

7.2. Rhetoric.

1988-1989, 2nd year of Rhetoric.

Rhetoric (literatology, “eloquence”),

Contents: see p. 156

Introduction (01/05)

This “rhetoric” is not merely general rhetoric, but also a “theory of the end,” -- for the benefit of Hivo-students. It is true that the main features of “being able to write and/or say well” (for that is, in its later, broader sense, “rhetoric” as applied doctrine concerning linguistic competence) will be discussed, in a very abbreviated form. But the emphasis is on “being able to responsibly write a thesis”.

A cultural mistake.

A century ago, approximately, a part of the intelligentsia of the time - French and others - began the deliberate ‘dismantling’ (to speak with Derrida: “la déconstruction”) of the approximately four to twenty-five centuries old (and successfully employed) rhetoric. To ... (don’t be surprised) to introduce it, today, since a few decades, although in a rearranged sense.

In doing so, we want to emphasize that “the rhetoric craze,” which is getting hold of some intellectuals, is more than a passing fashion. At least for our point of view. For us it is the reestablishment - one can also call it ‘actualization’ - of a rock-solid discipline (subject), which has made countless educated people proficient in language,-- even though we, from our own - again time-bound - point of view, judge rhetoric and its applications differently (sometimes very ‘critically’ i.e. pointing out the errors). Who among us, in secondary education, did not learn to say ‘hollow rhetoric’?

Our teachers have, most of the time, forgotten to add that, besides a very real “hollow” (“empty”) rhetoric or art of speaking and writing, there existed and - today - still exists a non-hollow, very useful rhetoric. One has loaded the term “(hollow) rhetoric” ideologically (i.e. from sometimes very learned presuppositions without much value except the subjective opinion expressed in it) with prejudices. Against this, the text that follows will (rest assured) take storm. For reasons including the following.

A growing complaint.

“At the college, one in three young French people no longer master their/their own language. A report from the Inspection générale tells us that, on admission to the Sixth, four pupils out of ten can be branded as ‘illettrés’ (illiterate).”

RH 02.

They cannot even read or write - with understanding - a simple and brief account of facts directly related to their daily lives. They do not have the necessary skills to integrate themselves into our society at a minimum level. (*Anne Vallée, Expression écrite: zéro!*, in: *Sélection du Readers Digest* (Zurich), 39 (1986), avril, 5/14).

Note.-- Dr. Guido Geerts, *Some reflections on language proficiency and culture*, in: *Onze Alma Mater* 38 (1984): 2, 87/99, says a.o. "(...) Here and elsewhere, past and present, 'people' complain that 'they' cannot write(...). I could fill entire pages with texts in which I have found the complaints I have just mentioned. They' cannot write, in other words. Nor can 'they' speak (.....). The 'new illiteracy' has been analyzed by Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (1978) as an aspect of anti-intellectualism. (...)". (A.c.,87v.).

Note.-- Cl. Callens, *La réforme du Français* (a copied text), says: "*Oswald Ducrot/Tzvetan Todorov* (both attachés de recherche au C.N.R.S., known for collaboration on *Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme?*, (What is structuralism), Paris, 1968), authors of *le Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage*, stated, in the broadcast '*Science et technique* (*France-Culture*):

"Today a disorderly impression prevails in the language sciences,--if only under terminological point of view. The subject terms are far from fixed; they vary constantly. Almost every system of learning ('doctrine') -- every month, every year, linguistic systems of learning challenge -- creates for itself its own vocabulary ('terminology') such that the same words cover, often, very different meanings;-- yes, sometimes, from learning system to learning system, they have a contradictory meaning." (*SBPF Bulletin* 72/73, 1972, 90, n. 34).

Conclusion: Lasch sees "Anti-intellectualism" at work; the French Structuralists "Babel-like confusion of language" among linguists themselves. This last observation prompts us to stick as much as possible to established, traditional professional terms precisely so as not to create confusion of concepts.

In addition to the factors mentioned above, one can mention the Sturm-und-Drangas aspect of Romanticism (with its 'genius' cult and individualism), the oldest Positivism (with its aversion to linguistic aspects),-- the 'Californian Revolution' (with the Hippie phenomenon and the New Left), allusions to 'Counterculture' and 'Gauchism' right down to the anti-intellectual, which further deepen the so-called 'generation gap' (instead of bridging it through calm dialogue). Generation gap" (instead of bridging it through quiet dialogue).

RH 03.

Topicality of Rhetoric.

The bibliographic sampling, which the remainder of the text will give credit to, will more than confirm the timeliness.

But on a more Commonsense level they are e.g. referred to :

(i) *Jutta Möller-Bäzner, Rhetorik (Riskieren sie die grosse Lippe)*, (Rhetoric (risk the big lip)), in: *Cosmopolitan (Für die Frau)*, 1985: 10 (Oct.), 128/133 (where a case is made for - especially - learning to perform in public);

(ii) *A.G., La persuasion, -- cela s' apprend* (Persuasion can be learned), in: *Journal de Genève*, 23.02.1989 (Gérald Menthe, marketing prof at the Université de Genève, establishes an accelerated course on 'rhetoric' for non-university students);

(iii) *Modèles de discours pour les dirigeants et cadres d' entreprise*, (Sample speeches for company managers and executives,), Paris (weka), 1987 (is a set of elaborate models of 'commons' ('lieux communs'), in the most traditional, though adapted to modern atmosphere). --

Conclusion: women, non-graduates, business executives,--all of them, here and there, are presented with "rhetoric," -- the profession that "Modernists," a hundred years ago, began to abolish, -- the profession that is now "in" again.

Bibliographic Sample.

(1) *H. Morier, Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique*, Paris, 1961-1, 1981-3.

(2) *E.R. Curtius, La littérature européenne et le Moyen Age latin*, (European literature and the Latin Middle Ages,), Paris, 1956 (German original: 1948);

-- *Ch.G. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (Interpreted from Representative Works)*, Gloucester (Mass.), 1928-1 (both works are "standard works").

(3) The first -- of course again a Greek --, to write a rhetoric, appears to be the early Protosfist *Anaximenes of Lampsakos* (-380/-320), with his *Peri rhètorikès*,-- a little work which appeared a little before Aristotle's Rhetoric (the classic, dating from + -362/-361).

Those who want to know more about Antique-Greek rhetoric can read e.g. (from an invisible mass of books and articles): *H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948,-- 81/98 (*Les Sophistes*), 268/282 (*L' enseignement supérieur: la rhétorique*).

Further: *C. Rehdantz, Demosthenes: Acht philippische Reden*, Hft 1, Leipzig, 1865-2, 13/16 (*Kurze Geschichte der Redekunst*), 109/133 (*Rhetorischer u. stilistischer Index*;-- still valid);

-- *J.W. Hey Atkins, Greek Rhetoric*, in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1950-2, 766/767;

RH 04.

- E. von Tunk, *kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Literatur*, (short history of ancient Greek literature.), Einsiedeln u. Kiln, 1942, 40/51 (*Die Redekunst*);
- R. Stock, *Eloquence*, in: *Helicon (Anthology from Greek and Latin Writers)*, Antwerp, s.d., 243/306.

(4) Situate, preferably Modern, rhetoric in a broader framework of thought:

- G. Fauconnier, *General theory of communication (A survey of the scientific theories of communication)*, Utrecht/ Antwerp, 1981, 19/27 (*From rhetoric to general theory of communication*);
- in a semiotic (= sign doctrine) sense: R. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1985, 85/165 (*L'ancienne rhétorique*);
- Umberto Eco, *La structure absente (Introduction à la sémiotique)*, Paris, 1972, 19 (*Rhétorique*, 154/166 (*Le message persuasif: la rhétorique*)). It should be noted that we have two models of sign theory, the semiotics of Peirce (Morris) and the semiology of de Saussure.

(5) Further works: H. Plett, Hrsg. *Rhetorik (Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung)*, Munich, 1977 (theme: *the handed down rhetoric as a research method following the Symposium at Essen*);-- literature-theoretical, pragmatic (result-oriented), action-theoretical (= praxeological),-- cultural-historical);--

- Chaim Perelman, *Rhetoric and Argumentation*, Baarn, 1979 (a pioneering and very solid work);
- M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, *Modern eloquence (Handbook of oral language control)*, Amsterdam/Brussels, 1968-3;
- G. Vardaman, *Effective Communication of Ideas*, New York, 1970;
- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985;
- O. Reboul, *La rhétorique*, Paris, 1984;
- J. Kopperschmidt, *Allgemeine Rhetorik (Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation)*, Stuttgart, 1973;
- G. Klaus, *Die Macht des Wortes (Ein erkenntnistheoretisch-pragmatisches Traktat)*, Berlin, 1969-4;
- K. Lehrer/ C. Wagner, *Rational Consensus in Science and Society (A Philosophical and Mathematical Study)*, Dordrecht, 1981;
- S. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and philosophy (What happens when one speaks?)*, Bilthoven, 1975;
- H. Lausberg, *Elemente der literarischen, Rhetorik*, Munich, 1967-3;
- H. Elentsen, *Moderne Rhetorik (Rede und Gespräch in der Wirtschaft und im öffentlichen Leben)*, Heidelberg, 1963-2;

Last but not least, an occultist approach:

- P.-C. Jagot, *L'éducation de la parole (Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire et assurée)*, (The education of speech (How to convince, seduce and captivate by a clear and confident elocution)), St. Jean de Braye, 1975.

RH 05.

Initial descriptions.

From what precedes, surely a vague notion of “rhetoric” has arisen in your mind. Yet this, for the time being, is too little. Therefore, a few descriptions, i.e. approximate definitions (beings provisions).

(1).-- *P. Larousse, Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siecle*, 15 vols., 1866/1876;-- t. 13, 1143, says:

“R(h)etorics is the doctrine concerning eloquence, where ‘eloquence’ is understood as ‘l’ art de persuader”, the art of persuasion (persuading)”. Géruzez, the author of the article, adds to this the classical method of rhetors (rhetoric teachers):

(a) as a prescriptive (normative) science, classical rhetoric gives maxims, i.e. prescriptions, which count as the presuppositions, hypotheses, of proper writing and speaking;

(b) as a reductive science, based on historical induction, classical rhetoric tests these presuppositions against the great masterpieces of good writing and speaking. So that in time a solid cultural-historical material is accumulated (at least in the good textbooks).

(2).-- *R.R. Bolger, Rhetoric*, in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, 19: 257/260, puts it somewhat differently, but not for that reason inconsistent with Géruzez. “Rhetoric is the name, traditionally given to

(a) the use of language

(b) as a skill (‘art’), supported by a system of ordered knowledge”.

What we learned a moment ago.

But Bolger teaches us something. After Older Positivism (*A. Comte* (1798/1857), *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830/1842)) emerged Neo -or Logical (also: Language) Positivism, which “in the thirties of our century drew attention to the importance of the analysis of language use” (a.c., 259).

Bolger then refers to *I.A. Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1941), who advocates the teaching of rhetoric in schools and universities in the U.S.A. Good professional science invariably pays attention to the (pre)scientific use of language.

RH 06

I. Is professional science separable from 'eloquence'? (06/10)

It may come as a surprise that, of all people, (Neo-)Positivists focus attention on the - possibly 'rhetorical' - use of language. Isn't strict, fact-based (professional) science and 'Positivist philosophy' at the heart of every Positivist?

Therefore, in a first chapter, a digression, which is at the same time a direct introduction, on the rhetorical aspect of any (professional) science.

New description.

a. *G.G. Granger* (1920/...), a convinced Rationalist, in his *Pensée formelle et sciences de l' homme*, (Formal thought and human sciences,), Paris,1967, 21/24 (*Rhétorique et contenus*), tries to make two claims true.

(a) 'Rhetorical' language is radically different from 'scientific' language in that it encloses itself in a verbal universe. (o.c., 21). In other words : we have rhetoric; understood as saying words, but without much content (RH 01), which we heard about in our teaching. In other words : an ideological, biased use of terms.

(b) Rhetoric - says some further (o.c.,22) Granger - uses language as a means of influence between more than one subject, - if only for the purely aesthetic (= beauty) enjoyment, which the speaking and listening or reading subject derives from it.

Professional science, on the other hand, uses language:

(i) not merely as a means of understanding between subjects engaged in professional science (the professional scientists),

(ii) but also as a means of interpretation between those same subjects and the perceived world such that the objects of that perceptual world become "maniables" (manageable) (o.c.,23).

If we understand the quoted Granger correctly, then professional science language is one of many rhetorical language uses. 'Rhetorical language' after all,

(i) employs language as a means of rapport, between writer/writer or orator/speaker and audience and

(ii) uses language as a means of interpretation in order to make the objects which the writer or speaker is talking about, together with the public, 'manageable'. For the public, at least that public which, above all, wants to learn something, is faced with 'unmanageable' things - think of a teacher who has to explain the concept of 'square' for the first time - and it expects of the (speaker/writer) that these same things become 'maniables' (to speak with Granger).

RH 07.

Explanation:

a. Take e.g. that thou, as a teacher, must actually make the idea of ‘square’ clear to children, who are learning it for the first time.

For such a creature, the idea of ‘square’ is a radical unknown (and, therefore, in Granger’s parlance, ‘unmanageable’). Such a child does not even have the merely human concept of ‘square’ and has yet to learn the term (the word, in which the concept is captured) either.

Idea (in the Platonic sense of “that which governs and, at once, illuminates all our concepts and terms, as well as the things to which those concepts and terms refer”), understanding (that which permeates our mind from the idea), term (the word or group of words, in which our concepts are recorded in the language context), -- the thing itself, all this is unknown and “unmanageable” (the child in question cannot “work with” it).

b. Thou comest into the classroom, -- with an e.g. metal ‘square’ (contemplative teaching), with thy prepared mind. What dost thou do first? E.g., draw a square on your blackboard (in Platonic terms: the phenomenon in which the idea exhibits just one image (“copy”)).

Further: pronounce the word (the term) ‘square’ and perhaps write it on the blackboard. Last but not least, have the metal square passed around, from child to child, - to look at and touch.-- What have you done, rhetorically?

(i) As to means of understanding, you have both a drawing on the blackboard (“material phenomenon”) and, perhaps, the word “square” on the same blackboard and the little square in metal that has come into circulation,--all this summed up in the term “square”, which you repeat quasi -continuously, so that amidst the sentences you utter it may gently penetrate the waking minds that are your children. Thus thou dost establish the basic phenomenon of every rhetorical act.

(ii) With regard to means of interpretation, you have precisely the same data : for ‘to interpret’, (‘interpret’) is **a. to** separate a given (‘something’ in the ontological sense) **b.** from the whole (‘totality’) of all that is (‘being’), in order to give it a name and thus make it manageable.

From that moment or you can start thinking about sharpening the geometrical surface, for example. “Side by side” is the formula. Thus, literally, the square also becomes geometrically e.g. “manageable”.

RH 08.

The rhetorical act includes “language as a means of influence”

(1) When one scientist speaks to another about his discoveries, about his scientific data or insights, he uses both means of understanding and means of interpretation in order ... influence that colleague by means of e.g. scientific language (take a set of mathematical formulas, which describe exactly the analyzed phenomenon; take e.g. a protocol statement, i.e. a description of an experiment). Willingly, he influences the other subject scholar.

That “making entry” of his insights and experiences into the mind of the colleague is typically rhetorical.

(2) If you, as a teacher, speak to your children about e.g. the square, then you use both means of understanding (after the lesson, if it is successful, the children ‘understand’ you and you can, in understanding, ‘handle’ the square with them) and means of interpretation (they have, with you, separated the square (and all possible squares), i.e. the idea, from the total reality and given it names).

But at once thou hast influenced them. For thou hast “made the idea of ‘square’ (with all that it governs, - the concept of ‘square’, the term (word) ‘square’, the specimens (‘phenomena’) of it found in nature or in culture) “take root” in the thinking and reasoning minds of the children. Which is the definition of ‘rhetoric’. Where “rhetoric” is anything but “hollow ‘rhetoric’“ or say words, but without much content .

An authority argument.

Thus, our thesis is : teaching, as a teacher,-- a professional scientific discussion (eventual discussion), -- they are two types (species, ‘species’) or applicative models of a universal idea “rhetoric”.

This understood, for the time being, as by means of and understanding and interpretation a message (to speak with the present communication theory), i.e. an information. Yes, perhaps there is no better definition of the rhetorical act.

As an argument for authority we quote Thomas Kuhn (1922/1996), who - together with Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend - is considered one of the great epistemologists (philosophers of science) of our time (cfr A. Chalmers, *What is science called? (On the nature and status of science and its methods)*, Meppel/Amsterdam, 1981, 114/127 (The paradigms -of Kuhn)).

RH 09.

In his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (// *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962), Meppel, 1976-2, 135, *Kuhn* says what follows: “If we survey the voluminous experimental literature (,...), the suspicion arises that something like a paradigm also underlies perception. What a person sees depends:

(i) both of the object he is looking at
(ii) as of what has been learned to see,-- by his past visual -- conceptual experiences. In the absence of such training (*op.*: rehearsal), there exists only -- in the words of William James (1842/1910) -- “a blooming, buzzing confusion.”

The great psychologist of religion James here brilliantly articulates what Granger calls ‘unmanageability’. -What ‘visual-conceptual experiences’ contain may be illustrated as follows.

For example, a teacher teaches what a ‘camera obscura’ (the closed box, inside a camera; metonymically: the camera itself) is. Without the visual aspect (seeing a camera), without the conceptual (= comprehension) aspect, which goes with it (because the teacher indicates the object with the term ‘camera (obscura)’), the pupil ‘sees’ actually an unprocessed, ‘unmanageable’, thing (a box e.g.).

Note that by ‘sticking’ the term ‘camera (obscura)’ on the object, the teacher situates that same object in the language (linguistic aspect) and, at once, introduces understanding and interpretation. The pupil is initiated into the group of people who both know the term ‘camera (obscura)’ and presuppose the language system (to speak with de Saussure and the Structuralists) in which the term is situated. Only when one puts this double aspect first, can the pupil ‘see’, (perceive). Otherwise he/she ‘sees’ only an amorphous (meaningless) ‘something’.

He/she does not see what the teacher sees,--what everyone sees, as long as he/she has not learned to see,--as long as the teacher has not influenced him/her, through means of interpretation and understanding, in that direction. That is: as long as the teacher’s “rhetoric” has not worked in that direction.

Kuhn’s applicative model.

O.c., 36, gives Kuhn an application.

“At some time - between 1740 and 1780 - the electricity theorists were, for the first time (RH 07:for the first time), able to accept the foundations of their field, without more.

RH 10.

(i) - From that time on they threw themselves into more concrete (*note*: defined) and hidden problems and reported - increasingly - their results in articles addressed to other electricity theorists, -- instead of in books addressed to the developed world in general.

(ii) - As a group they achieved what (1) the astronomers, in antiquity, (2) the movement researchers, in the Middle Ages, (3) the physical-opticists, end of XVIIth century, (4) the historical-geologists, beginning of XIXth century, achieved.

In particular: they had produced a (paradigm (*note*: from the ancient Greek 'paradeigma' (model, thought model, paragon)), which proved capable of leading the research of the whole group.

Except with the help of 'wisdom after the fact', it is difficult to find another 'criterion' (*note*: from the ancient Greek 'kritèrion', means of characterization,--that by which something is distinguishable (and therefore discernible) from all other things), which so clearly declares a field of study to be a (professional) science."

Until there Kuhn, who made the Antique term "paradigm" (aka by textbook, translated) common again.

In other words:

(1) the subject scientist strikes, usually favored by some coincidence, a new "view" (in Kuhn's language game: paradigm) of at least one object of observation;

(2) he communicates that view to other subjects (to speak with Granger), viz.

(2)a the educated reader (vulgar rhetoric) or

(2)b the 'specialist' (professional colleague) (high information, resp. rhetoric). Thus he influences the 'view' (paradigm,-- means of interpretation, and, immediately, means of understanding) of the observable world (the 'objects'), until his 'view' gains acceptance.

Conclusion.

'Theory' is, in the present sense, a set of concepts and judgments, - preferably axiomatic (deducible ('deductible') from strict premises (axiomata)) such that an ordered set of propositions concerning a field of study (the objects) is articulated.

'Metatheory' is, like 'metatheory' (language about, about language), a theory, which has as its object the theory, in the sense just defined. A true metatheory about science - as about teacher speech - certainly includes a rhetorical moment, because, in all scientific behavior, we find a minimal (and correctly definable) 'rhetorical element'.

What we have tried to demonstrate.

RH 11.

II (11/16) *The articulations of the rhetorical act.*

We do say “act,” i.e., language act. After all, rhetoric has invariably been a theory of action or praxeology (v/h Greek ‘praxis’, action, action). One has a message (“The speaker/speaker has something to say”). This message or ‘message’ (information) is intended to be introduced by means of means of interpretation and understanding. We saw this just now. This means: one works - actively - on one’s fellow man.

What are, now, the major parts, “stoicheia,” elementa, articulations (constituents), of this action? Five. - Aristotle foresaw four. But - especially since the Protosofist Hippias of Elis (-470/-400; *cfr J.P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Etudes de psychologie historique)*, (Myth and thought among the Greeks (Studies in Historical Psychology)), I, Paris, 1970, 106s. (*Mnemotechnie d’ Hippias*)) - one has added the memorization.

A -- *The textuological rhetoric.* (11/12.1)

Essential component of a rhetorical act - think of an advertising poster - is a minimal and essential text. Hence the term “textuology. Imagine a fragrant soup tureen on a publicity for chicken. one sees a fox, coveting, circling the bowl, but the words “Here’s chicken in it” explain what it’s about. That’s the text element. No matter how small. The effect is that the viewer already feels the smell in his nose and the taste in his mouth of delicious chicken coming up.

That is the total rhetoric of advertising, which includes both text and an act of language. An act, in other words, that uses the element of understanding, text (“There’s chicken in this”). An act of influencing, that is.

Bibl. st.:

-- *P. Larousse, Grand dict.*, 1143;

-- *A. Langlois, Le style: la chose et la manière (Du XVIIe au XXe siècle)*, (The style: the thing and the way (From the XVIIth to the XXth century)), Bruxelles, 1925, 56/58;

-- *R. Barthes, L’ aventure sémiologique*, 4, 121, 123.

According to these theorists, textual rhetoric was divided into three parts, which Géruzez, in the Larousse, characterizes as follows. “All mental work comes about by virtue of invention (heuresis, inventio),-- arrangement (diataxis or cabs, dispositici and -- design (stylization,-- lexis, elocutio)”.

Aldus Geruzez. -- The Latins describe:

(i) “invenire quid dicas” (find what thou wilt say; build the message);

(ii) “inventa disponere”(what one has found, arrange according to plan; the sequence of the message);

These two ranks make up the business section. “Ornare verbis” (put into (stylized) words;-- i.e. the ‘design’ or shaping of the message). Which is the verbal part.-- Note that these three operations are distinct, but not separate.

RH 12.

A.1.-- Heuristic rhetoric.

The invention, the traditional title, provides the “pisteis” (probationes), the “evidence” (the argument).

Logic (theory of thought) and especially applied logic (= theory of methods), which deals with concepts (terms), judgments (propositions) and reasoning, dominates, in a certain sense, this section. But also the pathetics (theory of feelings) plays a decisive role here.

Result: all elements, understood as raw data material, - what Herodotos of Hallikarnassos (-484/-425; founder of land and ethnology (W. Jaeger) or, as usual, ‘father of historiography’) called ‘historia’, research materials.

A.2.-- text formation rhetoric.

Textuological rhetoric is called by Herodotos “the doctrine surrounds the ‘logos’, the text.” -- Traditionally, two aspects are distinguished.--

(I). The harmological rhetoric.

The arrangement (such is the surviving title) edits, with the spirit, which establishes order (‘harmology’ (order (doctrine)), the loose materials of the study, - note the plan, the text parts order, the exposition scheme, the arrangement. - We will return to this regularly in the sequel.

(II).-- The stylistic rhetoric.

The design, stylization, is the final adaptation by our minds, as gifted with a sense of “beauty”, of the ordered text.-- We will not go into this in a separate chapter.

Bibl. sample :

-- H. Suhamy, *Les figures de style*, Paris, 1983-2 (the figures of style, including the tropes (tropology) are sayings);

-- P. Barucco, *Eléments de stylistique*, Paris, 1979 (Current theories).

The style is the way, in which one expresses the thought through the language (J. Broeckaert).

-- As R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.* 155/164, says, the Antique term is ‘lexis’ (Lat.: ‘elocutio’). Or also ‘hermeneia’ (Lat.: ‘interpretatio’, interpretation).

A purely logical-pathetic content can be expressed in more than one way.

The advertisement of a moment ago: “Eat chicken, because chicken is healthy” or “Here’s chicken in it” (says the greedy-gulp fox, affixed to the poster,-- model of the appetite).

RH 12.1.

Appl. model.

-- R. Bruzina, *Eidos (Universality in the Image or in the Concept?)*, in: R. Bruzina / B. Wilshire, *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague/ Boston, 1978, gives us an extremely telling specimen of 'styles'.

The same 'message' ('message', content) can be 'encoded' (made into text) in more than one way.

Situation: Negro Africa, with the Whites, sees a new religion enter the country.

(1) - *Negro-African style.*

The chief priest informs one of his sons that it is necessary to send him to the church (in Western Africa).-- "I desire that one of my sons accompany these people, to be my eyes there. If in there is nothing, come back. But if in there is something, bring me my share home.

The world is like a mask, dancing. If thou wilt see that world, do not remain in one and the same place. My spirit informs me that those who are not the friend of "the white man" will say today, tomorrow, "If only we had known! "

(2).- *Western style.*

"I am sending you as my representative among these people,--precisely so that if this new religion arises, continues, you will be safe. One should go with the times; if not, one remains behind. I have a vague suspicion that those who, today, do not come to terms with the Whites, will, in time, bitterly regret their lack of prospects." (From : Chinua Achebe (Nigerian writer), *English and the African Writer*, in: *Transition*, 4 (1965), 18:18/19,--a text, which talks about two styles in English, as far as it is written/spoken by Negro Africans).

Traduttore traditore.

"To translate is to betray." -- so goes an Italian proverb.

H. De Vos, *Einl./ Erl., Ernst Jünger (1895/1998), Lob der Vokale und Sizilischer Brief an dem Mann im Mond, Brüssel. s.d., (Praise of Vowels and Sicilian Letter to the Man in the Moon, Brussels.), 19f., provides an application.*

To render the Latin verse "Nulla unda tam profunda quam vis amoris furibunda" by "Keine Quelle/ So tief und schnelle/ Als der Liebe/ Reissende Welle" ("No fountain/ So deep and swift/ As love's/ Rip-roaring wave"), is to misrepresent the Antique-mysterious atmosphere of the Latin. (No wave is as deep as the perseverance of "love" is beyond itself).

RH 13.

B.-- *The dramaturgical rhetoric.* (13/15)

Dramaturgy' means "the theory of the theater or, better, of acting". We said it above: rhetoric is understood most purely when it is called an action theory. The text is one. But the presentation of the text is two. And 'reciting' is acting, acting on an audience - even if it is only one listener.

B.1.-- *The mnemonic rhetoric.*

(1) The Latins called this articulation of the rhetorical act "memoriae mendare" (entrusting to memory; the memorization of the message).

Bibl. st.: *Larousse, Langlois, Barthes*, as above.-

(2) The 'mnèmè', memoria, memory, is an Archaic heritage. This is clear from what *J. P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée*, I, 80/123, says about it.

a. The poets e.g. (such as a Homèros, Homer,-- between -900 and -700) recited the poems, from memory, sometimes thousands of verses long. The Hippias of Ellis mentioned above (RH 11) (cfr *J.P. Dumont, Les Sophistes (Fragments et témoignages)*, Paris, 1969, 145s.) possessed another such phenomenal (in the sense of 'exceptional') memory.

b. According to Vernant, the historical-psychologist, a memory like Hipoias' was, e.g., the secularization (worldization) of

(i) Mnèmèsunè, the goddess of memory (and expanded consciousness as some Alternatives now say),

(ii) who substantiated factually determinable (in Platonic terms 'phenomenal') memory by inspiring it.

Conclusion:

in mnemonic rhetoric lives on, in secular (= secularized, "earthly") form, an ancient sacred fact.

(3) To this chapter belongs also the theme of improvisation. We say: "to recite a text ... at random, at the very moment it is conceived". This implies that one has memorized the main points of a message (= text), but the final wording, including the stylization, is 'improvised'. Which, in very many cases, is the best way to recite it.

(4) A text can be memorized both silently and aloud (possibly for those present).

(5) A piece of advice: some speakers proceed as follows (and with results): the imprinted text is in the memory, at a given moment; from then on one takes samples from it, which one recites (silently or aloud), but in such a way that one recites as if one was already actually, in the future, speaking fully.

RH 14.

This recalls what is called, in the Bible, ‘prophetic perspective’: the prophet in question spoke as if he were already now the contemporary of a future humanity. One finds something like this, somewhat, in what the rhetoricians call ‘pictorial hypotyposis’ (“I already see the city burning ...”).

B.2.-- The ‘hypocritical’ rhetoric

(1) The Latins called this rhetorical aspect “agere et pronuntiare” (acting and pronouncing; acting out the message).

Bibl. sample : besides the already mentioned *Larousse (Géruzez)*, *Langlois et Barthes*, orphans mentioned:

-- *Sir Charles Bell* (1774/1842; famous nerve physiologist), *Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts* (1806; on the muscular movements, which, usually, accompany drives and feelings);

-- *Ch. Darwin* (1809/ 1882), *Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals* (1872; Darwin mentions Bell, among others);

-- *E.W. Straus* (Lexington, Kentucky), *The Sigh (An Introduction to a Theory of Expression)*, in: *Tijdschr.v.Phil.*, 14 (1952): 4, 474/, 95).

(2) Straus, who emphatically mentions both Bell and Darwin, refers to an analogy formulated by Bell: “Expression is to passion what language is to thought” (expression is to passion as language is to thought). Analogical scheme: expression / passion = language / thought. As an actor or an orator, one would do well to take this analogy into account.

(3) The Antique Greek term ‘hupokritikos’ does not mean, unless very secondarily, ‘feigning’ but rather acting. ‘Hupokritikos’ is, therefore, in Antique Greek, “what goes with acting.”

The Latins, aware of the praxeological nature of rhetoric, rightly translated “hupokrisis” by “actio” acting. “Agere et pronuntiare” even mentions acting before pronouncing.

The textuology and the mnemonic technique are only preparatory sections. The action, which includes both diction (elocution) and gesticulation (gesture), is, further, underpinned by

(i) the overall appearance of the actor (a type of dress can come across as “eloquent”; think of a Punk, speaking) and

(ii) the infrastructure (think of the evidence, that lawyers, on the court, show: “Behold the weapon of crime! “; think of teachers, who use the blackboard; think of the persuasive incorporation of tables or computer screen images) : all these aspects form, in fact, a unity.

RH 15.

An examination of conscience.

The undergraduate/graduate students of the Hivo (Higher Institute of Education) are, mostly, in active teaching. Perhaps it would make sense to analyze the teaching and parenting behaviors, which one exhibits, using the five rhetorical ranks.

A.1. The teacher has a message, the content of her lesson, divisible into a number of elements.

A.2. She has a message, the lesson content, ordered according to plan.

A.3. She has a message, the lesson content articulated with minimal stylization.

B.1. A well-prepared teacher has, at a minimum, memorized, but spices this up with fluent improvisation (if only because a student(s) raises a finger and asks a sometimes unforeseeable question that disrupts the programmed text).

B.2. Finally, if one does consider it, teaching is for a minimum-essential part acting. A teacher, who never “expresses” feelings, exhibits stuttering diction, lame gesticulation, faint appearance, lame infrastructure, will - most certainly - interact differently with the little audience she has before her, than the one in whom all these articulations are not so.

The message suffers from lack of rhetoric. Sometimes one hears teachers complain, “It didn’t go in.” That’s a direct reference to her/his rhetoric, which ... through -means of understanding -and interpretation (overflowing in the five echelons) tries to get -the message accepted.

Note.-- Does one understand, ever so quietly, why, higher (RH 1), one spoke of “cultural error” with regard to minimizing or even radically abolishing -- which has unfortunately happened -- time-honored rhetoric? Teaching is a rhetorical act.

Mouthfulness.

The agogists (pedagogues, andragists), the agogicists (theorists) of agogic behavior,--all of them, in recent years, including under the influence of the New Left, have been talking insistently about empowerment. ‘Empowerment’ is ‘being disempowered’. To be detached from the grip of one’s fellow man, who acts as “aliens” (alienators). Those who have studied rhetoric find it much easier to see through where, when, how, by what means that same fellow human being is ‘acting in’ and ‘manipulating’.

RH 16.

Semasiology.

‘Semasiology’ is ‘word meaning theory’. -- ‘Rhetoric’ can be defined in more than one way.-- R. Barthes, o.c., summarizes meanings.--

A.-- Technique of persuasion,-- say: fluency,-- i.e. thanks to “being well spoken”, to make a message (= message) easily accepted.--

B. (i) Teaching language skills and persuasion techniques”-- initially by the Antique ‘rhetors’, -- later by ordinary teachers.

(ii) What Barthes calls ‘protoscience’ (= beginning science),-- i.e., the analysis of the phenomenon (linguistic behavior), in terms of what may be called a ‘meta-language’ about linguistic competence).

Ethical-political slant.

In contrast to the purely ‘positive’ (= stilted) research of our days, traditional rhetoric was never - what is now called - ‘value-free’.

(i) Editing someone so that the message gains traction, one always found an act, for which one is responsible in conscience.

Note.-- However, there are differences.

a. Protosophers such as Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410) or even stronger Gorgias of Leontinoi (-460/-375) sometimes took a dim view of the ethical slant.

b. The Paleopythagoreans (Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500) and his school, as well as Platon of Athens (-427/-347), who advocated a thoroughly conscientious rhetoric, -- along with the great Platonic tradition -- so e.g., Cicero (-106/-43; the greatest Roman orator) or Quintilian (+35/+96; *De institutione oratoria*, a full-fledged rhetoric) -- adhered, as strictly as possible, to some ethical system. As Barthes says: this moral institution was predominant up to and including the XIXth century.

(ii) Editing someone so that a message, with the models of interpretation and understanding attached to it, gains acceptance, was invariably thought to be an act for which one was responsible -- not only as a conscientious individual, but also -- as a co-responsible citizen. -- Polis’, city-state, was the term, which led to our word ‘politic’ or ‘political’.-- ‘citizenship’, was the sign par excellence of conscience. Hence the pairing ‘ethical-political’.

Opm.-- The Humanities.

Around 1950, a new term emerged to replace the term “moral and political sciences” that had been perceived as outdated.

Bibl. st.:

-- J.Freund, *Les théories des sciences humaines*, Paris, 1973.

-- D. Hollier, *dir., Panorama des sc. humaines*, Paris, 1973.

RH 17.

III. *The origins (“genesis”) of Greek rhetoric.* (17/27)

As the great Catholic educationalist *O. Willmann* (1839/1920), *Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propdeutik)*, (Outline of Philosophy (Philosophical Propdeutics)), Wien, 1959-5, 51, 414, says, the so-called “genetic” approach, i.e., studying something from its origin, is one of the most appropriate ways of understanding it (think of Aristotle or Hegel). We shall apply this method, very briefly, to rhetoric,-- not to extend the text or give the impression of scholarship, but to offer you, who are going to write a thesis, one of the possible methods for ‘developing’ your theme and the problems connected with it.

Yet a Roland Barthes, as a Structuralist (in the Saussurian sense), is also right when he writes: “Rhetoric must always be ‘read’ (*note*: understand : interpreted) within the structural play of its burins, viz. grammar, logic (RH 12), poetics (*note*: the theory of poetry),--philosophy. it is the play of the system--not each of its parts individually--that is, historically, meaningful.” (O.c., 118/120).

In other words: does an O. Willmann, strongly under the influence of Historicism (om. of the German Romantics), emphasize the so-called diachronic view, Barthes, as a Saussurian, equally rightly emphasizes the synchronic or systemic view.-- You, who are preparing for a thesis, please, examine your theme and its problems from this dual, complementary method.

1.-- *Ancient tradition of the (democratic) Greeks.* (17/19)

“One has often considered Homer, the great epic poet (RH 13), to be the founder of rhetoric. Ernst Curtius (1814/1896; known for his *History of Greece* (1857/1861)) has rightly noted that almost half of the *Iliad* and more than two-thirds of the *Odyssey* consist of speeches by acting persons,--often of considerable length. Especially the ‘Iudite Odysseus’ (...) is a masterful orator”. (*M. Weller/ G. Stuiveling, Modern Eloquence*, A’m/ Bssl, 1968, 38).

Indeed: in Homeric culture, the “agora,” at that time the assembly of the people or army, of sacred right by the way, is central.

Appl. mod.

Agamemnon, the prince of Mycenae (Lat.: Mycenae), leader of the Greek army for Troy (= Ilium, later Pergamon,-- a city dating from at least 2000, in Asia Minor) -- then also called ‘Achaean’, receives, in a God-given dream (the Biblical Revelation also has God-given dreams,-- think of Joseph, the foster father of Jesus), the order to gather the people (= the fighters) (Il. 2: 1v.). This shows the Archaic sacred (or ‘consecrated’) character. Usually ‘sacred’ is confused with ‘authoritarian-sacred’.

RH 18.

But look: Telemachos, Odusseus' son, receives the inspiration -- on account of the goddess Pallas Athene, who appears to him in the guise (= appearance) of Mentos -- to convene the agora (popular assembly),-- to put the cynical (= shame-free) suitors who are literally eating up the palace of his mother, the princess Penelopeia (also 'Penelope'), who, mindful of her sacred marriage, concluded before its deities, is waiting for Odusseus, her husband and true monarch.

Well, the agora, after discussion, disintegrates without Conclusion: it only learns that, if conscious suitors continue in their, blindness, an 'atè', a judgment of the deity ('god's judgment') will hit them, a fate like fate. Everything comes down to a god-given warning, nothing more. Cfr *Od. I*: 289vv..

Not only the occasion, say: leadership, is sacred. the meeting structure is too.

The one who is authorized to speak is given the Zeus scepter,--which, in that mentality, meant that under the direct protection of the Supreme Deity, Zeus (think Jupiter with the Romans), he is authorized to speak freely. Speaking under Zeus' protection is - at once - inviolable (one also says : 'sacred', (power-laden) or, even, 'taboo' (but not in the Freudian misrepresentation)). Even if, while speaking, he turns against the army leader.

Appl. mod.

Diomedes e.g., in full agora, turns against Agamemnon, saying, "Atride (*op.* : Atreides, Atreus son), against you, first of all, I ought to take a stand, because of your lack of insight,--as it is 'themis', Lord, in the agora." (cf. *F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes (I: Altertum und Frühmittelalter)*, (History of Natural Law (I: Antiquity and Early Middle Ages)), Zollikon - Zurich, 1954, 14).

'Themis' is the name for the oldest, sacred legal system in Hellas, when the Archaic Greeks still honored the Mother Goddess religion,--for the legal system, which centered on the Olympic deities.

RH 19.

The Themis right applied to the family, the sibbe (the common kin) ‘the house (dwelling) and hospitality,-- the worship of the dead (Flückiger, o.c. 20). The ‘function’ (sphere of action) of Themis, identified, at times, with Gaia, the Earth Mother, applied to life, especially as a source of fertility,-- further the night, as well as the earth and the subterranean (o.c., 29).-- As always, in a sacred view of life and the world, it is also here:

(i) ‘Themis’ is the (Mother) goddess, who founds (‘causes’) the legal system concerning her ‘function’; hence she can also be called as ‘Urheberin’ (Söderblom), ‘Cause-provider;);

(ii) but ‘themis’ is also (as in the Homeric texts cited above often) the legal system itself, as the earthly manifestation of Themis’ operation. In Modern words : there is a ‘transcendental’ (transcendental, extraterrestrial) and an ‘immanent’ (earthly, ‘secular’) side to the whole given.

“This is the cradle of later democracy” (F.Flückiger, o.c.,14): in the oldest layer of law a minimum of ‘democracy’ prevailed,-- in the sense that even in full wartime freedom of speech and Conclusion prevailed. Unfortunately, that freedom-type, source of rhetoric, was limited to one class, the princes, the army chiefs,-- the ‘nobility’.

2.-- The polis (city-state) as a democratic legal system. (19/23)

After the Homeric era, democracy proper emerges. The ‘agora’ is now no longer the army assembly, but the people’s assembly. The freedom of speech is now no longer that of the aristocrats, but of all the ‘free citizens’ (not counting the slaves/slaves).

With the polis of the ‘politai’, citizens, a new sacred legal system emerges, the Zeus religion, with Dikè (literally: law) as its goddess of law.-- The ‘domain’ (function) of this goddess is the city-state and the law of the citizens. But now no longer in the name of Mother Goddesses (‘chthonic’, telluric, earth-bound) but in the name of Zeus and the surrounding ‘primeval’ or sky-gods, mainly male in nature.-- Over time the motto then became “it is themis and dike” (to express the complementarity).-- Hence the two-layered sacred background.

First right thinking, philosophically speaking.

Thales of Miletos (-624/ 545) was the first strictly Greek ‘thinker’. He founded, in virtue of ‘hetaireia’, thinking society, the Milesian way of thinking, which e.g. the later Aristotle labels as ‘physical’ (i.e. of the ‘fusus’, natura, nature, outgoing).

Indeed: ‘fusus’ (which is quasi-synonymous with ‘genesis’) is all that was, is, and will be.

RH 20.

Humanity, the 'nature' surrounding it, the whole cosmos,---they collectively make up the 'fusus' or 'genesis' : it is as if total reality (= ontologie) is a very large process of genesis ('genesis').

Well, it is on this background that we situate the first philosophical rhetoric (in the sense of language ability). Whether Thales also founded the first "science" (with or without education; RH 16) that had its linguistic skill as its object, we do not know.

Appl. mod.

(1).-- *Economic rhetoric.*-- There are two stories about Thales.

(i) As an astronomer (as a philosopher, he was literally interested in "everything"), he could, at some point, foresee a rich olive harvest for the following year. Thereupon he borrowed all the oil presses in Miletos. Later, when the pressing season arrived and people urgently needed oil presses, he lent them out at the (usurious) price he had commanded.

(ii) The other version says: long before the olives are ready to ripen, Thales buys up the entire olive harvest of his father's city. Later he sells them at a (usurious) price.

Two comments:

(i) One clearly senses here the Early Capitalist stage within the Greek city-states; usurious prices, enforced by monopolization (all oil presses, the entire olive harvest), seem "normal.

(ii) Thales has had to persuade either the owners of oil presses or the owners of olive groves, i.e. by using language skills to impose his own means of interpretation and understanding so that they let themselves be influenced by them. Isn't that the definition of rhetoric as language skill? (RH 8).--

(2).-- *Political rhetoric.*

The following anecdote teaches us the political language skills of Thales.-- Lydia, o.l.v. Kroisos (Croesus (-560/-546), the wealthy), threatens, at some point, the Twelve Ionian Cities, along the Kleinazian coast (including Miletos). Thales advises her of an alliance.

This recommending is, again, a rhetorical act, but this time in the political realm. Only Miletos entered into an alliance; the other states thwarted Kroisos.

RH 21.

That Thales acted in political matters, was 'normal': the Greek city-state had, after all, direct democracy (i.e. without the 'political class') and, immediately, for every free citizen, 'iso.nomia', equal rights, so that 'takoina', communia, also 'res publica', the public, non-private matters, could be freely discussed.

A second reason lay in Thales's ancestry: *G. Thomson, Studies in Ancient Greek Society, II (The First Philosophers)*, London, 1955, points out that Thales came from a family of priestly kings (note: Thomson is a Marxist). From home, therefore, he could hardly avoid politics.-- Perhaps there is a third explanation: according to a moral maxim, put in Thales's name, "it is preferable to be the object of envy." Is this, unintentionally, a sign of the fact that Thales wanted to shine,-- even in public life?

Historia, theoria.

Two terms are in circulation to characterize the work of philosophers, at the time of Thales:

- (i) 'historia' (inquisitio, investigation) and
- (ii) the 'theoria', speculatio, fathom, put in the name of Pythagoras. The first term still lives on in 'histoire naturelle' (natural history,-- from the Latin 'historia naturalis', investigation of nature).

The second lives on, but distorted, in our concept of "theory" (RH 10). Both terms indicate:

- (i) phenomena, visible and tangible data,
- (ii) which are investigated ('historia') and/or fathomed ('theoria') on their invisible, intangible 'grounds' (understand : presuppositions,-- 'stoicheia', elements,-- 'archai', principia, principles), -- grounds, which govern the phenomena (which has the consequence that, without presupposing those grounds, one cannot understand, explain the phenomena).

The student of Thales, Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/ -547) uses, as the first perhaps, the term 'archè, principium', - that which 'explains' a given, - that which makes intelligible something, which is immediately experiential.

Well, how - if we imagine ourselves in that atmosphere for a moment - will Thales have 'examined', 'fathomed', his own rhetorical acts? He will have interpreted them as a piece of 'fisis', a natural event, in the middle of the sea of natural phenomena. And, just as the course of the stars seemed predictable, so too was the course of the olive harvest, for example, as well as economic life, in and around his father's city of Miletos.

But - apparently - Thales was convinced that man is a piece of 'fisis', nature, of a special nature: he/she can, viz, intervene in nature, -- especially in that which is and will be.

RH 22.

Couldn't Thales, for example, persuade his fellow citizens to give him all the oil presses or to sell him the entire olive harvest? Are not the decisions taken at the agora, the popular assembly, proof of the 'efficiency', the effectiveness, of such an intervention by means of the spoken word? The spoken word is, therefore, in Thales' 'physical eyes' (his philosophy style), a very special kind of 'fusus' ('genesis').

The question must therefore have arisen, at once, in Thales's shrewd mind: what 'element', what principle, what 'archè', must be put forward to explain such a thing?" As one knows, Thales posited 'the smutty water' as a universal (actually, ontologically expressed: transcendental or all-encompassing) element. 'Smijdig', 'fluid' (in French), is that which, itself without any fixed form, can assume all possible and conceivable forms. It is that which, 'subtle' (rarefied or particulate), 'flows' or 'sails' through the entire 'fusus'.

Intangible, yes, but the basic energy in all "being" (Thales begins, according to W. Jaeger, to use "ta onte," the being, in a philosophical sense),--in the past, the present and the future being.

Such is the basic principle of the Thaletic historia, research, theoria, fathoming. Man, e.g. as intervening in the lives of his fellow men by means of the spoken word, must then also possess a special dose of 'smiftiness' ('water' as a primordial substance,--not 'water' as our present chemical element, of course). - Behold a hypothetical, but perfectly within the Milezian theoria of historia designed 'explanation' of 'rhetoric'.

If one wishes, a (proto)scientific explanation of language ability.-- Note that this "fluidic" or "primordial" explanation (better: hypothesis) has been taken seriously to this day, by a minimal number of thinkers, since the Mileziers.

We said, RH 19, "first right thinking." 'Right' or 'wrong', even now, especially in Archaic cultures, is a matter of dosing the basic cosmic element, the smite in all things.

RH 23.

Seen in the Milesian way of thinking, which is an Archaic type of philosophizing, 'justice' or 'injustice' must have been something like that. - The Greek 'hubris', arrogantia, transgression of boundaries (self-aggrandizement), incidentally points in this direction: an Ancient Greek postulated, consciously but much more unconsciously, that 'justice' was always distributive or distributive justice.

Those who, for example, lived through the transitory state of happiness were considered to be in a state of 'hubris' (they crossed boundaries). What limits? In the Thaletian-Milesian hypothesis (the all-encompassing contrite 'water') these limits were those of the dose, better: fate (share), of the contrite prime substance (in Thales' case: contrite or primeval water).

Right' is, therefore, the dose of primal substance (basic energy) considered 'plausible' by the deities and fellow humans. Injustice' is also the excess or lack of basic energy to cope with life within the 'fusus', the sometimes very harsh and merciless nature.

Thaletically speaking: rhetoric is 'good' (justifiable in conscience), insofar as it wants to keep the doses of the primal substance within the measure, as deities (Thales believed, notwithstanding his 'critical spirit', in 'theoi', 'daimones' (deities in the fusis)) and fellow men considered this 'legitimate'. 'Evil', morally bad, it is, when the speaker lapses into 'hubris', boundary crossing. Appropriate : didn't Thales have to feel his monopolization (all the presses, the whole harvest) and the (usurious) price achieved by it, as a 'transgression', in order to remain consistent with himself within his theoria, within the presuppositions of his historia?

Conclusion.

RH 17 taught us, with R. Barthes, the systems thinker in the style of de Saussure (Structuralism), to see the connections: do you see, now, how, by merely starting from

(1) The scant historical data and

(2) the propositions of Thales, we have had to invent and combine economy and politics, and law and morality, and nature and intervention in nature? With this Archaic example we wanted to give you a simple example - which still remains of great cultural-historical value, for it stands at the cradle of our entire Western culture today - of what that is 'systems thinking', -- thinking the data (facts, propositions) together, seeing them in synchrony.

RH 24.

3.-- *The Sicilian 'agonistics'*, (24/27)

R. Barthes, L'av. sémi., 90; rightly draws attention, in a certain sense, to the fact that Western rhetoric only really begins with (what we call) "agonistics," "Agon," show of force, is, after all, the core of a new type of Antique-Greek rhetoric.

Regime change.

a. Around -485, two Sicilian "turannoi" (coercive, "tyrants"), Gelon and Hieron, deport a number of populations, expropriate them to populate Syracuse and provide mercenaries with a plot of land.

b. But in -460 they were driven out by a democratic revolution. The brand new democracy wanted to restore the previous situation. But this gave rise, o.g.v. 'isonomia', equal rights, as an ideal, to endless legal battles.

Thus was born the forensic or legal rhetoric.-- In this narrower sense, Barthes is, therefore, right.

Emergence of an 'agonic' rhetoric.

In order to convince the democratic people's court of its "good right," the expropriated "had to be ter tale. Hence the need for expert drafters of legal self-defenses.

Well, the Paleopythagorean thinker Empedokles of Akragas (= Agrigentum) (-483/-423), known, especially in occultist circles, for his teachings on the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), happened to have a pupil, Koraks of Syracuse (tss. -500 and -400), who began by providing - as a rhetor (RH 16) - those concerned with good texts, which they could, on their own, recite or, at least, assert in court.

Thus, an initial rhetoric sui generis (with its own nature) emerged.- We see this, when we analyze the oldest schema (RH 12: settlement) of judicial speech.

(1) 'To pro.oimion' (pro.oemium, exordium, preface or introduction).

(2) 'Hi agones', controversiae, debates). So the term 'agon', show of force, has become - for a Korak - a rhetorical term. Now, one does not have to have much imagination to see what kind of discussions, quarrels, conflicts, etc., not to mention fights, the deportees, on their return to their homeland, faced! It was just as well that a court existed, even if that court was susceptible to influence on the basis of all kinds of language skills.

(3) 'Ho epilogos' (peroratio, conclusion),

As an aside, from Sicily, that type of eloquence blew over to Athens.

RH 25.

Initial eristics.

‘Eris’ meant - in Antique hellas - among other things, ‘armed handshake’, discord, rivalry situation. ‘He eristikè technè’ (e.g. with Platon of Athens (-427/-347)) is therefore “the skill, resp. the (proto)science or education in the skill of (limitless) discussion. Known for such a philosophy was the School of Megara (with e.g. Eukleides of Megara, Euboulides of Miletos and others as representatives), one of the ‘dialectical’ (reasoning) tendencies that sprang from the teaching of Socrates of Athens (-469/-399; Platon’s teacher) (Mikrosocratiek).

Very early on, however, in the Greek, Archaic philosophy which is in the making, one sees a move towards eristics, namely with the Eleates (Parmenides of Elea (-540/...), especially his pupil - thinker Zenon of Elea (+/- -500/...) who was actually practicing eristics). There, in the southern Italian city of Elea, reasoning and counter-reasoning become the main thing. Admittedly, this became the birth of the theory of thought or logic, but it was, from the outset, a debating spirit at the same time.

Appl. mod.1.

Koraks of Syracuse had pupils.-- Thus e.g. Teisias (= Tisias) of Syracuse, about whom more later;-- Gorgias of Leontinoi (RH 16), one of the greatest Sophists;-- Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338; the rhetor par excellence, rivaling, as an educator, Platonism, which he found too ‘learned’ and too ‘specialized’);

Lusias of Athens (-459/-380; the democratically minded rhetor, author of several hundred forensic speeches).-- Very sound names in the Antique Greek “paideia” (educational idea).

Appl. mod. 2. The relationship “teacher (rhetor)/student (thinker)”.

Koraks teaches Teisias, on the condition that he pays Koraks honorarium, “the skill of always being right in the agon (discussion).”

Money, which, from now on, begins to play a first-rate role in Antique-Greek philosophy, is gratitude for the reason of the effectiveness, the usefulness - the Anglo-Saxons say “efficiency” - of the education received. The pragmatic side (i.e. the efficient side) of education prevails.

A pithy detail: that money is payable, should Teisias win his first plea.

Turn.

But Teisias does not plead: he becomes, immediately, like his teacher, an orator himself; yes, he does it even more brilliantly and, of course, does not pay.

It comes to a lawsuit, the eristic eloquence of which we will now let you sense.

RH 26.

(i) Teisias finds a ‘dilemma’, dual lemma (proposition), on it. The logical ‘syntax’ (understand : structure) of this dilemma is as follows. proposition (thesis, propositio).-- Your demand for payment is without ground (necessary and sufficient reason).

Argument (pisteis, probationes).

(1) *Model.*

Either I provide you, Koraks, with conclusive evidence of the fact that I owe you nothing.--In that case, you, Koraks, rightly renounce your claim.

(2) *Counter model.*

Either I am not providing you, Koraks, with the convincing evidence.

But remember, then, this is my first plea. It fails. Which proves that your teaching of rhetoric does not come out useful.-- In that case, Koraks, you rightly waive your demand, as agreed.

(ii) Koraks, also not without eristic pinches, sets up a counter-dilemma. contention,-
- My demand for payment is, well founded. argument.

(1) *Model.*

Either thou, Teisias, dost not furnish conclusive evidence of thy refusal to pay. In that case, thou must, of course, pay.

(2) *Counter model.*

Either thou, Teisias, does furnish the conclusive evidence. In that case, your first plea is indeed effective and our agreement holds. In that case, thou must pay,

One sees it: the realm of cleverness begins. It is partly because of this that ‘forensic’ rhetoric, typical of lawyers, enjoys such a ‘bad reputation’ to this day. As a purely logical activity, that is. As an interpersonal relationship, that is. When the Sophists come up with such a philosophy, it is only natural that Paleopythagoreans and Platonists (with Socrates as their guide) take a stand against this realm of cleverness. Even to this day. And in the name of the sense of objective truth - in the name of real human relations, worthy of the name.

Protagoras of Abdera.

RH 16 introduced him to us as a Protosofist. He strongly advocated the ‘eu.boulia’, the sound (understand: pragmatic) deliberation. Property formation and political influence were his primary goals. Eristics fits in perfectly.

RH 27.

Note.-- The origin of the trivium.

a. The Protosofists (-450/-350), though distinct from a later, called Deuterosophistic, sophistic movement (under the Good Emperors), formulated a paideia, a method of culture. This formative system, cut out for the (agonal) democracy type of Sicily, included three basic subjects, 'technai', disciplinae' subject sciences.

(1) Grammar (speech theory) sharpened the sense of the word (term) and language as a word system.

(2) The dialectic (dialectica), as a theory of reasoning (logic), sharpened the sense of reasoning and counter reasoning (redoubt).

(3) The rhetoric, which presupposed both, was then the doctrine which sharpened a -- sometimes paradoxical (we saw it in Koraks' and Teisias' case) -- form of understanding,-- in virtue of means of interpretation and understanding, which were attuned to "getting it in any case" (euboulia).

In the Middle Ages, this was called "tri.vium" (three methods).

b. The areas of life.

One must, always within democracy, fetch it on one's fellow man

(i) on the court (forensic rh.),

(ii) in the popular assembly (in a direct democracy),-- in parliament (in an indirect democracy, which has a political class) (political rh.),

(iii) in a hall or, preferably, in Antique Hellas certainly, in the open air, when one gives a sample before a rhetorical audience, as Gorgias of Leontinoi introduced it (demonstrative rh., cultivating the zone 'showy speech'). In this 'eipdeictic type' of speech it is about a 'demonstration' of being in tune.

W. Jaeger, Paideia, I, 400, says what follows.

"The Greek system of higher formation, as constructed by the Proto-sophistics, now dominates the entire civilized world. -- It should be added, however, that this -- what Jaeger calls -- 'formal' (meaning: language-bound) formation merged in time with the paideia of the Paleopythagoreans, which included arithmetic, geometry (= number and space mathematics),-- musicology and astronomia, (in fact: cosmology, universe). This synthesis originated in Alexandria, during the Hellenistic-Roman period (-320+). It was called this synthesis 'enkuklios paideia', general education. The mid-century Scholasticism (800/1450) adopted this scheme, but refounded it: trivium et quadrivium.

RH 28.

IV. Rhetoric in the sense of literatology. (28/37)

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 94s., 100/102, outlines the conceptual change, which the word "rhetoric" underwent.

A. Platon excepted, all the rhetors - to begin with - advocated the Aristotelian interpretation.

Aristotelian works are:

(i) *rhetoric*, which focuses on public reason, with its prescient reasoning (especially "enthymemes" (vernacular, usually non-expressive syllogisms));

(ii) *politics*, in which the epic, lyrical, and dramatic imagination is central. Rhetoric, in this sense, exudes the spirit of Sicilian agonistics (RH 24), and is strictly distinguished from poetry, except, perhaps, in demonstrative (epideictic) speech.

Aristotle - according to Barthes - founded the theory, the Roman orator Cicero (RH 16) practiced it, and the Roman rhetor Quintilian (RH 16) introduced it into education and parenting.

B.1. The Augustan period (Emperor Augustus lived from -63 to +14) sees a profound change in meaning. Rhetoric and politics intermingle, 'Rhetoric', thus encompassing poetics, becomes literary science 'literatology'.

No longer the mere pre-scientific-popular reasoning (Aristotelian interpretation), but good writing and speaking becomes the essence"-- Figures like Horace (-65/-8; Roman poet), more so Ovid (Roman poet (-43/417)),-- Dionusios of Halikarnassos (+ - 30, -8; rhetor),-- later: Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (+45/+125; Platonizing historian and thinker),-- *Tacitus* (55/119; Roman historian), -- not to mention the treatise *Peri hupsous*, On the Exalted (a treatise that thematizes the literary ("exalted" called) style), - all signs of the fact that the idea and the term "rhetoric" exhibit the broad meaning.

B.2. The Neo-Rhetoric (deuterosophistics). From +100 to +400, in the Hellenistic-Roman world of life, the broad idea 'rhetoric';

As an epoch, it is marked by peace,-- with flourishing trade relations, especially in the Middle East. It is the epoch of the 'oikoumene', the entire inhabited world: in Syria as well as in Spain the same culture prevails,---the same Deuterosophism, the same rhetoric. 'Rhetoric' includes all that is linguistic (eloquence, poetry, literary criticism).

The schools of this period reflect this situation : the “Sophist” (in the second sense, which is very different from Protosofistics) is the school director appointed by the emperor or the city council, while the “rhetor” (rhetoric teacher) is the teacher - educator.

Note.-- Provided the necessary cultural changes, this type of rhetoric has carried over to the middle ages (think of the Rederiks).

Textuology (29/32)

The text (RH 11v.) is one side,-- well the decisive one, of ‘literatum’, literary phenomenon.

H.I. Marrou, Hist.d.l’ éducation dans l’ ant., 239, mentions that the Deuterosophists knew ‘progumnasmata’, preliminary exercises, as elementary rhetoric. One could also call this ‘pre.rhetoric’,.

1. Secondary education.

Here is the text typology of the time, enumerated by Marrou: story (myth),-- chreia (chrie; a kind of treatise, about which later);-- gnomè (sententia (saying,-- fact, which is subject of essay), -- kataskeuè (confirmatio, corroborating evidence) and anaskeuè (refutatio, refuting argument);-- koinos topos (locus communis, commonplace,-- a literatum applicable as a subdivision in many texts).

2. Higher Education.

The types of text were : enkomion (laudatio, praise(speech) about someone’s words and deeds) and psogos (vituperatio, blam(speech), ‘criticism’ about someone),-- sunkrisis (comparatio, comparison, ‘parallel’: prosopopoiïa (prosopopee: outward description,-- rendering the outward appearance and behavior) and ethopoiïa (ethopee: soul description,-- depicting the inner -- temperament and character),-- compare with current Behaviorist and Consciousness psychologies;-- ekfrasis (descriptio, description);-- thesis (propositum, propositio, position, whereby one defends a thesis (RH 26: Sicilian model);-- nomos (lex, discussion of law).

Compliance.

This rich textuological tradition has continued to be observed, modified and/or supplemented of course.-- A few samples.

(a) Noël Delaplace, *Leçons françaises de littérature et de morale (avec préceptes du genre et des modèles d’ exercice)*, (French lessons of literature and morals (with precepts of the genre and models of exercise),), Bruxelles, 1844, 552 pp.. Note that, in addition to textual science, the ethical-political side is also discussed (RH 16: ethical-political slant).

The Deuterosophists and their rhetors wanted an overall education. Note also the fact that ‘*préceptes du genre*’ (prescriptions, valid for the text type) and ‘*modèles d’exercices*’ (paradigms of practice) go together, as we, RH 05 (normative and reductive side together) saw.-- The book in question decays into two parts.

I.-- Prose.

The story, the ‘scene’ (in French : ‘*tableau*’ (a ‘painting variant of description’)), the description, the definition (which includes more than the merely logical ‘definition’ : the value judgment or ‘evaluation’ is also contained in it);-- the fable, the allegory (detailed description by means of a model).-- Religious morality,-- lay morality (‘*philosophie pratique*’).

The letter (a text type that includes many variants).-- The speech, the oratorical fragment (‘oratorical’ = concerning the speech),-- the introduction to the speech and the conclusion of the speech (closing address).-- The philosophical dialogue (a Platonic type), the ‘literary’ (bellettristic) dialogue. -- Character drawing (ethopoeia), the portrait (description of both the view and the character), the parallel (political, literary, ethical comparisons).

II.-- Poetry.

Here is the same list as for the prose (except for the letter : letters in verse seem to be non-existent). To which is added : the lyrical fragment.

Decision.

One feels one long tradition, but with obvious evolution.

(b) Less heavy expositions are books for secondary education, of course.

Thus, e.g., *Ch.-M. des Granges/ Mlle Maguelone, La composition française (Livre du maître)*, (The French Composition (Master Book)), Paris, 1930.-- The story, the description,-- the portrait (outlook and soul description),-- the letter. Of course, in the ethical-political tradition : the “moral” (essays on ethical and civic values).-- Finally : the literary analysis, the literary criticism.

Note.-- Here the ‘oratorical’ text types are omitted. Another model: *J. Gob, Précis de littérature Française*, (Précis of French literature), Bruxelles, 1947.

(i) Introductory concepts (professional, philosophical, “aesthetic” (understand: belletristic) texts)

(ii) language skills (invention, arrangement, design (RH 12),-- poetry, --

RH 31.

set exercises (description, story, discourse);

(iii) literary genres (= text types):

a. the essentially “literary” (understand: belletristic) text (description, story,-- lyricism, drama),

b. the accidental ‘literary’ text (the letter,-- the didactic (expository) text (which practically amounts to discourse),-- the scientific and philosophical text;-- the historical text;-- the text criticism.-- Attached: the didactic poetry, the eloquent (‘oratorical’) text.-
- Follows a comment on satire and the press).

Decision.-- Again : tradition and the re-establishment of tradition (evolution).

Without presuppositions (“prescriptions”) blind. Without applications (paradigmata) empty.

Late antique rhetoric (literary theory) was the synthesis of the regulative model (the rules) and the applicative model. A textology, which merely states abstract rules, remains “empty. A textology, which gives only examples, remains blind.

Think of a child listening to a fable (applicative model) without adding what a fable is, making it a fable (the criteria), it remains blind. Think of a child who hears an explanation of what a fable is: without telling at least one, the word “fable” remains blank. Only the two together (axiomatic and reductive) give the full teaching. The Laatanieks understood this well.

The importance to you, finalist/finalist

It may seem redundant to dwell on text typology. Yet it is not. There are people who produce a thesis which shows that they have not even assessed the type of text. In that thesis are texts where one expects a description. What does one find? A value judgment. There are theses in which narrative is required. What one sees: the story is clumsy, because one has never learned or rehearsed the theory concerning the story.

There are, in a final work, usually, four types of text : the description (one represents neutrally or as neutrally as possible what is), the narrative (one tells a course,-- methodically),-- the treatise (which is the main type in a final work, within which descriptions and narratives have a place).

Finally, there is the report, which includes the three previous ones : a report is usually an abbreviated treatise.

RH 32.

So what do you have to do? Get a clear picture of the type (kind, genre) of text you have to write. There is nothing better for that than to check a text typology as Deuterosophist and her tradition have tried to draw it up. Therefore this short historical overview.

The more recent textology.-- (32/34)

Bibl. st.:

-- T.A. van Dijk, *Modern literary theory (An experimental introduction)*, Amsterdam, 1971;

-- the issue of the journal *Poétique* (Paris),-- a.o. *Poétique (Raconter, représenter, décrire)*, (Poetics (Telling, representing, describing), No. 65 (février 1986);

-- R. Wellek/ A.Warren, *Theory of Literature*, New York, 1942 (Fr. transl.: *La théorie littéraire*, Paris,1971).

Around 1950, a new literatology emerges. Names like J. Kristeva, R. Barthes, J. Derrida, Ph. Boilers,-- N. Chomsky, M. Bense,-- A.J. Greimas,-- R. Jakobson, Ch.S. Peirce, T. Todorov and many others introduce a series of new auxiliary sciences to traditional rhetoric. In particular, they seek to define more precisely than before what a text is, what types of text there are. What a trope (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche) is. What style is. There arises -What is now called - ‘narratology’ or ‘narratiek’ (story theory). And the like more.

One notable feature: the hyper-specialization (with e.g. formalization,--also with hyper-sophisticated language), which we, here, will not discuss further.

A sampling.

J. Kristeva, *Sémiotikè (Recherches pour une sémanalyse)*, Paris, 1969.

Semanalysis, in Kristeva’s sense, is a variant of traditional text theory (the semiotics of Ch.S. Peirce; the semiology of F. de Saussure). The text, in a strong Marxist sense, is interpreted as a “product,” “produced” by a producer(s), the “text producer(s)

Phenotext/ enjoyment text.

This systechy (pair of opposites) dominates sem analysis.

a. The text, as we read it, usually, superficially, is the ‘phénotexte; the phenotext. It is the product of a subject who writes or speaks and, thus, enters into communication and interaction with other subjects.

b. The pleasure text (‘génotexte’) is the true text, because whoever writes or speaks, writes as a member of a social class (Marx) and from the un(der)conscious layers of the soul (Freud). Which has the consequence that the person who produces a text communicates a great deal that he/she is not aware of himself/herself.

RH 33.

But, according to Julia Kristeva, it is possible, through the surface of the phenotext, to trace the depth of the pleasure text.... By semanalysis.-

More so, the one who writes or speaks, from a social class or from an un(der)conscious layer, can also deliberately conceal or distort. This too is exposed by the semanalysis.

The auxiliary sciences, here, are

(i) Marxist social analysis (primarily Marxist ideology criticism),--which is one type of sociology;

(ii) Freudian Psychoanalysis, with its critique of consciousness,--which is one type of psychology.

Both auxiliary sciences are an attack on the conscious subject in the Modern sense of that term: the 'rational' human being, detached from the time-honored traditions, who thinks he can write and speak radically 'autonomously', as well as independently and from social and from un(der)conscious factors.

Which means that here external ('external') text analysis is committed: the text is not examined in itself, without any reference unless the verbal essence of it (= internal or internal text analysis), but from factors outside the text itself, namely the social situation and the un(der)conscious situation of the text producer, insofar as ascertainable in the text itself (or in what it exactly does not say) - "reading between the lines" says the popular man -.

'Critical Reading'

Cl. Hülsenbeck et al, *The little red book for schoolchildren*, Utr./Antw., 1970, 22/29 (Authority), gives us one sample of semanalysis.

"Scene 2: Authority at school.

Speakers: teacher(s), teacher(s), head of school, principal.

Silence: students. - "I didn't ask you anything." "Do you do that at home too?" "No, you sit there". "You do that somewhere else but not here, friend!". "You are guests in my classroom". "You pick up that bread". "You could be much better than 2B". "You get out".

By, e.g., referring to the pupils only as silencers, *The Little Red Book for Schoolchildren* nails them down in precisely one schema, -- the schema of the New Left (Gauchism). But, however one-sidedly, in the view of the time-honored 'authoritarian' teacher, every pupil is, in fact, essentially a 'silencer'. Throughout the phenotext, *The Little Red Book* exposes the 'authoritarian' pleasure text.

RH 34.

Bibl. sample :

T.A. van Dijk, *Text Science (An interdisciplinary introduction)*, Utr. /Antw., 1978. This book also contains text analysis, but again different from Kristeva's semanalysis and the (socially) critical (text) reading of *The Little Red Book for Scholars*.

Conclusion: a whole range of textual approaches can be found in more recent literatology.

Prepare a final work text.

Why did we pause, for example, at the semanalysis and the (semanalytically explicable) social criticism? In order to point out to you, studentess / student, who in turn are going to draw up a text, that you too, perhaps, are writing from your social class (situation) and from your un(der)conscious layers.

In other words: such a reading of the text forces us all to learn to realize the correct 'measure' (i.e. situation) of our writing and speaking.-- What, in terms of Fr. Nietzsche, is called 'perspectivism' (approaching something (your theme) from one or more perspectives, points of view). Taking a dogmatic-authoritarian tone becomes, from this Perspectivism, radically impossible.

The more recent literary criticism. (34/37)

In addition to *van Dijk, Modern Literary Theory*, and *van Dijk, Textology*, being cited briefly:

-- G. u. I. Schweikle, *Metzler Litereturplexikon (Stichwörter zur Weltliteratur)*, Stuttgart, 1984 (an extremely rich book);

-- H. Mahlberg, *Literarisches Sachwörterbuch*, Bern, 1948 (outdated, but very useful);

-- J. Peck/M. Coyle, *Literary Terms and Criticism*, Houndmills / London, 1984, (a very solid overview of the major literary theories is located o.c., 149/168 (*Critical Positions and Perspectives*));

-- M. Milner, *Freud et l'interprétation de la littérature*, Paris, 1980;

-- C. Pichois/A.M. Rousseau, *Comparative Literature*, Utr./Antw, 1972;

-- P. Brunel/Cl. Pichois/A.-M. Rousseau, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature comparée*, (What is comparative literature), Paris, 1983.

'**Criticism**' -- in the scientific sense -- means "logically justifiable value judgment." -- not (necessarily) "social criticism, of course.

-- Peck/ Coyle, *Lit. Terms and Crit.*, just mentioned, indicate as the main (not all) thrusts on literary criticism:

(1) **internal text critiques:** the American New Criticism (1940/1960),

-- F.R. Leavis and XX-st' century British Criticism;-- Russian-Formalist Literary Criticism (+/- 1917+); Structuralist Literary Criticism (on the Saussurian model of language);-- these tendencies pay attention, unilaterally or not, to the text itself, apart from its author and the time or situation, in which text and author are situated);

RH 35.

(2) *Feminist literary criticism* (which traces Sexism);

The Marxist literary criticism (which analyzes the text economically-socially);-- the Poststructuralist literary criticism (which analyzes the “dismantling” of Modern subject-values);-- also but differently: the Romantic-phenomenological literary criticism (which traces, in the text, the uniquely-singular personality, which expresses itself in it);

Finally: the Reception or reception theory (R. Jauss: also called Reader-Response critique, which examines how the reader/hearer processes the text (“reception” = absorption, processing)).

More peculiarly, Peck/Coyle do not mention Depth Psychological Literary Criticism (which traces the unconscious and subconscious in the text). These tendencies can be labeled as external text criticism.

Also worth mentioning is Socialist Realism, which was leading until glasnost and the perestroika of M. Gorbachev, in the Soviet Union, but now, as a contender, has received the Liberals (open) criticism.

Are you going to take this on?

Thou, studentess /student, who is going to do a final paper will read, - sometimes read a lot. Reading texts. How will you read? Are you going to take the text in itself, made abstract of the author, of the time and space in which it is situated (internal reading)? Or will you - taking the text as your starting point - pay more attention to its author, to the time and space in which it is situated and in which it becomes comprehensible (external reading)? It is up to you, before you begin, ... Become aware of this.

Appl. mod.-- We compare two recent foundational studies of the police novel (1) (“polar”).

(1). *Patricia Highsmith, L’art du suspense*, Paris, 1987, outlines to us the psychology at work in her own - famous - police novels (“the princess of crime” is her label). From the first intuitions to the final text (RH 17: genetic method), her main concern is : “How, from the first sentence, to captivate the reader(s)?”

RH 36.

Note.-- This is a typical ‘rhetorical act’. Note carefully what Protagoras of Abdera (RH 16) once gave as the objective of the ‘euboulia’, the efficient council :

1. Attracting attention,
2. Stimulating interest,
3. Fueling desire,
4. Eliciting consent

(Cfr *L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et sophistique*)).

As an aside, one of Patricia Highsmith’s signature traits is her USA flair for blockbuster (calling “a good book” the one that “has many readers”).

With this main concern, captivation, comes a second: the police - o.k. indications (one type of signs) - track down the criminal/criminal. Therein lies what the old rhetors called “suspensio,” intriguing tales.

J. Broeckart, Le guide du jeune littéraire, t. I (*Eléments généraux et compositions secondaires*), Bruxelles, 1872, 100, explains: is ‘suspensio’, keeping the attention tense, ‘suspense’ (look at Highsmith’s title: ‘*L’art du suspense*’), the fact of keeping the hearer/reader in uncertainty as to what you are going to say.

As an aside. A solid work such as *Metzler’s Literaturlexikon* does not even have the term ‘suspensio’ (suspense) in its repertory, but one does find it in a J. Broeckart, a good century ago,--which makes it clear that one should not throw away “an old book” too quickly. One who does mention the term “suspension”, with the necessary sometimes very sophisticated explanations, is *H. Morier, Dict. de poétique et de rhétorique*, Paris, 1981-3, 1053/1057.

(2) *Ernest Mandel, Meurtres exquis*, Paris, 1987, outlines to us the (Marxist) sociology that “explains” the readership of the crime novel. Mandel is the theoretician of the IVth International and author of a *Traité d’ économie marxiste*. Mandel takes an in-depth look at the success and the development (RH 17: genetic method) of the ‘polar’, the detective novel. The police novel is also called “the opium of the new middle classes”.

Indeed: it started with highwayman stories, continued with the whodunit and the Série noire USA style, up to and including the sociological detective stories since 1968. Throughout this phenomenon (visible and tangible fact), Mandel “reads” until when he discovers the “hypothesis” in it, behind it: the middle classes sense bourgeois-capitalist society as an opaque mystery: who, in fact, disentangles the mechanisms that make oil prices rise and fall.

RH 37.

Why is it that our daily bread suddenly becomes much more expensive? What is behind the up-and-down interest rates? You name it.

Final conclusion: an inextricable middle of life.

If we understand Mandel correctly: in the detective novel, the middle class meets, above all, a model of the original (society). A model is a known thing so that, by means of that known thing, one can better understand something unknown (here: the mechanisms of society). The model theorists call this unknown “the original”.

Here Mandel refers to *Ernst Bloch* (1685/1977), known among other things for his *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* and his commitment to the pacifist student movements.

“There is nothing surprising in the fact that educated people are possessed, as it were, by mysterious histories: after all, does not the whole bourgeois society function as one great mystery?”

Decision.

Again: the auxiliary sciences - including psychology, sociology and, inevitably intertwined, culturology - become, as it were, active in textual and literary science.

So when you make your final work, keep in mind that the texts, which you read in that context, may also be susceptible to what we have just indicated (very sketchily), namely, the approach by the three sciences mentioned...

The “corpus” of the texts, which thou dost read.

The “corpus” is, here, the totality of the texts which are at your disposal,-- e.g., when you have completed your thesis lectures.-- But it is not so simple. It is impossible for you to reproduce all the texts. You will, therefore, have to choose. What will you choose from that corpus?

We refer, here, to the students of *Ferd. de Saussure*. They - and not he - edited his world-famous *Cours de linguistique*, Paris, 1916-1.

Reason: de Saussure’s teachings were scattered throughout the corpus, which he left behind.

1. All publishing involved redundant portions.
2. Just one course was incomplete.
3. The original portions were too one-sided.
4. From all the texts, his students made a new work, but as faithfully reflecting the master as possible.

RH 38.

V. Rhetoric as a theory of information - or communication. (38/51)

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 95, rightly draws attention to the fact that Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, exhibits a peculiar mode of operation:

(i) *Rhetoric I* treats the message giver as the source of a message, the orator (with his argument etc.);

(ii) *Rhetoric II* talks about the message receiver as the “receptor/receptrix” of a message (developing the audience and drift theory);

(iii) *Rhetoric III* treats messaging as the bearer of a message (in which then the ‘cabs’ (dispositio, arrangement; RH 12) and the ‘lexis’ (elocutio, design; RH 12) come into play).

This form of exposition of Aristotle betrays an obvious theory of communication. It is therefore, not surprising that in more recent literature this basic theory, in updated form, returns.

Bibl. st..

-- G. Fauconnier, *General theory of communication*, Utr./Antw. 1981;

-- J.R. Pierce, *Symbols and Signals (Nature and Operation of Communication)*, Utr./Antw., 1966 (Eng. orig. work: *Symbols, Signals and Noise*, New York, 1961; Pierce draws very emphatic inspiration from Claude Shannon's mathematical theory of communication or information, *A Mathematical Theory of Communication* (1949));

-- Colin Cherry, *On Human Communication (A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism)*, Cambridge (Mass.)/ London, 1966-2 (a foundational work);

-- G. Mannoury, *Handboek der analytische significa*, (Handbook of Analytical Significance), Bussum, 1947 (the work deals with the whole understanding life of man and the ‘critique of understanding’ treating these phenomena);

-- B. Stokvis, *Psychology of Suggestion and Autosuggestion (A Significant-Psychological Account for Psychologists and Physicians)*, Lochem, 1947 (an applied signfica);

-- J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Frankf.a.M., 1981 (on which Th. Mertens, *Habermas and Searle (Critical reflections on the theory of communicative action)* in: *Tijdschr.v.Filos.*, 48 (1986): 1 (March), 66/94

R. Barthes, *L' av. sém.*, 86, defines ‘Ancient Rhetoric’ as the meta-language (speaking of) language, as it was rhetorically (narrowly and broadly) spoken and denoted from the V-th century B.C. to our days. This spoken (and written) and deduced language is then, in jargon, the ‘object language’ of that meta-language. Although Barthes confesses that Old Rhetoric is ‘mal connue’ (o.c.,86), poorly known, he nevertheless advocates - what he calls - a new semiotics (theory of signs) concerning the written and spoken word. Which entails that he situates himself in the doctrine of communication.

RH 39.

Semiotics.

Since communicating information (message) is done through signs (“symbols”), a sign theory is appropriate in a communication theory.

Bibl. st.

-- Ch.W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of signs*, in: *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science*, Series I, No. 2, Chicago, 1938 (Morris valorizes the semiotics of Ch. Peirce (1839/1914));

-- Colin Cherry, *On human Communication*, 219/257 (*On the Logic of Communication (syntactics/ semantics/ pragmatics)*);

-- I.M. Bochenski, *Philosophical Methods in Modern Science*, Utr./ Antw., 1961, 48/ 50 (*The Three Dimensions of the Sign*).

-- T. van Dijk, *Textology (An interdisciplinary introduction)*, Utrecht/ Antwerp, 1978, 71/74 (What is pragmatics?);

-- Max Bense, *Semiotic (Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen)*, (Semiotic (General Theory of Signs)), Baden-Baden 1967;

-- B. Toussaint, *Qu' est-ce que la semiologie?*, Toulouse, 1978 (the Saussurian counterpart of the Peircian theory of signs);

-- U. Eco, *Le signe (Histoire et analyse d' un concept)*, (The sign (History and analysis of a concept)), Bruxelles, 1988.

We repeat, briefly, what semiotics says.

Thou sayest e.g. to a pupil(s), “What dost thou understand by a square?”.

Syntactic: the order of the words, which make your sentence meaningful (information-containing), is checked by syntactic semiotics.

Semantically, the meaning (= information, message), which you put into that sentence and which you hope the child will understand, is object of semantic semiotics.

Pragmatic: in uttering that sentence, you want to achieve a result; the “purport” (purposefulness) of your speaking is examined by pragmatic semiotics.

Note -- According to J.R. Pierce, *Symbols and Signals*, 11, A.J. Ayer (1910/1989; Language analytic thinker) explained the generality of the information process: we communicate not only business information, but also mistakes, wishes, commands, states of mind.

Heat and breast milk are passed on and exchanged, on the animal level.-- Movements of all kinds, energies are exchanged in inorganic nature.

As a result, communication is both ubiquitous and extremely important.

RH 40.

We are talking, here, of course, first of all about the typically human erasures.

Note - A. Heymer, *Vocabulaire éthologique (Allemand/ Anglais/ Français)*, Berlin/ Hamburg/ Paris, 1977, 191s., talks about behavioral biology, which identifies means of understanding in animals and humans. Think of tactile (e.g. grooming the body by touches of all kinds), chemical (e.g. the perfumes), optical (movement, facial expressions e.g.), acoustic (e.g. sounds, words), even electrical (think of some fish) means of communication and interaction.

We do say, “means of communication and interaction, for communication of mere information, in the ‘reception’ (the reception, the message reception), invariably becomes cause for reaction to an action after all. So much for this ethological comment.

Two types of communication theory

G. Fauconnier, *General Communication Theory*, points out how varied information theories, in recent years, have become.

A. -- Electrical communication and its analysis gave rise to a widespread theory of communication, which thinks in technical, machine terms. Since Cl. Shannon/ W. Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*, Urbana (Illinois), 1959, we have, indeed, a highly technical theory of messaging, which speaks of ‘the source (sender)’ of the message, the ‘encoding’ (converting into characters) and ‘decoding’ (understanding those characters as the carriers of the message), the ‘receiver’ (recipient(s)) of the message.

B. -- More in the spirit of Phenomenology (E. Husserl) and the “*verstehende Methode*” (W. Dilthey) - the spirit of the *Geisteswissenschaften* – (Humanities), is e.g. M. van Schoor, *Existence Communication*, Bloemfontein, 1977: the doctrine of message exchange is human - intersubjective, -- in terms of “communicator” - “medium” (= code, signs), in which the “communication” (message) is interpreted - “receiver”.

Here we talk about communication and interaction in terms of “encounter” (acquaintance between persons, -- and not between things, things).

RH 41.

The Significant Approach. (41/48)

a. Lady Victoria Welby, once court lady under Queen, Victoria (1819/1901), was shocked by the many forms of misunderstanding (and mistrust), which governed relations between distinctive groups within society. To eliminate these, she initiated, in 1896, the Significance Study.

As an aside, E. Walther, Hrsg., Ch.S.S. Peirce, *Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und andere Schriften*, (Ch.S.S. Peirce, *The Consolidation of Conviction and Other Writings*), Baden-Baden, 1965, 143 (*Ueber Zeichen,-- aus Briefen an Lady Victoria Welby*), betrays to us that this lady maintained high scientific relations.

b. What does this significance study? “The significance in all its forms and thus ...working in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose”. (The ‘significance’ in all its forms, and, thus ... at work in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose).

The ‘Significant Circle’.

To the ‘Significant Circle’ belonged *Gerrit Mannoury* (1867/1956; Dutch mathematician, who was the pioneer, in Holland, of basic research on mathematics; author of *Handboek der analytische signfica* (*Handbook of Analytical Significance*), 2 vol., 1947/1948, and of an introductory work, viz. *Significa*, 1949),

-- L.E.J. Brouwer (1881/...; *Intuitionistic fundamentals of logistics and of mathematics*);

-- Frederik van Eeden (1860/1932; Eighties figure, -- physician, sage, orator, -- poet and prose writer; converted to Catholicism; was highly gifted in the occult field);

-- Fr. J. van Ginneken, S.J., prof in literature Univ Nijmegen; linguistic pioneer);-

-- also: Dr Godefroy, Prof Clay, Prof Westendorp Boerma, Prof Fischer and others.

The meetings took the form of Socratic exchanges (dialogues).-- In the spirit of Victoria Welby, they dwelt on the human means of understanding, especially from a psychological and sociological point of view.

Reason: the ‘relativity’ of every language expression. After all, one only fully understands a language expression when one situates it in its psychological-sociological context.

Mannoury in particular practiced systematic signification, as his works show. He defined ‘significa’ as “the doctrine of the means of understanding”. Among these he placed, in the first but not the only place, the expressions of language through which we influence each other.

RH 42.

In that context, Nannoury spoke of types of “language gradations;” after all, he was paying attention to the many ways (“perspectives”) in which language is used as a means of understanding.

Appl. mod.

Thus, one can characterize the use of language from the living center. By which he meant “the whole of the social conditions” (which indicates a sociological point of view). Thus he distinguished the common language from the official language.

‘Commonality’ is a person’s relationship with a fellow human being to the extent that he/she interacts with it vertically, on an equal footing. One of the variants of agreeableness is ‘intimate’ or ‘familial’ treatment. As a civil servant, this is not what a civil servant does.

Think of your neighbor notary. As a neighbor, he has a form of understanding with you that can even be common. But as a public servant - when he reads out a notarial document to you, for example - he will abandon that commonality - at least in part; then he will behave, even toward you, though you are a neighbor, aloof - official.

Conclusion: two forms of understanding are at play here, the common and the official.

Note -- Compare your behavior as a teacher e.g. : as a child of your neighbor, you will address and treat a pupil of yours - at home - rather differently than when the same child, in front of you, is sitting at the school desk. In other words: from common, your behavior, your language, becomes ‘official’.

Bally’s critique of traditional rhetoric. (42/43)

Charles Bally (1865/1947) was one of many pupils of F. de Saussure (1857/1913), the semiologist. - In his *Le langage et la vie*, Genève/ Lille, 1952-3, 13s., he talks about classical rhetoric and the linguistics that goes with it. Until about 1800 - he says - language was never studied for its own sake. Whether it was grammar or rhetoric (narrow or broad), one invariably wanted - through language

- (i) Provide logical formation,
- (ii) learn to write and speak with style,
- (iii) especially literary culture, through the great classical writers; instilling.-- All things that Bally finds perfectly legitimate.

One thing he notes is the underestimation of the language spoken every day, which one felt, easily, to be too ‘unpleasant’ (RH 28). In French, this is even more evident: ‘la langue vulgaire’.

RH 43.

This language - says always Bally - is, however, “la seule véritable, parce que la seule originelle” (o.c.,13). What one can, to some extent, question: what, precisely, does one understand by “real language” (langue véritable?) Bally is here defending a kind of “language populism. -- Which is his right, of course.

An earthquake takes place around this time: Sanskrit is discovered, a language which, from certain points of view, is more “archaic” (older) than Greek and Latin, which until then had been cultivated as the oldest languages. One discovers as soon as analogies between the various Indo-European idiomata and comparative speech emerges. One discovers that, in addition to conscious thought, the collective-unconscious, at work much more in large popular masses than in the intellectual upper strata, is also language-forming.

Bally also, with all due respect, opposes the one-sidedly-rational and one-sidedly-intellectualist view of language of his teacher de Saussure. And this on the basis of the analyses of ‘natural language’, insofar as it is not literary, but spoken in real life (not so much written as). After all, therein three aspects of linguistic behavior emerge, which in Saussurian semiology go into hiding:

- (1) The speaking subject (I, thou, we speak),
- (2) the whole situation, within which is spoken (me and ye are teachers and talking about our difficult students e.g.),
- (3) the non-logical disposition, from which is spoken (e.g., I see that my colleague, “thou,” has “become neurotic about it”).

Etienne Gilson (1884/1978; the great connoisseur of medieval Scholasticism), in his *Linguistique et philosophie*, Paris, 1963, 68, says:

“To know the meaning of the word ‘horse’, one must have seen one. Immediately it is enough to connect the name of the animal with the animal in question or with its image to grasp the meaning. (...)

The meaning of a word emerges in life and in history: by being confronted with data, already alive (in the context of the history of a people with a language), and attaching words to those data, one learns the terms of a language and its meanings.”

What can be called a kind of “life-philosophical-historical” view.

RH 44.

Moreno's psychodramatic 'significa'.

Jacob L. Moreno (1889/1974), founder of group psychotherapy.

In his *Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama (Einleitung in die Theorie und Praxis)*, (Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama (Introduction to Theory and Practice)), Stuttgart, 1973-2, 15f., he outlines his position as follows. One can speak of three psychiatric revolutions:

(1) *Philippe Pinel* (1745/1826; *Traité medico-philosophique sur l' aliénation mentale ou la manie* (A medico-philosophical treatise on insanity or mania), (1801)), instead of the rock-hard treatment of the insane, advocates the "gentle" handling of it ("He frees the insane from their/its chained condition");

(2) *Sigmund Freud* (1856/1939; *Psychoanalysis*) founded, instead of the one-sided-medical treatment, the psychotherapy as a fixed component of medicine;

(3) *Moreno*, with his sociometry, sociology and psychodrama, replaces individual psychotherapy with group psychotherapy. This from about 1914.- See law Moreno says, o.c., 3/4:

"The therapeutic group is (...) not only a branch of medicine and a form of society, but also the first step in the cosmos.

The question arises : "Is there a cosmic type of understanding?". What Moreno, understands by that rather strange term "cosmic communication," he explains as follows:

(i) there is, first of all, the purely conversational (he calls that "dialogical") form within groups, -- a method that is valid and remains valid in a group,-- method, which employs language;

(ii) there is, at the same time, the 'cosmic' form of communication and interaction : "However important language may be in the development of the individual and of the group, it is always only the essentially logical (...) form of rapport". Thus literally Moreno.

Non-linguistic factors play a leading role, especially in the infant and child's environment. "Language represents only a part of the entire psyché." Again Moreno's own words. In the so-called "groups" - therefore - a method of communicating and interacting has been designated that goes beyond language.

Note.-- The term "cosmic" is used by Moreno to indicate that man, in addition to society (sociology), is also at home in the whole cosmos, the entire universe (which includes sensitivity etc.). From all this it is clear that a theory of communication must include more than a generalized theory of information type Cl. Shannon.

Berthold Stokvis' significal psychology (75/78).

B. Stokvis, *Psychology of Suggestion and Autosuggestion (A Significant-Psychological-Explanation for Psychologists and Physicians)*, Lochem, 1947, 33/58, sets forth to us "the elements of the process of suggestion and autosuggestion."

Notice how communication theoretic (RH 38) his view is:

(i) suggestion takes place as a process, i.e. a course, between

a. the suggester and **b.** the suggested, who **c.** exchange a suggestion (called content);

(ii) autosuggestion is a process between

a. the autosuggestor and **b.** the autoguggested, which **c.** exchange a 'content'.--

'Mass suggestion' (o.c., 216/226) is the same process but characterized by

a/ aligned tendency of many individuals

b/ in virtue of their being together as a decisive cause.

O.c., 31, tries to give a kind of (vague) definition of 'suggestion' : it stands or falls with 'psychic resonance', i.e. the general possibility of influence between people, insofar as they go through a common experience.

For the reason of the very general nature of 'suggestive processes' we will dwell on them for a moment.-- Stokvis, o.c.,33vv., explains this.---

(i) The suggester must be able to bring about the belief and confidence in **a.** the possibility (as a hypothesis) and **b.** the effect (as a resultant action) of something like 'suggestion' (RH 10).

(ii) Only then does the suggested respond to thoughts, feelings, and acts of will of the suggestor (the content),---such that the suggested senses this "content" as coming from within himself (which then becomes "autosuggestion").

Indeed: from the suggestor's point of view (perspective 1) there is heterosuggestion; from the suggested's point of view it begins as heterosuggestion, but ends as autosuggestion (perspective 2). In other words: the rapport is in the long run such that what is foreign is lived through as one's own possession.

As a paradigm par excellence, Stokvis treats the physician.

Such signifying action does not only take place through the doctor 'suggesting' the patient(s) with words - in Moreno's language: logically. Medical suggestion also occurs through other means of interpretation and understanding - in Moreno's language: 'cosmic', non-logical. To prescribe a drug, to recommend a diet, to manipulate the patient electrically, to make him/her

Note from the editor: Sheet 46 is missing !!!

RH 47.

Note -- It should be noted that Stokvis is here doing cultural history and especially ethnology. Those who want to know more about this can consult e.g. *G. Welter, Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paléopsychologie)*, (Primitive Beliefs and their Survivals (Précis of paleopsychology), Paris, 1960. A man like Freud was right when, in order to understand Modern man, especially in his unconscious layers (the 'cosmic' layers, to speak with Moreno), he went back to the Archaic man,--to the rudiments, 'les survivances', the testamentary remains of it,

Note.-- It was noted that Stokvis, here, brings up a type of suggestion, namely, suggestion via a material object, in which 'something' (always that curious basic ontological concept) is present which, as the content of suggestion, is transferred. - Suggestion can also be done without such a material object, of course.

In this connection it should be noted that Moreno's distinction, indeed, separation of 'linguistic' and 'nonlinguistic' communication is very relative: a Mannoury speaks of 'language act'. A word, a sentence, for example, can be both logical and extralogical at the same time.

In Archaic man, the 'magically charged word' (in which, with the sound and the thought present in it, 'something', which is not that sound and not that thought, is transmitted) applies.

So says *Mannoury, Introduction*, in: *Stokvis, Psychology ...* 13;

"Significa is the doctrine of acts of language.-- An act of language is an act, by which one person or a group of people (for short: 'the speaker') intends to exert certain psychic effects on one other person or another group of people (for short: the 'hearer')"

Here reference should be made, briefly, to the language analyst *J.L. Austin* (1911/1960; *How to do Things with words*), who was one of the first to put the action character of, at least part of, language at the center. Language, in the 'constative' (establishing) sense, 'represents' (= displays) reality; language, in the 'performative' (language act) sense, changes reality. Which leads to descriptive statements and linguistic acts.

More to the point, it is difficult to distinguish between "descriptive" and "performative" language. Within everyday language the two - usually - run into each other. When I say, e.g., "I promise you," then this is representing reality and, at the same time, making the promise,--in those descriptive terms.

The acting character of language Austin denotes by "illocution.

RH 48.

The explanation of the introjection mechanism.

With this we had arrived - in Stokvis' text, above - at the aspect of 'reception' (absorption) of the process.-- "This introjection mechanism is only possible if the (patient) identifies himself with the physician, 'identifies'. And this introjection and identification mechanism can take place only if the bondage by sympathy exists." (O.c.,34v).

Stokvis falls back, in part, on depth psychology, to which he explicitly appeals, o.c.,112v. The necessary 'sympathy', with all kinds of emotional reactions related to it (reverence, awe,-- 'libido', lust (in the Freudian sense, among others)), takes the suggested from his 'Eros' (not to be confused, as often happens, with sexuality in the sense of adult sexuality, of course).

It goes without saying that, apart from this Psychoanalytic explanation, there are others. E.g. the occultist one, which speaks e.g. either of 'magnetism' (think of Mesmerism e.g.) or of 'life force'.

The application in your life, studentess/ student,

Since communication is so frequent, I'm sure you'll be hard-pressed to find a final paper that doesn't include it.

But there is more. Stokvis says: "Mutatis mutandis (after having changed what needs to be changed) the same (suggestive) process takes place in education,--when by the parents or teachers contents of thoughts or representations are (passed on) to children.-- Here too we have the 'erotic' (*note*: in the very broad sense just indicated) bondage --authority of the educator -- through which the identification and introjection mechanism takes place.

"Bad teachers' are, mostly, those in whom the 'erotic bondage' is not or not sufficiently established." (o.c.,35).

This aspect of our teacher life is something we should certainly check with ourselves. Does 'something' emanate from what we are, say, show, etc.? What axiological (value) property does that 'something' exhibit? "As soon as I even see it or sense it, I am already nauseated" one sometimes hears people say. That means that the 'something' which, as a suggestive content, is emitted comes across as 'not good'.

"That student(s) makes me sick" is heard to say in time: he/she exudes "something" that the teacher perceives as negative.-- Suggestion is a very frequent occurrence.

RH 49.

The interpretive approach. (49/51)

Communication (and interaction) implies the fact that the message (the ‘content’, the ‘information’) is input,--which is the reception aspect.

A -- *The (German) hermeneutics.*

Bibl. sample : H. Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1970, 116/ 120.

1. Initially - and still today - “hermeneutics” meant an auxiliary science of jurisprudence and theology: it analyzed the actualizations of (already) old texts,-- legal texts, biblical texts, coming from the past (a past culture) that had to be reinterpreted, in a new way.

2. However, since D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), “Hermeneutics” becomes the name for a whole philosophy (in his *Dialektik* (1839)): for Schleiermacher, the understanding, the interpretation (= interpretation) of a text is only complete when its content (the message or information) is incorporated (“integrated”) into the life of the person who “reads” the text. It becomes an epistemology or theory of knowledge.

Since then, this broadened interpretation of ‘Hermeneutics’ was adopted (and, in part, reinterpreted) by the historical school (F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861: *Understanding the Text through Massive Detail*) and by W. Dilthey (1833/1911: *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the Humanities), (1883),--with the ‘*verstehende Methode*’), to live on to the present (think P. Ricoeur, *le conflit des interprétations* (*Essais d’herméneutique*), Paris, 1969).

B -- *Peirce’s theory of interpretation.*

Ch. Peirce (1839/1914; RH 39 (semiotics); 41: V. Welby) has also left us a theory of interpretation.

Bibl. sample :

-- W.B. Galle, *Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, 1966;

-- K.-O. Apel, *Hrsg., Ch.B. Peirce, Schriften I/II*, Frankf.a.m., 1967/1970.

For Peirce, the human being is essentially - what he calls - ‘an interpretant’ (a signifier). And of signs (hence the centrality of semiotics).

Appl. mod.

(i) An astonishing fact, F, is established. E.g. “This child studies poorly”.

(ii) But, if the abduction, A, is true, then this surprising fact, F, becomes “intelligible” (“abduction” = supposition, hypothesis).

(iii) ***Consequence:*** there is a serious reason to conjecture that A contains truth.-- ‘A’ is a sign, a thought-sign, in the mind, which contains the interpretation (explanation) of F. Consider, e.g., the broken-up family of the poorly studying child,--as a possible explanation.

RH 50.

The A-B-C theory of personality.

A very fascinating application of both theories of interpretation offers us A. Ellis/ E. Sagarin, *Nymphomania (A study of the hypersexual woman)*, Amsterdam, 1965, 137vv..

A.-- The point 'A', in the language of both psychologists - psychiatrists, is a fact, e.g. a deep disappointment, incurred either with either parent or with a fiancé,-- a 'frustration', as one now likes to say.

B. -- The point 'B' is the interpretation -- not so much a sentence conception as a sentence direction -- by the person in question, who is experiencing fact 'A'. In the words of Ellis/ Sagarin:

"B is what the person deludes himself into thinking in response to A" (o.c.,138).

C.-- The point 'C' is the (wrong) reaction to A, 'neurotically' hinted at in B. "At A I didn't get what I wanted and 'because of that' I got overworked in C" (o.c.,137).

Behold the A-B-C theory of personality, especially psychiatric personality -- in this case, the personality of the 'nymphomaniac', who is driven from one man to another, with as traits

- a. radical lack of self-control ("If the urge arises, it must be quickly satisfied")
- b. insatiability ("constantly the nymphomaniac must enter a bed").
- c. compulsiveness ("Even if I wanted to, I can't master it"). - 'Compulsiveness',
- d. self-loathing ("I'm a slut").

The ambiguity.

'Ambiguity' means that one data, 'G', gives rise to more than one interpretation, 'D' (D1, D2,...Dn).-- Ellis / Sagarin clarify as follows.

I.-- *The interpretation of "common sense"* (as the authors themselves say).

I have, at point A, experienced something that I will never forget. But - at point B - I say "I can handle this unfortunate event - e.g., a severe sexual disappointment (e.g. : "I cannot achieve orgasm"). I will always regret the fact A, but I can bear it.

Consequence: at point C I live through tempered feelings of disappointment, regret, exasperation, -more not".

II.-- *The interpretation of the neurotic mind.*

I have, at point A, experienced something that I cannot forget.- At point B I say "I cannot process what happened. It's just awful. Horrible it is. It makes me a worthless person".

RH 51.

Consequence: at point C, the final editing, I fall prey to fierce negative emotions (comma, depression (dejection), anger, hostility or 'smartlap' (melodrama))."

Conclusion: - Not the failure (fact A), but the attitude, attitude - interpretation - towards the failure (interpretation B) gives rise to e.g. nymphomania (neurosis) (final C).

Note.-- Ellis/ Sagarin, o.c., 191v., list a number of easily recurring "misinterpretations" that they call "irrational ideas. Thus, among others:

-- "It is horrible and disastrous when things do not go the way one would like them to."

-- "It is, for a mature human being, essential that he/she should enjoy the esteem, indeed the affection, of practically every person of any significance in the environment."

-- "One should be, under all possible respects, duly competent, adapted and, above all, successful, in order to be able to consider oneself a 'valuable human being'"

-- "Man's happiness depends on outside factors: himself he/she has little or no power over what gives rise to worries and concerns, obstacles and disappointments."

-- "As soon as something comes across as dangerous - apparent or real then one should be 'terribly concerned' about it and constantly think that it could well end badly"

-- It is easier to avoid certain life problems than to face them courageously."

-- "Always there is just one good, right and perfect solution to human problems: disastrous is it when this one perfect, ideal solution is not found."

-- "A person's past is, in a decisive way, determinative of his/her personal behavior : if something happened in that past that made a deep impression, it will invariably exert the same influence."

-- "One must always depend on someone : one needs a strong personality on which one can lean". "Problems and disorders of fellow human beings completely confuse you; that cannot be avoided."

-- "Some people are bad,-- prickly, mean; they should therefore be punished severely for that meanness."

Such are some examples of interpretation ('B'), which give rise to neurotic or at least failure-containing end reactions (C'). They express themselves in 'phrases', as above.

RH 52,

VI. The discourse theory. (52/59).

Introduction.

The rest of this work deals only with one type of text, the treatise (“final work,” “thesis”). All that precedes is not without direct connection to the treatise.

a. So e.g. the previous chapter, - on communication.

There is almost no subject of discourse that does not deal with or touch upon a phenomenon of interpretation somewhere. This then belongs to one of many methods (thought schemata) for illuminating your topic.

b. E.g. the suggestion, which emanates from your subject. Your prof has recommended to you, e.g., J.J. Rousseau (and e.g., his system of education) as a subject. There is something (RH 48) emanating from himself, from some of his texts or terms, from the fact that he does not touch some things etc. m..

With many an HIVO studentess or student, this works negatively. (“I don’t want much from Rousseau”) or Positively (“What wonderful ideas does Rousseau sell”). For a treatise, be sure not to be fooled either by those negative or by those positive suggestions.

The suggestive aura of your subject may be serviceable to your exposition (if only because you explicitly address that aspect), but it may cloud your common sense, according to Platon, who calls it “the little man” in us, the only - sometimes very narrow - basis of sound reasoning.

Bibl. sample

-- O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, 9/13 (*Die Materien der Logik, von der aufsatzlehre aus gesehen*), 47f. (Chrie);

-- G. Niquet, *Structurer sa pensée/ Structurer sa phrase (Techniques d’expression orale et écrite)*, (*Structuring thoughts/ Structuring sentences (Speaking and writing skills)*), Paris, 1978;

-- S.P. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, Belmont (California), 1966;

-- O. Pecqueur, *Manuel pratique de dissertation française*, (Practical manual of French dissertation.), Namur, 1922-2;

-- J. Bojin/ M. Dunand, *Documents et exposés efficaces (Messages, structure du raisonnement, illustrations graphiques)*, (Effective documents and presentations (messages, structure of reasoning, graphic illustrations)), Paris, 1982;

-- H. De Boer, *Reporting in writing (A practical guide to composing reports, notes, memoranda, theses, dissertations, business correspondence and dgl.)*, Utr./Antw. 1961;

-- G. Beville, *L’expression écrite, image de l’entreprise (Structure, style, présentation)*, Paris, 1979;

-- U. Eco, *How to write a thesis*, Amsterdam, 1985.

RH 53.

The definition.

The (Platonic understanding) idea of “discourse” hangs like a light shining on all of us. But to clarify this idea by means of a definition (determination of essence) laid down in words, is something else : there are therefore more than one definitions.

Deuterosophism (RH 28) had a whole set of models of discourse, the list of which can be found in RH 29. But what it called “the thesis, propositio, literally: thesis (which one advocates),” is that type of text which comes closest to our general concept of ‘discourse. Deuterosophists defined the ‘thesis’ (the term is still used) as “the systematic (methodical) development of an abstract subject.”

2.-- E. Flerackers, *De verhandeling*, (The treatise), Antwerp, 1944-13, defines: “the treatise is the reasoned development of a theme.” -- One can see: by replacing ‘abstract subject’ with ‘theme’ Flerackers generalizes the definition.

The artery of your dissertation.

- S. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, 121/ 136 (*Opinion Statement*), says:

“A progressive opinion (...) is the thesis (*op.*: thesis, propositio), which, throughout the text, we wish to make true.” (o.c., 121).

We will come back to the arrangement (text order, plan), but here is already a preview.

The thesis is, in the introduction, touched upon (e.g., by attention-grabbing, benevolent mood, - by telling how one came to such a thesis e.g.,).

It is expressed in the thesis: this section of text explicitly and, preferably, with the greatest circumspection, formulates your thesis.

The format of your exposition, i.e. your plan, indicates, in short, how you will try to realize your thesis. in the format you list the main points of the theme development.

In the descriptions, in the stories, in the reports, with which you furnish your thesis, the factual side comes up, which is peculiar to your thesis.

The argument (argumentation) proves or, at least, makes plausible your thesis.

In the refutation - of those who challenge your thesis - - by negating the counter model - your thesis is indirectly made true.

RH 54.

In the summary, in which you reiterate the main points of your development, the statement is once again made true in an abbreviated manner.

In the conclusion (the “closing speech”), the thesis is briefly revisited - in a farewell - (situated in broader framework, axiologically gone through (positive or negative value judgment, emotionally reined in etc.).

Typology.

There are, as already mentioned, many kinds (types) of trading.

1. Fleerackers, o.c., 13, says that in a treatise the whole mind - intellect and reasoning, mind, will - is at work. in that light he rightly distinguishes three types:

(i) **reflection** - speculative, in ancient Greek ‘theoretical’, discourse - with its ‘abductive’ (hypothesis-forming) capacity, allows reason and ‘reason’ to weigh through;

(ii) **the reverie** allows the element of mind to come through strongly in all of us, even though one continues to advocate a thesis;

(iii) **the plea** (speech)-written or, preferably, spoken-presents the will to action.

Note.-- To you, studentess/ student, decide which type you will live up to in your final work! And for what reasons. Preferably in agreement with your supervisor / promotrix.

2. Pecqueur, o.c., distinguishes two types:

(1) **informal treatises** (o.c.,356/385: dissertations badines),

to which most treatises in secondary education amount; all kinds of themes, emotional (self-love, sadness and joy) or arid (the role of education in society), are developed “informally,” i.e. unpretentiously, without claiming to be scientific; let us say, pre-scientific work.

(2). **formal treatises**, which Pecqueur classifies into

(i) ethical-political (o.c., 13/166) (RH 16) -- e.g., self-love (La Rochefoucauld) or “men ought to help one another” (Lamennais)

(ii) literary (o.c.,167/318) e.g. “La Fontaine is our Homer” (Hipp. Taine).

(iii) strictly scientific (o.c.,319/355) so e.g. “science, industry and poetry” (Max Ducamp).

Only with the latter is the exposition logically as closed as possible, of course.

The task hermeneutic (task definition). (54/59).

What ‘hermeneutics’ is, we saw in RH 49.-- The second artery of every thesis - apart from the thesis, present in all parts as the unity in the multiplicity of text parts - is the correct task. The text that you should write can be determined overall on the basis of the correctly understood task.

RH 55.

A -- The systechie ‘given/requested’.

Bibl. sample :

-- O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), Braunschweig, 1907-2,48 (*Das Prinzip der Analysis*).

O. Willmann, in his account of the beginnings of Modern Mathematics, links up with Platonism.

(1) The “analytical method”.

The premise of Platonic ‘dissection’ (‘analysis’) of something, a given, such that its ‘stoicheia’, elements, are exposed, is the duality “given (the known / asked (the unknown))”. We all know this scheme from our mathematical problem-solving (where ‘solution’ stands for the Greek ‘analysis’).

Do not proceed differently for your final paper, please. When you have defined your assignment with your supervisor/promoter, do what comes first : “What data do I have? What should I be looking for next?” The “solution” or “analysis”, which then follows, will increase the data and specify the requested (the wanted). So that, after a while, the final text will become possible.

(2) The lemmatic-analytic method.

Platon is known, in antiquity, as the founder of the lemmatic- or hypothe-tic-analytic method.

a. She is one application of his hypothetical method. Platon thought continuously in ‘if, then’ sentences. The ‘if-sentence’ is the assumption or ‘hypothesis’. The ‘then - sentence’ is the inference. Please learn to express your thoughts, the proposition in the first place, in such a strictly logical language as well. Logic is the basis of commerce.

b. When one, without knowing the data completely - and this is quasi - always the case, still has to proceed with the analysis of the subject, then one can apply Platon’s method. One turns the sought (unknown) into a hypothesis : one pretends to already know the unknown and introduces it as a supposition. This is called the ‘lemmatic-analytical’ (in short: analytical) method.

This succeeds only if one enters, for the unknown (requested), a sign. As we enter e.g. ‘x’ or ‘y’ in the equations.

RH 56.

An applicative model (56/59)

Supposedly: a student woman/student comes up with a topic like “The Mother-God Religions”.

Such a theme may come across as “rare,” but it has already been a fact of life at the Hivo.

1. Respond, in such a ‘weird’ case with the pair ‘given/requested’.

What data do we have? The first task is to look up the sources. This is done in a minimum bibliography (the term ‘bibliographic sampling’ means that, amidst a multitude of works and articles, one makes a haphazard (if unavoidable) choice). Those who rummage through the relevant bibliography will soon notice two more recent books: *C.J. Bleeker, De Moedergodin in de Oudheid (The Mother Goddess in Antiquity)*, The Hague, 1960 (a factual account of what one finds in the Antique data - including Old Germania and present-day India);-- *Merlin Stone, Once God was embodied as a woman*, Katwijk, 1971. (a plea, feminist in nature).

As soon as you discover an article or a book, ask yourself what type of text it represents. A Bleeker has a professional-scientific attitude; a Merlin Stone, as an aggressive feminist, does look for ‘positive’ (definite, scientifically -sure) data, but to put them as soon as possible in the service of “the liberation of women”! That includes her pointing! And perhaps somewhat hastily, some Modern phenomena in the Antique ‘hineindeutet’, as the Germans say, to sense where sense is, expected, does).

Do you now understand better why the previous text of this exposition spoke of the doctrine of interpretation? There is nothing more universally current than the phenomenon of ‘interpretation’. Not surprising that a thinker like Ch.S.S. Peirce “interpreted” man, essentially, as “interpretant(e)”!

As an aside, please provide your bibliography in your text, as this will already allow your reviewer/assessor to make an initial assessment.

2. There is, therefore, data. Now the requested.

Your prof might let you off the hook, might not. If he/she says to you: “Check whether we, as present-day people, with a Western European mentality, profoundly influenced by the Scepticism (doubt) of Enlightened Rationalism, still have serious reasons to take this seriously, then you are bound by a task formulated by your professor.

RH 57,

Does she/he merely say, “Do what thou wilt,--as long as thou dost give me a good treatise,” then thou art seemingly free, unbound, except for the bondage to thy given.

Conclusion: the so-called “radical freedom” of trading, advocated by e.g. the Anarchist-Romantics or similar, is a delusion. Either one trades, and then one is bound to data (the thematic, the profound), or one simply does not trade. An “unbound style” (that’s what it’s called) never fits into a final work.

Of course, in the second case, you stand for the self-seeking of the demanded. The question arises, immediately, “What is the universal idea of ‘the demanded’? I.e., what right may, must, one designate as the demanded,--in all possible cases?”

Two types of answers are possible to this.

1.-- The haphazard, “empirical” answer.

One can find something like this in all textbooks on dissertation. *M. Roustan, La dissertation littéraire*, Paris, s.d. (note: ‘s.d’ means, in Middle Ages Latin, ‘sine dato’ (without date of issue)), one of the rare works on discourse, which attaches a decisive importance to the task hermeneutics (p.c. 95/42), notes, on problem, i.e. this part of the task hermeneutics that deals with the question asked, that ‘discourse’ can include:

a. beat (give a report: in this case, thou doest, in a less cumbersome way, what a Bleeker does),

b. to explain (then you dwell both on the defeat (that is always the first thing) and on the necessary and sufficient conditions, which make it possible to understand the given; e.g., in our case: there must have been seers who ‘saw’ something like Mother Goddesses (in an occult or paranormal way), otherwise you understand nothing of the given),

c. defend or refute a statement (in this case: “Those who claim that the Mother Goddess cult, as it is still practiced by some Peruvian farmers, is based on nothing except illusion, misunderstand at least a part of the data” could be such a statement (defend or refute)).

2.-- The systematic response.

Only ontology (theory concerning all possible reality) can show us a way here.

RH 58.

Bibl. sample :

-- R. Barthes, *L'av. sémiolog.*, 141, says that Port-Royal (a group of thinkers in the XVIIth e.) in his *Theory of Commonplaces* (the so-called Topics,--about which further followed the trail of Joh. Clauberg (1622/1665; Cartesian, who introduced the term 'ontology');

-- further, that *le Père Bernard Lamy, Rhétorique* (1675 (see Barthes, o.c., 118)), among the platitudes, which occur virtually in every treatise, also provides ontological platitudes (such as, e.g., the systechy 'whole/part', the pair of opposites, the causes of purpose and work, etc. m.)

Well, if there are two conjoined commons, of an ontological nature, it is the couple "existence/ essence" (the actual existence of something, the beingness of something),-- a couple which, according to M. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, (Introduction to Metaphysics), Tübingen, 1953, 138, can already be found in Platon's texts ("estin" (that something is) and "ti estin" (what something is)).

This seems corpse-abstract, of course. But look: return we to our Mother Goddesses. If your prof leaves you free, then you can, at least, develop two points of view (for platitudes are fundamentally nothing but 'perspectives' (approaches) directed at your theme):

(i) thou wonderest whether mother goddesses actually exist e.g. (existence question) and

(ii) you ask the question what 'mother goddesses' could be (essence question). Imagine that you, after a great deal of research (investigative work), could answer these two questions in a responsible manner, do you still think that these two platitudes are pre-eminently so 'alien to life'? That there are other, more 'telling' points of view besides those very general ones, is obvious. But none of them are as fundamental as those two.

All other points of view on your theme and, therefore, all other questions depend on these two: what would you know to say that makes sense, when that which you are talking about is not even a factually existing thing and, moreover, has no way of being?

Giving an account, explaining or defending or refuting a thesis about e.g. Mother Goddesses ('something') is only possible, if they (that 'something') exist and possess an own being (= creature form) distinguishable from the rest of reality).

RH 59.

Actual existence as a 'lemma'.

Suppose: you have to investigate, because of your professor, "what about those famous Mother Goddesses that Merlin Stone, the feminist, talks about". What are you going to do when you can't determine, one way or another, whether such a thing really exists? Then there is one answer: apply the lemmatic-analytical method. How to proceed?

Well, you say, "Whether such a thing exists, I personally cannot determine. I have neither criterion nor means of testing.

1. But what is given is that there are people, even to this day, who believe in mother goddesses (a form of belief). What is given, however, is that every now and then someone shows up, claiming to 'see' them (a mantic testimony)."

2. If these two data, which are certain. (that must be evident from your question of existence and its answer), then I can introduce a lemma (the Platonic term): I pretend that it is already certain (given, known) that there is such a thing as mother goddesses; immediately I introduce, as a sign for it, the term 'mother goddess', which has been in use for centuries, -- but note: I myself do not claim (= thesis) that they are there; I assume that they may be there.

In other words, if I use the term "mother goddess" throughout, I am using it only in the lemmatic, hypothetical, sense!

Who thus speaks of such a 'rare', understand: 'non-Enlightened-rational theme, remains within the strictly scientific attitude and can, miraculously, come to an understanding, -- even with the most rabid Rationalist; Such speaking leads to real dialogue

Hold, therefore, not a plea (RH 54),--not a reverie either, but at most a 'theory' (RH 54) in truly Platonic-hypothetical spirit, for in your final work, when it goes against public opinion, in, our Enlightened Society on such subjects. Then you can honor the essence of 'discourse' that produces accountable texts.

Note.-- Aristotle, the great ontologist, distinguished

(i). apodictically certain propositions of

(ii)a. 'Dialectically' contestable scientific claims,

(ii)b. as well as of purely "rhetorical" propositions (RH 26) 28), in the stricter sense of "purely emotional and intended for the masses.

This triad can still be useful today.

RH 60,

VI. A.-- Discourse theory: existence/ essence.

So it is clear: the first, the middle and the last thing which you, in your thesis, must expose is the fact that something (your theme, your thesis) exists and its mode of being (essence form). We have just learned to recognize this,--what follows now will reinforce it.

Cultural Anthropology.

Bibl. sample :

-- P. Mercier, *Histoire de l' anthropologie*, Paris, 1971;

-- Sol Tax, ed., *Horizons of Anthropology*, Chicago, 1964 (about twenty specialists, each with an article);

-- Th.Rhys Williams, *Field Methods in the Study of Culture*, New York, 1967 (the research 'in the field', i.e. already living with the people being studied).

-- J.D. Jennings/ E.A. Hoebel, ed., *Readings in Anthropology*, New York, 1955-2 (anthology, in which Margaret Mead, *Anthropology and an Education for the Future* (o.c.,3/5), opens the series).

Note -- What is called "physical" (biological) anthropology (humanities), is concerned with the analysis of the biological body, insofar as it takes shape in time and space (across the globe), Cultural anthropology (often short for "anthropology") studies cultures in time and space, planetary, taking shape.

A Prof. Franz Boas (1858/1942), Columbia University, sends a student woman to Samoa, -- for a treatise.

-- S. Clapier Valladon, *Panorama du culturalisme*, Paris, 1976, teaches us that (ethnological) culturalism is one movement among many, having as its features:

a. the study of personality as the center of a culture (psychological aspect);

b. the analysis of the culture, in which the personality is situated, as a totality;

c. the emphasis on the multiplicity of cultures and the cultural relativism associated with it (no culture can claim to be the true one);

d. culturoptimism (cultures are improving; converting ethnological insights into educational ones);

e. 'Positivism' (the will to speak as much as possible of the bare facts and these meticulously detailed).

Ruth Benedict (1887/ 1948), Abram Kardiner (1891/...), Ralph Linton (1893/1953), Margaret Mead (1901/1978) are the pioneering figures.

Note -- Cultural determinism and heredity determinism.

The cultural determinist says: we are all "determined" (determined) by our culture.

The heredity or biological determinist says: we are all determined by our heredity factors.

RH 61.

Some say as a thesis: our personality is acquired, our behavior shaped by our civilization. The others say: our thesis is that our personality is innate (and influenced, among other things, by “natural selection”).

Among those others we note *Sir Francis Galton* (1822/ 1911; *Hereditary Genius* (1869); eugenicist), who introduced a distinction between biologically valuable and biologically inferior individuals.

Among the first, the cultural determinists, was Franz Boas, the Prof. M. Mead, highly revered by the student woman.

By now it will have become clear to you that both tendencies think ‘oppositio-neel’: they cling, one-sidedly, to one factor in such a way that the other factor, advocated by the opposite direction - equally defended oppositely - is either minimized or thought away.

It is clear, to the unprejudiced, that both heredity (‘res’) and culture, both, form our personality.-- Not to mention the individual soul, of course, because, within the same heredity and the same culture, individual differences are apparent.

Margaret Mead had as her father a professor of economics and as her mother a feminist sociologist. Her grandmother was a teacher, an adherent of the “New Education” (Maria Montessori; Friedrich Fröbel). She was, therefore, “raised free” and, throughout her life, felt “a period ahead” of the next generation.

When she is twenty-four years old, she is sent by Boas to the Samoa Islands to study adolescence. On 31.08.1925 she sets foot in Pago Pago, the capital of Samoa.

The origins of discourse.

Do we, for a moment, apply the genetic method (RH 17, 35, 36).

The stay lasted nine months,--largely on Manua, an east-situated island.

She took up residence with an American family, in an outbuilding that served as an outpatient clinic. After all, E.R. Holt, a pharmacist in the U.S. Navy was her host.

Upon her arrival, she did not know the native language: however, she learned the elements of it for nine weeks.

To supplement this, she stayed for ten days with a tribal chief in Vaitogi, whose daughter was - what is sometimes called - “a ceremonial virgin” (a type of hostess with a serving role).

RH 62.

The daughter in question knew a little English and was honored in her community. With her, M. Mead spent the nights under the same mosquito net.

At Holt's polyclinic, she met some sixty Samoan girls, with whom she had long conversations,--about the relationship "parents/children," "boys/girls," and about the parenting system.

The thesis to be tested was:

sexual maturation, with its puberty crisis, as known to the West, is not a biological necessity (if heredity, then puberty crisis), but a cultural phenom, subject to change (if culture, then puberty crisis), since culture is changeable and, with it, education,

Since 1900 (with his *The Mind of Primitive Man*) Fr. Boas had defended this thesis. He expected a verification from M. Mead.

The main features of the text of the treatise.

1. *The fact*

In her analysis of the transition from child to adolescent(s), Mead, on Samoa, found that there was no adolescent crisis (existence question negatively answered). Behold the fact.

2. *The statement.*

The factors at work behind this absence of Sturm-und-Drang-period, puberty, with us Westerners, normally peculiar, lay in the difference in upbringing,-- upbringing system which--in turn--had to be situated in the totality of Samoan culture (one recognizes the theses of culturalism). Especially concerning sexuality the Samoans differ from the Western 'culture pattern'.

Striking trait: No deep ties to just one personality.

Genuine and deep appreciation both for the parents and for the sexual partner(s) are, on Samoa, rare.

Consequence:

Free love" is generally accepted; it is "a light and pleasant dance". Non-free love (of which rape is the extreme degree) is as good as untraceable.-- Consequence: the girls spread her erotic favors over such a large number of boys that a deep commitment toward just one boy is rare. The emphasis is, after all, on virtuosity in erotic techniques.

Further characteristic:

attack drive ("aggression"), rivalry and performance drive are non-existent. "Samoa is a place where the stakes are never high. No one is under stress there to draw the best out of life". (*S. Clapier Valladon, Panorama, 185/191*).

RH 83.

a. *The coming of age in samoa*. New York. 1927.

Behold the famous title of her treatise. Followed by many works and articles during the eventful life of M. Mead. One of them is of interest : *Culture and Commitment (A study of the Generation Gap)*, New York, 1970, already translated into French the following year: *Le fossé des générations*),--with as subject the sometimes so painful “generation gap” (*S. Clapier, Panorama*, 158/165 (*L’ anthropologie comme science du futur*)), (Anthropology as a science of the future). In which one sees the broadening of the ethnological method towards our cultural crisis.-- One called M. Mead “the goddess of anthropology”.

Verification.

As the foregoing shows, this book came across as the thorough confirmation of Boas’s hypothesis.

Reception

The reception that the book was prepared to receive was aided by certain cultural tendencies in the West, particularly the USA.

1. Bertrand Russell (1872/1970), the emancipator, with a number of others, received it with enthusiasm. The relationship of the sexes, the role of marriage, the value judgment on marital infidelity, on “free love” -- the abolition of a number of “taboos” (ethical prohibitions) around sexuality,-- all this kept, in the twenties, a layer within the intelligentsia going. Didn’t one *Calverton* write a book, *The Bankruptcy of Marriage* (1928)?

2. We all know exoticism, the (naive) reverence felt for what is foreign (‘exotic’). *J.J. Rousseau* (1712/1778), with his cultural critique (‘*Back to Nature*’), and, even more so, *Bernardin de Saint-Pierre* (1737/1814), known for his *Paul et Virginie* (1787), were the spokespersons of a cultural trend that honors both exoticism and primitivism (the will to return to ‘the primitive’, the unaffectedly happy life).

Our Hippies, today, cultivate such values. Our travel agencies thoroughly exploit this.-- Samoa, described by Mr. Mead -- and then scientifically -- fitted into the frame of mind of a larger growing number of people in the West.

For these two reasons, Mead’s book received a special reception.

RH 64.

Another treatise.

Derek Freeman (1916/2001; New Zealand anthropologist) publishes *Margaret Mead and Samoa (The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth)*, 1983.

The subtitle betrays the thesis of it : construction and deconstruction of a “myth” (here for imaginary representation’). Freeman, for the New York Times, has clearly restated his thesis:

(1) M. Mead’s theses were accepted as valid by the established scientific intelligentsia (and disseminated in all textbooks and encyclopedias);

(2) These statements are false: the reality, on Samoa, is thoroughly different.

The method.

Freeman lived on Western Samoa, teaching.-- He learned the language of the natives thoroughly, exam included. He was “adopted” by a Samoan family and even participated in the sessions of a group of chiefs who exercise such powerful influence on the traditional part of the Samoans. -- Freeman is a supporter of an extremely detailed account of phenomena. His book is therefore strictly scientific.

Main content.

(1) *The facts (existence/ essence).*

a. The “free love” that Mead talks about is non-existent. For example, virginity is a high value in the native mentality.

b. Competition (including erotic competition) is as frequent as in the West. The urge to attack is very strong : murder is frequent; Samoa leads in the percentage of rapes.

(2) *Mead’s statement.*

The facts refute her explanation from the local upbringing, rooted in the total culture.-- Freeman has established (existence/ essence) that upbringing, notwithstanding American presence, is ancestral - authoritarian.

Which, according to him, produces psychological ills: neurosis (hysteria), suicide go hand in hand with it.

Refutation of an objection.

Freeman arrived fifteen years later: Samoan culture has, by now, changed. What he does not accept: Mead neglected, e.g., to consult thoroughly the police reports, in her time. These contradict her claims.

The explanation of Mead’s mistake.

(i) Her “free” upbringing, at home, which she went so big on, will certainly have played a part.

RH 65.

(2) but apart from these possible prejudices of upbringing, which can be suggestive (“There is something (RH 48) about educators”), there is an error of method at work, which even those who still defend *Mead’s Coming to Age* consider possible: ethnologists working in the field experience this more often. Mead tried to create dialogues which were, in fact, interviews in the service of a power idea (A. Fouillée): the indigenous girls gave answers which derive from “Archaic liveliness”. Primitives answer more often not to communicate objective truth, but to appeal to taste. They want to appear lively.

Conclusion: thus Mead fell into observational error.

The moral lesson

You who are preparing your thesis, are perhaps in an analogous case to Mead: not texts (articles, books) or at least not only texts make up your theme, but real life data. Be careful, therefore, not to fall into analogous errors.

a.-- Strictly distinguish between sentence conception and sentence foundation (RH 50) in your interpretations of the given.

b.-- Pay attention to the range of your proposition.

Mead pretends that all (or practically all) youth on Samoa, ‘live free’. What she has gleaned, from her research, may be partially true: at least one, some youths answer her definition (which, thereby, instead of becoming ‘wordy’ (nominal), becomes matter-of-fact (accurately reflecting the existence and essence of the observed)), but by no means all. Singular and private differ from universal or predominant.

c.-- Recall the epistemological wisdom of *K. Popper* (1902/1994 ;RH 08), e.g. in his *Logik der Forschung* (Research logic), (1934): verification, i.e. finding that the data correspond to the representations (interpretations), is sometimes an extremely difficult matter.

Popper says that theories (= propositions, interpretations) such as those of K. Marx, S. Freud, A. Adler, as well as astrology can go big on “verifications” and can explain all sorts of things, -- too much not to arouse suspicion. Such confirmations, in a broad sense, must be able to be tested, in a second degree, -- by asking the question, “Verification, yes, but what right in my interpretation is verified by the observed fact?” To make that determination can be very difficult. Remember that well!

RH 66.

VI. B. Treatise theory: task hermeneutics (thematics). (66/73)

We have, now, already a first view of what it is “the interpretation of the task” (hermeneutics of what we have to do first of all). Let us now put this into a fixed form.

a.-- The Antique mathematicians, as valorized above, left us with the dichotomy “given (known)/ sought (sought; unknown).” We have already been able to sense how fundamental this starting point is.

b.-- (i) *P. Brunel et al, Qu’ est-ce que la litt. comp.*,115/134, has as its twin title: “*thématique et thématologie*”.

‘Thematic’ is the treatment of the theme, as we do it here.-- ‘Thematology’ differs slightly from that: take, e.g., *P. Brunel, dir., Dictionnaire des mythes littéraires*, Ed. du Rocher, 1988, is an encyclopedic work on a number of recurrent themes in belletrty.

For example, M.-J. Bénéjam-Bontemps, o.c.,1188/1207, talks about Satan in literature, under the title: “*Satan, héros romantique*”. Brunel calls these themata ‘motifs’ i.e. things, data, that resonate in a text’. Whether one speaks of themes or ‘motifs’, the important thing is that these are what one is talking about.

b.-- (ii) *P.R. Bize/ P. Gaguelin/R. Carpentier, Le penser efficace*, (Thinking effective), I (*Le fonctionnement mental*) in which a chapter on “*les étapes préparatoires de la problémation*” (the preparatory stages of problemation),-- II (*la problémation*), Paris, 1982.

Thus we have, in reframed (updated) form, the Antique dichotomy ‘given (theme)/ requested (problem): together they make up the task.

As already mentioned (RH 57), *M. Roustan, La dissertation*, 5/42, talks about the problem, i.e. the questions that arise, when one makes a treatise” i.e. when one is presented with a theme.

The problem position (demand position). (66/67)

Some treatises have the main purpose of making up the “status quaestionis” (in French: l’ état de la question). Your supervisor/ promotrix may also ask you something like this.

Appl. mod.-- *J. Kellerhals, dir., Figures de l’ équité (La construction des normes de justice dans les groupes)*, (Figures de l’équité (La construction des normes de justice dans les groupes),), Paris, 1988.

The question was: when one distributes the wealth of a group in a just manner (= ‘équité’) white (distributive or distributive justice), according to what guidelines (‘normes’) does one proceed?

RH 67.

Behold the question (problem) of the book. The work sees four answers to that question.

a.1. The economic presupposes that the numerically calculable interests of individuals and groups are behind the prevailing norms or rules of distribution.

a.2. Relativism postulates that, when comparing different norm systems, the singular - concrete situations, which govern the prevailing norms in distribution, are all too different (the distribution rules are “relative” or “relative” depending on very different situations).

a.3. Functionalism holds that, in inventing rules of distribution, one must start from their “functions” (that to which they serve).

b. Kellerhals, professor at the University of Geneva, advocates interactionism: the factors that are important when distributing wealth must be seen as “interacting”, i.e. as a single system in which no single factor may be privileged or eliminated. The factors involved are numerous: status (gender, race), social status (poor, rich), feeling (disdain, respect), nature of the goods (money, services, protection), distribution methods (democratic deliberation, recourse to outsiders, authority), objectives (each to his own (= harmony), competitiveness of the group), type of group (family, professional group), privileges (promote talent, reward effort), etc.

Ch. Widmer, Ethique (Justice pour un, justice pour tous), (Ethics (Justice for one, justice for all)), in: Journal de Genève (28.01.1989) typifies the problematic nature of Kellerhals’ work: “In fact, the book leads us nowhere: it pays attention to all shades of reality before anything else.”

In other words: three theories are refuted as insufficient; one is advocated - extremely hesitantly - as perhaps offering a solution to the question.

The book sticks to an issue, but is at the same time a problem stand : one knows where one stands with it.

The theme. (67/73)

Let us now return in more detail to the themes. These, after all, dominate the question.

O. Willmann, Abriss, 10, gives us the Scholastic (800/1450) insight on the subject. The Middle Ages distinguished two main types:

(1) “quaestio simplex de uno vocabulo” (= single question concerning just one term);

(2) “quaestio con iuncta de propositiva aliqua” (= multiple questioning concerning one or another statement).

RH 68.

It goes without saying that this distinction remains extremely valid to this day. What we are, now, briefly, going to demonstrate.

Underlying this is the distinction between what current model theorists call “original” and “model (of the original). In the task, the given is the original, of course. That given may, just as naturally, include a question that your prof imposes on you. But then there is already a question about something (the original) and the question is the question about a model of it.

Original’ is the information about which information is requested. ‘Model’ is the information, with which one explains the original, makes it understand(er).

A. Antepredicative themata. (66/70)

‘Antepredicative’ we call a statement in which there is no statement (with predicate on the subject).

A.1. One-terminal tasks.

Example : “Labor;” “The Proverb. We already saw (RH 57: “Do what you want”), such tasks present you with the problem : “How to start?”. The answer is: look at the task from commonplaces (information: report,-- statement, defend or refute opinion (RH 57: haphazard, empirical problematics) or formal (systematic: among which - essence/existence are the fundamental ones, as shown above). ‘Commonplaces’ are, after all, points of view, which are universal (‘common to all subjects’)

A.2. Polynomial tasks.

Examples: “Labor and leisure”, “Labor, leisure and play” (pay attention to the linking word “and”); “Proverbs as folk wisdom”, “Labor as therapy (labor therapy)” (note the bind word ‘as’, i.e., ‘under point of view of’).

“Either labor or play”, “Either learn or fail” (note the dilemmatic (or at least disjunctive) articulation by the tie-word ‘either ... or ‘.

“Above all, no Communism.” “No educational reform” (note counting word ‘none’, which expresses negation, elimination).

These word themes betray, except ‘if’ the connectives (connect of logistics (mathematical logic).-- Clearly, the original or originals in those themes are already accompanied by a model.

RH 69.

Thus, e.g., “Labor and Leisure” does not mean first a treatise on “labor” and then one on “leisure,” but a treatise on the relations between the two themata. “Labor as therapy” requires a treatise,--not on all possible points of view about ‘labor’, but on precisely one point of view.

“Either(do) learn or(do) fail” is not talking about each of the two data in succession, but about the choice, which is to be made.

“Especially not communism” betrays - actually - two platitudes:

- a. ‘none’, which expresses refusal (for any reason),
- b. ‘especially’, which even then, in refusal, includes a precedence.

One appl. mod.

Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres (La réflexion Française sur la diversité humaine), (Us and the others (French reflection on human diversity), Paris, 1989, is a work - written by a Bulgarian living in France since 1963 - on the relation between us, with our mentality, and the ‘others’; -- here not in the general sense of ‘the others’, but in the private sense of “the others, insofar as they are different (in terms of mentality)”. The question is, “Are we, with our mentality, capable of including (integrating) the others as different into our community?”

One sees it: a title must be meditated upon slowly and well. How? By checking its ambiguity (RH 50): for example, one asks the question : “If someone else were to read this title, what could he / she see in it?”.

The range.

Bibl. st.: *G. Booij et al, Lexicon of linguistics Utr./ Antw., 1980-2, 38 (Reach).*

A concept (and themata are concepts) has a content and a scope or range.

Appl. mod.

Imagine that, as part of an educational inquiry, your prof suggests that you take as the title of your treatise, “So the father, so the son” (compare with: “The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”). The whole question - similar to (RH 65) Mead’s research - is not whether that phrase is true, but whether it is always (universally) true. There is, e.g., a counter model: the French proverb says, “A père avare fils prodigue” (The father’s stinginess provokes the son’s wastefulness). Here one proverb improves upon the other, since both are merely selling divisibles.

One also expresses this in quantors (the logical square, as the Scholasticians said): all/some yes/some no, none.

RH 70.

It may come as a surprise that here, in the discussion of antepredicative themes, we quote a predicative model: “As the father (is), so (is) the son: but look a sentence can also be pronounced antepredicatively: “The influence of the father’s behavior on that of the son; in so far as that influence founds the equal behavior”. One ‘term’ (= word formulation of a concept (which here is a very compound concept)) may express itself in more than one word.

Well, what is the “scope” of a concept (i.e., the things that concept “strikes”), here is the “scope” of the maxim in question.

Applied: for some relationships ‘father/son’, the son adopts the behavioral type of the father. Understood, within the logical or aggregate-loop square: for some other relationships, the statement does not apply.

As an aside; the names of the quant(ifica)tors are: universal quantifier (all), private quantifier (some), existential (= singular) quantifier (just one).

Tropological lecture.

The tropes include, among others, the synecdoche. Here, in the proverb, a synecdoche can be read: one says ‘father’ resp. ‘son’, but one means ‘parent’ resp. ‘child’. - When thou, therefore, getst a title for discourse, pay attention to the style, i.e. the design (RH 12: stylized wording), The tropes are one type of stylization of what is said.

The reflexive, (looping) ‘if’:

Supposedly: your prof gives you as a theme: “The labor as labor” (= “The labor as such” = “The labor as such”). What will ye do?

First understand the expression, interpret it! The looping ‘if’ means existence/ essence of something, to the exclusion of the rest. In that type of ‘if’ sticks, after all, a dichotomy (complementation):

(i) on the one hand, all that is work: the fact, the mode of being (‘form’ or ‘essence’), by which something, which exists, differs from the rest;

(ii) the rest of reality. Of course, in such a discourse one will bring up ‘the rest’,-- for comparison, --to illuminate that by which something is distinguishable from the rest of reality, in an indirect way. But, in itself, the discourse consists only in talking about ‘labor-and-nothing else.’

RH 71.

B. Predicative topics. (71/73)

Here the structure of the judgment (proposition, statement) comes into play.-- From the subject (of the sentence), as the original, the predicate, as the model, is said.

B.1.-- One-sentence statements.

“Labor nobles”. Here the treatise focuses on the fact that the manner in which (exist./ess.) labor nobles. Or, what we already met: “Labor as a source of nobility” or “Labor, insofar as it nobles”. Precisely one point of view is requested for discourse.

B.2. -- Multisentence statements

From *Nerine E. Gun, Eva Braun (mistress and wife of Adolf Hitler)*, Rotterdam, s.d. (Eng. orig., New York, 1968), we quote the motto.

A ‘motto’ - it can also be useful for discourse - is a sentence, a maxim, placed somewhere at the beginning of an exposition to indicate, in short, the intention, say: the thesis, of it.

Here: if Hitler ever had an Eva Braun as mistress (and, at the last, as wife), this is only the illustration of the motto,-which we now leave to follow.

(1) Friedrich Nietzsche: “Ein Held must frei sein”.

(2) Adolf Hitler: “Das ist das schlimmste an der Ehe, sie schafft Rechtsansprüche! Da ist es schon viel richtiger eine Geliebte zu haben. Die Last fällt weg und alles bleibt ein Geschenk.-- Das gilt, natürlich, nur für hervorragende Männer”. (That is the worst thing about marriage, it creates legal rights! It is much more right to have a mistress. The burden is removed and everything remains a gift. This applies, of course, only to outstanding men),

How wilt thou begin such a theme? There are, of course, many sequences, but they will boil down to the following.

(A) Striking is a limitation. Nietzsche’s statement can be rewritten into logical language as follows: “If a hero, then (as a duty) (of marriage) be free.”

This is the aristocratic heroism (hero worship or Uebermenschen worship) of Nietzsche.

Hitler’s statement rewritten in logical language: “If above the rest excellent (‘hervorragend’), then (much more appropriate (‘richtiger’) a mistress (‘Geliebte’) (have, instead of a wife).” One knows that, like Nietzsche, whom they read busily, the Nazis practiced hero worship (which today’s Neo-Nazis still do).

By clearly formulating this strong analogy, the world and life background (logically: the premise), which governs the rejection of marriage, comes to the fore.

RH 72.

(B) The great difference between the two citations is that Hitler's also indicates the reason: a "relationship," which takes the form of marriage, is saddled with "Rechtsansprüche" (legal claims); in a "free" relationship, "that Burden" falls away.-- In your treatise, you can, indeed, you must take that justification at face value, of course.

(C) A third approach is the comparative method.

Put the above statements alongside what *Calverton, The Bankruptcy of Marriage*, says on the subject (RH 63),--next to Margaret Mead's 'free love'. Nazi or non-Nazi, a number of emancipated people (some out of heroism, others out of 'liberationism') advocate either a restriction of marriage (the Nazis rather restricted free love to 'Hervorragenden') or a 'unscrewing of it' (Mead, Russel). From different presuppositions they arrive at partially equal conclusions.

A tome.

The Sumerians were a people who settled in Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq-Iran) between -4,000 and -3,000. We have two proverbs, dating from +/- -2,000.

(i) "For the sake of pleasure marry; after deep thought divorce". (Which brings to mind Freud's pairing 'pleasure principle / reality principle').

(ii) "Thou mayest have a master. Thou mayest even have a king. But the man thou must truly fear is the tax collector" (More than one contemporary would very surely agree).

Note -- The 'gnomè', sententia, statement (aphorism) - RH 29 - is a statement, like e.g. the two Sumerian ones above: it contains a wisdom of life and, as far as intended, it is an observation (formulating the existence of a phenomenon). It can be interpreted as an advice, but in essence it is not. Cfr. *R. Barthes, L'av. sém.*, 132.

Discourse on a poem.

Note: it is always difficult to translate a poem, especially when, as here, it is written in a dialectic and outdated Dutch. What would you do with e.g. the following poem by G. Gezelle (1830/1899)? A poem can be denoted as a multi-sentence statement.

"O schone roos -- die, buiten alle grenzen van lieflijkheid en toverlonken, lacht.-- Toch zijt gij broos -- en zult, welhaast, verslengen.-- Kom, sta en blijf mij in 't gedacht. zult gij, vrij -- van duur en onbedorven,-- herspiegeld in 't geheugen, mij, voortaan,-- verheugen,-- zij uw stam, alreeds, gestorven en speel' de wind, verwentlend, in uw blâan".

Translated: "O fair rose -- which, beyond all bounds of loveliness and magic, laughs.-- Yet thou art frail -- and wilt, soon, consume.-- Come, stand and abide me in thought. wilt thou, free -- from duration and unspoiled,-- reflected in memory, rejoice, henceforth,-- be thy stem, already, died and play' the wind, spoiling, in thy leaves." (April 1878 (?)).

RH 73.

(A) The first thing one can do is to try to grasp the main impression: what do you think when it is proposed to speak here of 'reverie'? Musing', in our language, means **a.** pondering, thinking, **b.** rather quietly and, perhaps, somewhat vaguely, **c.** in a more or less melancholy mood of the mind, **d.** a state in which one is absorbed. The treatise as 'reverie' (RH 54) is a variant of this, in which the thoughtful act of trading prevails. - Gezelle stands for a rose, as the breakthrough of all that is beautiful ("... beyond all limits of loveliness and magic springs"),--with the impression of eternity that emanates from it. 'Yet' note : present in the text -- that beauty, is eroded from within in a process of nature. From there the melancholy that overtakes him, and makes him muse.

(B) The second is e.g. the structure. Here she is clear. -

(i) **a** "O fair rose ... smiles". The splendor of the rose --

(i) **b** "yet art thou brittle ... consume" The decay of the rose.

This harmony of opposites beauty/brittleness -- makes up the antithesis.-- This opposition returns in a modified form in the second section.

(ii) **a** "Come, stand and abide ... rejoice"

(ii) **b** "Be thy voice already ... leaves".

Gezelle was, fundamentally, Platonic in the Christianized sense: the eternal, the immortal, the enduring was central. But the aspect of temporality, mortality, impermanence was, him, equally unmistakable. The human spirit (noölogy), however, transcends, to some extent, the harmony of opposites in all natural processes. That spirit has a memory: "Come, stand and remain in my thoughts. There you will be, free from duration and unspoiled....".

In other words: let the process of nature cause the rose to perish; in my memory, the beautiful rose remains, re-mirrored.

(C) Those who know Gezelle a little know that, in many other poems, an analogous main impression and structure can be found. Which thou, in thy discourse, couldst elaborate.

Decision

Chales Baudelaire (1821/1867), the pioneer of "Modern Poetry," once said that even aesthetic things, such as lyrical poetry, are amenable to rational analysis. This great poet believed that we should not fall into absolute 'irrationalism' in interpreting beauty and art.

RH 74.

VI.C.-- *Treatise theory : the topics (platitudes).*

As *R. Barthes, L'av. sém.*, 125/148 (*l' invention*) says, - classically speaking - topicality (the doctrine concerning platitudes) is part of heuristic rhetoric (RH 12).

How to 'find' thoughts, yes, how to order them? According to the perspective of 'common-places: basic insights, which apply to every subject. The term 'topos', locus, literally means 'place' (where one finds thoughts).

Note.-- The linguistic usage which no longer knows its very useful value, uses the term "commonplace" only in the pejorative sense : a saying, which appears "worn out". But we also use the term in the meliorative sense.

1. This one was already, thoroughly, brought up -- RH 58 (Port-Royal, Lamy),-- where it became apparent that 'existence / essence' are the two great 'topoi', loci, places, where inspiration for text formation can be found.

2. RH 60/65 (Mead/ Freeman) taught us that anyone who does not first look at what is given, the facts, in order to draw conclusions, will have failed. Had Mead - thanks to strict observation (for the actual existence and the own being of something can only be grasped by accurate observation) - first examined the existence/ essence (the two always go together), her treatise would have taken root in reality.

Which Barthes also admits in his way, o.c., 142 (the modalities: possible/ factual/ impossible etc.), 144s. (the question "An sit?" (Does it exist? Are there facts?), eventual: "An fecerit?" (Did he/she/it, do it or not? What are the facts?), -- 142 (the question, "Quid sit?" (What is it? The essence or mode of being),-- eventual: "Quale sit?" (Of what capacity is it?)).

Of course, there are also non-universal "places," which then become private "common-places. Cfr Barthes, o.c., 143.

These are peculiar not to all, but to some themata. Thus, in a theological work, one will "find" arguments on some "places" (topoi, loci) of the Holy Scriptures (very great authority), the Church Fathers (already less authority), the theologians (even less authority), which are then theological platitudes.

Can you imagine a psychoanalyst who does not know the Oedipus complex as a depth psychological platitude? Every profession, every subject raises its platitudes to find thoughts on them.

RH 75.

Epistemological (logical) and axiological truisms.

When you, first, consider whether something exists (given) and what it is (given), the space opens up for the question, “What value does it have?” This question is the main question, axiologically (value doctrine) speaking.

A value judgment -- now conveniently called an ‘evaluation’ -- is a normal end part of any complete treatise.-- We saw, RH 64, already a professional-scientific value judgment: Freeman calls M. Mead’s statements ‘false’ (“The reality on Samoa is thoroughly different”). ‘Objective truth’ regarding statements is, subject science the ‘value’ (truth value) par excellence.

When we reject the Neo-Nazi theses - e.g. the fellow man because he/she is different (RH 69) in terms of race (‘racism’), hate, yes, eliminate or exterminate, then we are making an ethical (moral, moral) value judgment, based on a very high value, namely the fellow man as fellow man, belonging to one and the same humanity, in spite of all differences (= forms of ‘otherness’).

Truth-value, compassion-value, are values and, as such, common-place, where one “finds” axiological arguments (heuristic value).

A list of traditional platitudes. (

(A) A. Langlois, *Le style (La chose et la manière.-- Du xviiie au xxe siècle)*, (The style (The thing and the way -- From the 17th to the 20th century),), Bruxelles, 1925, 57, gives us such a list.

“The Antiques attached great importance to this heuristic part. (...). (They had at their disposal a whole arsenal”

1. The definition and enumeration (classification),--
2. The similarity and difference (contradiction),--
3. The circumstances, including the pairing “omen” (cause)/ sequel (effect), -- behold the most striking platitudes, with which one can find thoughts to develop a text around a theme.

(B). S.P.B. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, Belmont, Calif., 1966, discusses it at length. He distinguishes what follows.

1. ‘Fact Statements’ (protocol statements, findings of fact),-- ‘Example Statements’ (exemplifications, example statements, -- i.e., findings of singular instances of a general concept).

2.a. ‘What Topics’ (what questions) and ‘Definition Statements’ (definitions),-- ‘How Topics’ (how questions).

2.b. ‘Comparison Topics’ (comparison question),-- ‘Contrast Topics’ (oppositional question: what is the opposite of?;-- one type of comparison);-- ‘Compare and Contrast Topics’ (similarity-and-contrast question at the same time). --

RH 76.

One sees that Moss confuses 'compare' with 'equate', whereas we define 'compare' as "to put side by side, in order to see both resemblance and difference"). Note how comparison, in the broad sense, is merely a précising of the 'essence' (way of being), which is thereby more sharply delineated.

3. Among the circumstances, Moss highlights only one, namely, "Why Topics" (the question of the why/why,-- the explanation).

Conclusion:

Moss does nothing but actualize, reestablish, the time-honored commonplaces that Langlois named. In both enumerations (= typology, classification) three main commonplaces are at work:

- a. existence (which Langlois does not mention) - fact, exemplification -;
- b. essence - definition, classification (enumeration, typology), - what, how? -- These specified by similarity and difference (comparison) -;
- c. circumstances (especially 'omen/ sequel',--why/ why). One thinks of a 'circumstantial description' a 'circumstantial narrative', a 'circumstantial report' (RH 31); which are called 'comprehensive' only because, besides essence/existence, they include the circumstances, the whole situation.

That by which, that why something is, is only one circumstance. That the platitude of circumstances is still current is shown in *McLaughlin, Robert, What, Where? When? Why? (Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation)*, Dordrecht, 1982. The title of this Australasian treatise speaks volumes.

What, of course, is easily forgotten is value (the axiological truism par excellence). Once that 1/ actual existence, 2/ being and 3/ circumstances are known, then one can make a responsible value judgment,

Antique models.

How, now, can one forge a treatise out of these platitudes? Antiquity has left us models,

The "chreia" (chrie).

J.Fr. Marmontel (1723/1799), *Eléments de littérature* (1787), says that chreia is the interpretation ("definition" he also says) of either a statement or a curious fact.

Bibl. sample:

- *H.I. Marrou, Hist.d.l' éducat*, 241;
- *O, Peccieur, Man, prat.*,12;
- *O. Willmann, Abriss*, 9;
- *R. Barthes, L'av. sémi.*,138.

In Antique secondary education, the text size was "a small page."

RH 77,

The structure.

It is eightfold: eight paragraphs (= sections of text), called ‘cephalaia’, capita, are as many platitudes. It shows the ambiguity (RH 50; 69) of the theme.

Imagine that you are working with it. How wilt thou do so?

A.1. Given: “Isokrates of Athens (RH 25) once said : “The roots of education appear bitter, but their fruits have a pleasant taste”.

A.2. Requested: text formation according to the eightfold chreia. - until there the task.

B. Elaboration.

B.I. Characterization of Isokrates.

One begins by characterizing the personality, in whose name either fact or saying stands, i.e., its actual existence and its definition, rather briefly, to be discussed. Thou canst find in an encyclopedia such a thing.

Note.-- In antiquity this was often an ‘enkomion’, (a eulogy; RH 29), in which greatness of the figure is hinted at. Here : of the great rhetor.

B. II. The saying (happening the fact).

All the following paragraphs deal with this aspect.

a. Paraphrasis’, in three lines, of Isokrates’ aphorism (*note*: short statement, without its context). Thou formulates in other terms, a model, what Isokrates said (the original).

Note: tropologically, there is a metaphor at work here (RH 70). Nurture is compared to a plant, whose roots give off bitter taste, but whose fruits taste sweet: the substructure of nurture is unpleasant; the superstructure is not.

b. The argument (argumentation).

b.1. ‘Kataskeuè’, justification.

Here one seeks verification of the paraphrase, which contains the proposition.

b.2. ‘Anaskeuè, refutation.-- Here the opposite model (counter-model is subjected to falsification, refutation. The opinion, which Isokrates’ thesis contradicts, is undone by arguments.

Note - The chreia takes into account, systematically, dissenters,-- situates itself in a pluralistic climate of thought.

c The further argument.

c.1. ‘*Sunkrasis*’, comparison.-- Here one compares Isokrates’ assertion with analogous propositions.

c.2. ‘*Anecdote*’, illustrative exemplification.

RH 78.

Here one mentions a fact, which is an application (and, immediately, proof) of the statement or proposition. E.g. Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322), the great orator, suffered from a weak voice (which, in a culture without microphones, is a disaster) and was not very dramatically (RH 13: elocution) gifted. Carried by a power idea - to become a great orator - he nevertheless learned to speak, with pebbles in his mouth and, on the shore, against the roaring sea. He became the most famous orator of the Greeks. analogy: bitter roots/ Demosthenes' practice pleasant fruits/ famous eloquence.

c.3. Authority argument (testimony).

In late antiquity, "the ancients," such as Homer and Hesiod of Askra (between -800 and -600), for example, were considered spokesmen for high truths.-- We can, of course, actualize this.

Conclusion. We have seen a number of already known truisms at work, but discovered new ones, too. Perhaps this outline, in your final work, will come in wonderfully handy,--if only for verification.

The chreia of afthonios of antiocheia (+270/...).

This Deuterosophisid rhetor (RH 28) taught as follows.

A. Introduction.-- praise the saying/fact.

B. Middle.

a. Paraphrase (description, rewrite) it.

b.1. Explanation,-- 'cause' ('a causa'), -- which amounts to verification.

b.2. Opposite ('a contrario'),-- the counter model, which is subject to falsification.

c.1. Comparison ('a simili'), i.e. to set apart an analogous case.

c.2. Example ('ab exemplo'), i.e. a fact that confirms the proposition / fact.

c.3. Authority argument, testimony ('a testimonio').

C. Slot.-- "A brevi epilogo" (a short conclusion). Thus e.g. "Behold the solid thesis of Isokrates on education. - One sees that Afthonios' model is only a variant of the previous one. Which indicates flexibility in ancient rhetoric : the platitudes were not so immutable.

A mnemonic formulation.

A. Introduction.-- Quis? Who (spoke or acted so?).

B. Middle. - **a.** Quid? What? (paraphrase). **b.1.** Cur? By virtue of what (why? why?) (verification). **b.2.** Contra, counter model (falsification)). **c.1.** Simile, analogous case (similarity). **c.2.** Paradigmata, examples. **c.3.** Testes, witnesses (arguments of authority), both 'scripta' (sayings) and 'facta' (facts).

C. Lock.-- Exhortation for instance.

RH 79.

Applicative models of commons.

Although the notions of “definition” (in the sense of definition of beings) and “enumeration” (= classification, typology) must be known from logic, we still give a few quick examples.

A -- Creature definition.

a. To ‘define’ (determine) something can, first of all, mean to pronounce on something (e.g., in the proposition(s)). Think of the judges who, at the end of a trial, pass judgment: they ‘define’, in terms of law and jurisprudence, what someone has done or done wrong. Such a ‘definition’ is both a (legal) definition of beings and a (legal) value judgment.

b. Here, however, we are talking about ‘defining’ in the logical sense: delineating something from the rest of ‘being’ (= reality), delineating it as distinguishable (‘discriminable’) against the background of the rest of the universe.-

Appl. mod.

The Paleopythagoreans were, apparently of the first, in Antique Hellas, to draw up definitions. Thus the famous Archytas of Tares (= Lat.: Archytas of Tarentum) (-445/-395): “Wind stillness is **(i) the** air mass **(ii)** at rest”. “Silent sea is **(i) the** wave motion **(ii)** that came to a standstill”.

But it is Socrates of Athens (-427/-347), who introduced the ‘horismos’, (literally: demarcation), definition, (being) determination, very consciously and with strict logical commitment, into philosophizing.

A current example:

“Labor is **(i)** effort, **(ii)** insofar as it creates economic value”. This definition is not general : it means, willy-nilly, economic labor. Someone who wants to create non-economic value and makes an effort to do so, is also working, but not necessarily economically. Think of the mental labor, which a lyrical poet performs without economic intentions. We underline “will. Why? Those who make efforts without the will to create value are not ‘working’. Think of a young man who dances all evening long : he sweats from it, but does not want to create value; he amuses himself (unless one considers mere relaxation, if consciously willed, as one type of ‘work’ (in the very broad sense, then)).

Conclusion: drafting creature definitions is a very difficult business. Thou, studentess/ student, understands, now, why the Antiques asked only a ‘paraphrase’, not a formal definition from the students.

RH 80.

That defining the essence (and always the existence) is a serious matter is shown e.g. by R. Kühnl, *Faschismus (Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung)*, (Fascism (Attempt to define the term)), in: *Blätter für Deutsche und internationale Politik* xiii (1968); this essay is, in a sense, nothing but one sustained attempt to define--what "Fascism" is! This,--according to the statement:

a. given: Fascism (as name and reality);

b. requested: a definition as precise as possible. Which requires quite a bit of research.

B.-- enumeration (= classification, typology).

Platon of Athens (-427/-347) continues as the first who, formally, introduced the division. 'Diairesis', divisio, division,-- namely, of a universal collection into its private collections (= subsets).

Appl. mod.

We were talking, just now, about labor.-- Think of manual labor and mental labor, as two types,-- think of light and heavy labor, as two other types. The classification is a kind of enumeration, viz. of the types.

1. Since Aristotle of Stageira (the Stagirite; -384/-322) especially one divides a definition into two aspects: the genus (= universal set and the specific (= specific) difference. The latter is the basis of types. Or 'subsets', in the language of set theory. Take: labor and its lightness give 'light labor'.

2. Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 612, emphasizes the main requirement. The analogy understood as resemblance (= gender) and difference (= specific or typological difference), is the basis of classification. The main point is and remains that the difference is irreducible. So that the types of 'labor' e.g. cannot be reduced one to the other. Thus light and heavy labor are so distinct - except in borderline cases (think of the differential that tries to classify the light differences) - that they truly represent kinds (types) of labor.

Conclusion: it is the borderline cases, which can make defining types so difficult. Pay attention to this in your final work.

Note -- We treat "enumeration" and "classification" under the same heading. Why? Because enumeration is always summative. Meaning: it assumes a totality (universal collection, overall system).

RH 81.

Appl. mod.

The *revue Autrement*, for example, has, recently, had as its title “A quoi pensent les philosophes?”

In other words, the present philosophical tasks.-- Some thirty contributions attempt to present the main points of the contemporary themes and problems.-- We can, in summary, “list” them, -- without claiming completeness (which, as a classification, is a defect).

(i) *First theme:* the modern (la modernité). Philosophers of art, J. Derrida (1930/...; Postheideggerian), J. Habermas (1929/...; Frankfurter Schule, second generation) define “the Modern” as the break with, the crisis of “the (Western) tradition.

(ii) *Second theme:* ethics (moral philosophy). Our society struggles with pressing questions of conscience (think of biological manipulations, of chemical weapons). Some thinkers put values first, in whose name they seek to shape our conscience.

(iii) *Third theme:* the fundamentals of the professional sciences.

Sciences - logical-mathematical, natural and human sciences - put forward principles, the foundations; which actually make up philosophical points. A number of thinkers contribute in this sense.

(iv) *Fourth theme:* Law. Our society - think of the “rights” of immigrants - struggles with right and wrong. Some thinkers make this a main issue.

Conclusion: **a.** these are only main points; **b.** our list (enumeration, typology, classification) is certainly incomplete - a flaw, purely logically speaking. But even a deficient classification is valuable.

Appl. mod.

S. Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, (The discomfort in culture), Wien, 1929, lists. In connection with his concept of ‘Lustprinzip’ (RH 72), principle of lust, he divides both the causes and the forms (= types) of suffering, infringement of the principle of lust, as follows.-- “Suffering threatens us from three sides,

a. in our own bodies which, doomed to decay and disintegration, do not come ready without the alarm signals that are the pain and fear;

b. because of the outside world, which has invincible powers to throw itself at us and destroy us;

c. the third threat, finally, arises from our relations with other human beings”. -- Although very incomplete, this enumeration is and remains suggestive and thought-provoking.

RH 82.

VI.D. V trading theory: logic and method theory. (82/91).

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 125s., says that the goal of the rhetorical act is

- (i) persuade, i.e., to make a reasoning valid and
- (ii) stirring, i.e., introducing a value judgment.

In this twofold form, a message ('message', information) emanates from the writer/writer or speaker/speaker, respectively,--to be received by the recipient(s).

Let us dwell, briefly, on the first aspect. It is, admittedly, a logical and methodological aspect. But to emphasize some very important points seems to us absolutely necessary if we want to outline a somewhat complete theory of discourse.

We start from the main point.

Isokrates of Athens (RH 25.77) gave, as a means of interpretation and understanding, two uses of language:

- (i) "speak in such a way as to provide the (logically rigorous) evidence" or
- (ii) failing that, "speak in such a way as to make one's thesis credible."

Conclusion.

(a) Whoever, therefore, limits 'rhetoric' to the second type (as e.g. an Aristotle does), i.e. with "all kinds of 'persuasive means'" "trying to "make a view true", mutilates the meliorative concept of 'rhetoric', as Isokrates just described it.

(b) More to the point, what orator/reasoner - writer/writer - whether in a theoretical exposition or in a spirited 'reverie' or in a vehement or not (RH 54: three types of discourse), will neglect strict logical and method-conscious proof? No one.

'Pisteis', probationes, proofs. ((82/83)

R. Barthes, o.c., 126/136, briefly sets forth the traditional theory of (rhetorical) proofs.

He rightly distinguishes - with the Ancient Greek rhetoricians - between 'pisteis a.technoi', object-based proof, and 'pisteis en.technoi', subject-based proof.

(i) When countless people today, before human rights commissions, insist on repeating that they have been tortured, either by the (state) police or by (private, semi-public) agencies, then the facts (through the testimony) speak for themselves, 'a.technos', without the speaker/speaker or writer/writer weaving any 'reasoning' around them.

(ii) On subject-based reasoning, the ancient rhetors distinguished between three types of facts.

RH 83.

a. *The 'tekmèrion', the sure sign,*

so e.g. when a girl falls pregnant, then this is the sure sign that she was conceived (how,-- that is something else; was she raped? Did she seek it?). The reasoning is “if pregnant, then fertilized” (deductive). What is sensible to, in principle, everyone (universally verifiable), is ‘tekmèrion’, certain indication. Such a thing approaches apodictic reasoning (RH 59), according to Aristotle peculiar to ‘rock-hard science’ (today : ‘hard science’).

b. *the probable*

When, among all peoples, traditions say that one should “honor one’s parents and superiors,” it seems likely that this is based on firm assumptions. The reasoning is: “if such a universal-planetary opinion, then in all likelihood justifiable”.

If the ‘tekmèrion’, the certain indication, was almost object-bound (‘a.technos’), the probable, ‘eikos’, needs reasoning,-- certainly in a number of situations (circumstances, RH 76). Consider, e.g., the situation created by the generation gap (RH 63) : for a number of young people this planetary determinate -- honorary father and mother, as well as authority figures / authority bearers -- is no longer ‘evident’ (in Antique language ‘eikos’, obvious, ‘probable’).

c. *The 'semèion', indicium, the mere designation.*

Imagine - in U. Eco’s novel, *The Name of the Rose*, Amsterdam,1985, 35 - that someone is “reading” “tracks in the snow” (to use the language of the semioticians. A trace - footprints, - blood trails, of which the novel overflows, so as to depict “a great and heavenly carnage” (o.c., 53) - may be a mere indication, insofar as it is vague, ambiguous enough cfr. RH 50.89.

This is where subject-based reasoning must strongly intervene. The less verifiable and the more ambiguous, the more reasoning is needed. And ‘rhetoric’ - in the narrow Aristotelian sense - plays a role.

Conclusion.

Dear student/student, please keep in mind the Antique Theory of Proof just explained. This will save you from many well-meaning false arguments.

RH 84.

The evidence, as seen from the reception (interpretation). (84/85)

Just above, we saw the arguments from the data itself (which may or may not be (sufficiently) “eloquent” (“speaks from itself”).

We consider them, now, from the interpret(ion) of them.-- *Ch. S Peirce's* four methods of reasoning (RH 49).-- Peirce, in a non - complete enumeration, distinguishes four types, - in his *The Fixation of Belief*, in: *Popular Science Monthly*, xii (1877), 1/15.

1.a. “The method of tenacity”.

Peirce calls the person who ‘reads’ (= interprets) other people’s opinions or the objective facts on the basis of their own prejudices ‘self-willed’. From a rhetorical point of view, only what fits in with these presuppositions, typical of the individual that one is, is accepted.

He gives as an example an acquaintance of his, who was against (trade) protectionism and who only read literature, which was free trade friendly.

Teachers can get to know this type e.g. during home visits. One does not “get anything into it” unless some frames with individual ‘axiomata’.

1.b. “the method of authority”.

Note : in Dutch, “sincere” is the subjective quality, by which one “spends what one has in,” but “righteous” is all that allows itself, in its thinking and life, to be directed by the group or authority,--in any case by others.

Thus e.g. the traditionalist: “It has always been so”. The doctrinalists, who stick to an (established) doctrine (‘doctrine’): so the ‘orthodox’ Nazis or Communists. What Hitler or Marx taught, they call ‘true’.

To “get something in there,” one must assume, with such, their/its presuppositions, - -as this had to be done with the wayward. Only that here the other prevails and the “own” (individual) is lacking or comes through very timidly.--

1.c. “The a priori method”.

This school of thought departs either from idiosyncratic or straightforward premises, but considers them amenable to dialogue and discussion,--so much so that dialogue and discussion seem decisive.

A lot of “liberals” - here not as a name for some covenant, but as the name of a mentality - forget, from strongly emphasizing freedoms of opinion of all kinds, that what decides truth or falsehood is the matter itself. And not endless arguing “in absolute freedom”.

This type is perhaps the most inaccessible: the obstinate or the straightforward has firm principles (is “fundamentalist” or “foundationalist”) and, if one can convince him/her from there, every message succeeds; the aprioritarian(s), in Peirce’s language, understand: the one, who invariably asks: “How do you know that? How do you prove that?” is - basically - not susceptible to any dialogue-with-results. He/she gets no further than an endlessly stretched inquiry into the foundations or presuppositions. This attitude is characteristic of the current crisis of foundations and values in our society.

RH 85.

2. 'The Method of External Permanency' (also: 'The Method of Science').

Here the given itself, in its existence and essence with the circumstances, is decisive and is deemed decidable, at least in principle.

Whether one departs, now, from idiosyncratic, liberal or aprioritarian premises is of secondary importance : one always departs from one or more premises - called by Platon 'hypotheses' (RH 55: hypothetical method) but:

- (i) one is open to discussion (compassionate aspect) and
- (ii) one opens oneself to reality itself, as in principle susceptible to (individual or collective) inquiry,-- inquiry, which, unlike the 'aprioritarian method', is considered susceptible to firm results.

According to Peirce, this is typical of ((modern)) professional scientific research : hence the title 'Scientific Method', - Rhetorically speaking : when one has to do with this type of reasoning and method, one forgets, from looking deeply, with one's fellow man, at that about which it is about, all one's own, collective or aprioritarian concerns. Here real accountable understanding is radically possible. Which is the purpose of all rhetorical deeds.

Note - A sociological tome.

Uli Windisch, Le raisonnement et le parler quotidien (Reasoning and everyday speech), (1985), examines the reasoning of the Modern mass man (the vast majority,-- according to Windisch), which, in our Western democracies, plays a gigantic role (in elections, for example, that type decides on life issues).

From said work, it appears that the vast majority, in that mass, are opinionated, straightforward or, to a much lesser extent aprioritized, i.e., open to discussion. Of which we take note.

RH 86

The syllogistic design of an argument. (86/90).

Bibl. sample:

-- K. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (History of logic), (1835/1870; the history of logic, from Aristotle to the XV -th century);

-- J.M. Bochenski, *Logik*, Munich/Freiburg i.Br., 1956 (logic, as a methodology, is manifold: Greek, Scholastic (Middle Ages), 'mathematical' (formalized), Indian, etc.);

-- J.L. Golden/ J.J. Pilotta, ed., *Practical Reasoning in Human Affairs* (*Studies in Honor of Chaim Perelman*), Dordrecht, 1906 (a work in the spirit of Ch. Perelman (1912/1984), *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities* (*Essais on Rhetoric and Its Applications*), Dordrecht, 1979);

-- F. van Eemeren et al, *Argumentation Theory*, Utr./ Antw., 1981-2, 9/16 (*What is argumentation?*).

Behold an ultra-small sample from a mass of works and articles.

Prototype (= primal model) of argument.

Van Eemeren, o.c., says that "argumentation" is: "the defense of positions", understand : the verification of propositions.

The prototype - said work - is the concluding speech (= syllogism). This demonstrative text form is a reasoning, consisting of

(1) two prepositions ('premises'; preposition 1 (= VZ1) and preposition 2 (= VZ2)), i.e. the 'arguments', (in the narrower sense), and

(2) a Postphrase (conclusion, derivation, conclusion (= Concl.), i.e. the 'opinion' (thesis) one advocates. (o.c.27).

Two arrangements (sequences):

a. the forward-looking (progressive), who first formulates the prepositions and only then the postpositions;

b. the retrograde (regressive), which puts the Nazi first (as that which must be proved) and, only then, elaborates the Nazi (the "proofs") (o.c.,32).

Jan Lukasiewicz, Ground plan.

Jan Luksiewicz (1878/1956; a.o. Aristotle's Syllogistic (1951)) sought to 'axiomatize' the closure rhetoric!-- He exposed two basic schemata.

A.-- The deductive syllogism. - Expressed schematically "If A, then B (= axiom, hypothesis, lemma, 'abduction'). Well, A. (The two preceding sentences are the prepositional phrases, VZ1 (hypothesis) and VZ2 (second prepositional phrase)). So B. (The conclusion or proposition to be proved)';

B.-- The reductive syllogism.-Schem. "If A, then B. Well, B. So A".

Conclusion: it is seen that the second preposition, which expresses the step into extralogical reality, is the determination (of existence and essence, with circumstances) of either preposition A or preposition B.

RH 87.

From the thinking together of premise and observation, one decides on a - precisely because of this - justifiable proposition ('opinion').

Appl. mod. (87/90)

The abstract model can seem barren and empty. It is until the applicative model makes it alive and "real" (RH 31: without abstract schema blind. without paradigm, applicative model, empty).

Bibl. sample:

-- R. Denker, *Aggression (Kant/ Darwin/ Freud/ Lorenz)*, Amsterdam, 1967, 76/78 (Frustration-aggression hypothesis of the Yale School);

-- G. Müller, *Toynbees Reconsiderations (Die Studie zur Weltgeschichte neu durchdacht)*, (Toynbee's Reconsiderations (The Study of World History Reconsidered)), in: *Saeculum (Janrbuch für Universalgeschichte)* 1964: 1, 311/326 (in particular: a.c. 320f. (Challenge - Response)),

-- Following A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History xii, Reconsiderations*, London, 1961; Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, *Lessons for the Living (Conversations with Dying People)*, Balthoven, 1970 (esp. 40/140: the processing modes of the fact of dying)

-- Arno Plack et al, *Der Mythos vom Aggressionstrieb*, (The myth of the aggression drive,), Munich, 1974.

Main point, here, in our little example, is the relation "disappointment/ attack", (cf. with RH 50v. (A-B-C theory) thought within the scheme "stimulus (stimulus) / response (response)". the reason for the famous "frustration - aggression hypothesis" are facts like the following.

(i) A young man, full of the future magic of a beautiful summer afternoon with his fiancée, takes the bicycle, hops on it and finds that its frame is broken. It is impossible to continue riding it. You can understand his reaction by feeling it: he is very upset and says in a tone of voice: "You can never count on a bicycle".

(ii) The same young man walks to the bus. He waits, with many others. The bus does not come at the expected hour. His reaction: "The damned bus doesn't come now either. Buses are also never there when you need them".

Briefly analyzed:

Twice the young man, with respect to what is very close to his heart, is deceived ('frustration', 'disappointment'); twice he reacts, in response, with uneasiness,-- 'aggression', 'attack instinct'. Such a causal (causal) connection is made even by the most ordinary working-class man,-- guided by 'common sense' (the (all) common sense).

RH 88

Designing a theoretical understanding. (88/89).

Do we, first, examine, greatly abridged, but perfectly understandable, what e.g. the School of Yale did.

a. *The footsteps of Freud* (1856/1939: RH 72; 81).

Two propositions:

1. if inhibition of pleasure-seeking (a.k.a. pain-fleeing) behavior, then disappointment;

2. if disappointment, then attack-drive, directed against the inhibiting factor (fore-object, person: think - in our twofold case - of the bicycle, the bus, against whom the young man - angrily, yes, furiously (typical of 'aggression') - attacks, in terms of swearing).

b. *Yale School formulas.*

b.1. In 1937, John Dollard formulated : "If frustration, then aggression;

Note.-- Note the "if-then language," (i.e., formulating observable facts in logical-method terms).

b.2. In 1939: *J. Dollard/ L.W. Doob/ O.H. Mowrer/ R.R. Sears, Frustration and aggression*, New Haven, 1939,-- with the twin proposition:

(i) for all cases of aggression, frustration, as a 'portent' ('cause', 'explanation'), always precedes it (in short, 'if frustration, then aggression');

(ii) for all cases of frustration, aggression, as a 'sequel' ('consequence'), always follows.-- Definitions (RH 79).

Without definitions, however imperfect, no exact or, at least, accurate understanding: 'frustration' is defined as "obstruction of an endeavor" (toward a goal: here, a beautiful afternoon with the fiancée); 'aggression' is described (paraphrase) as "an act with the purpose of attacking the obstructionist (object, person)."

Note.-- It was noted, at the time, that "independent aggression," i.e., without prior frustration, was not considered, in the formulation.

b.3. In 1941: *N.E. Miller/ RR. Sears/ DH. Mowrer/ LW. Doob/ J. Dollard, The Frustration-Agression Hypothesis*, in: *Psychological Review*, 1941: 48, 337/342.-- Correctives (improvements) were introduced.

(i) Theorem 1 ("Only if frustration, then aggression" so understood that aggression always demands frustration as a precursor) is retained.

(ii) But proposition 2 ("If frustration, then always aggression") is improved.

Reason:

a. Frustration can, in some cases, provoke a different reaction;

b. 'Aggression' should be split into (1) "aggression tendency" ('tendency') and (2) "actual elaboration of the tendency"---this instead of "act with the purpose of attacking the obstructor (object/person): Where the emphasis is on the term 'act', now split into 'tendency to act' and 'act (elaboration).'

RK 89.

Conclusion: “Frustration evokes urges to a series of different reactions, one of which is the urge of aggressive tendency” the improvement read.

Verification.

One is familiar with the phenomenon of resentment (in French: le ressentiment). *M. Scheler* (1874/1928; axiologist), *Von Umsturz der Werte*, (From overthrow of values, I, 1919, 43/236 (*Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*),--((The resentment in the construction of moral), the resentment as a factor in the construction of moral systems), has already clearly recognized--what the Yale school discovered : the resentment impulse, in the resentment or ‘resentiment’ at work,

- a. inhibits the immediate response of destruction of the obstruction factor and
- b. counts on its delayed form (“Just wait! One day my day will come”). This clearly shows that there is always a reaction-act, but not always a full act of attacking urge). ‘act’ here in the Schleierian sense of “will act”

Verification.

E. Kübler-Ross, *Lessons*, 141, says that at least a five-member reaction group is possible.

Stimulus: a very sad information, e.g. the fact that one is supposed, by the doctors and the environment, to die.- But, in passing, this “sad tidings” can be e.g. also the moment, when a husband, who loves his wife to death, learns that she is “cheating” on him or the news, heard at home, that the husband is not coming home alive, because he crashed in his car.

Reaction (response) Kübler-Ross distinguishes at least five responses to such a situation, i.e. denial (with, as a possible consequence, isolation, loneliness tendency) - think:

Deny: “No, that can’t be true. I don’t” (“No, that my wife is cheating on me; that is unthinkable”)

Anger (the real aggression) - think “Why me?” (“What makes me come across such a thing?” “Just wait : if that is true what I am just now learning!”)

Things (marching’) - think of “I’ll do better from now on” (understood: then maybe God will let me live a little”) (“I’ll be sweeter than ever; then things will work out”)

Dejection (‘depression’), think of “since then I have been brooding all day; I feel vaguely guilty about something, but don’t know exactly how.” (“Since my husband’s death, I just can’t get over it”) -;

Acceptance -think “Yeah, it was to be expected, huh; everybody dies” (“Now I’m to the point where I accept divorce. I don’t worry about it anymore”).

RH 90.

Note.-- One could expand all this fiercely, of course. Think of *Y. Michaud, La violence*, Paris, 1986,3, where it is said that ‘violence’ includes things such as killing, inflicting blows, damaging, --war, oppression, --crime, terrorism. That ‘violence’ represents ‘aggression’ is clear from its definition: “an act, which, directly or indirectly, aims to restrain, injure or destroy persons and/or goods” (*H.L. Nieburg, Uses of Violence*, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1963, 3, vol. vii-1, 43).

Falsification.

An analysis is incomplete - since Karl Popper (RH 65), this is abundantly clear when one does not attempt to “falsify” a hypothesis, i.e., to catch it in error.

A. Plack, Der Mythos vom Aggressionstrieb, (The myth of the aggression instinct), criticizes the aggression views of Freud, Konrad Lorenz (1903/1989), *Nico Tinbergen*, *Alexander Mitscherlich* (1908/ 1982; *Aggression und Anpassung* (Aggression and adaptation), (in: *Psyche*, Stuttgart, 1956: 1957, 10, 177/193). Plack reproaches them with inadequate factual material (RH 64: existence/ essence), which is exploited one-sidedly.-- Plack (and the other authors of the book) hold the following thesis: ‘aggression’ is

- (1) not innate (cf. RH 60: cultural determinism) and
- (2) not as universally distributed as e.g. a K. Lorenz et al. claim;-- this, both in animals and humans.

Argument (abbreviated):

- a. great apes are friendly rather than attacking;
- b. primitives exhibit a type of ‘fellow humanity’ such that they were able to survive -- in their harsh living conditions (RH 76; 83).-- Which we note, here, as a corrective to some circulating ‘theories’ (sometimes of great repute).

In passing: *R. Girard, La violence et le sacré*, (Violence and the sacred), Paris, 1972, criticizes the notions of violence peculiar to the human sciences (which we do not address). Studentess/ student, draw from this little chapter, please, lessons for ‘your thesis’, and ‘your argument’.

RH 91.

Natural and humanities 'explanations'.

We saw that D. Schleiermacher and, especially, W. Dilthey introduced the strict distinction between natural science and spiritual science (RH 49/51).

We are now going to clarify this, by means of a short analysis of the relation 'frustration/aggression'. This, especially since ye, studentess / student, will quasi-certainly need this for your final paper.

(A). A. Toynbee borrowed the basic concept of human history - according to his words - from the poet R. Browning (1812/1889) - proving that belletrist (RH 72v,) too can contain "theses" - and from the Old Testament.

This basic concept reads, "Challenge and Response." There is, according to the great historian, in addition to "cultural determinism" (in the limited sense that our behavior is generally "determined" by the culture in which we live), also fundamental freedom at work somewhere, which, among other things, detaches us from our environment.-

He himself says: "The response to a challenge is not the effect of a cause" (The response to a challenge. (*note*: similar to the term 'stimulus') is not the effect of a cause). G. Müller paraphrases: "Geschichte ist (...) immer des was der Mensch aus ihr macht" (History is always what man makes of it).

(B). Dilthey (and the humanities scholars) will express this as follows: "History - all typical human behavior - one cannot, in a natural science way, 'erklären' (explain natural science, so e.g. in terms of "causes / effects", preferably in a deterministic way), but, in a humanities way. 'verstehen' (humanities explanation).

Because 'Verstehende Methode' (comprehensiveness or also 'understanding' method) is one type of explaining, i.e. starting from premises (hypotheses) or necessary and, preferably sufficient conditions, making something comprehensible.

Now apply yourself, student/student, the ABC theory of personality (RH 50v) to the relation 'frustration' (= point A) 'aggression' (point B and through B point C). 'Verstehen' is to understand the interpretation (point B) of a fellow human being and, from that interpretation, to explain his behavior. What natural science does not exclude as an additional 'explanation' (which a Dilthey and a Spranger have explicitly said) it is not about exclusivism.

RH 92.

VI.E. Treatise theory: pathetics. (92/105)

The term 'pathetic' is used in the following sentence: "The pathetic aspect of a tragedy leaves a deep impression on the viewing public". In Ancient Greek, the term 'pathos' (the word is still used untranslated in Dutch) has many meanings - not so easy to bring under one denominator.

Pathetics" - here - is to be understood in this sense: the doctrine of what one, as a human being, mainly experiences when reading something or hearing someone speak.

The three ranks of classical pathetics. (92/105)

Three aspects emerge, when trying to summarize the centuries-long rhetorical tradition, concerning pathetics.

A. -- The mind responses of the message receiver. (92/93)

R. Barthes, *L' av. sémi.*, 146s., called this, with the rhetors, "pathe" (plural of "pathos"; Lat.: "passiones").

Barthes, who takes a very Aristotelian view of rhetoric, names a series of systechies peculiar to the average human being: anger/ inner peace, hate/ 'love', fear/ confidence, ingratitude/ gratitude,-- envy(rivalry), etc..

Barthes himself rightly says that, in Aristotle's view, pathetics involves "a sociology of mass culture",-- certainly as regards emotional reactions.-- When one goes after Aristotle's teacher, Platon in this regard, a very different "rhetoric" is exposed (RH 15), in which the reactions of the mind, provoked--through a text, written or spoken--are much more elevated (Platon has left us a precious expression: "the noble soul").

Note.-- Here would be the place for a theory concerning the mind.

Bibl. sample:

-- *Th. Ribot, La psychologie des sentiments*, (The psychology of feelings,), Paris, 1917-10 (still valid);

-- *H. Albrecht, Ueber das Gemüt*, (About the mind), Stuttgart, 1961;

-- *S. Strasser, Das Gemüt (Grundgedanken zu einer phänomenologischen Philosophie und Theorie des menschlichen Gefühlslebens)*, (The Mind (Basic Thoughts on a Phenomenological Philosophy and Theory of Human Emotional Life)), Utr./ Antw./ Freiburg, 1956.

For this we have in its place some passages, here above (RH 41/48: signifie, in which the 'pathetic' aspect is strongly shown; 50v. (ABC theory); 87/90 (frustration/aggression)).

RH 93.

Note.-- Very early, in Protosophist rhetoric (RH 24/27), we see figures like Thrasu(m)machos of Chalkedon (450/-380) placing the greatest emphasis on editing the emotional life,-- by means of

(i) stylistics (RH 12: design) and

(ii) action (RH 14v.: acting). His contemporary and thinking colleague Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375; RH 25) has left us, in his Ode on Helenè, wonderful words about the (contrived, ‘stylized’) word as a ‘pathetic means’.-- All this situated within the art of words.

B.-- *The image impression* (‘image’, ‘figure of the messenger’. (93/95)

R. Barthes, *L’av. sém.*, 146, calls this aspect - as the classical tradition does - “èthè, the temperament traits, the character traits, of the one who writes or speaks (the plural of ‘èthos’, character).

Note -- One uses, also, untranslated ‘ethos’ in present-day Dutch (not to be confused with the Greek ‘ethos’ (note the first sound: not è, but e), which means habit, morality).-
- The Antiques, after all, were insistent that the one who writes or speaks, uses his own nature of being (‘personality’), as a guarantee for the ‘genuineness’ (in common Flemish ‘meanness’) of his message. If you like: the one who persuades is himself his ‘argument’.

I. Kant (1724/1804; top figure of the German Aufklärung), in a text on the thesis of J.J. Rousseau (1712/1778;RH 63), “back to nature; denotes the image impression of someone as follows:

“Rousseau did not, fundamentally, want man to return to the state of nature, but he did want him - from the level of culture at which he now stands - to look back at it.

Rousseau’s premise (RH 86: Lukasiewicz’s schema) was that “man is naturally good” - where ‘nature’ is understood as ‘inherited nature’ - yet in a negative way. Specifically, man - by himself and intentionally - is not evil, but he is in danger of being kindled and corrupted by evil or clumsy leaders and show figures.

Since, however, this again requires good men, who, in their turn, must be educated and since there is not a single one of them who does not (either congenitally or acquired (RH 60v.; 90)) carry depravity within him, the problem of the education of conscience remains unsolved. After all, a malevolent tendency peculiar to our generation is rejected by general human reason,--perhaps even curbed, but not yet eradicated (*J. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., Kantbrevier*, Hamburg, s.d., 339 (No. 788)).

RH 94.

Note.-- Kant as a radical Enlightened-Rationalist emphasizes -- what he calls -- “general human reason”(which, according to his own words, differs thoroughly from “common sense,” advocated by the Commonsense philosophers), but admits immediately that even “Enlightened Reason” cannot thoroughly cope with “evil in the world.

Note.-- We have underlined the little words “not/ but; not/ but but;-- well/ but not”. Why? Because we have here a figure of speech (RH 12: design), called by the Greeks “schèma kai ‘arsin kai thesin” (scheme containing negation (arsis) followed by (re)confirmation (thesis), or vice versa). By speaking in this way - and who never does? - we lay stresses, which gives our opinion (thesis) ‘color’: what gives our writing and speaking ‘color’ is called ‘style’.

Appl. mod.

We give here a very simple, but all the more telling (RH 82v.: a.technos) model.

Thou mayst know the actress Charlene Tilton, the performer of Lucy Ewing in the Dallas series. Listen to what she once said, “I have always admired Marilyn Monroe (*note*: the sex symbol of the first hour) immensely. Everything that has ever been written about M.M. -- a whole library -- I have read. For a long time I even wanted to change my name: I absolutely wanted to be called Norma Jean.

The first time I saw a movie, in which M.M. was acting, I was beside myself. I immediately felt that there was something (RH 46: suggestive “something”) that connected us.

Many people who have known M.M. directly maintain that I am “very much like her”--not so much physically (I am, in fact, too short in stature), but spiritually. The run-up of our careers is identical (RH 48: identitive trait): we were there very early on; we became sensational front-page figures from the outset;--we owe our right direction to ‘older men’;--we both have worries with our body weight;--we are both very vulnerable.

Conclusion: I cannot cope with the fact that she allowed herself to be manipulated until she succumbed to that manipulation. I, however, walk around with the conclusion: I follow my instincts; I will not be led by anyone”. (*Yup*, 379 (21. 06.1981).

RH 95.

We recognize, in such a “matronly reverence; the phenomenon of “fan” (or also “freak”), about which psychologists, sociologists, culturologists committed eager pages.

There are, of course, other ‘emanations’ of ‘rhetorically’ powerful, influential figures. Consider the concept of ‘charismatic authority’.

C. Rogers (1902/1986) described it as follows:

(i) this type - called “new man” - is averse to any form of authority, which is imposed from the outside, “authoritarian” (RH 84: righteousness);

(ii) it has a thorough confidence in its own, individual experiences,---so much so that -- precisely because of that -- it draws others along with it; it creates ‘inspirers’/ ‘inspirationalists’ --- figures on whom the others pull themselves up (RH 51: “One must always depend on someone”).

People like C.Rogers and also A. Maslow (the great man of Humanistic psychology) must have been such ‘charismatic leader figures’,-- ‘charisma’ (= socially intended gift of grace), which works suggestively (‘something’, something powerful, emanates from them).

C. -- *The value character of the message itself.* (95/101)

We have looked at pathetics, now, from two perspectives,

(i) The messenger/messenger,

(ii) the message recipient/message receiver. Now from that which is exchanged between the two terms: the message itself.

We begin with an applicative model.

R. Barthes, *L’av. sém.*, 136, gives it himself as a model of ‘epicheirema’ i.e. a syllogism (RH 86), in which the two prepositions are immediately followed by their verification. First the situation, in which the reasoning is situated.

In March 1965, Chinese students demonstrate in front of the U.S. Embassy. Russian police suppress that demonstration. Against which the Chinese government protests.

Thereupon the Russians send next note, a perfect model of epicheirema.

1.1. There are diplomatic norms, which are respected in all countries (*note*: an example of ‘eikos’, the obvious, the ‘probable’ : RH 83) -- This is the thesis.

1.2. The argument: the Chinese themselves, domestically, respect those standards.

2.1. Well, the Chinese students, outside their country, in Moscow, did not respect those standards.

The fix.

2.2. The argument: a description of the manifestation (insults, acts of common law covered by Russian criminal law).

3. Thus (unstated: ‘enthymem’).

RH 96.

Note.-- In traditional rhetoric one calls ‘argumentum’, argument (proof, ‘argument’), any reasoning,-- valid or non-valid, in so far as it makes the message valid.-
- Among such ‘arguments’ one finds most commonly -- what was called -- the enthymeme. This term, since Quintilian (RH 16, 28), designates the syllogism, in so far as it exhibits (at least partially) unexpressed wording.

By not expressing, in the Russian paper, the conclusion (“So...”), the Russian diplomat, who drafted the final text of the paper, fulfilled an age-old tradition of rhetoric. The reason was obvious: the two premises (prepositional phrases) spoke for themselves.

The axiological truism (96/97).

We have already, provisionally, defined them (RH 75). There we gave, as examples, two ‘values’, the truth and the fellow human being as fellow human being.

1. *Bibl. sample:*

except, in the Ontology to be discussed axiological (= value) literature, they refer to:

-- *J. Beatty, The New Rhetoric: Practical Reason and Justification (The Communicative Relativism of Chaim Perelman)*,-- this, in one of the issues of *Journal of Value Inquiry* (Dordrecht).

Such a journal examines values, ‘Values’, insofar as they are addressed in ethics (moral theory), social theory, legal theory (theory and practice),-- aesthetics (theory of beauty and art),-- professional science and methodology.-- In the Russian paper, those values are called ‘norms’.

2. The Antiques, of course, had no doctrine of value as we have it today, But “value” they knew very well, but by other names.

Thus, with Platon, the good, understood: the value without more (‘absolute’ value), is the idea, i.e. incorporeal -reality, par excellence, to which all other ideas (= incorporeal realities, whether or not visible and tangible in the material things around us) ‘participate’ (participate), the reason why everything represents ‘value’, albeit in very varied ways.

For example, Aristotle knows “topoi,” “places” (commonplaces), that represent “values.

Appl. mod.

Supposedly, a politician, in the agora (RH 19), wants to push through a measure. Therefore he will propose a ‘good’ measure. He proves this ‘goodness’ (= value character) e.g. by showing that he increases happiness which in itself also represents value, because one can define ‘happiness’ as “the human value par excellence”, in which all other values are partial values.

RH 97,

That this is true somewhere can be seen, among other things, in what is called 'eudemonology' (= happiness theory). To mention only one work, which outlines the history of eudemonology: Wl. Tatarkiewicz (1866/1981), *Analysis of Happiness*, The Hague, 1976 (semantic, psychological, bio-technical and ethical perspectives on eudemonology, especially since *Seneca's De vita beata of Corduba* (+1/+65; Late Classic)),--a work which takes an explicitly axiological approach.

Other axiological platitudes.

There are, of course, as many axiological platitudes as there are types of values.-- Aristotle, with all of antiquity, will discuss, e.g., the sense of measure, law, magnanimity,-- public interest, honor et al. as types of "good" (= value).

Note -- Max Scheler (1874/1928; axiologist) attempted to introduce an ordering of values.

Thus he distinguishes:

(i) '*sensual*' or sensation values: all that is lust (feeling), pleasure (or its opposite : pain, displeasure) (the (un)pleasant : "I have pain in my thigh");

(ii) *vital* values attached to the overall body, such as wellbeing, freshness (the opposite: dullness, fatigue),-- health (sickness) ("I feel perfectly well").-- Note: "I do have pain in my thigh, but otherwise I feel perfectly healthy." According to M. Scheler, "the noble" (the mean) also belongs to this value sphere.

(iii) The "*spiritual*" values constitute a higher category: the aesthetic (the beautiful (the ugly) and the art (the artless));-- the legal (right/justice);-- the knowledge (true/false).

(iv) *Highest* value, according to Scheler: the sacred.

Note.-- Student/student, when it happens to you that you have to make a plea, in your thesis, for some value ('good'), consider, on the basis of this list of 'platitudes', which value(s) exactly you are advocating.

Types of value feelings. (97/99).

People like Ed. Spranger (1882/1963; *Lebensformen*, (Life forms), Halle, 1921) or also M. Scheler look at values as objects of value judgments.

A work like A.O. Bettermann, *Psychologie und Psychopathologie des Wertens*, (Psychology and psychopathology of valuing), Meisenheim am Glan, 1949, does not analyze the content, but the value estimation (werten) itself (the subjective side).

RH 98.

The author does this, among other things, to delineate healthy from pathological value judgments.-- Bettermann distinguishes four major groups of “valuing.

(1). *The naïve appreciation.*

This seems to Bettermann to be “very diffuse.” Especially children value in this way without introducing distinctions, without asking questions around it, very self-confident (“centered” (around one’s own person) a Piaget would say) the naive value goes up - especially - in “inheritance values.

(2). *The emphatic (feeling-adjective) appreciation.*

Here, labelled as ‘irrational’ by matter-of-fact fellow men, emotionally charged appreciation - see RH 94: boundless admiration) is at work: it springs from the essence (‘soul’) of the appreciative personality, independent of the environment. Unconsciously the value which is appreciated is ‘deified’ somewhere, put on a throne, felt to be inviolable.

Bettermann says that **(i)** every true love and **(ii)** all true religiosity tends toward this type of value estimation.

(3). *The appraising (estimating) valuation.*

Here one values something as a function of something else. E.g. social prestige, profitable function. The not spontaneous, but the deliberate stands out. The calculating mind is the decisive factor here. - Think of a painting, for which the art lover “falls into awe”, while the art dealer is already calculating how much it will fetch.

Bettermann says : this type of value estimation is typical of “conventional” bourgeois culture.

(4). *The value alienated valuation.*

Bettermann’s term is “Wert.ent.fremdung. The value estimator is and remains aloof, distant, from value in itself (as object),--which was already, somewhat, active in the estimating estimate. Bettermann distinguishes here a multitude of types. Thus e.g. the ‘aestheticism’ (appreciating something beautiful, artful, -- not because it is beautiful, artful in itself, but because of the thoughtful-analysing lived experience of it). Such is the case with ‘intellectualist criticalism’ (which radially undermines the basis of any surrender to one or another value (cf. with RH 85: “endlessly stretched fundamental research”).

What Bettermann calls “humorous value attitude” seems to us rather “ironic-sarcastic value attitude”: he defines them as, o.g. distancing oneself from a value, securing oneself against the appearance of that same value.

RH 99.

Note.-- ‘Humor’ is innocently-good-naturedly drawing something (a value) into laughter. ‘Irony’ is obliquely ‘appreciating’ what one really disapproves of, with detached laughter,--not without bitterness (which is totally lacking in humor. ‘Sardonic’ laughter is, of that, the grinning-mocking degree. ‘Sarcasm’ (from the Greek ‘dispassion’) is biting irony, not without malice.

‘Humor’ is by no means value-less. Irony, sarcasm, once they belong to the keynote of a life, do.

According to Bettermann, value-averse value-attribution, in its fullest degree, is only found in psychosis (“soul disease”). We all know the alienating laughter of insane people.

Note -- The Temptation. (99/101).

Rhetoric would not be rhetoric if it did not - at least in a comment on seduction spoke.

Bibl. sample:

-- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 78/82 (*La logique de la séduction*);

-- J. Baudrillard, *Da la séduction*, Paris, 1979.

There is a dual side to the term “temptation.

a. idle: “I was tempted”;

b. enterprising: “He tried to seduce her”.

We give here Proverbs. (The ‘parakuptousa: literally: the one who bows sideways)).

The text describes, in biblical style (RH 12: stylistic rh.), the passive and the active temptation. But the text contains a narrative (RH 31: part of a treatise) with structure. So pay attention to that narrative structure, simultaneously.

(A). Introduction.

“My son, apply my words; keep my precepts in your inner being. For, if you implement my precepts, you will ‘live’ (*note*: here in the Archaic sense of “life that comes from Yahweh, God”) (...).

Say to wisdom (*note* : here: **a.** insight into life and universe, **b.** reflecting God’s insight)/ Thou art my sister! Title the insight (*note* : wisdom) with the word ‘relative’. This, to shield you from a strange woman, from an unknown lady who speaks seductive words.

(B). Center (“corpus”).

I. Frontknot.-- One day I sat, in my dwelling at the window, looking through the bars. I saw the scene of youthful delusion.

RH 100.

I saw - in the midst of what should be called 'still children' - a young man without 'insight'. (*Note: here in the Biblical sense*).-- He was prowling - down the alley - close to the corner where 'She' (*note: the 'parakuptousa'*) stood: he struck out in the direction of her house - in the evening twilight, when the day was coming to an end, in the heart of night and darkness.

II. Knot.-- Look: a woman approaches him,-- dressed up like a deer, -- the heart false. How enterprising and defiant she is! Her feet, of course, do not hold out in her house! Now she can be seen in the streets, then again in the squares; in all possible corners she keeps watch. Look: there she has him already; she embraces him at once. Unashamedly she addresses him: "I had to make another sacrifice, to fulfill my vows; with that I have met you. Searching I have found you. I have covered my bed with blankets, - with embroidered and Egyptian fabrics. Where I lie, there I have sprinkled myrrh,-- aloe and cinnamon oil. Come off it: let us, minnows, live until morning,-- enjoy it, -- in lust! Surely a husband is, in my house, not to be seen: 'he' is gone, -- gone for a long journey! And 'he' has, moreover, the bag of coins with him. So 'he' only comes home with the full moon!

III. Turn (reversal, turning point).

By persuasion with power she seduces him, with the caressing magic of her lips she enthrones him.-- True: without delay he follows her, like an ox drawn to the slaughter,- -like a madman, who, chained by foot, draws to his torture chamber, until an arrow pierces his liver. Or like a little bird flying into the safety net. Without realizing that his "life" (*note: again, in the Biblical sense*) is the stake.

(C) Lock.

And now: listen to me, my son! Heed the words of my mouth! -- Yet may your heart not be tempted toward the ways of such women. Walk not in the paths of such a thing lost.

For numerous are those who have afflicted such women with "death" (*note: in the Biblical sense of "loss of divine life"*); the sturdiest of fellows they have literally "necked.

Her home is the road to the "sheol" (*note: the Biblical word for "underworld"*), the road slope that opens onto the "realm of the dead.

RH 101.

Explanation.

(i) The text is, truly, a Biblical treatise: the thesis is there (“if observance of the precepts, then ‘life’”) with the proof - in Biblical style - through the counter model: if, like the seduced young man, one does not observe the precepts (of ‘life’), then one ends up in the ‘dead’ realm.

(ii) But, in order to dramatize the proposition, especially the counter-model (a method, which Aristotle already found in the theories of a Zenon of Elea (RH 25) -- Achilles, who does not overtake the turtle, as an illustration of a geometric- ontological proposition), the proposer engages a story that colorfully (RH 12: design) depicts the process of deception.

Try it, student/student: your children only really grasp an (abstract) proposition when it is dramatized. Or don’t they? But, in every discourse, opportunities for stories occur,-- e.g. to depict an (event) (process, encounter). In that case, try the narrative structure - pre-note (= introductory story)/ node/ (maybe) node/ ... / cover (final story) - consciously check and, in your text, clarify it. This increases the rational ‘power’ of your style.

Theoretical explanation.

It is clear that the “seductress” plays on the sense of value -- the naïve, resp. the feeling-addicted type of it -- of the seduced.-- Now there is more than one theory of seduction.

(i) *J. Baudrillard* (1929/2007), *De la séduction*, says: if narcissistic type of man, then seducer(s). Possibly.

(ii) *L. Binswanger* (1881/1966; psychiatrist) - known as the only one with whom *S. Freud* maintained friendly relations - gives us a more comprehensible key: he distinguishes between “taking as” (RH 68: (reflexive) ‘if’; see also RH 70) and “taking at”.

Appl. mod.

The mistress takes the young man as a weakling (seductive) and, therefore, she takes him - especially - by his weak spot. “We come across as seductive because our vulnerability to our fellow man is obvious.” (*Bellenger, o.c., 79*).

Thesis: if seduce (active), then take at.-- Perhaps the narcissist sees our weaknesses better.

RH 102.

Salesmanship (marketing). (102/105)

Especially in sales techniques is where the very large.

Bibl. sample:

-- L. Bellenger, *La persuasion*, Paris, 1985, 36/40 (*Marketing et spohistique*);

-- P. Vervaeke, *Prof. Dr. Ernst Dichter penetrates untrodden areas of sales*, in: *De Nieuwe Gids* (Ghent), 18.05. 1962, The literature is, of course, incalculably multiple. Yet a little look into salesmanship is rhetorically necessary. We are, after all, all consumers and, as such, buyers/buyers.

Marketing,

market analysis, is the methodical analysis of a product's sales potential (with the premise that, especially in a free market economy like the Western one, sales conditions are either optimized or preserved).

Publicity ("advertising"), "public relations" (maintaining contact), forward-looking management play a role in this.

Note -- School boards, for example, if they wish to proceed 'rationally', may view and 'mob' (manipulate) the recruitment and retention of students under that viewpoint:.

The businessmen of V-d' century Greece had themselves taught rhetoric by Sophists. And leadership figures - including politicians -, in our XX-st' century culture, entrust themselves to "market analysts. Thus Bellenger. Let us, then, also briefly discuss the phenomenon of the 'market'.

One sample.

P. Vervaeke, a.c., says that - since figures such as E. Dichter and Louis Chesking (Color Research Institute of America) - among others, the "pub" (publicity) was thoroughly changed.

A -- Traditional market research.

The task was summarized in six platitudes (RH 75: circumstances): **1.** what? -- **2.a.** where? **2.b.** when? -- **3.a.** how much? **3.b.** how? -- to **4.**whom? (i.e., is sold). In the light of these points of analysis, information is gathered concerning the sales possibilities. The geographical and current (respectively future) prospects of the market in question, -- its economic - social aspects, -- the psychological structures at work in it -- tied up in factual material, preferably made precise by figures -- are examined.

B.-- The more recent marketing model.

We dwell on a major modifier.-- Dr. E. Dichter (1907/...) was a doctor of psychology and a Freudian.

RH 103.

At Paris at the Sorbonne, Dichter, who came from Vienna, became a licentiate in Philosophy and Literature. In 1938 he settled in the USA. His power idea (Fouillée): to introduce professional psychology and sociology as auxiliary sciences (RH 32) into salesmanship.

By 1946, he has his followers ready in the Institute for Motivational Research. In the 1960s, he is a salesmanship mastermind.

The facts and their hypothesis.

(a) *The facts.*

We cite another source, namely M.A., The ‘second state’ of the impulsive consumer, in: *The Line* 07.02.1964.

Some time in advance, a bookseller, in the German Federal Republic, is conducting an experiment.-- Aim to try out a new sales stunt.-- Means: he places, at a central point of his store (where?), a “gondola” (open hanging bin with sales items displayed) (how?) In it he places some expensive scientific books (what?).

Above it all, he hangs a sign with a warning: “Beware! These books are difficult to read and require additional knowledge.” (how?).

Result: within days, the package of books was sold out; a few weeks later, an important inquiry still ran.

Conclusion.

(i) Note the conditions method of analysis of the experiment (RH 76: What? Where? When? Why?). It may become, in your thesis, a basic structure of analysis and representation. Note: one circumstance (‘parameter’, factor) was not explicitly mentioned, namely ‘to whom?’. But this appears from the ‘what?’: these were ‘scientific’ books, obviously intended for intellectuals.

Conclusion: We, intellectuals, are also ‘seduced’ by convenient, ‘manipulating’ stimuli, to which we ‘respond’ (RH B7: stimulus/response scheme). So it is not only mass man, with his Common - sense - insights, who is ‘defenseless’ in the face of insidious techniques in ‘peddling’

(ii) Such deeds of sale are called “impulsive” deeds of sale. This is something that has been the subject of thorough research. And these analyses show that, in a large number of sectors, the percentage of planned, well-considered, ‘rational’ purchases is significantly lower than the percentage of impulsive, ‘irrational’ purchases. ‘Impulsive’ buying occurs in an “état second” (“a second state”).

RH 104.

(b).-- *The explanation* (“hypothesis”).

It is so clear that the German bookseller, influenced the value judgment, active in the conclusion act to buy. His ‘message’ (“Buy these books”; RH 38) “went in” (RH 11: gaining acceptance). And apparently not so much by ‘rational’ and ‘conscious’ means. ‘something’ was at work (RH 46vv.), something very suggestive even. And: “Beware. These books ...” was an act of language (in signifying terms; RH 47).

Listening dedicates utility to Ernst Dichter.

The “axiom” (Dichter was psychoanalytically trained) was, “if you assume that most acts of buying are irrational, then you will engage in “motivational research” in salesmanship and, immediately, in sales, achieve greater results.

Indeed:

(i) ordinary pollsters aim at the conscious behavior, -perhaps indirectly at the unconscious factors that partly (not solely) control this behavior.

(ii) The ‘motive investigation’ type Dichter takes both psychological and sociological and even psychiatric (RH 44: Moreno; RH 50: ABC theory; RH 99: psychosis) approach.- Dichter distinguishes three levels in our mind:

a. *the conscious level*, within which people reason, at least in part, logically;

b. *the subconscious level*; in which Dichter et al. situate fear, envy, shame,-- prejudice of all kinds.

App1. model.

Chrysler, the car manufacturer, once asked Dichter his opinion about a sales campaign regarding the Plymouth type.

(i) Chrysler’s market researchers had commissioned as a roundtable question : “Why / why do seventy percent of car buyers buy a model of the same brand, when they change cars?”. Answers : “Because we are satisfied”.

(ii). Poet responded with: we must penetrate into the (sub)conscious of those buyers, where fear of the unknown determines that not changing brand.” The need for certainty is inherent in all individuals. So we have to show the new brand that is offered for sale on the market, but point out its traditional nature. That’s why we added a motto: “Five minutes are enough to get you acquainted with this new Plymouth”.

c. *The third level.*

Poet probes even deeper : there is an even deeper emptiness in each of us.

RH 105.

He calls this layer “the unconscious.”-- The psychic processes -- said Dichter -- including the sales processes, find their main “moving energies” in that unconscious. At this depth even the awareness of what we do is lacking. That is where the really conditioned reflexes are situated (think of the Psychoreflexology of Pavlov and von Bechterev, of the Behaviorism of Thorndike and Watson, who explain all forms of behavior starting from reflexes, unconscious reactions to stimuli).

In his *Strategy of Desire*, then, Dichter sees our culture as a “psycho-economic civilization.

Note.-- Like all innovators, Dichter has had ardent admirers (RH 98: feeling-adverse type) and vehement revilers (RH: ramming type). Among the latter Vance Packard (in his *The Status Seekers*, but too forward in his *The Hidden Seducers*): people like Dichter transform the commercial enterprise into a system of conditioned reflexes -- without integrating ethical values. In particular: is such a ‘demonic sales technique’ still justifiable in conscience?

Journal of Business Ethics.

In this context, we understand a periodical (Dordrecht) as mentioned Journal. -- A multidisciplinary approach with the theme of ‘business’ (‘business’) and as a problem “conscientious way of doing business”. By ‘business’ the review understands “all systems within which exchange of goods and services occurs”. By ‘ethics’ (moral theory) it understands “all human action whose purpose is to secure a ‘good’ life.”

‘Black market’.

R. Sedillot, *Histoire des marchés noirs*, (History of black markets), Paris,1984, offers us the opportunity to see a sui generis market mechanism.

The book has as its thesis: “if

(i) excessive government regulation and/or
(ii) too high a degree of scarcity (goods, services, -- e.g. food scarcity, foreign exchange scarcity), then ‘black market’.

‘Black market’ has as its definition : “market operations to the extent that they are

(i) outside approved channels and
(ii) take place on the edge of legality”.

Counter model: “Abolish rule and law and make sure there is no excessive scarcity, and there is, suddenly, no black market:

The Prohibition period in the USA (1919/1933) gave rise to the term “black market” in language usage.

RH 106.

VII. *The theory of description.* (106/121)

RH 58 we saw what rendering of existence (actual existence) and the essence (way of being), the commons par excellence, is.

RH 60/ 65 showed us what a treatise becomes when, on the basis of observation, “the facts” (= data, existence + essence) are not (sufficiently) represented. Mead’s treatise is, therefore, years later by a Freeman (RH 64v.) falsified, i.e. caught on errors of observation and interpretation - better : gaps.

RH 76 showed us, finally, how the circumstances (i.e., the “situation”) further specify the representation of existence and essence (RH 102v. gave us a marketing example of this).

Last but not least: the value judgment, which, normally, any treatise, worthy of the name, intersperses or, even, expressly articulates in the text itself, can only be valid when, first and foremost, representation of the data (again: existence + essence + (preferably) circumstances) is available (RH 76).-- In this context, the chapter on description becomes understandable.

Bibl. sample:

- *Poétique* 65 (fevr. 1986): Raconter/ représenter/ décrire;
- C. Ginzburg, *Ekphrasis and Quotation*, in: *Journal of Philosophy* 50 (1988): 1 (March), 3/19;
- E. Zola, *De la description*, (From the description,), in: *Le roman expérimental* (1880), in: *Œuvres complètes*, x, Cercle du livre précieux, 1968;
- Ph. Hamon, *Qu’est-ce qu’une description*, (What is a description,), *Poétique* 12;
- J. Ricardou, *L’ordre des choses ou une expérience de la description méthodique*, (The order of things or an experience of methodical description,), in *Pratiques* (Metz), numéro spécial, 75/84;

More traditional works:

- C. Lefèvre, *La composition littéraire*, Bruxelles, 1963-3, 300/322 (*La description*);
- J. Gob, *Précis de littérature française*, Bruxelles, 1947, 151/154 (*La description*).
- Also: Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Temps et description dans le récit d’aujourd’hui*, (Time and description in today’s narrative), in: *Pour un nouveau roman*, in : *Idées* (Paris) 45.

Origins.

According to R. Barthes, *L’av. sém.*, 148s., the origin of the ‘ekphrasis’ (RH 29) is what is called “a digressio (in Greek: par.ek.basis),--also: ‘excursus’, digression.

In poetic, rhetorical (sensu strictiori), and professional-scientific-wise works, one deviates from the “actual” theme or to “elaborate” on a “by.theme” (an “exemplification” or “exemplification,” a refutation of an objection, even a kind of closed discourse).

RH 107.

The definition.

One would best start from the definition (RH 79v.) For--looked at its essence--a definition (essence determination) is one type of description, viz. the shortest possible description of that which it is about,--although looked at according to its 'distinctness' (discriminability or 'essence form' ('forma')).

One who "describes" in the running sense of that word, is doing nothing more than giving a comprehensive definition.-- From this point of view, "definitions" of description become understandable and -- importantly -- improvable. Thus, e.g., "The description is the verbal, (...), circumstantial representation of a sense". (C. Lefèvre, o.c., 300). Omit "circumstantial," "sense," and even "perceptible," and the definition is general, i.e., a true definition. What the author gives is precisely one type of description. After all, one can also describe an imagined, not 'perceptible' fact. Why? One can describe, i.e. represent, anything.

Note.-- However, one can note three ranks of the descriptive act:

- (i) the one who displays (the subject),
- (ii) that which is displayed (in the description) and
- (iii) the representation or description itself.

One-Endedness.

Hermeneutically (RH 49), we must strongly emphasize one main trait, namely, object-boundness. To render what is factual, and what this actually is, with or without the circumstance, as a work of description, is to respond to one given thing in one unambiguous way.

Note.-- This does not preclude, e.g., different positions of description. For example, the Husserlian phenomenologist will describe the given as singular and introspectively attuned to what he wants to represent. Thus the true Marxist wants to describe - as objectively as possible - from a class struggle standpoint. But similarly, the Positivist wants to describe-"as objectively and factually as possible"-but verifiably by other professional scientists.

The result will differ, of course. But this does not prevent the essential and minimal objectivity (= one-another) of each description type.

RH 108.

Note.-- The one-unambiguity, spoken of, can still be understood in another, object-bound way: C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d' élocution*, (Practical treaty of writing and elocution,), Dour, 1910, 61, sees two variants:

(a) **The totality** (Gestalt psychology, among others) is represented as a totality” by subordinating the choice of details (*note*: circumstances) to the overall impression”. This ‘totality’, after all, gives the description its unity (coherence);

(b) **The alternation of details** gives this unity richness thanks to diversity; above all: the partial impressions - so says Ansotte - preferably original and new, “powerfully paint the given, make its characteristic come out, -- in a word: make it ‘see’ “. -- In Antique-Greek terms: the details reflect the multiplicity -- so that unity (coherence) and multiplicity (variety) go hand in hand.

Note -- G.J. Warnock, *Qualities*, in: *Enc. Britannica*, Chicago,1967, 18, 914/ 916, says that the term ‘poiotès’ was created by Platon and was Latinized by Cicero (RH 16, 28) by ‘qualitas’ (property). Cfr. *Theaitetos 182a*.

1. Feature” means anything that makes something distinguishable from the rest (trait, characteristic, “individuality”). In this sense the term refers to everything that can be ascribed to something in a description.

Conclusion: in that Platonizing sense, it can be said that to “describe” is to put the “peculiarities” of something into words.

Note.-- In contrast to logistic language that contrasts ‘property’ with ‘relation’, the Platonic holds that something as a trait (‘property’) has a relation to something else. “The earth is bigger than the moon” conveys a ‘property’ of the earth (and, reciprocally, also of the moon, which is then called ‘smaller than’). “Liesje is the daughter of Hendrik” gives a ‘property’ - a ‘relational property’ - of Liesje (and, reciprocally, of Hendrik, who is “the father of” Liesje).

2. The Platonic term ‘property’ means - according to Warnock - also value-ownership. Two types of clothing e.g. have different properties (in the sense indicated above). But even if they do not differ (the same fabric e.g.), they may have a value difference.

Conclusion: ‘property’ (Platonic) is very broad.

RH 108.1.

Appl. model.

Imagine : your prof asks you to create a final paper entitled “Characterization of Rousseau”. ‘Characteristic’ is, here, the name of one type of description.

Bibl. sample: O. Willmann, *Abriss d. Phil.*, 34, 153f..

(1).-- To “characterize” something (thing, person), says Willmann, involves being (i) represent (‘describe’) the essential (the essential, making it distinguishable from the rest),

(ii) with the omission of the unreal.-- In our current parlance, one can also use the term “typing” for this purpose.

(2).-- **The structure.**

Willmann takes, as an example, “The characteristic of a personality.” This includes:

a.1. The viewpoint description (‘prosopo.pee’, RH 29) answers the question : “How does someone look?”. Updated, this is the viewpoint of behavioral description (‘Behaviorism’).

a.2. The social positioning, which gives someone a ‘place’ (= situate) in society, - which includes something like ‘status’ (social standing), profession etc. ‘View’ here then is meant sociologically - not physically. - In Diltheyan terms, this would be ‘natural-scientific’ description (‘Scientistics’; RH 91), which clings to what everyone, sensory, can perceive. -- The lute view: as a single person in a social whole.

B. The inwardness description (‘etho.pee’, RH 29)

answers the question, “What kind of ‘human being’ (soul, spirit, character, and temperament) is a person?” This noölogical point of view (for, in Willmann’s view, ‘human being’ is equi- lent with intellect/ reason, mind and will (RH 54), i.e., ‘spirit’;-- which is brought up in noölogy, analysis of spirit) is actualized, among other things, in the Diltheyan *verstehende* method (RH 49,91), which, through the view, seeks to penetrate to the ‘soul’ (personality)

Note.-- Willmann, *ibid.*, notes that, in characterization, more than one point of view is possible.

(1).-- **The idealization.**

Aristotle, *Poetics* 15, says that e.g. “good” (meaning: seeking the ideal in the harsh reality) painters depict the characteristic of something, but, with all fidelity to the object, “they depict it more beautifully”. According to Aristotle, a writer who depicts defects of temperament and character should nevertheless render his figures in a refined manner.

RH 109.

(2).-- *Naturalism.*

Whereas idealization is the rendering (“describing”) of “reality”, purified (“cleansed”) and elevated to a higher plane (what the ancient Greeks called “catharsis”), naturalism is concerned with rendering (“describing”) the same “reality”, uncleaned, not elevated,-- “degraded” if need be. The naturalistic approach feels ‘idealization’ as an “escape from harsh reality”,-- which contains truth, but lapses, especially nowadays, into ‘miserabilism’ (what the Germans call ‘Elendmalerei’, misery painting).

What P. Ricoeur (RH 49) once labeled “the three critical materialists” - K. Marx (economic-social misery), Fr. Nietzsche (cultural misery), S. Freud (depth-psychological misery) can pass as examples of that “degrading” description.

If one were to read only those three writers, one does not escape a one-sided view of man. One can catalog those three authors under - what Bettermann called “intellectualistic criticism” (RH 98) or even under “ironic-sarcastic appreciation of value” (RH 98).

Note .-- A Nikolai Gogoly (1809/1852; Russian novelist) exhibits a rare mixture of and idealization and degrading representation, which Leo Kobbilinski-Ellis, once, called “the weeping laughter” of Gogoly: as a Christian Platonist, Gogoly lived from the high, idealizing ideas of God, but as a “realist writer” he was so rawly confronted with the degraded Russian society of his day that he;- thinking of the ideal, wept (the defect of God’s plans for mankind)... while, watching the caricatures of those God-ideas, he laughed bitterly.

Appl. model. (109/112)

The union of outlook and inwardness description is called, traditionally, besides “characteristic,” also “portrait.

We give, now, an example of this. But so that ye may at the same time become acquainted with a type of description, ‘tableau’ (painting).--

Within the general type of ‘tableau’ one situates, usually, the painting hypotyposis. The Greek ‘hupotuposis’ means

(i) outline, but also

(ii) reality sketch.

The pre-eminent trait (‘property’ in Platonic language) of the hypotypic is -- what the Latins call -- ‘evidentia’, putting it under the eyes,-- “situating you in the midst of it”.

RH 110.

1. A “painting hypothetical” known to current youth is the famous “I have a dream” by Martin Luther King (1929/1968).

More banal but still ‘hypotypical’, the working-class person says : “I can already see me living that!”. Or the student(s) : “I can already see me succeeding!”.

Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1636/1711) describes, hypotypically, the sphere of life of the time of the ‘Vadsige kings’ “Quatre boeufs attelés, d’ un pas tranquille et lent, // Promenaient dans Paris le monarque indolent”. The time of the ‘pious’ kings shared to such an extent in the slothfulness of the high lords that the oxen, slow by nature, were the symbol of the time.

2. *Marcia, the girl of the night* (110/111).

She has something of the cats. Dark and full of secrets... Like many cats, Marcia becomes active only at night. The hours after darkness falls are the element in which she only feels at home.

“Even as a teenager -- this is how it still strikes her, now that she is 21 -- I was someone who really dabbled in the night.” -- “This, -- much to the chagrin of my mother, who was consumed with worry until, as midnight passed, I emerged again. Which, each time, made me promise better.

But the sea of light that is the metropolis drew me - ‘magnetically’, says Marcia (RH 46: suggestion; ‘psychodynamic effect’) - time and again and held me in its grip. Where the illuminated signs of entertainment companies, of clubs and bars and discos turned night into day, there, for me, was ‘true life’. I simply could not sit quietly at home any more, as soon as I realized that ‘out there’ there was laughter, drink, life, eroticism.

Between sunrise and sunset, labor, feverish hunting, stress, pursuit of career and success, livelihood and money determine the course of time.

But then suddenly the offices and business close. And the doors of the classrooms and amusement arcades open.

But perhaps the main reason for my hiding at night lies in the fact that I was brought up in a shabby, pathetic-ugly part of London, where - frankly - daytime life was not a pretty sight.

Added to this is the fact that my parents split up after a quarrel and there was no question of - what is called - “harmonious family life” (Frech (Frankf.a.c.), 7.51).--

RH 111.

Note.-- One sees it: RH 72v. (bellettrise analysis) gives a first vista.

- a. Main impression: 'misery' amid 'glamour' (= mesmerizing sex appeal);
- b. structure: the comparison to cat life dominates the portrayal;
- c. what the Latins called 'evidentia', instead of describing it remotely, the author of this piece of literature throws us into the midst of what he wants to portray.

Studentess / student, if thou canst, endeavor either to draw up such a thing yourself or to find such a piece of description,--to make true, e.g., the, proposition, which thou dost advocate.

Note: the "view description" element of the barmaid's own person is missing. "Why?"

(i) The nature of the leaf Frech already says by itself (RH 82: argument) what the piece can contain.

(ii) By situating her in a 'nightclub', her mode of appearance (personal view,--'look' is now also said) speaks for itself. Thus, there is no need to describe unnecessarily.

Appl. model.-- (111-112)



Look, first, carefully at the picture, on the right, before you read the rest. Then confront your impression with what the portrait painting offers.

B. Heimo, Lolita (Une femme peut en cacher une autre), in: Geneva Home Informations, No. 566 (12.09.1985) 97r "For Lolita Moreno, since her election as Miss Switzerland, time has passed very quickly.

RH 112.

Meanwhile, she has proven that a miss can not only have beautiful legs, but also a head brimming with plans (...).

Egyptology (*op. study of Egyptian culture*), - immediately all her university studies were forgotten. A career as a photographic model could not satisfy her.

On the other hand, our former “Swiss beauty” has ambitions: she launches herself into business,--into a clothing company, a promotional agency (showbiz, sports); she is currently “the image (‘1 ‘image de marque’, figurehead) --and very much in the foreground --of Télécinema (*note: a television chain*). (...)

Amid jeans, T-shirts, Lolita Moreno is as spontaneous and simple as ever. She does not resign the title of beauty queen, which has established her fame. At the same time, she realizes that the label “Miss Switzerland” will be stuck on her for a very long time. “People walk around with a, cliché in their heads: for them I am ‘Miss Switzerland’--- so I can’t possibly be doing anything serious. (...).

Lolita Moreno has a whole bunch of pursuits and is accosted, from a wide variety of angles. Still, she exudes smiles and good cheer. “Sometimes I do have a hard time with it. I need a lot of sleep. But complaining,--one should not do that too much. My conviction now is that we have hidden energies somewhere: I would, in the past, never have thought that I would be able to keep it all up.” (...).

Note.-- The look or, rather, the pictorial impression ‘imago’ that a person has in the (superficial) eyes of fellow human beings, may insinuate the opposite of what the ‘verstehende’ (understanding, comprehensiveness) method (RH 49, 109), which looks through the view, discovers. This,-- by personal contact, by ‘participating observation’, by seeing people at work in the midst of their occupations.—Studentess / student, such a thing may be decisive for your final work, in its ‘persuasive value’.

Note.-- What Willmann calls ‘characteristic’ and others, most ‘portrait’ one finds already - determined by the time frame - in the Deutsrosophic (RH 28v.), namely in the eulogy (‘enkomion’).

Apart from the very explicit value judgment (praise), that text type is characterized by two parts:

- a. views and
- b. interior description

RH 113.

The parallel: (113/115)

We already met this text type - very briefly, RH 29.

The 'sun crisis', comparatio, contains at least two data, which are confronted with each other in such a way that both resemblance and difference (which is 'analogy') - both with equal right - are exposed.

The parallel, *sensu stricto*, is the description of more than one subject,--to draw them against each other or.

Appl. model.

We take as the basis of our paradigm *Et. Barilier, Les petits camarades*, (The little friends.), Paris, 1987.

The portrait of Raymond Aron (1905/1983), Liberal thinker, and the portrait of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905/1980), Left-wing thinker, are, in the first part of the said book, revealed. Although Barilier is pro-Aron, his attention, thereafter, turns emphatically to Sartre.

To better understand both 'figures' one must have sufficient 'background information'.

As an aside, remember well the systechy "figure/ background". Specifically, here the "figures" are Aron and especially Sartre, but both their "backgrounds" are highly identical.

1. Both were born in the same year. They met at the *École normale supérieure* (1924/1928). And became - both very freedom loving - friends.

2. During World War 1940/1945, Aron leaves for England and puts himself, along with many Frenchmen, under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle (1850/1970). In London, Aron became editor-in-chief of *La France libre*. Intellectually honest as he was, Aron was forced in time to distance himself critically from his leader: he reproached him, among other things, for claiming to represent only "legitimate France".

3. In 1946, a definitive rift arises between Aron and Sartre. This for the reason of very different views on 'Left'.

(i) To a certain extent Aron was 'Left'. But he did not tolerate that what presented itself as 'Left' degenerated into hollow rhetoric.

(ii)a. Aron's criticism did not concern the real Communists. For that matter : they systematically avoided any discussion with - what they disdainfully called - "bourgeois thinkers".

(ii)b. In France especially, there were very many intellectuals--what were then called--"Progressists. These mercilessly denounced every speck of beauty on the Western Liberal democracies,--in the name of such catchwords as 'Left' ('la Gauche'), 'Revolution', 'Proletariat'.

RH 114.

This,-- while they

a. engaged in “coarse politics” and **b,** with sophisticated “arguments” either tried to cover up or condoned the coarsest crimes of established Communism.

4. Aron saw, for example, how his “friend” Sartre and the Leftist Existentialist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908/1961) evolved into pro-Communist intellectuals.-- In 1955, Aron published *L’opium des intellectuels*, in which he denounced the hollow rhetoric of the “Progressists”,-- with rock-solid arguments.

Ch. Widmer, Projecteur sur le cas de Jean-Paul Sartre, in: Journal de Genève, 18.04.1987, outlines the further evolution of mentality, in France, as follows.

A. “From 1968 (*note:* the year of the New Left May revolt) and into 1980, Sartre and Aron are identified with the following image impressions (RH 112). Aron becomes rigid as a ‘reactionary’, a killjoy, someone who is old before he begins to live.

Sartre stiffens to “libertarian” enthusiasm, someone, who remains young in later life.

Now one obtains, happily from this simplistic contradiction. More than that: the tide is turning. ‘One’ now admits that Aron is “a meritorious man” - we would say: one is now exaggerating in the opposite sense. Sartre, meanwhile, is exposed to often scathing criticism, both in terms of his literary work and his style of thinking.”

B. Widmer then summarizes. Basing himself among other things on the data provided by Bernier, he says, in summary, what follows.

(i) Aron represents, in a masterly way, the traits of the professional intellectual; a sense of measure, a rational method (but one which Aron is aware of its limits), a concern to make one’s own theses verifiable through research, never forgetting that data, especially political data, are very complex, a refusal to sacrifice objective truth to so-called “urgent emergencies”.

Note.—Studentess/ student, these traits are all the pre-eminent traits that solid discourse exhibits.

(ii) Sartre, on the other hand, wanted, before anything else, to get into the spotlight, including by committing “philosophical” books and articles. By writing plays and novels. And deed-actually: Sartre is and remains even now -- a sometimes brilliant psychologist, a masterful writer of novels, “des romans à thèse” (novels with a Thesis incorporated in them, which one ‘defends’), Leftist plays, which reflect “pris au vif” (caught in the act) realities.

RH 115,

For two decades, Sartre, then, dominated the stands: he was widely read, commented on, translated. “Some now still haven’t recovered from Sartre” says Widmer.

But: the theses, which Sartre advocates, he has “proclaimed rather than verified publicly.” Thus literally Widmer. “Immediately, Sartre attributed to himself the ‘right’ to ignore the real data as well as those sciences, which describe that reality in a strict methodical way.”

Barilier’s treatise,

The task (RH 66).-- As we saw, the task falls into two aspects

A.-- *The fact.*

Two people, of the same age, study comrades freedom-loving and fighting to ensure that man -- as a free acting “subject” (the name, in France especially, to call the autonomous aspect in all of us) -- is secured.-- Yet each of the two have gone an opposite way (which we, above, as background information, have briefly explained).

B.-- *The requested.*

The explanation of the fact. Especially with regard to Sartre, who intrigues Barilier, who is Aronian.

Note.-- It is not the place here now to go into the rest of the work. Nevertheless, the following. Regarding Sartain, Barilier sees two hypotheses.

a. *The psychological hypothesis.*

If one puts Sartre’s childhood (especially) first, then one understands his Libertarian freedom drive.

b. *The creativity hypothesis.*

If one presupposes that Sartre is an artist (man of letters) rather than a “thinker,” one understands his success.

But - Barilier writes - this implies that one should never understand Sartre’s texts too literally. The reason is: for him, it was not about being radically objective; he wanted to be a writer whose work enriches the world and, immediately, stands in the full actuality.

Note.-- What *J. Parain-Vial, Tendances nouvelles de la philosophie*, (New trends in philosophy), Le Centurion, 1978, 61ss., confirms, the author ranks, without a glance, Sartre among the “Sophists” (RH 25 (Gorgias); 26 (Protagoras)).

RH 116.

The 'topography' (landscape description) (116/119).

Now don't think that traditional rhetoric didn't also go beyond humans. Not that it developed the sense of (natural) landscape that Romanticism, for example, discovered. Far from it. And yet. Classical rhetoric had a term: 'topography' ('topos' as 'place', in the sense of "space, in which a theme is situated").

Appl. mod.

(I). We begin with what *Pierre Fontanier (Les figures du discours)* (The figures of speech), Paris, 1977) calls a 'chronography': this is not a 'story', but the description of a short/long period of time. One describes an event (in this sense, chronography has something of the story), but one focuses on the 'accumulation of' the circumstances (RH 76, 83, 90, 106), whose concurrence helps to determine the event.

Aurora Bertrana, Fenue Tahiti (Vision de Polynésie), Neuchatel/ Paris, 1943, 106s. (Huhaine, one of the islands), gives us a 'chronography'.

"(...) We penetrate deep into the jungle (...). Between the tall tree branches, the pristine blue of the sky shines through. The forest is bathed in the rays of a fiery sun. Here air is in short supply. The heat is really suffocating.

In the absolute silence of this nature, all things come through more strongly and have a profound effect on the mind. The smallest sounds, the buzzing of thousands of insects, the chirping of a bird, the cracking of a branch. - A never-to-be-tangled tangle of branches, of tree trunks, envelops us: we are, literally, the 'prisoners' of this virgin-wild nature.

At a certain moment, the heat really became too much: we stopped. Our breathing became rapid, our heartbeat pounding. At the stroke, mosquitoes attacked us, sucking on our arms and legs and on my naked neck. A moment later our skin, already scorched by the sea air, is covered with hundreds of black spots. Then we fight, arms, legs swinging back and forth, leaping, maneuvering skillfully on all sides at once.

Result: all over our skins scattered little insect corpses and our blood, which had become theirs, splashed open everywhere on our skins.-- Me, staggered, jaded, thinking, "What senseless scum! Never have they seen men. Then why/why do they throw themselves upon us in precisely the same way as our 'civilized' fellow men?"

RH 117.

(II) Traditional “rhetoric” knew the commonplace “locus amoenus,” lustrous.

If we carry this fantasy through to the present, we come across, e.g., *Christine Brooke-Rose, A Rhetoric of the Unreal (Studies in Narrative and Structure, Especially of the Fantastic)*, Cambridge, 1983.

In the spirit of the Russian Formalists and of Structuralism (RH 35), The author analyzes the “real/unreal” distinction as it appears in narrative prose (*Tolkien, Lord of the Rings; Vonnegut/ McElroy, 'Sciencefiction' stories*; the French Nouveau Roman (e.g. *Robbe-Grillet, Nathalie Sarraute*); the more recent “Metafiction”).

She puts forward the classification of Tzvetan Todorov (RH 69), who sub-divides ‘the uncanny’ (the strange) and ‘the marvellous’ (the wonderful), within the fantastic. But beware: e.g. Science Fiction includes the fantastic strongly mixed with a kind of ‘realism’.

In this sphere we situate, for example, the work of *Ernst Jünger* (1895/1998), known among other things for his *Der Arbeiter* (the worker), (1931) and the Magical Realism it presents.

Inevitably you, a student, come into contact with these problems. Children, with whom you deal daily, still live for a serious part in a fantasy world. Which... is by no means an unreal world. On the contrary: when a child, especially before the age of twelve, does not have such a fantasy world, something goes wrong. Check that out. But without prejudice (RH 59: actual existence as a ‘lemma’). Thus it happens that a child ‘sees’ ‘head-footers’, (in his fantasy) or, like a *Frederick Van Eeden* (RH 41; *The Little John*), (*De kleine Johanne*), ‘sees’ ‘nature spirits’--and thereby insists that that ‘seeing’ is not a mistake.

The Romantic Idyll.

We already saw it, RH 63, that Western man - at least in part - carries ‘Romanticism’ within him. Therefore the following little example,--which may be useful to you, studentess/ student, for your thesis.

Stevens W. Mosher, Journey to the Forbidden China, New York/ London, 1985, 42ff. (in southern China, in Kwangsi province, west of Canton).

1. The settlements were, here, more dispersed, in this strongly incised landscape, and the roads seldom brought us to their vicinity. But, in a place where the road makes a sudden turn, I detected a village,-- far below us, caught in the curve of a roaring stream. A little corner of the world, tucked away far from the rest

RH 118.

(...). Enclosed as it was, the village seemed like something that existed entirely on its own,--a magical, enchanted world of about twenty sturdily built homes made of sun-dried building blocks (“adobe”). We were only twenty miles from Wu-chow, but we felt as if, in time and space, we were far away.

Only the wires of the electric grid, stretched along the river, testified to the century in which we live. The rest seemed to be a window looking out on a distant past.-- The whole was one feast of colors. In the pale blue of the sky nestled a brilliantly -- white cumulus cloud, which was slowly sliding by.

In soft, blue-green droves, the mountains drifted away, passing the group of posters from the river, which wound sea-green around the garden slopes. Purple-stemmed sugarcane fields, along with radiant-green grain samples, formed a checkerboard, in whose center a giant square of red and ochre yellow - the village could be seen. People with nut-brown faces and dressed in black moved in it,--slowly and with the appearance of peasant figures in ceramics.

The whole landscape was one splendor with an image impression of deep peace. This was the right place to go through the parabola of human existence - birth, engagement, childbirth, child rearing, old age, death - while living: the secure atmosphere of a small village. One naturally came under the spell of this blue-green solitude in eastern Kwangsi (...).

2. What appeared to be a masterpiece of form, composition and color,--from the vantage point from which I stood admiring it, would undoubtedly take on a very different appearance once I entered the village. This matter-of-fact consideration brought me back into the world of sober reality, within which this village would amount to “a village like any other.”

And yet, for a certain period of time, I had lived through the village as if immersed in perfectly clear peace, a quality which, although I realized it was an illusion, nevertheless continued to fascinate me.

A “performance” - the Romantic notion of an “idyll” - had me scattered. To escape, while dreaming, into a life of rural simplicity within a closed community is an important part of the fantasy life of today’s Western mankind.

RH 119.

J.-J. Rousseau (RH 63), who lived in a Europe of peasants, ennobled the “savages” while musing on the Hobbesian-barren reality of tribal life. (*Note: Thomas Hobbes* (1588/1679; Enlightened rational thinker, known for his *Leviathan* (1651 (a picture of a kind of police state))).

Western man, living in the oppressive stove of the age of electronics, sees peasant life as “Romantic,” at least from a distance, while forgetting or suppressing, there, the fact that the so-called “nature man” is often trapped in poverty, hounded by labor and undermined by disease (....).

The appearance of seclusion of this village was deception,--a ruse of its location. Units of the Red Army had, during the last days of the civil war, traversed the area.(...) Young cadres had come, in the early fifties, to apprehend the rich and collectivize the poor. Red Guards had come, in the late sixties (*note: the “Cultural Revolution”*), to destroy the statues of deities and the plaques of the ancestors.

This hamlet was a “production system,” part of a “production brigade,” which, in turn, was part of a “commune”,--for here, too, the “production” of corn and sugarcane “follows the central plan. As pristine and secluded as this settlement seemed, it was, unmistakably, the furthest reach of the leash of power, in the hands of Peking.”

A tome.

-- *Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization*, New York, 1934;

-- *Jeremy Rifkin/ Ted Howard, Entropy (A New World View)*, New York, 1980, among others, talk about the medieval world of living.

(1) The natural landscape was (predominant trait; RH 108: totality) “forests in which people lived.”

(2) The cultural landscape was correspondingly so: before coal and the steam engine, “wood” was the energy type par excellence. It was raw material, fuel and core of finished products (used objects, hand tools, appliances (ships, oil and wine presses, printing presses)). popularly said: “It was all forest and wood that struck the bell”.

RH 120.

Typology.

We can, now, summarize.

Bibl. sample:

-- B. Vouilloux, *Le tableau: description et peinture*, (The painting: description and painting), in: *Poétique* 65 (*Raconter, représenter, décrire*), 1986 févr., 1/18.

-- In that article, Vouilloux refers to *Gérard Genette, Introduction*, in: *P. Fontanier, Les figures du discours*, Paris, 1977, 16. There, rightly, Genette claims that traditional rhetoric has six main types of description:

1. Topography (landscape description);
- 2.a. Prosopography (view description),
- 2.b. Ethopoeia (inner description);
3. Portrait (in Willmann's terms: characteristic);
4. Parallel;
5. Tableau (painting).

To which Fontanier adds another seven: type, the chronography.

Above we have given of all seven and knowledges and applicative models.

Note.-- When you, therefore, read or form text yourself, try, when you establish descriptive type, to form a pure picture of the correct type.

Description is not a "statement."

Here the "reductions" (understand: "Ausklammerungen" (eliminations)) of Edm. Husserl (1859/1938; founder of intentional Phenomenology) comes in handy. 'To describe', in Husserlian spirit, is to grasp the subject 'purely' -- by eliminating everything that is not immediately given. It is pure perception -- sensory or mental -- and nothing more than that.

The eliminations are mainly:

1. the actual existence outside the act of observation itself (e.g. "In the distance I think I see a human being coming"; for the moment I continue with this uncertainty; RH 59: lemmatic method (i.e. focusing on the 'essence' ('eidos' called by Husserl, i.e. the preferably general mode of being of the given));

2.1. the perceiving self and its non-perceiving acts (e.g. "I think I see my personal enemy coming in the distance"; the value judgment concerning him is 'eingeklammert')

2.2. the lore concerning the object ("What others, for me or simultaneously with me, think about that person" is eliminated);

2.3. the theory concerning the theme ("Every enmity projects untrue things into what is or appears to be hostile": this thought does not come into consideration, when one is merely describing). - Student/student, please keep this Phenomenological advice in mind when you are merely "describing", i.e. purely reflecting your direct observations.

RH 121.

The description of the value judgment.

Bibl. sample: J. Ruytinx, *La morale et les sciences*, (Morality and science), in: *Philosophica Gandensia* (Meppel), New Series, 10 (1972) 1/12.

David Hume (1711/1776; pinnacle of English Enlightenment) is known for his thesis that one cannot derive ethics (the value judgments of conscience) from facts. Language analytic philosophy has resurrected that Humean theme.

From prepositions, in the demonstrative mode (indicative premises), normative, behavioral prescriptive nouns never arise. Put more strongly and literatologically: from merely descriptive prepositions one cannot derive non-descriptive postpositions. Thus, e.g., prescriptive ('normative'), value-giving ('evaluative'), commanding sentences.

Here we tie in with M. Scheler (RH 97) and A.O. Bettermann (RH 97). Scheler in particular stated, "Es gibt ein ursprüngliches intentionales Fühlen" (There is an original (i.e., reducible to nothing else) 'intentional' (i.e., attuned to an object) feeling).

Appl. model.

For example, "I have a feeling of remorse,--for the reason of a transgression". This feeling can arise and drift. In it there is a sense of value. I feel the value of not doing wrong. Of "acting well. The fact that I have partially cheated a fellow human being, in my merchandise, now strikes me as 'reprehensible.' The deception is a fact. The reprehensibility, from the ethical point of view (i.e. if I let my conscience speak), is not - nothing, but 'something'. an actual fact, a reality with its own nature of being. The perception of it is value-feeling.

Conclusion:

the disapproving sentence "I feel my act of deception is reprehensible" is a statement of fact and the actual (un)value of that fact (which are sub-separable, but not separable).

It is true that, in acts of perception of value, all kinds of objective and subjective factors play a role. I can react to the stimulus which is the sensed value or non-value in more than one way (RH 89): I can deny (repress, suppress) the remorse; I can become angry with myself; I can become dejected; I can also accept the value or non-value. But, before that group of possible reactions, is situated the value contact,-- the contact with a fact. This fact contains the actual (un)value. This I can describe in descriptive sentences.

RH 122.

VIII. Narrative theory (narration, narratology). (122/140)

Bibl. sample:

- Rimmon-Kenan (*Sholomith*), *Narrative Fiction*, London/ New York, 1933;
- Cl. Bremond, *Le message narratif*, in: *Communications 4 (Recherches sémiologiques)*, Paris, 1964, 4/32;
- R. Fayolle, *La critique*, Paris, 1978, 213/216 (*L'analyse du récit*);
- Mieke Bal, *Narratology*, Paris, 1977;
- P. Ricoeur, *La narrativité*, Paris, 1980;
- G. Genette, *Nouveau discours du récit*, Paris, 1983;
- J.-M. Adam, *Le récit*, Paris, 1984;
- id., *Le texte narratif*, Paris, 1984.

‘**Narrative**’ or ‘**narratology**’ (from Latin ‘narrare’, stories) is a new name for an old thing. Already Platon and Aristotle had texts about it.

As an aside, following on from the Greek ‘diègèsis’, story, storytelling is also called ‘dietetics’.

1. Narrative texts (“poetry”), according to Platon, include both purely word-textual storytelling and drama, which, of course, includes texts, but situates this one as an “actio” (RH 13v.: dramaturgy), an acting.

In passing: P. Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, (Time and narrative, I), Paris, 1983, follows Platon therein: drama and dietetics form one type.--

2. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1450a 2/3, calls the core of the drama (stage) ‘muthos’, story (here not in the religious science sense of ‘myth’).

As an aside, Gérard Genette, *Nouveau discours du récit*, (New narrative discourse, I), adheres to the Aristo-telic use of words: story is, if you will, that which is acted in a play, but is not a drama. He resists the broadened meaning.

Conclusion: matter of agreement. As we saw, Deuterosophistics (RH 29) also had its storytelling.

Current narratology is, o m. strongly established following Vladimir Propp, *Morfologija Skazki (Morphology of the Fairy Tale)*, Leningrad, 1928 (in the style of the Russian Formalists; RH 35)

Note -- A kind of problem stand (RH 66) of recent narration is M. Mathieu- Colas, *Frontières de la narratologie (Discussion critique)*, in: *Poétique* 65 (Raconter / Représenter / Décrire), 1986 (févr.), 91/110.

Description and story.

Actually, narration, in a well-defined, broad sense, is description. B. Vouilloux, *Le tableau (Poétique* 65), 11s, says that any given (theme) is amenable to two perspectives:

RH 123.

- a. the data is represented in its synchronic essence form (description);
- b. the same fact is presented in its diachronic creature form (narrative).

Which e.g. *J. Broeckaert, Le guide du jeune littérateur*, (The Young Writer's Guide), Bruxelles/ Paris/ Bois-le-Duc, 1872,180, expresses as follows:

(i) The description of a simultaneous set of data (“un tableau simultané”) is a description;

(ii) the description of a sequence (“une action successive”) is a narrative.

This combination is perfectly understandable: the first purpose of description and narration is not, for example, ‘to explain’ (RH 120), because one only explains - methodically - what one has first described (in its existence/ essence and, possibly, in its circumstances). The first purpose of describing and narrating is, also, not ‘evaluating’ (RH 121), because a value judgment - methodically justified - comes only after the description, respectively the story. - This is due to the object orientation (RH 107), which is defined (RH 107), so to speak, either in the description or in the narrative.

The anecdote (smallest story unit) (123/125)

Descartes (1596/1650; founder of Modern Enlightened Rationalism) - in order to make an unordered totality ... ‘rational’ (orderly) totality - split it into its smallest elements. Thus we take the ‘anecdote’ as, perhaps, the smallest ‘unit’ of storytelling. To read, in it, the structure of all stories.

‘An.ek.doton’, in Ancient Greek, is, among other things, ‘un.given’. Now ‘anecdote’ means a story that is short, but punchy (pithy, witty, cutting, attractive).

M. Maloux, L' esprit à travers l' histoire, Paris, 1977, 20, characterizes the anecdote as follows.

Anecdotes are characterized by

- i. original (singular) or at most rare (exceptional) either
- ii. quaint (picturesque) sayings or facts.

Georges Lenôtre (1857/1935) once said that one penetrates large-scale history through small-scale history. *Prosper Mérimée* (1803/1870), *Chronique du règne de Charles ix*, (Chronicle of the reign of Charles ix), préface, says:

“Actually, in historiography, I am only interested in the anecdotes. Among these, my preference is for those anecdotes which represent a creature-like painting (RH 109) of the morals and characters of a particular epoch.”

Note that the serious anecdote gives us a historically verifiable event, while the “little story,” “little history,” (little poem) is either true or “well found.”

RH 124.

Appl. model.

(1), George Bush, President of the USA, in 1988, was once in conversation with Pope John-Paul II (Karol Wojtyła, Pope since 1978), among other things, about Mao Tse Toeng and Mrs. Brezhnev.

a. Bush was USA - ambassador to Communist China. Mao Zedong (recent spelling; 1893/1976; founder of the People's Republic of China) was, a little before his death, in conversation with Bush : "Soon I will go to heaven. I have already received from God my invitation". Which, of course, is inconsistent with "religion opium of the people" (Marx).

b. Bush was at the solemn funeral of Leonid Brezhnev (1906/1982), head of state of the Soviet Union. "There - in the midst of the center of a totalitarian, cold - sad state - Mrs. Brezhnev stood, for the last time, looking at her husband. With a gesture that could not be mistaken, she stooped down ... to make a sign of the cross over her husband's chest". (*Journal de Genève* 21.09.1987).

(2) *Michaele Denis, Un léopard sur les genoux*, (A leopard on your lap), Paris, 1956, 35s., relates that, as an actress in a Hollywood -équipe, she -witnessed the filming of *The Mines of King Solomon* (Kenya).-- Her story is an extended anecdote. We divide it into.

a. ***Frontknot*** ('ektnesis', expositio).-- I had recruited a nine-year-old boy to carry my make-up box. The tips, which I gave him, put him in a category, which was higher than that of his father. I suspect he was very attached to me.

b. ***Knot*** ('desis').-- About a year later, -- when we were about to leave Nairobi (...), he came to see me. I looked at him: I suspected he wanted to say something. I thought he was in need of money and wanted to give him money.

c. ***Turnaround to the contrary*** ("peripeteia").-- He refused. The cup bowed, he remained standing before me, with a blur of tears before his dark little eyes.--"Explain" I said.--"Thou must accept me as thy child". -- "But your father and mother" I said "would be very angry, if they lost their son!". -- The Negro boy did not answer.

d. ***Dissolution*** ("lusion"). I took him by the chin and said, "I will be your aunt, your mother's sister." -- His little face brightened. He brightened up and said, "Good-bye. I saw him walk away singing.

Compare the format with RH 99/100, where, however, the denouement is pretty much lacking. Which gives the story a 'finis ex abrupto', a sudden breaking off as an ending.

RH 125.

Note.-- We selected the second applicative model of anecdote because it represents an encounter ('rencontre', 'encounter').

Bibl. sample: *F. Buytendijk, Zur Phänomenologie (RH 120) der Begegnung, (La phénoménologie de la rencontre,)*, in: *O. Fröbe - Kapteyn, Eranos-Jarhrbuch, 1950 (Mensch und Ritus), Zurich, 1951, 431/486.*

Buytendijk expounds there a kind of theory concerning the (Existential Phenomenological interpretation of the) encounter. In short, 'meeting someone' amounts to making a more than superficial acquaintance. Through the 'view' (RH 108.1: object of prosopopia; 'prosopon' is, in Ancient Greek, 'mask'), on a 'deeper level', getting to know one's fellow man so that one communicates and interacts with one another 'from soul to soul' (RH 108: object of ethopia) (object of signification (RH 41vv. (rapport);44 (psychodramatic form of encounter)).

The film actress, in a very simple story, suggests more than she says it does, a real "meeting" between her and a, in principle, totally strange Negro African boy,-- beyond the limits of "other-ness" (RH 69).

Note.-- What is called 'histoire anecdotique' or also 'History From Below; consists, essentially of a thesis, substantiated by a set of (well-chosen) anecdotes.

Cfr *H.C. Ehalt, Geschichte von Unten, (L'histoire d'en bas,)*, Wien, 1984, in which an older folklore tradition, re-founded as Alltagsgeschichte, proves the interlocking existence of 'Alltag' (everyday life) and 'Kultur' (overall culture).

Studentess /student, here appears the reason why we dwell and on description and on story: in every description and story, a proposition (RH 86).

A. Those who purely describe or narrate leave the proposition unexpressed (implicitly). That can charm,-- as pure description, as story for the sake of story.--

B. He who makes a treatise engages, constantly, descriptions and stories,-- but expresses the proposition in them.

So e.g. M. Denis' anecdote: by 'reading' (interpreting) into it the description of an 'encounter', the proposition in it was made explicit.

RH 126.

Further description.

RH 123 we saw the definition: “the representation of the diachronic essence form of a data”.

Precise we now. - Aristotle, *Poet.*, 1450a 2/3, defines, “The ‘muthos’ the story, is the ‘mimèsis’, representation (not imitation), of a ‘praxis’, action.” The object - according to the Stagirite - are ‘ta pragmata’, the facts. The narrative is, of these, the ‘sunthesis’. The closed representation. In *Poet.*, 1450b 23, Aristotle calls the narrative a ‘sustasis’. The structural representation, of the facts such that they emerge from the story as a complete and coherent ‘act’ (= happening ‘process’). It is therefore normal that this ‘action’ has a certain ‘megethos’, a certain, minimal size (a sentence or two can hardly be called a ‘story’).

The circumstantial story.

U. Eco *Postscript to The Name of the Rose*, Amsterdam, 1984, 41, points out, in this context, the classical requirements: the ‘action’ in question must exhibit unity (coherence) and, preferably, also unity of time (diachronic); and place (synchronous)

This involves the conditions method (RH 7, 106,-- especially 116 (description type).

The old *C. Ansote, Traité pr.*, 49, rightly says: “The story is the account of a real or imagined fact, -- with all the interesting (significant, ‘relevant’) circumstances, which go with it, from its origin to its final conclusion.” T.A. van Dijk, *Text Science*, 150/155 (*narrative structures*), says that only the non-redundant (non-redundant) circumstances do not bore (keep the narrative tension going: what follows must, after all, be unknown, ‘new’, or, at least quasi-unknown).

Note -- “Praxeology.

‘Praxis’, an event, constitutes praxeology, theory of action. Narration is a praxeological event: the action, its phases, its circumstances, are the object of praxeology.

Appl. model.

L. Rademaker/ H.Bergman, *Sociological currents*, Spectr./ Intermediair, 1977, 148, 149, gives us an application.

The situation (= all the circumstances) of the people involved, which are examined sociologically,- their actions, their behavioral alternatives are placed in an appropriate framework by the report (‘account’): “Who said something again? To whom? Where/when?”.

RH 127.

Note -- Alfred North Whitehead (1861/1947; with Russell author of *Principia mathematica*, one of the basic works of current logistics) is known for his process thinking,.

The central idea: the universe, which he identifies as an ‘organism’, consists of ‘events’, not ‘things’ (which, in his language, by definition, have no movement, change, ‘action’). In such a philosophy, therefore, narration is a principal thing.

As an aside: ‘process’ is ‘course’ i.e. a series of partial events, which together make up one whole ‘event’, occurrence.-- Which is very similar to e.g. Aristotle’s definition, above.

The “actants”. (127/130)

Bibl. sample: Kr. Hemmereichs, *A Plausible Story and a Plausible Way of Telling It (A Structuralist Analysis of Jean Rhys’ Novels)*, Frankf.a.M./ Bern/ New York, 1986.

-- Jean Rhys (1890/1979) is an English novelist,--who includes five novels. In structural style, Hemmereichs dissects structures. She draws on A.J. Greimas and G. Genette, among others. The narrative theory distinguishes, in that case, in the Saussurian-Structural sense,

- (1) a surface structure (the ‘actantial’ side) and, hidden,
- (2) a depth or “semantic” structure.

The ‘actants’, i.e. actors/actresses of a story pursue, ordered binary or in ‘systechy’ (pair of opposites), a goal. In particular : they want e.g. to acquire something or, the counter model, to avoid it. -- In the ‘background’ (in Structural language : ‘depth’) Hemmereichs sees ‘powers’. These are, in a sense, ‘actants’, but in the ‘depth’ of the event (the action).

Thus, e.g., they act, equally binary (in systemic form), on the enterprise (action) of the actors: by, e.g., favoring or, the counter-model, opposing.

Conclusion: the ‘power’ is the beneficiary/opposing ‘agency’ (part of the event) and the ‘actant’ is the beneficiary/opposing ‘agency’.

In Jean Rhys’ novels, now, something peculiar occurs, at least from Hemmereichs’ perspective: the actant roles are absent. The heroines, for example, ‘live’ there, without more, in perfect accord with themselves and the environment,--as ‘free and independent beings; without ‘powers’.

RH 128.

An application.

As unusual as Hemmerechts' depiction may seem to you, there is a real insight in the scheme "actors/powers (surface/depth)" - even outside the Structuralist view - that may happen to inspire you, the student.

One thinks e.g. of *Ch.R. Maturin* (1782/1824; Irish writer of 'novels noirs'; thus *Melmoth or the wandering man* (1820)). The book was translated into French: *Melmoth ou l'homme errant* (Trad. intégrale), Paris, 1988.

One thinks, on reflection, of Ch. Baudelaire (RH 73) or André Breton (1896/ 1966: Surrealist). Melmoth expresses something that is ancient, already known in Archaic (= ancient) cultures, namely the 'demonic' (in Church language: 'Luciferian') element or, in Hemmerechts' language, 'power'. In every man, in every woman.

Do not be so astonished: someone like *M. Scheler* (RH 97,121), in his *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, Darmstadt, 1930 (written when Scheler was no longer Catholic), 83, talks very emphatically about "the demonic, i.e. vis-à-vis all spiritual ideas (rather Platonic to be understood (RH 53)) and values blind drive" in the whole cosmos, in specie in man.

Appl. model.

R. Ambelain, Le vampirisme (De la légende au réel), Paris, 1977, 205, tells us something that makes "actants" and "powers" look or feel good.

1. Last century, a woman, between the ages of thirty-five and forty, Eugénie lived lived at Edney, near Bordeaux. (// Thérèse Neumann) She was considered to be a "seer" (mantis) and was, moreover, strongly gifted in the occult and could, e.g., make beings from the other world "appear" ("theürgie") at will.

A medical peculiarity: her abdomen was regularly swollen; she had legs like those of a "hydropique" (watery); she lived - it seems - for twelve years on mere water,-a phenomenon one still hears told.

She was, of course, even in Enlightened France, known here and there. Many great men of the earth, including Adolphe Thiers (1897/1877; historian and statesman),-- many physicians, of course, including a Dr. Fortin, whom Ambelain serves as a source, came to "see" her.

2.a. As very often in the 'alltagsgeschichte' (RH 125), a lot of people, very naively, converted "ses dons" (her gifts) into signs of God-given 'holiness'. Consequence: from all over the department people brought children to her "to bless them".

RH 129.

2.b. (a) *The fact.*

The very conspicuous way in which (*note*: circumstance: how?) she acted as a healer greatly aroused suspicion: she fell, literally, on those children, grabbed them, kissed them with passion (“avec fureur”) on the lips, the throat, the cup.

2.b (b) *The interpretation.*

Some bystanders said, inevitably : “It is as if she, a ‘vampire’ like, is saturating herself with children’s blood.”

Verification.

(i)a. In the winter period - when the roads of last century were difficult - Eugenie received few children as ‘clientele’. Curiously: simultaneously with this child absence (omen), ‘the saint’ became ill.

(i)b. But, in the summer, the mothers with children reappeared in abundance. Curiously: simultaneously with this (omen), she clearly came back to life” (thus, literally, Ambelain).

(ii) Dr. Fortin, who was apparently a sagacious physician, one day had the idea of “magnetizing” them (*note*: administering a dose of “life force”), but without notifying them. Result of this deliberate experiment: to the amazement of those around her, a uterine bleeding followed (omen).

Later, after a lot of emotions, Eugenie got up, got common hunger like everyone else and healed in a short time.

a. We intentionally divided the story because immediately another story structure is exposed.

b. We have made the basic pairing of all stories “portent/continue” at the end, in the testing section (verification), in the text itself, partially.

c. Now we point out: the actante, on the surface, was apparently Eugénie, the ‘saint’; the ‘power’, in the depth of her ‘acting’ (there is no better name), was...what? People like Ambelain, owing to obvious material, believe in ‘vampirism’, the fact that some people - along ‘occult’ (meaning nothing but “difficult or even not scientifically verifiable”) ways - ‘suck out’ something like the ‘blood soul’ (the expression occurs in all Archaic cultures), such that b.e. the children were “blessed” but lost “something” (RH 46: something (suggestive model), 94 (Tilton vs. Monroe), 104 (irrational buying)), instead of getting it.-- Which, according to teachers, e.g., also seems to occur in schools.

RH 130.

Note.

-- J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, (Frankf.a.M., 1981);
-- H. Kunneman, *Habermas' theory of communicative action (A summary)*, (Meppel, 1983, gives us a further theory concerning the 'actants').

According to J. Habermas (1929/ ...), second generation of the Frankfurter Schule (neither Positivist nor Hermeneutic), all intersubjective (occurring between "subjects" or individuals) and social acts can be classified into two types.

1. The "strategic" actions.

The 'actors/actresses' privilege their/their individual needs and interests (e.g.: pursuing profit, maximizing utility value to achieve ends; i.e.: using money or position of power to pressure or compromise; cf. RH 98 ('ramming appreciation')).

2. The "communicative" acts.

The actants want to put the action together by means of understanding. To this end they 'define' (RH 79) the action situation (= circumstances) - "This should be done" - jointly and, mutually, mutual indications arise - "I am going to undertake this; you take that on your responsibility". Instead of power relations, here comes contestability: the 'regulative acts of language' (cf. RH 47: act of language), i.e. the definitions and indications mentioned above, can always be contested,-- by a type of question such as: "What good reasons do you have for speaking in this way? - One thinks, at this, involuntarily of Alltagsgeschichte (RH 125), in our homes, kitchens, gardens, where one can so hear "communicative act".

The factual sequence: (130/137).

R. Barthes, *L'av. sém.*, 152s., says that t.v. the Early Scholastic (Carolingian Renaissance) a contemporary of Alcuinus (730/804) saw the factual order as twofold:

- a. 'ordo naturalis', i.e. one recounts the elements of action in the order of the facts themselves (from the beginning);
- b. 'ordo artificialis', i.e. one starts somewhere later (in the middle e.g.).

Note -- The "Nouveau Roman",

(1) In the traditional novel, "the thread" is clear : place and time, actants, the course of action (portentous/continuing; pre-knotting/entanglement/denouement) are presented in ordered and, above all, transparent order.

(2) In the 'New Roman' - since 1950+ (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Flanders and elsewhere) - there is, as it were, 'no thread'.

RH 131.

(i) An Alain Robbe-Grillet, a Michel Butor, a Nathalie Sarraute, a Claude Simon,-- each of the protagonists of the New Novel proceeds very individually.

(ii) Main impression: the labyrinth maze. The actual sense of life and world, after all, is weighed down by the massive impression that both one's own personality ('soul') and the world around us as a totality in the exhaustive sense are totally opaque. The experiences, perceptions, which we have both of ourselves and of our environment, are merely inductive samples, nothing more.

With a *U. Eco* (1932/2016; *The Name of the Rose*), the semiotician, one can at best infer something from vague "signs" and confusing "traces.

(iii) The narrative sequence reflects this labyrinthine sense of life and world: the reading of new novels is "difficult"-not that they are "learned," but there is no "thread," as it were.

It's like on the daily TV -screen: Brigitte Bardot, XXth century, comes before Charlemagne (early Medieval Ages), to which then follows a video by Walt Disney, to which then follows the news, to which then follows publicity!

In this sense, the New Novel is "realistic": it presents the narrative material in an analogous order as everyday life - again, *Alltagsgeschichte* (RH 125) - experiences it: now I work, now people make phone calls, now I eat, in the meantime I listen to radio.

(iv) The reception (RH 38) which the proposers of the New Novel presume, in the reader(s), is that the latter identifies with the authors, insofar as they ... make an attempt to decipher the maze that is life and the world,--that the reader(s) also co - decipher.

Note -- The Crisis of the 'Subject'.

(i) Moderns believed in an autonomous subject who, in the midst of a chaotic world, establishes order. The typical 'Modern' novel, therefore, put "the subject," the acting self, at the center.

(ii) People like the Structuralists (think Michel Foucault (1926/1984: "The subject is but foam in the midst of structures") or a *Derek Parfit, Reasons and Person*, Oxford, 1986, claim that that Modern 'order-founding subject; master of the acts of life, is fundamentally either non-existent or very much subordinate to 'structures' (physical, psychological, cultural).

Which is somewhat towards Nouveau Roman.

RH 132.

Note - What is called “The Modern Subject” comes into even sharper focus when looking at Middle Ages authorship. *Claire Jaquier, Deux visions du Moyen âge*, (Two visions of the Middle Ages), in: *Journal de Genève* 11.07.1987, briefly analyzes two books:

-- *R. Dragonetti, Le mirage des sources (L'art du faux dans le roman médiéval)*, (The mirage of the sources (The art of the false in the medieval novel)), Paris, 1987;

-- *P. Zumthor, La lettre et la voix (De la 'littérature' médiévale)*, (The letter and the voice (On medieval 'literature')), Paris, 1987 -- showing that the Middle Ages writer preferred namelessness, in most cases. Not only did he not want to be known as a the author; he did all sorts of things to make sure that people never found out that he had written the piece.

Even the clerks who copied texts were very free with authorship: if necessary they invented the text they had to copy! Which is a contradiction in terms, of course. Plagiarism (‘passing off’ the text of another as one’s own) gave rise, in the Arabic term for ‘poetry’, to the idea that ‘poetry’ was plagiarism.

But says Cl. Jaquier: “Rien n’ était, en ce temps, plus créateur que le copie” (freely translated: Nothing was, at the time, as creative as the writing down).

How do we, from 800 to 1450, understand the “Modern subject,” who “wants to be author; yes, absolute author, of his individual work. That, above all, wants to be known for it!

Further analysis of the couple “omen/continue,” (132/133)

A text, which narrates, establishes a sequence. The smallest unit in it is the antithesis pair ‘omen/continue’. One paid attention to the sentences: especially the adverbial clauses give us the true nature of ‘omen/ sequel’. “Because/ because she had seen that, she could not sleep” (omen: having seen something; continuation not being able to sleep (causal or motivic connection);

“She had seen that so she could not sleep” (consequential sentence) amounts to the same thing in thought.-- “When he got there, she was just cooking the potatoes” (temporal connection between the first sentence and the second);-- “I want you to come immediately” (the first sentence has its content in the second).

Conclusion: ‘Foreshadowing/continuing’ denotes only the pure order of sentences (where-under causation).-- Aristotle and, with him, the Middle Ages Scholastics defined ‘time’ as the order ‘earlier/ later’.

RH 133.

Well, no better definition of the pair ‘prefatory/continuing’, which expresses any connection between previous sentence and the next. Let us take an example from VI. Propp.

1. “A prince gives to a hero an eagle. That eagle carries off the hero to another principality.” The preface: “A prince gives ... an eagle”; the sequel: “That eagle carries away”.

2. In an analogous fairy tale, Propp discovers “An old man gives to Sushenko a horse. This horse carries Sushenko away to another principality”. -- Yet in another analogous case, “A princess gives Ivan a ring. From that ring spring young men, who carry off Ivan to another principality”.

The analogy.-- Is ‘analogous’ all that is partly identical partly non-identical. Propp’s ‘Formalist analysis’ relies on this.

(i) Non-identical are the actants (monarch, old man, princess,-- eagle, horse, ring (these too are ‘actants’ in the broader sense),-- hero, Sushenko, Ivan).

(ii) Identical are the actions (events), which Propp calls ‘functions’.

The essential and the incidental.

(i) Ancillary is ‘by whom’ the act is performed (human, animal, plant,-- object,-- extra-natural being),-- ‘how’ (by what means) the agents (= actants) proceed (persuasion, deception, violence, magic),-- ‘with what intent’ (damage, service, pastime).

(ii) Essential is ‘what is done’ (the function, the action). Cfr. *Cl. Bremond, Le message narratif*, 6.

Conclusion.

In Proppian Formalist analysis, the connection ‘omen/sequel’ is essentially a connection of ‘functions’ (actions), which follow one from the other. Thereby we have, personally, the impression that the term ‘what is done’ is better replaced by ‘whether there is ... is done’. The pure fact, without much essence!

Appl. model.

Take a fairy tale in which: “The princess came into the eyes of the wicked witch. She was, instantly, turned into a gem”. Or: “The princess came into the eyes of the prince. Immediately she vanished into thin air”. If we look not at the sentences but at the content of the sentences, then, clearly, the link ‘omen/continuation’ is one of “Something is happening”/ “Something is happening”/ “Something is happening”.

RH 134.

Further analysis of “front knot/ knots (twists, turns)/ denouement”. (134/ 137).

When the story is not a “rambled tale,” as in non-sensical or New-Roman style, it is distinguishable, at least in part, by the sequence “pre-knot / knot or knots / denouement.

Phaseology.

‘Phasis’, in ancient Greek, was the passing by, relative to the moon, in its ‘phases’ (rise, appearance).

A. Every ‘process’ (Greek: ‘kinesis’, Latin: ‘motus’) exhibits, normally, three phases:

- i.** the initial phase (discussed in protology),
- ii.** the turning point or turning point phase (object of kairology),
- iii.** the final phase (object of eschatology).

B. Dramaturgically (RH 13) and, therefore, also narratively, those phases read as follows.

a. The pre-node (‘ekthesis’, expositio, introduction).

The initial conditions (time/place, characters (actors)) - at least in part - are recounted. Ansoette says : this gives the pre-note the local or, better, own, even singular color.”

b. The button(s).

‘Desis’ (binding) or ‘plokè’ (entanglement, intrigue) is the phase, in which the action splits into more than one ramification. Broeckaert: ‘une Complication d’incidents’ (an entanglement consisting of unforeseen incidents).

Aristotle defines ‘knot’ as that part of the story that extends from the beginning to the turning point (reversal) for better or worse. RH 100 and 124 gave an example of ‘turnaround’!

c. The denouement (‘lusis’, dissolution).

Ansoette understands by this the outcome or result of the action. Aristotelian: the story from the ‘peripeteia’ (peripetia) or ‘metabasis’ (cover) to the end.-- RH 100 gave us, however, the absence of such a denouement. It is then called “finis ex abrupto” (sudden termination of the story).-- It can, by the way, also start this way: one is thrown into the knot and has to figure out, from the rest of the story, what the knot was.

Appl. model.

We take a ballad. It is by Joseph von Eichendorff (1788/1857), from the Jüngere Romantic Schule of the Heidelberger. This very balanced Romantic was, once, with Ludwig Uhland (1787/1862), exceptionally popular with the German public.

RH 135.

Defining the ballad and the balladic is not easy. Perhaps Börries von Münchhausen, who himself composed quite a few ballads, is the closest to it:

(i) central an act;

(ii) it has a foreground, visible and tangible, but at the same time a mysterious background works through. This gives the ballad now something idyllic, (RH 117) then something tragic; but in such a way that the tragic prevails. As a result, the ballad contrasts sharply with the 'everyday history' (RH 125).

Note.-- K.G. Young, Talewords and Storyrealm (The Phenomenology of Narrative), Dordrecht, 1986, says that narratives exhibit two ontological modes of being (reality types):

a. 'storyrealm', the facts, here and now -- surface phenomena;

b. 'taleword', a type of events in an 'other world'. 'Tales' would then be the back and forth between the two realms. - Whatever the case may be: the ballad exhibits

(i) actants and powers (RH 128v.);

(ii) this world and the other world.

Note.-- The title 'Lorelei' is divisible into **a.** die (also : der) Lei, rock, and **b.** die Lure, elf, nymph (female nature spirit). Such female beings, especially in incarnated form, are known as 'fullers of a deity's judgment' (Homeric: an 'atè'): beautiful and very attractive as they are, any contact with them that is not permitted is 'fatal'. Thus an old 'belief'.

So that this ballad is at the same time a ballad of fate analysis. 'Fate analysis' we know from mythologies, but a *Leopold Szondi* (1893/1986; *Schicksalsanalyse* (Destiny Analysis), (1944)), who came up with this idea after reading F. Dostoevski (1821/1881; novelist; Christian Realist), has redesigned it in a psychoanalytical sense.-

So now: *Die Lorelei.*

a.--Purchase.--"Es ist schon spat. Es ist schon kalt. It is already late. It is already cold.

b.-- Knot.

Was reitest du einsam durch den Wald?

Why dost thou ride alone through the forest?

Der Wald ist lang. Du bist allein.

The forest is long (to walk through). Thou art alone.

Du, schone Braut, ich führt dich heim!"

Thou, beautiful bride, - I lead thee home.

"Grosz ist der Männer Trug und List.

Great is the deceit and trickery of men.

RH 136.

Vor Schmerz mein Herz gebrochen ist.

Through sorrow my heart is broken.

Wohl irrt das Waldhorn her und hin.

Well does the forest horn wander back and forth.

O flieh : du weizt nicht wer ich bin”.

Flee anyway : thou knowest not who I am.

So reich geschmückt ist Rosz und Weib.

So richly decked out is horse and woman.

So wunderschön der junge Leib.

So wonderful the young body.

c.-- the turnaround.

Jetzt kenn' ich dich : Gott steh' mir bei!

Now I know you : God stand by me!

du bist die hexe Lorelei!”

thou art the witch Lorelei!

Du kennst mich wohl : von hohem Stein.

Thou knowest me well : from the high rock

Schaut still mein Schloz, tief, in den Rhein.

Looks silently my lock, deep, into the Rhine.

d.-- Denouement

Es ist schon spät. Es ist schon kalt. It is already late. It is already cold.

Kommst nimmermehr aus diesem Wald. Thou never getst out of this forest”.

So much for this archly beautiful ballad.

That the theme of Lorelei is a ‘motif’ a theme spread over several workers; RH 66) is shown by *M. Genevoix, Lorelei*, Paris, 1978, among others. This work is a novel, in which young Frenchmen are introduced to Germans (RH 125: encounter).

Behold how Genevoix presents a Lorelei, not in Romantic - distant, but in business - near form. -- O.c.,57.

“It was in Zabern (*note*: the present-day frenchified Saverne (Bas-Rhin).-- They entered a restaurant (...). On entering, they came face to face with a woman,-- tall in stature, slightly majestic, -- yet a tad pale and with a somewhat absent gaze.-- Her drawn but extremely beautiful eyes immediately caught his eye and the way she was dressed penetrated him deeply (...).

She brought the food menu, noted the order,--without revealing in anything, anything of her inner life. “What a curious figure,” Brigitte said, as soon as she had turned her back. “But it’s a ‘nixie’, an apparition. Just turned up from the other world. For us. Or rather to you, Julien! She seemed to “indicate” you with her eyes. Did you see them, those eyes? Two abysses. With colors like a stream. Enchanting.-- One would say, a Lorelei of old days,-- with her jewels of gold, her golden comb. I have literally

seen her locks of hair flowing over her shoulders.-- Be archly careful, my boy: in your place I would begin to be frightened.” Everyone, then, laughed heartily for the umpteenth time”.

RH 137.

The evidential value of the story. (137/140)

Before addressing this topic, we quote an applicative model.

H. Uyttersprot, *Reflections on Franz Kafka*, 2. *Style as an alternating current or the line to the infinite*, in: *De Vlaamse Gids*, jrg 37 (1953): 9 (Sept.), 534/548, reflects on the fact that the stories (novellas, novels) of Franz Kafka (1883/ 1924) exhibit two styles (formations; RH 12):

“Without effort one recognizes in *The Process*, in *The Lock*, a fairly regular change:

(i) Kafka argues sharply and rigorously;

(ii) he also narrates smoothly and lightly.

He is dialectician (*op.*: reasoner) and narrator. In the great novels he is both at the same time and in such proportion that narrative, respectively descriptive parts and dialectic roughly balance each other.” (A.c.,534).

The argumentative style is seen in “the accumulation of the discussion terms” (a.c.,546), such as “deuten, Meinung, erklären, einerseits/ auf der andere Seite”. (“interpret, opinion, explain, on the one hand/ on the other hand”), “In the discussion itself: this endless series of ‘facts’, ‘hypotheses’, ‘distinguo’ s. (*note*: from the Scholastic language: ‘I distinguish’),--which is explicitly said to be able to be continued indefinitely (...)” (A.c.,546v.).

As *an aside*, this brings to mind RH 85 (“endless foundationalism”), 98 (“intellectualistic criticism”).

It is clear that Kafka writes ‘stories’, but with the essential nature of a treatise, with its theses and its arguments. Also: these are stories, in themselves, as we saw RH 82 (‘a.technos’), wanting to prove something somewhere.

Appl. model.

Lou Andréas Salomé ou l’intelligence au féminin, in: *Pénéla* (Paris), 1968: 16 (Sept.), 39/49, gives us the following introduction

“Is it not preferable to fall into the hands of a murderer than to find oneself in the dreams of a bitch in heat? ... Woman is, today, not yet capable of friendship. Women are still cats and birds or - to put it correctly - cows”. Thus *Fr. Nietzsche* (RH 109) speaks through the mouth of Zarathustra (*op.*: imagined spokesman of the book), when, in his *Also sprach Zarathustra*, in 1883, he decided to glorify the ‘Ueberschensch’ (*op.*: the higher evolved one),-- to proceed, immediately, to a gigantic reckoning with the whole (*op.*: existing) humanity.

RH 138.

There is no longer any urgent need to explain the text of this masterpiece by *Nietzsche*. On the other hand, the genesis of *Also sprach Zarathustra* is much less well known. In particular: which drama - intimately lived through and then generalized - plunged Nietzsche headlong into his unbearable loneliness, which, a few years later, would end in the emptiness of his madness? Where exactly must one look for the origin of this grandiose vision of the future (*note*: which is his *Also sprach Zarathustra*) (...)? (...).

A small man,-- misunderstood by his social environment,-- abandoned by his friends,-- undermined by illness,-- but driven by the will to act as a “prophet” (*note*: hence probably the pseudonym “Zarathustra”), tries to escape from himself. As a weakling he dreams of greatness,--as (*note*: by ‘friends’) betrayed, he slanders, at all that is friendship,--as rejected by a woman he brands all that is woman. (...).

The heroine of this drama with three characters (*note*: Lou von Salomé, in +/- 1882, meant -- erotically speaking -- a great deal to Nietzsche, but she wanted him only insofar as she, too, was ‘friends’ with a second man) -- drama, which plunged Nietzsche into an admittedly fruitful -- despair,-- despair, which would provoke him (*note*.: the invective prose of his *Also sprach Zarathustra* quoted briefly at the beginning of this quotation would elicit was Lou von Selomé, then not yet twenty years old.

Lou was tall in stature, incisive in nature and implacable,--if one will: a female copy of Nietzsche’s Uebermensch. Lou was of the type that goes straight to its goal, without wasting words, coolly knowing what it wants,--a type that recognizes no other law but its own “law.

“In all eternity I am faithful to ‘memories’. But to men I will never be faithful”. That’s how Lou noted it in her diary, shortly after her encounter with Nietzsche.

Astonishing is such a phrase,--from the pen of a young girl, a century ago.-- The unquestioning cynicism (*note*: freedom from shame) in that phrase betrays a curious insight into one’s own nature of being. Loyalty,-- that Lou, indeed, would never be. Or rather : she did not know ‘fidelity’, except when it concerned her - otherwise strongly idealized - childhood : through all the phases of the life of her mind she tried, time and again, to revive the atmosphere of her early childhood.

So much for the text of the women’s magazine Pénéla.

RH 139.

Note the striking equality of tone between what Margaret Mead believes to be established on Samoa (RH 62: “no profound ties to just one person,” -- which Mead rather agrees with),-- what Nietzsche/ Hitler claim regarding non-marital love (RH 71) and what Lou von Salomé notes, as something obvious.

Compare with the variants of “appreciation” noticed by Bettermann RH 98.

Biographical note.

After this “suspensio” (RH 36), it is time to say something about Lou von Salomé, who has also been the subject of great interest in France for a few years now. As recently as May 1988, Jean d’Ormesson elaborated on Lou von Salomé’s “life in action” for television.

Lou von Salome (S; Petersburg (= Leningrad) 12.02.1861, Göttingen 05.02.1937) was the daughter of a Russian general.

She derives her name ‘Andreas-Salomé’ from her marriage to Carl Andreas (Djakarta (Indonesia) 1846/ Göttingen 1930), who, although of Dutch descent, became an utter German (and Orientalist).

In addition to the “meeting” with Nietzsche, +/- 1882, she had a long-standing “relationship” with Rainer Maria Rilke (1875/1926; lyricist), whom Lou met, at Munich, in 1897 (Lou published *Rainer Maria Rilke* (1928) on this subject.

Sigmund Freud (1856/1939; founder of Psychoanalysis) also met Lou, who became both his (very good) student and his girlfriend (which she describes in her *In der Schule bei Freud*, Munich, 1965 (posthumously), as well as in Open letter to Freud (1983 published in French)).

Bibl. sample:

-- Ernst Pfeiffer, Hrsg., *Lou Andreas-Salome, Lebensrückblick*, (Life review), Frankf.a.M. 1951-1 (French : *Ma vie (Esquisse de quelques souvenirs)*, Paris, 1978 - 3).

-- R. Binion, *Frau Lou (Nietzsche’s Wayward Disciple)*, Princeton (New Jersey), 1968;

-- E. Pfeiffer, Hrsg., *Lou Andreas-Salomé, Eintragungen (Letzte Jahre)*, Fr.a.M., 1982 (French: *Carnets intimes des dernières années*, (Diaries of the last years,), Paris, 1983).

RH 140.

Note: Lou was thoroughly “intellectual. Proof : in 1880, her mother sent her to Zurich (Swiss). There she takes courses of theology and religious studies, of philosophy and art history. So much so that, overstrained, she has to go to Rome - Italy was, at the time, the refuge for ‘overstrained’ people - where she ends up with the German Feminist Malvida von Meysenburg, in whose salon the European intelligentsia met for years,-- so a. o. including Friedrich W. Fröbel (1782/1852; educational reformer), Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807/1882; politician), Alexander Herzen (1812/1870; Russian revolutionary), Richard Wagner (1814/1883; composer).

There Lou met a Paul Rée, who was interested in philosophy like her. Rée immediately fell in love with Lou. But, in time, a prophetic dream of Lou’s would come true: she had dreamed, during one night, that in a large apartment - with a library room and three secluded rooms - she was sharing intimate life with two men at once. Rée was staggered but agrees somewhere. He even invites a friend of his, on sick leave in Italy, - a certain Friedrich Nietzsche. This rather shabbily living, sick man - he was almost blind, suffered from terrible cross-eyed headaches, had stomach cramps and was chronically insomniac - acceded, immediately and extremely enthusiastically, to Rée’s request. Nietzsche wanted, fundamentally, Lou to be his wife, but Lou and with Rée and with Nietzsche only “friendship” and intellectual conversations.

The genesis of “also sprach zarathustra”.

RH 17 (35, 36, 61) taught us the genetic approach. Here we have one applicative model.-- Nietzsche, connoisseur of men, estimates her, that Lou : she has at the same time remained very childlike and incredibly self-confident; she knows damn well what she wants without asking the environment for permission or caring about its judgment (thus Nietzsche writes to his friends).

Which verifies Pénéla’s assertion.

There is much more : with Lou, conversations are ongoing about a common concern: the emptiness of a world, in which god is dead.-- In February 1883 -- in a few days -- Nietzsche enters a state of inspiration: wildly enthusiastic, he writes his *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Which likewise verifies what Penela claims.

RH 140.1.

The redress principle of sufficient cause (ground).

a. Herodotos (RH 12) organizes the loose materials, collected thanks to ‘historia’ (inquisitio), into a ‘logos’, a closed and stylized narrative.

But, in the Greek ‘logos’ there is more than orderly narrative. While telling a story, Herodotos wants to make it comprehensible (‘explain’). In order to make something comprehensible, while telling the story, the ‘sufficient reasons’ (= presuppositions, -- Platonic: the hypotheses (RH 55.85)) - in the form of ‘prepositions’ -- must be worked into the closed and stylized narrative.

b. Thoe kudides of Athens (-465/-401; the great historian), according to *Meyerson, Le temps, la mémoire, l’histoire*, in: *Journal de psychologie*, 1956, 340, applies this literally: for Thoe kudides (= Thucydides) e.g., the telling of a battle amounts to the verification of a proposition concerning that battle, -- proposition, whereby the signs (in fact: the logical axiomata) are formulated, -- verification, whereby the sequels ‘prove’ the signs right. Time, with him, is both chronological (time theory) and purely logical.

Conclusion:

Also the sensible story can be expressed in “if/then” sentences. In other words: if all the precursors (= necessary and sufficient conditions), then the sequels (= necessary or possible course of events).

In commonsense language, “(Given all that we know of it) it had to come or, at least, it could come.” Note the ontological modalities ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’. Hegelian and Marxian dialectics.

Those who understand Hegel and Marx as historical dialecticians solely on the basis of the triad ‘thesis/ antithesis/synthesis’, only understand one - admittedly frequent - commonplace. That commonplace should be situated in the Hegelian Deduction: If one puts forward the (living) whole (totality), with its propositions, antitheses and ‘together’ propositions (narrative sign), then one logically - strictly understands a - at first sight merely ‘coincidental’ (again an ontological modality) - fact (= narrative sequel).

Note -- This is how one should interpret, “Was vernünftig ist, das ist ‘wirklich’ (note: conforming to the prepositions); und das was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig” (Hegel, *Grundlinien des Rechts, Vorrede*).

RH 141.

IX -- *The science of reporting.* (141/152).

A treatise may also need the report. Therefore, a brief word about essence and structure of the 'report'. We all know the terms 'reporter/reporter' or 'school report'. But usually never dwell on what that is 'report'.

1.-- *The object.*

Objectively, there are two major types of report.

a. *The case report.*

There is no text, but your client/assignor asks you to prepare a text concerning either a synchronic fact (e.g., the state of the school) or a diachronic fact (e.g., the crumbling of a neighborhood school). In the first case the report will be a description (see RH 106/121), in the second a narrative (see RH 122/140).

b. *The text report.*

There is a textual fact. Spoken or written. In that case, with your own words, you should describe, narrate,-- "trade" what the text's message (message, information) is.

2 -- *The text length.*

a. The concise ('short') report gives the characteristic (RH 108.1,--at least the, general definition of 'characteristic'), i.e., the objective representation of the essentials. The 'essentials' are the thrust of such a report.

b. The circumstantial or comprehensive report.

In addition to the existence and the essence (RH 58, 106;-- 64; 50), the circumstances also called "details" (RH 102) - are then rendered, which reflect the existence / essence more precisely.

Note.-- When the given is textual - a book, articles, then, since some time, a concise report is called 'text contraction'. The structure is 'much-abbreviated'.

Summary.

The report is defined by

a. the data (a case or a text) and

b. the requested (a brief or a circumstantial report).

The latter with or without value judgments on your part (RH 75).

Origins. (141/143)

Historically, it seems to us that Herodotus of Halikarnassos (-484/-425; the "Father of Historiography") is the first Ancient Greek who formed very precise thoughts about the nature and value of the record.

RH 142.

Bibl. sample:

-- Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, 1971, 141/167 (*Die Quellen des Erdbildes von Hekataios von Milet und Herodotos von Halikernassos*); ((The sources of the earth picture of Hekataios of Milet and Herodotos of Halikernassos)),

-- C. C. J. Daniëls, *Religious-historical study on Herodotus*, Antwerp/ Nijmegen, 1946.

As Krafft indicates in the title and, even more so, in the treatment framework - the Ionian 'physical' (= natural science and natural philosophy) - a Herodotos (Lat.: Herodotus) is to be situated in a movement, which is very empirically oriented. Observations are the basis. Within that business framework one must now understand what follows. As Daniel, o.c., 16, 100, 178, says, Herodotos distinguishes two 1days in the account.

a. What he calls "the historiè" (in another Antique Greek dialect: "historia"). By this he means "the free investigation of the matter (information, message)," which characterizes all possible data. The 'historiè' is, in other terms, the substance or accumulated data, insofar as there is no arrangement or design (RH 12) in it. In other words: all separate elements of invention (RH 12).--

The method.

The invention or heuristic proceeds in two ways.

(i) The 'aut.opsia', the eyewitness account, delivered by people who directly observed the data - the facts.

(ii) The 'marturion', the testimony, provided by the act of 'marturia', the witnessing. In which the reporter/reporter indirectly observes.

b. What Herodotos calls 'the logos'. This is the substance 'formed' by arrangement and design. The text, in other words, which makes up the record.

The method.

What characterizes Herodotian reporting is the perspective, the point of view, through which a loose multitude of data can be brought into unity, logical coherence. Notwithstanding the fact that Herodotus refers to himself as a 'historian', an informer, the facts do not always speak for themselves (RH 82: subjective argument). In addition to the materials, 'logos', processing by the human mind, is needed. This manifests itself in the point of view.

Appl. model.

With him this is, essentially, the kuklos - thought. In the 'fusis' (nature; RH 20, 21) a process (RH 127) is regularly going on. Many data **a.** begin small, **b.** grow, **c.** come to a pinnacle, **d.** to be, suddenly, thrown down (o.c., 27; 93v.; 199

RH 143.

In human data: someone starts 'small', sees his business grow; instead of knowing measure and his own limits, he - usually - goes on. The 'high' - 'happy' (e.g. rich) - state thus brought about involves both an objective transgression of boundaries and a subjectively experienced 'pride' - called 'hubris', *arrogantia* (RH 23).

These two aspects together form an 'aitia', a debt situation,--normally followed by a 'tisis', expiation. This process is -- according to the very religious Herodotos -- governed by 'to theion', one or the other deity (god, goddess) or even the collectivity of the polytheistic deities (they are the 'archè, principium, the premise, of it). But it is intrinsic in the 'fusus', the essence, of things - plants, animals, human beings (especially political systems) - clearly determinable for whom:

- (i) from the perspective of the 'kuklos' (cycle, circuit)
- (ii) provides thorough information.

For example, land hunger (imperialism) for a number of countries and their ruler(s) is the driving force behind that circular process "beginning/ increase/ peak (border-crossing/ guilt/ downfall".

Appl. model.

Anyone who listens to radio or TV regularly deals with the reportage. This is clearly the 'autopsia', the eyewitness account, of a Herodotos. According to *G.u.I. Schweikle, Hrsg., Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 364f. (Reportage), good reportage includes two aspects:

a. the clean report, i.e., the objective - matter-of-fact account (description/story) of the facts (a character, a condition, an event,-- a book) and

b. Eventually but not necessarily a line of interpretation (which is parallel to Herodotos' press perspective (angle of view)). Reportage, in the journalistic sense, emerged +/- 1880 as a form of report for the daily newspaper.

Appl. Model: Georges Simenon (1903/1989) (143/144)

"Georges Simenon is 85 -- Lausanne 10 (ATS) -- Georges Simenon is considered the most prolific French novelist since *Honoré de Balzac* (1799/1850; *La comédie humaine* (+/- 90 volumes)). On Friday he will celebrate his 85th birthday in Lausanne - he has been living there for thirty years -- he was born on 12.02.1903 in Liège (Belgium). He travelled all over the world until 1955 when he settled in Switzerland.

RH 144.

Georges Simenon published nearly two hundred and twenty novels under his name, including eighty police novels, which made Commissioner Maigret famous. Under a pseudonym, he gave birth to nearly three hundred other works. His books were translated into seventy languages, printed in forty countries. They have been adapted for film sixty times and for television more than two hundred times.

It is estimated that nearly five hundred million readers/readers would have already read him. And hundreds of millions of listeners/listeners and TV viewers would have heard and/or seen his psychological or police works, -- all over the planet.

Officially, G. Simenon stopped writing in 1973, but in 1981 he still published his *Life Memories*. He was honored, with the Medal of Honor of the City of Lausanne. He was honored many times in the odd. Very reclusive in a small house, Simenon lives in le canton de Vaud, his ...thirtieth residence.

We mention “pour la petite histoire” (RH 125) that he would have been born on 13.02. 1903 would have been born, but that his mother, because of her superstition, had him registered on 12.02.1903”.

Note.-- We have deliberately not clearly classified this little article from le *Journal de Genève* 11.02.1988. Studentess / student, there are certainly commonplaces (regularly recurring headings (text sections) in such a report type) sticking out, as approximately RH 74vv. (topical) was described: couldst thou extract them from the text? Which perspective (Herodotean) governs the elements of the text here? To name but one example.

Deuterosophist models (144/146)

Marrou, *Hist.d.l' éducation*,239, tells us that students had to learn to defeat a “muthos” (story, fable).-- We give an antique-typical model.

The lion and the fox.

A lion, getting older by the day, became very weak. Because of his strength and speed, he could no longer get his food. Consequence: he kept himself continually hidden in a cave,-- under the pretence that he was ill. -- The animals -- believing this to be appropriate -- came to visit him inside his cave. Whereby the lion, again and again, caught them to devour them. Also a fox came near. He saw through the lion's ruse and set himself down outside the cave. From there he asked the lion how he was doing. The lion said: “I am not well. But one question: why don't you come into the cave with me? Then we could talk to each other. To which the fox replied, “I would like to come in, -- except that I see many footprints of animals going in, but none of them coming out.

RH 145.

In a similar way, shrewd people make out ‘tekmèria’, (RH 83: clear signs), ‘signs; the dangers and they escape from them.-- Studentin/ student, try again to find (i) the classification, (ii) the perspective that governs the little story -- a classic animal story, as you may also tell one in your class.

Thus you learn, on the basis of ‘small examples’ (‘paradigmata’ or school examples), to make your own report. perhaps you can also try to grasp the main impression---pathetic (RH 73)--especially: which feeling exactly comes up after one has just chosen a little story?

Deuterosophistics (RH 28,-- 112,-- 53, 78) has left us, through recovered testimony, a sample. Perhaps it can serve you, in the classroom. The *Papyrus Fayoum* has left us a student work.

Given: a myth in verse form (not preserved);

Requested: a paraphrasis, a paraphrase (account, such that one’s own words defeat what the text offers).

Behold the statement (RH 66 (// 115).

Now here is the text the student(s) made on it. “A boy, who had killed his father and “who feared the legislation on parricide, fled into the desert” (*note:* is a quote or citation from what the teacher read aloud).

As he trekked through the mountains, he was chased by a lion. With the lion at his heels, he climbed a tree. Then he saw a snake (‘drink’) rushing towards his tree to, possibly, climb it too(...). While he was fleeing from that snake, he made a trap. -- (Gnomè, sententia) (RH 29, 72) : The malefactor does not escape a deity: “The deity will bring the malefactor to justice”(again, a quotation in verse).

RH 146.

Regulative and Applicative Model.

If there is a couple that is a commonplace, it is the universal model and the private, resp. singular model.-- Cfr RH 31, 87.-- Here we have an application.

(i) In the first fable, at the end, the moral lesson is pronounced. It is a model-theoretic formula: the shrewd man (the original or unknown) is described in terms of the fox (the model or, thanks to the fable, the known). It is even a semiotic wisdom (RH 49): just as a U. Eco, in his *The Name of the Rose*, makes the interpretation of ‘signs’ - traces - central, so also in this Antique fable the interpretation of signs is central, (but included in fate analysis (RH 135): the cosmos, in which we situate ourselves,-- the society, within which we live, they are unsavory. (as in the ballad); they give rise to a feeling of insecurity.

But one reaction, the strong one, copes (RH 50: ABC - theory); 89 (stimulus/response)): the ‘fox’ does as Herodotos does, namely, either by ‘autopsia’ own research, or by ‘maituria’ the testimony of others, he seeks the traces of danger. -- To avoid falling into it.

Conclusion:

Without the moral lesson, i.e. the regulative-universal model, the fable is blind; without the narrative, i.e. the applicative-singular model, the fable is empty.

(ii) In the second fable, the last phrase is a verse and it is by Menandros of Athens (-342/-291;--which is why we know the text dates from after that time), a famous comedy poet. It is a typical ‘mythological moral lesson’: In the ancient, not yet eroded myth, the deity (with all kinds of ‘mythical’ creatures) appears whenever borders are crossed (as we just saw with Herodotos; RH 143: kuklos): parricide is crossing borders.

Again, the fable (mythic fable) is destiny analysis: whoever fates his father to be murdered may, because of some mythic power (RH 128, 135), expect a corresponding “fate.

Again: without the moral lesson, the regulative model, the mythic fable remains a blind text without “perspective”; without the singular narrative, the abstract moral lesson remains empty.

Note.-- M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,I; Tübingen, 1927, 1949-6, 191/196 (The Fable of the Cura (Sorge)), proves that even a Fundamentalontologist like him can find insights in a fable.

RH 147.

The text contraction. (147/152)

Bibl. st.:

-- Y. Balloni, *Méthode de contraction et de synthèse de textes (Concours d'entrée des grandes écoles)*, (Method of contraction and synthesis of texts (Concours d'entrée des grandes écoles)), Paris, 1983-2;

-- J. Moreau, *La contraction et la synthèse de textes*, Paris, 1977;-- Editions Marketing, *Contraction et synthèse de textes A l'entrée des grandes écoles (Epreuves intégrales des concours)*, Paris, 1983.

In recent years, including in France, traditional discourse has been replaced by the singular ('contraction') or the plural ('synthesis') contraction

Appl. model.

The Ed. Marketing, o.c.,5/8, give following specimen.-H.E.C. 79 (Polytechnique).

Duration: three hours. -- Summarize, in four hundred words, the following text - a text by Roger Caillois (1913/1978), *L'esprit des sectes*. (The spirit of the sects.), In doing so, highlights

(i) the main ideas and (ii) the train of thought ('*l'articulation de la pensée*') (('the articulation of thought')), of the proposer.-- At the end of your copy, indicate the number of words used.

Note -- Falls on the quantification, in correct numbers, of the text.

Given : the text of Caillois;

Requested : a quantified report of text reduction.

Behold the task.

Appl. model.

E.S.C.A. 79.-- Duration: three hours. -- Summarize the following text (...) in four hundred words.-- Candidates should indicate, on the copy, with 'discs of fifty lines' (all fifty lines), the number of words used in the margin,-- just opposite the line corresponding to that number.

The total number of words used shall be stated at the end of the copy.-- An excess of ten percent is allowed. Above 440 words, however, one point will be deducted, for each ten-word slice, from the correction.-- The correctors will take into account the execution (o.c., 109/113).

Precision.

Y. Stalloni, o.c.,7, specifies: usually the point subtraction is one point for each cut (= section of text) - one point out of a total of twenty - for each 'cut' of ten words above the tolerance threshold. If, e.g., 400 words are requested, the margin is 40 (i.e., up to 360 or 440 deviant). From 359 or 441 words (too few or too many) the candidate loses one point; from 359 or 441 words (too few or too many) he loses two.-- Conclusion: a not tender requirement to succeed.

RH 148.

Definition (regulatory model).

J. Moreau, o.c., defines the “contraction” (single text contraction) as follows.

Given: one text;

Asked : reduce this to one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth, etc., of its length.

The ‘synthèse’ (plural text contraction): here the ratio is ‘many-ones’.

Given: more than one text;

Requested: to render these texts textually abbreviated. And to do so under the viewpoint of the unity (coherence, similarity) of them,-- either by subject or by treatment.

This means that shortening the text concerns both the ‘historiè’ (the content, the ‘elements’, which make up the text) and the ‘logos’ (the arrangement (= plan, division of thought) and the design (stylization),-- unless otherwise stated in the assignment.

The process.

Supposedly: thou standest before such a task. What wilt thou do? -- Y. Stalloni gives the following as advice.

(1).-- read the text in its entirety first.

Stalloni says that for 4,000 words one needs around 30 to 40 minutes.

Note -- We join this advice: whoever does not do so (and, immediately, starts with the partial analysis), risks to misunderstand the principle of economy (since the Late Scholasticus Petrus Aureolus (Pierre d’Auriol; +1322): one loses oneself in details. The principle of economics says: “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem” (The sides (points of an analysis e.g.) should not be multiplied except when necessary).

Short: Don’t do with ‘more’ what can be done with ‘less’.

The initial overall reading of your text will make you discover main thoughts, main impressions, important parts.

(2).-- Analyze the text sections afterward.

Stalloni: **a.** First summarize the larger sections of text (which involves an understanding of the plan, the format); **b.** Then, summarize the paragraphs (= sections of text each containing precisely one thought). **c. Summarize** the entire thought each time after the summary of each paragraph.

Note.-- For point **c**, we would express a slight reservation: yes, if one summarizes the total thought process separately.

RH 149.

Small-scale model. (149/150)

Bibl. sample: *G. Niquet, Structurer sa Pensée / Structurer sa phrase*, (Structuring your thoughts / Structuring your sentences), Paris, 1978, 10/12.

Given: a bunch of shorter texts;

Requested: render this text abbreviated.

(A)1. The TV runs out on late nights: often it is partly responsible for our morning fatigue.

(A) 2. Not a single fin is moved anymore! Moving around to experience something else or to meet fellow human beings: out of the question! One sits, nailed down, gawking at the TV screen (...).

(A)3. Man as a TV viewer is ready for a purely passive acquaintance with the universe: he/she receives information via the TV, but does not actively inform himself/herself.

(A)4. The TV images whirl, gusts alike, across the screen (...). The world becomes a whirlwind, a vortex. Like falling leaves, the news items, once passed on, are carried away.

(A)5. What is real and what is purely imaginary, - all that runs together: Stendhal (= Henri Bayle, this 'Stendhal' (1783/1842; French novelist)) right next to Georges Pompidou (1911/1974; French president 1969/1974); (...) Don Juan (legendary figure; perhaps once a Spanish nobleman, Don Juan Tenerio, who, during the XVIth century, lived in Seville) falls in love with Sylvie Vartan (current French actress) .(...) It is, culturally speaking, plenty of 'Flemish funfair'!

(A)6. Tell me how you spend your free time, and I will tell you what type of culture you belong to (according to a sociologist). Applied to TV processing, this phrase shows us that, among other things, Sunday TV programs provide a possible value measure of TV culture distribution. They range from the Western, in the afternoon, to the tearjerker show, in the evening. What disappointing mediocrity, spread across pitiful scenarios, texts, intentions, images on the TV -screen! Everything comes down to killing time. Result: just when the viewing density is particularly high, one stumbles upon a massively scattered, insipid mediocrity.

(A)7. A TV report ('reportage'; RH 143) never appears on the TV screen in its entirety and without 'explanation' ('commentary'). The TV reporter limits his/her images to a narrow selection and adds his/her own interpretation. It is immediately clear: TV imposes its viewpoint and its value judgment on the events.

(B)1. Sometimes people think that TV images come across directly and are processed idly. The reality is different: one member of the family wants sports broadcasts, another a movie, yet another technology or drama. The media enthusiast is, at the same time, a media darling, indeed a media critic. Far from always siloing them within their own perspective, TV can also force family members to discuss each other.

RH 150.

(B)2. The acclaim for broadcasts on medicine should not be surprising: these broadcasts address a need on the part of the viewer,---the need for inquiring white concerns medicine. (....).

(B)3. TV makes world literature available to the public. Something, which - without the TV - would never have gotten beyond a mini-circle of interested parties.

(B)4. I am a teacher of French literature. One day my pupils surprised me: they were arguing about *Le rouge et le noir* (a novel by *Stendhal* (1831)). I was curious (...): they had actually seen a film - the evening before - based on the novel. My bookseller told me that not only young people but also others had done so, and what's more: the book's sales had risen considerably since then. The same thing happened after *Germinal* (from the series *Les Rougon-Maquart* (1885) on the life of miners)--by the naturalist *Emile Zola* (1840/1902). (...). -- So much for the submitted text.

Your report.

(1) According to the Stalloni method, you have, now, read the text as a whole.

Note.-- The lettering and figures, which we, on our own initiative, have added, is intended to make your analysis, for once, run more smoothly.-- Can you, already now, put the main idea(s), together with the main impression (axiological), in a short summary title? So that the sections (A) and (B) are represented in that title?

(2) Always the Stalloni method: can you, on a separate paper (be practical), reproduce the train of thought (= arrangement, order of thoughts) - if necessary paragraph by paragraph - in summary (it is a contraction of texts)?

(3) Compare, in passing : (A)3 / (A)7,-- (A)3 / (B)1,-- (A)4 / (A)5,-- (B)1 / (B) 2, 3, 4. What emerges from this application of the comparative method?

(4) Couldst thou, in terms of 'thesis' and 'argument; formulate the overall text (summarized, of course)? See RH 86.-(5).

Count the words and of the assignment text and of your summary.

RH 151.

Applicable models. (151/152)

(1).-- *The presentation of a book.*

Supposedly: a publisher/publisher asks you to “announce” a book on the cover. What will you do? Some lines must ‘introduce’ essence and value (the two main (‘platitudes’) of a treatise) to the public (RH 11) - the theme par excellence of any rhetoric.

On the cover of *Gaël Fain, trad. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalisme, socialisme et démocratie*, Paris, 1951 - 1, 1984-2, is located the following report (text contraction).

a. *Joseph Aloys Schumpeter* was born in Austria, in 1883, and died, in 1950, in the USA.-- He is considered one of the best economists of our time. He was the undisputed leader of the Vienna School. Later he became a professor at Harvard University. Soon he had an international resonance.

b. His famous work *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, London, 1942, passes for one of the basic works on modern economics. It offers an unparalleled analysis of economic phenomena as we experience them.-- Can Capitalism Survive? Can Socialism succeed? The author answers both questions. Meanwhile, he provides a premonition of the development of our economy in the world of tomorrow.

Note.-- The two platitudes of a book offer are, of course:

a. the author of the text, **b.** the very briefly outlined contents of his book.-- Which we clearly find in the above announcement.

(2) -- USA: ‘Fast Food’ of the culture in California.

Journal de Genève 03.11.1981.-- Santa Monica,1(AFP).

“So many books; so little time!”-- Two California publishers have set out to solve this dilemma: they publish a cassette that allows you to “read” ten classic works in ten minutes.

This cassette is for the Yuppies,--young American careerists, who are always running out of time and are hungry for an easily acquired culture.--- “The sale of books recorded on cassette is increasing in the USA. We thought it was high time to pull them all together”. Says Jim Becker (31).

With “ten classics in ten minutes,” it is possible to find out in six hundred seconds what *Moby Dick*, *Gone with the Wind*, *Robin des bois*, *The Grapes of Wrath*, *Romeo and Juliette*, *Gatsby*, *A Tramway Named Desire*, *Alice in Wonderland*, *Oliver Twist*, and the *Odusseia* are all about. --

RH 152.

These text contractions are read by an actor known for his speaking speed. They last sixty seconds each.

Except *Gone with the Wind* and *Gatsby*, which are allotted an additional 0.48 and 0.75 seconds respectively. “The ‘great literature’ has this additional half-second of do” explains Andy Meyer (32).

Some literature lovers may protest, when they learn that *Chased by the Wind* undergoes a - indeed astonishing - text contraction: the work is condensed, in three sentences - by a total of three hundred and fifty words. Impossible: *War and Peace* to sixty-five seconds to pull together.

The restrictions imposed by Becker/ Meyer on the text size apparently have their limits too. E.g. *War and Peace* is not one of the ‘Ten Classics’ : it was simply impossible to compress the text of Lev Tolstoy within sixty-five seconds.

Tropological tome.

‘Tropology’ is one subpart of stylistics (RH 12, 38, 70, 93v., 99, 101, 137, 142).-- The tropics are metaphor, metonymy, - synecdoche.--

C. Stutterheim, *The Concept of ‘Metaphoor’*; Amsterdam, 1941, 517,-- cited in A. Mussche, *Dutch Poetics*, Brussels, 1948, 49, shows us how the metaphor is based on text contraction.

a.1. Colonel A. fought, in Aceh, as bravely as a lion.

a.2. Col. A. was as brave as a lion.

a.3. Col. A. fought like a lion.

a.4. Col. A. was like a lion.

Up to here, an equation works.

Now for the metaphor:

b.1. Col. A. was a lion.

b.2. Col. A., the lion of Aceh,...

b.3. This lion....

Conclusion.

Both tropology and, e.g., the California text-compilation types cited above, prove that the concept of “report; in the sense of “text-abbreviated report” are a permanent feature both of the primordial language (the metaphor is known to all Primitives) and of the now-growing language, which is intended for, e.g., hastily living, but attuned to sound information.

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Deo trino et uno Mariaeque gratias maximas (03.04.1989).