that this class is similar to the Indian *sudras* (the fourth class), known for the fact that, in their occupations, they "perform certain ritual acts, which give their professional activities or products an exceptional efficiency" (134/135).

In other words. the dynamism of polytheism is at work here: according to Homer, says Mireaux, 135/136, the carpenters and especially the shipbuilders, in their work, were inspired by the goddess Athene and their '*mètis*', skill, goes back to rules she taught them: "The creations of the *demiurgeons* come about (...) through divine assistance and share in the attributes of the gods" (136); the deity is itself '*demiurge(e)*', possessing the same power (*dunamis*) as the human *demiurgeons* but to a greater extent. Even the tool is 'power-laden' (one thinks of the divine *Kalupso*, who issues the ship carpentry tools themselves).

(GW 37)

**Conclusion:** Tatarkiewicz forgets that Olympian-Ouranic religion also has "inspiration," but not "transported," but rather controlled, that polytheistic dynamism is also present in Homeric religion, and that there is no absolute break with older chthonic religion.

In other words, technè, art (fine art, i.e. architecture, and non-fine art, e.g. carpentry, is also inspired and power-laden work.

See also :

- *L. Séchan, La danse grecque antique*, (Ancient Greek dance), Paris, 1930;
- *G. Rouget, la musique et la transe (Esquisse d' une théorie générale des relations de la musique et de la possession)*, (music and trance (Outline of a general theory of the relationship between music and possession)), Paris, 1980, 265/315 (Musique et transe chez les Grecs, where Platon and Aristotle are discussed);
- *G. van der Leeuw, Vom Heiligen in der Kunst*, (Of the sacred in art), Gütersloh, 1957(esp. 69/77 (Die apollinische und die dionysische Bewegung).

**b. the magic (the operative aspect) (37/38)**

*K. De Jong, De magie bij de Grieken en Romeinen*, (Magic among the Greeks and Romans.), Haarlem,1948: the author distinguishes: **a.** the naive epoch (-800/-450); **b.** the unbelieving epoch (-450/-100); **c.** the turning point epoch (-100/+50); **d.** the believing epoch (+50/+200); **e.** the philosophically responsible believing epoch (+200/+500);

It is noted that this classification is largely consistent with the evolution of culture and philosophy;

-- *JA. Rony, La magie*, 1979-7 (esp. 39/44: *La Grèce et Rome*); -- more specifically, the "black" (= unscrupulous) magic:

- *J. Lovichi, La sorcellerie*, Paris, 1980, 36/50 (*La Grèce; Rome*),
- *Migene Gonzalez-Wippler, The Complete Book of Spells, ceremonies and Magic*, London, 1978, 292/296 (*The Rites of the Greeks and Romans*);

-- Medical Magic: *CA. Heier, Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychtherapie*, Zürich, 1949 (very accurate study by a Jungian: the "incubatio" (temple sleep, which meant healing as a result) is described by means of three models (**i.** the older and more primitive Trophoniosincubation; **ii.** the more recent and civilized Asklepiosincubation; **iii.** the later (Hellenistic) Sarapisincubation); the essential thing was to have a dream or, if necessary, an apparition of the chthonic deity (Trofonios, Asklepios, Sarapis), in which ánd diagnosis ánd method of healing (therapy) were indicated;

-- *P. Saintyves, Le discernement du miracle*, Paris, 1909 (old work but useful, esp. 284/296 (Les miracles de guérison dans toutes les religions);

-- Theurgic magic; *ER. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1966, 283/311 (Theurgy; the first magician referred to as "theourgós" is Ioulianos the Younger, a Chaldean, who lived under Emperor Marcus Aurelius, (+161/+180), the son of Ioulianos the Elder; theurgy works with magical images, obtained through oracles, and medial persons; in both cases, deities are either created or subjugated to play the role of processors of results in that magical framework.

(GW 38)

'Theologoi' (theologians) speak of the deities; 'theourgoi' edit results with them));

-- *J. Bidez, la vie de l' empereur Julien*, Paris, 1930 (67/ 72: Chez les disciples de Jamblique); 73/81 (Théurgie chaldaique et mystères néoplatoniciens): excellent texts by a connoisseur);

-- *P. Saintyves, le discernement du miracle*, Paris, 1909 (304/319: *Les miracles des initiés* (on temple physics and deity control));

-- *Apollonius of Tuana*, the great miracle worker of (late) antiquity: *M. Meunier, Apollonius de Tyane (Le séjour d' un dieu parmi les hommes)*, (Apollonius of Tyana (The stay of a god among men)), Paris, 1936-1;

-- *Fr. Thiess, Das Reich der Dämonen*, Hamburg, 1940;

-- *JL. Bernard, Apollonius de Tyane et Jésus*, Paris, 1977 (long excerpts from *Philostratos' Life of Apollonios of Tuana*; though very tendentiously anti-Christian);

-- *J.de Bonniot, Le miracle et ses contrefaçons*, (The miracle and its counterfeits), Paris, 1895-5 (176/205: *Les miracles d' Apollonius de Tyane*; old but sound);

-- *Maurice Magre, Magiciens et illuminés*, Paris, 1930 (17/48: *Apollonius de Tyane*: among other things, on the daimon conception of this Neo-Pythagorean from the first century AD).

### **c. The mystery religion (the telestial or initiatory aspect)**

We adhere to *N. Nilsson, Mysteries, in Oxf. Class. Dict.*, Oxford, 1950-2, 593/594, supplemented if necessary by some data from other sources;-- Nilsson distinguishes two time periods:

#### **a. The ancient mysteries**

(Demeter, Dionusos; the Orphic mysteries (related to the Dionysian, but more controlled, 'Apollonian'), the mysteries of the Kabeiroi (Samothrake) and Sabazios (a god from Frrygia related to Dionusos);

#### **b. The Hellinist-Roman Mysteries**

(Kubele/ Attis; Isis/ Osiris; Mithras); these are separate from family and city-state and thus more individual; they are syncretistic (mixing religion forms) and Oriental; further: very detailed regarding prescriptions (allusions, magical rites, cleansings, asceticism (mortification), baptisms, sacraments); they aim at a happy afterlife, yes, deification; they have a myth as a doctrine, in which, as in the rites, by the way, a deity, who suffers and dies (passion), yet rises to new life (salvation), as a heros (hero), and thus serves as a model for the human being who is initiated.

#### **b1. The Eleusinian-Athean mysteries of Demeter (38/40).**

Nilsson describes the Eleusinian-Athean mysteries of Demeter as follows (summarized): as stated above on p. 7, the Homeric hymn t.e.v. Dèmèter, the beautiful one (-650/-600), that the daughter of Demeter and Zeus, Korè, with spring nymphs (Okeanieden), is picking spring flowers in a meadow; when she picks the Narkissos flower, the flower of death, suddenly the earth opens and Hades, the prince of the underworld, kidnaps her.

(GW 39)

Without eating, she searches for her mother with torches in her hands, until she learns (from Hekate or Helios) who has kidnapped her.

Demeter asks Zeus for the return of Kore; he refuses: Demeter leaves the Olumpos and, enraged, lambasting all corn growth, hides in Eleusis.

Zeus then determines that Kore should only stay in the Underworld for one third of the year (June/September), to be returned to her mother for the rest (October/May) (because she has accepted and eaten the core of a pomegranate (a fertility symbol) from Hades). - Thus *H. Steuding, Griechische und römische Mythologie*, (Greek and Roman mythology), Leipzig, 1905-3, 32/52 (*Ge, Demeter und Kore*), who adds that in, all Indo-Germanic, between child (human fertilization) and corn (seed fertilization) there is a narrow relationship (apparently of a magical nature: one process promotes the other).

Indeed, a Cretan myth recounts, Steuding says, that Jasion conceived, with Demeter, on a thrice-plowed seed field, Ploutos (the fruit abundance), the wealth (where "thrice-plowed" brings to mind Triptolemos (thrice-reversed), the heros, linked to the Demeter/ Kore couple).

Nilsson sees, in Kore's myth, a parallel with the seed grain, which is kept in subterranean silos for four months (Kore's sojourn in the underworld) and sown from October to May to grow and mature (Kore's union with Demeter). He points out two pairs and two triads:

Triptolemos + Demeter/Kore (daughter) --- June/September October/May  
Kore (Persefone) / Hades (= Ploutos) + Eubouleus

Which points to the two sides of Kore.

Cf. *WB. Kristensen, Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions*, A'm, 1947, 291/314 (The Wealth of the Earth in Myth and Cult: the wealth, in cas: corn, is created by subterranean (hupochthonous) deities, who impart 'happiness' to the natural process of corn growth); 275/278 (The 'Great Gods' as mystery gods: the main motif of all mysteries is the harmony (union) of downfall (passion, death) and upfall (salvation, revival) - see above p. 7/9 -; a 'heros' is a 'god'. 7/9 -; a 'heros', saviour, is someone who first undergoes the passion himself in order to rise again and who, precisely because of that, can transfer it to the others because of the community of destiny with the others (here: Kore with her mother).

Cf. *CA. Meier, Antike Inkubation*, (Ancient incubation), 17 (the chthonic god Asklepios is ánd disease ánd remedy at the same time) 36 (Asklepios is 'incomparable' physician (*Iliad* 4: 192/193), -becomes, however in time, chthonic oraimon or -heros to become apollonian god), Asklepios becomes sick as the humans (destiny community) yet is saved (and saves the humans, - destiny community).

Thus it becomes clear why Nilsson can say that the goal of the mysteries of Demeter is abundance and happy underworld living.



(GW 40)

Now we understand, somewhat, the celebrations following sowing time at Eleusis (and in time, around -625, at Athens):

**i. *The We Objects Parade:***

After the wine objects were brought from Eleusis to Athens, the "mystics" (mustès, mustis), those initiated into the mysteries of Demeter / Kore, assemble, take a bath in the sea and, in a great Iakchos procession, bring the wine objects to Eleusis;

**ii. *The celebration (of the great mysteries);***

There are, at a different time, also small mysteries: in the evening, in the great mystery hall, lit by many torches, the mystics, to which no murderers nor people who speak foreign languages are admitted, gather; three aspects make up the celebration:

1. the "legomena," the articulated things, in which the Eumolpids (the beautiful singers) play a role;

2. the 'deiknumena', the things shown, in which the 'hierophantès', the chief priest, who shows the 'hierra', the we objects, plays a role;

3. the 'dromena', the things done, in which probably the priests and / or the mystics portray the Kore / Persephon myth.

**iii. *The degrees of initiation***

These in three times allow the mystics more access to the mystery:

1. The "muèsis," the initiation into the precepts;

2. the 'teletè', the initiation(s) celebration, of which we suspect (Homeric hymn) that fasting, sitting on a chair covered with a ram's skin and drinking the 'kukeon', the mixed brew (according to *Iliad 11: 624,641* Kirke mixed barley flour, cheese and wine, to which herbs were added) belonged;

3. the 'epopteia', the contemplation (of the mysteries, i.e. the we-objects), of which one suspects that a district ear was a part, while the Christian writers claim that sexual allusions, by which the mystics became the 'sons' of the goddess, were involved (which Nilsson distrusts, in view of the Christians' dismissive attitude on the subject); result: the myst was then 'epoptès', epopt.

**Note.--** The mystics were subjected to **a.** ritual purity rules and **b.** to ethical-political standards, such as justice and humanity.

**b.2 ER. Dodds, *The Greek and the Irrational*, (270/282)**

(Maenadism), (40/41) Dodds gives us an outline of Dionysian mysteries, which, where the Demeter mysteries are agrarian (since the Neolithic revolution - see above pp. 18/19 -), appear rather as nomadic (gathering, hunting) (thus testifying to an ancestral stage; see p. 18.

***We briefly give the main features:***

1. the myth says that Dionusos, surrounded by 'mainades' (mainas = woman in mania, rapture (rage, anger, if need be), performed mountain dance; he was therefore called 'oreimanès', 'oreskios', 'ouresifoitès' (oros = mountain), mountain god;

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## **2. 'Bacheia', associations for religious rites.**

At Thebes, Pergamon, Priene, Mutilene, on Crete, Rhodes, etc. there are 'bacheia', associations for religious rites and/or experiences, whose members, women (= thuiads, backen, mainaden) or also, to a certain extent, young girls, hold biennial celebrations, in midwinter, called 'orgion' (= mystery celebration), characterized by ecstatic states or, at least, quasi - ecstatic states, in which the 'oreibasia' (= mountain dance) plays a prominent role (a nocturnal mountain dance, actually); those women are also called 'thursoforoi' (thyrsus-bearers), 'thursomanai' (who, waving the thursos in their hands, give themselves up to mania, rapture), the thursos being a vine with ivy and vine with leaves around it and a pine on the spire;

## **3. Dodds outlines the ecstatic dance as follows:**

- a. flutes, timpani accompany the dance (choreia 1);
- b. the head, waving its hair wildly, moves forward and backward (as in some hysterical forms of behavior, incidentally);
- c. pain insensitivity (analgèsia) - e.g., to contact with fire - occurs;
- d. the most extravagant postures occur, especially at the climax of the dance;
- e. can prevent some kind of robbery (with looting, if necessary) in village or town;
- f. snake manipulation is a component (Dionusos, Sabazios, all chthonic deities appear as snakes or are accompanied by them if necessary; think of Asklepios, the healer);
- g. the climax is the 'sparagmos'; the tearing to pieces of an animal (a sheep e.g.), followed by 'omofagia', the raw 'devouring' of its flesh (the deity after all, at least the chthonic one, can appear (epiphany) in the form of plant (thursos), animal (victim of the sparagmos), human, which are then eaten and drunk (juice, blood);-- Dodds notes that such an orgiastic dance, past and even present, occurs all over the world in exotic-archaic cultures.

## **4. The meaning is always the same (in many forms):**

Dionusos is at once the cause ('bakchos') and the liberator ('lusios') - think of Asklepios - of mania, the orgiastic rapture (Dodds, o.c., 273); as a hero he endures the madness of his followers, but, as a hero also, he overcomes that same madness both in himself and in his followers (community of destiny on the basis of fluid communication); he is, to quote Kristensen, "harmony of death (madness here as reduced life) and life" (healing; of madness here as revival) - see above p. 7 (harmony of opposites, characteristic of polytheistic dynamism).

**Note.--** Demeter is often represented as a giant woman, reaching above the earth only with the upper body (more rarely only with the head) while she usually offers her son Eri.chthonios to the goddess Athena for care.

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This is reminiscent of the famous giant statues (with head, neck and shoulder e.g.), found on Easter Island and in other megalithic cultures; also in Europe: the inhabitants have, with second sight, seen such creatures.

Also *E. Mercenier/ J. Barraud, les hommes et les dieux*, Paris, 1981, 1/19 (*J. Taverne, Cultes mystérieux*) discusses this (with photos) and *G. Hodson, Les fées*, Paris, 1966, the precipitation of the 'faces' of this excellent theosophically oriented seer, mentions such giant earth spirits, which 'float' partly above (as e. g. e.g. the Greek Demeter), partially below ground level 'hovering', - proving that such beings of a purely fluidic nature are still perceptible by people with a sufficient second sight

In later times Demeter is represented as a woman with a horn of plenty in her hand lying on the earth: countries, islands, cities, understanding themselves as the wealth and power-giving underworld reaching just above the earth, as Kristensen says, o.c., 253/266 ('Religious Geography'; Memphis, an image of the realm of the dead; The circle around the realm of the dead: "(...). The Greek conception of Thebes and its fortress, the island of the blessed (...): city and fortress, each in its own right, represented the realm of the dead as a land of divine (here: chthonic) life." (O. c., 258);

Even more clearly: "We find, therefore, among various peoples of antiquity the representation that the kingdom of the dead is a fortress or a place surrounded by walls, and, conversely, that the fortress and the city here on earth are images of the other world" (o.c. , 255)), - such countries, islands, cities, therefore, depict themselves in such a Demeter, lying on the first floor (as a 'gate' ('pulos', name of a number of cities in Hellas) of Hades), often provided with a wall-crown (= underworld sense).

So: also this portrayal is typically chthonic, although not exclusive (this exclusivity, by the way, is never there).

Third depiction of Demeter is that which is called 'kourotrophos' (who (raises) boys) - term, which was also said of a country, island, city: in a sitting position she holds children on her lap, together with fruit (see above: cf. H. Steuding, o.c., who discusses these three representations, without explaining them further; yet he mentions that, among the Indo-Germans, between child and corn (one may safely say: between child and fruit either vegetable or animal) a narrow relationship exists); at Demeter's feet cattle and sheep are grazing (see above what was remarked between brackets about the richness of the chthonic deities:

**1.** children, livestock **2.** that are young, and growing **3.** plants. For all this, see *WB. Kristensen, Contributions 291/314* (The wealth of the earth in myth and cult, esp. 298/299 (Eleusis).

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"When the ancients worked the soil and then sowed and harvested and stored it, they performed actions with consequences beyond human understanding and ability. For them, agriculture was a mystical business. It was part of the cult and accompanied religious ceremonies". (133) 'Mystical', in Kristensen's language, means 'chthonic' and thus 'mystery religious'.

**Note.--** The relationship between Demeter and Asklepios is very close : the subterranean life gives both arable and livestock wealth and health as forms of the same life (see above 32/33; 34/35). (cfr. *Meier, Antike Inkubation*, 113/118: *Das Mysterium der Heilung*, in which, according to the proposer, the 'epopt' (spectator of the mustèrion) is the incubant, the 'dromenon' (the salvific event) the dream (resp. the face), experienced by the incubant during the temple sleep, which heals. Also:

1. An Eleusinian priest (Eumolpiede) was fundamentally involved in the foundation of the first Serapeion (according to Tacitus);

2. Demeter 'phosphoros' (the light-bringing) as a healing goddess with serpents was worshipped in the Asklepieion at Pergamon;

3. A statue of Asklepios and Hugieia (the goddess of health) adorned the entrance to the Demeter - Kore Temple in Megalopolis;

4. on the 17th Boëdromion, the day of the great Eleusinia (see above), the memory of the initiation of Asklepios into the Demeter-Kore mysteries was celebrated in the Asklepio temple at Athens.

This, namely the fundamental nature of the Earth Goddess, who is Demeter, among others, points to the ancient Earth Goddess and Mother Goddess religion:

-- *M. Stone, Once God was embodied as a woman*, Katwijk, 1979 (feminist, but well documented hierologically);

-- *CJ. Bleeker, The Mother Goddess in Antiquity*, The Hague, 1960 (Earth Goddess (= Mother Earth);-- Ishtar, Isis, Anahita, Athena, Freyja, Kubele, Lakshmi/Kali; -- excellent work);

-- *J. Lederer, La peur des femmes (gynophobia)*, Paris, 1980 (psychoanalytic, but well documented);

### **Bibliographic Sample:**

#### **(i) Demeter:**

-- *P. Foucart, les mystères de Eleusis*, Paris, 1914 (always fundamental; except for the hypothesis of Egyptian origin, reliable);

-- *E. des Places, la religion Grecque*, Paris, 1969 (*Demeter*: 48/51; 97/100; 207/209);

**(ii) Dionusos:** -- *H. Jeanmaire, Dionysos (Histoire du culte de Bacchus)*, Paris, 1978 (thorough work);

-- *A. Daniélou, o.c.*, 44/52; 187/197 (*Tantrisme ou orgiasme*);

#### **(iii) Late antiquity:**

-- *F. Cumont, Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris, 1929 (1905 conferences; pioneering);

-- *E. Briem, Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung de hellenistischen Mysterien*, Lund / Leipzig, 1928,

(GW 44)

-- HW. Obbink, *Cybele, Isis, Mithras (Eastern religions in the Roman Empire)*, Haarlem, 1965;

-- Fr. Cumont, *Les mystères de Mithra*, Bruxelles, 1913-3;

-- Goblet d'Alviella, *Les mystères de Mithra dans l' Empire Romain*, Bruxelles, 1913 (= Revue de l' Université de Bruxelles, V (1900); );

-- M. Vermaseren, *Mithra, ce dieu mystérieux*, Paris/ Bruxelles, 1960;

**More generally:**

K. de Jong, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, Leiden, 1909 (1919-2);

-- FE. Farwerck, *The Mysteries of Antiquity and their Rites of Initiation*, I, Hilversum, 1960 (fascinating is Part B (*The Young Devotions, viz. among the Hindus, Parsis, Greeks* (183/205), *Romans, Celts, Germanics, primitives*);

**(iv) Christianity and pagan mysteries:**

-- G. van der Leeuw', *Phänomenologie der Religion*, Tübingen, 1956-2, 170 : "The Church has always felt very much at home in the indestructible structures of the: representation of God, preferring to adopt and Christianize them rather than sacrifice them to a rigid monotheism.

In this vein, in the sixth century, Pope Gregory the Great explicitly recommends that (Catholic) worship be situated in the ancient places of worship and that only the holy martyrs be put in the place of the demons, according to the wise fundamental rule:

"The one, who is bent on reaching the top, elevates himself with intermediate stages and steps, not with tremendous leaps" (Letter to Abbot Mellitus; cfr. J. Toutain, in *Revue de l' Histoire des religions*, 40 (1919): 11ss.).

If the Pope says this about religion in general, then the Mysteries are included in it: as proof the Christianizations of the Asklepio temple method; as proof e.g. O. Casel, *Glaube, Gnosis, Mysterium, Münster* (Westf.), 1941 (esp. 119/154: *Theologische Philologie* (Zum Worte 'Mysterium')), in which not saint worship but Christianity as a whole is no longer called 'mystery', even if in a very Puritan sense);

-- L. Monden, *Het misoffer als mysterie*, (The sacrifice of the mass as mystery), Roermond/ Maaseik, 1948 (Monden takes a stand against Casel's doctrine of mystery especially with regard to the Eucharist).

-- E. des Places, *La religion Grecque*, Paris, 1969, 327/361 (*Le monde Grec en face du message chrétien*) looks at the same relationship, though from the opposite direction.

The question arises, "Does it really pay to dwell on theology for so long, and especially on the mysteries?" The answer is obvious:

(i) as Jaeger says, all philosophical systems in Hellas, except skepticism, are ultimately theological;

(ii) des Places, o.c., 319, notes that the rapture, religious or not, is an "undeniable element" even among the philosophers, who, in Greece, are as good as never pure 'rationalists' (understand: secularists), yet, what is said here of the rapture, may safely be said of the mysteries.

(GW 45)

-- O. Willmann, *Gesch. d., Id., I, 33/47 (Die Mysterienlehre)*, points out that Puthagoras was considered an initiate in many mysteries; that Herakleitos' doctrine is "mystical" (here: mystery-religious) (*G. Pfleiderer, Die Philosophie des Heraklit im Lichte der Mysterienlehre, (The Philosophy of Heraclitus in the Light of the Doctrine of the Mysteries,)*, Berlin, 1886); likewise that of Empedokles; that Platon clearly thinks mysteriously.

-- E. des Places, *La religion Grecque*, 185, says that Parmenides' "vision" is a real religious experience, the prototype of which is found in the mysteries and the rites of initiation; by the way: des Places, o.c., 171/ 326 (*Histoire du sentiment religieux en Grèce*), -is one long study of the very great influence of theology on the whole of Greek philosophy (the mysteries are a part of it).

-- J.Hawkes, *Dawn of the Gods*, London, 1968, 285, writes: "The inexhaustible life force, begotten by the Minoan and Archaic traditions, first brought to light in the Mukeen (= Mycenaean) civilization, then further aroused by the revival of the Dionysian religion and the development of its mysteries, was already evident in various ways (...). It is a known fact that Attic drama, both as a mourning and as a comedy, began with the Dionusos celebrations, with the rural population singing hymns before his altar.

Again, if Olympic reason and detachment enabled the first Ionian philosophers and at the same time professional scientists to view the world without its deities, they could see that world in the terms of the pre-olympic dynamism, which the mystery celebrants celebrated and which the first "objective" thinkers of the Western world could recognize as *fusus* (nature). There is an interpretation, in which the golden mean of the Greeks really amounted to the balance of opposites."

**Note.-- On the ideas, i.e. pre - existent (pre-existing) models**

(pre-images) of things and processes. (45/54)

Bibliographically, there is one masterpiece here: O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2.

Theme is the idea (= Platonic term for pre-existing (pre-constitutive) model of a natural reality). This 'idea' exhibits sapiential (wisdom-like) structure:

- (i) it exists, however it does, for the things and processes, which it directs;
- (ii) it is operative in things, physical, natural, as the creature structure of them (= the constitutive side of the idea);
- (iii) it is in perception and mind and reason as the content of knowledge and thought, which is the representation (one-sided picture) of the idea in and for things and processes (= the cognitive, informative side of the idea);
- (iv) it regulates, 'directs' behavior (process), i.e. it is 'cybernetic' (= normatively deontic).

(GW 46) One observes, from the wisdom diagram, that a theory of ideas (idealism) covers a theory of communication: for the idea is essentially also intermediate (= meson, medium):

**(i) *between preexistent and physical world***

(the pre-existent idea in the things of nature and its processes),-since Albinos, who, in +150, was the teacher of Galenos of Pergamon, the famous physician, ideas function as intermediate terms between God (the ideas are God's ideas) and the things, in which God's ideas are brought about;

**(ii) *between physical and intellectual (rational) world:***

the idea present in things is, through perception (sensory and/or extrasensory), in the knowing subject, who knows the idea in the thing and its process;

**(iii) *between physical and ethico-political world***

Between the (normative, deontic, cybernetic) world: through the cognitive (informational) idea, the idea present in things works its way into behavior (as a regulating power).

***Idealism and realism of ideas.***

- Insofar as a thinker's teaching teaches the idea, it is theory of ideas (idealism);
- insofar as it teaches the realizations of ideas in natural reality, it is (ideas) realism;
- insofar as it teaches the central role of ideas in the intellectual-reasonable life, that doctrine is intellectualism, resp. rationalism of ideas;
- insofar as it teaches the leading role of ideas in behavior, it is "idealism" of ideas, understood as adherence to an idealistic model of behavior or "ideal."
- insofar as a theory of ideas conceives of the idea as an immanent principle of life, it is "organicism."
- insofar as a theory of ideas conceives of the idea as the leading force in the history of cultures, it is "history of ideas" (the idea as a historical principle);
- insofar as it teaches the continuity of leading ideas in cultural history, it is "perennis philosophia" (Steuchus, Leibniz, Willmann), "eternal" (which does not mean "denying evolution") philosophy, tradition-conscious philosophy;
- insofar as it conceives of the idea as the guide of experiment, however it may be, it is pragmatism (Peirce).

***Immanence and transcendence of ideas.***

'Choriston' (transcendent)/ 'enuparchon' (immanent) is a systechy (pair of opposites), applicable to the idea:

**(i)** in the Pythagorean, where the idea takes the form of 'arithmos' (number(form)), the idea (number(form)) is balanced and transcendent (before things) as well as immanent (in things);

**(ii) a** in Platonism the idea is predominantly transcendent;

**(ii) b** in Aristotelianism it is predominantly immanent: Platonism is then called idealism, Aristotelian realism.

**(iii)** in protosophistics and related fields, the idea is conceived only nominalistically as the product of subjective thought.

(GW 47)

***The coherence of the main forms of theory of ideas.***

The idea, as conceived by the great idealists - not its caricaturists - is:

**(i) *The idea as 'harmony'***

And namely the 'harmony' (synthesis, reconciliation) of genetic and structural approach: as *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, I, 16, says, already for mythic (understand: pre-scientific and for philosophical) thinking, every genealogy (genealogy) is at the same time and equally exposing a structure; yes, there is no other method, to account for a structure, than a genealogical story; -- which is true with what *WB. Kristensen, Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions*, 231/290 (*Circle and Totality* (1938)) brilliantly expounds (esp. 287/290: philosophical formulations: from the Ionian natural philosopher Anaximandros (in the first fragment of philosophy), through Herakleitos ('hidden harmony'), Puthagoras ('harmony'), to Platon ('arthmos teleios' (the order, which comprises the period of all that is divinely born and thus comes from the beginning, one, through its development, two, to its consummation, three,) or full.Aristotle (entelecheia, entelechy, i.e., that which regulates the period (one, two, three, i.e., beginning, development, consummation), purposefully containing from the beginning the end); i.e., all these thinkers express the doctrine of ideas, each in his own way.

**(ii) *The idea as an 'ideational principle'***

The idea can therefore be determined by *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id.*, III, 1033, as "ideal principle" (*ideales Prinzip*, "archè", *principium*), i.e. concept, expressing the cause of:

- a. the scheme (Puthagoras: number, measure, harmony),
- b. value and reality (Platon: seal,- form (eidos) as seal of matter, etc.),
- c. purpose and realization (Aristotle: seed,-goal, etc.);

Or still: the inner coherence of these three main types of idealism (Pythagoreanism (number), Platonism (idea, being), Aristotelianism (purposefulness, becoming)) was therefore seen very correctly by the late antique neo-Platonists (Plotinos);

The same inner coherence was also correctly seen by the later mid-century ontologists, where they spoke of the transcendentalities: being (Platon), - the one (Puthagoras), the true (Puthagoras) the good (Platon) (see above p. 29), first formulated by Eukleides of Megara (+/- -400);

**(iii) *the idea as a perfect number***

The idea is, thus, very emphatically and rightly, *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 370/379 (Das heraklitech-mystische Element der platonischen Lehre), that which, in the chthonic-uranic initiations of mystery religions, is 'beheld' as 'arithmos teleios' (vol.makes number) of all things and processes.



(GW 48)

Thus, e.g., o. c., 40ff, Willmann says that the mystery religion describes the penetration of life into the receptive primeval matter as the imprinting of a seal or stamp;- that, in an Orphic hymn, Pan (here identified with Apollon) is praised as possessing the imprinting stamp (resp. that Fanes (i.e. the primal principle) possesses the 'forms' (models) of all things; - that, in the Samothraic Mysteries, a deity must have been worshipped as the shaper of all things; etc..

It is not surprising that Platon, the great founder of the doctrine of ideas, calls the ideas 'tupoi' (= show-pieces, models), seals, and the matter in which the ideas take shape is called 'ekmageion', seal-matter, formable matter. Thus the core of the doctrine of ideas is 'eine Intuition der Vorzeit' (an insight from the past) (O.c.; 375), elaborated rationally and logically: "In Mystery Theology the doctrine of ideas has its main root, while its secondary roots are in the Socratic 'horoi' (definitions of concepts) and in the Pythagorean 'mimèsis' (expression, expression)" (373). Once again, the profound role that the religion of mysteries plays in the very heart of philosophy (and the professional science connected to it) is apparent.

***However, something needs to be clarified here.***

We do this using a Roman example. *J. Schmidt, Greek and Roman Mythology*, Helmond, 1968, 151, says that, in the context of the Jupiter - Juno belief at Rome, each man has his own 'genius' (akin to our 'kunne' (sex, proxy)) and each woman her 'iuno', and this from conception to death.

We could, Biblically expressed, say of every man and every woman that they have their, resp. her "adam" and "eve. Indeed, in all mysteries, the chthonic certainly, there is mention of "first parents" (protoplasts (according to O. Willmann, o.c., 36ff., 632ff.) progenitors, protogonoi); these are the primal couple, from whom, at least finely materially, if not coarsely (at least in the rough representation), the descendants arise.

Of these prototypes variable representations exist: sometimes they are presented as 'androgynous': thus M. Valerius Laevinus (consul at Rome in -210; he brought the Great Mother (Kubele) of Pessinous to Rome in -205) says of Venus, the fertility-giving ('almus'), that she is conceived both as a man and as a woman and, therefore, through sacrifices, is worshipped by men in women's clothing and by women in men's clothing (ritual travesti, dressing up).

Incidentally, the deity Janus (with the two, i.e. androgynous, faces) is apparently originally a hermaphroditic (androgynous) being. One finds this all over the globe.

Well, as is still the case with the Aborigines in Australia today, the protoplasts are "soul parents," i.e. as all-souls they contain all souls.

(GW 49)

The so-called 'animism' of the ancient Romans maintains that not only human beings are 'descendants' of the first parents (protoplasts), but that every being - every place (genius loci), every thing (genius rei;- think of the artificial model, i.e. what the N.-W. Africans call 'fetish') - has its 'genius', i.e. that which is present in it (immanent) because of its founders (protoplasts) (transcendent).

M.e. man (and to every living being, for that matter,-the living being can, after all, 'conceive' itself somewhat in the nature of the protoplasts) the immanent character of the 'soul' (genius = masculine; iuno = feminine) makes it the deepest 'I' of it (so that to say "'my soul' or 'I am hungry'" seems identical) and the transcendent character makes the soul or 'genius' (iuno) act as heavenly, extraterrestrial educator-supervisor (educator-supervisor). This duality of immanent - transcendent genius makes it easy to confuse with the living being's own nature, essence.

With regard to the non-living beings - places, things e.g. - the same applies, in an analogous way: on the one hand, the immanent character of the 'spirit' of the non-living being - its genius - makes that e.g. the place, thing or so be identifiable with its genius or iuno (think of the nymphs of a spring, of the tree spirit, etc.); on the other hand, its transcendent character makes the being (place, thing) appear as a 'fetish', i.e. dwelling place, living space, of its genius.

Well, it is evident that the identification, both with the living and the non - living, is never complete. Now it is so that, in mythology and in the thinking connected with it, the protoplasts are the 'originators' (progenitors) both of the idea, i.e. its own nature (structure) and of the genius of a reality. However, as we saw when we dealt with mythical wisdom - see above p. 10 - one must not confuse the inherent nature of something with its genius, although this genius empathizes (and identifies with) its own nature, at least in the case of a favorable fate, in order to bring its course to completion (periodos). - So that two extremes of error are possible:

**a.** one identifies without question genius and matter, to which the genius is attached; e.g. to have a good, fortunate harvest, one neglects the laws of the grain, the soil, the weather, etc., to adhere only to the religious rites, which mean the genius of the grain in its genesis; one, growth, two, and ripeness, three ;

**b.** one completely ignores the genius of a thing, in order to keep track only of its own nature; e.g. modern, desacralized agriculture does not even know anymore that the genius of the grain represents the (un)happiness of it (which is the case with e.g. the garden experiment at Findhorn (Scotland); cfr. *The Magic of Findhorn*, New York, 1975, where, in a modern context, the antique-archaic worship of nature's genii and iunones is involved in the cultivation of flowers and vegetables).

(GW 50)

**Conclusion:**

(i) the essence (person, thing, place)

(ii) his genius, resp. iuno,

(iii) his idea, i.e. his 'beginning/middle/end' (periodos, harmony),  
are three different, though related, realities.

The idea is the being, socratically expressed in terms; also: the being, pythagorean expressed in number harmonies (as especially emphasized by the older Platon).

The genius, resp. iuno has the task of making the idea of a being (person, thing, place) succeed (he, she is its 'luck', its 'good destiny'), by helping it to materialize in matter either the subtle (= fluidic, icy or fine) or the coarse (= secular) matter. This means that one's own nature or nature is the first factor of luck (destiny), while the genius, resp. iuno is the second (demonic) factor of luck.

We do say "demonic" factor: see above pp. 7/9. It is the demonism in polytheistic dynamism which has made both right-thinking (logically strict) and Puritan (morally strict) thinkers averse to the religious approach of the nature of things : the genii, iunones and the high deities which go with them are put in brackets or, even, fought against or denied them, over time (= secularism, desacralization or demythologization).

The furthest degree of secularization is the bracketing, combating and/or denial not only of the genii, iunones, deities (including the Supreme Being if necessary), but also of the ideas in / above the being of nature (nominalism). It is especially Protosophism (-450/-350), which continued this double tendency in Hellas, after it had been active since archaic times under the skin (one thinks of the scepticism, which surfaces in Homer's epics).

***Idealism critique (ideology critique).***

***Bibliographic Sample:***

-- P. Antoine, *Ethics and Conclusions*, in *Streven*, 23 (1970): 8 (May), 780/789, - one of the incalculable "critical" articles (and books) in our day, which declaim doctrines of ideas as "exemplarism"; so e.g. in ethics (moral philosophy) is exemplarism:

**a.** the value or good to be attained is an ideal, yes, purely ideal reality existing in itself (i.e. situated beyond this earth);

**b.** this idea, this ideal is presented as only achievable through copying mimeticism (mere imitation of universal paragons).

(GW 51)

The author doubts universal (= valid for all people) models of behavior, which are at the same time situationally efficient, i.e. adapted to changing, individual situations.

**Consequence:** he replaces classical' (and archaic) exemplar ethics with;

**a.** a theory of decision making ("decision-making"),

**b.** has a praxeological basis (i.e. is based on a theory of action). In other words: the proposer is 'pragmatically' minded; he assumes that the do-ability (practicability, 'operability') of an ethical (or conscientious) task is the big rule. Platonically expressed, 'he takes the "idea" of "doability" in concrete situations as the guiding rule, as the great, indeed, only "exemplary" reality. This immediately explains the unique emphasis on the concrete-individual structure (see course 'Logic').

**Is theory of ideas "exemplarism"?**

O. Willmann, o. c., 434, says that *Platon*, in his *Politeia 10*, names three kinds of "idea":

**(i)** a thought-content primal, the idea, in its transcendental (pre-existent, preconstitutive) sense,- incidentally,- a part of the 'theos noètos' (the thought-content or intellegious 'god', actually the including or system of all ideas together);

**(ii)** a sense-image of it, i.e. the idea, embodied in a natural thing (person, thing, place, etc.); the immanent sense;

**(iii)** an afterimage, a kind of second image, of the latter, in a human work of art, the causal agent of which is the artist or craftsman (dèmiourgos).-- All three in German: 'Urbild, Abbild, Nachbild'.

*P. Fierens, Les grandes étapes de l' esthétique*, (The main stages of aesthetics, ), Brux./Paris, 1945, 44/ 45, gives us an answer to the question above: "The artistic mimèsis, imitation, does not exist, according to Platon, in the literal reproduction of the earthly and transient model. Between the archetype (= transcendental idea) and the sensory object, which is only the shadow of it (= immanent idea), lies the ideal of the artist.

(...) For example, an artist who wants to create an Aphrodite (= creativity) poses a naked woman, but it is not exactly that model which he copies: he improves its forms and features according to a second model, which he carries within himself and which is nothing but his ideal. This ideal is not the pure idea (in the transcendental sense), i.e. the archetype; on the contrary, it is the memory that the artist keeps of it; it is a personal memory (anamnèsis): this ideal is individual and each artist has his own ideal.

By the way: this ideal is insubstantial (in the sense of not being material) and indivisible: one could not "objectify" (= project it into a sensory object) in its totality; one tries to approach it as best as possible (...).

(GW 52)

On the other hand, this ideal presupposes the existence of a unique and perfect type (archetype), which the artist tries to approach in his work of art." Fierens rightly concludes: "In this representation of the Platonic ideal - as, for that matter, in the plastic masterpieces of the V-th and IV-th centuries, the two opposing tendencies of the Greek genius merge:

(i) on the one hand, individualism, (ii) on the other, the need for rules, for canons; to which beauty submits."

Immediately it is clear that the doctrine of ideas does represent, on the one hand, an exemplarism (the submission to rules, canons), but on the other hand, precisely because of that, not anarchic but "regulated" individualism, i.e. situational adaptation available to the free individual.

We return for a moment to p. 44/45 above, to the question of the role of the mysteries in wisdom - in philosophy, above all - : it is now abundantly clear that the most typical part of Greek philosophy, namely the doctrine of ideas in its variants (Pythagorean, Platonic, Aristotelian, - but e.g. also Heraklitean and Parmenidean), comes directly from the mysteries. On which *O. Willmann* builds his *Geschichte des Idealismus* and on which we build with more recent data. Willmann, o.c., 34/35, refers to Platon:

(i) in the *Faidon* the true philosophers are identified with bakchen (here in the sense of initiates into a mystery religious experience);

(ii) in the *Faidros*, the philosopher is painted as the telest (initiate), worthy of the highest degrees of initiation;

(iii) in many passages of the *Timaios*, the *Nomoi*, and other dialogues - ancient commentators emphasize - Platon makes allusions to "mystical" (understand: mystery-religious) data.

The main idea of the mysteries is, Willmann, o.c., 35, emphasizes, namely the chthonic doctrine that the heavenly (deities, genii, iuones, thought-forms) descend on earth, in earthly things and processes (see above p. 47 vv.: seal, stamp, e.g.; the androgins being above the earthly, yet present in the earthly through genii and iuones).

Allen that, with Platon, the pre-existence of the soul runs into the pre-existence of the models (seals, stamps, seeds, germs, etc.) which gives rise to confusion: it is not because a soul comes into being only at a certain point in time, that it would not have an 'anamnesis' (memory, - better; consciousness, awareness of the 'heavenly' (higher) spheres and its influence (seals, seeds, genii and iuones). Platon confused the perpetuity of the higher spheres with its contents, with the eternity of the soul. This the Biblical tradition has contested as false. Yet Platon applies a main idea of the mysteries (however inappropriate):

(GW 53)

An ancient version of what since Dilthey has been called the 'verstehende' understanding method, also called 'einsichtige' method. As *Ph. Kohnstamm, personality in the making (sketch of a christian pedagogy)*, Haarlem, 1929, 18, says, the insightful method rests on the unconscious or conscious axiom of the essentiality of the known and the known (of 'knowing' subject and 'known' object), on the fact that what we know, in ourselves, is present once more, on so-called 'empathy'. The understood human understands the other or the other as 'Ich nog einmal' (to use Schopenhauer's expression, where he typifies the other type of 'knowing' as knowing 'ein Nicht-ich', a non-I). This beingness has, apparently several modalities:

(i) to "empathize" with a plant presupposes substantiality, but through the vegetable in ourselves;

(ii) empathizing with the music of punks presupposes substantiality but through the punk type in ourselves, etc...

S. Thomas Aquinas, following in Aristotle's footsteps, puts first that 'anima est quodammodo omnia' (the soul is in a sense everything): one could say: through 'everything in us' we know insightfully, understandingly, 'everything outside us'. Or: everything outside me is 'I-not-me', in every case, more than mere 'not-me'.

The first thinker in Hellas, who, to our knowledge, formulated this hermeneutic principle concerning epistemology, was Parmenides of Elea (-540/...). *Fr. Krafft, Gesch. der Wissenschaft, I, 237*, says that "according to ancient convictions, the knowing and grasping of any form comes about only in such a way that the like knows the like.

That, to cite an archaically expressed example, the eye must bear witness to the identically fiery condition as the fire proper to light." Thus, says Krafft, 'nous' (spirit, intellectus, mind), and 'his(de) belong together, just as the eye and visible things belong together. Yes, for a Parmenides, 'his(de)' and 'nous' (mind - being mind) are identical. From which Parmenides, however, draws a false conclusion, namely, that we who are called non-being, cannot be thought of at all, as if what moves on a higher level, cannot empathize with what is on a lower level. But let us leave aside this Parmenidean interpretation of an archaic epistemological principle, which was commonplace in the Mysteries.

O. Willmann, o.c. 637ff., gives us insight from the astronomical (astrological) teaching poem of Marcus Manilius (contemporary of the Emperor Augustus and Tiberius), *Astronomica*, into what might be called the ancient hermeneutical principle.

M. Manilius regaes against skepticism, which:

1. from the protosofistics (-450),
2. but especially the actual skeptics (Pyrrhonists, skeptical-Academians, Late skeptics; from -32 to + 200) undermined the archaic religious foundations of Hellas.

(GW 54)

He starts from the ancient (mystery) religious belief that knowledge rests on the inner kinship of the soul with things. Manilius appeals to the equally ancient insight that the one human being is 'micros kosmos' (small universe) vs. the 'macros kosmos' (large or actual universe):

"What is there to be found strange in the fact that men come to know the world (mundus), if the world is in them (mundus in ipsis) and each of us is an imprint (exemplum) of God in the form of a small image (in imagine parva). Or may we believe that men descend from elsewhere than heaven? (o.c., 638).

**Said in passing:** here one sees yet another basic insight of archaic and mystery religion, namely, that descent (genealogy) determines nature (understood as nature of being): because we are "descended from heaven," we "are," fundamentally, in our real "nature" heavenly beings. This general principle the author applies to astrological knowledge:

"We know our progenitor, since we belong to his lineage. We raise ourselves to the stars (= heavenly bodies) since we belong to her tribe or...). As the world consists of the elements, the air, the fire up there, the earth and the sea, so our body consists of parts of earthly nature in our spirit from the aitheric breath of life, which governs everything and guides men."

What else: (...) (man) directs his starry eyes (sidereos oculos) to the stars. (ad sidera mitit). (o.c., 638). It should be noted that 'aither' designates aither, the highest layer of air, as opposed to 'aer' (the ordinary air), and means the blue high sky, the dwelling place the (primeval) deities.

It should be further noted that *St. Paul*, in his *speech on the Areopagus* at Athens, quotes the Kilikian poet Aratos (-300/ -200), where the latter says: "For we too are of his (God's) race," which Kleanthes, successor of Zenon of Kition, the Stoicer (-336 264) also expresses in this way.

These epistemological-eudemoniacal beliefs also belong to the doctrine of mysteries: Platon therefore calls the true "wise" "teloumenoi," initiates (literally: brought to their perfection, finished) thanks to perfect initiation (teleoi teletai), while he calls the philosophy: the all-revealing initiation (*Faidros*). Its principle is that man is somewhere equal to the cosmos and especially to the cosmogonic deities.

**Conclusion:** thus one understands that the informative philosophy (see above pp. 29/31) is only complete (teleos, brought to perfection, initiated), when one has understood the preconstitutive, mystery-religious philosophy, which exposes the epistemological principles of being.

(GW 55)

**(c) Constitutive** (= physical) **philosophy**.

Wisdom, in its philosophical form, besides dealing with informational (logical, epistemological and methodological) and metaphysical (preconstitutive) problems, is also and even first and foremost concerned with the "nature" (fisis, natura) of things and processes, i.e. with their constitution over structure.

**Bibliographic sample:** two works we pick out as particularly instructive:

-- *W. Jaeger, Paideia (Die Formung des griechischen Menschen)*, 3 Bde, Berlin, 1, 2, in which, esp. in the first part, the eminent role of the concept of fisis (nature) is expressed;

-- *Fr. Krafft, Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, Freiburg, 1971, which looks at the same study of nature from a professional scientific standpoint, where Jaeger is primarily educationally oriented. One is more natural science oriented, the other (Jaeger) more humanities oriented (or humanities, as it is more commonly said today).

Amidst an incalculable mass of works are, among others.

- **a. science history:**

-- *M. Berthelot, Introduction à l'étude de la chimie des Anciens et du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1889-1, 1966-2;

-- *J. Rosmorduc, De Thalès à Einstein (Histoire de la Physique et de la chimie)*, Paris / Montréal, 1979 (14/17: *Le miracle grec?; l'école d'Alexandrie*);

- **b. engineering history:**

-- *J. Bidez, Les premiers philosophes grecs, techniciens et experimentateurs*, in *Le Flambeau*, 4 (1921): 4, 414/427;

-- *B. Gille, Les mécaniciens grecs (La naissance de la technologie)*, Paris, 1980 (esp. Pp. 32ss.: *Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes of Miletos, etc.*).

**This shows what Krafft claims:**

**(i)** Natural science is the reasonable explanation of distinct natural phenomena through:

**a.** unitary (seeking unity in the multitude) and

**b.** universal (general) for setups.

**(ii)** Modern natural science

**a.** assumed peoples, who were, directly or indirectly, the heirs of ancient and classical culture;

**b1.** Its pioneers did not turn against antique-classical culture, but against its dogmatization (Copernicus criticized the Ptolemaic worldview in the name of older astronomy; Galileo criticized scholasticism (mid-century philosophy of ecclesiastical centers) in the name of Archimedes; Kepler knotted to Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines, yet renewed them).

**b2.** Recent representatives like W.Heisenberg or E.Schröder point out the on the fruitfulness, also for modern natural science, of the study of Greek science.



(GW 56)

**c. Method-historical:**

(i) already in antiquity the awareness of a double view of nature (and to parts) appears: Poseidonios of Apameia (135/51), according to Diogenes Laërtios, 7; 132, says: "The doctrine concerning the universe is twofold:

(1) The mathematicians are concerned with one part, viz. the investigation of the fixed stars and planets, of the apparent size of the sun and moon, of the axis rotation, etc., and the other part is the study of the stars and planets.

(2) The physicalists (natural philosophers) are only concerned with the other part, i.e. the question about the essence of the universe, about the substance and form of sun and stars, the question whether the universe came into being or not, animated or not, transitory or not, governed by a providence, etc. In other words, the mathematicians or professional scientists work, as one would say since the 19th century, 'positively' (although the calculating element is strongly present), whereas the physicists work 'philosophically' (with a strong empirical attitude, by the way);

(ii) *EW. Beth, Philosophy of Nature*, Gorinchem, 1948, 11/42, discusses, strongly methodological, the content of traditional philosophy of nature (distinction between mathematical, hypothetical-constructive, and physical, empirical methods).

*M. Ambacher, Les philosophes de la nature*, Paris, 1974, assumes another two-fold method:

(1) as all philosophy, he says, is conceived on the one hand, encyclopedically encompassing all possible sciences (e.g., with Platon and Aristotle), and on the other hand, as a separate type of wisdom, viz. speculative,

(2) Thus, from ancient times, there is a distinction between, on the one hand, natural philosophy, i.e., a comprehensive, encyclopedic knowledge, according to "objective" method ("positive"), of the various kinds of phenomena that, collectively, make up nature, and, on the other hand, natural philosophy, this is the speculative study of the more abstract properties of nature and its parts.

Thus, with Aristotle, there is the natural philosophy, which studies the heavens and the heavenly bodies, the subhuman world and the living beings (plants, animals) strongly empirical, i.e. recording and classifying the facts, and natural philosophy, which is concerned with the definition of nature, the 'cosmological' (natural philosophical) fundamental concepts ('categories'), such as chance and necessity, unboundedness, emptiness, place and time, the 'biological' fundamental concepts, such as souls, life, and the theological fundamental concept, the First Mover; in the latter case, one would now speak of fundamental natural science or foundational research of natural science, if necessary of metanatural science.

Thus, with Platon already: *L. Brunschweg, les étapes de la philosophie mathématique*, Paris, 1947-3, 55 ss., says that the distinction between the positive professional science and the speculative philosopher who was as strict as in the 19th century, viz. in positivism (A. Comte et al.)

(GW 57)

M. Ambacher o.c., 36/45, then shows that Aristotle's vision lives on, first among his pupils, the Peripatetics (less gifted often), later among the scholastic thinkers (of the middle ages), while on the one hand, atomism (atomistics) since Leukippos of Miletos (the fifth century) and especially Democritos of Abdera (-460/- 370), natural philosophy (understand the strongly positive facts investigative knowledge of nature) and on the other hand, neo-Platonism, since Ammonios Sakkas (+175/+ 242) and esp. Plotinos (+203/+269), emphasize natural philosophy (understand the speculative fathoming of basic concepts).

M. Ambacher, o.c. 46ss. shows briefly how both natural, positivist encyclopedic philosophy and philosophy of nature (taken speculatively), on the one hand, run into positivism and neo-positivism and, on the other hand, into natural philosophies such as those of Leibniz, Berkeley, Hegel, Schelling, Bergson, etc.), so that, again, the Greeks, in spite of the 'coupure épistémologique' (epistemological cut, i.e. a break in the flow of the history of science and philosophy, so emphasized by e.g. the structuralists), are not able to find a solution to the problem. e.g., the structuralists, who emphasized the "coupure épistémologique", (epistemological cut, i.e., a break in the flow of the history of science and philosophy), they are still in the vanguard and have founded a filosofia perennis (Steuco, Leibniz, Willmann), i.e., a lasting though flexible tradition.

**d. Natural and human sciences:**

-- G. Lloyd, *Les Débuts de la science greque (De Thalès à Einstein)*, (The beginnings of Greek science (From Thales to Einstein)), Paris, Maspéro, 1974;

-- id., *Les débuts de la science en Grèce*, in *La Recherche*, 125 (1981: sept), 920/927, notes that the Greeks left us two lucky types of science:

(i) +/- - 300 the *stoicheia (Elementa)* of *Eukleides of Alexandria*, in the line of *Hippokrates of Chios* (-470/- 400) with his *Stoicheia geometrias, Elementa geometria*, - work which, because of its axiomatic-deductive method, still stands today as a model, although logistically purified;

(ii) +/- -300 medicine (peculiar to the Corpus Hippocraticum, whose central figure is Hippocrates of Kos, contemporary of Socrates (fifth century), the founder of Platonic medicine) and +/- -300 life science (biology), the work of Aristotle of Stagaira (-484/- 322, who had a more than ordinary aptitude for the positive study of living things. However, through these successful and also unsuccessful types of Greek sciences runs another line, viz. that of

a. the beta sciences, the natural sciences, Milesian in nature;

b. the alpha sciences, the humanities or humanities, Attic in nature.

*W. Jaeger, Paideia*, emphasizes.

(GW 58)

And also this dyad lives on to this day: *WC. Kneale, Philosophy*, in *Enc. Britannica*, Chicago, 1967,17, 865/866: e.g. in the 17th century Galilei's exact (mathematical-experimental) natural sciences are called 'natural philosophy', while 'moral philosophy' deals with botany, zoology, psychology, ethics and politics (think *D. Hume, A Treatise of human Nature (Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method Reasoning into moral subjects)*, 1739; this especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Today one knows the problem, which *PC. Snow, Two cultures*, i.e. the contradiction between 'explanatory' natural science and 'understanding' spiritual science since *W. Dilthey*, last century.

Indeed in the 17th century the double name is still kept, but, as the subtitle of Hume's treatise betrays, one wants to extend the natural scientific method to everything human. This is what *G. Vico* reacts against with his 'new', i.e. spiritual science, which finds its German-idealist development in *Dilthey*.

Either the mere name (with Hume e.g.) or both the name and the reality (*Vico, Dilthey*) survive from the pre-socratic era:

**(i):** the spirit of Ionia (Milesian mentality) was pure 'theoria' i.e. on the basis of 'historia' ('inquisitio', examination of facts with classification, etc.) a 'physical', a philosophy of nature which was at the same time natural philosophy, building, first globally and transcendently (all-encompassing), then privately: the nature of landscape and people (*Herodotos' Historiai* b.v.), the nature of the body as healthy or sick (*Corpus Hippocratum: the Hippocratic medicine*), the nature of the inner life, the soul life (protosophistics with its impetus of psychology, sociology (*Thoekudides* b.culturology), in which the 'nature' of landscape and people, of body and psyche was mainly seen as each time 'another piece of nature' (understood as the whole of the mainly material things and processes); here one could indeed speak of physicalism, the (incidentally, still continuing today) tendency to use the firstly material nature as a frame of thought without further ado, in which everything is situated;

**(ii)** the spirit of Attica (= the region around Athens) (Attic mentality ) was, says *Jaeger, paideia*, I, 405, speaking of both cultures (// *PC. Snow's two cultures*), 'durch und durch tätig und politisch', (through and through active and political), in so far as even the theoretical consideration of nature and the separate investigations into the nature of the components of nature, from Ionia (Milesian), were involved in political praxis, to begin with as formative material for the educated city-state citizen, to be finally applied in political action, however it might be. It is here, then, that man, the science of the mind, Attic philosophy, arises.

(GW 59)

The two cultures can also occur within the Attic cultural context e.g., "The study of the physical was apparently an object of preference for Aristotle, so much so that we see him reproaching Socrates for having drawn too much attention to the problems of ethics and politics to the detriment of knowledge of natural phenomena." (M. Ambacher, o.c., 13)

**d. bis. Physical and political theology.**

O. Willmann, o.c. 194/216 (*Politische und physische Theologie*) cites, o.c., 205, St. Clemens of Alexandria: "All theologians - the non-Greek and the Greek - have shown the primal principles ('archas') of things in veiled ways and have handed down the truth in riddles, allusions, allegories, metaphors, and similar forms." (stromata 5). Especially an 'onomastikon', a list of terms, naturally of a religious nature (hieroglyphic), will, later, in the inception and development of philosophy, play a key role (o.c., 196: Orphic writings contain such an onomastikon):

- (i) archè, principium, beginning(sel), usually connected with 'source' (pègè);
- (ii) stoicheion, elementum, member of a series, either member of a series of celestial bodies (hence: celestial body) or member of a series of substances, matter (hence: raw material).
- (iii) hulè, matter, substance in the sense of material from which something is made (originally: forest, wilderness; construction wood).
- (iv) idea, view (being), shape, form (in the Orphic hymn t.e.v. Proteus with hulè, matter, connected).
- (v) eidòs, form view (there is a goddess called 'Eidè' eu.eidès', the clean-shaped form);
- (vi) fusiòs, natura, nature, about which further specially;
- (vii) nomòs, law, custom (so e.g. Nomos, as a deity with legal resp. lawful function (Functionsgott; cf. Usener), is called 'paredros Dios', seated on the throne next to Zeus); o.c., 208/209.

O. Willmann, o.c. 217/238 (*Hervorgang der physik aus der physischen Theologie*); 239/254 (*Hervorgang der Weisheitslehre und Ethik aus der politischen Theologie*), 255/265 (*Vereinigung von Physik und Ethik im idealismus*), (Emergence of physics from physical theology); 239/254 (Emergence of wisdom teaching and ethics from political theology), 255/265 (Unification of physics and ethics in idealism.), show, on the basis of historical-philological research, how both Milesian natural wisdom and Attic human wisdom are already at work in religion, especially in mystery religion (o.c., 202/ 204).

JP. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, I and II, Paris, 1971, completes or, if need be, improves upon what Willmann has genially exposed at the time. Just said pointed out the 'hieroi gamoi', i.e. the primordial marriages of the first parents (genii, iuones) see 48 above - which in the backish mysteries determine the genesis, origin, or the fusiòs, nature (= being nature), of a being.

(GW 60)

See O. Willmann, o.c., 204f. Further reference should be made to what *Dr. Stock, The Greek Drama and Western Man*, DDB, 1959 called 'prephilosophical civilized paganism', or what *K.J. Popma, The knowledge concerning ancient culture*, in *T.V. Fil.*, 22 (1960): 3, 446 called '*a philosophically defended polytheism*' as the key to the correct understanding of the incipient physical (Milesian naturalism).

**(A)** For example, Willmann, o.c., 205, points to Apollon, the muses Athens as:

**(i)** constitutive beings, resp. forces (polytheistic dynamism) and

**(ii)** as informational beings, resp. forces (id.);

thus the 'archai', principia, principles, will constitute both the very nature of things and processes (constitutive) and the knowledge of them in man especially participated (informative). Especially Okeanos, who was the first to marry sacredly (hieros gamos, sacred marriage) with Tèthus, - both together being the primordial androgion, from which all other partial androgions spring, - is

**(i)** capable of changing himself in all sides (Thales, Herakleitos) - constitutively he 'is' 'becoming in all' all himself,

**(ii)** able to know and to make known all being - informatively 'is' he, see above pp. 53/54 - all sides, equal to all that is equal to him (similia similibus) - illustrating the ancient hermeneutic principle of equality of being; - what remains of Thales of Miletos in texts or testimonies, does not even seem to remind us.

**(B)** Similarly, Willmann, o.c., 207, points to the anim(at)istic side of polytheistic dynamism, to viz. the nymphs, dryads (tree spirits) yes, all the 'fisis' (nature) 'inhabiting' spirits, 'nature spirits' correctly called (cfr. Course in Hieroanalysis: centers, non-human or non-personal thinking and acting beings), of which he claims:

**(i)** are not merely transcendental daimones, i.e., beings, resp. forces, existing in themselves, independent of the things of nature,

**(ii)** but at the same time (what Aristotle calls) 'entelecheia', entelechia, i.e. immanent, purposeful powers in the natural things and processes themselves.

More so:

**(i)** not only are they, as transcendent daimones 'noëroi', thinking beings (at their infrahuman level, of course),

**(ii)** yet they are 'noëtoi', thought, thought through, as immanent forces of being and life in the natural things.

This animistic side of dynamistic polytheism, once philosophically reformulated in abstract terms of Milesian physicalism naturalism) will be called "hierosemitism.

**(C)** Likewise Willmann, o.c., 207f, points to both the orphic precursors of the later Pythagorean-platonic numerology (see above p. 47vv.) as well as the late antique triad 'the One', the Spirit (nous) and the soul (Psuchè) in which one sees the principle of the universe descending as it were towards matter, which finds its precursor in physical theology, namely in the series 'Zeus, Fanes, Dionusos'.

(GW 61)

So much for a few grips of the theological physical as a prelude to the philosophical physical. On the theological ethics and politics as a precursor to philosophical ethics and politics we shall return later.

**Conclusion:** what is striking is that the true philosophers separate neither Milesian natural knowledge nor Attic human knowledge; on the contrary, one tries, especially in the philosophy of ideas since Pythagoras, to make both branches of integral thought one.

***The concept of nature.***

*B. Valette, la Nature*, Paris, 1978, a booklet written from the "ecological" point of view, shows how frequent the word "nature" can be, so that a brief semasiology (theory of meaning) is appropriate here.

**a1. *The antic hermeneutic nature approach* (61):**

This aspect is close to some ecological concerns of 'green philosophy'; for, as O. Willmann, o.c., 214, says, physical theology views nature, understood as the universe, as macrocosmic man and man as 'including' microcosmic, of nature; the two go hand in hand; this leads to a hermeneutic, which Empedokles formulates as follows:

"We see earth through earth, water through water, etc."; for we know every element outside of us, in nature, through the essentially similar element within us. So that modern nature alienation is virtually non-existent among ancient physicalists.

**a2. *The ancient-mysterious nature approach* (61):**

Yet the 'soul', especially in mystery religious circles, is felt as a reality, however 'natural', which in principle stands alien to what characterizes nature, namely the 'kuklos anakès'; the cycle of fate (compare the 'samsara' of Hindus); the 'soul' descends from higher light regions (Oeranian, Olympian) to the earth, which already, as Willmann, o.c., 215, notes, occurs as an 'underworld' (subhuman), into which the soul descends, inasmuch as the actual underworld, Hades, is merely a repetition of 'underworld'. The theory of soul migration, e.g., situates itself here.

**b. *The ancient connection between diacrony and syncretism* (61/69):**

The chthonic great daimones (deities), descend into the earth (and into Hades); so does the soul; yet the "great" deities are first people, protoplasts, and macrocosmic people: from them all beings are "begotten," so that all sides draw from them their nature, their beingness.

This genealogical or genetic view of nature decides, in turn, the very nature of the initial Greek physical, as will be seen further.

(GW 62)

**Note.-- The generative or generational religion.**

"To portray the regenerative power of the spring sun and its effect on all nature's creatures through a tangible object, the ancients resorted to what those Greeks called the phallos, the sacred representation of masculinity." (*Ja. Dulaure, Les divinités génératrices*, (The generating deities,), Paris, 1; 1974-2,19).

Already in 1805 Dulaure noticed that the cult of phallus was both so alienating and so universally spread. Notwithstanding the inevitable exaggerations and misrepresentations from which Delaure's work suffers, its essential core remains unrefuted to this day; on the contrary. What N. Söderblom calls 'Urhebers' or 'Ursprungwesen' (causers, origin beings) is universally diffused (see below).

What was said above page 48v. about the primal couple (primal androgynous), finds here its striking application: all true mythologies refer to a primal couple, i.e. a male and a female being, who, in time, become androgynous (hermaphrodite (Hermes + Aphrodite)) (the two then temporarily fuse into one female primordial being with male phallos); usually connected to the primordial waters (one thinks of the many libations (water, also milk, wine, even blood, etc.)) and active in a love community.)) and active in a love-community, called by those Greeks 'hieros gamos' (sacred marriage), they conceived ('created them', but then in a phallic-vaginal sense of that word) all being, i.e. all that the universe - and especially the human world - contains.

These 'mythical' (i.e. never conceived as grossly material) progenitors (progenitors in their dominant-female-hermaphroditic appearance) were also called by the Greeks

(i) called 'proto.plastoi' (first-born, first-formed, etc.), insofar as they themselves were the product - in a mysterious way, otherwise of a Supreme Being, who, if need be, was in turn conceived as primal couple or androgynous, although this was only a very analogous understanding t.vis-à-vis the real primal couples or 'causers' (Söderblom), since this Supreme Being must be understood as essentially elevated (transcendent) vis-à-vis all that is created;

(ii) 'Achanthropos' (first man, primeval man) also was the Greek name; indeed all that is human on earth, comes into the world only thanks to such a primeval couple, resp. primeval hermaphrodite, who function as 'generator', causer, Urheber, beside and in the ancestors in flesh and blood; one therefore never confuses the primeval couple with the physical first human couple.

The mysteries (see above p. 38vv.) had as a central feature this primordial couple but as life soul, i.e. that principle of life which, from conception to last breath, governs life on earth. Mysteries that promise truly immortal life work with the immortal soul.

(GW 63) *Note.*-- It may be objected that the texts cited at O. Willmann, I, are open to more than one interpretation and, especially, that the mainly Orphic texts are younger than he, in his time, thought. So that the development of philosophy from theology is no longer provable as he did it.

To this we reply that the chapter '*Die Urheber*' (the causers) of N. Söderblom, *das werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion)*, (the becoming of the belief in God (Investigations on the beginnings of religion)), Leipzig, 1926-2, 93/156; 283; 289/32 (*Die Urheberreligion in Europa*); etc., directly touches upon the problem of the 'Origin Beings', which the Greeks gave under the name of *protoplastoi* or *archanthropos*. They are called, e.g., in the primitive cultures, 'Primordial Fathers', 'Alvaders' (92).

A. "The common and basic thing in all legends (understand: myths) belonging to this remains their meaning: to explain the origin of things." (96)

The *arachanthropos*, says Willmann, 37, is the "world deity": from the seven parts of Dionusos arises the world (from the Dionusos-Zagreus myth, which treats Dionusos as a "progenitor," characterized by the phallos).

We find our views confirmed that the primal beings must explain everything which one regards as needing explanation" (107); they are "verkörperte Ursachen" (embodied causes) (107), according to Söderblom; but concrete data are brought forward: certain trees, stones and rocks, for example, are unformed primal fathers; natural phenomena, through cultural phenomena as well, such as roads over steep mountains are attributed to them (*ibidem*).

(B) Surely a certain conception of a fixed order in nature and world order is also connected with the belief in origin beings." (121).

In an orphic hymn in honor of Pan, identified with Apollon, *alfather* is praised as 'the shaping stamp of the whole world'; 'Fanes' (other name for the same *alfather*) possesses the forms of all things ('*demas hapanton*', the structure of everything ) in himself (40/41). (See also *ibid.*, 43ff.: space forms, music).

(C) "As those weighty operations of the causal agents must count the institutions of secret ceremonies and of the establishments of the tribe, as well as the creation of the totem animals and people" (Söderblom, 107).

"As a rule, (...) these beings, about whom one sings in the religious-magical mysteries (Söderblom says in German: 'Mysteries'), and who have arranged these rites themselves, have also established the fundamental ground rules and prohibitions of society." (121).

The ancestors regularly appear in animal form (the explanation of the relationship between the clan and its totem animal). The Dionysian mysteries we have touched upon briefly (see above p. 40vv; as father of life e.g. Dionusos-Zagreus is sung about as a holy bull, e.g. in the *dithurambos* of the Eleates ('Holy bull, come with the bull's foot walking in the whole holy temple').



(GW 64)

*As an aside*, N. Söderblom relies heavily on Australian totemism; for recent data see *AP. Elkin, The Nature of Australian Totemism*, in *J. Middleton, ed., Gods and Ritual*, Austin / London, 1967, 159/176.

This third point means that the enablers are at the same time cultural heroes (salvagers). (109).

**(D)** The peculiar status of primordial beings is shown by a comparison:

**(i)** they are not souls of deceased people (not "manistic" beings); therefore, they are not ancestors (pro(to)gons), first truly historical people, who have as descendants along biological lines the tribe or members of mankind (not pro(to)gonistic beings);

**(ii)** they are not nature deities in the running sense of that word; though they have something naturalistic and animistic about them, yet they are not nature spirits or polydemonistic nature deities without more; they are certainly not ordinary polytheistic deities; - well, these primordial beings are regularly confused by the uninitiated with all these kinds of nature beings in the unseen,

**(iii)** Nor are they without question Supreme Beings in the sense of the primal monotheism of A. Lang and Father W. Schmidt;

**(iv)** they are also not salvationists, cultural heroes without question, although they have this role among others.

*So what are they?*

**(a)** They are primordial beings: they were active "in the beginning", "beginning" here meaning very first "beginning in time" (chronological meaning: they are protological beings): when they had finished their work, they departed from their earthly activity, to where? To a sphere of their own, which present seers situate somewhat to the left of the main aura of the person concerned in a mantic or magical act;

*As an aside*, an Orphic hymn speaks of Fanes, the primal father, as a "ruler in the golden age," as the "first" man in the beginning.

**(b)** Yet they are continuously active as "origin beings": what they, in the beginning, did, it continues; in other words, they are not some "beginning beings"; they are also and continuously, from the beginning, origin beings, causers.

*AE. Jensen, Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur*, (The religious worldview of an early culture.), Stuttgart, 1949-2; id, *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölker*, (Myth and cult among primitive people), Wiesbaden, 1951, mentions "primordial beings" (named "dema" (Marind-Anim)), which appear in the agricultural period, next to the creator-heaven deity already known in the hunting period, and which turn into the "deities" (polydemonistic, polytheistic) in highly developed cultures (as e.g. the ancient Greco-Roman). Jensen, with his demagodities, strongly approximates Söderblom's alvaders, enablers.

(GW 65)

Perhaps the order of the Samothraean deities (the so-called 'Kaberoi', Cabiri, Kabieren, or 'Megaloi theoi (great deities)) about which FWJ. Schelling (1775/1854), the great idealistic-romantic philosopher, wrote the essay on the Samothracian deities, is conclusive; - these deities are Voorhellean, pelagic; related to Demeter and Dionusos: Alexander the Great, in their honor, had an altar-like boundary stone erected on the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indus, the eastern border of his empire, in which he had chiseled, "To Heracles and the Samothracian Kaberoi" (cfr. *Kristensen, Collectyed Contr.* 275vv. (*The Great Gods*); 256); - perhaps, therefore, the order of the Kabires is extremely summary (Willmann, 43):

(1) *the first, the Highest Deity*, which is not involved in the process of processing, is called Axieros, Zeus, Hephaistos, etc.; it recalls the supreme being of the primal monotheists (Lang, Schmidt); it is uninvolved 'high', primal (Olympian) to some extent;

(2) *the middle position* is occupied by a male-female, androgynous, or even a coupled male-female deity, who immediately 'causes' the process of processing (causers, 'Urheber', to use Söderblom's word); they are called e.g. Axiokerses and Axiokersa, Hades and Persefone (see above p. 39, the central figures in the Demeter Mysteries); Pothos and Venus, Ares and Aphrodite etc.

(3) *the third, completing* (teletè), lesser deity who descends from the androgynous, resp. the primordial couple (from the hieros gamos) (the genius, resp. iuno; see above p. 48), the paredros or secondary and subordinate 'deity', who does sit on a throne, but below the main crowns, occupied above by either the Supreme Being or the generative deities or better 'primeval beings' who, in creation, represent the Supreme Being as 'generative primeval power' t.v. the universe (a kind of genius and/or iuno on world-, on universe-scale, - later called world-soul); this third instance of 'generation' or generation, its final term (teletè, initiation term), is called Kadmilos, Kadmos, Hermes (see Alexanders' altar border stone).

Willmann, 43, adds, "In Kadmos' name Kadmon, the Ancient One, and kosmos, the world, run together, and the world is thought to be the sprout of a processing and sealing (i.e. containing the seeds and paragons of things) androgynous origin, above which stands a Supreme Deity."

So that Söderbloms' multiplicity of explanatory hypotheses of the Causers (primordial monotheism, Ancestor hypothesis (pro(to)gonism, resp. manism), Nature hypothesis (astral, totemic side)) finds here an ideal summary, which also explains why a multiplicity of hypotheses has been advanced by the hierologists.

(GW 66)

**Note.--** As already insinuated above p. 43, when talking about the 'uxoric' foundation of Asklepios' salvation - 'uxoric' meaning that the 'uxor' or wife is the true possessor of life force with respect to the male partner - , Willmann, o.c. 43, where he speaks of the order of the Samothracian deities and/or genii (iuones), that the writers (*Petersen, Griechische religion*; *Ersch / Gruber, Encyklopädie*), on whom he relies, apparently minimize the sky-queen religion (mother-goddess religion), and do so in the hierarchy enumerated above: Between the Supreme Being (Oermonotheism) and the androgyn(s) (causal religion) are situated, in fact, the so-called sky queens, who, in their chtonic role, are called Earth mothers or mother goddesses. See above, for bibliographic samples, p. 43.

More specifically concerning the term "queen of heaven" (malkat), by which the Assyrian-Babylonian Ishtar, the Phoenician Ashtarte (worshipped as a goddess of fertility in All Pre-Asia), was referred to by her worshippers (worshippers), see *J. Plessis, Etude sur les textes concernant Istar-Astarté*, Paris, 1921. She is mentioned, in the Bible, in *Jer. 7:18; 44:17,18, 19, 25*: the prophet casts banishing lightning against those who, in the cities of Judah and in the streets of Jerusalem, worship Ishtar-Ashtarte (the children gather wood, the fathers light the fire, the women bake cakes for her fertility goddess).

Specifically, with respect to uxoric law, see:

-- *F. Flückiger, Gesch. Des Naturrechts, I; Die Gesch. Der europäischen rechts-idee im Altertum*, (Geschichte des Naturrechts, I; Die Gesch. Der europäische rechts-idee im Altertum), Zollikon / Zürich, 1954, 27ff; :

-- *F. Kern, Mutterrecht - einst und jetzt*, (Mother right - once and now), in *Theologische Zeitschrift*, Basel, 1950,9 292ff.

The term 'mother law', introduced in 1861 by JJ. Bachoven, is only applicable - legally speaking - to well-defined tribes, mainly in the tropical and subtropical areas, where the women cultivate fields and, thereby, establish land ownership and, in part, permanent family residences, while the men take care of hunting, warfare (protection, conquest). In the political field, uxoric law is applicable to cases where, as in Homer's *Oduessa* (*Penelopeia, Klutaimnestra*), the succession of the dynasty passed from mother to daughter (brother, husband).

More specifically in the fluid field (as well as culturally (concerning worship) as magically-mantically), uxorically founded order is noticeable wherever chtonic life force (the earth and its earth- or nature spirits) is at stake: there one venerates a heavenly queen, who descends chtonically (epichthonically: the field fruits, the livestock wealth, the children's wealth; hupochtonically: the dead souls and their shadows, the subterranean nature spirits and demons, the night).

(GW 67)

More specifically with regard to the double-sexed or androgynous character of the sky-queen-mother goddess, see:

-- M. Delcourt, *Hermaphrodite (Mythes et rites de la bisexualité dans l' Antiquité classique)*, (Hermaphrodite (Myths and rites of bisexuality in classical antiquity)), Paris, 1958; M. Eliade, *Méphistophélès et l' Androgyne*, Paris, 1962,

-- A. Daniélou, *Shiva et Dionysos*, Paris, 1979, 80ss.

-- Sukie Colegrave, *Hermaphrodite (Myths and rites of bisexuality in classical antiquity)*, (Hermaphrodite (Mythes et rites de la bisexualité dans l'Antiquité classique)), Rotterdam, 1981 (57vv.: the great goddess d.i. the queen of heaven, especially as an earth goddess, is hermaphroditic; Jungian book );

-- C.J. Bleeker, *The mother goddess in antiquity*, The Hague, 1960, 99.50/51, 117:

(i) Double-sex deities occur in various peoples in antiquity;

(ii)a Ishtar was apparently, as sky queen - fertility goddess male-female;

(ii)b Kubele, the Phrygian great goddess, at Rome worshipped by the state, was, according to indications, originally hermaphroditic;

(iii) 'androgyny', says Bleeker, is not a sexual deviation of a biological nature, of course, but a fluid structure, calculated to the genesis task: the ancient mythological (understand: concerning the causal structure in its entirety) idea is that the deity (either Supreme Being or heavenly queen or androgynous-causal or genius-iuno) possesses the total, This is male-female, life possesses; W. Lederer, *La peur des femme ou Gynophobie*, (The fear of women or Gynophobia.), Paris, 1980, 276s.; "Fertility is due to a vaudou-loa, nature or human spirit, essentially male-female, which does not necessarily idealize 'woman' as the fertility principle." (The passus is about the Haitian and/or West African vaudou religion). So much for the essentials.

**Conclusion:** the antique-archaic connection between diachrony (conception) and synchrony (nature of being, nature) can only now, after this long but necessary digression, be properly understood as it really was in its cultural framework.

"Pour la pensée mythique, toute généalogie est, en même temps et aussi bien, explicitation d' une structure; il n' y a pas de autre façon de rendre raison d' une structure que de la présenter sous la forme d' un récit généalogique". (JP. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, I, 16: For mythic thought, every genealogy (genealogical narrative) is, at the same time and equally, the uncovering of a structure; there is no other way to account for a structure than to present it under the form of a genealogical narrative).

These words of a structuralist, i.e. essentially synchronic-system-analytical working historian of the school of Dumézil are significant; moreover: they give the answer to the question, which today makes both structuralists and transformists and/or historicists differ concerning the Greek way of thinking, i.e. whether it is "static" or "kinetic" (evolutionary, dialectical-movable, historical - evolutionary).

(GW 68)

The answer is abundantly clear after all we have gone over regarding begetting religion:

*W. Jaeger, paideia*, I, 54-3, 209, says that the research (historia) concerning 'fusus' or 'genesis', i.e. origin - we translate literally - is practiced in Ionia for the sake of the 'theoria' itself, i.e. selflessly; i.e. where religion aims at life and fertility 'selflessly' in its fusis-, or rather: genesis-, rites, there now suddenly the physical (fusiologia also called) 'selfless' knowing for the sake of knowing concerning the same genesis-fusus process.

The same *W. Jaeger*, this time in *A la naissance de la théologie*, '66, 27, says that fusis means :

**(i)** the act of 'funai', i.e. the process that is creation and growth; e.g. 'fusus ton onton' (the nature of being, - this is how we usually translate it) means the origin (creation) and growth of the things that surround us (are at our disposal), which shows how archly bad we translate 'fusus' if we substitute our present 'nature' for it;

**(ii)** the origin itself, out of which things arose and are continually arising - we quote Jaeger literally - i.e., the reality that lies at the root of things given sense;

The same Jaeger, *ibidem*, says that genesis has the same double meaning; he adds: genesis is synonymous with fusis. He refers to Homer (in the later passages) where he says, e.g., that the god Okeanos is the genesis of all things (together with Tethus he forms the androgynous, about which above); the Greek terms 'theogonia'; deities come into being, - 'kosmogonia', universe come into being, - 'anthropogonia, human come into being, refer to the same language root 'gen-esis', 'gon-ia'.

Immediately it is abundantly clear that philosophy, even in the form of physical, - form, which is closest to processing religion, - is essentially doubly different from generative religion:

**(i)** i.e. instead of the concern for life (i.e. happiness) and death (i.e. calamity) now comes the theoria, the selfless and in time life-less, in any case areligious knowing for the sake of knowing itself;

**(ii)** instead of movement (arising, growth, (and also always) decay: 'genesis' and 'fthora') gradually the unmoved idea comes in all its modalities (see above p. 45v.); we say 'gradually', because 'idea', 'eidos' is actually the purely theoretical thought process which is arising, growth and decay, resp. completion, and, as a steering standard, governs the course (the movement) in nature. See p. 47vv. higher: idea as 'arithmos teleios', as structure which is the process to be completed, resp. finished.

In the process, philosophical-scientific attention has gradually turned to an unchanged or even unchangeable aspect, which Aristotle, *Metaph. A 3.983 b6*, formulates:

(GW 69)

"According to the 'fusikoi', the philosophers of nature, there must be a unique 'fusus' (nature) somewhere or also more than one, out of which the other arises (and in which it finally perishes again), while that nature or natures continues unchanged.

'The other', i.e. the being available to us, is rooted in the 'archè', the principle (here called either singularly nature or plurally the natures, which is clearly the genealogical-religious meaning); both, 'being/principle of being' form a systechy, which *Th. Ballauf, Vom Ursprung (Interpretationen zu Thales' und Anaximanders Philosophie)*, (Of Origin (Interpretations of Thales' and Anaximander's Philosophy)), in *journal v. Phil*, 15 (1953): 18/19, is called in Heidegger's language '*the ontological difference*'.

Instead of 'thinking' the genetically-generated tetrad (Supreme Being / mother goddess / androgynous / genius-Iuno ) and doing so with pragmatic objectives, viz. to found and/or promote life (in the sacred sense of: (i) existence and (ii) successful or salvific existence) to found and/or promote life, physical and later post-physical philosophy gradually 'thinks' more of an abstraction, the opposition pair 'being / origin of being' - and this without any direct pragmatic concern, fundamentally, life alien (where 'life' is to be understood in the sacred sense).

This is the tragedy of Greek (and in time Western) philosophy, that it has betrayed the sacredly understood "life" for abstraction. Protosophism and the Socratic (Socrates, Platon, Aristotle, - the little socraticers) who 'thought' and 'acted' in its wake, though against it, have made that abstraction process definitive. More about this later.

**c. *The physical as incipient "theology"*. (69/70)**

W. Jaeger, *Humanisme et théologie*, Paris, 1956, 78ss. responds against classicists scholars such as Gomperz, Burnet, et al. who claim that the physicals are the "first professional scientists in the modern sense"; reason: they would, according to these scientist-positivist oriented interpreters:

- (i) the phenomena of the material world
- (ii) explained (ab- and induction especially) by rationally systematizing (i.e., exposing structures of distributive and collective nature) natural (understand: deterministic) causality, at work in the course of nature (in the sense of materially visible world).

W. Jaeger opposes this with *S. Augustine, De civitate Dei*, 8: 2, that the Greek physicals are at the head of the philosophical theologians; S. Augustine, in the line of later "theology" (understand: rational theology) cites as evidence:

- (i) the physicalists criticize mythic theology with its anthropomorphisms (overly human, non-wholesome and non-puritanical, representations);

(GW 70)

(ii) The physicalists attributed to the incorporeal God properties such as "infinite", "eternal", "providential with respect to all being" omnipresent, which the later theologians, the more radical ones, attribute to Him; the reason is: the so-called "origin" (archè, principium, principle of being), although purely "physical" represented, is, in fact, divine, both by nature and by order (hierarchy).

With this double trait, **a.** demythologization and **b.** rationalization, the first Greek philosophers-physicians withdraw theology from its frame of origin, i.e. from its life-giving and life-promoting (pragmatic) character, to turn it into a professional science and rational philosophy, yes, its summit, as explained above p. 32f. 32f. has been explained; yes, even more, they set in motion the process of secularization, i.e. the withdrawal of this earth and its operations and orders of life of all kinds from the grip of polytheistic-animistic dynamism (hylozoism) in order to place it in the hands of purely "earthly", purely "secular" people working. Of course, that secularization process is double, as explained higher p. 33 v. (double type of 'enlightenment'). Yet both variants go together to a great extent.

*Note.--* In *Paideia, I*, 212f. *Jaeger* treats the same theme, yet there he expresses himself differently:

(i) the question of the first physicalists is, in our parlance, 'meta-physical' (beyond and above the 'physical' (here in the sense of beyond and above the secular) outgoing;

(ii) the 'physical' information, however, is the subordinate layer until, especially from Anaxagoras and Democritus onwards, it becomes independent (true positive natural science). See above pp. 56/57.

#### **d. *The one nature and the many natures* (70-93)**

(unitary science, the sciences):

*W. Jaeger, A la Naissance*, 168, distinguishes "global" (better: transcendental, all-encompassing) empiricism, with the Milesians, and "private" empiricism; Anaxagoras, Herodotos, Hippocrates, the empirical physicians in general, are the main representatives of them. *F. Krafft, Gesch. D. Nat.*, I, 76/91, shows that Thales of Miletos already harbored such a private empiricism, which we shall demonstrate further. We explain this briefly:

(a) *historia*, inquiry (inquisition) is a basic word to characterize Milesian philosophy; 'histor', eyewitness, one who, by his own seeing (*idein*), acquires knowledge (*eidenai*); 'histor' can also mean one who, by examination of reports of others, eyewitnesses, acquires knowledge. Already *Hesodios, Works and Days*, 790, uses the word. Herodotos in particular uses the word:

(i) 'historeo', I seek to know (1: 61), also: I investigate, I check, I question; I narrate what I know;

(GW 71)

**(ii)** used independently: 'historia' (historia, history, i.e. the by 'aut.opsis' (own seeing) or by inquiry, investigation, won communication of actual facts: 1: 1; 2:118. This Herodotean meaning is only the private form (type) of a general concept, which reflects the Milesian physical.

**(b)1.** Situation of Ionian (Milesian) wisdom: *W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 213f. cites ancient lore, which claims that the Ionians (esp. Milesians), through contact with Voor Asia and Egypt,

**a/** the 'mètis', the demioergic (we now say: 'technical') skill with its achievements concerning

**(i)** surveying and nautics (marine science) and

**(ii)** adopted celestial observation (meteorology, cosmography, astronomy, and astrology, respectively) from Egyptians and natives of pre-Asia;

**b/** the 'theoria', the reflection on the deeper questions, which the peoples answered in their cosmogonies (myths concerning world and universe origins) and theogonies (deity origins concerning myths) have also redone;

**(b)2.** characterization of Ionian-Milesian wisdom:

People like Thales, Anaximandros, Aaximines - the three first physicists-Milesians - introduced something radically new, according to Jaeger, i.e. to make the data of the Eastern and the Hellenic 'mètis' (technical knowledge) concerning earth and heaven, instead of interpreting them mythically on a deeper level, as both the Easterners and the Hellenic religions did, directly in the service of the deeper questions concerning the universe and 'nature', understood as 'onta', i.e. the sensory perceptible and available data, and this causally (causal) and 'theoretically' (analyzing the relations of distributive and collective nature).

**Conclusion:** the change is:

**a/** to proceed non-mythically (demythologization );

**b/** secular data secularly explain (theory concerning the connection 'cause/ effect'), which implies 'scientific philosophy', according to always Jaeger. So that scholars al Burnet and Gompres, positivistically oriented, are 'positively' (i.e. their claim taken at face value) right, but 'exclusively' (i.e. their claim taken in its exaggeration) wrong.

Immediately the word "nature" takes on a new meaning, namely, lawful causal events, in which the essence (nature, nature of being) of the reality of sensory experience is expressed.

One has, even recently, when discussing the "natural law" as a standard of morality in church circles, called that view "physicalism. Jaeger speaks of (Milesian) empiricism. Both words are correct: one designates the object sought, the other the method.



(GW 72)

**Note.-- HJ. Blackham, *Humanism*, 105, claims, not entirely wrongly -- that the pre-Socratic sages, from their 'historia' (research), purified a view, which:**

**(i)** was evolutionary, culminating in the atomistic of Demokritos, and

**(ii)** was naturalistic, yet purely speculative, but curiously anticipating the modern scientific view in its broad outlines, where 'naturalistic' means the same as 'physicist', yet with purely secular slant.

After all we have seen, once again this humanist interpretation "positive" (in itself) is correct, yet "exclusive" (as exaggerated) is wrong; for, undeniably, the pre-Socratic have left us with a world- and life-view, which, as Jaeger has shown once and for all:

**(i)** 'nature' - finally in our modern sense of 'the collection and system of all sense-perceptible facts (ta onta) as governed by causal law' - and, in that nature framework,

**(ii)** the 'natures', i.e., the subspheres of the total, global, indeed all-encompassing or transcendental 'nature' (of just now) - land and ethnical nature, human nature, e.g.,

**(iii)** Investigates **a.** empirically, **b.** physicistically (naturalistically), yet

**(iv)** crowns this research with a form of rational theology, which for the time being is still bathed in the religion of softening, but gradually becomes more empirical and physicist.

Cfr. above pp. 69/70; 33/34; 45vv.. *W. Jaeger, A la naiss. D. l. théol*, 29, says that e.g. Thales' claim that "everything is full of deities (daimones)" means that he sees a new mode of deity contact: their 'power' he can ascertain (historia) in its effects, insofar as these are visible and tangible, - empirical-physical thus -; the 'onta' (the being that surrounds us daily) are, after all, the realm where the higher powers are at work and where we encounter them not mantically-magically, as in the conception relic, but empirically-physically, as in the physical. This is a new type of religious experience. From this one sees very purely that the humanist Blackham is 'positively' very right, but 'exclusively' projects his own ideology into the pre-Socratic. See also *Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 236.

**Note.--** That an enlightenment (in the sense of opposing any archaic-religious viewpoint to rational-intellectual thinking) is at work in the Ionian-Milesian physical is shown, among other things, by the following two data:

**(i) Individualism regarding free inquiry into nature,**

Hekataios of Miletos (-560/-480 ) writes: "Hekataios the Milesian speaks thus: I write down as it seems to me; for the stories of the Hellenes, as they appear to me, are numerous and ridiculous". Not the Muses, as Hesiod experiences them as truth-giving powers, but self-willed 'historia' i.e. own, free research, lies at the basis of Hekataios' geography.

(GW 73)

But there is more: also the archaic-religious man investigates freely, but Hekataios arrives at what *Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 11f, calls 'theoria', which he describes as follows: "that attention to things in their words and decay, both in 'nature' and in the human world, which is the clear view of their permanent structures, i.e. their lawfulness".

But here something new begins: as *Jaeger, A la naissance*, 69/71, says, the Hellenic religion possessed neither dogma nor creed, and it is philosophy, especially philosophical theology, which introduced it: when Hekataios writes down what appears to him, he is celebrating 'dogma', because 'to dogma', the dogma, is precisely that which appears well, opinion, conviction, - in the physical frame of mind: this opinion, part of theoria, structure analytical work. Admittedly, only from:

(i) Xenophanes of Kolofon (-580/-490), the first intellectually-rational 'theologian' (in the strict sense of that word) with a dogma, i.e. a clearly defined conviction concerning the 'nature' of the divine and

(ii) Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500), who founds a kind of religious-intellectual and rational society, which, to begin with at least, adheres strictly collectively to 'autos efa' (ips dixit) the master has said it, the founder of the 'school' (hairesis will later be called such a 'school', d.i. in intellectual direction, be called; which later, with the Church Fathers, will become the word for 'heresy', i.e. intellectual-rational group formation against the Church, at least outside the Church).

Both thinkers, then, will only fully carry through Hekataios' dogmatism, which, in the Hellenistic-Macedonian and -Roman periods after -320 especially, flourishes openly.

**(ii) *The relativism on free investigation of nature* (73/92)**

This springs immediately from the individualism in question; - 'relative' means relative, that which depends on something else, dependent (opposed to 'apolelutos', absolutus, absolute, dependent on nothing);

Relativism is that intellectual-rational opinion which emphasizes the relative character of something, here of free inquiry and especially of its result, the opinion of the inquirer. Ionic-Milesian history contains within it, in its result, the germ of its own downfall, namely, the relativization of its own "sensitivity".

Indeed, the later historians of relativism concerning truth-knowledge (which in time will be called "skepticism," "scepticism," about which more later) make strict distinctions among the pre-Socratics between:

(a) the "dogmatizers," such as

1. the Paleo-Milesians, Thales, Anaximandros and Anaximenens of Miletos, and
2. the Paleo-Pythagoreans, who viz. honor the 'autos efa', the master has said it (i.e. his dogma is rule of thought) through thick and thin, and

(GW 74)

(b) the prescientists outlined by *ER. Dodds, The Greek and the Irrational*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1966, 180ff. briefly outlined: (74/78)

**(i)1. *Hekataios of Miletos*,**

mentioned above who Dodds called the first enlightened mind, because he found myths "funny" and put "rational-physical" explanations in their place; further Xenophanes of Kolophon, from whom Dodds mentions the attacks on the Homeric and Hesiodic myths from a moral angle, as well as his criticism of the mantics, his relativism concerning religious ideas, above all, however, a distinction between 'knowledge' ('reason') and 'faith' - a systechism, which furores to our days and in such a way that 'faith' is not real 'knowledge' and thus... - finally the term falls - 'irrational' (Fideism is born where the physical appropriates the monopoly of 'real knowledge').

'Fideism' is the acceptance of an epistemological-logical-methodological leap from the real - i.e. physicist-empirical knowing to ... to what?

To 'mysticism' (now not in the mystery-religious but) in the physicist-empirical sense of that word, namely in the sense of murky, physicist-empirical at least, uncontrollable 'knowledge', if one can apply the word 'knowledge' to it.

Dodds, in response to that dyad of "reason/faith," speaks of the "foundation of scientific humility" (o.c. 181); his words are translated literally ("scientific humility").

One measures the tremendous revolution that the physical has founded in the world and that continues until our days. That "revolution" consists in declaring - not in the name of lack of religious or sacred experience, but in the name of physical, understand: science of those days - religion and sacralism cognitively-informatively invalid, unless as an irrational leap.

People like Locke, Hume even more and Kant in his 'critical' way find their inspiration here, namely between -580 and -490 (life dates of Xenophanes). Dodds, however, does not mention the rational physicalistic and empirical re-foundation of the 'religion' (i.e. belief), which Jaeger et al. already thought to discover in Thales' demon belief (see above p. 72), i.e. the information domain of the 'religion-as-belief' is withdrawn from the mantis and the magic and moved into the secular data, on which the physical then takes hold. The rational theology-physical theology then-is founded.

Dodds, himself enlightened mind, skips over this aspect, unless one can take his remark that Xenophanes "was a deeply religious man himself and had a private faith (sic!) in a God, 'who is not like men according to form or mentality' (Xenophanes' words) (o.c.181), as the substitute for that re-foundation of religion and theology.

(GW 75)

The prescepsis of Herakleitos of Ephesos, which Dodds cites as the foundation of the Greek physicist-empiricist enlightenment, continues, on Herakleitos, very individual ground ideas, in the sense of Hekataios and Xenophanes: criticism of the mantic-magical value of the dream, of the ritual 'catharsis' (incantation), the ongoing mysteries, the funeral rites, the concept of destiny concerning the inner daimon (genius/ iuno), the worship of images.

As for Xenophanes, Dodds skips the positive re-foundation of religion and theology by Herakleitos in connection with the mysteries (the unusual ones then), emphasized by many a classicist. Which insinuates a skewed idea of "enlightenment" (see above p. 33v.).

**(i)2. Euripides' criticism of religion,**

This had been prepared by the singular ionic-Milesian figures above, especially Xenophanes, and by, among others.

**1.** Anaxagoras of Klazomeinai (-499/-428), the physicalist who comes closest to the modern -physical-scientific point of view (and who reduces the so-called "divine" sun - reductively denoting it, typical of the enlightenment - to a "golden clod" and ridicules the professional seers),

**2.** as well as Protosofistics (-450/-350) induced basic ethical-political concepts to think in terms of the systechny nomos - fisis (law, custom, agreement - nature). Dodds refers to *F. Heiniman, Nomos und Physis*, Basel, 1945, who offers an orderly semasiology of the two oppositional terms, which Dodds summarizes as follows:

**a.** 'nomos' can mean:

**a1.** the surviving and established religious order of society;

**a2.** the rule of coexistence, deliberately imposed by one or another social class, fundamentally arbitrary, based on self-interest (class interest);

**a3.** the typically Greek, non-barbaric order created by the system of laws;

**b.** 'fisis' can mean - after a few centuries of thought evolution then:

**b1.** the unwritten, unconditionally valid law of nature (see above p. 71), set against local private law;

**b2.** the so-called human rights, i.e. the "natural" rights of the individual in his self-defense against the arbitrary interventions of the city-state governments;

**b3.** the power of the strongest, disguised as 'the right (!?) of the strongest' the so-called natural right then of that strongest, where 'fisis', nature, is defined from an anarchic immoralism (viz. that view, which continues the kuklopic interpretation of nature (see above p. 8v.)), expressed by the Athenians towards the weaker Melians (in Thukudides' Peloponn. war) and by Kallikiles (in *Plato's* dialogue *Gorgias*).

Dodds summarizes:

**i.** ethical - political validity of rights (and duties) and

**ii** psychological origin of human behavior, - behold the two main viewpoints at work in the systechny 'fisis-nomos'.

(GW 76)

**Two comments regarding Euripides:**

(i) He, like the enlightened spirits before him, replaces religion, which he incorporates abundantly into his tragedies, with a well-defined physicality; viz. he describes the behavior of Mèdeia e.g. as the work of an 'alastor'; an evil demon, who does not leave a crime unpunished, but stubbornly wants to avenge it, Faidra e.g. is 'possessed' and the victim of an 'ate', the madness generated by a daiamon; but, as an enlightened spirit, who reduces everything to 'fuisis', 'nature', he is not the victim of a 'alastor', but of an 'alastor'. Faidra e.g. is "possessed" and the victim of an "ate", the madness conceived by a daiamon; but, as an enlightened spirit, who reduces everything to "fuisis", "nature", here to human nature, one of the sub-natures of total nature (see above p. 70: private empiricism - private nature), Faidra describes the demon as the work of an "alastor"; an evil demon who does not allow a crime to go unpunished, but stubbornly wants to avenge it. 70: private empiricism - physticism), he reinterprets these pseudo-religious phenomena as "natural", situated in man himself, exclusively, "powers of 'evil'": Medeia for instance has to do - not with an alastor, a tough evil spirit, but with her own "thumos", her own "irrational fuisis or nature".

(ii) In Euripides, the enlightenment comes to a double turning point:

a. his enlightenment is ostensibly religious in the sense just indicated - and thus betrays the a- and even anti-religion of the enlightenment, - at least to some extent that enlightenment was a- and anti-religious: his predecessors were convinced that the fuisis was 'rational', - understand: well-ordered in itself purely physically speaking; - Euripides is convinced of the irrational character of that same ostensible fuisis;

b. the irrationality, which Xenophanes, according to Dodds at least, put into faith, - outside reason and its physical, Euripides now puts into reason and its physical: it is, after all, reason and the 'fuisis anthropinè'; natura humana, human nature itself, which are now irrational; the rational-intellectual optimism of a Protagoras, the great sophist, who believed in rational-physical progress, and of a Socrates, who, on the basis of ethical-political 'epistèmè' scientia, science - which Protagoras did not do, for he relied on the environment as the educating factor par excellence, - was also optimistic, is viewed with pity by Euripides on the basis of the brutal facts of the irrational behavior of himself and his contemporaries, that his tragedies represented, as the Peloponnesian War of Thøekudides, the other critic of human behavior, also enlightened mind, sophisticatedly of mentality, analyzes this same behavior as fuisis anthropinè, as part-nature of the whole nature present in human nature.

Cfr. again p. 70 supra: private empiricism- mysticism. - As *Dodds* says elsewhere in *The Greek and the Irrational*, "Euripides (...) reflects not only on the enlightenment, but also on the reaction against the enlightenment: in any case, he reacted against the rationalistic humanity (psychology) of some representatives and against the convenient immoralism (absence of moral objections) of some others." (o.c., 188 ).

(GW 77)

**(i)3. *Death summarizes the further effects of Hellenic enlightenment.***

And this together with Jacob Burckhardt's characterization of 19th century religion in the West, namely, it was the "reason cult (rationalism) for the intelligentsia, the little educated, and magic for the masses"; well, due to the Greek enlightenment together with the absence of generalized education, from +/-425 the gap arose between the "wise", understand: philosophers and philosophically educated, the intelligentsia, and popular religion with its increasing demand:

1. to magical healing (see above pp. 37 (especially Asklepios religion); 43 (mystery character)) in -420 the Asklepios religion was introduced to Athens, including through the holy snake, which found shelter with the great tragedian Sophocles until it found a temple habit,

2. to strange mysteries (Kubele (Phrygia), Bendis (Thrace), Sabazios (Thrace / Phrygia), Attis and Adonis (Asia); cf. above p. 38vv.) noting that most of the mysteries were "orgiastic" (accompanied by out-of-body phenomena),

3. to - but this is already the fourth century - folk magic, centered around the famous 'katadesis', defixio, fate casting of a black-magical nature by means of invoking the chthonic powers as cursors, especially in the region around Athens - custom, according to Dodds, which still exists today in Greece and around the Mediterranean (see above p. 7vv).

That a real 'dialectical' change took place out of the enlightenment, Dodds expresses as follows: "I am inclined to conclude that, among other things, one effect of the enlightenment was to provoke in the second generation, 'a revival of magic'" . (195).

In other words, not only the irrationalism (Xenophanes; - esp. Euripides' cover) among some enlightened minds, but also the "revival" of the anti-enlightenment that was the triple renewed folk religion (magical healing; strange, mostly orgiastic mysteries; destiny wrestling), proves the "judgment of God" that the enlightenment brought upon itself as hubris, borderline (see above pp. 6v., 9vv).

Which makes Dodds the say that Sophistics as a main stream of enlightenment, notwithstanding high possibilities and expectations, still failed. Cfr. for more information: *ER. Dodds, Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, (The idea of progress in antiquity), Zürich / Munich, 1977, 113/129 *Die sophistische Bewegung und das Versagen des griechischen Liberalismus*; (The Sophist Movement and the Failure of Greek Liberalism)), 97/112 (*Euripides as Irrationalist*).

Dodds is himself a rationalist, yet, by virtue of the evolution of our times (think of the hippie movement, pacifism, "green" philosophy, etc.), he became attentive as a classicist to the irrational and the irrationalism in antique-classical and Hellenistic Hellas.

(GW 78)

He does not, of course, declare the failure of protosophism (and the whole rational enlightenment) as "judgment of God" (see course first year on Hieroanalysis).

So much for three remarks on the enlightenment, which, however unintentionally, has contributed no little to relativism and this, as we have seen, in various ways.

**(ii) *The differentiation*** (= specialization) **of the physical.** (78/93)

As we, pp. 70 (the one nature and the many natures) and 76 (application by Euripides (drama) and Thoe kudides (historiography)), already noted, the encompassing physical and its historia differentiate themselves into a multitude of partial physicalities. About this, among other factors, as a factor of relativism, we now speak.

**(ii) a.** We deliberately start from a very current fact, namely the opinion of *N. Luhmann*, *Soziologische Aufklärung*, II, (*Aufsätze zur theorie der Gesellschaft*), (Sociological Enlightenment, II, Essays on the Theory of Society), Opladen, 1975 and of *Jürgen habermas*, *Theorie des kommunikatieven Handelns*, (Theory of communicative action), I, (*Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung*), (Rationality of action and social rationalization), II (*Zur kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*), (On the Critique of Functionalist Reason), Frankfurt, 1981, who, both of them, attribute the secularization in our present society (the 'Entzauberung' disenchantment, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the renationalization and cooling) ascribe to the progressive specialization of, in particular, contemporary business, - phenomenon, which, according to proposers, begins as early as the Renaissance, to come to full fruition as of the Enlightenment (18th century rationalism).

Specialization calls for experts, which gives rise to the idiosyncrasy of the profession: the fact that people are so specialized that they barely understand specialists in other branches and the whole of the society in which everyone lives.

This specialist misunderstanding more often than not brings moral-political indifference to fellow human beings and to society as a whole.

**(ii) b.** Does such a thing also exist within the Greek physical, organ par excellence of incipient enlightenment? The distinction 'nature/natures' is related to this. There are more than one differentiation processes (specializations) within the one physical.

**1. *First type of sub-physics.*** (78/84)

***Hekataios of Miletos*** - according to Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 479 - is the first who transferred the study (historia) of the fusions as a whole to the subfield, which is the 'inhabited earth' and which, until then, had been treated only as a part of the whole cosmos (especially in its surface articulation). With this 'logografos' (logographer, prose writer), geography and historiography are still undifferentiated;

(GW 79)

**Herodotos of Halikarnassos** (-484/-424), (78/82) the "father of historiography," elaborates Hekataios's partial physicality about the "inhabited earth," according to Jaeger, 480, into "ethnology of peoples and lands"-i.e. he preserves the unity of people and land, as Hekataios had conceived it, but he places man at the center, which is not surprising, for *Herodotos (Paideia, I, 227)*, like the poets Pindaros, is imbued with the Apollonian spirit of Delphi, known for his 'gnothi seauton' (know thyself); he is (*A la naiss. D. l. théol, 170*) the friend of Sophocles, the tragedian, who sheltered the sacred serpent of Asklepios in his house, - also: Herodotos belonged to the archaic-intellectuals ('sages') - and contemporaries of Hippocrates, the founder of the human-oriented medical physical; Hellas, Asia Minor, Pre-Asia, Egypt he had traversed, with his ever empirical physicalist spirit, - and he is the one who, in his own words, 'has been the first to know': he makes that area the scene of struggle between the democratic Greeks (the West) and the despotic-Eastern Persians (the East), through which, in the midst of his physical historia, history-physics, the Homeric - Hesiodic epic revives.

French, left-wing intellectuals, in the journal '*Hérodote*' (1977+), accused Herodotos of being, on the one hand, the curious traveller, the daring merchant and the first historian, and, on the other, the agent (!) of Athenian imperialism (he usefully informs Pericles about the political organization of the barbarians (not Greeks)), the justifier of the domination of the Greeks: this duality they call "the constitutive contradiction of geography".

One can see how far leftist prejudices project their own Marxist-enlightened ideas into someone who was exceptional and religious - archaic and empirical - physical, so much so that one can conceive of his history as an engaging adventure novel rather than a political battle script.

The central theme, meanwhile, is not the imperialistic information of an agent (left-wing intellectuals see 'agents' in non-left-wing fellow men - intellectuals - just about everywhere), but exactly the opposite - which proves that the publishers of '*Hérodote*' have not even read him objectively, - viz. "Just as the deity in fisis tries to maintain a certain uniformity and order by the wise division of forces (a typical fascist term), so in the life of men she has drawn certain boundaries, whose violation she will on no account tolerate. If, however, man fails to take this into account and exceeds his limits, he comes up against the "phthonos ton theon" (the rejection of the deities).

In addition to this term, we also find in Herodotos 'nemesis et theou' (restorative intervention on account of the deity)" (*G. Daniëls, Religious-historical study on Herodotos, Antwerp / Nijmegen, 1946, 28/29* ).



(GW 80)

Apart from the great sapiential harmony of nature and humanity, - theme favored by the Greens today, - it is notable that one and the same law - see above pages 71/72 - governs both fisis and man (cybernetics), namely the 'nemesis' of the deities situated in nature, among others in the nature of humanity.

We know this theme: see above *page 6/12 (Narkissosmythe hieroanalytical view)*. There is however one striking difference: the term 'phthonos ton theion' is now no longer 'the evil or evil eye', the so-called 'envy' of the deities, demonistically understood, but ethico-politically purified (one thinks of Xenophanes, who also de-demonizes the concept of the Supreme Being and purifies it ethico-politically (*see above pages 33/74*)).

A further difference is that the divine nemesis is highly immanent, although its transcendence is safeguarded, thanks to the tradition-bound yet enlightened faith of Herodotos, - which Jaeger already sees at work at least in Thales' demon belief (*p. 74 below: physical - rational theology moves the information domain of religion into the visible and tangible fisis*).

The French leftist intellectuals could not possibly have read Herodotos; if not, they would accuse him of everything except service to imperialism.

Daniel, o.c., 56vv, 93v, presents - what we will summarize here - the structure (logos) of Herodotos' historiography (historia) as follows:

**(1) a. *The conceptual content of the "logos"***

(one paid attention to the philosophical word, instead of 'muthos', myth), i.e. the logical structure of both from objective fisis event and of its objectively set narrative:

**a1.** the many deities work according to one plan (program), viz. 'genesis-phthora', becoming-and-decaying (see above page 7 at the bottom: harmony of the opposites 'life-and-death'); this is called Herodotos 'kuklos' (cycle; cfr. *WB. Kristensen, Coll. Contrib. 231/290 (cycle and totality, - an extensive - expert study on the kuklos-idea in the ancient world)*); i.e. all fisis-genesis events, in the demonist -polytheistic mentality,

**(i)** starts small,

**(ii)** becomes larger,

**(iii)** usually - that is the demonic phenomenon, which the Greeks call 'hubris' (border crossing) comes 'too great' (poorly translated in many cases by 'hubris'), i.e. border crossing, which in itself is already 'guilt' (i.e. in the demonic system),

**(iv)** followed nemesis-like (with Herodotos already active in the fisis) by 'Tisis' (poorly translated by 'punishment' (in many cases, at least, viz. where non-moral responsible beings are at stake), corrective ( called 'ison' by Herodotos, i.e. equalization, leveling ); - behold the cybernetics of Herodotos' kuklos, which culminates in 'teleute' 'outcome ).

(GW 81)

This kuklos can also be referred to as 'aitia-tisis' harmony (aitia = blame, - later, in a purely physical sense, cause; tisis = expiation, corrective,- modern: feedback, feedback).

**a2.** Aristotle (in his political writings) will mention something analogous as a structure: see *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id*, III, 1055, where he discusses (schematically) the *Parekbasen des Philosophierens*; *Aristotle Pol 5:5* talks about forms of constitution, which deviate from the lawful one; this deviation he calls 'par.ek.basis' (deviating from the path prescribed, by a lapse); the recovery he calls either 'ruhmosis' (to rejoin the programmed rhythm) or 'ep.an.orthosis' (to rectify again afterwards). Which proves that the cybernetic scheme of thought does not now date from Norbert Wiener.

**(1)b. The beginnings of the logos in the fisis,**

including the human fisis, at work: the deities exert this corrective influence: **b1.** in the plant kingdom and the animal kingdom; **b2.** in individual life and - here Herodotos is formally anti-imperialist - in nations (peoples, states).

**(2) The applications in the political field:**

Herodotos' political theology - concept that indeed dates back to the ancient religions (and was made secularized-actualized by Metz) - discusses at length how the 'aitia', the cause, resp. guilt (we are dealing here with morally-civic conscious princes. 'guilt' is therefore present here in the more than purely demonistic-polytheistic sense, - which is consistent with Herodotos' religious enlightenment (see above p. 35: Xenophanes as a pioneer of an enlightened theology, which is not ipso facto in conflict with archaic-antique theology; which Herodotos proves by uniting the two)).

Herodotos discusses at length - the French intellectuals, who read him, must have read this - how the aitia, here land hunger, i.e. the old word for 'imperialism', is at work in the lives of Kroisos, Kuros, Kambuses, Xerxes, Polukrates - all imperialists with great land hunger - hubris, i.e. border crossing - consciously or unconsciously, - it doesn't matter - is at work;

- how that aitia is momentarily inhibited by some "sumbouleutès," admonisher, who points out to the imperialists their crossing of borders and the danger they themselves create;

- how the blindness - think of Homer's atè' (*see above p. 6 (Echoes and esp. Nemesis' 'atè'; by which Narkissos is afflicted); - (10fatality throw))* - commits two errors:

**(i)** it rejects the good advice of the admonisher and

**(ii)** in oracle consultation (Herodotos cites sixteen oracle sites) proceeding one-sidedly, she dwells only on that interpretation of the multilateral statements which suits her blindness, while the true interpretation escapes her altogether;

(GW 82)

Finally, how crimes -- murder, senseless looting, corpse violations -- et al -- are simultaneously both the result and the sign of transnational land hunger or imperialism: -- one can safely compare current forms of 'land hunger' (imperialism) to see how accurately identical the structure Herodotos has exposed is.

One therefore rightly wonders how the French leftist intellectuals managed to read Herodotos in such a way that they "saw" (with what curious eyesight then?) in it "l'agent de renseignements de l'impérialisme athénien"!

**Note.--** We will return to such deviation - recovery structure or rule - deviation structure or the two structures together, when we discuss the oldest philosophical text, namely the famous fragment of Anaximandros of Miletos (-10/-547) one and a half centuries before Herodotos historio-analysis.

**Note.--** The word 'kuklos' is also the term of choice for understanding the 'astro.nomia' (celestial science) of Meton of Athens (akmè: -438). A younger contemporary of Herodotos, to understand.

#### ***Theokuddidès of Athens*** (-460// -400)

Theokuddidès says *Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 480 - is, after Hekataios and Herodotos the third step in the settlement of the part-physics, which is concerned with the nature of the peoples (and the countries, in which they are situated).

*H.J. Blackham, Humanism*, 10.4, says that the History of the Peloponnesian War (covering a time span from -431 to -404) is 'a unique humanist document'. Jaeger says that he is the founder of "political" science of history: where Herodotus analyzes the worldwide horizons of countries and peoples, Thukudides limits his material to the horizon of the "polis" that is Athens;

Theokudides is "political" thinker. According to Jaeger. Further, he is the decay descriptor:

**a)** like Herodotos he analyzes hubris namely in the form of the imperialism of cities, Athens and Sparta in particular; in the essence of the 'modern' state - we quote Jaeger literally - lies its pursuit of power, mitigated by the enlightened concern for the educational role of that same 'modern' state, emphasized by the Protosophers Pericles and Thukudides themselves; so that the city-state is torn apart between so-called 'democratic' 'iso.nomia', equal rights, and 'right of the stronger', called 'natural inequality' (o.c.,406). 'democratic' 'iso.nomia', equal rights, and the 'right of the stronger', called 'natural inequality' (o.c.,406);

**(b)** like his predecessor, Theokudides analyzes the uprooting of the physical and protosophical, accelerated by the years-long war of attrition between Athens and Sparta.

(GW 83)

Thukudides, in the spirit of protosophism, engages in linguistic analysis; -- the devaluation of ancient religious values, brought about on the one hand by the critical mentality of the physical and on the other hand by the confusion of ideas in the warring world, is readable in the use of words: words such as 'nature', 'justice', etc., which in the past had signified the highest values, were misused to mask the most despicable practices; e.g. when 'natural' inequality is spoken of by the strong, in order to denote their pursuit of power as the most powerful, which had formerly signified the highest values, have been misused to mask the most despicable practices; e.g. when "natural" inequality is spoken of by the strong, in order to present their pursuit of power as lying in the fisis itself, where everyone knows that it is free choice which creates that inequality. But the word 'fuisis', 'fusikos', still sounded instinctively lofty. So it could be used linguistically to manhandle.

When Blackham boasts of a unique humanist document, - which is to a great extent correct, - where does the reason lie? It is twofold :

**a.** Thokudides broadens or, more correctly, enriches his understanding of nature compared to that of his two predecessors in two ways:

**(i)** the Hellenic physical physicians had emphasized the physical fuisis of man, viz. they were convinced that a **1/** rational **2/** cause-effect chain studying **3/** part-physics only really revealed the 'nature' of the healthy and the sick body;

**(ii)** the Sophists - about which more later - had emphasized the **1/** rational **2/** cause-effect chain analyzing "technè" (professional science), which studies the entire nature of man, especially, however, the inner - if one will - "psychosocial" nature of man;

**(iii)** Thokudides unites the two previous concepts of nature and emphasizes the socio-ethical or the ethical-political "nature" (*Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 388),

**b.** Thokudides, in contrast to Herodotos, but continuing Hekataios' enlightenment, analyzes the downfall of the Athenian polis power exclusively as caused by internal immanent dissolution process, without reference to transcendent-religious or moral factors;--which means utter secularization.

The difference between Thokudides and his predecessors has been formulated by saying that Thokudides emphasizes, resp. The difference between Thokudides and his predecessors is expressed by saying that Thokudides emphasizes the coherence of events as well as the distinction between 'external cause' and 'actual cause' of the same events and, therefore, replaces Herodotos' 'referential' historiography with the 'pragmatic' one which fixes the more or less repetitive structure of the facts once and for all (ktèma es aei, an achievement for all time) as the true 'fuisis', nature, of the historical facts and, thus, creates an indefinitely useful book.

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*E. von Tunk, Kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen literatur*, (Brief history of ancient greek literature), Einsiedeln/ Köln, 1942, 37/38, quotes Ed. Schwartz quotes: "For (Thukudides) the essential thing in any state was power. He wanted to determine, through thought and experience, what factors made up the outwardly active force of a community reality,-how much these factors could perform and process. To this - and only to this - was his judgment directed.

Moral standards he strictly eliminated: on this point he in fact goes along with N. Macchiavelli". Or, as W. Schadewaldt expresses it: "relegation of what is significant in history from the ethically active example to the practically applicable model: But that implies, according to v. Tunk, that Thukudides touches on all problems, even contemporary ones, such as e.g. neutrality of the weaker states, national unification, peace based on understanding or defeat, decline of political morals, etc."

## **2 - Second type of deelfvsiek. (84/91)**

***Alkmaion of Kroton*** (z.. Italy)

Alkmaion, ± -500, was one of the first physicians, who, partly in Pythagorean, partly in Heraklitean Spirit, practiced subject science, especially then medicine in the line of the Milesian empirical physical: he practiced dissection, discovered the role of the brain, was a dietitian, etc..

His definition of health: the balance (harmony) of opposites - see above pp. 7, 9, 80 -. He described the distinction between humans and animals as follows:

- a. man possesses reason, the animal only perception;
- b. the soul, like the heavenly bodies, is divine, immortal, ever-moving.

His basic medical-dietary experience, backed up by

- a/ separation and - the opposite -
- b/ mixing of small constituents in a nutritional regime, - which is a typical mechanicist-combinatorial process - clarifies, cf. him, the whole fuis: the whole process of coming into being and perishing of nature is one big separation and mixture of 'constituents'. So much for one sample from the earliest medical physical.

**W. Jaeger, *Paideia***, II, 13ft., claims that already Egyptian medicine exceeded the magic and incantation type - which in my opinion can be said of all primitive, prephysical medicine, since all primitives quickly realize that, whoever only uses magic and mantis in healing, without first checking the natural structures, will go wrong even mantically-magically.

Yet it was not until Greek medicine

1. rational,
2. cause-effect law studying,
3. aligned with theoretical system! In other words, she was part-physical. Man as a healthy or sick being, has a nature and is part of total nature. The Greek physicians created the concept of human nature.

(GW 85)

**Conclusion:** from +/- 500 the archaic, i.e. the Asklepiomedicine, and the physical exist side by side (for the Asklepiomedicine see above p. 36, (*healers are demiurgeons according to polytheistic dynamism*); (37*medical magic*); 38 (*Apollonios v. Tuana*); 40v. (*Dionusios mysteries as therapy*); (43 *relationship between Demeter and Asklepoos*)).

This coexistence will continue throughout antiquity (*see e.g. above p. 77*) or even they were connected with each other, as already *Herodotos, Hist. 3*, speaking of Kambus' falling or 'holy' disease, shows.

By the way, the great physical physician, Hippokrates of Kos, is called the 'Asklepiaad': he belonged to a very old family and guild of physicians, who worked Asklepiadically. Asklepios was, at the time of Homer (VIII -th e.), still a man in the mentality of the Hellenes, but, in the VIth e., he begins to be honored and invoked as hēros, as a deity even who saves (sotēr, salvator, savior, healer): Epidauros Hierra (in Argolis), the holy Epidauros, is the first sanctuary of Asklepios; it dates from the VI th e..

In other words, both Asklepiadic and physical medicine arise simultaneously from the older ones, *Crf. CA. Meier, Antike Inkubation und Moderne Psychotherapie, (Ancient Incubation and Modern Psychotherapy,)* Zurich, 1949, 23ff.

#### ***The Hippocratic Physician's School on Kos,***

This one, after the death of its founder, furnished an Asklepieion; already a hundred years after Hippocrates' death, the Asklepiosian service was the predominant state worship on Kos, and the snake staff of Asklepios was state crest. - Also at Athens, in the IVth century, the archiatrists ("physicians") considered the Asklepieion their center.

***Galenus of Pergamon*** (+129/+199), the greatest physician physicist of antiquity, was open to Asklepiadic medicine (in his native city there was an Asklepieion which, next to that of Epidauros, was the most famous; Galenos there enjoyed his first philosophical and medical education; he became a physician, on the basis of a dream of his father, and, in a dream, was cured of a fatal pus tumour by Asklepios, the saviour; Meier, o.c.,20f.).

**Note.-- *The corpus Hippocratum***, a collection of medical texts, the oldest dating from +/- -430, is in Hippokrates' name, though it is not even certain which part is his. *CJ. Singer, Medicine, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 1950-2, 548*, cites among others the particle 'The sacred disease'. Therein it is said, "This disease has the same cause (profasis) as other (diseases), which come and go in the body: cold, sun, changing restlessness of winds (pneumata). These are "divine" (theia). There is no reason to classify this disease in a special class, as more divine than other (diseases). All diseases are 'divine' and all are 'human' (anthropina). Each has its own nature (fusus) and power (dunamis)".

(GW 86)

One can see that 'physical' medicine was not simply secular. - Singer notes that the terms 'fusus' and 'pneuma' recur again and again in the medical literature. By the way, there are three - four opinions on 'divine' in the Corpus Hippocraticum.

**1/ The coherent method:**

**1a.** There are two domains of nature that have pathological effects on man (e.g., the book *Decorum*): is "divine," which indicates no immediately discoverable cause (principle); the rest is "natural.

**1b.** there is one double domain that is sickening; 'divine' and 'natural' ('human') run together (so 'The Holy Disease' (above);

**1c.** there are three domains that make one ill; the "divine," the "human," and the "natural" (e.g., *Prognostics*, *Women's Diseases*),

**2/ The eclectic method:** there are tracts in the Corp. Hipp. which mix the three previous opinions.

**Note.-- Hippokrates of Kos** (-469/-399): this contemporary of Socrates is virtually unknown as far as his biography is concerned. His works have been lost. His doctrine and method are roughly known: he is the founder of platonically conceived medicine. Platon says that he conceived the nature of the body as the nature of a whole: only if one sees a whole in it can one know what acts on it or what it acts on. Medicine comprises three: **a.** the disease, **b.** the sick person and **c.** the physician.

According to *Jaeger, Paideia*, II, 47/66; 188; 262, Hippokrates is the one who makes "human nature" medically central;-although this "fusus anthropinè" (human nature) is still strongly conceived physically. Consider Hippokrates' son-in-law, Polubios, who writes a *Peri fusios anthropou*, *On the Nature of Man*. Thus, the medical physical as a specialization arises very clearly; it has its own formal object, physical-human nature.

**The influence of the medical physical.**

As early as *Solon of Athens* (-640/-561) was Ionically influenced and medically , medicine, according to Solon, is

**a.** rational

**b.** study of nature, viz. understood as coherence between the part and the whole (system concept) and between cause and effect (causal system concept, **c.** which is lawful (collection concept inductively applied) (*Jaeger, Paideia*, II, 14).

This bodily-human view of disease Solon transfers to the polis, society: polis crises are like health disorders, equally studyable. Solon sees the coherence in man and in the city-state even numerically (like his contemporary Anaximandros of Miletos (triadic cosmology) and, somewhat later. Puthagoras of Samos and his school and, still later, the hebdomadian text from the Corpus Hippocraticum).

Solon thus developed an organic-mathematical social theory under Milesian influence.

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***Protosophism and Thukudides.***

Both the Sophists and Thukudides were (...) determined from many points of view by the medicine of that time; for that medicine had created the concept of man's nature and took it as its basis. However, precisely on this point, that medicine depends on the idea of 'fusus' in the big picture, on the universe namely, as it had developed the Ionic philosophy of nature (*Jaeger, Paideia*, II, 15).

Here we quote a text, reproduced in translation by *P. Werner, La vie en Grèce aux temps antique*, (Life in Greece in ancient times), Fribourg, 1977, 133, which gives an account of Hippocratic-physical naturopathy - to be called that now in its distinction from Asklepiadic -mantic and -magical: "We examine the diseases according to nature, inherent to all things, and according to nature, inherent to each individual, i.e. and according to the disease (universal) and according to the sick person (singular); -- according to the things which were administered to him (...), according to the general composition of the atmosphere (the air space) and according to the composition peculiar to each region; -- according to the habits, the regime, the kind of habitual occupations, old age, words, silence, thoughts, sleep, sleeplessness, nature and the moment of the dreams, (...) the itches, the tears, the moments of climax, the defecations, the urines, the spits, the vomits.

One should also take into account the sweat, the cold, the shivers, the cough, the sneezing, the hiccups, the breathing, the belches, the farts with or without sound, the hemorrhages, the hemorrhoids. One should investigate - historia (!) - what arises from these signs and what they imply".

P. Werner emphasizes that, in addition to the preceding "signs" (symptoms), the influence of the means of life was considered of great importance: seasons of the year, (cold or hot) winds, water, location of the city with respect to the winds, sunrise, land (fallow) dry; or (wooded) moist, high or low.

Further: the way of life of the inhabitants: wine-loving, appetite, laziness, gym-loving, healthy hunger, liquor-moderation.

***To summarize:*** the disease resp. the sick person is both a system (coherent whole) in itself and is situated in a system (center of life, way of life). Nature is more than an unordered collection of data.

More to the point, *H. Selye, Stress*, Utr./Antw. 1978, 26/28 (Hippocrates), notes that, in the Hippocratic system of healing, disease as distinguished from, e.g., all other abnormalities (e.g., having lost a leg, being lame, being deformed), is doubly determinable:

(i) idle 'pathos', suffering undergoing,

(ii) but with a built-in recovery attempt, called 'ponos' struggle, fight, which aims at the normal state - as in the modern formulated homeostasis, according to Seyle - as a goal-oriented system. Even that goal-directedness aspect of today's systems theory is incorporated into the Hippocratic-physical theory of disease in the contemporary manner of the time.



(GW 88)

Yet in there is no such thing as systems theory-without: the emphasis on the singular aspect guarantees this; our current systems theorists minimize the singular individual as "foam" (Foucault); the Hippokratish-physical does not.

**Research (historia), system - understanding, hermeneutic contact with the individual**, these are the three characteristics of physical medicine identified so far. Another aspect is exposed by T. Kotarbinski, *Leçons sur l'histoire de la logique*, (Lessons on the history of logic), Paris, 194, 327s.: it deals with the eliminating induction - absent, at least according to Kotarbinski, from Aristotle, as the physicians apply this method. He cites *Ph. H. de Lacy, Philodemus on Methods of Inference*, Philadelphia, 1941, 122. This is about a collection of essays on medicine, predating Aristotle (tss. -500 and -400).

Here is the text: "If a disease simultaneously and collectively affects many people, young and old, men and women, water drinkers and wine drinkers, those who feed on barley and those who feed on wheat, the hard workers and the idlers, then the cause of that disease cannot be the individual way of life but an element common to all."

In other words, this form of induction eliminates the individual causes (eliminative induction) in order to keep the collective and/or universal... - The same text then ventures an abduction: that common cause is the air that all breathe simultaneously and collectively, which then, of course again must be examined by induction (eliminative).

Kotarbinski notes that this embryonic induction doctrine concerning eliminative abduction induction takes on a systematic form among others with the Epicurean Philodèmos of Gadara (-110/-35).

**The manuscript from Herculanium**, found in the last century, expresses Philodemus' opinion: 'If A as such (i.e. because it is A) is B, then A will also be B in the future - not just so far. This is a view of beings, which implies universality (' If all A is also B, then also all future A (and not only all past A)).

The question for the purely empirical Epicurean is, of course: how can I assert purely empirically that all A, are B, since I have always examined only a part of it - not all of it (I conclude from the subset examined: I cannot possibly empirically verifiably examine all past and certainly all future cases).

Here we clearly encounter the limits of the purely empirical or historia method.

(GW 89)

**Note-** W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Korystos, Die Griechische Medizin und. die Schule des Aristoteles*, (Diocles of Corystus, The Greek Medicine and. the School of Aristotle.), 1938.

Jaeger maintains that the physical-medicine doctors understood human nature as physical nature, first and foremost, as physical organism (*Paideia*, I, 387). Yet this was apparently understood broadly: D. Fontana /A. Slot, *Inleiding in de pedagogische psychologie*, (Introduction to pedagogical psychology), Nijkerk, 1978, 92vv., sees in Hippocrates' teaching on the four temperaments - melancholic, phlegmatic, choleric, sanguine - the impetus for a nomothetic theory of personality' (i.e. a general law discovering theory); he refers to the espousals of WB. Wundt and HJ. Eysinck. See also R. Le Senne, *Traité de caractérologie*, (Treaty of Characterology), Paris, 1945), 46: "Hiipokrates, then Galenos, by their theory of the four humoral constitutions, have presided over the principles of a characterology so happy (...) that it has defied the ages."

According to this theory, there are, in the body, four fluids - the blood, (sanguine), the bile (choleric), the black bile (melancholic, swarthy), the phlegm (phlegmatic) - Medicine has held on to this doctrine until the XIXth e. with variants. The Groningen school of characterology (G. Hyemans/ E. Wiersma) redirected them: the sanguinics became the primary non-emotives, the phlegmatics the secondary non-emotives, the choleric the primary emotives, the blackgallics the secondary emotives.

One might ask whether Hippocrates did not confuse the soul body (subtle, fluidic), in four of its parts at least, with the gross body, like so many fusikoi of the first hour.

**(1) Protosofistics** has redirected the human nature of medici-physicians in two ways:

**(1)a.** the Sophists understood 'human nature' - according to Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 387f. - the whole of soul and body, with emphasis on the inner disposition of man (about which more later);

**(1)b.** the sophists, rhetorical as they are, see much more the human interaction at work and in medical science and in medical praxis JP. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée*, II, 55, ad 28, ML. Bourgey, *Observation et expérience chez les médecins de la collection hippocratique*, (Observation and experience in the physicians of the Hippocratic collection.), Paris, 1953 114ss., citing, says that especially - but not only - the sophist physicians interdisciplinarily defended their own 'thesis' (opinion) with eloquence against those who disagreed, - this, the more so as the 'cause' of the disease and health, belonged to the 'adèlon' (the invisible and therefore susceptible to discussion and persuasion, with or without eliminative induction); they exceeded, of necessity, the mere 'empeiria', the purely empirical proceeding viz. by reasoning (logismos) - see above p. 88 at bottom -;

(GW 90)

G. Rager, *Hypnosis, sophrologie et médecine*, 1973, 180s. says that Antifon of Athens (-480/-411) aristocrat, sophist, rhetor, opened, at a given time, at Corinthos a room that gave out on the agora, the public place; he had prospectuses circulated, stating that he had means of curing people through language and that it was enough for the sick to confide to him their ailments as to its 'causes', that he might cure them. - Later antiphon gave up these 'mètis' (medical praxis), because he found them too difficult.

Meanwhile, this medical-rhetorical mètis shows two things:

(a) every physician and / or healer(s) goes at least rhetorical (persuading, influencing by language) to this day;

(b) the effect of language on the interior of the human fuis was a sophistical main point. Even more so Antiphon was also a dream-duster: he must therefore have possessed an impetus for depth psychology (everyone knows how Freud called dream-duplication the 'royal road' to the unconscious). That aspect with Antiphon also points to the internalization of human fusion, as understood by Sophistics.

*Note.--* This double correction of protosophism situates Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 185., and *A la naissance d.l. théol.* 188ss. in the formal foundation of physical ('rational') anthropology by the sophists of the V-th e., therein the precursors; according to Jaeger, of the XVIII - century enlightenment.

a. the object is man, as part of the overall fuis;

b. as such, human beings, like the overall nature, are also structured by law.

c. this object can be approached fourfold:

c1. as bodily nature, as with the physicians (cfr. the sophistical physicians);

c2. as psychological nature, of which especially the sophists recognize its own nature and by which they are the founders, says Jaeger, of scientific psychology, even before Platon (in his description of the unique personality of his teacher Socrates, - a masterpiece of individual psychology, against the universalizing tendency of the physicalists) and Aristotle, on the soul et al. elaborate them further in the spirit of the socratic;

c3. as a sociological nature (see Jaeger, *Early Greek Theology* (= *A la naissance d.l. théol.*), of which the Sophists design a precise theoretical study: the nature of the state (city), of society, of state law, of morality ('aretè politikè, state virtue); - especially Thøekudides will elaborate this socially - ethically.

c4. as culturological nature (*Paideia*, I, 393ff.) in which the Sophists emphasize the educability of human nature (Protagoras on the head), the masterpiece of the typically Greek ennoblement and nature-improvement tendency; - in this, the malleability of human nature is only one case of the relation 'fuis (nature) / 'nomos' (law, custom, etc.)' / 'technè' (art).

(GW 91)

Jaeger refers to *Ploetarchos of Apameia's on youth education*, -- work that was fundamental to Renaissance humanism (o.c., 394). One can see that from the broadened fisis concept of fusikoi, protosofistics has purveyed the overall impetus for contemporary humanities.

## (2) *Thoekudides of Athens*

(Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 379ff., *Thukudides as Politischer thinker*) founds the political or city-state history, as, already above pp. 82/84, briefly explained, starting from the human-scientific concept of "human nature" broadened by the Sophists. *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, II, 55, points out that. with Thoekudides, as *MI. Meyerson, le temps, la mémoire, l'histoire*, (time, memory, history), in *Journal de psychologie*, 1956, 340, tried to prove, the sequence of facts is not chronological but logical.

Thus e.g. the story of a battle is actually a theory (a logically coherent system concerning the facts to be narrated in their nature), which inductively verifies the systemic coherence of the facts: the victory achieved e.g. is a tested reasoning (the commander plans the battle in view of the overall situation, its course verifies this planning). Actually this is a pragmatic reasoning (see above p. 30/31): the commander's plan is the lemma (his abduction) the outcome of the battle decides on the veracity of that plan (induction). - So much for the beginning of specialization (partial physics), which is further defined in the course of Greek history of philosophy, more on this later.

**Conclusion:** the prescepsis in its twofold form:

**a.** the enlightened criticism of religion (see above pp. 74/78 (*Hekataios of Miletos, Xenophones of Colophon, Euripides of Salamis, reason cult hand in hand with folk magic*));

**b.** specialization of the initially transcendental physical into sub-physics (see above p. 86/91 (*First type of partial physiques (Hekataios of Miletos, Herodotos of Halikarnassos, Thoekudides of Arhene: country and people physiques); second type (Alkmaion of Kroton, Asklepiadic and Hippokratic medicine as partial physiques sui generis each; Protosofistics and Thoedudides) medicinal physiques, broadened to human physiques*)); -- this double intellectual assertion of the archaic ancient tradition leads to relativism:

**ad. a.** the enlightened critique of religion puts presphysical religion in perspective;

**ad. b.** specialization greatly relativizes the prephysical general "wisdom" that was still unspecialized: one specialist relativizes the other and, what is more, one specialization relativizes the other, -- up to our days of hyper-specialization, -- above all, the specialist relativizes the whole of society: he tends to isolate himself in his field of specialization and risks in the long run to take into account only his own habits of thinking and doing and - presuppositions; he becomes "unsocial," if he does not cultivate a new social feeling as a counterbalance.

(GW 92)

*RG. Bury, ed., Sextus Empiricus*, 4 vols., London/ Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1961, I, XXIX, says: "A skeptic," in the original sense of the Greek term, is simply an "investigator" (cf. *histor*) or sleuth. But research often leads to an impasse and ends in disbelief or despair of a solution. Consequence: the 'investigator' becomes a 'doubter' or an 'unbeliever'.

Immediately 'skepticism' acquires its familiar connotation. Throughout the history of philosophy in Hellas or beyond, we have found traces of skeptical thinking, viz. in the frequent emphasis on the folly of the opinion of the great masses and in the ever repeated discrediting of sensory experience."

*R. Jolivet, Les sources de l' idéalisme*, Paris, '1936, 205s., adds to this:

(i) apart from the philosophical contempt for the opinions of the average people, i.e., non-philosophically educated people (calling the "masses," the "man of the street," the "people's man," the "many" (in the literally translated Greek), etc., contemptuous);

(ii) except, secondly, the-in-doubt drawback of sense perception (think of the *systechy* 'visible/invisible');

(iii) Jolivet, rightly complementing Bury's formulation, adds the critique of the concept, the idea (the universal collection) as necessarily foreign to the continuous and incessant assertion (change) of phenomena and also foreign to the singular, individual - after all only (seemingly after all) 'real' - realities.

This threefold critique is, among other things, and esp. the work of Protosofistics, prepared by the preceptics, -- the major features of which we have outlined;

***Conclusion:***

**a.** positive: only the subjective impression, the so-called phenomenon, i.e. what shows itself to my consciousness, is certain;

**b.** negative: all that is non-phenomenal, the so-called 'objective', i.e. realities independent of my consciousness (what the masses believe, - what sensory perception establishes, - what the concepts (ideas) pronounce), is uncertain.

Behold what the specialized one, i.e. the sage, establishes: for in relation to the non-sage the sage is a specialized one.

(GW 93)

Thus perishes the physical as specialization wisdom, estranged from wisdom - without - more. Unless the physical - broader: the whole philosophy - takes root in the wisdom - without - more, from which it has detached itself as a partial wisdom by 'specialization'. Thus it becomes clear from the history of philosophy itself, why this course begins with sophio-analysis or wisdom theory: see above esp. pp. 3/4 (*the philosophical degree of sophio-analysis*). "Though the (specialized) partial wisdom runs so fast, the (unspecialized) total wisdom overtakes it."

***Presocratic philosophy can be divided into two types.***

See above pp. 73/74 - *the dogmatists and the presceptics*; it is now clear why:

- a) the dogmatists start from the initial and total wisdom without leaving it;
- b) the presceptics do the same - one cannot do otherwise -, yet they 'abandon' the point of departure in order to encapsulate themselves in 'specialization' (partial wisdom): the epistemological demands, made by the interpretive community of the specialized, are such that 'skepticism' in that specialized, purely specialized sense, as Bury says, evolves from 'inquiry' to 'doubt'. -

***More concrete:***

a. the Eleates, with their emphasis (specialization) on mere comprehensible thinking reasoning, separate from the masses and sensory perception, run into the Sophist Gorgias of Leontinoi, who doubts 'being', 'knowing' and 'communicating';

b. the Herakliteans, with their emphasis (specialization) on the mobility of all being, apart from the masses and the comprehensible thinking, run into the sophist Protagoras of Abdera - via the Heraklitean - par excellence Kratulos, who takes his position to the extreme - who questions the objective truth (= being) as knowable (knowing);

c. the Mechanicists, esp. the Atomists (Demokritos), with their emphasis on the invisibility of the atomic structures (again, one-sidedness and specialization, detached from the masses and sensory experience, run into Metrodoros of Chios ( VI th e. B.C.), who asserts that "*we know nothing*,-not even whether we know anything" (the atomic structure becomes all being, which is invisible) and to Anaxarchos of Abdera, (the friend of Purrion of Ellis, the skeptic-at-large (pyrrhonism)), who accompanied Alexander the Great on his Persian-Indian conquests.

***Total impression:*** the multiplicity of all possible being is the final sum of the physical, resp. of the whole philosophy.

But this ambiguity not as proof of the inexhaustible riches of reality, but as riches giving rise to doubt, which are too much and too unattainable either for philosophical comprehensible reasoning (Eleates, Demokrites) or for philosophical sensory experience.

(GW 94) ***The triad of 'matter / energy / information' in nature.***

Weert N. Wiener, +/- 1948, with - his Cybernetics (steering science) in its logistic - mathematical form, valorized the concept of 'information' in physical-chemical - yes, in all possible contexts, physicists and human scientists work with, in addition to 'matter' and 'energy', also 'information'. - This triadicity is clearly recognizable in the earliest concept of nature of the fisis researchers. Which we now explain in more detail.

**a. Ancient "materialism".** (94/109)

The fact that people regularly speak of 'ancient' materialism proves that the basic concept of modern science (and philosophy) dates from antiquity. In order to prepare the basic concepts (categories), we start from the current concepts of matter. With Lange and Poortman we fundamentally distinguish two main types of matter conceptions: the monistic (monos = only, alone; there is only one kind of matter) and the pluralistic (plures = several; there is more than one kind of matter). Which will now be explained in more detail.

**a1. Monistic materialism** (= hylic monism) (94/98)

'Hulè' = matter; 'hulikos' (hylic) = material; hylic monism = that view which regarding matter assumes only one kind.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- *D.Dubarle, Concept de la matière et discussions sur le matérialisme*, in *Fr. Russo et al, Science de matérialisme, in Recherches et débats*, (Concept of matter and discussions on materialism, in *Fr. Russo et al, Science of materialism, in Recherches et débats*), 41 (déc. 1962, 37/70);

-- *FA. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, (History of materialism and critique of its meaning in the present.), 1886-1 (now outdated work, but still very valuable: Lange is a non-materialist Kantian; he does not value materialism as an ideology, but as a method of natural science especially).

The following results emerge from the study: **1/** according to modern, especially XVIII-th and XIX-th century materialism, is **1/a.** all are "substance," matter; i.e., modern materialism is a distinct ontology or theory of reality (see above pp. 14v.; 29) that claims that all that is "real" is simultaneously and ipso facto "hylic" (= material, material);

**1/b.** Although all being is substance, nevertheless there is diversity: the aggregate states (solid, liquid, gaseous, plasmatic), consciousness, resp. soul and life, - all these kinds of 'substance' belong radically to one and the same type of substance, which can be investigated exhaustively with the means of the exact (i.e. ánd experimental ánd mathematical-logistic) method that has emerged since Galilei; more precisely: so-called 'paranormal' or even occult and religious methods are reducible to 'exact' of the type Galilei and have no independent value, epistemologically speaking; radically expressed, for some materialists, this is not the case for all substances. More precisely: so-called paranormal or even occult and religious methods are reducible to 'exact' of the Galilean type and have no independent value, epistemologically speaking; radically put, with some materialists: life, soul and consciousness are only 'epiphenomena' (side-effects) of the one matter.

(GW 95)

2/ *The diachronic aspect of the matter is variously interpreted:*

**2/a. Mechanistic materialism**

among the moderate (Empedokles, Anaxagoras) and the radical (Leukippos, Democritos) mechanists among the pre-Socraticists and among the Epokoureans, in antiquity; among C. Vogt (1817/1895), J. Moleschott ((1822/1893) and L. Büchner (1824/ 1899) last century, e.g. sees some dust particles (atomistics) or dust species (element theory) moved purely quantitatively and spatially.

**2/b. evolutionary materialism**

starts from the biological transformism, which assumes an evolution of the species of living beings (scientific and also philosophical (Spencer, Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin)) - introduces the notion of 'evolution' into the concept of matter; moreover: goes so far as to propose, between matter, life and consciousness, one continuous, uninterrupted progress of matter (from mere matter to consciousness via living matter); cf. *G. Canguilhem, la connaissance de la vie*, Paris, 1965 (there is a political antecedent to the theory of evolution: economism, ethical progressism insinuated, on the biological plane, 'evolution' );

**2/c. dialectical materialism**

Starting this time from the human world and its history and formulated especially by Hegel (1770/1831), the dialectical-idealist - introduces, in matter, not only life (biological) but human spirit and culture with the having and making of history, yet, in contrast to Hegel, with the accent on the economic, technical and "material" factors of culture.

This implies, in addition to a quantitative aspect, a qualitative, non-mechanistic aspect; more so: the so-called 'historical' materialism - part of the dialectical and so typical of the Marxist analysis of society - term first used by FR. Engels, Marx's friend (1820/1895), holds that human history has as its main factor the economic mode of production (economism) such that the leading ideas, the law, the political organization, etc. are the 'Ueberbau' (superstructure) of it (which does not prevent Engels from opposing the irresponsible interpretation of his historical materialism, which claims that the economic phenomena (esp. the mode of production) are the only factor of history).

It is clear that, in evolutionary and especially dialectical-historical materialism, pure mechanism (purely quantitative motion) gives way, to some extent, to "dynamism" (which introduces forces and energetics (energy theory); *cfr. P. Foulquié, La dialectique*, Paris, 1949 (41/122: *la dialectique nouvelle*)).



(GW 96)

**Note.--** The dynamism concerning matter goes, largely, with the concept of energy:

(i) practically technically, the energy concept +/- 1770 in England, during the first industrial revolution (steam engine, coal, later petroleum and, still later nuclear energy), was given a first-rate role;

(ii) theoretically this grows into energetics, energy management: *Robr. Mayer* (1814/1878), German physician, with his *Bemerkungen über die Kräfte der unbelebten Natur*, (Remarks on the forces of inanimate nature), in *J. von Liebig's Annalen der Chemie*, 42 (1842), and his *Die organische Bewegung im Zusammenhange mit dem Stoffwechsel* (The organic movement in connection with the metabolism ), (1845), formulated 'energy' theoretically: he conceived of the 'Energetik' as a unitary science (starting from the physics of energy conservation);

*HLF. Von Helmholtz* (1821/1894), with *Mayer, JP. Joule, W. Thomson* (= Lord Kelvin) one of the co-founders of the formulation of the law of conservation of energy, in his *Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft* (About the conservation of power), (1847), made Mayer's hitherto misunderstood ideas famous;

**the dyad 'matter/energy'** pervades all of nature: there is mechanical (movement) energy, thermal or heat energy, chemical, atomic energy, etc.; i.e. thermodynamics (part of energetics), mechanics, -- physics and chemistry, astronomy, physiology (biology), etc. - all these subject sciences gradually work with the Mayerian unified energy concept; philosophy, e.g. with *Wilh. Von Ostwald* (1853/1922), will catch on and broaden the energy-foreign concept of matter; which led to a crisis in the materialistic midst, especially where one thought purely mechanistic: for the mechanistic matter is of course energyless, inert (slow) and movement is something that comes from outside the actual matter(particles) (non-intrinsic).

**Note -- The information conception concerning matter** has been, since N. Wiener's cybernetics (steering science), which conceives material behavior essentially as navigated by information (a kind of goal-oriented 'knowing', intrinsic to moving matter, which steers and, in case of deviation, adjusts (feedback, feedback)), a second great revolution, next to and after that of energetics (dynamism), in the matter conception; a kind of teleology (goal-oriented theory, finalism) has been introduced, next to dynamism; cfr. *H. van Praag, Information and energy (Building blocks of a new world view)*, Bussum, 1970 (against ET. Vermeersch, who places the triad of 'matter/energy/ information' at the center, van Praag places the triad of 'information/ energy' at the center; because 'matter' is only one form of energy). *Abr. Moles, Objet, méthode et axiomatique de la cybernétique*, (Purpose, method and axiomatics of cybernetics), in *Le dossier de la cybernétique*, Marabout, 1968, 47/61 (the emergence of information theory from cybernetics is outlined a.c., 58/59).

(GW 97)

The richest and fullest elaboration, however, of the concept of information is to be found in the general systems theory: *L.A. Apostel et al, De eenheid van de cultuur (Naar een algemene systementheorie als instrument van ons kennen en handelen)*, (The Unity of Culture (Towards a general systems theory as an instrument of our knowing and acting)), Meppel, 1972 (in which six specialists make a contribution; the general systems theory (since von Bertalanffy), arising from theoretical biology, automata theory (dynamic system theory) and production analysis (since Taylor), is conceived esp. by Leo Apostel as a unity science (analogous to *Rud. Canap's Der logische Aufbau der welt*)) and as very close to FR. Engels' dialectical materialism (o.c., 201), yet in the spirit of the great system builders of philosophy, i.e. Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel; mathematically oriented (mathematism), oriented towards the content and the objective world (and not unilaterally towards the phenomena of language) (objectivism), experimentally minded (against rigid notions), (experimentalism), thus the main features of the conception of matter).

***In summary***, matter is not just substance (particles or species ); it is energy (dynamism) and information (system) somewhere.

***Note.-- The anti-matter concept*** concerning matter is a recent, by controversial corrective which stems from nuclear physics: proton, electron, neutrino, etc. are fundamental particles (with mass, spin, charge, magnetic moment as properties); an antiparticle (antiproton, anti-electron, antineutrino, etc.) has the same of the same mass, yet opposite charge, spin, etc.; now it is so that every kind of fundamental particle has a corresponding antiparticle (paired structure); the ratio between the two kinds of particles is the same. Now it so happens that every kind of fundamental particle has a corresponding antiparticle (paired structure); antimatter is the collection of antiparticles; the relationship between the two kinds of particles is such that, when a particle comes into contact with its corresponding antiparticle, in interaction, they both destroy each other (annihilation), releasing energy (in radiation form or other particles). Is there only antimatter but also an anti-universe? This is the controversial side. One sees that the concept of 'antimatter', resp. 'anti-universe', can rather be classified under the heading 'matter'.

*A. Alkoun, et al. La Philosophie, 3 t., Paris, 1972-2 t. 2, 459, says: "Strictly speaking, every science is materialistic; it is therefore legitimate for it to try to subsume everything in matter, which is the basis of every physical connection and every observable phenomenon.*

But this does not imply 'reduction': if one ever succeeds in integrating every expression of life into matter, one would undoubtedly extract from that matter very different properties from those which science and philosophy assign to it today." In other words, materialism is the (un)declared ontology or theory of reality of modern science, since Galileo.

(GW 98)

Yet one must partially contradict this crass assertion: (*R; Ruyer, Le gnose de Princeton (des savants à la recherche d'une religion)*), (The Princeton Gnosis (scholars in search of a religion)), Paris, 1974, shows that concerning non-reduction, i.e. concerning the non-reduction of all data to a flat materialism, people like the physicalist cosmologists Eddington, Whitehead, Jeans, - further as Stromberg, VF. Weiskopf, ET. Whittaker, CF. von Weiszäcker, GJ. Whitrow, DJ. Sciama, D; Bohm, IJ. Good, Fr; Hoyle, VA. Firsoff, RP. Feynmann, - further the Soviet cosmologists, E. Parnov, I. Chkovsky, - the French J. Merleau-Ponty, C. Costa de Beauregard, further the biologists and/or psychologists JC. Eccles, JBS. Haldane, J. Marquand, WM Elsasser, WS. Beck, EP. Wigner, A. Koestler, BL. Whorf, E. Berne, E. Ruyer himself, - and last but not least the humanistic psychologists among whom AH. Maslow, CH. Tart, J. White, V. Levy (brain function in a non-materialistic sense), - Ruyer thus shows that all these people ((neo-) gnostics, 'cosmolaters', 'Palomarians' (in Pasadena the movement arose earlier than in Princenton), 'theosophists', are the antipodes in the scientific field - and indeed in the ontology - of materialistic scientism (o.c., 35); they assume that all data are explained equally well, if one assumes that there are being non-bodily, 'souls', 'centers of consciousness'.

**Conclusion.** claiming that "science" is materialistic certainly does not apply to these eminent scientists of the turnaround to the contrary.

## **a2. Non-modernist materialism (98/109)**

(hylic dualism and/or pluralism).

### **(i) Dualistic materialism**

This is typified by *G. Heymans, Introduction to metaphysics on the basis of experience*, Amsterdam, 1933-2, esp. 59/63 (*naive dualism*), (*133dualistic materialism*), as follows:

1/ Also dualistic materialism considers all the sides to be of a material nature;

2/ yet, in the living bodies, it supposes, besides general matter, still a special kind of it, denoted by such words as 'warm vapor,' 'small, smooth, round atoms' (Democritos e.g.) etc.-

*FA. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und kritik seiner Bedeutung*, (History of materialism and critique of its meaning.), albeit little consciously, notes that Democritos conceives of the soul as consisting of a special kind of atoms (fine, smooth round), that the Stoics conceive of the soul as 'material', 'corporeal' (though different), and the Epicureans (at least the pure ones) call the soul a 'fine' body, - that Francis Bacon, in the antique sense, conceived of the soul as 'fine' matter; further, Lange notes the doctrine of the so-called Lange further notes the doctrine of the so-called spirits of life (*spiritus animales et vitales*), since Galenos in medicine (see above p. 85) so central, conceived materially.

(GW 99)

It is right to speak of religious materialism: the belief in deity is found especially among the Stoics, but also among the Epicureans, as will be explained later. Immediately one measures the enormous distance that separates modern materialism from antiquity, which still bathes in polytheistic dynamism.

**(ii) *The pluralistic materialism***

So that includes, first of all, the dualistic, yet, in principle, also the more-than-dualistic: for one can, within the fine matter (subtle matter, fine materiality, rarefied materiality), also find still more degrees of fineness. But more about that below. Here we are concerned with the pure understanding.

**b. *Material or hylic pluralism,***

of which, in antiquity, Proklos of Constantinopolis (+410/+485), the Neoplatonic scholastic (so called because of his schoolly spirit of order ) and theurg (see above page 37v.), is probably one of the purest representatives, can be characterized twice:

1/ The soul possesses not one but several 'ochèmata', (vehicles, i.e. adherent soul bodies) of a subtle nature (and of decreasing density), situated between the soul itself, which is incorporeal, and the material body, in which it is embodied on earth by conception in the mother's womb;

2/ The soul itself is not material, not even finely material, but purely spiritual, immaterial (as e.g. the Supreme Being );

Because of this, hylisch or material pluralism clearly sets itself against any materialism, being grossly material, like the modern, or dualistic, like the ancient (e.g., that of the stoa or of Epikouros). *Cfr. JJ. Poortman, Ochêma (history and meaning of hylic pluralism), dissertation, Assen, 1954, 22/29, etc.*

Or one can speak of psychic pluralism, but in one kind of hylic pluralism: many exotic religions, e.g., know a plurality of "souls" including, possibly, the immaterial (if those religions have come so far as to know pure incorporeal being) and the fine material (the high-subtle, which are less "dense" or "coarse"; the low-subtle, which are "denser," "coarser").

Expressed in the language of modern theosophy; there is the immaterial (divine) and there are the particulate (fluidic) souls, including the "astral" (high-subtle) and the "etheric" (low-subtle).

Psychic pluralism always includes a minimum of what is called "materialistic psychology"; thus, one speaks of the "materialistic psychology" of some church fathers and Christian thinkers, of many Hindu and of the Buddhist system, of which modern theosophy and anthroposophy (F. Steiner), because they speak of more than mere immaterial souls or realities.

Yet that term sounds bad.

(GW 100)

**Bibliographic Sample:**

- JJ. Poortman, besides the above-mentioned work, *Ochêma*, 1954/ 1967 id. *Vehicles of Consciousness*, 4 vols., Utrecht, 1978 (the English text, a standard work on the subject);
- id. *The concept of Hylic pluralism (Ochêma)*, Utrecht, 1978;
- S. Mead, *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in western Tradition*, London, 1919-1, 1967;
- K. de Jong, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus*, Leiden, 1932;
- Aksel Volten, *Der begriff der Maat in den Aegyptischen Weisheitstexten*, in F. Wendel et al, *Les sagesses du Proche-Orient antique*, Paris, 1963, 94ff. (the hylozoism, centered around soul substance (fine materiality), among the Voorsocratiekers);
- J. Prieur, *L' aura et le corps immortel*, Paris, 1979 (historical part: 213/275; 222: Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epikouros, - Lucretius); 247: the two types of conception concerning soul substance, viz. *monadology* (Pythagoras, Leibniz) and *atomistics* (Demokritos, Epikouros); 273/275: *the invariants throughout the different conceptions*); concerning 'pneuma' (spiritus, 'spirit' in the sense of incorporeal and/or fine material beings):
- G. Verbeke, *L' évolution de la doctrine du stoïcisme à S. Augustin*;

**Concerning the conception of the soul among the ancient Greeks:**

- Erwin Rohde, *Psyche (Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen)*, Tübingen, 1890/1894 (for the majority of ancient Greeks, the soul is something airy, something breathable);
- Fr. Rüsche, *Das Seelenpneuma (Seine Entwicklung von der Hauchseele zur geistseele)*, Paderborn, 1933 (the ancient Greeks evolve somewhat regarding the soul concept, about which more later ); regarding the resurrection:
  - G. Zorab, *The third day (the resurrection story in the light of parapsychology)*, The Hague, 1974-2.

From the soul matter or fine matter problem must be thoroughly distinguished, without absolutely separating them:

(1) theory of ideas (idealism); an idea can be either immaterial or particulate (one thinks of Volten's article on the Egyptian Maat, mentioned above; see above pp. 16/17); on that idea see above pp. 45/54);

(2) Spiritualism: G. Verbeke, *The genesis of philosophical spiritualism*, in *Tijdschr. v. Fil.*, 8 (1946); 1 (Feb); 3/26; id. The determination of the essence of the spiritual, in *TvFil.*, 8 (1946): 4, 435/464 (the spiritual (purely spiritual, immaterial) can be described as a mode of being characterized by:

- a. I-awareness (a spiritual being knows himself to be "I"),
- b1. immanence (that "I" is an inwardness, interiority),
- b2. autonomy (that "I" is independent, and thoroughly so, of the rest of being),
- c. transcendental openness (that 'I' stands, with mind and will and spirit directed (intentio) to the all-embracing 'being'); a.c.,461); one sees that it is something entirely different from subtlety. We are talking here about the immaterial soul