

5.6.2. Introduction to Greek Philosophy. (Vol. 2, pp. 101 to 236)

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Bibliographic Sample:

- JJ. Poortman, besides the above-mentioned work, *Ochêma*, 1954/ 1967 id. *Vehicles of Consciousness*, 4 vols., Utrecht, 1978 (the English text, a standard work on the subject);
- id. *The concept of Hyllic pluralism (Ochêma)*, Utrecht, 1978;
- S. Mead, *The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in western Tradition*, London, 1919-1, 1967;
- K. de Jong, *Die andere Seite des Materialismus*, Leiden, 1932;
- Aksel Volten, *Der begriff der Maat in den Aegyptischen Weisheitstexten*, in F. Wendel et al, *Les sagesses du Proche-Orient antique*, Paris, 1963, 94ff. (the hylozoism, centered around soul substance (fine materiality), among the Voorsocratiekers);
- J. Prieur, *L' aura et le corps immortel*, Paris, 1979 (historical part: 213/275; 222: Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Epikouros, - Lucretius); 247: the two types of conception concerning soul substance, viz. *monadology* (Pythagoras, Leibniz) and *atomistics* (Demokritos, Epiko); 273/275: *the invariants throughout the different conceptions*); concerning 'pneuma' (spiritus, 'spirit' in the sense of incorporeal and/or fine material beings):
- G. Verbeke, *L' évolution de la doctrine du stoïcisme à S. Augustin*;

Concerning the conception of the soul among the ancient Greeks:

Erwin Rohde, *Psyche (Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen)*, Tübingen, 1890/1894 (for the majority of ancient Greeks, the soul is something airy, something breathable);

-- Fr. Rüsche, *Das Seelenpneuma (Seine Entwicklung von der Hauchseele zur geistseele)*, Paderborn, 1933 (the ancient Greeks evolve somewhat regarding the soul concept, about which more later); regarding the resurrection:

-- G. Zorab, *The third day (the resurrection story in the light of parapsychology)*, The Hague, 1974-2.

From the soul matter or fine matter problem must be thoroughly distinguished, without absolutely separating them:

(1) theory of ideas (idealism); an idea can be either immaterial or particulate (one thinks of Volten's article on the Egyptian Maat, mentioned above; see above pp. 16/17); on that idea see above pp. 45/54);

(2) Spiritualism: G. Verbeke, *The genesis of philosophical spiritualism*, in *Tijdschr. v. Fil.*, 8 (1946); 1 (Feb); 3/26; id. The determination of the essence of the spiritual, in *TvFil.*, 8 (1946): 4, 435/464 (the spiritual (purely spiritual, immaterial) can be described as a mode of being characterized by:

- a. I-awareness (a spiritual being knows himself to be "I"),
- b1. immanence (that "I" is an inwardness, interiority),
- b2. autonomy (that "I" is independent, and thoroughly so, of the rest of being),
- c. transcendental openness (that 'I' stands, with mind and will and spirit directed (intentio) to the all-embracing 'being'); a.c.,461); one sees that it is something entirely different from subtlety. We are talking here about the immaterial soul

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Note.-- Two comments regarding Verbeke's philosophical definition of the "spiritual":

(1) The spiritual is not necessarily 'I': the immaterial idea of something is also immaterial, 'spiritual', purely spiritual, pure immateriality, but it is not 'personal', not conscious as 'I'; - with the ancient Greeks this refers to the distinction 'noèton' (intelligent, thinking content, ideal) and 'noèron' (intelligent, thinking, grasping ideas, which goes with 'I');

Consequence: 'spiritual' must be defined differently, i.e. from the concept of 'substance' (= a - what has (in)directly to do with particle and antiparticle processes); spatiality seems to be essential for such 'particles' (cf. Descartes' definition of 'substance', resp. 'body'); also temporality; yet 'energy' or 'particle of matter' seems decisive without more; so that immaterial, spiritual, is all that exists without being 'particle' anyway); 'I' is thus one possible form of such a particle-less existence;

(2) The 'I' is not necessarily the immaterial I without more, at least with the human, who is a person (the I-awareness of a nature spirit e.g. is impersonal): which 'I' e.g. is at work in the dream (think of Freud's dream analyses)? Or which 'I' is at work in the trance (out of body experience)?

There is apparently a deeper 'I' and there are superficial 'I's' (in a manner of speaking, roles of a deeper 'I'): one can already see this in well-executed stage acting: the actor or actress empathizes with a role in which another 'I' acts, lives, without completely merging with his own 'I'; how happy the player, performers, too, are, on stage, in the film, he knows, with real i.e. material tears, as if he, she, were the one to be played. Verbeke apparently does not even suspect the problem of the multiplicity of the 'I' (with him, by the way, the whole philosophical tradition that proceeds in this way).

Further: each 'soul' (immaterial, high-subtle, low-subtle, etc.) possesses its own 'I' (awareness, consciousness); consequence: expansion of consciousness is possible, when the 'I' (immaterial) acts or incarnates high-subtle and/or low-subtle; conversely.: our embodied, earthly incarnated 'I', once expanded by the high or low subtle dimension, experiences an expansion of consciousness; or by the immaterial dimension realizes the all-encompassing nature of itself as immaterial 'I'.

An analogous problem arises in the analysis of telepathy: I know, feel, 'am' another, in his inwardness, at a distance (again, that expansion of consciousness; more so: every hermeneutic, for whom the (or even the) other is not non-I but I-again (see above pp. 54 (micros versus makroskosmos), 58 (Dilthey)), is a form of consciousness-expansion; every psychic knowing (mantic; see higher p. 35) is a form of consciousness-expansion and I-multiple.

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The soul substance (fluid) among the Voorsocratiekers. (102/106)

Cfr. JJ. Poortman, *Vehicles of Consc.* II, 55 (o.c., 28/31); states summarizes the period with F. Rüsche, *Das Seelenpneuma*: Throughout the entire pre-Socratic period, the substance (= mode of being) from which the soul - so it was thought - consisted was referred to by various names, but always considered as something in the nature of air. Meanwhile, 'air' is not to be understood in our modern way simply, as our science does, but rather as something relatively fine(material)." (o.c, 30).

Fr. Krafft, *gesch. D. Naturwissenschaft*, I, 124, notes, with all other researchers, that all Preplatonic philosophies - insofar as they are physicists whole certainly - do not yet know the later, especially since Platon valid distinction between substance and incorporeal spirit to be explicitly formulaic. In this sense they are all materialisms, i.e. naively their notion of 'substance' is at the same time their notion of 'reality' ('being').

In other words, their concept of 'matter' is not exclusive (as aggressive modern materialism conceives it), but inclusive: it includes the (later at least so called) incorporeal (and transcendental even). In other words:

(1) the primal principle of the Protomilesians (Thales (water), Anaximandros (the indefinite), Anaxiùines (air, breath)),

(2) the 'arithmou', number forms, of Puthagors, the 'on' (being) of Parmenides (however thinking reached), the fire, resp. the logos (universe understanding) of Heracleitos,

(3) the elements (= species of matter) and/or the particles of matter of the mechanists (Empedokles, Anaxagoras, - Leukippos, Democritos), they are all "material" in the above understood inclusive sense, except somewhat with the Atomists (Leikippos, Democritos, who nevertheless seem to accept the evil eye and the apparitions of the gods as real events).

This framework of thought explains why the being or not being of a purely fluidic (fine) nature of the soul(estof) and, certainly, the being or not of a purely incorporeal nature of e.g. the soul cannot yet be discussed. One must therefore answer the question of the soulpneuma (Rüscher), soul dust (Aksel Volten) from the context, not from the explicit statements.

Only with Empedokles of Akragas (Girgenti, Sicily) (-483/-423) - according to Krafft, o.c., 124 philosophy begins to distinguish groping ('hulè' (matter, substance) from what later, Aristotle, is called 'moving cause' (in Empedokles' case: 'eros' (love), 'filia' (friendship) in their fight with 'neikos' (discord, strife) and these still in a strongly mythical sense, i.e. in the sense of deities, who are both transcendent and yet also immanent in the fuis; cf.)

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Thus we understand in the exegetically correct way what follows:

(1) *Anaximines of Miletos* (-585/-525)

claims that the soul (psuchè) is 'aër', breath (soul), air (soul) (this is a general concept, according to Poortman, II, 29);

(2) *Xenophanes of Kolofon* (-580/- 490),

the first enlightened-secular thinking culturologist-theologian (see above p. 74), says that the soul is "pneuma," breath (soul);

(3)a. *Puthagoras* (and the Paleopythagoreans) of Samos (-580/-500),

the arithmologist, says that the soul is 'a fragment of the 'aithèr' (aether, god-inhabited hell-blue sky); - such a thing is new and points to a new, Orphic (see later) conception of soul that conceives of the soul as (lapsed) deity;

(3)b. *Herakleitos of Ephesos* (-535/-465),

the first modern-dialectician (*see above p. 95: dialectical materialism*), says that the soul is 'augè xèrè', a dry light, at least the soul of the sophos, the sage (the other souls are 'moist' i.e. according to Poortman, dry light is subtle and alive (hylozoism); - by the way Herakleitos understands the fire (probably subtle) as the primal beginning of the fusi; - here too is a new conception of soul, viz, as with Puthagoras, inherent in the mysteries (see above p. 45);

(4)a. *Anaxagoras of Klazomeinai* (-499/-428),

the first modern-scientific philosopher, puts the 'Nous' (intellectus, Universe Mind) at the root, as the source and moving force, as well as the organizing mind, of all that is; according to Rohde and Windelband, Poortman says, 'nous' is thought matter (and thus difficult to conceive bodiless or substance-free);

(4)b. *Demokritos of Abdera* (-460/-370),

the great atomistic-mechanicist, sees the soul as matter but consisting of small, round, charged 'atoma', indivisible particles, very closely related to fire (see Herakleitos), the main element (substance type).

He conceives of the deities as mortal daimones, known thanks to small 'eidola' (images), when they appear to mortals; -- perception, both ordinary and paranormal (in our language of today, of course: Demokritos does not yet make that distinction, apparently), viz. in dream and 'face' (= vision, second sight) is done via 'eidola' (small images); although Demokritos sees different types of perception: he speaks explicitly of 'pleious aisthèseis' (a plural of perceptions); Poortman calls such a system the prototype of dualistic materialism, which apparently had an eye for paranormal phenomena.

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Summary.

(i) Epistemologically, we see two main strands:

a/ Demokritos in particular situates the atoma, both fine and coarse, within the framework of observable data; consequence: soul and deity matter (at once also psychic reality) is also more than pure imaginary reality, more than pure imagination and more than pure reason and or reason;

b/ Above all (Empedokles and in his wake) Anaxagoras situates the moving cause, at work in the obviously motionless, passive substance, purely in the data reachable only by thought (here Parmenides' influence is palpable): "Both thinkers are (...) dualists. For them there are two essentially distinct kinds of principles:

1. a passive kind, which undergoes something, and an active kind, which processes that undergoing,

2. a Corporal - material and especially with Anaxagoras - 'an almost disembodied and disembodied species. (*Fr. Krafft, Geschichte d. Naturwissensch.*, I, 278).

Krafft notes that this "physical" dualism of "substance/form" leans to the anthropological dualism of "body/soul (spirit)," which, in Hellas, has been in vogue since Hesiod.

JJ. Poortman, Ouchêma, 1954, 68vv. notes that from Anaxagoras, who contrasted the (almost immaterial) 'Nous' (universe-spirit) with everything else (typical 'physical' dualism 'Spirit/dust'), over Platon and especially Aristotle (with his hylemorphism or dust-form philosophy), further on over Augustine, one long line runs, which conceives the soul, 'angelic', d.i. exclusively immaterial, yes, hostile to matter or at least alien to it, and which is to be found with Thomas, more strongly with Descartes and, later still, with Kant, i.e. with the great opponents of hyic pluralism.

(ii) Physical: a plural of soul neuma

Physically, we see that a plural of soul pneuma (breath soul) or soul substance (soul substance) can be found among the Greek thinkers:

(ii) a. the thought substance, purely active, of the Nous (universe mind) at Anaxagoras (opposed to the passive substance of physical things), which make up the universe;

(ii)b. a plural of physical substance types, pointing to a layer or type of the soul or deity (daimon):

b1. aër (air), a pneuma (breath) by Anaximenes, Xenophanes;

b2. aither (blue or azure sky) at Puthagoras;

b3. fire, sparkle of light by Herakleitos (augè = brilliant (sun) light, eye sparkle), Demokritos (fire = main element or substance).

As you may know, even today, sensitives and visionaries note that the aura (radiation of the soul or appearing spirits) is blue, fiery or luminous or is experienced as a cool wind.

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Note - 'Hylozoism' - to be found among the first Greek thinkers especially "is called the standpoint that substance eo ipso (by the fact itself, of course) is alive: the atoms, for example, are not dead substance without more, but they possess as an original property also certain consciousness, a vague striving, weak sensations or something like that". (*JJ. Poortman, Ochêma*, 1954, 29).

"Indeed, hylozoism sees everything from the point of view of matter as it is simply perceived or known by us, and it now claims that there (and not only in living beings), contrary to expectation, there is a continual conjunction of consciousness and perceptible matter." (*ibid.*, 30) - Poortman opposes this with his notion of "psycho-hylism," which sees everything from the standpoint of consciousness and claims that consciousness constantly has a material or bodily side. Seen in this way, psycho-hylism is a kind of hylic pluralism, of course (which, however, does not hold true with regard to the consciousness of the Supreme Being, if conceived as purely incorporeal).

'Hylozoism'

This is understood differently by A. Volten, *Der begriff de Maat in den Aegyptischen Weisheitstexten*, (The concept of Maat in the Egyptian Wisdom Texts), in *F. Wendel et al, Les sagesses du Proche-Orient ancien*, (Wisdoms of the Ancient Near East), Paris, 1963, 73/101:

The Egyptian idea 'Maat' (justice) see above p. 16v. - is, in its origin, astrological; 'God' namely is the mysterious force (dynamism) which shows itself as world soul (understand: world fluid, in the first place) in the sun, moon and stars; from there 'God', as nemesis, directs the total natural events; above all 'God' creates the encounters of the heavenly bodies so that the people on earth would understand them as determining their fate - see above p. 9v. (destiny analysis).

The so-called 'star deities' are one aspect of that universe process: those deities, situated in the heavenly bodies, cooperate with the 'Maat', i.e. the judicial judgment of 'God'. Everything that lives stems from a divine fluid (*sic*, a.c., 92), which pervades everything - the heavenly deities as well as plants, animals and human beings (see above page 32) and the universe is governed by this fluid, which shows itself, in its highest form, in the heavenly bodies (astrological aspect), according to eternal and unchangeable laws (cybernetic aspect; nemesis). That fluid is precisely the "Measure" (a.c., 92).

There is therefore a material side to it, but apparently first of all a subtle or rarefied material side. On this Volten, a.c., 94, writes: "It is in any case clear that the pre-Socratic hylozoism is Egyptian inspired, as already seen in antiquity. The basic problem of pre-Socratic philosophy is, "What is the raw material from which the soul is formed?" The Maat, apparently, is, says Volten, soul substance (a.c., 99), which sails through the universe as raw material.- Thus understood, hylozoism is very much "psycho-hylic" and exists on the basis of materiality, which, however astrological, is soul-like (and living, conscious).

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'**Hylozoism**' in the proper sense, is even more strictly defined by W. Brugger *et al*, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Freiburg, 1961-8, 412: Diogenes of Appolonia (V-de e., synthesis of Anaximenes of Miletos and Anaxagoras of Klazomenai) asserts that the air is the primal ground (cfr. Volten's 'raw material') of all sides (// Anaximenes) and that this primal ground possesses intellect (nous) (// Anaxagoras).

Here the emphasis does shift to the mind aspect as a universe-ordering power, as Anaxagoras did: it is oxygen (air), yet "noetic" (minded).

Conclusion: the philosophical aspect of soul substance implies:

1. A gross material side (the secular, visible and tangible world);
 2. A cosmic or universe side (astrologically, "physical" understood as transcendental);
- which poses the problem of the pure immateriality of the Supreme Being, of course; about which later.

The soul substance (fluid) among the later Greek thinkers. (106/109)

Cfr. JJ. Poortman, *Vehicles of Consc.* II, 31/55.

(1) Platon: though not clearly articulated, hylic pluralism occurs with Platon: more clearly still with Speusippos (leader of Platon's school -347/-338) and Herakleides Pontikos (-390/-310), disciple of Platon and Speusippos (Herakleides speaks of the soul as an 'aithêrion soma' (aitheric body), which is 'photoeides' (luminous));

(2) Aristotle: all aspects of hylic pluralism occur with Aristotle, yet neither he nor his commentators proceed with sufficient clarity;

(3)a. Epikouros and his school: as a Demokriteic philosophy, the Epikourean is clearly dualistic - materialistic (see above p. 103);

(3)b. the Stoa: as materialistic as the Epicurean philosophy, the Stoa, on the other hand, is a 'model of hylic pluralism' (Poortman, *Veh.*, II, 43); the doctrine of the pneumatic or vital spirits was taken by the Stoics from the medicine of the time: in man, for example, according to certain Stoics, the pneuma, the soul(substance) is connected with the 'effusions' (= moving aura or radiance) of the blood (one thinks of the Old Testament, which, in the bloody sacrifices to Yahweh, offered the blood soul or blood fluid); --

Galenos, who after Hippokrates is most famous physician of antiquity, eclectician (he connected Platon, Hippokrates and Aristotle), takes on life spirits, yet what they (apparently fine) materialize (see Lange, *Gesch. D. Mat.*)

(4)a. Erastheneas of Kurene (-275/-194), in whose line Ptolemaios the Platonist (+130/+200), later, proceeds, advocates the doctrine of the 'ochêma' (soul vehicle): the soul constantly possesses a soul body (vehicle, garment) and, after death, it passes into 'leptotera' (finer, subtler) bodies; - Thus Jamblichos of Chalkis (+283/+330), the great Neo-Platonicist;

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(4)b. Ploutarchos of Chaironeia, (+45/+125), the priest at Delphi, whose oracle he revalued in the midst of a skeptical age, often mentions the pneuma, soul substance, consisting of more subtle particles, one application of which he emphasizes, viz. The (mantian) pneuma or seer-soul substance, which plays a role in the (clairvoyant) vision openness (one cannot 'see' with the second sight without a special soul substance), - so among others in the oracle clairvoyance;

(5)a. Mithracism, i.e. the offering of Mithra'(s), originated in Iran, which, in late antiquity, was very widespread in the Roman legions (see above p. 38: Hellenistic-Roman Mysteries), cfr. *J. Bidez, la vie de l' empereur Julien*, (the life of the emperor Julian), Paris, 1930, 79, 162s, 219/224 (*Le sanctuaire de Mithra*) states, in a rite (A. Dieterich), a 'soma teleion' (a perfect body) is central, which the initiate in the mystery of Mithra'(s) invokes as his higher 'I' and with which he wishes to come to a mystery-religious union; well, 'aër' (air) or 'pneuma' (breath) and light are characteristics of that perfect soul-body;

(5)b. The *corpus Hermeticum*, the literature, with which *Hermes Trimegistos*, the thrice higher Hermes, is central, coming from Egypt, teaches among other things that the soul as a 'peribolaion', shell, garment, has a pneuma in the form of 'mists' (aëres) as a vehicle or churning;

(5)c. the Chaldean oracles (Oracula chaldaica), whose proper title was 'Logia di' epon' (revelations), written by a certain Ioulianos the theurg (see above p. 37), this obscure work postulates that the soul possesses a pneumatic or soul material covering (garment) and that, descending to the lower spheres (= layers of reality, which are more and more approaching the coarse material sphere, which we experience on earth), it puts on less and less subtle 'garments' (coverings, vehicles, soul bodies), in order, upon resurrection, to take these off again and replace them with more subtle soul bodies; this is a doctrine that becomes fundamental in late antiquity;

(5)d. the papyri magicae, the Magical papyri, about which among others *K. Preisendanz, Papyri Graecae Magicae*, 1928/1931, - *T. Hopfner, Griechisch-Aegyptischer Offenbarungszauber*, (Greek Egyptian Revelation Spell.), etc., speak often of different forms of soul substance; this among others concerning daimones;

(5)e. the alchemical writings speak, as early as late antiquity, of

(i) natural processes, especially transformation (transmutation among others) of metals,

(ii) soul material processes, in which the soul body of man becomes more and more subtle, with, as an ultimate goal, an indestructible and perfect soul body comparable to e.g. the perfect body of the Mithras Mysteries (as, for that matter, of all mysteries, which directly touch the soul body).

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Immediately apparent to the alchemists, as already indicated above (see p. 105 ff.) in connection with the concept of 'hylozoism', is the connection between outer human nature and the inner, soul material man;

(6)a. The Neoplatonic school founded by Ammonios Sakkas (+175/+242) of Alexandria and developed by Plotinos of Lukopolis (Egypt; +203/+269) in the Platoniscch-Aristotelian sense will, after both founders, thoroughly develop the doctrine of soul bodies and related: Plotinos himself, as speculative as Platon and Aristotle, was less interested in subtle matter and soul bodies, but he clearly accepted them; clearly, however, he spoke of a "cosmos noètos" (mundus intelligibilis, a thought-content world) consisting of "noètè hulè" (materia intelligibilis, thought substance, - similar to the thought substance of Anaxagoras (see above pp. 102v)), according to Plotinos the daimones shared in that subtle substance;

(6)b. Porphyrios of Turos (+233/+305), pupil of *Plotinos* and editor of his work *Enneaden*, already clearly, though hesitantly, shows the shift of neo-Platonism from the speculative theoria to the theourgia (see above p. 37v.), i.e. a form of thinking which, averse to mere 'contemplative consideration', wants to intervene actively in the process of life and world, not secular-materialistic substance but fluidic-soulsubstance, supported by the fluid present throughout the universe (see above p. 9/12 (*destiny analysis* etc.), 32v. (*unity, wisdom, cosmic and human*), 45 vv. (*doctrine of ideas*), (105// 16vv.: *Maat*) (*hylozoism*)), *Fluïdum*, pre-eminently present in the 'theoi' (theai'), deities, existing or artificial (see theürgie), which are literally mobilized for the purpose of changing destiny (in which precisely lies the active, so different from the speculative-contemplative);

Porfurius himself further elaborated the doctrine of soul substance and the daimonologia connected with it; one detail: the fantasia, i.e. reforming-creating capacity concerning soul substance (doctrine) which reappears strongly in the Renaissance) plays an important role with Porfurios;

(6)c1. Jamblichos of Chalkis (+283/+330), pupil of Porphurios, founder of the Syrian school, elaborates in detail the doctrine of souls:

1. the soul itself,
2. its various soul bodies,
3. the descent and ascension of the soul through the "spheres" (layers of reality (less or more grossly material)),
- 4 the 'augoeides ochèma' (the splendid vehicle), among other things peculiar to deities (when Jamblichos had such appearances, he became 'powerless "like a fish in the sky"');

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(6)a2. Proklos of Konstantinopolis (+410/+485), the thinker who "systematized" Neo-Platonism and is therefore called the "scholasticist"; incidentally, because of his influence, he is the forerunner of the Middle Ages Scholasticism;-- his theory of souls summarizes his predecessors in orderly fashion:

1. the soul has several 'pneumatika ochèmata; soul material vehicles (the combination of pneuma and ochèma), which he also called 'chitones', garments;

2. the question of whether and how long the ochèma survived death, still hesitantly answered by Porfurios and Jamblichos, is answered by Proklos:

2a. the ordinary vehicles (soul-bodies) the soul, in its re-ascension to the 'higher', understand especially: the subtle (highly subtle) 'spheres', leaves behind Himself.

2b. the innate (sumfues augoeides ochèma) soul body, however, is imperishable and stays with the soul (what Poortman calls psychohylism: of course the soul has a soul body); cfr. *Poortman, Ochèma*, 1954, 46/50, where the author compares this innate, splendid soul body with the glorified body, as Jesus showed it on Mount Thabor and after his resurrection;-- cfr. Proklos, the innate, magnificent soul body was 'ahulon', immaterial, incorporeal (Poortman thinks that 'incorporeal' here means 'non-coarse material', because of the supposed psychohylism, of course);

3. the concept of ' platos', vastness (width of a massive body), e.g. in the expression 'en toi psuchikoi platei', on the psychic, soul material plane; according to Poortman this concept corresponds to the concept of 'sphere' (as e.g. with the modern Theosophists); one could speak of (subtle) spheres of life or life-spaces (layers, if one includes the higher or lower character);

4. Immediately it is clear that Proklos - and others - , in addition to 'bodies', also accepts purely fluidic 'substance' (not all thinkers speak of 'substance', when they do speak of 'bodies', in which the 'substance' takes form);

(6)d. A series of writers more or less Neoplatonic or Neoplatonizing: Themistios, Hierrokles, Olumpiodoros ('a Christian), Sunesios ('a Christian bishop), Surianos, Damaskios, etc. evidently also adhere to some form of hylic pluralism.

Conclusion:

1. Main impression: in the Greco-Roman world, hylic pluralism prevails, in various forms;

2. anthropological dualism (soul/body without fluidic middle term) is almost non-existent.

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b. The ancient dynamics (theory of force. (110/117)

W. Brugger, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Freiburg, 1961-8, 413 (*Üntersuchung über das Werden und die Veränderung*) distinguishes among the pre-socratics, two types of doctrine concerning 'force':

1. the "dynamist" explanation, which conceives of the being as self-existent (the force that causes change (movement) is internal) and as qualitatively distinct from the elements (i.e. types of matter); Herakleitos of Ephesus (535/-465) and his pupil Kratulos (Platon's teacher) are typical examples;

2. the "mechanical" explanation, which the being

(i) conceives of it as non-self-acting (= slow, inert, without internal force) and

(ii) accepts only a quantitative distinction of the elements of the substance; -- apply as typical examples:

2a. the non-strictly enforced mechanicians, who, thus, still maintain a qualitative distinction of the elements (= half dynamic): for example Empedokles of Akragas (-483/-423), who advocates that all being from four elements (fire,- air, water, earth) come into being by mixing (which is a mechanical event, but which already applies to qualitatively distinguished elements, namely before they are mixed).

Thus Anaxagoras of Klazomeinai (-499/-428), who claims that (instead of four, as with Empedokles) an unlimited number of already qualitatively distinguished elements (homoiomereiai) or primordial substances exist, which mechanically (whirling movement, mixing and separation), but under the guidance of the Nous (= Intellectus, Universe Mind) change, resp. move;

2b. the extremely thoroughgoing mechanisms, which

(i) 'an unbounded number of elements (here 'atoma', indivisible elements),

(ii) that are purely quantitatively different from one another, assume and

(iii) which change or move purely externally; so by Leukippos of Miletos (V-th c.); so by his pupil Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370), who maintains that there are an infinite number of 'atoma', indivisible primordial particles, which differ only by geometrical characteristics, i.e. size, shape, position in space, mutual position, that, further, there is no force other than gravity, which acts externally on the geometry of the atoms.

As W. Jaeger once noted, the physicians, with their processing of substances (food and drink, medicines) play a major role here, especially in terms of mechanism: they mix or separate them; -- which then, by analogy, is transferred to the cosmos or fisis as a whole.

Cfr. higher p. 84 Alkmaion of Kroton's dietetics).

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It is clear, to those who know a little of the history of ideas, that, with dynamism (of Herakleitos) and mechanicism (of Empedokles and others), two basic schools of thought in philosophy and science have been founded, which, in ever-changing forms, live on to our days.

Therefore, these further descriptions:

a/1. mechanicism is:

- (i) A collection of necessary and sufficient (sub)parts - matter-,
- (ii) so harmonized (pieced together) according to a structure - ,
- (iii) that they cause change (= movement, functioning) - energy -;

2. Thus seen there are:

(i) natural and (ii) artificial mechanisms; what is called "device" (machine) is such an artificial mechanism, designed and made by man;

3. cybernetic (steering) is a mechanism, insofar as the structure (the harmonization) or information, in case of deviation, provides a recovery (corrective) to the change caused (a control mechanism).

4. the parts of the mechanism are, in the ancient view (of esp. Demokritos), 'elements', 'atoms', in the present view physico-chemical 'elements', 'particles' (see above p. 97);

b/ *Mechani(ci)sme: nature, as a mechanism*

Mechani(ci)sm is that view, which, wholly or predominantly, sees reality, nature, as a mechanism or collection of mechanisms;

1. cognitive: nature (parts) are mechanical; in other words, all phenomena - the inorganic and the organic (biological), but also the psychological, the sociological and the culturological - are reducible (reductive view) to mechanical phenomena; e.g. the body is reduced to a mechanism; likewise (psychologically) the urge or thinking capacity (e.g. the electronic brain as 'model' of all thinking activities); likewise society and its collective functioning is reduced to a mechanism. The body is reduced to a mechanism; so too (psychologically) is the urge or capacity to think (e.g. the electronic brain as 'model' of all thought processes); so too is society and its collective behavior (which is interpreted as obeying social mechanisms); so too e.g. the creation of a work of art (culturologically);

2. technical: the automation (mechanization) of all processes, including the processes of life (bio-, psycho-, socio-, culturological), is a kind of ideal or program of mechanistic man; -- this reminds one of the myth of Pugmalion: the prince of Kupros (Cuprus), at the same time a renowned sculptor, was an ascetic and wished to remain unmarried; his withered (and repressed) 'eros', love, he transferred to a statue of a girl, which he had made: he begged Aphrodite to give him a wife who would resemble his work; the goddess breathed life into the statue and so Pugmalion was able to marry his own creation of a technical nature, Galateia; - this myth reflects, indirectly, something of the experience of the mechanic;

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It is clear that the mechanistic view becomes problematic as soon as biological and human (psychological, sociological, culturological) data are supposed to be interpreted in a natural way; consequently, mechanicism becomes opposed:

(i) **Finalism:** the universe (de fuis) or at least life and mental life are purposive according to a predetermined plan (purpose); not that the mechanistic interpretation is devoid of purposiveness; no, it assumes only an immanent, internal, purposiveness, situated in the mechanism itself; no external, transcendent, external purposiveness, as assumed by the finalist or teleologist; for the mechanist finalism is a metaphor, a transference of pragmatism, which establishes the usefulness, i. e. the subjection, of machines or materials or operations to predetermined purposes; - such is the assumption of the mechanist, of course, but he refuses to give these predetermined purposes any priority. i. the subjection of machines or materials or operations to predetermined aims; - such, of course, is what the mechanist also assumes, but he refuses to put these predetermined aims also before the whole of nature, beyond man, or before life.

Clearly, finalism (teleology) is based on a preconstitutive wisdom (e.g., a Providence, which directs nature in advance toward a goal, regulates it according to a plan, etc.; cf. above p. 32v.).

(ii) **Vitalism:** Hippocrates of Kos (Patronizing Physician; see above p. 86), - later Aristotle of Stageira and his school, Peripateticism or Aristotelianism, assert that, against the atomism and mechanicism of their day, life is irreducible to mechanism, that life is characterized by 'en.tel.echeia' (entelechy, i.e. in (= and) the living self is a purposefulness (telos), which programs it);

Against Descartes, who introduced modern mechanicism, the representatives of the Montpellier school (XVIIIth. century (reflex theory) were vitalists; Cl. Bernard ('le milieu intérieur'), - Kurt Goldstein (Husserlian influenced neuropsychiatrist: unity of organic and psychic phenomena), - Georges Canguilhem (organicist epistemologist) are vitalists, who reject the mechanist interpretation of life as one-sided; -- the philosophy of Henri Bergson is a vitalist philosophy;

(ii)a. **Organicism:** related to vitalism to a great extent, but emphasizing the concept of organism; 'organism' contains two characteristics:

1. holism, i.e., the living is a whole (holon), independent and self-directed as a goal (Eigenwert); dynamistic aspect;

2. interaction, i.e., the parts are alternately ends and means one versus the other; system-theoretical aspect; "organicism" then is that interpretation which conceives of all of nature, or, at least, life as an organism (and not or not only as a mechanism).

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In other words, here the whole (holon) is for the parts and 'force' is locked up in that whole (which is then not slow or inert and relies on external forces, as in the mechanism);

Representatives are: Cl. Bernard, who experimentally investigated the glucogenic role of the liver, finding that the anatomical parts of an organism

a. be relatively autonomous and **b.** still integrated in the whole of the (physiological) functions (operations, roles); thus the organism is an *milieu intérieur* (an internal living center), with its own unity (cohesion).

E. Goldstein extended organicism (from the physiological to) the psychological field the *psyché* is not only in interaction with the body, but the psyche expresses itself in the organism; -- what the existentialist thinker M. Merleau Ponty interpreted in his theory of the 'own body' in its relation to the world;

Representatives in the broad - and metaphorical, metaphorical, analogical sense are: linguist, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1707/1835), who conceived of language as an organism (anticipating de Saussure, who conceives of it as a "system");

sociological, Emile Durkheim, who conceives of the ordering of society (even too strongly) as an organism, etc.

(ii)b. cybernetics (*steering science*) and - more broadly: - systems theory:

The cyberneticists (systems theorists) broaden the concept of 'organism': every structuring (= system) is called 'organic'; e.g. a machine (mechanical organism; electronic device e.g.); a soul life (psychic 'organism'); a society (social 'organism'); a culture (culturological 'organism'); a body (biological organism); this 'organismic' science thus runs through all subject sciences and treats the 'elements' as 'black boxes' (as in and of themselves unknown, but nevertheless part of an organism) and sees the whole and the parts as provided with input and output, - thus cybernetics (resp. systems science) is a generalized form of organicism;

It should be noted that already Platon:

(i) viewed the body as a steering phenomenon (the head controls the heart and- the belly);

(ii) conceived of society (the polis) analogous to the body as an 'organism'. All this to show that the pre-Socratics addressed a duality ('dynamism / mechanicism') with after-effects.

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Typology of forces.

(I) The current state of the theory of forces.

'Fundamental' physics accepts four types of forces, which underpin all interactions between matter.

1. The oldest known basic force is gravity (already Demokritos puts it first): "gravitation" causes two masses (the apple, which falls, and the earth, which revolves around the sun, etc.) to attract each other.

2. Electrical power and magnetic power have also been known, at least vaguely, for a long time: the ancient Greeks knew about the magnetic stone; the Chinese are said to have used compasses for many centuries, supported by the magnetic force field of the earth;

J. Maxwell found the common formula to describe both in physical language: since then one speaks of the one electromagnetic force (e.g. the (negative) electrons revolve around the (positive) atom nucleus). 1. and 2. The gravitational and electromagnetic forces act at long(er) distances.

3. The third force, intra-atomic, nuclear, now, is called the strong interaction or strong nuclear force: in the atomic nucleus there are (neutral) neutrons and (positive) protons; the protons, closely stacked within the atomic nucleus, should repel each other (because of the same charge), but, in fact, they make up, closely stacked, solid atomic nuclei; which force holds them together? The strong nuclear or interacting force: in nuclear fission (in the controversial nuclear power plants, for example) the third force is released.

4. The fourth force, also nuclear, is called the weak interaction (or nuclear force): the radioactive decay of a neutron into a proton, an electron and a neutrino is 'explained' by this fourth force.

Hideki Yukawa, Japanese physicist, postulated, in 1935, that the four fundamental forces of nature are realized by particles (see above p. 97): gravitons, photons, mesons, and bosons; they "each transmit their force" (between matter parts).

Well, in 1979, ST. Weinberg, Sh. Glashow and Abdus Salam, Nobel laureates, for physics, that the second, the electromagnetic force, and the fourth, the weak interaction (nuclear force) are only two types of one basic force, the electroweak force; thus, according to Yukawa 's particle theory, there had to exist a particle that synthesized both the electromagnetic and the weak-exchange force, viz. the weak boson (W-boson, from 'Weak' boson), ninety times heavier than a proton, but existing for only a fraction of a second, with three variants (W^+ , W^- , Z^0).

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The Cern (European Centre for Nuclear Research) in Geneva reports, at the end of January 1983, that the weak boson has been experimentally determined in nine cases (among a billion cases): would Einstein's dream of formulating the four basic forces into a single formula ever come true? In that case, there would be one primitive or primal force.

As for the third and fourth forces, in ancient Hellas there can only be one experience which is epistemologically strong enough to perceive or presume them, already then, namely the "seeing" of the subtle, the soul pneuma (see above p. 102v.). Which one should not exclude a-priori.

(II) *The theory of forces of the ancient Greeks.*

That the ancients knew a theory of species (typology) of forces, proves a.o. *Cicero, De natura deorum*, II: 16, 44, where he attributes, according to Stoic philosophy, the regularity and constancy of the heavenly bodies,

(i) nor to chance (which, being changeable, undermines constancy)

(ii) nor to natural force (which, according to Cicero and the stoa, lacks reasonableness, reason and sense)

(iii) but to astral awareness and reason (only awareness and reason can cause regularity and constancy). Cfr. *EW. Beth, Philosophy of Nature*, Gorinchem, 1948, 28)

Similarly, Epikouros, - says Cicero, *ibidem*, I: 25, 69, the phenomena of fisis are caused (force!) by:

(i) the own weight of the atoma, which pulls them down (gravity);

(ii) also by human arbitrariness, which, suspending the downright drifting gravity, makes the atoma deviate a very little' (which his paragon, Democritos, did not see);

(iii) according to Epikouros' rather godlike understanding, however, the phenomena were not determined by a "divine" (i.e., deity-derived) force; -- herein appears the difference from the godlike stoa. Cfr. *EW. Beth*, o.c., 28.

Conclusion: chance, force of nature, own weight (gravity), human randomness, celestial mind and consciousness, divine power, -there is the dynamics of the ancients in a nutshell!

Hylozoism - see above pp. 104-vv. ,108 - which accepts one common force substance that pervades the universe - both deities and humans, animals, plants and so-called inanimate nature - forms the background of this theory of forces.

Cfr. *EW. Beth*, o.c. 35/37. In that hylozoism there is room for both mechanicism - think of the atomistic, also in relation to soul-matter (see above p. 103 (Demokritos)) - and for dynamism (including finalism, vitalism, organicism, yes, cybernetics).

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Note.-- The word "dynamism" has two meanings, among others:

(i) the physical, i.e., that tenor in the Greek physical, which situates the "force" in matter itself (and also has qualitative differences between matter).

(ii) the religious one, i.e. that purport concerning the essence of religion, which claims that the typical of religion is "power" (dunamis) spread over Supreme Being, deities and other realities (totem, rite, etc.).

Note.-- Religious science (hiero-analytical) the dynamics of the Greek physical can be clarified, briefly, as follows. *WB. Kristensen, Coll. contributions to knowledge of ancient religions*, A'm, 1947, 164, notes that

(i) the mysterious power (life energy) of the earth (element)

(ii) thought of as water (element) or rain (element in action) or as fire (element) or lightning (fire in action), i.e., depicted in religious art if necessary, but, in any case, experienced "dynamically" and applied magically,

(iii) further as 'soul' or 'spirit of life' (air - breath, wind as element, if necessary in action) depicted, experienced and magically applied,

(iv) is the foundation of humanity (chthonic or telluric religion).

We will elaborate on that when it is appropriate.

WB. Kristensen, o.c., 18, notes that, on the background just mentioned, 'theology' (understand: deity theory) and, given the similarity and participation in deity existence, also 'anthropology' (human science) stands or falls with the 'mustèrion', the mystery (in the strict sense of rite, which communicates 'power' (see above)).

As a result, either the deity or man or the rest of the universe (plants, animals, so-called inorganic reality) dies and resurrects periodically and does so by virtue of a struggle or fight against killing 'forces'.

This because the 'soul' (fluid) always (whether it is inorganic or organic or human or divine (polytheistic) (or Supreme Being (monotheistic))) "creates itself out of the original waters" (o.c., 49; one might as well say, "out of the original earth, fire, air") as the 'victor' by definition.

In doing so, however, it is the case that this victory over death is always deceptive (O. c., 120vv: Pandoramythe; Pandora gives life with death contained in it; -- which Supremely, of course, does not hold true).

Which, of course, is the theology and anthropology and fusionalism of (poly)demonism (o.c., 272vv.), i.e. of that religion, which essentially conceives the root of existence and life as deceitful, treacherous, tragic, etc., and which the Church labels Satan. See above p. 8v.

This conception of reality (and, among other things, dynamics) is perhaps most brilliantly translated into rational language in Herakleitos' philosophy.

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She is, in the so-called Delfic theology the essence core (o.c.,S5/99). The oracle at Delphi, after all, was usually consulted in response to fateful situations that implied doom: prolonged drought, infectious disease, murder (resulting in demonia) - cfr. *Rohde, Psyche, I* - ; fate is death as power; salvation from it is life, resurrection, 'epiphania' (epiphany, appearance); thus Asklepios - see above pp. 43, 85 - heal, because he was chthonic, yes death deity: he himself had been sick and conquered by the power of death, yet his immortal soul, as a periodically resurrected life-force (dynamic base), made what he had gone through also for others, who, resurrected with him, - in case of illness, healed with him; the tripod and the world's bill (omphalos, the piece of land that first emerged from the water of creation, the primordial hill) were at Delphi the symbols of that power resurrected through death (o.c.,88ff)

c. The ancient theory of information. (117)

EW. Beth, *Philosophy of Nature*, Gorinchem 1948,35/37, gives us a concise but solid insight into the oldest informational theory of Greek physicists:

(1) Anaximandros of Miletos

the first thinker, from whom we have a text, says: "That, out of which is the origin of things (being), therein also is necessarily their ruin; for they give each other penance and retribution according to the 'order' ('judgment seat') of time."

a. First of all, the (poly)demonic principle appears here, which implies life-death in a programmed way (= Time, as transcendent Goddess, who controls, 'steers' the immanent happenings) - one thinks of Nemesis (see above page 9v.) -; existence itself, is, demonist-satanic, sensed as 'hubris', border crossing, and thus, insidiously, 'deadly' threatened and undermined;

b. as explained in more detail above (p. 9), there is a steering in this: life is, demonistically-satanically speaking, an aberration (for the so-called envious deity or the evil eye), which can only, in time, be put right by a restoration, namely death;

(2)a. Puthagoras of Samos,

said Cicero (*De republica*, III:11,19), like the later Empedokles of Akragas, assumed that one and the same order of law applied to all living beings; consequence: violence, committed on a living being, provokes non-expendable punishments; here the application is narrowed to violence, but the principle is apparently the demonism described above;

(2)b. Herakleitos of Ephesus

is summarized by Beth in purely steering terms: cosmic harmony implies a lawful compensation: there is a rule, which foresees the normal course (see above p. 113) and which, for every deviation, establishes a compensation.

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Bibl. Sample:

- WB. Kristensen et al: *Antique and modern cosmology*, Arnhem, 1941;
- H. Kelsen, *Die Entstehung des Kausalgesetzes aus dem Vergeltungssprinzip*, in *Erkenntnis* 8 (1939).

For Herodotos, see above p. 78/82; for Aristotle, see above p. 81, p. 78/82; for Platon, see above p. 81, *Platon* comes up very briefly in Beth, o.c., 36: "If the blood does not sustain itself from food and drink, but, from deviated things, obtains its equilibrium against the laws of nature, then all these things become causes of disease." (*Timaios* 32A); where 'natural law' is not our present understanding, but cosmic harmony, above adequately described disease is therefore, says Beth, in Platon's view, the with necessity incurring sanction to a violation (deviation) of cosmic law.

Before the tragedy:

- B. Verhagen: *The tragic masks of Hellas*, Amsterdam, s.d. (Aischulos and Sophocles are discussed, in several works);
- P. Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité*, II (*La symbolique du mal*), Paris, 1960, 151/332 (*Les myths du commencement et de la fin*), esp. pp. 167ss.: the drama of creation; even more "tragic": 199ss.: the treacherous deity and the tragedy of existence; also very much 21ss.: the exiled soul (reincarnate).

Note.-- Concerning the wisdom side of the theory of information, see above p. 45vv. (The theory of ideas, especially aspect iv, the regulation of the process by the idea, which, though transcendent, is nevertheless immanent in the being, and their process (movement, change, causation) at work.

The idea is, after all, the structure of reality; it highlights the processes which this reality goes through first and works ('causes') as 'genius, resp. iuno' (see above p. 47f.: "The idea is (...) the 'arithmos teleios', the perfect number (numberform harmony), of all things and processes").

The mathematical side of the idea of things and processes.

'Information is idea, but with, if need be, mathematical bias'. Fr. Krafft, *Gesch. der Naturwissenschaft*, I, 112., writes: Anaximandros' worldview is the result of a critical dissection of the views of his two predecessors, Hesiod and Thales. In doing so, of course, his starting points are:

(i) the rational view of a Thales and his explanation of individual phenomena of earth history;

(ii) the systematic and genealogical view of Hesiod and his cosmological worldview and law of the order of genera among the deities (hypostases). - Only the synthesis of both approaches and its results made possible a view, with the speculative and consistently implemented worldview, that makes us think of Anaximandros as the first true cosmologist. Anaximandros was so convinced of this world view that he not only constructed a celestial sphere but also a map of the earth: from this map the beginnings of a mathematical geography developed (...).

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(a)1. Hekataios of Miletos (-560/-480)

He elaborates thoroughly on Anaximandros' work (e.g., he went on a journey in the Nile valley (under Amasis II (-568/-526) and wrote 'Periègèsis'); he in turn constructs an earth map, which only completes and adds more detail to that of Anaxisandros (Krafft, o.c., 141; 199; incidentally: 168/199 (*Das geometrische Erdbild des Hekataios von Milet*)).

This map and the geometric-symmetric thinking underlying it are important because this thinking continued beyond geography. The earth was, for Anaximandros and Hekataios, a disc surrounded by the Okeanos; more than that: like Anaximandros, Hekataios was convinced that the parts of the earth, which one can imagine, only in outline, with the help of geometrical figures, were actually formed according to such figures, worked out by the water of the seas or rivers.

In other words, the real earth and its parts are mathematical figures somewhere. The earth map of Hekataios was used by the Greeks until Eratosthenes (-275/-194), who was the first systematic geographer (Geografika (physical, mathematical (on the measurement of the earth) and ethnographic geography)) despite the criticism levelled at it by Herodotos, among others (at least, he found it too little empirical in large scale): thus, the geometric-symmetric view corresponded to the Hellenic mentality.

Hekataios is convinced that the fisis is geometrically constructed:

1. certain landscapes were delineated geometrically by water (seas, streams), even made square.

2. The entire earth is circular (disk); seas and streams divide it "naturally" (geometrically); the southern half is bisected by the Nile; Delphi is the earth's pinnacle (omphalos: initial hill of life).

(a)2. Puthagoras of Samos and his school

They start from the same point of view: number-form harmony (arithmos) is present in the forms of fisis and art; they are not merely projected in them by the human constructive-mathematical mind. According to Krafft, o.c., 200, that objective, better: constitutive or 'physical', mathematics is still that of the Pythagoreans Archytas of Taranton (-400/-350) or Philolaos of Kroton (contemporary of Socrates; Krafft, o.c., 221). Philolaos e.g. assumes the sacred 'dekas', decade (tenfoldness), as directly present in the cosmos.

Conclusion: for the aforementioned Greeks, the idea (structure, which, informatively, present in the fisis, 'regulates' (directs) its processes), mathematically if necessary.

Given their sacred spirit, that mathematical information is not only immanent and constitutive, but also preconstitutive (see above p. 46).

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As one knows from art history, there is, in Hellas and its surroundings, a geometric ceramic art: around -1050 the protogeometric ceramics begins in Athens; the late protogeometric period is dated between -1.000 and -900, the Early Geometric period (-900/-850), the Middle Geometric period (-850/-760) and the Late Geometric period (-760/-700) follow; -- then follows, art historically, the 'archaic' period (-700/-480).- Apparently this geometric view of things is still active in the Greek physical.

(b)1. *Parmenides of Elea* (-540/...)

He represents a break in the mathematical tradition of Hellas. He is the first explicit ontologist or philosopher of being (see above p. 29) : the 'being(s)' is central to his mentality. Not as a copula, but as an accomplished verb.

(1) being(de) is that which fills space (and thus, according to our notions very definitely, 'material'), the 'empty' (kenon, vacuum) is 'non-being(de)'.

(2)a. But that space-filling "being" is invisible and escapes ordinary sensory experience, "a.fanes" (though material); -- in that sense it resembles subtlety, as conceived by e.g. Anaxagoras (see above p. 103v.).

(2)b. That being is therefore only attainable by 'noein', thinking (related to 'nous' (see above p. 103v.), intellectus, mind) and reasoning, i.e. concatenation ('counting') of sentences (judgments, reasonings). Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 236f.

(2)c. That being is -- not like the reality, fusi, of the Milesians and Herakleitos especially, "arising" (life) and "perishing" (death), yet -- permanence. -- Behold the revolution which Parmenides introduces into the physical.

Zenon of Elea (-500/ ...), Parmenides' pupil, will continue this in a paradoxical way, among other things, through his famous 'reasonings' against becoming, movement and multiplicity and through the unconscious foundation of the infinitesimal calculus.

In other words, this form of mathematics exists only in the human mind - and no longer in the fusi itself, immanent, constitutive, as before. Thus arises, about -450, an ideal mathesis (see higher theory of ideas p. 46: transcendence) and a mathesis which, as far as physical is concerned, is a reasoning tool, nothing more, to clarify some aspects of the fusi.

This mathesis shows a number (form) world that does not exist in, but outside the physical world. Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 200f. This mathematics is not empirical (Krafft, o.c., 296); it has its own domain, next to visible things and processes (ibidem). The (hyper)rationalism of (modern) mathematics is born. An ever greater 'chorismos', separation of fusi and number(form) takes place.

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(B)2. Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-485/ ...)

He represents the second break in the same mathematical tradition of Hellas. Indeed, a tradition runs from Thales, through Anaximandros and Hekataios, to Herodotos.

This tradition is 1. the empirical-Milesian, 2. yet not without mathematical-physical slant, as we have noted with Anaximandros and Hekataios.

This tradition of physical is characterized by the review or verification principle,

(a) That, as Krafft, o.c., 271, notes, the Milesians and other thinkers have unconsciously, or at least unsparingly, formulated,

b) until that Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428) expressly pronounces it: 'Opsis ton adèlon ta fainomenal (The 'seeing', resp. seeing the foundedness, of the invisible (things) are the showing (visible, phenomenal) (things)).

Herodotos formulates the same principle Hist., 11: 33v.): "For the Nile comes from Libya (understand; Africa south of Egypt) and, as I suspect - I infer the unknown from the known -, the Nile runs in the same celestial direction (= main region) as the Istros (Greek word for 'Danube')." Then Herodotos explains how known the Istros is and how unknown, at least to its origin in Africa, the Nile is.

Herodotos applies the principle of testing or verification on the basis of symmetry (reasoning): the lower course of the Nile is symmetrical with the lower course of the Danube; then, given the 'summetria', the upper course of the Nile must also make the same curve as the Istros. Here one sees Herodotos' mixed view:

a/ On the one hand, against Anaximandros and Hekataios, he upholds the empirical verification principle, relying on what he himself or others (historia, research; see above p. 70v.) have seen;

b/ on the other hand, and this according to Anaximandros' and Hekataios' geometrically - symmetrical a-priori, he upholds the symmetry principle. Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 173f.

That this is really so is shown, e.g., by another example: Herodotos talks about the cause (explanation, abduction) of the annual Nile floods (a subject that throughout antiquity, interested the Greek physicals).

1. The Thaletic view: indeed, Thales of Miletos claimed that the regular summer winds (from the north) drove the Nile water back to its origin and thus caused it to overflow; Herodotean critiques: If this hypothesis is true, then

a/ the Nile would not flood, whenever those trade winds did not blow; .Well, - fact - in some years they do not blow, and yet floods are established;

b/ other streams, certainly of lesser size, should also overflow, under the influence of the same winds; well - fact - a series of streams in Syria and Libya (= non-Egyptian Africa) do not overflow;

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2. The view of Euthymeres of Massilia (end of VIth ed. BCE.): the Okeanos flows around the earth; the Nile springs from that Okeanos and therefore it overflows; Herodotian criticism: the explainer (abducting) who mentions the Okeanos, starts from "something unknown, which does not allow for verification" (thus very explicitly Herodotos, -- which proves that, apart from Anaxagoras, certainly also Herodotos, known for his sacred views -- see above pp. 78/82 -- clearly formulated the testing or verification principle,-- here in a negative sense. "I know nothing about this Okeanos flow.

In my opinion -- cfr. supra p. 72v. (Hekataios' individualism regarding 'historia', research,-- which Herodotos follows) - Homer or some other even older poet invented the name 'Okeanos' and introduced it into poetry". Thus literally the very religious Herodotos, who here demythologizes like his contemporaries, who thought little or nothing sacred.

Krafft, o.c., 145, comments as follows: "The one, who posits the Okeanos as an explanation, reverses the epistemological principle of the then epoch of Herodotos et al. Namely, the phenomenal, visible data are 'known', understand: deduced, from the invisible - and then unverifiable! That is as topical as it gets.

3. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai,

By far the most "rational and sensible" view, namely that of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, who maintains that the Nile floods stem from melted snow;

Herodotal criticism: what would that mean, - the Nile emerges from melted snow? After all, it comes from Libya (Africa south of Egypt). So how could it emerge from snow, since it comes from the hottest regions and largely flows into colder ones! (...) The winds that blow from that region are hot winds (Herodotus traveled to Egypt in person and speaks from his own historia or experience). In addition, that region is free of rain and has no ice (Herodotus traveled only as far as Elefantinè and therefore did not see with his own eyes (historia) that the snow can be on the mountain tops). After snowfall, however, rain inevitably follows, within five days (here he generalizes, without foundation, a rule applicable to Hellas).

Consequence: if it snowed in Libya, it had to rain in those source areas of the Nile as well.

Thirdly, according to Herodotus himself, the tribes in that region are, as a result of the great heat, black-skinned; the hawks and the swallows remain there throughout the year; the cranes leave, at the onset of winter, the land of the Skythians (name given by the Hellenes to the region between the Carpathians and the Don) and go for the winter to the source areas of the Nile.

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If in the country, through which the Nile flows and from which it springs, even a little snow fell, all these facts could not be true."

Conclusion:

(i) Herodotos explicitly formulates the principle of verification in an empirical sense:

(ii) he applies it, beyond the geographical data known to him, again and again, even though he remains faithful to the geometric-symmetric a-priori of Anaximandros and Hekataios in a number of small-scale cases.

In other words: speculative-deductive thinking in mathematical concepts (a-priori's) is criticized by Herodotos and his fellows in the name of an empirical and inductive-abductive approach. Thus the archaic mathesis became questionable in a second way, in addition to the way in which it has been questioned since Parmenides.

(iii) Hans Reichenbach, once a member of the famous Wiener Kreis (a neo-positivist circle, to which Rudolf Carnap a.o. also belonged; however such that both Carnap and Reichenbach later left the strict positivist standpoint) has tried to describe the word 'test' ('verification'); he distinguished following possible meanings:

1/ logical verification: once the verification is free from contradiction (contradiction), there is logical verification (this, placed back in Hellas, would have been the verification of a Parmenides or a Zenon of Elea, with their intellectual-rational thinking style);

2/ empirical verification: as soon as a sensory observable fact confirms the theoretically (abductively) preconceived fact, there is empirical verification, which, Reichenbach says, is twofold:

(i) **physical**, if the test does not contradict the laws of nature (in the present sense) (e.g. claiming that a mass can move at a speed of more than +/- 300,000 km/sec. (speed of light), is, within the data and laws of Galilean-exact natural science, impossible (= falsification or sign that the preliminary proposition is false (falsum));

(ii) **technical**, if we have technical means of verification (e.g., the solar temperature, inside the hot core, is not verifiable with an earthly thermometer for the time being); both types of verification fit best into Herodotos' inductive-empirical style of thinking;

3/ transempirical verification: as soon as an assertion which falls outside the horizon of the 'enlightened' (intellectual-rational or - inductive-empirical) way of thinking (actually: 'ideology') is nevertheless confirmed somewhere, outside the secular, naturalistic framework of thinking (peculiar to the 'enlightenment'), there is transempirical verification; thus Herodotos' logo of history (see above p. 80v.), a sacred structure.

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Overview.-- The mathematical side of the idea of being

The (things, processes) was thus, fundamentally, brought up in two different ways in the physical:

a. Anaximandrian

(Hekataios, Puthagoras), i.e. in the belief that the mathematical (numerically and spatially mathematically speaking) was present and at work in nature itself: one first analyzed the visible data (dèla, fanes) in that way and designed the invisible data (a.dèla, a.fanes) similarly (geographical forms,- distances and velocities of the planets, - number of planets, number of worlds);

Astronomy (Puthagoras a.o.), geography (Anaximandros, Hekataios, Herodotos), the theory of harmony (Puthagoras), plastic (Puthagoras), urban planning (Hippodamos of Miletos) a generation younger than Hekataios, planned the rebuilding of Miletos destroyed in the Ionian revolt in -479, planned the harbor Peiraieus at Athens (-446), planned the colonist city Thourioi (Gulf of Taranton), each time following a structure of a chessboard, with rectangular intersecting streets) (cfr. Krafft, o.c., 230f.);

b. Parmenidean

(Zenon v. Elea et al.), i.e. in the belief that mathematical entities (numbers, space forms, etc.) existed only in the mind (intellect, reason) and were subject to 'arithmetic', i.e. logical-stranding of theorems, - which in time gave rise to the axiomatic-deductive geometry of *Eukleides of Alexandria* (+ -300); with his *Stoicheia*; - Eukleides himself merely elaborating what his predecessors had begun: (Zenon of Elea), - Hippokrates of Chios (-470/-400), with his *Stoicheia* (Elementa), Leon, Eudoxos of Knidos (-408/-355), a student of Archytas of Taranton, the Pythagorean, Theudios of Magnesia (contemporary of Platon);

Which means that the Pythagoreans, since Hippasos of Metapontion, had split into conservationist 'akousmatikoi' (hearers) and 'mathèmatikoi' (scholars, later: mathematicians), who, like Hippasos, moved with the times and redubbed mathematics Parmenidean. Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 203ff.

c. The two preceding views became issues:

The question arose whether the fisis did in fact guarantee in itself the mathematical structures which Anaximandrian mathematics (and the (proto)geometrical art - see above p. 21bis -) put forward in it; Herodotos, as indicated briefly above, -- even a poet like *Aristophanes of Athens* (-450/-385), in his *Ornithes* (Birds, - in -414) criticized the old, Anaximandrian view, at least to some extent.

Only Platon of Athens (-427/-347), who tries the synthesis of the two mathesis views, doubts the possibility of mathematically interpreting nature as on and in itself.

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Platon distinguished between:

- (i) pure number forms, perfect paragon of the thought content;
- (ii) geometric figures, governed by the aforementioned pure number forms;
- (iii) the number forms noticeable in sensory things

(L. Brisson, *Le Même et l'Autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon*, (The Same and the Other in the ontological structure of Plato's Timaeus), Paris, 1974).

For example, the circle: all sensory circles are only approximations of the geometric figure 'circle', which is definable, but never executable in matter in a perfect way; -- in the two preceding ones, ideas are present and at work.

Thus Platon came to implement 'a strict division between

- (i) the sensory number forms and
- (ii) the non-sensory (geometric or purely ideal) (number) forms. This 'chorismos' (separation) dates from Parmenides, who separates the 'being(de)', pure thinking attained, from the 'non - being(de)', which the senses perceive. Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 296ff.

An example of Parmenides' influence on mathesis is the definition of "number" and "unity" (in Eukleides' Stoicehia):

- (i) "Unity is that to which every thing is called 'one'". One here means, in the Parmenidean sense, 'indivisible'

Consequence: Parmenidean mathematics does not know fractional numbers, but it does have a theory of proportionality! For example, if I divide 1 by 5, I reach the ratio 1:5, -- not 1/5, as in our mathematics. The monas, unit (as an element), as indivisible, never becomes smaller (as in our fractional numbers); no, it is imaginary (in order not to do injustice to the Parmenidean dogma of indivisibility), replaced by a set, namely five units; well, this set is divisible;

- (ii) "Number (arithmos, number) is the collection (plèthos) brought about by the units."

Consequence: the monas, unit is never a number, understand: collection! Only two or more is 'number'. -- Only from here one understands the conceptions of matter of Empedokles, Anaxagoras, - Leukippos, Dernokritos, who think the material 'units' Parmenidean, i.e. as indivisible, and introduce the multiplicity as 'number' (collection of units). See above p. 110vv. on the mechanistic theory of matter.

Nevertheless, there is 'a big difference between the arithmeticists and the mechanists: the arithmeticists pretend that the multiplicity of units (of unity, better said) is only imaginary, while the mechanists, of course, present this multiplicity (of unity) as real, yes material (they are talking about being). Cfr. Krafft, o.c., 322; A. Szabo, *Der älteste Versuch einer definitorisch-axiomatischen Grundlegung der Mathematik*, (The oldest attempt at a definitional-axiomatic foundation of mathematics), in *Osiris* 14 (1962): 308/369.

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In summary, "Reason (of Greek philosophy) is not yet our (modern) reason, the reason of present experimental science, focused on the facts and their theoretical processing.-- It did, however, work out a mathematics, a first formalization (= articulation in abstract symbols) of sensory experience.

But look: she did not want to utilize them in the investigation of physical reality. Between the mathematical realm and the physical, between calculation and experience, the connection was missing. Mathematics remained connected to logic. After all, for the Greeks, *fusis* represents the realm of the imprecise, to which neither exact measurement nor rigorous reasoning are applicable (Cfr. A. Koyré, *Du monde de 'l' à-peu-près' à l'univers de la précision*, (From the world of 'à-peu-près' to the world of precision,), in *Critique*, 1948, 806/883). Reason is not discovered in the *fusis*, but it is immanent to language; it does not come to itself through the techniques that act directly on things; rather, it comes about through the precise description and analysis of the various means of acting on people, namely the techniques of which language is the common tool - the skill of the lawyer, of the teacher, of the rhetor (= teacher of eloquence), of the politician. Greek reason is that reason which allows, in a positive, thoughtful, methodical way, to act on men; not, however, does it allow nature to be transformed." (JP. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, 11, 123s.).

This "chorismos" (separation) between reason and nature has a double reason, according to Vernant et al.

(i) Ionic philosophy - instead of being seen sacredly as a conception (and arising from a father and mother i.e. genealogically) - sees the *fusis* as arising from abstract 'archai', principia, principles, which are immutable (the water, the unlimited, the air, resp. breath).

(ii) The Parmenidean philosophy, dividing man into a sense-perceiving and a thinking part, sees the *fusis* as foreground, which hides true being(s), which is unchanging.

Indeed, Krafft showed us how mathematics, among the Ionians, was present in nature, yet geometrically-symmetrically remained outside of nature (until 'n Herodotos points this out, at least in part), not empirically discovered, but a-priori assumed in it; how, among the Parmenidians, nature was, as it were, ignored as non-being(de), to make way for a purely thinking, calculating view, which exposes the invisible, purely logical 'being(de)'.

In both cases mathematical aspect and nature do not intervene unless hesitantly: there is 'chorismos', gap, between the two. Platon especially will emphasize extremely strongly this gap between idea (number (form)) and nature (sense). With him many, many Greeks.

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General Conclusion.

The study of the fisis has given us a threefold:

(i) matter,

(ii) energy (with the mechanicians (see above pp. 110 (ancient), 95v. (modern) there is even a gap between matter and energy, insofar as matter is conceived as inert or slow and energy is then external);

(iii) information (idea, mathematical idea or number (form)) (for part of the Greek thinkers there is even a gap between information (idea, mathematical structure) and matter, resp. energy (see above p. 118vv.); since +/- 1948 (*Norb. wiener, Cybernetics* (information-processing machines) modern materialism has also evolved).

Note.-- On the relationship between pure physical (science) and technique among the ancient Greeks.-- Two positions may be briefly mentioned here: on the one hand, *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, II, 5/54 (*Le travail et la pensée technique*), who advocates the following theses:

a. the inhibition of technical progress (esp. by means of machines) by

a1. the so-called Greek disdain for manual labor and technical occupation;

a2. the influence of social order and esp. of slaveholding;

a3. the unwillingness towards technical progress;

b. the thesis that technical knowledge essentially stands or falls with scientific knowledge; viz. according to Vernant, technique is essentially applied theoretical science; -- in other words, the gap between information and matter and/or energy does not exist, actually, so that technique and theorizing go together in experiment and exact science; on the other hand, *B. Gille, Les mécaniciens Grecs (La naissance de la technologie)*, Paris, 1980, who, esp. pp. 170/195 (*Le blocage*) and 196/223 (*La formation de la connaissance technique*), makes responsible criticisms of Vernant's extreme propositions:

a. both disdain for manual labor and technology and social organization (slavery) and unwillingness toward technical progress have most certainly existed, but Gille questions Vernant's generalization: far from all Greeks fall under Vernant's critique;

b. Gille defends the inherent and independent being of technical skills and knowledge as being something other than theory building, which is experimentally tested.

So Gille writes, with a much more positive attitude towards the ancient Greeks: "If he really was the fruitful inventor, as the ancients presented him, then we welcome in Archytas (from Taranton, a mathēmatikos like Hippiasos, cfr supra p. 119; - 400/-350) the first technical mind of classical antiquity. No doubt the antiquarians themselves were not mistaken in situating him in the dawn of a new technical world.

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Man took over from the deities and heroes. From that day forward, the technical imagination could develop:

(i) The technique is lacerated (= desacralized);

(ii) even more, - as the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Mèchanika*) underlined it - technique becomes unnatural, i.e. it allows to accomplish what nature could not get done, sometimes even against it." (o.c., 211s.).

Indeed, as far as one can now see, at least as far as mechanical engineering is concerned, the great discoveries of the Greeks are situated from the IVth to the VIth century, i.e. from Archutias (and Thales down to the beginning of the school of Alexandria (founded by Demetrios of Falèron (port of Athens), (-350/ ...) in -305, at the instigation of Ptolemaios Soter, prince of Egypt from -305) (cfr. o.c., 54ss. (*L'école d' Alexandrie*); 211).

Well, according to Gille, the technicians proceeded in different ways,-somewhat as Philon of Buzantion (-250/...), in his *Méchanikè suntaxis*, says: "There are things which one does not achieve by reasoning or mechanical procedures alone (concerning machines). Many discoveries are due to experience". Hèron of Alexandria (nicknamed 'ho mèchanikos), drawing on Filon's works, puts strong emphasis on that experience, yet he adds that scientific knowledge is necessary and that rational reasoning must flow from it. (o.c., 207s.).

Summary:

(i) reasoning (which seeks to find the causes),

(ii) Mechanical demonstrations,

(iii) experience, - behold three ways of making technical progress.

In other words, one cannot reduce technical skill to Vernant's one type, i.e. experimentally tested theory.

Note: "empeiria," experience, never denotes a well-defined process of scientific knowledge, but rather "experience" (including, if need be, a scientific experience) (o.c., 212s.).

Experience' means - Aristotelianly speaking - the accumulation of singular observations (e.g. the observation that a medicine 'works' without one being able to indicate the 'cause' (= reasoning, which reveals the cause)). In time a theory (geometrical formula, e.g.) grows, according to the circumstances, which transforms this experience into an experimentally testable theory, as Vernant demands (in the spirit of modern, Galilean science and technology, which the Greeks never knew, except very fragmentarily).

Proklos of Constantinopolis (+410/+485),

the Neo-Platonist, in his commentary on Eukleides, says that there is a science called 'mechanika', which is a part of the study of the sensible and material things, e.g. as science of warfare (Archimedes e.g.) or of 'wonderful' devices, in which bellows or weights are used

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Proklos expresses what was then thought of technology (at least in its mechanical part): it was called "science" (in the ancient sense).

The problem is: is there information knowledge in purely technical-mechanical demonstration of harnesses (to prove their usefulness or functioning) and approximate empirical method (to technically solve a posed problem without any theoretical insight)? In our opinion yes: in technical demonstrations of a found device (an action, etc.) there is a lot of information present.

(i) 'An abduction or supposition always at the forefront (whether it can be expressed theoretically (in an ancient explanation of nature and cause or in an arithmetic-geometric formula of the time) or not, is secondary: there is an insight, intuitive, into the situation and the problem posed and its solution;

An example: Athènaïos, an author on siege implements (*Peri mēchanēmaton*), between -200 and -100, relates the invention of the battering ram:

a. During the siege of the city of Gadeira, the Carthaginians had conquered a point; some young men, having no harnesses to destroy the wall, take a beam and, with their arms, in group, they thrust it against the wall, which is thus largely demolished;

b. a native of Tuross, Pefrasmenos, a shipbuilder, had seen this: he planted, at a subsequent siege, a large mast in the ground, attached to it a beam, which could be moved in a back-and-forth movement against the fortress;

c. the Karthager Geras had a frame in carpentry constructed, which could be moved on wheels and measure roof above it: in it was a beam, which could be bumped against a wall by a large number of men, with the whole rig; he called his invention "tortoise" (because it moved so slowly over the ground)).

Here mechanical demonstration and approximate invention (in three phases) run into each other: without much theory and mathematical formula, it is immediately clear in the praxis that insight (information possession, both as idea (thought content) and number (form), because sizes and circumferences are involved) is at work here;

(ii) the visible and tangible result 'proves' (of course not theoretically) that the preconceived insight (abduction) was correct, viz. that the idea-with-numberform (= information) embodied in the three 'battering rams' at the outset achieved the intended result (goal) and was, therefore, correct, just as a theory, once experimentally confirmed, proves correct; In other words, by induction, i.e. concrete experience (applications), one knows whether the deductions drawn from the abduction are true, i.e. usable in the technical field. There is therefore technical information without theory, but equally valid.

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In other words, the pragmaticist view (CS. Peirce) "saves" technical thinking as thinking.

One more aspect: the three forms (i.e. applicative models) of battering ram cover a single idea, i.e. regulative model, which summarizes them all. In principle, there are an unlimited number of realizations (applicative models) of the one idea (resp. mathematical idea). (See above p. 45vv.). The technical process of discovery, sketched above, compared with artistic process of creation (see high: p. 50v.), shows that an theory of ideas, correctly understood and not 'exemplaristically' caricatured, as so often happens, expresses the informative aspect faithfully: the three types of battering ram reveal, in retrospect, one type, archetype, which is at work in it as one and the same model and which makes summary (collection, i.e. distributive and collective structure) possible. Exemplarism and situative adaptation go together (see above p. 52).

Rightly, *W Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 236, says about the older natural philosophy (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes), what can be said about the later Greek philosophy:

- (i) fantasy, guided and controlled by reason;
- (ii) plastic and architektonic sense-so typical of the Greeks-which seeks to order and assemble the visible world (dèla, fanes) by its means (esp. mathematical);
- (iii) symbolism, which blots out from human life the extra-human life interpretively.

In other words, the traits of the fourfold structured wisdom (see above pages 14/17).

The Tenth Scientific Colloquium (08.12.1982) at Heverlee, on the essential characteristics of life, gave Prof. Wildiers the opportunity to ask Manfred Eigen (Ludus vitalis, -- the world and life as game) and Ilya Prigogine (*Order out of Chaos*, -- the world and life as work of art), two Nobel Prize winners and specialists in the field, whether we, who see the deterministic world view of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries (the world as machine) fading, can replace it by either the ludic world view (Eigen) or the ordering one (Prigogine).

A very lively discussion between the two scholars did not provide a clear answer, but gave very interesting points of view of a general nature. When we see Jaeger summarize - fantasy and plastic - architectural sense - , we believe that, for all and very obvious progress since the ancient physicalists, we are still today working on the same unbroken tradition (see above page 46: perennis philosophia (Steuchus, Leibniz, Willmann)).

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The soul in nature.

Before we introduce the physical of the 'soul', we pause to consider the semasiology (ordered theory of meaning) of that word. There are, after all, four major domains in which the word 'animism' (soul belief) - and at the same time the word 'soul' - is used. They are strictly distinguishable, but, ultimately at least, not separable.

(1) -- *The medical-biological field.*

'Animism' means, in *Stahl, Theoria medica vera*, 1707, the fact that one and the same 'soul' is the 'principle' (explanation) of both organic and intellectual - rational life (in man, of course).

Thus understood, (Stahlian) animism is one type of 'vitalism' (see above p. 112) or, at least, one aspect or complement of it: 'vitalism' means, after all, broadly speaking, any doctrine (theory) which claims that life is essentially different from the purely mechanical (physico-chemical) structure of inanimate matter (among other things, through a 'life force', 'entelechy', etc.).

Attention: 'vitalism' in this biological-medical context, can also be interpreted in an even scarier way, namely as the name of the doctrine of the Montpellier school (*Th. de Bordeu; Barthez, Nouveaux éléments de la science de l'homme*, 1775). In this case it means the doctrine that, in each individual, there exists a principle of life, distinct both from the physico-chemical properties of the body and from the soul as an intellectual-rational faculty (thinking soul). Cfr. A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, Paris, 1968-10, 60; 1214s.

(2) -- *The ethnological-hierarchical domain.*

Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der Religion)*, Leipzig, 1926-2, 10/25, remains perhaps the best introduction to this archaic field, from which we extract a few main concepts.

(i) *EB. Taylor, Primitive culture*, 1867-1, 1878-2, defines "animism" as the doctrine of spiritual beings (beings), which constitutes the essence of spiritualist philosophy in its opposition to materialist philosophy.

Thus conceived, of course, Tylorian animism, on the ethnological-hieroanalytical terrain, is open to very many criticisms, although its core remains valid. The exotic-archaic and primitive cultures, after all, are situated almost entirely outside the Western discussion between Spiritualism and materialism concerning soul.

W. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, IV (Mythus und Religion)* Leipzig, 1914-3 (1909-1), distinguishes between

a/ body soul (a soul or soul force (fluid) present in one or more body parts and

b/ free soul (free soul), which represents mainly two types, viz.

b1/ the breath(soul) - see above p. 100; 103vv.) and

b2/ the phantom (shadow soul) which means sometimes more the dynamical power than again the apparition of the deceased.

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The concept of the soul with Tylor and his numerous followers boils down to this: it is the interlocking of **(i)** the principle of life and **(ii)** the double (= phantom) which can separate itself from the body (by out-of-body experience, e.g. in sleep (dream), or by death (final out-of-body experience)). Ethnography constantly brings evidence for Tylor's theory. Yet it does not confirm the great role that Tylor attributes to dreams. And above all it points out the very great complexity of the representations of peoples concerning "soul" etc. This gave rise to the following.

(ii) *The distinction between animatism and animism.*

"A stone or a rock can be conceived, among primitives, as a living being without ascribing to it a 'soul' - analogous to the human soul - or without putting into it the 'soul' of a deceased person or some 'spirit'." (Söderblom, o.c., 11).

"The natural peoples have long seen in the objects living beings, which they imagine to be animal or human forms, without ascribing to them a 'soul'"(ibid.).

Söderblom sees four, richly proven possibilities:

a. the nature thing is conceived as living (without a 'soul'): it is 'alive' (animatism, - from 'animatus' , living), but not 'animated' (animism);

b. the nature thing is "inhabited" by a free-floating "spirit" -- e.g., a forest spirit or and growth spirit (thriving demon) -- without that spirit being that object's own soul or without it being the soul of a dead person;-- such a thing is a kind of fetishism (fetish = dwelling of a spirit);

c. the nature thing possesses a 'soul' of its own, -- analogous to that of man (it can even have several, as, in many peoples, man has several souls; one thinks of the breath soul and of the phantom for example); -- some cultures even have a 'full' animism, i.e. they are convinced that not only some, but all nature things have a soul of their own;

d. the nature thing is "inhabited" by an unknown death soul or by that of a powerful deceased (e.g., a "sacred" tree or crocodile is animated or better "inhabited" or "animated" by a human soul). This then is one kind of animism, in the stricter sense.

Actually, only point '**a**'((living belief)) is strictu sensu 'animatism'; point '**b**' is strictu fetishism; points '**c**' and '**d**' are strictu sensu animatism.

Usually "animism" is used for all four (it is then "animism" in the broad and somewhat sloppy sense).

(iii) *J. Piaget*, the structuralist psychologist, who was concerned with the evolution of child thought, called "animism" in children, the tendency to interpret all bodies as alive and gifted with intentions (*La représentation du monde chez l' enfant*). This is a diluted ethnological meaning, purely psychological.

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(3) The paranormal-occult field.

AN. Aksakow, *Animismus und Spiritismus*, 1890-1, introduced a new meaning of the word 'animism'. - Spiritism' is all that has to do with the spirits of the dead as well as with other beings in the unseen; in particular, a number of paranormal or occult phenomena are attributed to spirits (the spirit hypothesis).

GW. Samson, *To Daimonion*, Boston (USA), 1852, is the first work to counter the spiritist hypothesis with the so-called 'animistic' hypothesis, in his case the 'nervous principle', which, analogous to the magnetic and/or electrical principle, allows the human spirit to act on matter and to produce, for example, knocking noises, which are then attributed - spiritistically - to phantoms or the souls of the dead.

The English physiologist Carpenter (1852) - ideomotor -, the German philosopher *Eduard von Hartmann*, *Der Spiritismus* (1885) - "psychically unconscious" - continue that animistic path. Von Hartmann speaks of illusions and hallucinations (false perceptions), of clairvoyance and 'psychic' (understand: occultly acting psychic) forces; he rejects the spirit hypothesis - regrettably, unscientifically - a-priori (it does not fit into his frame of mind!).

AH. Aksakow (1890) responds to Von Eartmann's thesis by speaking of personalistic phenomena (automatic writing, personality splitting, e.g.) within the limits of the body, animistic phenomena (telepathy, clairvoyance in space, telekinesis (paranormal movement of objects)) outside the limits of the body. Against this he contrasts the spiritualistic ones, which may give a personistic or animistic impression, but which are situated both outside the bodily boundaries and extraterrestrially.

Briefly, in the current language, one uses 'animism' to claim that all paranormal phenomena are purely 'psychic' in their origin (and that 'spirits' etc. are superfluous); 'parapsychological psychology' i.e.

Cfr. WHC. Tenhaeff, *Spiritism*, 's-Gravenhage, 1971-5, 32/37. Feldmann, *Occult phenomena*, 1949, 32/3.

Opm.-- M. Uylert, *Plantenzielen*, Amsterdam, s.d. (esp. 69/72 (*Immortal pattern (palingenesis)*); R.Montandon, *De la Bête à l'homme (Le mystère de la psychologie animale)*, Neuchâtel / Paris, 1942; L. Verlaine, *L'ame des bêtes*, Paris, 1931 (historical overview) expose something of animism concerning plant and animal.

Note.-- The concept of 'algeest'.-- 'Akashic archive', 'akashic record (English) or algeest is that layer in the subtle (subtle), in which the traces of all (human) events are fixed. Seer(s), who penetrate it, 'see' what once happened ('akasha = Sanskrit for 'subtle'). - Do not confuse with world soul!

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(4). The philosophical domain.

Scientifically (and immediately ever philosophically) the discussion is in full swing.

a. *J. Monod, Le hasard et la nécessité (Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie moderne)*, Paris, 1970, 35/55 (*Vitalismes et animismes*); proposer starts from 'objective' science; 'objective' here means 'free from intentions', 'design-free' (since Galilei, Descartes); that 'postulate', 'unprovable at all times' (according to Monod himself, o.c., 33) founds modern professional science in its opposition to that of ancient Greece (perhaps excluding Demokritos and the pure mechanicians).

Well, in that 'objective' 'frame of mind, Monod notes that 'life' has two characteristics:
1/ invariance (the living structures persist, against a breaking down (entropic) climate);
2/ teleonomy (purposeful (!) maintenance of structures).

The question arises: which of the two properties, invariance or teleonomy, takes precedence?

(i) In the Darwinian spirit, Monod opts for the primacy of invariance over teleonomy, which is derived from invariance, on the grounds of the 'objectivity' postulate of modern science (nature knows no purpose except secondary). In other words, chance must be preserved and 'natural selection' is the mechanism that accomplishes this.

(ii) All other interpretations to explain the strange character of life reverse the primacy: the invariance is somewhere 'protected', 'guided', and evolution, instead of being 'natural' (understand: accidental-mechanical), is 'directed', namely by an initial teleonomic principle, of which all that lives is the expression: teleonomy has primacy over invariance.

(ii)a. The limited theory in this sense is called Monod 'vitalism': the vitalist (philosophically: Bergson, scientifically: H. Driesch; - Elsässer, Polanyi) situates the primacy of purpose within the biosphere.

(ii)b. The encompassing theory he calls 'animism': the animist sees purpose at work, with priority over invariance, in the whole cosmic event, of which the biological is but a part. Monod sees in it a return to the infantile stage (cf. supra p. 132: Piaget's infantile animism) of humanity (the primitive sees in plants and animals his own design for life ('projection'); but rocks and thunderstorms, heavenly bodies and streams also have a design: again and again the primitive projects his own teleonomic nervous system into the things around him; consequently: man and the universe are not alien to each other).

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Against "objective" science, thinkers are trying to revive that primal animism: Leibniz, Hegel; - Teilhard de Chardin; but also Spencer, Marx and Engels -- the positivist Spencer, the dialectical-materialist Marx and Engels being the nineteenth-century scientist progressists, -- they all see evolution in the biosphere as an extension of cosmic-universal evolution.

Thus, e.g., the unknown and unknowable "force" which, according to Spencer, is at work in the whole universe to establish there both diversity and coherence, both specialization and order, plays precisely the same role, in the last instance, as the "ascending" "energy" which, according to Teilhard, both in the nuclear particles and in the galaxies, "dynamizes" (there is no inert matter) the matter of the universe toward the point Omega.

Both thinkers want to give nature an 'animistic' purposefulness, without speaking of a soul: (then it is animism) to feed that 'design' (purposefulness) one speaks, instead of 'soul' of 'force' or 'energy' (then it is animism again)

For example, for Hegel, the (absolute) Spirit (i. e. that 'divine' reality which gives the direction to the universe and its creation) is the only reality at work in nature and cultural history; this 'Spirit', the Idea which thinks itself, is dialectical: from thesis (starting point) it goes, via antithesis, to synthesis; for Marx, Matter (i. e. that absolute reality which gives the direction to the universe and its creation) is the only reality at work in nature and cultural history; this Matter thinks itself in just as dialectical a manner as Hegel's Spirit. i. that absolute reality, which, to the universe and its genesis, gives the direction of purpose) is the only reality, at work in nature and cultural history; that Matter thinks itself in as dialectical a manner as Hegel's Spirit (= self-thinking Idea).

For both tendencies, the idealist-dialectic and the materialist-dialectic, mankind is a kind of culmination of the universe principle (spirit for Hegel, matter for Marx), which, in man, comes completely to itself, i.e. to its full development. "To make the dialectic contradiction (= thesis, antithesis) the constitution of all movement, of all evolution, is, notwithstanding everything, to cast a subjective (I mean non-objective, i.e. introducing a direction of purpose) interpretation of nature in a systematic form, so that this allows us to uncover in nature an ascending, constructive, creative 'design'; it is, after all, to make it meaningful and morally significant.

This 'animistic projection' is always recognizable, no matter how it is disguised. An interpretation which is not only strange with respect to (understand: objective, accidental-necessary) science, but contrary to it, as has appeared every time the materialist dialecticians, abandoning their purely 'theoretical' word-juggling, have tried to shed light on the ways of experimental science by means of their concepts." (o.c., 51). -

Monod claims, on the contrary, that e.g. the biosphere, starting from the whole universe, is never deductible, but at most explainable, nothing more.

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Monod, o.c.,55, betrays his own deepest inclination as a scientist of "objectivity," i.e., the in itself purposeless becoming in nature:

"We want to conceive of ourselves as necessary, inevitable, since always foreseen beings. All religions, almost all philosophies, a part of science even testify to the tireless, heroic effort of humanity insofar as it desperately denies its own contingency ('contingency')."

b. Manfred Eigen, Ilya Prigogine

As already touched upon above (p. 130), the specialists, Manfred Eigen, (Max-Planck Institut für Biophysikalische Chemie, Göttingen) and Ilya Prigogine (Université Libre de Bruxelles), have partially different views of life than Monod;

Criticizing Darwin (**1.** complex systems arise through evolution; that **2.** evolution relies on natural selection; **3.** that natural selection is a direct result of self-reproduction), Eigen claims that life, today, somewhat differently and more cautiously, is determined as follows:

- 1.** genetic information, reproduced, is life;
- 2.** some core acids can be faithfully reproduced;
- 3.** reproduction provides us with the basis for preservation of the information but also for its selective treatment and for optimization. Although only investigable in lab (and thus not a sure representation of the historical origin of life), life proves itself to be obedient to regulated physical laws and quantitatively formulable in its selection, evolution and optimization. Eigen, impressed by the enormous complexity even of the molecular level of life, speaks of *Ludus vitalis* (game of life).

Prigogine, starting from 'irreversible' processes, i.e. processes situated from their equilibrium - in fact the only real processes-, notes that they proceed non-linearly, i.e. with more than one single outcome. Their study led to complicated formulas (equations), which Prigogine and his team were able to solve exactly:

Main impression, as with Eigen, was the variety of behaviors that matter can exhibit in these non-equilibrium conditions, - which adds up to complexity.

Conclusion : reversibility (multiplicity of solutions), instability, complexity play an important role in the origin of life and its evolution.

Cfr. *L. Van Gerven, Two Nobel Laureates on Life*, in *Alumni Leuven*, 14 (1983): 2 (April), 32/34.

c. R. Ruyer, *La Gnose de Princeton*,

Paris, 1974; id., *Les cent siècles prochains (Le destin historique de l' homme selon la Nouvelle Gnose Américaine)*, Paris, 1977 offers us 'a group of scientists, who think explicitly 'animist'.

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Indeed, Neo-Gnosis in the USA wants to be science - cosmology first and foremost. - In that frame of mind, it claims that the universe is governed by Spirit, which creates itself a resistance, matter. Spirit is cosmic consciousness, i.e. something that sees itself in its own unity as 'I'. The universe is made up of 'forms' - humans, animals, plants, inorganic 'forms' - that are aware of themselves (as the Spirit in the big picture) and of 'interactions' (mutual effects) of those 'forms' through mutual 'information'.

So how is it that there are "material bodies"? Yes, how is it that materialism is possible, which believes that everything is dust? Neo-Gnosis, on the other hand, claims that the forms do not have or are not bodies. 'Substance', 'body' only arises, when one purely incorporeal form looks at the other as 'object': the forms look at each other and then they have the outside of the other, which looks material, nothing more. "General animism is true in the strongest sense of that word. There are only 'spirits', souls or forms of consciousness, which have become individuals. These have no body which they would animate; they do not dwell in bodies. Physical existence is never other than a delusion, a by-product of perceptive knowledge. The childish appearance of animism is accidental: it is due to the fact that, in the universe, there are many accumulations, which one should not take for 'beings'.

It is childish to suppose that the flooding Mississippi, the Arizona desert, the Atlantic Ocean, the clouds or the typhoon have a soul. But there is nothing childish in conceiving of an animal, a plant, a living species, the collection of the living species, the Tree of Life, and the informing connections, which make up the unity of those beings, whether large or small, as a living soul." (o.c.,36).

Neo-Gnosis has adopted this panpsychism (everything is 'psychic' in its interior) from Eddington and Milne. It is convinced that ordinary science is 'materialistic' (see above p. 97v.), in that it only accurately records the outside of essentially 'psychic' reality. One who, like the Neo-gnostic scientists, sees through that exterior, the interior of the real, is no longer a materialist as a scientist.-- Behold, a brief outline of Neo-gnostic animism.

So much for this exceptionally long semasiology of "animism. Its purpose is to pose the problem of the soul.

The soul among the Ancient Greeks.

(A) Animatism.

W. Röd, *gesch. D. Phil.*, I (*Die Phil. D. Antike*, 1 (*Von Tharhales bis Demokrit*)), Munich, 1976, 48f., talks about Milesian hylozoism. "Milesian hylozoism rested (...) on the idea that all reality as such (= insofar as real) is alive, animated, resp. in a certain sense permeated by divine forces".

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If one expresses it in this way, one has animatism (livingness belief), animism (animatedness belief) and dynamism (divine-force belief) at the same time! Yet, just for that, says Röd:

"The (Milesian) thinking was (...) not hylozoic in the sense that they conceive of the substance as such that there is an additional determination of animality added to it". This is animatism: there is no separated soul belief. "The world and its 'ground' (archè, principium) are, according to Milesian conviction, something living, so that all being belongs to a dynamic coherence and, consequently, is mutually related." Röd, clearly too unfamiliar with religious science and its refined concepts, here articulates animatism, which, as also outside Hellas, is at the same time belief in force (dynamism) and a sense of unity (see above pp. 17 (*Egyptian Notion of Measure*), 34v. (*Greek Unity Concept*)). The idea that man is microcosm in relation to the macrocosm, the universe, says Röd, springs from this (cfr supra p. 61).

As stated above, p. 104v., 'hylozoism' is the view that matter eo ipso (obviously) is alive (*Poortman, Ochêma*, 1954, 29. But that is animatism concerning matter.

As also said above, p. 105, hylozoism also includes dynamism, with or without a fineness idea (Volten's Maatduiding), which Röd comes to indicate just now.

Hylozoism in a narrower sense occurs with Anaximenes of Miletos (-588/-524): the in itself indefinite (apeiros) and unbounded (aoristos) air (aër) is the 'archè', the universe principle, from which, by dilution (manosis), which runs to fire, and condensation (puknosis), which runs to liquid and solid, all things come into being.

It is clear that 'air' here does not mean ordinary air, but an air sui generis: it is obvious to see in it fineness. Why? We know, for *Rohde: Psyche (Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen)*, Tübingen, 1893/1894, with the majority of ancient Greeks 'soul' is something air-like, breath-like. Cfr supra pp. 102 (Rüschke), 103v. (first Greek thinkers).

Indeed, Anaximenes explicitly compares air as a principle of the universe to the soul, which, airborne, brings the parts of the body into unity: "As our 'psuchè' (soul) holds us together (sunkratei), so (perièchei) 'pneuma' (air, breath) and 'aër' (air, encompass the whole 'cosmos' (ordered world))."

The text actually contains: 'hè psuchè hèmètera (= our soul) aër ousa (= being air)'. Seen in the context of the fine matter doctrine, however tentatively formulated, as seen higher (103v.), "air" is clearly **a.** fine matter, **b.** life, **c.** force (holding together).

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A soul doctrine (animism) emerges here, hesitantly (for there is nothing to suggest that "soul" is understood as "air" segregated, as in full animism).

Hesitant: indeed, the fact that Anaximenes called the whole universe 'air' points rather to animatism. Röd, o.c., 47, says in reference to this doctrine, "He thereby took a first step toward the concept of the 'world-soul'". This is reminiscent of the general spirit (akash) of the occultists (see above p. 133 (*akash archive*), i.e., the fluid, omnipresent throughout the universe, but therefore not yet a world soul in the proper animistic sense of a conscious (whether or not finely materialized) soul. The fact that the soul is individual, cosmic) holding together, moving, does not yet prove the existence of more than fluid (and thus we are still in animatist sphere, -- perhaps in animistic sphere).

(B) Fetishism.

'Fetish' means 'dwelling of a spirit'. 'Fetishism' is the belief that something - or sometimes all of nature - is inhabited by spirits, fluidic beings of all kinds. In other words, the spirit in question is not the soul, the (separate) life principle of the something in question (fetishism is not animism); it is also not the fluid of that something (fetishism is not animatism); it inhabits it alongside and through, if need be, the soul and fluid.

Thales of Miletos (-624/-545) has left us. 's piece of sacred wisdom, which *Aristotle, Peri Psuchè* A5, quotes: "The whole (pan, all being) is animated (empsychon) and at once full of daimones". In what sense Aristotle speaks here of "animosity" of the universe is not clear: it points in the direction of hylozoism as animatism. Is it more? Yes, if one counts the appended phrase 'and immediately full of daimones' as animism. We would rather see fetishism in it.

Th. Zielinski, La religion de la Grèce antique, Paris, 1926, 12/30 (*La divinisation de la nature*), describes how the ancient Greek sees the earth, the sea, the sky inhabited with innumerable 'spirits': spring spirits (nymphs, naiads, river spirits, forest and wood spirits (dryads, satyrs), mountain spirits (oreads), sea spirits (nereids), who, on occasion, are called sometimes 'daimones' (demons), sometimes 'theoi' (theai) (deities). The fisis, is sacred through and through and through, - not desacralized (and secularized), as with the strict monotheists (Yahweh faith in Israel, Zoroastrianism in Iran) or with the modern secular thinkers.

Zielinski, o.c., 16, quotes a text of Platon: on the banks of the Ilis(s)os, a stream in Attica, was a plane tree, under which Socrates, with Faidros, went to rest; -- "See how wide and high it is! How tall and shady, too, this beautiful wild pepper-tree! It is now in full bloom, and balsifies everything here with its fragrance. What wondrous spring springs up under this plane tree! How fresh its water feels to the feet!

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Small dolls are hung up beside other offerings: one sees that it is here the sanctuary of some nymphs or of Àcheloos". Acheloös, mentioned in passing, is already mentioned by *Hesiod* (*Theog.* 340) as a stream god.

E. Mireaux, This is how the Greeks lived at the time of Homer, Baarn, 1979-3, 13/25 (The frame of life: the Homeric universe), describes this for the Homeric. era:

"Certainly, not all mortals deal with deities as confidentially as the heroes of the epic. But still the possibility exists for everyone to suddenly meet a great or a small deity: in a bend of the road, at the edge of the forest, in the morning mists, in the evening twilight, yes, on the threshold of his home. He must be able to recognize them at the first sign, know how to invoke them, and not forget to promise an offering immediately, as the gray-haired Nestor did, as soon as he noticed that, in the form of the old Mentor, the companion of Telemachos, the goddess Athene was residing with him." (o.c., 20).

Well, if one reads Aristotle's citation : 'everything is full of daimones', would this not be the correct interpretation? Space is not empty, as for the later mechanist atomist Demokritos; no, it is 'inhabited' (fetishized) by beings of a fluid nature, - spirits, demons (polydemonism) deities (polytheism).

Alongside the ubiquitous fluidism (animatism, dynamism), fetishism is one aspect of the sacredness of fuis.

That Zielinski meant this strictly realistically, he says from: "In close relation to the sea stand the sea nymphs, the nereids,-the 'personification' of the caressing sea waves (as one will one day, dryly and foolishly, claim).

'Personification' ! Never, of course, will those who will speak thus, be worthy of seeing them with their own eyes, the silver-footed nereids, frolicking, on a beautiful day, and playing with the dolphins, with her golden curls, sparkling on the crest of the waves. This is a great favor". (o.c.,19).

Indeed, even today people with second sight see these "inhabitants" of the fuis. One thinks of the experiment of Findhorn, where one gardens in rapport with such inhabitants of nature. They are clearly not the souls of plants, animals, etc., but separate, fluidly visible beings, "centers" of fine material life, and therefore "dynamically" important (power-charged, power-generating), but not the life fluid itself of plant, animal, etc.

They are as Söderblom (see above p. 132, ad b) typifies them. Cfr. also *M. Nilsson, La religion populaire dans la Grèce antique*, Paris, 1954, 1/34 (*Les campagnes*).

Note -- The word 'soul' is used several times for fluid: 'thumos' is e.g. the hot and smoking part of a blood sacrifice; one translates it by blood soul (better true: blood fluid) (*Iliad* 22:68; *Oduss.* 11:105)

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(C Animism.

'Soul belief' or 'animism' can be described as follows:

(i) there is a living and material being (if necessary, fine material being); that is the animated being;

(ii)a. as a principle of life is, in that being, something called 'soul';

(ii)b. that principle of life, the soul, can exist, if need be, independently of the animated being. That is the animated aspect of living and material being mentioned under (i).

Since Platon and Aristotle, one distinguishes three levels of soul (inspiration):

a. the vegetative soul, peculiar to all that lives (plant, animal, human, etc.);

b. the sensitive soul, peculiar to animals and humans;

c. the intellectual-rational soul, peculiar to humans (and, if need be, to extraterrestrial beings, yet characterizable as persons, e.g., the souls of deceased persons).

Regarding the material and/or immaterial status, see above pp. 99/109 (the material or hylic pluralism);

a. The word "spirit" is not necessarily the same as "soul"; a "soul" becomes a "spirit" (whether subtle or immaterial, or both at once) only when it animates a material-living being;

b. the word 'idea' is not the same as 'spirit' or 'soul' (see above p. 100; also 45/54); however, especially among materialists, who proceed in an imprecise manner, people do confuse: 'idea' is mental content, which is structure in the cosmos; e.g. a living being is idea, i.e. it has structure; this structure is worked out by the soul, yet is not the soul; also the soul itself is idea, has structure; the same applies to 'spirit'; structure is there where mental content is present. See above p. 60: 'spirit', 'soul' can represent entelechy, in the inspired or animated being, leading idea,--is however always more and different than pure idea.

Bibliographic Sample.

(a) Regarding the human soul:

-- *Erwin Rohde, Psyche (Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen)*, Tübingen, 1890/1894;

-- *Fr. Rüsche, Das Seelenpneuma (Seine Entwicklung von der Hauchseele zur Geistseele)*, Paderborn, 1933.

Regarding the development in the sense of somato-psychic dualism (accepting a duality 'body (somato-)/soul (psychic)'), see *Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite (L'homme entre les choses et les mots)*, Paris, 1968, 362/365.

(b) Regarding soul views:

-- *E. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1966, 179:

a. the transitory breath, which is either poured out into the air (aër) or absorbed into the 'aither (high air); the breath soul is perhaps, etymologically, rendered in the word 'psuchè' (see *P. Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité*, II (*La symbolique du mal*), Paris, 1960, 268ss. (the breath that leaves the dying);

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a (bis) What is this breathing soul? It is the perceptible aspect of the principle of life, which is the soul: it begins with conception (in plants and animals: with what corresponds to the human conception) and ends, at least as a principle of life, i.e. as a vivifying 'spirit', with the last breath; which does not mean that the principle of life is no more and no less than the pure breathing soul; no, the breathing soul is the 'living spirit'. as life-giving 'spirit', with the last breath; which does not mean that the life principle is no more and different than the pure breathing soul; nay, the breathing soul is the air aspect of the soul; -- which also appears from the interchanging of soul and air, -- so e.g. with Anaximines (see p. 138 below): 'pneuma and aër comprise the universe'; 'the soul which is air-like or rather is air';

b. the corporeal remains in the tomb, in so far as they are alive, - says Dodds, 179; indeed, the soul as a temporary principle of life, from conception to death, - with plants and animals it goes analogously - is indeed subtle, but lowly subtle, viz. The corpse is the 'vehicle' (but a coarse material one) of that lowly subtle soul body and the latter remains attached, if necessary for a long time, to its 'vehicle' as its double and even as its guardian spirit; for this double role is played by the principle of life during life (as source of life or 'soul') t.Relative to the gross material body;

1. as a double e.g. it forms the pattern of the gross material body (as the idea, which is at the same time the principle of life (see above p. 141)).

2. as guardian spirit or angel o.m. - better were: as envoy and guardian spirit at the same time, because the two go together - one thinks of *Acts 12:15* (where the waiting - praying Christians, when they hear the maid say that Peter, seemingly in prison, is knocking at the door, answer: "ho angelos estin autou" (it is she angel)-;

as (guardian spirit and) emissary, the soul forms a form (phantom) perceptible to the second sight, which acts as an emissary, in appearances at a distance during life (the so-called bi- or multilocation, i.e. two or more places filling simultaneously, visible presence, as a number of saints of the Catholic Church e.g. exhibit them);

as guardian spirit (and emissary), -- not in the ordinary sense of another, extraterrestrial person or "spirit" (of impersonal level, a "center" of power), which, invisibly, accompanies the living person (or animal or plant, if need be), but as an androgynous soul, which is at once transcendent (emissary, guardian spirit) and immanent, i.e., principle of life, -- as, higher p. 48/50 (genius, iuno), has been said;

as a guardian spirit acts the life soul (for that is also a correct name) - in distinction to the surviving and if need be immortal soul

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as a higher, shielding power against (possibly strangling) destructive influences either from the cosmos or from the fellow human or extra-natural environment;-

If the soul body of a lowly subtle nature (life soul) remains attached to and within the corporeal remains for a long time, then an impression of 'life' (i.e. fine material life) emanates from the corporeal remains, perceptible e.g. to the second glance as the phantom of the deceased; if need be, this phantom has the form (occasional form) of an animal or a demon (e.g. in totemic cultures); one should in no way confuse this appearance with the surviving, if immortal, soul (similar forms also occur in plants and animals).(e.g., in totemic cultures); this appearance should in no way be confused with the surviving, if not immortal, soul (plants and animals also present analogous forms): the appearance of the spirit is only the emissary of that soul, nothing more;

c1. the shadowy soul in Hades (underworld),

according to Dodds, 179 (Ricoeur, o.c., 268s.: the light and shadowy existence of the deceased); -- this is the 'psuchè' as 'eidolon' (shadow form), about which Homer (II. 23:104; Od. 11/51; 11:83);

the eidolon is, according to Homer at least (for the distinction between the occasional and the true appearance of the immortal Hades soul is neglected), a kind of double, similar to the living one (II. 23:66), which, when touched, fades away like smoke (Od. 11: 206); the eidolon is exhausted (= without 'strength' (dynamically understood)), his memory e.g. is correspondingly so: only the drinking of the blood-soul (thumos) - see above p. 140 - awakens the memories again (Od. 11:25);

c1 (bis) the shadowy soul is better described by Pindaros, quoted by Platon: "they pay to Persephone (the goddess of the underworld) the retribution (see above p. 9v.: Nemesis, reparation) for their ancient errors," - the souls, - says Pindaros (*Platon, Menon 81bc*);

c2. the daimon, who is reborn in other bodies on earth, -- thus again Dodds, o.c., 179; 'daimon' has, in Ancient Greek, fundamentally two meanings:

(i) the nameless power (dynamical) of a being, preferably of a deity;

(ii) the spirit in the other world, which is indeed more than a human being or even a hero (hèros), but less than a deity of higher rank;

these two meanings apply here, at least to man (the plant or the animal are obviously not deities); - again: Pindarus reproduces a main trait, where he says that Persephone, once they have repaired their mistakes, sends the souls to the sun above the underworld, at the ninth year,

that she sends them again to earth to reincarnate: among her are the famous princes, the powerful men by virtue of their strength or by virtue of their science, who, in time, as heroes, heroes, saints, are revered without spot among mortals.

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Note -- *Hesiod of Askra* (VIII-th c. ; where Pindaros lived between -518 and -438 -) wrote, in his *Works and days*, about the (cfr. G. Dumézil (see above p. 19)) in the Indo-European cultures always more or less recurring three basic classes, called for him (priestly-judicial) princes, soldiers and farmers.

But he considers them religious-ethical through and through, breaking them down into six sub-classes, according to the fact that their members practice either Dikè, Justice, or Hubris, Transgression, (Injustice) as a rule of life. Because of this, Hesiod is rightly considered a great religious-ethical reformer. Especially the farming class he - himself a farmer - brought out of contempt, since the Olympic religion had supplanted and suppressed the earlier chthonic religion, in which the farming population played a central role.

Not only does Hesiod push religion and the ethical-political order, but he considers fate in the other world.

1.a. The people of the golden age are princes, who assert religion and law as rulers in the midst of the population and this according to Dikè; they represent Zeus, the Olympian main deity; -- after their death they become daimones epichthonoi, 'demons' residing just above the surface of the earth, by which, in passing, they displace resp. suppress the earlier chthonic female deities of fertility; they have power over the living and are treated by them with worship.

1.b. The people of the silver epoch are, the same as the Titans -- see above pp. 7/9 --, princes, but they act according to Hubris atasthalos (insane iniquity); -- after their death become makares hupochthonioi, deities or demons living under the earth's surface, as "immortal" as the epichthonic ones but repressed and suppressed to the underworld; they also receive worship, but less.

2.a. The people of the bronze age are professional soldiers, characterized by great strength (or rather violence), bodily power and terrorizing looks and actions; they suffer from war-hubris and die in battle; -- after their death they populate the moldy abode of Hades (underworld) as 'nonumoi', inglorious, nameless dead. - Some of the 'heroes', the (war) heroes, known by name, undergo, by virtue of their war-hubris, the same fate....

2.b. The small minority of (war) heroes, for the reason of their (war) dikè, war justice, go, after their death, not to the night and oblivion, like the two previous subclasses, but to the islands of the blessed, where they remain known by name; they become, as it were, immortal demigods, in the light and memory at home.

The subclasses named under '2' are similar to the giants (giantesses) or giants.

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3.a. The people of the first part of the Iron Age are characterized by what Kristensen calls "harmony of opposites"; Pandora, as woman (from whom living child arises) and earth (from whom living plant arises) - one senses the chthonic-telluric atmosphere -, is the epitome of it; a mixture of hubris and dikè is also characteristic of what Hesiod considers his epoch.

3.b. The people of the last part of the iron age fall completely into hubris: violence, falsehood, injustice characterize, then, society.-This is therefore the end of the kuklos or cycle (see above page 47, ad (i)).

Indeed, that kuklos about which later Herodotos will also speak, but then as a physical thinker, (see above p. 78v.), is 'demonistic' (see above p. 7/12): the golden and silver epochs are youthful; the bronze and heroic epochs are mature; the iron epoch, in its two epochs, is old. One recognizes the harmony of life and death, so typical of the (poly)demonic universe order. Life, as Pandora, is deadly from the beginning!

Bibliogr. sample.

-- JP. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée*, I, 13/79 (*Structures du mythe*), divided into two chapters:

(i) 13/41 (*Le mythe hésiodique des races (Essai d'analyse structurale)*);

(ii) following J. Defradas, *Le mythe hésiodique des races (Essai de mise au point)*, in *L'Information littéraire*, 1965:4 (152/156) : 42/79 (*Le mythe hésiodique des race (Sur un essai de mise au point)*).

-- W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, 89/111 (4. *Hesiodos und das Bauerntum*);

-- F. Flückiger, *Gesch. d. Naturrechts*, I (*Die Gesch. der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalter*). 9ff. (*Die sakralen Rechtsformen der homerischen Zeit*);

-- A. Mirgeler, *Hesiods Lehre von den fünf Weltaltern (Werke und Tage V:106/201)*, Düsseldorf, 1958.

From this we see how at least some of the ancient Greeks, from very early on, saw the judgment of the immortal soul. Also: how the word daimon took on a very specific meaning, very early on, that of one type of soul. So that we now understand the text of Pindaros better.

The Orphic-Pythagorean-(Neo)-Platonic doctrine of souls.

-- WG. De Burgh, *Inheritance of Antiquity*, Utr./Antw., 1959, I, 127, mentions that there are fundamentally two striking soul views:

(i) that of 'psuchè' i.e. the principle of life, which makes the body alive and, in Hades, continues to exist as (unconscious) soul (see above ad b and ad c1);

(ii) that of a 'divine' (to be understood in the context of polytheism and polydemonism) part in man, the 'soul', distinct from but confined to the body and dormant in it until psychic giftedness indicated awakening

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(cfr. *supra* p. 107 (*Ploutarchos on the mantic pneuma*); *ibid.* (*Mithracism* (higher 'I'), theurgy, alchemy); divine part, which, by 'purification' (catharsis), can escape reincarnation ('care of the soul').

(iii) De Burgh sees a third conception, that of Socrates. This 'psychology' was a turnaround in the soul conception of the ancient Greeks: he identified 'soul' with our conscious personality, capable of rational-intellectual workfulness, both speculative (e.g. in scientific knowledge) and active (e.g. in ethical-political praxis). This is, of course, an enlightened (see above p. 72v.) conception of 'soul'.

P.Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité, II (La symbolique du mal), Paris, 1960, 261/284 (*Le mythe de l'ame exilée et le salut par la connaissance*), dwells on the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic-Neoplatonic conception of soul, as daimon, which reincarnates, resp., cleansed, escapes the chain of reincarnations.-

(i) Two views run together:

a. The soul, in the body, reincarnated, atones for sins it committed in a previous existence; the body is therefore an instrument of atonement;

b. the same soul is seen as to be cleansed (to escape rebirth); the body is therefore place of exile (not merely instrument of penance); in other words, it is out of place here, on earth.

(ii)a. The ancient theme of the Indo-Europeans says that the soul "moves," i.e., reembodies itself;

(ii)b. the same theme sees this chain of reincarnations as part of the chthonic religion: just as the fuis, in spring, rises again from her (winter) death, so the soul, once gone from this world, rises again in a next reincarnation (the agrarian myth); in other words, the soul is situated in the framework of nature;

(ii)c. that same theme, in a chthonic sense sees the center of gravity of life and earthly nature in Hades (underworld): the hell powers possess the souls in the underworld as its wealth, over which Plouton rules; yet even the (reembodied) life is still 'wealth', in the possession of Hades, who enriches himself with the reincarnation of the souls in his possession; the telluric (= chthonic) aspect is at the same time the infernal or hell aspect.

(iii)a. By seeking to escape soul displacement, from the cycle or *periodos* (see above pp. 145, (47,78)) of life, which, chthonic-infernal, carries death within it, from the power of hell, the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic conception of soul takes a stand in a cathartic or "Puritan" (Dodds) sense;

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(iii)b. we now give once more that world-view, against which the Orphics and their followers, too long last, rebelled; no better description than *WB. Kristensen, Verz. bijdragen tot kennis v.d. antieke godsdiensten*, A'm, 1947, p. 254v.:

(1) basic conception: among various peoples of antiquity one finds the representation, typically telluric-infernal, that the realm of the dead is a fortress or a place surrounded by walls and, conversely, that the fortress and the city here on earth are the visible presence of the realm of the dead fortress or city;

(2)a. the applicative case developed by Kristensen is the Greek city of Thebes with its fortress (with in that fortress the Demeter temple): Demeter, the chief goddess of the city (see above p. 38vv.), Dionusos (see above p. 40vv.), the Kabeiroi (Kabirs), the Great Gods of Samothrace, as well as Harmonia with her son Poludoros (Plouton, Dis Pater) - all underworldly or infernal deities were, in the context of mysteries (see above p. 38v.), worshipped there;

(2)b1. the fortress of Thebes, Kadmeia, was called by Hesuchios (cf. Pausanias of Ludia, 9) 'the island of the blessed' (see above p.144 ad 2.b.) - 'blessed', i.e. makares, deities -; the fortress was the dwelling place (fetish) - see above p.139) of Demeter (which Kristensen calls 'cosmic' dwelling place) reaching out from the underworld;

(2)b3 the city of Thebes itself as a whole is visible presence of the underworld, the Hades: the saga told that the Ismènos, which flowed past the city, was originally called 'Ladon', i.e. Lèthè (literally oblivion), the underworld stream;

(2)b3. the wall, as well known as the wall of Troja, had come into being through the art of Harmonia, with Korè, the consort of Hades, equated the seven-stringed lyre, which then for the first time showed its 'harmonious' sounds, had so moved the stones that they were, as if by themselves, joined together to form the Theban wall;-so says the myth, which so expresses the telluric-underworld character;

(2)b4. the legendary seven gates of the Theban wall, which represented the separation between this earthly and the underworld, were the 'gates of hell' (according to Kristensen, o.c.,255), i.e. symbols and presentations of the underworld life ('resurrection'), which shows itself in nature and in mankind (fertility-religious);--yes, the Greek cities, which were called Pulos, were, according to this telluric-mythical conviction, so called (pulos = gate);

(2)c. the name 'Thèbai' (Thebes) was understood by the ancients to mean 'kibotion' (coffin), i.e. the mysterious attribute of Demeter, representing the underworld, her realm; Thebes was coffin city, in that it visibly represented Demeter's real dwelling, i.e. the realm of the dead.

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By the way: from the same coffin of Dionusos a snake winds upwards, the earth snake, which is also depicted several times around the coffin of Demeter.

(2)d. The inhabitants, already by the fact of their habitation, were initiated into the mystery. The cities and the lands were "sacred," power and life-charged, in that they visibly made present the "sanctity," i.e., the high power of Hades.

This holiness contrasts sharply with the "holiness" represented by, e.g., the Old Testament Yahweh religion, which is built on completely different grounds.

Conclusion: if one now situates the body, in which the daimon or divine, godlike or daimonic soul, incarnates, in that framework, then it is not surprising that the Orphicists had to interpret it as 'strange' with regard to that soul, as they conceived it, i.e. non-demonistic double-hearted, ethico-politically unambiguous 'good' at least as an ideal. The Bible, too, has addressed that problem of (poly)demonism in a similar, though thoroughly different direction, viz. on the basis of an ethico-politically pure monotheism. -- about which more later.

The Orphicists did it on the basis of a kind of purified demonism, namely with **(i)** ritual and **(ii)** especially ethical-political "cleansing" (catharsis), backed by an Olympian religion (see above pp. 8/9), which tried to save the good core of the chthonic-heroic religion.

(iii)c. The valid core of the telluric underworld religion was sought in the psychic giftedness of the soul (= daimon), which (re)incarnates: once (re)embodied, the soul 'sleeps', although its 'life soul' (e.g. the breath soul) watches over it: the soul and the body have (...) inverted possibilities (potentialities), which mutually suppress and repress.

In the dream, the rapture (mania), the eros, the death (understand: the mystery-religious death, the deeper soul or daimon awakens. Herakleitos says: "Immortals die; mortals, immortals. Our life is their death and our death is their life". (Fr. 62) (cfr. 62), (cfr. Ricoeur, o.c., 267).

The meaning is the following: if the life of the deeper soul, the daimon, is to come into its own, then the life of the surface soul (breath soul), doppelganger even to a certain extent) must recede; namely, in the dream, the rapture, the eros and the 'mystery' dying, the deeper daimon with its psychic giftedness emerges.

Seers, Healers, "purifiers" (exorcists) had long known, chthonically-demonically, that giftedness, but the Orphicists practice it Olympically-controlled and "pure" (Puritanism).

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(iii)c.bis. CA. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, Zürich, 1949, 88, gives us 'an applicative model of healing method, in which the soul, as a daimon with psychic giftedness ('potential' says the current movement for human potential), acts.

Strabon of Amasei (Pontos, Kl.-Asia; -64/+21) informs us of a temple in honor of Plouton (god of the underworld) between the cities of Asia Minor Karia, Tralleis and Nusa, where, in a village, the sick stayed near the cave dedicated to Charon, the boatman in the underworld. There were two cave sleeping methods:

(i) the priests incubated (= consecrated cave or temple sleep for the purpose of revelation or healing) in the place of the sick, while they called on Hèra Katachtopia, the subterranean Hera (Zeusgemalin), uxoric (see above p. 43 (*Demeter-Asklepios*), 66), and, with her, Plouton, the infernal god; they experienced dreams in which both 'aitiologia' (indication of causes, diagnosis) and 'therapeia' (method of healing) were indicated by the (if necessary appearing) deities;

(ii) the sick themselves were often led into the cave to stay there quietly for several days without eating, to experience dreams for themselves, during which the priests acted as 'must.agogoi', i.e. initiates in the mysteries of Hera Katachthonia and Plouton (see above p. 38vv. higher), which here amounts to dream interpretation, according to Meier, but which in our opinion was certainly more than that (the priests fluently participated in the ailments and problems of 'sick' and 'problem people'; sickness was a 'problem' and so were the 'dreamers'). certainly was more (the priests fluently participated in the ailments and problems of the 'sick' and 'problem people' (they came both for 'sickness' and for all other forms of 'death'; sickness was only one form of exhaustion of life (power or -dunamis; see above p. 7v.)); they came for the 'sick' and for all other forms of 'death'. 7vv)); they literally 'helped' the deities with their life force to produce 'miraculous' rescues ('aretalogy = the story of the 'aretè' or dunamis, - at work in the mysteries of the dream)).

As an aside, non-sick or non-problematic people had no access to the shrine. -- Note that this cave is an ancient or archaic form of psychic salvation.

The same Strabon, as well as Pausanias (see above p. 147) report an ancient incubation place in honor of the chthonic hēros, hero or, better, savior, Amfiaraos (see *Oduisseia*, 15:244, 253) in Oropos, a city on the east coast of Central Hellas:

(i) first, as a "cleansing" (the ritual catharsis), a ram was sacrificed (one transferred the fluid evil of the problem man to the animal);

(ii) afterwards one lays oneself on one's skin in order to experience, during the sleep of salvation (incubatio; Gr.: 'enkoimēsis'), the dream of salvation (or apparition of salvation, when the watcher was awake; - the ancients make practically no distinction between actual dream appearance and apparition or vision in waking state; also Amphiaraos 'dwells' (fetish (see above pp. 132, 139v.) in 'a well, in which

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one throws silver and gold pieces as offerings (for the priest-mystagogues, who, fluidly, draw the suffering into themselves and thus share the fate (see above p. 9vv.) of the afflicted).

Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite, Paris, 1968-2; 363, in search of the origin of the dualism 'body/soul, believes to find it among other things in the wisdom sleep, like Epimenides the Cretan and Hermotimos of Klazomenai (religious teacher and miracle worker, +/- -500). in the sleep of wisdom, as Epimenides the Cretan and Hermotimos of Klazomenai (religious teacher and miracle worker, +/- -500, known for his exits with his soul body from his gross material body) seem to have practiced and/or taught them: "The exercise consisted, after preparation, in going to sleep either in a wine grotto or in the open air on a pitch, with a view to dreaming, - this in order to discover, in the dream, the secret of sins committed, the causes of impurity and of disease, the purification rites and the healing methods. One did a journey (understand: soul journey): something, peculiar to man, left the sleeping surplus while an umbilical cord was kept for the return. This would be the origin of the dualistic views, the theme of the "soul" and of the "garment" and the theme of the "journey". Stelster does not know whether, in this tradition, the (sleeping) surplus was called 'soma', corpus, body, and the traveler 'psuchè', anima, soul.

As one knows, this 'journey' - better 'out-of-body experience' - is very well known in contemporary occult literature. Since the details are quite similar, one can safely assume that the phenomena described represent 'out-of-body experiences' of the daimon, i.e. the psychically gifted soul (and not simply the 'soul' without more) (one thinks of the shaman's out-of-body experiences).

It is clear that there is a difference between the first two cases, cited by Meier, and the third, briefly outlined by Ramnoux: one could say that the first two are "spiritualistic" and the third "animistic," to use a language borrowed from paranormology (see above page 133 (Aksakow)). The soul journey or, better, out of body experience is an operation peculiar to the soul as daimon itself, although it may be guided by an extraterrestrial being, whereas in the first two cases, the operation and the initiative (the afflicted sometimes 'wait' for days for the deity) depend on the deity.

Yet they too are typical operations of the soul as daimon: the deity, after all, cannot act either in sleep dream or in conscious appearance without communicating fluidity to the soul (as daimon especially). Such an interaction still attests to the (daimonic) soul.

Note.-- *Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite*, 149s., quotes a text of Empedokles: "Thou shalt retrieve, from the hades, the 'menos' of the dead man". This happens, Ramnoux says, when a miracle-worker (thaumaturge) performs a resurrection or, rather, as Ramnoux corrects himself, when he (re)conjuges up an inspiration or summons a phantom.

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'Menos' means principle of life (soul); but it is also pronounced by Empedokles et al. of the winds ('menos anemon, Fr. 111) - their 'violence' -, of the 'aithèr' ('aitherion menos'; Fr. 115:9) - its power -, etc.; in other words, everything which, in nature, suggests an impression of force, violence, roughness, is called 'menos'. Ramnoux refers to *Aischulos*, the tragedian, who, in the *Choephores*, has the inspiration emanating from the tomb of the father evoked and, in *the Persians*, a phantom.

This praxis, too, is connected with the daimon: one can, ritually, summon an inspiration (as the present-day Nazis, for instance, do) or a phantom (as the necromancers of all times do): that one then has to do with 'soul', as a force merging with violence (aggression), appears more than once to the great surprise of those summoned. In more than one case one can no longer master the 'menos'. Then the sorcerer's apprentices - also of today - begin to realize that the Homeric, Empedoclean 'menos' is more than a literary image!

Note.-- Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 150s., extracts the word 'fren',

1. diaphragm between heart and lungs, on the one hand, and intestines, on the other,
2. membrane surrounding an organ,
3. inwardness ("soul" as the seat of thought, will, mind, inspiration, etc.), to the same Empedokles.

Thus e.g. Fr. 151v.: "No wise (man) shall, with his 'fresi' (plural of 'frèn'), with his daimon as a mantic faculty, here at least), proclaim following (nonsensical) things soothsaying ('manteusaito'), viz. that we exist ('eisin') only as long as we live - which is what people usually call it - Empedokles wants to say that the actual existence of man exceeds the present life (what people call 'life') in duration. Anyone who would claim the opposite as a mantis, as a soothsayer (clairvoyant), is not saying this with his 'frenes', his truly daimonic-mantic or clairvoyant ability, but with an inferior view of man's 'being'.

Ibid., the other direction of the truth concerning being is expressed (Fr. 114:3): "I know, says *Empedokles*, that truth dwells in the words, which I shall proclaim (in his *Song of Atonement* viz.); but laboriously it is acquired by men, and difficult does that strong effort to believe ('pistios') 'epi frena', penetrate the (daimonic) soul."

In other words, a truth can penetrate to a lesser or greater degree into the 'soul' of the hearer: for Empedokles it is a question of his proclamation penetrating to the daimonic, i.e. paranormal level of man. Ibid., 151, 'frèn', paranormal center of a being as truth-power, is excised from the deity (of the Sfairos, cf. Ramnoux) : she is without human head, without legs or feet, without 'hairy pubic parts'; nay, she is 'frèn', spirit (truth-power), 'hierè kai atthesfatos; sacred and ineffable, moving; with swift thoughts she flies through the whole cosmos (Fr. 134).

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Here one sees that man, as daimon, in the Orphic-Pythagorean - (Neo-) Platonic tradition, is divine: he possesses a spirit, i.e. the clairvoyant ability to 'see' the overall truth of things at once (one thinks of the expression 'second sight', 'seer(st)er').

Only that man usually does not realize it and, more to the point, he virtually never exercises that ability, except in rare circumstances and even then hampered by the polydemonism and polytheism that, doubly, plagues that ability.

The famous and controversial idea of 'the(i)osis', deificatio, deification, has its root here: potentially man is a 'theos', i.e. a psychic being. This idea dominates the lion's share of Greek philosophy, from Empedokles to the last Neo-Platonics.

The palingenesia, reembodiment.

Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 147ss. Addresses this subject, which we are going to outline very briefly.

Bibliogr. sample.

-- K.O. Schmidt, *We do not live once*, Leiden, s.d. (Dt. ed., Gettenbach, 1956),-- gives, among other things, on the latter basic concepts concerning destiny analysis; *Reinkarnation*, in *zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Köln, 11(1957): 2, 97/199 (giving, at a high intellectual level, the then state of the art);

-- RO. Van Holte *tot Echten, Reincarnation*, Bussum, 1921 (esp. 7/69 is historical overview; the author is a spiritualist and anti-reincarnationist);

-- H. Petri, *Kult-Totemismus in Australien*, in *Paideuma*, V (1950), 44/58 (see also CA. Schmitz, *Religionsethnologie*, Frankfurt a.M, 1964, 233ff. (from 1933 onwards AF. Elkin (see his *The Nature of Australian Totemism*, in J. Middleton, ed., *Gods and Rituals*, Austin / London, 1967, 159/176; id, in *Oceania*, 4 (1933): 2, 114/131) on, among other things, worship totemism, which speaks of 'mythical ancestors' (in fact 'Causers' (Urheber); see above p. 63vv.), who, along a route in prehistoric times, performed rites of conception in such a way that nowadays, according to the Aborigines, 'spirit children' are still fluidly present at those sacred places, who, in the case of intercourse, incarnate in the womb of the mothers;

Elkin calls this "reincarnation of the 'ancestors'" (see above p. 62vv.: revival religion), - which is a very original form of reincarnation belief, which, actually in all revival religions, including the Greek, is present)).

-- JJ. Poortman, *Raakvlakken tussen Oosterse en Westerse filosofie*, Assen/ Amsterdam, 1976 (esp. 1/64 (*Existence and survival*);

-- J. Gonda, *Les religions de l'Inde*, I (*Védisme et Hindouisme ancien*), Paris, 1962, o.c. 249; 248s. (karma(n)), 250 (samsara); 307 (yoga);

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Greek reincarnation

-- R. Jennings Rose, *Transmigration*, in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford, 1950-2, 921

- (1. The reincarnation or transmigration belief is, in Greece, widespread;
2. to date, it appears to have existed only as a philosophical and/or theological doctrine of non-people origin;
3. it is peculiar to Orphism (Pindaros, fra. 127), to Pythagoreanism (Empedokles, Pindaros);
4. from there it passed into Platonism (*Platon, Republ.* 10: 614Dvv.);

-- ER. Dodds, *The Greek and the Irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1966, 135/178 (*The Greek Shamans and Puritanism*):

1. Whether the Orphicists advocated soul transfer as an explicit proposition is not so clear from the surviving documents;

2. The soul-perception of the Orphics and Pythagoreans is connected with shamanism from the north (o.c., 143ff.) namely through early contacts with Thrace (N. Greece) and through trade- and colonization-contacts, during the VIIth e., around the Black Sea (Skythia (see Muli, in *Hermes*, 1936)) where the Greeks got to know shamanism: 'iatromanteis' (healing seers) like Abaris, a Skyth, who was a priest of Apollon (Herodotos, 4:36), Aristeeas of Prokonnesos (= Marmora, Propontis), also an Apollon priest (Herodotos, 4:13), Epimenides the Cretan (see above p. 150), more correctly: of Knos(s)os, Hermotimos of Klazomenai (see above p. 150), emerge; they were regarded as 'divine men' ('theoi andres), who stepped out; in this line Puthagoras (with Epimenides of Knosos) situates himself; he considers himself identical with Hermotimos (whether really reembodied or merely re-entered, is uncertain).

-- Of *Aristeeas of Prokonnesos* says *The Oxf. Cl. Dict.*, 90: he knew 'ekstasis', separation of the soul from the body, accompanied by apparent death, while appearing elsewhere in the meantime (multilocation); he took on a non-human form: he accompanies Apollon in the form of a raven; he meant by his exit to make the god Apollon honor himself.

-- Whether, in all these cases, the mere reappearance of a deceased shaman through a medium or a real reembodiment (animate a new gross material body) is meant, whenever, in this context, there is talk of "resurrection," "reappearance," "revival," "reembodiment," -etc., is not always so clear, according to Dodds.

-- W. Röd, *Gesch. D. Phil.*, I (*Von Thales bis Democrit*), Munich, 1976, 53f notes among other things that between the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis (metempsychosis, soul-transfer; sometimes also metensomatosis) and the coherence of all living things (see above p. 132v. (world-soul, spirit). 104/106 (hylozoism), 16 (Maat)), which is expressed in totemism (human identification with animal, plant, inorganic nature thing) , among other things, a connection exists.

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"The individual soul belongs to the omnipresent life of the animated universe and it belongs, through the victory over the impurity incurred, i.e. through its individual incarnation, to be reunited with the Universe Soul."

Röd expresses himself rather "monistically" where the Pythagoreans, certainly of the first hour, were not yet ready for explicit monism (that the universe is one being). Situated in hylozoism, his assertion is perfectly acceptable.

The totemic side of that hylozoism is manifested in that the totem worshipper - as R. Ambelain, *Le vampirisme*, Paris, 1977, 233s., says - exchanges souls with a natural or cultural phenomenon: the magician with the totem of the animal exchanges, fluidly, an image of his soul body with an image of the soul body of e.g. a lion; thus he is a visible representation of that lion, conversely, that lion participates in his human life (the fluidic incarnation process amounts to 'participation' in both directions).

Well, Aristotle, *Peri Psuchès* (On the Soul), 1:3, says that the Pythagorean myths claim that any souls enter any bodies: in totemic thinking this sounds perfectly plausible (after all, the core of totemism is soul-body exchange between human and non-human realities).

The Pythagorean-thinking Empedokles will therefore claim of himself that he was "already reborn as boy and girl, as plant, bird and fish" (J. Zafiropulo, *Empédocle d'Agrigente*, Paris, 1953, 292 (Fr. 117; see also Fr. 127 (lion, laurel tree)); -- hence the aversion to animal sacrifices (those who make animal sacrifices eat, after the sacrifice, at the sacrificial meal "their own flesh" (Fr. 137; Zafiropulo, 300))

Conclusion: a cursory review of what has been written about it reveals that

(i) reincarnation, in Hellas, springs from shamanism (iatromanteia), where the theme of the reappearing shaman, iatromantis, gives rise to the view that his soul (daimon) either avails itself of a later iatromantis as of its medium, mediator (mediumism, or truly reincarnates itself in a subsequent earthly body (reincarnation);

(ii) reincarnation, as far as possible in non-human bodies, springs from hylozoism (the universe is pervaded by one and the same fluidic life, - whereby plant, animal, yes, nature thing of an inanimate nature to us at least, possess in a sense the same life as man) and this in its totemic interpretation, this means: with respect to the exchange of the respective soul (man 'participates' fluidically in non-human life and vice versa) on the basis of rites of all kinds.

That in it the concept of the soul (as daimon especially) alludes is immediately clear, both mediumistic (inspiration, rapture) and reincarnistic and hylozoistic (reembodiment, exchange of soul). That ethical-political ideas work themselves out in them, we would like to explain briefly.

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(i) The starting point is the 'kuklos anankès' (the cycle of destiny (see above pp. 7/11, 47, 78vv, 145)) or, also, the 'kuklos geneseos' (the cycle of creation or 'nature' (see above pp. 61/68, 68/69 (fusi = genesis)) - Fate and nature (genesis) are distinguished (see higher pp. 9/10), but not separated, in them the soul is situated, which, like the seasons and other cycles of nature, returns, reincarnates (see higher pp. 143 (Pindaros), 146 (connection reincarnation / chthonic and underworld religion)).

Pindaros (-518/-438), in his song t.e.v. Thèron of Akragas on the occasion of his victory in the chariot race (Olympics -476), treats of the reincarnation. Pindaros begins genealogically (see above p. 9): the ancestors of Theron were, after many a calamity, favored by fate; may he and his descendants, according to Pindaros, experience similar salvation;

As a rich man, Thèron has experienced the pinnacle of success (through the Olympic victory), but wealth alone is one-sided; according to the harmony of opposites (see above p. 7, 9 ff.) Thèron should, with the 'genesis', also be aware of the 'fthora', the perishing and, immediately, of the nadir of life, which is painted here according to the religion of mysteries: "If, inasmuch as its possessor knows the future, namely, that the poor souls that have died on earth ('a.palamnoi frenes (see above p. 151v.)', powerless, unhelpful spirits) soon have their debts to pay;

that the sins committed here, in Zeus' realm, ('alitra', guilty, criminal act) judge someone, under the earth, by passing sentence, hostile, as fate would have it; but the nobles enjoy eternal sunshine, shining by day as well as by night: They lead a more trouble-free life; they do not stir up the earth with the force of the arm nor the waters of the seas for the sake of nefarious gain; on the contrary, all, who never forgot their oaths, lead, by highly honored deities, a life without tears; but the others endure afflictions, which are not to be seen;

but those who were able to dwell three times on each of the two sides and to preserve their souls ('pssuchan') completely ('pampan') from iniquity ('adikon'), arrive, by the way of Zeus, in the fortress ('tursin') of Kronos; there breezes from the ocean sweep over the island of the blessed ('makaron'); golden blossoms on splendid trees blaze from the shore (...)" (Cfr. H.Rüdiger, *Griechische Lyriker (Griechisch und Deutsch)*, Zurich, 1949, 170/173).

In other words, three times on earth and three times in the 'beyond', man is put to the test: if he passes this ethical-political test, he will be placed on the island of the blessed, if not in the dark underworld. This is the judgment seat.

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(ii) Already indicated the reaction of the Orphic tradition:

"As with the Orphicists and representatives of related doctrines, the belief in immortality with Puthagoras took the form of the theory of soul migration (...): the soul passes (...) through a series of embodiments, until it succeeds in detaching itself from all the influences of corporeality, i.e. in breaking the cycle of births (kuklos tès geneseos') and returning to the region of the divine.

The fate of the soul is decided by the way of life: the soul of the ethically superior is reborn into a higher form of existence; the soul of the ethically inferior descends to lower forms of existence. The purification of the soul, which should ensure the redemption from the circle of rebirth, is the result of an ascetic (= depraved) way of life and of scientific efforts.

Both aspects characterize the 'Puthagoreios bios' (the Pythagorean way of life)." (Röd, o.c., 54).

"The implicit rationale of the Pythagorean ethics is the at all times so powerful religious idea of the equality with the deity, indeed of the deification of the human soul conceived in its origin as divine."

Indeed, *Jamblichos, Pythagoras (Legende, Lehre, Lebensgestaltung)*, Zurich, 1963, brings us, in Greek and German, the life of Futhagoras, of Jamblichos (+283/+330), the Neo-Platonic: between the two, Puthagoras and Jamblichos, lie eight hundred years! That is how long the prestige of the Orphic-Pythagorean view of the soul lasted.

Empedokles, spokesman for that tradition, articulates them as follows: "At last they become seers, singers ('humnopoloï'), physicians, and princes among earthly men, and grow further into deities ('theoi'), who are richest in honor." (Fr. 146).

This was already the tentative and partly the idea of Hesiod of Askra (see above p. 144v.), who lives in the VIIIth e.,-which in comparison with Jamblichos is a difference of about ten centuries! Evidently the spiritual doctrine of the Hellenes is one of their most remarkable heritages.

(iii) A final link in that tradition bears mentioning: the Platonic view of reincarnation: Two traditions run together with him, Platon:

(1) the Socratic conception of the soul; (see above p. 146), which emphasized the conscious and intellectual-rational as well as ethical-political aspect; not for nothing does Socrates stand close to both Demokritos' conception of the soul and that of Protosophism under many points of view;

Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite, 341/356 (Naissance de l' âme) outlines Demokritos' view: "On the basis of all these testimonies (cited by her textually) (Ramnoux had dissected them), one must conclude that, with Demokritos, there is a somato-psychic dualism, which is completely worked out.

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'Psuchè' (soul) and 'soma' (body) or 'skènos' (soul-shell) have acquired the meaning of 'soul' and 'body', which they have, since then, retained.

Somato-psychic dualism" does not mean "belief in the immortality of the soul". Precisely with Demokritos, in whom a dualistic humanism is more evident than elsewhere, this humanism is accompanied by the primacy of the soul, but it is not accompanied by a belief in its immortality.

One is therefore wrong to seek the history of human dualism only in the realm of religious beliefs." (o.c., 350).

In other words, secularization (see above p. 7f) continued with Demokritos. According to Ramnoux (o.c., 355) its origin is medical: Demokritos sees man as soul-body, where the soul prevails, and he believes in a medicine that has somato-psychic effects thanks to a regime of "logismos" (following the discussion of the physicians of his time, where some with thinking exercises ("logismoi"), the others with nutrition and physical gymnastics try to work effects: one sees the secular dualism) - cfr. (partial physicalism (medical)). Not without reason Socrates reflects the Protosophist: see supra p. 89v: medically, psychologically, sociologically, culturologically, Protosophism works out a human science that is secular. According to Ramnoux, o.c., 356, the duality "man / deity" with Herakleitos would have its secular effect with Demokritos, among others. We know, incidentally, Herakleitos's influence on the Sophists (Protagoras in particular). So that the seeds of secularization can already be found in Herakleitos. Which Ramnoux clearly elaborates.

Note.-- The enistemology of the palingenesia, among others in Empedokles, is based, among other things, on what the Greeks called 'mnèmosunè', memory, recollection:

(i) see *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, I, 80/123 (*Aspects mythiques de la mémoire et du temps*), in which 'mnèmosunè' is, preconstitutively, a goddess (o.c., 82) and constitutively, the awakening (one may even say emphatically, 'consciousness expansion' (ibidem)) of past, present and future ("To remember, to know, to see, - as many terms, which are equivalent" (o.c., 83)) concerning Pindaros and Empedokles see o.c., 93ss.; among the Pythagoreans, exercise of memory (anamnèsis) was on the daily program:

1. In the evening, in an examination of conscience, one "remembered" the events of the previous day,

2. but one tried to push through, in that examination of conscience, to the past lives, as a cleansing method of the soul (o.c., 95);

(ii) See Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 363s., where one speaks in analogous terms.

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One sees the enormous difference with Demokritos and Sophistics as well as with Socrates, the "conceptualist", i.e. the one who, first put the concept at the center; indeed, who saw in "concepts" (the good, the righteous, the wicked, etc.) the solution to the problem posed by the crisis, generated among others and especially by Protosophistics, in which all established values were "de.valuated".

It began physically, viz. with the abstract 'archè' or principle (the 'water (Thales), the 'a.peiron' or unbounded (Anaxinandros), the air (Anaxinenes),-- later: the number form (harmony) (Puthagoras), the opposites- tension and -harmony (Herakleitos), the being(s) (Parmenides, the elements (Empedokles), the 'homoioimeriai' (Anaxagoras), the 'atoma' (Leukippos, Demokritos),-- until Socrates put the thought form, viz. the abstract as such -- the concept without more -- became central.

Why? Because the concept was universal and allowed us to escape from radical individualism (see above p. 72ff.). As if the uprooted individual could pull himself up by pure though universal concepts! But it was the conclusion of the physical, which had begun with private or even transcendental abstractions (in the place of souls, deities, forces, harmony of opposites, etc.).

Socrates was much more 'physical' than one tends to think, namely as a radical conceptualist, -- where his predecessors-physicians were only partial conceptualists. Socratic consciousness is therefore a real expansion of consciousness compared to the mnemosune or consciousness-expansion (anamnesis) of the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition, which also worked with concepts, yet situated within the comprehensive and concrete framework of thought of the mnèmosunè.

Immediately, Socrates also narrows the concept of soul to what the comprehensible world allows of it: it becomes, as it were, concept soul, theoretical, practical and productive (technical), as Aristotle will think of them.

(2) Platon sees the problem: on the one hand, the Socratic narrow, and on the other, the Orphic-Pythagorean broad view of soul. After him, one will see the whole Greek philosophy combine Either narrow or extremely narrow (minor Socraticists, Skeptics, Epikouros (notwithstanding Epikouros' belief in God) or broad or extremely broad (major Socraticists (Platonists, Aristotelians (= Peripatetics), Stoics, -- or -- very broadly -- the Theosophical tendencies (Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonics, etc.).

Dodds, The Greek and the Irrational, 207/235 (Plato, the Irrational Soul and the Inherited Conglomerate) summarizes: Platon identifies the soul as daimon of the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition (with its divine, understand: psychic, faculties usually in a dormant state) with the soul as conscientious - understanding, intellectual-rational consciousness of Socrates.

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Platon, secondly, reinterprets - says always Dodds - the shamanistic (iatromantic) basic pattern of his predecessors (Orphics, etc.):

1. the rapture (or, what Dodds does not seem to see, the *mnèmosunè*) becomes Platonic anamnesis, better: contemplation (*theoria*, as the physicalists had begun them) of now not concepts (or abstract archai, principles of physical nature but 'ideai', ideas (see above pp. 45/54 (a.o. those passages concerning Platon)));

2. the social role of the 'iatromantis' (shaman), which reached from poet, over healer to counselor - becoming 'agodic', i.e. educating-welfare-promoting becomes that of the 'watchmen' in Platon's ideal city-state, i.e. theoretically guiding - educating;

3. reincarnation, besides reembodyment with what accompanies it, becomes first and foremost 'anamnesis' of ideas, 'contemplated' (*theoria*) in an ideal, resp. ideal world of transcendental and extrasensory ideas,--a doctrine of knowledge in depth.

So that A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 89, can write that pre-existence and survival, with Platon, have two meanings:

(i) To give a foundation to the anamnesis of ideas, once, in a previous, higher, intellectual-reasonable existence "contemplated" (*theoria*);

(ii) provide the "proof" that the soul of the idea-seeking ("theorètikos") the theorist, possesses the same nature as the eternal ideas that escape creation and decay (the "kuklos geneleos", the harmony of opposites).

This does not prevent Platon, next to (and without much contact with) his central doctrine, from agreeing with the doctrine of his predecessors - Orphics and/or - Pythagoreans concerning retribution after death.

The centre of gravity, however, remains the 'theoretical' life derived from Socrates (and the physicalists), with all its consequences, i.e. the existence of an *intelligentsia*;-theorists, artists, etc.-who, as it were, shut themselves up in that sphere of ideas, without much contact with 'reality' (one could paraphrase Freud, saying: they push the principle of the love of ideas to the detriment of the principle of reality; or, alternatively, they push the principle of the love of ideas to the detriment of the principle of reality). (One could paraphrase Freud, saying: they push through the principle of the lust for ideas at the expense of the principle of reality; or: they lead to idea narcissism; cf. *supra* p. 12ff.). (ii) (159/163)

(D) Causal belief. (159/163)

On p. 153 higher we read that Aristéas of Prokonnesos sometimes assumed a non-human form. N. Söderblom, *Das werden des Gottesglaubens*, o.d. 145, speaking of the "Urheber" ("causers"), says that they regularly assume "animal form" or are half animal, half human; thereby he believes that, at least in part, the explanation lies in that they explain the origin of man and animal or the kinship between man and animal, between clan and totem animal. What he further indirectly questions- 146 (sometimes there is no totemism connected with causal belief)-.

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To recap:

the 'Causer' is first and foremost an aitiological or explanatory being (he explains by what); he causes something either by metamorphosis - the metamorphic type - or by conception - the generative type - (where reception' (o.c., 96; 99; cf. Elkin's conceptual-cultural totemism in Australia) preparation is one of the conception types);

However, in the long run, transformation is also one type of begetting: cfr. o.c., 101 ("The (Kangaroo and/or opossum men of primeval times) had the ability to change one's own form, at will, and 'bring forth' the animals whose names they bore."); 103 ("The 'Causers' of totems), from fatigue, threw themselves down on the ground and their bodies were changed partly into wooden objects, partly into stones, called 'tjurunga', i.e. 'one's own, hidden body'.);

O.c., 149ff., Söderblom summarizes the modes of generation:

(i) 'emanative' (the first humans and animals e.g. either their 'souls' or 'germs' come as 'effusions' (e.manationes) from the body of the primal being)

(ii) artificial' (the 'conceived' things are 'manufactured' from shapeless 'lumps', (also: 'created'; thus 'creative' conceiving);

(iii) both - the emanative and the artificial (resp. creative) - types of conception are mixed (o.c., 150);

O.c., 151, Söderblom notes that even 'emanation' (outflowing committed by a Causer, is not the type of conception peculiar to the ancestor or primal ancestor: "As we have seen, 'begetting' ('gebären', according to Söderblom himself in German), committed by the Causer, is thought, among the primitives, not in the ordinary sense of marriage and birth, but in that of other types of 'emerging from oneself' ('Aussonderung')."

O.c., 153ff., Söderblom explains how the primitives reverted to the 'iatromantis', the paranormal healer, resp. savior as the paragon of 'causing': - Already from the beginning we could suspect - which the reports fully confirm - that 'Bäjämi' (one Causer model) or some other Causer is represented as an ancient, magic, wise iatromantis (medicine man), 'quack' or shaman ('Schamane'), who, in the old days, 'made' and 'set up' everything."

In other words, the mantics and magic (see above pp. 35; 37), especially the mysteries (see above p. 38vv.) offer the key of the causal type, who is neither supreme being without more nor nature deity or demon without more nor ancestor or ancestor soul or phantom without more (o.c., 146, 154), but all this together and according to mantic-magical and mysterious ways.

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Söderblom specifies, further, that the Causer-Iatromantis, as we can now safely call him, - according to gender can also be female (o.c., 102: the Aranda (Australia) speak of "alknarintja" (prehistoric women), who "were never allowed to marry" and thus "had to avert their eyes from men", - of "tnéera" (the beautiful), i.e. primeval time women, who possessed supernatural and extraterrestrial powers, -- whereby the Causal Myth says that both the alknarintja and the tnéera turned into rocks or bushes, while her souls moved into the earth (chthonism with infernal aspect: see above p. 146v.);

Söderblom further defines how youth initiation (that of the young, marriageable men especially) is in immediate relation to just about every Causer type (o.c., 103; 97; 105; etc.); thus he says o.c., 105, that the Causers instituted the rites (circumcision; dance, song and music (*the choreia of the Greeks*; see above p. 36)) of youth initiation or - mysteries (see above p. 38vv., esp. 52/54 (Platonism and mystery wisdom)) and that they founded, at the same time and in the same rites, the thriving and multiplication of the totems (stones, wooden objects; - plants, animals; cf. o.c., 95 (plants, animals, half-human beings; 96 (half-man half-plant or - animal); 101; etc. (where the Australian natives mention among other things 'making fertile' ('bringing into good condition'))).

For the uninitiated (women, children), then, the exoteric myth of the "initiate" applies (see o.c., 97ff.),--which further underscores the Causer's own nature.

Söderblom, o.c., 94 (and elsewhere), underlines that "it is in the nature of the case that the 'creator' can pass imperceptibly into figures who are called 'cultural heroes', 'bringers of salvation', etc.". Not infrequently the primeval hero (see above p. 10 (*mantis, magic, 39 (saviour, heros)*) who 'produced' everything is at the same time the one who taught people how to make fire, to manufacture tools, to hunt, to build canoes and huts, to use medicinal plants, to learn animal names, etc. - in one word: 'saviour', 'cultural hero'. In other words, the Causer is, essentially, an active (unless as *deus otiosus*) and especially an agogic being. He works and promotes well-being. Not contemplative or theoretical.

Well, reread higher pp. 35/45 (the paranormological side of Greek religion); 47/50 (*genius, resp. iuno*); 52/54 (*mystery wisdom*); 61/69 (*coherence 'synchrony/diachrony'*), and thou shalt see the profound resemblance of essence between the present-day 'Cause religions studied by primitivologists and ancient Greek religion. Especially, if one starts from p. 65 (the Samothracic order).

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1 - It is clear that the third instance of the Samothraic deities, viz. the immanent genius, resp. iuno in man (or in another reality of nature, but then in an analogous way) is the 'soul' in its life-giving, animating function (see above p. 132 (*Tylor*); 141 (*animism*)), viz. the principle of life, which, with conception, comes into operation to cease, with death; this principle of life is interwoven with the life-giving powers, - in the Samothraic order the second instance, the male-female Causer (Causer)-.

2 - It is immediately clear that the Causer (Causer) plays an animating role, namely in and through the immanent genius (iuno): this comes through, in hiero-analysis (resp. religion-ethnology) in the following ways:

a. animist-dynamist:

Söderblom, o.c., 26, says that, with the Swedish folk believer, a horse, a man possesses "something," which he designates by three meaning-related terms: "power," "destiny," "guardian spirit"; ibidem, 17, Söderblom says that the Egyptian "ka" (to be distinguished from the "ba") as a life force (principle of life)

a/ during life, as a double (see above p. 142) and guardian spirit (see above p. 142) and

b/ after death, acting as death spirit (phantom, eidolon; cfr. supra 143);

b. animist-theological:

In Homer e.g. 'daimon' (which has no feminine and no plural) means the 'power' (= dynamism cf. the New Testament 'dunamis'), which, on account of deity, determines fate, so that it often means practically 'destiny' (see above p. 7f.). 7f.) later compositions appear as 'eu.daimon', i.e. with a beneficent deity power and/or destiny gifted (olbiodaimon) or 'kako.daimon', i.e. with an inauspicious deity power or destiny;

In Hellas one spoke of a good or an evil 'daimon', who accompanies a person during his life. Eudaimon' is meaning related to 'makar(ios)', (see above p. 144 (*Hesiod*)), blissful, said of deities and also of deity-related people.

As an aside, the weeping poet Aischulos in one and the same sentence calls the spirit of Dareios, Persia 's prince, 'daimon' and 'theos'. Which points to the deity-relatedness of 'daimon', of the animating power. That is why we say 'animistic-theological' above.

Note.-- C. Meier, *Antike Incubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, Zürich, 1949, 38, says that animals -- horses, dogs, snakes --, 'alexikakos', ominous, are used, as such, in Asklepiadic medicine; healing deities -- Asklepios, Sarapis, Trofonios -- regularly take -- in dreams and/or appearances -- the form of such an ominous animal deity. This, to point out that the 'daimon' of a deity can also take on animal form. And that the animal possesses a 'daimon' sui generis and, precisely because of this, is useful.

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Conclusion: - The "soul" - its various layers (breath and life soul, shadowy Hades or underworld soul, higher gifted daimon) - cannot be separated from

(i) an intermediate authority, the Causer, resp. Causer (i.e., the deities for short) and, along there, of

(ii) the Supreme Being. This scheme is reflected, among other things, in the order of the Samothraic deities (see above p. 65).

(E) World soul belief. (163/165)

Although at first glance without a direct connection to the "soul in nature," this theme is nevertheless fundamental, if correctly understood.

1-. The concept.

Just as man consists of body and life-giving, unifying and formative soul, so too the world (the universe) consists of matter (body) and life-giving, formative, unifying world- or universe-soul. So the basis is an analogy (partial identity, partial non-identity).

2- The epistemological foundation.

How does one come to ascribe a 'soul' to the world: the roles of the soul (shaping of matter, life-foundation (inspiration), unification in the multitude) indicate the reason. The world, the universe, exhibits, as a whole, form, life and unity, which are not attributable to (Demokriteic-atomistic) matter - see above p. 95 (*mechanism*); 104vv. (*hylozoism*); esp. 110vv. (*ancient mechanicisms*) - can be attributed, but to something else, which can then be called, among other things, the 'world soul'.

3-. Typology.

(a) First of all there are the many myths, which speak of a world soul, in a more or less vague sense; also the mystery religions mention a macrocosmic living being, which is described as a worldly deity. One may think of the causal role of the Causers (see above p. 63 ('Alvaders'); 160 (modes of generation)).

(b) Philosophically, world-soul belief first appears with Anaximenes of Miletos:

1/ First, the Milesians' climate of thought was "worldly" in the sense that their "archè" or universe principle, hylozoic, was understood as life-giving (*see above p. 102*);

2/ very special is Anaximenes' "world soul" thinker (*see above p. 138*) and, in his line, Diogenes of Appolonia (see above p. 106: universe understanding, following Anaxagoras).

3/ To Empedokles and a number of Pythagoreans, a world-soul doctrine is attributed;

4/ Demokritos too is said to have spoken of a world soul;

5/ Platon situates the world soul in a triad:

(i) the ideas are

(ii) by the thinking God as paragons of the things and processes, "to which he gives form, thought together.

(iii) in the world-soul, these same ideas are found as immanent forces in things and processes.

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Cfr. *supra* p. 51 (*thought-content primal image; sense-image*). In the *Timaos* Platon says that the world-soul is the work of the Dèmiourgos (*see supra* p.36v.) i.e. the world-builder, and that it 'shares' in the being of the thought-content God. So that the following picture emerges: center are the ideas; the Demiürg (Worldbuilder), uses these ideas to shape matter via the conceptual God (= tone images) and the Worldsoul (= immanent ideas as forces). In other words, between the two extremes, ideas and matter, there are intermediate terms, which bridge the (dualistic looking) gap.

One should not think that this Doctrine of Worldly Souls is pure theory G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe*, Paris, 1980, 281, says, speaking of Platon's teaching on health, disease (resp. madness) and the right movement of the body (gymnastics), coupled with the right movement of the soul (music, philosophy), that he insists that, in this double movement of body and soul, one must imitate the form of the whole universe; dance, music, etc., must be integrated into the great whole, and this not without the cooperation of the deities.

We know that even before that the Pythagoreans saw number, -- number form (arithmetic, geometry), music (lyre) and celestial bodies (astronomy) as interconnected (choreia, dance, music and poetry, - are in touch with the sun, the planets and the other celestial bodies)

Father Festugière, *La révélation d' Hermès Trismégiste*, II (*Le Dieu cosmique*), Paris, 1949, xii, notes that this doctrine, briefly outlined above, is the doctrine of the later Platon (*Laws, Timaios*), in which dualism comes through softened; that it contrasts with the younger Platon, who thought much more dualistically: the younger Platon radically contrasted the world of ideas (thought-content, unchanging, divine) with the sensory world (genesis, arising, and fthora, perishing (= kuklos));

Consequence: the whole effort is directed toward liberation from the body; matter, - dark, changeable, ungodly, - is an obstacle to the world of ideas.

In the latter works, however, matter is rather pure delimitation, where ideas run dead, nothing more. In other words, Platon is much more positive about matter and, immediately, about the body and this life. The world-soul bridges the rigid gap of the younger works.

Festugière, o.c., x/xii, says that the same dual world and life view dominated the Hellenistic intelligentsia. "The common source of those two currents, the dualistic and the non-dualistic (the pessimistic and the optimistic), is Platon, whom one can easily call the father of the philosophy of religion of Hellenism." (o.c., xii).

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He shows the same double tendency, the younger Platon, dualistic-pessimistic, the older Platon, less dualistic, less pessimistic. Aristotle, the Stoa, the eclecticism of Cicero, the treatise *De Mundo*, Philon the Jew, - they all work on in that second, less dualistic sense. - The astrotheology of Platon (and later), the Sun-god religion (III- de e. A.D.) are largely situated in that current.

(c) *More recently: the biological vitalists*

e.g. - Schelling, Scheler (in his late works) - cfr. supra p. 112 - were, for the most part, world-soul adherents, in that they wanted to provide an explanation of the cooperation of **(i)** the organisms and **(ii)** the realms of nature.

4 - Assessment:

(i) The reproach of 'pantheism', i.e. underestimating, indeed misunderstanding, the transcendence (= exaltedness) of the Supreme Being, does partly strike the Stoa, who identifies God and World Soul.

(ii) The fallacy of the World-Soul adherents lies in the fact that unity, order and liveliness of the universe can also be explained outside a World-Soul, e.g. by the order which a Supreme Being, whether or not aided by intermediate beings (one thinks of the Causers), puts in nature (via ideas e.g.; cfr. supra p. 50 (a being, his genius and / or iuno, his idea)).

(iii) The strong side of the World Soul concept lies in the notion of the 'omnipotent' (*see above pp. 133; 139*) and in hylozoism (understood as the belief that one fluid, analogous from being to being - thus not monistic - sails through the universe and thus realizes the unity of the universe (*see above pp. 16v. (Maat); 104vv. (hylozoism)*). Cfr. Aristotle's doctrine of the aithèr (the fifth element, quinta essentia); see Willmann, I, 499/501. Such ideas need by no means be interpreted monistically, resp. pantheistically.

(iv) Willmann, I, 634f., quotes Varro, who speaks of the soul father and soul protector (of the Roman mysteries who is at the same time venerated as "genius": he controls and possesses the life force with regard to all things, which ever undergo creation, conception; that "genius" is also called world soul, because he "comprises all souls").

This means that he is soul-creator, soul-giver. Cfr. the Causers as life-creating beings (*see above pp. 63vv; 162*). It is added in this context that every being - place, thing, man - has its genius, i.e. its 'deus naturalis' (nature deity) , which is its true 'I', even its gifted one (daimon), its leader and guide (angel), its destiny maker.

All of this should not necessarily be interpreted monist-pantheistically, but fluidistically and animistically and causally.

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***The occult in nature.* (166/173)**

'Occult' can be defined in more than one way. With A. Lalande, *Vocabulaire* (...), 1968-10, 712s., we define it as follows:

(i) what is hidden or secret,

(ii) such that the majority of people, even the learned ones, must classify it as unexplained and, within scientific rules of play, as inexplicable. First of all, the hidden character refers to perception: all those who are not sensitive, i.e. who sense the fluid, in one of its forms, and who do not possess second sight, i.e. who 'see' that same fluid, however it may be, do not reach the 'occult' with the ordinary senses. The second degree of hiddenness lies in the axioms of interpretation: for example, modern (or even ancient) science, methodically, cannot "explain" a number of phenomena because it excludes, systematically, certain observations and/or models (of interpretation).

1- *The beginning of the occult physical(s) in ancient Greece.*

a. See above p. 77v.: with Dodds we note that +/- -425 the "turning point" of Greek secularism begins to take place.

b. With *Pater Festugière, La révélation d' Hermès Trismégiste, I (L' astrologie et les sciences occultes)*, Paris, 1944, 195, we note that, after the death of Aristotle's first disciple, Theophrastus of Eresos (Lesbos) (-372/-288), the so-called occult 'sciences' begin to get off the ground. Let us say = - 275.

2- *Bolos by Mendes*

(Mendes: the Egyptian city in the Nile delta, known for its 'holy goat'), nicknamed the demokriter (+/- -200), can be taken as a typical 'anèr fusikos', i.e. physicalist, in the Hellenist sense of that word, i.e. occultist: he is, after all, a pioneer, followed by a whole series of 'physicalist occultists' (see Festugière, 197). The overview on his works offers us a first insight:

a. symbolism (allusion theory), - further: the doctrine of the 'sumpatheia' (agreement) and 'antipatheia' of (occult) phenomena: *Fusika dunamera* (= *Peri sumpatheion kai antipatheion*), his main work; *Cheirokmèta dunamera* (Artificial sympathetic medicines);

b. wonders: *Thaumasias*;

c. *mantics* (divination), *magic* (*Paignia* (on entertaining prescriptions of magic));

d. astrology; alchemy (*Bafika*);

e. medicine (*Technè iatrikè*); agronomy (*Georgika*); -- further: tactics (*Taktika*);

f. ethics (*Hupomnèmata èthika*);-- history (*Peri Ioudaion*).

It should not be forgotten that, when viewed thoroughly, these works cover a whole program of philosophy with its attendant sciences: In God-given knowledge (theosophia) concerning the being (ontology), containing:

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(i) synchronically, the structure of the universe (especially the celestial bodies within it) and

(ii) diachronically, the cycles (kukloi, cycles) of that universe and its parts (beginning, middle and end of times (myth);- the kuklos of sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, of the seasons). - In other words: an encyclopedic whole.

3-. *The paradigms of occult science.*

The paragons of a Bolos and successors are multiple:

a. the mainly Aristotelian natural science, which studies the three realms (inorganic, plants, animals,

a1. with purely theoretical intent (theoria), without agogic or utilitarian intentions,

a2. merely paying attention to (i) the classification (species, subspecies) and (ii) the causal relations of a secular nature; where the 'morpheme', forma, the form, i.e. the structure of stone, plant, animal is central (hylemorphism);

b. the own Greek (mythical-mysterious-religious and mantic-magic) 'science' that also existed; one thinks of the Asklepiadic medicine e.g. (see above p. 85v.):

c. the (i) Egyptian temple sages, (ii) Chaldean astrologers, (iii) Iranian magicians, (iv) Indian fakirs and 'gumnosofistai' (yogis) (i.e. in Indosland, i.e. around present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan) and (v) the Hebrew prophets are models, -- outside the circle of the Greek secular physical, of course.

4-. *The method.*

Up front, we cite a text by *Bidez-Cumont, Les mages hellénisés*, Paris, 1938, I:107 (cited by Festugière (200)):

"The Eastern religions did not separate contemplations of deities and man from the study of the material world. Faith was, after all, closely intertwined with scholarship; consequence: the theologian was also more physical. The clerics engaged in research,- in their way, of the three realms of nature:

(i) the animals, the plants, the rocks were, by secret common characteristics, attuned to the heavenly powers;

(ii) the theosophia, divine wisdom, revealed to pious souls the operation of occult forces, which gave rise to all "physical" (understand: gross material) phenomena. One cannot express it better!

(A) *The object.*

This is, scholastically expressed, double: material (totally identical) and formal (partially identical, i.e. the distributive and o.m. collective structure of the material object).

(A)1. *The material object:* the three realms (magical) and also the heavenly bodies (astrological) and the inner material structure (alchemical).

(GW 168)

(A)2. *The formal object* (perspective):

these can, with Festugière, 195ss., be reduced to three:

a/ the 'thauma', the miracle,

i.e. that which is different, 'alternative' to the ordinary (and that is to say) secular course of events; Festugière, with all secularists, reduces this to lack of sense of the lawful-universal and calls it 'idiotès', singularity,--which is wrong; better is the expression, which he, footnote p. 196, quotes, viz. 'idiotès arrètos', 'qualitas occulta' (= Middle Ages and correct translation), occult nature (and if need be lawfulness); -- although the occult, as paranormal, is rather rare or even singular (at first sight);

as an example of 'thauma': the shed skin of a snake has a menstrual effect; the tongue of a live frog, placed on a woman's breast, makes her confess all her deeds; yellow amber attracts all light objects except basilisk and oiled objects; magnetic iron, rubbed with garlic, no longer attracts iron; the murik (plant), a small blue- or red-flowered plant, removes evil occult influences; hyenagal cures eye ailments; etc.(o.c., 199):

assessment: formulated in that universal language and as a precept that is universally applicable, these thaumata are not valid; for it is known that magical (astrological, alchemical) 'facts' are highly dependent on:

(i) the individual (singular to subject) and his "power" (dunamis), which varies from zero to very great from individual to individual--to the great despair of secular scientists, incidentally;

(ii) the situation (singular to circumstances) and the magical (astrological, alchemical) influences (dunamis, 'forces', which happen to be present and, if need be, interfere with the operation from zero to very great; i.e., the aforementioned 'miracles' (paranormal phenomena) are formulated in a language that curses with their nature of being (resulting in the impression of quackery and superstition, which, in that case, is correct, but beside the real issue).

b/ the sympathy and antipathy,

i.e. the mutual interaction, on the occult plane that is, between things and processes, not in their secular nature, but in their occult, psychic power relations; in their 'fusus', or rather their 'fusus', i.e. occult nature or natures, i.e. properties, 'forces', 'workings'.

P. Festugière, o.c., 37 o.d., determines "sumpatheia," that

(i) originally means pity, also compassion for (the suffering, the feelings of the other);

(ii) but, occult 'chain', occult connection' means, e.g., between celestial bodies (and the deities, spirits, demons, who 'inhabit' them) and sub-mundane realities of which following applicative models:

(GW 169)

for example, a certain plant may only be picked under the protection of a certain celestial body (or zodiac sign),

astro(theo)logical; for example, a certain rock is only magically active (effective), if one utters a certain invocation over it (signifying a demon or deity e.g.);

theological; thus, conversely, a deity obeys only if one makes a well-defined sacrifice;

theürgic, i.e. aimed at the submission (to either pragmatic (purposeful, 'useful') or agogic (welfare-promoting) intentions) of a spirit, a deity; *as Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational*, 283/311, explains, there are two main forms of theürgie (theourgia):

a. the (dedication) of an object (teletè),

Festugière, 37, says that, based on the law of sympathy, a deity will obey only if one succeeds in capturing his 'fusus' (fusesis), i. e. (in Hellenistic-occult context) his 'strength' (forces), in a symbol, e. g. a statue; this succeeds among other things because one captures other 'senses' (forces) in a symbol, e. g. a statue, in a human being. i. (in Hellenistic-occult context) his 'power' (forces), in a symbol, e.g. a figurine; this succeeds, among other things, by hiding other 'symbols' (see Bolos' work on 'symbolism'), - animals, plants, stones, perfumes, etc., in the hollow inner space of the head. - animals, plants, stones, perfumes, etc., in the hollow interior of such a figurine;

Well, according to Dodds, 292, each deity has its own 'sympathetic representative' ('symbol') in one of the three realms (rock, plant, animal) or in the inscriptions or spoken formulas, which, at the (dedication) of a more comprehensive 'symbol', can be used ('thesis', the placing of an inscription in a statue, for example; 'ekphonèsis', the uttering of a formula following the (dedication));

Dodds, 293, adds that the theuric fabrication of 'allusions' ('fetishes' one would say in Western Negro Africa) was based on "the primitive and widespread belief in the natural 'sumpatheia', which links the image and the original." - which, very sharply expressed, amounts to this: that a fluid or subtle bond both contact (contact magic) and likeness (imitation magic), constituting the essence of the 'sumpatheia', 'connects' image and original (the depicted), mutually aligning; We refer, here, to the chapter on '*Fetish Beliefs*' in the *Hieroanalysis course*;

Dodds notes that the telesthetic or phantom theology certainly goes back to Bolos of Mendes (293), but is older and used in Greco-Egyptian magic, among other places;

b. The "inspiration" (the induction of a mind)

'eiskrisis') of a (mediumnically gifted) human being by a spirit, demon, deity; the 'inspired', 'enthusiastic' human being in question then becomes 'symbol', hupodochè (fetish), dwelling, of that alien entity and is then called 'katochos' (seized, in the pejorative case: possessed; inspired) or 'docheus' (host, hostess);

(GW 170)

Critical Comment:

Dodds, 295, asserts that, just as ordination rests on fluidum kinship (sumpatheia) between example and image, inspiration (deity induction) rests on the widespread belief in being seized (which he designates with the bad name 'possession', by the way) by a deity, daimon, deceased; -- it is, for experienced people, clear that such an entrance of an entity (= spirituality) only succeeds if beforehand a minimal sumpatheia, fluid relationship, has been realized; what Dodds himself indirectly founds by quoting that, with a view to eiskrisis, the medial person e. g. wears special clothes with special curtains.v. wears special clothes with special belts aligned with the deity (296);

He refers to the 'othonè' (fine linen garment intended for women) or 'sindon' (resp. 'sindonè'; fine linen fabric, from Indosland: which were taken off at the 'apolusis', i.e. The medium also wore wreaths with magical effects and was given 'symbola' (images of meaning, see Telestial Theurgy!) on his clothes, such as e.g. 'eikonisma', image of a deity who had been summoned as an intervener or inspirer(ibid.);

Also damp vapour (atmosphere) or invocations (epiklesis, invocation of a deity), etc. (ibid.); i.e. what can be put into objects, with hollow interior, that is put into or attached to them with humans, but the meaning is the same: sympathy. (ibid.); in other words, what in objects, with hollow interior, can be put in, that in humans is put around or hung on or attached to it, but its meaning is the same: sympathy, fluid relationship (contactual and mimetic); - incidentally, o.c., 289ff., Dodds cites the case of Plotinos (from *Porphyrios' Life Description* 10), who, as a daimon, i.e. indwelling attendant (see above p. 143v.; 162 (ad - 1 - b. (animistic-theological)), was a deity, of higher rank t.v. the ordinary daimones, had; Dodds adds, "The belief in an indwelling daimon is very old and widespread; it was accepted and rationalized by Platon and the Stoics, each in his own way." (289) Dodds does say "indwelling," -- which recalls the consecrated "sense" of telesthetic theurgy, in which an entity was also present and "indwelling," though in an analogous way; -- eiskritic theurgy artificially (on the grounds of sympathy) generates temporary "indwelling" with, among other things, inspirational effect. - So much for sumpatheia in its most striking forms.

Note. It is clear that the Asklepiadic method (see above p. 149v.) is a kind of theurgy, i.e. the priest, respectively the sick or wretched one, on the basis of sympathy, which appears among other things from the preparations, does eiskrisis of himself (he allows himself to be seized). What Festugière, 198s, says of the other sympathies, requires reservation; snakes are sympathetic with fennel seeds; salamanders are with fire; swallows with stinking gow, etc.; precisely the same remark applies here as for the thaumata: wrong (because universal) language about possibly true, but (as occult) paranormal and therefore rare facts, depending on laws, in which the individual and his unique situation play an essential role (see above p. 168 (review); e.g. the sympathy between salamander and fire is not pure imagination;

(GW 171)

One reads R. Schwaeble, *Grimoires de Paracelse*, LUG-Bersez, Paris, 1976, 7/40, (*Traité des nymphes, sylphes, pygmées, salamandres et autres êtres*); the speaker is Paracelsus (1493/1541), who is not just anybody; i.e. each of these listed sympathies must be examined separately and concretely (not in that abstract-universal prescriptive language).

The "antipatheia" (antipathy), fluid contradiction.

Just as there is contact and imitation, visible presentiment in other words, between one "fusus" (occult nature) and another "fusus" (occult nature of being), so there is also conflict, conflict, yes, antagonism between some fuseis (occult natures).

Festugière, o.c., 198, lists e.g.: ibis/ snake; snake/ oak leaves; snake/ saliva of a fasting man; lion/ cock; lion/ fire, etc..

We refer to the chapter on 'taboo', i.e. antipathetic relationship, in the *Course in Hieroanalysis*. Whoever pretends - consciously or, as happens very often, unconsciously - that antipathy does not exist, but accidentally nevertheless treats an occult (= hidden) antipathy as if it were sympathy, transgresses a taboo and will, depending on its nature, not escape the nasty consequences of hubris (see above page 9) in the long run. Yet that is part of the hiero-analysis.

(B) The subject.

The historia (see above p. 70v.) (investigation of physicals)) of occult phenomena demands a subject who possesses the following properties.

(B)1. The Egyptian priests, the Chaldean magicians, etc. - the paragons. - possessed, according to Festugière, 37, two essential skills:

a. they were theurgically gifted or, at least, theosophically gifted, i.e. were assisted, in their research, by entities (spirits, daimones, deities) who provided them with cognitive assistance this divine favor (or, in the case of theurgy, this divine cooperation) is a first subjective requirement; For whoever is not assisted, in his mantic-magical, astrological or alchemical work (research, application of knowledge), will soon run into insurmountable difficulties, if only because some deities create antipathies where man, unsuspecting, does not even suspect it; 'theosophy' (not only in the modern sense) is, theurgical or not, wisdom, but god-given (extra- and supernatural) wisdom;

b. they were magical, i.e. regarding manipulation of fluid (particulate; see above p. 99 (hylic pluralism; expert; i.e. they saw through the sym- and antipathies.

(GW 172)

After all, these anti- and sympathies come into play constantly in just about every magical act.

Conclusion: one sees that **a.** religion (theosophical, possibly theurgical) and **b.** magic (fluidic) form a unity.

(B)2. The pragmatics

The pragmatics is the second major feature of the historia of the (occult) fisis scholars. Speaking of the two physicals, the secular (represented especially in Aristotelian natural philosophy) and the theosophical (represented in the "physical" of Bolos by Mendes), Festugière, o.c., 194. expresses the difference as follows:

"(The) utility criterion is decisive: it marks the boundary where two worlds diverge." Indeed, the pure 'theoria' (see above p. 91v. (*relativism*); 56vv. (*doctrine of method*); 124vv. (*pure science and technology*); esp. 158v. (*conceptualism*)) is, to a high though not overall degree, typical of philosophy and professional science.

The theosophical-magical attitude, however, is fundamentally pragmatic, i.e., focused on achieving results. Festugière himself provides applicative models:

(i) the three realms are studied in order to detect and make usable the 'fisis', i.e. occult power, of them; -- Magical;

(ii)a. the celestial space is not seen as a 'form' of a matter (Aristotle's hylemorphism), but astrologically, i.e. in order to determine fate there (see above p. 9vv. (*fate analysis*), 16vv. (*Measure as determinant of fate*)) which concerns princes or ordinary people; - astrologically;

(ii)b. the rocks and metals are examined not as forms of matter (Aristotelian: but as possible transmutation material; -- alchemical.

(B)2.bis. The pragmatics of the (occult) physical

It is highly agogic, i.e. guidance and welfare enhancing. The Greek man of the time came with his problems and worries to the magician, respectively astrologer (and possibly alchemist), not to learn theory, but to be helped. Hence the occult physical was so close to medicine. And to the soul leader.

(B)2.ter Difference from traditional mage.

The great difference from the traditional magician, resp. astrologer and/or alchemist consisted in the fact that the theosophical-magical concern now wanted to be physical and, in its occult, i.e. psychic and, at once, concrete-individual way (see above p. 168 double singularity, - personal and situational), was also.

Conclusion: the word 'philosophos', sage, now takes on the meaning of more physical, at the height of occult sciences (Festugière, 37). He knows the 'fisis', resp. 'fuseis', the occult forces of things and processes.

(GW 173)

Bibliogr. sample: except higher p. 35vv, *Max Wellmann, Die Fusika des Bolos und der Magier Anaxilaos aus Larissa, in Abhandl. der Preusz. Akad. der Wissensch. , Phil.-Hist., 1928, 7.*

For astrology and alchemy: see History Course itself. Astrology at its Hellenistic origins +/- -280 a.d. Bèrosos of Babylonia (Babuloniaka, Babylonia's History).

Alchemy becomes physical by Bolos of Mendes bafiek (= traditional alchemy) in that he gave traditional alchemy a substructure of physical.

(B)2. quater. White and black magic.

The pragmatics gives rise to an ethical-political problem: one can, after all, determine fate, i.e. the occult side of natural life and events, benignly and maliciously, in two fundamentally different ways.

Kristensen, Verz. bijdragen tot kennis der antieke godsdiensten (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), A'm, 1947, 274, notes that, while religions show great differences, the magical incantations and practices to ward off evil spirits and dangerous influences (cathartic, exorcism) are remarkably the same all over the world; the monotony of the facts is so great that one can hardly speak of a special - e.g. Greek - magic, - says Kristensen. Kristensen sees the consequence for his defense of the harmony of opposites (demonistic interpretation of religious facts): in magic there is a distinction between good and evil, which, in the end, cannot be reconciled; in other words, there is no harmony (synthesis on a demonistic basis (see above p. 7v.)) but antagonism, i.e. irreconcilable opposition.

Agogically, one does not escape it: one theosophy, resp. theürgie works morally and politically downward, destructive; the other morally-politically constructive, equalizing.

There is 'white' and 'black' magic (theosophy, theurgy). In other words, one cannot simply uphold the main idea of the mystery religions, as Kristensen conceives them:

(i) there is, in the fusis, a demonism at work that harmonizes the opposites;

(ii) but at the same time - and extending beyond this - there is antagonism of opposites:

1) the primordial monotheisms, 2) the later 'negative' demonism fundamentally combating monotheisms (Yahwehism (Israel), Zoroastrianism (Iran), Ekhnaton (Egypt)) postulate that there is a Supreme Being, who is non-demonistic, viz. which thoroughly distinguishes between good and evil (antagonism); -- of this all practical magicians (god-fearing and god-hostile) are living proof: they affirm, as Kristensen also sees it, that same antagonism but in their way (sometimes very demonistically), -- agogically-magically. The misery, with which they are in fact confronted or which they establish, cannot be denied. The "harmony of opposites" of demonism (which only partially reflects the mysteries) cannot explain away this antagonism.

(GW 174)

(d) Normative (= ethical-political, deontic) philosophy.

Wisdom, in its philosophical, professional scientific and rhetorical form, is, finally, also concerned with behavior insofar as it is standardized, i.e. subject to norm(s) (*see above p. 47 (regulation, value and purposefulness by the idea)*).

Note.-- We have already discussed several normative aspects; here is a brief overview.

1. The four aspects of wisdom, respectively myth and/or philosophy: *pp. 14/17 (myth, religion); 28v. (philosophy); 57/61 (Ionic physical / Attic human science; physical and eth.-pol. theology); 16v. (Measure)*.

2. The concept of order as a basis:

(i) mythic-demonic (6/12 (*Narkissosmythe*); 144-v. (*Hesiod*); 147v. (*Thebes*); 63/68 and 159/163 (*Causal Belief*); 32, 66 (*chthonic*));

(ii) Biblical: 4v.; 15;

(iii) de-demonization

a/ Orphic: 145/152 (152/158: *reincarnate*);

b/ Supreme Being: 4v. - 33, 74 (*Xenoph.*); - (173*monotheistic; magical*);

c/ physical: 78/82 (*Herodotean*);- *apocalyptic*: 5);

(iv) theory of ideas: 45/54 (*esp. 50/52 (exemplarism; idealism criticism); (113cybernetics); 111/113, 134/137 (dynamism and related); 67v. (genesis = fisis)*).

3. The concept of fate; 9v. (*destiny analysis*); 98/109 (*fluidic basis of destiny*); 133, 139 (*general spirit*); 163/165 (*world soul*); 166/173 (*occult*).

4. The spiritualist foundation: 100/101 (*Verbeke; criticism*); 146, 156v. (*Socratic understanding of soul*).

5. The soul aspect: 141/159 (*soul layers*)

6. The culturological aspect: (27*method*); 82/84 (*Thoekudides*); 89/91 (*Protosofistics*).

7. The enlightened, respectively skeptical aspect: (71*secular humanism*); 72vv. (*'Enlightenment' as secular rationalism*) -- (*individualism; relativism*); 74/77 (*skepticism*); 91/93; ((*pre*)*skepticism*).

Conclusion:

One can see that the normative aspect comes through between two extremes (interval): on the one hand, destiny and order; on the other hand, the enlightened and (pre)septic aspect, -- with in between the spiritualistic foundation; -- the soulistic and cultural aspect are special issues (freedom vis-à-vis order and/or cultural framework).

The great problem is, after all, that for an ethical-political philosophy there must be both order (regulation) and freedom; without the two there is no conscientious behavior either individually (morally, ethically) or socially (politically). If a free being consciously accepts an order as the regulation (steering) of its behavior, it enters the ethical-political sphere.

Fate is something else: destiny means **(i)** causality, **(ii)** which regulates freedom not so much as curtails it (one undergoes fate) or which is freely caused (one prepares oneself or others a fate).

(GW 175)

Cfr. R. Guardini, *Freedom, Grace, Fate*, Antwerp, 1950, 159/ 268 (Fate, - with emphasis on necessity; fact (= what stems from freedom), chance; - one may add that 'grace' (101/157) is one aspect of fate).

(1) *The premise.* (175/178)

The sophio-analysis (*see above p. 1/17*; esp. the fact that Schärer defines 'wisdom' as, in a concrete situation, on the basis of exchange solutions, subject to norms, deciding in view of the possible consequences of that conclusion) shows us that, "before the advent of 'speculation' (i.e. the philosophical thinking of wisdom), the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy, which in the idea of wisdom lay undivided, prevailed". (*O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 387).

This implies that (*see p. 14v.*) the four-part structure of wisdom operates here:

- (i) the truth (informative) concerning the nature (physical, constitutive) of things and its background (preconstitutive)
- (ii) is simultaneously "duty" resp "right" (deontic).

This forms the structure of philosophy (*see p. 28v.*), approached internalistically. The information, concerning nature and nature foundation, is at the same time norm of action (deontic, normative).

This quadrilateralism is the background to *F. Grégoire, Les grandes doctrines morales*, Paris, 1978-7, 14/31 (*Les types de doctrines morales*): relying on Dilthey's topology of philosophies (+/- 1900)

- (i) Objective idealism (the idea is for and in nature),
- (ii) naturalism (nature is there, without idea for it or in it merely material),
- (iii) subjective idealism (the idea is a creation of the human subject) - draftsman designs a classification of ethical systems:

(i) 'transcendent' ethics, which assume an order that is higher (transcendent) than nature, in which it manifests itself; so e.g. the religious ethics; so also the 'leke' (laicized, understand: secularized) ethics (Platon, Aristotle, the Stoa, Neo-Platonism): there is an order for and in nature, which 'transcends' (transcends) that nature (and free man);

(ii) 'naturalistic' ethics, which only assume nature, without pre-existing ideas (order) in it, but which, if necessary, are provided with a regularity (laws of nature), which can be revealed by scientific disciplines; so the physicalists, who founded a theory of behavior on the basis (nature) - but then with the exclusion of transcendental, religious or post-religious (leke) ideas or order in it -; so especially Epikouros who reduced being and a.o. man to a coincidental aggregation of atoms (cfr. Demokritos' atomistic), which, with death e.g., and saw only 'ataraxia' (undisturbedness) as his goal.

(GW 176)

It should be noted that, in naturalistic ethics, there is an order, but understood purely as an idea in nature (an idea that is purely immanent and hardly deserves the name "idea," in that sense, insofar as chance is conceived as decisive; something else is, that naturalism which accepts real natural law);

(ii) 'kinetic' ethics, which do not accept an initial order, but rather an order, which comes into being (gradually or leapfroggingly) either through a striving present in nature (e.g., evolution) or through human activity (e.g., subjective order); the author discusses this latter type of becoming order in what he calls the 'activist' ethics (some Sophists, e.g., assumed that only with man does the universe, nature, acquire order).

F. Grégoire, o.c., 16, says that 'transcendental' (objectively idealistic) ethics occur either at the base or at the termination of metaphysics. Indeed, *O. Willmann, Aus der Werkstatt der Philosophie*, Freiburg, 1912, says that 'metaphysics' can be described fourfold:

1. as the consummation of wisdom; then it is analysis of the first principles, which are at work in nature and in the spiritual - ethical world (so e.g. the ideas or the deity);

2.a. as ontology; then it is the analysis of absolute being (Parmenides), present in becoming nature and in thinking as knowledge of being;

2.b as theology; then she is the analysis of the deity, who, with her wisdom (laws, parables), is at work in nature and in humanity as a thinking - investigating 'nature';

2c. as a doctrine of the transcendental (immaterial); then it is analysis of the external and supernatural reality, which comes through in nature and in man.

The 'transcendent' (i.e., the preconstitutive 'metaphysical' lies in the 'first' (antecedent, pre-existent, preconstitutive) principles, in the 'absolute' (radically pre-existent) being, in which everything is situated in the deity, which, within being, plays the 'first' (pre-existent) role vis-à-vis the non-godly, in the transcendental, which is only one type of pre-existence, unless one identifies it with principle, being and/or deity; whereby it should be noted that 'immaterial' is multivalent, it can mean both 'particulate (fluid, subtle (see above p. 100) and immaterial' (radical and non-decipherable and incorporeal).

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 356, says:

(i) nominalism, i.e. that interpretation of the idea, resp. the concept (thought-content which claims to be merely psychic, merely mental, consciousness-content (conscientism concerning thought-contents), reduces wisdom, - truth (informative), faith-content, dogma (preconstitutive), lawfulness as general information in nature (constitutive, physical) and morality and law (normative) to pure products of either individual impressions or common understandings ('conventions');

(GW 177)

In other words, nominalism is not so much denying the generality of the idea (concept as universal set) as it is ignoring the objective correlate in reality (preconstitutive, constitutive, normative);

(ii) idealism, i.e. the interpretation which conceives of the idea as a self-existing mental content with its own logical reality, maintains that the idea really exists in the object of consciousness: truth, the contents of faith, the laws of nature, morals and law are therefore objective, though mental (informational) realities, independent of the psychic or collective-psychic activity of the human subject; they are not subjective but objective (realism concerning mental contents, d.i. information as idea or number (form); see above pp. 45/54 (*idea*); 96v. (*information*); 117/130 (*ancient information-physics*)).

Well, the purely activist ethics are nominalist. Protosofistics, then, was an activist movement on morality and law.

One can also express this differently: the 'origin' (object of 'genealogy' (understood here philosophically)) is either ideal or historical (historicism concerning idea). Hegel made a radical distinction between these two types of 'origin'.

Nietzsche (Genealogie der Moral) designs a special kind of historicism (one type of kinetic ethics): he 'understands' ('interprets') them from the (un)conscious motives (motives); e.g. (*Der Antichrist*, 1888) the son's conviction has as its 'origin' that which the father told as a lie; correctly understood: the father's motive, resp. The father's motive (through which, resp. why he lied) led him to lie; that lie leads the son (who does not realize it in his father) to a conviction; the 'true' (in Nietzschean terms) 'origin' is not the paternal lie but the motive, resp. the motive.- Such a historicism is, at least minimally, at work in Protosofistics.

(2) *The misunderstanding of ideas theory.* (177/184)

One of the decisive reasons concerning rejection of ideas (as prior, objective information) lies in the fact that the theory of ideas easily gives the impression that the order for and in nature is 'total'. This is wrong: nature is unfinished: the beings in it have a task, namely to finish that order. More than that: the ideas, according to which that task is finished, 'grow' (in the consciousness of the creatures. Both constitutively and informatively there is genesis. Cfr. supra pp. 50/52 (*exemplarism*; idealism criticism).

(GW 178)

A second misunderstanding of idea lies in misunderstanding its content and scope. O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 357, allows us to sense this sharply. Following Aristotle's *onomastikon* (glossary) in his *Metaphysics* (Book Delta; see D. Ross, intr., *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. London/ New York, 1961, 18 (*Substance, ousia*)), he notes three distinguished meanings of idea:

(i) 'ousia' (beingness) means first of all the simple bodies (earth, water, fire, etc.; bodies in general and compositions of them, as e.g. living beings, celestial bodies); Willmann calls this beingness as being-substance;

(ii) 'ousia' means, further, the immanent cause of being in the aforementioned bodies (so e.g. the soul is the immanent cause of being of the animals); that is the being as a ground of existence;

(iii) 'ousia' means, also still, those elements or parts, which are immanent to the aforementioned things and which define and separate them as individual realities such that, after their destruction, the whole is destroyed, (the line, say the Pythagoreans, is 'substantial', (constituent) of the plane; the plane, of 'a three-dimensional body'); that is the being as a whole of creature constituents;

(iv) 'ousia' is, finally, also the 'essence', the formulation of which is the determination of being or definition (so man is a reason-bearing animal; thus man is, definitively, embedded as a subset in a universal set); that is the essence as determination of being.

It is seen that (iii) and (iv) represent system and collection and that (ii) denotes that property which makes up a system (bond of the constituents named under (iii)), while (i) is the first denomination of systems according to their corporeal-material appearance, resp. substratum.

Willmann somewhat forgets (iii). One should not simply identify the idea with (iv), essence determination; reason: all four types of 'ousia' are thought-content and thus idea.

Ethically applied: if I violate the body of a fellow human being (= (i)),-- then, through the systemic connection which constitutes the soul (ii), the whole (iii) is also violated, e.g.; if I, in that fellow human being, switch off reason (= (iii) and immediately (iv)), by getting drunk, e.g.,-- then I violate, immediately, his soul(even) (= (ii)).

In other words, collection and system (distributive and collective structure) define 'idea',--not just collection (definition)!

The concept of fusis (nature). (178/184)

cfr. supra p. 61/93; esp. 74/77 (*Xenophanes; Euripides*); 82/84 (*Thoekudides* 89/91 (*Prophilosophy; Thoekudides*); 91/93 (*prescepsis; skepticism*) can be understood as irrational (informative), unethical (normative) at least in more than one sense.

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We explain this in more detail.

Bibl. sample: *JP. Dumont, Les sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1969, provides an ordered overview:

1) epistemological: only sense perception is accepted, which tilts toward phenomenism (i.e., which takes purely subjective impressions as only certain); consequence: ideas non-existent, numbers included as ideal beings; deity is non-existent or reduced to "natural phenomenon," if not to product of human consciousness;

2) natural philosophy is the only basis, on a materialistic basis; in that nature, however, man with his culture acts, especially the polis or city culture, which apparently introduces something new into the *fusis*, nature, as the Sophists conceive it, namely 'nomos', legislation (and application of law) especially;

3. ethico-political: through professional science and cunning wisdom (a reduced form of 'wisdom', of course) the Sophist and the citizen of the polis raised or guided by him is supposed to achieve 'progress'; literary 'magic', eloquence, dialectics (argued art of discussion), yes, eristics (refined dialectics), - ultimately, possibly, 'polumathoa' (universal erudition) play a leading role; successful citizenship, with labor and friendship, is the 'ideal'.

F. Flückiger, Gesch. d. Naturrechts, I (Die Gesch. der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum (...), Zollikon-Zürich, 1954, 105/124 (Die Physis als Rechtsnorm): "The world view founded by the Sophists (and further elaborated by Epikouros) is, culturally historically, of great significance. From it springs the concept of 'natural law'. (121). Meant are the so-called younger Sophists, of course (the older Sophists were pioneering). Hippias of Elis (-460/...), Antiphon of Athens, Trasumachos of Chalkèdon were the first, according to Flückiger, 107, who consciously considered the '*fusis anthropinè*' (see above) p. 87 (*Jaeger, Paideia, II, 15 viz. human nature (as formulated by medicine and agronomy)*), as the 'measure' (norm) of the being (as sensually perceived being, that is), also of ethics and politics.

With them, '*fusis*' means the secularization of '*fusis*' as the word was used in *Odusseia, 10: 303* (power, which inhabits a certain magic herb, with which Odusseus can protect himself from the black magic of Kirkè), i.e. that which arises and grows as gifted with certain natures of its own and, as such, thanks to power and longevity, sustains itself (o.c., 107).

Consequence:

(i) natural is that which is self-satisfied, self-effacing, gifted with its own power, perseveres, and endures (in the struggle for life);

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(ii) 'legal' (resp. 'lawful') is that which is imposed by tradition, compulsion or conclusion of someone, from outside us, and is therefore always, more or less, unnatural, doing violence to (human) nature: morality, legislation, custom and usage are therefore viewed by Protosofistics with more or less revolutionary view.

Two basic lines are emerging, in ethics and politics, from that revolutionary conception of fusi:

a. the two principles (see above p. 157v. (conceptualism)) lust and power typify nature: lust as the deepest driving force of human behavior (hedonism); power as the rule that governs relations among humans;

b. individualism typifies, further, all living beings, who, thereby, seek to develop and indulge the predispositions and possibilities lying in their individual fusi, -- the later Sophists understand this individual nature as plainly present; Euripides (*see above pp. 75/77*) sees in it an evil daimon ('alastor') (cfr. *ER. Dodds, Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich/München, 1977, 95/112 (*Euripides as Irrationalist*); esp. 100, 103;

"Mèdeia, Hippolutos, Hekabè (Hecuba), Hèraklès: what gives all these dramas their deeply tragic character is the triumph of irrational insistence over reason in a noble yet unsteady man." (103).).

Thus we better understand the statements of Hippias of Elis ("The law, the tyrant of men, often does violence to nature" *Dumont, 156; Flückiger, 106; 116*),--of Trasumachos of Chalkedon ("I assert that the lawful is nothing but what is convenient to the strongest." (*Dumont, 138; Flückiger, 112*)).

Ad a) The lust principle comes across 'positively' in natural affection (love, friendship), yet 'negatively' in aversion (hatred); the power principle creates the relationship 'master/slave': the 'law' is set by the stronger (sometimes the masses, through democratic legislation, sometimes more individual or private bodies, through aristocracy or tyranny);

This principle of power becomes, with Kalliklès, (in *Platon's Gorgias*, he draws the final consequences from it), "political" immoralism, the "first Übermenschtheorie" (according to *Dodds, Die sophistische Bewegung und das Versagen des griechischen Liberalismus*, in *Fortschrittsgedanke*, 113/129, viz. 125);

"If, among us, a man rises who has the strength to do so, he shakes off everything (viz. what the masses call 'law'); he breaks his fetters and escapes; he tramples underfoot what is after all only letter, imagination, and enchantment, all our counternatural laws; he who was hitherto a slave exalts himself and comes to us and makes himself a lord. Thus natural law shines in its brilliance". (*Gorgias 484*).

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Prevails the "right" (understand, in idealistic language: "power") of the strongest in the animal kingdom; it prevails, fundamentally, in human culture: it acts openly in war.

The occasion for such a naturalistic interpretation

of nature (as lust-sensitive and power-wielding individual nature understood the deep crisis into which the Greek world had fallen -450/-350. Not only the Sophists, but also other thinkers such as Platon, - later: Epikouros or Diogenes of Sinopè (-400/-325), the Kuniaker,- were disillusioned, despairing at the sight of the then 'state of law'. But one can react to a decline in more than one way.

We illustrate this by one aspect of decay, namely violence, the 'bia', as Hesiod, *Erga* (275), describes them. Violence is a fate, either that others do it to us or that we have drawn it upon ourselves. It therefore creates order, but only a factual, not an 'ideal' order (see above p. 174v.). The 'idea' 'violence' is a true idea, but not an 'ideal', at least not as opposed to 'right' (dikè, as Hesiod, *ibidem*, says). Descriptively, this idea is valid, but normatively it is not: it is "nature" as factuality, as accomplished fact (fate), but not "nature" as idea, i.e. ideal. One sees this in the three possible reactions to violence:

(i) the passive, i.e. one undergoes violence as nonviolent ('Peisas labe, mè biasamenos' says one of the Seven Sages (see above p. 1), Bias; i.e. 'Acquire something by persuasion, not by violence');

(ii)a. the active but limited, i.e. lawful self-defense: one adheres to "law" as an idea and ideal, but, in need, one breaks that law in "lawful" self-defense; all idealists have accepted this form of "violence"; yet with this, in some way, the "spiral of violence" is realized;

(ii)b. the active but unlimited, viz. the power-hungry, as Kallikles described them above (and as, in the Renaissance, Machiavelli will renew them and, later, Nietzsche); this naturalistic attitude continues the 'spiral of violence'; it does so through the 'bia' as an idea, which is at the same time an ideal ('right of the strongest' means 'ideal of the strongest'), but then a counter-ideal; -- in contrast to legitimate self-defense, which accepts the bia as an emergency solution (and thus to be eradicated in time), the powerless posits the bia as a rule, an ideal. The nonviolent undergoes violence, the lawful defender accepts it, the power-wielding one affirms it.

Idealism, correctly understood, can reconcile itself with the first and the second, but never with the third attitude. Naturalism inevitably ends up in the third attitude, as the evolution of ProtoPhilosophy proves: "The older Sophists were (...) concerned to situate their individualism within the framework of the traditional ethical teaching.

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And yet: it was they - or their pupils - who gave Kallikles his intellectual weapons in hand. 'Fusis' became the catchword of the robber individual and the robber society". (Dodds, a.c., 127). However, Dodds defends Protosofistics as much as possible.

O.i. here again is the demonism, present in the subconscious of humanity, also of the Greek, and also in the subconscious of the Greek physicalists (see above pp. 7/9), who, to a certain extent, in their conceptual rationalism and secularism, made illusions about it.

Note.-- There are other typologies of normative philosophy. For example, *R. Le Senne, Traité de Morale Générale*, Paris, 1949,

(i) 128/183 (Socrates and Platon, Aristotle (the citizen as philosopher), Epiktètos of Hierapolis (+50/+138) (the Stoic); 375/515 (ethics of pleasure, interest, good (happiness), feeling (mind), 'will' (sense of honor), self, tradition, and positive moral fact). Traces of all these latter types can be found in Greek ethico-political thought.

On violence and related phenomena, hubris, border crossing (see above p. 6ff.) see *A. Daniélou, Shiva et Dionysos (La religion de la nature et de l' éros)*, Paris, 1979, esp. 207/224 (*Le sacrifice, la sacralisation de la fonction alimentaire*): "All the life of the world - be it animal or human - amounts to incessant killing. 'To exist' means 'to eat and be eaten'." (207);

"The fundamental principle of Shivaism is to accept the world as it is and not as we would like it to be." (207);--which means that Daniélou agrees with demonism to a certain extent and thus thinks naturalistically, in the sense that, in (demonic) nature, he does not put forward an idea as an ideal, but rather as a (demonic) anti-ideal, --this perhaps within certain limits: "Only if we accept the reality of the world can we understand its nature" (ibidem). It sounds naturalistic, by all accounts. In this context, he speaks of human sacrifice, which he calls the "highest form of sacrifice" (212), of omophagy (eating raw), human eating, etc., in a tone, which, for all its "humanity," nevertheless looks naturalistic.

R. Girard, La violence et le sacré, Paris, 1972, also begins by discussing sacrifice as an 'ambivalent' (two-sided) sacred reality (= as something 'sacred' and as something criminal), whereby the violence of some beings, which one seeks to protect, is passed on to others (11), namely the victims.

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Note.-- *The scope of the Protosofist revolution in the field of law.*

Flückiger, o.c., 98, claims that Protosofistics has repressed, resp. suppressed, two layers in political culture, namely, thematic law and thicket law.

(i) Labeled as 'themis' are those matters, which concern the family, the sibbe,-- the house, hospitality,-- the worship of the dead (o.c.,20); they are under the authority of the goddess Themis (preconstitutive), who belongs to the preolumptic religion (which places the Titanic (see above p. 7/9) deities centrally and is chthonic-infernal, at least initially); the stake of that religion and a.o. of that moral and legal order is the life-force, insofar as spread over five aforementioned spheres; every disturbance of the balance (see above p. 168v. (sumpatheia / antipatheia of the 'fusus', i.e. the life-force) is restored (see high: p. 9vv. (*steering structure*)), unfortunately disturbed by demonism (life-death harmony) and the Kuklopic (Satanic) order underlying it, through which the immoral-brutal character threatens to stand out in such a way that the divine core is no longer seen;- thus one understands that Flückiger, 29, writes: "Also Themis (...) belongs to the Mother Goddesses (see above p. 66v.); she is sometimes even equated with the Earth Mother, Gaia. 'Sacred' for her, the Mother Goddess, are the domains of life and fertility, as well as the domain of the earth and the subterranean; likewise the night";

(ii) As 'dikè' is labeled all matter connected with the polis, the city-state, and the legislation of the citizens; 'dikè' is therefore that which is due to someone as a 'right' within the city (as a citizen thereof);

Preconstitutively Dikè is the goddess who protects the law, founded by the Olpumpian Zeus, and ensures that it continues; she is 'teleiosis', completion, finishing of law in the polis; the stake here is the life force, which is involved in such a legal situation: every malfunction is put right by Dikè

Well, Protosofistics has repressed (unconsciously) and suppressed (consciously) this double layer and put in its place a desecrated 'fusus' (as individual lust and power-expression), -- the so-called 'right of the individual hedonistic and power-willing) fusis', 'natural right' in the naturalistic sense. This is the Greek enlightenment (see above p. 72v.) in its thoroughgoing stage. The non-naturalistic natural law (under Socratic influence, for example) will never again fill the gap created by the suppression of themis and dikèrecht. Secular relativism is always attached to it, which undermines it. Cfr. o.c., 51.

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Flückiger, 123f., underlines the elimination of the mother-law, Mother-goddess (uxoric) principles: "Since the V.-th e. before Christ, the knowledge of these things (viz. life, fertility,- earth, underworld,- night,- femininity as regards religion) was lost to Western legal thought (...). The doctrine of the state was, since then, one-sidedly rational and fatherly and corresponded to the exclusive high estimation of the intellectual consciousness among the Western cultural peoples." (124-). To express it with an aggressive topical term, phallocracy was founded by the Greek enlightenment and particularly by protosophism.

(3) *The foundation of a normative philosophy.* (184)

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 239/254- (*Hervorgang der Weisheitslehre und Ethik aus der politischen Theologie*) sketches how not with Socrates (which is usually claimed), not even with Puthagoras (which is done with much more justification) does the beginning of Greek ethics commence, but already with the seven sages: they, after all, do not dwell on the norms (e.g. 'measure' and 'time' (kairos, the appropriate moment)) as divine commandments (themis, dikè), but as reflections of the nature of things: emphasizes political theology e.g. the preconstitutive aspect (the divine commandment), the Seven Sages emphasize the constitutive (physical) aspect and anticipate the actual physical. "Know thyself," "Keep measure," "The (measure of) time brings all good," are aphorisms, which express the essentiality of nature, without explicit reference to the preconstitutive ground (the deity as moral and law-giving powers are, fundamentally, physical, the nature of morality and law formulating statements. Man is informed directly by contact with nature as a normative complex, -- not (only) by the divinity revealing itself concerning that nature.

O. Willmann, o.c., 255/265 (*Vereinigung von Physik und Ethik im Idealismus*), outlines a second step toward a normative philosophy as follows.

(i) Among the Seven Sages, there are two who are also called "physicalists," namely, Thales and Puthagoras.

(ii)a. With Thales, an explicit connection between his physical and his wisdom theory (= ethics/politics) is not apparent: the 'water' as all-embracing principle is physical, but not ethico-political (unless one supposes that 'water' is equated with the chthonic-infernal life-force (posited in an element as a symbol today) and one knows that life-force is also always normative).

(ii)b. With Puthagoras, however, principles are clear - number (form), measure, consonance - which are directly incorporated into normative sentences.

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What Willmann, o.c., 266/334 - (*on Pythagorean idealism*) says, he summarizes, "The same principle - arithmos - number, number form or figure, number form harmony - which constitutes the being (their fisis, nature, constitutes), informs the knowing mind.

In other words, what confers reality on beings confers truth on thought (concerning that reality),-- (...) the rationale of the idealist theory of being and knowledge." (282). Or: "The legal and at once moral order is a part of the natural order constructed by the deity: inasmuch as the moral - dikaion - is in nature itself ('fusei') and not merely by human institution (nomoi)." (324).

Summary:

(i) deity (preconstitutive) as constitutive agency;
(ii) nature (constitutive, physical) as reality, constituted;
(iii) truth (informative) as knowing about (ii) nature and (i) deity;
(iv) morality, right (normative) as (i) from the deity (ii) laid down in the fisis itself and (iii) evidenced through knowledge,-- such is the basic structure of wisdom as Puthagoras as the first physicalist clearly translated it philosophically by seeing the number, resp. the number-form harmony as present in all four dimensions.-- Which we shall now summarily clarify.

(1) 'Them', the one, the 'one'.-- O. Willmann, o.c., 272, puts us on the road to understanding Puthagoras and his disciples by pointing out the dual meaning of 'them' (one), arithmetically speaking:

(i) now once 'one' means the element (stoicheion) of all numbers ('two' = twice 'one'; 'three' = three times 'one', etc.);

(ii) then again, 'them', 'one', means the connection (henosis) which, from a multiplicity of elements (stoicheia), constitutes a number into a 'unity of elements'; thus, five separate elements form the number 'five' only if taken collectively, collectively; the 'them' (one) here is (collective) structure, which constitutes a collection (henosis).

(2)a. 'Immanent' (enuparchon)/'transcendent' (choriston).-- The ancients had different habits of interpretation than we do: for example, they saw the relationship between 'one' and any other number under point of view of 'transcendent (transcending, exceeding)/ immanent (present in it)'. Willmann describes congenial as follows: "The 'one' is to every number, without being number itself (which is true of the antique-Greek 'one' - conception); yet it is simultaneously in all numbers and this as the possibility condition of them."

I. Gobry, Pythagore, Paris, 1973, 44, confirms this view:

(i) the 'one' is the 'matter', i.e. the element from which, by multiplicity, all number arises;

(ii) the 'one' is form, i.e. the unit that makes a multiple of elements ('units') into a number. More so

(iii) the "one" is "exemplary": it precedes the material and the formal order;

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This appears to be methodological: in the 'analysis' (decomposition towards the elementary units) the idea of 'one' (as stoicheion, last indivisible or irreducible element) takes precedence;

in the case of the 'synthesis' ((re)composition of the elementary units into 'one', i.e. one connection or, as one now likes to say, 'structure') the idea of 'one' as a structure takes precedence;

This puts forward an ontological insight (see above p. 29: the one is, for Pythagoras, the true, i.e. the informative: in the sense that, in analysis and 'synthesis' (structural analysis), the truth about nature and its preconstitutive background is articulated according to 'one' as element and 'one' as structure (link). In this sense the 'a' (elementary and/or structural) is exemplary, i.e. informative. Normative it is therefore ipso facto: the norm of analysis and synthesis (= structural analysis) is precisely that 'one' in its dual (distributive and collective) sense.

Gobry, o.c., 45, notes that the "one" is also teleological (terminal): the "one" is the finished reality, for it is, analytically, resp. structurally analytical, "peras" (final term; at once finish); it is therefore "telos" - end, termination, finishing, consummation, consummation - and, at once, "teleion" (perfect).

In other words, what, at the beginning of the analysis, resp. synthesis, is exemplary and preliminary as a pictorial reality, is, at its termination and success, final, finishing. - Thus I see that the 'one', basis of the whole Pythagorean idealism, possesses intrinsically, i.e. by nature, a normative nature. Pythagoras succeeded in working out the physical, through the philosophy of information (the true is to be sought in the one), as the root of normative philosophy. After the independent ethics of the Seven Sages, this is the second step in normative philosophy.

(2)b. -- The basis of that unity of physical, informational and ethico-political is analogy, i.e. the partly identical and partly non-identical. - The 'one' as an element is 'one' insofar as it is internally coherent and indivisible, as well as irreducible to anything else.

The "one" as a structure (connection, henosis) is "one" insofar as that which makes a multitude of elementary "units" "one" implies inner coherence, indivisibility, but also irreducibility to something else.

In other words, although different in scope (sometimes purely analytical, sometimes structural-analytical (synthetic)), the "one" is identical in content. As one knows, analogy, especially in medieval Scholasticism, is the basic theory.

(3)a. -- The 'sustoichia' (systechy; pair of opposites).

One of the most rewarding applications of the above henology (arithmology) is the ancient habit of expressing totality in the form of the pair of opposites.

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Yet this we explain in his frame of mind. Basis is analogy (what later Pythagoreans called 'tautotès' (identity)/ 'heterotès' (non-identity)).

(i) Distributively conceived, the pair of opposites is twice 'one', however such that the first term is opposite and even contradictorily opposite (either or instead of and/or) to the second, within the same perspective, in which they belong together; thus 'male'/'female' are opposite, yet within the 'gender',

a. (informative) true/false (false);

b. (physical) light/dark; masculine, feminine; -- (geometric) straight/curved; left/right;

c. (normative) good/ evil; -- (ontological)- immutable/ changeable; ordered, disordered (tetagmenon/ atakton); finished/ unfinished (peras/ aperon).

(ii) Collectively thought, the pair of opposites is a complement, i.e. a totality, divided into two domains (parts),-one form of 'henosis' (structure); -- so e.g.

(ii)a. Synchronic: beyond all that is ordered and disordered - note the conjunction 'án', which is complementary - there is, in the universe (ontologically), nothing more; the arestotality is indicated with it; the same with immutable and changeable or finished and unfinished; well, ancient man - a.o. the Pythagorean - had o.m. this complementary 'sustoichia' pair of opposites) to express the totality of something under one point of view; he also did it with less conclusive oppositions ('and/or'), such as 'good en evil' to mean 'everything' (though logically not strictly valid, the intention was nevertheless to speak transcendently (totally)).

(ii) b. Diachronic: WB. Kristensen, *Verz. bijdr. tot kennis v.d. antique godsd.*, A'm, 1947, 243vv. (*Cycle and Period*) points out how the ancient Greek uses the word 'periodos' both locally (the loop, which a dancer performs around an object) and temporally (the itinerant movement, which the sun performs, gives birth to the seasonal succession); the distinctive feature of the periodos is that the end of the previous itinerant movement constitutes the beginning of the next.

Now it is so that e.g. *Aristotle (De coelo 268a)* uses the number three as figure of the whole (according to antique tradition): after all it is (1beginning), (2middle), 3 (end) in a.o. (so he says) the holy acts; thus totality is expressed and in nature and in culture but it is also so, in antique mentality, that the end of the previous is the beginning of the next. (so he says) the holy acts; thus totality is expressed both in nature and in culture but it is also so, in antique mentality, that the endlessly renewing, in which the end of the previous is the beginning of the next, is also 'totality', but then spiral-shaped if one will; the cyclic movement is like that; -- a variant is the demonic cycle, in which the opposition 'life/death' helps to form the alternative cycle (*see above pp. 7, 11*). Pythagoreanism also incorporated this 'totality'.

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One sees that, in the *sustoichia*, both the "one" as an element and the "one" as a structure (connection of elements)-is decisive. The henology (at the same time arithmology) is a coherent doctrine!

One also sees that the finished and the totality are one: as long as the totality (which only arises thanks to the 'one' as structure, syn- or diachronically) is not there, something is not finished. Yet this is normative for action. Ethics resp. politics will have to take this into account continuously.

This is all the more true since Greek philosophy, certainly the Orphic-Pythagorean one, is strongly mystery-religious; well, Kristensen, o.c., 270, points out that completion (completion) is sanctification: "Also, the Greek terms 'telos' and 'teletè' denote 'end' and 'sanctification' (initiation; see above p. 40). That our word 'holy' is related to 'salvation' and 'whole' may be a casual illustration of the ancient representation. But the semasiological connection between 'end' and 'consummation', 'being perfect', is not an accidental illustration: the end is also the goal to which all previous work is directed and in which it reveals its idea. Therefore, the end is a reality of higher order than the components of the series. It creates totality." -- All this is Pythagorean.

Note.-- Kristensen, o.c., 283vv, shows totality (especially diachronically yet in two types:

(i) chthonic: *H. Diels, Sibyllinische Blätter*, 1890, says Kristensen, points out that, in tellurism (chthonism) the holy trinity is present everywhere (e.g. the 'tritopatores' (the ancestors; see manism, resp. pro(to)gonism or ancestor worship), who take care of the 'permanent' (because endlessly renewing and thus cyclically 'total') life) are, in Hellas, honored with 'trita', the sacrifice of the dead; similarly, there are 'three' judges' in Hades: they represent, in the underworld, the holy (understand: telluric sacred) three or the ceaselessly renewing (beginning, middle, end = 3) life as a judicial authority);

(ii) Olumpian: the 'savior' (sotèr; soteira) is the 'third', i.e. where 'life' (the basic category of ancient religion) is threatened with ruin; e.g. Asklepios (see above pp. 37; 43; 149) is called 'savior', because healing is actually revival (resurrection) (Asklepios himself had died (death) but resurrected (life), i.e. type of 'totality');

e.g. Zeus is called 'Third' as deity (i) of the living, (ii) then of the dead and (iii) as savior (divine totality); thus the first drink was dedicated to Zeus 'Olumpios kai Olumpioi' (Olumpian deities); the second to the subterranean 'Hèroes' (heroes; see above p. 144v.); the third to Zeus Soter. The 'third' as lord of life and death (totality) is the greatest and savior.

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(3)b. The harmony. (189/195)

The word 'cosmos', according to Willmann, o.c., 276, received from Puthagoras its speculative value as 'ordered and clean whole', excluded from nature. The structure (henosis), which **a**) joins all beings and **b**) especially the opposites (systechies) together in the orderly and clean whole of the cosmos, Puthagoras called 'harmonia', i.e. the unification (henosis) of the several and the unification of the opposite. Cfr. Willmann, o.c., 280.

This harmological note is fundamental:

(i) the harmony, i.e., interpenetration, fitting together, is objective, situated in things themselves (physical);

(ii) harmony exists by virtue of order according to rules and, among other things, symmetry, i.e., according to number and measure (henological-arithmological). Cfr. *Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Gesch. der Aesthetik, I (Die Aesthetik der Antike)*, Basel/ Stuttgart, 1979, 105ff.

The harmology, with Puthagoras, is according to *Kristensen, Verz. bijdr.*, 288 (254), a reminiscence springing from Korè (see above p. 7;38vv.) with its dual nature: Korè's being is 'unity of discord', (i.e. the harmony of life and death, according to demonic formula);-i.e. the mysteries (Thebes, Samothrake, Eleusis) were at the forefront of that 'harmony'. Here the unity of opposites is in the foreground.

The harmony is manifold.

Within the whole of the cosmos, subordinate harmonies occur.

(i) The "sungeneia" (kinship) of all beings, within the harmonious whole of the cosmos is an aspect, which is fruitful.

(i)a. Informative: the sungeneia or kinship makes possible the principle "by means of the like the like' knowing" (*Y. Gobry, Pythagore*, 54); human knowledge, according to Philolaos of Kroton (contemporary of Socrates), relies on that sungeneia (see above p. 168v. : sumpatheia); 68 (man as micros cosmos); 52/54 (Parmenides in Puthagoras' line is the first, who developed this on pure intellectual-reasonable plane)).

(i)b. Physical; the kinship is "unity" (henosis) between beings physically speaking; thus man is

(a) by his life-soul related to all living beings, within the world-soul (cf. above p. 34v. (*organic unity*); 163/165 (*world-soul*); (133*algeest*; 48;139) (cfr. Gobry, 51: there is no doubt that early Pythagoreanism assumed a world-soul; the cosmos was a kind of great living being (as later Platon and the stoa assumed), moving, breathing, ordering (cfr. Anaximenes);

(b) through his daimon, his divine soul, man is related to the deities (see above pp. 143 (daimon);145/159 (Orphic-Postorhic soul doctrine: This will be decisive for ethics.

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Indeed, the 'spirit' ('fronimon') - in contrast to the body ('skānos'), which, consisting of the same substances as the other bodies, is mortal, notwithstanding that the 'best' artist gave it, after his own image ('archetupos'), its form - was given by the deity as an 'apospasma' (a part, torn away from the deity), equally immortal; that 'contemplative part' ('spirit') comes 'from outside' ('thurathen'), d.i. from outside the sensory-material world; leaving the body, the spirit receives the god Hermes, the 'psuchopompos', viz. the soul guardian, who both leads the souls up out of Hades, the underworld, as well as he leads them back to it, as a companion: Hermes is, after all, 'futalmios', originator, causer (see above pp. 48/50 (*genius, iuno*); 62/67 (*generative rel.*); 159/163 (*Causative Belief*)) of the life of the especially chthonic sphere; to this title he is also 'angelos', messenger, herald, mediator between the deity world and this earth, bearer of the herald's staff ('rhabdos', magic branch, -- related to the 'kèruk(e)ion', proclamation staff, and to 'skètron', scepter), which was carried by princes and judges, as well as by speakers in the agora; he is, as *Kristensen, Verz. contribut*, 142, says, "the originator of the life of the earth, and he brought divine life among men," among other things through his power money (*cfr. polytheistic dynamism; supra p. 8; 16v.*) word.

As "tamias psuchon," companion of souls, he carries out the deity judgment:

(i) the pure souls he leads to the highest (level), 'hupiston';

(ii) the unclean souls he leaves to the Erinues, the goddesses of fate, who subject her to the 'kuklos anankès', the reincarnation cycle (see above p. 155).

Note.-- *O. Willmann, Gesch d. Id.*, I, 274, elaborates on this Pythagorean doctrine concerning the spirit of man:

a. towards the body: the human spirit is a daimon (see above p. 143), which "animates" the body, yes, "spirits" it, just as God - like the world-soul - animates, spirits the world; therefore, the body is something "daimonion", something that carries divine power in it (we are far from the ongoing, highly erroneous conception of dualism, which advocates body contempt), just as the world is something "theion", something divine;

b. towards the deity and the Supreme Being: man's spirit is destined to return to the deity and the Supreme Being; his (re)incarnation is a penitential time, as the ancient theologians and seers testify (according to the Pythagoreans themselves); thereby Zeus (the Supreme Being as Causer) gives man a daimon, who guides human life and frees it from much evil (Gobry, 145); this 'genius' ('iuno') as the Latins called him (see above p. 48vv.) is a 'katachthonios daimon' (Gobry, 114), an earthly deity, distinguished from:

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1/ the hêroes, the heroes (situated in the aithêr) and 2/ the immortal deities (Gobry, 112/115; with the Supreme Being, according to Gobry, the deities, the heroes and the daimones form the metaphysical and religious hierarchy (comparable, to a certain extent, with the hierarchy of Samothrake (see above p. 65); which does not prevent that at the same time the human spirit or daimon, -- through which humanity is in 'theion genos', a divine race, -- receives its truth from the 'hiera proferousa fisis' (sacred nature as truth revealing agency, among other things, in the mind of man, who practices philosophy);

In other words, though 'begotten' and transcendent, yet the spirit is immanent and self-acting, (as higher pp. 48/50 (*genius, iuno*); 65 (*ad (3) (the androgine genius resp. iuno)*); 143vv. (*phantom/daimon*); 162 (*Causal Belief*) set forth). So that:

- (i) the preëxistence of the tonal soul, which is a model for our soul,
- (ii) the guardian spirit or daimon as protector (see Hermes figure) and
- (iii) the 'better' (or, if need be, worse) 'self', i.e. the deeper 'T' (see above p. 101), i.e. the same daimon as immanent to our body as its 'soul', "run into each other" (according to O. Willmann, o.c., 275). Which Gobry, o.c., 145, in agreement with Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125), so many centuries later, confirms:

"Le démon comme génie autonome et le démon comme âme humaine en ce qu'elle a de divin sont facilement identifiables". (The daimon or genius (*iuno*) as transcendent principle of life and the daimon as human soul (as divine reality) are easily identifiable).

Thus we understand much better the sungenia doctrine, part of the doctrine concerning the harmony that makes supreme being, deities, souls as daimones, souls as life principle, bodies, material world mutually 'related' (harmonious). Man as a dual whole (Willmann, 274ff.); the soul itself as a composite whole (Gobry, 56) are themselves 'a harmony'. (191/195)

(ii) Kinship of man and Deity

In addition to the kinship of man (detailed above), the kinship of the Deity to the world, the universe, is further defined by Pythagoreanism as harmony.

(ii)a. Twofold, the relationship between the Supreme Being (Zeus Pater, Zeus as Father, i.e., Alderman; see Gobry, 144; 113 (nomos, i.e., the eternal world law of Zeus as Alfather determines that the deities of secondary rank (see above pp. 7/9; 33) are his "work" ("begotten")) and the cosmos is described by Willmann, 272, (henological):

a1. God as Supreme Being is "One" and exists for all begotten realities (as being distinct, transcendent), while being in her (as her ground of being), immanent, as the "one" is for and in the numbers (collections, systems);

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a2. God as Supreme Being unites all beings begotten by Him - and thus related and, at once, harmonious with Him - as the ground of beings (Cause) for and in them, just as the 'one' as henosis (structural unit) makes a multitude of elements one (indivisible inwardly, irreducible outwardly).

In this twofold sense, the transcendent and the immanent conception permitting sense, the texts are to be understood: 'hen archa panton' (the One - description in henological-arithmological language, of Supreme Being - is the principle (in Causal sense; genealogical) of all being); 'to hen stoicheion kai archè panton' (the One is element and principle (causal reality) of all being). Cfr. Willmann, o.c., 272f.

"God is unique, and not, as many believe, an outsider to the cosmos (diakosmasios), but present in it, whole and entire in the whole circle of the universe,- as 'episkopos; overseer of all that happens,- as 'krasis', including the whole,- as the eternal creator (ergatas) of all forces and works,- as giver of light from heaven, the Father of all beings,- as spirit and inspiration (nous kai psuchosis) of the whole circle of the universe, - as the movement of everything." (Klemens of Alexandria as interpreter of the Pythagoreanism of the time).

(ii)b. The relationship, as harmony, i.e. sungeneia, kinship, and this on a henological-arithmological basis, between God and begotten realities is still described in a second, tolerant and fundamental way:

a. the Orphicists, in accordance with the samothracic mysteries (see above p. 65) describe, mythically-theologically, the God-world relationship as fourfold:

(i) Kronos (if necessary Chronos, Time), i.e. the Supreme Being, source of all causation, kinship, harmony, 'unity';

(ii)a. Zeus, equal to Aithèr, who is the

(ii)b. 'chasma', i.e. the primal substance of everything, gives form (imposes idea, number) - see above pp. 47, 48 -, so that

(ii)c. Fanès, i.e. the visible world (nature), arises (is conceived;

In other words, Fanès, the visible world, is in harmony (syntehse) with Zeus, the form-giving causer, who acts as a mediator between Kronos, on the one hand, and the primordial substance, which he crafts with 'seals', i.e. 'forms', 'models', 'ideas', -- 'numbers';

b. the Pythagoreans, through *Philolaos*, in his book "*On Nature*," formulate it as follows: "Nature in the cosmos consists in the interlocking (harmochthè) of data without defined form (apeiron) and data representing defined form (perainonton), -- both the cosmos as a whole (unity as henosis) and all things in it (units as elements thereof)." (O. Willmann, o.c., 280);-- the informative value of that 'harmony' (union of form and substance) is evident from the following assertion: "We would know nothing of the being and the knowable, if the harmonia, the union, did not lie in the innermost self of that of which the cosmos consists, viz. the form-giving and the formless principles.

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Since these are heterogeneous (dissimilar) and not related, it would be impossible for them to be built up into a whole, if the harmonia, the unification, did not come between them in some way. Similar and related things do not need unification; dissimilar and unrelated and diverse things should be joined together by the harmonia (sunkekleisthai), if there is to be coherence (katechesthai) in the cosmos." (Willmann, o. c., 280).

Immediately one sees the very great progression between e.g. Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547), who let all being emerge from the 'apeiron', the formless primal ground of all material nature (comparable to Thales of Miletos, who proposed 'water' as primal ground, and to Anaximenes of Miletos (see above p. 184 (Thales); 138 (Anaximenes))), on the one hand, and on the other hand, Puthagoras, who conceived the same primal ground and design and formless, but harmoniously from the causal hierarchy. 184 (Thales); 138 (Anaximenes)), on the one hand, and on the other hand, Puthagoras, who conceived of the same primal ground as being both form and formless, but harmoniously interpreted from the causal hierarchy (see above p. 65v.; 161).

The 'form' namely is one type of 'arithmos', number, i.e. something that can be joined together: the Pythagorean conceived 'number' (better: numberform) is after all, as Willmann, o.c., 281, notes, more general: it includes both the Godhead and the 'apeiron, the formless substance. 'Number' (understood as 'interlocked element' and/or as 'interlockedness', by virtue of interlock or structure) is truly transcendental.

c. Platonists translate the Orphic and Pythagorean hierarchy as follows:

(i) 'aition', the Cause,

(ii)a. 'peras; the well-defined form, conceived as a formative force,

(ii)b. 'apeiron; the formless substance and

(ii)c. the 'koinon' or 'mikton', the common, mixed; i.e., under the direction of the Cause, the formative power gives form to the substance and thus works out the harmony, interpenetration of both.

d. the Aristotelians further interpret the same hierarchy in a more naturalistic sense: "In Aristotle's philosophy, fertility, reproduction, creation, come to the fore. No doubt he and Alexander the Great, his most famous pupil, held conversations about the Samothrace gods." (*P. van Schilfgaarde, Aristotle, The Hague, 1965, 11*).

And *W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 208, says that "primordial mythology" is found at the very core of Aristotle's thought (e.g., the "love" (eros) of things to the Unmoved Mover, which corresponds to the Supreme Being in the Samothracian-Orphic-Pythagorean scheme). Cfr. *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 375; cites Aristotle (*De an.* 11:4,15): "It is, for a living being the highest operation, which corresponds to its nature, when it produces another being similar to it 'an animal 'an animal,' a plant 'a plant, - so that they may acquire share in the eternal and divine, as far as it is due to them."

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In *Metaph. 14: 4,6*, Aristotle mentions that the ancient poets attributed this operation ('*ergon*') to Zeus with more reason than to e.g. water (Thales) or fire; that also the philosophical poets like *Ferekudes of Suros* (+/- -550) - cf. his *Heptamuchos*, a work that attributes the generation of the universe to

- (i) Zeus (Supreme God and Highest Heaven) in harmony with
- (ii)a. Chronos (Kronos) (Second God and Lower Heaven) and with
- (ii)b. Chthonia (the Earth Goddess) - and the Magi conceive of "the First Verge as the best".

The difference with his predecessors, especially the Orphicists, Pythagoreans and Platonicians, lies in the fact that Aristotle lets nature itself, in a more naturalistic sense (see above pp. 175/177), carry out what in his predecessors was attributed to the middle term, the secondary Causers; thus he speaks of the '*fusis dèmiourgèsasa*', the '*demiürgic*' nature, d.i. nature as a "public worker" (see above p. 36ff.), which imposes form on matter, e.g. not only by creating living beings full of art, but also by carrying out actions similar to those of humans (she instructs the swallow to build a nest; she also directs ants and bees to work in an orderly fashion).

The name, which one gives to Aristotle's way of thinking, is therefore hylemorphism (philosophy of matter form), - in which one recognizes the "harmony" of matter and form, - and "artificialism" (philosophy of art work), yet apparently on a "genetic" basis (a remnant of religious Causer belief), in which the First Mover (God) is a remnant of Causer figures. Cfr. O. Willman; *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 556/571 (*Die Preisgebung der Ideenlehre*).

Conclusion: from what precedes, it is clear that the Greek philosophers, each in his own way, have redirected the Causal Belief, which combines conception and design (idealism). The harmony between Deity and visible world is thereby a henological-arithmological conclusion. The One supreme deity - whether or not with causal intermediate terms - founds a multitude (elements), which are made 'one'. It can do this because, in a concentrated way, it carries that multiplicity within itself. We are not so far from the creation idea of the Bible.

Note.-- Kristensen, *Verz. bijdr.*, 288, notes that, cosmologically speaking, i.e. concerning more concrete description of the cosmos,

(i) locally, the cycle of the celestial bodies around the central fire (which may be the fire seen in the mountains of fire in the earth and/or the fire of the sun) as the hearth of renewing life and

(ii) temporally, the periods of the seasons and the cyclic world periods (the earliest Pythagoreanism taught the "eternal return") clarify the "harmony" of the opposites (with demonism).

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Note.-- The distinction between the 'Monas', the Monad, and the one seems to be of later date (Gobry, o.c., 46s.). Theon of Smurna mentions that, for Archytas and Philolaos, those two words were interchangeable. Yet it was true that, in original Pythagoreanism, the summary henology-arithmology sounded as follows:

(i) the 'one' as element (stoicheion), harmonizable within the unity (as a structure of elements), is the number, consisting of elements;

(ii)a. the Monad is the name for the One as Supreme Being, which, being concentrated (which is one type of unity, i.e., creative unity or causal unity), carries within itself the possible multiplicity (number);

(ii)b. the dyad ('Dyas') is the name for all that, outside the Monad (Supreme Being), is characterized by unfinishedness, limitedness. Cfr. Gobry, o.c., 44s., 46, 48. One may, in this connection, call the elementary units 'monads' (with lower case, in distinction from the Monad (capital letter, denoting the one Supreme origin of all monads)).

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 343ff., claims that Empedokles' limited mechanicism is "unripened" Pythagoreanism and that the Atomistics of Leukippos and Demokritos are "corrupted" Pythagoreanism. The chapter on ancient materialism (see above pp. 94/109), that on ancient (if necessary mechanistic-atomistic) dynamics (see pp. 110/117) show that except for naturalism, both forms of thought elaborate on the original Pythagoreism. It is now a fact that, in nature, atomic and mechanical processes are present: henology-arithmology (see page 185) can perfectly situate the elementary material units (as well as their mechanical processes) within the doctrine of the elements (units as stoicheia) and their 'units' structures - (unity as henosis). The atomic-mechanical processes are one applicative model of the one as stoicheion and as henosis.

(3)c. -- *The Musical henology.*

One characteristic of Pythagoreanism is its "philokalia," its predilection for the beautiful. This is evident in the musical doctrine that we now briefly outline.

(a) The Pythagoreans did not only calculate with the one and its multiple, the number (arithmetic); they translated the one and its multiple, the number, into spatial figures (geometria, geometry). This is partly a consequence of the antique, Voorsocratic 'materialism' (see above p. 102); but also partly the result of the idea of 'henosis' (structure either collecting (distributive) or disrupting (collective)). Logismos' (arithmetical operation) and 'gramma' (geometrical construction) interact and merge.


(b) The Pythagoreans did not merely 'see' the one and its number (plural); they also 'heard' it (with their 'second' hearing), in such a way, however, that the sound(s) were again henologically-arithmologically signified.

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This leads to the Pythagorean theory of music (see *Willmann, Gesch. d. Id., I, 288ff.*). "What the mind (as reason) calculates (arithmetic), the construction sets before it and the ear hears as consonance." (o.c., 289f.). One object (the one as element and union) is grasped by several harmonious faculties in man. Knowing then that "kalokaigathia," the harmony of the beautiful and the moral good, is a Greek phenomenon, one measures the scope of the beautiful and music (better: choreia, the harmony of music, poetry and dance; see above p. 36) in Pythagoreanism.

"Music is the greatest among the arts: it reaches the pinnacle of harmony. Pythagoras shows us the soul, torn apart by the movement of its anarchic urges, regains its unity thanks to the hearing of music. And Jamblichos defines purification as 'a medicine that works through music'." (Gobry, o.c., 55).

(b)bis. *Jaeger, Paideia*, I, 221, says that the lyre, with its structure (henosis) of strings (lengths):



model stands for both the auditory and the cosmological model. Auditory, because the ear hears all at once ('one') what the strings, apart and after each other for the most part, give to be heard (harmony of sounds); cosmological; the distances of the heavenly bodies and their trajectories (see above page 194 at the bottom) are, next to the structure of the lyre, a further applicative model of one and the same 'unity' (structure), viz. bodies (strings, heavenly bodies), which move, at a distance, but within one 'field'.

Conclusion: this is how we understand the unity of the four Pythagorean learning subjects, - arithmetic, geometry, music theory and astronomy. They are the applicative models of one basic tenology-arithmology.

(4) The henological-arithmological ethics-politics.

Bibl. sample: *O. Becker, Die Aktualität des Pythagoreischen Denkens*, in *O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., Hermeneutische Philosophie*, Munich, 1977, 177/200 ("On the one hand - for us alienatingly - concepts such as 'justice', 'soul', 'spirit' and 'right moment' (kairos) are mentioned here; on the other hand - for us much more understandable - musical harmony (its properties and proportions) and the heavenly bodies." (a.c., 178f.).

JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée, I, 124/229 (Hestia/Hermes; geometry and astronomy; Anaximandros cosmology in relation to geometry; space and political organization: even before Pythagoras, the Greeks were thinking ethico-political problems geometrically in the wake of ancient religious space ideas).

(i) "Ethics is established on the harmony of the universe, which connects the one (henosis) with the deity (see above pp. 145vv.; 189vv.) and on the harmony of the

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soul, which is the goal of perfection". (Gobry, o.c., 57s.). We now easily understand this statement.

(ii)a. *The informational side.*

"The Pythagoreans teach that the mind practiced in number relations ('mathèmata = number relations) is the criterion of things; the mind namely. - as Philolaos said -, in the theoretical knowledge of the nature of the universe, shows a certain kinship with that nature of the universe, since it, by nature, knows the like by means of the like (hupo tou homoïou to homoïon)". Thus Sextos Empeirikos on the Pythagoreans (Against the Subjects, 7:92). This hermeneutic has already been touched upon (*higher pp.* 52/54; 61; 167vv.; 171vv.). Cfr. *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 350/352: 'wise' is the sage himself (as subject; 'wise' is also the world (as object); objective and subjective wisdom face each other; *ibidem*, 373: application of this hermeneutic principle to the sense of value (only man, who is value-sensitive (and at once ethical), 'knows' the objectively valuable in the world around him (by means of the like (value-sense) he knows the like (value)); *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id*, I, 255:

1) the 'wise' (sofon) of physicalists like Thales, Anaximandros and Anaximenes, viz. water, indeterminacy, air, is not yet an ethical-political 'sofon' (wisdom, taken objectively);

2) only the Pythagorean 'sofon', objective-wise, is fully normative; -- see also *ibidem*, III, 212 (the 'kalon zugon' (clean yoke, i.e. unity of subject and object as later Platon, in the same tradition, formulates it); see also *ibid.* I, 439 (the idea in the subject corresponds to the idea in the object).

Pythagorean: the one (as element and as structure (henosis)) in the subject corresponds to the one (as element and connection) in the object; the clean-and-good will have to obey that duality of subject and object; though non-identical, clean-and-good and 'one' run together, -- harmoniously!

Here we refer to what has been said above (p. 181): the idea in itself is not yet an ideal; it is merely ordering thought-content; likewise the one (and its number): in itself it is orderly (distributive and collective structure), henology-and-arithmology; but, within a subject-object relation, where the clean-and-good is already awakened, the one (and its number) plays an ordering role. The one (element, number) is only then ideal, not merely idea. Pythagoreism is ethico-political on the basis of value-sense; it interprets value (conscience, morality, etc.) henologically-arithmetically. Here it has always linked 'one' (number) unconsciously or consciously with ideal (clean-and-good) (harmony of 'one' and clean-and-good). In this sense it was consistent with itself: all distinctions notwithstanding, nevertheless the connection, the unity of number and clean-and-good, predominated.

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(ii)b. *The sofio-analytic side.*

Whether it is naturalism - of which we examined one applicative model a bit more closely (see above pp. 178/184 (the so-called natural law of the later Protestants; esp. p. 181: nature as a predatory fact does not yet found an ethics-politics valid for the conscience; it sees and formulates an idea, descriptively, nothing more)) - or whether idealism, e.g. in its Pythagorean form, taken as the basis of ethics-politics, both forms of thought fall short in themselves of founding a real ethics, resp. politics; at most they are, as a description (purely descriptive), standardized; nothing more.

In this sense, they are "specializations, as analytical, but as relative as the physicals, which we have described higher, p. 78/91 (differentiation).

The only valid basis is and remains "wisdom," as outlined above (p. 1vv.): *R. Schärer, L'homme devant ses choix*, formulates ethics as (politically) valid, by saying that

(i) in 'a concrete situation, (ii) the 'sage' (iii) considers (sees trade-off solutions), (iv) makes a choice, (v) according to norms, (vi) which he knows, (vii) once he acts causally, is going to have consequences (viii) that will mean salvation or calamity for him.

Cfr. p. 1 supra. The whole structure of wisdom, in its prescientific (pre-scientific, pre-rhetorical) form, is and remains the foundation, even though analysts like the naturalist or the idealist (resp. number idealist) will present "ideas," "numbers," which are descriptively profitable. They only touch the actually ethical-political if the analyzing subject takes root in the concrete life, which already existed beforehand, and operates in it, as Schärer describes (and all wisdom). Cfr. pp. 14/15 (the whole structure of wisdom at once and indivisibly).

This is why an ontology remains at its foundation. It systematically encompasses all of reality, including the ethical-political dimension. This is why we refer to p. 47 (coherence of the main forms of theory of ideas):

a/ regulation (Pythagorean), but also **b/** value and reality (Platonism: the good and the being together) and **c/** purpose and accomplishment (Aristotelianism) govern normative philosophy together.

Only then is there a subject, which is ethical-political, and an object, the ethical-political in reality; together: by means of the equal (subject) grasping the equal (object)! This harmony, *sumpatheia* (see p. 168v.) only establishes full normativity.

(ii)c. *The daimonia of the ethical-political man.*

Pythagoreans point out the importance of the daimon again and again on the subject of norms.

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We begin with an applicative model, borrowed from Archytas: "The law relates to the soul and to the life of man, as harmony (subj.: of sounds) relates to hearing and to the voice. For the law forms ('paideuei') the soul and regulates the life ('regulates': 'sunistèti'), as harmony forms the hearing and harmonizes the voice with itself ('homologon poiei').

My teaching is that every community ("koinonia") consists of:

- (i) the one in charge ("archon"),
- (ii) those who are led ("archomenoi") and
- (iii) the law;
- (iii)a. the living law ('empsychos nomos'), however, is the sovereign,
- (iii)b. the inanimate law ('apsuchos') is the book of law ('gramma').

(a) The law is the first: through it the sovereign is lawful ('nomimos'),-the one who is in charge is docile ('akolouthos'),-the one who is led is free, and the whole community is 'eudaimon', i.e. according to its daimon good-and-pure.

(b) If, however, the law is broken, then the ruler is a tyrant, the one in charge is imperfect ('anakolouthos'),-the one being led is a slave and the whole community is 'kakodaimon', i.e. according to its daimon bad-and ugly." (cfr. *O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 325).

Willmann further explains: prince and leader respond to the formative, 'perainonta', ('peras', defined form) the conductive to the formless ('apeira') aspect and of the community; the law, the living first and the inanimate afterwards, brings both aspects together as their mutual 'harmonia', incorporation, and this according to the clean and good.

Note.-- Here one can clearly see that the prescient wisdom type dominates normative philosophy: the sage -- according to p. 1 supra -- chooses between two fundamentally distinct ethical-political qualities, the good-and-beautiful or the bad-and-ugly.

A pair of statements attributed to Puthagoras reads as follows: "The greatest thing in man is to persuade the soul to the good-and-beautiful or to the bad-and-beautiful ('peisai')", - thus calling rhetoric to a moral-political role (as Platon will later conceive them, against Protosofistics);

"The soul is the equipment room (armory) of the good-and-beautiful and of the bad-and-beautiful, according to whether man is good-and-beautiful or bad-and-beautiful. (O. Willmann, o.c., 326) .

Thus it becomes understandable that Puthagoras' normative philosophy could never be used by the (pre)-skeptics to undermine the foundations of the society of the time and its moral-social code.(Cfr supra p. 73; 91vv.). Therefore, notwithstanding its authoritarian note ("The master has said it"), it is still inspirational.

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Note.-- The concept of 'daimonia' (eu-, kako-daimonia) expresses the 'ariston', the best, concerning the subjective side of the ethical-good-and-beautiful - or the worst. The soul, after all, is the key of normative philosophy; well, that soul (see above pp. 143 (*daimon*); 145/159 (*Orphic and Postorhic concept of soul*); esp. 162v. (*Causal Belief*)) is, toward the Causers and the Supreme Being, "daimon," as The Golden Revelations (Chrusa epè) say (verse 62). The eudaimonia is accompanied by an 'agathè psuchè' (a good soul): man himself creates, by his ethical-political behavior - possibly strengthened by mysteries (see above pp. 38/45 (*mysteries*); 65/67 (*hierarchy*); 191 (*Pythagorean hierarchy*) - a 'daimon', i.e. a strengthened 'I' (or 'soul'). Cfr. Willmam, o.c., 330f.; see also his Abriss, 380, where Willmann echoes Aristotle's teaching on the subject:

(i) the clean-and-good act ("kala prattein") causes well-being ("kalos prattein") (*Eth. Nicom.*, 1:3);

(ii) this well-being Aristotle calls 'eudaimonia', to be guided by a good-and-beautiful daimon or genius (iuno) - see above pp. 48/50 -; like Socrates, he attributed such a guidance to himself (Fr. II: 40 (Heitz)) and observes that experience confirms the belief in a daimon in that nature: "Often an ill-built ship completes its voyage in an excellent manner, not because of its condition, but because it has a good helmsman; likewise with someone it goes well from all points of view, because he has in his daimon (companion) a good helmsman." (*Eth. N. com.*, 7:14 (or 8:2)) - "The good nature is not in our power, but is given by a divine decree to those who truly have a good destiny ('eutuchesin')." (*Eth. Nicom.*, 10:10; cfr. *Rhet.*, 1:6); -- from this one sees that, so much later, Aristotle proclaims the very same doctrine as the Pythagoreans.

Later secular hedonism (lust ethics) has stripped the word "eudaimonia" of its soulful-deep psychological meaning and placed in it purely psychosocial meaning, namely, lustful happiness.

(iii)a. The agogic side.

'Agogy' is, today, defined in two ways:

(i) broadly, viz: the praxis which, by service, favors the fellow man under the point of view of his' well-being;

(ii) narrowly, viz. praxis, which, by education, favors the same fellow man under point of view of spiritual and fellow human maturity.

The two need not be mutually exclusive; on the contrary. Cfr. R. Koopman, *Welfare as a problem* (Sociology/welfare/welfare work), Alphen a.d. Rijn, 1976;

J. Muurlink, *Anthropology for Educators and Social Workers (Ideological Manipulation or Self Determination)*, Bloemendaal 1981 (including the problem of power vs. free responsibility).

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In passing:

(i) agogics is the teaching about the models, regulatory and applicative, of praxis (helping, educating); the direct speech about agogics;

(ii) agology is, more abstractly, the teaching about the structures ("henoseis") at work in those models (the indirect speech about the praxis of agogy).

One now distinguishes (i) ped.agogy (children), (ii) andr.agogy (adults), (iii) geront.agogy (elderly).

In contrast to JF. Herbart (1776/1841), who took 'pedagogy exaggerated to andragogy' pejoratively (he forged the word 'andragogy'), the word is now taken melioratively, i.e. anti-authoritarian, non-elitist, 'democratizing', 'empowering'. Cfr. *M. van Nierop, Nieuwe woorden*, Hasselt, 1975, 16vv. (andragogy, antiauthoritarian), etc.

Note -- The language of e.g. Aristotle (see above p. 200), who speaks of 'kalos pratein' (welfare), 'eutuchia' (good destiny), 'eudaimonia' (possessing good daimon), proves that also the antiques treated welfare - *Jaeger's* famous book, *Paideia*, shows the educational side - rationally. The Pythagoreans, continuing the ancient religion, were ahead of us. -- One therefore speaks of eudemonology (theory of happiness), soterology (theory of the savior, redeemer), resp. soteriology (theory of salvation ('sotèria') or salvation), which, in part, cover the theme of agogics, as we shall see immediately.

More modern is 'pragmatics', i.e. the doctrine about the result of an action (theoretical (cf. Peirce's pragmatism, which tests the result of ideas, judgments, reasoning) or practical) under point of view of well-being or unwellness especially. 'Therapeia' (therapy) and 'therapeutikè (technè)' (*Platon, Pol 282a* (art of caring for the sick)) move in the same sphere of well-being and guidance and give rise to 'therapeutics', but with the emphasis on liberation from illness, physical or mental.

JL. Moreno, Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama, Stuttgart, 1973, situates his group therapy, which builds on medicine, sociology and religion, as a 'therapeutic world view' in relation to the, according to him, one-sidedly economically oriented methods of welfare care that are communism and liberal democracy (o.c., 1/8), because his therapeutic philosophy only reveals the full measure of the real misery ('the therapeutic proletariat'). Coincidentally, the ancient religions, from which Pythagoreanism emerged, were also extremely 'therapeutic' in nature. Hence the therapeutic philosophy that kept Pythagoreanism alive in Hellas for centuries. All 'theoretical' concerns notwithstanding. (Cfr. *Jaeger, Paideia, I, 211*).

(GW 202)

Bibliographic Sample:

(i) -- B. Boelen, *Eudaimony and the essence of ethics*, Leuven, 1949:

a. experience of happiness runs in tandem with experience of pleasure and experience of usefulness;

b. Aristotle is eudemonist in a noble and intellectually-rational way; Thomas Aquinas is eudemonist on the basis of a doctrine of the objectively good and intellectually-rational life; Kant detaches ethics entirely from eudemonia by conceiving of moral action as purely "formal"; Scheler rejects eudemonism by saying that man does not strive for pleasure but for values ("material value ethics");

c. the author defends eudemonism (but as a psychological concept, not a religious one);

-- Libbe van der Wal, *Het objectiviteitsprincipe in de oudste Griekse ethiek (The principle of objectivity in ancient Greek ethics)*, Groningen, 1934: Anaximandros, Herakleitos and Demokritos are tested for the objectivity on which their ethics are based; eudemonism is the inconsistent form of hedonism (pleasure ethics), in which the pleasure maxim dependent on personal taste, without moral quality, is purified to the level of equal and above all surreptitiously judged morality (o.c., 93); in order to ethically "save" eudemonism, which is called "good" which promotes happiness, it must become intellectualistic, i.e., put virtue first as the only source of happiness, virtue identified with "wisdom" (ib., 94/96); Demokritos, who does not call his ethical principle "hèdonè"(lust), but prefers "terpsis" (refined pleasure), connects it with usefulness or goodness (again, eudemonology is conceived purely psychologically);

(ii) -- Cl. Brelet-Rueff, *Médecines traditionnelles sacrées*, Paris, 1973 : shamanism, pyramid medicine, agrarian-ritual gen., gnostic gen., alchemical gen., these are the titles that concern antiquity;

-- F.Kudien, *Der Beginn des medizinischen Denkens bei den Griechen*, Zürich/Stuttgart, 1967;

-- L. Edelstein, *Ancient Medicine*, Baltimore, 1967;

-- G. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience*, Cambridge Un. Press, 1979;

-- id., *Les débuts de la science en Grèce*, in *La Recherche*, 125 (Sept. 1981, 920/927(deals mainly with the healing arts in Hellas);

(iii) Apart from W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, cf.

-- O. Willmann, *Didaktiek als Vormingsleer in haar verband met de maatschappijleer en de geschiedenis der vorming*, I (*De geschiedkundige typen van het vormingswezen*), Lier/Antwerp, 104/127 (*De Griekse vorming*);

-- Hl. Marou, *Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité*, Paris, 1948 (*from the Homeric era to the Hellenistic era: 1 and 2*);

-- JD. Butler, *Four Philosophies and their Practice in Education and Religion*, New York / Evanston / London, 1967 (*naturalism (Leukippos, Demokritos, Epikouros); idealism (Platon); realism (Aristotle); pragmatism (Herakleitos, Protosofistics); existentialism; language analysis*).

(GW 203)

(iii)a1. Hieromancy (astral vitalism) . -- "Just as man owes the wheel of life to the deities, so also the order and completion of life. From her comes the nomos, the law, which founds human society, - the expression of the same justice, which dwells as themis (...), as dike (...). since the deity-loving generations of the preterite dates the commandment to spare all living reality and the wisdom, which gave things their names. From the deity has come philosophy, which consists in:

a. the cleansing (catharsis) of the **1.**material incapacity for thought (hulikès a.logias') and the **2.**mortal body and

b. the consummation ('teleiotès') - see above p. 188 supra -, understood as reappearance of the original fortunate life ('tès oikeias eu.zoias analèpsis'), which leads up to godlikeness ('theian homoiōsin')." (*O. Willmann, Gesch. d. Id., I, 275*).

Note -- Before we go any further, we should, with great emphasis, clear up a misunderstanding regarding the "cleansing," which Dodds deadpans as Puritanism and which is usually misunderstood as a negative act.

WB. Kristensen, Verz. bijdr., 238/242, on 'lustratio' (cleansing), says that 'cleansing' should be understood sacredly, i.e. that cleansing is a communication of life, - life, which is present in the cleanser (240); -- e.g., he says, water, according to a generally antique (meaning: archaic) view, possesses a creative and renewing power, which, by ritual sprinkling, can be transferred to others (*ibid.*);

- ritual purity equals life, thriving, renewal(*ibid.*); it is more than absence of uncleanness: it is splendor, glory, divine life (*ibid.*);

- not only water, also e.g. incense, whose fragrance is described as divine life, has the same meaning (*ibid.*);

the basic idea is that the cleansing agent is the divine carrier and giver of life (*ibid.*);

- the negative descriptions should not mislead us, says Kristensen, 241, for, if the cleansing drives out demons, washes away infections, resp. diseases, lifts the state of sin,-

Summary: Man out of the grip of "death" (absence of life force; see above p. (17)polytheistic dynamism); 62vv. (generative religion); 159vv. (Causal Belief)), then this is merely a negative articulation of the fact that deity (re)generates, (re)causes life. Pythagoreanism is already too religious not to start from this idea of 'purity', resp. 'reinging'.

-- See also *R. Flacelière, Devins et oracles grecs*, Paris, 1965-2, 8s. (on cathartics or purification art, a medical-sacred term, which thinks and treats both guilt and disease at the same time).

(GW 204)

Return for a moment to Willmann's text, at the top of p. 203, now that we can understand him semasiologically:

(i) the deity, in its hierarchy from Supreme Being to human (and extra-human) daimon - see above pp. 65; 191 -, is the source (Causeer, Sourcer) of everything, i.e. of life (for everything is alive, in the ground); wisdom, law, etc., is there to establish that life;

(ii) Philosophy, when it is what it ought to be by virtue of God, is life, life-giving, life-restoring, 'generating', 'causing';--thus it is purification and consummation, i.e. initiation, into the divine life; --this we understand better, when we take into account that even the Supreme Being is 'generating': "The theistic or transcendental theology connects, preferably, to the figures of Kronos or Zeus. Kronos the Greeks, if they came to know Israel, called the God of the Jews.

Well, Kronos comes through as the supreme guardian spirit (see above p. 190v.) of all beings, in the prayer that Zeus as demiürg (i.e. world-creator) addresses to him, at Orpheus: "Raise up our generation, peculiar daimon ('arideikete daimon')."

O. Willmann, *Gesch.*, I, 210, writing that text, quotes the commentary of Proklos of Konstantinopolis (+410/+485), the Neo-Platonic of so many centuries later: "The supreme Kronos, from above, imparts to the demiürg (here called Zeus) the principles ('archas') of the (Creator's) ideas ('noèseon') and directs the whole work of creation. Therefore Zeus calls him, in Orpheus' text, 'daimon' (protector spirit; better: causer in what he causes)". But already Platon (-427/-347) had, centuries before, spoken in the same sense: Kronos is called Platon 'megalè tis dianoiā' (a high thinking power) with regard to Zeus (Krat. 396b). In other words, we have here an old tradition.

- In other texts the Supreme Being is called 'Zeus',--according to the wavering thinking of the polytheists (in contrast to Israel, which is unambiguously monotheistic); e.g. in the text, in which Pythagoreanism pronounces its Supreme Being (see above p. 191, ad (ii)).

- However, Willmann, o.c., 213ff, points out that the Supreme Being, in addition to being (mono)theistic and transcendent (as in Israel, in Zoroastrianism and Atonism), is also, and even especially immanent, thought to be pantheistic: thus 'Zeus', in numerous Orphic texts, occurs as 'one with the universe'; consequence: the expression 'Dios d' ekpanta tetuktai' (from Zeus all things have come forth) cannot be interpreted as 'great thinking power (Platon), which creates all things, in a preexistent way, in its inwardness, but as a chthonic power, as the macrocosmic man (see above pp. 48/50; esp. 62/67; 159/163; 190v.), whose 'body' (understand: fluidic 'body') constitutes the universe, - body, which was, formless 'night', from which all things arose; -

(GW 205)

exactly as Söderblom, ethnologically especially, establishes with the "Causers" (see above p. 166v.: metamorphosis (metamorphic model), conception (generative model), outflow (emanative model) is the name used to denote how the universe emerges from the Deity,-- this with or without intermediate causers, of course).

Conclusion: both the (mono)theistic-transcendental representation of the process by which the world comes into being (artificialistic, idealistic, exemplary), and the pantheistic-immanent representation of that same process by which the universe comes into being (emanative, generative, metamorphic) are applied to the Supreme Being (and his possible 'auxiliary agencies' (polytheistic-polydemonistic causers), -- think of Hermes (see above p. 190)).

- The same dual, transcendence (exaltation) and immanence (indwelling, inspiration) emphasizing God at the same time prevails in Pythagoreanism (see above p. 195 (the Monad (capital indicating the Supreme Being) is for (above) and 'in' creation at the same time). The 'sungeneia' ('kinship' (see above p. 189vv.; esp. 191vv.), i.e. the harmonia, the fitting together) of man and Deity, resp. deities is the direct expression of this. Even so that the notion of the 'world-soul' (see above p. 192 (deity as 'spirit', 'inspiration', 'movement' of everything) comes through here;--which is not yet to be explained in a strictly pantheistic sense, but first of all as Supreme Being-immanence and/or omnipresence (see above pp. 163/65¹), so that the Supreme Being, whether or not through intermediary figures, is fluidically, i.e. life-giving, present everywhere in the universe he created.

- Thus we understand the 'purification', 'initiation' (completion, fulfilment) which philosophy should be: God, the deities, are 'life' and 'life-giving', resp. 'life-restoring', so too is man, if he lives ethically-politically good-and-clean; so too is philosophy, if it is what it ought to be. This is most clearly seen in the immanent side of the deity (generative, emanative, metamorphic).

That is why we dwelt so long on the theological basis of the Pythagorean philosophy: God, deities here are not first and foremost authority and idea (as in the strict monotheisms), but life and life-giving or life-restoring. This cannot be emphasized enough. This is hierozoism, sacred vitalism, which does not exclude transcendence, on the contrary.

(iii)a2. Hierozoism as a therapeutic philosophy. (205/214)

"Philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom is the purification and consummation of life, the highest art of musing, the purest ordination service, the true art of healing:

(GW 206)

'As the art of medicine is worth nothing if it does not remove the diseases from the body, so is philosophy if it does not banish evil from the soul.'" (*O. Willmann, Gesch.d.Id., I, 321*). One can see both the parallelism and the coexistence of philosophy and medicine. One can put it this way:

(i) medicine becomes philosophical and, then, it is medicine to the full;

(ii) philosophy becomes medicine and, then, it is philosophy to the full. This is a therapeutic philosophy, analogous to Moreno's: the problem of misery is central; the elimination of misery, physical and mental, is the task par excellence and in the first instance of both, medicine and philosophy. 'Cleansing' (but antique, i.e. archaic, understood, as Kristensen at the time so emphasized, and not 'classical', i.e. enlightened-septic and -secularizing (see above pp. 33/35; 72/93)) and 'completion' (initiation) are the two aspects of therapeia, therapy of which our present-day medicine (academically understood) and e.g. psychoanalysis represent only the secular glimmer.

Among the (sacred) professional sciences, busily practiced by the Pythagoreans, medicine excelled: "A thoroughly sacred character has, with Puthagoras, medicine: he called it 'to sofotaton ton par' hëmin' (the pre-eminently 'wise' among human things)."

"Preserving and restoring health is a matter that concerns wisdom and, conversely, wisdom is the basic condition of health: the 'sofosunë', i.e., prudence, health of the soul, secures the health of the body." In other words :

1) A psychosomatic conception is clearly expressed here: the somatic, i.e. physical, - in spite of all so-called Orphic and/or Pythagorean 'dualism' (which apparently is situated on a completely different plane) - is also determined by the psychic; the human being is grasped here, in this dualistic system, as a psychosomatic unity ('harmony', i.e. the union of soul and body) (henological: see above p. 185v.);

2) Conversely, a somatopsychic view resonates just as much: by living healthily, physically, man secures his mind, "wisdom.

"The way of life of the prehistory with its austerity, its natural division of labor and rest, waking and sleeping, was Puthagoras's model.

Dietetics ('diaitètikon eidos', i.e. the doctrine concerning the 'diaita', way of life in its entirety, physical and mental, - in particular: way of life prescribed by a physician (dietary regime), characterized by the omission of some foods and drinks, with therapeutic intent) was, in Puthagoras' school, much practiced."

"The disturbances of health Pythagorean medicine, like all sacred medicine, sought first of all to eliminate along the soul.

(GW 207)

Hence the use of music, by means of which Puthagoras, following the Delfian 'iatromantis' (see above p. 153; Willmann refers here to the healing method of Delfoi under the guidance of Apollon, the deity, who, together with Dionusos, was strongly honored by the Pythagoreans; see above p. 12), subdued the urges and tried to alleviate suffering."

(1) Note.-- (207/209) "Apollon, says Aristotle, Fr. 2, revealed on the lyre to men the laws according to which they should live: by melody he tamed their initial wildness, and by the magic of rhythm he granted access (to the origin men) to the commandment." Music (choreia; cf. supra p. 36) was therefore an integral part of Apollonism.

"The same ideas of 'ordering, enlightening, and in tones expressing deity power' are fused in the conception of the Mousai, the Muses (Kleio, Euterpè, Thaleia, Melpomenè, Terpsichorè, Ourania, Erato, Polumnia, Kalliopè), whose leader is Apollon: "They sing law and right way of life of all things ('nomous kai èthea kedna') and say from what is, what will be and what has been before, proclaiming it with the voice; effortlessly the pleasant sound flows from her mouth." (*Hesiod, Theogonia, 66;38vv.*)" (*Willmann, Gesch., I, 24*).

"Another form of Apollon-serving spirits are the Iungen ('iunx' was a quicksilver; in myth: a nymph, the daughter of Peitho or Echo, who, by magical formulas, means, conquered the love of Zeus (either for herself or for Io); one used the quicksilver on a wheel as an erotic magic device (Pindaros, Pyth. 4:214)) or Keledons ('kèlèdon' is witch, sorceress; plural: the Sirens). The iunx's father is Pan (the god of fields, flocks, and their shepherds); her mother Echo or Peitho (words meaning "reverberation" or "persuasion"). The six golden Kèlèdons, says Pindaros (Fr. 25), sing from above. They were the ones who decorated the metal roof of the temple of Delfoi (as statues): birds with girls' heads: the temple roof stands for heaven; the winged creatures signify the all-pervading divine forces, singing like a bird, pensive like a human head". (*O. Willmann, Gesch., I, 25*).

"That the sound was conceived as an expression of a law, which pervades the whole fufis, nature, is evident from the beautiful myth of the Lokrian singer Eunomos (name, meaning, 'ruled by good laws'): During the feast of Apollon he sang of the subjugation of the Python dragon; a string of his lyre breaks; at that moment a cicada (cricket) flies on the lyre and replaces, with her tone, the missing string, by striking at the moment when the string was to be plucked.

A statue at Delfoi depicted this. The cricket represents the living creatures, who received from Apollon a tone, by which, henceforth, they are represented in the harmony of the universe." (*O. Willmann, Gesch., I, 25f.*).

(GW 208)

Note.-- In addition to the conjunction of Apollinism with musical activity, we should also briefly underline the conjunction of Apollinism with healing.-- "In the earthly sphere, Apollon works not only as an oracle god, legislator, and teacher of musical art, but also as protector of life. Thus he is

(i) god of flocks, 'karneios' (Doric-Peloponnesian nickname of Apollon), and of pastures, 'nomios', 'agreus' (concerning the shepherds and/or pastures; hunter and/or fisherman (agreuo, agreo = I catch while hunting or fishing);

(ii) the protector of youth, 'kourotrophos', - see above p. 42v. (Demeter),- the giver of life, 'genetor', genitor (Lat.), 'father', 'ancestor', 'the one who begets' (sire) - see above p. 62vv. (begetting religion),- also 'patroios' (who is related to the parents, ancestors),- the healing god, 'iatromantis', 'akestor' (healer; 'akestoria' = healing art, therapeutics).

One sees in this list, the background of which is the antique-archaic concept of 'wealth' (i.e. growing plants, young cattle, children especially its 'wealth', i.e. (rising from the earth) life) - cfr. *Kristensen, Verz. contribut.*, 291/314 (The wealth of the earth; sacred-agricultural);

(iii) on earth he descends as a shepherd, but also as an urban planner: he builds the walls of Ilion, Megara, Buzantion; in the myth about this urban construction becomes a symbol of world building; (see above p. 42;147v.);

(iv) previous myth captures city-building and herding as much as slave labor, which Apollon, stripped of his light guise, performs.

Excursus: WB. Kristensen, o.c. 201/229 (*The antique conception of servitude*); 305 (slaves), explains how the slaves and slave women, representing chthonic deities, maintain life versta: wealth in the archaic sense); the best-known 'servant' is Hèraklès, the hèros, viz. divine man or human god, who, in death, is venerated as the benefactor and savior of men; to atone for the murder, which he, in madness, had committed on his children, he had to 'serve' in the foreign one (he, as murderer, has lapsed to the deities of the other world: he should restore the fluid of life, disturbed in its equilibrium; cfr. supra p. 9vv. (*fate analysis*); 183 (*themis*)); Herakles' twelve 'works' are victories over the powers of death and acquisitions of life.

Apollon, in his descent to earth, denies his heavenly nature and stains himself with something strange to him. Which is shown in the myth of the dragon slaying (the python dragon is the symbol of dark, wild, evil power,-- infernal, chthonic).-- "This history is compared to the banishment of Dionusos and the wanderings of Demeter." (O.Wilmann, *Gesch.*, I, 30).

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Only after Apollon fled, did he do penance, after his defiling contact with the dragon, did he recapture his light form,-- according to Ploutarchos. In the Dafnèforia (celebration of Apollon, during which one carried an olive branch surrounded with laurel ('dafnè')) his fall and atonement were dramatically depicted (see above p. 38vv. A boy fled, was, symbolically, made a servant, reconciled and, in a festive procession, carried back to Delphi with laurel branches. As a cleansed penitent Apollon now held all the penance and was 'katharsios' (purifier), 'soter' (saviour), reconciler, redeemer. (O. Willmann, o.c., 30).

Behold the Apollonian theology that served as a model of Pythagoreanism: only when one includes this background does one fully understand how it lived from the progenitor religion, also as philosophy. -- Cfr. also *E. Des Places, La religion grecque*, Paris, 1969, 38, where the healing aspect comes to the fore (titles); ib., 40 (Apollon was revered as a judge, murderer (cf. Heracles), his oldest titles are medicine, mantics and poetry; already Homer mentions him as a physician; between medicine and mantics the link is close (iatro.mantis): "The two skills act together among the auxiliary necessary for life, (says des Places).

(2) Note.-- (209/212) "Of Pythagoras it is reported that he was initiated into all the mysteries; that he renewed the Bakchian-Orphic, however, and based the rites of his society on it. His house the inhabitants of Metapontion called 'the Demeter Temple'. His disciples he labelled 'initiates of the universe'". (O. Willmann, o.c., 34).

We refer for the ideas, at the basis of the chthonic mysteries, to higher pp. 62vv. (*generative rel.*); 4-8/50 (*genitive or daimonic aspect*); 159vv. (*causative rel.*).

For the typical Dionysian mystery see above pp. 40/41 (Bakcheia).

See also *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, Paris, 1971, 11, 79/94 (*La personne dans la religion*), which deals with the Dionysian religion as a marginal one (women, slaves).

The great daimon of the (chthonic) mysteries, the hero of the mystery-religious drama, comes across to us as -

1. man: he is born, commits sin, suffers and dies". (O. Willmann, o.c., 36). Thus the chthonic Zeus in Crete; thus Dionusos: this one is Semelè's son; as a child or youth he is, either while engrossed in play, or while sunk in contemplating his reflection, or after he has become, by drinking from a cup, drunk, assailed by the Titans (see above p. 8v.) and torn to pieces, whereby the goddess Athene only managed to save the heart equipped with thought ('noërèn kradièn'); - This is the primal tragedy, depicted in the oldest drama;

(GW 210)

2. the chthonic-mysterious man is, however, not an ordinary man but the 'archanthropos', the 'first' (understand: generating) man the Causer; - see above pp. 62/64 (*Dionusos*);

3. The Causer-man is, at the same time, world deity; from the seven pieces of flesh, in which Dionusos is torn apart by the Titans, the world, the universe, also comes into being; he is not only 'primeval man' ('archanthropos') or 'first-formed' ('protoplast'), but also 'macrocosmic man' (in reference to this the Orphic texts speak of 'first-born' ('protogonos', 'protosporos' (the first sown, i. e. born), yes, at the same time 'first progenitor' ('protos genetor'); -- see above page 208, where an analogous title is applied to Apollon as Causer).i. born), yes, at the same time 'first progenitor' ('protos genetor'; - see above p. 208, where an analogous title is applied to Apollon as Causer);

This passive role vis-à-vis the Supreme Being (see above p. 204v.) is merged ('harmony') with the active role vis-à-vis the fusi, in which man is situated (again 'harmony' but now as the merging of intermediate cause and the visible world (resp. humanity)); see above p. 48/50 (*genius aspect*); 65 (*Samothean hierarchy*); 191 (*Pythagorean hierarchy*); 161v. (*animism*);

One may also call this, with the Pythagoreans 'sungenia' (kinship; 'begetting bond') (see above pp. 189; 190 (*Hermes*); -- this world deity is called in other texts Pan (see above p. 207), apparently another name and guise for Dionusos, according to Willmann, *Gesch.*, I, 38; sometimes, as a secondary figure Eros, is described (*ibid.*);

It should be noted that in the many names and myths (with their variants) the theory of mysteries (especially its archaic form, the truly chthonic one) does not forget that unity is characteristic of the deity: for example, Dionusos is sometimes conceived as the Supreme Being, while, as mentioned above on p. 209, Zeus is presented as a chthonic god (the myth loves variation in one theme, as Lévi-Strauss says somewhere, while emphasizing its musicality). 209 was mentioned, Zeus was presented as a chthonic god (myth loves variation on one theme, as Lévi-Strauss says somewhere, while emphasizing its musicality; rightly so, because, as we saw above, mythic man is musical, 'musical', radical).

Willmann, Gesch., I, 42/44, draws attention to the fact that;

(i) the number, i.e. the multiple of the (elementary) 'one' (see above p. 185v.), plays a weighty role in the mystery doctrine, chthonically speaking: the dismemberment of Dionusos' body (one body becomes many pieces; the multiplicity of the visible world is, in its 'generative -hierarchical ground, one) shows it;

(ii) the space forms also play a decisive role: the Kourètes, the Kouretes, dancing their 'kourètismos' (Kourétendance), guard Dionusos as a playing child; but the Titans stalk him and deceive him with toys - a sphere, a cone, a teetering, a top, a wheel, Hesperian apples (cfr. Heracles myth), a mirror;

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The interpretations of the Orphic-Pythagorean-Platonic tradition are obvious: e.g. the Kouretes represent the planets as the dwelling places ('fetishes', see above p. 132; 139v.) of the Olympian deities, the Titans the 'powers' (dynamism) of the chthonic deities;

Platon sees in Dionusos as a child, engrossed in the geometrical toys, the fact that "theos aei georretrei" (that the deity always works as a geometrician), a.o. 'playing' (playfully playing) with the ideas, resp. number forms, present in the by itself formless matter (see above p. 192v.);

(iii) music, which plays a very important role in the (chthonic) mysteries (see above p. 41), is present in cosmological myths: the seven pipes of the 'surinx' (the Pan flute) represent the seven planets e.g. (mythically one - ambiguity (see above p. 210); they can just as well represent the sun, silenced, surrounded by the (seven) planets; -- so were the strings of Apollon's lyre (see above p. 207, where the civilizing aspect comes through); -- Pan is depicted in sculpture as playing the 'periodoi' (the flute) in the midst of the starry sky, of which he, the musician, is the 'period' (the flute). 207, where the civilizing aspect comes through for once);-- Pan is worked out in sculpture as playing with the flute amidst the starry sky, of which he, making music, regulates the 'periodoi' (orbits; see higher p. (187*sustoichia; harmonia*)) (cybernetic aspect; see higher p. 9; 47 (ideas, resp. numbers as 'regulating'); 45 (normative); 185v.);

Loukianos, On the dance, 7,

a) asserts, e.g., that, according to the most truthful genealogists (cfr. generative rel.), the dance is as old as the cosmogonic (i.e., cosmos-generating) 'eros' (lover), which ordered things (*cosmos*; see above p. 189);--which proves that, among the archaic antics, the 'eros' (erotic magic) did not necessarily have to be 'wild', on the contrary;

b) Conversely: according to Loukianos, dance took as its 'prototupos' (prototype), exemplary model, "the chorus of celestial bodies, the constellation of the planets and fixed stars, its harmonious society, its admirable unanimity"; - already centuries beforehand Platon had spoken in the same sense: this harmonious order, which, overcoming disorder, was the principle of the world, is at the same time a law, an endeavour, deeply laid down in man (see above pp. 52/54 (*hermeneutic method; man as 'microcosm'*); 189) and by which he distinguishes himself from other living beings; - man, with his sense of order and rhythm, used the 'orchestikè' (the art of dance) to express this' the dance chorus thus remained, for the ancient Greeks, the symbol of every ordered group, of every 'symmetrical' (balanced) whole (cfr L. Séchan, *La danse grecque antique*, Paris, 1930, 35s.);

One can still, fluidly dancing, test this 'dynamistically-harmonious' reality for its 'effectiveness' in the occult-religious field,-this according to the pragmaticist method (see above p. 46 (idea as guideline of experiment));

(GW 212)

O. Willmann, *Gesch.*, I, 632, notes that the salii ('salire' = dancing; an ancient, ritualistic sodalitas (secret society) in many cities of Italy, usually associated with Mars, the god of war) performed their dance as an "expression of celestial movement,"-- proving that the Pythagoreans were not alone in this "cosmic-chthonic" conception of orchestral music.

The protoplast elevated to deity - e.g. Dionusos - is the daimon, genius, of the entire (human) genus: the mortals can begin to resemble him, because, like them and in their place, he committed sin, suffered and died (see above p. 39 (heros = savior)), as such, i.e. as 'lusios' (liberator), 'katharsios' (purifier), he accompanies them.

Agogic aspect -; he is, in that field, stronger than Apollon, according to Willmann, o.c., 45 (the reason being that, the less chthonic a savior proceeds, the less he has at his disposal 'life-force' (dunamis), at least insofar as he is working on earth and in the gross material order);-- like Hermes (see above p. 190), Dionusos is 'psuchopompos' (soul-agogue):

(i) he leads the souls down to earth, into the moist depths, from the fiery ether (see above p. 103; this language is a fluidic language);

(ii) at death he accompanies them again, upward, at least if they have lived 'pure', i.e. good-and-clean, i.e. ethico-politically righteous; otherwise he accompanies them into 'unclean' animal bodies or - in the case of non-reincarnation - into the underworld (cfr also O. Willmann, o.c., 11f. (daimon as agog in this life and in the life to come)).

Dionusos, says des Places, o.c., 89, is "the god of wine, of fertility, of phallos";-- this implies that he is then also a healer;-- which we higher p. 41 (simultaneously 'bakchos' (causer) and 'lusios' (causer of the opposite) of disease (according to the 'harmonia of opposites; peculiar to demonism)).

Conclusion: the brief examination of the two main causal figures, Apollon and Dionusos, of Pythagoreanism as 'agogoi', genii, daimones, companions, especially in distress (calamity), has made it clear that especially to the extent that they act telluric-chthonic, they possess that mysterious energy ('dunamis'), which is saving, healing.

This should not make us lose sight of the fact - we already pointed out - that their energy rests on a demonic basis and is therefore questionable for biblical revelation; this is shown, among others, by K. Leese, *Recht und Grenze der natürlichen Religion*, Zürich, 1954, esp. 288ff. (*Naturfrömmigkeit und christliche Glaubenshaltung*), explicitly addressed;

(GW 213)

a) what the proposer, as a secularizing liberal Protestant theologian, says about the essence of Christianity (he reduces it to a moralizing religion of love, but in such a way that the "agape" (i.e., the typically-Biblical love of God and neighbor) receives as its preliminary stage and sustaining basis the "eros" (i.e., the typically pagan minus)), we leave for his consideration, of course;

(b) what he tries to make clearer, however, viz. the purely divine, understand: Supreme, value of the pagan minstrelsy, so central to the paganism of the archaic period (Canaanite (Baal/Ashtarte), Babylonian, Asia Minor-Thracic (Dionusos), Germanic (Freyia), Indian (Shiva/Shakti), etc.), seems to us worthy of reflection. (o.c., 302f.)), seems to us worthy of reflection:

"The great secret of life seemed to these peoples to be so deeply worthy of veneration that one could not help but interpret its origin and its hidden being and power as something, which was under the protection and guidance - agogia - of a great deity." (o.c.,302);

c) Regrettably, the great and eternally true idea, which here seeks its expression, namely, that to conceive life, as holy, belongs before God's face, has been mostly brought down in praxis." (ibid., where the author cites *R. Kittel, Die Religion des Volkes Israel*, 1921, 12); the author himself formulates it as follows: "The natural event situated outside and inside man is never unequivocally (...) revelation of God (= Supreme Being). It is not holy; it can be holy! The Christian faith sharpens the eye for its demons, i.e. for that which, to that natural event, is not divine-creating, but anti-divine-destroying, yes, satanic." (o.c., 295f.).

(d) The author himself links to Romanticism: "to have rediscovered nature as the mediator of divine revelation is (after the 'Sturm-und-Drang' process) the religious charism of Romanticism, which is precisely what theologians judge so hostile." (o.c., 305); he refers, o.c., 42, to Herder during his Bückeburertijd (1771/1776) and *Schleiermacher* in his *Reden über die Religion* (1799), who, instead of the enlightened, 'aufgeklärte' natural religion ('natural' here means: 'rational-seculine'), set the sense for historically-saturated revelation and individuality, animated contemplation and living feeling.

It should be noted that, at about the same time, in France *JA. Dulaure, Le culte du phallus (Les divinités génératrices)*, Paris, 1805, appeared.--indicating that the role of sexuality (already in the infant), discovered by Freud, had found its sacred place in the archaic-antique religions,--that the role of sexual energy (orgone energy), discovered by W. Reich, Freud's dissident disciple, also had its sacred place in the aforementioned religions.

(GW 214)

After this theological digression, we resume the theme, interrupted on page 207, regarding music as therapy.

"The 'wise' (understand: the philosopher) ought to examine himself (cf. pp. 58; 70vv; 12 (Apollonian-Delfic religion): 'Inasmuch as thou knowest thyself not, keep thyself but for one who is insane ('nomize mainesthai'), says an 'akousma' (spell), which deepens the Delphic oracular maxim ('Know thyself') in its own way.

We refer to *Platon's* doctrine (*Faidros* 144v.) concerning the 'mania' (transported state, resp. enthusiasm, possession) and its being subordinate or not to 'sofrosunè' - restraint - :

(a) the mania of prediction, peculiar especially to wives (e.g., at Delphi, Dodona; the Sibylla) under the direction of Apollon;

(b) the initiatory mania, peculiar to "purifiers" led by Dionysos (see above p. 203), who turn fate around;

(c) the poetry mania, peculiar to poets and other articulators led by the Mousai (Muses; see above p. 207);

(d) the eros- or minnemanía, peculiar to erotically moved people under Afrodítè (Lat.: Venus) and Eros,--excitations, about which Platon speaks with more or less reverence, notwithstanding his rational-intellectual pathos

(cfr. -- G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe*, Paris, 1980, 267/315;

-- ER .Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1966, 207/235 (*Plato and the Irrational Soul*);

-- id., *Der Fortschrittsgedanke i.d. Antike*, Zürich/München, 1977, 130/150 (*Platon und das Irrationale*);

-- D.N. Morgan, *Love: Plato, the Bible and Freud*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, 174ff).

-- E. Farwerck, *The mysteries of antiquity and their rites of initiation*, Hilversum, 1960, 102/108);

In short: mania can be pathological or godlike; godlike it can be seizure (anormal; good) or possession (katanormal; bad); -- according to Platon it is, in some areas, preferable to 'sedation'. -- This leads to a controversial point in the therapeutic philosophy of the Pthagoreans, namely, the kathartikè (technè) (art of purification), the skill of purging out the effects of 'ancient' (i.e., from past lives) sins by means of penitential praxis, cleansing, and so on. The city of Thebes, in King Oidipous (-430+) of Sophocles) or singular (think of Orestès, Agamemnon and Klutaimnèstra (Odusseia; taken up again in Aischulos' Eumenides (there are 'theai' i.e. benevolent goddesses);

cfr R. Flacelière, *Devins et oracles grecs*, Paris, 1965-2, 8s., where it is claimed that this mantis-bound art anticipated the modern methods of psychoanalysis;--it is in any case thoroughly wrong to write off this mantischiatic ('iatromantis') method as 'superstition', as Willmann, *Gesch.*, I, 302, does (especially where he must note that "sacred medicine everywhere went down this road").

(GW 215)

(iii) a3. *Hierophilia as an educative philosophy.* (215/217)

To beget life is to raise life: "The temple should be adorned with gifts of wisdom ('anathèmasin'), the spirit with studies of formation ('mathèmasin')" (O. Willmann, o.c., 322).

The organ of knowledge, central to the Apollonian philosophy of the Puthagoreans, is reason, resp. reason, which resemble a good sculptor: they give the soul, always equally central in depth (see above pp. 145/159 (Orphic-Puthagorean concept of soul); 189/191; 197vv.), a good-and-beautiful appearance, 'number form harmony':

1. *The henology* (see above pp. 185/197 (the 'one' (the 'one') immanent/transcendent; pair of opposites (systechy; totality); harmony; musical and ethico-political applications; all on the basis of analogy (i.e. one/many relationship, expressed in identical/different - terms (see above p. 186, basis of Puthagorean collection and system theory (proportional (collecting) and attributive (distorting) analogy)) is the basic science of formation.

2. *The sacred* sciences-see above p. 206 (medicine)-are the second stage in formation studies: Willmann, o.c., 296ff., goes over them:

a/ linguistics, historiography (esp. Mythological, -- what we would now call 'sacred history'),

b/ mathematics (distinguished from the 'henology' explained more fully above; cfr. *Matila Ghyka, Philosophie et mystique du nombre*, Paris, 1978, esp. 10ss., where reference is made to the three major types of 'number' among the Puthagoreans:

(a) divine numbers (1 to 10 (O.c., 13/19), also called "pure" numbers that are objects of "mystical" arithmetic or numerology (practiced to this day);

(b) 'scientific' numbers ('epistèmonikoi arithmoi ((divided into

b1. 'posotès', i.e. countable set, finite type, number expressed in number, unit set;

b2. monadic composition, what in present language might be called 'class of classes': e.g. the triad (threefold), the tetrad (fourfold), etc. are 'principle' of all that is 'threefold', 'fourfold', etc. among the sensuous things (three donkeys, three blades, etc.);

b3. 'chuma' (flood) of monads (elemental) units;

(c) ordinary numbers, object of the 'logistikè (technè), the arithmetic of e.g. businessmen),

c/ astronomy (in concurrence largely with astro(theo)logy (the mystery doctrine e.g. attached importance to the 'galaxia', the Milky Way (see above p. 16 (*Egyptian model*)) as a transit place of the disembodied souls; Willmann, o.c., 45), music theory (canonical (= elementary music theory), harmonics (higher learning)).

3. *The Puthagorean physical* is a further partial science, practiced by the Puthagoreans (see Willmann, o.c., 307/317);-- **1/** the real unity, **2/** the 'organic' (more than mechanical) character (see above p. 110v.),

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3/ the real nature of the course of nature, **4/** the position of individual beings in the unity of the universe,-- such are the main points of the physical as Willmann summarizes them; -- we have already gone over pieces of them: so e.g. on p. (187*periodos*, *circulation*); 189vvv. ('cosmos', 'sungenēia I (kinship); 191/193 (*Supreme Being* vs. *universe*; *form / formlessness (matter)*, 94 (*cosmological*);

Willmann points to the five regular bodies (pyramid/fire; cube/earth; octahedron ('oktaëdros; which has eight sides)/air; ikosahedron ('eikosaëdros; which has twenty sides/water; dodekahedron ('dodekaëdros; which has twelve sides)/ aithēr (o.c., 311/314).-on an onset of crystallography, of atomic theory, -- further, on the theory of life (biology: plants, animals, humans each have a specific soul).

Note.-- If we compare these Puthagorean 'mathemata' (educational subjects) with Herodotos' system of testing, we see that Puthagoras and his followers preceded him: the (sacred and partly profane) subject sciences with the physical consist of:

(i) logical-mathematical subjects (henology; mathematics (both number and space mathematics))

(ii) empirical subjects

(a. alpha or human sciences (linguistics; history; - both the core of later philology; -- medicine, which also becomes medicine (see above p. 84 (*Alkmaion of Kroton was Puthagorean*)));

b. the STEM or natural sciences (astronomy, musicology, physical);

(iii) transempirical subjects (all typically sacred subjects); - cfr. above p. 123).

Note.-- However strongly ethic-politics was rooted in the physical, a characteristic and of all archaic religions (see above p. 16v. (*Maat*); 34v. (*unity of theology, philosophy, natural science, rhetoric*) and immediately of incipient philosophy - is evident from 'an "akousma" (aphorism), typically Puthagorean in nature: "Harmony is the virtue of the world; eunomy (eu + nomos = good-and-good laws) the virtue of the congregation; health and strength the virtue of the body: in all these things every part is determined according to the whole and the collection ('suntetaktai poti to holon (coherent whole) kai to pan (collection))." (O. Willmann, o.c., 327). 'Virtue' is simply 'henologically' determined (see above p. 185vv.). Which testifies to logical-mathematical (henological) coherence).

Note.-- Hippodamos of Miletos, a Puthagorean, was the founder of town and country planning: he connected politics with henology (even with "ordinary" mathematics) by e.g. building the Peiraieus, the harbor of Athens, in a planned way. Already before that he had rebuilt the ruined Miletos in -479 according to chessboard plan; Thourioi (Thourion), a Southitalian colony of Athens he designed and led in -444/443 (*Fr. Krafft, Gesch. d. Naturw., I, 230ff.*).

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Archytas of Taranton (-400/-350), a Pythagorean, continues, among the ancients, as the first technical mind of antiquity, on a "mathematical" basis. See above p. 127v.

Conclusion: both applied science ('mathèma') and pure technical skill were included in the Pythagorean synthesis. Of course, 'pure' technique was, for a Pythagorean, difficult to imagine: his henological-arithmetic disposition almost forced him to trace the 'mathematical' conditions of possibility of it.

Note.-- The two kinds of mathematics and its reconciliation were touched upon higher pp. 124/126.

4. The "akousmatikoi" (listeners) and "mathematikoi" (scholars).

Cfr. -- K. von Fritz, *Mathematiker und Akusmatiker bei den alten Pythagoreern*, in *Sitzungsberichte d. Bayerischen Akad. d. Wiss., Philos.- hist. Class*, 1960 (11), Munich, 1960;

-- W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon)*, Nürnberg, 1962.

The teachings of Pythagoras were given in (i) 'akousmata', aphorisms, and (ii) 'sumbola', sensuous statements. The fusion of 'iatromantic' (one now says also 'shamanic') wisdom and Milesian physical brought with it a kind of two-prongedness.

Consequence: at one point they had two types of trailers:

a/ The asketically (mortified) living disciples, who emphasized the religious-moral, peculiar to the community consecrated to Apollo,--without therefore neglecting the scientific subject (one thinks of some commandments of silence); these are the akousmatists;

b/ the more scientific minds (whether this was always the Milesian physical, as Burkert claims, is questionable), led by Hipasos of Metapontion (see above p. 124), emphasized science, a.o. mathematics, as they knew it then; 'historia' and 'mathemata' were research and subject sciences of the time; they were called mathematonists in that then sense; -- among them was e.g. the aforementioned Archytas of Taranton; the four subjects of learning -- arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music (harmonics) -- were among the most practiced 'mathèmata'. Cfr. the later 'quadrivium'.-- Gradually Platonism will take over and elaborate that legacy.

(iii)a4. Hierozoism as a pragmatic-eudemonic philosophy. (217/222)

In addition to the therapeutic (supra 205/214) and the educational (215/217) side, the agogic slant (200/202) also contains the typically pragmatic side, i.e., the philosophy wants a result (= pragmatic) and namely a happiness form (= eudemonic, soter(i)ologic intention) as a result.

(i) This is abundantly clear from the key position of the concept of daimonia, as set forth above pp. 198/200.

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(ii) This is equally evident from the therapeutic side, as detailed above: what is more contributory to 'happiness' than health to body and soul?

On p. 205v. the pragmati(ci)sm of the Puthagoreans was clearly shown: both medicine and philosophy are judged by its result, i.e. the elimination of disease and evil! But the result goes deep, much deeper than e.g. the Protosophist, which aims only at the secular-sensualist-hedonist-'happiness', it goes into the soul as daimon (genius/ iuno). One has only to check the history of aesthetics; e.g. *Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Gesch. d. Aesthetik, I, Die Aesthetik der Antike*, Basel/Stuttgart 1979, 103ff., where one studies the beginnings of philosophical aesthetics: the founders of that philosophical branch are the Puthagoreans:

(i) The harmony, i.e., the merging that is good-and-clean, is the basis;

(ii) symmetry, i.e., the insertion, good-and-clean, insofar as it contains measure (geometric) and number (arithmetic), is the second basis;

(iii) the music better the choreia (see above p. 36v.) - had the emphasis: the theory of art and beauty was based on it (not on the plastic arts so much); the choreia represented harmony and symmetry;

(iv) the cosmos was clean to the Greek: for it was in itself, objective, harmonious and symmetrical (see above p. 118vv. (the mathematical side of the fusis; Herodotos's incipient critique).

W. Jaeger, Paideia, I, 1954-3, 225, expresses the internalization of the cosmos as harmony:

(i) he goes over, o.c., 222ff., the incalculably large role, since Puthagoras, played by the harmony idea in Sculpture, architecture, poetry, rhetoric, -- religion, ethics, politics;

(ii) he adds, "Everywhere the consciousness is awakening that even in the productive and practical actions of men there is a strict norm of the appropriate ('prepon', 'harmotton'), which, like that of law, one does not violate with impunity.

Only those who survey the unbounded dominance of these concepts in Greek thought of classical and late antique times on all sides will make a correct picture of the norm-creating effect of the discovery of harmony.

The concepts of rhythm, measure and proportion are closely related to it or are given a more specific content by it.

"For the cosmos thought as well as for harmony and rhythm, its discovery in the 'nature of being' is the necessary stage for its transmission to the inwardness of man and to the problems of the order of life." Indeed, for the Pythagorean, inwardness goes all the way to the soul as daimon (genius/ iuno).

This is how one understands the Puthagorean aesthetics of choreia, i.e., the merging of dance, music, and poetry.

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(a) *The foreground.*

(b) The choreia works in and on 'choreutès' and on viewer.

(a)1. In the Dionusosian service, Tatarkiewicz says, 107, at first only the dancer, singing and/or playing music, was active, -- orgiastic (cfr. supra p. 40v.): expressive as this event was, it exposed the 'èthos', the soul insofar as it is good-and-beautiful or bad-and-ugly; self-knowledge (cf. supra pp. 12; 214 (mania)); in this the choreia was privileged: it gave 'homoiomata', images, of what was present in nature, first of all, and, then, in the in and behind that nature of the dancing hidden deity (daimon); for the 'èthos' is more than what Demokritos or the Protosophist made of it, deductively-seculine, namely its immediately visible and tangible expressiveness.

(a)2. The Puthagoreans, according to Tatarkiewicz, 107, noted that the viewer was also involved;-- according to Diogenes Laërtios, for Puthagoras, life was plural, like a spectacle:

1. the competitions e.g. are attended by the contenders for the reason of fame;

2. the merchants involved in that spectacle seek profit there;

3. the pure observers find there knowledge by means of 'theoria', i.e. contemplation of **i)** the one (the harmony in the multitude of impressions), **ii)** the true (what shows itself to be real), **iii)** the good and beautiful (the 'value' of what that harmony and that showing reality is);-- cfr. above p. 14v.; 47 (*transcendentalia of ontology*); -- the urge for knowledge without gain or ambition for honor was considered by Puthagoras to be the most honorable.

(b) *The background.*

The choreia was not only expressive for player and spectator; it was also operative, effective.

(b)1. The Orphicists saw cleansing, 'catharsis', in it (see above p. 41 (bakchos becomes lusios); 203; 214); -- more so, to the extent that the mania, the out-of-body experience, continues, the player (and, somewhat, the spectator) enters into contact with the 'dunamis', the life force, present in nature and in the (generative) deities and spirits (the dynamist aspect);

In other words, the mantic-magic aspect is double: **i)** generative (inclusion of life force) and **ii)** applicative (here: catharsis).

(b)2. The Puthagoreans saw in it, moreover, simply, 'psuch.agogia, soul guidance: just as the choreia is expressive, so it can also be used effectively, i.e. by choosing the music, the singing and the dancing well-and-cleanly, one can act on the participants (players/viewers) in an educational way; one can, in other words, Damon of Athens (+/- -450), who Platon is talking about regarding the ethical effects of music, relied on the Puthagorean choreography doctrine to warn against innovations in the field of choreography which would endanger the 'eunomia', the inner discipline, of dancers and spectators;

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He was convinced that choreia, in addition to mastery (typically Apollonian) and courage (rather Dionysian), could also teach justice (i.e. moral-political quality, virtue); consequently, choreia changes, once pushed through, also bring revolution; choreia therefore belonged to be introduced into public education as a subject.

Note.-- The peculiar nature of the Puthagorean aesthetic is even more evident when compared:

1. *the beautiful* is, Puthagorean, "mathematical" (harmony, resp. symmetry); Sophistic is the sense of lust in eyes and ears (subjectivist) (cfr. supra p. 180 (*individualism; lust and power*)); Socratic is its usefulness in view of an objective (functionalist-teleological);

2. *the aesthetic experience* is, Puthagorean, either cathartic (Orphic) or psychagogic; sophistically, it is 'apatè', illusio, deception, better: delusion (it creates, in the subject, purely subjective illusions); Socratically, it is 'mimèsis', imitatio, imitation (it discovers likenesses, images, of nature (paragons) in the artist's work). Cfr. Tatarkiewicz, 137.

3. *Platon* will -

ad 1. - To formulate beauty as an idea (cf. above p. 45v.; esp. 50/52 (*artistic mimèsis*); cfr. o.c., 147; -

ad 2. - Platon saw in aesthetic experience a lesser form of the rational-intellectual vision of ideas of philosophy; he was therefore very dismissive of art; o.c., 159.

4. *Aristotle* minimized beauty (which Platon emphasized), but emphasized art, which he called 'mimèsis', imitation, viz. plastic art as well as poetry and music are 'imitation'; the Puthagoreans understood 'imitation' to mean 'expression of èthos' (theatrical imitation), freely reproducing; Demokritos understood 'imitation' to mean expression of actions (a pupil imitates his teacher), Platon understood it to mean production of (sensory) things, reproducing the idea as a model; Aristotle sees all three together (o.c., 175f.);-- the operation of art was, Puthagorean, cathartic-psychagogic; Sophistic was illusory-hedonic; Platonic was moralizing; Aristotle held that all these theories contained a partial truth; -- beauty was, for Aristotle, both Puthagorean (harmony) and Socratic (usefulness in relation to a purpose) (o.c., 186).

5. *The Hellenistic era* sees three answers to the one great question of how, in this world, one can live happily:

a. a hedonistic one, namely that of the Epicureans (to be happy one needs lust);

b. a moralizing one, viz; that of the stoic philosophies (to be happy one must live virtuously only ethically-politically);

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c. a skepticism (to be happy, given doubt and suspension of judgment, one should keep aloof);

consequence: given the heavily weighted issue of happiness, one had only secondary consideration left for aesthetics.

6. *Eclecticism*, around +/- -100+, emerged from

(i) the Stoa (Panaitios, Poseidonios), which incorporated Aristotelian and Platonic partial theorems, and from

(ii) the Platonic academy (Philon of Larissa, Antiochos of Askalon), which Platon and Aristotle sensed as one; -- Cicero concludes eclecticism as a great aesthete, unifying partial insights. Cfr. o.c., 205f.

7. Meanwhile, the *Epicurean and the skeptic schools remained* alone: they merged in its rejection of art and art theory. Cfr. o.c., 236f.

8. *Plotinos of Likopolos* (+203/+269), an Egyptian, who came to live in Rome as a forty-year-old, where he had followers, was a very original thinker and someone who at the same time knew history exceptionally well.

The "two-world theory" links Platon and Plotinos, the Neo-Platonic:

(i) 'this' world, spatially - physically, accessible by the senses;

(ii) 'beyond' world, unspatial-unphysical, 'spiritual', accessible by thought.

The distinction between Platon and Plotinos consists in that

(i) Platon, at least the younger one, recognized only one type of beauty-and-goodness, namely, the transcendental-ideal, which was reachable only by the mind;

(ii) while Plotinos, in addition to the transcendental, also recognized the sensuous, spatially-bodily beautiful and good, which, immediately, was sensually knowable.

That second type was by origin, transcendental: it revealed the ideally beautiful and good in "this" world; more to the point: the only perfect feature of this world is its transcendent beauty: consequence: aesthetics became a very important part of Plotinus' philosophy.

Toward the Puthagorean definition of "clean," Plotinos took a stand:

(i) in the good and the beautiful is harmony, resp. symmetry; but these are only the external visibility of the real good and the beautiful, which, through harmony and symmetry, shines through from the 'other' world; that real good and beauty is both the transcendent idea ('archetupon', paragon) - see above p. 45ff. 47; but also and especially 185; 191v., where that transcendence is also Puthagorean emphasized - as well as the 'inner form', which, as it were, constitutes the 'soul' of the corporeal-spatial as beauty-and-goodness - see above, ibidem, where true Puthagoreanism emphasizes the same immanent side.

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The difference between the paleo-Pythagoreans and Plotinos lies in the fact that, since Empedokles, Anaxagoras and especially Socrates, Platon, etc., the immaterial has been more clearly delineated from the material (especially coarse material) understanding (*see above pp. 94/109, antique materialism; esp. 100v.*); otherwise there is striking similarity;

(ii) Plotinos reasons: if the aesthetic existed only in harmony, resp. symmetry, then it could exist only in compound (collection, system; *see above p. 185vv. (henology)* sensory or immaterial objects; one sound, one color, the sun in itself, the gold in itself, etc., separated, would then possess no beauty-and-goodness at all; yet we find, says Plotinos, that they are to be ranked among the "cleanest-and-best" things; consequence: beauty-and-goodness is not a relation but a quality, perceived by a subject (*see above p. 181 (idea in itself is not yet an ideal); 189 (informative kinship); 197 (hermeneutics)*);

By the way:

(i) the same face e.g. differs from moment to moment, according to the expression, while the harmony, resp. symmetry remains identical; the difference of beauty is thus not bound up with the relations that make up the harmony (symmetry);

(ii) also the evil-and-ugly possesses equally harmony, resp. symmetry; yet it is unaesthetic;--to which the Pythagoreans might reply that, in that case, no real harmony, resp. symmetry, is present; whereas, in the case of the face, the differences of expression are connected with the whole and its relations (so, after all, harmony, resp. symmetry).

It remains true, however, that harmony alone cannot make up the clean-and-good: it is also quality (feeling of value). The run-up to this, within Pythagoreanism, lies in the idea of the 'one', especially understood as Supreme (*see above pp. 191ff; 195 (element, Monad, dyad)*). However, it appears again and again that Pythagoreanism implicitly thought the qualitative along: after him it was thought explicitly; in the aesthetic field Plotinos has perhaps done so most ingeniously, filling the gap in Pythagoreanism. Both philosophies, meanwhile, are characterized by *filokalia*, love of beauty (*see above p. 195*). Cfr. o.c., 361ff.

Conclusion: this long digression, as a comparative description (and critique) of Pythagoreanism as eudemonic philosophy, is justified: one cannot build a true agogie(k) without including the beautiful (-and-good). Only a clean world is also a happiness-giving world;

Incidentally: to beget life is to make life clean: *see above pp. 207 (Apollonian); 211 (Dionysian)*. Hierosophy implies aesthetics.

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(iii)a5. Hierozoism as a harmony of singularity and community. (223/235)

As we have already seen, following the 'daimonia', the character of ethics, resp. politics, going to the depths of the psychic soul, supra p. 199, the law is a paideia, a system of formation, for the soul and a sustasis, a system of regulation, for life.-- We will now briefly examine how Puthagoreism sees this.

1. -- The social aspect. (223/230)

Bibl. sample: *J. Imbert, Le droit antique*, Paris, 1976-3, 19/53 (*la civilisation grecque*), distinguishes, fundamentally, three political systems,

the "basileis", the kingdom, grown from the klan ("genos") - at Rome the "gens" - the head of which was "basileus", king, over all the members descended from one common ancestor and providing the same family service;-- This institution was transferred to the 'polis', the city (state), after clan law was superseded by the rise of the 'poleis', the cities (about three hundred for all Hellas); this 'basileia' continues to exist in Macedonia but must make way, in whole or in part, for the 'aristocratia', the rule of the nobility; thus e.g. partly in Sparta and partly in Macedonia.v. partially at Sparta and, in time, entirely at Athens as well as at Syracuse;

The "turannis", which easily arises in newer cities, where the merchant class acquires power over the landowning nobility ("aristocratia") and, with the "dèmos", the people (usually impoverished small owners), restricts or displaces the basileia, resp. aristocratia restricts or displaces them through revolution, which brings a 'turannos' ('tyrant', but not always in our pejorative sense) to the reign; Drakon and Solon e.g. are 'tyrants', the one hard (draconian), the second soft, at Athens (cfr. supra p. 86 (*Solon*));

the "dèмократia", the popular rule, which, between the VIIIth and VIth centuries, emerged in many cities, but of which Athens remains the model best known; one should not compare this "dèмократia" with our Western democracies: its basis was citizenship, which, however, was the possession of few (foreigners, slaves, etc. are not "citizens").

The Hellinist systems are an elaboration of the basileia: the Macedonian basileis, Fillipos II, who, in -338, at Chaironeia subdued Athens and founded the Corinthian league of cities, of which he was the basileus, and, from -336, Alexandros the great, Philip's son and successor, who conquered Asia Minor, Egypt and Persia, penetrated as far as the Indos valley, but died suddenly in -323, at Babulen (Assyria) prematurely (aged 33), -- these two basileis founded the Hellenistic basileia; especially Alexandros, who, on the one hand, rules personally, as a Makedonian basileus, over Macedonia, Egypt (of which he is pharaoh) and Persia (of which he is absolute monarch), but, on the other hand, thinks universally, in that he tries to push through the fusion of Hellenes and Barbarians, on all possible cultural planes;

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so e.g. in -324 he, in the Macedonian army, takes on thirty thousand Barbarians notwithstanding the Macedonian protest; similarly, he himself marries a Sogdian princess, Roxanè, and, later, Dareios' daughter Stateira (who passed as the most beautiful woman in the whole East), while, at Sousa, the residence city of the Persian 'great' basileis, many of Alexandros' fieldmen marry foreign women and ten thousand soldiers, rich by booty, take Asiatic women as wives; similarly, he founds many cities (Alexandreias) and establishes new forms of trade. Alexandros also adopts the religions and integrates them into his own Samothracian religion of mysteries (*see supra p. 65*), in whose honor he erects, on the Indian border, a border altar monument, with the inscription: 'To Herakles and the Samothracian Kabeiroi' (i.e., on the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indos) (*cfr supra p. 208: Herakles*).

Cfr. J. Gregor, Alexander the Great (The World Domination of an Idea), Amsterdam, 1933, esp. 290vv., where, in detail, all this is recounted.-- Especially the "proskunèsis" (the deep knee bending), imposed both on Barbarians and especially on Hellenes, deeply shocked the Hellenes, who considered such a thing as beneath their Hellenic dignity, but accepted it of necessity. It was neither more nor less worship of the baileus in its Asian form. This fact alone points to the profound cultural shift that Alexandros, once the student of Aristotle, introduced as a result.

Later development revealed, provisionally, two types of Hellenistic basileia:

(i) in the Hellenic Territories of Alexander's empire (Epeiros, Makedonia) the polis was past, but the basileus considers himself bound to the customs of the polis to some extent;

(ii) in Persia, Egypt, however, the basileus is ruler in his personal capacity and autocratic on the Asian model; from the IIIth e. B.C. this Eastern "despoteia", despotism, continues also in Hellas.

Note.-- Imbert, o.c., 34vv., explains how, in that context, the "politikè" (technè), the political science of discipline, comes into being:

(a) The political triad, mentioned above, is first described by Herodotos (-484/-425) - see above pp. 78/82 -;

(b) the law, which, with Homèros, is still unknown as 'nomos', but is valid as 'themis' and 'dikè' (see above p. 183), is first described, with the name 'nomos', law, by Hesiod, and this as opposed to 'fysis', understood as lawless state of nature (which Protosofistics will reduplicate; see above pp. 178/184) : the 'law', says a Posthesiodic writer, is equal to all ('isonomia') and wants the just, the beautiful and the useful, -- especially since it is sacred and/or divine in origin.

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We refer here to *W. Schilling, Religion und Recht*, Schorndorf, 1957, - book that illuminates the "intricate interlocking of religious primal experience and legal idea" through comparative and/or phenomenological science of religion; proposer distinguishes:

(i) early religious either tribal or genossal or folk vital religion and

(ii) high-religious, free-choice world religion;-- an applicative model:

(i)a. murder, in the context of a "natural religion," is forbidden "because of the demonization of the shed blood.

(i)b. in the context of popular religion, is crime, religiously speaking, because of the "damage to the tribe, resp. to the numinous (= sacred) tribal peace.

(ii) murder, highly religious, is 'threat to personal salvation', -- for Hellas: see *F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes*, I (*Die Gesch. der europäischen Rechtsidee im Altertum und im Frühmittelalters*), Zollikon/ Zürich, 1954, 9/256 (*Themis, Dikè, Nomos*; - *Protosophistic and metaphysical* (Platon, Aristotle); *Stoic natural law*; *Neoplatonic hierarchical law of order*); - the book begins with the 'sacred law foundations of natural law'; except in Sophistics (and the Skepticist-Epikourean philosophies) religion plays 'a pervasive role.

Note.-- Imbert, o.c., 38ss., explains how political doctrine has two stages:

(i) the city-state stage, with Platon and Aristotle (Platon wants a justice, which treats all equally and is social; Aristotle wants the happiness (see above pp. 200; 202 (*eudemonism*)) of the citizens of the middle class);

(ii) the cosmopolitan stage, which detaches man, as an individual, from the urban-local context and re-situates him in the cosmos:

a. the Kunics (Cynics: so e.g. Diogenes and Krates; the latter, when in -315 his native city of Thebes was rebuilt, refused to return there : 'I have not a polis, city, but the whole world to live in' he said);

b. the Stoics were cosmopolitan universalists, who called all individuals home in one "polis" (makropolis), one people,-the slaves included.-It is clear that the Hellinist era fostered such a mentality, -time when the cities became parts of monarchically governed countries.

Note.-- Imbert, o.c., 49ss., notes that private law, because it never rose above the local stage (and never became a general legal system), remained underdeveloped, compared to the magnificent legal system of Rome.

Puthagoreism belongs to be situated in what has just been said by way of introduction. Two aspects stand out: (i) the political interventions and (ii) the political theories. We will briefly review them.

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a- The political interference.

Samos, the native region of Puthagoras, was governed by a turannos, who represented democratizing tendencies with respect to the former aristocratia, which had been overthrown; Polukrates, the turannos, favored trade and industry instead of agriculture; he made Samos a cultural center (poets were attracted).

Puthagoras, at first in good relations with Polukrates, broke with him: although not a nobleman himself, he defended the aristocracy and chose to move to southern Italy, to Kroton, where the aristocracy still prevailed. Puthagoras occupied himself with a constitutional law and influenced the social and political development of Kroton, which, economically, flourished; among other things, he is said to have designed the currency system.

Puthagoras founded a "hetareia," a community of order, religious-scientific-political. Elsewhere such hetaireiai were also founded in S.-Italy. Their conservative character led to tensions and rebellions; so among others at Kroton, so that Puthagoras, probably, had to flee to Metapontion, where he died. The hetaireiai, however, held out everywhere until, +/- -450, the collapse began, so that only, in the long run, at Taranton, where Archutas (see above pp. 127; 199) exercised decisive influence, did the Puthagorean dominion hold. +/- -400 there were hetaireiai at Thebes and at Flious (in the moedevland). Around -350 everything disappeared.

Hippasos of Metapontion, +/- -450+, instead of acting authoritatively and attributing everything to Puthagoras, thought independently and revealed the doctrines to be kept secret to the public - for which he was censured (ban) by the orthodox Puthagoreans -; he united around himself a whole group, which was more liberal and democratic (cfr. *Fr. Krafft, Gesch. d. Nat.*, I, 203); they acted against the turannis rising in Surakousai (Syracuse), which, however, gained ground and provoked a second exodus of Puthagoreans (to Taranton and Thebes and Flious).

Conclusion: although initially aristocratic, Puthagoreanism, as a political system, was also more democratic over time in at least one group, around Hippasos. Cfr. *Röd, Gesch. d. Phil.*, I, 50/53.

b - The political philosophy.

With regard to politics, the opinion is that, although not the basis of Puthagoreanism, political interference and theory were an essential conclusion of the central doctrine (henology).

Reason: as Röd, o.c., 73f. rightly points out, Puthagoreanism is not merely a "values-free" (purely science-positive) physical (as Röd imagines the Milesian physical), but a wisdom, which did not lose sight of life and values (see above pp. 175; 181 (*idea, ideal*); 184v.; 197v.; 222).

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b1 - *The major dimensions of social life.*

On page 19 supra we saw that the structures are micro-, meso- and macro-social. We find these in the Puthagorean politics.-

(i) *Microsocial* there is the family and friendship.

(i)a. The family is brought up by Kleinias, a contemporary of Socrates: 'One should teach the youth from the beginning to honor the deities and the laws'.

(i)b. Friendship ('filia; 'filotès') is an ancient theme of profound nature. Puthagoras said of it that it is 'enarmonios isotès; an equality based on harmony; -- the disciples adhered to it: Fintias, the friend of Damon of Surakousai, was condemned to death by the turannos Dionusios (I or II), but enjoyed a stay of execution; Damon replaced him in prison, while he arranged his affairs; nipping at the last he returned to be executed; - - fidelity until death was instilled in the disciples, incidentally.

(ii) Mesosocially there is the "hetaireia," about which above.

(iii) Macrosocially, there is the "polis," the city-state.

See above p.199, where Archutas of Taranton provides an outline of the community structure of the polis.

Hippodamos of Miletos (see above pp. 124; 216), the urban planner, also wrote about state organization, without being a legislator himself: like Archutas, he derives that conception of the polis from principles (the theory of music, i.e. concerning the instrument, to his **(i)** construction ('exartèsis', i.e. the assembling of the parts,- system concept),

(ii) voting ("harmoga", alignment) and

(iii) play ('epafa', touch, manipulation, entrapment)); just as space consists of dispersed parts ('diastasis'), so the state consists of three social dimensions (modes):

(i) Government ('bouleutikon'),

(ii) the soldiers ('epikouron'),

(iii) the working classes ('banauson': farmers, artisans, merchants),

which somewhat recalls Dumézil's triad (see above p. 19); this point of view corresponds to the "construction" of the musical instrument (analogy; see above p. 186).

Röd, o.c., 69, says that "the Puthagorean state was a coercive state": one should be careful with such statements, for listen to Archutas of Taranton, who claims that the judge is like the altar (analogy!), for both are the refuge of those who suffer injustice;

This goes back to the right of asylum; the 'asulon' or 'hieron asulon', i.e. the inviolable (sanctuary of deities) existed in the archaic religions: every persecuted person had the possibility to enter an inviolable sacred space, where he enjoyed the protection of the deity; these spaces were marked by taboo signs (see above p. 11 (taboos); 168v. (sum- and anti-p.) marked.

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The right of asylum existed in Egypt, Israel, - in Hellas and Rome; - whoever did not respect it, exposed himself to heavy sacred and legal sanctions (Herod., Hist., 6:79; Thukud., 1: 126; 5:16 (for years a supplicant lived in such an asylum); 4:98): We might (...) see in the existence of the 'asylums', within the early religious or folk-religious mentality, a groping for rights, which go beyond the state: the deity takes under her protection those who are exposed to right (understood as pure exercise of power)." (W.Schilling, *Religion und Recht*, 14-3);

The 'sitting at the altar' is the outward sign of it; hence Archutas' comparison (analogy); see also *Homer, Iliad*, 11: 808 ("where the agora (people's assembly) took place and where the court ('themis') was, and where they had erected altars to the deities" (cfr. Flückiger, o.c., 14-, n. 19)); -

M.a. here is a direct precursor of "human rights" (Schilling, o.c., 139), preserved by the Puthagorean Archutas from archaic culture (see also above p. 27 (isègoria, free speech, which already existed before the secular polis; "It is the primal form of later democracy" says Flückiger, o.c., 14-));

Which is not surprising given the thoroughly sacred and theological spirit of the Puthagoreans -- A Puthagorean proverb hints that the husband should esteem his wife highly, "since she, as a supplicant", has come to her husband," incidentally, in the hetaireiai women were included,-- which even Röd finds curious (o.c., 52; e.g., Theano).

Conclusion: in a coercive state, such a thing as asylum and free speech are excluded.

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The mere provision of punishment in the Puthagorean state is not yet a coercive state foundation, as Röd seems to insinuate (o.c., 69) what state does not have a minimum of punishment?

(iii) bis. Macrosocial is certainly the following, as Willmann, *Gesch.*, I, 334-, observes: in the hetaireiai they included, e.g., Okel(l)os, the Lukanian, a distinguished Puthagorean, but not a born Greek; -- Abaris, a Skyt (see above p. 153), an iatromantis, - Zalmoxis (Salmoxis (Herod, 4: 94), a deity of the Getai, a Thracian tribe near the Istros (Danube), were accepted into the Puthagorean system, notwithstanding that they belonged to the "barbarian world of the North

A Puthagorean maxim read, "A righteous man from the foreign ('xenos') is not behind, not only with respect to the citizen, but also with respect to the tribal ('sungenous')."

In other words, Puthagoreism transcends both kinship and nationhood in order to think universally.-- To understand the scope of this one should think of the "homonoia" launched by the Protosophist Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375) and taken up by Isokrates of Athens, the rhetor and his Panègurikos logos: the homonoia is the panhellenic unity (against the Persian basileus):

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the particularist Hellenes did not finally take it up unless reluctantly, but especially the Macedonian basileis, Philip II and Alexandros adopted the idea and we have seen (higher pp. 223/225) how Alexandros in particular took a universal approach. From this one measures how potentially revolutionary certain aspects of the hetareiai were. One thinks of the rabid opponent of the panhellenic homonoia, unanimity, Dèmosthenès of Paiania (-384/-332) and many another rhetor and/or politician.

b2. - *The applicative hermeneutic.*

Röd, o.c., 69; 71, notes that a "formal" (understand: universal) idea like e.g. the will of deities, resp. of the Supreme Being or harmony or natural law, is susceptible to arbitrary applicative (i.e. individual or private) interpretation (skunst or hermeneutics). He reproaches the Puthagoreans with this concerning ethics and politics.

We reply to this with what, higher p. 181 (natural law), 197v., has been said: always practically by ethicists and politicians, under the guise or at least under the regulative form of the universal, the private and/or singular is thought of and, even more so, in axiological-pragmatic terms (in value judgments). This also applies, among other things, to Röd's philosophy itself!

Röd does not yet seem to have discovered the scope of hermeneutic thought, as e.g. *H. Arvon, La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, 116/120, briefly outlines it:

(i) Hermeneutics has always been an auxiliary science of theology (interpretation of God's words (oracles), Bible texts) and jurisprudence (interpretation, jurisprudentially, of legal texts); double dealing:

(i)a retrospective (historical), by empathizing with the past situation in order to understand the texts as they were understood by their drafters ((with a tendency toward repristination (merging into the past)) cf. the Historical School (F. von Savigny (1779/1861),-- Eichhorn, Grimm, von Ranke);

(i)b. prospectively (creatively), by attempting, in the spirit of the texts handed down, to respond, in new situations, new (Or, at least, in ordinary situations, to respond faithfully, i.e., to interpret with a view to application (applicative interpretation);

(ii) Hermeneutics, broadened and deepened, since Schleiermacher (1768/1834), means that the whole of thought, professional, philosophical, rhetorical, is and retrospective and prospective interpretation.

Applied here: the given reality, and textual-traditional and actual-situational, requires

a. empathy retrospectively (consciousness of thrownness, to speak with Heidegger) and

b. inventiveness prospective (design sense). It is normal that Puthagoreanism falls ánd under the auxiliary scientific ánd under the broadened-depth hermeneutical law as does all thinking without more.

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More than that, Röd fails to see that the transition from the universal (the "formal," as he calls it) to the singular and/or private (the "concrete") is only one type of hermeneutics. Even more than that: Röd does not see that the Puthagoreans accomplished this transition via analogy (partially identical, non-new, partially different, new), as we have indicated above.

2. -- *The singular, resp. private aspect.*

Bibliographic sample: *JP. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, II, 79/94 (*La personne dans la religion*: the Greek deities, even as 'personal' deities, remain very non-singular; the official religion is impersonal; yet even dissident religions like Dyonisism, which allows women and slaves,- which, through mania (see above p. 214), escapes the *sofrosunè* (the self-restraint) of the political (= official) religion, remain very impersonal; the mystery religions (different from Dionysism, of course), which mean 'adoption', 'childhood', 'sexual union with the deity', do not reach into the individual either; the Hippolotos (Euripides) reaches further, though not far enough (the Hellenic deities are powers, not persons), heroism (hero worship; see above p. 144v.) places individual figures at the center, yet Usener finds precisely in the heroes his function deities most;-- the soul as daimon (see above p. 143; 145v.) approaches the individual most);

M. Deschoux et al, Ethics, Utr./Antw., 1968, esp. 17/25 (Conscience and history: Socrates is the 'historical moment' at which the individual conscience (classical man (Kristensen)) works its way out of the 'closed society' (ancient mankind (Kristemen))); more to the point: "Socrates (-470/-399) addresses, in each, the person: he awakens, in each, the conscience (24); morality is not a system, but 'conscience'

the Little Socraticists like the Kuniekers (see above p. 225) betray the Socratic conscience for "energetic action"; others like the Kureniekers for "pleasure"; Xenophon for "Eastern theological-military system")

-- *ER. Dodds, Moral und Politik in der Orestie* (Aischulos), in *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich / Munich, 1977, 58/78 ("morality" is understood, e.g. since Hegel, individually and "politics" socially);

-- *J. Ritter, Politik und Ethik in der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles*, in *O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., Hermeneutische Philosophie*, Munich, 1977, 153/176;

-- *VI. Soloviev, La justification du bien*, Paris, 1939, 362/ 382 (*Moralité et justice sociale*);

-- *A. Rüstow, Im Frühlicht der Freiheit (Politische Idee und politische wirklichkeit im klassischen Griechentum)*, in *Wort und Wahrheit*, 17:5 (1962), 285/298 (even in the Periklean culture of Athens,

a/ the woman not equalized,

b/ the slave even less (and in significant numbers) and

c/ the ally a submissive).

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2a - Peirce's methods list.

Kl. Oehler, Einl., *CS. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear (Ueber die Klarheit unserer uedanken)*, Frankf.a.M., 1968, 105ff., briefly outlines the four methods Peirce discussed for forming opinions. All four are somewhere 'personal', yet one, the authoritarian-doctrinaire, forms a break with the other three; we will therefore explain them separately.

(a) The authoritarian-doctrinaire method

("method of authority"): whether theological (e.g., the Church during the Middle Ages) or political (e.g., any oppressive state system), this method is the persistence on research of the group (either Church Fathers and theologians, or state governments), which considers itself collectively responsible for the theoretical and practical well-being; since ancient times, it has been the means of establishing and maintaining rule; -

it is evident that the Puthagoreans, through the foundation of the hetaireia (see above p. 226v.) with the "commandments of silence" concerning doctrines of a fundamental nature (whether or not provided with threat of punishment in case of disobedience), thus represent an authoritarian-doctrinaire method, even if this was never extreme, given the structure of isègoria (see above p. 228), free speech, prevailing in the polis, since archaic times.

(b)1 The idiosyncratic method

('method of tenacity') consists in the individual always giving the same answer to the same question, to the exclusion of all other possible or factual answers; Peirce observes that many people apply it among other things Peirce observes that many people apply it, among other things, for the sake of great peace of soul; -- it is clear that among the Puthagoreans such a method was applied, if only by Puthagoras himself, by the fact that he instituted the commandment of silence: His opinion was thus propagated to the exclusion of all others (public discussion was, after all, ipso facto excluded); the personal-individual was not very clear because the idiosyncratic was immediately turned into a group phenomenon.

(b)2. The apriority method.

('method of apriority; 'apriori method'), according to Peirce, typical of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel (the great philosophers of the modern period), is more intellectual and rational at first sight, in that it places public discussion at the center, but, in fact, opinion rests time and again on accidental, i.e. subjective-individual insights of a purely abductive, i.e. hypothetical nature; thus Descartes, according to Sartre, elaborates the modern geometrical style of thinking to the basis of a whole world- and life-view (think of Spinoza, who developed ethics 'more geometrico', according to the geometric-axiomatic method, deductively starting from accidental, i.e. Spinoza elaborates axiomata, really Kartesian) -- it is clear, after what we have explained as logically strict as possible, that e.g. wanting to use through thick and thin 'harmony' or 'music' as a basic concept (think of Hippodamos' theory of the state on a musical basis, supra p. 227,

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somewhat "sought after" because of the meager degree of similarity between musical instrument and state; analogy is good but has limits); the analogy, stretching to infinity (rigorously carried through equals everything somewhere on everything) is the instrument par excellence of the apriority method, which brings it to a system;

this does not mean, now, that henology, understood as the doctrine of the (elementary) one ('element') and either the distributive one (collection) or the collective one (system), is not a definitive achievement: did not Bertrand Russell first establish that current science is returning somewhere to the Puthagorean subject sciences?

a/ According to *M. Ghyka, Phil. et mystique du nombre*, 5, he was then thinking of Einstein 's generalized relativity theory and of the Quanta and Wave mechanics of Planck and de Broglie;

b/ but one can just as well think of set and system theory. - That this is so can be verified by seeing *Vieta*, (+1603), the founder of modern typesetting (*In artem analyticam isagoge*, Introduction to Analysis), at work according to a purely Puthagorean principle: 'analysis', Puthagorean, has two meanings, viz.

(i) the inductive, where one 'analyzes' (dissects) a collection into its elements and/or a system into its parts (see above p. 185 (*stoicheion, henosis*); (*187an application to systechy*) 215);

(ii) the abductive one, which involves not elements and/or parts but 'principles' ('archai', explanatory hypotheses), which should be exposed, 'analyzed' (see *O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung*, Kempten/München, 1909, 22); the latter method was applied in mathematism, but in reverse: one departed from provisionally assumed hypotheses (principles, principia) - 'prolepsis' later called or also 'lemma', one pretended that the provisionally assumed (hupothesis) proposition was true and worked out the inferences - deductively; the result (pragmatic aspect), which amounts to induction, was obviously and ultimately decisive; well, this lemmatic-analytic, in short: analytic method applied François Viète no longer to numbers but to universally valid letters, purely Pythagorean (see course on logic first year); cfr. O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, 111, 48ff. for precise-historical explanations on the subject).

What is the purpose of this longer digression on the analytic method ? To make clearer the profound difference with the apriority method: the apriority-doctrinal method starts from certain (because 'obvious' and 'clear') premises, the analytical one from the result at the end and inductively.

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(c). *The 'scientific' method*

also 'method supported on the "real" or on "external permanency" starts exclusively from what cannot be influenced by our thinking in any way; i.e. the subjective-collective (authoritarian method) or the subjective-individual (self-willed and/or aprioritarian method) is radically banned; hence the term "external", i.e. extrasubjective.

This 'method of science' cannot, as some mystics claim, remain purely individual, even if it starts out that way (there is always one individual who finds a new paradigm (Kuhn), which then, as 'normal' i.e. regulative, is a model for countless others); -- one presupposition of an ontological nature (see above p. 14v. (structure of wisdom), is normative here: there are real things and processes, whose properties are independent of our subjectivity (either collective (authoritarian) or individual (idiosyncratic; aprioritarian)); this hypothesis is continually confirmed by the fact that people, working lemmatically-analytically, also outside geometry, perceive from the result that it is so.

In other words: had the Puthagoreans extended one geometrical method, namely the analytical one, to their whole thinking, they would never have fallen into any of the three non-scientific methods, - certainly not into the authoritarian - doctrineism, which characterized them and which, after them, made school, all through antiquity, even - however paradoxically - among the Skeptics, who deny evidences, which they themselves, already living (pragmatically), affirm.

2b - *A double individualism.*

The incipient Greek philosophy, says Röd, o. c., 50, has two main currents, the Milesian physical and the Italic (understand: Puthagorean) mathematism.

Both have a their own individualism (accompanied by authoritarianism sui generis).

(a) We have already looked more closely at the Milesich-physical individualism: see above p. 72vv. (Hekataios' free inquiry, which, culminates in Xenophanes' dogmatism); 180 (the Protosophist individualism, which implies 'a fuis authoritarianism; see the ideal which they express in the fuis as a working hypothesis, working, without any significant concern for the result).

(b) The italic-mathematical individualism, which we have just explained theoretically and of which we will now examine more concrete applicative models.

(a)1. Within the hetaireia were individual and private propositions:

(i) not all grasp the "one" ("them") as an element and/or principle of unity in the multitude;

(ii)a. some placed great emphasis on the systechies; others did not;

(ii)b. there was disagreement as to whether the formless substance principle of things was also to be sought in the 'one' and the number; etc.

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(a)2. Specialization was also present here: Alkmeon (see above p. 84) applied the general principles to medicine, Damon and Aristoxenos to music theory, Ekfantos to atomic theory, Archutas to mechanics.

(b) Outside the hetaireia, there were Hippasos (226 supra) and Ekfantos (partly insider), who took a 'physical', Milesian, approach; also Empedokles of Akragas (-483/-423), who introduced the four-element theory and who *J. Zafiropulo, Empédocle d' Agrigente*, Paris, 1953, 113ss, is labeled as highly individualistic (see supra 150); according to Willmann, o.c., 343ff. the atomistics of Leukippos and Demokritos are 'degenerate Puthagoreism'.

(c) Socrates was the founder of the henology of the Puthagoreans (see higher p. (178*the content and scope of the concept (idea) has a clear henological structure*)): 'historia', research, see higher p: 70vv. (*Milesian*), - was already either empirical or historical (Herodotos, later), with the Milesians; it becomes mathematical (broad: subject-scientific; narrow: arithmetic-geometrical) and 'hetairikè', collective in hetaireia context, with the Puthagoreans, with whom it was also self-examination (214 supra) (auto-implicative) with Socrates (and the Great Socratics, viz. Platon and Aristotle) 'historia', research, becomes also 'dialectical', i.e. the research gets the structure of the dialogue (cfr. Platon's works e.g.; before that Socrates' maieutic method), yet without the authoritarian - doctrinaire constraint of the hetaireia of the Puthagoreans;

Socrates, in addition, takes an inductive approach:

(i) a supposedly useful definition (e.g., of pious) is prefixed (lemma, prolepsis);

(ii) dialogue, with like-minded people and/or Protosophists (eristic, i.e., set on contention), deduces, vividly, its implications;

(iii) inductively, as a result ('pragmatically') - as in the Puthagorean lemmatic-analytic method above -, an improved (cybernetic) definition emerges.

In doing so, Socrates, like the Puthagoreans, emphasizes the idea present in reality, independent of subjective impressions (which the Sophists posited as the main thing; see supra p. (179*phenomenism*); (46*Sophistic nominalism*)), which he, however, instead of 'one' and/or 'number', calls 'concept' (*conceptualism*), see supra p. 158). This philosophy of concept is narrower than the Puthagorean henology, in that it thought the content fuller, the scope smaller, but it was broader, in that it escaped the too narrow arithmetic-geometric interpretation, which the Puthagoreans usually gave it. The older Platon seems to have sought the right conception: the 'one' resp. 'number' (multiplicity) interpreted as a collection resp. system of elements of a purely logical nature, of which the mathematical 'one' and/or 'multiplicity' is only an applicative model. - Socrates applied this new method especially to ethics and politics (ethical-political conceptualism).

(GW 235)

Conclusion -- The 'law' ('themis' and 'dikè'; 'nomos') on the ancient outskirts and, later, in the 'polis', cosmic (see supra 207 e.g.) and ethical-political at the same time, 'binds' community and individual.

It is preconstitutive (god-ordained), physical (present in nature itself), and endorsed (informative) by human institution and legislation, so that it is normative.

This insight was common to Puthagoreans and Socrates, since they saw harmony between the four dimensions of wisdom. - This was denied by the nominalists, who saw in it only human legislation and institution. Parmenides had begun with the 'chorismos', separation rather than amalgamation; the Protosophists pushed them consistently.

(iii)b. The harmony of virtue and good.

(i) the "aretè", virtue (ility) is the subjective side (see above p. 216), through which the individual and the group actively work on the harmony, respectively the good (value).

(ii) The 'agathon; the good (èn clean, kalon;- cfr. supra pp. 195; 222) is the objective side,- that which is both pre-given and workable by human virtue effort.-- Thus the 'clean yoke' (see supra 197) of subject (individual, community) and object (which is above all 'eudaimonia'; see supra pp. 198v. with the whole agogy), is the summary.

Overall conclusion.

As a farewell to Puthagoreanism, a text by Moderatos of Gadès (+50/+100), a Neo-Puthagorean, cited by Porphyrios, the Neo-Platonist, may count:

"Since the Puthagoreans could not express the prototypes ('ta prota eidè') and the first principles ('tas protas archas') clearly ('safos') in words, because these are difficult to express in thought and articulation, they resorted to the numbers, in the style of the space and number mathematicians,-this for the reason of their easy comprehensibility when teaching ('eusè mou didaskalias charin').

In other words: Moderatos saw the 'one' and the 'number' (multiplicity) as merely didactic. O.i. this interpretation is severely flawed: henology has remained an integral part of our thinking to this day (think logistics), though it may also be didactically valuable. Granted that in the beginning philosophy had the trouble.

Study Note.-

(i) The basic page, methodological, is 234 (the different interpretations of 'historia' (research) and its basic structure, i.e. the lemmatic-analytical order.

(ii) The basic pages, historically, are

(ii)a. p. 70/93 (The one nature and the many natures;-- the problem of unitary physics and partial physics;-- this for the Milesian mentality);

(ii)b. pp. 184/200 (The Puthagorean foundation of a normative philosophy based on henology (unity theory) and its components (immanent/ transcendent; systechy; harmony; philokalie; eudemony).-- Consider also pp. 14 (fourfold structure); 45 (idea structure) and above.

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