

**7.3.1. Philosophy of the Life Course (FLC) part I, p. 1 to 150.**  
**Introduction to Philosophy 1988/1989 . Second year**  
**Higher Institute for Pedagogy, VII-the Olympiadelaan 25, 2020 Antwerp**

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**Preface.** (01/07) What people, just about everywhere in the world, call 'life' is, in the second year, the central theme.

**1.1.-- Bibliographical sampling.**

-- Kurt Rothmann, *Duitse letterkunde* (German Literature), Utr./Antwerp, 1981, 112/127 (The Romantic Movement (1798/1835));

-- M. Brion, *L'Allemagne romantique* (Romantic Germany), (Kleist, Brentano, Wackenroder, Tieck, Caroline van Günderode), Paris, 1962.

Around 1797, an otherwise broadly European movement, Romanticism, started in Germany. Friedrich von Schlegel (1772/1829; Romantic thinker, known for his *Philosophie des Lebens*),

-- his brother August Wilhelm (1767/1845),

-- Ludwig Tieck (1773/1853),

-- Novalis (= von Hardenberg; 1772/1800),

-- a certain Steffens and, last but not least, the great Romantic philosopher Joseph Schelling (1775/1854), -- they founded the Romantic School. They publish a literary and literary critical journal: *Das Athenäum* (1798/1800).

-- Joh. Lotz, *Romantik*, in: W. Brugger S.J. e.a., *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Munich, 1945-1, 258f., says, with regard to Romantic philosophy: "To begin with, instead of reason and understanding, life in its entirety becomes the central point". Reason and the central rational-intellectual product, the (abstract) understanding, were central to the Rationalism of the Enlightenment, which dominated the entire 18th century. The Romantics do not exclude reason and understanding,-- certainly not the German Romantics. But they situate them in the overall cosmic and human life.

**1.2.-- Bibl. sample**

-- Henri Arvon, *La philosophie allemande*, (German philosophy), Paris, 1970, 17/66 (L'irrationalisme).

(a). One understands the term 'Irrationalism' correctly: as just said, certainly German Romanticism continues to think rationally, but - compared to the hyperrationalism of some Enlightened minds - Romantic thinking comes across as a kind of 'Irrationalism' (i.e. denial of (Hyper)Rationalism).

(b). In 1841 Joseph Schelling, a true Romantic thinker, became a professor in Berlin. Mikhail Bakunin (1814/1876), the later Anarchist,-- Sören Kierkegaard (1813/1855; the father of Existentialism),-- Friedrich Engels (1820/1895; the co-founder, with Karl Marx (1818/1883), of Marxism, as well as someone like Jacob Burckhardt (1818/1897; the cultural historian, author of *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (Renaissance Culture in Italy), (1860)), -- they all followed Schelling's infamous teachings

What they heard was no longer the first, the second or the third Schelling (Schelling evolved, truly Romantic, his whole life), but the founder of “die positive Philosophie”. The ‘positive’ or ‘firm’ thinker says, with Schelling: “What factual reality must achieve must also take its starting point in that factual reality”.

The ‘positivist’ thinker does not remain, like the reality- and life-denying thinker, faltering in the ‘Was’ (the ‘what’, the abstract concept) of things. He takes root in the “Dasz” (the “that”, the living-concrete factuality) of things.

This fourth Schelling lives on, in various ways, in Anarchism, Existentialism and Marxism.

### **2.1. (02/03) *Bibl. sample:***

-- K.-O. Apel, Einf./ Hrsg., *Charles Sanders Peirce, Schriften*, (Charles Sanders Peirce, Writings), I (Zur Entstehung des Pragmatismus), (On the emergence of pragmatism), Frankf.a.M., 1967, 13/34 (Peirce und die Funktion des Pragmatismus in der Gegenwart), (Peirce and the function of pragmatism in the present day);

-- Kl. Dehler, ed., C.S. Peirce, *Ueber die Klarheit unserer Gedanken*, (On the clarity of our thoughts), Frankf.a.M., 1968, 103.

(a). Apel defends the thesis that three current philosophical currents - Marxism, Existentialism, Pragmat(ic)ism - present themselves as ‘life’ (= Marxist praxis, Existentialist commitment, Pragmat(ic)istic experimentation), which comes to consciousness in some theory.

#### **(b).1. *Marxism.***

Already Hegel, notwithstanding his ‘Idealism’, called only that thinking ‘wirklich’, ‘real’, which satisfies the actual requirements of its reasonable-sense processing: thus the Ancien Regime, before the Revolution, in France, in 1789, had become ‘unreal’, i.e. no longer satisfying the actual requirements of reason.

Following in Hegel’s footsteps, but Materialist, Marx thinks, with Engels, that life (“der Lebensprozess” he says) is invariably a social situation which can be changed by “Praxis”, i.e. the realization of the Marxian view.

#### **(b).2. *Existentialism.***

Going against Hegel with his alien “philosophy of concepts”, Kierkegaard argues that life is always being thrown into one or another changing situation, but in such a way that, thanks to an elementary human freedom of choice, one always commits oneself (“engagement”) to some design (“life purpose”).

In short: although governed by a past, one governs one's life thanks to a future orientation that is, to some extent, in one's hands.

The so-called "idea" for which Kierkegaard lives is invariably a singularly concrete idea, which concerns him alone, in his individuality and "Einmaligkeit" (uniqueness). Hegel's 'idea' was and remained an abstract - general idea, -- at least in Kierkegaard's interpretation of Hegel. For it is certain that Hegel too gave the singular-concrete a place (borrowed from Romanticism).

### **(b).3. Pragmaticism, resp. pragmatism**

Pragmatism" is the name that Peirce himself chose to contrast with the thinking of his friend and fellow thinker William James (1842/1910). James was too much a mere Empiricist: he underestimated the leading role of pure, 'intellectual-rational' thinking. Peirce did not. On the contrary.

For a Pragmatist like Peirce, life can also be made transparent in a scientific sense: an abduction (= hypothesis, lemma (Platonic)) may be tested (inductively or non-inductively) while living, in or outside the work of professional research.

**In short:** "the world in the making", in other words: the world in which we, inevitably, find ourselves is not a once-and-for-all established world. The world is literally 'in the making' and we, scientific or extra-scientific, are part of that world. As co-respondents.

To sum up: praxis (Marxist), existence (Existentialist), experiment (Pragmatist), - life is central.

### **2.2.-- Bibl. sample:**

-- I.M. Bochenski, *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, (Contemporary European Philosophy), Bern, 1947, 106/134 (Philosophie des Lebens), (Philosophy of life), -- where among others Henri Bergson (1859/1941), the pioneer, and, indirectly, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833/1911; the Hermeneutic of Life) are discussed;

-- Hellmut Diwald, *Wilhelm Dilthey (Erkenntnistheorie und Philosophie der Geschichte)* (Wilhelm Dilthey (epistemology and philosophy of history), Gottingen, 1963;

-- R. Gillouin, *Henri Bergson (Choix de textes avec étude du système philosophique)*, (Henri Bergson (Selection of texts with study of the philosophical system)), Paris, s.d.;

-- F. Challaye, *Bergson*, Paris, s.d. (03/04) life, individual and collective (history), is central to Bergson's - otherwise very spiritualistic - thinking.

The concept of 'creation', mentioned in *L'évolution créatrice* (Creative evolution), (1907), dominates Bergson's so-called vitalism (= philosophy of life). Life, "la vie", central concept, is "action", handling, -- whereby this notion of "handling" is used in a very broad sense: movement, change, development ("evolution") is the correct representation of it.

One betrays the idea of 'creation', says Bergson (R. Gillouin, o.c., 10ss.), by thinking of a thing ('chose') that 'creates' a thing ('chose'). Thus the 'chosistic' mind ('notre intelligence'),--which Bergson conceives very narrowly, 'vitalistically', speaks naturally. As if our mind (= intellect, reason, spirit) did not also grasp everything that moves, is active or foundational!

But anyway: Bergson has the right to introduce a generally used term in a narrower, very individual sense.

So Bergson opposes intelligence (in the narrow sense) with intuition: the (narrowly defined) mind is "created by la vie, life, in narrowly defined circumstances, to act on narrowly defined things. (...)

Fortunately, there is a complementary faculty of the mind ('entendement'), intuition, akin to instinct, which allows us to deepen the nature of life and to reveal its meaning". (F. Challaye, o.c., 169).

A. de Waelhens, *Existence et signification*, (Existence and meaning), Louvain/Paris, 1958, 74, says that "around 1910 - Note: *after L' évolution créatrice* (1907) - the term "philosophie nouvelle" ('New Thought') emerged to designate Bergsonism.

The Enlightened Rationalism traditional in Western Europe (with its Empiricism and its Intellectualism (Apriorism)) is replaced by a type of thinking that does not conceive of man, the cosmos and the deity as 'merely viewable' things, but philosophizes as "la vie parvenue à la parfaite conscience" (life coming to full awareness (consciousness) of itself)".

"Starting from very different perspectives" (= views), Hegel and Marx, even Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900) tried to establish the idea of 'New Thought'. After all, the conjunction of experience and the explanation of that experience was once Hegel's great discovery, the very essence of Hegelian thinking". (O.c., 76).

***Hermeneutics of Life (W. Dilthey).*** (05/06)

Father Bochenski rightly treats Dilthey in the context of Vitalism. After all: life and history are “interchangeable concepts”. (H. Diwald, o.c.,33).

So that one can also speak of historicism (also: Historism, Historical thinking).

But the object of Dilthey’s Vitalism, resp. historicism, is “the agent, the driving force of the historical process” (H.-J. Schoeps, *Over de mens (Beschouwingen van de Moderne filosofen)*, (On man (Reflections of the Modern Philosophers), Utr./Antwerp, 1960,150).

In other words: whereas Bergson emphasized change, Dilthey emphasizes who, resp. what, is at work in that change.

But, as with Bergson, beware: “Dilthey’s notion of ‘life’ has no connection with biology: it encompasses spirit, soul, subject. It reminds, in the richness of its content, of Hegel’s concept of ‘spirit’.

**Conclusion:** in history, spirit (soul, subject) is at work. That is the agent in it.

***Two conclusions:***

(1) Dilthey is the founder of the idea of “Geisteswissenschaft” (spiritual science). What we understand by this term now is that to study history, especially the history of ideas and culture, is to look for spirit (subject, soul) in the (cultural) phenomena which give that history its outlook; -- not so much laws, as the natural sciences do.

(2) Dilthey says: “We do not grasp the nature of man (note: spirit, soul, subject) by introspection. This was Nietzsche’s great fallacy: hence he could not grasp the meaning of history”. (H.-J. Schoeps, O.c.,147).

Or again: “Man learns to know himself only through history,--not through introspection”. (Ibid.)-- Thus, long before 1927 (appearance of *Sein und Zeit*, (Being and time), I), man, as ‘being-in-the-time’, became the actual theme of the *Geisteswissenschaften (Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Humanities (Introduction to the Humanities)) 1883).

A Martin Heidegger (1889/1976; author of *Sein und Zeit*) learned much from Dilthey and his friend Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg (1835/1897).

Three moments (= moving elements) form the pedestal of the hermeneutic method:

**a1.** the agent (soul, spirit, subject) experiences something;

**a2.** it expresses that experience (life expression);

**b.** the one who understands (‘understanding method’), sees through the expression the soul of the agent.

**Hermeneutics.** -- Immediately Dilthey expands on a traditional-classical concept of 'hermeneutics', which means 'text exegesis'.

(1) It is Friedrich E.D. Schleiermacher (1768/1834), in a posthumous work entitled "*Dialektik*" (Dialectics), (1839), who first expands the idea of hermeneutics: a biblical text, for example, as an expression of the thought of the sacred author, can only be understood ("Verstehende Methode") if one experiences it in one's own life in one way or another.

(2) F. K. Von Savigny (1779/1861), founder of the Historische Schule, understands "hermeneutics" as the method of gaining an in-depth understanding of a historical phenomenon (a period, a figure, an event) through a maximum of details.

(3) Dilthey continues this double broadening and deepening.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- H. Diwald, W. Dilthey, 153/170 (*Der Ausdruck als Mittelglied zwischen Erlebnis und Verständnis*), (Expression as the middle link between experience and understanding), : the title betrays the triad of Diltheyan Hermeneutics);

-- O. Pöggeler, Hrsg., *Hermeneutische Philosophie* (Texte von Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ritter, Apel, Habermas, O. Becker, Ricoeur, Bollnow), Munich, 1972;

-- Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations* (The conflict of interpretations), Essais d'hermeneutique), Paris, 1969;

-- K.-O. Apel u.a., *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Hermeneutics and ideology critique), (Beiträge von Apel, Bormann, Bubner, Gadamer, Giegel, Habermas), Frankf.a.M., 1971.

-- What remains to us of the past people and their civilization (ideas, feelings, deeds, institutions, etc.), Droysen (Johann - (1808/1884; known for his History of Hellenism (1677/1878)), Dilthey calls 'Ausdrücke' (expressions, expressions).

(a). Even our understanding of ourselves passes through our expressions ('I am thinking this now'; 'He/she is avoiding me: it makes me angry').

(b). Certainly our understanding of our fellow human beings - even more so of those from a past that is accessible to us only in remnants, "testimony" - proceeds by the roundabout route of their utterances.

So what is "verstehen" (understanding)? It is a process, "in which we know from signs ('Zeichen'), which come from the outer world (i.e. the 'Ausdrücke'), inner life (i.e. spirit, soul, subject)". So says Dilthey himself.

**Conclusion.**-- With this expression analysis of the (human) soul (spirit), Dilthey is close to semiotics (Peirce) and semiology (Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/1913), -- two variants of the same theory of signs.

### ***General conclusion to the foreword.***

A whole series of important philosophical currents are, consciously, taking root in life. Atheistic-materialistic currents like Marxism as well as Spiritualist like Bergsonism or Kierkegaardism or, still, vaguely-Pantheistic like Hegelianism and Diltheyanism, -- furthermore a purely scientific-logical streak like Peirce's philosophy, -- they all situate philosophizing in life. The fact that we spend the second year of philosophy on the course of life, finds therein a first justification.

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### ***The guiding idea.***

We use the term 'life' or 'course of life' (there is no life without a minimum course of life), but we have not yet defined it.

### ***A.-- the definition. (07/15)***

#### ***A.I.-- Biological definition. (07/08)***

Let us begin with the definition, which biologists can accept (even if there is more than one argument about it).

**(a). *The phenomena.***-- With some Antique Greeks, among them Platon (Plato) of Athens (-427/-347), 'fainomena', phenomenon and definable as data, which one can observe immediately. In this case: a life cycle, which, relying on exchange with an environment (metabolism), comprises as phases **(i)** origin (conception/birth), **(ii)** growth, **(iii)** reproduction and **(iv)** death.

Everyone can see that -- the professional scientists a little better than the ordinary man and woman ('Common Sense' (as distinguished from 'common sense') comes to its full development in professional science). This in plant, animal and man, who are the organic world.

**(b). *The principle.***-- What governs such a course of life so that its knowledge makes it intelligible, logically coherent? That is what we call, with the Ancient Greeks, the 'archè', 'principium', the 'principle', which can explain the phenomena which, together, make up the course of life.

After all, what is alive can be distinguished ('discriminated') from what is not alive. It has - to speak with Platon and Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322) - its own form of being ('morphea', forma): it is formally distinct from all that is not alive.-- That principle we call 'life'. From the manifestations, the expressions, of life, in the course of life, we conclude the life, which becomes visible in it.

### ***The different interpretations of the principle.***

We will, for the time being, remain within the sphere of organic (biological) life, i.e. life insofar as it is present in gross matter.

(a). **Structure.**--It is certain that, in all living beings, a whole (totality) with (integrating) parts can be discerned. Further: that a certain type of self-movement (the ancients called it 'self-movement') is visible.

These two together characterize, more or less sufficiently, everything that lives. If, after all, these two traits (common characteristics) are not present, it is difficult to speak of 'life'. One, self working totality: let us - for the time being - summaries like this.

### **(b). *Animism. Vitalism. Organicism.***

1. The principle of 'self-expanding totality' (with the systems experts we can also say 'self-expanding system or system') is what the Animists call 'soul' (from the Latin 'anima' or the Greek 'psuchè').

This "soul" or "principle of life" is, of course, subject to further discussion (e.g. is it purely spiritual or is it subtle or ethereal or the two together?) Some modern biologists ridicule this idea: however, it is, in itself, without prejudice, not ridiculous. It could happen, for example, that sooner or later a method is found to define the 'soul' in a businesslike way.

2. The principle of 'self-acting totality' is defined by the vitalists as that which - beyond the mere constituents and processes of nature and chemistry - generates the structure with its 'self-activity'.

That 'vital principle' (again, possible in more than one interpretation) is different and more than merely physical-chemical.-- What is difficult to deny - in that general form -: inorganic nature differs, after all, from 'vital' ('distinctiveness').-- precisely because of that.

3. The principle of a 'self-executing system' is defined by the organicists as the fact that such a structure begets life,--whereas the vitalists say that the vital principle begets such a structure.

### **A.II.- *General (philosophical) definition. (08/10)***

Non-organic beings 'live' too! For example, St. John says of God that he is life. Archaic man says that all life on earth (organic world) forms a kind of unity, which includes plants, animals, human beings and ancestral souls as well as all kinds of deities (not to mention a Supreme Being).



As soon as life is situated in a non-organic (not present in gross substance or matter) life-space, one has to do with a broader concept of 'life'. But there, too, the same structure: **(a)** totalities **(b)** self-reality. But then extra-organic.

In the same way, J. Kruithof, *De zingever* (Een inleiding tot de mens als betekend, waarderend en agerend wezen), (the meaning-giver (An introduction to man as a signifying, appreciating and acting being)), Antwerp, 1968, 15/60, establishes a step-by-step hierarchy:

**(i)** the organic being, **(ii)** the psychic being, **(iii)** the human being. All three levels of life are life, but there is a level difference.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and minds (Psychology in Modern world)*, New York, 1967, also makes the same distinction, emphatically. Von Bertalanffy, a.o. o.c., 65ff., criticizes the purely 'Mechani(c)stical' approach, to which control science (cybernetics) sometimes gives evidence: not all systems are cybernetic systems: biological life, psychological-human life is more than a purposeful device (appliance, 'machine'). Unless one understands cybernetics more broadly so that plants, animals, human beings and so on also have steering characteristics.

**Conclusion:** -- A philosophical definition could be e.g. as follows. Is 'living' a totality (system, system) situated in time and space (dia- and synchronic) with two main characteristics:

**a.--autonomy** ('hupostasis', substantia): living beings are delimited with respect to their environment (they are hyposystems with respect to a hypersystem) such that they show a selective (non-random) absorption and processing of what enters from that environment;

**b.-- permanence:** living beings are self-conditions, 'substances', which show an intrinsic purposiveness in such a way that every deviation from the (essential) purpose is followed by a corrective (repair), as a result of which the system (a) becomes different, (b) but not another system.

**By the way,** from the early Greeks onwards, the structure "telos (= goal)/ par.ek.basis (= deviation)/ 'rhythmosis' or 'ep.an.orthosis' (= repair)" is known. Thus, for example, with Aristotle.

**Comment 1.** -- The basic ideas of “self-existent totality” and “independent permanence” are, apparently, only a general framework, within which the strict definition of “life” is situated.

Isn't a photon, the particle that helps light to exist, characterized by ‘self-existent totality’ and ‘independent durability’ -- in its own way?

This analogy compels all those who wish to contrast ‘life’ with what is inorganic or non-living, to see both the similarity and - above all - the (difference between beings).

This can even force us to put the idea of the ‘soul’ first: is a virus alive or not? Mere structural considerations (so typical of the Organicists) can hardly force one to distinguish between an atom and a cell,-- unless from the point of view of degree difference. And atom and cell are self-reactive totalities and permanent selves! And yet they differ and are called one inorganic (dead) and the other organic (alive).

A true definition must, therefore, offer more than the framework of definitions within which we situate ourselves. Perhaps only a ‘soul’ makes the difference.

**Comment 2.** -- Even the basic idea, quoted by a Kruithof among others, “situated in time and space” is open to criticism: if God, understood as the Supreme Being, exists and if He is situated outside, indeed above, time and space and yet lives and gives life, how can the definition of life include “being situated in time and space”?

### **A. III -- Evolutionary definition; (10/15)**

Durable substances, constituting a self-replicating whole, exhibit, according to biological transformism (theory of the evolution of species), development (‘evolution’). There is, perhaps, non-evolving life,

At least when one considers individual beings. But there is the organic totality.

(a) The phenomena.-- 1. The fossil testimony and 2. the hereditary variability are the two main facts.--

(b) The principle.-- What governs these undeniable facts so as to make them logically intelligible. -- The Fixists maintain that there is immutability. -- The Transformists (‘Evolutionists’), however, presuppose evolution as a factor. Life on earth has evolved. With Lamarck (1744/1829), leapfrog development (“mutations”) is assumed; with Charles Darwin (1809/1882; *Origin of Species* (1859)), gradual development, induced by interaction between environment and life as well as by natural selection, is assumed.

In both cases, the impression prevails that the species evolve from lower (simpler, more singular) to higher (more complex, more compound). But geneticists, psychanalysts and ethnologists have come to question whether what is simpler is also 'lower'. -

### ***Evolution.***

The general concept is change.

1. E.volution is gradual development (change), which is called 'forward'; in.volution is gradual change, which is called 'backward'.

Re.volution is both leapfrogging and reversing change.-- An escalation e.g. of a conflict situation is one case of evolution. Complexification' (Teilhard de Chardin), from less complex to more complex, is another.

2. But, in all this, it is always an enduring entity, forming a self-reactive whole, that evolves,--involves, escalates, complexifies, undergoes revolution.

### ***Evolutionism.***

Situated outside the strictly organic domain, one finds philosophies (philosophies of life and the world) that put evolution first as the main feature of all reality.

Such as Herbert Spencer (1820/1903). Also Henri Bergson (FLC 04) and the Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881/1955). Teilhard spoke of the evolution of life towards the supreme consciousness of 'le Point Oméga'.

However different they may be, the three evolutionary thinkers in question see a continuity (uninterruptedness) between matter and biological life, between the latter and consciousness and spirit,--uninterruptedness which includes both individuals and species.

***Comment.***-- The question arises: is it really responsible to construct a whole philosophy from one subject science, biology, and even then from the concept of evolution, which raises more than one question? Generalizations are risky. Generalizations of controversial ideas are even riskier.

***Max Scheler's sublimation processes.***

Max Scheler (1874/1928), in his last, anti-Catholic, evolutionary-pantheistic period, wrote *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, (The position of man in the cosmos), Darmstadt, 1930 (posthumously).

**A.** Instead of using only the idea of 'evolution' as a basic idea, he conflates it with a concept - apparently borrowed from Freud's *Psychoanalysis* - of 'sublimation', 'Sublimation' - somewhat akin to a Hegelian 'Aufhebung' (dissolution) - encompasses:

- (i) the elimination of what, at a certain moment in evolution, is too low and
- (ii) raising it to a higher level.

At the root of the process of the creation of the universe, Scheler posits a 'blind instinct' ("the unconscious, empirical and imaginative 'instinct'"). o.c.,17). Although distinct from the inorganic realities, this cosmic-wide 'urge' is already active in that same inorganic world.

**B.** Scheler then proposes, as a kind of axiom, a law: "Powerful in itself is the lower, life (note: with its blind urge to feel); powerless is the highest, spirit (note: with its ideas)".

Cf. o.c.,77:

**1.** The human spirit, for example, does not possess any energy of its own (meaning creative power). If we think of building a house, for example, our spirit does possess a thought plan (= representation, idea), but as a passive capacity for gaining insight. Nothing more.

**2.** But our minds can acquire this capacity if a sublimation process, which works its way into them, takes place.

**Sublimation** - a process which one may safely extend to the whole universe,-- says Scheler (o.c.,79) - is:

(i) forces, peculiar to the lower spheres of reality, -- in the course of the universe process,

(ii) to place in the service of a higher agency.-- Of these servitudes Scheler himself gives examples.

**a.--** The mutually active forces of the electrons are made subservient to the structure (totality) of the atom.

**b.--** The forces active within the inorganic world are placed at the service of the structures, which make up, for example, the cell and all living things.

**c.--** The emergence of man and his spirit, as the pinnacle of the cosmos, encompasses all previous servitudes in a highest and, for the time being, final sublimation. -

Again: there is analogy. It is partly true to see the 'urge', from the inorganic world to the human mind, at work but the differences, indeed the jumps, between inorganic and organic world, between organic world and human mind should be much more precisely defined. -

One could label all evolutionisms as "assimilisms": they see the similarities one-sidedly (one could also speak of "concordisms").

The opposite view, which one might label 'differentism' (think of the Antique-Middle Ages Dualisms, which greatly enlarge the gap between matter and spirit, resp. deity), this statement too is exaggerated.

With Willem Vogel; *La religion de l' évolutionisme* (Essai d' une synthèse éthique moderne), (The religion of evolutionism (Essay on a modern ethical synthesis), Bruxelles, 1912, 181s., one can assert:

(i) On the one hand, it is impossible to fit mankind simply to the standards of the lower stages of reality (...): for it contains elements which give it its own form of being.

(ii) On the other hand, the appearance of that same humanity does not break the harmony of the evolution of the lower worlds: humanity, which is the full development of them, can therefore be seen as always having its roots in the preceding stages of evolution".

Or even more precisely: "The higher one climbs the ladder of beings, the more pronounced are the difficulties inherent in a concealed or openly known materialism, and the more its adherents are forced to bend the facts to their preconceived theories,-- to suppress or deny them. (O.c., 120).

**Conclusion** - Only a sharpened sense of analogy, which makes one aware of both similarities and differences, can offer a way out here.

### ***The introduction of essence.***

We repeat: with the Antique-Middle Ages thinkers, we use the term '(creature) form' to designate that by which something differs from the rest of reality (= dichotomy or complement) and is thus distinguishable.

M. Blin, *Le travail et les dieux*, (Work and the gods), Paris, 1976, defends a concept of evolution that fits precisely these forms of being and the jumps (level differences) existing between them into a cosmic harmony. Evolution' consists of introducing forms of being, which differ in stages, yet fit together.

Let us listen to a few fragments.

(1) “For all that is plant, animal or human, ‘life’ does not merely mean bare existence. To live is to impose and defend a quality.

Neither (note : biological) life nor (note : human) history separate

(i) the inevitable adaptation to the environment

(ii) from the continuation of the forms of being which biological species and civilizations actually are. They are not reducible to anything else; they arise from themselves; they are from what precedes, not to be predicted; put in naughty language: they are a kind of wealth phenomena.

(a). It is true that biological life has colonized earth, water and air. But it has done more: it has given birth to thousands of life forms - those that still exist and those that have already disappeared. These offer the spectacle of an inordinate capacity for inventing new forms.

(b). In man (note: his cultural forms) there corresponds, to this exceptional wealth of forms, a scarcely lesser wealth in deities, skills, laws, popular customs, modes of dress.

In both cases there is, admittedly, efficiency (‘efficacité’), but this is made subservient to the introduction of one’s own forms of being (‘gratuité’). (...). Thus it is that neither the species of life nor the cultures can be derived from the environment” (O.c.,13).

(2) “All the problems which life raises are already present in its most difficult aspect, that of the beginning of life. From the matter that preceded it, life emerges with its own form of being. Yet from that matter it derived its components. (...).

The environment in which life originated (...) was thoroughly hostile to life. In order to persevere, life had to create its own conditions of existence against such an environment. In this sense, life, in a sense, preceded itself.

**Applicative model.** (...) The original atmosphere contained large quantities of oxygen and carbon gas. But both were trapped in chemical compounds.

Now, (...) both must be available to life in a liberated state. And indeed: in photosynthesis (chlorophyll process), life uses solar energy to decompose the carbon gas present in the air, thereby fixing carbon and releasing oxygen.

*As a result*, the oxygen in the atmosphere, -- a necessary element for life, is in fact the product of that same life". (O.c.,19).

From this it can be seen that (what is called with a collective name) life itself is its own form of being (in this case: a form of life) and - in order to make itself possible and liveable - first of all it selflessly founds a new form of being, i.e. the chlorophyll-with-what-it-goes-together.

**B. *The Biblical definition according to Vladimir Solovjev* (1853/1900;**

One of the most independent thinkers of Pre-Communist Russia). (15/37) Solovjev (= second spelling) belongs to the 'Christian Realists', who think both Biblical revelation and Platonism together.

We will now consider the main features of what Solovjev (there are certainly other thinkers - and perhaps better - than him, but he remains suggestive) says about 'life'.

**B.I.-- *The most important forms of being.* (15/16).**

We borrow from Vl. Solovjev, *La justification du bien (Essai de philosophie morale)*, (The justification of the good (Essay on moral philosophy), Paris, 1939, 182ss. (La réalité de l'ordre moral), (The reality of the moral order).

Seen from the point of view of increasing volatility, the inorganic world, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, 'natural' (i.e., beyond the bounds of the Bible) humanity and, as the climax, 'pneumatic' (i.e., moved by God's Spirit) humanity are distinguishable.

***Characteristic*** (= short description of the essence).

**(A).-- *Inorganic forces* -**

e.g. stones and metals - **(i)** are locked in themselves and **(ii)** do not evolve of their own accord: if it depended solely on such things, nature would never have "awakened from a dreamless sleep".

This does not prevent the subsequent stages of growth of that same nature from finding in it "a firm foundation or ground".

Notwithstanding his radical Platonism, Solovjev apparently speaks very appreciatively of inorganic realities.

**(B).-- *Plant data.* -**

Plants are distinguished by - what in poetic terms is called - "unconscious and unmoved dreams" (this refers to what about the consciousness that characterizes animals).

Its orientation towards heat, light and humidity distinguishes it from inorganic matter.

**(C).-- *Animal data***

Animals are characterized by perception and free movement. They seek, therefore, really, the fulfilment of sensory existence: they want to satiate themselves by food and drink; they seek sexual satisfaction; they try to enjoy existence by, for instance, playing or singing (like the birds).- Above all, they are characterized by an animal consciousness.

**(D).-- *Human data.***

(1) 'Natural' (pre-biblical, i.e., 'Pagan') mankind also desires sensory existence (food, sexual life).-- But its consciousness is characterized by spirit (reason), which expresses itself in language.

This manifests itself in the rational improvement of existence: science, skills, social institutions bear witness to this.

(2) Natural, pre-biblical mankind does arrive at the idea (ideal) of a 'full existence'. -- Only biblical revelation - in the person of Jesus, the man of God - brings us to the full realization of this.

By 'full existence' Solovjef means:

- a. actual existence, inherent in inorganic nature,
- b. Being alive, like the plant,
- c. being conscious of things, like the animal,
- d. Being spiritually gifted and
- e. are moved by God's Spirit ('pneumatic' life). This 'new' man, in Christ, is situated, with the Bible, in an overall cosmic renewal: "the true beginning of all things" says Solovjef. The universe is involved in the pneumatic level of life.

**B.II -- *Special characteristic.* (16/30)**

We now consider, with Solovjef, the above-mentioned stages.

**-- II.1.-- *The distinctness of the inorganic.***

Solovjef limits, in this context, the term 'existence' to inorganic existence.

"The stone exists." -- He seeks proof in an experience of resistance: those who doubt the existence of a stone need only bump their heads against it. That existence is tangible to the senses.



In contrast to an abstract concept, which Hegel upholds, a stone, for example, as an inorganic reality, shows no “inner tendency to turn into its opposite”. (Hegel also saw inorganic nature as “dialectical”, i.e. as inclined by an inner contradiction to turn into what is inorganic).

“A stone is what it is and what it has always been, namely the perfect type of existence without change. A stone does nothing but ‘merely exist’. It does not live and therefore does not die: just look: the fragments into which it can be crushed do not differ, according to composition, from the stone as a whole”. (O.c.,187). Apparently Solovjef, with this, contrasts the stone with the cell division of the plant.

### ***Solovjef on the sacred view.***

What Solovjef has just asserted, is not in contradiction with e.g. the ‘life of nature’: as e.g. the Primitives (Animatism, Animism) or some ancient thinkers (Hylozoism: matter felt as ‘living’) assert.

Or think of the presence of a kind of ‘soul’ (resp. ‘soul substance’) in seemingly inorganic entities such as the sea, the rivers and streams,-- the mountains and forests (the ‘holy’ river (the Ganges e.g. in India) or ‘the sacred forest’ of the Germanic people, mentioned by Tacitus). Similarly, stones can be made to serve as the means for an activity of certain beings: the Bible, for instance, speaks of a ‘bethel’ (God’s dwelling). Appearing and interacting angels (spirits, deities) or, simply, forces deemed divine seem to ‘dwell’ in such a stone.

Solovjef sees in sacralization an elevation (to speak with Scheler (FLC 12) ‘sublimation’) of purely inorganic matter.

### **-- II.2.-- *The distinctness of the vegetable.***

“The stone exists. The plant exists and lives”. The proof: from the fact that it dies, one deduces that it, first, lived.

Thus there is an unmistakable distinction between a tree that is growing and a bunch of firewood. So too between a flower that has just burst into bloom and one that has withered.

Such distinctness is found nowhere in the inorganic world. In the midst of an inorganic world, the first vegetable life forms arise.

In time, they developed into a luxuriant system of e.g. flowers or trees.-- (i) To say that they appeared “just”, i.e. without any sufficient reason or ground, a.k.a. “of their own accord”, would be preposterous.

(i) To say that they arose ‘by chance’, i.e. without any sufficient reason or ground, as it were, ‘of their own accord’, would be preposterous.

(ii) To say that they arose from mere accidental structures of inorganic elements would be equally unfounded.

### ***The surplus value.***

Life, of which the plant is one degree, exhibits a well-defined, new, positive (= determinable) form of being, of which something stands out, namely, “to be more than lifeless matter”. To infer something that contains an added value from something that lacks this added value is to claim that ‘something’ can emerge from ‘absolutely nothing’.

***In passing***, this is what happens in fairy tales. It is something like the emergence that Solovjef means. Such a thing seems absurd to him.

In mathematical language: what clearly becomes ‘a + b’ over time cannot be equated with ‘a’; for, in that case, something, namely ‘b’, would amount to absolutely nothing. Here ‘a’ stands for ‘inorganic’ and ‘b’ for ‘vegetable living’.

### ***Conclusion.***

(i) On the one hand, between the phenomena of the organic world and those of the plant world, there is a kind of unbroken continuity.

(ii) On the other hand, the vegetable is essentially distinct from the preceding stage. Even more so, as the plant world develops, i.e. elaborates its form of being, this distinction becomes more and more apparent. Which proves that this form of being is different and more.

### **-- II.3.-- *The distinguishability of the animal.***

“The stone exists. The plant exists and lives. The animal lives and is aware of its life, in its variety of states”.

One can, of course, define the term “consciousness” in such a way that it cannot be said of the animal. But Solovjef considers such language artificial and arbitrary.

In a sense, which he calls ‘natural’, consciousness is what follows.

Between:

(i) the internal psychic life of e.g. an animal and

(ii) its environment, there is a mutual correspondence (// communication) and effect (// interaction). Now, that type of correlation undoubtedly exists in animals.

**(1) *Environmental consciousness.***

That consciousness exists in animals, especially the higher evolved species, which clarify a tendency that was already present in the first specimens, is perfectly clear by noting the difference between an animal in a sleeping state and an animal in a waking state. The animal in the waking state ‘consciously’ participates in life around it. That type of direct communication and interaction is clearly disabled in the psyché of the sleeping animal.

A second proof of consciousness of the animal lies in the phenomenon of its purposeful movements, in its facial expressions and in its linguistic utterances consisting of various cries - think of the dog that yelps with satisfaction when its master comes home. Think of a dog yelping in satisfaction when its master comes home. Think of the expression of a horse when it sees its master approaching from afar: the head, with the eyes and the facial muscles, suddenly acquire a different ‘expression’. -- Such a thing is unthinkable in the plant world.

**(2) *Time consciousness.***

An animal - says Solovjef - not only has perceptions and images at its disposal: it connects them by means of sensible associations.

(i) On the one hand, the animal form of life is governed by the interests and impressions of the ‘now’ (the present moment).

(ii) On the other hand, it has the memory of past situations, which it has lived through, and anticipates the future. It has not forgotten. In spring, birds prepare for reproduction by nest-building and the like. Some animals build up winter reserves “in anticipation of scarcity”.

***The counter model.***

If the animal did not have such a sense of time, dressage - a daily fact - would be impossible: everything would be “forgotten”.

***Conclusion:*** remembering something and being aware of that something are one and the same form of life.

***The added value.***

(i) Sometimes it seems that the plant and animal forms of life spring from the same principle. Think of the idea of ‘zoophyte’: the most elementary forms of life sometimes seem to be plants.

The earlier - now outdated - zoological classifications introduced this term - 'zoophyte'. Vegetable animals" was the thinking.

(ii) Whatever may be the case, says Solovjef, even if this were the case, the subsequent stage of evolution of animals reveals a form of being which is radically and essentially different from that of plants.

**Conclusion:** there is something new and something more that proves its distinctiveness.

#### -- II.4.-- *The distinguishability of the human.*

"The stone exists. The plant exists and lives. The animal lives and is aware of its life, in its various states.-- Man grasps the meaning of life,-- according to the ideas. The sons of God (note: the pneumatic men inspired by God's Spirit) - in an enterprising way - make this meaning of life a reality.-- The meaning of life can be defined as follows: the full-grown order in all things brought about,-- endlessly". (O.c.,187).

#### *Mind and language.* (20/22)

**a.1.** -- Not by consciousness, vaguely taken, is man distinguishable from the animal, which also possesses consciousness.

Human consciousness is determined by spirit, reason and will, as well as mind. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that, in contrast to animal consciousness, man possesses universal concepts (with an inductive basis), indeed higher ideas (ideals).

**a.2.**-- We saw that the animals also had some kind of language (cries) at their disposal. Human language, however, is "thoroughly and radically determined by the mind (o.c.,189)". The human word, for example, expresses not only states of consciousness, but also the "all-encompassing meaning of everything".

**Note:** This is what, in Western Scholastic language, constitutes 'the transcendental school of the concept of being or reality'.

To define man as a being of consciousness without any specification is to remain below the human level of existence.

That is why Solovjef follows ancient wisdom (philosophy), which defines man as a being that exhibits 'logos', i.e. spirit and the articulation of that spirit. That is consciousness, but then typically human consciousness.

Precisely because of this, man, much more and thoroughly different from the animal, has access to objective truth, -- truth about the totality of all that is.

“The ability, inherent in the very nature of reason and language, to conceive of the truth that embraces all and unites all”. Human consciousness, determined by its spirit, gives out on, is attuned to, the totality as totality,--what is more, and something new, in evolution. It is the basis of the distinctiveness of the specifically human.

**b.--** Whether every human being, taken as an individual,--or every nation realizes that ideal ‘human’, is something else.

The ability to grasp the truth about the totality of all that is, in mind and in mental language, was once active in very different ways in individuals and in the womb of nations.

Solovjef does believe that, as a vague general line, a kind of gradual elevation of humanity above the level of life typical of animals can be discerned in the course of the history of culture and ideas. But not much more.

***The added value.***

(i) In the phenomenal order certainly there is a close and profound material connection between the animal (think of the monkey) and the human form of being,

(ii) Through his spirit and the language in which that spirit expresses itself, however, man, apparently, transcends the animal, even the supreme ape.-- This difference in being becomes more apparent as some people testify to “more becoming human”. Solovjef mentions e.g. Platon or Goethe, compared to the Papua, as he was known at the time of Solovjef, or to the image impression of the Eskimo of that time.

Apparently, Solovjef resorts to Western culture in order to find something that can ‘prove’ cultural evolution from archaic man to modern man. However, his profound Platonic-Christian cultural pessimism prevents him from seeing in it anything more than a mere ‘rational’ progress.

***The monkey, the ‘man-eater’ (semi-wild), the modern culture man.***

(a) A man-eater is, perhaps, in itself not a much higher type of human being than the ape.-- But that is not because of the human nature of being itself: it is irreducible to the animal. The ‘low’ of the ogre (and of every ‘savage’) lies in the fact that, although human, he is apparently to be situated below his typically human form of life.

“Human fullness - literally Solovjef says - requires spirit, i.e. reason and will. These are present - albeit sometimes in rudimentary form - even in the most backward savage”. Solovjef thus distinguishes himself categorically from a Hume or a Darwin who, disdainful of the enlightened mind, looked down on the so-called ‘primitive savages’. In this sense he sticks to a Biblical tradition, which sees in every human being, rudimentary perhaps, a child of God.

“The monkey - he specifies - as long as he remains situated in the creature form ‘monkey’, acquires, however, no substantial surplus value with regard to a full existence.

**(b) Cultural-historical consciousness.** - We saw that the animal does have a sense of time: in the ‘now’ it remembers a number of things and anticipates the future. But it has no ‘historical consciousness’ of human level.

**(i).--** The biological connection between the sexes, one after the other, in animals does show itself, but only in the heredity of traits. Even though the animals share, to a certain extent (according to the theory of evolution), in the evolution of animal life forms and its full degrees, the results of that large-scale evolution and its purposefulness are situated outside the animal consciousness.

**(ii).--** An unbroken series of genders lead from the so-called ‘man-eater’ (the ‘wild’ or ‘semi-wild’ in the language of the day) to figures such as Platon or Goethe. Apart from the hereditary bond, there is, in the human form of being, a solidarity based on a cultural-historical memory.--This is, among other things, the more and the new that distinguishes man from the animal.

***The deified man and the true man of God (Jesus).*** (22/26)

In contrast to Scheler, who once was a Catholic follower of Platon and S. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest Church father of the West), Solovjef, as a Russian Christian Realist, also mentions the evolution that started with the historical appearance of Jesus of Nazareth.

Before continuing with Solovjef’s ideas on the development of life on earth, we will mention an opinion, which is of a nature to make the fact that Christianity also belongs to the evolution more understandable.

W. Vogel, *La religion de l'évolutionnisme*, (The religion of evolutionism), Bruxelles, 1912, 321, quotes Louis Ménéard, Hermès Trismégiste, Paris, 1910.

**Main idea:** religions in the true sense of that word, are ways of solving human problems.

“Christianity did not strike like lightning in the middle of the Antique world.--it has, in its way, known an incubation period. While it was still searching for the definitive articulation of its main truths, the thinking minds of Greece, Asia and Egypt were also struggling with the problems whose solution it sought (...).

For mankind had raised great philosophical and, among other things, ethical questions, such as the origin of evil, the final destination, fall and redemption of souls. What was at stake in this struggle was the control of souls.

The Christian solution to these problems prevailed over all others of the time. They even fell into a kind of oblivion because of it. (...). The breakthrough of Christianity was prepared by those who imagined themselves to be its contenders, when in fact they were only its precursors.

They deserve the title ‘precursors of Christianity’ with good reason,--even though some of them were contemporaries of Christianity and others came a little later. In particular, the breakthrough of a religion dates only from the day when it is accepted by the people. Just as the true rule of a crowned pretender only dates from the day on which he makes it”.

It is annoying that Ménéard speaks in politico-military terms of ‘controlling souls’. Yet he articulates a fundamental truth about our biblical religion: it once tied in with real life problems. In this sense it had a vital - or, as we now say, ‘existential’ - character.

The “souls” of early Christianity liked to be “controlled” by the impression that converting to Christianity would solve one or more of their life problems.

Let us now listen to what Solovjef says about this.

**1.-- Main idea: Christianity is a new form of being (life form).**

(i) Also in the example of Christianity one sees a law of evolution at work: the lower forms of life are a necessary (“conditioning”) but not a sufficient (“creating”) condition for the higher ones which follow.

**Application:**

(i) Christ is not simply the product of overall pagan and Jewish history, just as, by the way, in analogy, the kingdom of God, which constitutes the previously hidden essence of today’s Christianity, is not simply the product of that same Christianity and its actual, earthly history either.

(ii) In other words, biological evolution (through the forms of plant, animal and human life based on inorganic existence) and cultural history (through its problems and partial solutions) worked and still work today on the natural and ethical conditions in so far as they are necessary for the autonomous self-revelation of the man of God, Jesus, as the model and source of grace for humanity deified by Him.

**2-- Main aspect: the divinity as leading idea. (24/26)**

Who, for example, knows a little about the Christian liturgies, inspired especially by the Greek Church Fathers (33/800), knows that the leitmotif is: “The Incarnation of God is the deification of man”. This basic idea is merely the Christianization of an ancient Greek idea, among others, which was already clearly expressed by the Orphics, the Paleo-Pythagoreans (560/300) and the later Platonists and to some extent worked out in liturgy and in the praxis of daily life.

Man becomes truly man (i.e. realizes his true form of life) only by moving away from the animal level of life, to a certain extent, and approaching the level of life of the deities.

In Late Antiquity - especially from -200 to +600 - this gave rise to a separate type of philosophy, called ‘theo.sophia’, God-given philosophy.-- In that great Late Antique tradition moves the modern Platonic Christian, which Solovjef always wanted to be, even if some aspects (e.g. a sometimes vague form of Eastern mysticism) are open to criticism.

**(i)-- The inner evolution.**

The idea of the “kingdom of God” emerged in the human mind by two methods:

- a. the ideal of the pagan deified man (e.g. in the form of the emperor and
- b. the idea of the ‘Kingdom of God’, centered around the God-man Jesus.



The pagan ideal entered the minds of mankind at that time by means of “theosophical” philosophy as a method. The Biblical idea of the ‘Kingdom of God’ also entered the minds of the Jews, but rather by ‘prophetic inspiration’, which does not necessarily exclude the Old Testament books of wisdom and revelation.

**Note.** - That Solovjef does lean towards the Late Antique theosophies, appears - briefly - from the fact that he, o.c., 189, n.5, points out how both methods - the purely naturalistic, as preparation, and the Biblical-prophetic, as completion - in the system of the very influential thinker Philo Judeus, i.e. Philon of Alexandria (-20/+50), came to a first attempt at unification: Philon is, thus, in Solovjef’s eyes “the last and greatest thinker of the ancient world”.

**(ii).-- *The external evolution.***

The political and cultural unification of the main “history-making peoples” of the East and West took shape in the Imperium Romanum, the Roman empire.

In Greece and Rome, however, “natural” (pre-Christian) mankind reached its limits: it saw the ultimate meaning of life in something “absolute” and “unconditional”, namely the deification of all-too-animal mankind.

**(i)** Among the Hellenes, this divine sense of purpose was manifested, among other things, in the beautiful sensuous bodily form (which the Greeks interpreted as something “divine”, as a down-to-earth Aristotle once remarked), as well as in one or another higher philosophical idea.

**(ii)** With the Romans, the same ‘divinity idea’ came through in the reasoned will to build a political-cultural power system, the Empire. This took on an Orientalizing form in the ‘deification’ which some later emperors in Rome centered on their own person and position of power during what was called ‘the dominate’.

But seen from Solovjef’s biblical concept of deity, the pagan idea or ideal of deification had to remain too abstract or even purely imaginary.

With this very negative judgment on the ancient pagan gods and goddesses, Solovjef stands in a purely Jewish-Biblical tradition, which wrote them off as ‘nothingness’ (which is certainly an exaggeration).

Expressed in Western language: the divine world reached beyond the biblical revelation, just like the biblical supernatural realities, beyond the ‘natural’ degree of reality.

In Western ecclesiastical language, this is called ‘extra-natural’. Well, supernatural realities are, in themselves, absolutely not ‘nothing’. They are only so in comparison with the supernatural divinity.

### **3.-- Outcome.**

“Yet the (Pagan) idea of ‘divinity’ demands to be embodied”, - says Solovjef. In contrast to the ‘deified’ Roman emperor as the climax, then comes the true God-man, Jesus. “As the monkey anticipates man, so the deified Roman emperor announces the God-man”.

When the pagan world was confronted with the failure of its ideal, a number of believing souls and a couple of philosophical minds got the prospect of something different but of the same order of beings.

This, according to Solovjef, was the incarnation of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, the Son of the Father. Deified man, but fundamentally situated within the purely natural or extra-natural order, though adorned with the splendor (glory) of the Roman emperor, in the dominion, remains, in fact, “an empty dream”.

This, while the God-man Jesus, even in the pitiful appearance of an itinerant rabbi in Israel, can still reveal his true, divine nature,--in his healings and exorcisms.

### **Conclusion.**

The outcome of a dead-end ideal thus appears, in retrospect, to be the incarnation of the Son of God. There the evolution of life on earth achieves:

- (i) an admittedly somewhat prepared,
- (ii) but fundamentally unpredictable form of being, to which the term ‘full humanity’ can rightly be applied.

Behold how a true Platonist and Bible believer can brilliantly ‘integrate’, indeed ‘refound’ or ‘actualize’, evolutionary theory.

**Note** -- We would like to add one clarification to Solovjef's insights. -- In nature, the divided being is at the same time the factor and the stake of every level rise: the individual being is and remains, in terms of life reality, first-rate.

**Consequence:** the level at which something lives is determined by the forms of being (note: inorganic, vegetable, animal, human), but these forms of being (levels) are only second-rate in terms of their real value. The level of life means the phase in which the individual creatures move,-- the general living environment established by their progress along the ladder of evolution.

Cfr. W. Vogel, *La religion de l'évolutionnisme*, 325, where the author writes about a similar idea.-- Admittedly, Solovjef has pointed out the limitless alternations which individual beings represent within the 'order' (type of life, form of being), especially in the human phase of evolution. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing this singularization of the general type.

What many scientists forget is that as soon as one enters the stage of life (plant, animal, man), the remark by Father Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 605, comes into force. "The biological sciences therefore include, at one and the same time, sciences concerned with facts which have an order in time, and sciences concerned with beings, i.e. forms of life, which live together in space.

(i) In so far as the life sciences deal with facts, their method is that of the natural sciences.

(ii) In so far as they are interested in individual beings and their types, "their method differs rather widely from that of the natural sciences". It is not some law that is central.

### ***The concept of type***

A type of living thing is all that a system of traits is: a number of distinguishable traits invariably and necessarily exist together (such that one of them (distinguished) does not exist without the other (non-separated)), while they exclude certain other traits.

### ***Applicable model.***

1. The type of induction is the Socratic one: one examines a limited number of individuals at random - e.g. a number of cows -; one compares (comparative method); one arrives at a system of characteristics. Then one generalizes: what one has found of some individuals, one claims of all (Socratic induction), i.e. the type.

2. Thus it is established that cows are 'ruminants' (Ruminantia), like e.g. also deer, camels and giraffes.

a. A ruminant always includes: cloven hooves, multiple stomachs, molars with flat crown (= the system of traits: distinct, but not separated).

b. This system always excludes: gills, single stomach, canines, molars with a knobby crown (= the system of predators).

### ***Targeting.***

Lahr, O.c.,607, says that such a typology appeals to purposiveness as a principle (that which governs the system of characteristics of living creatures, as e.g. ruminants or predators). In order to explain the typical coherence of traits - their invariability, their combination - the adaptation of such life forms to the environment must be put first:

“Thus one understands the fact that so many specimens (individuals), testifying to an individual and independent existence, subject - for the rest - to such a variety of external conditions of life, yet, from sex to sex, follow the same type of behavior and invariably continue repeating the same typical traits”.

### ***Jakob von Uexküll***

von Uexküll (1864/1944; Romantic biologist), e.g. in his *Theoretische Biologie* (Theoretical biology), (1920), gives the task (of the family of mites (Ixodidae), which lives as a parasite on the skin of mammals) as a model: the tick has only three senses: its eyesight enables it to find a branch; its sense of smell and temperature enable it to feel a warm-blooded animal passing under that branch. The tick drops onto that animal to suck its blood.

The animal's senses are a kind of 'sieve': their construction alone allows only what is necessary for life and survival to pass through them. From the highly adapted, specialized group of knowledges one can deduce with certainty the way it lives.

If you like: the animal, as an animal, is completely determined by its know-how, expression of its creature form.

### **Arnold Gehlen**

Gehlen (1904/1976), a.o. in his famous work *Der Mensch (Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt)*, (Man (His nature and his position in the world)), 1940), links up with Uexküll's ideas to demarcate man from the animal. Man, in contrast to the hyper-tuned animal, is unadapted, zoologically speaking. Man, in contrast to the hyper-tuned animal, is maladjusted, animal-wise speaking. At least the initial human being: he lacks hair coverings (he is unprotected against the environment); he lacks attack or escape organs (= unprotectedness); he lacks sensory acuity, characteristic of animals (unadaptedness). Especially in the condition of an infant and child.

### **Conclusion:**

In Gehlen's interpretation (an animal interpretation, we stress) man is "a form of being characterized by shortcomings". All abilities - including his spirit and his cultural creations - are compensations for his shortcomings. Nature gave him reason and freedom of will, so that he could construct his life in a self-willed way. While the animal is hyper-specialized, man is open to the world around him. "Man does not have an animal center. He does have a living world".

**Bibl. sample:** H.-J.. Schoeps, *Over de mens (beschouwingen van de moderne filosofen)*, (About man (contemplations of the modern philosophers)), Utr./ Atw., 1966, 216 / 232).

Schoeps severely criticises Gehlen's basic view: a.o. with Adolf Fortmann (1897/...), *Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen*, (Biological fragments for a doctrine of the human being), Basel, 1951, he says: "It is the spirit that builds the body".

In other words, what Gehlen, in van Uexküll's footsteps, has accurately observed is precisely the consequence of the human being's form of being, not the other way round.

More precisely and in Solovjef's spirit: precisely because human consciousness is not enclosed by a hyper-adaptedness, it testifies that it is determined by an all-embracing spirit and this is reflected, from the very beginning, in the reception and growth of this human being, who, thanks to spirit, can dispose of a multitude of roles (=adaptations). It is precisely for this purpose that his (animal) maladjustment serves. With a too adjusted form of being, the open mind would be hampered.

### ***Individuality and individualism with Platon.***

In order to build up real, universally valid insights (scientific and philosophical), Platon placed a very strong (some would say too strong) emphasis on the idea in its generality.

Yet one must be very careful:

(i) for the sound Platonic method, as he explained it e.g. in *de Zevende brief*, (the Seventh Letter), the singular phenomenon (e.g. the individual horse) is and remains the springboard for ascending to the universal idea ('hippotès', 'horse-ity', i.e. the form of being realized in all copies of 'horse');

(ii) as G.J. de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens* (Plato's image of man), in: *Tijdschrift v. Philos.* (Louvain) 15 (1953): 3, 426 / 438, it is:

- a. to oppose unrestrained individualism radically (think of the Sophists),
- b. to recognize - equally radically - the individuality of man.

1. The spirit (logos) in each individual is, in principle, identical and also common. Therefore very different individuals, as they expressly speak in Platon's dialogues and defend the individual opinions, can nevertheless achieve a dose of unanimity, also and especially concerning the main values of a society.

2. But each individual can assert this identical and common 'reason' in his own way (a.c., 434). The individual traits, whose "system" sets the individual, as an individual, against the rest, must therefore be maintained: the (individual) positive is, after all, richer, more valuable (a higher image of the supreme Good (value - without - more)), than the lack of it.

De Vries therefore rightly says: "That a Socrates and a Theaitetos - in spite of their union in common acquired insight - each in their own way, through difference of age and temperament, realize reason in themselves, is an enrichment of the philosophical life, which Plato does not want to miss. in spite of the striving for 'unity', the diversity remains a positive value". (A.c.,434f.).

In Platon's theology this healthy individualism is further reinforced: each individual tries to portray in his/her own way in life the deity whom he/she has followed during the journey along the celestial axis in order to contemplate the 'heavenly realms'. -- After death the individual soul does not merge into some vague universe soul: it remains an individual.

### **B.III.-- *The theocentric idealism.* (31/34)**

'Idealism' here stands for 'doctrine of ideas'.

#### **a. *Platon***

Platon is the founder of the doctrine of ideas. A Platonic idea is:

(i) a form of being - e.g. the form of inorganic matter, plant life, animal consciousness and human spirit -,

(ii) insofar as that form of being governs (as a principle, an explanation of) the phenomena in which it is determinable.

*Consequently*, evolution, insofar as it is the introduction of being forms, is at the same time the introduction of ideas, which - in the Platonic interpretation - exist prior to it as models of all possible copies. That these forms of being, in nature in and around us, must be pre-existent, is due to the fact that they are active as exemplary models from the very beginning.

*Note* -It is therefore not surprising that they are, in Platon's interpretation, 'divine' -amongst other things, opposite to 'mortal'.

#### **b. *Albinos of Smurna***

Albinos of Smurna (= Smyrna) (100/175) is the first thinker, who, centuries after Platon, situates the Platonic (divine) ideas in the mind of God (as supreme being, - not yet understood as Biblical God). The creature forms, active in nature as pictorial models, are then God's ideas. These God-ideas guide God in founding (ordering or, in the Biblical sense, even really creating) nature (the universe).

If Platonic theory of ideas is 'ideocentric' (ideas are the center and divine culmination of his worldview and life), then Albinos' theory of ideas is 'theocentric theory of ideas! God is the center and his ideas (working models, models of order and creation) stand, at once, in his mind as models for all that is ordered or even created by that God.

The Christian Platonists have adopted and developed this thesis. Think e.g. of S. Augustine. After all, it was easily compatible with the Biblical view of God.

It is against this background that one should understand the figure of Solovjev (like the other Russian realists): they are 'theocentric idealists'.

*Note* -- In order to understand Solovjev's view better, it is necessary to define the idea of 'matter' more precisely.

***Bibl. sample:*** *Recherches et débats du Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français*, (Research and debates of the Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français), Cahier 41: Science et Matérialisme, Paris, 1962: décembre.

- James K. Feibleman, *The New Materialism*, The Hague, 1970.
- G. Verbeke, *De vorming van het wijsgerig Spiritualisme*, (The formation of philosophical spiritualism), in: Tijdschr. v. Philos. (Leuven) 8 (1946): febr., 4/26;
- id., *De wezensbepaling van het spirituele* (The determination of the essence of the spiritual), in: Tijdschr. v. Philos. (Leuven) 8 (1946):4, 435/464.

### ***Spiritualism***

Let us say, to begin with, that 'Spiritualism' is:

- (i) the non-material nature of the human soul (spirit) and
- (ii) to postulate the immateriality of the Godhead.

### ***Materialism***

'Materialism', in this perspective, is the negation of both these presuppositions and their reduction to the material, - or to the merely imaginary.

Summarizing the endless discussions on 'matter', we find that there are, broadly speaking, two main conceptions.

(i) 'Matter is that which is without life, without consciousness, without spirit. We call such a thing 'pure matter' (nothing but matter).

(ii) 'Matter' is that reality from which we see first inorganic matter, then successively life, consciousness, spirit emerging. We call this 'rich matter', (more than matter).

This second interpretation is only tenable in so far as one regards life, consciousness and spirit as potential, i.e. as a predisposition (more or less in their germs in pure matter).

**Note** - This double interpretation is explained, in great detail, in D. Dubarle, D.P., *Concept de la matière et discussions sur le matérialisme*, (Concept of matter and discussions on materialism), in: *Science et Matérialisme* (cited above), 37/70.

**Consequence:** it is clear that the concept of 'materialism' falls into two radically different meanings, depending on whether one is a 'materialist' in the first (poor matter) or in the second (rich matter) sense of the word.

Especially the modern meanings of the word 'materialism' adhere to the 'rich' meaning.

**Note** -- Actually, our history of ideas regarding the idea of 'matter' is even richer.

### ***Bibl. sample:***

-- J.J. Poortman, *Ochêma (Geschiedenis en zin van het Hylisch Pluralisme)*, (History and Meaning of Hylian Pluralism), Assen, 1554;

-- id., *Vehicles of Consciousness*, 4 vols., Utrecht, 1578 (books, in which the idea 'Hylian Pluralism' is discussed in more detail).

Hylic' means 'material' (as regards substance). 'Pluralism' implies,

- (i) apart from the 'gross' substance (of our physics and chemistry),
- (ii) thinner, 'subtle', 'fine' substances exist.



These then bear names such as e.g. 'astral' (in one school this means what in another 'ethereal' means) or 'ethereal' (usually 'astral' means 'more subtle' and 'ethereal' means 'less subtle').

As is well known, this ancient idea of 'fine materialism' (it dates back to the Archaic religions (and also the Milesians, e.g. Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547), who called them 'a.peiron' the subtle, i.e. that which is susceptible to all possible coarse material or psychic-intellectual forms, knew this idea) remains common in occultist circles to this day.

Materialisms' which put this fine material meaning ahead of the coarse material were e.g. Stoicism and Epicureanism (which were at the same time deeply religious,-- certainly the Stoa). They did not know the strict Platonic concept of 'spiritual' (= spiritual, immaterial).

Solovjef's interpretation.

**(1) *The phenomenal basis.***

Solovjef states very clearly: there are facts (in Platonic language: phenomena), which only become comprehensible if one puts forward an evolutionary hypothesis. "It cannot, in this sense, be denied". That is pure Platonism.

**(2) *The theocentric-idea interpretation.***

**1.--** The fact that, out of / after the lower forms of existence, the higher ones emerge (life, animal consciousness, human spirit) or reveal themselves (the pneumatic, God-spirit-inspired life emanating from the God-man Jesus), does not at all prove that the higher forms of beings - certainly 'ideas' in his eyes - are 'produced' or even 'created' by the lower ones.

The reason: ontologically, i.e. insofar as there is a reality content in them, higher forms of existence are richer in reality,--even if they only become - in a course of time and evolution - ascertainable after the lower ones. What is less or not real cannot possibly produce, let alone 'create', what is more real.

Solovjef does not discuss in this context the question whether actual matter cannot sometimes contain 'germinal' (potential) life, animal consciousness and human spirit.

**2.-- *The role of the lower forms of being.***

This is limited to providing 'material conditions', i.e. 'a favorable environment' (according to Solovjef).

**Note 1.** What Solovjev does not mention himself, but what can certainly be quoted here, is the idea of a “biotope”. Biotope’ can be defined as “the center (place) into which a plant or animal is radically inserted” (the appropriate center of life). This immediately leads to the character of a rather uniform (homogeneous) habitat.

**Note 2.** There is nothing to prevent, by analogy (partly identical partly not identical meaning), speaking of “the biotope of man” or even of “pneumatic man” (introduced by Jesus model).

**Note 3.** Whether matter is interpreted as without life, without animal consciousness and without human spirit or not (the poorer, pure and the richer interpretations of matter) is, in such a view, not so relevant.

**Note 4.** This is all the less an issue since the Biblical idea of creation, which was certainly Solovjevan, holds that all forms of being - whether purely material or spiritual - are created by God. Even that form of being, which is called ‘evolution’: God creates, in a sovereign transcendent way (i.e. beyond the created actuality) and, at the same time, in a sovereign immanent way (i.e. within the structure of the created itself) also the whole of evolution, - the fact of which can therefore never be used as an argument against the Biblical concept of creation.

Whoever, as still happens today, tries to play off the theory of evolution against the idea of creation, presupposes a flawed (and basically laughable) idea of ‘creation’.

***Eternal and non-everlasting.***

**1.** That evolution gives us, in its forms, new things to see, -- even the crudest materialist admits this. -- So, in a limited sense, in Solovjev’s eyes too, newness is at work.

**2.** Yet the idea of ‘inorganic matter’, ‘organic life’ (vegetable and animal), ‘human spirit’, ‘pneumatic life’ is eternal. In what sense? Since God, in Solovjev’s view, exists from all eternity, his creation models (God ideas) exist from all eternity as well. Thus, what appears as ‘new’ within the evolutionary time course is - in fact, in the Divine background - ‘eternal’.

***Note on the value of common sense.*** (25/48).

Specialists in biology or human sciences (anthropology) may remark that e.g. Solovjev's view on the evolution of life does not take into account the highly scientific data, e.g. concerning the transition from inorganic to organic (think of the discussion on viruses).

In other words, these specialists have a certain elitism, because only specialists can, in this hypothesis, speak with sufficient authority about life and the origin and evolution of life. On the other hand, since the eighteenth century, there is what is called "commonsensism".

Therefore a short explanation of the correct value of what is called 'common sense':

***Platonism on the subject*** (35/38)

Since we are writing this course within the premises of Platonism, let us first consider three points.

**(1). *Common sense.***

One should not confuse 'common sense' with 'common sense'. -- 'Common' means, here: "that which is common to a greater number of people". Common" here means "that which, in terms of logical thinking, works correctly". Platon knows this aspect of man.

**(a) *Cosmic***

The phenomena, which the universe offers us to experience, show, according to Platon, something like 'anankè', the inevitable fate. Our orderly-goal-oriented mind does not see through a number of data,-- finds no order(s), no efficiency in them. The 'anankè' comes across as disorderly and inefficient.

But the same phenomena in the universe show, also, a second side, the rational-objective. It is called "nous" (intellectus, mind) or "logos" (ratio, "reason").

In the universe, apart from 'anankè', also 'nous' is at work. The 'common sense' is situated in the reasonable-purposeful, 'sensible' (non-absurd) aspect.

**(b) *Human***

The human soul is, according to Platon, a trinity of faculties (parts, elements,-- aspects). Note: Platon does not mean by this that there would be no fourth aspect, for example. The enumeration is unpretentious. But it is very useful in practice, as will be shown later.

"The soul consists of a big monster, a lesser lion and a little man". n". (G.J. de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens* (Plato's image of man), in: Tijdschr. v. Phil. 15 (1953): 3, 432).

This differential (big, less big, small) is also translated by:

(i) *The big monster*. “The coveting part” (“epithumètikon”), i.e. the animal needs for sleep, food and drink, sexual life and economic property),

(ii) *The lesser lion*. “The proud” (“thumoeides”) or the validation drive, i.e. the animal, though “nobler” needs of honor, which manifests itself in courage and selfconsciousness, in anger and resentment (if disappointed),

(iii) *The little man*. “The reasonable part” (“logistikon”), i.e. the common sense in man. The highest aspect, the downright logical thinking, Platon calls ‘little’ (‘the little man’), in contrast to the big primitive and dangerous animal. and the lesser lion.

*In short:* Platon had no illusions about the amount of common sense in mankind, as he had come to know it in Athens and e.g. in Sicily.

## (2). *Public opinion*.

Common sense is not, just like that, the prevailing opinion.-- Platon had no illusions about that either. He got to know Socrates of Athens (-469/-399), his later great teacher, from his earliest youth.

Now, after the restoration of ‘democracy’ (as it actually functioned then, i.e. in decline), in -403, Socrates, on the initiative of Anutos (= Anytus), one of the leaders of the moderate people’s party, was accused in court of ‘wickedness’. In -399 the case came before a jury, which convicted him with a small majority. Although he was given the opportunity to flee abroad, Socrates chose death with the gift cup.

This injustice to such a high figure shocked Platon and the other Sokratics. With some of them he fled to the city of Megara for a time.

This implies that Platon clearly understood the malleability (‘manipulability’) of public opinion in a decaying democracy.

Secondly, the Sophists (-450/-350), a bunch of ‘wisdom teachers’, who, for money, offered education, speculated on precisely this malleability,--through their rhetoric or the skill of influencing public opinion, if necessary by base (ethically lower) means. Which made Platon, in them, see the “very little man”.

Common sense, in the meliorative sense, was therefore, for Platon, quite different from such public opinion.

### **(3). *Group-thinking (class-thinking).***

The common sense, in Platonic interpretation, is also not groupthink, object of sociology e.g.. -- He was an aristocrat. But this did not prevent him from claiming that the manual worker too can lead a life that is illuminated from the world of ideas (about which more later), center of one main aspect of Platonism.

In other words: not only professional teachers ('philosophy' in the specialist sense), -not only 'generally trained' ('philosophical life' in the generalist sense) have access, thanks to the 'nous' (spirit) present in all people, in principle, to the world of ideas.

Incidentally: a professional life, such as that of the grocer or the innkeeper for example, is, in itself, not at all objectionable: in so far as such people are 'good' (participate in the highest idea, 'the good'), their professional life is 'plausible' (G.J. de Vries, a.c.,432;435).

**Conclusion.**-- In Platonic interpretation, common sense is that which, in terms of common sense, is present in all human beings, at least in principle, and which they, in the context of some community (e.g., a polis or city-state; e.g., the oikoumenè, the then known inhabited world), are able to manifest.

Platon does not deny that there may be great differences of opinion between peoples (he was too well-travelled for that) or, not least, between individuals (this is abundantly clear from all his dialogues): the "reason" or "spirit" which is fundamentally the same in all people remains, for him, a fact, in spite of the manifest contradictions.

**Note** -- More recent neurology and psychiatry has discovered that even in the:

- (i) the neurotic / neurotic (the nervous patient),
- (ii) the psychopath / psychopate and
- (iii) the psychotic / psychotic (the soul sick) mind and possibly logically coherent mind remain active, although to a lesser or greater degree disturbed.

A top example of this is paranoia: a bunch of delusions (without much contact with the everyday world), put together to form a kind of 'closed system', betrays the spirit that is fundamentally present in all people.

The same applies to ethnology: Primitives think really logically, albeit from their own axioms or presuppositions.

A good part of today's pedagogy recognizes that children share 'the common mind'. But, again, just as with the Primitives, in the child's mind, there are its own preconceptions, partly different from those of the adults.

In other words, in the child, in the primitive, in the psychiatric patient, 'the little person', i.e. the primordially healthy mind, which cannot be clouded by anything, is always active, to a greater or lesser degree.

**Note:** in strict logical terms: children and primitives, madmen and normal man have one and the same logic, which is based on collection (all/some/just one/no) and especially on system (= system: whole/some parts/just one part). But each of these categories applies this one, identical and universal logic in a different way (a.o. because each of them has its own presuppositions (axiomata, lemmata)).

**"le sens commun" ('common sense),**  
The term comes from Claude Buffier

**René Descartes** (1596/1650; founder of the apriorist streak within Modern Enlightened rationalism) started from 'le sens intime' (the individual mind): the Modern subject or I looks at both himself and the outside world (including his fellow men) from within (in a kind of introspection). This is the so-called method of 'le sens intime' (the method of individual consciousness). Descartes constructs the entire professional science and the entire Modern-Enlightened philosophy on this ultra-small basis, as a kind of superstructure.

**Claude Buffier** (1661/1737). In contrast, the Jesuit Claude Buffier, in his *Traité des premières vérités* (Treatise on the First Truths), (1717), proposed the method of common sense: instead of Descartes' 'le sens intime' he proposes 'le sens commun', reason insofar as it is common to all people. The common sense intuitively sees that, apart from one's own inner self (introspective side), the outer world with, in it, fellow human beings (extrospective side) are equally real and certain.

**The common sense** (Thomas Reid) (38/40)

David Hume (1711/1776; top figure of the Experimentalist ('Empiricist') tendency within Modern Enlightened Rationalism) wanted to found a science of mankind on a purely experimental basis (against the Middle Ages Scholastics and, above all, against the Cartesian method of 'le sens intime', which reasoned aprioristically).

(a) The twenty-three-year-old Hume publishes, in 1739, *A Treatise on Human Nature* (two chapters). Hume is - what is called - like Descartes, a mediator: we reach our deeper self, the things of the outer world, our fellow men, knowingly, not unless indirectly, by means of representations (hence the name 'Representationism').

It is not my own self (as a permanently existing being), but only a representation ('idea') of it that I reach directly. So too to the outside world and neighbor.

From this Hume concludes a radical Scepticism: his radical and scientific certainty is only the impressions (representations) of the data, not the data themselves.

(b).1. Thomas Reid (1710/1796; known among other things for his *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764)) was deeply shocked by Modern-Rational skepticism: the certainties of life that everyone, except for enlightened minds, thought they had, seemed totally undermined.

As a counter model, Reid designs a Common-Sense philosophy (also called 'Scottish philosophy'), as the basis of a spiritual science.

(b).2. The first example of such a science of mind is the experimental method of Francis Bacon (1561/1626; *Novum organum scientiärum* (1620)), as it was elaborated into a mathematical physics (mathematical physics) by Isaac Newton (1642/1727; *Philosophiae naturälis principia mathematica* (1687)) and others.

Reid noticed that Newton, while reasoning, started from premises, found by experience and inductive (= generalization) reasoning among others, in order to reason further from there.

The second example: Euclidian geometry. Euclid of Alexandria (-323/-283; *Elements of geometry*) also started from propositions, called 'axiomata' (postulates), in order to reason from there. Experimenting or reasoning a priori (Newton, Euclid), one always starts from intuitively conceived, unproven or as proven or provable certainties.

(b).3. Humanities, as Reid imagined them, were to resemble that method.-- Here too there are premises.

(i) There are the premises of logic;-- e.g., the fact that "two plus two is four"--that red differs from blue. There are also the precepts of mathematics, unmistakable.

Reid calls both classes of basic certainties 'necessary' certainties, postulates.

(ii) But there are also the non-essential (accidental, contingent) presuppositions:

a. the reality, immediately grasped (immediatism) of all that is clearly perceived;

b.1. the immediately grasped reality of all that is remembered, insofar as clearly perceived (memory);

b.2. the immediately grasped reality of the permanently existing self, insofar as it is indirectly perceptible in our inner states (e.g., “I feel healthy”) or acts (“I took that decision”) (I-consciousness);-- so far Reid seems rather Cartesian (le sens intime or the introspective side).

c.1. There is, extro-spectively, the directly susceptible reality of an external world,-which makes our mind, in effect, a mind-in-the-world;

c.2. Furthermore, there, in the midst of that world, is a multitude of fellow human beings, whose ‘mind’ is more or less directly susceptible in their behavior (alter ego, fellow humanity). - So that we emerge, in Reid’s philosophy of mind, as “minds-with-other-minds-in-the-world”. In a common world, then. That is quite different from the Enlightenment-Rationalist solitude of many ‘I’s’, locked up in their inner lives and observing from a distance what seems to be or is outside. Which must lead to radical skepticism.

**Conclusion:** humanities postulates form the second (contingent) part of the chapter of postulates.

**(b).4. Methodological.**

Euclid’s geometry proceeds deductively, starting from axioms (postulates).

Newtonian mathematical physics works inductively (= a form of reductive method), starting from its own postulates (partly discovered by experience).

Knowledge is thus in all cases based on presuppositions, from which one concludes either deductively or inductively.

But where does one situate the intuitive grasp of the propositions themselves? Reid calls this ability ‘comon sense’, the common sense. No one is deprived of it: it is common to all people.

**Conclusion:** Commons thinking is scientific thinking, but for once it does not end in skepticism, but is based on certainties of life.



**Note** -- One may safely compare Dilthey's science of mind with Reid's. One can, in fact, see Dilthey's method as an elaboration and precision of Reid's Commonsensist method. Cfr. FLC 05f..

**Note** -- What de Vries, a.c.,434, calls "the common speech" with Platon, is made clearer in Luc Brisson, *Lettres de Platon*, Paris, 1986 ("seule la septième est authentique") (only the seventh is authentic"), and in Platon, *Der siebente Brief (An die Verwandten und Freunde des Dion zu Syrakus)*, (The Seventh Letter (To the Relatives and Friends of Dion at Syracuse), Calw, 1948, 35.

**1.** Platon, in that passus, resists that some of his teachings are expressed and/or published in school terms. For: in that case the pupil risks clinging to the purely verbal expression,-- without grasping directly and with the living spirit the high idea which is more or less obscured in it.

To put it more bluntly: the pupil might - like a computer - reproduce the verbal text very accurately, but let the deeper meaning (the idea) pass by carelessly, unaware of what is actually being said and meant.

**2.** The right method is 'the common sense', 'the little person' in each of us: "But both repeated conversations ('dialogues'), precisely about those points of learning, and intimate coexistence give rise, suddenly, to such an idea in the soul. Like the light that is lit from a spark of fire. Afterwards, such an idea paves its own way" (Der siebente Brief, 35).

**Conclusion**-- The similarity between Platon's 'little man' in all people and Reid's 'Common Sense' is striking. But, here especially, we grope for the profound difference:

**(a)** before Platon, in a number of ancient Greek schools of philosophy (e.g., the Paleopythagoreans), the 'hetaireia' was the school of thought. Even Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-545; second figure among the Paleomilesians) was called the 'hetairos', the thinking associate, of his predecessor Thales of Miletos (-624/-545; the first scientific thinker of Antique Hellas). Relation to someone who thinks with you was the basis.

**(b)** With late-medieval Nominalism (think of a William of Ockham (1300/1350)), one begins to think individually-subjectively. The fact that Descartes takes 'le sens intime' as his starting point is an extension of this.

It is precisely against this that a Buffier (le sens commun) and a Reid (the common sense) are rebelling: they want to get out of the narrow, suffocating carcass of the Modern 'subject' (the self with its inner world, through which it observes everything, at a distance).

**By the way:** the Phenomenologists (at least in part) and, above all, the Existentialists have taken a very similar stand to Enlightenment-Rationalistic thinking, which is why the Commonsensists put so much emphasis on an external world, on fellow human beings,--as real, immediately given forces. Something Platon needed much less.

***The pre-scientific type of thinking.*** (42/48)

One application of 'the little person' in each of us, of the common sense, is the insight that non-scientifically trained people can demonstrate.

Commonsensism - it must be repeated - is not an unscientific or anti-scientific type of thinking. Quite the contrary. But it has an eye for the very weak side of the Scientist elitism, which seems to speak and to impose itself as if only specialists in the field of science possessed real knowledge,-- as if they had some kind of monopoly on real insight. Like an elite.

***Psychological model.*** (42/43)

We derive the example from Dr. Noël Lamare, *De passionele jaloezie* (The passionate jealousy), Kapellen - Antwerp, s.d.,157. This book is a (sometimes irritatingly bad translation) of a French work on the pathological, paranoia-like envy, in all its forms.

Page 157 talks about a married woman who, within the narrow straitjacket of traditional married life, creates extremely painful situations.-- We analyze.

**(1).-- *The thesis.***

Dr. Lamare - somewhat in a Psychoanalytic vein - postulates that the "jealous" people (men, women) - "jealous" in the sense of "morbidly envious" - are in fact, in their unconscious strains and aims, disguised, not self-consciously aware homophiles (lesbians).

**(2).-- *The argument.***

The language of the woman in question reads as follows: "All the women that my husband meets, along the road, he 'devours with his eyes'. He shows 'real tendencies to break up'.

But her way of saying ('style') has a peculiar 'emphasis', 'tonality': behind this moralizing disapproval there is 'something' hidden (a factor; in Platonic language: a 'stoicheion', explanatory element).

That ‘something’ **(i)** does determine her speech, **(ii)** but it is not explicitly mentioned in the text of her words (on the contrary, it is ‘suppressed’, -- in Psychoanalytic language: ‘repressed’ (unconsciously) or ‘repressed’ (consciously)). In traditional language: “she does not want to know that ‘something’”.

**(2).a.-- *The common sense***

One day, the husband in question says: “After all” - not without irony - “I am, in the eyes of my wife, a kind of womanizer. But, meanwhile, the one - of the two of us - who is most interested in women, -- the one who (in other words) ‘cheats’ the other (at least morally speaking), is, first of all, my wife herself”. By the term ‘morally’ is meant ‘inwardly’.

**(2).b.-- *The scientific understanding.***

“However uninitiated the man was in depth psychology, he had nevertheless found - almost alone - the explanation for this strange behavior of his wife”. Thus, literally, Dr Lamare.

**(i)** It had struck him, during his contacts, that the wife harbored an extreme disdain, indeed a boundless hatred, for her own sex wives.

**(ii)** According to him, it is as follows: while she sees her husband ‘peeping’, it is in fact she herself - because of her identification with him (‘transference’) - who ‘peeps’ at her sex partners, the women, with his eyes. It happens that she, on the way, e.g., returns to those women, takes them up brutally with her gaze and looks at them closely, approaches them inquisitively or, sometimes, follows in their footsteps herself.

But she does not realize this, she suppresses it. She is like a lesbian who, jealous of her husband because he can, in all honor, approach women, look at them, admire them, is happy that he commits ‘that sin’ because she can then occupy herself with it.

**(iii)** See - says Lamare - such jealous ladies in the fine season and in summer places, when her sex partners stroll around half or three quarters naked: their behavior is ‘very peculiar’ (he means: the unconsciously lesbian tendency and attention for sex genders flows off like that).

**Conclusion.--** Without being a professional psychologist, neurologist or psychiatrist, that man was a real people expert.

***Sociological model.*** (44/45)

Andrei Amalrik, *Rasputin*, Paris, 1982, 190, gives us a model of social understanding.

***Rasputin***

Grigori Novykh (1872/1916; nickname: Rasputin) is not a real 'monk' (monk in the Russian Orthodoxy); he was a 'starlet' (individual self-made man, with apparent gifts; if you like: a charismatic).

a. He was a healer: he stopped the bleeding of the tsarjevich, who was suffering from a hemorrhage. Which, of course, caused him no small amount of envy.

b. But he sometimes exercised, among others, at the court of the Russian Tsar, a decisive political influence.

In 1916 he was murdered - in a gruesome way - by two relatives of the czar and a representative of the people.

***To conclude:*** Rasputin was highly gifted, but illiterate and had annoying weaknesses. E.D. Chermensky (Soviet historian), for instance, labels him as "cultureless" and, therefore, "politically incompetent". Something Amalrik does not agree with easily. We analyze.

(1) ***Amalrik's thesis.***-- "As a person who has taken no formal course of study, I reject Chermensky's flat mandarin opinion".

(2) ***Amalrik's argument.***

(I) ***The inductive proof.***-- Samples -- preferably many -- from cultural history often prove that:

1/ uncultured or half-cultured autodidacts

2/ sprung from the lowest strata of society,

Some Byzantine emperors, for example, started out as simple soldiers. (Note: who does not think of the corporal Adolf Hitler?) - Even Nikita Khrushchev (1894/1971; First Secretary of the Communist Party): his clumsy speeches aroused general laughter, but - at least in the first years of his policy - he managed to save the Soviet Union from a dangerous situation.

(II) ***Approximate definition.***

1./ It happened to Amalrik - "like everybody else" (he says) - to receive from simple Russian peasants advice, which made more sense than that of experts overloaded with diplomas. The 'usefulness' is, in Amalrik's eyes, a decisive element of the definition.

2./ “Innate intelligence and practical skill often allow complicated problems to be mastered. Common-sense’, here in the form of innate intelligence and practical sense, is the root (second definition element).

**(III) *The social application.***

(a) According to Amalrik, e.g. politics is such that :

a/ in fact every politician is an autodidact (one learns politics little from books) and  
b/ a direct grasp of the essence of the problems is the only feasible method.

At once, we know more precisely what ‘meaningfulness’ means, being able to analyze a complex political situation in such a way that one can see its essential form, reduced to its core.

“This, while an analysis using so-called ‘common tools’ counts the trees without realizing that these trees make up a forest”. Thus, literally, Amalrik.

In other words: specialists lose themselves in such a large number of details (‘trees’) that they no longer see the totality (‘forest’) in which they are situated. And this totality is reduced to its essential core.

(b) The example of Rasputin.-- Rasputin’s broad information (broad-mindedness base) was acquired thanks to a method: thanks to his life, he was able to make a cross-section through the whole of Russian society,--from the riffraff of society (the outcasts) to the elite of the nobility, he knew practically all layers by living in them.

*Consequently*, his insight, sociologically speaking, was richer than that of the peasant who never left his village, or of the officer confined within the narrow horizon of his regiment, or of the merchant, the industrialist, the squire or the civil servant, each of whom lived confined to his narrow circle and whose views were valid only for the limited horizon of it.

*Conclusion.*-- “That intelligence of Rasputin was, therefore, noticed by almost everyone, friend or foe, who got to know him”. Thus, literally, Amalrik.

***Immanuel Kant***

I. Kant (1724/1804; top figure of German Enlightened Rationalism).-- In his Prolegomena (1783) the enlightened mind shows itself: it is, indeed, “eine grosse Gabe des Himmels” (a great gift from heaven), to possess an undisturbed human intellect. But one must prove this by deeds. To invoke the ‘common sense’ as an argument is to turn it into a kind of unquestionable oracle. Genuine philosophizing demands “eine kritische Vernunft”, (a critical reason).

One sees the suspicion and, also, the misinterpretation of e.g. Reid.

After all, for Buffier and Reid, it was a set of presuppositions that everyone makes, in their own way, and that spring from common sense.

Kant makes something (incidentally ridiculous) vain out of it. Kant too, with his 'critical spirit', starts from - sometimes far from proven - presuppositions. His scornful criticism of common sense conceals this,--in an uncritical way. For, if anything is 'critical', it is the acute realization that we all, critically or naively, draw from a source of presuppositions.

***A Defence of Common Sense*** (George Edward Moore). (46/48).

(a). G.E. Moore (1873/1958) is situated in Analytic Philosophy (which is also called: 'Linguistic Philosophy', 'Language Analytic Philosophy', 'Philosophical Analysis'). The name and what is indicated by a name (the named) are central to it. These are highlighted in the analysis of concepts (terms), judgements (propositions) and reasoning. Sometimes in very detailed elaborations.

The first period of the Language Analytic philosophy starts around 1900, with two main figures, G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell (1872/1970; Logical Atomism).

***Bibl. sample:***

-- G. Nuchelmans, *Overzicht van de Analytische wijsbegeerte*, (Survey of Analytic Philosophy), Utr./Antw., 1969 (concerning Moore: oc., 62/79);

-- id., *Proeven van Analytisch filosoferen*, (Trials of Analytical Philosophizing), Hilversum/Amsterdam, 1967;

-- Louis Vax, *L'empirisme logique (De Bertrand Russell à Nelson Goodman)*, (Logical empiricism (From Bertrand Russell to Nelson Goodman)), Paris, 1970.

(b). *A Defense of Common Sense* appeared in: Contemporary British Philosophy, London, 1925.

How to analyze the propositions (prepositions) of the Common Sense, of which we know clearly and unequivocally that they are true, by means of logical language analysis? This is perhaps Moore's main concern.

***The analysis of a philosophical language.***

(a) It is a fact that many philosophers use a language, which sometimes deviates strongly from the normal language usage (own specialist terminology). This makes the language sometimes very obscure and 'technical'. Difficulties in understanding, therefore.

(b) It is a fact that many a thinker holds propositions (and starts from assumptions), which seem to be in conflict with common sense: e.g. That there are no material things in a world independent of consciousness; that each of us does not know (with absolute certainty) whether the "alter ego" (the other self, the fellow human being) has the same type of (inner) experience as we do; that "time" and "space" do not exist; that when it

comes to empirically established data, we can never acquire real certainty. Again: difficulty in understanding.

Moore's pressing question: by means of what kind of analysis (of language and of realities corresponding to that language) can we test both the use of language and the propositions of such philosophers?

***The comparative method.***

We can, most certainly, compare the language and the assertions of the philosopher (as outlined above) and those of the ordinary man and woman, representatives of pre-scientific and pre-warrior thinking. What then strikes one?

(a) As a rule, the concepts of judgement and reasoning (the logical operations) of ordinary, non-elite people are expressed in the generally intelligible language of everyday life.

(b) In many cases, the assumptions of the common man are irrefutably true: e.g:

- That there are, indeed, material things, independent of our consciousness (i.e. the common mind is not conscientious);

- That, daily, in direct lived contact with my fellow men, I can observe that they go through similar psychic experiences as mine (no Solipsism, no subjectivist Individualism);

- that I, indeed, live in time and space (yesterday I was in Antwerp, today I am in Herentals, tomorrow in Brussels) (no Hyper-spiritualism);

- that concerning some empirical fact (e.g. whether my child does well at school), I can indeed, on several occasions, be absolutely certain (no Humian skepticism).

***Conclusion.*** - Moore points out, among other things, inner contradictions: a thinker (possibly inspired by Eastern ideas) will deny the existence of 'time' (life locked in time) and, while explaining this, take that same time into account (by beginning, continuing and ending, for example).

***Moore's result:***

(i) though not all the statements of the common man (evidently only one type of Platon's 'little man' and Buffier's and Reid's source of postulates) are unquestionably true,

(ii) yet they are, in many cases, more solid than the sometimes highly paradoxical, extravagant propositions of some philosophers.

In other words, not all, some statements of ordinary people are true. This, while a number of philosophical, specialist assertions are untrue.

Moore therefore defends the good law:

- (a) of the ordinary language and
- (b) of the presuppositions of the ordinary human type (called common sense, but in fact representing only one type of it) also in purely technical-philosophical discussions.

“There is no question of these convictions (and the language in which they are expressed) going unchallenged against the first philosophical reasoning. On the contrary, there is a hard core of such beliefs against which no philosophical reasoning can stand. (G. Nuchelmans, *Overzicht v. d. Analytische Wijsbegeerte.*, (Survey of Analytical Philosophy, 68). This is how Nuchelmans summarises Moore’s position.

As Françoise Armengaud, G.E. Moore, in: D. Huisman, dir., *Dictionnaire des philosophes*, Paris, 1984, 1859, says: The term ‘comon sense’, in Moore’s parlance, means:

- (i) not a set of popular beliefs and prejudices,
- (ii) nor the orthodox (orthodox, authoritative) opinion of the majority,
- (iii) not a treasure trove of universal and innate opinions either.

In other words, it indicates the insights inherent in non-specialists. But note: in Platon’s perspective (the common reason, the ‘little man’ in every human being), in Buffier’s and Reid’s perspective (source of premise), ‘common sense’ means something else, namely that which is sound among the opinions of ordinary people.

Or in other words: common sense is not the monopoly of specialists; ordinary people also possess (part of) common sense.

**Wisdom.**-- As we know, in the ancient civilizations the term ‘wisdom’ meant valid insight.

In time, it became the term used to designate ‘general education’ and ‘specialized philosophy’. Wisdom differed from polytheia (polumathea, polumathia) and from both the above-mentioned later meanings.

We still say, for example, “That woman has much wisdom”. Or: “That man possessed great wisdom”.

Indeed, the term “wisdom” covers a knowledge that springs from life,--not a general education or specialization. Common sense, in its proper meaning, is the bearer of wisdom.



## **Chapter 1. Platon's Dialectic Method. (49 /69)**

### **Introduction.**

#### **Bibl. sample:**

- E. W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 32f.;
- Albert Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 56/63;
- E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), Antwerp, 1967, 103v;
- O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*, (History of Idealism, III (The Idealism of the Modern Era.)), Braunschweig, 1907, 48ff.

(A). As E. De Strycker, o.c., 92, says and shows, Platonism is not a 'closed system', as one can find especially with the Modern Enlightenment-Rationalist thinkers. For Platon - as for the Pythagoreans - philosophy is 'philosophia', the search for wisdom (valid insights), as far as this is possible for a human being on this earth. "He is always on the way and can make no worse mistake than to think that he has reached the end point, even if on a very limited matter". (E. De Strycker, O.c., 92).

This is what we call 'the inductive method', which learns about the overall reality (being) by means of sampling. "The system - insofar as there can be talk of a system - is thus essentially unfinished and consists of a number of converging lines, directed at a single point, which lies outside our field of vision". (Ibid.).

(B). Although in Platon's works (dialogues) there are many parts that are "informal" (non-committal reasoning), a method emerges with force from all that he left us: the dialectic method.

#### **General characteristic.**

Who can be called, in a strictly Platonic sense (for the term 'dialectic' has more than one meaning), 'dialectician(s)'?

(1) The dialectician(s) thinks -- first and foremost -- for himself and researches for himself, -- aiming at the formation of his own immortal soul -- but he does this -- secondly -- in "intimate fellowship": in friendship (with the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists friendship was "sacred"), concerned about the formation of the soul ("psychagogia") of his fellow man, who thereby becomes "hetairos", thinking partner/ thinking associate. This takes the form of dialogue (conversation).

But this mutual consultation about the truth, is governed by a method:

- (1) definitions and
- (2) the connection 'premise/ inference (derived proposition) are commonplace in the course of the conversation.

In other words: the logical slant is decisive.

(2) The dialectician stands in contrast to the rhetor (teacher of eloquence) and the sophist (the thinker who uses eloquence).

The rhetor, the sophist, first of all seeks to convince himself of one or another proposition. Above all, he seeks to persuade his fellow man, friend or foe, by the written or spoken word. In the word, he sees a power that has a convincing effect. The rhetor and the sophist seek to exert this power of words - whether it consists of logically valid or invalid reasoning, is of secondary importance - primarily on the audience (in the public assembly, at court, in a discussion room).

The decaying Greek (especially Athenian and Sicilian) democracy was a dream terrain for the rhetoricians and sophists.

To that type of thinking Platon was rather hostile. The immortal soul and its formation, the higher values, the rather small circle of discussion, weighed too heavily with him. He continued his "rhetoric" (eloquence and skill): in -387/386 he bought a piece of land and founded the Akadèmeia, the Academy, a school for dialectics.

***Further description.***

Following especially the mathematicians of his time (especially in Pythagorean circles), Platon attached great importance to the diuretic and hypothetical methods.-- We will explain.

**(A).-- *The dietetic method.* (50/51)**

Concepts were central -- since Socrates. Diairesis', divisio, division, means the separation of a whole into its parts, of a collection into its elements.

Concepts can be ordered among themselves (comparative method): one starts from the 'genos' (genus, gender) - e.g. the concept animal - to divide it into sub-concepts, like e.g. horse, dog. In the multitude of "horse, dog, cat" the genus (total concept) brings unity. It sums them up somewhere.

The definition can be derived from this: "A horse is an animal that possesses (well-defined characteristics), (which distinguish it from other animals and from the rest of the cosmos)". One sees in it the genus (universal collection) and the species (subset).

**Note --** One may compare this diairetic (= diiretic) method with what FLC 27f. Typology. Platon developed this method especially in the *Faidros*, the *Sophist* and the *Politikè*.

Of course, one can also proceed in the opposite direction: the synoptic method.

Creatures such as a horse, a dog or a cat can be summarized ('synopsis') in the term 'animal'. In this way one situates (partial) concepts in a (total) concept.

It should be noted that people who define their concepts in this way, both for themselves and, even more so, in a conversation or discussion (eristics), create clarity for the interlocutor ('fellow thinker'). Which makes many useless words and phrases superfluous,-- even today.

**(B).-- The hypothetical (lemmatic-analytical) method. (51/69)**

Once the concepts are well defined, one is able to formulate clear judgements (propositions, derived propositions).-- This theme Platon developed especially in *State* vi/vii.

**(B).1.-- The hypothetical method in mathematics at that time. (51/54)**

Hypothesis' is a judgment (proposition, assertion) that is put forward - without proof, without justification. It is the name for our 'premise'.

A proposition can be derived from a premise (= 'synthesis'), as was done in mathematics at the time. Or also: the other way round, from a proposition (to be found) the hypothesis (proposition) can be derived (= 'analysis').

**(i) The 'sunthesis**

The mathematicians of the time postulated "archai" (principia, "principles") or "stoicheia" (elementa, elements). These were unproven propositions, which were held to be irreducible and obviously useful in mathematical reasoning.

"Those concerned with geometry and arithmetic start from premises. For example, the even and odd, the figures, the three types of angles, - as well as what corresponds to them, according to the work of investigation.

Because they presuppose such things - as if they knew them with certainty - they attach no value to justifying them, either to themselves or to others: "It is obvious to everyone". Thus, literally, Platon in *State* 510c.

In other words, the fact that Platon “does not find these propositions so obvious” is already reflected in this text.

**(i) Bis: *The proof from the absurd* (*‘reductio ad absurdum’*).**

Aristotle calls this ‘apagogè’ (apagogic proof).

The structure of this ‘sunthesis’ or deduction (from propositions) is as follows: if one starts from the proposition, one arrives at the contradictory (contradictory) proposition. Which is therefore unrhythmic, ‘incongruous’. Hence the name.

D. Nauta, *Logica en model*, (Logic and model), Bussum, 1970,27f. says that the Pythagorean mathematicians knew the proof from the absurd: “The most beautiful achievement of the Pythagoreans is that they proved that it is impossible to find a rational model (a fraction) for the square root of the number 2 (root 2). That is: for the number whose square is 2. (...). The most beautiful example of a ‘proof from the absurd’ from Antiquity.

In a proof from the absurd, one assumes that a counter-model ‘exists’, that is, an example or ‘instance’ that satisfies the particulars of the problem, but not the demand (that which must be proved).

One then systematically shows that such a counter-model cannot exist, because it leads to an incongruity or contradiction (other terms are ‘contradiction’ and ‘paradox’). It is then proved that every object, which satisfies the data, must also satisfy the demand”. (O.c., 27/28).

**Conclusion.**-- The sunthesis or simple deduction (from axiomata and propositions) is the construction of a logical system, as e.g. the later Euclidean geometry (FLC 39) will work out.

**(ii) *The ‘analysis’*.**

This is a backward movement of thought (where the sunthesis is a forward movement of thought): instead of deducing from propositions (deductive construction) one seeks from these same propositions the ‘archai’ (principles, which govern them) or ‘stoicheia’ (elements, which govern or explain them). “What does the concept of ‘even or odd number’ presuppose?” Under what conditions is a geometrical figure possible (conceivable)? “What presuppositions govern the three types of angles?”

In Kantian terms, the possibility conditions are looked up.-- Where forward deduction (construction) starts from premises, backward 'deduction' seeks the premises of premises. This is basic research. -In this case, for example, one looks for the foundations of mathematics or of another positive science. This is the analytic way of thinking: one 'analyzes' a (proposition) for its conditions of possibility -- for its 'principles' or 'elements'.

**Conclusion.** Schematically summarized:

(a) synthesis or axiomatic-deductive construction: "if (proposition), then inference".

(b) analysis or basic research: "if proposition, then proposition". The first train of thought is progressive, the second regressive.

**Note** -- the lemmatic-analytic method. (53/54)

**Bibl. sample.:**

-- O. Willmann, *Abrisz der Philosophie (Philosophische Propädeutik)*, (Wien, 1959-5, 137;

-- id., *Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, (*Geschichte des Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 48ff (Das Prinzip der Analysis). This is one type of synthesis or deduction.-- One of the most fruitful methods of Modern mathematics, the principle of analysis, is of Antique and Platonic origin. "Of Platon it is reported: "He first placed the study by 'analysis' at the disposal of the Thesian Leodamas." (Diogenes Laërtios 3:24)". (O. Willmann, *Gesch.*, 48).

(i)-- Starting point is the duality (systechy, pair of opposites) 'given/requested (sought)' as it is known to all mathematicians, among others. Or, in ancient Greek, 'faneron/ afanes' (visible/invisible; immediately given/not immediately given).

(ii)-- The requested (= unknown) is treated, in a lemma, premise (hypothesis), as if it were the given (i.e. as if it were a known).

It is treated as if it were a 'black box' (the actual content of the knowledge remains unknown).

From this, one draws 'deductive' conclusions,--in an analysis of the implications (presuppositions).

O. Willmann, *Abrisz*, 137, rightly says that the name would be much better 'lemmatic-analytical method'.

O. Willmann, *Abrisz*, 137, says: “Of this type are the solutions of problems which begin with the phrase: ‘Supposing the problem were solved (etc.)’.

The whole of algebra is based on this method: the unknown (required) quantity is introduced, lemmatically, as the quantity ‘x’; immediately the equation (into which it is introduced) is formulated so that, by hypothesis, one performs operations with the unknown, as if it were a known (given) one”.

O. Willmann, *Gesch.*, 48, gives the following model.-- The problem reads: “The sum of 7 + a number (unknown) is 19 (= the given). Asked: what is that number?”

**Note.**-- Where the medieval mathematicians spoke of ‘res’ (the unknown), François Viète (1540/1603; founder of the letter calculus) -- also called Viëta -- and René Descartes (1596/1650) introduced letters (Descartes : ‘x’).

Indeed: instead of working with numbers (e.g. “7 + 12 = 19”), Viète worked, for the first time, with letters: “a + b = c”.

What progress was made with this? The mathematical progress lies in the fact that -- by introducing letters as lemmata, hypotheses, presuppositions (“supposing that the requested number was ‘b’”) (which is an analysis) -- the synthesis (deductive operation) becomes possible: “7 + b = 19”.

Mathematical progress, further, lies in the fact that a universal or private number value (here: b ) acquires the operative character of the singular numbers.

More clearly: by introducing b, b acquires the operability of 12.-- But operability (operational character) is synthesis, deductive construction,-- made possible by analysis, presupposition of a condition of possibility (the lemma ‘b’ instead of ‘a number (12)’).

In short: by introducing ‘b’, one pretends that ‘a number (unknown)’ was already known. But it is precisely this that makes arithmetic possible.

### **(B).2.-- *The hypothetical method in Platonic dialectics.***

Platon applies it in his dialogues.

#### **(i) *The Platonic synthesis (deduction)* (54/57)**

In his *Politeia I* Plato ‘deductively’ (synthetically) analyzes an assertion of Kefalos (Cephalus), who gave as a definition of justice (= moral behavior): “Always tell the truth and always give (back) what is owed”.

What is striking about Kefalos' definition is its generality (universality), expressed by the adverb 'always': all cases of telling the truth and giving (right) what is due (right) are 'righteousness' (here in the very broad sense of 'conscientious action').

***Excerpt.***

Josiah Royce, *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1912-1, 1961, 12, explains.

(a) Defining - in the Platonic doctrine of method - is governed by a set of particular (singular and private) cases (in this case: to tell the truth, to do justice), in which the concept (here: justice) is applicable and definable.

(b) But examples (applications, applicative models) by themselves do not make up a definition (essence, regulative model or 'rule').

For example, by listing nothing but the different cases of clay (application), we do not yet learn what clay itself ('rule') is.

For this purpose it is necessary to:

(i) in general terms, grasp what is common to all these separate instances of clay (common property).-- But so it is also if we wish to define the concept of 'knowledge' or the concepts of 'righteousness', 'virtue' (= invariably conscientious behavior). For a definition aims at the essence,--at what Platon calls 'the idea', i.e. the form of being of which the enumerated cases are examples.

Here the case is like this:

- a. always tell the truth and always let justice be done
- b. is the general idea 'justice', at least in Kefalo's interpretation.

But look what Platon does. He tests the definition by the apagogic method (proof from the absurd).

(a) Let us suppose that this definition is correct, what will be deducible (sunthesis) from it? By pretending that it is correct, Platon applies the lemmatic method.

"Suppose a friend, in good spirits, entrusts you with weapons. Later, having become insane, he asks you for them back. Suppose: you give them back to him (you give what he is entitled to).

No one will say that, in that 'hypothesis', you are acting 'righteously' and therefore have a duty to return the weapons to an insane person".

(b) Platon, by assisting Kefalos (provisionally, methodically), reasons on (= synthesis, deduction). What does he encounter? The opposite of what Kefalos, in fact, meant: the unsubtle application of the definition leads to the negation of the definition.

***Explanation.***

Royce, O.c.,12, writes:

(i) A definition, (a) starting from the singular or private cases, (b) expresses in universal terms.

But it must, further, be tested. This is done by applying it to new, different examples. This, with the express intention of detecting its defects (falsification).

For a truly universal formulation of a concept:

(a) must be verifiable in all cases covered by it (rule;-- inclusion) and

(b) must be falsifiable in all cases which fall outside it (exceptions;-- exclusion) (FLC 27f.: type) (FLC 51: diairetic method). Thus one knows whether the definition is too much or too little.

Look: what Platon, unsaid, notes on Kefalos' definition, is that, when someone gives (back) weapons to an insane person, he/she becomes, in principle, an accomplice to the abuse of those weapons. As a result, he/she does not give to third parties, the victims, that to which they are entitled (e.g. an uninjured body, life) (in contradiction with the definition). In other words: the idea of "complicity in evil done by others" arises here.

***Explanation.***

Royce, *ibid.*, expresses it as follows:-- The testing of definitions is particularly well served by the realization that no general concept (Latin: universale) exists in isolation.

Here one of the main features of Platonism emerges: the universals form a system. Singular or private data may, superficially, appear unrelated. In fact, they are members of an encompassing coherence.

E. De Strycker, *Concise History*, 98, says this as follows:

(i) Platon calls the interrelationship 'koinonia' (communio, community): 'three' shows 'koinonia' with 'odd number'; 'snow' with 'winter cold'.

(ii) This interweaving makes the concepts an ordered and coherent system. The later Neo-Platonists (-50/+600) called this system 'kosmos noëtos' (mundus intelligibilis, thinking world).



Note that the idea of ‘the one’ (= the good, i.e. the completely valuable) is the unifying basis (premise, ‘element’) of that system.

Here this is apparent: ‘always doing justice’ runs, in some cases, in tandem (‘koinonia’) with ‘complicity in another’s evil’. This sense of coherence (‘Gestalten’) is typically Platonic.

### ***Conclusion.***

Here already appears similarity and difference with the purely mathematical ‘hypothetical method’:

(i) mathematicians apply them to mathematical entities (space mathematical and number mathematical);

(ii) Platon applies them to life: philosophy - in Platon’s interpretation - has to do with life. It does search for answers, which are objectively founded (justified), but, therefore, do not cease to concern life and thus imply a decision or choice. Only when a choice is made by living persons does it come to light as to what precisely it contains,-- what conclusions it leads to.

Cfr. E. De Strycker, *Beknopte gesch.*, 90.--The straightforward logic of mathematicians, yes, but applied to vital or life situations,--as e.g. the handing over of weapons to a madman.

### **(ii) *The Platonic analysis (foundational research) (57/69).***

A small example: to analyze the ‘logos’ (here: judgment) “Virtue is teachable” on its premises is to seek an ‘archè’, a principle, which governs that sentence, or a ‘stoicheion’, an element, which makes that statement meaningful. For example, “virtue is a kind of knowing”. If virtue is indeed a kind of knowledge, then it is - like any insight - teachable.

This can be interpreted as fundamental research of ethics (moral theory).

### ***Ontological investigation of the foundations.***

Platon is more than an epistemologist (basic researcher) of one or more sciences, -- mathematics, ethics.

He sees the being, the total reality, in which all these sciences and their objects (mathematical entities, conscientious living) are situated. Hence Platon seeks that in which all propositions (and, immediately, all inferences from them) converge.

As O. Willmann, *Gesch. D. Idealismus, III (Der Idealismus der Neuzeit)*, Braunschweig, 1907-2, 1036, says: Platon saw two 'transcendental' (all-embracing, nothing-excluding) concepts:

**a/** 'being', a concept which he derived, first and foremost, from Parmenides of Elea (540/...), founder of the Eleatic logic and ontology, and which he thoroughly rethought (so that it included becoming);

**b/** 'value', usually rendered as 'the good', in Dutch.

As Willmann, *ibid.*, also says: especially the older Platon Pythagoreanized (adhered to some of the main ideas of the Pythagorean school);-- thus arose the series of transcendentalisms: being, value,-- unity (i.e., the connection which the multiplicity of being exhibits through resemblance and coherence),-- truth (better: meaningfulness, i.e., that through which all being (all data) can acquire meaning for our mind,-- become 'intelligible', understandable).

By the way: Platon identified value and unity (usually translated by 'the one').

**Note.**-- The philosophical subjects: ontology (being), -order (unity), epistemology (truth) and axiology (value),-- they are still prevalent and illuminating today, at least in updated form.

All this looks, of course, especially to non-professional philosophers, alien to life.-  
- But look what that practically-vital amounts to. When we look at ourselves and the world while we are alive, many things seem valuable: when we see Florence Griffith running in Seoul at the 24th Olympic Games (and think of her whole lifestyle as depicted in the magazines), it happens that even people who are not very interested in sport exclaim: 'wonderful'.

Well, they don't know that they are responding platonically: 'Fast Flo' not only has long nails, which she paints in every possible fluorescent color ('Florescent'); she is working on a book of lullabies and fairy tales, an athletics novel and even a novel (autobiographical) and she draws (a set of Christmas postcards). Such things provoke the word 'wonderful', -when one sees them praying in the 4 x 100 meters.

Well, if one knows that, for Platon, ‘the good’ is also ‘the beautiful’, then one understands a little better that the exclamation ‘beautiful’ is a Platonic reaction. Beautiful’, in the Ancient Greek and especially in the Platonic sense, is everything that commands admiration and astonishment.

*Note.* - One thinks of the idea of “kalo.k.agathia”, which can be rendered by our word “high moral form of behavior” and which is said of a man or a woman, who lead a life that is as conscientious as possible.

The first part of the word (kalo) means “clean”: for example, when we see someone who has been faithful to a friendship in very difficult circumstances, we still say today: “He/she has acted cleanly”. In short: the Platonic expression “clean” does not have the “aestheticism” (enjoyment) which clings to our modern word.

Thus one understands that ‘value’ (including moral value), for the Platonist, also includes ‘beauty’.

#### *A two-fold different model.*

Beauty: in the technical-philosophical sense, is scale. We call the large-scale beauty, for example, ‘grandiose’ (‘exalted, sublime’). The small-scale clean we call e.g. ‘lovely’ (graceful,-- beautiful).

#### *Appl. model.*

When, in summer days, as a tourist or, sometimes, as a pilgrim, coming from the Northern Italian city of Aosta, along the Dora Baltea (a river), one approaches Mont Blanc, one suddenly sees, in Courmayeur, the last city before the tunnel, on the left, quite high in the mountains, a small ‘cute’ (another word for lovely) church.

If you take the road that leads to this point, over Dora Baltea, you will come to a smaller river that flows into Dora Baltea, the Dora di Veni (in local French ‘Val Veny’), in which, with a loud roar, the mountain stream that Mont Blanc gives off - among others due to the enormous glacier - thunders southwards.

And look: all the way up you suddenly come across the beautiful, lovely little church, dedicated to Notre Dame de la Guérison (Our Lady of the Healin). One cannot enter it - at least in summer - without encountering the incessant coming and going of prayers. When, after a prayer, one pauses to contemplate the scene, the contrast is striking: on the one hand, the graceful church, in its unsightly little insignificance; on the other, the ferocious massif of Mont Blanc.-- Some exclaim: Some exclaim: ‘magnificent’.

Where, now, is the fundamental research ('analysis')? -- When, with Platon, one asks oneself: "Here something beautiful (Florence Griffith); there something beautiful (Notre Dame de la Guérison/ Massif de Mont Blanc). When one sees how these 'beautiful' things came into being and, in time, risk disappearing, the question arises: what is at the origin of all this splendor?"

One can also put it another way, hypothetically (like the mathematicians of the time, for example): "if there exists ('is') 'something' by which Florence Griffith, Notre Dame de la Guérison and the Mont Blanc massif can be experienced as 'beautiful' - that which Platon calls 'the good', 'the beautiful' (the two concepts 'run into each other' (FLC 56f. (koinonia of ideas)), then both that experience and its object, the good and beautiful (to stay in the ancient Platonic language), are comprehensible, 'sensible', logically justified.

### ***Comparison.***

We saw that Platon reproaches the mathematicians and ethicists for starting from premises (even / odd, geometrical figures, types of triangles; -- good and evil (conscientious, 'righteous', and unscrupulous, 'unrighteous') and, from there, reasoning on - which is mere 'synthesis' (axiomatic-deductive proceeding (FLC 51 ff.)) - without reflecting backwards on those premises.

Platon also subjects the then current theory of beauty and art (later called 'aesthetics') to its own analysis: he asks about the condition of possibility, not only in man - who admires (subjectively), but also and especially in the admired object, - that which one finds, e.g., 'beautiful', 'grandiose', 'lovely', 'adorable', etc. This he calls 'the good'. The latter he calls 'the good', resp. 'the beautiful', This is basic research of aesthetics.

### ***Relativization.***

Relativization means "to see the non-absolute value of something". It is precisely by reasoning towards the absolutely mathematical (the one), the absolutely ethical (the good), the absolutely beautiful (the beautiful) that Platon sees that what we, here on earth, call 'beautiful', for example, is ambivalent, i.e. susceptible to two opposing value judgements (e.g. beautiful and ugly).

Florence Griffith, Notre Dame de la Guérison, the Mont Blanc massif, -- they are beautiful, but never "the beautiful itself, -- in its absolute form".

The beauty, for example, of The beauty of Griffith's performance pales into insignificance when one remembers that she, like many athletes, may have committed some form of doping; the beauty of the magnificent Mont Blanc massif becomes uncanny and frightening when one knows that, every year, people die there; the lovely little church of Notre Dame de la Guérison takes on a shrill, dark note when one sees all the ex-votos (concretions of all sorts of ailments and diseases) hanging on the walls inside.

The exposure to these dark sides puts into perspective the "goodness" (value character) and the "beauty" (splendor), which, on a first, perhaps naive view, overwhelms the spectator.

Platon has been blamed for emphasizing these dark sides so strongly and, in a sense, 'killing' all 'aesthetics', in its very root. That is somewhat true. But, even if this relativizing aspect approaches the view of the Kunics (Cynics; founded by Antisthenes of Athens (-455/-375; a pupil both of Socrates and of Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375; one of the greatest Sophists)), Platonism is far from being a Kunics philosophy that is culturally pessimistic. On the contrary: in Platonism, both cosmos and human culture are affirmed, but not "absolutized".

### ***Conclusion.***

It is as de Vries, *Plato's Image of Man*, 437, says:

- (i) Platon sees in everything the universal duality ('ambivalence'),
- (ii) From which only the idea of the good is free.

This is due to his absolute will to subject - backwards - our starting points (presuppositions), from which we live, to an examination, the fundamental examination (= analysis).

Expressed in a modern term, especially prevalent since Kant, Platon is "critical" of our presuppositions, -- in ancient Greek: "our hypotheses".

**Note** -- This aspect involves Platon exposing the radical finiteness of all that we are and experience as realities around us. This, because he thinks from the 'an.hupotheton', the 'absolute' (that which is not governed by any condition of possibility).

### ***A scholastic (medieval) application (51/66)***

In order to grasp the Platonic analysis (fundamental research) even better, it is appropriate to consider what John of Salisbury (1110/1180; Early Scholasticism) says about the systechy (pair of opposites) 'thesis/hypothesis'.

To begin with, John of Salisbury belongs to the School of Chartres (XIth/XIIth century). As a thinker he was a Christian Platonist.

1. But he was also a 'Humanist'. This word is taken here in the broader sense: is Humanist someone who wants to organize life and its framework, society, in such a way that the human being ('humaniora'), as a person and as a personality, can fully develop thanks to a higher education, especially of a cultural-historical and literary and artistic nature. Antiquity serves as a model.

2. This was possible for John in a 'Renaissance' (re-foundation. Actualization) of especially the Latin writers:

(i) M.T. Cicero (-106/-43; the great orator and Eclectic (i.e., inspired by a multiplicity of tendencies) and Seneca of Cordoba (+1/+65; Stoic thinker);

(ii) P. Vergilius Maro (-70/-19; great poet), P. Ovidius Naso (-43/+17; poet), Q. Horatius Flaccus (-65/-8; poet), D.J. Juvenalis (+60/+130; satirical poet, who criticised decaying Rome).

"Humanism of the XIIth century was the precursor of the Renaissance. Thus H. Davis, Thomas Aquinas and Medieval Theology, in: R.C. Zaehner, ed., *Zo zoekt de mens zijn God* (Thus Man Seeks His God), Rotterdam, 1960, 110 (referring to Fred. B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1953, ix / x).

**By the way:** Johannes is the author of *Metalogicus* (a theory of the value of logic) and of *Policraticus* (the first great Middle Ages theory of the state).

Roland Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique*, (The semiological adventure), Paris, 1985, 115; 143/145, gives us the facts about 'thesis/hypothesis'. Translated into our language: "the abstract idea (ideal) / the concrete-singular situation (circumstances)".

(1). - **Platon's thesis.** (62/64)

De Vries, *Plato's Image of Man*, 430, gives us an example.

In Platon's eyes, man is first and foremost an immortal soul. The mortal body is both tool and image of that soul. But it is a defective tool and a deformed image. "Thus it can become a hindrance to the activity of the soul and, in that case, it is 'a prison', in which the soul is shut up like an oyster in its shell and from which it yearns to be freed".

1. This brings us to one of Platon's so-called "dualistic" views. Dualism' is understood as the view that there is a gap between spirit and matter, between soul and body, such that spirit and soul are overvalued and matter and body are undervalued. This is 'give a meaning' (hineininterpretieren), not 'grasp a meaning' (the correct interpretation) of Platon's thesis.

2. We saw that, except for the good itself, nothing is absolutely valuable: Platon counts his own statements among these dual realities,--especially as they express ideas.-  
- Says de Vries: "These are perhaps Platon's most famous 'statements'".

**Note:** He means the statements concerning the soul and the body, especially the body as a 'dungeon', in which Orphism (a doctrine of the immortal soul and the rigid morality based on it) is at work.) But, like all his 'theses', they have no more than limited validity. (A.c., 430).

That this was truly Platon's own opinion is shown e.g. in Platon's last work, the *Nomoi* (Laws), where he says: "Man should be grateful for three 'possessions'. The deities, his soul and his body". Which shows Platon's high regard for what represents the lowest degree of reality, the body.

Or still, in the *Faidon* (Phaedo) 115b: the soul should take care of itself (think of the psychagogia (FLC 49)). But in the *Faidros* (Phaedrus) 246b: equally, the soul should take care of "all that is inanimate". "It may not shirk this responsibility: bound to the body it does yearn - "gazing upwards like a bird" - for the vision of ideas, but a premature liberation by suicide is not permitted.

Like Plotinos of Lukopolis (203/269; the great speculative Neoplatonist, who despised this earth), Platon speaks of an 'escape', but with Platon this liberation is "a becoming as close as possible to the deity (FLC 24: deification)" in an activity that remains within earthly life.

The search for the pure 'theoria' (note: the vision of ideas) by turning away from the body can soon lead to 'hubris' (note: crossing borders, usually by overestimating oneself), which does not want to take into account the limitations of human existence.

“Even too severe a training of the body in order to subjugate it is not desirable”. (de Vries, a.c., 430f.).

***Conclusion.***

(a) A definition and the corresponding proposition of Platon must be situated within the total system of being, governed by the good (the value without more), as by an incorporeal sun which illuminates everything (FLC 56: koinonia).

(b) An abstract idea, if it is to be fully understood, must be situated in the fullness of life (FLC 57). What happens here e.g. with - what Platon considers the pinnacle of successful life - the contemplation of ideas (about which more later): this has to be put into perspective, by taking into account the limits of our body, which is not designed for a merely contemplative life.

We are thus far from the dualism or künism that one regularly finds in Platon’s words, when he speaks of the body as a dungeon.

**(2).-- *The thesis of John of Salisbury.* (64/66)**

John of Salisbury assigns to two subjects a task of their own:

(i) what in Early Scholasticism was called “dialectics”, deals with the ideal, taken abstractly; this was called, in mid-century Latin, “thesis”, “positio”, “propositum”.

For example, “Should one marry?”. No singular-concrete circumstance is mentioned.

(ii) What was then called “rhetoric” is concerned with the ideal, situated in a set of circumstances. This was then called “hypothesis”, “causa”. Here ‘hypothesis’ does not mean ‘premise’ (FLC 51). It means “situation”, the totality of circumstances in which an abstract idea becomes real.

For example, “Should Carine marry?”. This “Carine” is then a single individual, living e.g. in Hasselt, in the year 1987 (time/space or “when/where”) who breaks off her engagement, because she becomes depressed (action and reason for action), against the expectations of her environment (contrast), but like a friend of hers - though in very different circumstances (she left for a developing country) - did (example),--on the advice of a psychologist (influence of authority).

In short: for John, dialectic was philosophy and rhetoric literature,-- the one abstract, the other singular-concrete.



Thus, one understands that John was both a Christian Platonist (dialectician) and a Humanist (rhetorician). He did not want the abstract ideas without the living realities and the living realities without the abstract ideas. That is the true scope of the 'thesis/hypothesis' system.

***Explanation.***

1. We have given FLC 64 the situation according to the ancient scheme, called 'chreia' (literally: useful scheme), chria, chrie. In the version of Afthonios of Antiocheia (+270/ ... ; a Late Antique rhetor) the chrie contains eight 'kefalaia', capita, points of view (perspectives), - which are summarized in a verse:

"Quis (who), quid (what), cur (why, why), contra (contrast, counter-model), simile (likeness) et paradigmata (paragons), testes (influences of authority). There are variants.-- This scheme seems wooden. But it has heuristic value: it makes one, on reflection, find thoughts ('heuresis', inventio, finding).

2. However, one can go into Carine's own experience and representation of it.-- Carine is a twenty-one-year-old nurse. Although both her parents and her fiancé had prepared her forthcoming marriage in detail, after two or three years of engagement, she abruptly broke everything off. She said: -- "I am frightened when I see myself married. I do not see myself as happy. On the contrary. And the closer the wedding day approaches, the more frightened I become.

The dejection around her was great. "In such a prospect I should not marry! For another thing: nobody is obliged to marry. Is marrying someone not a free choice?

**Note.**-- One is touching here on the hypothesis, the singular-concrete circumstances, which govern a situation: in normal circumstances one should marry, of course. That 'ought' is even lived through as a 'may' (a form of experience of happiness).

But here it is different: it is the reverse (reversal into the opposite).-- Compare this with FLC 55 (proof from the absurd: whoever pursues a definition without taking into account relativistic circumstances ('sunthesis', - pure deduction), arrives at the counter-model.

She said to her psychologist: -- “It started so promisingly with John: we even built up a passionate relationship.-- But -- and this was from the beginning -- the worm was in: I had the feeling that I was going to prison as soon as I accepted the marriage, as it is usually understood.

On another occasion she said: -- “I am, in fact, ashamed to have to tell it: I suffer from a kind of contradiction in myself. When, for instance in a discotheque, I approach an inviting boy, the relationship falters again and again: all the hours that I spend with him intimately, I feel, from something very deep inside me, a pitiful feeling of uneasiness eroding me. - I want love, yes, real sex. Imagine: I catch myself again and again in my fantasies being raped by a dozen men - young men - and then being happy. I am red with shame, when I tell that.-- But, am I with a boy alone, look that sex dies out. I become frigid, passive,-- anxious, insecure, inhibited, extinguished. -- So, gradually, I never see myself as a married woman. It is as if marriage means my death. Do you understand?” -

**Note:** For those who want to go deeper into this on the psychological plane, H.J. Schoeps, *Over de mens* (About man (Reflections of the modern philosophers)), Utr./Antw, 1966, 282/292 (*De aan fobie lijdende mens*), (The man suffering from phobia), where e.g. Harald Schultz-Hencke, *Der gehemmte Mensch*, Leipzig, 1940-1, Stuttgart, 1947- 2, is quoted (‘desmologie’ is what Schultz-Hencke calls the discipline that deals with ‘bondages’ (desmos’ = bond, brake). Of course, Carine is something for the psychologist-psychiatrist.

**Conclusion.**-- Comparing Platon’s thesis (opinion) and that of John of Salisbury, we see the similarity.

(i) Deification, attainable, in Platon’s eyes, by the contemplation of ideas, is the thesis, the ideal. But this liberation of the soul from the disappointments of life bound to the biological body runs up against limits: suicide is unjustifiable; so is overly severe physical training;--all the inanimate, including the body, is a high value, entrusted to the soul; to turn away from the body out of sheer self-aggrandizement is irresponsible.

(ii) The duty of marriage has limits.-- Only the good’ (the value without more) has no limits).

***A current application.*** (67/69)

***Bibl. sample:*** Jos Muurlink, *Anthropologie voor opvoeders en hulpverleners (Ideologische manipulatie of zelfbepaling)*, (Anthropology for educators and caregivers (Ideological manipulation or self-determination), Bloemendaal, 1981, 17/19 (Oppositionalism).

***‘Oppositionalism’*** is a new term, but an old idea. “Oppositionalism arises when one strongly opposes a particular term or concept and places another term or concept in opposition to it, to which absolute validity-value is assigned”. (O.c.,17).

Translated into Platonic terms, one concept is mistaken for absolute unworthiness, the other for the good (the value without which).

***Applicative models.*** - We borrow them from this work on agogie(k).

**(1) *Biological (psychological).***

Some absolutize the role of predisposition: at birth, in an individual biological being or psyché, all or nearly all possibilities of life are predetermined, fixed.

Others exaggerate the role of the environment: an individual being is, in its life course, completely or almost completely ‘determined’ by the environment in which it is situated.

When, Platonically, one situates both concepts in actual biological and/or psychological realities (FLC 57; 64), i.e. in actual life, where they turn out to be interwoven and with other and with opposite data, only then it becomes imperative that a divided being is determined both by his disposition and by his environment. In other words: common sense (FLC 35),--without ‘Oppositionalism’, without preconceived ideas with their own hobbyhorses or favorite ideas.

**(2) *Sociological.***

Model a. Some people absolutize human individuals as the workers of the relations in a society (e.g. the relations between the wealthy and the classes that own nothing, between the rich and the underprivileged).

The others absolutize the social relations as the sole processors of the individuals who are brought into them by birth or so.

Situated in life, it appears that both theses each contain their own truth, but are limited.

***Model b.*** -- Some absolutize the individual subject (‘I’) as the processor of all ‘structures’ (Subjectivism), others the structures as the processors of the individuals (Structuralism).

Both statements are - Platonically seen - connected by a 'koinonia' (interconnection; FLC 56; 60) and, immediately, limited in their 'value' -- as limited as all of Platon's theses (FLC 63). With the difference that Platon knew it and even justified it philosophically. What many Anti-Platonists do not seem to know.

**(3).-- Philosophical.**

**Bibl. sample:** M. Richard, *La pensée contemporaine (Les grands courants)*, (Contemporary thought (The major currents)) in: *Chronique sociale de France*, Lyon, 1977, 179 (cited by Muurlink).

(1) In this context, it concerns, first of all, thinkers such as Louis Althusser (1918/1990; Marxist Structuralist), Michel Foucault (1926/1984; Poststructuralist), Gilles Deleuze (1925/1995; Nietzschean).-- According to Richard, these philosophers divide contemporary thought into two camps:

a/ 'la pensée bourgeoise' (bourgeois thinking), against which they sometimes vehemently oppose and

b/ "la modernité" (Modernity), which they often emphatically defend.

**(3).1. Bourgeois thinking.**

**Given:** life in our society,--with its incoherent and disorderly (FLC 35: anankè).

**Asked:** How can we establish coherence and order?

Said 'Moderns' typify as follows. - All philosophies, until now, have wanted to give life and society a foundation, a necessary and sufficient ground (foundation(al)ism), by giving it an "essential" (meaning: higher sense or meaning).

This is because they relied on reason, as the ability, in man, to order and to "ground" (foundation).

Until now, all philosophy has boiled down to an ideology, i.e. a set of concepts which give a basis to life and society,--yes, they have boiled down to a flight into an imaginary world of representations ('des idées', -- but not understood in the Platonic sense), --this with the pretence of 'governing' life and society 'dogmatically' (without a fundamental examination of one's own positions so that one does not see the limits of them).

**(3). 2. Modern" thinking.**

Modern' here does not mean merely opposing everything that appears to be outdated! It is first of all anti-fundamentalism.

**Given:** life and society, insofar as we cannot understand them by 'reason',--the 'fragmentation', the incoherent.

**Asked:** explain how and why/why it is that the absurd (opaque to the mind) - Platon's 'anankè' - exists and why/why our mind seems unable to make it transparent.

**a. Platon's cosmology,** i.e. his theory of the cosmos, takes due account of the absurdity in it. The Dèmourgos, Demiürg or Cosmos-builder, who makes and, above all, orders the body (cosmos-body) and the soul (cosmos- or world-soul) of the cosmos, seeks to bring about the higher world of ideas, guided by the Highest Idea, the good (the value without which).

This is, of course, half mythical half speculative. But what affects us most here is what the World Builder - whom the Christians, in the biblical sense, will call God - must accomplish to bring about the higher world of ideas: He must make the 'anankè' (disorderly chance), from which there is no escape, -- badly translated by 'necessity', which in itself does not fit into an ordered, purposeful, planned action, fit somewhere.

***Appl. model.***

The Platonic Demiurge, for example, wants to give solidity to the biological body, which consists mainly of flesh. For this purpose he designs the bone system. This includes sufficiently hard bones, but not so hard that they cannot break, e.g. in a fall or when crushed under a rock.

A biological matter, which is at the same time pliable like flesh and hard like bone, is unfeasible.

This is, in Platon's eyes, one model of 'anankè', inefficiency, uselessness, within the plans of the purposeful (teleological) work of the Demiürg.-- Cfr. FLC 27f. (types are mutually exclusive); 51 (diairetic method); 5 (definition).--

**b.-- Modernity,** with its emphasis on the nonsensical, thus actualizes one aspect of traditional Platonism, which very clearly recognized and thought through the 'fragmentation' of life and society and also of the cosmos, within the limits of the mentality of the time.

But there is a clear difference: Platonic thinking tries - as much as possible - to realize order, order, purpose, reason (spirit). Which is sometimes very much lacking in the pessimistic thinking world of modernity.

By babbling on and on about the absurd, one increases the ... useless.

## **Chapter 2. The platonic 'stoicheiosis' (factor analysis). (70/97)**

The 'stoicheiosis', elementatio, factor-analysis, is a very important aspect of the dialectical method. Because Platon's factor analysis is a method.

### **(1). - Factor analysis.**

In Dutch 'factor' is all that is element (collection) or part (system) of a totality. A factor is co-determining (co-explaining) the totality in which it is situated or to which it refers.

#### **Appl. model.**

(a) "The fact that Elsie was very sensible was a decisive factor in her life's journey" (inner factor).-- "The fact that her parents were farmers was a not inconsiderable factor

(b) in her life course" (external factor). It is, at once, clear that a factor is, in the hypothetical method, at the same time a premise. Thus it is said: "If one assumes that Elsie was very wise, then her rapid rise becomes understandable". "If one assumes that her parents were farmers, then it is easy to understand how, in the midst of her city life, she always needed the countryside,--"to breathe there," she said. -

**Note.** - In mathematics, 'factor' is any number that factors a multiplication (forms a product), e.g. 2bc.

The reverse, 'to factor', is to remove the factors from the number complex.

**Note.** - Epistemological meaning: factor analysis is the method by which one traces the factors that determine (and thus explain) certain 'correlations'. For example, in a psychological test, the correlation between social environment and cultural interest.

### **(2). - Stoicheiosis. (70/75)**

According to E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano)*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 44, summarizes the two main meanings of factor analysis in Platon.

#### **(a). The diaeric meaning (FLC 50).**

Something can be presuppositional ('archè', a principle) in that it is present in a totality, as a constituent of it.-- Aristotle, Platon's pupil, uses in that case the term 'element' (stoicheion): e.g. "The letters are the constituents of a word".

#### **(b).-- . The hypothetical meaning (FLC 51 ).**

Something may be a preposition of something, -- without being an integral element of it.-- Aristotle, here, simply employs the term 'preposition' (principle).

For example, “The invention of the letters is the premise of the written word”. The inventor of an alphabet is not a constituent of the alphabet. - But he is a constituent of the totality, of which both inventor and invented alphabet are elements, resp. integrating parts.

In current (systems theory) language: inventor and what has been invented are sub- or hyposystems of the super- or hypersystem of which they are parts.

*Conclusion.* - Even the second meaning, the hypothetic, presupposes the first, the diaeric. So that ‘stoicheion’, element as a factor, and ‘archè: premise as a factor, run together somewhere, but each expresses a different point of view (perspective).

To take Elsie again: her high intelligence is a part of her person (personality); her parents - farmers are a part of the totality that makes up Elsie and her life course. The totalities differ but the thinking from totalities is identical. That is the scope of the factor analysis in Platonism.

*Appl. Model.* -- E.W. Beth, O.c.,44, cites G. Milhaud, *Les philosophes géomètres de la Grèce*, (The geometric philosophers of Greece), Paris, 1900, 341 -- “The point is, in Platon’s eyes, no longer a constituent part of the line,-- it is no longer a ‘stoicheion’: it is an ‘archè’ (premise).

The interpretation of the point, which is criticized by Platon, is therefore the naive conception of the geometrical point as a fragment of a line (whereby the line is interpreted as the sum of the line segments attached to it)”.

This shows that Milhaud is not saying that element of a whole and premise of that same whole cannot be kept completely apart.

*Appl. model.*-- The Paleo-Pythagoreans (-550/-300) had already realized that element and premise, although distinct, are not separate.

O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.id.,I (Vorgesch. u. Gesch. des antiken Ideal.)*, 272, writes: the unity (‘monas’, monad), with the Pythagoreans, exists for every number (the two is the smallest number),--is itself not a number (‘number’ is always a multiple of the unity); yet it is in every number.

Again: component and premise are distinct, but not separate.

This ties in with the first philosopher of Hellas, Thales of Miletos (-624/-545; the 'water' (meaning liquid) as 'primordial substance' or fluid which, being supple, sails through everything).

"The first definition of number is attributed to Thales, who defined it as a "collection of units" ('monsaon sustèma: a system of units, a definition almost identical with Euclid's, namely "the multitude made up of units". (...) Eudoxus defined a number as a "determinate multitude" ('plè thos horismenon'). Thus Thomas L. Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics*, Oxford, 1931-1, New York, 1963-2, 38.

**Note.**-- Semasiology of the Greek word 'sustèma'.

-- M.A.Bailly/ M.E. Egger, *Dictionnaire Grec-Français*, Paris, 1903, 1875, explains as follows.

(a). Sustèma' means the totality (sum)

(i) of a multiplicity of particulars (e.g. 'all flowers' is the 'sustèma' of flowers; collection),

(ii) of the distinguishable parts of the same data (e.g. 'the whole flower' is the 'sustèma' of the flower; system or system).

(b). Applications.-- "To holon sustèma tou somatos" (the whole system of the body);-- group (a group of people, the priestly college); -- herd (a herd of animals); -- collection/system (a constitution as the set of basic laws; a philosophical system); -- stanza (the whole of the verses), chord (a musical chord), quantity (a quantity of blood).

**Conclusion:** when Thales defines number as "the system of units" his definition is situated in the whole language system of the Greeks concerning 'sustèma'.

**Note.**-- Semiology of the Greek word 'plèthos'. -- Same dictionary, 1570.-- 'Plèthos' means 'quantity' (number).

(a) Large quantity (abundance): a mass of people, the (great) mass, the majority;-- a mass of gold, an immeasurable plain, a great number of months.-- Small quantity: a small number.

(b) Indeterminate quantity: "How large was the number of ships?"

**Conclusion:** the mathematicians have introduced 'plèthos' into their sciences as indeterminate (large, medium, small) quantity. Or ditto 'number'.

**Platonic language.** It is obvious that Platon adhered to that language use.



A. Guzzo, *Le concept philosophique de 'monde'*, (The philosophical concept of 'world'), in: *Dialectica* 57/58 (vol. 15: 1/2; 15.03.1961), 89/127, writes, a.c., 97, concerning Platon's concept of 'cosmos' (ordered world) as follows.

According to Theaetetus 205a the terms 'all' and 'whole' are equivalent in so far as they both mean 'all parts'.

In his dialogue Parmenides, Platon regularly underlines that the reason for this equivalence lies in the fact that one cannot conceive of "what is one" (i.e. a totality) without its parts and vice versa. Which *Filebos* 15d/17a confirms: nothing can be thought of except as the definite number of its well-ordered parts.

**Socratic heritage.**-- W. Klever, *Dialectisch denken (Over Plato, wiskunde en de doodstraf)*, (Dialectical thinking (On Plato, mathematics and the death penalty)), Bussum, 1981, 24vv, says of Socrates, Platon's teacher par excellence, what follows.

(1) Aristotle says: "Two things can be rightly attributed to Socrates:

(i) inductive arguments and

(ii) the definition of the general.

These two together are the principle of science" (*Metaphys.* 1078b29).

It is clear that by 'science' Aristotle, like Socrates and Platon, means: science of the universal in the data. That 'science' can also have the individual as its first object, the said thinkers know somewhere, but, in view of an ethics-for-democratic-thinking to be re-established, they emphasize - excessively - the general.

"Inductive Method" was, first of all, the application of summative induction, i.e. the summarizing of all the cases studied into one common concept.

(2) Socrates in his dialogues on the 'agora', the public square, in Athens, for example, encountered with the regularity of a clock strongly convinced,--yes, to speak with Muurlink, oppositionalists (FLC 67). But they spoke without ever going into the assumptions on which, unconsciously most of the time, they were working. These presuppositions decided the course of their part in the dialogue!

"Socrates could never refrain from leading the conversation back (note: analysis; FLC 57ff.) to these presuppositions of the propositions explicitly discussed.

Platon demonstrates this Socratic regression to the hypotheses (FLC 54ff.) in all his dialogues and will explicitly include it in his dialectical epistemology of the State". (O.c., 25).

(3) Socrates is not a teacher; he is not a writer of books. He starts from the position that he “knows nothing” (i.e. has no ‘dogmatic knowledge’). He does, however, constantly seek out interlocutors in order not merely to ‘discuss’, but to engage in real dialogue, i.e. to build up a rapport by talking to each other.

Philosophy’ - for Socrates - is not teaching, nor is it writing books, but it is dialoguing in a scientific way; ‘dialegethai’.

As one knows (FLC 49), Platon retains dialogue, but does not exclude philosophical and artistic (Humanism: FLC 62) teaching and book-writing. On the contrary, he intensely cultivates both.

*Note* -- Semiology of the Greek word ‘archè’. - Bailly/ Egger, 281.

(a). **General meaning:** something that (co) determines, factor.

(b).1.—**The beginning**;-- e.g., “the beginning (origin) of a quarrel (*Iliad* 22:116); end: the end of a cord (where it begins); (the beginning of) a branch: e.g., where a watercourse splits in two;-- “praxeon archai kai hupotheseis” (the premises and bases of actions;-- Demosthenes).

(b).2.-- **Authority**, power,-- command.-- Public office: “hai archai” (the government, those who control a population); the domain or area, which is ruled over: kingdom, principality.

Decision: ‘archè’ is that which must be taken into account if something is to be understood; certainly necessary, perhaps sufficient reason or ground of something. Thus one understands a quarrel, if one knows its reason (origin); thus one understands a country, if one knows how it is governed.

*Note* -- Semiology of the Greek word “stoicheion”. - Bailly / Egger, 1795.

(a).-- . General meaning: all that is part of a line or rank (order).

(b)1.-- The hand, which determines the hour (sundial).

(b)2.-- The letter,-- not as a separate thing, but as a sign determining a syllable or a whole word (so in *Theaitetos* 202e: “grammatōn stoicheia” (the letters of the written word).

(b)3.-- Factor (both constituent and premise).-- Thus in Platon, *Laws* 790c.-- Thus also in *Theaitetos* 201 (the factors, which govern the universe.

The main points, which govern (summarize) a description, a story, or an argument.

E.g. *Stoicheia geometrias* (Elementa geometriae, Elements of geometry) by the famous Greek Eukleides (-323/-283 FLC 40;), who certainly had predecessors in this.

For an ancient geometrician, after all, things like the point, the line, the plane and the body were the ‘elements’ (constituents) of spatial mathematics.

For the later Aristotelian theory of thought (logic), understanding, judgement and reasoning were ‘ta stoicheia’, the elements (i.e. both elements and propositions).

Further: the planets were called ‘elements/prepositions’; in late antiquity: the signs of the zodiac (as factors of the human life cycle; astro(theo)logical meaning. This term will return, later, in the letters of St. Paul (+5/ +67; the great apostle) (according to F. Prat S.I., *la théologie de Saint Paul*, (the theology of Saint Paul), II, Paris, 1937-20, 503/509 (Note G: les éléments du monde).

Note.-- What seems to have escaped Bailly/Egger is that what were called the material elements (since Empedocles of Akragas (= Agrigentum): fire, air, earth, water (‘rhizomata’, he called them)), were designated by Platon with the word ‘stoicheia’ (*Sophistes* 252b; *Timaios* 48b).

**Note.**-- The term ‘stoicheiosis’, according to the same dictionary, means:

- (i) to construct, compose something from a set of data,
- (ii) a to teach the ‘elements’ of a subject,
- (ii) b the book about those elements.

***The principle (= premise) of sufficient reason or ground.***

Immediately it is clear that the Socratic and Platonic return to the presuppositions (elements) is itself another presupposition, namely the fact that something (all that is) - if it is to be intelligible - has its necessary (taken separately) and, preferably, sufficient (taken together) conditions (‘reasons’, ‘grounds’, ‘presuppositions’, ‘elements’) either in itself or outside itself.

What we saw FLC 70: inner, outer factors.

***Applications of the method of factor analysis.***-- We have tried to clarify the idea of ‘factor’ (factor analysis) and ‘stoicheiosis’, also and especially linguistically, as thoroughly as possible. We now turn to the applicative models.

***The systechia ('sustoichia')*** (76/80).

A first, simple application, but with very current uses is the 'su.stoichia: the pair of opposites.

***Bibl. Sample:***

-- O.Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I (Vorgeschichte u. Gesch.d.antiken Idealismus), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 10 (Ploutarchos v. Chairōneia (+45/+125; Eclectic Platonist) on the pairs of ideas "higher/ lower; good/ evil; perfect/ imperfect"); 273.

The Paleopythagoreans elaborated the pair of opposites, -- literally: 'elements that go together' (subj.: 'of an opposite nature') into a curious doctrine. At some point, a kind of category list ('katego.rie' = basic concept) was in circulation, apparently borrowed from ancient traditions.

People such as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908/2009; Structuralist Anthropologist) have pointed out to us, and to many other ethnologists, that what we call - sometimes disparagingly, in the spirit of the Enlightened Rationalists - 'Primitives' (a.k.a. 'Archaic thinkers'), display a high sense of classification (FLC 50: diairetic method), called 'taxonomy'.

Something of this comes across in the following, strongly Pythagorean, systechies: "good/evil; light/darkness; male/female; straight/ crooked; right/ left - ordered/ disordered; invariable/changeable; defined (definite)/ imprecise (indefinite); -- square/rectangle; even (number)/ odd (number)".

Perhaps of non-Paleo-Pythagorean origin are "knowable/unknowable; identity/non-identity (= resemblance/difference).

This last system plays a decisive role in the thinking of Platon (and Aristotle), among others. It is the presupposition and the element-by-example of every harmology.

In the diary method just mentioned (FLC 50 ff.) the 'tautotès' (identitas), opposed to and at the same time thought along with the 'heterotès' (alteritas), is decisive, of course.

The basis is and remains, also, analogy, i.e. what is simultaneously (under one point of view) identical and (under another) non-identical (different).

**Note** -- Here, again, is a field for Opposition (FLC 67): some emphasize, to the point of one-sidedness, identity (Assimilism, Concordism), others difference (Differentism). The analogical way of thinking holds the middle ground.

It should be noted that - semasiologically - “su.stoichos” means “that which belongs to the same series”: e.g. all the points are situated on the same line “sustoicha”.

In the concept of “sustoichia” the totality is limited to two elements, which are different (e.g. good and not-good), but belong to one and the same set or system (here: morality). One sees it: a case of analogy.

**Note** -- The Parmenides dialogue places a very strong emphasis on the systechies. E.g. Parmenides 129a/e. There one speaks among other things of the ‘mixing’ (identity) and distinction (non-identity) of the ideas.--”In the greatest embarrassment one gets (...) by the demand that the ideas exist in themselves, separated from each other (133b). The ideas all appear to have their existence or being in their involvement with each other,-- as the ideas ‘slavery’ and ‘dominion’ imply each other”. (W. Klever, *Plato, Mathematics and the Death Penalty*, 53).

**By the way:** the great figure of the XIX-th century so-called “New Dialectics”, G.Fr. Hegel (1770/1831; top figure of German “Absolute” Idealism, -- inspirer of Karl Marx (1818/1883; top figure of Dialectical Materialism)) once called the dialogue Parmenides “die heilige schrift der philosophie” - apparently in reference to the dialectic (the interlocking; koinonia (FLC 56) of ideas.

The dialogue Sophistes, also a more mature dialogue, develops analogous insights: “Only by mutual interweaving of the concepts (‘ton eidon sumploki’) does insight arise” (259th). This is true - as the example of ‘slavery/rule’ shows. - also and even more so for the opposite concepts.

We believe that we are here at the source of the infamous ‘dialectic of the lord and the servant’ with Hegel (and, rephrased in a revolutionary sense, with Marx).-- But that is systechy! Totality of opposites. Or, as the ancient Greeks also said: “harmony (= union) of the opposites”, -- an ancient religious theme.

**Note** -- Following in the footsteps of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/1913; *Cours de linguistique*, (Linguistics course), 1916-1), with his phonology (as distinct from traditional phonetics) or structural sound theory, which revolves heavily around pairs of opposites (e.g., ‘enseigner/ renseigner’), the Structuralists have revived the system. Which proves its topicality.

**Note -- A Paleopythagorean theory of order.**

Archutas of Taras (= Tarantum, Sicily) (-445/-395) was known in antiquity as a Pythagorean technologist. He was also the friend of Platon.

A text bears his name: “Supposedly, someone can put all concepts (‘genea’, ‘genera’) under one and the same ‘archa’ (= ‘archè’: presupposed element) (‘analusai: analysis (fundamental research; FLC 52)) and, from that same presupposed element, compose and join them together again (‘suntheinai kai Sunarthmèsas-tai’, synthesis (construction; FLC 51)).

Such a person seems to me to exhibit the highest degree of wisdom (note : valid insight). He is - it seems to me - in possession of all truth, for he has a viewpoint from which he can know the deity and, immediately, all that is. Such a person understands how the deity has put everything together through pairs of opposites and order (“en tai sustoichiai kai taxai”). (O.Willmann *Gesch.d.ideal.*, I, 284).

**Note** - Notice the contradictory pair ‘analysis/synthesis’ (basic research/deductive construction).

Notice also how the idea of deification goes together with factor analysis (FLC 24; 63) man, thanks to ‘the little man’ (FLC 36), i.e. common sense or reason, develops above himself, in his lower evolution, towards the deity, paragon for Pythagoreans and Platonists.

It is not without reason that Werner Jaeger, *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les Présocratiques)*, (At the birth of theology (Essay on the Presocratics), Paris, 1966, 11, has said that all Greek currents of thought - except the Sceptic - end in theology. What a number of atheist Humanists sometimes seem to forget or gloss over. The Ancient Greeks, after all, were a deeply religious people. Also in their thinking.

**A psychological systechy (78/80)**

Reread FLC 42 f. (The passionate jealousy).-- The envious woman shows, in her soul life, clearly a systechy. Because there are two contradictory factors (paramount elements) at work in her personality.

Dr. Lamare discovered:

(i) hot interest (especially on sunny beaches) in the kindred (lesbian element), but also

(ii) severe disdain (indirect, moral disapproval, in her husband).

This is a case of taseology (theory of tensions, events, conflicts; conflictology (theory of conflict)). One and the same fact provokes more than one appreciation,--at least two appreciations, then, which are contradictory.

**Psychoanalytic example:** Oedipus, by imitating his father's love for his mother (mimeticism), creates a conflict with the same father: they both want, in the same way, to covet the same object: the mother. What was developed by René Girard (1923/2015) in *La violence et le sacré*, (Violence and the sacred), Paris, 1972.

In Lamare's example, the valued object lies first of all in the lesbian woman herself. But also outside her.

**Hermeneutically** (= interpretation) expressed:

(a) one and the same fact (either the sexes outside her or her lesbianism inside her, -or the man in his relation to her sexes) provokes:

(b) more than one interpretation (interpretation: lesbian affirming/moreover disapproving;-- covertly concurring/ spokenly disapproving).

An 'enthymeme' in Aristotelian logic is an unspoken (often unconscious) reasoning (conclusive or syllogistic). Enthymematically (i.e., considering the unspoken, respectively unconscious reasoning in the woman), we can draw up the following scheme of thought.

**A.-- Concerning the man.**

**Sentence 1:** "I see my husband as a womanizer" (observed fact).

**Sentence 2:** "Well, on the one hand, as a lesbian, I would like to be in his place (and I support him,--unspoken, unconscious); on the other hand, I find his 'peeping' to be reprehensible (as a woman married to me, he does not have to be attracted to other women) (contradictory interpretations of the observed fact).

**Conclusion:** "So I live through a painful tension, yes, a life conflict".

**B.-- Regarding lesbianism.**

**Sentence 1:** "I see my sex partners" (observed fact).

**Sentence 2:** "Well, if I engage my lesbian inclination, then I take an (occasional peeping) interest in women (approval);

If, however, I engage my ethical preconceptions (lesbianism is morally reprehensible), then I am inhibited in that inclination (Disapproval) (contradictory interpretations of the observed fact).

**Conclusion :** "I live through a conflict, deep inside me, yes, a lasting tension".

**C.-- concerning same-sex people.**

**Sentence 1:** “I live in the same world with my same-sex people” (observed fact).

**Sentence 2:** “Well, on the one hand - as a lesbian (already as a woman) - I feel solidarity with her and they are same-sex people; on the other hand, however, I'm married to a man who peeks at women, I feel they are rivals (contradictory interpretations or value judgements of the observed fact).

**Conclusion:** “Thus, in a conflict situation, I live through a lasting tension”.

**Note** -- Any syllogistic will tell you that a closing statement arises from two ideas, insofar as they interlock somewhere (FLC 56: koinonia). So that Aristotle's closing speech is merely the schematization of the Platonic doctrine of the interpenetration of ideas (here: the three contradictory interpretations, confronted with the observed fact, give as a reasoning result a tension (conflict)).

**Models of Platonic factor analysis.** (80/81)

E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte van de wiskunde* (The Philosophy of Mathematics), 36f.. -- The model comes from *Filebos* 18b/d.-- First of all: as all Archaic cultures did it -- ascribe a benefit, a cultural fact, to a higher being (deity, ancestor) -- so did the Ancient Egyptians: the deity Theuth or Thoth was considered the founder (bringer of salvation, savior) of hieroglyphic writing.

Here is how Platon, as a model of his factor analysis, relates this mythical representation.

1. “Someone - either a deity or a divine man - according to an Egyptian myth, his name was Theuth - noticed that sound was infinitely diverse (note: ‘many’). He was the first to recognize the following points:

- (i) the Vowels, in that infinite variety, are not one, but many;
- (ii) there are other sounds (note : semivowels), which, though not vowels, nevertheless possess a certain sound value; of these, too, there are a certain number;
- (iii) a third kind is distinguishable; we now call them consonants.

2. Then he divided the consonants until he distinguished each one separately. Likewise he divided the vowels and the diphthongs until he knew their number -- each one and all together called ‘letters’.

3. But he saw that none of us could understand a single letter without all the others. He thought, indeed, that in this case there was a connection which made them one.

Therefore he assigned to them one science, which he called ‘grammar’”.



**Conclusion.**-- Behold a 'stoicheiosis', elementatio, factors analysis.-- It attempts to:

(i) to describe the elements which, once established, define the (phonetic or the phonological) grammar, namely letters and types of letters (FLC 75: elements of a science);

(ii) to conceive of grammar as a system theory (systematology), as we have done FLC 73 (a totality, here: the collection and system of letters, cannot be thought of logically without its 'elements' and its 'parts' (each letter separately) and vice versa (all together, not without all the others): if one element (premise), then all the others (division) but also: if all the other elements (premises), then that one. Which is the definition of 'system'.

**Models of Platonic 'stoicheiosis'** (81/82)

E.Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics*, 46/51 (On the Good). Aristoxenos (= Aristoxenus) Van Taras (= Tarantum) (+- -375/ ... ), the musicologist, was a pupil of Aristotle, but with Pythagorean leanings (the musical philosophy of the Paleo-Pythagoreans). He wrote *Rhuthmika stoicheia* (Elements of Rhythm), a title that sounds significant in this context (the nature of rhythm and its smallest unit).

Also: *Archai kai stoicheia harmonikès* (Preparations and Elements of Harmony). Again, a meaningful title, in this context. Cf. FLC 75: Elements of Science.

Well, in his *Harmonics* 44:1/15, on the authority of his teacher Aristotle, he reproduces the contents of a speech 'On the Good' by Platon in the latter part of his life. In it, the Pythagorean Platon speaks: to the surprise of many listeners, Platon did not speak directly about the good in human life, but about the numbers (literally: arithmoi, number forms) of the Pythagoreans as the first elements of a theory to be put forward. This is called, in Dutch, the doctrine of idea numbers.

**The model.** -- Platon sets the example of the linguist in that speech.-- Language is a totality.-- But, before tackling the totality, he examines the elements it puts forward. These are:

- (1) words (it is composed of them; sunthesis (FLC 51; 60; 78),
- (2) syllables (words are built from them),
- (3) sounds (from which the syllables are built up).

**The original.** -- The ‘model’ is the known, with which one illuminates the ‘original’ (the unknown,-- here the (natural) philosophy intended by Platon).

**a.** As the linguist dissects the totality and its elements, so does the true natural philosopher: before, however, describing (defining) the totality, he too should analyze the elements that govern the universe. (FLC 75: Think e.g. of the elements of this world in St.-Paul’s, in the wake of ancient thinkers). Celestial bodies belong to this.

**b.** But Platon, in this exposition, goes on to what are called “idea-numbers”, such as the “Definite One” and the “Indefinite Two-Unit” (things, with which, for him, the Paleopythagoreans had been concerned).

**Note.**-- It reminds, somewhat, of what will later be called ‘mathesis universalis’ (think of Ramon Lull (Raymundus Lullus) (1235/1315: *Ars generalis*, a system of basic notions and basic judgements, from which - thanks to combinations and mechanical operations - the sciences can be derived);--think, especially, of R. Descartes, who wanted to generalize algebra, and of G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716; Cartesian), who wrote *De arte combinatoria* (1666), a prelude to today’s logics (formalized logic)).

### **Conclusion.**

**(1).**-- FLC 51ff. taught us that Platon - in order to solve life problems logically - took the then mathematics as a model.-- Now we see, here, how he proposed the then linguistics as a model.--

**(2).**-- There seems to be some analogy between contemporary structuralism, which has its roots both in the linguistics of F. de Saussure (FLC 67; 77) and in the mathematics of e.g. the Bourbaki group; *Eléments de mathématique*, (Elements of mathematics), published from 1939 onwards in thirty instalments: the notion of ‘system’ - and immediately ‘structure’ - is central there, not the solving of problems.

Cfr. G.-G. Granger, *Pensée formelle et sciences de l’homme*, (Formal thought and human sciences), Paris, 1967, 1/6 (Au lecteur, sur les structuralismes).-In any case: a Platonist discovers, very quickly, some of the main ideas of Platonism in Structuralism.

### **A comparison: the Cartesian method.** (82/84)

R. Descartes (1596/1650; founder of modern, enlightened rationalist philosophy) saw mathematics as the model of philosophy.-- He was not just methodical; he wanted, above all, to be a methodologist. This means: he wanted a strict logic applied.

**Bibl. sample:** E. Lenoble, *René Descartes*, in: J. Bricout, dir., *Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses*, II, Paris, 1925, 778/786.-- Here is how Lenoble characterizes the Cartesian method.

**1.-- Main idea.**

**a.** Descartes had absolutely no contempt for the empirical, resp. the experimental method. Yet the mathematical method prevails.

As, in passing, Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, (*Une archéologie des sciences humaines*), (Words and Things (An Archaeology of Human Sciences)), Paris, 1966, 66/72 (Descartes), writes, Descartes wanted a general theory of order (a.o. by the comparative method (o.c., 66)). This is “a mathesis, understood as a universal science of measure and order. (O.c., 70s.). This is Descartes’ idea of ‘mathesis universalis’ (comprehensive mathematics).

**b.** The human spirit, called ‘raison’ (reason), first of all grasps the totality of the data thanks to an intellectual intuition! Especially when they are “clear and unambiguous”. In other words, the intuitive phase is global -- but this same “reason” only “clearly” grasps “le simple”, the simple element.

**Consequence:** The complete Cartesian method includes division into ‘simples’ (elements, constituents) - ‘analysis’ - and re-composition into the whole, - then - ‘synthesis’.

**Explanations.**

**a. Analysis (division).**

Standing before complex (compound and complicated) data, we have to break them down until we reach the irreducible elements.

Our earthly mind grasps this clearly. Testing the analysis: what he called ‘énumération complète’ (complete enumeration,-- summative induction) checks, in the end, whether all the separate elements or ‘simples’ have been examined and are ready in the mind. He was averse to vagueness.

**b. Synthesis (reconstitution).**

Only now can the reconstruction of the totality begin. One by one, we think the elements together on the basis of simple (transparent) relations -- thus from the simplest data - step by step - to the most complex.

**Test of the synthesis:** again ‘énumération complète’ or summative induction, -- seems whether all elements and all relations are involved.

**Conclusion.** - What the ancient Greeks called ‘akribeia’, accuracy, has become, since modern natural science, ‘exactitude’, i.e. the qualitative facts, preferably clarified experimentally, precisely expressed mathematically. That is the difference between Platon (akribeia) and Descartes (exact science).

It is argued, in the name of the global method, that Descartes makes us forget the totality. This is simply wrong: what he makes forget is the vague totality. Nothing more.

***Existential Analysis in the Works of Franz Kafka*** (1883/1924). (84/97)

We saw that Platon’s intention was to illuminate life in a society like the Athenian and Sicilian world of the time. This, by means of a method inspired by mathematics and linguistics, drawing conclusions from preconceived elements and/or the reverse above all, for he is the very founder of philosophy, in so far as it was given its own form of being,-- thanks to him.

Can his method, now, be applied to the works of Kafka? We shall try to show that it can.

Kafka’s works have been translated into many languages. They have been filmed, set to music and adapted for the stage. He is even read in secondary schools. For - especially since the Second World War - he is considered world literature.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- W.J. Simons, *Tijdloze actualiteit van Kafka pas laat erkend* (Timeless topicality of Kafka only belatedly recognized), in: *Spectator* 30.08.1983, 34/36;

-- H.-J. Schoeps, *Over de mens (Beschouwingen van de moderne filosofen)*, (On man (Reflections of modern philosophers)), Utr./Antw., 1966, 119/141 (Franz Kafka: the belief in a tragic position).

**Note** -- Kafka has provoked contradictory interpretations (FLC 75).

(i) Certainly Albert Camus (1913/1960; known for his controversial *L’homme révolté* (The revolted man), (1951; contested by both right-wing and left-wing (including Sartre, who therefore broke with Camus) politicians), as an Existentialist thinker, is not far off, when he says: “In any case, Kafka’s work reflects the problem of the absurd (FLC 35; 68) in its totality”. (Cited by Simons, a.c.,36).

(ii) Much confidence can, however, be given to Schoeps, for - with Max Brod, a friend of Kafka’s - he published *Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer* (When building the Great Wall of China), (1931; extracts from Kafka’s bequeathed writings).

Schoeps, being of Jewish origin and a typical Christian Jew, was also well placed to penetrate the world of Kafka,--a bit according to the “verstehende method” (FLC 06: Dilttley), i.e. to deduce from external signs (e.g. Kafka’s texts, even the unpublished ones; e.g. a number of striking facts from Kafka’s life) the inner life and deeper soul.

(iii) But also a psychiatrist like Dr. Hesnard - think of his *A. Hesnard, L’univers morbide de la faute*, (The morbid universe of the fault), Paris, 1949 (in a final chapter: *Quelques enseignements de la psychiatrie éthique, II (Application à l’art)*, (Some lessons from ethical psychiatry, II (Application to art)), where Kafka’s case is treated) - can provide us with a valid interpretation.

***First hermeneutic (85/87).***

We transcribe, at the outset, Dr Hesnard’s characterization. But, before we do so, we will situate the religious guilt - for that was certainly the case with Kafka - in the world of psychiatry. Dr. co Trygve Braatoy, *Uit de praktijk van een psychiater (Een populaire inleiding tot de medische psychologie en de psychiatrie)*, (From the practice of a psychiatrist (A popular introduction to medical psychology and psychiatry)), Utrecht, 1939, 180/190 (*Eenige beschouwingen over de religie in de psychiatrie*), (Some reflections on religion in psychiatry), is a text written by a warm-feeling, ‘verstehend’ (understanding) physician, with long and very fine clinic experience.

Braatoy is not a psychoanalyst (he does know Freudism) and, in that sense, is less prejudiced against religion than more than one Freudian -- “If one is involved in psychiatric work, one will be struck by how many patients worry about religion and morality.

The problems in the field of morality bear -almost always- a more or less obvious stamp of religious sinfulness.

Very striking, often, as a predominant feature of the clinical picture, are such debilitating religious anxiety states in - what is called - the melancholic depression”. (O.c.,180).

Braatoy, as an ‘understanding’ physician, addresses the vital question, “Why/why does this ‘disease’ manifest itself as an incessant, religious nightmare, in which the patient(s) is not left alone for a moment by his burden of sin, regret and repentance?” (Ibidem). The way in which a melancholic/melancholic states his/her psychiatric problem, the language he/she uses in the process, all these remind one of “the religion lesson of our youth” (O.c., 180f.).

After this informative text by Braatoy, the following text by Hesnard will be much easier to understand.

“Franz Kafka (...) was the son of a gentle, attractive and timid mother. Above all, he was the son of a radiant, uncompromising and self-satisfied, domineering and overwhelmingly authoritative father (...).

Once that son had grown into an adult man, he was unable to climb the ladder of society (...).

The works of this son gradually appeared to reflect a strange world, namely the world in which he himself lived. That world - something that is obvious to everyone and, in particular, to Kafka himself - is the world of the sin debt (“le monde de la faute”). And that world in its most tragic form (...).

(2) Relying, among other things, on Kafka’s diaries, Hesnard writes:

“(a) This dark and absurd, incomprehensible and tyrannical guilt weighed heavily on the whole existence (note : the actual life) of this artist.

(b) More than that: Kafka behaved - his whole life and in all his fields of activity - like a guilty person who cannot discover the exact nature of an unforgivable mistake.

Well, precisely this ‘Kafkaesque’ world - he described it in all his works - is our “morbid world of guilt”. (O.c.,441ss.).

W. Simons, a.c., 34, quotes, in this connection, a short extract from *Brief an den Vater* (about one hundred pages, in which Kafka, in the last phase of life (36 years), looks back on his past life).

“Thou canst treat a child only as Thou art created: with power, noise and temper. In my case, moreover, Thou didst seem therefore very suitable, since Thou wouldest make me a strong, courageous boy”.

In Freudian terms: an Oedipal case (Franz has not been able to correctly interpret his father from early childhood). In Jewish-theological terms: a punishment for sin, but colored by the unprocessed father figure.

To return to Braatoy, o.c.,189, a certain Ole Hallesby, then the most influential theology professor in Norway, disseminated an image of God (we say ‘image impression’,--which differs greatly from the living Biblical Godhead), which Braatoy characterizes as follows :

“A cruel god, -- something by which the melancholic/melancholic is actually right in his/her reasoning, for from such a god one cannot expect any understanding of his/her difficulties”.

**Note** -- Here we are putting our finger on Platon's eminent theory of ideas, which warns against the temptation to confuse - to confuse - our earthly-alien 'image' of God with the true 'idea' of 'God' (i.e. that which He really is). We will come back to this later.

In the words of St Augustine of Tagaste, do we not confuse the 'caricature' of God with the true 'idea' of 'God', i.e. God Himself as He is, independent of our (sometimes very subjective) experiences and states. Platonism stands apart from the doctrine of ideas, which we encounter here in one of its most pregnant applications.

Well, something like a God caricature dominated, as a decisive 'factor', Kafka's life and coexistence.

**Second hermeneutic.** (87/89)

1. Schoeps, o.c., 123vv, begins with a work by Kafka, *Zur Frage der Gesetze*, (On the question of laws). It is about the 'laws' known in Jewish circles, about which theologians are full of talk (including the Chassidim, whom Kafka describes as a kind of theological 'nobility').

Kafka, in this play, feels like an 'Am ha-arez', an ignoramus, but an ignoramus who has come so far that he wonders if these 'Laws' are not just sham laws. Kafka lives in the constant impression that he is "governed by Laws, which one does not know". (O.c.,123). In fact, experientially ('phenomenally', in Platonic language), the only visible and tangible law is the 'nobility' of theologians, who interpret it for the benefit of 'the people' (der 'Am ha-arez').

**Note** -- One senses here the loss of faith or, at least, the crisis of faith in which Kafka, with many Jewish contemporaries, lives.

2. Schoeps, o.c.,124vv, immediately adds something that brings us into the very heart of Kafkaesque guilt.

The great mass of the 'Am ha-arez' ('the people'), as opposed to the Law-keepers ('the nobility'), deviated from those laws. And such a thing is, in Jewish 'straight' (orthodox) terms, a real 'gesera', a judgment of God.

Kafka's story, *Nasporingen van een hond* (Trackings of a Dog), expresses this judgement of God in a figurative way: a dog tells how 'the people' of the hands, many generations ago, went astray.

This 'mistake' or 'guilt of sin' weighs heavily on today's dog breed, which can no longer even interpret it, but bears the burden of it.

***Schoeps explains the term 'dog'.***

(i) The Talmud (Sanhedrin 97a) speaks of a prophecy of doom, saying that, in the end times, a time of 'terrors of all kinds', which precedes the coming of the Messiah, "the faces of the end time people will be like the faces of dogs" (O.c.,124).

We are faced with an eschatology, an end-time doctrine: for Kafka, it is as if this prediction of doom from the Talmud has become an everyday reality and co-determines our present existence, our day-to-day existence,--as an element that must be put first if we are to understand what is happening in our Western culture, seen here from a purely Jewish perspective.

**Note** -- The Talmud (literally, "study" or "teaching") is a "sacred book" of the Jews, containing theological insights of Old Testament law scholars. Among others, there is the Talmud of Jerusalem and the Talmud of the Babylonians (by Rab Asji (352/427) and his successors).

(ii) This apocalyptic (revealing the calamities of the end times (in Greek, 'apokalupsis' is revelatio, revealing) atmosphere, in which a Kafka lives, is explained by Schoeps with a text by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900), who calls nihilism, i.e. the fading away of the high ideas, a 'nihilism'. the sweeping away of high ideas - note: these are not human ideas, which are sometimes caricatures of ideas - that inform mankind in its earthly existence, already at the end of the 19th century:

"The most important events are the ones that are hardest to grasp: for example, the fact that the Christian God is dead, -- that, in what we experience, there is no longer any heavenly goodness or guidance, no longer any divine justice, and -- generally speaking -- not even an 'immanent morality' (note: a phenomenally perceptible ethic).

This is the terrible news that will need a few more centuries to sink in with the Europeans. And then, for a time, it will seem as if all the weight has gone out of things" (*Morgenröte*) (Dawn), O.c.,119).



**Note:** both Kafka and Nietzsche stay within “what we experience”, within “what is noticeable”. Platonic: within the phenomena.

**Second corrective:** when Kafka and Nietzsche speak of the removal of ‘god’ from our culture, they do so as if radically all Western people had left religion behind,-- whereas only some, especially among the intelligentsia (scientists, artists, thinkers) had done so.

Starting from some, they speak as if all had. Starting from the private, they make universal statements.

This does not mean that the part that lives through cultural criticism, e.g. in the Kafkaesque or Nietzschean sense (for there is a multitude of lives through), is not among the dominant ones in our culture. In this sense, the crisis of some concerns all.

**Conclusion:** What The tracking of a Dog says about our dog culture (albeit from a Jewish point of view) is “essentially to be found in all of Kafka’s literary works”: the forgetting of what, in fact, is the cause of today’s cultural criticism (O.c.,126).

**Clarification of the second approach.** (89/97)

Now that we have begun to understand both the psychiatric and the theological aspects, we can examine the artistic aspect. We could summarize it as follows: in a narrative form, it is about the unravelling of the enigmatic (what Camus calls the absurd, i.e., what escapes our mind,-- Platon’s ‘ananke’ (FLC 35; 68; 84).

Or still, in more popular language: “Where did I earn that? “Where did we get that?”. If one means culturologically broad.

**Applicative model.** - Take, for example, *Der Prozess*. (The process), Joseph K. is accused by a mysterious, higher court. Neither Joseph K. nor his lawyers have access to the file that indicts him. At least not directly. Behold the riddle.

Joseph K. tries to trace the guilt for which he is being prosecuted. He therefore appeals to lawyers: their main task is to guess the offence. “To deduce from the interrogations the content of the file, which forms the basis of it, - that is very difficult”. (Schoeps, O.c.,130). To deduce the offence by means of the interrogations is to deduce it indirectly.-- Behold the deduction.

***The structure of the gesera (God's judgment): hypothetical*** (FLC 54; 73).

We are, to speak with C.S. Peirce (1839/1914; Pragmaticist), in the midst of abductive derivation.

We recall his immortal example:

***Sentence 1.***-- This handful of beans is white.

***Sentence 2.***-- Well, all the beans in this bag are white.

***Conclusion.***-- So these beans come from this bag". An abduction or hypothesis is only probable (not - apodictic).

***Transferred:***

***Sentence 1.***-- My, our present existence is absurd

***Sentence 2.***-- Well, according to the Old Testament-Talmudic tradition, such an absurd existence is the result of some debt.

***Conclusion.***-- So my, our absurd existence is the result of a debt.

Platonically expressed: if we posit a debt as an element (FLC 74), then my, our existence, in its absurdity or 'anankè', becomes intelligible.

***The inductive side of the gesera.***

Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 591/598 (*L'induction*), distinguishes types of induction.

(i) ***The Aristotelian (= summative) induction*** (FLC 83: Cartesian model): from all (= sum, summa) individual cases one concludes all together (= summative induction or generalization).

(ii) ***The Socratic induction*** decides from a part of cases (private collection) to the totality of cases (universal collection) and from all actual cases to all possible cases of exactly the same form of being (= amplificatory induction).

(iii) ***Baconian induction is*** - fundamentally - a variant of both the previous ones: the actual object is not generalization in general, but one type of generalization, namely causation.

Where between two or more phenomena a connection has been established (antecedent/consequent,-- if need be: cause/effect), one concludes that there is a lawful connection (generally valid for all cases of the same form of being).

This form of induction is called 'Baconian', not because he invented it (FLC 56: complicity is one type of causality), but because he suspected its experimental scope (Fr. Bacon, *Novum Organum* (1626)).

Well, this causal connection is at the center of a God's judgment.

**Examples (1). Old Testament. (90/93)**

**Judges 1:6/7,**

“(fact) Adoni-Bezek took flight. But they went after him, took him prisoner, and cut off his thumbs and his big toes.

(Significance) Adoni-Bezek said, “Seventy princes with thumbs cut off and big toes cut off gathered up the refuse from my table. God has rewarded me for my deeds. -- He was taken to Jerusalem. There he died. -

**Note.** - The question arises: “On what did Adoni-Bezek base himself in order to attribute the punishment to something else, in this case: a God judgment, than mere coincidence (one form of ‘anankè’, i.e. what our mind cannot explain, but imposes itself as fact, brutal)?”.

Even if he adopted this as a habit of thought (‘traditional-sacred explanation’) of others, still: “On what basis did the first man, who saw in it something other than mere ‘anankè’, brute unexplained fact, and founded the tradition, support himself to see in it a God-judgement?”.

There is, sensibly believing (the Scriptures are inspired by God's Spirit), only one explanation: On a ‘higher’ - often called ‘mystical’ - understanding, i.e. an idea (which is not to be confused with its human-earthly representations or educational concepts).

In other words: the fact itself, in its so-called ‘brutal inexplicability’, gives a light about itself, i.e. the idea, which ‘reveals’ itself in and through that fact.-- More on this later.

**1 Kings 21: 17/19.**

(Fact) 1 Kings 21:13 -- “Then it was reported to Izebel, ‘Nabot has been stoned to death (note: at the insistence of Izebel herself, who, as it were, forced the prince to do it). He is dead. -- (Prediction of divine judgement).

“But thereupon the word of Yahweh was spoken to (the Prophet) Elias of Tishbe. “Arise and go to (the prince) Ahab (...). He is in the vineyard of Nebot (note: against his express will), which he has taken possession of. Say to him: “Thus says Yahweh in the place where the dogs licked the blood of Nabot, there they will lick yours also”.

Here is the origin of the interpretation, namely God's retribution or Gesera, and not a coincidence, clearly expressed by the inspired author of 1 Kings: ‘Yahweh's word’, which is the light that illuminates the brutal, future fact of retribution - a Platonic idea alike - as it were from within.

## **2. Samuel 12: 10.**

One knows the sin that King David committed with Bethsabees.

**Part 1:** “David saw a woman taking a bath. It was a very beautiful woman. He asked them to find out who the woman was. He was told ‘It is Bethel ... the wife of Uriah the Hittite’. Then David sent for her. She came to him and he had ‘intercourse’ with her. (...). But the woman became pregnant and she let David know”.

**Part 2.** David had Urias placed “on a forward post, where the battle was most dangerous”. Urias was killed.

**Part 3.** Covering up a ‘guilt’ works on a human-earthly level. Not, however, on God’s plane. “What David had done was - in the eyes of Yahweh - ‘evil’. That is why Yahweh sent the prophet Natan to David.

In the cleverly devised form of a parable - in the manner of the Orient - Natan tells David a similar story. One had only to replace the names ‘the rich’ and ‘the poor’, as well as ‘one lamb’, with ‘David’, ‘Urias’ and ‘Betsabee’, and the divine judgment had its ‘portent!

Now listen to the ‘sequel’: “Urias the Hittite, thou hast killed. His wife hast thou taken to thine own. Well, then, the sword shall never again depart from thy king’s house. This, because thou hast scorned me (note: it is the word of Yahweh) by making the wife of Urias the Hittite thine, and by the sword of the Ammonites (note: against whom the war was going on), to have him killed.

Thus Yahweh speaks: “Yes, out of your own house I will call the disasters against you: before your very eyes I will take your wives (note: David had more than one wife) and give them to another, who will sleep with them - in the full light of day. You have, indeed, acted in secret, but I will carry out my threat before all Israel in full light”.

Then David said to Natan: “I have sinned. To which Natan said to him: “Yahweh forgive thee thy sin. Therefore you will not die. But because thou hast shown by the deed in question thy contempt for Yahweh, the child which is born unto thee shall die with necessity”. Whereupon follows the story of the illness and death of the child in question.

**Note** -- One is familiar with the sowing-harvesting law, which is at work here for the umpteenth time: “whatever man sows, he will also reap” (Galatians 6:7/9). What David sowed, that is, the cause of God’s judgment, he will also reap, if he does not repent.

1. It is the same with such observations or statements as with the Platonic (FLC 56; 60; 58; 77; 80): there is always some observation or statement which puts them in perspective, i.e. which specifies their limitations.

In this way they escape both the 'absolute' observations or statements of psychiatric patients, who are in hopeless straits (FLC 85), and those of 'absolutist' theologians, such as Braatoy (FLC 65f.), who think they should be denounced either in a religion class or on the chair of a theology institute.

Here both David's confession of guilt and God's immediately comprehensible act of forgiveness improve the - in itself, absolutized - rock-hard 'seed-harvest law': "Therefore you shall not die - as provided in the unilaterally applied seed-harvest law".

2. We refer, in this connection, to *Catechismus ten gebruike van al de bisdommen van België* (Catechism for the use of all the dioceses of Belgium), DDB, 1946, 51(223f.).

The idea of "vengeful sin" contains - according to (what is called) "the old catechism" - two causal sides:

(i) the omen, viz. a striking degree of malice,

(ii) the sequel, provoked by that degree of anger, namely "the just revenge of God, also in this world".

In other words, not every sinful guilt, but a limited type of it, falls under the sowing-harvesting law of the Gesera (God's judgment). As a type the "old catechism" mentions e.g. "voluntary manslaughter".

Which in David's case (though through intermediaries) appears to be appropriate. But also, for example, "unchastity against nature", "oppression of the poor, widows and orphans" and - this must make a Marxist religiously minded - last but not least "unjust withholding of workers' wages".

We are not going to analyze these ideas - for they are ideas, mystically susceptible realities, not terrestrial-human products of thought - but they would at least be worthy of meditation.

### ***Examples. (2) Talmudic.***

Besides Old Testament and apocryphal models, Schoeps, o.c.,128, mentions examples from the Talmud.

(i) If omission of dough sacrifice, if omission of the Jubilee Year, then drought, food scarcity, longevity and no merchant profits.

(ii) If negligence or - what is worse - perversion of justice, then epidemics (plague) and drought.

These examples are reminiscent of what one can hear in Primitive religions, with its magical-mythical views. Enlightened-Rationalist thinkers (think of Greek Proto-Philosophism (for the most part) or of the “Philosophes” of the 18th century) understand such a “mentalité primitive” (Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857/1939; thinker, who reproaches Cartesian thought, insofar as it is already enlightened and rationalist, for not understanding it) or such a ‘wild thought’ (Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908/2009; *La pensée sauvage* (The wild thought), (1962) is a work by this ethnologist). But it probably covers more truth than these Enlightenment Rationalists imagine.

**Conclusion:** -- We spoke (FLC 90) about induction.

(i) Causal induction then, which pays attention to the connection ‘omen’ (cause)/sequence (effect)’.

(ii) Causal induction,-- not based on direct earthly experience or experiment, but:

(a) on facts (e.g. thumbs and big toes cut off, bloody death, -- illness and death of child),

(b) which are interpreted on the background of mysticism) (one gets the insight, called “enlightenment”, that in these “facts”, which everyone can see and feel (“phenomena” Platonic), an “idea” is an invisible and tangible structure (law) at work).

From the first human being on earth to realize this, a kind of ‘tradition’ gradually grows, which has as its content a kind of ‘lawfulness’, but then not of a natural or chemical nature. This law received one of its many possible formulations, for example, in the Catholic-theological idea of “vengeful sin”.

In this well-defined sense one can speak of ‘sacred or religious’, ‘mystical’ induction.

### ***Schematization.***

We saw it: if sin (guilt), then punishment.

Formalize it a little, in Jan Lukasiewicz’s style:

“If Z, then S.-- Well, Z. So S”. That is the deductive scheme.

“If Z, then S.-- Well, S. So Z”. That is the reductive scheme.

We already see which scheme will be typically Kafkaesque: the reductive scheme.-  
- This explicitly confirms to us Schoeps, O.c.,129.

“Thus, from the character and form of the punishment, one must try to find the ‘x’ of the sin,--even though a ‘real’ (note : an earthly ascertainable) verification cannot succeed.

This is precisely what happens in Kafka's work. Both in the great novels and in the short stories, this 'motif' recurs again and again as a tendency: to determine the nature of the guilt from the nature of the punishment".

Now reread FLC 84: "Can the Platonic hypothetical method - deductive (synthesis) or reductive (analysis) - be applied to Kafka's works?"

We believe that a Schoeps, of whom it cannot be said that he was not capable of a proper Kafka interpretation, gave us the answer, clear as day.

Of course, one should introduce a shade of color, such as: "If - within well-defined conditions

a. absence of any sense of sin (which appears in Kafka's radical forgetting of the fact of sin), . repentance (as in David's case) - Z, then S. Well, S.-- So Z".

Schoeps, o.c., 125, expresses this as follows: "It is therefore guilt - in its essence, admittedly, no longer recognizable guilt - which has so darkened the world that its order (note: organization) can no longer grasp 'the true word' (note: apparently God's revelation and the higher ideas which it expresses). This is because the pressure of the centuries (note: the gradual alienation (of modern (especially Jewish) mankind) from the original divine revelation has already made that word too firm and the 'dogs' (note: end-time people) too 'dog-like'.

***The history of salvation ... reversed into history of doom.***

"The apostasy from the 'law' of revelation makes history the history of human doom, which manifests itself as the increasing separation of the world from its revealed destiny.

This, by a single, hastening series of destructions, - which, judged by human blindness (history as calamity), must be regarded precisely as higher development and constructive progress. Thus Schoeps, interpreter of Kafka, o.c.,125.

**Note** - This is reminiscent of the theses of the Frankfurter Schule (Theodor Adorno (1903/1970), Max Horkheimer (1895/1973): think of *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Dialectics of Enlightenment), (1944), *Negative Dialektik* (1966)).

She claimed that Enlightenment-Rationalist mankind was 'auto-destructive'. Man, thanks to 'reason' (FLC 83), is active in science and technology, instead of liberating them, works in reverse.

What the 'Humanism' (the 'autonomous' human being) of the Enlightenment had planned as progress, has turned into the opposite: e.g., the machineism so praised and encouraged by the 18th century thinkers has, in the meantime, led to many industrial workers becoming the slaves of the so glorified machine. The Frankfurt School has called this 'negative dialectics'. What was meant as liberation from the grip of nature, has a repeatedly addictive effect.

Compare this with what Schoeps, in interpreting Kafka's work, says: Kafka was, by birth, a Jew. Religious ideas, which in the eyes of his contemporaries - and, perhaps, himself - had become 'mythical', meaning 'good for Primitives', made him look again and again for what in Jewish language is called 'the law'.

According to Schoeps, what, in Kafka's eyes, is the catastrophe is that this present humanity - without 'the law' - continues in a void,-- that present humanity, without the consciousness of being a creation of God (Agnosticism (one does not know whether God exists); Atheism (one claims that He does not exist); Skepticism (one doubts it)), loses the very features that characterize it as a person(s), and, immediately, grows into a nameless mass and - individually seen - i. Instead of being a person (body), it becomes a 'thing' or a 'lifeless thing'. (O.c.,131).

***Applicative model.*** -- In Kafka's artistic imagination this thing-ness is elaborated, for example, into a ghostly being called 'Odradek'. Slavically understood, this designation amounts to "outlawed". In fact, as a model of today's 'dog-like' man, it no longer has an 'I' but is an 'it'. Just like the objects that man uses.

Odradek, for example, has taken on "the senseless form of a spool of thread" (Schoeps, o.c.,131). It has thus become "an automatic running mechanism". Does this not suggest a depiction of present-day humanity as a (working or laboring) machine, in the immense frame of an industrialized planet, the ideal of the 18th century?

One could call this, by analogy with 'Negative Dialectics', 'Negative Sacred History'. Actually, 'Consecrated history of doom'.

***Tragedy or salvation from tragedy.***

Tragic' is, in one of the many meanings that word has provoked, "situation without prospect".



Cf. Karl Jaspers, *Ueber das tragische*, (About the tragic), Munich, 1952.

1. Jaspers (1883/1969; physician-psychiatrist and Existentialist) says that ‘tragedy’ presupposes transience, yes, actual downfall, but is absolutely not. Tragedy’ is consciousness-through-mind (mind/speech) of impermanence and decline. Cfr. o.c.,18.

Even more so: through the acute awareness that one is wrapped up in a process of impermanence and decline, one looks forward, instinctively and/or with the mind, to redemption. This prospect of eventual, desired redemption is the second aspect by which the ‘tragicus/ tragica’ differs from the merely transitory and/or perishing human being.

2. Is Kafka’s work ‘tragic’? After all we have said about it - and Schoeps in particular - yes! The ‘dog-eared’ life is, for him, the thoughtful Kafka, undergoing and, at once, a sign of transience.

But, as Max Brod confirmed in Brussels in September 1967, in a lecture on his friend Kafka, “Kafka was only striving for a pure world view and a brighter future”.

Which, on reading most of the products of this tragic writer, may come as a bit of a surprise. It is as if Kafka, at least in this respect, resembles a Nikolai Gogolj (1809/1852; Russian writer). Gogoly, as a deeply religious Orthodox man, believed in the higher world of ideas, background of this, visible and tangible world.

But when he writes - except in the wonderful work on the Russian Liturgy of the Mass -, one is not dealing with the ideas, but with the caricatures of ideas,--in the petty or criminal characters, who populate his stories.

Leo Kobbilinski-Ellis called it ‘the tragic impotence of Gogolj’, who - while laughing at the caricature - wept because they were only caricatures and not ideas. Kobbilinski-Ellis calls it “the weeping laugh”.

One should assume the same with Kafka. Schoeps, o.c.,138/141, confirms this somewhat. In Kafka - so he writes, o. c.,140 - lived the messianic hope. Schoeps says: “the myth of faith in a tragic position” (Ibid.).

Perhaps the fact that Max Brod, in Brussels, said that Kafka, in his youth, loved to read,-- Modern writers, but ...also Platon, is one of the reasons why Kafka thought hypothetically and continued to hope. And was his image of God not as caricatured as FLC 87 briefly said.

### **Chapter 3.-- Elements of Platonic Philosophy (Psychology).**

Introduction.-- Now that we have got to know, in the Platonic sense, both the concept of 'life', also in its evolutionary stages (FLC. 7/34), and the concept of 'common sense' (FLC. 35/48),--after we have studied both the dialectic method (both definition and hypothesis; FLC. 49/69) and factor analysis, as a Platonic method (FLC. 70/97), we can apply these four great Platonic elements to described data.

We follow a model here. Z. Barbu, *Samenleving. cultuur en persoonlijkheid*, Utr./Antw., 1973 (Eng.: *Society, Culture and Personality*, Oxford, 1971), explains, o.c., 145, that the ideas 'order(ning)', 'structure' and 'system', are the premises of the ideas:

1. Personality (a psychological fact),
2. 'society' (a sociological element) and
3. 'culture' (a culturological element).

Therefore we have, especially in FLC 49/69 (e.g. 56 (system), 64 (the total system of 'being' (= reality)) and, especially, in FLC 70/97 (e.g. 71 (thinking from totalities), but passim (= spread everywhere)), the three mentioned prepositions of the human triad "person(s)/society/culture", as thickly as possible - and in preferably Platonic terms, such as e.g. 'element' and 'preposition'. e.g. 'element' and 'premise' but also e.g. 'systechy' (pair of opposites), so central to all dialectical thinking, including non-Platonic thinking.

Now don't think that a Barbu stands alone.

J. Goudsblom, *Nihilisme en cultuur*, (Nihilism and culture) Amsterdam, 1955, 74/77 (Society, Personality and Culture), in the line of a Talcott Parsons / Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, situates the nihilism problem in the framework of a theory of action (theory of action), which presupposes the said triad as a frame of thought.

But even Mikhail Bakhtine, Russian thinker and literatologist, in contrast to e.g. Structuralism (FLC 67), thinks from the said triad. However, he gives them 'poetic' names. Language and especially dialogue are defined as 'voices'. There is

- (i) the voice, which speaks (// personality),
- (ii) the voice spoken to (// society), and both are situated
- (iii) within the 'voice' (metaphorical, of course) of the culture, within which is spoken.

This threefoldness is applied in Tzvetan Todorov, *La conquête de l'Amérique* (La question de l'Autre), (The conquest of America (The question of the Other)), Paris, 1982.

-- See also: Mikhail Bakhtine, *Esthétique de la création verbale*, (Aesthetics of verbal creation), Paris, 1984 (translated from Russian);

-- T. Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtine et le principe dialogique*, (Mikhail Bakhtin and the dialogical principle), Paris, 1981.

**Conclusion.**-- Relying on such solid examples, we now begin a threefold analysis of Platonism. We look at some elements of personhood, society and culture, as a healthy understanding of Platonism can elaborate them.

**1.-- *The soul as essence and as principle of life.* (99/104)**

We have already established it: the immortal soul is central in Platonic thought and life.-- We will now - briefly - elucidate that point ('element').

**a.-- *The soul is essentially individual.***

FLC 27 (Solovjef), 30 (Individual and individualism with Platon) already set us on the way.-- Let us add:

(i) Before its embodiment in an earthly-mortal soul-and-body, the soul, in Platon's Reincarnist view (he had, among the Paleo-Pythagoreans, predecessors in this), is already radically individual, 'fused',--not a pure 'emanation' -- somewhere a fragment of soul-matter, released from a universe- or world-soul --, but definitely a 'being'.

(ii) After death the soul remains a single individual.

**b.-- *The human soul is an intermediate term (which is what we are talking about here)* (99/100)**

(i) In the historical Platon, time-bound as he is, one meets e.g. the following order of precedence: imperishable are the ideas (at least the higher ones), the deities (male and female), the immortal soul of man.

Perishable, however, are the mortal souls of men (note: Platon is not alone in using a plural of souls, e.g. in man; a series of Primitives and a number of occultist movements also distinguish such a plural),-- further: the earthly bodies, including the body which is made alive by the immortal soul.

(ii) The tragedy of the soul.-- FLC 96f. taught us Karl Japers' concept of tragedy:

(a) transience, yes, actual ruin (e.g. in death),

(b) but transcended by two things:

a. the clear awareness of impermanence and

b. some prospect of salvation from that transience.

Well, if that is the idea of ‘tragedy’, then tragedy is at the center of the Platonic concept of the soul. This soul is, after all, on the one hand obviously attuned to imperishable things (ideas, deities) and, on the other, just as clearly attuned to what within space and time is perishable (mortal human soul, body).

More than that: it is more than mere mediation. The soul is both image and representation of the eternal. That same soul is both model (paragon) and originator of the body. The anagogic (upward pointing) and the catagogic (downward pointing) are dynamic data, not slow or inert.

**Note.**-- Thus Platonism can be called a spiritualism.

Spiritualism’, in one of its possible definitions, means “belief in, on the one hand, all that is divine and, on the other, all that is incorporeal”.

Now, both aspects are clearly present in Platon’s writings. In contrast, e.g., to his very secularist disciple, Aristotle, who does not even seem to know of an immortal human soul.

Concerning ‘Spiritualism’, see FLC 32.

**c.-- *The human soul as source of life.*** (100/103).

All that is a *psuchon*, inanimate, is in Platon’s eyes ‘lifeless’ and that shows itself in the fact that such a thing must be activated from outside (e.g. in a physical movement), before there can be ‘life’ (understand: activity).

Everything that is ‘*em.psuchon*’, animated (literally: with a soul in it), is alive. This can be seen in the external behavior: one sees that something of the nature of being is active from within, from itself.

***The soul in itself.***

That the human being is an (immortal, at least spiritually gifted) soul can be seen from his/her behavior: in all freedom he/she has insight (spirit), perseverance (will) and a sense of value (‘desire’)

***The soul reflected in the body.***

As a tragic being, man possesses a body, but he is not one. He does not coincide with corporeality, but, although radically incarnated (Platon does not leave the slightest doubt about this; on the contrary, he suffers greatly from it).

“What I really am, is soul,-- immaterial (incorporeal;-- Platon is the first to state the concept of ‘incorporeal’ in all its clarity), at once: immortal. What is called ‘my body’ is one possible (among many, because, in reincarnation, there are many embodiments) reflection (‘image’ says Platon, in his technical terminology) of what I, really, am, soul.

**Note** - Educationally speaking, this leads to ‘psych.agogia’, soul formation (FLC 49; 63), an extremely central part of all Platonic philosophizing. As it already was this with the Paleopythagoreans. It is fortunate that the great classicist Werner Jaeger -- famous for his Paideia idea (in Latin: ‘humanitas’) -- has recalled this.

**Appl. model.**-- One knows that, among the Antique Greeks, ‘beauty’ (FLC 58/61), thought together with ‘goodness’ (understand: ‘value’), weighed heavily: think of the immortal building and sculptures e.g..

Th. Zielinski, *La religion de la Grèce antique*, (The religion of ancient Greece), Paris, 1926, 57s., cites the rather scientific Aristotle: “Supposedly: we meet some day a man, whose appearance is that of the deities made by our sculptors. In such a case, one thing is certain: we would all bow down, willingly, and worship him/her as if he/she were a higher being”.

Zielinski tells this anecdote in connection with what he labels “the self-disclosure of the divine in beauty”.

Again: FLC 24, 53, 78 taught us that theology was inherent in Antique Greek thought.-- Even with a secularizing Aristotle!-- Now what does Platon say in this regard?

**(i) The rare case.**

Is “attractive” a “beautiful soul” (meaning a soul, person or personality, which compels admiration and astonishment) in a “beautiful body” (meaning a bodily appearance, which provokes admiration and astonishment).

**(ii) The frequent case.**

Charming’ remains a clean soul in a non-clean body. Here, however, the ‘ugly’ Socrates, for whom Platon cherished such boundless admiration, will weigh through.

Even more so: harmony, i.e. the union of a number of elements into a totality which fills one with wonder and amazement (FLC 71), -- harmony which comes from ‘heavenly’ regions, is the ideal characteristic of the undefiled soul.

This harmony should be developed by the soul (understand: us, the people) both in itself (personality formation) and in the body, as an expression of the soul.

Which may surprise us, Moderns: Platon insists that this is done through musical training, in gymnastics and dance.

We quote, here, G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe (Esquisse d'une théorie générale des relations de la musique et de la possession)*, (Music and trance (Outline of a general theory of the relationship between music and possession), Paris, 1980, 267/315 (*Musique et transe chez les Grecs*), ((Music and trance among the Greeks). Although the author deviates on a number of points from what one traditionally finds in Platon's texts, what he says is in line with the entire inspiration of Platonism.

“There are now people, who - as far as somewhat vulnerable in the psychological field - as a result of the resentment of some deity, suffer from ‘divine madness’ (note : ‘mania’, a rapture or ‘trance’ attributable to an alien being).

They heal from such a thing by devoting themselves to ritual dance. This starts with a musical motto and grows into a (full) dance. The reason: music and dance - thanks to the effect of their own movement - reinsert the sick person into the general movement of the cosmos. Healing is thereby ensured by the benevolence of deities favourably disposed through sacrifice”.

It is abundantly clear that, here, ancient (“Archaic”), working with extraterrestrial (one now says also “paranormal”) forces and beings, practices of a sacred nature are under discussion. It is, at once, certain that a Platon, notwithstanding his rational trait, is not detached from the Archaic world.

**Note** -- In this soul-formation and body-searching, (FLC 61) Platonism is shown to be far removed from the Ancient Canonists, with their cultural pessimism. That Diogones of Sinope (-413/-327), to express his haughty disdain for wealth and social niceties, lived in a barrel, may, cynically speaking, be a ‘happening’, but the common man (FLC 35/48), with his ‘common mind’ cannot so easily reach it.

One may say: the ‘common man’ also cannot so easily go with a Platonism, which puts the soul first as the essence of the whole human being. That may be right. But taking care of oneself, rich or not, remains radically accessible even for the common man. And that is what Platon is all about in the first place.

A question arises: “Where is the harmony now,--in ritual dance mentioned?”. It consists first of all in the fact that, by dancing and, at the same time, making music (that is ‘chorea’, the unity of dance, music and poetry (singing)), man fits himself into the universe.

This must be based on the tenuous or subtle matter (FLC 32) which, being tender, sails through everything: it is a kind of soul substance which goes both from the dancing to the heavenly bodies and from the heavenly bodies to the dancing.

Furthermore, by making sacrifices, one establishes reconciliation with the powerful beings who, among other things, control this soul substance (which is one form of harmony). Remember : man is a microcosm in the cosmos.

**d. - *The human soul as an “eternal, immortal” being (103/104).***

The Bible, thinking from a vastly different religion and related presuppositions, holds that creation had a beginning.

This is a Platon, of course, unknown. The soul is not only immortal (that is also Biblical), it is “eternal. Reincarnation gets a very distinctive trait from this.

(i).-- Our life, as impermanent (both created and doomed), ends in death. FLC 62/64 taught us the outstanding value of physical life: death may, under no circumstances, be attained by suicide.

Here one gropes for the systechy of tragedy. On the one hand, this earthly life and work is a value - otherwise high. On the other hand, it is a “dungeon” experience and dying acts as a liberation.

One can, now, stand against, this tragic interpretation of life as one wishes: one thing is certain, namely, that dying is not just a terrifying calamity. In the belief in immortality, indeed in the hypothesis of the belief in eternity, death loses its frightening character. At least partially.

This partial character is evident in Platon’s life itself: in -361 he was imprisoned by the Sicilian tyrant’ Dionysios and was in mortal danger; thanks to Archutas (FLC 78), a scientifically oriented Pythagorean, he was freed in the spring of -360. Platon was happy that his life was out of danger and that he could continue his ‘Paideia’, his teaching and cultural work. He truly loved life.

**(ii).**-- The time immediately following death is devoted, among other things, to the more direct perception of ideas and also to contact with deities (FLC 30), whereby, as the case may be, a future reincarnation receives part of its preparation.

Except, of course, the fact that, after dying, the soul suffers the consequences of its ethical choice (reward or punishment).

This aspect of Platon's soul science is, evidently, strongly mythicized. But, unlike the Bible and the Catholic Church, for example, many contemporaries believed in Reincarnation somewhere. Which actualizes the Platonic representations in this regard.

**(iii).**-- *The birth shock.*

To reincarnate - according to Platon - is, among other things, to be confronted with 'resistances' and to undergo a reduction in happiness. The bodily urges and other traits are a challenge.-- The already mentioned de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens*, (Plato's image of man, 430, says what follows:

**(i)** Birth brings, for the reincarnating soul, a severe shock.

**(ii)** But the eventual bad effects of the birth shock can, already prenatally, be cushioned (e.g. by uninterrupted rhythmic movements). This, notwithstanding the fact that - according to Platonic texts - the soul, before incarnating, can choose from a set of options.

*The anamnesis theory.*

As E. W. Beth, *Wijsbegeerte der Wiskunde*, (Philosophy of Mathematics), said, Platon knows fundamentally two methods, the "anamnèsis," memory, and the "stoicheiosis," factor analysis. Factor-analysis won, gradually, more ground -- said Beth -- in Platon's theory of knowledge and epistemology.-- How, now, is one to understand this cognitive 'anamnesis'?

**Given.**-- The embodied soul through its body, reflection of its being, undergoes sensory perceptions of what Platon calls 'fainomena', phenomena, i.e. immediately given realities.

*Significance.*

**a.** Through the senses the soul contacts the images of ideas, which are the phenomena. An earthly fact is a visible presentiment, at:

**(i)** singular and

**(ii)** imperfect way, of the higher idea present in it.

To perceive is, therefore, indirectly, to contact ideas ('to behold').

**b.** Yet, in Platon's Reincarnation hypothesis, to perceive, i.e. to behold ideas is at the same time to remember that one once, before the birth shock, beheld them. This memory is more or less vague.



## **2.-- The main features of the human soul life.**

One should not expect from Platon a scientific psychology as we know it since the XIXth century. But basic ideas. We summarize them now.

(i) The triad “mind (insight) / will (perseverance) / desire (attaching value, feeling value)”.

(ii) What we have already touched upon, FLC 25v.: “a great monster/ a lesser lion/ a little man” (= coveting, lower, proud, higher, reasonable, spiritual). The allegory (i.e., the more elaborate comparison) in the *Faidros* of the rider and the two horses (= reasonable part/ proud part/ coveting part) can be reduced to this second triad.

### **2.a.-- The triad ‘mind/ will/ desire’ (105/114)**

A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 81f., briefly explains to us.

Platon, in the Pythagorean line, does ‘theoria’, *speculatio / contemplatio*, i.e. ánd theoretical research ánd intuitive-mystical contemplation.

Its basic structure is:

(i) ‘*empeiria*’, *experientia*, experience (perception),  
(ii) but then as a basis of thrusting through to what is not immediately perceptible or directly observable. This invisible, this intangible, is twofold.

#### **a. It is, in platonic terms, idea.**

The idea is as an invisible being in the phenomenon, which is singularly and imperfectly the representation (= ‘image’, ‘picture’) of it. This is where the theorizing focuses.

#### **b. It is further all that is invisible.**

E.g. deities, who appear. Thus seeing an apparition or hearing inspiring words - think of the ordained writers of the Bible - is one type of ‘theoria’.

In the traditional liturgy, for example, one bewails the Gospel book as if it were Jesus himself who proclaims. Whoever experiences this, that presence of Jesus, in response to and through that Gospel proclamation, experiences a process of ‘theoria’. He/she does not ‘behold’ an abstract idea alone (the idea ‘Jesus proclaimer’); he/she directly contacts, through the symbols of the book and the reading priest-pastor, Jesus himself.

This is called, especially in the Greco-Eastern churches, a ‘theophany’, an appearance of God.-- It is well remembered, then, that a Platon lives by that twofold theoria, traditional in Archaic Hellas, contacting the indirectly given.

*Note.--* O. Willmann, *Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke (in historischer Anordnung)*, (The most important philosophical terms (in historical order)), Kempten/ Munich, 1909, 20, explains the term ‘theoria’, theory building and/or mystical contemplation.

According to an ancient, it originates from Pythagoras himself, who preferred the attentive observation and/or contemplation of the phenomena of daily life (e.g. the Olympic Games of his time (which very religious games date from -776 and lasted until +396)) to the thoughtless absorption in them.

This detachment from daily life should not make us forget, however, that, also for the Pythagorean, daily perceptible phenomena were and remained the basis.

In our Modern language usage, as much theory(formation)’ as ‘mysticism’ have acquired a pejorative connotation: they ‘float’ and produce ‘untestable’ (even not falsifiable) results.

Willmann, himself a strong Pythagorean and, most certainly, Platonizing thinker, says of ‘theoria’, theory formation, (the aspect of ‘mystical contemplation’ is not involved in the context) what follows:

(1) the basis is ‘Erfahrung’, ‘empirisches Interesse’ (observation, empirical interest).

(2) The philosophical ‘speculating’ (because that is what Willmann’s text is limited to) “geht den hinter der Erfahrung, dem Gegenstande des empirischen Interesses liegenden zusammenhängen nach”(o.c.,20).

In other words:

(i) there are the phenomena;  
(ii) there are, speculatively-mystically-interceptible, the correlations, behind the immediately observable phenomena.

Willmann then cites a definition - decisive for our human research, among others, in the Platonic sense - of Platon himself: “Platon calls ‘science’ “theoria, theorization, resp. mystical contemplation, of being (note : reality)” (‘theorètikè tou ontos’).

Let this, once and for all, be agreed upon: ‘theoria’ is anything but a ‘floaty’ or even ‘untestable’ way of speaking or thinking.

**Appl. model.--** It is precisely here that Gödeckemeyer’s text fits perfectly.-- How is Platon going to make ‘spirit’ clear from everyday observations? By going into “well-defined observations concerning the behavior of men in everyday life” (sic). But not without a working hypothesis, namely, in this case: “one and the same being cannot do contradictory (contradictory) things at the same time.”

Behold the idea, which, like a light, illuminates the daily phenomena.-- Now what are these phenomena?

1.-- Platon, like all men (FLC 35ff.: the common mind), observes on occasion that a heated man, notwithstanding violent thirst, yet does not drink.

Theoria: if one puts forward the accompanying spirit as a factor (stoicheion; FLC 70ff.: stoicheiosis), then such an astonishing fact becomes intelligible after all (FLC 75 (necessary, yes, eventual sufficient conditions)). ‘Mind’, after all, in Platonic language, is, among other things, the insight and perusal of coherences (FLC 71: coherences = totalities). The coherence, in context, is avoidance, usually represented by ‘asceticism’ or even ‘mortification’,-- in short: learning to control oneself concerning drink.

2.-- Platon, like every man, suspects (= theoria), in / behind such an act of control, more than mere mind and/or reason. The decision itself is more than mind: “The observation that the decision, which springs from the human mind, in the struggle with desire (note: value attraction, sense of value), is supported by the will (note: perseverance), must serve to distinguish - apart from desire and mind - a third faculty, the will” (Gödeckemeyer, *ibid.*).

Gödeckemeyer, interpreter of Platonism, says immediately afterwards, “For the will is not identical with desire, since, enlightened by the spirit, it resists it; nor is it identical with the spirit, since it is active also in children and even in animals,-- both beings, which do not yet possess spirit.”

Note.-- The whole Platonic context (FLC 56) shows that, especially in the child, “spirit” is present but at a prerational stage (which is apparently what is meant here).

***Appl. model.***

***Bibl. sample:***

-- Platon, *Der siebente Brief (An die Verwandten und Freunde des Dion zu Syrakus)*, (The seventh letter (To the relatives and friends of Dion at Syracuse)), Calw, 1958, 10f..

The whole letter, whose authenticity is no longer in doubt, testifies to keen observation of everyday life,-- we say “little life,” on the island of Sicily (where Greeks also lived).

Dion, at the court of the Syracuse tyrant Dionusios, had become an influential man and friend of Platon.

The mores - especially the political ones - there deeply shocked Platon, as a straight man. Here is what he writes about ‘la dolce vita’ there.

“Animated by these thoughts (note: Platon means his philosophy of society), I came to Italy (note: usually called ‘Greater Greece’) and Sicily, when, for the first time (note: 467), I travelled there.

What greatly disappointed me here, however, again on my first appearance, was the ‘blissful life’ prevalent in those regions. This consists of the so-called ‘Italian and Sicilian roast’: twice a day one indulges in lavish meals; at night one is not alone in bed. In short: one is absorbed in the pleasures associated with such a way of life.

No man under heaven can, however, in such a way of life - when, from childhood, he lives in the midst of such things - grow into a prudent man, gifted with true wisdom. Still less will it occur to such a person to strive for real ability,--meaning: a life which under every point of view testifies to mastery by the spirit in all of us (...).

Furthermore, no system of government, even one with the best constitutions, can attain the happiness of domestic peace when its members, on the one hand, proudly rush through everything with exaggerated extravagance,-- this, while, on the other hand, they consider it normal that they do not exert themselves seriously, either in body or in mind, ... except when it comes to indulging in excessive feasting and drinking, as well as in lust, to which one gives oneself up in bed.

Such societies are governed sometimes by an absolute autocrat (‘turannos’, tyrant), sometimes by the power of the money aristocracy or by the rule of the mob. Immediately they fall from one revolution into another. The rulers, in such a society, cannot even hear the mere name “constitution. By ‘constitution’ I mean “a legal arrangement, which, on the basis of a law applicable to all, guarantees freedom and - as regards the application of that law - equality.”

Immediately we have, here, a foretaste of Platon’s true political ‘paideia’, conscientiousness.-- For the rest, Platon’s text speaks plainly for us, XXth centuryers.

It testifies, in every case, to Platon’s perception of the ethical and political phenomena,--without bias. Businesslike. Though deeply vexed.

**Appl. model.--** Another sample of observation of behavior offers us W. Peremans, *De Griekse vrijheid (Boodschap en waarschuwing)*, (The Greek Freedom (Message and Warning)), Hasselt, 1978, 17v..

We are in full early IVth century. “Exhausted by long warfare, Greek man now demands above all ‘peace and rest’ ... for himself,-- personal gain and material gain. The individual enriches himself, while the state impoverishes.-- He no longer cares about principles that used to apply, he no longer feels bound by laws and worship, and he frees himself from obstructive regulations and laws. The concept of ‘freedom’ takes on a different content”. (O.c.,16v.).

How does Platon respond to this? “I can well imagine that a ‘democratic state’, thirsting for ‘freedom’, will not be able to keep up with the situation and will start to revel in the unadulterated wine of ‘freedom’. (...).

1. “Leaders who have nothing and subjects who have everything to say. That is the motto! Such a thing deserves all praise and honor, both public and private. (...).

2. The father gets used to placing himself on an equal footing with his son and being afraid of his children. The son considers himself “as good as the father. He neither spares nor respects his parents. For, yes, “he wants to be free”.

3. In such a state, it is the master who fears and flatters his students, while the gentlemen students look down on their professors from on high.

4. With the home teachers (note: a habit) it is already no better.

5. Young people place themselves on a totally equal footing with the elderly; they take on them in word and deed. Old people ‘adapt themselves to such youth; they exhaust themselves in jokes and jests: in order not to give the impression of being squeamish and bossy, they imitate the youth’.

Who would not think of the ‘anti-authoritarian phase’ in which we live? Immediately it also appears how person(s), society and culture (FLC 98: human triad) are indeed not to be kept radically apart, but exist in ‘koinonia’ (FLC 56; 77; 80; 83), in ‘dialectical’ connection, together.-- Cfr. Platon’s *The State* 562v..

**Note** -- Applicative models 2 and 3, above, we have interjected to show that Platonic theoria, theorizing and/or mystical contemplation, feeds from a different source than the bare phenomena.

Indeed: as applicative model 1 demonstrates and, sporadically, model 2 as well, Platon starts from the soul as spirit, i.e. the capacity to, through the ...repeatedly disappointing phenomena, which, in that case, come across as caricatures (FLC 97: Gogol) of higher ideas, such as e.g. 'self-control', 'constitution', 'true freedom:', to 'see', to 'behold' the ideas, which are singularly and...deformed present in them.

How, by the way, could anyone see the 'Italic and Sicilian roasts' as caricatures of human life, if they did not carry - if necessary against their will - ideas in their minds? They are the conditions of possibility of 'criticism', understand value judgments about unvalues. A roast still testifies, in all its exaggeration, to a normal, 'responsible', eating and drinking. Abuse of freedom still testifies to its 'proper' use. Yet the justifiable, the right, is the idea.

***The tragic situation of man as 'mind/ will/ desire.***

Tragedy includes the conflict between ideal (here: immortality) and actual mode of existence (here: downfall). A conflictology is always imperceptible, latent, in tragedy. Do we find such a thing in Platon? Yes, as follows.

**a.--** De Vries, *Plato's Image of Man*, 434, notes that animal 'harmony' (understand: absence of conflict tension) is not a human ideal for Platon. Truly 'human-like' harmony (FLC 101) is conflict-related. There is, after all, an inner conflict situated in the soul life itself between 'lawful' and 'unlawful' desires.

**b.--** Unlawful, i.e., unacceptable to the human mind, value tendencies are at work in everyone. They spring, as we shall see more fully, from 'the great monster' (needs for sleep, food,-- sexuality, -- economic possession) and, perhaps, even more so, from 'the lesser lion' (sense of honor, resentment, anger). The 'little man' (= spirit) is, with that, involved in a conflict, in virtue of his triad of "big monster/ lesser lion", on the one hand, and, on the other, the "little man".

Now, how are the first two terms of the tripartite conflict transformed into human factors (elements; FLC 70). For, according to Platon, they need not be eradicated at all. That would be misplaced mortification. We find this, as the case may be, in the cynics and the Stoics who evolved from them. Not in Platonism.

**a.-- *The controlled side.***

The state of alertness of human consciousness ensures that the “impure desire” (the big monster) and the “noble urge to spend money” (the lesser lion) are kept within spirit-justifiable limits.-- Three factors (“elements”) play a role in this:

- a. the good habits, which can be learned through practice,
- b. the noble “desires” (the urge to validate, insofar as it is the source of self-control: out of a sense of honor, we will not do many of the things that we “desire”)
- c. the insight of the mind, which sees the ‘good’ (value-less) (FLC 60: relativity).

**b.-- *The uncontrolled side.***

Except, of course, when, in the waking state, man lets himself go or is driven (‘drift’), man, in the sleeping state, is sometimes overcome by the first two terms (noble urge for money and uneducated desire). De Vries, *Plato’s image of man*, 432, says in this regard: in sleep the mind rests (‘movement’ is life (FLC 102 (cosmic) 104 (prenatal)); it then also no longer (completely) controls the unlawful lusts of the mortal soul, which then indulge themselves.

The (inferior) coveting part satisfies its lusts and, in that state, dares anything - liberated and loose as it feels from all shame and insight. No diffidence prevents that aspect of the soul from lying, for example, with a mother, in his imagination, or with any other being,--animal, human or deity.

**Note:** Therapy -- De Vries says Platon recommends, as contraceptive habits:

- a. (mind): to cherish positive (“good”) conceptions or thoughts, just before falling asleep;
- b. (noble money drive): just before sleep shun anger or resentment - results of frustrated money drive;
- c. (unmeritorious desire): giving the lowest desires the “right measure” (by avoiding excessive control or so).--

**Note** -- One cannot get rid of the impression that, here, Platonism contains a kind of depth psychology, which, of course, remains more than amenable to further elaboration.-

**Conclusion.** The conflict situation, in which the eternally immortal soul (personality) is embroiled, is thus not absolutely ‘tragic’, in the strong sense of ‘hopeless’. On the contrary, both the (noble) urge to be valid and even the (base) desire are integral components of a life from the spirit.

**Applicative model.**-- That the 'un.noble desire' - in Platonic frame of thought - can be elevated to an integral constituent of spiritual life (compare with e.g. Scheler's sublimation; FLC 12), is evident from Platon's position on the 'paid.erastia', boys' love.

**Bibl. sample:**

-- Thorkill Vanggaard, *Phallos (Symbol und Kult in Europa)*, (Phallos (symbol and cult in Europe), Munich, 1971, 21/47 (Paiderastia);

-- H.I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948, 55/67 (*De la pédérastie comme éducation*); ((On pederasty as education)).

-- A. Gödekkemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 56f., 61/68 (Die Schulgründung).

-- Nathalie Turner, *Antiquité grecque : l'homosexualité Comme partie de l'éducation*, (Greek antiquity: homosexuality as part of education), in: Journal de Genève 18.12.1986, expresses the opinion of Claude Calame (prof of Greek language and literature), in a speaking engagement at Lausanne.

**1.--** The fact of homoeroticism, resp. homosexuality (lesbianism) between adults and adolescents/adolescents, in Hellas, is no longer denied by anyone.

**2.--** The interpretation of that fact is somewhat different.-- Already the Ancient Greeks themselves were contradictorily divided.

**(a)** Satirical authors like an Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385; older contemporary of Platon), condemn, full of ridicule and insulting language, the raw-biological drive in that form of 'eros', minstrelsy.

**(b)** Others, including Platon, acknowledge, of course, the raw-biological side, but strive for ennoblement: such an eros is, as the case may be, the prelude to a mania (FLC 102) for a world of ideas which is felt to be masculine, although that eros is an aspect of the great, immoral monster.

M. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 56f., outlines this piece of Platonism as follows. Just every eros is "beautiful" (FLC 59), i.e., giving rise to admiration and wonder, and praiseworthy, but only that eros which incites us to noble love. Thus literally Gödeckemeyer, *ibid.*.

For Platon, philosophical instruction was, in part, the rigid learning under the guidance of a teacher, as advocated by the Sophists, who allowed themselves to be paid for it (which was new in the philosophical world). Moreover, it was a thinking together in the context of friendship relations (FLC 49).



But in the sphere of Pagan Antique Hellas, friendship was often homoerotic, indeed formally homosexual or lesbian (think Sappho). She was - what is now called - 'private friendship'.

Platon, confronted with an existing tradition (which, incidentally, had strong sacred origins: one worshipped e.g. the god Eros or the goddess Aphrodite), tries to give a higher meaning to it.

**a.-- *Every eros (drive for love) is a kind of mania. Transported state***

One also speaks of "inspiration" under the direction of deities.-- This characteristic makes the drive for love related to the ecstasy, characteristic of e.g. the prophetic women (think of the Puthia in Delphi), the initiates ('mystics', e.g. in mystery religions, e.g. in honor of Dionysos (bakchanten)) and -last but not least- the truly inspired poets (think of the worship of the Muses).

Again: theology (FLC 78;-- 24; 63; 101; 113) plays a leading role in this. Those who think minnedrift outside of any religion (like the whole Septic philosophy tradition, which begins with the Sophists) secularize more easily than any other.

**b.-- *The specifically Platonic philosophical drive for love***

This is, eventually, the highest form of eros.

(i).-- Among the Greeks, the drive for love was connected with beauty (and value) - certainly this was the case in Platonism, where the highest idea was not a value-free abstraction, but - as we saw, FLC 60 - the idea of 'the good', which Platon sometimes calls 'god' (which still lives on in our traditional expression 'the supreme good').

It is too often forgotten that Platonism -- precisely because it is doctrine of ideas -- is an axiology, first and foremost. -- The true life, the happy life, therefore, lies in involving that supreme good, the value -- without -- more, in the course of life.

(ii).-- The drive for love is, among other things, described by Platon in his *Faidros*. There he speaks of the psychology of temptation (temptation) by a lower value,-- something that is tempting. What is meant in particular is physical, so-called 'external' beauty.

Temptation consists of being driven with unbridled desire to something that appears tempting to us because of its external appearance. This is done without even asking ourselves whether the unproblematic act of responding to such a thing is responsible, 'lawful', in conscience.

This process of a catagoric nature (downward pressure) continues until the moment when the deeper memory (Reincarnation hypothesis: FLC 104: anamnesis theory) sees in the beautiful phenomenon, the higher (anagogic, upward) value, namely the clean-in-self, the clean-without-more, the absolutely clean,--which, as we know, coincides with the good-without-more.

Thus Platon sublimates what, at first, belongs to the lowest values.-- Likewise Platon can speak of a specific philosophical inspiration (as e.g. E. Montier, *A l'école de Platon*, (At the school of Plato), Paris, s.d., 122/125 (on the rider and the two horses), expounds).

**Note:** One knows the aversion of our Puritan traditions, among others, within the Christian Churches,--inspired principally by a St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; greatest Church Father of the West), --aversion, which so easily denounces sin and, even more, mortal sin, as soon as eros is involved. Well, after what has gone before, one must violate the historiography of Platonism to dare to claim that it is precisely this school of thought which is at the origin of this “sex-hostility”.

**2.b.-- The triad “great monster (the wild animal) / lesser lion/ lesser man”.**

Summarize, psychologically, once more, Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 82f .

In every human soul - just as in society, the Kallipolis or ‘beautiful society’, as Platon once called it - three aspects, ‘merè’, so-called ‘parts’, are at work.

**(i)a.--** One factor is attuned to livelihood and earning livelihood,-- the great monster, also called ‘vegetative’ part.

**(i)b.--** One factor makes man adrift honorable,-- the lesser lion, also called ‘animal’ part.

**(ii)--** One factor makes man covet the truth and the understanding of it,-- the little man, also called ‘humane’ part.

***Platon’s theory of virtues.*** (114/115)

Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue (A Study in Moral Theory)*, London, 1981, includes a severe critique of European Enlightened Rationalism, following the collapse of the medieval Scholasticism (800/1450).

Under the ‘critical’ influences of a Descartes (FLC 82v.), Intellectualist Rationalist, and, to an even greater extent, of a John Locke (1632/1704; formal founder of the Enlightenment), Empiricist Rationalist, an ethic emerged that led us to regard all that is called ‘virtue’ rather with distrust. Those who, nowadays, come across as virtuous, risk being written off as backward or Puritan.

Well, MacIntyre now lets us hear a different bell: only a return to virtue ethics, i.e., a theory of conscientious behavior centered around the formation of moral competence -- that is, namely, virtue: that one possesses virtue in matters of conscience -- can rescue us from this crisis of ethical values.

Platon has left us a transparent theory of virtue.-- Fr. Schneider, Hrsg., Johannes Rehmke, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (History of philosophy), Wiesbaden, 1959, 40, gives an excellent account of this. He distinguishes, with Platon, four cardinal virtues, a classic in virtue ethics.

**a.-- *The three partial virtues.***

(i) If a person's life exhibits as its main trait spirit, the little man, he possesses, according to Platon, "sophia," wisdom (One of several meanings of the term "sophia").

(ii)a. If a person's life testifies to spirit, the lesser lion, then he possesses 'andreaia', (masculine) courage of life.

(ii)b. If a person's life testifies of spirit-bearing immoral desire, the great monster, then he possesses 'sophrosune', sense of measure.

**(b)-- *The one total virtue.***

Harmony (FLC 101, 110) is, in Hellas since the Paleo-Pythagoreans and Platon, a basic concept, which goes hand in hand with stoicheiosis (FLC 71: thinking from totalities).

Well one application of it is that virtue, which gives to all three main aspects of our soul life what is due to them ('justice'). The total virtue is therefore the 'dikaiosune', justice, i.e. conscientiousness, in so far as it gives its due to a multiplicity (here: the three aspects) of parts,--without eliminating or underestimating one element.--In fact, this doctrine of the 'cardinal' or principal virtues is a theory of the (balanced) personality.

***The soul triad.*** (115/116)

Fr. Schneider/J. Rehmke, o.c., 38, situates the triad 'monster/lion/human' (do we call them that) - in Platon's total soul science.

**A.-- *The tragic duality.***

In a mother's womb a biological body arises. An insistence on (re)embodiment prompts a soul, -- eternal, immortal, disembodied as it is, only 'life' (movement) in itself,-- to embody itself in ... a become, mortal, impermanent body.

From that moment on, our soul (understand the root of our personality) is engaged in a struggle.

**B.-- *The duality in soul life.***

Our actual and observable soul life is the expression of the tragic basis. As a result, our soul exhibits “parts” (“merè”), which do not fit together so well (harmony deficiency).

**(a) *The divine - imperishable part***

We call it also the “nous” (intellectus), “logistikon” (reasoning), “filomathes” (what likes to learn, eagerness to learn). It is, fundamentally, the soul itself, as it was before the incarnation and as it will be afterwards, enriched or impoverished by earthly life. It is characterized by the openness (mystical and/or theoretical) to the invisible realities (as e.g. ideas).

**(b) - *The mortal-perishable ‘part’.***

This arises only once the eternal soul embodies itself. In fact, this is what Platon calls ‘the mortal soul’. This is, as a corollary of the immortal soul, the life force, which gives life (‘movement’) to the body, which, of itself is rather inert, lifeless, motionless.

***That mortal soul now, exhibits two ‘parts’:***

**(i) *The noble urge for money.***

‘Thumos’ (literally: breath of life; -- animating force), ‘thumoeides’ (‘character’ and/or ‘temperament’, as it is said “He/she has at least character”; in the language rather: rising, quick to anger,-- the opposite of ‘gentle’; also ‘unruly’). This is the ‘lesser lion’, eager for honor and fame.

**(ii) *Base desire***

‘Epithumia’ (desire, covetousness;- drive (passion”); ‘epithumètikon’ (unsophisticated desire); ‘philochrèmaton’ (that which is greedy, ‘possessive’, money-hungry). This is the great monster (eating/drinking, sleep, sex life,-- economic possession. - Behold what this ‘monster’ in our bodily soul (‘mortal soul’) ‘desires’).

Both these last parts are the antagonists of the little man in us, the immortal soul. Thus e.g. during sleep, when the little man is ‘resting’, the lustful nature of the big monster (FLC 111) is expressed.

**Note.--** An important remark provides us with de Vries, *Plato’s image of man*, 431: both the little man and the lesser lion have their creature desires. So that the term “desire” must be understood sometimes narrowly, sometimes broadly.

## **2.c.-- Explanations concerning “little man/ lesser lion/ great monster”.**

We are, now, going to deepen each of the three famous “parts” of the total human soul separately. This, both with purely Platonic and actualizing applicative models. This should demonstrate that Platon’s soul science is still valid and useful.

### **2.c.a.-- The unholy desire (the great monster). (117/136)**

In passing: the autocrat (‘tyrant’) is predominantly controlled by his great monster, who paradoxically ‘tyrannizes’ him (he is therefore unfree), while at the same time, according to Platon, he exhibits a dose of real freedom, since he himself chooses, to some extent, his objects of desire.

In this way, Platon wants to attribute somewhere the right measure of unfreedom and freedom in the human being of that type.. Cfr. FLC 107, where both children and even animals ‘want’. The right dose of freedom is, even now, a problem.

### **Patristic model. (117/121)**

Evagrius Ponticus (346/399) -- Euagrius -- was a monk, whose ascetic - mystical texts had a very great influence on the monastic world (especially the desert monks; he once lived as a monk in the Egyptian desert after a vocation crisis).

But he was also very influential in the Church of the East and West, although he gave rise to controversy. He is still read today. Evidence: A. Grün, OSB, *Het omgaan met de Boze (De strijd van de oude monniken tegen de demonen)*, (Dealing with the Evil One (The Battle of the Ancient Monks Against the Demons)), Bonheiden, 1984.

The author, a Benedictine, writes about Evagrius’ psychology of temptation in terms of C.G. Jung (the depth psychologist),--which is somewhat disturbing to the proper reading. For Evagrius belongs to the Patristics (33/800). He is a Platonist concerning psychology. Like Platon, he believes in “demons,” i.e., invisible beings, who “request” (tempt) us in our great lion or our great monster. The monk, who is tempted, is first of all tempted by his desires, but demons, extremely cunning, play on them.

The method of Evagrius consists of first allowing the temptation to pass so that one can get to know its psychological root in oneself and the demon(s) that act upon it. After this diagnostic phase, the therapy can begin.

Evagrius distinguishes three types of temptation, which connect to the big monster in us: gluttony, fornication, greed.

*A sample.*

**(i) Greed ('gluttony').--**

Evagrius describes how the demon(s) of eagerness does not outright induce excess in eating and drinking, but instills a negative thought.-- "The thought of eagerness whispers to the monk the rapid failure of his method of mortification.

**a.** This thought brings before his eyes: his stomach, his liver, his spleen, - further: dropsy (note : sickly accumulation of water in the organism), a long-standing illness; finally: the absence of a physician (note: in the desert).

**b.** Sometimes this thought makes him think of certain brothers, who were subject to these ailments.

**c.** Often the demon also urges these sick persons to go to an ascetic ('penitent') to tell him of their fate, pretending to have become like this as a result of their mortification."

In other words: look at the undesirable effects of my penitential life, and you will understand that I must give it up.

In the eyes of A. Grün, o.c.,37, this is a form of what the psychologists, now, call "rationalization" Seemingly reasonably justifiable reasons are the expression of an unconscious urge, -- here to escape penance or austerity concerning diet. The mean man says, "One makes something up to oneself." - So much for what Grün calls -- not so badly found -- "a first primal urge".

**(ii) Unchastity ("fornication").**

Grün, interpreter of Evagrius, says that this demon works mainly along the imagination.

**a.** "The demon of unchastity urges 'All manner of bodies to covet'. Thus he mercilessly seizes upon those who live in abstinence. Something, which then makes them renounce abstinence, "because they achieve nothing anyway".

**b.** He defiles the soul by tempting it to "shameful deeds".

**c.** He makes her utter certain words and hear them again and again, as if the object of unchaste desire were visibly present in the flesh.

Now let it be the imagination, which comes to the fore, yet again it is negative thoughts, which are active: "because they achieve nothing anyway!"

According to Evagrius, it happens more often that the impurity demon sails directly into the body and makes it horny. Which would be a lighter or heavier form of 'possession'.

**(iii) Possession (“greed”).**

“Greed” mirrors old age, the incapacity for manual labor, -- coming famine and disease; -- the bitterness of poverty and “what shame it is to have to get the necessities of life from others.

Again: the rationalization method! With the negative idea of ‘poverty’.

Says A. Grün, o.c.,38v. ““Anyone who has experienced drug addicts and their/their way of arguing feels confirmed by Evagrius’ observations: here, too, every motive for imposing restrictions on oneself is questioned with seemingly shrewd reasons. But, in fact, behind these “reasons” is the infantile need to possess more and more. As children, one has not learned to renounce and adapt to reality”. In other words, what the desert monk Evagrius observed in Late Antiquity, thanks to his psychological method, still seems actualizable.

**(iv) Sleepiness.**

Platon says that to the great monster or “primal urges” - to speak with Grün - also belongs the need to sleep.

Evagrius, who ranks this among acedia (one type of disappointed urge for money), describes, truly, a soporific: “When reading (note: ascetic-mystic reading for monks), the acedary often yawns and feels strongly drawn to sleep: he rubs his eyes, stretches out his hands,-- turns his eyes away from the book and stares at the wall.

Then he looks into the book again, reads a little, and wearies himself unnecessarily to fathom the meaning of the words.-- Then he counts the pages and examines the writing. He disapproves of the writing, as well as the whole execution.

Finally: he folds the book shut, puts it under his head and sleeps a shallow sleep. Until he is awakened by hunger and eats something”.

As Grün comments: written with humor. Indeed, one sees the ludicrousness of a desert monk, who likes spiritual reading anything but! That too, in Platonic view, is the great monster, which encompasses the primal urges - among others, the primal urge, which drives to sleep.

**Remark:**

(1) Nowadays one easily mocks the classical psychology of seduction. But one reads the Gospels about Jesus’ temptations in the desert,--not to write off so quickly, Biblically speaking.

(2) Euagrios' *theoria*.-- FLC 105v. introduced us to the very Antique-Greek concept of 'theoria', which we translate, still best, by 'fathoming'.

As a Platonist he exhibits, like Platon, the threefoldedness of all Platonic fathoming, i.e. penetrating to the (last) grounds, i.e. elements, resp. postulates.

**(i) Behavioral description.-**

The Antique 'ekphrasis' (descriptio, description) exhibited over time three main types, viz. landscape description, outlook description (prosopopee) and character description (ethopee).-- It is evident that Euagrios, in the humorous description of the listless - sleepy monk, gives a brief prosopopee or outline of external behavior.

This is a literary type ('genre') which, in behaviorism (cfr Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence* (1898)) and psychoreflexology (I. Pavlov (1849/1936)) took on a professional scientific-psychological form.

Euagrios does not describe the monk in question from the inside (reflective-introspective), but looks at him from the outside,--with akribeia,--in order to fathom his soul life.

**(ii) Character description.**

Especially the impure description, with its imaginative contents, and the greedy description, with its fears among other things, give us a brief ethopoeia or description of the soul life from within, in which the thoughts, the feelings, the striving are central, as they are lived reflectively (by "reflection" or return to oneself), introspectively (by the look within), lived through.

This is a literary type which is used e.g. in the psychology of non-reflective consciousness (O. Külpe (1862/1915); J. Lindworski S.J. (think of his *Experimental Soul Science* (1935)), O. Selz (psychology of thought); Ph. Kohnstamm (Nutsseminarium)) or in phenomenological psychology (Franz Brentano (1838/1917; intentionality); Edmund Husserl (1859/1938)), took on a professional scientific form.

**(iii) Mantic description.**

The Antique Greek word 'mantis' means 'see(st)er' ('prophet'). 'Manteia' is the supernatural or, as it is now said, psychic giftedness to 'see' (also called 'clairvoyance' or 'sensitivity' (clairsentience)).

It is clear that the methodical perception of the action of demonic beings, within the body or within the soul (think of being possessed by a horny demon), is neither ordinary outward description nor ordinary inward description, but a class apart.



***Bibl. sample:***

- S. Kicken, *Alternatieve wetenschap (Op het spoor van nieuwe paradigma's)*, (Alternative Science (On the Trail of New Paradigms)), Antw. / Amsterd., 1975 (91/ 111 (*Alternatieven in de psychologie: parapsychologie* (Alternatives in psychology: parapsychology (in 1882, in England, the Society for Psychical Research was founded)));

- Y. Castellen, *La métapsychique*, (Metapsychics), Paris, 1955 (survey of the main varieties of 'metapsychika' , (= paranormology));--

- J. Feldmann, *Occulte verschijnselen*, (Occult phenomena), Brussels, 1938-1; 1949-3 (Catholic work, which treats both scientific paranormology and real "occultism" (which goes beyond pure professional science));--

**Note** -- We do not, on account of its enormous complexity, discuss this psychological method any further.

***Update notes.*** (121/124)

"The creation of the Academy as a permanent society for the prosecution of both exact and human sciences was, in fact, the first establishment of a university." (Enc. Britannica, Chicago, 1967, vol. 18, 21). For Platon, the term "sciences" (which appears several times in his texts) meant a high idea (understand: a high value, because all partial ideas are partial ideas of the highest idea, the good, i.e. The value-without-more). Therefore we referred, just now, to the scientific, actualizing forms of e.g. the (temptation) psychology of the Platonist Evagrius.

**-- a - *Platon's psychology is a psychology of values.* -**

The term "values psychology" comes, for us XX-st' centuryers, from what is called "humanities psychology" (FLC 05 (Dilthey); 38/40 (Reid))

It was especially Eduard Spranger (1882/1963), student of W. Dilthey, who developed a values psychology.-

His type of Spiritual Science psychology seeks a theoria (in Antique-Greek terms), i.e. a fathoming, such that the core of the spiritual person(s) - cf. FLC 115 (righteousness) - is uncovered, at least as far as this is possible.

The human being is, by a Spranger, signified as a member of a world of values. A human being's own form of being, seen individually, lies in the intertwined (unique, individual) set of values (FLC 71; 101: 107), which he displays, through his external behavior.--

The human 'soul' (understand: personality)  
(i) is both carrier of (unconsciously 'chosen') values  
(ii) as it is determined by a system of values situated outside it.

Thinking and reasoning, feeling and deciding, -- all this becomes more comprehensible, if one puts, as 'elements', values ('goods' in the Antique-Middle Ages language) first.-.

As Bigot / Kohnstamm / Palland, *Leerboek der psychologie*, (Textbook of psychology), Groningen / Djakarta, 1954-5, puts it lapidary: "If one knows what man values, then one can say who he / she is." (o.c., 430). Or "Tell me what values ye 'desire' (to remain in Platonic language), and I will tell you what soul ye have."

**-- b. - Platonic psychology is structural psychology.**

"Tell me what ideas ye take seriously, and I will tell you what your soul is like." But, in Platon's system (though open, yet quasi-closed), the ideas, included in those of the good, which is also the one (FLC 58), i.e. the transcendental (all-encompassing) foundation (premise) of the cosmic coherence, in which man is situated, make up a system. A system, which exhibits a structure, better said: a configuration (in Pythagorean terms: 'arithmos', a set of elements, placed in a geometrically drawable figure).

Compare with Spranger's structural psychology.-- The idea 'value' in Spranger's psychology is "what gives (to soul life) meaning (significance)": Well, what has 'meaning', yes, is "that which is factor within a totality of values." -

In his parlance, 'structure' is "a whole, the parts of which, among themselves, exhibit an 'organic' (note: the paragon here is a living organism) relationship such that, without the parts, the whole is no longer there and, conversely, without the whole, the parts change their nature."

Axiological (value doctrine) : such a psychological whole or 'structure' is meaningful, in that it is oriented to values.-- With Platon, this structure shows itself in justice (FLC 115).

**-- c - Platonic psychology is cultural psychology. -**

E. Moutsopoulos, *Platon*, in: D. Huisman, dir., *Dict. d. philosophes*, Paris, 1984, 2074, says: "The paideia principle, which governs the whole of Platon's philosophy, means both 'teaching' and 'culture'."-- --

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Indeed, as W. Jaeger has emphasized, both culture and teaching (as a transfer of culture) - in a word: 'paideia' (humanitas) - always determine Greek philosophy. Not only the Platonic or the Pythagorean.

Compare, with this, Spranger : he distinguishes, in Hegelian terms,

(i) 'subjective mind' i.e. the structure, which the values exhibit in the 'subject' (understand : the individual), and

(ii) 'objective spirit' i.e. the supra-individual culture with its own value structure. These 'objective' (understand : present within a society) values Spranger believes he can reduce to six main types.

These are:

**1.** economics (in which the economic man, essentially, is absorbed: "What will this yield, in money or other economic value?"),

**2.a.** community (in which the socially sensitive person is at home : the community interests, rooted in the interindividual 'love', weigh through here ("Something must be done for the marginalized!"));

**2.b.** state (the so-called power man becomes more 'political', possibly a 'statesman' (the higher evolved politician) in order to work out his sense of 'command');

**3.a.** science (the 'theoretical man', carried by the urge for knowledge, becomes absorbed in observations, concepts or criticism of science);

**3.b.** art (the 'aesthete' is absorbed in experiences of beauty of all kinds and in the creation of art);

**3.c.** religion (the religious person is absorbed in the sacred, in the saints and in his Godhead).

Behold the six types of feeling of value (= structures), which Spranger, in his *Lebensformen* (1914), highlighted.--

*Note:* -- Allport and Vernon, in 1951, subjected this classification to a 'factorial analysis' (FLC 70), a dissection of personalities according to 'factors' ('elements').

Their conclusion: it is valid, provided the types run together (e.g. an aesthetic person also has a political sense; think of the 'committed artists' e.g.; the religious person can, like the average Calvinist, have strong economic concerns).

This is oil on the fire of Platon's idea of 'koinonia', interlocking, of ideas (FLC 56;-64; 98; 107;-- 60; 68".-

It should be noted that the six Sprangerian ideals of life (for these are values, insofar as they 'give meaning' to a life) are also above many others in Platonism. So that Spranger's psychology may very well be seen as a partial updating of the Platonic.-- Of course there are differences.

(1).-- The “soul: of which Spranger also speaks, is not without doubt the “soul” of Platon. It is a “persistent spiritual subject, which is quite different from the mere ‘stream of consciousness’“ of a William James (1842/1910; founder of Pragmatism). But about its deeper form of being, Spranger says nothing.

(2).-- Spranger is a typical Modern German thinker. Fully aware of the enormous cultural crisis (FLC 88), he wanted to develop both psychology and pedagogy as instruments to overcome this crisis of values. In this he clearly resembles Platon, who tried to take analogous roads in the cultural crisis of the time.

But with Spranger one cannot rid oneself of the impression that e.g. religion is nothing more than one cultural factor, -- without any objective background, evolving along with the eternal currents of cultural history. He does hold on to ‘eternal values’, but they remain - what has been called - ‘culture-centric’.

With Platon the ‘values’ - he says ‘ideas’ - are situated both in the culture of his time and in a supernatural sphere, which does illuminate the culture in which he lives, but is more than that.

***Further clarification about the ‘primal urges’ -***

The richness offered by Platonism’s basic ideas of psychology, if they become, as Alfred Fouillée says, ‘ideas for strength’ which inspire us in our search for new insights, compels us to consider the ‘primal drives’ of an inferior nature separately.

**(i) -- *The primal urge that creates the need for sleep.--***

To go into this in depth, e.g. medically or psychologically, is unnecessary: what enormous efforts do people today not make in order to ...sleep well! What a huge pharmaceutical industry has tied itself to this! What number of physical and psychological techniques have not been developed to teach people how to sleep!

FLC 111 has taught us that already Platon clearly realized the ‘problem of sleep’, albeit in his time context.

(ii).-- The primal urge, which arouses the need for nourishment.-.

Again, the term 'food problem' applies. From the sitiophobia (food refusal; think of the 'anorexia mentalis') to the 'gluttony' : what problem! Consult e.g. three books:

- R.C. Atkins, *La nutrition révolutionnaire du docteur Atkins (ou se soigner sans médicaments)*, (Dr. Atkins' revolutionary nutrition (or treating yourself without drugs)), Paris, 1981,

-- R. Masson, *Soignez-vous par la nature (Traité de naturopathie pratique)*, (Heal yourself with nature (Treaty of practical naturopathy)), Paris 1977-1;1987-2

-- C. Kousmine, *Soyez bien dans votre assiette jusqu' à 80 ans*, (Be well in your plate until 80 years old), Paris, 1980,--

What a problem! And a problem at that, in which the spiritual side, apparently, just as in the night's rest problem, often plays a beslissing role.-- Again: the doctor and/or the psychologist - psychiatrist - neurologist must again and again supplement the (whether present or not) common sense.

FLC 64 (too strict 'training' (mortification) of the body rejected), 108 (eating and drinking bouts) taught us how Platon both saw and rejected both extremes.

(iii) . -- *The Primal Drive that drives man to sexual life.* (125/127)

Again : just like the night rest - and the food problem the sexual problem. Like both the previous issues, it is an object of enormous effort, of an entire industry ('the sex industry') and of medical and non - medical sciences,-- including 'sexology'. --

'Sex' -- Derived from the Latin word 'sexus' (either 'virilis' (masculine) or 'muliebris' (feminine), the term 'sex' was used, also in Dutch.

This,-- instead of e.g. our 'of both sexes'. But suddenly the American term 'sex' dominates, right into the language of the 'mean man'. Let us say: from the fifties onwards. The new content of the term can be reduced to a form of 'freedom' concerning sexual life ('free sex'). But not the controlled freedom, which belongs to Platon's higher ideas (values), but the freedom which we, in his text State 8: 562v. (FLC 109), have met: the freedom of an Anarchist or Libertarian nature. See also FLC 117 (dise inherent in human freedom.-- 'Koinonia', interlocking, of ideas (FLC 56) again: sex life, yes, but not without freedom(s)! -- Platon, apparently, also knew 'sex' : FLC 108 (bed lust), 112 (boys' love). We saw with how much caution he judged e.g. 'paiderastia', if necessary against some contemporaries.

**Note:** -- There is room here for a detailed discussion of such books as

(i) D.N. Morgan, *Love (Plato, the Bible and Freud)*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964 (in which Platon's propositions, concerning "love," can be compared with those of the Bible (which first of all taught us the idea of "charity and God") and those of Freud),

(ii) A. Nygren, *Eros et agapè (La notion chrétienne de l'amour et ses transformations)*, (Eros and agape (The Christian notion of love and its transformations)), Paris, 1944 / 1952 (in which, from a Protestant point of view, the Pagan 'eros' (love drive) and the Biblical 'agapè' (the Greek word for '(love of neighbor and God)') are examined in the course of their disintegration and convergence in the course of cultural history.

**Note** -- One could say, with the risk inherent in purely hypothetical interpretations, that the sublimation of the ancient Greek 'eros' (e.g. in the form of love for one's son), as advocated by Platon, somewhat anticipates biblical 'love'.

This claim includes the following points:

(i) both with Platon and in the Bible, the tendency to learn to control - through spirit - the primal urges (including 'eros' or, Latin, 'sexus') predominates;

(ii) both with Platon and in the Bible, the tendency to distrust the uncontrolled forms of the primal urges rather prevails, - without eliminating them. There is, however, one striking difference with regard to 'eros/ sexus' : in the Bible there is, clearly, a kind of suspicion which, in every 'eros/ sexus', thinks it must and sees evil (which, e.g., has been expressed very clearly by a St. Augustine). That type of suspicion is clearly absent from Platon's thinking.

**Note.**-- M. Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, (Nature and forms of sympathy), Frankf.a.M., 1948, 95ff., elaborates, in his own way, on the way in which St. Francis of Assisi (1182/1226; founder of the Franciscan Order), not without connection with Medieval Minstrel literature (courtly love), sought to reconcile 'eros' (here strongly nature-related, 'cosmic' as Scheler says) with Christian 'caritas' (= 'agapè').

**Note.**-- One has only to read the youth magazines, to observe how not only the term 'sex(e)' but also the term 'friend(s)' and 'friendship' according to meaning has experienced the 'sexual revolution', with its new idea of freedom. In the past, "I have a friend(s)" meant something like "I have a confidant(s)." Now it means "I have someone to go to bed with".

**Note** -- The “sexual revolution” did not, to be sure, fall from the sky.

(i) For example, A. Adam, *Les Libertins au XVIIe siècle*, (The Libertines in the 17th century), Paris, 1964, which shows that already in the XVIIth century, “freedom” in the Anarchist-Libertarian sense was used.-- Now it is a fact that the Libertines, in their turn, did not fall out of the sky : one thinks of the Middle Ages texts, which do not express the courtly love, but the very profound “eros”.

In Geneva, for example, these “burned” texts are performed, as it were, live in one of the city’s theaters. Richard Vachoux is the producer. The title “*Les Chevaliers de la Table Ronde (Estaminet courtois)*”. (The Knights of the Round Table (Estaminet courtois)), “The texts chosen by R. Vachoux break with the idea we have of brave knights on their knees at the feet of their ‘lady’:-- The poems, prose pieces and comedies chosen by Vachoux bear witness to a shameless horniness,-- let them be written by Charles d’Orléans, Pierre Duc or Courteline “. (*Journal de Genève* 21.08.1988: Ces lestes troubadours).

(ii) One also reads Denis de Rougemont (+1985), *L’amour et l’Occident*, (Love and the West,), Paris, 1938, which has as its main theme the troubadours of southern France, but thematizes the whole struggle between ennobling and degrading interpretations of the primal drive ‘eros / sexus’ to this day.-- It is clear: the courtly Minne (love) reacts against the actual degrading customs.

**Conclusion**.-- The West, from its origins, has waged a battle of conscience around ‘eros / sexus’, which it has not yet brought to a successful conclusion.

(iv).-- ***The primal urge, which gives man the need for economic goods.***—

We begin by citing a text by Platon, cited - against Platon - by H. Arvon, *La philosophie du travail*, (The philosophy of work), Paris, 1961.5.

Here is that text.-- “The desire for wealth - so Platon observes in his Laws -

(i) deprives us of all leisure and

(ii) prevents us from engaging in what is not our individual wealth.

If the soul of every citizen were simply absorbed in such material goods, it would be utterly incapable of devoting any care to all that is not daily profit. Under such an assumption, everyone is ready to deepen or exercise, with eagerness, any skill or activity that concerns those material goods.

This is the only value for which every state lives, insofar as it is not prepared to make any effort in the sciences or, more generally, in its taste for all that is beautiful and good. As a result of this voracious appetite for gold and silver, every man, in this hypothesis, is prepared to use - without distinction - all means and methods,-- both the fairest and the most shameful. If only one becomes richer by it”.

**Note.**-- Arvon identifies this text as the telling proof that a Platon despises manual labor : “The nobility of the idea (...) is opposed to the vile character of an action on the matter, -- action, which supposes an imperfect and unfinished reality “. -

To such a clerical interpretation of a Platonic text we reply as follows.

(i) Arvon, against the spirit of Platonism, does not situate this statement in the totality of his statements (which contradicts Platon’s systemic spirit).--

(ii) As de Vries once said: every statement of Platon must be interpreted together with its opposite. -- Cfr. FLC 56 (system thinking); 63 (limited validity of Plat. theses); 63 (one-sided view of ideas is, possibly hubris);-- 37 (the manual worker too can lead a life illuminated by ideas).

Do we, now, without Arvon’s bias, analyze the text, as it is.

(1) What is striking, logically speaking, is that the hypothetical method (FLC 52 (*bewerking uit het ongerijmde*), (operation from the incongruent), -- here from a universal thirst for enrichment); 54ff. (the Plat. applied hypothetical method).

(2) But that text is more than a reasoning. He describes (FLC 106ff. (well-defined observations concerning the behavior of men in daily life) : he indeed describes the Greek capitalism of the time. And this as a form of the great monster, which swallows up all the rest (what is left of the sense of values aimed at non-enrichment).

**Conclusion.**-- The thrust of the cited text is not manual labor disdain, but nonsensical profiteering denounced both logically and empirically. It is a Platonic critique of capitalism,--to use a Modern expression now.



### ***Comparison with the Marxist interpretation.***

The text quoted by Arvon shows that - in Platonic interpretation - the individuals, seized by the urge to possess, as human beings can be thoroughly determined by economic life.

Now listen to K. Marx / Fr. Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, (The German Ideology), Berlin, 1932-1 (in fact put down in 1845 / 1846).

-- "The first premise of all human history is, of course, the actual existence of human individuals. (...)-- One can distinguish human beings from animals e.g. by consciousness, religion, -- by whatever one likes. In fact, they begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their food. (...). Because men produce their foodstuffs, they, indirectly, produce themselves. (...)-- The manner in which men produce food (which may be found in nature) is already, in itself, a well-defined type of activity of the individuals in question. It is a well-defined way of expressing life, their own well-defined way of living. As these individuals express their lives, so they are.--But what they are coincides immediately with their production,--both with what they produce and the way in which they produce it. What individuals are depends on their material conditions of life.

### ***Conclusion.***

**(i)** Compare with what we said about Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life (FLC 05: History is the work of life): Marx / Engels engage in 'theoria' (fathoming) of history by:

**(a)** describing the actual, - here first of all, food and property formation activities (FLC 106: well-defined observations); 128),

**(b)** to denote them at once, -- and indeed as expressions of life.-- The great difference with respect to a Dilthey (and even more a Platon) is that Marx / Engels are silent about the soul (Dilthey: spirit, subject.)

**(ii)** But, as with Platon the enrichment drive determines the whole man, so, with Marx / Engels, every economic activity determines the whole man ... in his 'being'.

**Conclusion:** Platon should not be branded as a 'world and earth follower' (so by Arvon), because he denounces the sluggish nature of economics, insofar as it expresses enrichment drives,-- from his high ideas.-- Compare with Spranger's economic man (FLC 123).

***Second comparison with a Marxist interpretation.*** (130/133)

The Early Capitalism of the Middle Ages and its further elaboration,-- Liberal economic theories (Physiocracy (François de Quesnay (1694/1774)), -- in the main Economic Liberalism (Adam Smith (1723/1790)), -- they have created in modern Europe a situation, which, in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), has one of its descriptions and interpretations.

Here is an excerpt, which concerns us.

“The Bourgeoisie has, in history, played a most revolutionary role.-- Where it has come to power, it has disturbed all the Middle Ages-early relationships. Bourgeois has unmercifully broken the multicolored bonds that, in the Middle Ages, bound man to his natural authority figures. She has, at once, left no other bond between man and man than pure self-interest,--than cold cash payment.-- She has drowned the sacred emotion, inherent in the pious zealotry, the chivalrous fervor, the petty-bourgeois melancholy, in the freezing waters of selfish calculation.-- She has made the dignity, inherent in the person, disappear in the exchange value.

In the place of the innumerable, guaranteed and hard-won freedoms, it has substituted the one unscrupulous commercial freedom.-- In a word, it has replaced exploitation, shrouded in religious and political imagination, with open, shameless, direct, arid exploitation.

The Bourgeoisie has robbed all activities formerly regarded with reverent diffidence of their sacred appearance: it has made the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the scientist its paid wage-earners. The Bourgeoisie has ripped off the veil of affection from family relations and reduced them to a purely pecuniary relationship.(... ).

The Bourgeoisie cannot exist without the means of production,--at once, nor without the relations of production, --at once, nor without all the social relations, all three of which it revolutionizes. -

Unchanged maintenance of the old mode of production was, on the other hand, the first condition of life of all previous productive classes. The constant upheaval of production, the steady shaking of all social conditions, the eternal uncertainty and movement distinguish the Bourgeoisie period from all other periods.

All fixed, ingrained relationships together with consequent, viz. beliefs made venerable by age, change before they can stiffen.--

All that is enduring and fixed evaporates; -- all that is sacred is desecrated. The need for an ever-expanding market for its products drives the Bourgeoisie across the planet: everywhere it must nestle, everywhere it must establish itself, everywhere it must forge connections. The Bourgeoisie, through its exploitation of the world market, has unified the production and consumption of all countries. (...).

The old, limited and national complacency is now being replaced by all-sided communication, by an all-sided dependence of the peoples on one another.--So in material production, so in spiritual production: the spiritual products of the individual peoples are becoming commonplace. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible: out of the many national and local literatures a world literature arises. (...).-- In short: the Bourgeoisie is forming a world in its own image. (...)'".

**Comment.** (131/133)

(1) Note the inlining of economy and (Liberal) freedom (FLC 56: koinonia). And this is the freedom, which Platon also knew, though in the form of his time: FLC 109. Compare with FLC 30 (unrestrained freedom) and 125 (free sex).

But again: the individual, in such a living and thinking framework, is both free and unfree (FLC 117): notwithstanding the emphasis on the (absolutely) free individual, Physiocracy and Economic Liberalism have founded a system, within which the individual free choice is sometimes extremely small. Which the Marxist text, above, incidentally emphasizes.

(2) Note also the nihilistic tendency, hidden in the forms of 'freedom' just mentioned:

(i) unrestrained Individualism, at some point, no longer takes into account the higher social values (ideas,-- e.g. solidarity);

(ii) the unrestrained sex life (think of video sex) demolishes all higher ideas (e.g. chastity, marital fidelity);

(iii) unrestrained Economic liberalism, if it does not take into account the moderation rules of e.g. A. Smith, the great founder of - what is called - “the classical economy”, demolishes both the social higher ideas (solidarity, fight against usury, tariff laws, control of the issuing of bank notes) and the ecological higher ideas (environmental protection).

***Bibl. sample:***

-- M. Heidegger, *Holzwege*, (Wood paths), Frankf.a.M.,1950, 193/247 (Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’); (Nietzsche's Word 'God is Dead),

-- Ernst Jünger, *Ueber die Linie*, (Across the line), in: W.F. Otto U.a., *Anteile (M. Heidegger zum 60. Geburtstag)*, (M. Heidegger on his 60. Birthday), Frankf.a.M., 1950, 245/284 (a study of Nihilism);

-- H. Redeker, *Existentialisme (Een doortocht door filosofisch frontgebied)* (Existentialism (A Passage through Philosophical Frontier)) Amsterdam, 1949, 194/231 (Intermezzo (Existentialism in confrontation with German thought),-- a chapter, in which the ‘Nihilistic situation’ (sic), and created and thought through by German thought, is discussed.

**Note:** -- Nietzsche's expression ‘Gott ist tot’ means both the Christian concept of God and the higher ideas (= ideals, values) founded in the God of European (and Western) Christians,-- according to Heidegger, o.c.,199f.

Heidegger rightly says: “The statement ‘God is dead’ means: the transcendental world is without power, which works something (note: in the minds of men). That world gives no life. - Metaphysics: in Nietzsche’s language: Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end.

Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement against ‘metaphysics’, i.e. - for him - against Platonism.” (O.c., 200).-- ‘Nihilism’ is therefore “Absence of a transcendental, in conscience binding world” (as Heidegger, *ibid.*, says).- - But “Nihilism, thought through in its essence, is rather ‘die Grundbewegung der Geschichte des Abendlandes’ (the basic trend of the history of the West).” (O.c.,201).-- This word of Heidegger is confirmed by, among other things, Sex and the unrestrained Free - Market system (= Liberalism), touched upon briefly above.

**Note:** -- J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism en cultuur*, (Nihilism and Culture), Amsterdam, 1960 (where Nihilism is addressed culturologically), 1/19 (the concept of Nihilism), discusses the semasiology of the term.-- Note:

**Note:** -- Another term for ‘Nihilism’ is, now, making headway, viz. ‘cynicism’ (following Peter Sloterdijk, *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, (Critique of Cynical Reason), Frankf.a.M., 1983 (but from an Eastern-mystical, and cynically' called premise).-

**Note:** -- The process of culture and education, called Nihilism or Cynicism, goes hand in hand with a desacralization process. This is expressed lapidary in *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, where it is said : “All the sacred is desecrated”.

It is true that Marx / Engels also desacralize, where they e.g. “unmask” the “sacred” as “holy appearance” - just as Nihilist-Cynical (to speak with P. Ricoeur, who labels Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as unmaskers). But it is equally correct that Marx / Engels situate the Free-Market mechanism, as it actually functions in the Western sense, in ‘metaphysics’: with its ‘sacred’ (meaning ‘higher’) ideas, ideals and values -- in order to unmask it from there.

After all: if there are absolutely no higher, ‘sacred’, ideals, in the economic field, on what do Marx / Engels base themselves in order to unmask their opponents, the unrestricted - Liberals, as ‘deconsecrators’?

**(3)** Finally notice how Marx / Engels blame the ‘deconsecrated economy’ on one class, the much hated Bourgeoisie, i.e. the bunch of entrepreneurs (‘patrons’ or ‘bosses’), who lie at the root of our Western economy called ‘Capitalist’-- as if the ‘deconsecration’ of the economic relations would have been the work of this one class only!

By not thinking through the idea of ‘Nihilism / Cynicism’ philosophically - thoroughly, Marx / Engels finally misconstrued it as a mere class phenomenon.-- Thus their social critique, a term which has been in vogue for the last few decades, has been narrowed down to one form of (class) social critique.

***Comparison with a psychoanalytic interpretation.*** (133/135).

***Bibl. sample:***

-- H. Arvon, *La gauchisme*, Paris, 1977- 2.63 / 69 (Naissance du Freudo-Marxisme).

-- It is Freud’s disciple Wilhelm Reich (1897/1957), who was at the same time a Socialist militant, who tried to reconcile Marxism and Psychoanalysis, -- by breaking Freud’s apolitical stance. The Gauchists (“Situationists”) spread Reich’s ideas.-- Yet, within a non-Marxist Psychoanalysis, one can also dissect economic primal drives.

-- Ch. Odier, *Les deux sources-consciente et inconsciente - de la vie morale*, (The two sources - conscious and unconscious - of moral life), Neuchatel (CH), 1943,130, gives us an applicative model.--

***Title: “The small-profit complex.***

The primal urge, which interprets everything in terms of economic gain, can take paradoxical forms. Platonic : the same economic idea ‘profit motive’ can show itself in very different, indeed opposite phenomena. -- ‘Complex’ can be translated, simplified, by ‘idée fixe’ (coercive idea).

***A. Regulative model.***

The small-profit complex is, according to Odier, a rather frequent phenomenon.

(i) It is the possessive urge to **a.** take, **b.** get or **c.** get back (‘besoin captatif’).

(ii) It tends to become invariable, chronic, yes, methodical.

(iii) It focuses on what is insignificant (incidental, accidental, minute).-- Odier notes, further, that this possessive -- not so bad -- form of avarice goes well with a benevolent, giving, tendency (‘tendance oblative’), which can -- sometimes -- grow into real mildness,-- yes, into a wonderful unconcern, when it comes to large expenditures or losses.-- “The small items of a budget are more important, for this complexed behavior, than the large ones. Minute losses cause a more serious shock of mind than the large ones”.

***B. Applicative models.***

(i).-- A Parisian, if he travels by rail, invariably does so in wagon-lit (extremely expensive). If he takes the bus, he invariably goes a long way on foot (ultra-expensive).

(ii) - A very wealthy man

1/ Overpowers his wife with jewels and fur coats,

2/ becomes, however, very enraged when she, by mistake, overfees a letter.

(iii).-- Shamelessly tells a state official that, at work, he cannot help but hijack staples. “I gloat in that” he says. “It is like a victory in miniature over a powerful and invisible enemy.”

***C. Psychoanalytic interpretation.***

The phenomenon and its idea (structure) is interpreted, by Odier, as follows

(a).-- . Small thefts often betray a stage tendency from childhood (typically Freudian), in which possessiveness or also lamentation (kwerulantism) is at work

(b).-- The adult Ueber-Ich (i.e. the set of actual moral presuppositions, situated in the unconscious sphere of a person’s soul) condones thefts. Yet the more that Ueber-Ich punishes the big thefts mercilessly, the more easily it steps over mini-thieves.

**Note:** -- Here it appears, more or less clearly, that what the Psychanalysts call 'Ueber-Ich' and which they call 'unconscious conscience' is not the pure conscience which springs from our 'spirit' ('the little man' in us). That type of so-called conscience shows, regularly, demonic traits.

**c.--** The thoroughly honest (Odier knew him well), but not finely tuned state official confused 'the state' (note the abstract) with 'the father' (again: note the abstract word so beloved of Psychanalysts).

**Note:** -- Again typical of the caricatured conscience, which is the Ueber-Ich.-- Explanation from childhood: his father had answered his demanding with great greed and avarice.

**Note:** -- The simplistic (the Psychoanalysts like to say 'Primitive' (as if what is 'Primitive', is also 'simplistic')) unconscious conscience bullies the "Ab uno disce omnes": if one 'father figure', then all father figures. If my father, then also 'Father State'.

**Summary view of the great monster.** (135/136).

If one notes that Platon, apart from erotic urges (the analogue of Freud's 'libido' or primal lust) and attack urges (the analogue of Freud's death urge) (FLC 111: noble money urges), also prefigures the night urge and the possessiveness urge, in order to indicate the lower value judgments in man, then his set of preconceptions is broader than Freud's. Nevertheless, we dwell for a moment on a masterly summary. And then from the Marxist corner.

-- Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy), Stuttgart, 1888, ii in fine (= at the end).

-- The occasion for that work was a then recently published book, viz. C.N. Starcke, Ludwig Feuerbach, Stuttgart, 1885.-- Engels reproaches Starcke, in typically Marxist -- vehement language, for using the terms 'Materialism' and 'idealism' in a 'papist' (= Roman - Catholic) sense.-- Listen:

"The 'Philister' (note : petty-bourgeois - narrow-minded man) understands by 'Materialism'

- (i) eating, boozing,
- (ii) peeping, carnal lusts,
- (iii) greed for money, stinginess, avarice, usury, swindling,--
- (iv) haughty (= arrogant) conduct.--

In short: all those filthy, evil qualities, to which he, secretly, surrenders himself." By "Idealism," the same narrow-minded person understands faith in virtue, general love of man, and, without more, faith in a better world. --

With such things he boasts, in the presence of others. But, for himself, he believes in them at most as long as he - after his 'Materialistic excesses' to which he usually surrenders - has to endure natural catcalls or bankruptcy and, while doing so, sings his favorite song: "What is man? Half animal, half angel".

**Note:** -- Peter Sloterdijk claims that it is since Enlightened Rationalism that cynicism has become prevalent in the West. But Engels cannot give a better summary of both the great monster, of which he indicates all the traits except the desire to sleep, and of the lesser lion, which he touches when he speaks of forgetfulness.

**2.c.b.-- *The noble desire (the lesser lion).*** (136/175).

The names, with which one translates, are among others: 'courageous' or 'emotional' part of the soul;-- honor, prestige, self-preservation,-- expressions of a valid urge, which expresses itself in it, are the object of the 'thumos', the (life) urge;-- courage, anger and resentment,-- 'demon of anger', 'the demon of sadness', 'demon of acedia' (Euagrios),-- such are the forms of behavior, which are usually indicated.

**Note:** -- Euagrios catalogues the "demon of vain glory" and the "demon of pride" in the "spirit" of man. Yet, then, he denotes 'nous' ('intellectus'), spirit, differently from Platon. If, moreover, the spirit of man were essentially -- which Euagrios seems to insinuate -- vain and haughty, then there is no faculty in man which can save him. In Platon's thinking, the spirit is precisely that ability.

**Conclusion :** we rightly rank vanity and pride among 'the lesser lion'.

***Applicative models.***

FLC 127v. (The Merciless Enricher) gave us, indirectly, a model of the perseverance, which is the moneyed urge, again and again (unless it collapses).-- There is a personal model in Platon's life itself. *The Seventh Letter* (Calw edition, 13ff.) is understandable, if one starts from Platon's sense of honor. (136/140).

The occasion is his first Sicilian journey (-389). Dion's relatives and friends explicitly appeal to Platon's ability, as a thinker in the political field. See here how Platon, in a reflective analysis (FLC 120), one of the psychological methods, describes his own urge to be valid.--



“I considered, therefore, the situation and weighed whether I had a duty to travel (to Sicily), how I would lay the sins on board.-- At that moment the following consideration was decisive in the sense of a duty to travel.--”Now or never one had to risk it, at least if one wanted to realize one’s ideas concerning state laws and state constitutionalism. Even if I had convinced just one man completely of the truth of my idea of ‘the ethical restoration of the state’, I would have achieved all the salvation in this world that lies in that idea.” It was precisely this thought and this cool feeling that made me decide to leave my beloved home. Not the motive that the delusional thoughts of some attributed to me.

*First of all*, the respect I had for myself made me decide to do so. I refused to give the impression that I possessed only a certain strength in the theoretical field, while when it came to practical implementation I was nowhere to be found.

*Secondly*, I could not, also, be suspected of betraying my friends, especially Dion. With him, after all, I was bound by the bonds of hospitality and those of a relationship that lasted for many years. Moreover, he had, in fact, found himself in no small amount of danger.

Stated: Dion falls into deep suffering or he is exiled by (the tyrant) Dionusios and the rest of his political opponents.

In that case I imagined that he, somewhere on the run, came to me and said: “Platon, as a beaten, as an exiled person I come to you.

Not that I do not have an army of foot soldiers and cavalry to defend me against my enemies. No: it is because I need a teacher of ethical and political matters and an orator - an area in which, as I well know, you have an unrivalled mastery -.

This, to guide young men in the way of the good and the righteous, as well as to make their hearts one in the firmness of friendship and alliance. But, having been utterly abandoned by you under that point of view, I was at once, through your fault, expelled from Syracuse, and am now here as a fugitive.

For you, taken personally, my calamity still means the smallest damage. Heavier weighs through the fact that thou hast betrayed philosophy. About 'philosophy' you have, in other circumstances, the mouth so full of praise and you criticize, again and again, the fact that the rest of humanity feels nothing for 'philosophy'. Has not, then, along with me, 'philosophy' also been abandoned by you,--this, without presenting the slightest excuse? -

Yet it is: had we lived in Megara (note: which lies in Hellas), thou wouldst, no doubt, have come as a political adviser,--in carrying out the plans, for which we appealed to thee. Either thou hadst not been of an honorable disposition. No, to evade your duty by pretending that the great distance (i.e., from Athens to Sicily), the long voyage, and the magnitude of the effort required, is a failure.

Supposedly: Dion had addressed me in this way, would I have been able to make a cogent response to it? Absolutely not.-- That is why I went away. (... )".

**An interpretation** (138/140).

**(i) One sees that, at least for Platon, 'philosophy' is more than academism**

(i.e., debating 'ideas' with ease, from a chair, without 'commitment' ('involvement', 'effort'). -- True morality (= moral solidity) does not consist in wanting to believe (in something); still less does it consist in wanting to uphold something, despite the fact that one has doubts. It consists in wanting to act while being in a state of complete uncertainty about a value which, as an ideal, is certain, but, as a good to be realized, seems uncertain". (A. Fouillée, *l'avenir de la métaphysique fondée sur l'expérience*, (the future of metaphysics based on experience,), Paris, 1889, 272).

Of this typically 'Idealistic attitude to life' we have here, in Platon's life, a very clear example, indeed a true paragon : "Now or never one must venture out,--at least if one wished to realize his ideas (...)." (FLC 137).

"Philosophy is concerned with the problems of life; it looks for answers which are objectively founded, but - for that reason - do not cease to concern life and, therefore, involve a decision or a choice. (E. De Strycker, *Bekn. geschied. v/d Ant. fil.*,90).

**Note:** -- One compares this, very briefly, with J.-P. Sartre, *L'existentialisme est un humanisme*, (Existentialism is a humanism), 1970, 54 : “D’abord, je dois m’engager, ensuite agir, selon la vieille formule : “Il n’ est pas besoin d’espérer pour entreprendre. (...). Le quiétisme, -- c’est l’ attitude des gens qui disent : “Les autres peuvent faire ce que je ne peux pas faire “. -

- La doctrine que je vous présente, est justement à l’opposé du quiétisme, puisqu’elle déclare : ‘Il n’ y a de réalité que dans l’action’ (...)”.

Sartre assumes purely human products of the mind, such as his doctrine (‘doctrine’ he clearly says) is one among many.

So does Platon.-- The difference lies in the fact that -- for Sartre -- his ‘doctrine’ can nowhere undergo the judgment of higher idea and, which they illuminate as singular applications (and then imperfect ones) of those same higher ideas, such as the good (= value - without - more; FLC 63) or the just (FLC 115), which Platon does presuppose as ‘norms’ of his ‘limited propositions’.

(i) Neither Platon nor Sartre are ‘Quietist’ (‘quies’ (Lat.) = ‘rest’).

(ii) But Sartre starts from a Nihilistic premise, while Platon starts from an Ideological premise.

(ii) The ‘power idea’ of Alfred Fouillée (1838/1912).

Known among other things for his *La psychologie des idées-forces*, (The psychology of forceful ideas), Paris, 1893, says, with regard to ‘power idea’, that it is both a presupposition (of course,-like an experimenter in a laboratory works with a ‘hypothesis’ (lemma)) and influences the result (like someone, who wants to realize an idea, thanks to his action).--.

One sees that, at least insofar as Fouillée allows the idea, understood as a human mental product, to play an informative role, he stands in pure Platonic ‘engagements philosophy’.

(iii) ***The method of (painterly) hypotyposis.***

We see Platon, FLC 137, say : “In that case I imagined that Dion (...) was closing in on me (...)

This is called, in traditional ‘rhetoric’ (literary theory), a (pictorial) ‘hypotyposis’-- ‘Hupotuposis’, outline, description, can also be dramatized. But here this dramatization is, moreover, charged with -- what is now called -- ‘an encounter’, i.e. a direct confrontation with a given fact,-- here, the question of the friend, his relatives and friends.--

The term “encounter” (“Begegnung”, “Rencontre”, “Encounter”) is now relatively common: its real conceptual content is, equally real, present in Platon’s “pictorial hypotype”, without its actual theory. Again: a theme, actualizable from Platonism.

***Archaic applicative model.*** (140/142).

Before we give our next splendor on Primitive thought and speech, a little semasiology concerning the Antique - rhetorical term “suspensio”, suspension.

-- J. Broeckaert S.J., *Le guide du jeune littérateur, I (Eléments généraux et compositions secondaires)*, (The young writer's guide, I (General elements and secondary compositions)), Bruxelles/ Paris/ Bois-le-Duc, 1872, 100 (La suspension), gives a description: “Suspension consists in leaving the attention of the hearer/reader in uncertainty about what one intends to say”. It can be seen that this Antique rhetorical mode of information corresponds to the current English ‘suspense’.

***Application.***

Attilio Gatti; *Mensen en dieren in Afrika*, (Humans and animals in Africa), Antw. /Amsterd.,1953, 187/190, what “thumos”, life force, is outlined to us through a text written by a Negro-African who had served him as a “boy” during his ethnological missions in the service of sub-Saharan governments. Gatti, a fine connoisseur of the “soul” of the Primitive, had to abandon, urgently, his stay in Rwanda, when in 1939 the Second World War broke out. Among other things, he sent home one of his boys, who later, full of Primitive affection, recounted to him his fortunes. Here is the text.

“To the good master of yore. From his boy, whose name is Bombo, and whom he called the ‘ever-fearful’. Health, peace and prosperity.-- This writing is not for help, but gratifying news.-- The groundnut harvest is good. The game is plentiful. The children are growing up. The women are well,-- though one of them was ill, when the drums, for the first time, spoke in the night, saying that the angry white men and the angry yellow men, from far away, had gone to war against the Belgians, the French, the Americans and the others, who are their friends.

- One of the women was sick, the oldest.-- But the drums spoke again: they said that the enemies tortured and killed even the men and women of mercy, who heal the wounds and bury the dead,-- even those men and women of God, like those who taught me to revere the true God, to read the written word and to write it, with my own hand.--

One of the women was sick,--with much pain. The others sighed and wept much.

But my feet carried me away from the village: my heart carried me there where the soldiers have their camp. There the white healer ('medicine - man') practiced his magic : he looked into my eyes and ears; he patted my chest; he poked into my arms with needles loaded with a medicine of the white man. And lo and behold, I was a soldier! I was a soldier, and they made me march, turn around, and stand still. Until the white man's lieutenant gave me a rifle, which was the property of the white men of the government, but belonged to me to clean, polish and carry,-- for many hours.-- Then I learned to put my cheek to it, close one eye and peek into a small hole with the other and press it with my index finger. And behold: the gun gave a thunder and my heart trembled with terror and my shoulder was numb with pain. But ... the bullet had gone into the center of a round piece of paper.

Then the white man lieutenant said, "And now we go far north and chase the bullets not into round pieces of paper, but into the hearts of the evil enemies of good men." -- And I was filled with fear, because my mother had made me neither bold nor brave.

-- After many moons of travel, the white man lieutenant said : "Soldiers, the enemies are there!"-- And one of them, who could not be seen, raised his rifle against the white man lieutenant : but I heard the movement and knew where he was ambushed, and, being the first, chased a bullet into his heart.

And, though still trembling with fright, I was made a corporal. "Because my ears were found to be good."

Then, on another day, I saw that the white man lieutenant was about to go over a strange trap. So my feet ran in front of him and my hands bared the trap and pulled it out. And the trap made a great thunder with lightning in it. And I was terribly frightened. But all was well, for I was the only one wounded. And the white lieutenant is not dead, but can continue to fight against the evil enemies.--

Then the white man colonel himself came to the hospital. And all were silent full of attention. And I was weak from the loss of blood and from sleeping and from much fear. But he had come only to pin a medal on my breast. "Because my eyes were found to be good."

And when he had pinned the medal on, he said : "Now thou art cured. Go back to your village and be chief". Which is a great honor and good.-- But I was unable to speak. Instead, I laughed and laughed. And the white man colonel said, "Why dost thou laugh, like a fat chimpanzee?". And I said, "Because the needle has gone through the fabric and is tickling my breast". Then the white man colonel laughed. All the others laughed. Everybody laughed,--just like a fat chimp. Although I didn't tickle their chest with the needle from a medal.-- Ha! That was a great joke! And now I'm back home. And my eldest wife is doing well. And the groundnut harvest is also good.--

And the same I wish you.-- Your faithful boy, Bombo". -- Gatti adds that, on the reverse side of the second sheet of the letter in question, there were a few more lines, "in the same laborious script. Gatti had trouble reading them :

"These words are my own, but the writing is not: because my two hands are no longer with me. The fall took them away with its thunder.-- but that does not hinder, because now there are other men who write and work and hunt for me.-- and all is well.- - Because the fall also took away my eyes. But my ears are still good."

***Interpretation:***

(1) One sees: it is a perfect example of suspension, but not as a literary process. The naive Negro African in question simply hadn't thought of writing everything in an orderly fashion.

(2) This piece of Primitive prose is a masterful model of what Josiah Royce calls "loyalty,": dedication.

***Conclusion.***-- This Primitive, unbeknownst to him ("My mother has made me neither stout nor brave"), has nevertheless grown into a 'brave' man. But in a primitive way. This primitive life-elan contrasts sharply with the modern self-loathing, which we, in certain fellow men, hear more and more. It is as if modernization is 'breaking' something of the unbroken spirit of life, typical of the Primitives, into the souls of such discouraged people.

(3) Note also the power of what the Greeks called 'eukleia', fame, honor, that of which one can be proud.

Narrative explanation. (143/147) ‘Narrare’, in Latin, means ‘to tell stories’ (‘tell’). ‘Narratio’ is ‘story’.-- The very recent term ‘narratology’ means ‘theory’ concerning narrative and storytelling.

***Bibl. sample:***

- G. und I. Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 298 (Narrativik);
- J.-M. Adam, *Le récit*, Paris, 1984 (a work introducing the pre-history of narratology);
- Vladimir Propp, *Morfologie van het sprookje* (Morphology of the Fairy Tale) (1928), is one of the first current narratological works, in that Propp analyzes the structure of the Russian fairy tale, as a story.
- Tzvetan Todorov, in 1969, suggested ‘narratology’; but others want e.g. ‘narratiek’ or, after the Greek, ‘diegetic’. Matter of scientific name.
- Two big names, in France: Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et récit*, (Time and story), 3 vols., Paris, 1983/1985;
- Gérard Genette, *Nouveau discours du récit*, (New narrative discourse), Paris, 1983.-.

Ricoeur defines ‘narrative’ as “exposition of a factual sequence,” whether rendered in a purely verbal story or in a theatrical performance (film e.g. included).

Genette defines ‘story’ as “purely verbal representation of an order of facts.--in which he follows an Antique usage of language, which distinguishes ‘diègèsis’, verbal narrative, from ‘mimèsis’, portrayal, on the stage, of an order of facts.--.

Platon, differing from Aristotle in this, adheres to the broad definition : “Every poem (note: ‘illuminating poem’ is meant) is ‘diègèsis’, story, of past, present or future facts. The narrative so broadly defined may exhibit three types:

- (i) ‘haplè diègèsis’, the pure story (note: purely word-for-word),
- (ii) ‘dia mimèseos’, the ‘mimetic’, : on stage depicting story,
- (iii) (...) the blending of both”. (Platon, Republic 3: 393 v.). -

**Note:** - The dichotomy between the two views is unresolved, as e.g. shown by M. Mathieu-Colas, *Frontières de la narratologie*, (Frontiers of narratology), in: Poétique (Paris) 1986 (février) (Raconter, représenter, décrire), (Telling, representing, describing), 91/110.

***Narrativism.*** (143/145)

Narrativism’ is a tenet related to repetition: when we ourselves, as individuals or as belonging to a group (family, state, class), are not told or when we ourselves do not tell about ourselves, we remain, as it were, unprocessed factual material, without being form (= idea).-- P. Ricoeur, in : *Construire* (Building), (Geneva), 24.09.1986, 28/29 (Interview de J.-Fr. Duval), says that:

(i) what we call human time only acquires ‘creature form’ when we say, e.g., “From -776 one has, every four years, an Olympiad,-- this, until the year 396 after Jesus Christ.” Our Gregorian calendar ‘dates’, i.e. orders chronologically-historically, all that happens in this way. Christ was considered “the center of human history.” This Biblical-theological fact becomes the calendar system.

(ii) What we call human history only acquires “creature form” when we sort out the “traces” (vestiges, such as buildings, texts, stories) of the past so that a real history, i.e., a factual sequence, emerges from a formless mass of data.

Just as, without our space mathematics, space remains a shapeless extent, so what happens remains a shapeless order, as long as no “form” is given to it by the narrative (historical or fictional).

-- “There would probably be no order in time if we did not tell it. Roland Barthes (1915/1980; text scholar), has moreover, insisted on this: we do not know any society that does not have stories “. (A.c., 29)

-- P. Ricoeur, *L’identité narrative*, (The narrative identity), in: *Esprit* (Paris) 1988: 7/8 (juillet/août), 255/314, talks about our singularity (“identity”), either individual (my self) or collective (we, the Flemish).

-- Derek Parfit, *Reason and Person*, Oxford, 1986, had argued that our single-mindedness, especially individually, is “only an afterthought,” compared to the physical and psychological laws.--

Ricoeur opposes that view : the self, acting in the life it lives, is at once a core of being and an “identity,” which becomes real and irreducible to something else through the narrative (I am told; I narrate), among other things. Ricoeur calls this “narrative identity.”

***Bibl. sample:***

-- B. Verschaffel, *Verhaal, toeval en geschiedenis* (Narrative, coincidence, and history), in: *Tijdschr. v. Filos.* (Leuven) 1988: 1 (March), 20/39 (conscious article gives remarks on Narrativism);

-- F.R. Ankersmit, *Twee vormen van Narrativisme* (Two Forms of Narrativism), in: *T. v. Phil.* (Louvain) 1988:1 (March), 40/81 (what is essential and what is non-essential in narrative, particularly historical narrative).

Up to there an overview of the scientific approach.



### ***Application within Platonism.***

That Platon, already in his time and of course in his way, practiced narativism is evident from his Timaios.

That work is a cosmology, a ‘theory’ (if one may use that word) of the cosmos.-- Now this (material) cosmos, FLC 35; 68v.; 84, is partly opaque to our minds, ‘anankè’ (= that which one must, of necessity, take with it).

***Consequence*** : this earth, as a part of it, remains, for the most part, opaque, ‘irrational’.

***Consequence***: Platon cannot, with regard to the cosmos, practice a real ‘theoria’, fathoming, -- except in the form of an ‘eikos muthos’, a story which possesses some probability. The shapeless mass of becoming and far-reaching earthly things acquires, in that narrative way, some creature form. But this is nothing more than an ‘eikos logos’, a logical account,-with some probability,-a “rational looking conjecture”.

***Consequence***: Platon’s theory of the cosmos takes, in effect, the form of a ‘cosmogonila’, cosmogony, i.e. a story concerning its origin. Like the ‘myths’ do.

### ***Conclusion.***

A story, mythical or not, is, in Platonic view, a beginning of theory, of insight into the form of beings. (145/146)

Return, now, to the two stories.

#### **(1) *The story of Platon himself.***

**a.** It is, immediately, clear that the figure of Platon suddenly comes out quite differently, more vividly, more ‘animated’, when one hears him tell of his friend, far in the turmoil of Sicily, Dion, of one’s own hesitations, of the ‘leap into the unknown’ (FLC 137: “Now or never must one venture out ...”).

**b.** But as he tells, he tells his history. This factual sequence is such that his life’s courage, the ‘lesser lion’ in him, faces a fork in the road. Thrown into a situation not chosen by him, he must design, i.e., devise an act, with or without cowardice. In this he betrays his true soul.--

### ***Conclusion.***

Without time, no history is conceivable : it is situated in it. But without history facts, no story. But also: without history no soul expressions (FLC 106 (well-defined perceptions); 129 (Life Hermeneutics);-- 120 (behavioral description))

Sartre’s remark that “there is only reality (he means: Behaviorist reality, which is externally observable) in action”, can be reinterpreted in this way: without being compelled to it by external situations (= without being ‘thrown in’, as some Existentialists say), the true soul-properties (‘virtues’ or ‘vices’) do not come to (externally ascertainable) expression.

**Note:** Since we have heard Platon, overwhelmingly, advocate (political) action, also with regard to himself, it is immediately, overwhelmingly clear that his psychology is a psychology of action.

This form of doing psychology was introduced, among others, by Théodule Ribot (1839/1916; French thinker and experimental psychologist), who made psychology “une science de l’ action” (a science of action, a ‘praxeology’), as Charles Baudouin, *L’ame et l’action (Prémises d’une philosophie de la psychoanalyse)*, (L’ame et l’action (Premises of a philosophy of psychoanalysis)), Geneva, 1969, 11, says.

**(2) *The story of the Negro-African Bombo.***

**a.** The same remark applies here: the soul, -- the “soul not made bold or even brave by its mother” (FLC 141), once confronted (= encounter (FLC 140)) with situations, in which ‘thumos’, the noble desire (to respond to expectations and ideals), necessarily ... ‘becomes’ (notice the ‘becoming’), reveal an unexpected form of courage and bravery, yes, of boldness.

**b.** Again: a psychology of deed (action, action) only can expose (fathom) the true, unconscious ‘desire’ to respond to expectations, to excel etc.-all the domain of “the lesser lion in us.”

Not e.g. a canapé psychology! Not a mere psychology of conversation! But a psychology, which, as it were, goes into the field .... to make observations of everyday life (FLC 106; 128; 129; 145). What is now, sometimes, called ‘participating observation’. Something which is advocated by ‘verstehende Psychologie’ among others. Platon’s psychology as psychology of desire. (143/147)

Platon knows, as said, three main types of ‘desire’, namely the desire, peculiar to the big monster, the lesser lion and the little man in our soul.

It is the same Theodule Ribot, as Ch. Baudouin, o.c., 11, 24, 63, says, who has made psychology into a ‘psychologie de la tendance’ (tendency psychology).

“The value attraction (‘tendance’) expresses itself in consciousness thanks to the instinctive urge (‘la poussée affective’), thanks to the ‘desire’ (le désir).

In this way the attribution of value explains all feelings - which already Benedict (Baruch) de Spinoza (1632/1677; Cartesian philosopher) thought he could reduce to 'modalities' (modes of expression) of 'desire'.

As far as intellectual life is concerned, it is based on the act of attention; well, our attention goes in the direction of what interests us,-- in other words, in the direction of our value relations". (Ch. Baudouin, O.c.,12).

Baudouin goes on to say: "If we look more closely, we can see that the Psychoanalysis of S. Freud (1856/1939; founder of Psychoanalysis) is also based on the basic ideas of Ribot. Something which I (= Baudouin) could demonstrate twice (in: *Psychanalyse de l'art*, (Psychoanalysis of art), Paris,1929 (Introduction), and, earlier already, *Etudes de Psychanalyse*, (Studies in Psychoanalysis), Neuchatel (D). 1922, 25, 36)".

Indeed, Freud's value attraction, sometimes expressed by the term "Wunsch" (desire, longing), sometimes by "Trieb" (urge), lies, as in Ribot's case, at the basis of psychological life. Do we say: at the basis of life without more (FLC 112; 125v., -- as far as the 'libido' form of value attraction is concerned with Plato).

**Note:** -- P. Campion, *Diderot et le 'conatus' de la narration (Pour une politique spinoziste de la narration dans Jacques le Fataliste)*, (Diderot and the 'conatus' of narrative (For a Spinozist politics of narrative in Jacques le Fataliste)), in: *Poétique* 1986 (février), 63/76, defends the thesis that even a narrative -- including the history narrated in it -- possesses a 'conferral of value'.

"For Spinoza, *Ethica* (1677), iii: 9, 'every being, according to its own power, supplies the effort necessary to its existence' (... ). In such a perspective, I (P. Campion) wished to introduce the notion of 'story conatus'" (A. c.,65).

'Narrative' becomes, in that premise, the development (in either words or drama or so) of the value attribution ('conatus', in Spinoza's parlance, is 'conscious value attribution: springing from the 'unconscious value attribution'), proper to an I (subject), which, as it were, totally coincides with that value attribution.

**Application.**-- Compare story 1 (Platon) and story 2 (Bombo): one can feel, while reading, that one value provision, namely not disappointing others, responding to other people's expectations, 'pride' (Platonic), shines through in the text itself.

***The Narkissos (Narcissus) myth.***

World famous, especially since S. Freud, who reinterpreted it depth psychologically, is the Narcissus myth. Since it recounts a peculiar form of monetization, we give here its contents, in both surviving versions.

**(1). *The alteriocentric version. (peer-centered)***

Narkissos was a young man. He had a sister, whom he loved passionately and who resembled him strikingly.

However, the girl met an untimely death. In order never to forget her image, Narkissos kept staring at himself day and night, bent over the water surface of a well. He thought, in this way, to keep the image of his deceased sister with him permanently. But, in doing so, his life force diminished to such an extent that he slowly withered away and died.

***Interpretation.***

(i) The basic structure is, apparently, the systechy “disappointment/ sadness”.

(ii) As we saw, FLC 90 (causation), here too is a portent (frustration) and a sequel (sadness),--with as the immanent sanction (= inner-necessary consequence) loss of life-force and death.

**(2) - *The egocentric version.* (the Freudian version)**

Narcissism (sometimes shortened to “narcissism”) is, now, synonymous with self-centeredness, (self-righteousness, vanity.) The Freudians vulgarized the term. We shall now understand how.

(a) Narkissos was the son of the nymph Leiriope (Liriope) and the river god Kèfisos (the stream Kèfisos or Kèfisos is in Fokis).

When he came into the world, the blind seer (FLC 105 (seeing the invisible’); 120 (Teiresias (= Tiresias) is a ‘mantis’) Teiresias predicted that Narkissos “would live, until the day when, he would see his own image.”

(b) Narkissos’ appearance, as a young man, was of an exceptionally rare beauty. He was, therefore, the attraction of countless young girls. Yet, just an unmoved, Narkissos did not reciprocate their feelings of love. Until the nymph Echo (literally: echo) fell madly in love with him.

But, again, because of Narkissos, the young girl was met with disdain and defamation: she died of heartbreak and hurt shame.

Her sisters were deeply shocked by the whole event. They turned to the goddess Nemesis, the goddess of distributive justice, who punishes certain forms of hubris.

The sisters complained, to Nemesis, about Narkissos' excessive happiness and in particular about his complacency.

The goddess of vengeance proposed to bring justice to the haughtily rejected lovers, responding to the prophecy of Teiresias. When Narkissos went hunting, Nemesis gave him in at a spring, his thirst to be quenched): then, for the first time, in the surface of the water, he saw his countenance reflected. On the stroke he fell dumbly in love with his own effigy, but, all his futile efforts notwithstanding, the effigy remained beyond his reach.

Yet he continued to stare at it,-- so much so that he forgot to eat and drink. As a result, his life force crumbled. Immediately, by some deity, he was gradually transformed into a flower, which took root at the foot of the spring.

Since then the narcissus flower has reflected, in the spring, in the spring water,--to die, in the autumn.

**Note** - There is more involved with that daffodil flower than an 'etiological' (explaining the existence of something) myth: in Greek religion:

(i) the local god Hades (underworld) in Pulos, (literally: 'gate'), in Elis, is known ('Pulos', gate, meant, actually, 'gate of Hell' (cf. the Gospel, where Jesus promises that "the gates of Hell" will not crush the Church));

(ii) further, the universal Hades, Underworld god, who, together with his consort, Persephone (= Persphoneia), the Underworld princess, rules over the entire underworld ("hell"). Well, the narcissus was considered the flower consecrated to him,--with the occult consequence that whoever plucked it -- unconsciously or consciously -- would suddenly, before his mind's eyes, see the earth open, the god Hades himself ascend and fetch him/her, as just occurred to Korè, the daughter of the supreme god Zeus, herself.

***Interpretation of the dual myth.*** (149/151)

The 'atè' or deity judgment. Reread first FLC 89/97 (Gesera).-- Fundamentally, it is the same general idea (= structure). To make this clear, we must briefly break down the semasiology (set of meanings) of the Greek term 'atè'.

**(a). Phenomenal.**

The term 'atè', deity judgment, describes a process (a sequence of facts).

(i) 'atè' means, to begin with, blinding of the mind (sensual confusion, madness) - so e.g. in Homeros' Iliad and Odusseia.

(ii) 'atè' means, also, its consequence: a wrongdoing (e.g., a crime committed in a twilight state).-

In summary, 'atè' means, further, 'mischief' (accident, miscalculation).

*Note*.-- The verb ‘ateö’ means “I behave like an insane person”.

**(b). *Transphenomenal.***

The process (portent: insanity/continue: misconduct), described above, as a phenomenon directly observable, has, in Archaic Greek religion, a sacred and ideal background.

**(i)** ‘Atè’ means, thus interpreted (‘theoria’, fathoming), the punishment, which is the result of a divine intervention: deity punishment.

**(ii)** Metonymically ‘atè’ then also means the one who inflicts that punishment, viz. ‘Atè: the causer (Urheberin,-- cf. Nathan Soderblom) of the punishment, which consists in senselessness and insanity. As a universal goddess she is as:

**(ii)1.** the goddess who begets all miscalculations (disasters, calamities),

**(ii)2.** the goddess, who edits those miscalculations by giving in to all mishaps (process of inspiration).

**(iii)** There are, however, non-universal deities - so e.g. the Erinues (= Erinyes) - who play an analogous role in the religiously deduced miscalculations.

As *an aside*, Platon, *Guest meal* 195d, mentions Atè. Now reread both versions.

**(1).-- *The alterocentric version***

This one mentions a ‘hubris’, boundary-crossing, namely, the inability to resign oneself to fate (which among other things (not only) the deities determine),-. in this case, the untimely death of the sister of Narkissos. One who cannot let go of what he desires, what he wants, when a form of ‘ananke’ (FLC 35; 58; 84; 145), an inescapable fact that cannot be understood with the mind, makes the desired, the wanted, experienced as unattainable.

This resembles a kind of ‘delusion(sense)’, which results in the senseless exhaustion of the life force, which is not available indefinitely. Cf. FLC 116: The mortal soul (life force), by Platon.

*Note:* That process (‘kinèsis’, motus, in Greek and Latin) “border crossing/life force exhaustion” proceeds phenomenally, ‘immanently’, i.e. without extra-natural factors, as e.g. deities. The myth contains, first of all, just like the ‘theoria’, a fathoming of the natural process.

**(2).-- *The egocentric version.***

This one is, if possible, as a process description, even stronger: Narkissos does not merely cling to an unattainable fact (the own image),--until he, until, for lack of life force, he dies; and the seer as well as the goddess Nemesis structure the process.