6.3. Philosophical rhetoric.
Philosophy (second year) 1985/1986

Part II, 6.3.2. p. 151 to 306

Contents: see p. 305

Conclusion.-- It is not the gross substance and the earthly body in itself, against which Orphism is directed. It is: the meaningless and purposeless, tangible in the eternal return of the same underworldly "life" (which is more dead than alive), sometimes on earth, in the body, sometimes in the Underworld, disembodied.

(iii) *Puritanism*.
E.R. Dodds, The Greeks, 149, outlines this as follows.
a. "I will (...) use the term 'Puritan doctrine of souls' both to represent early Orphic and early Pythagorean beliefs concerning the soul." This includes following sub-ideas (WR 5).

(1) The body is the tomb of the soul.

(2) The soul, though unclean ('stained') by sin, can be cleansed (Cfr. 'catharsis'; WR 46vv.), thanks to rites (*note --* 'Rite' is a non-natural act) and, also, thanks to the shunning of meat-eating (WR 144 (devouring); 146 (eaten by Titans)),-- which includes vegetarianism.

(3) That purification - which, in addition to rites and vegetarianism, includes ethical good living - applies both in this life and in the underworld. Cfr. Ricoeur, o.c., 268s..

b. Both Dodds and Ricoeur give the deep reason for Puritanism, i.e., purity, cathartic lifestyle. The soul, though titanic, i.e. an Underworldly being, is actually at home in the dungeon. But it participates in the titanic banquet: the Son of God Dionusos, o.g. that banquet, is in the human being. As a result, there is a luminous, immortal-godly component in man. Cfr WR 76; 121.

As a result, Orphism and Paleopythagoreism shifts the emphasis to the deity, which is immortal, in man. The dull and shadowy existence in the Underworld is not necessary. - Cfr. WR 138: Teiresias as escaping the dull shadowy existence, in the Underworld itself. Cf. WR 86 (the one, who 'knows'): the poet, as mantically gifted. These Homeric paragons are actualized, in Orphism and Paleopythagoreanism.

c. Reincarnation, as the 'cycle of reification'; should be broken. One wants to escape from it, thanks to a process of deification through which the long process of upbringing, which comprises the many lives, is transcended and culminates in a not - Underworldly life, but in a ouranic-olympic, immortal (WR 76) life. Cfr Dodds, o.c., 151. -- Later Platon will speak of the noble soul.

3.5. -- *The pythagorean psychagogy.*

The term "agogie(k)" (WR 6: agogè), in its current parlance, derives from J. F. Herbart (1776/1841), who introduced the term "andragogie" (peilage of the lower classes).

Today, this term - often, in a gauchist, libertarian sense - is interpreted as the praxis and theory of assistance and educational guidance in such a way that, out of authoritarian subjects and elitists, anti-authoritarian "mouths" and non-elitist "democrats" are formed. In this sense they can, somewhat, be compared to the 'mathemationists', since Hippasos of Metapontion (WR 100).

Agogy is the praxis, agogics is the theory (the doctrinal models), agology is the theory concerning agogics (metatheory).

Paleopythagorean philosophy as agogia, agogics, agology.

The whole philosophy of the Pythagoreans did not merely possess an agog(k), it was -- essentially -- agog. After all, the promotion of well-being is the essence of agogia(k). Well, 'eu.daimonia', well-being, understood as possession of a good 'daimon' (destiny), is, in Pythagorean eyes, the highest value.

Herakleidès of Pontos (-390/-310), a Platonist, attributes, to Pythagoras, the following statement: "The 'eudaimonia', the good destiny, on if need be, supernatural basis), proper to the soul, is the science of (the perfection of) numbers."

We know what "number" (WR 104vv.) means:
(i) structure, consisting of "units" (elements),
(ii) such that, preferably, the ideal structure (WR 114/118 (Gestalt); 133 (idealized 'form' or structure) is meant.

Well, for the Pythagoreans, the goal was not mere "theory" (in the modern sense of "rational coherent system of statements"). Nay: well-being was the goal. Any "theory" that was not welfare-oriented, "agogic," was banned. The term 'harmonia', the structure so that all elements fit together in a welfare-oriented way, expresses this.

The pythagorean agogia(k) as psychagogia(k).

Diogenes Laërtios (+200/+250) 8: 32, as a Pythagorean tenet, informs, "Man possesses eudaimonia, well-being, if he comes to   acquire a good soul   ('psuche').

But the term eudaimonia we must, now, briefly, explain". it is one of the terms of the systechy 'eu.daimonia / kako.daimonia'.

(A) Is 'eu.daimon', i.e. gifted with a natural and extra-natural favorable destiny factor, the one, who possesses both a good soul ('agathe psuche'), i.e. a him/her own 'daimon' (depth soul), and a good guardian spirit, i.e. a him/her accompanying 'daimon', by virtue of good, conscientious behavior, which overcomes the Titanic (bloodlust and love drive).

(B) Is 'kako.daimon', i.e. afflicted with a natural and extra-natural unfavorable destiny, the one, who has both a bad (in-depth) soul and a bad accompanying daimon, due to bad behavior, which represses resp. suppresses the good soul, the divine-luminous soul, in order to let the Titanic, which manifests itself particularly in bloodthirstiness and wrong disdain, come to full development.

Note -- lot analysis.
A theory concerning destiny sticks out, of course, in this Pythagorean teaching.

Even still the already strongly secularizing Aristotle of Stageira, the Stagirite (-384/-322), will write that "kala prattein," moral living, leads to "kalos prattein," well-being.

There is, by the way, a fragment attributed to him, which says that he attributed to himself a Pythian daimon, companion, which drove him to philosophy. In other words : about as much as Socrates had one. Cfr O. Willmann, o.c., 472f..

Note -- What follows amounts to the essence of a paleopythagorean depth psychology. It is, admittedly, unlike the Freudian, not materialistic and atheistic from the outset, but noölogical and anagogical (i.e. emphasizing the higher in the soul and its upward orientation.

"(i) Orphism is a spontaneous and secret religion; hence its great emphasis on Dionusos-Zagreus.

(ii) The Pythagorean religion is a reason-led religion; hence the first-rate role of Apollon.

Yet Pythagoreanism, faithful to the principle of general harmony which manifests itself, first and foremost, in the world of the deities, does not set Apollon against Dionusos : it unites them (...), according to a principle of subordination, which subordinates the non-reasonable to the reasonable." (*I. Gobry, Pythagore ou la naissance de la philosophie*, Paris, 1973, 41).

In other words, what Orphism began, Pythagoreanism elaborates.

W.R.   154.
Palepythagorean rhetoric and psychagogy.
Now retake WR 135/ 136, even:
(i) rapport **(ii)** such that influence beneficial, well-being-founding influence is exerted (WR 4; 118; 135v.),-- such is the psychagogical core.

Both the akoesmationists and -especially- the mathemationists (WR 100: psuch.agogia) aimed, the one rather authoritarian, the others rather democratic, welfare.-- Which is, e.g., for teachers, perfectly, actualizable, -- still to this day.

The paleopythagorean humanities.
The agogie(k), resp. psychagogie(k) of the Paleopythagoreans stands or falls with their conception of man. We give, of this, now a brief, but substantial sketch. Cfr. O. Willmann, O.c., 274/276.

a. -- Man is a duality of a higher and a lower part. The sustoichia, systechy (oppositional pair) 'lower/ higher' dominates, the conception of man, as in Orphism, which, likewise, reasoned from lower (titanic) to higher (divine). This -- evidently -- in the cathartic belief in progress (WR 76; 151)

Man, in his essence core, is, of course, 'fronimon', soul, as contemplative,-- soul, as immortal being.-- on earth, however, that essence core, sheathed in a 'skanos' (= 'skènos', literally: 'shell'), is the body, which is mortal.

1.-- *The somatic part*
The somatic part is equal to the beings, all around us: it consists of the same matter. Yet, in contrast to Orphism, Paleopythagoreism (WR 99, where Röd says the body was "denoted as the ground of evil," appreciates that the body is the same.
Röd confuses Neo-pythagorean pessimism with Paleo-pythagorean body-formation) the body: the body testifies to a very good creator, who took himself as a model, in founding the 'arithmos', the structure, of that body.

2.-- *The nocturnal part;*
The contemplative part is what the Paleopythagoreans call 'thuraths', not from 'here': it is - in this one senses parallelism with Orphism - gift of 'Zeus' (the Supreme Deity). Yes, it is an 'apospasm', a part detached from the Supreme Deity. It is, therefore, incorporeal, like the immortal deities.

W.R. 155.

Note -- Mythological note.

'Myths' are thought stories.

(1) "As the ancient theologians (WR 73; 129; 139; 149) and visionaries (WR 88) testify" - this is the language of the time (which indicates the updating of traditions) - the soul, resp. the faculty of reflection, which is its own, suffers from the malady of the reincarnation series (WR 138), - this, because of the primal debt (WR 150) and the time of atonement connected with it. Which is Orphic and Paleopythegorean.

(2) Yet, like the Orphics, the Paleopythagoreans do not resign themselves to this reality of fate: God-following, god-like, deification, -- such is the goal, the destination, of man, as a higher being. Humanity is directed toward regions of light, not underworld.

b. -- *Man is a duality of freedom.*

"The greatest thing in man is that he can direct the soul both to good and evil," reads a proverb attributed to Pythagoras. 'Directing', in ancient Greek, reads 'peisai', literally: 'persuading'. This is tantamount to self-influence. (WR. 4). With this we have a new branching of rhetoric, which, usually, is understood transitively (transitive), i. e. building rapport in such a way that one person influences another.

Self-influencing - think of the autosuggestive form of signifying (WR 20) - is then Reflexive (looping) rhetoric.

1. As one knows, modern psychology has touched on this e.g. (in Freudian terms), when it speaks of 'rationalization'. When someone - against their better judgement - 'convinces' themselves (that's the vernacular, but very apt term) that they can afford something, they formulate this in 'rational' (understand: 'reasoning' 'arguing'; 'arguing') language, inside. This, until the self-influence seems 'satisfactory'. One compares this 'course' with the transitive persuasion (WR 28).

2. Overemphasized self-determination in, e.g., existentialist philosophies. J.-P. Sartre (1905/1980), the great French existentialist, emphasizes - according to the structuralists, in an exaggerated way - 'la liberté' (freedom). And so much so that one gets the impression, at least at times, that neither rule of conduct nor social structure pose any problem whatsoever.

With Sartre, however, self-affirmation was a very conscious process.

W.R.   156.

A second maxim attributed to Pythagoras reads, "The soul is the storehouse (arsenal) of good, if man is good, of evil, if he is evil.

The approach, this time, is the reverse of the previous spell. Did what the human being decides himself, consciously or unconsciously "rationalizing", depict in the (depth) soul, in previous perspective, in this one what the (depth) soul keeps in stock (the unconscious directions), depicts in the behavior.

In other words: his behavior betrays, at the bottom of his 'soul' '(here : depth), what influences him/her.
This is, of course, a direct depth psychic observation.

Note -- This is grist to the mill of the significi (WR 20), who point to unwordly, possibly unconscious aspects of influence.

Note -- If the harmony of opposites, anywhere, has its application, then here: good and evil spring from one and the same freedom (WR 11).

c. -- *Man is a destiny weaver*.
Indeed: twofold is destiny (WR 153).
(i) The pure (versta : ethically responsible) soul is, at death, guided by Hermes (WR 68), the 'tamias psuchèn', the administrator of souls (under point of sanction), to the highest region (versta : the astral, celestial world). Thus, in the Pythagorean 'catechism', what follows reads: "Which are the 'Elusia pedia', the Elysian fields?-- Sun and moon". One sees: by no means the Underworld! (*Note:* 'Elysian' means: what has to do with happiness(bliss)').

(ii) The unclean soul, at the transition, becomes the prey of the Erinues (Erinyes), i.e., the frenzied Vengeance Goddesses.--immediately it lapses into the (senseless; WR 151) 'kuklos anankes' (cycle of fate), the reembodiment series. One sees, here, parallelism with Orphism.

d. -- *Man is dually "daimonic*.
WR 79 (76) taught us that "daimonios," in ancient Greek, means:
(i) extra-natural (WR 76)
(ii) such that this extra-natural aspect is destiny-defining (WR 79; 153).

First type.
The mind (understand: intellect, capacity for reflection and memory; better yet: expanded consciousness (WR 142)) is, according to "Golden Words" (a Pythagorean basic text), "daimon," supernaturally gifted. (Verse 62).

Is "daimon" (WR 153) what programs life's destiny.

W.R.   157.

Note.-- Following on from WR 154 (high body valuation), the following.

The relationship "body/soul" is called "harmonia" (WR 100), interpenetration.-- Here the Paleopythagoreans assume an analogy.

(i) Just as God, the Universe Controller, controls the universe from within, so too our own daimon, depth soul, controls the body from within.

Note -- One compares this with WR 96 (Anaximenes' world soul).

(ii) Just as the universe is a "theion," divinum, "something divine," due to the immanence (= inner presence) of God, so too, for the reason of the immanence of the soul sedaimon, the body is "daimonion," something extra-natural.

One recognizes, in this analogy, the scheme of thought 'macrocosm/microcosm', but, this time, applied to the body -- one sees that the so-called dualism 'body/soul' by no means necessarily leads to contempt for the body or, even, to worldliness. However, this is often either explicitly stated or insinuated.

Second type.
God (called 'Zeus') allows the embodied soul, to be accompanied on earth by a daimon, guardian spirit. According to the Golden Words just mentioned, this 'daimon' guides man's life and delivers it from many evils."

Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (WR 83; 122; 141), the great lyric poet, in his *Pyth., 5:* 122, expresses this - Christianly speaking - "preserving angelic faith" as follows: "The spirit of Zeus, the Great, guides the daimon of beloved men". Much later, notwithstanding the Protosophist crisis of faith and morals (WR 64; 121), the comedian Menandros of Athens (-342/-290) will say, "As soon as he is born, every man, like a good 'must.agogos', soul leader, is given a daimon as a companion".

The relationship between the two types.
O. Willmann, o.c., 274f., describes them as follows.
a. The accompanying daimon is the guardian spirit.
b.1. He is the pre-existent paragon of the soul, which he accompanies.
b.2. He is the higher "self" of it, i.e. he is so one, fused, with the "I" that he is, as it were, identical with it. -- All this determines the un(der)consciousness of the accompanied person.

W.R.   158.

Pythaprean agogia(k) is more than mere psychagogia(k).

The one-sidedness would violate the harmony ideal, which is the relationship 'body / soul" governs.

1. Pythagorean agog(k) also includes typically physical aspects. Thus e.g.
(i) Austerity (relative to the opulence already emerging at the time);
(ii) healthy eating (with vegetarianism, as already mentioned);
(iii) healthy division between work and rest, between waking and sleeping.
These were busily rehearsed in the hetaireia, the Society (WR 98).

2. Thus it is not surprising that the Pythagoreans conceived of their philosophy as a cure (medicine, healing), insofar as it purified ailments, of physical or soul nature. For that too -- healing -- is 'catharsis', purification. Cfr WR 151 (Orphic model).

O. Willmann, o.c., 321, summarizes agogie(k): "philosophy insofar as it is wisdom-driven is
(a) The cleansing and consummation of life,
(b) the highest art of music (WR 81),
(c) The purest ordination service.

(*Note:* the Paleopythagoreans (and more so, but more obscurely, the Neo-Pythagoreans), like Platon later, regarded philosophical formation as structured according to the idea of "mystery(religion)" (WR 146; 150),

(d) The true cure. Just as, after all, medicine is worth nothing if it does not remove the diseases from the body, so also philosophy is worth nothing if it does not banish evil from the soul."

This fourth characterization expresses an analogy: so like, so like. but net is more than that : it is about an insertion ('harmonia'). After all, the archaic idea of 'wisdom' (general education) included a primitive health science.

A Paleopythagorean question-answer phrase betrays this still: "What, among the things proper to mankind, is the wisest? -- The ability to heal".

Pythagoras is known as the one who first founded philosophy as a closed system : since he actualized traditional wisdom (WR 155), he could not help but conceive philosophy as more than mere abstract-life 'rational' thinking,--though the latter was also part of it.

Here, perhaps, lies the enormous difference between our, strongly Enlightened-rational "philosophies" (its "crises," present, included) and the Paleopythagorean conception of "philosophizing"! Didn't Marx say that "until then, philosophers had only interpreted the world, but not changed it"? With regard to the Pythagoreans, he was sadly mistaken. 'Philosophy' for them, is the life that is presupposed, purified, leveled.

W.R. 159.
Pyth. -- 4. *The Pythagorean concept of beauty.*
We conceive of this last Pythagorean particle as a model of text generation (essay, treatise). Cfr WR 105 (number-in-motion); 106 (Chomsky's generative model).-- Cfr. WR 5v. (textuology).-- Therefore, we give, first, the schema (WR 105: thinking content skeleton).

I -- *The general universal idea of ''beauty.*
(a) *Given:*
(i) the method (**1.** the Milesian 'theoria' (WR 70: list; 88: supplement); the **2.**text WR 98/158 (the Pythagoreanism); eventual**3.**: new Pythagorean texts);
(ii) the theme viz. clean(heath).
(b) *Asked (sought):*
 a description (approximate definition; WR 96).

II.-- *the particular (private) idea of 'choreia' beauty.*
(a) *Given:*
(i) the method (see above;-- but applied to choreia); the tradition hermeneutic method (viz. **(i)** the tradition (shamanic choreia and Orphic choreia); **(ii)** actualization, in its Pythagorean form);
(ii) the theme, i.e., beauty, peculiar to choreia.
**(b).** *Requested (sought):*
 A description.

Note.-- This scheme ("thinking content skeleton" or "arithmos", Pythagorean expressed) is boundlessly appropriate, since just about every theme is divisible into universal and private (yes, singular) approaches.

Opm.-- Textually (textuologically) and linguistically generative, at the same time, one can say that the text, which will now follow, has as its subject 'schoon(heid)' and as its sayings a finite collection of sentences, in which - directly or indirectly, explicitly or concealed - 'schoon-(heid)' (pythagorean understanding) is the subject,-- subject, which, in a plurality of sayings (in the various sub-sentences of the whole of the text) is, as the Dutch like to say, pronounced.

Since these sentences are countable, because finite in number, the text will be a real application (verifying application, even then) of the Pythagorean view that the text, as a multiple of one(heid), is generated, -nl, from one idea (pythagorean understood) 'clean(heid)'.

Note.-- As a "grammar" (WR 111; configuration), the text can be drawn out, roughly, as follows.

Note.-- This is a primal traditional Pythagorean scheme: division.

4.1.-- The general idea of 'clean(heath)
(a) Given.
WR 70; 88.-

1. Theoria', a Paleopythagorean idea, which we have clarified, following Thales' philosophical statements or traditions, means that, through sensory data - e.g. the columns of the Parthenon, at Athens, which, according to a study by Georgiadès (*J. Brun, Les Présocratiques,* Paris, 1982-3, 35), according to the Pythagorean stave (WR 129), i.e. through an 'empeiria', sensory observation, one penetrates to an invisible data - here the structure of the Pythagorean 'octave' (stave indication), i.e. through 'logismos', reasoning, which destroys this invisible data. We extend, in other words, the former idea of 'theoria' to the perception of what the Pythagoreans call 'clean'.

2. Theoria, penetration, in this figure, can proceed in the form of 'sumpatheia' (WR 85), i.e. the sensing, from subject (the beauty-seeker) to object (the enjoyed beauty), of what beauty(s) is. This sensing has the structure 'the like (the beauty in the 'object') through the like (the beauty in the subject, -- what the Platonists, later, will call the idea 'beauty(heid)'). Paleopythagorean: the (objective) number (in the beautiful) through the (subjective) number (in the idea, number idea, 'the beautiful', in our mind).

Platon speaks here of the noble yoke (understand: the union, in being dependent on each other, of object and subject). Cfr O. Willmann, o.c., 439.-- Cf. WR 133 (two planes).

(b) Asked.
A description, in Pythagorean terms, of the essence (WR 96 : definition) of the beautiful.

The elaboration.-- This addresses the requested. We divide (= break down; WR 159) - methodologically - into two parts.
(a) the lemma, i.e. the universal idea (as Gestalt; WR 118);
(b) the applications, i.e. the verifications (peirastical reduction).

(a) The lemma (hypothesis). - Starting from the main idea 'harmony', we can 'guess' that 'clean' is the same as harmonious, which fits together. However, starting from the second main idea 'eudaimonia' (WR 152v.), we 'guess' that the harmony, at the same time, should be welfare founding, to be able to be called 'clean', -- at least in the Pythagorean sense.

(b) *The deductive reduction*

After the lemmatic reduction, comes the derivation: if the previous conjecture (the Gestalt "welfare-founding conjunction") is correct, then we should be able to find statements or other applications that are model-identical to the conjecture.

(c) *The peirastic, verifying reduction.*

There is, indeed, preserved an 'akousma', thought spell, which reads as follows: "what is the most beautiful thing? -- the harmony". This expresses, in the form of a maximum, that clean and harmony go together. Cfr O. Willmann, o.c., 283.

Further elaboration.

Split further.-- Starting from the idea that harmony is always numerical (WR 111vv.), we may suspect that a Pythagorean,-- if at all possible,-- will emphasize the numerical and the configurational (which goes with it) in beauty.

Indeed: Sextos Empeirikos (± +150/200), where he speaks about the Pythagoreans, as a skeptic, well, says : "No art has come about without proportion (WR 109; 129). Well, proportionality exists in a number. Consequently, every art is created by a number (....).

Consequence: there is a proportionality in plastic (sculpture, apparently), likewise in painting,--this, to achieve resemblance and the absence of distortion." (*Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Geschichte der Aesthetik*, I (*Die Aesthetik der Antike*), 112).

What is meant here is the proportionality between the object portrayed in the image or painting and the image or painting. -- But we know that the proportionality, in the form of an (eventual, idealized) gestalt (WR 114vv.), was already thought to be present in the object, the thing to be depicted in sculpture or painting.

There is more: Ioannès Stobeus (Stobaeus) (tss. +400 and +500) says: "order and proportion are clean and useful. disorder and disproportion are ugly and useless."
In the same sense Iamblichos (+250/ +333), in his Life of Pythagoras, 203, speaks.

Conclusion.-- 'summetria', proportionality,-- mutual relationship of the parts ('points') of a whole (= harmony),   as a quantity expressible in numbers, is an essential constituent of beauty, at least where it is measurable (WR 129). There where measure comes into play. She is the mathematical moment (part, aspect) of harmony.

Summary.

The first elaboration referred to the beneficent, welfare-founding character of harmony; the second ("further") to the mathematical aspect of that harmony. This twofold definition (harmony, symmetry) is confirmed by Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 107.-- Twice we have used the reductive method (lemma, deduction, review).

The typological (= specific, species) elaboration.

We have, now, a universal concept of 'clean'. But can we verify it as to the types (kinds) of 'clean'?

(i) *The "natural beauty/artistic beauty" couple.*
Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *J. Segond, Traite d 'esthétique*, Paris, 1947;
-- *P. Fierens, Les grandes étapes de 1'esthétique*, Bruxelles / Paris, 1945;
-- *D. Huisman, L'esthétique*, Paris, 1983-9;
-- *Cl. Khodoss, ed., Hegel, Esthétique*, Paris, 1954.

D. Huisman o.c.,119, touches on the idea of Prof *Edgar De Bruyne* (*in his Esquisse d' une philosophie de l'art*), who distinguishes in natural beauty and artistic beauty. Huisman calls such a definition 'infiniment trop vaste' (boundlessly exceeding the measure). But what does Huisman do with an art photograph, which depicts a 'clean' landscape? Or with a painting (a work of art), which depicts natural beauty? Just because the two are non-absolutely separable, we must hold De Bruyne's idea.

(i)a. 'Aesthetics' is the theoria, fathoming, of beauty, whether natural or artistic. The foundation, as experience, is the encounter (sumpatheia).

(i)b.1. 'Natural beauty' was known to the Pythagoreans. WR 124vv. (the (musical music) teaches us: there is order, harimony, even mathematical harmony (= symmetry) in the universe. Read, now, WR 126v. (Pythagoras' theoria of gesternde sky).

Read, also, WR 128 (Pythagoras recognized the octave (= harmony) in sounding hammers of the blacksmith). The fusis, nature, covers harmony, symmetry, which is pleasant to hear and which works beneficially, founds 'eudaimonia'. Note: the smiths are not musicians! Their non-musical intended hammering mounts euphony.

(i)b.2. 'beauty of art' the Pythagoreans knew, of course. We now split that up.
(ii)a. the cultural landscape.-- Hippodamos of Miletos, a Pythagorean town planner, rebuilds, in -479, the previously destroyed city of Miletos.

In -446 he rebuilt the Athenian port city of Peiraieus (Pireils); after -450 he rebuilt Prièné (today Semsun - Kalesi; in Ionia).

The basic structure, 'arithmos', of these cities is the chessboard. Rectangular street intersections, orientation of the streets according to the cardinal directions, mathematical regularity (symmetry),--these are the features.

As the accompanying sketch (very rough) of Prièné shows, 'Gestalten' (WR 114vv.), characterized by proportionality and regularity, were implanted in fusis, nature, a.k.a. imposed on nature.

helling

Fr. Krafft, Gessh. d. Naturwissenschaft, I, 230ff., mentions "hyperrationalism. Whether that is the right word is not so certain.

One would better speak of "musicalism" (the euphony of the ground plan was decisive).

To the right: The 'gramma' (drawn out plan) of Hippodamos' ground structure of Prènè, with the natural contour lines

(ii)b. The building.

As mentioned above (WR 160), according to an analysis by Geogiades, the gaps (intervals) between the columns of the Parthenon were found to have numerical values that were exactly (WR 113: akribeia) proportional to Pythagoras' stave. Cfr WR 129. This architectural harmony - think also of hexagons, rose windows, etc. - was laid down by *Marcus Vitruvius Pollio* (tss. -100 and 0), in his *De architectura*, and, from there, passed on to the architects of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Cfr WR 119 (musicological after-effects).

(ii)c. *The image and the painting.*
 Cfr. WR 161.

Conclusion.
We stand, here, for (what Piaget would call; WR 109; 112; 114; 128; 130) a structure.

(i) A system (set of city plans, buildings, sculptures, paintings)

(ii) exhibits self-regulation (i.e., the same idea of beauty 'harmony', if need be symmetry, which comes across as beneficent (musically); the 'structure' in the strict sense)

(iii) and this throughout the transformations '(from cultural landscape to building, from building to image from image to painting).

W.R.   164.

"The Pythagorean conception of art was adopted everywhere in Greece,--albeit in a somewhat milder sense: beauty depends on order, i.e. regularity in the mutual arrangement of the parts of a whole (*note:* that whole is a town plan, building, sculpture, painting). (...) In the narrower sense, however, namely that beauty stands or falls with measurability ('measure' and countability ('number'), this interpretation remained the idea of only a few art directions and art theories". (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 107).-- This signifies the enormous scope of Paleopythagorean aesthetics.

To return, briefly, to the structural idea of 'structure' (WR 109): the (possibly mathematically conceived) harmony, as a well-founding principle, is the measure ('metron') by which the beauty of a cultural landscape, a building, a sculpture or a painting is measured. Or: the (thus conceived) harmony is the structure, with which the beauty of these things is structured; - One sees how close arithmetical Pythagoreanism is to some basic aspects of structuralism.

4.2.-- *The special idea of "beauty of choreia*
(a) *Given*: (164/166) the choreia (WR 82;--125v.), i.e., the unity of the "triad" (WR 104: tricho.tomia) music, dance, song (poem); though existing in themselves, they were, often, practiced together;-- given, secondly, the tradition hermeneutic method (WR 11 (hermeneutics as textual interpretation); 15 (literary theory); 17 (meaning hermeneutics); 20 (comparative hermeneutics).

Digression.
We interrupt the outline, to bring the idea of "hermeneutics" into definitive focus.

H. Arvon, La philosophie allemande, Paris, 1970, 116/120 (*L'herméneutique*), provides an overview.

1. The classical-traditional meaning is "the skill, resp. professional science, which enables the interpretation (interpreting, explaining, 'understanding', 'comprehension') of transmitted texts (e.g. a Code of Law (judicial herm.; the Bible (Bible herm.). It is an auxiliary science of e.g. literary theory. See above e.g.: WR 11, etc., as examples.

2.1. F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861), founder of the Historical School, gave a new accent: "hermeneutics" is, above all, accurate "re.pristination", (to empathize, down to the details, with the past, through interpretation of historical documents: "How did people think, live in the past?". WR 3 (cultural history method, -- elaborated for Thales : WR 31/91)). This is a method, valid for a historical analysis.

W.R.   165.

2.2.a. *F.D. Schleiermacher* (1768/1834), in his *Dialektik* (1839) re-founded hermeneutics: it became a science of interpretation, taking transmitted texts as its object,--those of the Bible, but in such a way that the meaning of the Bible was 'understood' through one's (existential) experience of it; only the person who tries to make the text real in his personal life understands ('Verstehen') the meaning of the Bible (cf. WR 17): hermeneutics of meaning, referring to an interpretation that goes beyond the textual data; this is still "repristinising": one seeks to "understand" the meaning of the text as one understood it at the time;

Schleiermacher would add, to this first degree of meaning, a second: I, personally, seek to "make real" the ideal "the reverent man" in my own life; in other words, I "actualize" the text (and its "meaning").

2.2.b. W. Dilthey (1833/1911), founder of the humanities method, reestablishes hermeneutics, as a science of interpretation, with as its object the behavior of human beings (formerly,-- in virtue of documents), so that the soul life is "understood" ("verstehen"),-- this not without a minimum of personal, "existential" experience of it (axiom of beingness).

Conclusion.
In all four variants, one and the same structure is exposed.

(i) one does not understand without repristination (empathizing with what the surrendered meant in his time).

(ii) But one also does not understand without a minimal actualization ('to realize', the Anglo-Saxons say, i.e. to empathize with the transmitted, as if one were, somewhat, personally involved in it, now, in one's own time). Schleiermacher goes furthest in this actualization.

Between the time when the tradition originated and the time when it is interpreted, now, there is a cultural-historical interval: elements of the situation have changed. This change in the situation is called "historicity": we have history and we make history.

Tradition hermeneutics means, therefore, the fact that people interpret the past (tradition) in the context of current circumstances. They actualize the lore. Tradition hermeneutics also means the science of that actualization.

W.R. 166.

As an applicative model of this we refer to WR 103/130 (the pythagorean number) : we have, therein, as far as this introductory course allows,

(i) Repristinizing, trying to "understand" the then current sense (meaning) of the one and its multiples (numbers) (first interpretation type),

(ii) Actualizing, tried to translate the then sense into current ideas (e.g., Chomskyan algorithm; Gestalt; Piagetian 'structure'),-- this, to give it a current, present sense -- which is still useful, notwithstanding the vast cultural-historical interval, which separates us from the Paleopythagoreans. So much for the fact.

(b) *asked (sought)*
A description of the way in which the Paleopythagoreans 'understood' ('interpreted') the transmitted choreia and founded an actualized choreia. In other words: how they re-founded the choreia.

4.2.A.-- *The surviving choreia*.
This one was triple.

(a) *The shamanic choreia*.
WR 99; 140v..-- M. Hermanns, *Shamans*, 4, says "Thus the activity of the shaman/shaman is, for a gans substantial part, artistic:
(i) Acting out, theater playing;
(ii) singing, dancing; or
(iii) painting".

Or still: "The girl mentioned in the poem *Gau tang*, who, appearing to the king, in his dream, initiates him in the erotic art, becomes shaman, then girl of deities, finally shaman goddess.

She was worshipped on the centrally located worship mountain of the pa people, on which, on the occasion of the famous folk festival, music resounded on the full moon night of the eighth month. (...).

As components of the shamanic whole, (a connoisseur) W. Eberhard lists: "Worship of a shaman goddess, - shaman dances, shaman songs, general sad mood of the songs - god of shaman dances (...)" (M. Hermanns, o.c.,16).

Conclusion: if, as Dodds supposes, Pythagoras was a shaman, then the central significance, in overall Pythagorean philosophy, of choreia becomes "intelligible" (WR 161).

(b) *The orphic choreia*.
Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 108, says: "The thesis of the Pythagoreans - that music represents a power - had its root
(i) not only in the art of the Greeks,
(ii) but also in the religion of the Greeks,-- more particularly in the ideas of the Orphics."

167.

The essence of these ideas boils down to this:

a. The soul is like a prisoner in the body,--this, for the reason of a debt incurred;

b. She will be liberated as soon as she cleanses herself of that guilt: her cleansing and liberation is man's loftiest goal.

c. To that end, the mysteries (WR 146; 150; 158) of the Orphics contributed.

d. In this, dancing and music also played a role". Cfr WR 139; 143/151 (Orphic animism).

Loukianos of Samosata (a Syrian city) (+125/+192), On the dance, says the following.

(1) Orpheus and Mousaios (a mythical, perhaps historical singer (Herod.,7: 6), who is closely associated with Orpheus) were the most accomplished dancers of their time. They founded 'mysteries'.

Well, - says Loukianos - an archaic consecration (WR 158: consecration service), which has no 'orchestical' accompaniment, is untraceable. 'Orchestikos' means 'what has to do with dance'. Orfeus and Mousaios also have, in the very structure of their mysteries,

(i) 'rhuthmos' (i.e., the movement, insofar as provided with regulation (wr 109: self-regulation (= structuring)) and measure), 'rhythm', and

(ii) dance introduced.

(2) The genealogy (origin story) of the dance.

The most reliable "genealogists" (origin storytellers) - according to Loukianos - say

(i) that the dance is as old as the 'cosmogonic (= standing at the origin of the cosmos) 'eros', minnedrift (both a force and a personal being)

Cfr. WR 39 (Hesiodic); 40 (Primal Couple); 102 (Dionysian and Orphic - Pythagorean Eros); 143 (Fanès - Eros) 145 (Desire) --; that this Eros gave all being its order.

(ii) that the chorus of celestial bodies - planets, fixed stars - characterized by

a. their harmonious understanding (WR 85: sumpatheia),

b. their beautiful performance with music, dance and song (WR 120: cosmic music); 125 (Muses song / sky music)), the prototype and models were for the 'first', i.e. origin dance, performed by 'mortals'. Compare with WR 103 (the orb, in 'rapport' (sumpatheia) with the sun ('identitative method').

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- *L. Séchan, La danse grecque*, Paris, 1930,-- 35s., 37, 39...,

-- *O. Willmann*, o.c., 632 ("Like the Koureten (Hes., Fr. 198: the protectors of Zeus, as a baby, in Crete, by means of their dance) and the Korubants (the Kubelewijmen-, who, in Phrygia, performed 'wild' dances and songs), so the Salii, i.e. dancers, seem to represent the moving heavenly bodies."

W.R.   168.

Indeed, 'salire', in Latin, means 'to dance'. The Salii belonged to a sacred society, which one found, in many cities of Italy, -- usually, as war god worshipers --; so e.g. in Rome, Lavinium, Tusculum, Aricia, Anagnia,-- especially at Tibur (where they were associated with Hercules).

Note.-- *L. Séchan, La danse grecque*, 38, emphasizes, in addition to the universistic (= cosmic) character, the goddess-given character.

(1) "When Lucius Apuleius Theseus (+125/+180; a Roman thinker) wants to characterize the inherent nature of the Greek deities, he says, very correctly, 'Graeca numina plerumquechoreis gaudent' (The Greek deities usually engage in cord dancing) (....). Gods like Dionusos, Apollon, Ares were called, often, 'dancers'; -- along with Pan, whom Pindaros (WR 83) proclaims to be the handiest dancer among the 'immortals' (WR 76)."

(2) "Pan (a Hermes son (WR 68), at home, among the shepherds, in the Arcadian mountains, on the Peloponnèsos) is the genial dancer on lonely mountain heights, while (,...) the oreiades, the mountain nymphs (WR 80), just invisible tonal artists, are singing, deep in the caves, weaving fine fabrics, which no mortal would ever get to see. (...)

As soon as the dawn rises, the muses (WR 81; 124) form her dance choirs, on the Helikon (today: Zagora), near inspirational springs(...)".

Note -- Loukianos -- just mentioned -- says that Rhea (*note --* The mother of Zeus, the Supreme God), was the first to teach dancing to the (above-mentioned) Courets (Crete) and Korubantes (Phrygia). Thus the choreia, among the ancient Greeks, was considered to be inspired. Cfr WR 81 (inspirantes); 85 (sumpatheia).

Conclusion.
For both shamanic and orphic, choreia is considered a religious phenomenon, which is both inspired and cosmic-universal.

If one forgets this double aspect, one understands virtually nothing of the high reverence with which the ancients approached them,--not excluding the Paleopythagoreans.

Note --- We recall - very briefly - the Dionysian choreia (WR 121vv), which, both by the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, was rejected as an inferior music.

W.A.   169.

Not, however, without keeping the core of it, on a higher plane, viz. the animistic side: "From the states of rust, which (the Pythagoreans), in the bakchic (= Dionysian) music, observed, they drew the conclusion that the soul, under the influence of such music, frees itself (WR 140 (out of body); 147) and, for a wele, leaves the body." (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c.,108).-- This was, incidentally, also typically Orphic,

4.2.B.-- *The reestablished choreia.*
Do we see, now, what the Pythagoreans founded, starting from tradition.

(I) *Given*
(1) *The method*.
This one is the antiquated "understanding" method:

a. in the object, the 'soul' (WR 133), i.e. the 'number' (WR. 105 (the thinking frame)); in the subject, the image (the equal of the soul/the number of the object); both, together, Platon's noble yoke, which, fluidly, is called 'sumpatheia' (sensation) (WR 160);

b. behold the type of 'theoria' practiced by the Pythagoreans.
That this theoria can be called truly understanding method is shown by the fact that the rhythms were called the 'homoiomata', reflections ('projections' (WR 14), of the soul (W1. Tatarkiewicz, o.c.,109). The soul, in music, dance, song, expresses itself. This is its expressive nature.

Well, Dilthey, Spranger et al, who apply the understanding method, do behavioral analysis in such a way that, through the observable-external behavior (history), the soul and its 'life' are, as it were, directly observed. This is called - but in an ancient Greek context - 'theoria', i.e. to 'see' the invisible through the visible (WR 41).

One big difference: the fluidic penetration to the object, in the sumpatheia, is missed, in the Diltheyan conceived method, which, here, speaks of axiom of beingness.

In other words: here too the theoria is groundbreaking and actualizable for us, still (WR 4: philosophia perennis).

It is so that the Paleopythagoreans noted two moments, which Tatarkiewicz, well, exaggerates somewhat:
(i) the reflexive moment (WR 155), i.e. the effect of the music on the person who dances, plays music, sings himself, and
(ii) the transitive moment, i.e. its effect on the mere spectator(s).

W.R.   170.
(2) *The theme:*
We say it just now, namely, the dual, reflexive or looping and transitive or transitive action.

(II) *asked.*
A description, starting from the main ideas (number, soul) of Pythagoreanism.

(III).a. *The lemma* (= abductive (WR 60) reduction).
WR 110 taught us that Pythagorean idealism discovered at least two aspects, in all being:
a. the pre-existing (pre-existing) and
b. the immanent. Again, this will be the case.

The rhythms (music, dance, song) are prompted by the deities (first type of preëxistence) and they are locked into the fusis itself (second preëxistence type). That fusis, nature, is twofold:

i. she is nature, all around us (e.g., the heavenly bodies, in constant motion; the knocking of the hammers of blacksmiths);

ii. but she is also what, in one's own daimon (WR 156: depth psychological) or depth soul, as innate, is present.

It is so that one understands the following testimony text: "The nature and power of numbers one sees
(i) not only in divine and daimonic things,
(ii) but also in human words and deeds, everywhere, in all musical (*op.:* intellectual) activities and, immediately, also in music. Numbers and harmony (WR 161) tolerate no deception". Thus Philolaos of Kroton (-470/-400).

Furthermore, this Platonic text (*Platon*, via Damon of Athens, was, as far as music is concerned, to a great extent a Pythagorean, so that his statement, indirectly, provides the proof that we are looking for): the deities (WR 168) have given the sense of measure and harmony - as a gift - to humans, as a sign of their humanity. Dance has developed thanks to the inspiration of these same deities". (*Laws*, 2: 654a).

Hippodamos of Miletos (WR 162v.) says: "harmony is the 'virtue' (*op.* that which constitutes soundness : virtue) of the universe. The eunomia (WR 93; 125; 129), i.e. the virtue law is the 'virtue' of the polis (society). Health and strength (WR 157) is the 'virtue' of the body.

In all these things, each part is fixed in function of the whole and of the totality. O. Willmann, o.c., 327; cfr WR 114: Gestalt).

Conclusion.-- These testimonies confirm ('verify') the lemma: before and at the same time in actual music, dance, song, welfare-founding harmony is, eventually numerically, active.

W.R. 171.

In other words: before there is, in fact, any music, dancing or singing by people, there is, already, a 'seal' i.e. - in the antique - Greek language - a fundamental chord (O. Willmann, o.c.,27f. ('sfragis', as diminutive: 'sfragidion' (seal), which coincides with the center point of the universe (as world soul(estof) (WR 97; 134))).

This ground chord or seal is considered, by Philolaos of Kroton (WR 170), to be situated in (what he calls) 'the universe fire center' ('hestia', in Latin: Vesta, the goddess of the hearth fire). WR 104 (divisional signatures); 108 (branching model); -- 112 (configurational branching or generation model);-- all these places, above, exhibit the (numerical or configurational) one(s), calculated as 'sphragidion', universe seal.

Another name, among the Paleopythagoreans, for that universe-fire-heart-center point, is "archidion" (O.Willmann, o.c., 308), i.e. <u>arche-in-the-small</u> (WR 45). - micro-arche, if one will.-- Not only all multiples of the one(s) or all configurations thereof, but also all music - at least, in the insights of a Philolaos et al. - are generated, 'conceived'; WR 40), calculated, by the power of that 'archidion' or 'sphragidion', that micro-brain particle or micro-seal, which, by the 'see(st)ers' (WR 88v.), is always, noticed and/or sensed, in the midst of a little fire or, even, simply, a flame(metje).

Note.-- Bibl. stitchpr.: except O. Willmann, o.c.,308f., where the text, with the original (but too difficult Greek terms, attributed to Philolaos, already in 1907-2- edition, is mentioned, reference should be made to Mattei, a.c., 2165.

Mattei calls this the pyrocentric view of the universe: the celestial bodies - sun, moon, planets, stars - revolve, according to such views, around a (note), by Mattei explicitly labelled as invisible, universe fire. One of the names that Mattei quotes - as coming from Philolaos - is 'the hestia of the universe' or, as he describes: 'foyer du monde' (world fire).

Also Herakleitos of Ephesus (whom we, in the First Course Year (Doctrine), got to know as the oldest-known representative of modern dialectical thinking (Hegel, Marx, - the "scientific dialecticians"), talks, in some of his fragments, about the ever-living (universe) fire. This proves that we, here, stand before a more than merely Paleo-pythagorean basic concept.

W. R. 172.

Note -- WR 102 taught us, with the idea 'eros', the driving force ('drift') in what man does, including in music-making, dancing, singing. WR 134, with the animating power and the lust for life, taught us two forms, generated (WR 106: begetting) by the Eros, which, taken at face value, is begetting. -- It is that moving (WR 100: moving things) power, which, from the little seal, cradle, beginning, is active and founds creativity, ever new actualization of what goes before.

As *A. Nygren, Erôs et Agapè,* 1: 176/180, says: the (as higher, anagogic, conceived) Eros arose from religion,-- more specifically in the midst of the mysteries (WR 146) and namely the Orphic, which, attributing to the universe principle, the fact that it "awakens in mortals a noble purpose" (O. Willmann, o.c.,27: literally, from an Orphic hymn).

This "noble purpose" arises, according to the Orphicists, from the divine side ("Dionusos side"; WR 151), in man, since the Titanic meal.

(1) The Pythagoreans incorporated this, in their idea of 'fronimon', contemplation, into their view of man itself (WR 154vv.). The 'Eros' focuses, with them, on the unit multiples (number structures) and the soul(s).

(2) With Platon, later, the 'Eros' will focus on the ideas (which he conceives as seals of visible things) and, with his pupil Aristotle, on the 'forms', i.e. the germs (seeds; WR 105: biological model), active in the visible things themselves. - But - in contrast to the Freudian Eros - also directed anagogically, towards higher, towards elevation (o.g. purification; WR 46: cathartic; 76: level elevation). The lower Eros, lust for life,

    (i) is assumed,
    (ii) is purged and
    (iii) elevated on a higher plane.

That the Paleopythagoreans in particular had no illusions, on this point, concerning the lower nature of man, is evident from an akousma, proverb: "Insofar as thou knowest thyself not, think thyself not mastered" (in Greek: 'mainesthai': to be frenzied).

In this sense they update the ancient Apollonian ethics, which we learned WV53v. (the ken-uzelf ethic) learned, with a special uses of boundary-breaking, viz. mania, not being in control of oneself, to the point of frenzy,--as expressed, easily, in music, dance, and song (WR 81: Witches' Sabbath; 122: Dionysian Music).

W. R. 173.

(**III).B. *The deduction and the testing*** (= deductive and peirastic ed.).

Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c. 107, says that, for the Paleopythagoreans, music is "a power, which stirs the soul."

Have they

(i) inferred from this (deductive reduction) that they could work this out practically and

(ii) did they, by trying (testing or peirastical reduction), seek to obtain a definite answer to this? Which would be only the historia, the investigation (WR 40), which they took over from the Milesians (and extended to the unit multiples and souls).-- Apparently yes.

a. Aristoxenos of Taranton (-370/...), an Aristotelian, who wrote a theory and history review on music, but who took classes with a Pythagorean, says that

(i) the Pythagoreans practiced the catharsis (WR 172;-- 158: purifying character of philosophy)

(ii) on the body (WR 158) through medicinal methods and on the soul through music.

b. *Iamblichos of Chalkis* (+250/+333), one of the top figures of Neoplatonic theosophy (WR 101), wrote a *Life of Pythagoras*. In it he says: "It is claimed that (the Pythagoreans), in the treatment of some diseases, made use of magic songs (WR 136: rhetoric). Their starting point was: music, too, if applied correctly, contributes a great deal to healing.

They did, however, also read verses, namely from Homer and Hesiod (WR 39). But they chose those verses with the dog on the recovery of soul-sick".

a. It should not be forgotten that poetry, originally, either coincided with song or, at least, coincided with choreia (dance, music) much more than it does now.

b. Note that not any music or verses, but rather applied music and selected poetry were used. This is the Puritan (anagogical, uplifting) principle of choicelessness or "selectivity".

Note -- **(i)** The Paleopythagoreans were, apparently, not adherents of "art for art's sake" ("L'art pour l'art").

Note.-- *Théophile Gautier* (1811/1872), in his *Albertus* (1832,-- a horror story, with a preface), proclaimed aestheticism, i.e. the proposition that art and beauty have nothing to do with ethics; one practices art for art's sake. In his case, this was a kind of 'consolation' for the hopelessness he suffered for the reason of his unbelief.

(ii) Nor were the Paleopythagoreans 'libertarians' (WR 124). Our current libertarians, following in Nietzsche's footsteps, put desire ('le Désir', *D. Huisman, L'esthétique*, 61) at the heart of the matter. "Art has, increasingly, the tendency to 'contest' ('contester') itself, insofar as it has become a fixed institution: the 'happening', the celebration ('la fête'), the 'gestuele' art (the art of 'the gesture'), lyrical abstraction, Pop concerts, Body Art,--all these 'activities' are utopian.

'Utopian' in the sense that those who practice or participate in the libertarian arts have no fixed ideas.

In other words :
(i) The self-expression of desire
(ii) such that all established ideas, ideals and values are challenged. This is called the libertarian "creativity.

It is clear that Pythagoreanism, for reasons of
(a) The harmony will never value the aesthetic pleasure in itself, but always in the context of the whole of life, which, for him, is essentially, ethically based (WR 153: determination of destiny, also on the basis of ethical behaviour); in other words: even in the midst of the most intense or the finest aesthetic experience, man has a conscience;-- for reasons also of

(b) the welfare foundation, which is inherent in all activities (WR 152: agogia). WR 160 approved of aesthetics only if its well-being founds.

The two: ethics such that well-being arises and well-being such that ethical behavior arises, cause the Pythagorean to reject both aestheticism (which cultivates one-sidedness) and libertarianism (which cultivates one-sidedness, but in a second way).

Those, in antiquity, who, approximatingly, advocated aestheticist and libertarian perception of beauty, were the protosophists (WR 64; 78: 82; 84:-- 121).

The definition of "clean" reads, "Clean is that which is - to the hearing and to the sight - pleasing. Thus *Platon, Hipp. mai.* 298 a.; which Aristotle confirms (Top., 146a, 21). It should be noted that 'hearing', here, is only the (coarse) material hearing (WR 126vv.: the 'hearing' of the unit multiples), while 'seeing', here, likewise, is only the (coarse) material seeing.

"Such definition was the aesthetic expression of sensualism and hedonism, of which they were adherents." (Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 122).

'Sensualism' means to assume only the (grossly) material form of perception, as subjective permeation.

Note.-- We write (coarse) materially. Why? Because some of the Protosophists, like e.g. their leading figure, apparently also accepted (we will return to this) subtle materiality. But they did not do this (any more), in order to penetrate either the soul or the unity and its multiples (or the Platonic ideas and/or the Aristotelian 'forms'), as a form of theoria (WR 41). Even in their 'belief' in fine materiality, the Protosophists stuck to the coarse material.

'Hedonism' means the fact of putting forward, as the meaning of life, enjoyment, pleasure, in all forms (from the more refined to, in more than one case, very low forms).-- It is clear that both general idealism (WR 110; 133;--172 (anagogic idealism)) and anagogic idealism kept the Pythagoreans from both mere sensualism (philosophy of the senses) and mere hedonism (philosophy of enjoyment).

c. Aristeides Kouintilianos (tss. +200 and +400), a Neoplatonic (WR 101) theosopher, who wrote On Music, along the lines of Aristoxenos (WR 173), writes: "Since the Paleopythagoreans established (the influence of music) from childhood, they forced the schoolchildren to practice music.

As melodies and rhythms they used only tested melodies and rhythms. By legislation they regulated - both in response to private parties and to public deity worship - the performance of widely known melodies. They called these "laws" (nomoi; WR 129).

They did this in order to achieve consistency in the organization of religious celebrations. Already by the very name, 'laws', they proclaimed aloud that it should remain unchanged."

Note.-- WR 100 taught us the conservationist trait, of at least a portion of the Paleopythagoreans.

We believe that Aristeides offers us, of this, an application. This is certainly not to be generalized. -- But it does show, from it, an understanding of the possible educational 'value' which rejects the merely hedonistic (pleasure-seeking) or the merely Dionysian (survivalist). Note, again (WR 173), the elective principle.

d. Platon, a, as he grew older, increasingly Pythagorean thinker, says: "It is necessary that our young people should
  (i) not just good dancing
  (ii) but also 'dancing the good'".

"The truly educated man should be able to dance and sing well." Such statements confirm what was already said by the Paleopythagoreans.-- Cfr L. Séchan, o.c., 45.

W.R.   176.

Note.-- Wl. Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 109f., points to a politicization of music, advocated among others by Damon of Athens (± -450), a rather conservative Pythagorean, and by the Plates just mentioned.

Damon was a member of the Areopagus (a governing body). To its fellow members he sends, at some point, a circular letter. He notes, in it, innovations in music. In this he sees a danger to the city-state.

His speech sounded as follows.

(1) *The interaction*
The interaction between soul and rhythm (WR 169) is such that the - what Damon calls - 'right' rhythm is the 'homoioma', the expression, of the 'eu.nomia', the virtue law (WR 170), and vice versa.

(2) *Application.*
Singing and making music not only teach the youth courage or a sense of measure, but even a sense of justice.

Consequence.-- A change in the music will, inevitably, entail a change in the political system.

Platon shared this politicization. It is clear that here, again, the conservationist, indeed aristocratic, of some Pythagoreans (WR 100: authoritarian tendency) is at work. So it has been said: this wing was not the only one.

Note -- Even today there are state systems - one thinks of the communist state guidelines for the practice of art, which nevertheless politicize what is certainly not in itself simply political. Those who know the actual state governments can suspect the naiveté of Damon and Platon, who think that music, dance and song, now too, should be subject to legislation and-- what goes with it--state control.

e. Theon of Smurna (+1151+140), a Platonist, Math.,1, says: "The Pythagoreans - Platon being, other many a point of view, their supporter - called music the harmony of opposites, the incorporation of disparate things, the reconciliation of the irreconcilable. (Cfr WR 11).

(1) Music is, first of all, the harmonization of rhythms and melodies.
(2) She is more than that: she is the harmonization of the whole universe system.

The reason: the meaning of music consists in uniting and merging.

Incidentally, also God (WR 131) is the one who joins together the contradictory: that very thing, both in music and in medicine, is his greatest work, namely, to vote what is hostile into friendship (WR 98; 130).

W.R.   177.

The Pythagoreans claim that, in music, the harmony of the beings lies, yes, even the 'aristokratia', the government of the best, of the universe. This 'aristokratia', the government under the direction of the best, is called, in the cosmos, harmony,-- in politics, a good constitution,-- in private life, prudence (WR 154).

Universal unity or aristokratia makes up the unity and mutual adaptation of the multiplicity of phenomena.

Conclusion.-- The elaboration and application of this insight extends into four areas of human life:
(1) in the soul and in the body (W7 154; 158),
(2) in private and in public life.
These four domains are, apparently, in need of interlocking and ordering so that they show interlocking."

Believe we cannot find a better organ point than this late antique Platonic text. It is, however, remarkable for the fact that it also brings up - we would, almost, say "at last" - the friendship type of harmony (WR 98) which, among the Paleopythagoreans, receives so much emphasis.

F. Strabon of Amaseia (-64/+21), the well-known geographer and historian, first Aristotelian, later Stoic, once left a text, which, perhaps, offers the key to all the above.

"The Pythagoreans and, after them, Platon called philosophy a muse skill (W.R 130). They asserted, further, that the cosmos is put together by virtue of harmony.

They hold all that is "musical" to be the work of deities. By the way: also the muses are goddesses and Apollon (WR 122) is the muses leader. The entire poetry is also one hymn of the gods". We started with the muses, o.l.v. Mnèmosunè (WR 38). We end - with Strabon -, likewise, with expanded consciousness (for that is 'mnemosune' (WR 137), when that word is translated creature-like), expanded consciousness, which the muses, under the leadership of Mnèmosunè, instill.

Overview.
(1) 98/ 102 : Pythagoras, the Paleopythagoreans and the Neopythagoreans.
(2) 103/ 130: the Pythagorean number (i.e., the unit and its multiples,-- number mathematical, space mathematical, and musicological).
(3) 131/ 158: Pythagorean animism.
(4) 159/ 177: the Pythagorean idea of beauty.

Note.-- This final section is a verification, in the form of a treatise, of the first three chapters.

W.R.   178.
Third sample: Alkmaion of Kroton (-520/-450).
Bibl. sample:
-- *A. Kremer-Marieth, Alcméon de Crotone*, in: *D. Huisman, Dict. d. phil.*, 43;
-- *J. Zafiropulo, Empédocle d'Agrigente*, Paris, 1953, 99ss. ("*Alcméon, le grand médecin de la secte de Crotone, dont la renommée était, alors* (*op.:* Empedokles of Akragas (-463/-423), éclatante (o.c., 99);
-- *W. Röd, Die Phil. d. Antike*, 1:71/73.

Alkmaion or, also, Alkmeon of Kroton (WR 98), the city, where Pythagoras ended up, was both a physician and a Pythagorean, in the context of the school of Kroton.

Yet what interests us now is his theory of interpretation (= hermeneutics; WR 42;-- 164v. (the basic structure of the XIX - d'century German 'Hermeneutical Philosophy').-- Allkmaion enriched the theory of interpretation with a theory of signs (semeiology, tekmeriologie).

A -- *The perception.*
We learned - WR 89 - that Alkmaion accounted for the rarefied substance in perception. According to Röd, o.c., 72, he could, for this, go back to Pythagoras himself, who taught that, in perception (especially vision perception), an air-like substance plays a role in eyes and brain.

In other words: just as, later, Demokritos of Abdera (WR 89), will claim, Alkmaion claims that something like a phylloemic stimulus (image) penetrates into eye and, immediately, into brain, and 'works', such that man 'sees'. That is 'aisthanesthai' ('aisthèsis'), perceiving. -- Man has this type of knowing in common with the animals.

Note.-- Röd, ibid., says that this view, under the name 'doctrine of the spirits of life' (spiritus animales), will live on into the thinking of Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626), the founder of the inductive method on causation (WR 63), and René Descartes (= Cartesius; 1596/ 1650), the founder of modern 'intellectualist' (geometrising) philosophy.

But -- what Röd either conceals or does not know -- it lives on, in a much finer way, in today's occultism and/or paranormology (WR 89).-- Speaking of "philosophia perennis" (WR 4)!

B - *The interpretation*.
'Xun.ienai', literally: to gather in thought, to 'interpret', to interpret. -- Behold what typifies man, as man.

According to Alkmaion (who, in this, Pythagorean) the human soul (WR 100: moving number; 134: sungeneia) is something divine, just like e.g. the ever-moving heavenly bodies: it moves of its own accord. It also has the ability to 'tekmèria' symptoms, to grasp, literally: to hold together in thought.

(1) *Alkmaion was a physician.*

This meant that, professionally speaking, he was confronted with what is - to this day - called "semeiology" (symptomology).

Indeed: posed a woman - called them Nausikaä, (like the daughter of King Alkinoös, the prince of the Faiakes (Feaken), on the island of Scheria), who, according to *Homer's Odusseia,* 6:1, possessed "the grace of the Charites (WR 68; 82)" -; she, with her companions played ball (Od 6:100) and ... hurt herself on the leg.

Arriving at the doctor, Alkmaion, she complains that her ankle hurts. After carefully examining, the doctor, Alkmaion, thinks together, in group, the possible causes and the possible injuries, does she have a simple sprain? Or is something broken, inside? What he sees - the 'tekmerion', symptom is that it is blue - swollen.

Throughout the visible (the symptom), he seeks to "see" the invisible, the actual full facts (theoria; WR 41).

After all
(i) the story of the girl and
(ii) the swollen ankle are only part of the total phenomenon. resp. the total physical fact. To interpret becomes to interpret the 'tekmèrion'.

(2) Alkmaion, as an ancient Greek and Paleopythagorean, knew the oracles (divine speeches) and the art of interpretation, associated with them. Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425) relates, e.g., that, after the legislation of Lukourgos (-900/-800; WR 33), the Spartans became a powerful people, but lapsed into 'pleonexia' (WR 93): they wanted, out of land hunger ('imperialism'), to conquer all of Arkadia. The Puthia, at Delfoi, consulted by them, replied, "I will give you that you .... 'orchèsasthei'...".

The word "orchèsasthai," however, has two meanings:
a. dancing and
b. perform labor in the garden. In their transgression of boundaries (WR 53), they believe they may 'translate' the text (WR 5) of the Delphic seer by "(of joy) dancing".

Yet, after the lost campaign, they experience the true interpretation (the outcome): they "labor (as prisoners of war) in the gardens (of the Arcadians)."

In other words: through the visible. (the mere undistinguished text) of the oracle, they tried, by projection (WR 14), to 'hinein zu interpretieren' their own uncritical opinion, literally, in the text, but they were confronted with the invisible in the text.

Behold the two types of interpretation, which Alkmaion, surely, has known.

W. R.   180.

Bibl. sample : on oracle interpretation, see *G. Daniels, Religious-historical study on Herodotus*, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946 (esp. 71).

Note.-- The configuration of the indication.
WR 111 (configuration);-- 104 (signature); 108 (tree diagram);-- 172 (seal).-- We first give the 'gramma' (outline) :

Just one fact (observation; aisthèsis) ---- more than one interpretation (symptom; tekmèrion; oracle text)
// visible   // invisible

This is, apparently, a generative scheme: it is as if the given (the visible) has the earth of the seal. The given, after all, is 'archidion', beginning, origin, of more than one interpretation. In current language, the sign (blue - swollen ankle of Nausikaä; 'orchèsasthai', in the text of the Puthia) is ambiguous.

Note -- One can also see all this starting from the causality idea (WR 60: causal explanation). After all, one can e.g. interpret the injury as caused by the malady (sprain, fracture, ordinary bruise). Even the seer's cryptic text can be regarded as caused by the true outcome.

C.-- *The wisdom*.
According to Alkmaion, the deity "sees" (theoria):
(i) directly, i.e. without symptom, sign, as an intermediary between the full act and the knowing, inquiring man, and
(ii) utterly certain, i.e. not searching, investigating (WR 40: historia).

1. This is purely Pythagorean. One lore says that Pythagoras, to characterize the human inadequacy of all knowledge, introduced the word 'philo.sophia'. he was convinced that only deities (e.g. Mnèmosunè and the Muses) possessed 'sophia', (the full) wisdom. Man was 'wise(heids)gerig;--no more.

2. Charles S.S. Peirce (1839/1914) is the founder of semiotics or sign theory. All human knowledge, according to him, was only sign indication. So that he called man 'an interpretant'. The idea was a thought or thought sign; the spoken word was a speech sign; the written thing (the 'text', in the strict sense), a writing sign.

Also, Peirce underscored that signs, essentially, were ambiguous and, immediately, that to err was always inherent to signification (fallibilism fallibility doctrine)

W. R.   181.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- *W.B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, 1966, 109/ 137 (*The Doctrine of Thought-Signs*);

-- *Umberto Eco, La structure absente* (*Introduction à la recherche sémiotique*), Paris, 1972.

Opm.-- Rhetorical inferences.

It is clear that understanding so that influence follows (WR 4), i.e. rhetoric as 'agogè', actio, ('interaction' through communication), once the fellow human being is recognized as a fellow-sufferer, takes on a new color. The 'sumpatheia' (WR 135), however direct, passes through (WR. 169) 'homoiomata', reflections, of the soul (inner life).

For example, when Nausikaä, back from playing with her companions, at the water's edge, complains about her 'sore' ankle and describes how it happened, she gives her doctor, Alkmaion, only language, i.e. signs.

When she lets him examine her ankle, he 'sees' (in the sense of empeiria,--not in the sense of theoria) only symptoms. The process of understanding is always process of interpretation.-- That is the achievement, rhetorically speaking, of Alkmaion's genius 'textmeriology'.

2. This implies that Alkmaion, as a Pythagorean, not only believes in wisdom (rather than full wisdom), but that, within the hetaireia (thought society; WR 98), he belonged to the 'open' (= mathemationists, in later Pythagorean language) Pythagoreans.

a. This theme - the interpreter community - was strongly emphasized both by Peirce himself and by the Josiah Royce (1855/1916; an idealistic thinker) who was influenced by him. Royce spoke of 'interpreting community'. People are, at least in principle, a community of interpreters. They should, in principle, come to an agreement regarding signs.

b. This same theme was expressed by the founder of (linguistic) soiology, Ferd. de Saussure (1857/1913), *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1916-1, as follows. "Semiology is a science, which studies the life of signs, in the context of social life." (O.c.,33). In other words, there is, always, an intersubjective and social understanding aspect inherent in all sign language.

Conclusion.-- Alkmaion founded a piece of philosophia perennis (WR 4).

W.R.   182.
Third sample: xenophanic and eleatic rationalism (-550/-421).
Bibl. sample: *G. - G. Granger, The rational mind*, Meppel, 1971.

As early as Greek Antiquity, "rationalism" occurs,-- according to Granger,o. c., 10/13:
a. correct thinking (different from e.g. mere opinion),
b. intuitive and discursive type of "reason" or "intellect" (WR 188),
c. reasoned behavior,
Behold the three features.

But we mean by 'rationalism' something more: inheriting the so-called 'enlightened' type. We highlight two main traits, skepticism and 'autonomous' thinking'
.
(A). ***First trait: skepticism.***
Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *V. Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs*, Paris, 1887-1; 1969-3;
-- *R. Jolivet, Les sources de 1'idéalisme*, Paris, 1936 (esp. 7/15; 198; 206);
-- *A. Lalande, Voc. technique et critique d.l. phil*., Paris, 1968, 949s..

1. The term "skepticism" or "skepticism" is used in more than one sense. Here we mean, with this, an interpretation type regarding
   (a) universal, generally valid propositions ("truths"; WR 55: wisk. type) and/or
   (b) extra- and supernatural propositions ("truths," "dogmas," WR 75), viz. insofar as one. asserts that our limited knowledge cannot pronounce on them except in contrary, indeed, contradictory judgments.

The denial by Protagoras (WR 239), the "first humanist, of the pure geometrical structures is one example of "theoretical" skepticism (which disavows general statements); the denial by Renan (WR 90), the "religious" skeptic, is one type of "sacred" skepticism (which disavows sacred statements; see also WR 87 : Hektor's "skepticism").

Note -- we mean, first of all, methodical skepticism. The "methodical doubt" dates from Arkesilaos of Pitanè (-314/-240; leader of the Platonic Academy). The Church Fathers Gregorios of Nussa (335/394) and Augustine of Tagaste (354/430) continued it. R. Descartes (1596/ 1650) updated it in modern ways. 'Methodical' doubt is to weigh both the for and the against, on purely rational grounds.

The ideological doubt, as e.g. a Sextos Empeirikos, the "systematic" skeptic (+/- +150), advocated it, exceeds the methodical by making it more than a mere method, i.e. a "theory", replacing the pure research (WR 40) by aprioritarian propositions.

W.R.   183.

From the "theoria" to the "theory",

1. W. R 41 taught us what "theoria," fathoming, is. The German classicist Eduard Zeller (1814/1908), in his *The Philosophy of the Greeks*, shows how, in the theoria, peculiar to the Paleomilesians and the Paleopythagoreans, the human mind (= reason and reason) turns directly ('immediatism') to (the analysis of) reality, 'nature' ('fusis') -- without analyzing the subject-bound activity, which is the 'theoria' itself.

In other words, the thinker does not doubt for a moment that, however bounded and uncertain (WR 87/91; 180 (philosophia), he "knows" nature itself.

Whether this theoria, as with Thales and most Paleopythagoreans, is the fathoming of the visible, towards the invisible, or whether it, as with Alkmaion (WR 178vv.), in addition to the visible, also fathoms signs of the invisible (hermeneutics/semeiology), it is and remains certain (free from doubt) concerning the core of knowing,--even if it underlines the fallibility of mere earthly-human knowing.

2. V. Brochard, o.c. underlines that only the paleomilesians and the paleopythagoreans are never named as precursors of skepticism. This agrees with Zeller's assertion. Indeed: the theoria turns, with Xenophenes, with Parmenides and Zenon of Elea, into a method of reasoning, yes, into a real theory, i.e., a set of logically coherent judgments;

a. Instead of intuitive reason (= intellectus), especially discursive reason (= 'reason', 'speech of language', - 'ratio', 'discursus') comes to the foreground. Reasoning and counter-reasoning take precedence.

b. More to the point: skepticism, both sacred and also, though less so among the Eleates, "theoretical" sets in, in full, with the critique of knowledge.

c. Finally: mediatism, i.e. the view that we do not grasp ('know') reality (e.g. the fusis) directly (= immediatism of the theoria), but only indirectly.

Conclusion.

As Brochard says, the "real" skeptic adheres to phenomena (the "visible"). This involves either phenomenalism (man knows only phenomena, the immediate, in consciousness, given) or phenomenalism, even (man knows only merely subjective impressions, deprived of all objective value). What reality is in itself remains virtually unattainable.

W.R. 184,
History of skepticism.
(A).-- *Diogenes Laertios* (+200/+250)

He says: Some skeptics identify Homer (WR 33; 38) as a precursor to their view, because he, more than anyone else, points out the same subjects in different opinions (WR 180). this, without ever determining or explicitly affirming anything.

Later, besides Xenophanes and the Eleates (Parmenides, Zenon), among others a Protagoras, the first Sophist, in a philosophical sense, will say the same. One thinks of Protagoras' antilogiai.

(B).-- *The pre-socratic pre-skeptics*.

V. Brochard, o.c., 3, 10s. says that, except for the Paleomilesians and the Paleopythagoreans, all the praesocratics prepared for full skepticism, however it might be.

a.-- The eleates, in the wake of Xenophanes, and the herakliteeans

a1.-Says Xenophanes: "There never was and there never will be a man, concerning the truth, who knows this truth with certainty, concerning all that I say concerning the deities and the universe. For even if he expressed himself, by chance, in the most perfect way, he would not know certainty. For only 'dokos', the pure impression, is available to (all of) us". (Fr. 34).

Later 'dokos', also 'doxa', will be used as a terminus technicus for 'opinion' (pure impression).

It is known that the second great Sophist Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375) relies explicitly on the Eleates.

a2.-- The 'dialectician' (cfr. Course First Year) Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), who - instead of. the Eleatic univocity - introduced the multivocity concerning nature (opposite, yes, contradictory 'opinions' (views) are equally valid), ran into Kratulos (Platon's first philosophy teacher), who dared not pronounce any judgment ('radical 'epoche' or judgment suspension'), and into the humanist Protagoras of Abdera (WR 225/227), who advocated opposing views on every topic.

b.-- *The neomilesian thinkers,*

Empedokles of Akragas (= Agrigentum; -483/-423),-- Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428; the founder of the experimental method),-- especially the two atomists (= atomists), Leukippos of Miletos and Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370; WR 89),-- all of them, each in his own way, end in some skepticism. For example, Metrodetros of Chios, in Demokritos' line, claims that we, even, do not know if we know anything.

(B).--Second *characteristic : the self-constituted "I".*
Bibl. stitchpr.: *O. Willmann, Gesch.d.Id.,*I: 135.
Willmann distinguishes two types of tradition hermeneutics (WR 159; 164v.).

(I) *Philosophia (theologia, rhetorica) perennis* (WR 3v.)
Continuity, i.e. the will to continue the lore, notwithstanding

(i) purification and **(ii)** levelling (WR 76), typifies the tradition-reliant type of thinking. It starts, after all, from the idea of 'hereditary wisdom', i.e. a system of truths derived from a primeval revelation, spread over the changing traditions of families, tribes, peoples of all kinds.

(II) *Enlightenment* (e.g., WR 86).
Discontinuity, i.e. the will to determine for oneself, free from the 'ties' ('taboos') of tradition, the rules of thought and action, is, here, decisive.

(i) *Hesiod* (WR 39), already, says that "the poets lie". This, while he himself, poet, considers his own "truth" concerning the deities higher (Fr. Krafft, o.c., 42).

(ii) a. *Hekataios of Miletos* (-560/-480), though a Milesian, says: "(...) What follows, I write down, as it appears to me to be true ('dokeëi', opinion). For the stories of the Hellenes are both numerous and ridiculous, as they appear to me ('fainonta', phenomenon)". (*W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I: 212).

The 'self-willed' autonomous self, independent of all tradition, puts itself first as the source of 'truth' (even if one typifies this truth as 'opinion', based on 'phenomenon'). The self judges, self-possessed, the other 'mortals'.

(ii)b. *Xenophanes of Kolofon* (WR 184) speaks similar language.

(ii)c. *Parmenides of Elea*, considering himself higher, says: "I warn against the (second) way (= method) of investigation, on which ignorant mortals form imaginations, two-headed ones alike. Inability to think leads the wavering spirit ('noön') within. They drift about, like speechless and blind, out of their depth, like a mass without judgment ('akrita'). For such, 'being(s)' and 'non-being(s)' (WR 197vv.) are both the same and not the same. For every fact there is, for them, an opposite ('palintropos') way out." (Fr. 6).

What seems to point to Herakleitos' harmony of opposites.-- one's own reasoning power, whether or not supported by empirical data (WR 189vv.), not without a tinge of self-importance (Enlightenment narcissism) and assertiveness, becomes very decisive.

W.R.   136.
First sample.-- the xenophanic enlightened rationalism
Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I: 230ff.; 373ff.;
-- id., *A la naiss.* , 45/62 (*Xénophane ou la doctrine du Dieu unique*);
-- *W. Röd, Die Phil. d . Ant.*, 1: 75/82;
-- *J. Salem, Xénophane*, in: *D. Huisman, Dict.d.Phil.*,2685s..

The proper place of Xenophanes of Kolofon (whom J. Salem, in his way, situates between -570 and -480) in the school of Elea, a city in S.-Italy, is partly disputed. According to *Aristotle* (*Metaph., A5* 986b 18s), he would have
(i) founded the school and
(ii) have been the teacher of Parmenides. Platon, however, situates him as only one of the Eleates (Sophist., 242cd). Salem says: the surest thing is to situate him as the predecessor of Parmenides.

A.-- *Overall image impression.*
W. Jaeger, Paid., I:370ff., says that Xenophanes -- half a century before Protosofistics -- introduced the enlightened conceit ('der xenophaneische Geistesstolz'). The high esteem of reason and knowledge,-- this as 'rationalization of the whole life' ('die Rationalisierung des gesamten Lebens'), -- as of the XVIIIth century, people like John Locke (1632/1704), the founder of modern Enlightenment (Enlightenment), F.M. Voltaire (1694/1759), the typical representative of La philosophie des Lumières, Christian Wolff (1679/1754), the forerunner of the Aufklärung, will actualize this; -- this high esteem of the intellectual ('das Intellektuelle') led to what, nowadays, would be called : an intelligentsia (a class of 'progressive' 'critical' culture bearers).

B.1.-- *Culturological.*
In *Xenophanes* -- according to Jaeger, *Paid.,* I: 249-- it comes to a sharp conflict between, on the one hand, his personal actualization of the Milesian physical and, on the other,
(i) popular religion and
(ii) the ideal of combative masculinity of the Greek nobility.

I.p.v. the 'virtue(ility); in Greek 'aretè' (Lt.: virtus), Xenophanes, first, states the rational knowledge, which he named 'sophia', reasoning ability (WR 43: 'wisdom', Thaletic, is something else).

This means two aspects.
(a) Xenophanes founds culturology (theory of culture, science of culture), which the Protosophists, half a century later, will begin, elaborate as a true science of man.

(b) Immediately he engages in cultural criticism (in an Enlightened sense).

B.2.-- *Epistemological.*

1. Epistemology' or philosophy of knowledge, or philosophy of science for that matter, is the analysis of knowing.-- We have, already, previously encountered whole sections of epistemology.

(i) WR 40/42 (wisdom as theoria (**a.** empeiria, perception; logismos, reasoning; **b**. historia, investigation (= lemmatic - analyt. meth.)); WR 43/54; esp. WR 53v.): transcendental form;-- WR 54/57: mathematical form;-- WR 59/63: geographic form;-- WR 70/72; 135v. (Pyth. model): rhetorical form;-- WR 87/ 89 (46/48: Cathart. model ; 77/79: hylic - pluralistic model): theological - sacred type.

(ii)- WR 79/84: Musical model (WR 79/84: religious-hist. foundation;--WR 37/39; 42: abductive type; 63; 66/70: positive-scientific and political type);-- WR 124/130: Paleopyth. model.

(iii) WR 104/110: arithmetic type;-- WR 111/118: configurational model.

Behold the main types of actual, strictly defined theoria, which is very closely related to the mantic form of "theoria.

(iv) WR 178/181: the sign theory type of theoria.-- What the following pages on epistemology, add to this, was, by the Milesian and Paleopythagorean schools, of course, actualized, but as much as possible within each of the two styles of thought.

2. - It is W. Röd, o.c., 80, who attributes to Xenophanes "metatheoretical insight. -- are we, there, for a moment, dwelling on. --

(i) *The distinction between 'theoria' and 'theory'.*

What theoria is, we presume, known after all that goes before. But 'theory' remains to be defined (WR 96). We call 'theory', in the rational or reasonable sense, a system of statements, logically-stranded, starting from premises ('foundations', 'presuppositions', 'axiomata', 'postulates', 'lemmata'), whose unity stands or falls with the object which these statements ('judgements') are talking about.

That there are types of "theorizing" we leave aside, for now.

The most striking distinction between theory and theoria is that the latter is a method, i.e., a state of mind, whereas theory is always an objectified, i.e., projected into sentences (statements). Which does not prevent theoria too, strictly, from adhering to statements. But these are not the essence of it.

W.R. 188.

Note.-- Especially since Scholasticism (800/1450), one distinguishes, with respect to knowing and thinking, between

(i) The intuitive mind, which engages in theoria, the direct or immediate (immediate) grasping or beholding, fathoming, 'seeing', of the data, and

(ii) The discursive mind (= 'reason' in the strict sense), which strings together ideas, judgments and reasoning, in series, which are generated (WR 105vv.). It is the discursive mind, which is at work in 'theory'.

Bibl. stitchpr.: Ch. Lahr, Psychologie, Paris, 1933-27, 199s. (*L' intelligence et la raison*).

(ii) *The distinction between 'theory' and 'metatheory'*.

This distinction parallels that between 'language' and 'meta-language'. In direct 'speech' (understand: language speech), I say, "Kirke is aartsmore". In a lateral speech (language speech), I say, "The sentence 'Kirke is archly beautiful' is a singular sentence, but the sentence 'Kirkè, who is an antique Greek goddess, is archly beautiful' is a compound sentence."

In other words: in that lateral speech about direct speech (language about language or meta-language) I am only talking indirectly about Kirkè, its situation in mythology and its feminine appearance, but I am talking directly about my language speech (= statement, direct speech) about those three data. Well, metatheory is theory about theory-(formation). It is in this sense that Röd's statement concerning Xenophenes should be understood.

1.-- "Not from the beginning (of the inception) have deities, to the Mortals (humans), shown all (being). On the contrary: in the course of time, thanks to tireless searching work ('zètountes'), they find better (solutions)." (Fr. 18).

(i) This text apparently allows deities to play a role, in culture growth (WR 81vv.). Xenophenes, indeed, is religious. This will become more apparent later.

(2) He has an eye for progress.-- We said, a moment ago, that he was a culturologist: this is evident here. He even has an eye for historicity, (WR 165) or the in the course of time ('history') developing of all civilization.

Cfr WR 56: Proklos' eye for language development.-- Not only does he have an eye for change, development, but he is meliorist: the evolution is toward the 'ameinon', melius, the better.

Such is indeed progress belief, analogous to, the progress ideology of the XVIII - d'century enlightened rationalists (WR 186).

W.R.   189.

Note -- It may be noted that Xenophanes' culturoptimism, whose general articulation we analyzed, above ("for all/some better (things) it is true that, thanks to untiring search work, in the course of time, they are found by mortals", WR 55), must have relied on applicative models, which he generalized.

It has been pointed out that he was familiar with the Lydian invention of the coin. He also admired the stellar workmanship of Thales. (WR 58).

It has also been pointed out that as an itinerant poet, he was a well-traveled man so that he could practice comparative culturology (which could show the difference between backward, respectively primitive and developed). -- Rationalist as he was, the difference lay, above all, in knowing and thinking.

2.-- Röd relies on the distinction, in the Greek language, between 'eidenai', by observation, knowing with certainty (Fr. 34), on the one hand, and, on the other, 'dokos' (Fr. 34; WR 184), opinion, cfr also Fr. 35: 'dedoxastho', 'eoikota tois etumoisi' (probably)).

That is the first step in his reasoning, concerning Xenophanes. He is indisputable, linguistically.

But Röd transfers this distinction, now, to the then (professional) science, the physical, which Xenophanes knew and vulgarized.

a. Röd thinks that Xenophanes meant "eidenai," knowing with certainty by observation, of part of the claims of the physicals, namely, the statements, which express observed facts.

b. Röd thinks that Xenophanes meant "dokos" (and related), pure impression, opinion, of a second part of physical statements, namely, those statements, in which one expressed assumptions, lemmata, "hypotheses.

It is certain that the theoria, of which we have so often spoken above, does indeed involve the transcending of the immediately given. However, where the Paleopythagorean, e.g., will speak of a "seeing" "fathoming" (even when it concerns signs (WR 179: Alkmeion)), there the more skeptically minded Xenophanes, speaks only of "guesses", "impressions", opinions.

Also: the Paleopythagoreans were never invoked as precursors to skepticism, while Xenophanes was, at times, invoked as such (according to V. Brochard; WR 184). Now one would say: he was more critically minded than either the Paleomilesian or the Paleopythagoreans.

W.R.   190.
Note -- The factual basis(s) of Röd 's assertion.

a. Apart from the structure of the theoria (through the visible, by transcending, the invisible 'seeing'), about which we have just spoken, there is Alkmaion's thesis, which, likewise, distinguishes between 'aisthanesthai', perception, and 'xuniena'; interpretation (WR 178v.). The later Krotonians, in a language play of their own, expressed something analogous.

b. Both thinkers, Xenophanes and Alkmaion point to the immediatism of perception and the mediatism of opinion and interpretation respectively. But, as a consistent Pythagorean, Alkmaion had to assume a minimum of immediatism also in interpretation (as theoria), while, as a consistent Enlightened thinker ('critically minded'), Xenophanes could see in opinion, only, mediatism.

Note -- 'Immediatism' means the fact of assuming direct contact of a knowing nature (the so-called intuition or direct contemplation); 'mediatism' means the fact of assuming only indirect 'contact' between our knowing capacity (better: discursive, reasoning capacity, within consciousness, sensed as interiority), on the one hand, and, on the other, the known, suspected', object (WR 188: intuitive/discursive).

Update: --
a: Read, above, what we said of Xenophanes' view of progress:

(i) WR 189 gives the observed facts (coinvention; Thaletic astronomy; compared culture distinctions);-- this answers 'eidenai' by observation, with certainty, knowing;

(ii) WR 188 gives the generalized proposition, in which those applicative models find their universal or, at least, private model (all / some (more than just one)), -- this answers to 'dokos'. opinion.

In other words: in Xenophanes' own theory, one distinguishes, proceeding from his own use of language, two layers, perceptual judgments and generalization judgments.

Note that the universal and/or the singular, as such, is not (sense-perceivable)! Only the singular is (sense-perceivable).

b: Rudolf Carnap (1891/1970), in his *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928), examines - in a logical-positivist sense (WR 2) - the structure of scientific theory.

In this he distinguishes two 'languages', namely a language of perception (Tw), in which the sayings indicate directly observable realities (e.g. relations), and a theoretical language (Tt), in which unobservable knowledge content is discussed such as e.g. laws (universal statements).

W.R.   191.
Take the model of Jan Lukasiewicz (1878/1956).

(1) If all water boils at 100° C., then also this water and that water (= private / singular).-- Well, this water and that water boils at 100° C..-- So all water boils at 100° C..

(2)a. "This water and that water boils at 100° C", is a statement, which belongs to Tw (language of perception), because it is the twofold statement of a fact that anyone can, in principle, repeat.

(2)b. But "All water boils at 100° C"., is another type of sentence : it is a generalization (induction), which is not immediately detectable in observation. Such language is called Carnap, appropriately, Tt (theoretical language).

One sees that the reductive reasoning (here in the inductive form) contains the two language types. They may not be separable (collective structure), but they are distinct (distributive structure): if Tt, then Tw; well Tw; so Tt.

Applied to Xenophanes' model: the 'eidenai' (by observation, certain, knowing) gives rise to Tw (observation expressing sentences) and the 'dokos' gives, in Xenophanes' language, sentences belonging to Tt (theoretical language). Only that, for the Tt, he emphasizes that it is conjecture, opinion, impression; nothing more.-- Philosphia perennis!

General Conclusion.
Xenophenes did not develop an actual metatheory. However, he did have a metatheoretical insight (cf. WR 55: the mere insight, at Thales).

Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *L. Vax, L'empirisme logique*, Paris, 1970, 49ss.;
-- *I.M. Bochenski, Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 126 (deductive and reductive reasoning).

Note -- Relativity of observation.
That, as V. Brochard, clearly says, Xenophanes was on his way to skepticism, without ever, himself, being skeptical, proves his "relativism" regarding perception.

Fr. 38.-- "If (a) deity had not produced ('caused'; WR 9) the 'pale yellow' honey, people would have perceived the figs as much sweeter."

In other words: a separate perception, in principle, does not exist; it is, always, unconsciously or not, engaged in the total framework ('Gestalt'; WR 114) or - Paleopythagorean terms - in the total configuration (= background) of all possible perceptions. 'Skepticism' is, here, sense of totality of separate acts.

B.3.-- *Theological*.

WR 73 taught us that physical theology was an offshoot of natural philosophy.-- WR 131 taught us, in a Paleopythagorean sense, that deity and one(s) go together.-- We will see that Xenophanes emphasized the singleness of the supreme god.

(1) *Religion Criticism.*

Under three points of view, at least, Xenophanes criticized the religion handed down.

Divination Criticism.

WR 88vv. (mantics): 179 (oracle hermeneutics).

Manticism, after the physical arose, became subject to criticism (unlike before: WR 87 (the infidel Hektor)) of a new type. In this, Xenophanes is truly Presophistician: "Alone, among the oldest thinkers ('antiqui'), Xenophanes utterly rejected mantics ('divinatio')." (Thus *Marcus Tullius Cicero* (-106/-43), in his *De divinatione* (On the Mantic)

R. Flacelière, Devins et oracles grecs, Paris, 1961-1, 1965-2, 103s., says of this what follows.

1. An extremely hostile attitude emerges with Xenophanes: not only did he reject folk mythology and anthropomorphism, but also the belief in the "providence" of deities, which is the basis of oracular belief.

As an aside, one can, safely, compare this to the critique of "superstition" (and obscurantism) made by the modern Enlighteners. One thinks of a Renan (WR 90). 2. Of course: one reads WR 87/89 (the analysis of this disbelief).

Anthropomorphism Critique.

P. Fournier, Paganism: *l'anthropomorphisme*, in: *J. Bricout, Dict. prat.d. conn. relig.*, Paris, 1927, V: 196s., defines "anthropomorphism" as follows: "The attribution to the deity of human features,-- human body,-- ways of thinking, feelings and drives, intentions,-- evil (physical and ethical) (such as murder, adultery, incest)".

One can see that -- religious history-wise -- the "humanizing" of the deity is typical of polytheism, especially in its demonic slant (WR 12),-- something, which the polygoddesses themselves generally realized very well.

Fr. 14 says, "But mortals believe ('dokeousi'; WR 189) that deities are born and have the their own clothes, voice, appearance."

Fr. 15: "But, if the oxen (and the horses) and the lions possessed hands, could paint with the hands and make objects as men do, then the horses would paint deity figures resembling horses, the oxen figures resembling oxen, and make such bodies, resembling the kind that makes them."

Fr.: "The Ethiopians (claim that their deities) are dark-skinned and stumpy, the Thrakians that theirs have blue eyes and reddish hair."

W.R.   153.

Note -- It is clear that we, here, have projection criticism. WR 14 already taught us this idea.

For the analysis of this criticism itself, reference should be made to WR 14v.: the enlightened-rational man is, humanly speaking, structured differently: he no longer 'sees' mantically, as archaic man does; consequently: he takes the modes of appearance, which are fluid, for 'interpretations', 'inventions': 'imaginations' etc.; -- add to this the syndrome of ownership, peculiar to many an enlightened mind (WR 185), which, for the reason of its intellectual superiority, feels itself greatly elevated above 'primitive', indeed 'infantile' man. Consequence: no understanding, unless a bad one (misunderstandings of all kinds).

Demonism Criticism.
Fr. 11: "Of all things Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the deities, that which is but, with men, shameful and taunting: stealing, committing adultery, and deceiving one another.

Fr. 12: "As they recounted many unrighteous deeds of the deities: stealing, adultery, mutual deceit."

Here we have ethical anthropomorphism, -- better: demonism (WR 12v.: among the Sumerians, already, the double-hearted ethical system (two measures and two weights) was clearly theologically commonplace, yet they did not, without question, see this as religious projection, but as the true essence of the extra-natural beings. Which continues our Biblical demonology).

Note: the latter, demonism, is sometimes called "anthropopathism" (the drives of deities are the same as those of humans).

(2) - *The transcendent god*.
Against this, Xenophanes states his, higher type of deity.-- In his Peri fuseos (On Nature) he draws the highest god as follows.

Fr. 23: "A sole god, among deities and, men the greatest, equal neither in appearance nor in thought to mortals."

One sees here that Xenophanes does seem to assume second-class deities (WR 188: culture-building role), as does, e.g., the Bible (*Ps 82 (81); Ps 58 (57);-- Ps 8:6; Exod 4:16; 7:1; 1 Sam 28:13*; etc.).

W.R.   194.

Although Fr. 32, somewhat, gives a different impression: "What 'they' call Iris, that too, according to its nature, is only a cloud,-- purple and bright red and yellow-green when viewed."

'Iris' is the rainbow (goddess), a.k.a. the light shine around e.g. the moon or so. As a rainbow goddess, Iris had the 'function' (WR 9) of being the divine messenger between deities and humans and, also, between humans themselves (WR 68v.: Hermès). One would say that this, here, is rubbed evenly.

The guiding idea, behind the criticism of religion and behind Xenophanes own image of God, is apparently, as Rod, o.c., 78, says: God's perfection.

God is therefore
(i) unchanging, elevated above creation and decay (WR 11), which are - both - the harmony of opposites, so typical of all that is "demonic"; he is
(ii) universe mover ("Without effort He moves the universe, thanks to His thinking power" (Fr. 25)).

Yet Xenophanes does not escape Voorplatonic materialism (WR 52): "He remains, always, in the same place, moving nowhere; it does not suit him that, now once here, then there again, he moves.

The most remarkable thing, perhaps, in this 'transcendent' (= elevated) view of God, is what Fr. 24 says : "God is all seeing ('eye'), all thinking ('noei'), all hearing". "Thus His consciousness is not, as with men, bound to sense organs or anything of that nature. (Thus *W. Jaeger, A la naiss.d.l.théol*., 51).

"More than that, the God of Xenophanes is, without a doubt, a being who possesses consciousness and personality" (ibid).

Even more curious seems to us the assertion of Fr. Krafft, o.c., 45; 75, that "this highest God, already in Homer's Iliad, is the deity of the 'spirit', i.e. of the thinking reasoning faculty: Xenophanes
(i) assumes,
(ii) purges out and
(iii) elevates to the level of the then physical (WR 76) what the Homer he so criticized, already, knew: the supreme God is more than the second-rate deities, thanks to "spirit power," intellectuality.

A supreme being, which is somewhat Biblical in appearance. This, because God is without the demonic traits. Exalted morally. "One cannot doubt - says Jaeger - Xenophanes prayed to his one and only God (o.c.,52). Among other things, his feast-elegance (of which we are now giving a translation) testifies to his high sense of religion.

1.1. Now, after all, the paved floor - along with the hands and cups of all (present) - is clean. Someone puts, around our heads, braided wreaths. A second reaches out, in a bowl, fragrant self.

The mixing jar stands there, full of mirth, and, also, other wine is ready. It never, insidiously, seems to be missing,-- in jars giving off a honeyed sweet floral scent.

1.2. in the middle part (of the house), incense sends up holy incense. Cool water, sweet in taste and pure, is at your disposal. Next to it are blond wheat loaves and the table of sacred abundance succumbs to the pressure of cheese and fragrant honey. In the center stands the exalted altar (the Olympic deities in honor), decorated all around with flowers.

1.3. Song, accompanied by dance, and feast all around hold the house in their spell.

2.1. The first duty is to sing hymns in honor of God, in which salutary myths and pure words resound, for people who are well disposed.

Follow sacrificial worship and prayer,--this, to gain the strength to put righteousness into action. Which is obvious.

2.2. Only then, yes, is it not borderline ("hubris") to drink to the extent that someone, not too elderly, returns home without a helper, leading the way.

Among men, the one is praiseworthy who, though on the drink, gives evidence of sound things, -- how his memory and his vocal cords have manhood as their chief value.

3. Not the singing, in epic verse, of battles of Titans (WR 145) and Giants (= Giants) or also of Kentaurs (*note:* monsters half man half horse - all inventions of earlier generations - or of violent civil strife - there is no salvation in that -; however, always giving priority to honoring deities, is good.

Note:--

(1) Xenophanes does not, here, demythologize; he does, however, demand morally superior myths.

(2) WR 171 (the center point of the universe) pointed to the belief that there is, subtlety at least, a central point ("seal"), which, at the center of the house, is present.

W.R.   196.
Second sample.-- The eleatic logic of being or non-being.

Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *L. Jerphagnon, Parmenide*, in: D. Huisman, Dict. d. Phil., 2000/2003;
-- *Cl. Ramnoux, Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats*, Monaco, 1979, esp. 99/148;
-- *J. Beaufret, Le poème de Parménide*, Paris, 1955, vrl, 76/93 (Fragments);
--W.*W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics* (*From Permenidos to Bolzano*, Antw./ Nijmegen, 1944, 11/28 (*De Prae-Socratici*);
-- *Fr. Krafft*, o.c.,235/242 (*Parmenides von Elea*);
--W. *Röd, o.c.,* 108/125 (*Parmenides*);
--W. *Jaeger, A la naiss*., 99/117 (*Parménide ou la mystère de l' être*).

Parmenides of Elea lived from + -540 to at least -475.

General Location
1. "The criticism of religion - meant popular religion - of Xenophanes (WR 186/195) and the revival of theogonic contemplations (*note:* Jaeger means Orphism (WR 143/151)) showed us the profound influence that ionic natural philosophy, on the religious movement of the VIth century (-600/-500), exerted.

So far, philosophical thinking has been of the physical type (WR 40):
(i) she analyzed the process of emergence and decay (WR 11;92),
(ii) on its enduring origin ('archè', WR 39v.; 45v.), i.e. it sought to trace a first principle, the so-called 'arche' (principium)." (W. Jaeger, o.c., 99).

We may, at ease, add Paleopythagoreism (parallel to Orphism), which, likewise, saw in the one(s), as the origin of number (unit multiples; WR 103vv.; 111vv.; 119vv.; especially 171 (archidion)) its point of departure.

2. "With the Parmenidian doctrine concerning being ('on') begins a new, original phase of philosophical thought." (W. Jaeger, ibid.).

Indeed: the actualization, which Parmenides performed on the transmitted (WR 159) philosophy, looks, for the most part, like a rupture (WR 185: discontinuous).

The after-effects
Through Parmenides' disciples, through Platon of Athens and (Neo-) Platonism (WR 102) - takes 'un bon millénaire' (a good thousand years),-- according to L. Jerphagnon, a.c., 2000. A reason to spend a few minutes on it.

General characterization.
(1) *The "mythical" characterization.*
The poem (*op.:* by Parmenides) begins in a solemn tone.-- "The mares, who bear me, have led me as far as my desire ('thumos') wished.

W.R.   197.

They have, after all, led me to the famous path of the goddess ('daimonos', feminine). She, alone, through all the cities, carries man who 'knows' (...). And 'kourai', young girls, showed, hereby, the 'way'".

a. This preface has paragons : Homer (WR 38), Hesiod (ibid.),--as well as Xenophanes. The orphic model also comes into play (L. Jerphagnon, o.c., 2000). Jerphagnon says "le voyage d'un initié" (the "journey" of an initiate; WR 146: mystery religion), beyond the ways of the commonsense human being. -- One says - once again - no more, with the Enlightenment-rational historiography, that Greek philosophy originated laissez-faire, secularist, religion-free! For the umpteenth time, the historically verifiable fact appears to be different.

b. "Curious, again, is the inclusion of female figures - the 'demone' (goddess) and the girls. Similar to the muses (WR 42; 130).

(2) *The philosophical characterization.*
Do we, therefore, listen to what "thea," the goddess, says (1:22).
1. "Well: so I am going to speak - ye, hear my words and remember them. I am going to tell you what two only avenues of inquiry are conceivable.

(i) *The first way:*
How (being) is and how it is impossible that it is not. This is the way, which is reliable, for it adheres to the truth ('alètheiai).

(ii) *The second way*:
How (being) is not and how it is necessarily not. I tell you that this path is at worst a (dead-end) path, for this path implies nothing reliable". "Possibly Parmenides (...) simply wanted to express, in an abstract way, a complete disjunction of opinions concerning being(s) (...)" (W. Röd, o.c., 111).

This, at least, is how Parmenides' text was interpreted and one does not escape this interpretation, even though others are possible (inclusive interpretation, rather than exclusive interpretation). One has, here, what is now called: 'model' (being is) and 'counter-model' (being is not; which is incongruous, 'absurd; nonsensical).

a. By "disjunctive" one understands a sentence such that it ascribes as a saying opposites to the subject such that then terms "and/or" are used. Thus e.g. "In *Homer's Odusseia*, 5: 190v., it says: "I bear, in my heart, not a heart of iron but of endeared nature" Thus spoke the high goddess Kalupso".

W.R.   198.

Note the opposites 'heart of iron'/'endeared heart'. They are processed ('generated': WR 108vv.) in a 'not/ but' formula. "not a heart of iron, but an endeared heart".

In its depths lies "Either I, Kalupso, have an iron heart or I have an endeared heart." That is the speculative (W.R. 107) phrasing: the possibilities. The empirical phrasing reads, "I do not have a heart of iron, but an endeared heart."

Indeed, the goddess in love with Odusseus (Od., 5: 155), under the pressure of Zeus, lets him go (Od., 5/161), arranges for him to build a raft and provides him with food and clothes... so that he can return to his homeland, Ithakè, Ithaca (today: Theaki, Tiaki, -- an Ionian island). These are the empirical data, which turn an 'either/or' - possibility into a 'not/ but' factuality.

b. By 'complete disjunction' one means an either/or sense, which does not tolerate a third possibility, So e.g. it is impossible for something to be simultaneously 'be' and 'not - be'. Or be simultaneously 'so' (e.g. of iron) and 'not - so' (e.g. endeared).

2. "With this - says 'Thea', the goddess (8:50) - I end, for you, my exposition, which is reliable, and my reasoning ('noèma') of the truth.

Hear, from these words, by listening, the opinion 'doxa'; WR 189 (dokos), mortals own, and, at once, the 'kosmos apatelos' (the deceptive order) of my exposition. (...).
(i) On the one hand, the ethereal fire of the flame (...).
(ii) On the other hand, (...) the lightless night (...)".

So much for the poem of Parmenides. Follows then a kind of genesis (cosmogony) of the cosmos,--which is reminiscent of the physical. The arranger of this mixture of flame and night, two balanced 'forces', is the god eros (which is borrowed from *Hesiod's Theogonia*; WR 39; -- 102; 167). One senses that Parmenides means, with this, a kind of critique of the physicals (the Paleo-milesian and the Paleopythagorean).

W. Röd, o.c.,111, says, herewith, that this is an indirect proof in favor of his own complete disjunctive. If only either "being is" or "nonbeing is", on the one hand, and, on the other hand, "both being is and nonbeing is" are the only prepositions (starting points of reasoning), if further, the first preposition "being is" is valid, where the two other prepositions "nonbeing is" and, even, "both being and nonbeing is" are not valid, then, only, Parmenides' thesis "being is" (as the only valid one) remains.

W.R.   199.

Indeed: the structure of the indirect proof is the following: "either 1'... either 2... or 3..."; well, either 2... or 3... are invalid; so either 1 ...".

This is - as mentioned - natural, but valid as strict logical reasoning, if they are really complete disjunctions, which do not allow for any other statement.

If, now, with 'being is', Parmenides expresses his own, new philosophical intuition, and, with 'being is not', as well as with 'both the flame (// being) is and the night (// not being) is', expresses the theses either of the Paleomilesians or of the Paleopythagoreans or of Herakleitos (as one also thinks), then he has attempted, in the form of a strictly logically closed argument,
   (i) substantiate themselves and
   (ii) undermine (refute) the others.

In any case : the indirect proof (substantiating the model by the incongruent - with - proof of the counter model) became, since then, a fixed philosophical achievement. Cfr WR 4 (philosphia perennis).

The structure is: "either model or counter-model; well, counter-model not; so model" (Either M or TM; well, TM not; so M; or also: Either M or TM1 or TM2; well, TM1 AND TM2 not; so M).

Or still: "Only M or TM1 or TM2 make sense, possibly; well, in fact, TM1 and TM2 make no sense; so M makes sense." - One sees that the reasoning begins with the speculative (what may be), to end with the empirical (what is factual). One sees the structure of the theoria (WR 41) : through the empirical application one 'sees' the speculative idea (i.e. 'complete disjunction').

Id.
We call everything that is consistent with or related to 'identity' 'identitarian'. Well, Parmenides is at the same time the founder of ontology (theory of being) and of the ontologically founded, identitive logic. (theory of thought).

Identical **1.**
-- *G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtsschreibung*, Stuttgart, 1962, 9/20 (*Das Skelett der Logik*), -

6.3.3. *Philosophical rhetoric*. *Part III, p. to201308 .*

W..R.   200.

(i) defines traditional logic as the doctrine of identity and negation;

(ii) adds, to this, immediately, that either full, total, complete identity is of something with itself (= looping, reflexive identity) or partial, partial identity is of something with something else (analogical, partial identity).

Applicable model:

(i) Kalupso's endearment is volitional only with himself;

(ii) but endearment is part-identical to its concrete manifestations (the infrastructure provision), as well as to all that is either related to or similar to endearment.

Id. at 2.

The Scholastics (800/1450) introduced a systechy - common to this day namely "material object/formal object".

(i) Kalupso, considered materially, Kalupso is volitional (i.e. as distinct, resp. independent of the rest of being(de).

(ii) Kalupso, formally speaking, is the volidentical kalupso, but part-identical denoted;-- i.e.

(a) Kalupso, mythologized, is a goddess;

(b) Kalupso, ethically speaking, is good-hearted;

(c) Kalupso, erotically, is in love with Odusseus, etc..

"Omne individuum inafabile" said, already, the Scholasticians: every volitional ('individual-concrete') fact is inexpressible (the series of sayings, on such a subject, is infinite). What C.S.S. Peirce called the infinite series of interpretations.

Note.-- The scheme stands WR 160: one-verb, ground scheme of hermeneutics.

Id. at 3.

The Microsocracykers:

1. The Megarics (School of Megara: Eukleidès of Megara (+ /- -400); his pupil Euboulides of Miletos));

2. The Elician-Eretrian School (Faidon of Elis (+/- -375); Mènedèmos of Eretria (-319/ -265);

3. The Paleocynics (Palaeicynics: Antisthenes of Athens (-440/-365); the infamous Diogenes of Sinope (-400/-325; the 'cynic')),-- these three Kleinsocratic schools eleatized.

The identitative judgment structure.

What Platon, later, will call "to onoma" (the noun component, "subject") and "to rhèma" (the verb component), within a sentence of judgment, has - logically - a distinct, though closely related structure:

(i) the nomen (= subject) vol-identically designates the reality, about which the judgment is concerned;

(ii) the verbum (= saying) denotes part-identical, -

W. R.   201.

Judgment is, as Aristotle, later, in his booklet on judgment, in its title, will say 'hermeneia', interpretatio, interpretation (WR 164vv.; 178/ 181).

But the eleatizing microsocracykers misrepresent this. For example, they will claim that the phrase "Kalupso is in love with Odusseus" is an untrue judgment" and back up this value judgment with the claim that "the know- and think-contents (ideas) 'Kalupso' and 'in love with Odusseus' are 'non-identical', so to speak. Two fallacies they commit:

(1) the idea, expressed in the subject, is meant materially (= volidentically) and the second idea, expressed in the saying, is formally, partidentically asserted from the subject;

(2) they, like Parmenides, their great predecessor, never seem to have distinguished between total and partial identity. The analogy, in the practically used idea 'being', they seem never to have discovered.

Wittily expressed, "Kalupso is in love with Odusseus" does not mean that "Kalupso is nothing, per se (reflexively), but 'in love with Odusseus,'" but rather that one of Kalupso's (otherwise purely transient) traits is that she is "in love with Odusseus. Nothing more. There 'is' more and different - in her - than that!

Conclusion.

W. Jaeger, A la naiss., 112, notes: since Homer, noein; intellegere, reasoning into, 'identify', has always meant

(i) become aware of a fact

(ii) such that this awareness (WR 137: expanded consciousness) enters into "that which it is" (according to Jaeger), i.e., its identity (singularity). immediately we have the basic idea of eleatism.

The "absolute" nature of "his(de).

Verse VIII: 29, informs us that the his(de) is "kath'heauto te keitai", the (his(de)) is there in itself.

Bibl. Stitchpr.: *Silvio Senn, An sich (Skizze zu einer Begriffsgeschichte*), in: *Philosophica Gandensia, New Series*, 10 (1972): 80/96, notes that the expression "in itself," "taken in itself," "objective," "absolute" (or other words, which represent the same thing), governs the entire ontology, but is first found with Parmenides.

Senn underlines the fact that this term, par excellence, is an ontological term, a problem in itself: how to know being(de) in itself, independently of the knowing subject (= noèsis, intellectio, insight)? The reason seems to be that we, humans, at least, possess only formal, part-identical insights ('interpretations') and, thus, never, grasp the total identity of 'being(de)'. This is, undeniably, correct.

W.R.   202.

But Senn himself: how does he know that we grasp only the subjective (WR 189: opinion), if he himself has grasped absolutely nothing of the objective his(de)? Senn can only maintain his claim, if he, himself, has already grasped beforehand (WR 203: identify) **(i)** that and **(ii)** what "being(de) is"!

Note -- Last year, Denkleer, we saw that 'being(de)' always includes both factuality (though that 'existence' ('existentia') was only true in the imagination) and mode of being ('essentia'). In other words, everything that is not-nothing is 'something' (and that is 'being(de)'). The totality of all that is not-nothing is what we call Permenides' term 'to on' (being).

In other words: who does not grasp the idea of 'not-nothing'? Even a child understands - intuitively, admittedly - that. Well, Parmenides' being is nothing more - purely logically speaking - than the collection of all that is not-nothing. However vague, in its final details, everyone understands this. Well, that is the starting point for situating the absolute character of 'being(s)':
  (i) all that is actual being (= non-nothingness)
  (ii) is situated in its totality.

1. That's all Parmenides claims with 'kath' heauto', per se. For: notice how what is not-nothing, confronts us with our inability, in our honest inner consciousness, to ignore it! Conscience has this as its (only) foundation. The conscientious man never denies what is not-nothing: "kath' heauto te keitai", it is there in itself, absolutely.

2. This is, even, so true that the incongruous (absurd) e.g. "kath'heauto te keitai" (there, in itself, imposes itself (on consciousness)).

a. Did we not see that:
  (i) Parmenides himself put down the phrase "being is not" (which is pure nonsense, 'absurdum', nonsense) (WR 197) in his teaching poem (= didactic text type) and
  (ii) that our mathematicians continually prove their (however very sensible) theorems by the roundabout means of what is incongruous? (WR 198v.: the indirect proof).

b. Did we not see how often the (merely) speculative - among others by the structuralists - is used as a starting point? (WR 41; 112; 198).

c. Did we not see how the tawdry is the rash of (religious) works of art? (WR 52).
Will Senn dare to claim that:
(a) The absurd (of mathematicians),
(b) the purely conceived possibilities (der structuralists),
(c) The fantasies of artists
etc. be the "absolute nothing"? Then he would be deleting a huge part of our culture!

W.R.   203.

3. -- The Paleopythagoreans

through Philolaos of Kroton (WR 170v.)--have (like so many other ideas derived from other schools) adopted the idea "in itself": "To no one would ever be known but a single being

(i) either in itself ('kath' hauta')

(ii) or in its relations ('allo pot' allo') if the (unit and its) multiples did not exist (...)". (O. Willmann, o.c., 282).

This proves the argumentative power of Parmenides' second basic idea "in itself" (as distinguished from "with respect to").

The "onto.theo.logic," eleatic.
W. Jaeger, Paideia; I, 237, says that Parmenides, apparently, deliberately hooks up with Anaximandros of Miletos (WR 92v.).

1. Nature, according to Aneximandros, comes into being and perishes (WR 196). Yet this coming into being and passing away is not capricious : it is the expression of a deeper ananke, dike, moira (three names for one and the same natural law, which founds justice).

The highest goal of human wisdom ("knowledge") is to "see through" (theoria) precisely that basic justice.

2. As mentioned, Parmenides rejects the (demonic structure "becoming / decaying" as the norm and law of being.

On the contrary - says Jaeger - the basic justice (dike) is the steering power (W.R 46) which directs 'being' in such a way that that being can neither come into being nor perish. In other words : in the Parmenidean idea of being, necessity lies in such a way that it is above arising and perishing.

Better said : above every multiplicity, she weze diachronical (like arising and decaying) she weze synchronical (like a multiplicity which would 'condemn' being e.g. to its opposite, non - being, or to an 'inner contradiction', like the flame / night contradiction of some physicalists (Herakleitos e.g.) (WR 198v.)),-- above every dispersion ('multiplicity'), being is, eleatically signified, exalted, yes, deified.

This is the theological aspect (which was already present with the Milesians and the Paleopythagoreans as well: WR 39: Okeanos; Gaia and Eros; WR 131; 171: Pythag. divine unity).

This theological aspect is the very core of Parmenides' ontology. This we express, with M. Heidegger, in the term 'onto.theology'. But, as we saw, with Röd, WR 198v: Parmenides founded "a strictly logical whole" (*W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I: 236f.). Consequence: again, with Heidegger, we say: 'onto.theo.logic: Thus the threefold structure of Eleatism is articulated.

W.R.   204.

When, in his teaching poem (I : 26vv.), Parmenides, as a young man, 'in love' with the truth, concerning physical, is taken in by the goddess, she says : "for sure, by no means a fate has set you on this road - this road is, after all, not that of the common man no; Themis and Dike (WR 66), the oldest law and the younger Zeus law, represented in the goddesses Themis and Dike, (have led you on it)."

Further, VIII: 12vv, Parmenides explicitly states what Jaeger claimed. "Nor will the firm conviction ever again admit that out of being there arises anything - however it may be - that exists 'nevens' (outside) that being.

This is precisely why Dike (the Zeus righteousness) has not allowed - thanks to tight control - the being to arise or decay. Being persists. The judgment ('crisis', verdict, conclusion), under that point of view, deals with the basic choice: either the being is or the being is not. (...). For, supposing that being came into being, then it is not. Nor, supposing that being would ever, in the future, come into being, is it.

Conclusion: the analysis (of being) is, by no means, about its arising or perishing". -- One sees that, as a ground (necessary and sufficient reason or ground; WR 60: abduction) of the steadfast, unchanging order, to which the thoroughly logically ordered being testifies, Parmenides, as an archaic Greek, sees nothing but a legal order founding couple of goddesses, Themis and Dike. cfr WR 46 (conformed); 197: initiate. Cf. also Parmenides' teaching poem VIII: 37 (Moira).

As especially his disciples, Zenon and Melissos, though not unanimously, will explain, for Parmenides, multiplicity is dispersion of the one, single being. But, as a dispersion of that one and only being, is to assume multiplicity of being and non-being; well, the latter is impossible.

Consequence: purely logically there is no multiplicity, (meant, by Parmenides) multiplicity of being, i.e. more than one total being,--which, for him, would be being and non-being (i.e. inner contradiction).

W.R.   205,
The gestalt' of being.

WR 114/118 (Paleopythagorean Gestalt). - We saw that the Paleopythagoreans always used schemata, grammata, configurations, to perform thought operations.

We know, too, that the psychology of unreflective consciousness, since Oswalt Külpe (1862/1915) - spread over the Würzburg, Cologne, Mannheim, and Amsterdam schools - have, thanks to retrospective thought experiments, revealed that there are, simultaneously, but not always as clearly and strongly, two fundamental levels of consciousness. These are:

(i) the sense singular given ('representation' (e.g., that picture there of Brigitte Simonetta, the meteorologist of Antenna 2)),

(ii) the abstract idea (e.g., a female meteorologist or meteorologist). This is, however, a kind of interval or interstice : it has been established that, in thinking, there are schematic, less singular representations. For example (to remain in the same order): the idea of a 'female meteorologist' is accompanied, in the imagination, by the 'figure' of a woman (with a faint hint of 'learning', for example).

This two-prongedness (because the schema, gramma, faded - generalized representation, is not an idea) comes from the Cologne school (under Lindworsky).

Bibl. stitch pr:
-- _Bigot et al, Leerboek der psychologie_, Groningen/ Djakarta, 1954-5, 376v..-- We shall, now, see how right this is.
-- _J. Brun, Les présocratiques_, Paris, 1982-3, 72, summarizes the series of characteristics that Parmenides attributes to being.
-- As _E. des Places_, S.J., _La religion grecque_, Paris, 1969, 185/187; 314s., says, Parmenides wrote a hymn (religious song, in hexameters), whose accumulation/ enumeration of lofty qualities is striking.

We can classify them into two collections
(a) Inherent, imperishable, -- eternal, what was not and what will not be, but is (in an eternal "now"); these features are evident from what went before (ontotheologica);

(b) one, contiguous (= continuum), without dispersion or aggregation, indivisible, always whole and all,-- unmoved located in the same place, radiating from the center point in all directions at once, not here and not there, not diminished and not increased, finished all around such that it resembles a sphere, (spherical), which is nicely round.

It is clear that here - in (b) - not an abstract idea, but a 'gramma', a 'visualization', a configuration formed in Parmenides' imagination, is being expressed.

Parmenides' 'being' exhibits, at once, two thoroughly different levels of consciousness, to use Lindworsky's language : WR 197vv. teaches us a strictly logical 'being'; WR 207 teaches us a 'being' 'proposed' in configurative imagination.

WR 52 brought us to the fact that Parmenides was labeled the "father of materialism" by J. Burnet. If Burnet could find any evidence for his thesis, it is the schematizing level of consciousness (which is essentially at home in the imagination; WR 49, 133: the smug is not purely coarse material), with which Parmenides makes his 'being', which he, however, thinks strictly logically (on an abstract, unschematic and, certainly, unsingular, coarse material level), a.o. sensual or rather phantasmatic (cfr WR 31).

Parmenides does it in his Greek-Paleopythagorean way (WR 114: schematism)

Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *G. Verbeke, The genesis of philosophical spiritualism*, in: Tijdschr.v. Philosophy, 8 (1946): 1 (Feb.), 3/26;
-- Fr. Krafft, O.c.,237ff..-- Krafft, ibid., says: "Being or, better, being is, for Parmenides,

(1) something situated above and beyond any ordinary visibility ('visualization') and sensory perception. In this sense, it is 'non-present',

(2) But Parmenides' being is not yet in any way, 'disembodied'. Reason: the systechy of 'corporeal/ disembodied' at that time, not yet conceivable. A being presupposes, automatically, a corporeal being.

The sharp distinction sets in, only, with Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (WR 52). But, only with Platon of Athens, does the opposition 'corporeal/ disembodied', 'material/ incorporeal', find its - virtually immediate - highest formulation."

Noelogical aspect.
WR 142 (higher gifted soul); 152 (good soul); 153v. (noölogical) taught us - admittedly Paleopythagorean (Orphic) - what noölogy is: it is that part of psychology which reveals the higher in the human soul.

Parmenides' teaching poem, VIII: 34, says, "Noein (WR 203), identify ('identify'), and that to which the act of identification is directed ('noèma'), are 'tauton', idem, the same.

WR 135 taught us, already, the basic idea, which is applied here, for the umpteenth time : by means of the like (the model) to know the like b.v.;-- here: by means of the idea of being (because, apparently, Parmenides is that far) to achieve being.

W.R. 207.

Parmenides is, truly, the founder of idealism and spiritualism, stricto sensu: he sees, first, that

(i) opposite 'its(the)' there is absolutely nothing (WR 198v.),

(ii) in man the 'noein', the identifying (identifying) knowing and thinking, which achieves his(de), by means of 'the same', i.e. a being-idea. The idea of being transcends, boundlessly, the 'Gestalt' (WR 207v.) of that being(de) in the imagination;

1. That transcending involves idealism, i.e. the assumption of a "something" in the mind ("nous", - Homeric "voös" (so e.g. Odusseia 1:66)), which is above and beyond any sense-perceivable reality, viz. the idea (as, some time later, Platon will say; WR 30), which corresponds to being(de).-- WR 110; 133; 170; 172; 175, (= Paleopythagor. ideal.).

2. That transcending involves, secondly, spiritualism, i.e. starting from the fact that the being (man), which, over a sense-perceptible transcending idea, is suitable, at the same time, itself, in its deeper essence, transcends the sense.

In other words: it must, itself, in its 'soul', be 'spiritual' ('spiritual'). -- idealism and spiritualism are related.-- We summarize this in the term 'noölogy'.

Rhetorical aspect.
J.-P. Vernant, Les origines de la philosophie, in: *Chr. Delacampagne/ R. Maggiori, dir., Philosopher* (*Les interrogations contemporaines / Matériaux pour un enseignement*), Paris, 1980, 468, says:

"Against the full 'positivity, ('stilted' or tethered to observable facts, of the ionic physicalists (WR 40), rises the ideal of a complete and elaborated reasonableness ('intelligibilité'). (...).

It is the formal rigor of the evidence (...) and not its apparent conformity with the 'natural evidences' (...). The effort at generating series of statements, which are so interlocked that each of them encompasses all the others (...)" (O.c., 468s.).

Behold how Vernant characterizes Parmenides' contribution. We shall see this more clearly in Zenon's applications of that strict-logic method of understanding such that one 'influences' the fellow reasoning (WR 4).

W.R.   208.

Third sample.-- The zenonic fundationalism critique.

Bibl. stitch pr. :

-- *J. Salem, Zenon d' Elée*, in: *D. Huisman, Dict.d.phil.*, 2098;

-- *Cl. Ramnoux, Parménide et ses successeurs immédiats,* Monaco, 1979, 151/166;

- *W. Röd, Die Phil.d.Antike*, 1, 126/139 (*Zeno*);

-- *Fr. Krafft, Gesch.d.Naturwissenschaft*, 1, 240/242; 295ff.;

-- *P. Foulquié, La dialectique*, Paris, 1949, 12/14 (Zénon d' Elée);

-- *E.W. Beth, The Philosophy of Mathematics* (*From Parmenides to Bolzano*), Antw./Nijm., 1944, 15/28 (*Zeno of Elea*);

These works/worksheets provide the background information on Parmenides' most famous student/thinker (WR 91) Zenon of Elea (-500/...).

Introduction.

Bibl. stitch pr:

-- *F. van Eemeren/ R. Grootendorst/ T. Kruiger, Argumentation Theory*, Utr./ Antw.,1981-2, 17/20 (*A basic model of argumentation*);

-- *T. van Dijk, Textology* (*An interdisciplinary introduction*), Utr./Antw., 1978, 71/74 (*What is pragmatics?*);

-- *I.M. Bochenski, Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 48/50 (*The three dimensions of the sign*);

-- *Colin Cherry, On Human Communication* (*A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism*), Cambridge / Massachusttes/ London, 1966-2, 219/ 257 (*On the Logic of Communication* (*Syntectics/ Semantics/ Pragmatics*));

-- *C.W. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, in: *International Encylopaedia of Unified Science Series*, I, Na. 2, Chicago, 1938 (*note:* Morris is the founder of semiotics, vertex as signification (*Lady Welby, Significs*, in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, London, 1911-11; WR 6; 20).

This brief bibliography demonstrates - once searched - that a three-part structure can function as a ground insight. We now explain these.

1.-- *Applicative model.*

Let us take - to remain in the antique-Greek sphere - an extract from the Odusseia (1:19b/ 95: The meeting of the deities). We translate, quickly, what the goddess Athene says: "Our Father, Son of Chronos (WR 139: Chronos; 143: Zeus), the Highest among the commanders,(...) the misery of the wise hero Odusseus weighs heavily on me (= Athene).

So long already, he endures, far from his loved ones, many forms of misery,--and all on the island surrounded by tidal waves, the navel of the sea (WR 171: archidion); 195: midpoint).(*note:* meant is the island of Ogugia, the ancient - venerable (island), where Odusseus, washed ashore as a drowning man, was saved by the goddess Kalupso (WR 197v.)). (...)."

W.R.   209.

The island is, admittedly rich in (beautiful) forests. But a goddess, the daughter of the all-pervading Atlas (*note:* in Greek myth, the deity of the heavens as a steadfast system) - Calupso - inhabits her cave there. (...) . But Odusseus dies of nostalgia for - if only - (from afar) seeing smoke rise (from the hearths) above his father's ground and, then, to die.

Does not with you, Olympian (WR 123), in your innermost being, your heart turn, moved by sympathy with Odusseus? (...). - So much for reasoned plea.

2. -- *Initial analysis.*
a. Hermeneutics (WR 164), as text analysis, distinguishes, first, two dimensions ("aspects," partial identities) in a text.

a.-- There is the actual, strictly "textual" message. Thus e.g.
(i) the words themselves, which Homer quotes, as Athens' plea; and
(ii) the words, which, in this course, are quoted from the Odusseia (context of Athena's plea/ text of her plea).

b. What, by F. van Eemeren et al, *Argumentation Theory*, 17, is called the purport. Thus, in this applicative model:

    (i) the thrust, in Athens's plea, is to return Odusseus, at the command of the commander, par excellence, Zeus, to his homeland;

    (ii) the thrust - by citing the entire text - of the drafter of this course, namely, to provide an applicative model, following a textual analysis.

b. Hermeneutics, as text analysis, can avail itself, also, of T. van Dijk, *Text Science,* 71, to -denote precisely the same thing - matter-of-factly -speaking.

a.-- The author distinguishes, in a text, first, the language expression (the object that is 'expressed', i.e. the strict message (see above)).

b.-- Then, in the same text, he distinguishes the act of language (WR 6; 20) or language act, i.e. the purport (see, also above).

We take a step further into the pragmatics of text (analysis): 'pragmatics' is called, by van Dijk, "the science, which is concerned with the study of acts of language" (o.c., ibid.).

3.-- *Second analysis.*
With Charles Morris (1901/1979), both Colin Wilson and Bochenski distinguish, within the strict message (language expression), two partial aspects.

a.-- *The syntactics.*
The system of words, as interpretations of ideas (WR 5), has an "interrelationship. ' The analysis animal relations, mutually, Morris calls 'syntactics.

b. -- *The semantics.*

The system of words, which make up the textual communication, has a meaning: the sentences uttered are talking about the subject, the given.-- Let us now apply this dual scheme.

Ad. a. - *Syntactic*

Let us take the sentence "The misery of the wise hero Odusseus weighs me down"! Subject: 'the misery' (involving the adverbial clause of 'possession' (attribution), viz.) 'of the wise hero Odusseus'; predicate: 'weighs' (involving the precisions or determinations of direct object (the attribution of 'weighing')), 'me' (and the adverbial clause of wise, viz.) 'heavily'.

A. *It is clear that:*

(1) the signifying structure 'subject' (volitional)/ 'proverb' (partialidentical subject) ,

(2) 'further determined' (specified) by 'stipulations' (in both interpretation file parts), controls the syntax, the interrelationships, of the words (WR 180: one/ plural', -- 159: one subject/ plural of sayings; 200: noun and verb head part).

B. *The interpretive twofoldness with its provisions*

is a structure, in the structural sense. WR 109 taught us that self-regulation (= structure, in the stricter sense) governs (= keeps within its grasp) a series of transformations (transformations) such that the series forms a system (coherent whole).

We transform the preceding sentence, thanks to the substitution of subject and predicate (with clauses). "So long, already, he endures, far from his loved ones, many forms of misery, - and this on the island surrounded by tidal waves, the navel of the sea".

The syntactic analysis (dissection) shows, again, the self-regulation (identical structure) inherent in every sentence (however diverse the subjects and the sayings may be).

Subject; 'he', (with adjective clause) 'removed' (with adverb clause) 'from his loved ones';

Saying: 'endures' (with direct object) 'many forms of misery' (with adjective clause of place), 'and does so on the island surrounded by tidal waves' (with adjective clause), 'the navel of the sea'. All the individual words of this last sentence are different from those of the preceding one (= transformation); but the structure (= self-regulation) is identical .

Consequence: both sentences belong to the same system of transformations, governed by the interpretation structure.-- thus one can transform the structure, in its elements, by analyzing the following sentences similarly.

W.R.   211.

Re b.-- *Semantic.*

The same phrases are, now, analyzed differently. - The words, in interpretive structure, mean something, viz. **(i)** Odusseus' misery(s); **(ii)** Athens' attitude to it, etc..

In other words: meaning, in the language community, becomes, through singular-concrete language use, content of communication.

Note. **a**. In linguistics, semantics is concerned with the meaning of words ("lexigraphy"), groups of words, sentences.

In philosophy (resp. logic), this is assumed and the emphasis is placed on the argument, which is expressed in words, groups of words and sentences. One speaks, then, of 'interpretation' (interpretation in singular and concrete terms) of what the syntax offers.

Especially when that philosophy proceeds in a formalized manner. - Cf. WR 108: Z = ab (= subject / proverb).

b. *An application.*

(1) *Syntactically*: o (= subject) + b1(o) , b2(o) , b3(o), ... bnn(o) + g (= predicate) + b1(g), b2(g), b3(g), bn(g) (*note*: the signs b(o) and b(g) represent the clauses of subject and predicate). The series of signs is a structure (self-regulation). As written down, above, it is purely syntactic, -- 'uninterpreted' (i.e. an empty scheme, fillable by meanings).

(2) *Semantically*: "The misery (= O) of the wise hero Odusseus (= B(O)) weighs (= G) heavily on me (= BG).

In other words: by filling in the abstract-synthetic signs, which only represent the structure (self-regulation), by semantically interpreting them (providing them with meanings), one establishes an applicative model (= semantic model, application of the regulatory model, which is hidden in syntax).

In other words: the syntactic structure gives a set of relations (of 'empty shells'); the semantics 'interprets' those abstract signs through meanings formulated in words.

Note.-- One can compare this with WR 114/118 (gestalt) : through semantics one 'sees' the syntactic gestalt. So much for the introduction, with its threefold semiotics.

Fundationalism Criticism.--Already in 1925, a remarkable representative of the Anglo-Saxon type of language analysis, Georg Edward Moore (1873/1958), in his *A Defence of Common Sense*, in: *J. Muirhead, Contemporary British Philo-sophy*, London, criticized Fundationalism.

Karl Popper (1902/1994) (WR 61), in his *Logik der Forschung* (1941) does it in turn.

'Fundationalism'

'Fundationalism' is the view that all knowledge must be grounded. By 'ground' ('reason'), necessary and sufficient reasons, one means first of all conclusive proof. A 'justification' such that what is asserted can be considered proven, is an absolute necessity, in the eyes of the fundationalist.

Fundationalism is a kentrek of one type of rationalism. The fundational rationalist

(i) believes, with René Descartes (1596/1650), that a knowledge, an insight, a proposition, is grounded, justified, and, thus, "rational," if it is grounded on (preferably mathematically) rigorous proving reason;

(ii) believes, with John Locke (1632/1704), that knowledge is grounded if it is grounded on sense perception and, thus, is "rationally justified.

The intellectualist rationalist (Descartes type) has faith in (mathematical) reason, as in the firm foundation (foundation); the empiricist rationalist (Locke type) has faith in (sensory) perception, as in the firm foundation.

Both variants of rationalism believe, still, in infallible authority, one of intellect, the other of perception.

Conclusion.

'Fundationalism' is

(i) the view that knowledge should be grounded and

(ii) that, for that grounded knowledge, really, a ground can be found (either intellectual reason or empirical reason).

Fundationalismcriticism

Fundationalism criticism is - thus - the questioning, on 'rational' grounds, of

(i) the need for all assertions to be absolutely proven and

(ii) the possibility, for that purpose, of a ground of proof.-

Fundationalism criticism comes, therefore, loose from

(i) the evidence mania and

(ii) the naive belief in the authority of evidence, reasoning, and observation.

K. Popper, Logik der Forschung, Wien, 1934, 10f., says, concerning the reason for the need of 'grounds', absolute foundations, the following: "We suspect that scientific research - psychologically speaking - without a scientifically unquestionable faith - if one, therefore, wants : a 'metaphysical faith' - in, more often than not, extremely inexplicable theoretical ideas - is not possible at all".

In other words: well-founded points of departure, propositions which are guaranteed to be true, cannot, humanly speaking, be missed - not even in scientific work and research. Thus even the scientist needs 'foundations'.

W.R.   213.

Thus e.g. Popper himself says that "what is science" is not itself "science-decidable" (i.e., makeable),--that the idea of "science" is itself a philosophical extra-scientific starting point. Popper says -- just now -- that even the professional scientist cannot get by without 'metaphysical belief' (e.g., the so-called metaphysical belief in professional science itself) and that that belief is psychologically necessary. This must be - because of the sharp-thinking Popper - a mistake: he must have meant that such a belief is metatheoretical (WR 188). This implies that, purely methodologically, a sharp idea - itself unprovable by professional science: it cannot begin, without that belief, a sharp idea 'professional science' determines the language (and at once the view) of the professional scientist.

Rhetoric of professional science.

G.-G. Granger (1920/2016), a well-known rationalist, commits an analogous fallacy. In his *Pensée formelle et sciences de l' homme*, Paris, 1967, 21/24 (*Rhétorique et contenus*), Granger attempts to make two claims true:

(1) 'Rhetoric' (which he conceives very poorly, making it all the more easily - can be - let us say - ridiculed) locks itself into the purely 'verbal' (word stuff). Thus o.c., 21 ("L' usage rhétorique du langage se distingue radicalement de son usage scientifique en ce qu' il s' enferme dans un univers verbal").

(2) 'Rhetoric' - says Granger a little further - uses language as a means of influence between more than one subject (if only for the purely 'aesthetic' enjoyment, which the speaking and listening or reading subject derives from it; o.c., 22).

(3) Professional science, on the other hand,-- Granger says, always -- uses the language
(a) not only as a means of understanding between the subjects (= the subject scientists) engaged in professional science,
(b) but also as a means of interpretation between those same subjects and the perceived world such that the objects of that perceptual world become "maniables" (manageable). (O.c., 231s))

In the words of *Thomas S. Kuhn* (1922/1996), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Meppel, 1976-2, 135 : "When we survey the vast experimental literature (...), the suspicion arises that something like a paradigm, too, underlies observation.

W.R.   214.

What a person 'sees' (WR 41: theoria), depends **(i)** both on the object, to which he looks, **(ii)** and on what he has learned to 'see' through his past visual -conceptual experiences. in the absence of such training (= rehearsal), there exists only - in the words of William James (1842/1910) - 'a blooming buzzing confusion' ".

Note.-- 'Visual-conceptual' means, practically, the paradigm (in Platonic terms: idea), which, through practice, in group relation, rises from the observed facts.

Kuhn provides an applicative model o.c.,36: "At some time between 1740 and 1780, the electricity theorists (WR 190v.: language of perception/theoretical language) were, for the first time, able to accept, without more, the foundations (WR 212) of their field.

1. From that moment on, they threw themselves into more concrete and hidden problems and reported their results, more and more, in articles, addressed to other electricity theorists, instead of in books, addressed to the developed world in general.

2. As a group, they achieved what
(i) The astronomers, in ancient times,
(ii) the movement researchers in the middle ages,
(iii) the physical-opticists in the late XVIIth century,
(iv) reached the historical-geologists, early XIXth century.
I.e.: they had produced a paradigm, which proved to be capable of leading the research of the whole group.

Except with the aid of hindsight, it is difficult to find another means of characterization ('criterion') that so clearly declares a field to be a (professional) science."

Conclusion.
(1) As also the orator (the so-called "rhetor")
    a. addresses other subjects (Granger's first dimension)
    b. to influence them to a different (preferably his own) view ('theoria'), i.e. re-determination, of the objects from their perception,

(2) so does the professional scientist:
    a. he finds, by chance, usually, a new "view" (in Kuhn's language game: paradigm) of the objects of an observation;
    b. he communicates that view to other subjects,
        b.1. the educated reader (vulgarizing rhetoric of professional scientists),
        b.2. the 'specialist' ('high' vulgarization), such that both 'view' (= interpretation) of the observable world ('objects' from it) is influenced (preferably in the sense of the influencing professional scientist himself).

W.R.   215.
General Conclusion.

1. WR 43 taught us that, from the earliest "philosophy," theology, philosophy, professional science, and rhetoric were a contiguous whole.

2. It is clear that, after what Popper and Kuhn said, this is still true today - except as far as theology is concerned. Metatheory of scientific theory (WR 188v.) includes, by necessity, both philosophy (WR 213) and rhetoric (just now).

In other words: if the professional scientist wants to come to full consciousness (WR 137) of what he is doing (= professional scientific work), he should do it metatheoretically. If he wants to do it metatheoretically, then he should involve both philosophy and rhetoric: these belong intrinsically, i.e. situated in the cogwheel of the science of the trade itself, to the full awareness of itself.

Note.-- Regarding the crisis of enlightened rationalism, following its foundational crisis (by the fundationalism critique), see: *W.W. Bartley, Flucht ins Engagement* (*Versuch einer Theorie des offenen Geistes*), Munich (Szczesny Verlag), 1964.-- We will return - in part - to this.

The zenonic (logical) syntax.

Clemente Ramnoux, Parménide, 158ss, summarizes the logical syntax (WR 210v.), founded by Zenon of Elea, as follows. Ramnoux calls this 'formalization', i.e. reduction of a text (the full text, semantic-pragmatic) to its strict logical binte (= the syntax).

a.-- Zenon, Ramnoux argues, begins with the starting base ("foundation") of the opponent (which includes agonistics; WR 11; 144).

Phraseologically (i.e., in terms of the formulation of the 'frasis' - sentence formation), an 'if' heralds the sentence.

Applicable model:
"If (which my opponent claims) there is a multiplicity of 'being', there is ...".

Applicable model:
 "If there is movement (= multiplicity of traversing places), ...".

Note.-- One can see that the eristician (contention speaker; WR 9: the soemeric tenzones) Zenon is so cunning as to express the thesis of his opponent (perhaps either the Paleopythagorean (multiplicity) or Herakleitos (movement)) in the (WR 214: training) language (which at the same time contains the interpretation) rehearsed by his teacher. Which - logically - is dishonest. Why? Because, in the closed language system (of Pythagoreans or Herakleitos), he introduces a language alien to that system.

W. R.   216.

Read the pages on Pythagoreanism (WR 98/181) or the further to be developed ultra brief overview (as well as what was said about the dialectic, Course First Year) on Herakleitos' philosophy: there is, at least, as much logical syntax (coherence) in it as in Zenon's system. It would have been more appropriate, for Zenon, to choose not the Parmenidean starting point but that of the opponent. Only then would he have shown the full sense of system.

b. -- Ramnoux summarizes the further steps, in reasoning as follows.

b.1. To derive from the lemma (basic proposition) - thanks to argumentation (argument, proof) - inferences, which, are mutually (i.e. syntactically) contradictory (contradictory).

b.2 To infer from such contradictions that the basic assumption is impossible (understand: incongruous, absurd).-- Cf. WR 198v. (Parmenides' method).

Note.-- Ramnoux, o.c.,158, says that as a metatheoretical lemma Zenon supposes (without articulating it) that, to be valid, a premise, must not lead to contradictory derivations. Which is the method of proving from the incongruous (i.e., from the counter model). Parmenides, of this, laid the foundation of proof, in that he drew, ontologically, the absolute contradiction of being(s) and not being(s) ready.

See - thus - higher, before that. Meanwhile, it appears that philosophy, in its ontology, is one of the philosophical (and not vocational) presuppositions of vocational science. (WR 213). In other words, professional science runs, with philosophy, into one. "Put more simply, one must not contradict oneself" (Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 158).

Simply formalized:

If - as a lemma - acd1, acd2...,acdn are postulated, such that - in the analysis - the derivations csq1, csq2 ...csqn , which, according to the logical syntax, necessarily, follow from it, are mutually contradictory (in the form 'either csqx or csqy or csqz') then that lemma contains incongruity and, immediately, some alternative lemma is logically valid.

Behold the logical syntax of Zenon's argument.

Compare with WR 211: there it was about the logical coherence of the judgment; here it is about the logical coherence of a series of judgments, which can be called 'argument'.

W.R.   217.
The zenonic fundationalism critique.

a. We know, now, that Zenon is the -- as far as we know -- founder of (applied) logical syntax (sense of systematic derivation coherence).

b. But is he, at once, in that way (the analysis of logical syntax), also the founder of the (applied) critique of fundationalism? Yes, if Aristotle - as E.W. Beth, o.c., 19, says - is telling the truth: "The four movement paradoxes (*op.:* logical-inconsistent reasoning; 'antinomies') mentioned by Aristotle are all variations on the same theme.

They lead, all of them, to the same conclusion: (the hypothesis of multiplicity) does not provide a starting point for the rational explanation (of the phenomena of motion) either as does (the Eleatic unification theory)."

Consequence: both theses have nothing to reproach each other with. What implies is that Zenon himself was convinced of the absurdity of Parmenides' starting point. He only wanted to prove - if Aristotle is correct - that the opponents also took equally absurd positions.

If, therefore, Aristotle correctly points out, then Zenon is, unmistakably, the founder of
(1) of the realization that every reasoning needs premises (Platonic : lemmata; in present language axiomata, presuppositions or whatever),
(2) of realizing that both types of reasoning, concerning multiplicity (synchronic multiplicity or diachronic multiplicity (motion)), were equally incongruous.

This we call, with the above-mentioned *W. Bartley, Flucht ins Engagement*, supra note 97, "the also-you argument" or, still, "the you-even-as-me argument.

Update.
WR 165.-- Bartley, as a rabid rationalist, attempts, but with little result (logically speaking), to refute the Protestant theologians -- Karl Barth (1886/1968), Paul Tillich (1886/1968), Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, who represent the new Protestant thinking.

These theologians assume, among other things, the logical limitation of reason. They account for this limitation - rationally - as follows.

Whatever reasoning is presented, one can always ask two questions
(1) "How knowest thou?" (the epistemological question) and
(2) "Expose your final 'grounds' (axiomata, lemmata)."

These two little questions, unfortunately, cannot be repeated endlessly, after every answer to them.

W.R.   218.

If, therefore, the endless questions, epistemological and syntactical (How do you know? Prove to me, again, what you claim!), should ever become finite, in number, then - said Protestant theologians - there is only one way out: to stop somewhere. Which boils down - said always the same theologians - to taking on authority ('faith' Popper would say; WR 212) of e.g. a first premise (lemma),--which could then be e.g. a yardstick (criterion), a final goal, etc.

With C.S.S. Peirce there is, with this, talk of 'authority' or tenacity of a priori (i.e. orthodoxy (what others prescribe, imitate), willfulness (what I think is right), liberality (I do argue, but only on the basis of my freely chosen starting point)). To speak, with Peirce, also: of 'scientific method' ('external permanency') is, thus, absolutely out of the question (See Logic Course, First Year).

In other words: such a mode of reasoning is anything but 'scientific'. Behold the rational proof of the irrationality of every, but every, premise of logical syntax (reasoning rigor). So that the analysis of logical syntax, if pushed far enough, turns rational thinking into some form of 'irrationality'.

In other words: in principle at least, every irrationalism is rationally foundable. Talk about a paradox!

First religious application.-- Since all opinions are - to long last (i.e. logical - syntactic) - irrational, let us seek the way in a religious belief.

J. Daniélou, Origène, Paris, 1948, 32, cites the apologetics (rational foundation of faith) of Origenes of Alexandria (.../+254), with S. Augustine of Tagaste (+354/+430), "the greatest genius of Christian antiquity" (o.c.,7). Origenes prompted thinking Christians to analyze all opinions (with a certain reservation for the "atheistic" Epikoureeans (Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271)). The result resembled that of today's Neo-Protestants "They never listen to those who think differently from themselves."

Consequence: no thinker among the 'ancients' (*note:* predecessors) has succeeded in persuading even one adherent of the 'new' (*note:* later) to adhere to his own system". Daniélou describes Origenes' final conclusion: "akritos tuchè" (blind chance) - not reason - decides on the factual opinion a person holds

a. As an aside, in his account of the processes of opinion formation, Peirce also emphasizes their coincidence.

'A.kritos' means 'that which is not (yet) shapen, ordered. That which is in the unshifted (concerning itself). Blind (in the first place, concerning itself).

b. Even worse says Immanuel Kant (1724/1804), the top figure of the German Aufklärung: "Folly and reason have such unknowably defined boundaries that it is difficult to go on for any length of time in one area without making an indent in the other." (*I. Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik*, Leipzig, 1880 (First edition: Königsberg, 1766), 48).

To put it more clearly: the boundaries between reason and folly are so unknowable that, once in the realm of reason, one easily falls into the realm of folly. This implies that, in lucid moments, this archrationalist had no illusions about the work of reason. So that Origen is far from alone regarding the actual use of reason, respectively.

Second religious application.
a. Origen resolves the foundational crisis of ancient Greek philosophies by saying, "Do not adhere to any philosopher (having analyzed them all). Adhere, however, to God and his prophets". (Thus J. Daniélou, o.c., 33).-- As if, with this, everything was clarified!

b. Analogous is the "also-thou" argument of the Neo-Protestants.
(i) For reasons of well-defined logical arguments, (Enlightened) reason is so circumscribed that no one escapes a "commitment" ("commitment," "engagement: "involvement") situated outside reason, which, to a "critical" person, comes across as "dogmatic.

(ii) *Consequence:*
a. The Christian has the right to fulfill a choice (commitment), according to his free conclusion;
b. this is a right, which no one can blame him for, on purely rational grounds, at least. Cfr W. Bartley, o.c., 100.-- As if with that, everything was cleared up!

Note.-- As already clarified in Course on Doctrine (First Year):
(i) the postulates belong to be understood as lemmata, hypotheses, which, initially, suffer from the boundedness of reason;

(ii) can clarify the analysis (axiomatic-deductive or reductive).

W.R.   220.
Applicative model of Zenonic argument.
(1) Simplikios, a Neoplatonist (tss. +500 and +600), has left us an account.

(2) For ease of understanding, let it be reported that, in the days of Zenon, two anthologies were in circulation, each containing a theory of matter (conception of what a gross or fine material body is) and a mathematics. The reason is that the pure idea and the Gestalt attached to it in the imagination were too little kept apart (WR 205v.).

E.W. Beth, The wijsb. d.wisk., 18vv., outlines both anthologies.

A.-- *The multiplicity theory.*

This amounts to an atomic ontology. It can be attributed to the Paleopythagoreans. The atomistic/ atomic theory of matter says that a body (all that has extensiveness, 'size',) consists of extensiveness such that these units ('points', micromonads; WR 104; 111) **a/** are finite in number and **b/** include indivisible (last units). 'Point configuration' seems to be the this summarizing term.

B. -- *The Unity Theory.*

This amounts to an infinitesimal ontology.

It can be ascribed to Zenon, among others. The infinitesimal theory of matter says that a body is composed of extensiveness such that it contains contiguous parts, which are **a/** divisible and b/ infinitely divisible (infinitesimal divisibility: in the small there is no smallest, but always something smaller, -- which are **a/** magnifiable and **b/** infinitely magnifiable (infinitesimal magnitude: in the great there is no greatest, but always something greater).

Note -- One could, also, say that the multiplicity doctrine teaches discontinuous units and that the unity doctrine teaches continuous matter coherence. The doctrine, which teaches continuity, is also called synechism ('sun.eches', contiguous, continuous). So that Zenon's view can be called 'infinitesimal synechism'.

Note -- One sees that, in the synechist ontology, the idea of "limit value" (limit) is at work: one approaches, well, continuously, but never reaches, the intended limit. - In infinitesimal arithmetic this gets, later, application, actualization.

So that Zenon's critique (eristics, 'dialectics', 'agonistics') is directed against subsequent ontology(s):
a. being possesses extensiveness ("size"),
b.1. being composed of a finite number of indivisible units,
b.2. being really moves (exhibits multitude of places).

W.R.   221.

Do we read, now, the applicative model, as Cl. Ramnoux, o.c., 159v., puts it (supporting himself on the texts).

1. *The thesis ('thesis').* 'Thesis' is called the assertion, which one wishes to defend. It falls into two parts.

1.1. *Given.* The premise (of the opponent) : "If there is a multiplicity of being".

1.2. *Requested (sought).* The contradictory derivations from that premise: "Then those being, at the same time, are great and small,--and large to the infinitely great and small to the infinitely small."

2. *The proof (argument, argument).* 'Proof' is called the series of judgments, which, according to a logical syntax (WR 210 (judgment); 216 reasoning)), make the proposition 'true'.-- Remnoux sees two - three parts.

2.1. *Argument a.* "A being (corresponding to the above-mentioned features, namely, at the same time infinitely small and infinitely large), if added to another (being), does not increase this (latter), thereby. Reason : if an extendedness, which is nothing, is added to another, it cannot increase the latter.

Consequence: so the added, in that case, would be zero".

Here Simplikios notes that Zenon wants to show that something that exhibits neither extensiveness nor gauge ('thickness') nor mass is without more - in ontological terms - 'nothing'.

2.2.a. *Argument b.* "If, however, the 'being' in question is (something), then this implies, necessarily, that any part of it exhibits a certain extensiveness (size), a certain diameter (thickness), a certain distance from other parts."

2.2.b.(i) *Argument b.1*.
***Regressive evidence*.**
"The same proof, however, applies to any component, which lies before the one just discussed : that too, in turn, will possess extensiveness"

2.2.b.(ii) *Argument b.2.*
Infinitesimal - regressive evidence.
"A third (arbitrarily chosen) part will lie before the (second) one just mentioned.-- It comes down to the same thing whether one asserts this once or an infinite number of times: no part, after all, will be the last and no part will not be involved in another.

3. Conclusion (value judgment, evaluation).

'Conclusion' is called the comparison between the question asked and the proof so that, in the latter, one sees the answer to the question asked.

See here how Zenon expresses this.-- "If, therefore, there is a multiplicity of being, those being are, at once, great and small,-- great to the infinitely great,-- small to the infinitely small." Behold Fr. 1, from *Zenon*'s *On Nature*. It is a paragon of argument (proposition/ proof/ conclusion).

"Because of the logical clarity, which characterizes Zenon's argument, Aristotle conceived of him as the founder of logic, in the stricter sense." (W. Röd, o.c., 137). At least according to the logical syntax.

Note 1. One can see that Zenon likes to perform the endless repetition of a (partial) reasoning (WR 106: algorithm). It is as if the discovery of the limit (limit increasingly approached, yet never reached) fascinated him.

As an update, reference should be made to WR 217v.: the endless reclaiming of the proof of the set of assertions (as a means of proving the boundedness of reason). But, with the Neoprotestant theologians, this endless asking back serves to support that it is impracticable (i.e.: a summative induction, which involves an infinite set, is impracticable unless one finds something else on it).

2. We are not, here, going to lose ourselves in the multitude of interpretations provoked by Zenon's text, which is not so ready. We are concerned with two things:

(i) the merging - with all its nasty consequences - of ontology, material science and mathematics.
(ii) Zenon's sense of logical syntax, which still holds true today.

Note.-- We do cite, here, the interpretation of W. Röd, o.c., 128.

(A) Zenon's basic idea.

If one conceives of things (multiplicity theory) as aggregates (configurations) of indivisible parts, then these parts must be, **(i)** unexpanded and **(ii)** expanded. Or at least are thought to be so.

Re (i).-- If they are inexpansive, i.e. mathematical 'points', then any aggregate of them would, likewise, be inexpansive.

Re (ii).-- If they are extensive, then they must be bounded beforehand, by nearby parts,-- which, in turn, are also so bounded,-- which -continues boundlessly-.

In other words: relationism characterizes Zenon's conception of matter and being: once bounded (= involved in a nearby specimen), they are subject to recursion (regressive) and this endlessly (infinitesimal). Which as summative induction (first all separate, then all joint) is impracticable.

Being - says Röd - would, in that case, as a sum of infinitely many extended parts, inevitably, be thought of as infinitely extended." (Ibid.).

Conclusion.-- Being is at the same time to be thought of as unexpanded and as expanded. Consequence: given this nonsense (contradiction), the counter-model, the unity theory, must be assumed to be possibly true. The dilemma means the syntax.

(B) *Zenon's additional idea.*
As an addition, to his reasoning, Zenon argues against the presupposition of uncomprehensive parts. After all, adding uncomprehensive parts to something does not make the latter more comprehensive. Taking it away, neither does it. Something that is such that both its addition and its removal neither enlarge nor diminish anything else is nothing.

So much for Röd's interpretation. We know too little of the context, in which Zenon argued, to see completely finished.

Second applicative model of Zenonic argument.
The quick-footed Achilleus ('podas okus Achilleus).
Aristotle is, now, our main source.

1. *The thesis,* - Zenon now addresses itself against the diachronic multiplicity in the movement (displacement, change) located.
Given.-- The quick-footed Achilleus chases the turtle, the slowest animal.
Requested.--Prove that, no matter how fast-footed, he never catches up with them.

2.1.-- *The argument 1.*
 "That which moves must, inevitably, reach half the lag (interval, interval) before it reaches its stated goal. (infinitesimal - regressive).
Before moving it reaches the goal, it has, already, passed through half of the half of the interspace. this proceeds so in infinity".
One calls this the argument of dichotomia, dichotomy (WR 104).

2.2.-- *The argument 2.*
"Never will the swiftest, while walking, overtake the slowest. Indeed: inevitably, the one who overtakes must reach the point from which the one to be overtaken departed.
*Consequence***:** the slowest will, inevitably, always keep ahead of the fastest".
So much for Aristotle's rendering.

3. *The conclusion.*

"In the two cases - dichotomia, swift-footed Achilleus - one proves the impossibility of reaching the limit (value) (limit), by dividing the space to be traversed in a well-defined way. But in the second argument one dramatizes by means of the failure of the figure of the quick-footed hero in his pursuit of the slowest". (Thus Aristotle, Phys., 6: 9, 239b).

Note.-- 'Dramatizing' is a well-known form of rhetoric: by means of vivid representations one establishes rapport such that, thanks to singular - concrete interpretation (WR 211: semantic interpretation), one understands an abstract idea much faster and more clearly.

Here: replacing the moving (abstract model) with the pursuing Achilleus (singular model). What Aristotle noted. The logician Zenon knew, truly, also rhetoric!

Note.-- The critique of Zenon's argument.

(1) Aristotle says: "To assert that - in the case of Achilleus and the tortoise - the one, who is ahead, is not overtaken, is false.

a. It is true, however, that as long as the turtle has a head start, it will not be overtaken.

b. But, if one assumes that the distance to be run is a finite distance, it will still be overtaken." (Ibid.).

But o.i. the problem, for Zenon, did not lie there:

(i) he knew, of course, also that, in the physical reality, which the common sense (the mean mind) sees, Achilleus overtakes the turtle;

(ii) he wanted to convince, apparently, purely reasoning, against all physical reality, -- because he wanted to fight not physical reality, but the axiomata, lemmata of the opponents, not by experimental-physical falsification, to by purely logical-syntactic (WR 210 + 215v.) reasoning, which was falsification.

Not for nothing is he, in Aristotle's eyes, the father of logic. He founded strict - logical rhetoric. It deals with the way in which someone

(i) establish rapport

(ii) such that he affects strict-logical reasoning (WR 4; 207: Parmenides' model).

(2) *Ch. Lahr, Logique*, 701, notes that Zenon confuses two types of division: equally divisive (two halves, fours, etc.) and the proportionally divisive (two halves, two halves of both halves, etc.).

W.R.   225.
Fourth sample: Protagoras of Abdera (- 480/-410).
Bibl. stitch pr:
-- *G.Romeyer-Dherbey, Les sophistes*, Paris, 1985 (7/32: Protagoras; vlg. him, probably born in -492);
-- *J.-P. Dumont, Protagoras*, in: *D. Huisman, Dict.d.phil.*, 2138/2142;
--id., *Les sophistes* (*Fragments et témoignages*), Paris, 1969 (24/53: *Protagoras*).

We situate Protagoras, first, in the whole Protosofistics. This is distinguished from Deuterosophistics (= Second Sophistics, which was a different movement, under the "Good Emperors" (+96/+180)).

I. - *General image impression of the protosophistics (-450/-3501).*
Five kentracks will suffice.

I.A. -- *The emergence of the 'classical' man the 'humanistic' man.*
E.R. Dodds, Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike, Zürich/ München, 1977 (oorspr. Eng.: *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, Oxford, 1973), 124f., typifies as follows. "(Protosofistics) exhibits the same traits as the liberal thinking of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries. These are:
(1) Individualism,
(2) "Humanity" (*note:* humanism, about which later),
(3) Worldification (*note:* secularization),
(4) Critique of lore based on 'reason',
(5) great confidence in applied 'reason' as the key to ceaseless progress."
One cannot better characterize the transition from the "archaic" man to the "classical" ("humanistic") man.

Indeed: up to now, all thinkers, - Paleomilesians, Paleopythagoreans, Eleates, Heraklitians - were archaic in their deepest being. the paragon of their thinking was - notwithstanding their thoroughly rational behavior - deeply rooted in religion. just that - that sacred root - will, thanks to desacralization, be eradicated. The Protosophists are the perpetrators of this, perhaps unconsciously, at least the best among them. -- We show this now, by means of two examples.

First example.
Protagoras was Heraklitean. As a reminder, Herakleitos of Ephesus (either -535/-465 or -567/-480) is the founder of what has been called "dialectics" since German Idealist Romanticism (Cfr. Denkleer, First Year). Well, two main features of the dialectics of destiny (that is still the best name) are
(i) 'panta rhei' (everything flows) and
(ii) harmony of opposites. We are going to see how Protagoras, as a typical "classical" (humanistic) man, actualized them.

W.R.   226.

The archaic interpretation of 'panta rhei', all being 'fluid', is twofold.

(a) Platon, in the dialogue Kratulos, conceives of 'rhein', 'flowing', as a verb, incorporating (mother) earth (WR 65: Gaia), called Rhee or Rhea, the Mother of Zeus, as the wife of Kronos/ Chronos (WR 93 (the time); 139). In this sense, 'panta rhei', everything flows, is the same as 'being of the essence of Rhea, the Chthonic primordial goddess'. (WR 123). One sees everything as flowing in the nature of Rhea, the central, female figure of the oldest layer of religion, in Hellas.

(b) *C1. Ramnoux, Herakleitos* knower, says that 'rhein', flowing being, should be understood choreically (WR 82). In other words: all beings move (= movement, change) according to a 'rhuthmos', rhythm (WR 129).

Rhuthmizein' means to arrange something, within the framework of a series (e.g. a reidance), at calculated distances and, in the process, to provide it with a measure and rhythm of movement. Choreal ordering, if you will. "One would prefer, in panta rhei, to think of (...) 'une ronde' (a dance circle),--rather than to think of the image of a flowing stream." (*Cl. Ramnoux, Héraclite*, in: *D. Huisman, Dict.d.phil*. 1184).

Note.-- Like the first thinkers, so did Herakleitos: he has come to know a mystery-religion somewhere (WR 158: ordination service; 167). It must be the orphic (WR 143vv; 188). Herakleitos, if orphic to be understood, becomes comprehensible through and through. For him the movement (WR 223) is not as for a Zenon of Elea, of course.

But Protagoras, as a classical-humanist thinker, actualized the movement, why, differently: 'dialectically' as well, but now as back-and-forth argumentation (here the name fits: discussion dialectics). Logical-rhetorical becomes the interpretation. There, too, everything flows: one asserts now this, then that; the other, again, 'creatively', draws out a new 'equally flowing' (understand: uncertain, open to criticism and therefore changeable) opinion (WR 184; 189)). Opinions, in Protagoras, worldly, are fluid. Behold the desacralized interpretation. Opinion dialectic.

Second example.

Herakleitos, as a destiny theorist, emphasizes the harmony of opposites, WR 11 (the Sumerian model) taught us that the deities, in the Sumerian reality itself, had "caused" ("begotten") opposites, which turned that reality into a demonic system.

W.R.   227.

Well, on that same sacred ground stands Herakleitos. W.B. Kristensen, *Verz. bijdr. to knowledge of ancient religions*, A'm, 1947, 288v., points this out.

(a) Fr. reads as follows: "Nature too is oriented towards 'enantia' contraria, opposites. from opposites - and not from equal things - it brings forth the interlocking.(...). This is expressed in what is said by Herakleitos the obscure: "interlocked are what is whole and what is not whole, unity and discord, euphonious and discordant. From all being comes forth the one and from the one all being'". (*Aristotle, De mundo*, 5: 1176a.7).

(b) Fr. 54: "The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible". -- "In truly ancient spirit, Herakleitos considered the mystery of totality (WR 12) more important than the 'rational' relations of existence." (o.c., 289).

In other words, what, later on, the desacralized way of thinking will find most important, the 'rational' structure of reality, Herakleitos finds precisely that less 'strong', influential, decisive. After all, an invisible power is, in the fusis itself, operative such that the opposites are, as it were, simultaneously present in it.

But Protagoras, as a classical humanist, reinterprets this: "he was the first to assert that on every subject there are two arguments, which are opposed to each other. He was, at once, the first, to introduce this principle of 'dialectical argumentation' into praxis." (*Diogenis Laërtios, Lives*, 9: 50).

A little further, Diogenes Laërtios says : "He was also the first, who showed how one could approach the refutation of an opposite opinion".

Conclusion.
'Opinion Dialectics'. This becomes the commonplace of the entire Protosophist movement.

I.B -- *The foundation of the classical-humanist "paideia*
W. Jaeger, *Paideia* , I: 379f., characterizes Protagores' idea of education as "ausgesprochen humanismus"(pronounced humanism; o.c., 380). He outlines them as follows.

A.-- *Two cultural stages* are distinguished.
(a) The first stage in human development is the Promethean gift. In Hellenic mythology, Prometheus is the offspring of a Titan (WR 145), who, by stealing fire from the 'heavens', became a 'salvation-bringer' (culture-founder). The name 'Promethean gift' comes from the tragedian Aischulos of Eleusis (-525/-456). It means, in Protagoras' actualization, the skilled, 'technical' civilization.

W.R.   228.

Note.-- We must, herewith, correct Dodd's view that Protosofistics echoes the VIII-th century Enlightenment: in contrast to Protosofistics, Encyclopedists, e.g., strongly valued industrialization o.g., technique

(b) The second phase is what will later be called humanistic culture -- "Notwithstanding the mastery of fire, men (equipped, since Prometheus, with the Promethean gift) would have been doomed to a pitiful doom: they destroyed each other in terrible fights. But Zeus - according to the myth of the origin of culture - granted them the gift of law so that they were able to found a community and a state. So says W. Jaeger. This one raises the question whether this myth comes from Hesiod, Erga, 276 (WR 39; 64) or from Aischulos.

Note.-- One sees, again, the two layers in ancient cultures, the titanic-destructive and the olympic-building (WR 66).

B.-- *The protagorean actualization.*
(a) While the Promethean gift, technology, is given only to craftsmen ('des Spezialistentum' (o.c.,380)), Zeus implanted the sense of law and justice in all men. Otherwise the state cannot exist.

(b) Yet there is an even higher level of understanding of the foundations of state and law.
It is taught in the techne politike, the politikology, of the protosophists. For Protagoras the 'techne politike', the knowledge, resp. skill so that one can lead the life in the polis, is the actual humanist paideia.

Conclusion.
(1) 'humanism' Jaeger calls the priority, given to the formation of the human being, as a human being, over the whole field of technological formation.

(2) "Diese grundsätzliche und klare Scheidung zwischen dem technischen Können und Wissen und der eigentlichen Bildung ist die grundlage des humanismus geworden" (o.c.,380: this thorough and clear separation of technical ability and knowing and actual (human) education has become the foundation of humanism).

B. bis. -- Protagoras held such a high opinion of the profession of sophist, teacher of civic "wisdom". The average sophist has been content to sell his knowledge

One sees, again, how the archaic-sacred dichotomy 'chthonic/ olympic' (WR 123) is re-scripted into a secular-culturological 'technology'/'humanism'. Thus, the entire culture is desacralized.

B. ter. -- *The protagorean political elitism.*

'Elitism' is the fact that, culturally speaking, one gives preference, indeed leadership, to a certain 'elite', keur.

(a) *The basic issue of democracy*.

Classical humanity, through its emancipation from the ancient sacred sphere, acquires a new main problem: it needs, if it is to sustain its democratic society, leader(s) figures.

W. Jaeger, Paideia, I: 368, even says: "das Problem der Probleme für die Democratie" (the problem par excellence in democracy). - The century of Perikles is known, at least in Athens, for its democracy. But Perikles of Athens (-492/-429), the leader of the democratic party, became, in - 444, the sole ruler of Athens: Jaeger says, in doing so, that his 'democratic' government was "eine kaum verhülte Tyrannis" (a barely concealed autocratic rule)! (o.c., 368).

This raises a new tension between "the strong, cultural personality, on the one hand, and, on the other, society" (o.c.,ibid.). All thinkers of society, in its democratic form, have been concerned with this, "ohne damit fertig zu werden" (without coming to terms with it; o.c., ibid.).

(b) *The leadership formation of sophistry.* -

Not generalized education of the people, but the formation of leaders was the goal of the educational movement, which the sophists tried to bring about. "It was, in essence, only the old problem of nobility in a new form; o.c., ibid.

(b).1. However, everyone - including ordinary citizens in Athens - could acquire an elementary education.

(b).2. But the Sophists addressed themselves, from the beginning, only to an elite: "to them comes only the one who **(1)** wants to make himself a politician and **(2)** wants to lead his 'polis' (city)." (w. Jaeger, ibid.).

Justice' was twofold: **(1)** obeying the laws, **(2)** leading the polis itself, by means of introducing laws. But, to do so, it required an understanding **(a)** of the praxis of politics and **(b)** of the theory of man.

W.R.   230.

I.c.-- *The foundation of philosophical rhetoric.*

1. Hesuchios of Alexandreia (+/- +400/+500), *Life of Protagoras* (Suidaslexikon), says: "Protagoras was a porter (porter), but, having met Demokritos of Abdera (*op.:* the atomist), he practiced philosophy and absorbed himself in rhetoric. He was the first to invent eristic (WR 9 (tenzone); 215 (Zenon)) speeches and received from his pupils one hundred mnai (note: a mna (mine) is one hundred drachmas, in silver or gold) as a fee of honor.

One gave him, therefore, the nickname 'the rhetor'. Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338) (*note:* the great 'rhetor' and counterpart of Platon), as well as Prodikos of Keos (tss. -500/-400) (*note:* well-known sophist and rhetor) were his disciples."

2. - *Platon,* in the dialogue *Protegoras,* 317b, has Protagoras say :"(...) I claim the title 'sophist' and my profession is to teach people culture (.,...).

(a) The others,-- they destroy the young : (...) they reduce them -- against their will -- to the specialized subjects (...). - calculations, astronomy, geometry, music (WR 126v.).(...).

(b) But if a young man comes to me (Protagoras), he learns only what he likes to learn. The subject matter, which I teach, is 'eu.boulia', the sound deliberation (*note:* what we, now, would call 'know how' concerning private and public action, 'sense of (private and state) affairs'). In particular:

(i) in private matters: the way, in which one manages one's property excellently;

(ii) in state affairs : the way, in which one, in the polis, acts and speaks, with maximum efficiency (result)." (Cfr *J.-P. Dumont, Les sophistes*, 29s.).

Note -- One compares with WR 70/73 (rhetoric). Already Thales of Miletos, businessman and politically-involved, has pointed that way, ... though it was, in the context of the older 'theoria'.

Opm.-- *the power of money*

(1) The sacred wisdom was, concerning property (goods, money) extremely suspicious. WR 78 taught us how, even the inheritance, after death, was sensed animistically (i.e., intangibly). WR 53v. taught us how border crossings, e.g. concerning property, were subject to immanent sanction (the punishment, built into the crossing itself (WR 93/94)).

(2) The desacralization of property (goods, money) encourages the classical, "humanistic" conception of property.

W.R.   231.

We see this, in Protagoras' behavior, at work.

"(...) **(i)** After the lesson given, if one agrees, one pays (immediately) the sum, which I conditioned.

(ii) If one does not agree, then one enters a sanctuary, where one declares, under oath, what value (right) one attaches to what one has learned : that sum then pays me." (Platon, Protagoras, 326b).

Note.-- One sees, here, how the old sacred validation, still, lives on.

a. -- *The Sicilian word agonistics (= rhetoric).*

WR 11 (Sumerian model); 144 (mythic-Orphic model); 215 (Zenonic model) brought us, already, the core idea 'agonistics' (competition). We are, now, going to establish how this ancient idea, in the word-sense, is introduced.

The Sicilian Koraks of Surakousai (tss. -500/-400) (Syracuse), after the demokratia, people's government, took hold in Akragas (= Agrigentum), around - 460, became embroiled in many legal disputes. As a result of these legal experiences, Koraks developed an early rhetoric. Thus e.g. he distinguished, in the judicial ('forensic') speech, three parts (WR 17; 103).

a. to pro.oimion, ex.ordium, preface/ introduction;
b. hoi agones (enk.: ho agon), controveriae, debates;
c. ho epi.logos, per.oratio, conclusion(word).

One sees that the name 'agon' (mv.: agones), already, betrays the rivalry, indeed the fighting mentality of classical man, once it is about **(i)** possession and **(ii)** political power. Demokratia, popular government, always involves more or less - what Herakleitos of Ephesos (WR 225) called - 'polemos' (lat.: bellum), fight, war, and these desacralized, i.e. as the fighting out of earthly people, without sacred background.

How far the protosophistic "agonistics" are from the e.g. Zenonic ones is shown by what follows.

As the logical ground(s) (WR 215v.) of debates, Koraks saw 'to eikos', probabile, the probable (i.e. what may not be certain (true), but possesses at least the appearance of truth). What a lawyer, on the court, puts forward is not necessarily logically true. It is - mostly - rhetorically expedient. Nothing more. WR 209 taught us that, in the analysis of the (spoken) word, pragmatics is one of the 'formal' (WR 200) objects. Here it prevails!

Note.-- One establishes the desacralization process, if one compares WR 65/70 (archaic-sacral eloquence);154 (Palep. rhet.); 155 (ref1. rh.) with the Protagorean-Sophistic eloquence doctrine. Or with the doctrine and especially the praxis of Koraks.

b.-- *The master/apprentice relationship.*
Koraks had, among others, one Teisias of Surakousai as a "pupil.

(1) This "disciple" had, in turn, also, "disciples. And no small ones! First of all, Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375) - who, next to Protagoras, is considered the second greatest philosopher;-- then - whom has just been mentioned - Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338; WR 230);-- as well as Lusias of Athens (-440/-380). Very big and resounding names, then, in the history of classical paideia (= culture).

(2) Let us consider the "teacher (rhetor)/student" relationship.
(i).1.-- Koraks teaches Teisias the skill of "always, in the agon right". the condition -- as with Protagoras -- to be called money, 'honorarium'. To be paid, if Teisias wins his first plea, this, as proof of the efficacy (WR 230), usefulness, - more genteelly expressed: pragmatics -- of Koraks' teaching.

(i).2. Yet Teisias does not argue. He becomes, notably, himself, immediately "rhetor," (teacher of eloquence), like his master, Koraks. Yes, Teisias does it even more brilliantly than his master. and ... does not, of course, pay!

(ii).1. -- It comes to litigation.
Teisias, with or without Eleatic reasoning (logic: WR 222/216), presents his 'teacher' with a dilemma, -- what we, now, call 'dilemma' (Latinized). The structure (logical syntax (WR 215v.)) comes down to this:

Thesis.-- Your demand for payment is without merit (WR 212).

Argument.
(1) *Model*: either I, Teisias, furnish conclusive evidence of the fact that I owe thee nothing. In that case, thou, Koraks, waive thy claim, rightly.
(2) *counter-model*: either I do not provide you, Koraks, with the conclusive evidence: but, then, it is my first plea, which fails,--which proves that your teaching is not useful. Then, too, thou, Koraks, rightly renounce thy claim. as agreed, concerning my first plea.

(ii).2. Koraks, also not without pinch, says thereupon what follows.
Thesis.-- My demand for payment is, well, well founded.
Argument.
(1) *model*: either thou, Teisias, dost not furnish the convincing evidence of thy refusal, to pay. Then thou, of course, must pay.

(2) *counter-model*: either thou, Teisias, does furnish the convincing evidence; -- in which case thy first plea is, well, efficacious and our agreement holds. Even then, thou must pay.

Note.-- The hetaireia, thinking society, among the Paleopythagoreans, would never have dared, even, to think such a thing. More so: we are among desacralized ones.

c.-- *The emergence of the 'trivium'.*
The paideia, formative system, of Protosofistics included three basic subjects, 'technai', disciplinae, (professional) sciences.

(1) grammatike techne, grammar, speech theory, which sharpened the word and language,
(2) dialektike techne, dialectics, reasoning theory, which taught reasoning and reasoning,
(3) rhetorike techne, rhetoric, eloquence theory, which is the doctrine of
    (a) the understanding was,
    (b) so as to influence, by all possible means (pragmatic moment), one's fellow man -- the audience, in the agora, popular assembly,-- the judges and hearers, on the court,-- the hearers, in the hall or, rather, in the open air, at 'epideictic' or show-offs (WR 4), behold the threefold nominalist or merely verbal 'rhetoric'.

Nominalism" is taken to mean the view that denies any content of knowledge or thought that is not (sense) perceptible (WR 205: O. Külpe et al.), so that only perceptible content of thought and mere words ("nomina", enk.: nomen, names, name) remain. The Socratic 'concept', the Platonic 'idea' (WR 30), yes, the Paleopythagorean unity and its multiples (WR 110) and, even, the Aristotelian 'morphe' (forma, form, i.e. idea immanent to things),--all this seems to the nominalist to be non-existent, indeed, fiction.

However, note that it is precisely this nominalist paideia - later called 'trivium', threefold method - that forms the basis of - what W. Jaeger calls - the 'formal' (understand : word-bound) formation of the West (Paideia, I: 397ff.).

With the input of the palepythagoreans (WR 100) or the quadrivium, the nominalist subjects of learning constitute "the seven artes liberales" (liberal arts).

"The Greek system of higher formation, as constructed by the Protosophists, dominates, today, the entire civilized world."

Jaeger, Paideia, I: 400).-- Reason, why we dwelled on it so extensively -- on all two entries.

W.R. 234.
Indeed, in Alexandria, the "enkuklios paideia," general Formation, emerges,

(1)a. The philological part (grammar, dialectics, rhetoric) taught the perusal of the (reading and writing and speaking) sign.-

(1)b. The business part (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy) taught the understanding of the ideal in the sensory data.

(2)a. On that twin foundation built philosophy (which, itself, was hermeneutic (commentary of texts; philological) and systematic (understanding of the being itself; factual)).

(2)b. Among the thinking Christians (especially since St. Klemens of Alexandreia (+/- +175/+225)), there followed, thereafter, theology (WR 73: supernatural theology), which, again, was and philological (in scripture exegesis, hermeneutic) and systematic (matter-of-fact).

Bib. stitch pr.:
-- *O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke*, Kempten/ Munich, 1909, 48;
-- id., *Gesch.d.Id.,* I: 351/356 (*Der Nominalismus der Sophisten*); II (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastiker*), 328f. (Die Scholastik: also the Scholastics adopted this formation scheme of the enkuklios paideia, but updated).

I.D. -- *The utili(tari)sm ('pragmatism') of sophistry.*
1. *G. RomeyerDherbey-, Les sophistes,* 19 and 30, underscores the fact that, for Protagoras, the given (the "thing" or "being") is indicated not by the term "pragma"(= thing), but by the word "chrèma", useful given. Protagoras aims, therefore, at the pragmatic or usable, at the usefulness value in the data.

2. The "truth" about the given is, likewise, defined by the usefulness of that truth, which lies in the phenomena.

Trasummachos of Chalkedon, disciple of Platon and of Isokrates (WR 232), a well-known Protosophist, says : "I come to the conclusion that what is just is nothing but what, to the strongest, is useful." (*Platon, Republ*., 1: 338c).-- Which is also endorsed by another sophist, polos (WR 64).-- That utilitarian value is basis of right.

Kallikles, another sophist, claims that, in politics, first of all, power relations are at work. 'Rhetoric', the power of the word, is, in it, but one factor of power.-- Everyone possesses the right to work out his (power) desire, by any means (WR W. R.4).

W.R. 235.

Bibl. stabpr.: *S. IJsseling, Rhetoric and Philosophy*, Bilthoven, 1975, 14 (concerning Polos and Kallikles, in *Platon's* dialogue *Gorgias* (subtitle: *On Rhetoric*).

Updates.

1. *E. Grassi, Die Macht der Phantasie* (*Zur Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens*), Königstein/Ts., 1979.

The book discusses the relationship of Renaissance Humanists to science and philosophy. The author emphasizes that the Humanists started from the needs of man, both material and spiritual, to measure the value of truth. The self-development of "life" (the humanist) is the measure of the "value" (usefulness) of a given and the truth about it. From there - says Grassi - the impression on rhetoric.

2. *Romeyer-Dherbey, Les sophistes*, 30/32, explains how Fr. Nietzsche (WR 123v.: libertarianism), apparently, thinks Protagorean.

The "Uebermensch" "estimates" all being according to their "value," their usefulness in the service of the self-development of life, the Dionysian-libertarian life. "Ranking Nietzsche and Protagoras together is not based on arbitrariness, for it seems that Nietzsche himself suggests this." (o.c., 31).

Pragatism Criticism.

(1) G. Romeyer - Dherbey, o.c.,16, says that enemy number one of Protagoras was eleatic ontology. WR 201/203, indeed, taught us that Parmenides is the first, who thinks the given, being(s), in itself, objectively, absolutely. This entails approaching it, independently of the subject (and, among other things, his needs, his desire(s), his self-fulfillment or whatever). To accept a fact, valid in itself, is for the pragmatist or utilist (utility thinker) a curse, of course.

a. - The "truth" concerning the given is valuable in itself and our mind submits to it.

b. For the utilitarian, truth is valuable only insofar as it is useful. Fundamentally, one subjects truth to the subject (his needs, his desires, his self-fulfillment, etc.).

(2) S. IJsseling, o.c.,14, cites that Socrates (= Platon) -- against Polos and Kallikles -- argues that, in politics, although, in fact, power relations are at play, this is a regrettable fact,-- that moral good should prevail.

W.R.   236.

Power, indeed, violence are not according to conscience and do not, therefore, ever establish what is morally good and just. The state and politics have as their deeper meaning to make possible and secure conscientious life -- for all.-- It should be noted that Socrates, like Parmenides (and the Paleopythagoreans), take as their foundation the objective rule of conduct binding in conscience.

Note - 1.-- We recall *W.B. Kristensen, Verz. bijdr. tot kennis der antieke godsd.,* 273 : "Righteous - in the ordinary sense of the word - were (the supreme deities : Zeus, Fortuna (Rome), Varoena (India), Ahura Jazda (Iran)) not. By their conduct they denied the laws, which they had nevertheless established for men. And the ancients were aware of this contradiction (WR 11 (harmony of opposites); 226v.), in the divine being."

In other words, the ancient theologians were, by no means, subject to the rose-red naivete from which more than one enlightened mind or Catholic theologian suffers. Nor was a Herakleitos of Ephesus.

Well, the same ethical contradiction, which constitutes the essence of the demonic polytheism, can be observed in the pragmatism (utilism) of Proto-Sophilosophy: the "laws" (which the Sophists talked about so much; WR 229 teaches us that they liked to make them themselves) were - for the majority (not all) of the Sophists - above all useful, before being binding in conscience. That is the demon of sophistry, the enlightenment of ancient Hellas.

In other words, most of the Sophists were no better - ethically speaking - than the deities they fought, sometimes so rabidly,; they were the "humanist" actualization of them. Nothing more. And, in addition, they were the model for all Western democracies.

Nota.-- 2.-- *Fr. Nietzsche* is, perhaps, one of the rare thinkers, who was aware of the inner contradiction, especially in the ethical field, of the humanistic culture, characteristic of the West, since the Protosofistics.

In his *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1687), 12, he deals with the physical, which looks for the cause (archè (WR 45)), compared to the pragmatics, which looks for the usefulness. It is, in 12, about origin and usefulness ('Zweck') of punishment. Nietzsche puts the after pressure on the fact that "the cause, which explains the origin, and the ultimate usefulness of a thing, i.e., its actual use, within the framework of a system of purposes, are diametrically opposed."

W.R. 237.

He specifies: "Something that is given, -- that has come into being, is, again and again, interpreted, i.e. recaptured, transformed into new usefulness and reoriented, by a power reaching above it, in view of new intentions. (...). All usability is only the sign of the fact that a will to power ('wille zur Macht') has taken possession of something less powerful and, from its own point of view ('von sich aus'), has 'stuck' on it the meaning of a usability ('Funktion')."

Expressed differently - more simply - the physicalist, who seeks the cause (origin), is bound to something objective, independent of himself; the pragmatist, however, takes into account - initially - only his own perspective.

It is, therefore, not surprising that G. Romeyer-Dherbey (WR 233) sees a clear kindred spirit between Protagoras and Nietzsche.

Bibl. stitchpr.: J. de Gaultier, De Kant à Nietzsche, Paris, 1905 (an old book, but one that, at least, does not "romanticize" Nietzsche).

I.E. -- *The hedonistic aesthetics of sophists.*
Wl. Tatarkiewicz, Gesch. d. Aesthetik, I (*Die Aesthetik der Antike*), Basel/ Stuttgart, 1979, 120/ 127 (*Die Aesthetik der Sophisten*), emphasizes
   1. The firm (= positive) method, regarding beauty and art,
   2. the culturological view,
   3. the hedonistic explanation.

It is not surprising that, unlike e.g. the Paleopythagoreans (WR 139vv), the Protosophists - according to Alkidamas of Elaia (ll. of Gorgias) - saw in works of art "pictures of real life, which, when viewed, provide pleasure, not usefulness for practical life."

According to Tatarkiewicz, o.c., 122, the systechy 'useful/pleasant' prevailed. Not only the work of art, also the beauty, very contrary e.g. to the Paleopythagoreans, is hedonistically (pleasurably) indicated : "beautiful is what - to the ear and the face - is pleasant". (*Platon, Hipp. mai*.,299a).

In other words: everything is tested for its usefulness. Yet the pleasant is also "useful. Pragmatism and hedonism are much closer to each other than, purely word-for-word, would appear.

II.-- *Protagoras' criteriology.*

The term "criteriology" means the analysis of the (evidence) grounds (WR 212v.). Another equally recent designation is epistemology (WR 187). One can also say 'foundational research' (WR 3).

II.A. Sextos Empeirikos (Sextus Empiricus, Hupotup., 1: 216) says: "Protagoras maintains that man is the criterion of all being,--particularly of the existence of those being, which really exist, and of the nonexistence of those being, which, in fact, are non-existent. The term 'metron', mensura, 'measure' (WR 53, where one still finds the archaic-sacred meaning) -- according to Sextos all the time -- means the kriterion, criterion, (literally) shifting model.(...).

Consequence: Protagoras puts forward only the existence of 'fainomena', phenomena (better: the visible data(WR 41))". (*J.P. Dumont, Les sophistes*, 34).

A late antique theorist, *Hermias*, in his *Critique of Pagan Thinkers*, 9 (Dumont, o.c.,35), puts it with another kriteriological term, namely, "determination of beings (definition; WR 96) and judge (i.e., the one, who establishes the reality type in a judgment, as it were) of the being is man.

With this we have Protagoras' own criteriology or fundamental research. It is called by a Latin term "the homo-mensura theorem.

H.J. Blackham, Humanism, Harmondsworth (Eng.), 1968, 105, who, as an attacking God-denying humanist (WR 225), of course ánd the materialist-atomist Demokritos of Abdera (WR 89); ánd the atheist-humanist Protagoras dedicates his book, says:

"It seems certain that Protagoras:
(1) an agnostic (*note*: who claims not to be able to make up his mind),
(2) a positivist (WR 2; 190 (carnap)),
(3) was a relativist (WR 235: is "relativist" one who accepts nothing "absolute").

Further, a keen analytical intelligence with strongly practical points of interest (WR 230: property formation; political power formation), also, finally, the man, who first proclaimed the 'regnum hominis' (= the kingdom of man), was". One cannot paint a more sharply defined picture of Protagoras' criteriology. At least if one understands the term 'a.gnostic' correctly: the 'agnostic' claims to be unable to pronounce on the actual existence or otherwise of two kinds of data.

W.R.   239.

A.-- "Protagoras (...) writes somewhere: Concerning the deities, I am not able to say either whether they exist or of what nature they are. For numerous are the obstacles, which I meet". (*Sextos Empeirikos, Contra Phys.*,1: 55).-- This means that all mantics as a source of knowledge or 'criterion' is dropped (WR 87/91: miracle belief).

B.-- "It is not at one point that the circle (*op.:* the sensuous circle) touches the straight (line)." (Arist., Metaph., 3, 997b32).-- Aristotle attributes this opinion to Protagoras.

The full performance of Protegoras is:
(i). a pure ideal reality, such as theoretical geometry thinks it can treat, is nowhere neither sensually given nor in the imagination - in the form of a vague - generalized phantasm ('Gestalt'; WR 205) - perceptible;
(ii). Consequence: only circles which touch a straight line in more than one sensory perceptible point are actually perceptible. In other words: Protagoras recognizes 'geometrical' figures, but only in its sensory and 'visual' models.

Conclusion.
Everything that is not immediately perceptible (internally, e.g., in the imagination; externally, e.g., with the organs of perception) and, thus, (sense) perceptible, such as, e.g., mantically perceived realities (deities, e.g.,) or idealistic (perceived in sensually indiscernible consciousness) realities (geometrical data, e.g.,), is, in Protagoras' eyes, undecidable, undecidable, without criterion.-- Behold Protagoras' justly delineated agnostic position.

In other words: the sentence "man is the 'metron', the shifting or delimiting means, of all being, concerning their being - whether or not they have stood or whether or not they are - (mode of being)" should be rewritten by "agnostic man is the measure of all being". That, after what goes before, is abundantly clear.

II.B -- The theoria-free man, therefore, is the norm. Cfr WR 41 (through the visible reach the invisible).-- But the question arises: the individual or the group?-- "Protagoras, while declaring that man is the measure of all being, said: 'As the ones appear (show themselves) to me, so are they, to me. As they appear (show themselves) to you, so are they, to you". (Platon, Kratulos, 385th).

In other words: the individual is decisive.

W.R. 240.

G. Romeyer-Dherbey, Les sophistes, 22/28 (*Le discours fort*), tries to make true that Protagoras, notwithstanding this individualistic criteriology, still means something universal (not in the object, but in the perceiving subject) when he says "man is the measure of all being."

Yet, to that end, Romeyer-Dherbey must appeal to the systechy 'weak assertion/ strong assertion', ('logos hètton/ logos kreitton'),-- and do so in political-democratic context.

1. We saw WR 228 that all men, thanks to Zeus, possess the gift (= sense) of law, as opposed to - one would say almost actualized - the "specialist idiot" (specialist). Well, - says Romeyer-Dherbey - in the democratic form of the state (WR 231), alone, the all common and equal sense of right comes into play.

2. Precisely because a single person, by means of understanding and influence (WR 4; 233), i.e. by means of protosophistic rhetoric, succeeds in having the singular opinion, which is, at first, his own, shared by more than one other,--thereby a kind of "universalisation" (generalization - WR 60: the inductive idea of "generalization", thoroughly different from the "democratic-rhetorical") takes place. In Protagorean language: from weak (merely individual) opinion becomes strong (more than individual).

Conclusion
(1) The agnostic man, first individual, then, preferably, politically-rhetorical "universal. -- Behold "man" as the measure of all being. Behold the theorialless kriteriology.

(2) One understands, then, that Romeyer-Dherbey, o.c.,16, emphasizes that the parmenidean ontology, which objectively presupposes 'being(de)' (WR 201) (= lemma), is enemy number one of Protagorean 'thinking'.

Note.-- An analogous interpretation of 'rhetoric' can be found, e.g., also in *Ch. Perelman, Rhetoric and Argumentation*, Baarn, 1979, 149: "While rhetoric aims at making some opinions prevail ('apply') over others, competing with them, philosophy, which, originally, included the special sciences (WR 54), seeks impersonal truths."

'Impersonal' - here - in the sense of objective, absolute, independent of (the whims of) the subject. Not in the sense that philosophy and professional science would not concern us deeply (and, in this sense, 'touch us personally').

W.R.   241.

Opm.-- The push-through rhetoric

Klemens of Alexendreia (WR 234), the Church Father, in his *Mengelingen*, 6:65, says, "The Greeks say that Protagoras was the first, who, in opposition to every argument, put forward a counter-argument. (WR 227).

The Stoic *Seneca of Cordoba* (Spain; +1/+55), *Letters to Lucilius*, 88:43, says, "Protagoras says that, in every matter, one can put forward the for and the against, by presenting an equivalent argument."

Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2: 24/1402a 23, says : "Forging from the weakest argument -- of two arguments -- the strongest,-- that's it. This is precisely why people were outraged -- quite rightly -- by Protagoras' appeal. After all, the phenomenon (that which shows itself (to sense perception); WR 239) is deceptive, not (necessarily) true, and merely apparent. No other skill uses it, except rhetoric and eristics". Aristotle means, apparently, the (Proto)sophist rhetoric.

Stefanos of Buzantion, Geographical Dictionary, Abdera, says: "Protagoras, of whom Eudoxos mentions that he forged from the weakest argument the strongest, and that he taught his pupils to both praise and reject the same fact."

In other words: one of the most appropriate means of turning a weak opinion into a strong one (to make it share, to socialize it, as one now says among sociologists) is to undermine the 'competing' - 'annoying' - opinion, by means of 'dialectical' ('rhetorical', eristic) counter-reasoning. The agonistics (WR 11; 144; 215;-- 231), the power-measuring mentality, which is at work here, necessitates push-through techniques ... to socialize.-- In this, Protagoras is actualized, today, by all push-through practitioners.

II.C. -- *The agnostic man, -- preferably socialized.*

Behold the standard.-- The question arises: is it the quantified (socialized) or the qualified human being?

A. "In democratic equality, one does not weigh the votes, one counts them." (G. Romeyer-Dherbey, o.c., 25). Indeed, everyone possesses an equal 'voice', expression. It becomes, then, a matter of majority against minority to push through. Which G. Romeyer-Dherbey, ibid., admits.

B. Yet Protagoras does not advocate an absolute equality of all opinions and an utter identity of wisdom, in all people.

W.R.   242.

The 'best' people, after all, know how to speak in such a way that this speech, because of their fellow men, elicits consent. In this way, the speech of a single person becomes 'strong' speech (...)". (G. Romeyer-Dherbey, o.c., 27).

In other words, as WR 240 has already taught us, a political leader (or a shrewd lawyer), for example, "polarises" (as Romeyer-Dherbey puts it) as many supporters as possible around him.

Quantity is, after all, very decisive. The quality of "reason" is its "strength. Its strength is its quantity (of assenters).

Conclusion.
(1) Quantity plays a very large role.
(2) Quality, finally, shows itself, above all, in quantity (in terms of assenters).

Would Jaeger, who (WR 229) spoke of elitism (judging figures), nevertheless prove a certain right? More so : in order to recruit as many assenters as possible ('strong reason'), even, professionalism (WR 228: professional idiots; 240) is very 'useful'. WR 234 taught us Protagoras' pragmatism (utilitarianism).

Indeed: not the skill in itself, but its usefulness in the process of forming a strong assertion,--that is what Protagoras values. All studies, the whole paideia, on which he goes so big, is 'chrèma', useful thing.

Incidentally, in his defense speech, Romeyer-Dherbey conceals the proper, i.e., Protagorasian, meaning of the term "best" (people). "Yea, young man, (...) the day, when thou hast had intercourse with me (= Protagoras), he will come home as one who has become 'beltion', more cunning (note: Romeyer-Dherbey translates by 'better'). The following days, things will be the same. With each day you will make progress - uninterrupted - toward the cunning". (*Platon, Protagoras* 318a).

J.-P. Dumont, Les sophistes, 30; 249, explains, in this much more honestly than Romeyer-Dherbey, what 'beltion' precisely, in the protosophist language game (WR 56), means: "Better,--in the sense of more handy, more powerful, more cunning." Romeyer-Dherbey should, in fairness, have added that.

Note -
(1) *W. Jaeger, Paideia*, I: 405, notes: "Only when the time of the great Atticians (*note:* he means Platon, Isokrates, etc.) has passed, does Ionic (*note:* Milesian; WR 54v.) science - in Alexandria - experience its revival". The Attic - strongly influenced by Protosfistics, with its emphasis on property formation and political power formation - mentality emphasizes - according to Jaeger - the trivium (WR 233) and in such a way that the eloquent, reasoning, eloquent 'man' who is "durch und durch tätig und politisch" (active and political through and through) (ibid.), even when he is doing theoria, theory, conceived in the power of the consenting word.

In contrast, Milesian scientism possessed a "Geist der reinen Theorie" (a mentality focused on pure theoria, resp. theory), which was expressed first of all in the quadrivium of the Paleopythagoreans and the physical of the Milesians.

(2) Also *J.-P. Vernant; Mythe et pensée*, II, 52s., emphasizes this 'Attic' - understand: Protosofist - aspect. He speaks, there, of Aristotle's mechanics': "Its theory is not 'applied science'. (...). The thinking of it is not 'technical'. From the point of view of design, vocabulary, frame of mind, the theory, which Aristotle's Mechanics recites, is strangely close to (proto)sophistry.

The 'mechanè', device, is described as something that has to do with cunning, usefulness, i.e. in so far as a clever invention allows you to get out of a jam, in a difficult situation, in an 'aporia', pocket street situation; -- in so far as a device allows you to get ahead of a force of nature, which is both hostile to you and superior.

This fight between the 'techne' (note: here, mechanical skill) and the 'fusis' (WR 39) and the pinches, which ensure the mechanical skill the victory over nature(force), are pointed to the model of the word-mouth fight, in which the (Proto)sophist rightly makes a difficult case true, against his opponent."

In other words: thanks to skill, to be persistently cunning.

Conclusion.
The agnostic 'man'(= man type),--with as many assenters around him as possible, -- thanks to pervasive cunning. Behold the homo-mensura position, essence of classical humanism.

II.D.-- *The classical man and the 'antilogia'.*
"The 'god' ('theos') is 'day/night', 'winter/summer', 'war/peace', 'abundance/famine' (...): he turns into the opposite,--just like the fire, which, mixed with incense, is given a name according to the odor, which, according to the kind of incense, it exudes." (Fr. 67).-
'God' stands for the universe. Herakleitos of Ephesus (WR 225; 231), the inspirer of Protagoras, speaks like this. But, as mentioned, there is a big difference between pastor and follower.

W.R.   244.

(a) For Herakleitos e.g. winter and summer belong to one and the same god (understand: fusis, nature), objectively. In other words: the being itself of e.g. the natural landscape (= fusis) is such that it is, sometimes, winter and, then again, summer. Cfr WR 201/203 (the absolute nature).

The difference between Herakleitos and Parmenides consists in the fact that the first thinks contradictory characteristics to be present simultaneously (i.e.: potentially) in the same data, while the second, Parmenides, who thinks strictly logically, rejects this way of speaking. In other words: potentially winter and summer are simultaneously locked up in one and the same landscape; currently they alternate, in the 'flow' (WR 226: panta rhei) of the season's changes.

(b) For Protagoras, first of all, subjective perception applies. "Does it not happen that the same gust of wind gives one of us a chill and not the other? Does it not happen that the same gust of wind is perceived by one of us as a 'gentle breeze', while another perceives in it 'something wonderful'? (...).

After such observations, what are we going to claim about this gust of wind in itself? 'Is' it, now, in itself, cold or non-cold? Either are we going to admit Protagoras that the same gust of wind, insofar as cold, is there in the perception of the one who shivers with cold by it and, insofar as non-cold, is there in the perception of the one who does not shiver with cold by it?" (*Platon, Theaetetus*, 151st).

Well, that is, in Protagorean language, antilogia, contradictory speaking. One says, 'That gust of wind is cold'. The other says, of the same gust of wind, 'That gust of wind is not cold.' That's what the Antiques called 'dialectics'.

Conclusion.
(1) Parmenides, ontologist, thinks strictly unilaterally;
(2) Herakleitos, nature dialectician (destiny dialectician) apparently thinks "contradictorily" (contradictorily);
(3) Protagoras, word dialectician, thinks, likewise, seemingly "contradictory.

WR 160: signification scheme; 199/201: identitive order structure, taught us that there is a third (neither univalent nor contradictory (multivalent)) mode of speech, the analogical: 'The gust of wind (= volidentical) 'is' (partidentical) sometimes cold, sometimes not cold!

II.E.-- *The classical man as phenomenist.*

'Phenomenism' means the doctrine, which claims that - as a knowing being - man attains only phenomena (WR 243: subjective permeation), never the being itself.

a.-- Both Platon and Theophrastos of Eresas (Lesbos; -372/-288), Aristotle's successor, claim that Protagoras held the following doctrine of perception.

Structural Analysis.

I see a white something.

(i) In itself (WR 201) that 'object' is not white. It can, however, give rise to a 'fainomenon', a phenomenon, which I perceive and call 'white'. Reason : the object 'radiates' (WR 89, where Demokritos of Abdere, who holds the same opinion, is briefly outlined). -

(ii) The eye - I, that is, as a seeing being - likewise 'radiates', viz. the 'light' of the gaze. -

(iii) If both radiations meet each other in the interval (the air of the interval), only then does this meeting of both - object and subject - create the 'fainomenon', the phenomenon, which shows itself to the eye (and the self). This 'phenomenon' works, therefore, in both directions:

    (i) it founds the white color as if it emanated from the object;
    (ii) it founds the perception of the same white color, in the eye.

b.-- Aristotle draws, from this teaching, the sensualist-actualist conclusion.

Outside of actual perception (contraction of at least two emanations), there is neither object property nor subject survival. This is called "actualism.

This is, all the more, correct, since, for Herakleitos (WR 226: panta rhei) and for Protagoras, are merely moving, "fluid" (not fixed, unchanging) phenomena.

(ii) Outside of sense (WR 233: nominalism; 239) perception (= observation) there is neither object property (the something e.g. is, in itself, neither white nor black nor colored) nor subject experience. This is called 'sensualism' (WR 14).-- Says Aristotle : "Neither hot nor cold, nor sweet, nor - generally - the sense perceptible (= beheld) exist outside the (actual) sense experience. (...).

Incidentally : no being possesses sense perception except at the moment of perception itself, in the very act of contemplation." (*Ar., Metaph*., H: 3/1046b 29).-- actualism sensualism,-- phenomenism. behold the theory of knowledge (epistemology; WR 187) of the first humanist.

III.-- *The value-judgment of Isokrates and Platon.*

Protosofistics remained, at first glance, a minority. But a minority with far-reaching influence.-- Reactions, then, did not fail to come.

III. A.-- *Isokrates of Athens* (-436/-338)

(i) Eloquence is, for this authentic 'sophistès', in the ancient sense of 'wisdom teacher'(= educator),

1. no bellettrie (art of words and literature practiced purely for aesthetic value),

2. not a life-altering contemplation (in the purely speculative ended philosophy,

3. no 'eristics' (WR 9 (reasoning duel); 215 (agonistics),

4. not forensic or merely political persuasion. If need be, it contains one or more of these ingredients.

(ii) In this way Isokrates sets himself apart, both from Protosofistics and from Platon. 'Philosophy' is, for him, general development. Therefore he takes philosophy seriously. But it is only auxiliary science. The ideal of Isokrates is the solid Athenian citizen, eloquent, with the broadest possible information - background ('filo.sophia'), who, both privately and publicly, 'knows how to manage' (pragmatism, but of a higher standard).

Conclusion.-- A revived, improved sophistry.

III.B. -- *Platon of Athens* (-427/-347)

(i) The Platon of the dialogue *Gorgias* is very critical of the Protosphist rhetoric: it is based only on 'doxa' mere opinion (WR 184),.

(ii) In the dialogue *Faidros* founds his conception of rhetoric. 'Episteme' professional knowledge (based on truth) is the battle.

A. Goedeckemeyer, Platon, Munich, 1922, 57/62 (*Rhetorik*) outlines them as follows:

a. eloquence is language,

b1. carried by "eros" (enthusiasm, zest for life; WR 102), focused on the ideas, as ideals,

b2. carried by 'akribeia' (WR 113), philosophical accuracy (which shows itself in the general 'eidos' (WR 30) and in the classification),

c1. such that the soul of the interlocutors is affected,

c2. by preferably higher values (WR 24).

Therefore, philosophizing-in-group (WR 20: Psychodrama) was, for Platon, 'true'(= conscientious-ideal) rhetoric. To this end he bought, in -387/-386, a piece of land, on which he built the akademeia, his, school of philosophy. Without this infrastructure, there was no "true rhetoric" (understand: each other, as "hetairoi" (thought-mates; W.R 91; 96; 98), friends-thinkers, for the better, by understanding, influencing (WR 4)).

W.R. 247.

IV.-- *Market analysis ('marketing') as an updating of sophistry.*
Bibl. sample:
-- R. Laufer/ C. Paradeise, Le prince bureaucrate, Paris, 1982;
-- L. Bellinger, La persuasion, Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et sophistique*);
-- R.-G. Schwarzenberg, L'état-spectacle, Paris, 1977;
-- M. Le Seach,, L'état-marketing, Paris, 1981.

(I) 'Marketing' (market analysis) is the methodical analysis of a product's marketing potential (such that sales conditions are optimized or, at least, maintained), -- involving publicity, 'public relations' (maintaining contact), forward-looking management.

(II) a. We saw that the businessmen of V-d'century Greece were taught, by the Protosophists, the science of persuasion.

b. The leading figures and politicians of the XX,-th century entrust their expertise and education to market analysts. -- According to Bellenger. -- Just as the Socraticists (Socrates, Platon, Aristotle,-- the macrosocraticists) rejected Sophistics, so too a number of current thinkers, concerning leading circles, complain of "marketing practices-.

Essential, for the market analyst, is the appearance (of the product),-- the pictorial impression ('image') of it. As the above-mentioned proposers say : the 'marketing man' -- like the Sophist -- is a technician of seduction (WR 23/29). This one proceeds from appearances.

Concerned about sales, he is - methodically or, even, ideologically - out for profit (WR 70: economic rhetoric; 230: power of money) : ethical values (conscience) are minimized or, even, eliminated (economism).

The language exhibits manipulation of the truth: by omission (concealment of disadvantages), by inversion (presenting what is disadvantage as advantage), by shift (one does touch on the disadvantage for a moment, but emphasizes the advantage).

The language used is "rhetorical" through platitudes: slogans, unchanging sayings (Who buys that, still buys that), verbiage and so on.

In other words: not truth, not conscience, but market superiority is decisive. Attracting attention, stimulating interest, arousing desire, eliciting assent - such is the four-stage rhetoric of Protagoras. It is also the ground plan of the market, analyst. And of all who apply his method!

Part II.-- Introduction to systematic rhetoric.
Introduction.
Situation of rhetoric in "general education" (enkuklios paideia).

1. *O. Wilmann, Gesch. d. Idealismus, II* (*Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der Realismus der Scholastik*), Braunschweig, 907-2, 328ff., explains how, Scholastically speaking, the antique 'general formation' ('enkuklios paideia' of Antiquity) is a genuine hermeneutic (WR 11; 164).

(A) *Perception* (theme and problem).
The sense experienced ("phenomenon") is the starting point, the given. It is asked to be interpreted.

(B) *Clarity.*
1. The trivium, which includes grammar, rhetoric and dialectics (reasoning), is, first of all, the 'Verstehen', the understanding of written, spoken (word) signs (WR 178). This interpretation of signs proceeds verbally, rhetorically, and reasonologically.

2. The quadrivium, which includes arithmetika, geometria, - music and astronomia, is, first of all, the 'Verstehen', the grasping of 'die Sachen', as Willmann, literally, says, the things themselves (and no longer the signs, which refer to them). And indeed the things themselves, contemplated, fathomed (WR 41: theoria), according to their idea (the knowing and thinking essence).-- Only then was the young Scholasticus confronted with philosophy or theology.

2. The young Scholasticus had, apparently, to go through an intellectual and ethical catharsis, cleansing (WR 46vv.; 76), located in that general formation, before he could take on the learning that philosophy (and, if need be, theology) represents. Cf. *O. Wilmann, Gesch.d* . Id., I: 303f.: catharsis (in virtue of music) as a condition of all learning.

Everywhere, today, one hears, increasingly, complaints regarding language proficiency.

Anne Vallée, Expession écrite: zéro! , - in: *Sélection du Reader's Digest* (Zurich), 39 (1986): avril, 5/14, says:

In secondary school, one third of French young people no longer master their own language. At the beginning of the sixth grade, according to a report by the General Inspectorate, four out of ten students can be said to be 'illiterate'. Unable to read or write, and understand, a simple and brief presentation of facts related to their daily lives, they do not have the necessary skills to integrate at a minimum level into our society.

Such voices are also raised in Germany and with us.

W.R. 249.

The neglect of grammatical, dialectical (= logical) and rhetorical training, which was at the heart of traditional language skills, is, among other things The neglect of grammatical, dialectical and rhetorical training, which constituted the core of traditional language skills, is due, among other things, to the Sturm-und-Drang aspect of Romanticism (with its veneration of genius and individualism), to Positivism (with its aversion to linguistic aspects),--also to what one could call 'the Californian revolution', namely, the Hippie phenomenon and New Left (New Left, gauchism), with their counterculture and far-left tendencies.

The way out is an updating of the antique-medieval trivium.-- All the more so since the computer science of the rising youth will require an accuracy (WR 113: akribeia) of the most exact type possible. One thinks, in our own case, of Sidel (computer firm), which bought the elan programming language.

Elan is
(i) a language for the computer to perform routine work later and
(ii) a logically structured type of thinking. Language sloppiness will not get you far here.

A.-- *Pre-rhetoric (preretoric).*
H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l' éducation dans l'antiquité, Paris, 1948, 239, mentions that deuterosophistics (WR 225) had so-called pro.gumnasmata, preretorics, i.e. elementary rhetoric. Let us say 'preretoric' for short. We briefly outline this.

(1) The first thing a child or young person of that time learned was a task hermeneutic.

For example, the curriculum began with:
(i) a muthos, fabula, myth, and
(ii) a diegema, narratio, story.
A text was, viz, narrated by the teacher (= the given). The student(s) had to give a summary account of it (= the asked).

One sees that what e.g. the mathematicians of that time also did, namely to present the task, split up in given (theme) and asked (problem), as a guideline, norm, was also done by the teachers of language skills. A very first requirement of linguistic competence (just as of mathematical-scientific or musical thinking (quadrivium)) is the close grasping, the interpretation (task hermeneutics), of the given and the asked (= task, task). If not, one falls under the maxim of S. Augustine of Tagaste (WR 119) 'Bene currunt, sed extra viam' (They walk excellently, yet off-piste).

W.R. 250.

Note.-- From that antique-medieval tradition live through two, incidentally, related thematics, resp. methods:

(i) *P. Brunel/ C1. Pichois/ A. M. Rousseau, Qu'est-ce que la littérature comparée*?, Paris, 1983, 115/ 134 (*Thématique et thématologie*);

(ii) *P.R. Bize/ P. Goguelin/ R. Carpentier, Le penser efficace,*

1, (*Le fonctionnement mental*,- in which '*les stapes opératoires de la problimation*')

2. (*La problémation*), Paris, 1982.

We will need this pairing of 'thematology/ problematology' for quite some time to come.

Note -- One reads, now, WR 199/201 (identitive method). The given, object of thematology, is the volitional subject of e.g. a task. The requested is the part-identical aspect, which is being faced (object of the problematology). One can also say, with the Middle Ages Scholastics, the material object (theme) and the formal object (problem, aspect, under which one looks at the theme).

This is reflected in Aristotle's distinction between:

(i) being(s), 'substance' (independence), the full-identical given (theme), and,

(ii) incidentals ('accidentals', partial points of view)" the partial-identical demanded (so e.g. the relation(s), the property(s)). Both together Aristotle calls the categories (praedicamenta), predikamenten (in Scholastic Latin).

(2) The second, which a Late Antique student(s) was taught, was a literatology (= textology).

(a). This textology was twofold: it gave the maxims along with the exercise models (les préceptes du genre et les modèles d'exercices). Without maxims, an exercise is blind (for it does not know the structure of what it is doing). Without applicative -and, in particular, demonstrative (exemplary) models, a maxim is empty. One rereads, now, WR 209/211: semiotics, -- syntactics is, without semantic interpretation, empty; semantics is, without syntactic structure blind.

The maxims offer the syntactics (empty); the models of elaboration (esp. the tonal) offer the semantics (blind). What is a, student(s) with the word "fable" without ever having heard one? (empty word). What is he/she with the word 'fable' without explanation (what the fable is)? (blind listening to a fable).

(b). The antique-medieval textology, within its cultural framework, corresponds to our textology.

W.R.   251.

The reason for this honing of text types and their requirements lies in knowledge per se, but, at least as much, in the concern for good rapport between teacher and student(s). "People do not come to misunderstand or conflict, respectively, unless because they have either not defined or have defined poorly." (*J. Fr. Marmontel* (1723/1799, *Eléments de littérature* (1787)).

By knowing accurately (akribeia) what myth, story, -- later: chreia (chrie), gnomè (sententia, proverb, aphorism), kataskeuè (confirmatio, proof) and anaskeuè (refutatio, refutation of a proof), koinos topos (locus communis, commonplace, expository), are, the teacher could accurately indicate what kind of text elaboration he/she meant and the learner(s) could accurately, understand what precisely he/she had to draw up.

Our current teaching, by neglecting the definitions and leaving the matching models "free," is founding a series of misunderstandings.

Apart from the seven types of texts mentioned above (for secondary education), Deuterosophistics (for higher education) had the following types: enkomion (laudatio, praise (speech) about someone's actions; possibly negative: psogos (vituperatio, blame (= criticism)), sunkrisis (comparatio, comparison (parallel)), prosopopoiia (prosopoppeia, painting of the view (appearance)) and èthopoiia (ethopoeia, painting of the interior (character) of someone (possibly of an animal)), ekfrasis (descriptio, description), thesis (propositum, propositio, position, which one defends), nomos (lex, law(s) discussion).

The connection between task hermeneutics and textology is clear: the text (type of it) is the answer to the question asked and its elaboration, as the task stated. - Speaking of linguistics.

A.I -- *Bibliographic sample.*
That late antique tradition, historically evolving, has continued. Thus e.g. *Noël Delaplace, Leçons Françaises de littérature et de morale* (*avec préceptes du genre et des modèles d' exercices*), Bruxelles, 1844" 552pp..-- The book decays into two parts.

I. -- *Prose:* stories, tableaux ("tableaux"), descriptions, definitions, fables, allegories;-- religious morality, lay morality ("Philosophie pratique");-- letters;-- speeches and oratorical fragments, speech introductions, speech conclusions (closing speech); -- philosophical or purely literary dialogues; character drawings and portraits, parallels (political, literary, ethical).

W.R. 252.

II. *Poetry:* same list, except letters, but added: lyric fragments.-- It is claimed that rhetoric has not evolved, but the comparison, objectively, of the late antique and the XIX-th'century list is nevertheless clear: taste evolves with cultural development.

If we look at *Ch.-M. des Granges/ Mlle Magueloner, La composition Française* (*Livre du maître*), Paris, 1930, one notices, again, tradition and evolution: stories, descriptions, portraits, letters, 'morality' (ethical essays), literary analysis and criticism. The persuasive ('oratorical') texts have been omitted. -

Another view is offered *by J. Gob, Précis de littérature Française*, Bruxelles, 1947:
(i) introductory concepts (subject matter and, philosophical texts/aesthetic texts);

(ii) language skills:
a. invention, arrangement, design (stylization);
b. poetry;
c. set exercises (description, story, treatise);

(iii) text types (litéraire genres): the essentially "literary" (understand: aesthetic "type" (descriptive, narrative; lyrical; dramatic); the accidentally "literary" types (letter; didactic text; scientific and philosophical text; historical text; criticism; didactic poetry; eloquent text); a note on satire and press.-- Again, tradition and evolution, simultaneously.

Around +/- 1950, a reversal occurs: *T.A. Van Dijk, Modern Literary Theory* (*An Experimental Introduction*), Amsterdam, 1971, is, evidence of this. J. Kristeva, R. Barthes, J. Derrida, Ph. Sollers,-- N. Chomsky, Max Bense, A.J. Greimas, R. Jakobson, C.S. Peirce, T. Todorov and others, who looked at language and text in new approaches, found a new theory of language (or 'rhetoric'). 'Text' 'literarity' 'style' 'metaphor' and 'metonymy, -- narratology (narrative theory) etc. become, suddenly, topical in new ways. Textology and literature emerge, in the present sense.

One thinks of *R. Wellek/ A. Warren, Theory of Literature*, New York, 1942-1 (Fr. transl.: *La theorie littéraire*, Paris, 1971).

What was set forth for centuries and centuries - in a relatively simple way - by rhetoric now becomes the prey of (often hyper-specialized, indeed, formalized) theories (WR 103; 187/ 191).

A.II.-- *Four pre-rhetorical text types.*

We dwell briefly (and in traditional style) on report, description, narration and discourse: they are, after all, presupposed to be known in every speech. Whoever wants to come to an understanding, which influences (WR 4; 28v.), by means of the word (text), must, as the case may be, be able to **(1)** report, **(2)** describe, **(3)** narrate, **(4)** treat.

(1).-- *The report*

'Hupotuposis', short sketch, was an antique-medieval exercise in text formation. Taking, *Marrou, Hist.d.l'ed*., 239s., as a model.

Paraphrasis, here in the sense of 'summary account' of what, immediately before, was heard, read, viz. a muyhos, fable or myth. The Papyrus Fayoum has preserved for us another apprentice work.

Given: a myth in verse;
Requested: 'paraphrasis', 'hupotuposis' (clearer term).
So much for the task at hand.

Now the text.

"A son, who had murdered his father and 'who feared the legislation on parricide, fled into the desert'" (= verse from the reading).

As he trekked, through the mountains, he was chased, by a lion. With the lion at his heels, he climbed a tree. He saw, then, a snake ("dragon"), which rushed toward that tree and, possibly, was able to climb it (...). As he fled from that snake, he fell.

(Gnomè, sententia, proverb:) The malefactor does not escape the god : 'The deity will bring the malefactor to justice'. This last phrase is, again, a verse memorized by the student(s),--and it is from Menandros of Athens (-342/-291), a famous comedy poet. We would call it, now, 'the moral lesson '.

This is the summary idea or structure of the muthos. This saying (proverb, proverb) is, after all, the regulative model (syntactic structure), of which the narrative is the applicative model (semantic interpretation; WR 209/211; 250).

Note.-- It is, here, about the judgment of God (WR 53: borderline; 93: Dikè), well known to the ancients.

Without the "saying" (aphorism = structure) the story is blind (a pure anecdote, with no meaning for life). without the saying, the "moral lesson" (better: structure) is empty.

That a myth can, even today, have philosophical significance is shown by *M. Heidegger* (WR 29), *Sein und Zeit*, I, Tübingen, 1927; 1949-6, 191/196 (*The Cura or Care Fable*),

W.R. 254.1,
Second example of report.
Bibl. sample : -- *J. Broeckaert, Le guide*, 82s. (Les circonstances);
-- *O. Willmann,.- Abriss*, 9 (*Merkspruche der Rhetoriker*).

(1) *Ambiguity.*
'Many-identity' is that which obeys the rule 'one-unique' (WR 180; 199/201; 250). The full identity (= material object, theme) is one; the partial identity (= analogy,-- formal object, viewpoint, requested) is many.--

(2) *Plurality Schemata.*
For the drafter, it comes down to making the ambiguity idea useful in text formation.-- There are, in terms of an event (diachronic data), two variants of an interpretation scheme in circulation.

A. J. Broeckaert, o.c., 82, teaches us the circumstantial scheme. -- The Latin verse summarizes: Quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), per quos (by means of which persons), quoties (how many times), cur (by which/why), quomodo (how), quando (when).

O. Willmann, o.c., 9, gives a variant: quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), suibus auxiliis (with what aids), cur (by what / why), quomodo (how), quando (when).

Ordered:
(i) actor(s), acting persons (beings) and action (what, praxis);
(ii) how / with - what - tools / with - cooperation - from - who are the precisions of (i);
(iii) where/when (how many times) is the location in time and space;
(iv) what/why is the explanation (necessary and sufficient reasons to make the event, the action, understandable).

Conclusion:
(a) theme (material object) is praxis (action, happening);
(b) asked (formal objects) are the aspects, 'commons', perspectives, peculiar to the theme, called 'circumstances'.

B. *L. Rademaker/ H. Bergman, Sociological Currents,* Spectr./Intermed., 1977, 148; 149. "The situation, the people involved, their actions and their behavioral alternatives are placed in a specific framework by the report ('account')! -- "To recognize as such a particular instance (= applicative model) of 'telling the code' (using and, immediately exposing a secret appointment system), you have to know who said it, when, where, to whom, - in what circumstances, etc."

In other words: adapted to current sociological research, the circumstantial generalities - updated (WR 165) - return again and again. Its 'eternal value' (WR 4: philos. perennis) is abundantly clear. We shall now see how the ancient Greeks founded the scheme.

W.R. 254.2.
Second example of report.
Marrou, o.c., 240.-- ***The diegema, the story.***
Following the muthos is a more difficult exercise in summary defeat.

(1) *The task.*
(a) *Given*: the teacher reads a poem, drama fragment, ordinary story.
(b) *Asked*: in a dozen lines (note the (quantification) write down a representation, which is
(i) as accurate (akribeia; WR 251), objective (WR 201) as possible,
(ii) as clearly as possible,
(iii) and is error-free (by grammatical standards),-- this, by next model:
a1. time,
a2. place;
bl. agens (acting being),
b2. act (praxis),
b3. course ('manner, in which the act takes place'),
b4. explanation ('cause'). One sees that what we, now, call praxeology, description of an event, resp. an action, was practiced here, on an elementary level.

Note.-- The fact could be mythical, poetic, historical.

We cite a poetic model, namely Odusseia, 10: 348/373. Odusseus is in the dwelling of Kirkè (WR 106; 138). He narrates, "The four helpers of Kirkè were, meanwhile, at work in her dwelling.(...). They were the daughters of the springs, the forests, and the sacred streams flowing into the sea (WR 80). One lined the high seats with beautifully colored blankets,-- the purple ones on top, the linen ones underneath. In front of the seats the second placed the beautiful silver tables and set the golden baskets on them. The third poured the delicious, honey-sweet wine into a silver pitcher and, immediately, set out the golden cups.

The fourth, however, of the helpers brought water. Underneath a large tripod she kindled a strong fire. One saw the water getting hot. When it had reached boiling point inside the shining metal, she made me sit down in the bath. With the water from the mighty tripod she prepared a pleasant mixture and poured it over my head and shoulders until she had expelled the debilitating fatigue from my body. She bathed me and anointed me with oil, on which she wrapped my undergarment in a beautiful cloak. Then she brought me to the beautiful, artfully silver covered seat. Under my feet she slid the footstool.

In a beautiful golden jug one of the helpers brought water: over a silver basin she sprinkled, washing, my hands. In front of me she set the table made of polished wood. The high housekeeper came and put bread on the table, which she replenished with many dishes: from the stocks she shared without calculation. Thereupon she invited me to dinner (...)".

W.R. 255.
(2) *The report,*
(i) *Introduction.*
In this text from the epic, the Odusseia, Homer (+/- -800) has Odusseus speaking.

(ii) *Middle -- (time and place)*
During Odusseus' stay in the home of the sorceress Kirkè, (action) nymphs, as helpers and as housekeeper, prepare Odusseus a reception in line. (manner/ course) By monde wan the hero Odusseus, the poet dwells at length, on it. One nymph gets the seats ready, another the tables, with the baskets on them, the third the wine. The fourth gives the hero a restorative bath, after which she assigns him the place of honor. One of the nymphs washes his hands. The distinguished housekeeper sets the table. The meal can begin.

(iii) *Conclusion.*
All this happens because Kirkè and its hairs want to live up to the high duties of hospitality (explanation/cause).

Conclusion.
One sees that, describing structure (in six points of view of praxeology), on a dozen lines, one can make an accurate account of the Homeric epic text. -

Note.-- Omit one of the six integrating components, and there is a gap, violating the totality (the Gestalt; WR 114). Note how time and place situate the event and how the other four 'commons' characterize it. Without the six points of view, the story (structure) is blind. Without the story, the structure is empty.

Update.
Bibl. sample:
-- Y. Stalloni, Méthods de contraction et de synthèse de textes (*Concours d'entrée des grandes écoles*), Paris, 1983, 2;
-- J. Moreau, La contraction en la synthèse de textes, Paris, 1977;'
-- Ed. Marketing, Contraction et synthèse de textes à l' entrée des grandes écoles (*Epreuves intégrales des concours*). Paris, 1983.

The 'contraction' (literally: contraction, summary) is, according to Moreau, "the 'resumé' (summary) of a text, i.e. nothing but the reduction of the basic text to a third, a fourth, a fifth, etc., of its length.

The "synthesis" is a very clear "contraction": more than one basic text, either identical or related or dealing with several subjects, summarized according to their unity (in terms of content, arrangement (= layout, plan), design (= stylization)).

W.R. 256.
The Editions Marketing, o.c., 5/8, give, following specimen.
H.E.C. 79 (Polytechnique).-- Duration : 3 hours.

Summarize, in four hundred words, the following text (by *Roger Caillois* (1913/1978), *L' ésprit des sectes*).
Highlights, in the process, the author's main ideas and line of thought ('1'articulation de la pensée').
At the end of your copy, indicate the number of words used.

Note -- One can see that the quantification has gone far.

Other example.-- E.S.C.A. 79.-- Duration : 3 hours.
Summarize following text in four hundred words.

Candidates must state on their copy, in blocks of fifty lines (i.e. all fifty lines), the number of words used in the margin, just opposite the line corresponding to that number. The total will be given at the end of the manuscript.

An excess of ten percent is allowed. Above 440 words, however, one point will be deducted, for each ten-word slice.-- The improvers will take the performance into account. (o.c., 109/113).

Y. Stalloni, o.c.,7, specifies: usually the point subtraction is one point (out of a total of twenty) for each cut (= section of text) of ten words above the tolerance threshold. If 400 words are requested, the margin is 40 (i.e. up to 360 or 440 words). From 359 or 441 words the candidate loses one point; from 349 or 451 two points,

Conclusion.-- The entrance exams, for the higher institutes, in France, obey non-maleficent conditions.-- Stalloni recommends:
al. first, suddenly, read the entire text (30 to 40 minutes for 4,000 words),
a2. then, summarize its components (arrangement, plan, diagram),
b1. then, summarize the paragraphs (sections of text with one idea) each time, after reading,
b2. summarize the line of thought, in each case following the paragraph reading

Perhaps our education in language skills would do well to hone, as early as possible, the model of the ancient summary. Later on, the pupils would then be ready to handle this recent form of (single or multiple) contraction. "Es übt sich früh, was ein Meister werden will", (Early practice makes perfect what wants to become a maste).

W.R. 257.
Small-scale model of multiple text contraction ("synthesis").
Bibl. sample : *Gilberts Niquet, Structurer sa pensée / Structurer sa phrase*, Paris, 1978, 10/12. Niquet gives a series of texts on TV; we choose a few.

(A)1. The TV runs out on late nights: it is often partly responsible for our morning fatigue.

(A)2. Not a single finger is moved any more! Moving around to experience something else or to meet other people is out of the question! One sits, nailed down, gawking at the TV screen (...).

(A)3. Man, as a TV viewer, is ready for a purely passive acquaintance with the universe: he/she receives information via the TV, but does not actively inform him/herself.

(A)4. The TV images whirl, gusts alike, across the screen (...). The world becomes a whirlwind, a vortex. Like falling leaves, the news items, once passed on, are carried away.

(A)5. With the real runs the purely imagined into one: Stendhal (= Henri Bayle, this Stendhal (1783/1842), French novelist) juxtaposed with George Pompidou (1911/1974; French president 1969/1974); (...) Don Juan (legendary figure; perhaps once a Spanish nobleman, Don, Juan Tenerio, who, during the XVIth e., lived in Seville) falls in love with Sylvie Vartan (current French actress) (...). It is culturally speaking, plenty of "Flemish Fair".

(A)6. Tell me how you spend your free time, and I will tell you which type of culture you belong to (according to a sociologist). Applied to TV processing by the public, this phrase shows us that, among other things, Sunday TV programs provide a possible measure of the value of TV culture dissemination. They range from the Western, in the afternoon, to the tearjerker show, in the evening. What disappointing mediocrity, spread across pitiful scenarios, texts, intentions, images of the TV screen! Everything reduces to killing time. Result : just when the viewing density is particularly high, one encounters a massively dispersed, tasteless mediocrity.

(A)7. A TV report ('reportage') never appears on the TV screen in its entirety and without explanation ('commentary'). The TV reporter limits his/her images to a narrow selection and adds his/her own interpretation.
It is, therefore, obvious: TV imposes its viewpoint and its value judgment on us.

W.R. 258.

(B)1. Sometimes people think that TV - images come across directly and are processed idly. The reality is different: one member of a family wants to watch sports, another wants to watch a movie, and yet another wants to watch technology or drama. The media enthusiast is, at the same time, a media observer, indeed a media critic. Far from continually flattening them within one's own perspective, TV can, therefore, force family members to discuss each other.

(B)2. The support for medical broadcasts is not surprising: they respond to a need on the part of the viewer, -- the need to be informed about medicine. (...).

(B)3. TV makes world literature available to the viewing public. Something that, without TV, would never have made it outside a mini-circle of interested parties.

(B)4. I am a teacher of French literature. One day my pupils surprised me: they were engaged in a dispute about *Le Rouge et le Noir* (a novel, by *Stendhal*, published in 1831). I was curious (...): they had, indeed, seen a film.
Evening before - based on the novel in question. My bookseller told me that, in addition to young people, others had done this. What's more, the book's sales had increased considerably since then. The same phenomenon occurred after *Germinal* (from the series *Les Rougon-Maquart* (1885), about the life of miners, by the naturalist *Emile Zola* (1840/ 1902).(...).

Requested.
(1) Reading (Stalloni method; WR 256). The overall reading provides you, perhaps, ;and concise title that summarizes (A) and (B).

(2)1. Provide a summary (reflecting the train of thought).

(2)2. Ver. equal therewith, (A)3 and (A)7; (A)3 and (B)1; (A)4 and (A)5; (B)1 and (B) 2,3,4.

(2)3. Are WR 180 (interpretive scheme), WR 227 (dialectical argument), even WR 215 (eristics) applicable?

(2)4. After careful reading, in your opinion, is TV amenable to 'marketing' (WR 247)?

(2)5. Can the texts be called 'rhetorical'? Are they trying to influence you in one direction or another?

(2)6. On (A) 6, is the pairing of "regulatory and applicative model" applicable? (Cf. WR 253).

(2)7. Is the praxeological scheme (WR 254) applicable anywhere?

(2).1. --The "ekphrasis" (descriptio), description.

If the report was a text type, which shortens (up to quantified shortening), the literature types, which follow now, are (rather) lengthening, extending, developing.

The first type, which we outline, is the description

Bibl. sample :

-- *J. Broeckaert, S.J., Le guide du jeune littérateur*, I (*Eléments généraux et compositions secondaires*), Bruxelles / Paris / Bois-le-Duc,1849 - 1; 1872-2, 179/219;--

-- *C. Lefèvre, S.J., La composition littéraire*, Bruxelles, 1936-3, 300/322 (*La description*);

-- J. *Gob, Précis d. litt. fr*. BXL. 1947, 151/154 (*La description*);

-- *E. Zola* (WR 258), *De la description*, in: *Le roman expérimental* (1880), in: *Oeuvres compl.* x, Cercle du livre précieux, 1968;

-- *Alain Robbe-Grillet* (1922/2008), *Temps et description, dans le récit d' aujourd' hui* , in: Pour un nouveau roman, in: Idées (Paris), No. 45;

-- *Ph. Hamon, Qu'est-ce qu'une description*, in: *Poétique*, No. 12;

-- *J. Ricardou, L'ordre des choses ou une expérience de la description méthodique*, in: *Pratiques* (Metz), No. spécial, 75/84.

Definition.

"The description is the verbal, (...), circumstantial representation of a sense" (C. Lefèvre, o.c,. 300) "A description aims at making the fellow man (hearer, reader) perceive, through the power of the word, a spectacle ('spectacle'), which the author has observed or imagined". Gob, o.c.,151).

One sees that sensory perception must either factually precede or be possible ('perceptible'). Further: that the descriptor reclaims that perception, eventual, in the fellow human being.

Ch.-M. Des Granges/ Mlle Maiguelone, La composition. fr., Paris, 1930, 799ss., says: "One tries by means of words to suggest the impression that a personal-direct observation or a landscape painting would give! Here the suggestive (WR 135v.) is emphasized, i.e. the awakening in the fellow man of his own perception, although this is, first of all, directed towards the perceived itself.

Phenomenological (cfr E. Husserl): the 'I' - through its language - makes the 'ye' (fellow human being) participate in its own attentive orientation ('intentionality', on the observed, **(1)** I, ye **(2)** intentional orientation communicated, **(3)** in a verbal way,--see three structural aspects.

W.R. 260.
One-Ended Character.
The fellow human side (possibly in its suggestive degree) is, only, second-class. To describe is, first of all, to represent what is (WR 201/20-3: in itself).

C.Ansotte, Traité pratique de rédaction et d' élocution, Dour, 1910, 61, designates of this object-boundness two aspects:

(a) The "gestalt" (WR 114/119) is represented "by making the choice of details subordinate to the overall impression" i.e., according to Ansotte, the totality of the observed gives the description its unity;

(b) The alternation of details reflects the richness and diversity of the observed : the partial impressions (preferably original and new) "powerfully paint the observed, characterize it, make it visible". This is the multiplicity aspect, inherent in the objectivity of the representation.

Typology.
J. Broeckaert, o.c.,180, distinguishes two types.
(1) The description of a course of action ('une action successive'; o.c.,180/190), -- what the author calls a story;

(2) The description of a simultaneous fact ('un tableau simultané', a tableau. -- o.c., 211/219) , -- what he calls actual description.-- Within actual description Broeckaert distinguishes subtypes: "Landscapes, buildings,-- portraits, mores,-- everything can be described.

Hence such appellations as topography (landscape description,-- natural and cultural landscape concerned), prosopopoiia, view description (portrait, stricto sensu) and character description, èthopoiia (character image) (WR 251), 'ethopee' also called. These last two types are actualized in the behaviorist and the humanities ('verstehende') description

Applicable models.
We briefly discuss some types.

App. Mod. 1.-- The simile or dichotomous description.
Bib st.:
-- H. Morier, Dict d. poét. et de rhétor., Paris, 1981-3, 989/1005 (Similé).
-- Homéros, Iliad, 4:141vv, gives us a model.

Menelaus, the prince of Sparta, is hurt by an arrow (WR 33: Trojan. war).-- "As a Meonian or Carian girl dyes the ivory, which will serve as the ornament of the bridle (= bit) of the horses, with purple;-- the ornament lies, meanwhile, in her bedroom; many horsemen would gladly take it, but it lies there as an ornament for a prince, both ornament of the steed and showpiece of the horseman.

W.R. 261.

Thus, Menelaus, your shapely thighs, your legs, and your beautiful ankles, below, were stained with spots of blood! -- One sees that Homer introduces an equation to describe the fact of war: "as ..., so ...". as a (....) girl colors the ivory with purple, (...) So (...) were (...) stained with spots of blood". One sees : purple --- blood; ivory ---- thighs, legs, ankles. But the epic poet is left faltering a the scene in peacetime : "The ornament lies, meanwhile, in her bedroom (...)". This is an interjection. but it describes.

The simile type of text lies in what Morier calls the bijection between purple and blood and between ivory and thighs, legs, ankles. The war scene is depicted in a peace scene, point by point ("bi.jection" or "addition"). What is not true of the insertion, which, painted in isolation, does not bijectively, (not added') correspond to the war scene. The simile or bijectively elaborated equation is, in other words, not fully elaborated.

Except for the insertion, the description is twofold:
(i) she is direct (the war scene);
(ii) it is indirect (the peace scene, at least in part, as a depiction of the direct description).

App. Mod. 2.-- The characteristic.
Bibl. St.: *O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie* (*Philosophische Propädeutik*), Wien, 1959, 34; 153f.

'Characterize' means
(i) describe the essentials of a given
(ii) such that the unreal is omitted. One can also introduce the Greek word 'tupos' 'typify' (WR 255). We refer to the term 'hupo.tuposis'(WR 253), hypotyposis, outline (here : of the essential).
With the characteristic, we approach, strongly, but undeveloped, the phenomenological description of being ('eidetic' phenomenology: the eidos (WR 30; 246)).

Strict sense perception (WR 259) is, hereby, preserved as 'empeiria' (WR 41: the visible), but it is at the same time transcended, as 'theoria', fathoming, insight (WR 41: the invisible).

Willmann, o.c.,153f., describes the structure of the characteristic or creature sketch of e.g. a human being.
(1)1. How does someone look (view description, prosopopoiïa)?

(1)2. What is he in society?

W.R. 262.

In other words: the profession, the stand (according to Willmann). Which again is prosopopoïïa, view description (but socially understood).

Note.-- This dual external aspect refers to scientism as actualization: the natural scientist pursues and describes the view, the visible and tangible.

(2) Who, what kind of "person" (character, soul) is someone? Willmann emphasizes, herewith, mind, will, spirit.

Note.-- This aspect, which represents the èthopoiïa, the character or soul description, means the interior, behind the view. It is actualized in the science of the mind (hermeneutics as a science of man) which, throughout the externally perceptible, describes the soul, the interiority, -- this, according to the understanding ('verstehende') method.

Willmann points out that one can understand the typical, the characteristic, in two ways.

1. *The idealization.*
Thus Aristotle, in his Poetics, 15 says "The 'good' painters depict the characteristic of the themata treated (*op.* : the realistic, one-another aspect). Yet, for all their faithful rendering, they portray it more beautifully. Likewise, if a man of letters depicts people who are short-tempered, frivolous or have other defects of character, he should refine his figures".

2. *Naturalism.*
There is a 'realism', which depicts 'reality' raw, yes, degraded, because it considers idealization somewhere as an escape from harsh reality. The typical is, then what constitutes misery (miserabilism e.g.).

Appl. Mod. 1. -- The summary report.
(a) If, a learner(s) when analyzing a muthos (WR 253), in what we, now, call 'moral lesson', recognizes the structure (regulatory model), he /she is expressing the characteristic, the outline of being.

(b) If, in summarizing an event, someone succinctly describes its six-part structure, it describes its typical, its characteristic.

To describe the structure succinctly,--that is to characterize.
App. Mod. 2.-- The behavioral description.
One takes e.g. *Homer, Odusseia* 10: 210/219. The epic poet wants to describe, succinctly, what the behavior of wild animals, edited by the "sorceress" (WR 80v.; 106; 254) Kirke, as lady of the animals (= a magical title), looks like.

W.R. 283.

In the valley, between the mountains, they found Kirkè's dwelling: it consisted of polished stones. The point was visible from afar.

Nearby were mountain wolves and lions, which Kirkè, by administering black-magic potions, had magically worked. The animals did not, therefore, attack the men wildly. On the contrary: they rose up and, with their long tails, strode past them.--as the dogs of the house wag their tails around their lord, when he comes home from a feast, always, after all, he, then, has tasty morsels with him,--so also, with their heavy claws, the wolves and the lions, tail-waving, walked around them."

1. The outward appearance, external behavior, is described here, succinctly, with a trait (the wagging of the tail), but, at the same time, the inner life, of the animals - just through the external behavior - shines through. Here we have prosopopia and ethopia in one!

2. Again (WR 260v.):
(i) the real event is, directly, depicted (one - unambiguously described) in the behavior of wild animals;
(ii) this, in turn, is depicted, in the comparison with the dogs -- pets,-- indicating indirect representation. The simile process is a powerful descriptive tool.

App. Mod. 3.-- The characterization of. The landscape.
Bib. Sample :
-- *Lewis Mumfordr Technics and Civilization*, New York, 1934;
-- *Jeremy Rifkin, Ted Howard, Entropy* (*A New World View*), New York, 1980.-- It is about the mid-century world of living.

(1) The natural landscape was, mainly (predominant trait, main impression), forests, in which people lived.

(2) The cultural landscape was correspondingly : wood was, before the introduction of coal and the steam engine, the dominant industrial resource ('energy type'). This, **(i)** as a raw material, **(ii)a.** as a fuel, **(ii)b.** as a finished product (utensils, hand tools, appliances (ships, oil and wine presses, printing presses, etc.) were, all, made of wood).-- forest and wood, - such were the characteristics of the Middle Ages environment. In popular speech : "Wood and forest were the order of the day". One sees, again, the summative ('inductive') character. Indeed: the summative induction is the foundation of the outline of being.

App. Mod. 4.-- The characterization of a man type.
People know the term "fan" from the pop world. The word comes from "fanatic" enthused.

W.R. 264.

(1) *The fan's view.*

Bib. Sample : Joepie (Deurne), 392 (20.06.1981): 4/5.

Speaking of Angela, one of the girls of the six-member Dolly Dots, who, in Japan, garnered overwhelming acclaim.

a. "In one of Tokyo's biggest discotheques there are about two thousand 'fans'. We enter: all are singing along, to the hilt. We sit down at the table for a while: I assume that almost all of the 'fans' take a closer look at us, with the peculiarity that they touch you for a moment,--and then walk away, smiling.

b. "**(i)** With us (in the West) the 'fans' ask for an autograph.

(ii) There, in Japan, they touch you for a moment and seem - with that - to be soulful."

One sees: the pop starlet, looking at it from the outside, "behaviorist" (one would say), describes the phenomenon. Prospopee!

(2). The soul of the fan.

Bib. Sample : Joepie (Deurne), 409 (17.01.1982): 76/77.

Speaking of Beedee, a member of the four-member group Ramones.

(i) "I like to have something to do with a hero. A 'hero' is someone in whom one believes, yet with whom one should not deal directly (*note:* distant worship)."

(ii) "Thus John Lennon, the Beatle, was my last hero. Although I don't necessarily agree with his 'philosophy' (*note:* world view and philosophy of life), I do appreciate what was real in him: he was **a. a** man with honest opinions, **b.** with a 'heart' - **c.** someone who wanted to achieve something!

Here the fan - being, from within, is described by someone, who lives it, himself. The journalist, who covers the words, participates in that living through.

To substantiate: Joepie (Deurne), 398 (01.11.1981), 66v., has the singer Feerkal Sharkey, from the five-member Northern Ireland pop group The Undertones, say, "I think it is in the nature of man to always want to put someone - a politician, a singer - on a pedestal."

This statement **(i)** confirms the essence, 'characteristic', of the 'fan' (hero worship at a distance), **(ii)** but explains (WR 254: cause) him. Which is no longer a description, for explaining exceeds the given (the visible phenomenon). Ethopoeia! Who does not think here of idealization, (WR 262)

App. Mod. 5.-- The 'enkomion', laudatio, praise(speech).

Bib. st.: H.I. Marrou, Hist. d. l' ed., 273/275.

Given: a personality, living or dead, mythical or historical.

Requested: laudatory characterization,

W.R. 265.

The eulogy is a description, but with the intention of substantiating a value judgment.-- Behold the ancient, Deuterosophistic scheme.

(A)- *The view description.*
   It expires in two parts.
(A)1. *The external values*.
a. The 'eugeneia' (the noble lineage. **b.** The middle: **i.** city of birth, **ii.** people, **iii.** political regime (e.g. democracy), **iv.** parents, family. **c.** The personality: **i.** education, which was enjoyed, **ii.** circle of friends, **iii.** acquired fame ('fame'), **iv.** public offices, **v.** property, **vi.** children (number, beauty), **vii.** leuthanasia; peaceful death.

(A)2. *The physical-external values.*
a. health, **b.** body strength, **c.** beauty, **d.** 'euaisthèsia' sensitivity.

(B) *The soul description (character sketch).*
Two main aspects.

(B)1. *The attitudes to life.*
a. wisdom (= general education), **b.** self-control, **c.** courage, **d.** sense of right, **e.** sense of religion, **f.** nobility of soul, **g.** magnanimity (which does not falter at trifles).

(B)2. *The behaviors deriving therefrom*.
a. Its purposefulness:
i. altruistic, disinterested activities,
ii. activities geared to the objective good (and not to the useful (WR 236) or to pleasure (WR 237)),
iii. activities geared to the public good, iv. activities demonstrated notwithstanding risks and hazards.

b. *Its situatedness* (the circumstances, in which):
i. the sense of the appropriate time, **ii.** Precedents (acts done for the first time), **iii.** activities done alone. **iv.** activities surpassing the others, **v.** activities done with few collaborators, **vi.** activities unusual for his age, **vii.** against all hope yet accomplished, **viii**. performances not done without effort and suffering**, ix.** activities done quickly yet well.

Behold more than thirty 'cephalaia', points of view, perspectives, on one's being. One sees that prosopopia and ethopia -- again -- go together. One sees that the soul values, however highly regarded, are not examined without the analysis of intentions (goal analysis) and especially not without the situation, i.e. the totality of circumstances. A remarkable sense of the totality in which man finds himself. Cfr. WR 255 (situate, in time and space).

W.R. 266.
App. Mod. 3.-- *The painting hypotype;*
Bibl. stab pr.: H. Morier, *Dict. d. poét. de rhét*., 520/531.

'Hupotuposis', outline, can also mean a dramatizing outline. Morier says :*The hypotyposis is a figure of speech (*note :* manner of saying), in which one describes. The scene is so vividly, 'energetically' rendered and perceived that it offers the sight of the actual presence, relief and colors of the reality described." (o.c.,520).

The Latin word is, among other things, evidentia, to put it under the eyes.-- to situate it in the midst of it'. A famous model is *M. Tullius Cicero* (-106/-43), in his *Fourth Catalinarian Address*.

"To my mind: I see this capital (Rome), the light of the inhabited world and the fortress of all peoples, suddenly, collapsing in one great fire. I see, in the midst of the dead of our fatherland, heaps of citizens in a miserable and unburied state. Before my eyes rises the scene of Cethegus, and, at once, one, who indulges himself, when he murders you!

Cicero sees the danger of Catilina and his political group, which is bent on the reversal, indeed the destruction of Rome. In order to sharpen the effect (the consequences), to bring it clearly before the eyes ('evidentia'), he pretends to be, already, the contemporary of the future. In this he mimics, welts the seers, who also - although 'mantic' (under inspiration; WR 88) - exhibit such a 'style'. Not from a distance; no: in the midst of the described itself.

One actualization, which has become world famous, is the famous "I have a dream" by Martin Luther King (1929/1968).

More banal, yet 'hypotypical', the working-class person says: "I already see me in that situation". Or still: "I see you already sunk". The understating is a commonsense fact. the immediate presence with the described stands out. The strictly rhetorical nature stands out.

The dramatizing sketch or hypotype may be very short. *Le Lutrin* is a burly epic by *Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux* (1636/1711). He outlines the atmosphere of the "paternal kings" as follows: "Quatre boeufs attelés, d' un pas tranquille et lent // Promenaient, dans Paris, le monarque indolent". Even the oxen are getting fat.

But, in a novel, the dramatizing hypotype can be sustained for three, four pages. But always the reader is situated in the middle of it.

W.R. 267

(2).2. -- The 'dietis' (dietgema, muthos), narratio, story.
The second expository text type is the narrative.

Bibl. st.:

-- J. Broeckaert, Le guide du J.litt., I, 180/190 (Description d' une action successive);

-- C. Ansotte, Traité prat., 48/59 (De la narration);

-- G.- A. Gasquy, La narration française, Marseille, 1905;

-- Ch.-M. Des Granges/ Melle Magualonne, La comp. fr., 794/799 (Un récit: *Gil Blas et le fripier*);

-- R. Fayolle, La critique, Paris, 1978, 213/216 (*L'analyse du récit*);

-- Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif, in: *Communications*, 4 (*Recherches sémiologiques*), Paris, 1964, 4/32;

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-- Rimmon-Kenan (*Sholomith*), *Narrative Fictiony*, London / New York" 1933;

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-- P. Ricoeur, La narrativité, Paris, 1980;

-- G. Genette, Nouveau discours du récit, Paris, 1983.

'Narratology', story theory, is the new term for an old thing: *Aristotle*, in his *Poetika*, 1450a 2/3 and onwards, talks about the core of drama (stage play), namely the muthos, the story (WR 253). Deuterosophistics has its teaching on narrative, both muthos and dègèma (WR 254). Narratology has, especially, taken off since *Vladimir Propp, Morfologija Skazki* (*Morphology of the Fairy Tale*), Leningrad, 1928. It is highly formalizing.

Definition.
"The muthos, the story, is the 'mimèsis,' the representation of a 'praxis,' action." (*Aristotle, Poet.,* 1450a 2/3). The story is 'sunthesis', closed representation, of 'ta pragmata', the facts: this is how Aristotle describes, also, in his Poet., ibidem. Poet., 1450b 23, calls the narrative a 'sustasis', structural representation, of the facts such that they constitute a complete and coherent act (event). This action should have a certain size ('megethos'). In other words: a sentence or two does not make up an actual story!

Thus we understand *J. Gob, Précis d. litt. Fr.* , 154/160 (*La narration*): "A narrative is the representation of a series of events, which are so connected that they constitute a whole, i.e. a single and complete act (happening)." (o.c., 154). This determination of being sounds Aristotelian.

C. Ansotte, Traité pr., 49, says: "The story is the account of a fact really happened or imagined, with all the interesting circumstances, which belong to it, from its origin to its general end."

W.R. 268.

We note the term "circumstances," insofar as "interesting": not all details belong, meaningfully, to a story: only those circumstances, which keep the interest going. The tension, which keeps the interest going, seems to go hand in hand with what Ansotte, o.c., 49, says: "Nothing must let be foreseen what must happen". In other words: the very fact that the reader, hearer, does not know what is going to follow, 'fascinates' him.

T.A. van Dijk, Textology, 150/155 (*Narrative structures*), points out that the object, is to 'action', in the broad sense. The acting beings can be people, animals, plants, inanimate things : an earthquake or a storm, e.g., emanating from the earth's crust or the air layers as 'acting' subjects, are an 'action' an event. States, objects (as far as not actionable) - according to van Dijk - do not belong, unless indirectly, to the narrative object. The author introduces the term 'non-redundant' (non-redundant, not contradictory, because 'old news') to indicate that what follows must be unknown, new or, at least, like new, to keep the attention going.

Ch.-M, des Granges, o.c. 795, says: "The story is the direct account of an action, the narrator being the witness and sometimes the hero (acting subject)". This definition applies, essentially, to stories in the I form (and then an I, which claims or pretends to have experienced the event, itself). this does not seem to us to be essential for every story.

Structure.

(1) The structure of the narrative, already WR 253 (the dichotomy 'regulatory' and 'applicative' narrative model) and WR 254 (the praxeological six-part representation), came up. -- These two approaches remain, narratologically, of course, valid. But they need to be more precisely defined.

(2) *Two clarifications.*

The pair 'foregoing' (= antecedent) / 'sequel ' (= consequent) and the pair 'knot/ denouement' make up the structure of the action, the story event.

(A) *The couple "omen/continue.*

Take an example from Vl. Propp "A prince gives an eagle to a hero. That eagle carries off the hero to another principality. "The omen (= antecedent (= acd)) is

W.R. 269.

"A prince gives an eagle to a hero". The sequel (consequens, (= csq)) is "That eagle carries off the hero (...)". In an analogous Russian fairy tale, Propp discovers the following sequence: "An old man gives a horse to Sushenko. This horse carries Sushenko away to another principality". In another analogous fairy tale: "A princess gives a ring to Ivan. From that ring spring young men, who carry off Ivan to another principality".

Propp, by paying attention to the order, (the foregoing, the sequel), and comparing more than one fairy tale as a story structure, discovers analogy

(1) Non-identical are the names of the actors/actresses (prince, old man, princess;-- eagle. horse, ring; -- hero, Sushenko, Ivan; etc.), as well as their features.

(2) identical are the actions (events), which he calls "functions.
In other words:

(1). Ancillary is by whom the action is performed (human, animal, - extraterrestrial beings, objects),-- What means the agents (acting beings) employ, in acting (persuasion, deception, violence, magic, etc.),-- With what intention (damage, service, pastime, etc.) they act, in the event;

(2). Essential is what a character does,--what role (function) to agent plays. (*Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif,* 6).

Conclusion.
1. The connection 'the foregoing/ the sequel' is essentially a connection of actions, which fulfil a role (function). We denote that connection by the pair 'omen/ continuation', 'omen' being all that is necessary and if necessary sufficient condition for the 'continuation' which, in one way or another, follows from it.

2. We go one step further than Propp: it does not even matter (= not essential) which role an agent plays, what happens : essential is that a role is played, that something happens. In other words: the pure connection 'foregoing/ sequel' is essential.

What connection exists precisely between the foregoing and the sequel is incidental. In the exciting story, that connection is such that the foregoing stimulates the interest (because of the surprising aspect of the foregoing). If, e.g., in a fairy tale, one princess, suddenly, turns into a gemstone or just fades into nothingness, that is enough: the sequel surprises, seen from the foregoing. No more is needed.

W.R. 270.

3. Another improvement we make to Propp's story theory is that, once the pure time-displacement story (as e.g. most fairy tales are) is exceeded, the relation foregoing/ sequel becomes qualitatively important: someone, who reads a novel about a love triangle and e.g. as a biblical believer takes marriage seriously, does value the quality of the relation foregoing/ sequel:

"Miet was married (=foregoing). She falls in love with a man, at her work (= sequel)." for the Biblical believer, that sequel (on foregoing) is an onset of "sin," whereas, for an uprooted person, for whom marriage has been secularized, this sequel is merely called "partner change. It does matter, to both types of reader, what takes place, what role (function) is played by the agent (to use Propp's terms).

In other words:
(1) the phrase 'foregoing/ sequel' is a syntactic phenomenon;
(2) by situating it in real life ('sitz im leben'), that syntactic sign is semantically signified (WR 209; 250; 253). Value judgments, e.g., emerge, in semantics.

(B) The pairing 'knot / denouement'.
C. Ansotte, Traité pr., 49, mentions a second structure.

(1) The knot.
This expires, strictly speaking, in two times
(1)a. The 'ekthesis', expositio, introduction (pre-note) puts **a.** time and place (WR 254), i.e. situational,
b. characters, agents (WR 254: acting beings),
c. initial conditions (initial situation) of the action, dispersed (J. Broekaert, o.c.,189).

Ansotte, o.c., 50, says: the introduction bestows the local color ('la couleur locale'), i.e. the singular-concrete data (time/place, characters, initial conditions).

(1)b. *Note:* The introduction is, thus, the preliminary or initial node, in the sense that the global sign (foregoing) is present in it. once one knows the initial situation, one has the first foregoing; the first sequel (continuation) can begin.

(2) The actual knot,-- 'desis' (binding) or 'plokè' entanglement (intrigue, 'plot'), is called Broeckaert, o.c.,184, 'une complication d'incidents' (an entanglement consisting of incidents (unforeseen occurrences)).

Aristotle calls "knot" that part of the story, from the beginning to the part, which is the last, from which springs the reversal for good or evil.

(2) *The denouement.*

'Lusis' denouement, Aristotle called the story from the cover (perirpe.pateia or metabasis) for better or worse to the conclusion. Ansotte speaks of the outcome or result of the event"

Application.

This abstract (syntactic) scheme, above, gets life thanks to its (semantic) interpretation. we take a ballad by *Joseph von Eichendorff* (1788/1857), from the Jüngere romantische Schule der Heidelberger. This very balanced romanticist was, once, with Ludwig Uhland (1787/1862), exceptionally popular with the German public.

The title reads: *Die Lorelei*. 'Die (also: der) Lei' is 'rock' and 'die Lure' is a nymph (female nature spirit, elf). Such nymphs, who appear as insidiously beautiful women, go on to be full-fledged witnesses of 'a judgment of God' (WR 253).

A.-- *Introduction.-- (Frontknot)*

"Es ist schon spit. Es ist schon kalt.   It is already late. It is already chilly.

B.-- *Knot.*

Was reitest Du einsam durch den Wald?	Why dost Thou ride alone through the forest?
Der Wald ist lang. Du bist allein.	The forest is long. Thou art alone.
Du, schöne Braut, Ich führ' Dich heim!"	Thou, beautiful bride, I lead thee home.
-- "Grosz ist der Männer Trug und List.	Great is the deceit and trickery of men.
Vor Schmerz mein Herz gebrochen ist.	My heart is broken by sorrow.
Wohl irrt des Waldhorn, her und hin.	Well does the forest horn wander to and fro.
O flieh: Du weiszt nicht wer ich bin".	Flee anyway: Thou west not who I am.
"So reich geschmückt ist Rosz und Weib.	So richly decked out is horse and woman.
So wunderschöm der junge Leib.	So wonderful the young body.

C.- *Denouement.*

Jetzt kenn 'ich dich: Gott !steh' mir bei!	Now I know you: God help me!
du bist die hexe lorelei!"	Thou art the witch lorelei!
"Du kennst mich wohl: von hohem Stein	Thou knowest me: from the high rock
Schaut still meim Schlosz, tief, in den Rhein.	Looks silently my, lock, deep, in the Rhine.
Es ist schon spät. Es ist schon kalt.	It is already late. It is already chilly.
kommst nimmermekr aus dieser Wald".	Thou never getst out of this forest.

W.R. 272.

Note -- F. Buytendijk, Zur Phänomenologie der Begegnung, in: *O. FRöbe-Kapteyn*, Hrsg., <u>Eranos-Jahrbuch</u>, 1950 (*Mensch u. Ritus*), Zürich, 1951, 431/ 486, offers us an existential-phenomenological description of what is called - in a technical sense - an 'encounter' (Begegnung, rencontre, encounter), i.e. through the view (WR 261vv.) with one's fellow man, on a deeper level, from. soul to soul, getting acquainted.

Here: the man imagines, pityingly, that he is supposed to save this beautiful, seemingly defenseless woman, -- until (cover), suddenly, it turns out, at what Aristotle calls "anagnorisis" (recognition of true identity), that he himself is right in front of his, by her, machined demise. The view, prosopon, is a pretty girl; the truth is a Lorelei, a woman who fulfills fate.

Application.
1. There are, of course, many types of story. One type we pick out, randomly, is the anecdote. There is more than one definition. Always, however, it is a narrative, typifying something as 'singular-concrete'. There is also something in it that goes beyond the merely singular-concrete.

2. An applicative model, which, again, literally tells a real encounter, acquaintance at a deeper level, below the "view.

Michaela Denis, Un léopard sur les genoux, Paris, 1956, 35s., tells how, among other things, as an actress, within a Hollywood squad, she experienced the shooting of The Mines of King Solomon (in Kenya).

A. *Frontknot (ekthesis, expositio).*
I had recruited a nine-year-old boy to carry my make-up box. The tips, which I gave him, put him in a pay category, which was higher than that of his father. I suspect he was very attached to me.

B. *Knot (desis).*
About a year later, when we were about to leave Nairobi (...), he came to see me. I looked at him: I suspected he wanted to say something. I thought he was in need of money and wanted to give him some. He refused. The cup bent, he remained standing before me, with a blur of tears before his dark little eyes.-- "Explain" I said.-- "Thou must accept me as thy child." -- "But your father and your mother", I said "would be very angry, if they lost their son". -- The Negro boy did not answer.

C. *Denouement (lusis).*
I took him by the chin and said, "I will be your aunt, your mother's sister." -- His little face brightened. Relieved, he said, "See you again." I watched him walk away singing.

W.R. 273.

(2).3. -- *'Thesis', propositio, treatise.*

The "thesis" at the time of Deuterosophistics, is the systematic development of an abstract subject.

Related, at that time, with it, were:

1. the chreia (chrie), about which later, and the gnome, sententia, pronunciation;

2. the kataskeue, confirmatio, justification (argument, proof) and its opposite, the anaskeue, refutatio, refutation;

3. the enkomion, lauditio, eulogy (WR 264v.) and its opposite, the psogos, vituperatio, eulogy;

4. the sunkrisis, comparatio, comparison (parallel);

5. the prosopopoiia, the view description, and the ethopoiia, the soul description (WR. 261vv. and

6. de nomos, lex, legislation(s) discussion.

Separately should be mentioned the koinos topos, locus communist commonplace (face-point development), since this is a component of virtually all texts without more.

Apart from the abstract, peculiar to the theme and the problem, the discourse is the foundational text, present in all previous text types and, in particular, in the one just listed.

Bibl. sample:

-- *O. Willmann, Abriss d.Phil*., 9/13 (*die materien der logik, von der aufsatzlehre aus gesehen*); 47/48 (Chrie);

-- *O. P. Spandl, Methodik und Praxis der geistigeri Arbeit*, Munich, 166;

-- *E. Fleerackers, L. Geijsels, S.J., The treatise*, Antwerp, 1965-12;

-- *G. Niquet, Structurer sa pensée/ Structurer sa phrase* (*Techniques d'expression orale et écrite*), Paris, 1978;

-- *S.P. Moss, Composition by Logic*, Belmont (Calif.), 1966;

-- *O. Pecqueur, Manuel pratique de dissertation française*, Namur, 1922-2;

-- *J. Bojin/ M. Dunand, Documents et exposés efficaces* (*Messages, structure du raisonne-ment, illustrations graphiques*), Paris, 1982;

-- *H. De Boer, ed., Schriftelijk rapport* (*A practical guide to composing reports, notes, memoranda, theses, dissertations, business correspondence and dgl.*), Utr./Antw., 1961;

-- *G. Beville, L'expression écrite, image de l' entreprise* (*Structure, style, présentation*), Paris, 1979;

-- *U. Eco, How to write to thesis*, Amsterdam/Deurne, 1985 (a work of semiotics).

Definition.

The discourse is the reasoned development of a theme (*E. Fleerackers, The Discourse*, Antw., 1944-5, 13). Father Fleerakkers says that the whole mind (intellect, feeling) is at work in it.

W.R. 274.

Types of discourse include, Fleerackers said,

(i) The reflection, i.e. a discourse, in which the imagination (with its abductive capacity) predominates;

(ii) The reverie, in which the mind comes through strongly, while (iii) the reason(s) focuses on persuasion to a conclusion.

The 1965-12 edition, e.g., defines, "The treatise is the clean representation of the reflection on reality." (o.c.,7). If one considers the term 'clean' to be essential, then one has to do with only one type (kind) of discourse, namely the bellettristic ('literary') discourse.

The term "contemplation" stands for the didactic text type, which differs from epic (predominantly far-reaching), lyric (predominantly and decisively, even, expression of mind) and dramatic (stage-play).

Typology.

In addition to those already mentioned, one can use O. Pecqueur, o.c,

(1) informal (o.c., 356/385: dissertations badines) treatises distinguish : self-love, sadness and joy, e.g., are then the themes; most school exercises in discourse give informal treatises, i.e., unpretentious, pre-scientific expositions.

(2) The scientific (o.c.,319/355), the ethico-political (o.c.,13/166), the literary (o.c., 167/318) treatises lay claim to formal text formation, i.e., the most logically closed manner of treating the theme.

A.-- *Statement Hermeneutics.*

Cfr WR 249v., -- *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 10, gives us the basic insight on the subject.

The Scholastics (800/1450) distinguished between 'quaestiones simplices de uno vocabulo' (single questions concerning just one term) and 'quaestiones coniunctae de propositione aliqua' (compound questions concerning one or the other statement). This distinction remains, to this day, very decisive.

A.1. -- *One-term assignments.*

E.g. 'Labour' 'The proverb' are terms consisting of a single word. Whoever receives such a statement is immediately confronted with an extremely wide range of possible interpretations and justifications.

But, as Willmann says, in all these cases the first task (partial demand) is definition. WR 96;-- 104 (conceptual scope and content); 238 (Protagorean definition) gave us, already, sketchily, an insight into what defining, actually, is. WR 251 (Marmontel 's warning) taught us its very great importance.

W.R. 275.

Aneximenes of Militos (-588/-524) taught us that to determine essence is to "say what something 'is'" The Paleopythagorean Archutas of Taras (= Archytas of Tarentum; -445/-395) left us with examples:

"Windlessness is **(i)** the air mass **(ii)** at rest";

"Silent sea is **(i)** the wave movement **(ii)** that came to a halt".

Socrates of Athens (-470/-399) systematically introduced the 'horismos' (definitio, 'delimitation) description). Platon of Athens (-427/-347) introduced typology (diairesis, divisio, classification).

Applicable models.

(1) Labor is effort insofar as it creates economic value. The proverb is a saying that succinctly summarizes repeatedly ascertainable situations in a statement.

(2) Platonic typology (classification of concepts): there is physical and there is mental work (= two types); there are proverbs, which establish facts (So the father, so the son) and there are those, which make value judgments (Safety first: safety comes before everything) (= two types).

For antepredicative (predicate-less) one-term themata, as Willmann, rightly, says, the definition is main viewpoint (first commonplace). The other viewpoints. (applicative models (= examples), explanations, situations etc.) are subsidiary commonplaces. See further.

A.2. -- Polynomial tasks.

E.g. 'Labor and leisure', 'Labor, freedom and play'. -- 'Proverbs as folk wisdom'. 'Proverbs and life situations'--all these statements consist of more than one term. The hermeneutics of this second antepredic type pay attention to the binding words like, 'and', 'as'.

For example, the requested concerning 'Labor and leisure' is not two treatises after one, but the relationship between the two data. Thus, the requested concerning 'Proverbs as Folk Wisdom' is not two treatises on each of the two terms', but the proverbs interpreted under point of view of folk wisdom (viewpoint; WR 200: formal obj.).

B.1. -- One-sentence statements.

A sentence contains a predicate. With this we find ourselves in the predicative statements. E.g. 'Work, though effort, is nevertheless a source of health'. The proverb contains, often, imagery'.

Here the requested is not more than one discourse (on subject and other phrases), but the subject as far as brought up (= indicated) in the saying and the other phrases. For example, one defines labor, effort, and source of health, then indicates the relationship.

W.R. 276.
Note.-- We refer, herewith, to WR 200v. (soil structure).

B.2. - *Multisentence assignments.*

The predicative theme may be **(i)** a full sentence (= prefatory and postfatory, 'protasis' and 'apodosis') or **(ii)** a multiplicity of sentences (a text).-- We refer to WR 11 (text indication); 20 (comparative h.); 164vv. (general, especially: tradition herm.).

Appl. model.

Supposedly, one gives as a theme the following poem by *G. Gezelle* (1830/1899).-- "O beautiful rose -- which, beyond all bounds -- of loveliness and charms, laughs.-- Yet thou art frail -- and, shall, soon , devour.-- Come, stand and abide me in the thought.-- There, free -- from duration and unspoiled, -- reflected in memory, thou shalt, henceforth, -- rejoice, -- be -- thy stem, already, died and plays the wind, spoiling, in thy leaves, (April 1878?).

We refer to the foundation of all text hermeneutics, WR 253/258 (the report). Those who cannot summarize (summative induction) cannot characterize (WR 261/265).

Characterized, Gezelle's poem comes down to this:
(i) a contradiction between the exceptional aesthetic splendor of a rose (WR 272) met by chance (with the impression of eternity that emanates from it), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the imminent death of the plant in question. Cfr WR 11(harmony of opposites);

(ii) Gezelle's response to that setting splendor: come, stand and stay me in 't thought (where things, even the accidental never undergo, that is in human memory, part of the human mind (WR 137vv.: expanded consciousness) 153vv. (nocturnal aspect)). Only after one has implemented this summary characteristic as the first commonplace (= basic viewpoint), can one handle the full demanded (which includes the rest of the viewpoints).

Stylistic comment.
Stylistics is design, with rhetorical intent (WR 5: "lexis").
O. Willmann, Abriss, 106f., points out that discourse theses can include stylistic figures.

(1) For example, the oxumoron: 'Mysticism contains an aspect which may be characterized by the terms asofos sofia, insaniens sapientia, unwise wisdom.

(2) Likewise, for example, the paradox: "Shared joy is doubled joy" or "Once is not a time". After analysis it quickly appears that these two figures of speech, the oxumorom and the paradox, are very useful sayings. Try to 'translate' yourself into a non-style laden text.

W.R. 277.
Logical observation.

Predicative themes are subject to (what the Scholastics called) the logical or range square, which is the old name for order structure (= distributive structure).

Bibl. sample : *G. Booij et al, Lexicon of linguistics*, Utr./Antw.,1980 - 2.38 (range).

1. *Appl. model.*

'So the father, so the son' (// The apple doesn't fall far from the tree). The whole question is not whether that phrase is true, but whether it is true all the time. There is, e.g., a French proverb that says "A père avare, fils prodigue": the parents' stinginess, often, provokes wastefulness in the children. In other words, one proverb enhances another, in that both express only a partial truth.

2. *Logically translated:*

(i) the quantors (quantifiers) stem from the logical square: all/ some yes/ some no/ none (= all no);

(ii) one speaks, recently, of universal quantifier (all), of 'existential (better: singular) quantifier (just one), of private quantifier (some), the most frequent in human affairs.

The latter is appropriate here: 'For some relationships father/son (parents/children), the son adopts the father's behavioral type' (under understand 'for others (some), he does not'). Cfr WR 55: 57: 140 (all possible); 189. The logical scope (the realities, to which the sentence refers) or range, is critical to accurate discourse (WR 249: akribeia). The correct range in the statement is very important.

B.-- *trade generalities*

'Place of mind' is recurring point of view (perspective, angle of interpretation).

M. Roustan, La dissertation littéraire, Paris, s.d., one of the rare works on discourse that attaches decisive importance to task hermeneutics (o.c., 5/42; notes, on problem (the requested), that a discourse can mean

(i) defeat (report),

(ii) Declare (indicate the necessary and sufficient conditions),

(iii) defend and/or refute. But Roustan doesn't go much further than that either. There is more than what he says. One who takes much more care with that is *S.P. Moss, Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California, USA), 1966. We start from that work.

The requested (and thus the expository structure) could be approached, among other things, from the ontological dichotomy "actual being" (Scholastic "existence" actual existence, and "essentia" (being)).

W.R. 278.

Moss, o.c. 27/38, talks about 'what topics'. The examples make it clear that with the interrogative pronoun 'which? / what (for)?" everything and nothing is specified.

(i) What fact was established at Geneva, in 1553, that shocked public opinion? In 1553, Jean Calvin (Kalvin) (1509/1564) caused Michel Servet (1511/1553), Spanish physician and theologian, to be burned at the stake. The factic is the range of the questioning relativum.

(ii) What proof did Calvin give that he had the right, in the name of "God," to have M. Servetus burned? (The essence of the evidence is asked).

What distinction is there between the pyre ordered by Calvin and the pyres to which witches, for centuries, were subjected? (The comparison is the point of view)

To what did Calvin attribute the perseverance of the "saints" (elect) (the explanation (cause) is asked).-- In other words, Moss considers the what topic as a separate one asked. This topical (commonplace) is reducible to many others. The noun with it determines its nature.

B I. - *Factual commonplaces*

Moss, o.c., 97/105 (fact statements) thematizes - what is called in scientific circles - protocol statements. He understands this to include quantitative, statistical determinations. This firm or 'positive' side of the fact includes the correct representation of a sensory fact. E.g. a chemical process (take the nuclear cloud of Chernobyl, in the Ukraine, end of April 1986) or a historical fact (take the rise of Pop music). The representation - according to Moss (and all the others) - must be **(i)** true to reality ('objective') and **(ii)** accurate.

Clearly, with this, we end up in the description (WR 259/266), especially regarding its one-ness (WR. 260).

Conclusion: The requested of a discourse may be simply a description. But its reasoned form, of course.-- Describing a diachronic event is narration (WR 267/272). Treatise narration is formal narration (WR 274; not "informal"),-- reasoned.

The propositional side also comes through in the where-and/or-when question. Situation can be chief question (WR 254; 270 (ekthesis)). E.g. 'Where exactly/when exactly is M. Servetus killed at the stake? ' -- The emphasis is on situating, but, immediately, factuality is theorized. that goes together.

W.R. 279

The stellarness comes up, also, in what Moss, o.c.,144/148 (example statement), deals with: the exemplification (example statement).

One clarifies an idea (concept) or definition (WR 274) by means of an applicative model (= example). This is the illustrative exemplification: one 'illustrates' what one asserts (if, viz., the reader/hearer finds the illustration familiar).

One builds a general assertion through established facts, which, all point to the same model. This is the inductive exemplification.

Well-known example: the pragmatic historiography of Polubios of megalopolis (-200/-125) 'pragmatic', in his language, means 'what the 'praxeis' is reflecting the facts (especially, in his case, of a political nature)." (Note the difference from WR 209; 236, where practicality is meant).

The emphasis on factuality (did something happen?) is also found
(i) among the romantics, at least the German ones (one thinks of the "positive philosophy" of F. W. Schelling (1775/1854), and
(ii) among the French positivists (e.g., A. Comte (1798/1857)).

B.II. *Orphanage sites.*
It should be noted that one cannot represent the stellar or factual side without a minimal creature understanding of what is factual. Stellarness and substantiality are complementary.

First type of essence description.
(1) Moss, o.c., 137/143 (definition statements) discusses the essence clause (WR 274v.; 261: characteristic).
For example, there is *R. Kuehnl, Faschismus* (*Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung*), in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, (Faschismus (Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung), in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik,), xiii (1968): the treatise is a conceptualization, but formal (reasoned).

(2) Moss, o.c., 39/46 (how topics), raises the question of "how? One may consider this as a description of being, of a more precise nature: 'How did Louis Pasteur (1822/1895), the founder of micro biology, discover the vaccine principle?:-- This is an event (WR 251; 276vv. (story). Not infrequently the "how?" refers to a process. The treatise is then a reasoned description of the course of events.

Second type one essence description.
(1) Application of the distributive structure.-- Moss, o.c., 57/70 (*contrast topics*), 71/81 (*comparison topics*) and 82/92 (*compare and contrast topics*), introduces the distributive comparison : by comparing one discovers **(i)** similarities and **(ii)** differences (contrasts). One learns to see them both together.

W.R. 280.

The basis of this is, of course, analogy (WR 200). And this is the proportional (proportional) or metaphorical one.

(2) Application of the collective structure.

Moss, o.c.,7/26 (why topics), is talking about the statement, "why/why is Karl Marx criticizable?" the connection, the coherence, between the criticizability and the necessary (separately) and, eventually, sufficient (jointly) reasons for it is the demanded one. This is purely logical.

Or also, real: see WR 254v.: the cause of hospitable behavior : the connection (coherence) between hospitable behavior and the reason why.-- The basis, here, is analogy, but now the attributive or metonymic: between e.g. the hospitality shown and the high value, which shows itself in the guest, there is partial identity: one is caused (motivated) by the other. Relation (e.g. causation) is discovered by comparing both terms (from the point of view of relationship); collective comparison.

Applicable model.

Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375), the second greatest Protosophist, is known for his, *Enkomion Helenès*, Praise of Helenè. Helenè, in the Iliad and the Odusseia (WR 33), is the wife of Menelaus (WR 260), but she is cheated by Paris (= Alexandros), the son of Priamos, prince of Troy (WR 33), where she is his legal wife.

Gorgias, who wants to prove that one can justify anything, assumes the necessary (and sufficient) reasons for it. He introduces a polylemma (plural of lemmata): either Troy's fate was already programmed by fate and the deities, and, then, the blame lies with those fates; or Helenè was violently abducted, and, then, she is Paris's victim (who bears the blame); or she was seduced by Paris's words (WR 21/29; esp. 25), and, then, "Athenians, become aware that nothing, in this world, works so powerfully as the word ('the blame lies, again, with Paris).

Conclusion: Helena is innocent regarding the war conflict between Greeks (Achaians) and Trojans.

The whole treatise strikes at the connection between the cause of Helena's behavior and her (im)guilt, --her degree of responsibility. The Factors, which determined her behavior, excuse her (immediately a wonderful example of ancient destiny analysis (WR 153)).-Cfr. WR 273 (enkomion).

W.R. 281.

Applicative Model.-- ***Bibl. st.:*** *P. van Schilfgaarde, Aristotle*, The Hague, 1965, 10/12 (*The Mysteries of Samothrace*).

On the island of Samothrake there existed, since time immemorial, mysteries (WR 146), of which the Kabeiroi, Cabiri, were the deities. They were signified as two (or three) male (Axiokersos and his son Kadmilos and others) and two (or three) female (Axiokersa on Axiëros and others).

Philip II (-382/-336), king of Macedonia, and his wife, Olumpias (-375/-316), the parents of Alexander the Great (WR 35), were initiates. "On the boundary stones built as an altar (in -325), on the banks of the Hufasis, a tributary of the Indus, which formed the eastern boundary of the empire, Alexander had others chiseled, 'To Heracles and the Samothracian Kabeiroi'!" (O.c.,11). The mysteries of Samothrake received, in Hellenistic-Roman times (WR 35) very large adherence: so e.g. the Egyptian Ptolemies and the Romans favored these mysteries.

One paid attention, now, to van Schilfgaarde's reasoning:
(1) Traditionally, the Kabieren were enablers/ causers (WR 9) of
a. fertility, **b1.** maritime traffic and **b2.** asylum.

(2) Alexander and his teacher Aristotle - said van Schilfgaarde -
a. create each, in his field, a new world (fertility),
b1. with new forms of traffic, on an international scale,-- economic, political, scientific (traffic).
b2. That new world offers an ample asylum (refuge) for numerous ethical, religious, philosophical currents, in which old wisdom, ongoing, fertilizes new forms (ad a). Cfr. o.c., 11/12.

One sees how an entire culture, the Hellenistic-Roman, is characterized (WR 263: Middle Ages) on the basis of (distributive) comparison: the analogy between the Kabi(e)rian religion, on the one hand, and, on the other, the world as its creators, Alexander and Aristotle, created it, is, here, the commonplace (viewpoint). The distributive equation!

B.III.-- *Polynomial commonplace..*
Ambiguity (WR 180; 227) is discussed by Moss, o.c., 47/56 (combining: double thesis organization; triple thesis sentence organization) as a discourse task. One can, indeed, illuminate the light sides (the pro or the pro) alone or the shadow sides (the contra or against) alone. One can also analyze both sequentially (dual view). One can analyze both sequentially and take a higher view, from which one "reconciles" them (dialectic).

W.R. 202.

The appl. model is located WR 257v. : pros and cons of TV. At least as far as the dual model is concerned, without a 'reconciliation' of the two positions.

What Moss does not seem to see is that ambiguity should not necessarily take the form of light and shade (advantage and disadvantage). He sees only the axiological (value-teaching) plurality.-- There is, however, also the general or viewpoint plurality. An example of this is found in WR 200 (Kalupso, mythological, ethical, erotic, etc., pointed out). See also, relatedly, WR 210.

A. *Dialogue.*

Bibl sample : *C. Ansotter Traité prat*., 101/103 (*Du dialogue*). As a definition can apply: the dialogue is the fact that at least one subject ('theme') by at least two interlocutors, in the form of a conversation ('conversation'), is interpreted so that the points of view ('opinions, positions') with regard to the subject come into their own.

Existentialist thinkers-such as Gabriel Marcel (1889/1973) or Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980)-have taken advantage of the stage to dramatize "points of view" in the form of (what Peirce would call) interpreters, (WR 224). - Platon's dialogues of Athens (-427/-347) are immortal specimens of interpretant encounters (WR 272). They are treatises in dramatized form.

Appl. model.

That theater can be reasoning, the reasoned development of a theme (WR 273: definition of treatises), proves the following extract from Antigone (-441) by Sophocles of Kolonos (-496/-406).

1. 'Ekthesis' (introductory notes; WR 270).

Antigone, Oedipus's daughter, against the prohibition of Kreon, Thebes's prince, delivered a funeral liturgy to her brother Poluneikes (in order to dedicate him, thereby, to the deities of the underworld (Hades; WR 66: Themis law)).

2. Dialogue.

Kreon: "Thou there, with eyes fixed on the earth, confessest thou or deniest thou to have committed what menu accusest thee?"

Antigone: "Yes, I did it. That is what I come out for. I deny absolutely nothing".

Kreon: "Answer me, plainly and in short words: didst thou know or of the prohibition which I had issued?"

Antigone: "I was aware of it. How would I not have known, since your prohibition was public."

W.R. 283.

Kreon: "Notwithstanding, hast thou defied the law?"

Antigone: "Indeed! After all, it was not Zeus who issued this ban. nor Dike (WR 64; 66), the goddess, who belongs with the subterranean deities,-- deities, who imposed the right to kill on humanity.

Your 'commandments' are, for me, not powerful enough to make a mortal break the unwritten, indelible laws of the deities for them, - not of today, - not of yesterday either, - no: these laws always apply! No one knows, therefore, since when they have been in force.

Consequently: I did not want - out of mere fear of a man's opinion - because of the deities to incur a punishment."

Conclusion.

(1) First, factuality (WR. 278) comes into play (the fact of the liturgy of the dead; the fact of the knowledge of the law).

(2) Then the justification (the opposition between purely human - earthly 'laws' and purely divine (though chthonic) laws dominates the reasoning; cf. with 280 (the necessary and sufficient reasons)), two points of view (interpretive types) dominate the dialogue.

Note -- The dialectical method of Protosofistics (WR 227),-- yes, rather: the eristic method of Zenon of Elea (WR 215;--9);-- the scholastic method of. 'the sic (yes) et non (no), which is only the elevation on a higher plane (WR 76), of both the preceding methods -- it dates from Peter Abelardus (1079/1142) and S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/ 1274); -- the 'dialectical' 'method of G.F.W. Hegel (1770/1831) and K. Marx (1818/1883; see course First Year: Logic),-- all these methods are only variants of the polynomial general.

Opm.-- The method-conscious discourse.

Take a book like *Ch. Bühler, M, Klein, Introduction to humanistic psychology*, Bilthoven, after 1972, which discusses three methodological approaches to psyche (the behaviorist, the depth psychological, and the "humanistic-existential"), it stands or falls on the ambiguity idea.

Or take L. *Rademaker/ H. Bergman, ed., Sociological Currents*, Spectrum/ Intermediair, 1977: positivist, functional-analytic, conflict-analytic, phenomenologic, symbolic-interactionist, ethnomethodologicer systems theory-stellar, exchange-theoretic, Marxist, 'Critical-Rationalist methods meet you. again: ambiguity-meaning!

W.R. 284.
B. *The "chreia" (chrie).*
Bibl. st.:
-- H.I. Marrou, Hist.d.l' éd. ant., 241;
-- O. Pecqueur, Man: prat., 12 (*La Chrie*);
-- O. Willmann, Abriss, 9 (*Chrie*).

The 'chreia' (literally: useful diagram) concerns an anecdote (WR 272), attributed to a famous character. This anecdote may be an act or a saying. Or the two. The text size, in ancient high school, was "a small page. The structure of that text to be worked out was eightfold. The paragraphs were called 'cephalaia', capita, i.e. main viewpoints or 'platitudes' These were, apparently, polynomial viewpoints.

According to the text of R.I. Marrou, o.c., 241, the elaboration took place as follows.
Given.-- "Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338; WR 246) once said, 'The roots of education appear bitter, but its fruit has a pleasant taste.'
Requested.-- Text formation according to the eightfold chreia.
Elaboration.
I.A. Characterization of Isokrates (WR 261: structure),--this, as 'enkomion' (1of speech; WR 264v.: elaborated model).
1.B. Characterization of the saying (WR 276).
1.B.1. Paraphrasis (WR 253) of the aphorism (= short, context-free statement). This, in three lines.
I.B.2.a. Kataskeuè (justification; argument; WR 251) of the paraphrasis (representing, apparently, the opinion or thesis of the leadership).
I.B.2.b. Anaskeuè (refutation; WR 251), as a contrast (WR 279), of the counter model (WR 197), i.e. the opinion, which contradicts Isokrates' saying.
I.B.3.a. Sunkrisis (comparison"-- better: illustrative comparison; WR 251).
I.B.3.b. Anecdote (WR 272), i.e., an illustrative exemplification (WR 279)

Marrou mentions, here, Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322), who - according to an anecdote - fought with a weak voice and an equally weak speech; to become a great orator nonetheless, he learned to speak with pebbles in his mouth and against the roaring sea, on the shore. He became the most famous Greek orator.

Note -- Note the analogy (WR 2821: bitter, roots -- Demosthenic exercise; pleasant fruits -- famous eloquence.

II. Authority arguments, borrowed from the 'ancients' (e.g. Hesiod of. Askra (WR 34; 39)). Here the discourser relies on what others than he/she said or did in the matter.

Note.-- The gnome (sententia, proverb, aphorism; WR 251) has the same structure as the chreia, but without the character (See WR 275: proverb).

WR. 285.

The version of Afthonios of Antiocheia (+ 270/ ...).

This late antique rhetor proceeds as follows.

A. *Introduction.*

Praise the anecdote (act/proverb).

B. *Middle.*

B.1. Paraphrase (characterization of anecdote).

B.2.a. Cause, i.e. explanation (WR 254; 264; 280 (a cause) - that which meets the justification of the opinion advocated.

B.2.b. Opposite (a contrario), i.e. refutation v/h counter model.

B.2.c. Similarity (a simili) - apparently comparative illustration.

B.2.d. Example (ab exemplo), - the applicative model.

B.2.e. Testimony (= authority argument: a testimonia).

C. *Lock.*

"Behold the sound idea of Isokrates of Athens intake education" is an example of this (a brevi epilogo).

A mnemonic version reads as follows:

A. *Introduction*.-- Quis? (= quis egit / dixit? who acted /spoke thus?).

B. *middle*.

B.1. Quid? (= what? what did / did he/she say?; -- paraphrase).

B.2.a. Cur? (cur res ita se habet: why / why is it so?;-- explanation).

B.2.b. Contra (= counter model).

B.2.c. Simile (= parable; WR 260v.; 263).

B.2.d. Paradigmata (= examples).

B.2.e. Testes (= witnesses; i.e. 'dicta et scripta', spoken and/or written authority arguments).

C. *Lock* -- Adhortatio (= exhortation)

Marmontel (WR 251) says that the chreia was the interpretation of a statement or a curious fait. Note 'interpretation', Since a portion of the Romantics misinterpreted chreia as 'bondage' (i.e. of 'wild' freedom), many believe that chreia should be written off. And yet! One looks closely: the eight 'cephalaia', points of view, are types of interpretation. Behind this scheme hides the ambiguity of a fact or a saying.

1. This is evident, first of all, from the counter-model, i.e. the opposite interpretation, which is invariably provided in the discourse scheme (WR 283: eristic, 'dialectical-Protosophistic. Scholastic, Hegelian-Marxist schema (method)). For and against, light side and shadow side, more than one partiality,---they are explicitly provided for in the Chreia.

2 This is evident, secondly, from the purely methodological ambiguity (WR. 283: methodical approach), which, likewise, is explicitly provided for in the diagram:

(i) the authority argument (through which one learns to listen to others than oneself);

(ii) the characterization, explained by **a.** the statement, **b.** the resemblance, **c.** the paradigm (preb.) and the other points of view, prove this quite clearly.

W.R. 286,

B.-- *rhetoric, eloquence.*

Introduction.-- The first, who wrote a 'rhetoric', appears to have been the early Protosophist *Anaximenes of Lampsakos* (-380/-320), with his *Peri rhètorikès*,-- slightly before Aristotle's rhetoric (which is situated +/- -362/-361).

Bibl. sample.: besides the works, WR 1 cited, may still be mentioned:

-- *Umberto Eco, La structure absente* (*Introductiomi à la sémiotique*), Paris, 1972, 19 (*Rhétorique*); 154/166 (*Le message persuasif: la rhétorique*);

-- *O. Reboul, La rhétorique*, Paris, 1984;

-- *H. Elentsen, Moderne Rhetorik* (*Rede und Gespräch in der Wirtschaft und im öffentlichen Leben*), Heidelberg, 1963-2;

-- *H. Lausberg, Elements der literarischen Rhetorik*, Munich, 1967-3;

-- *G. Klaus, Die Macht des Wortes* (*Ein erkenntnistheoretisch-pragmatisches Traktat*), Berlin, 1969-4;

-- *Kopperschmidt, Algemeine Rhetorik* (*Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation*), Stuttgart, 1973.

The general scheme (platitudes) of traditional rhetoric was given WR 5/6,--as the lemma, the working hypothesis, of this course. We elaborate this schema, now, a bit more.

B.I. -- *The Textual Rhetoric*

We have learned, just now, in, preretoric, what constitutes a text form. All the text types - report, description, narrative, treatise - recur in the affecting text type, which is reason(s). - Rhetorically, text theory looked like this.

B.I.A. *The theory of finding (heuristics).*

Findings rhetoric includes, traditionally, five headings.

B.I.a.1. *The theory of proof.*

Isokrates of Athens (WR 246) gave as the task of the persuasive text type

(i) "speak in such a way as to provide the (logically rigorous) evidence" or, failing that,

(ii) "speak in such a way as to make one's assertion credible".

In other words: all those who, today, limit rhetoric to the second type, i.e. the transmission, by all kinds of 'persuasive' means, of a proposition (opinion, thesis; WR 273), mutilate full, true rhetoric. Not only does this contradict the great rhetor Isokrates. It also contradicts factual persuasive speech: no rhetorician will neglect a rigorous logical proof. Cfr WR 213/215 (professional scientists also engage in 'rhetorical' speech),

W.R. 287.
Three types of reasoning.
Aristotle (and, with him, Eco e.g.) distinguishes

(1) *The apodictic reasoning,*
inherent in expert, including philosophical, language.
a. the prepositions are
al. the first (in)logical principles (WR 197/199) : **(i)** what is (so), is (so); **(ii)** what is not (so), is not (so); **(iii)** something cannot be (so) and not (so) at the same time;
a.2. the prepositions (premises), which are absolutely certain, proven or provable. Cfr. Aristotle's logic.
b. the derivations (= after-phrases), which always have the basic form of the concluding statement (= syllogism), in one form or another, give, as a reasoning result, apodictic (absolutely certain, indisputable) conclusions.

According to Aristotle, the community of experts ('philosophers; 'professional scientists') is the social group in which such certainties circulate. Thus they, among themselves, come to understand and influence each other. Which is a first type of rhetoric (WR 213/215 in evidence),

(2) *The dialectical reasoning*
(discussed in Aristotle's Topics).
a. the prepositions are **a.1**. the first principles; **a.2**. the prepositions are probable, 'plausible', 'reasonable' prepositions, as e.g. the established opinions (e.g. 'It is duty to defend his fatherland').

b. The derivations, through reasoning, in all kinds of forms, are, as the case may be, mutually contradictory or opposed. One tries to 'prove' the most 'plausible' conclusion, while reasoning, -- as Isokrates said: "to make credible".

The community of experts works with such 'hypothetical' starting points and, thus, arrives at a second type of mutual understanding and mutual influence ('rhetoric).

(3) *The rhetorical reasoning*
(discussed in Aristotle's Rhetoric).
a. the premises are **a.1.** the first principles; **a.2.** the premises are, as in dialectical reasoning, "plausible," "credible" prepositions (e.g., "The value of the animal kingdom, to man, is indisputable").

b. the derivations, via syllogism (so e.g. the enthymeme or implicit syllogism), give 'credible' conclusions. (so e.g. 'Animal protection is a meaningful thing').

W.R. 288.

The process of understanding, with its mutual influence, here, exhibits, in addition to strictly logical (apodictic and 'dialectic') reasoning, also non-strictly logical reasoning, -- e.g., the appeal to the value-feeling side in man (WR 24: axiology), as e.g., the influence of authority, the influence of 'charisma' (strongly radiating personality), desire (WR 28v.), etc.

1. According to Aristotle, this is typical of the common sense (common sense, as exhibited by the "common" people).

2. But protosofistics (WR 230vv,) elaborated on this in a technically sophisticated ("sophisticated") way. Cfr. *L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, 12/17 (*Les premiers professionnels de la persuasion: les Sophistes*). This arose from Sicilian democracy (WR 231).

This gives, then, **(i)** the narrower notion of "rhetoric" (used by Aristotle) and **(ii)** the pejorative idea of "rhetoric" (WR 246: Isokrates; Platon), up to the present (WR 247: Marketing).

Update

"Today we tend to attribute the characteristic 'apodictic' only to some logical systems, which are deducible from indisputably presupposed axiomata" (U. Eco, o.c., 155).

We cannot subscribe to this skeptical (WR 182) assertion of Eco. That only some (WR 277) semiotic systems (e.g., logistics and axiomatized mathematics) offer absolute certainties is simply untrue. Would Umberto Eco, for example, at the University of Bologna where he teaches semiotics, doubt that a nuclear disaster occurred on the night of 25-26 April 1986 at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union? And yet he arrives at this absolute certainty by other means than the sign theory (logistic-mathematical) method!

Already *Cl. Buffier, S.J.,* forerunner of commonsensism (the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense), in his *Traité des vérités premières* (1717) pointed out that the prescient mind possesses basic certainties.

A. Farges, La crise de la certitude (*Etude des bases de la connaissance et de la croyance*), Paris, 1907, 22/27, gives the Scholastic position in this regard
(a) there are certain facts (WR 278 (firm certainty), certain presuppositions (WR 201: absolute nature); 198), certain derivations (WR 216;198v.)
(b) there are certain testimonies (WR 284v.: authority argument).-- Any kriteriology, which is not skeptical, accepts this.

B.I.a.2. *The closing redemption doctrine (syllogistic),*
We refer to logic (Course First Year).

F. van Eemeren/ R. Grootendorst/ T. Kruiger, Argumentation Theory, Utr./Antw., 1981-2, 9/16 (*What is argumentation*?), says that 'argumentation' is the defense of positions' (WR 281vv.: plurality). - The prototype of this 'argumentative language' is the closing speech.

This one is a demonstrative (= argumentative) text, which can be represented as a reasoning with **(1)** two premises (prepositions; prephrase 1, prephrase 2) i.e. the 'arguments' and **(2)** one conclusion (postphrase; conclusion), i.e. one 'opinion', (o.c., 27).-- That's Aristotelian heritage, of course, in a new guise.

The authors distinguish two settlements:
(1) the forward, which **a.** elaborates the prefaces (arguments, premises) and **b.,** only then, the postfaces (= thesis, opinion), and
(2) the referring back, which **a.** elaborates the postphrase (= conclusion, proposition, opinion) and **b.,** only then, the prepositional phrases ('prove') (o.c.,32).

The three-part scheme of C.S.S. Peirce (1839/1914).
Bibl. st.: K.*-O. Appl, Einl., Charles Sanders Peirce, Schriften*, I (*Zur Entstehung des Pragatismus*), Frankf. a .M., 1967, 373/394 (*Deduktion, Induktion und Hypothese*).

Given.-- I enter a room and see a series of bags standing there, containing beans. On a table is a handle of beans. They are, on analysis, 3/4 white.--
Asked.-- The syllogistic reasoning of that determination, if one knows that just one bag has been opened.

I.-- *Abduction (= hypothesis; regressive reduction).*
Intuitively, I deduce (I decide) that the handle comes from that one pocket.
-- **Rg.** (= Rule, regulatory model).-- All (WR 277) beans, in this bag, are 3/4 white.
-- **Rs.** (= Result, conclusion).-- (Well) these (WR 277) beans, here and now, are 3/4 white.
-- **Tp.** (=Application, applicative model).-- (So) these (WR 277) beans, here and now, come from that (one opened) bag.

Note--Comparative meth.

II.-- *Deduction (= progressive reduction).*
I assume that all the beans, in the bag in question, are 3/4 white.
-- **Rg.--** regulatory model.-- All beans, in this bag, are 3/4 white.
-- **Tp.--** applicative model.-- Well, these beans, here and now, come from this bag.
-- **Rs.--** result (= conclusion).-- So these beans are 3/4 white.

W.R. 290,

Note.-- The abductive, 'guessing', 'guessing' syllogism is not certain : the handle lying on the table may have been brought there by someone, who brought it from outside the space of pockets (WR 107: speculative possibilities), It is, in other words, not an apodictic proof.

Note --Normally the deductive syllogism is apodictic here, viz, the part (private set: the handle) is like the whole (universal set: the hole bag).-- Of course, since this is statistical reasoning, it is only the limit (boundary value) of handles out of the whole bag, which gives apodictic certainty.

III.-- *Induction (= peirastic, testing, experimental reduction).*
In the deduction just elaborated lies the power idea of a possible experiment: if I haphazardly (randomization; 'at random' = haphazardly) and repeatedly take a handle from the same bag, then I obtain the experimental (trial-and-error) testing (verification/falsification) of the hypothesis. This is the sampling method.

-- *Application* (= applicative models).-- These beans come from this (one opened) bag (= haphazard, repeatable sample).
-- *Conclusion* (= conclusion of deduction).-- Well, these beans are 3/4 white.
-- *Rule* (= regulatory model).-- So all the beans, from this bag, are 3/4 white.

Note.-- There are two types of induction (sample reasoning).

(A) The amplifying, "extrapolating," extensible induction lasts until when one has redone all the samples. The certainty is provisional and not apodictic. Reason: there is dichotomy (complementation). There are the beans already examined (analyzed). But there is the rest, the beans not yet examined, so it is always (speculatively) possible that these do not fit the provisionally established sampling model.

(B) The summative, exhaustive, final (aka 'aristotelian') induction is a fact, when the final sample has been completed. If all beans have been tested for the percentage of 'white', then there is apodictic certainty.

Cfr WR 263: outline of being;-- 253/258: report (induction is defeating (from some to all; from all separately to all collectively)-276 (characterization).-- Summative induction is the limit of amplificative induction.

Typology of syllogisms.
(1) *The enthymeme.*
'Enthumèma' is what one has in his mind; -- what is implicit, unexpressed.

Appl. model: "I am a human being. Thus fallible (WR 180)". Explicit: "All humans are fallible. Well, I am a human being. So I am fallible.

W.R. 291,

"Is fecit, cui prodest"

He/she has done the deed, who benefits (to do them). Seneca of Cordoba (+1/+65), Nero's wisdom teacher, wrote a Medea (Medeia), in which this abduction occurs.

She is a guilty verdict, which is very often committed by the judicial police (think of the police films, in which Maigret and others). It is the anthymematic form of following syllogism:

(i) The one, who benefits from the crime, is guilty of it.

(ii) (Well, You brought that misdeed benefit).

(iii) So Thou art guilty of it.

It is, of course, not apodictic reasoning.-- "Cogito; ergo sum" (I live through a conscious activity, 'think'; therefore I exist). This famous reasoning of the founder of modern. philosophy, René Descartes (1596/1650), is an enthymeme:

(a) (All beings, which are conscious ('thinking'), must first exist)

(b) well, I, Descartes, am conscious ('think').

(c) So I exist.

Note.-- Aristotle called "enthymeem" not only the syllogism, part of which is concealed, but also that syllogism, which rests on credible premises (WR 287),--i.e. is not -- apodictic.

(2) *The epicheirema.*

This is a closing statement, every preposition of which is immediately followed by its verification.

Thus M.T. *Cicero*'s reasoning in his *Pro Milone:*

(a) All unlawful attackers may, in conscience, be killed (lawful self-defense). -- This is derived from both the natural law and the positive (man-made) law (WR 282v.).

(b) Well, Clodius was the unlawful assailant of Milo.-- This is concluded from **i.** his previous life (antecedents), **ii,** the escort (armed escort), which accompanied him.

(c) So Milo was allowed to kill Clodius, in legitimate self-defense, in conscience.

B.I.a.3. *The theory of sophisms, resp. Paralogisms.*

A paralogism is an invalid reasoning performed unconsciously; a sophism is a conscious fallacy.-- Aristotle, in his Sophistic refutations, treats the sham refutations, which the Protosophists were so fond of, as invalid or sham reasonings.

Applicative model.-- 'Cum hoc; ergo propter hoc': sequel goes together with omen; so omen is the cause of sequel (WR 268/270).

In gay circles, one conspicuously bumps into aids. So homophily is the cause of aids.-- Which is certainly not apodictic reasoning.

W.R. 292.

Note.-- The distinction between jointly sufficient and separately necessary conditions ("precursors") is, here, not made: homophily is necessary, but not sufficient in causation.

Applicative model.-- The ideological language.

An ideology. such as e.g. liberalism or communism, consists of apodictic**1.**, '**2.**dialectic' (and thus open to contradiction and dispute), extra-rational (what Aristotle calls 'rhetorical') and, also, **3.** paralogical or, even, sophismatic statements, while the whole of it is recited as a rationally sound world- and life-view.

Listen to the following reasoning.

(1) Defense of the "free" world is duty. Well, that 'free' world is threatened by Libya. So a counteraction is duty.

(2) Fraternal aid to 'socialist' countries ('allies') is duty. Well, our 'socialist' ally, Afghanistan, is under threat. So fraternal aid to Afghanistan is duty.

Rhetoric here becomes a critique of ideology : it examines the sham reasoning of ideologues.

Bibl. st.:

-- *S. Breton, Théorie des idéologies*, Paris, 1976;
-- *M. Amiot et al, Les idéologies dans le monde actuel*, Paris, 1971;
-- *L.J. Halle, The Ideological Imagination*, Chicago, 1972;
-- *K.O. Apel et al, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, Frankf.a.M. 1971,

B.I. a.4. *The topics or platitudes doctrine*.

"The ancients attached great importance to this heuristic part. (...). They had a whole arsenal at their disposal":

1. *The definition* (WR 279;-- 274v.; with the genus (= universal collection) and the species (= type; private collection: WR 275 (typology)) and the enumeration (WR 255: struc- ture description; the 'enumeration' is the listing of the integrating components of a whole (collective structure);

2. *The parable and the contrast* (WR 279vv.).

3. *The circumstances* (WR 254.1v.; 284v.: chreia);

4. *The portent and the sequel* (WR 268/270; -- 254.2 (cause); 264; 280 (why topics)).-- Thus *A. Langlois, Le style*, 57.

One can also go beyond this scheme, at least in appearance. See here how *S. Freud, das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, Wien, 1929, carries out an enumeration ('énumération'), He develops the idea of 'lust principle'.

W.R. 293.

In that context he lists the sources (causes, 'omens') as well as the types of suffering: 'Suffering threatens us from three sides:

1. in our own bodies, which, doomed to decay and disintegration, does not come ready without the alarm signals, which are the pain and fear;

2. because of the outside world, which has invincible and implacable powers to throw itself at us and destroy us;

3. The third threat, finally," comes from our relations with other human beings: the suffering that arises from this is perhaps even more painful than all the other forms of suffering (...)!

This triad 'body/ fellow human beings/ outside world' intends, apparently, to give a kind of overview of the great dimensions of suffering. -Compare with e.g. 263 above: characterization of landscape (nature: culture as great dimensions). Or cf. WR 103: beginning/middle/end as integrating parts of a totality.

B. I. a. 5. *The doctrine of drift (pathetics).*

Thrasumachos of Chalkèdon (-450/ -380) (WR 64), Protosophist and rhetor, taught how to work the mind (of e.g. the judges) (by design (= stylization) and 'action'(= action). Since then, the theory of drives (the theory of the passions) and a theory of mind has remained an enduring aspect of rhetoric (WR 288: value sense).

Bibl. st.: In addition to the strictly rhetorical theory of mind (WR 20vv.), they refer e.g. to

-- *Th. Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917-10 (which still remains instructive);

-- *H. Albrecht, Ueber das Gemüt*, Stuttgart, 1961;

-- *S. Strasser, Das Gemüt* (*Grundgedanken zu einer Phänomenologischen Philosophie und Theorie des menschlichen Gefühslebens*), Utr./Antw./Freiburg, 1956;

-- further: *J. Broeckaert, Le guide*, I, 258/282 (*Sentiment*);

-- *C. Lefevre La comp. litt.,* 80/83 (*Les passions*).

J. Broeckaert, 260, describing, sums up, "Admiration piles up glowing exaggerations, flattering comparisons. The biting irony, the wry reproach, the ruthless threat are favored expressions of the hatred and the revenge. Envy, wanting to avenge her disappointment, but ashamed to do so openly, covers up her dislike with praise. Pride is defiant; fear begs for mercy. Acknowledgment honors. A wavering gait, broken speech, straying from the train of thought, dejection, which shines through in speech, mark sorrow. Lust for life hops, bubbles, erupts, cares neither for obstacles nor for the future, takes neither rules nor time into account, indulges in humor, avoids profound things, speaks to the mind

W.R. 294.

Less conspicuous and yet touching the mind, less unexpected and yet more expressive is quiet, spirited joy. Gloomy and anxious sorrow delights in living through ominous thoughts, sad memories, dark premonitions. Solid hope shows itself in firm expectations, in constantly flaring wishes : it looks up to the heavens with confidence. Despair - which, by the way, can be justified by nothing - shrouds itself in an unsavory silence, interrupted only to hurl its indignations, against nature: in its rage it perishes of regret, it calls upon nothingness (Cérutty)."

After this enumeration, typical of rhetoricians, it does not surprise us that pathetic effects are commonplace in rhetoric. "Since the purpose of persuasive language is to strike the heart, the persuader/ persuader searches, when preparing the text, which chord, preferably, should be vibrated, in the audience: admiration or indignation, enthusiasm or hatred, disdain or laughter, fear or hope" (*A. Langlois, Le style*, 57).

Axiological platitudes.
According to Aristotle, persuasive language belongs
(1) starting from general 'topoi', loci, topics (commonplaces
(2) find ideas and their articulation.

Supposedly, a politician wants, in the ekklèsia (WR 65: agora), to push through a measure. To do so, he must tout what is 'good' (the 'good' measure). Well, being happy is one type of 'good'. But similarly, sense of right, sense of measure, magnanimity, etc., is one type of 'good'.
Conclusion : the general topic "good" sets off to find ideas (and its articulations) (succeeded right, measure, magnanimity).

Otherwise platitudes of a pathetic nature are: the public interest (political rhetoric), law and justice (legal ret.), honor (eulogy).

One can see that, in these platitudes there is a theory of values.

One takes a look - outside of these classical domains - at how in a market the sellers "advertise the goods" by speculating on the feeling.

W.R. 295,

Applicable model.

Bibl. sample : *M. Starace, De l'intuition à la voyance*, Périgueux, 1981, 19s..

Writer, with her teacher of insurance rhetoric, is visiting. She reproduces the conversation (WR 282v.):

(i) the already insured spouses have, as a position, that further discussion is unnecessary;

(ii) the agent has, as a position, that they gain.

1. "May I ask what company you have had your insurance with?" The agent stood, meanwhile, already in the kitchen.-- "By La Séquanaise, Sir! "Good," said the agent. "That's a very solid company" -- "Oh! So!" let slip the disconcerted husband. "That's the first time a competitor has said anything like that to me." -- "People are so wicked and jealous. All those companies are sound: they work, after all, under state guarantee. So your insurance is good". The couple looked at each other disconcertedly (...)".

Attempts to characterize (WR 276) what feeling (and, immediately, what value) the agent is "speculating" on

2. "May I take a look at your agreement?" persisted the inspector. The willing woman rushed to the drawer of the buffet. A large envelope, with the contract inside, emerged. She reached out to hand it to the inspector. The latter unfolded it and read "Five hundred thousand F.F". (We write 1961: the new French currency did not yet exist),

"Look, sir. If you deposit the amount, you will save the sum of five hundred thousand francs. More than that: should you make a miscalculation, through an accident on the road - hastily he added, "Should such a thing never happen to you!" well, the widow will receive an immediate deposit of one and a half million.

But ye sir, are worth much more than that, surely!" With great emphasis he pronounced this net. Our good husband especially remembered that he was worth more than a million and a half (of the time). Flattered as he was, he asked, "Could I sometimes increase that?"--"But surely that goes without saying sir.

But there is more, now that we have come this far: you can, in addition to La Sêquanaise, also be insured with us. Then you will enjoy two contracts instead of one". The inspector then sat down at the corner of the table between the two children and began to write down the man's name on the pink sheet. "Profession?" he said (...)". Needless to say, the people accepted.

Attempt to characterize the commonalities (value, feeling) being acted upon.

W.R. 296.

B.I.b. *The theory of settlement (harmological rhetoric)*

The persuasive language west, after the 'heuresis' (inventio, invention), what evidence it has at its disposal (and the form in which they are cast), what values it can assert. The 'diataxis' (= 'cabs', dispositio, arrangement, mutual order) draws up the plan.

Bibl. sample : J.-P. Dumont, Les Sophistes (*Fragments et témoignages*), Paris, 1961, 26; 40s., gives us a scheme of Protagoras of Abdera (o.c., 26) and another scheme, which we note:

1. Proöimion (exordium, introduction),

2. middle: **2.a.** diègèsis (narratio., story; WR 267), **2.b.1**, tekmèria (indicia, oratorical grounds for evidence; WR. 179), *2.b.2.* eikè (probabilia, plausible grounds; WR 287),

3. epilogos (conclusio, peroratio, decision).

The main arrangement.

W.R. 17 (Ptahhotep); 103 (Paleopythagorean 'arithmos', (= structure)); 231 (Koraks' scheme) taught us the basic structure of. all arrangements (WR 109: structural arrangement) : all variants of texts exhibit, somewhere, this basic arrangement. It is 'commonplace'.

The isokratetic model.

Isokrates of Athens (WR 246) structured as follows.

A. prooimion (exordium).

B. middle.-- **a.** Diègèsis (narratio). **b.1.** Pistosis (persuasion by means of 'peitho', i.e. plausible arguments). **b.2.** Agon (persuasion by, apodictic grounds; WR 11; 144; 215; 231). **c.** Anakephalaiosis (recapitulatio, summary view)

C. Epilogos (pathètikon meros, pathetic part).

The classic model.

Symmetry (mutual balance) governs, in Paleopythagorean spirit, the arrangement. the expositio, exposition, i.e. the middle section, is introduced and completed, before and after, by three sections,

A. *introduction.*

B.1. prothesis, propositio, proposition; WR 273;-- in which the given and the requested (WR 249: statement) are stated,-- together with diairesis, divisio, arrangement ('plan').

B.2. diegesis, narratio, the story, in which the facts are told.

C. ekthesis, expositio, exposition (WR 270, where the term narrative is used) i.e. the actual treatise or argument, proof.

D.1. elenchos, refutatio, refutation (WR 291: the refutation of the counter model), cfr WR 199 (Parmenidean model).

D.2. anakephalaiosis, recapitulatio, summary overview (retrospective classification).

E. lock.

Note.-- For all retorts, this is only an ideal practice model, which is modified.

W.R. 297.

The thesis.-- *S. Moss, Composition by Logic*,121/136 (opinion statement), 121, says: "A forward opinion (...) is the thesis (thesis, propositio), which, throughout the text, we wish to make true."

In the persuasive language, this is, of course, as true as elsewhere. Precisely that proposition is, -in the introduction, touched upon (attention-affirming, benevolent). -in the 'thesis' articulated,-in the classification (enumeration 1) according to the main features, outlined,-in the narrative, according to the factual side told,--the argument proved or made plausible,--in the refutation of its counter-model, indirectly proved,--in the summary (enumeration 2), outlined,--in the concluding speech, happened, situated or emotionally treated.

Formal and statement arrangement.
Bibl. sample.: *A. Barilari, Méthode pratique de dissertation*, 1, Paris, 1980, 68/127 (*La mise en ordre: le plan*).

Barilari distinguishes two types of settlement:
(i) the formal, which is commonplace (and antecedent) (o.c.,69/75; 105/109), under which he takes issue with two subtypes,

(a) the chronological (genetic) diagram, which outlines the development (WR 3), and

(b) the dialectical schema (WR 283), which reconciles opposing views, at a higher level;

(ii) the fundamental (better: task-wise), which adapts directly to the task, without taking commonplaces into account (o.c.,75).
Sometimes - so says Barilari (o.c., 110) - the arrangement is imposed by the jury who presents the task. Thus, e.g., when theme and problem sound as follows: "The qualification of life.

"What content do you give to this concept?" (WR 274; 279; 292: definition)--"Can one have a politics of qualified life? (WR 275: polynomial task ("politics of qualified life"); 275v.: one-sentence task)

"What, in your opinion, would be the main aspects of such a policy?" (WR 292: enumeration).

It is clear that, if the task is set in this way, the text designer will read the arrangement from it. But very quickly, by the way, if he is sufficiently familiar with the rhetoric, he will recognize the platitudes, precisely in that statement. But it is clear, as Quintilian says, that too uniform and too general rules (platitudes) may have to be violated, although they remain, of course, useful (Institutio oratoria (+/- +95), a summa on education and language skills). A totally "free" arrangement does not exist, fundamentally.

B.I.c. *The theory of design (stylistics).*

Pragmatic (affective) language pays attention to a third aspect of the text, namely, the 'lexis' (elocutio, saying) or, still, 'hermeneia' (interpretatio, interpreting).

Bibl. sample:

-- *H. Suhamy, Les figures de style*, Paris, 1983-2 (the figures of style are one, very distinguished stylization phenomenon);

-- *P. Barucco, Eléments de stylistique*, Paris, 1979 (review of current, sometimes sophisticated theories);

-- *A. Langlois, Le style* (*La chose et la manière, du xvii au xx siècle*), Frameries / Bruxelles, 1925 (large collection of citations, sort of anthology);

-- *J. Broeckaert, Jeune litt.,* 1, 115/150 (Du style);

-- *C. Lefèvre, La comp. litt.*, 161/290 (Le style);

-- *H. Triebel, Vom Stil des Rechts* (*Beitrag zu einer Aesthetik des Rechts*), Heidelberg, 1947.

Definition.

"The style (design) is the way, in which one expresses the thought through the language" (J. Broeckaert, o.c., 114).

Current stylistics take inspiration from Bally (WR 21), Bruneau, Leo Spitzer, among others. Suhamy, o.c., 12, defines as follows: "Stylistics is the systematic description of the means and objectives of 'expression' (design)! These abstract definitions will become alive through the applicative models.

Applicable models.

We have already met there:

(i) WR 260: simile (263); **(ii)** WR 266: picturesque hypotyposis; **(iii)** WR 286: oxumoron; paradox; **(iv)** WR 282: dramatization by dialogue.

All that deviates from the 'dry', merely summarizing communication acquires, in principle, stylizing value. The pragmatic, signifying (WR 20) value increases, by design.

Two models. -- Bibl. sample : R. Bruzina, Eidos: Universality in the Image or in the Concept?, in: *R. Bruzina / B.Wilshire, Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague / Boston, 1978.

Behold two formations of the same idea (which makes it understandable that 'hermeneia' (interpretation) can mean 'style').

(I) The chief priest informs one of his sons that it is necessary to send him to the church (in Western Africa).-- "I desire that one of my sons accompany these people, to be, there, my eyes. If there is nothing in it, come den back. But if there is, bring me my share home. -- The world is like a mask, dancing.

W.R. 299.

If ye wish to see that world, do not remain in one and the same place. My spirit informs me that those who are not the friend of the white man will say today, tomorrow, 'If only we had known.'

(II) (Now the same idea follows in a different wording ("style").

"I am sending you as my representative among these people,--precisely so that, if this new religion arises, continues, one may be safe. One should, with one's time, go along; if not, one remains behind. I have a vague suspicion that those who, today, do not come to terms with the whites, will, in time, bitterly regret their lack of prospects. From: *Chinua Achebe* (Nigerian writer), *English and the African Writer*, in: Transition, 4 (1965), No. 18, 18/ 19, -- text, dealing with two styles in English, insofar as it is written/ spoken by Negro Africans).

It is clear that both speaker/writer and hearer/reader differ in the first and second styles: archaic, Negro-African, modern-Western, Negro-African. The same idea interpreted in non-same language (WR 180: interpretive configuration; 200: material/formal object). Hermeneutics is the key to stylistics.

Literary typology.

The literary genres are distinguishable, precisely under point of view of style. WR 15 (playful, artistic, sacred type of 'style'),-- 196v. (mythical and philosophical style) already taught us.

WR 254.2 (Kirkè's hospitality), 260 (Menelaus' injury); 262 (Kirkè's animals) offers us epic style. WR 271 (Die Lorelei), 276 (O fair rose) offers us lyrical style. WR 282 (Antigonè fragment) offers dramatic style.-- Thus there is defeating, descriptive, narrative, discourse, oratorical (rhetorical, persuasive). Thus, in the persuasive style, there is sub-style: political, legal, academic style.

Translation

Traduttore traditore (To translate is to betray)r- so goes an Italian proverb.

H. De Vos, Einl./Erl., Ernst Jünger (1895/1998). *Lob der Vokale und Sizilischer Brief an dem Mann im Mond*, Brüssel, s.d., 19f., gives us a telling example. The Latin verse "Nulla unda, tam profunda quam vis amoris furibunda" (No water is so deep as the power of love (minne) is frenzied). There is a rhymed German translation: "Keine Quelle/ So tief und schnelle/ Als der Liebe/ Reissende Welle".

W.R. 300.

The difference in style can be represented by saying that Latin evokes the deep, dark resting water in the Roman cistern and German the clear, flowing waves of a well in the Germanic landscape. Here the water mirrors itself in a hellish, eventful, transparent form; there it reveals its dark, inscrutable nature.

The figures of speech.

1. "There are sayings and turns of language, which, to the ideas, give them a form, a.k.a. a 'scheme', figura, configuration, giving them a beauty and a force, distinguishing them from the colorless expression." (J. Broeckaert, o.c., 90). Boeckaert situates the stylistic figures the 'auxèsis', amplificatio, amplified design (o.c.,76).

2. There are innumerable figures of speech. There has been an enormous amount of arguing about them. To this day.

In addition to the simile, the picturesque hypotypic, the oxumoron, the paradox, the dramatization, we dwell, briefly, on the tropics (tropology).

Bibl. sample :

-- *A. Mussche, Dutch poetics*, Brussels, 1948, 34/75 (The image);

-- *H. Morier, Dict. d. poét. et de rhét*., 670/742 (Métaphore); 743/793 (*Métonymie*); 1102/ 1119 (*Synecdoque*).

Starting point.

1. strengthened phrasing by replacing a less strengthening expression with a more strengthening one,-- lo and behold, it seems, the key idea. 'Tropos', in Greek, means 'turn',-- in textual theory, saying. The tropos are, the metaphor, the metonymy and the synecdoche.

2. Applicative model.

Mussche, o.c., 414 cites *C. Stutterheim, jr., The concept of metaphor*; Amsterdam, 1941. One noted the replacement of the colorless expression by a - colorful one and, even an even more colorful saying, this, on an identitarian basis (W.B. 199/201).

a. Colonel A. fought, in Aceh, as bravely as a lion. Colonel A. was as brave as a lion. comparison (distributive type, WR 279v.)

b. Colonel A. fought like a lion.   Colonel A. was like a lion. comparison = partiden-tity

c. Colonel A. was a lion.   Colonel A., the lion of Aceh. Metaphor. This lion.

One sees that model theory (WR 57) is at work here: one speaks in terms of a known object (the lion) about an unknown object (Colonel A., about whom one provides information, in the text).

W.R.   301.

So it was with the simile e.g. (WR 260): Homer speaks, in terms of girls, who color ivory with purple (model = known fact), of Menelaus' blood, which colors body parts (unknown fact, about which the model provides information). the provision of information is the reinforcing basis.

Applicative model: the metonymy.-- One goes after the reinforcement.

a. Eating apples causes, in part, health. Apples cause, in part, health. (comparison: collective type, WR 260). (partial identity)

b. Eating apples,--that is health, is healthy. Apples are health, healthy. metonymy

c. The healthy food. The healthy apples. Metonymy.

Model theory works, here, not by similarity (= metaphor), but o.g. coherence (omen / sequel; WR 268v.),

Here causal connection. The caused (sequel, consequence), health, is considered (identified) part-identical with the causing (omen, cause). This partial identity allows one to speak in terms of sequel (consequence) about the omen (cause).

More to the point, "Eating apples can be replaced (identified) with "Apples." Why? Because the apples are the direct object of the eating. This coherence (collective or systemic structure) allows one to speak, in terms of the suffering object, about the action of that suffering object (eating).

Conclusion: here are two metonymies.

Applicative model: *the synecdoche.*
One goes after the reinforcement:

Apples are healthy.
An apple is healthy.   Equation = partial identity
The healthy apples.   (quantitative comparison)
A healthy apple.

Model theory works here by quantitative comparison: one apple is a sample (WR 290: induction), one specimen, one singular element, from the collection of apples. This allows, in terms of a single specimen, to speak of all specimens (universal collection).

In other words: in the metaphor it was about the common property of the elements of a set. In the synecdoche it is about the range (the quantitative connection) (WR 277): one knows, in terms of just one or some, to speak about all (and vice versa).

Similarly, in terms of the part ("a good soul") one can speak of the whole (human).

W.R. 302.
B.II. -- *The mnemonic rhetoric.*
Bibl. sample : Apart from WR6, reference should be made to *H.I. Marrou, Hist. d. l' éd.*, 275, (*la mnemotechnie*).

Marrou says that, among the Deuterosophists, memorization was, mostly, based on association of facial images. Yet, in principle, improvisation was "the pinnacle of oratorical skill."

Indeed: already Alkidamas of Elaia, pupil of Gorgias (WR 25; 280), drew up the following order : if someone has broad background information (omen), he possesses the power of improvisation (continuation).

As mentioned above (WR 6), Hippias of Elis, in a secularizing sense (WR 225vv: desacralization), put the work of memorization at the center.

In addition to these three moments - visual association, background information, memory-strength, the archaic-sacred rhetors knew the goddess mnemosune and the muses.

See, on that subject, WR 79/84 (religious-hist. basis); 37/39; 42 (de-legitimization; ontolog. type); 63 (positive-law. type); 66/74 (political type);124/130 (Paleopyth. model); 196v. (Parmenidean type). All mental labor, like all other forms of labor, were thought of as guided by and inspired by musical entities. So too was rhetorical labor, especially memory work.

Musical memory work.
J.-P, Vernant, Mythe et pensée I, 80/107, as a historical psychologist, outlines some aspects of it.

(1) 'Enthousiasmos', 'enthousiasis', 'eagerness' - either in the transported or in the sober sense: One does not confuse enthusiasm, being driven, prompted, by a 'spirit', with rapture ('trance') - was the psychologically-conscious experience, permeation, of a provision of information emerging from the depths, of which the beneficiary (poet, scholar, speaker) was the interpreter (WR 68/70: after the hermetic or 'prophetic' (mantic) model, all archaic-sacred interpreters were conceived).

(2) But there were two complementary aspects:
a. The basic repertory, which included the declarations (data/ demanded), along with the commons, which had been created through lore;
b. The rock-hard schooling, led by the musical entities, together with an earthly teacher.
Some believe that "inspiration" by muses is a passive thing. What a mistake: the archaics knew better!

W. R.   303.

B. III. *The significal or language act rhetoric*.

We refer to WR 6; 20vv, (signification, the doctrine concerning the (human) means of expression); 4 (behavioral biology: 24; 27vv.). Of course also to WR 208/211 (semiotics: syntactics, semantics, especially pragmatics). That, as far as foundational research is concerned.

G. Fauconnier, Algemene communicatietheorie, Utr./Antw.,1981, offers us a new view: one can, indeed, interpret the influencing rapport (core of all rhetoric) under point of view of communication process. The whole of nature is teeming with message communication: mechanical (think of the TV or the telephone), vegetal (the sunflower reacts to the light, which acts as a 'message' (information portion)), animal (the domestic cat reacts to the message (information, idea) contained in the kitchen odors), especially human.

a. Since *Cl. Shannon/ W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, Urbana (Illinois), 1959, e.g., we have had a tech(nolog)isc messaging theory (source/ sender; receiver/ destination encoding/decoding, etc. are the basic terms).

b. *M. van Schoor, Existencekomnunikasie*, Bloemfontein, 1977, provides a humane, intersubjective message exchange theory (communicator; medium (code, signs); receiver;-- communication, message, interpretation, -- are the basic terms, in which mutual information is spoken of).

Conclusion: this dual layered message transmission theory can serve as background information for an updated rhetoric. Cfr WR 165.

The dual aspect.
1. Thrasummachos of Chalkedon (WR 64; 293) taught the basic traits of recitation (declamation), which he borrowed from acting (technè hupokritikè, stagecraft).

H.I. Marrou, Hist.d.l' éd., 275, notes that the agoge, actio, the act of language (acts of influence) involved the occurrence, the rate of speech, the control of voice (WR 284: Demosthenes), especially the sustaining of the word by the mimicry (gestural skill).

2. Yet there is the soul side (WR 261v.; 263vv) the acting was a 'meeting' (WR 272) of soul to soul. The Prosopopoeia (display of views) covers an ethopoeia (soul influence; WR 135v. offers us a Paleopythagorean interpretation of this; cfr. *P.-C. Jagot, L' éducation de la parole* (*Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire et assurée*?), St Jean de Braye (Fr.), 1975).

W.R. 304.

Note -- The ethical persuasion.

"The ancients wanted the persuader, always, to deploy his own personality, his own moral nature, as a guarantor of the veracity of his word." (*A. Langlois, Le style*, 57). In other words, the one who persuades is himself an "argument" for the benefit of what he is persuading.

We refer, first of all, to WR 246v.: Langlois says 'the antiques' but the range (WR 277) is wrong. For the expression suggests 'all' the antiques,--which is incorrect, for a number of Sophists had virtually no conscience. That conscientiousness was, correctly, underscored by the Great Socraticists (Platon, Aristotle), as well as by Quintilian. "Already Aristotle notes that **(1)** the correctness of the propositions of the language user and **(2)** his honesty are two good arguments." (*L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, 18).

The influence by the ethical disposition of one's fellow man

This is evident from I. Kant (1724/1804), the main figure of the German Aufklärung, where he interprets the thesis of "back to nature" of J.-J. Rousseau (1712/1778) (WR 275: polite opg.; 284: chreia). The text is, immediately, an example of the stylistic device, 'schème kat 'arsin kai thesin' (... not ... but).

"Rousseau did not, in essence, want man to return to the state of nature, but he did want him, from the level of culture on which he now stands, to look back at it. His premise was that man by nature (as that 'nature' is inherited) is good, yet in a negative way. In particular: man is, of his own accord and intentionally, not evil; but he is in danger of being infected and corrupted by evil or clumsy leaders and exemplary figures.

Since, however, this again requires good people, who, in turn, must be educated themselves, and since there is not a single person among them who does not carry (congenital or acquired) depravity within him, the problem of the education of conscience remains unsolved.

Reason: the malignant tendency innate to our sex is rejected by general human reason, and may be restricted, but has not yet been eradicated. (*J. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., Kant-Brevier*, Hamburg, s.d., 339 (Nr 788)).

Kant is, apparently, much less of an optimist than Rousseau! See also WR 261v. (characterization); 263v, (ethopoeia); 285 (soul description).

W.R. 305.

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