

**7.3.2. Philosophy of the Life Course (FLC) part II, pp. 151 to 314.**  
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This implies that the higher (or at least supernatural) idea, working in that process, bathes the whole event in a sacred atmosphere,--as the idea 'atè'; goddess of vengeance (here: Nemesis), resp.

This phenomenal and transphenomenal process "sees" the seer Teiresias, from his birth. He thus predicts it in the "allusive" (allusive, not so clear) language, peculiar to the "god-speeches" or oracles.

**Conclusion.** - The first version is limited to the narrative "description" of the natural event; the second version adds a supernatural dimension. This is mythical "theoria" (fathoming of a process).

**The Ancient Greek "kuklos" idea (151/152).**

The full interpretation of this myth, in its two-fold version, includes another Ancient Greek 'element' (premise), namely the idea (= structure) 'cycle' ('kuklos', cycle).

An excellent description of this offers us G. Daniels, *Religieus-historische studie over Herodotus*, (*Religious-historical study on Herodotus*), Antw./ Nijmegen, 1946, 27/38 (Herodotus' conception of the government of the gods).

Herodotus of Halikarnassos (-484/ -425; known for his *Historiai*, Investigations), the "father of historiography" (better put with W. Jaeger: "father of land and ethnology"), is known as a theologian.

He often tries to uncover (= fathom, 'theoria') an idea (structure, which governs these events) in the phenomenal course of events. The name of this idea is 'cycle'. By this he means that a large number of phenomena:

- (i) start small,
- (ii) grow larger, to reach - for a short time - a climax and
- (iii) then, suddenly, become small again, indeed, void.

The domains in which this law operates are both nature and humanity: "Just as the deity tries to maintain a certain uniformity and order in nature by the wise distribution (note: Nemesis is usually considered to be distributive justice) of forces (note: to begin with, the 'life force'), so also in the life of man she has drawn certain limits, and she will on no account tolerate a violation of these limits.

When man, however, does not take this into account, and goes beyond his limits, he encounters the ‘phthonos’, displeasure (not: ‘envy’ or so), of the deities.-- In addition to this term we find, however, with Herodotus, also the term ‘nemesis ek theo’: responsible punishment because of the deity.” (O.c., 28v.).

**Note.**-- That we rightly translate ‘phthonos’ by “justifiable displeasure” (and not by the word ‘envy’, as is more often lightly done), proves Daniels, o.c. 29ff.:

(i) the justifiable displeasure is shown by the fact that the ‘phthonos’ is the reaction of mind in response to irresponsible acts (which, incidentally, are often ‘hubris’, borderline pride, self-importance and the like);

(ii) this displeasure is also rendered, by Herodotos himself, with ‘nemesis’, just punishment.

(iii) A third reason is that Herodotos, following in the footsteps of Aischulos of Eleusis (-525/-456; the first great writer of tragedy), considers the deities free from the sin of envy (envy etc.) and, thereby, paves the way for Platon, who says, e.g., in *Faidros* 247a, that “envy is situated outside the choir of the deities.” This amounts to a revolution in archaic theology, which ascribed both good and evil to the deities. Cfr. Daniels, O.c.,31.

### ***The application.***

A “kuklos”, cycle, is certainly to be found with Narkissos.

#### **(1). *The first version***

Herein he pictures himself, a man given up to delusion alike, that he shall preserve his sister’s image, by gazing upon himself,--therein crossing a boundary, which all undergo in analogous cases.

#### **(2). *The second version***

This is, apart from a similar boundary crossing, a second boundary crossing at work: his self-importance, due to a beauty which exceeds normal limits, causes him not only to reject every lover, but also to disdain and humiliate her.--Nemesis intervenes in precisely this way, equalizing (‘leveling’, Daniels also says). As goddess of distributive justice a.o.

Note that Narkissos, regarding the great lion, crosses boundaries. His assertiveness, ‘pride’, conceit, is the ‘conatus’ (Spinoza) of the mythical story.

**Note** -- We have inserted, FLC 143, a piece of narratology.-- It is clear that myth, ‘muthos’, also belongs to narrative theory.

“Mythology is a product of consciousness, which, ceaselessly rediscovers itself (...)” (F.-W. Schelling, *Inleiding tot de filosofie der mythologie* (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology), I, 10).

This verdict, in 1825, of the Romantic Schelling, which differs from the opinion of the Enlightenment rationalists and is favorable to myth, may serve as an introduction: in myth, man arrives at a certain type of awareness (‘Bewusstsein’) of reality, especially seen as human destiny.

### **Myth.**

Myth is a story, which, starting from observed realities, thinks through to the elements (FLC 70/97) or presuppositions that make those observed facts understandable(er). In this sense, myth (‘mythology’ is, among other things, the collection of myths) is a ‘stoicheiosis’ (factors analysis).

This is abundantly clear from the analysis of the two versions of the Narkissosmythe.-- Precisely because of this, the myth is e.g. not a ‘fable’ that - for children - offers a diversion (although it can also be instructive); it is also not a fairy tale, that - also for children - does not differ much from the fable, except for its length; it is also e.g. not a (medieval) legend, if only the myth, instead of edifying, annoys. For that the myths of non-Biblical cultures exasperate,--that is beyond doubt. Platon, among others, was irritated by this irritating character (as to what is attributed to deities, of which he had a purified conception, all the irritating things).

**Note** - K. Marx says, somewhere, that the modern man of today will be “ein Mythenfresser” (a myth eater).

In Marxist parlance, however, ‘myth’ means a set of ideals, preferably conceived as ‘unreal’ (alienated from the naked economic-social conditions), but in such a way that this set of ideals exerts a great influence on the psyché of contemporary man.

**Appl. Model.** Thus one speaks of “the myth of Progress” (with a capital letter), peculiar to the XVIII th ‘century Enlightenment-Rationalists.

Thus, at the time, the Socialists spoke of “the Great Evening” (with a capital letter), by which they meant that, through a violent Socialist revolution, the Bourgeois era would be put to an end (“Evening”).-- This is a myth designation, which is rather psychological-sociological-culturological (human science).

**Note** -- Semasiologically noted: ‘mythology’ can also mean “the study of myths” (for which some, then, use ‘myth analysis’).-- With this, this comment will suffice, for the literature on the subject is vast.

***The “lesser lion” in the form of vanity.*** (154/159)

As is well known, our Dutch word “vanity” has two main meanings:

- (a) empty, not full (e.g., “a vain vessel”);
- (b) worthless -- better yet: unreal (so e.g. “vain dreams”).

A variant of this last meaning comes through in e.g. “a vain boy” (i.e. leaning on nullities to be proud anyway); yes, ‘vain’ can also mean “nothing but” (so in “vain display”).

Now it so happens that what Platon calls “the noble desire” (of which we saw models), also decays into spurious forms. We are going to take a brief look at this psychologically very important form of behavior and life.

**Note:** (154/155) The psychologist who has laid a very special emphasis on vanity is Paul Diel, in his *Psychologie curative et médecine*, (Healing Psychology and Medicine), Neuchatel (CH), 1968,-- esp. o.c., 133/151 (*La vanité et ses métamorphoses (Origines et conséquences)*), (Vanity and its metamorphoses (Origins and consequences)).

***See here how Diel expresses himself on this subject.***

The term “vanity” usually denotes things like “bloat” (“fatuité”), “posturing” (“prétention”), “haughtiness” (“orgueil”), “posturing” (“arrogance”), which give a certain tint to character traits.

(i) Superficially, all these distinct ‘vain attitudes to life’ do not seem to have any genetic link.

(ii) More to the point, as far as one examines the external behavior, they do not seem to have any connection with other imperfect life attitudes, such as, e.g., anger, laziness, timidity, etc.” (O.c.,133).

Notice that Diel deepens the concept of vanity. What does he, then, understand by it? “The Latin word ‘vanitas’, vanity, includes a meaning, which lives on in the French ‘vain’, synonymous with ‘insufficient’. Vanity is an inadequacy, which one does not want to be known”. (O.c.,134).

Diel’s main thesis, throughout the book, is: vanity, so understood, is perhaps

(i) not merely one trait among many others,

(ii) but “a state of soul, which determines the totality of psychic functioning insofar as it is wrong (‘perverse’).” (Ibid.). The fact that a person holds an opinion about himself, which includes self-aggrandizement, would, therefore, cause all psychic abnormalities, in one way or another.

***Applicative model.***

The great crisis of hysteria, which Freud witnessed, in La Salpêtrière, is, in Diel's interpretation, not a matter of "repressed sexuality" (as Freud postulated). Hysterics - according to Diel - need imitation and dramatization (play-acting).

**Note:** The Hôpital de la Salpêtrière in Paris was probably the most famous psychiatric institution in Europe in the 19th century. Under the name Hôpital Universitaire Pitié Salpêtrière, it is still a hospital today.

One of the patients had succeeded in drawing the attention of the doctors to herself, - which her fellow patients quickly seized, consciously or, even more, unconsciously, and imitated ... in order to draw the attention of the doctors to themselves as well.

Diel substantiates his interpretation by pointing out that a whole hospital ward, which receives such a major crisis, remains "a unique case" and that -- even in an individual case -- that "major crisis" which made such a deep impression on Freud, -- which, in passing, more or less interprets a coitus, sexual intercourse, is extremely rare.

**Conclusion,** "It is important to remember that the repressed motive, which worked underground and caused the crisis, would not have been -- in most of these women -- something of a sexual nature (note :what Freud believes), but rather a tendency to a display that betrays vanity. By neglecting this interpretation as a possible hypothesis, Freud was forced to conclude to a subterranean sexual unsatisfactoriness, imagining that the cause could be found in the praxis of the "coitus interruptus" (note: interrupted sexual intercourse).

The attempt to extend this hypothesis to other neurotic syndromes (note: 'syndrome' is "a set of symptoms") - such as obsessions, phobias - quickly ended up exposing the inadequacy of his initial theory". (O.c.,81).

One could hardly make a fiercer criticism of Freud, of course.

***A platonic model of vanity.*** (155/158).

Platon, *Der siebente Brief*, Calw. s.d., 24; 30f., gives us the character sketch of the ruler Dionusios.

(i) Platon wanted to bring a message to the ruling class in Sicily, namely, a profound science, which realizes what, both for the present and for the future, is "really good and just", both in nature and in humanity.

Dionusios was not susceptible to this. His life history (FLC 145: without history no soul expressions), which exposes his ignominious life, proves it.

(ii) Platon sketches Dionusios (*Der siebente Br.*,30 “Dionusios (...) who, by the way, was not without inborn talent and, when it came to scientific expertise, was exceptionally studious, did take great pleasure in (...) philosophical dialogues, but, on the other hand, he turned red with shame, when it turned out, as a result of those conversations, that he had learned nothing at all from what I (= Platon) had recited during my first stay (in Sicily).

**Consequence:** in part the desire arose in him to listen thoroughly to what I had recited, -- in order to gain a clear insight; in part, however, the vanity of his ambition drove him to do so. (...).

After I had declined his second invitation (...), Dionusios seems to have tormented himself profoundly with the following thought, result of his vain pride: “It may well be that Platon, in the eyes of many, displeased as he is, did not seem anxious to come to him a second time.

This, allegedly, because I personally despised Dionusios, due to the experiences I had with his mind and his continuous external behavior as well as his way of life”.

**Note.** - One can see at once that Platon’s psychology was more than a mere ‘theory’ alien to life: he examined the people with whom he was dealing as closely as possible, as his portrait of Dionusios shows.

In particular, the dichotomy "mental attitude/external behavior" (FLC 120), with the viewpoint of "way of life," is exposed in that dichotomy.

**Note.**-- Note also, within the soul of Dionusios, a systechy, viz. on the one hand, (superficial) philosophical interest,-- on the other, (deep-seated) vanity (cf. FLC 78/80 (contradictory soul factors)).

The latter “displaces” resp. “suppresses” philosophical interest. Platon knew more: “Dionusios (...) sought to take me in and bribe me with honors and money: his aim was that I should, in a manner visible to all, take his side with my friendship. This was to serve, then, among other things, to condone the fact that he (note: Platon’s friend) had banished Dion.-- Needless to say, he did not achieve his goal.” (*Der siebente Br.*,22).

As in previous citation: that which the people find out, that is what counts for the honorably-vain Dionusios. Even if it must be achieved by dishonest means.

Moreover, Dionusios had at some point banished Dion,--this, robbing him of both his rights and his honor. Which, among Dion's friends, among whom, of course, Platon, aroused great anxiety.

“When Dionusios, however, became aware of our mood, he had us all - very graciously - summoned, fearing that our fears would become ‘the mother of something worse’. With me in particular (= Platon) he held a reassuring and encouraging conversation: he even begged me to stay,--that “in all events”.

For: “Nothing good could come from my running away, but from my staying. Hence he did not think it beneath his dignity to address me, a supplicant like me.

But of the entreaties of ‘high men’ we know that they are salted with commands. He simply made it impossible for me to leave on any ship, by having me brought to the castle and by giving me accommodation there so that no boatman - against his orders, yes, not even without issuing a supreme, explicit order on his part - would have taken me away from there by ship. (...).

At the same time people everywhere heard: “How graciously Dionusios is treating Platon! What, however, was true of this? (...) Dionusios, the longer he got to know my behavior and my mentality, the more he sought a kind of rapprochement.

But he also had his own whimsical desire that “I should speak more highly of him than of Dion”, -- “that I should regard him as a friend in a visible way more highly than Dion”. It was precisely this sign on my part that he was most eager for”. (Der sieb. br., 16f.).

**Note.**-- Again: (i) the vanity, (ii) with “what men think”. Appearance is of far more decisive importance than “being. Just as the “vain boy relied on trifles to be proud” (FLC 154), so too Dionusios: the image-impression is more decisive than his real personality, - Platonic: “than his soul”.

Notice, also, the insidious nature of such a ‘vanity’: “One never knows how to hold it” says the vernacular. The egocentric man is here clearly drawn out by Platon.

It tends toward “relationship delusion”: everything that happens is “involved” in the persona of the egocentric man, -even that which is said or done with no intention whatsoever.

**Note** -Look again at the systechy “behaviors / mentality” (FLC 120; 158).

**Psychoanalytic commentary.** (158/159).

We cite Dr. N. Lamare, *De passionele jaloezie* (The passionate jealousy), Kapellen, s.d.. Cfr. FLC 42.

**(1)** “Egoism (note : selfishness) is the apparent continuation of narcissism (FLC 148). Recall, by the way, Freud’s so correct remark: ‘Narcissism and egoism are one and the same thing’.

**(i)** The narcissistic person, who is really in love with his own body, bears it a veneration,--attends to it invariably and with zeal; for this veneration occupies his chief thoughts and attentions, yea, even all his thoughts and all his attentions.

**(ii)** The narcissistic person is, from that moment on, much too taken up with himself to take an interest in others. Thus narcissism already includes egoism, i.e. that excessive and even exclusive attachment to oneself which leads the selfish person to think primarily and even solely of himself, to be concerned only with his own interests,-without caring in the least about the interests of others (...).

**(2)** “The egoist feels very well the sufferings of others, but he is not satisfied with the fact that he does not suffer by them: he also enjoys them. The calamity of others reassures him and relieves his burden. Just as an examination of workers reassures and relieves the distrustful patron: “ They have not stolen anything from me.” The happiness of others, however, is a painful thorn in the heart of the selfish. (...) As our readers have found out for themselves (...), envy and jealousy are contained in selfishness. (...).

**(3)** “The egoist wants people to value him highly and, of course, him alone. Also: with him there is no question of sharing the attention. From egoism flows, of course, vanity (...)

**(4)** “The egocentrism has something of the egoism. It cannot be separated from it, in that both are based on the embittered expression of a self driven to extremes. The egocentric person makes himself the center of everything, including the world.

He involves everything in himself; everything concerns him". (O.c., 61; 66v.; 68; 69).

Behold one possible main form (FLC 154v.: Diel's thesis on vanity) of what Platon called "the lesser lion ('fieriness') in us.

***A Patristic description of the "lesser lion".*** (159/164)

We borrow again from A. Grün, *Dealing with the Evil One*, FLC 117/121. Euagrios from Pontos was more Platonic. It is, therefore, interesting how he, in Church Fatherly midst, in the 'eremite desert' of Egypt, points out the lesser lion.

**1.-- *The demon of the vain glory.***

**(i)** "The thought of 'vain glory' is a very penetrating one. It easily creeps in on those who practice virtue. In particular: it gives them the desire in their struggle (note : the inner-private struggle with vice and vice-demons) to show publicly and, immediately, to strive for fame among men." (O.c.,46).

**Note.--** One sees it: a negative thought, again.-- Now see how that negative thought (by an 'atè', a mischievous inspiration, from a demon reinforced (FLC 149v.)) instills two typically Church delusions.-

**(ii)a.** To that end, that thought lets 1. demons screech, 2. women be healed, and 3. a crowd of people touch his mantle.

**(ii)b.** She prophesies to him, also, even the priesthood (note: the desert monks were not necessarily priests) she has people besiege his doors to seek him out and, if he does not want to cooperate, to carry him away in chains." (Ibid).

**Note:** One can see that the eremite is enamored by the thought of becoming a famous demon exorcist or a successful priest.-- Yet consider the outcome of the demonic 'atè': "When that thought has made him - by vain expectations - spoiled, she weakens (note: out of his consciousness). She delivers him, then:

**(1)** either to the demon of pride,--to subject him to a test of strength,

**(2)** or to the demon of melancholy, who instills in him thoughts that are the opposite of his expectations.

**(3)** Sometimes she delivers him to the demon of unchastity,-- him, a man, who, a short time before, was still spirited and a holy priest."

**Note --** One sees a certain kuklos (FLC 151) at work, in the 'atè': it begins quietly, folds open into fond expectations and ends with 'frustration'.

*Note* -- That the deity judgment ('atè') and the 'kuklos' (cycle) often present in it are also present within Christianity is not surprising: in the Biblical interpretation, the deities of the pagans, who 'know' (i.e. are at home in) both evil and good, were 'demons' ('unclean spirits').

## **2. The demon of pride.**

The 'autonomous' (self-willed) man, who "fears not God, nor is he troubled by men," (as Scripture says of the 'unjust judge,' who, fundamentally, is a Nihilist), is - even he - not free from God's judgment and cycle.

**(1)** (in summary): The demon of pride leads the soul to the deepest abyss.

**(2)a.** (Rise) He leads the soul not to acknowledge God as a helper, but to believe that she herself is the cause of her good deeds. He simultaneously leads her to view the brethren from on high as "unwise" and "ignorant."

**(2)b.** (Decline) On such pride follow anger and sorrow. As a final mishap, sensationalism, madness, as well as visions of a multitude of demons, follow in the skies."

*Note:* -- One sees that, in the Christian description of psychological phenomena:

(i) the same natural and extra-natural data come through,

(ii) but that a typically Biblical supernatural dimension - God as helper - is also taken into account as an 'element' (factor).

One finds such analyses today in e.g. the novels of F. Dostoevsky (1821/1881), Russian novelist, who, at the time, caused astonishment in the West because from his Patristic-Orthodox faith he inserted God and demons (sacred factors) in his 'secular phenomena'.

Dostoevsky saw through the 'autonomous man', on which the secularized West was going for so big: "If God did not exist, then, in principle, everything would be allowed" is the saying, which J.-P. Sartre (FLC 139) took from him, To justify an Atheistic Humanism, in which God and his higher ideas are reduced to 'nihil' (nothing) and man has radical autonomy, self-power, even over all ethical rules.

For the Patristic way of thinking this is 'the demon of pride'. Cf: Franz Kafka moved, clearly, in a similar sphere (FLC 96). With Dostoevsky he was therefore included by the Existentialists in their cultural criticism.

### **3. *The demon of anger and resentment.***

We already saw it, FLC 136 (anger and resentment): the “lesser lion” (pride, in us) can take the form of anger (wrath, indignation) and resentment (resentment). Let us see, now, how the desert monks (and, without more, the Christians) experience this happening.

#### **a. *Anger.***

“Anger” is a drive characterized by a high degree of passion. It is defined as “a boiling movement of the soul’s urge to money”. This ‘movement’ is directed against the one who committed injustice or had the appearance of committing injustice:

(i) “All day long it makes the soul ‘rage’;

(ii) above all, however, during prayer it drags the spirit along,-- this, because the face of the one who committed the injustice (in reality or in appearance) is constantly before the soul.”

*Note.*-- The tragedian Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406), in his *The Raging Heracles* (perhaps of -416), gave us an illustrious, mythical example.

The force of nature, which, often, governs Euripidean heroes, is, in that play, the ‘lussa’, rabid, attacking (‘aggression’). This ‘lussa’ or ‘rage’ is, always in Euripidean view, prompted by the fire deity (‘Aithèr’) (FLC 150: process of inspiration). But, phenomenally (as far as tangible and visible), this process is a rage, which takes hold of Heracles.

This ‘movement’ (‘process’) involves two times:

(i) Heracles, ‘moved’ by this motive (unconsciously), destroys his own house and kills wife and children.

(ii) The frenzy leaves him, suddenly, as if it were, for a short but intense duration, a kind of ‘autonomous’, but embedded in his soul ‘power’; only then - not before - does his mind come to an understanding: he realizes - only then - what it was that he committed. Then he becomes frightened and collapses. In order to atone he says, then, only then: “Together we have been smitten by the hand of Hera (note : the wife of Zeus, the Supreme God).” (The Raging Her., 1382).

In other words, when Heracles becomes himself again (i.e., when his mind, once again, controls the twosome of primal urges and noble pride), he recognizes that “a power foreign to him, but active in him” has “driven” him.

***b.-- Anger.***

Euagrios typifies, after the acute form, the chronic form: “When anger lasts a long time and becomes resentment, it causes, at night, confusion, impotence, a pale appearance of the body and attacks by ‘wild beasts’ (note: ‘wild beasts’ was, as the case may be, a term used to describe demons; in the desert Jesus stayed “in the midst of the beasts”). These four symptoms, characteristic of resentment, are usually accompanied by numerous thoughts”.

**Note** - Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900), in his *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (On the Genealogy of Morality), 1887, 1: 11; 3:15, elaborated what the French call ‘ressentiment’ into a basic concept of his Nihilist view. ‘Ressentiment’ means the memory of an injustice, with the desire to avenge this injustice. What, among others, Anarchists and Anti-Semites call ‘justice’ has, according to Nietzsche, its origin in ‘Ressentiment’ (in French). Taking revenge - for real or imagined injustice - is then called ‘justice’.

Max Scheler (1874/1928; FLC 12) expanded on this Nietzschean idea in his *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen* (a chapter from his *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (2 (From the overthrow of values), Bde; 1919).

***A characterization of it explains to us Euagrios’ characterization.***

According to Scheler, “ressentiment” (resentment) is a lasting (chronic) self-poisoning of the soul life, springing from well-defined factors and giving out on well-defined effects.

***We dwell for a moment on the causes.***

These consist, according to Scheler, in the first place, in a persistent (unconscious) repression and/or (conscious) suppression of - what he calls - the ‘Entladung’ (discharge, working itself out immediately) of a number of mental movements and affects, such as vindictiveness, hatred, malice, envy, treacherousness.

The will, understood in its primal form, to revenge is the most striking starting point of ‘resentment’:

(i) an immediate working out of revenge (ii) is, out of impotence (whether based on reality or not), suspended (‘inhibited’) and postponed until the nearest ‘favorable opportunity’. “Just wait! I’ll have him/her, them in due course!” Behold, condensed into a maxim, what ‘ressentiment’ (Nietzschean-Schelerian-speak) is.

Very accurately, according to Scheler: where the feeling of revenge cannot/should not work itself out (the feeling of impotence, physical or ethical or the two together, is stronger than the impulse of revenge), that is precisely where ‘ressentiment’ arises: it is the dogged degree of impotent need for revenge.

The “resentful man” is “firmly convinced” of his “right” (possibly of the injustice done to him) and, everywhere, he looks for opportunities to express it. But the fewer opportunities there are, the more his need for revenge turns into dull resentment.

*Note* -- One of the most striking expressions is: “The grapes are too green” said the powerless fox! The person on whom one wants to avenge oneself. is, admittedly, very significant, happening, but “one does not want to know this”. So one says, “He is not even worth the trouble!”.

#### **4.-- *The demon of sadness and homesickness.***

Disappointment (“frustration”) was, already, the root of anger and resentment. It is also that of sadness and homesickness. Our ‘proud’ lion does not resign himself to disappointment, whatever it may be.

##### **a.-- *The sadness.***

Euagrios distinguishes, among other things, two types of sadness:

- (i) a disappointed desire or
- (ii) anger they generate.

In itself he characterizes them as follows: “Through the depths of the water (note: of sadness) no ray of sunlight penetrates anymore. The light, once it has been received, no longer brings clarity to the dark heart: for example, a sunrise is a joy for people, but a soul in a sad state experiences discomfort - even at a sunrise. -

*Note*.-- This reversal of the meaning (‘value’) of e.g. a sunrise proves, for the umpteenth time, that our reactions to our perceptions involve an interpretation (which includes hermeneutics).

##### **b.-- *Homesickness.***

Euagrios describes homesickness as a sequence of “thoughts” (understand: perceptions + interpretations).

(1) First, in a person, thoughts arise, reminding the soul of home, of parents, of the life of the past.

(2) When these “thoughts” discover that the soul, instead of resisting, responds and rejoices inwardly in the pleasures (note: those belonging to this memory), they sink into the soul and plunge it into sadness: “the former is no more. Also: “because of what is now, what was before can no longer be”.

The more the soul rejoices in the first thoughts, the more the second sinks it into discouragement and dejection.

### **5.-- *The demon of acedia.***

A. Grün, *Dealing with the Evil One*, 53, notes that the method of retrospection was used by Euagrius. This ascetic recommends, for example, that the demon of acedia be quietly admitted into the mind for one or two days: only in this way can information be gathered about it. "In order to examine the demon in detail, a certain familiarity with it is necessary: one must admit it to oneself in order to be able to see the mechanisms it employs (FLC 117: Diagnostic phase; 120: Euagrius' theory). (Ibid.).

Let us now examine the result regarding the demon of reluctance. For this is the phenomenon of 'acedia' in the ground.

#### **(i) *Main characteristic:***

The demon of reluctance "expresses an aversion to the way of life (in this case: the life of honor),-among other things-to manual labor.

To reinforce this: he reminds one of one's relatives and one's way of life in the past (FLC 163: homesickness).-- Naturally, he keeps the objections of asceticism before his own eyes (negative thought).

#### **(ii) *Subordinate traits.***

**a.** The fellow human side: the demon of reluctance inspires the thought "that love has disappeared among the brethren and that, therefore, no one brings comfort". Even more so, when someone - in the period of acedia - acts offensively, this demon feeds the displeasure and resentment against the offending person.

**b.1** The diachronic side: the demon in question "depicts how long life lasts". He makes the sun move slowly or not at all! He incites one to "constantly look through the window and - if one is a desert monk - to walk out of the cell", - this, in order to look at the sun (understand: the position of the sun .... to see if it is still far from the ninth hour;- also in order to look out for a brother, who might come.

**b.2** The synchronic side: the demon of the desire for life - that's it - indicates the desire for another place: "There one could more easily find what one needs. There one would find a less troublesome and more advantageous way of life". -- "Surely the pleasure of the Lord is not bound to a place". "Surely everywhere God can be the object of worship!".

*Note* -- Referred, of course, to the great monster in reluctance: FLC 119 (sleepiness as a component).

*Note*-- Our Flemish poet Guido Gezelle (1830/1899), a Platonic poet, describes an analogous state of soul in his poem "vertijloosheid. 'Vertij', means "what keeps the attention pleasantly strained," such as amusement, pleasure, joy, -- occupation, in which one is absorbed. 'Vertijloos' is the opposite, that what 'vertij' lacks. This lack is a form of disappointment, of course.

“Traduttore, traditore” is an Italian expression that tells us that translating a text is actually a bit of betraying that text. We make that same mistake here by translating this poem and know that in doing so all originality and feeling is lost.

*“Vertijloos, al den dag,-- en zie ‘k in ‘t nauw gesteken  
geen blijden zonnengang -- de duistere wolken breken;  
en zie ‘k noch bol noch boom,-- noch hout noch iet dat groent  
en, met den kwaden dag,-- mijn kwaden zin verzoent”.*

“joyless, all day long, -- and I am cornered  
No joyous sunset -- The dark clouds break;  
And I see neither flower nor tree,-- nor wood nor anything that grows  
And, with the evil day, -- my evil sentence reconciles.

One sees it: ‘bad mood’ can serve as a description of life’s reluctance.-- With Gezelle, as with many, a joyless mood is tied to the natural landscape:

*“Het wintert, zonder ijs -- of sneeuw! Ach, of het snerpen  
des Noordens nog een snee -- mij liete in ‘t water scherpen  
dat stijfgeworden ligt -- en glad! ... Wacharme, ‘t stinkt  
van ‘t smoorend smokkelweer, - dat zon noch mane ‘n dwingt!”.*

“It winters, without ice -- or snow! Ah, like the wind,  
coming from the North, the gusting wind -- sharpening me like the water  
That lies frozen -- and slippery! ... My God, it stinks  
This the killing weather, - that sun nor moon compels!”.

**Note** -- The sense of smell is also a part of the joyless mood : it is Gezelle as if the weather, -- winter weather, without sun, without the glow of ice or snow (note the absence of that to which he expects himself), “stinks.”

But listen further:

“‘k wille uit en blijde zijn!-- Ach, blijde zijn leert even -- dat schier gestorven was,  
-- weêr daden doen en leven! ... -- Ik adem, ja genoeg -- om lijf- en longertocht -- te  
halen, maar mijn hert is lam en zonder locht!”.

“I want to go out and be happy! -- Oh, being happy teaches us -- what almost died,  
-- to act and live again! ... -- I breathe, yes enough -- to stay straight -- but my heart is  
lame and without air!”.

**Note** . - We will not lose ourselves in the comparison with the ‘Schwermut’, the dreariness, of a part of the unbalanced Romantics or with the Spleen, the dandy’s bleak-deathly Schwermut, which Charles Baudelaire (1821/1867), in his *Fleurs du mal* (Flowers of Evil ), (1857), full of self-pity, expresses: “(...) hope, that vanquished, weeps; repulsive fear, like a despot, plants, on my tilting skull, its black flag” (Ixi:

Spleen). -- But 'vertijloosheid', 'Schwermut' and 'spleen', they are forms of life's repugnance.

Compare with J.-P.-Sartre's 'nausée' (disgust). (165/168) H. Redeker, *Existentialism*, Amsterdam, 1949, 263/269 (First stage: La nausée), sketches us how Sartre, in 1936, suddenly gained fame with his *La nausée*.

It is a narrative in journal form, in which one Antoine Roquentin, situated in the provincial town of 'Bouville', circa 1932, tells how "things are changing for him".

Character sketch: Roquentin is a lonely, somewhat colorless intellectual, engaged in "historical research" concerning a "marquis de Rollebon" (a figure from a century and a half ago). The world around him appears to him as colorless as he is colorless and coldly impersonal: he is not a "participant" in life, but a "spectator" of what is basically indifferent to him.

One model: with Françoise of the Rendez-vous des Cheminots, he has a wordless and, thoroughly considered, impersonal sexual 'relationship'. Another figure in Roquentin's little world is "l'autodidacte", regular visitor to the library, a kind of 'idealist', but who ends sadly: he is expelled for reasons of an accusation of homosexual acts.

Furthermore, there is the gérant Fasquelle: "Quand cet homme est seul, il s'endort" (reminiscent of FLC 119 (sleepiness)).

What change does the book tell us? "So this is Nausea: this blinding evidence? (...) Now I know: I exist; the world exists. And I know that the world exists -- that's all -- but I don't care. It is strange that everything is so equal to me: it frightens me" .. (J.-P. Sartre, *La nausée*, Paris, 1938, 173s.).

### ***We explain further.***

"So recently I was in le jardin public (the public garden). The root of the chestnut tree was sticking into the earth, just under my bench.-- I did not remember that it was a tree root. The words had faded away and, with them, the meaning of things, their instructions for use. (...).

I was seated,--a brook bent over, the head hanging down,--alone facing that dark gnarled mass (note: of the chestnut tree), which was whole and unworked, and which frightened me.--

And since then I have gotten through that illumination. It took my breath away. - Never before, for the last few days, had I felt anything like what it meant to 'exister' ('exist'). I was like everyone else (...). Like everyone else, I said, "The sea is green. That point up there,--that's a seagull". But I did not feel that such a thing 'exists', -- that the gull was an 'existing gull' ('mouette-existante'). Usually "l'existence", existence, keeps itself hidden (...) (O.c.,179; s. ).

Now reread, briefly, FLC 35 (ananke; // 68v.; 84 (Kafka/Camus); 145 (*Timaios*); 150 (Nark.)): the phenomena, which Platon encountered, were often opaque, incomprehensible, but they imposed themselves as an inescapable factual fact.

Sartre goes through a partially similar experience. O.c., 182s., Sartre continues: “At this moment the word ‘meaninglessness’ (‘absurdité’, ‘absurdity’) flows from my pen. Just now, in le Jardin public, I did not find it. Nor was I looking for it; I didn’t even need it: I was, after all, thinking without words,--about the things themselves, with the things themselves.

That meaninglessness was not a representation, somewhere in my head; nor was it something that my voice uttered, but rather that long dead snake at my feet,--that snake of wood (note: the root of the chestnut tree) (...).

And, immediately, without articulating it ready, I realized that I had found the key of existence, the key of my disgusts, of my own life. In fact, everything I have been able to grasp since then can be traced back to this profound meaninglessness. Meaninglessness’: again, a word. I resist words. In Le jardin public I was directly confronted with the thing itself. (...).

***In other words:***

- (i) the given, the ‘thing’, (as Sartre likes to say), is ‘meaningless’, absurd.
- (ii) The mental reaction thereby provoked is ‘disgust’.

Similar to Gezelle’s “it stinks” (i.e. that drizzly weather). Yet very different again: with Sartre it is more than the (passing) winter weather. It is not a weather-landscape experience of reluctance, but an ontological one.

“I have just experienced the absolute: the absolute or the Absurd. There was nothing, with respect to what that tree root was absurd (...). Absurd, irreducible. Nothing - not even a profound and secret madness of nature - could explain it. (...).

(i) A circle is not meaningless; for it is explained, ready and clear, by the rotation of a line segment around one of its ends. But, yes, a circle does not ‘exist’.

(ii) But the tree root in question ‘existed’ to the extent that I could not explain it. Gnarled, motionless, nameless as it was, that root captivated me, filled my eyes, reminded me without ceasing that it ‘existed’. (o.c., *ibid.*).

**Conclusion.** - In Sartre's language -- at least in his first phase -- 'exister' (existence) means:

(i) the factually given being of something,-- if need be of anything (which is the medieval 'existentia'),

(ii) but insofar as this factual existence appears unexplained, inexplicable in the mind,--which responds to it with, e.g., 'disgust.'--This is a matter of agreement, of course.

Existential thought has sometimes been called an "empiricism of the mind" ("empirisme émotif", -- according to J. Wahl, *Les philosophies de l'existence*, (The philosophies of life), Paris, 1954, 15). Heidegger, e.g., responds to the factual with "fear," Sartre with "disgust."

As rightly stated by H. Redeker, o.c.,267, the 'emotional' plays, since Heidegger, a role of first rank in the heart of philosophy itself.

One who has dealt with this thoroughly is O.-Fr. Bollnow, *Les tonalités affectives (Essai d'anthropologie philosophique)*, (Affective tones (Essay in philosophical anthropology)), Neuchatel (CH), 1953. This is the translation of *Das Wesen der Stimmungen*.

Indeed: from some mood:

(i) wanting to deduce the essence of all (possible) moods and, even,

(ii) the essence of human existence, is a logically perilous undertaking.

Why, e.g., instead of disgust or fear, not start from the experience of happiness,-- which also unmistakably belongs to total human existence? Bollnow, therefore, thoroughly criticizes Heidegger's thesis in this regard.

But one can, equally well, criticize Sartre's thesis from his thorough standpoint.-- The fact is that a Heidegger and a Sartre did contribute to a remarkable philosophical psychology of moods. It is to that title that we say a word about it here.

**Note:** Soren Kierkegaard (1813/1855) broke through, after 1916, as the 'father of Existentialism! In his *Either or* (2 volumes (1843)), a youth work, he situates despair at the very heart of human existence or (human) 'existence! With this he set in motion a fashion, namely, philosophizing from a state of mind.

With him, however, this was an expression of his very personal melancholy (B. von Brandenstein, *The Twentieth Century: Age of Despair?*, in: *Internat. Philosophical Quarterly* (New York / Heverlee), vol. iii, no. 4 (1963: Dec.), 554), -- a melancholy, which in his case was connected with his sense of sin (cf. FLC 85: religious sense of sin,-- psychiatricly speaking).

***Summary view of the lesser lion.*** (169/175)

Whether in full self-development or disappointed, the “lesser lion” comprises a huge part of our soul life. If we have dwelt on it at such length, it is to show that, starting from Platonic presuppositions of a psychological nature, we are capable of situating even the most topical analyses on the subject. In this sense, our Platonism is an “eternal philosophy”, in the sense that, at every stage of development of the human psyche, Platonism can function as an informing force (“power idea”).

One knows how the ‘Individualpsychology’ of Alfred Adler (1870/1937) -- first Freud’s supporter, then opponent of it in the sense that he assigned to the urge for money the place Freud had assigned to the (eroticizing) libido -- translated to some extent the idea ‘Ueberschensch’ (the higher, ‘superior’ man) of Friedrich Nietzsche, the Nihilist, into depth psychological terms.

For Nietzsche, Adler repeatedly expressed sympathy. The higher values - e.g. the true, the morally good, the beautiful (in the exalted sense), the sacred - do not play, either with Nietzsche or with Adler, a role of their own that fits that of a real higher idea, in the Platonizing or Biblical sense.

Adler looked for the ‘elements’ (factors), which make every human being what he/she is. With a Spranger (FLC 121ff.), as with a Platon, these are well-defined - preferably higher - values. With Adler, as with Nietzsche, this is - what Adler calls - “die Leitlinie,” the ideal that governs our lives (for that is what it truly is), which springs from a mysterious life plan or programming of our doings. However diverse people’s individual ideals may be, at their core they are all identical: they are “Wille zur Macht,” power drive (for “Wille” here, rather, is to be interpreted depth-psychologically). Every human being knows only one value: to assert oneself, to rise above the others, to control fellow human beings, to subject fellow human beings to oneself.

**Note** -- This does not prevent believing Christians (the Catholic Rudolf Allers; the Protestant Fritz Künkel) from being, to some extent, “Adlerians. Which, from the “lesser lion,” as he is more fully outlined in Platon’s *Republic*, 554a and what follows (chap. ix), we can deeply understand.

All this brings us to a problem, which, here, we can treat only very sideways, namely, the problem of power.

R.F. Beerling, *Interpretaties van macht* (Interpretations of power), in: Tijdschr.v.Filos. 14 (1952): 2, 346/361, defines 'power' as "the ability to exert influence". (A.c.,348).

Beerling distinguishes;

(i) 'Naturalistic' (understand: Positivistic), psychological, sociological and  
(ii) ontological (philosophical) interpretations of "power". Among the 'metaphysical' interpretations he ranks, quite rightly, Friedrich Nietzsche, who, in Beerling's eyes, may have been an excellent power psychologist, but also, yes, first of all an ontologist of power. Central concept in Nietzsche's world of ideas is life. The urge for power is its basic feature.-- Unfortunately, Nietzsche uses more than one concept of power:

(i) power, seen as brutal, yes, very brutal natural fact (which is Naturalism),

(ii) power, understood as aristocratic-nobilistic (anti-democratic) ideal of life, which preaches contempt for the herdsman of democracy,

(iii) power as an ontological, i.e. all its explanatory and illuminating, 'element' (presuppositional principle).

**Consequence:** the metaphysics of Nietzsche is a mixture, not to say a jumble, of these three interrelated but not logically rigorously held together. - Which does not prevent him, precisely with such a 'metaphysics of power', from becoming one of the leading figures of present-day Postmodernism.

**Note -- Platonic psychiatry.**

Since the "nous" (intellectus, our "little man" or mind) represents all that is right, righteous and morally good, -- which implies that all deviations are ultimately due to the lower desires (= the big monster, the lesser lion), we must look for the psychiatric element in us, precisely, in the two last parts of the human soul.

(a) An orderly exposition of a Platonic psychiatry is given by W. Leibbrand / A.Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn (Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie)*, (Der Wahnsinn (History of Western Psychopathology)), Freiburg/ München, 1961, 59/76 (*Platons Beiträge zur Psychopathologie und Trieblehre*), (Plato's contributions to psychopathology and drive theory). To summarize this exposition even superficially is impossible for us, here (for lack of space).

In any case, like other historians on psychopathology, Leibbrand/ Wettley rate Platon's contribution, culturally historically, highly.-- Therefore, one applicative model here.

**(b) *The criminal lives from night dreams.***

And this happens in the form of the tyrant. Besides quoting Platon himself, we also rely on D. Anzieu, *Oedipe avant le complexe ou de l'interprétation psychanalytique des myths*, (Oedipus before the complex or the psychoanalytical interpretation of myths), in: D. Anzieu et a., *Psychoanalyse et culture grecque*, (Psychoanalysis and Greek culture), Paris, 1980, 5/25.

The article, a.c., 41/44, deals with a fifth myth (= mythic element), namely, sexual intercourse with the mother (FLC 153: exasperation of myths).

**(i)a.** Herodotos of Halikarnassos (FLC 151), in the *Historiai*, tells of a tyrant, Hippias, who, with the Persian army, attacks the city-state of Athens. For this reason he is banished from his native city, of course.-- But, subsequently, he has a dream in which he has sexual intercourse with his own mother (incest). Decision of the tyrant: he will enter Athens -- galvanized by the "mother, whom he, by seduction, submitted to himself (the will to power) --, restore his power there to die in old age.

**(i)b.** Sophocles of Kolonos (-496/-406; second great Greek tragedian, after Aischulos and before Euripides (FLC 161)), in his *Oedipus king* (around -430), ff. 981v., literally says: "Many people, after all, have, in their dreams, committed sexual intercourse with their mothers." Sophocles puts these words in the mouth of Jokaste, the wife of Laios and the mother of Oedipus.

**Note** -- "One may be familiar with *Die Traumdeutung* (The interpretation of dreams), (1900) by S. Freud: one sees that this book, at the door of our current century, is only one facet of an ancient tradition. That is also why we have Platon's teaching on the subject (at least one aspect of it) to discuss here.

Robert Baccou, introd./trad., *Platon, La république*, Paris, 1966, 333; 334; 337; 338, gives us one aspect of a possible Platonic dream interpretation.

**(1).**-- At the beginning of Book ix, Platon briefly discusses the illegitimate (counternatural) desires (FLC 110). This, in connection with the genesis (process of becoming) both of the criminal and of the tyrant.

“It is about those desires, which are awakened during sleep. In sleep, namely, the soul aspect that is gifted with spirit and gentle and suitable for controlling the other part of the soul (note: the big monster/the lesser lion) comes to rest. This, while the animal and wild soul aspect, if it gorges itself on food or drink, as it were shakes off all sleepiness (of desire) and goes out to find satisfactions for its desires.

As you well know: in such a state this soul aspect dares everything, freed and disconnected as it is from the bonds of any sense of shame, as well as any insight (FLC 111).

Thus e.g. it does not shrink from having sexual intercourse, in imagination, with its own mother or with anyone else,-- man, deity, animal.-- Thus e.g. it does not shrink from defiling itself with any murder,-- without abhorrence it eats anything. (Note: Aristotle, Eth. Nicomach. H: 6, 1148b gives as a model the eating of children’s corpses).

**To sum up**, there is no madness, no shamelessness, to which that soul aspect is not capable.”

**Note:** Note the duality “madness/shamelessness”. P. Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, Neuchâtel (CH), 1968, 107/113 (on neurosis), 111/113 (on the cynical criminal), -- theme that the author repeats o.c., 162/157 (Nervousness and trivialization),--makes us pay attention to two forms of psychopathology, the neurotic (the one that is the first and the most conspicuous, because the psychologist, resp. the psychiatrist/neurologist comes into play) and the ‘banalizing’, d. i. the case of the blunted in his conscience, who shows the same syndrome, i.e. deviation, more, instead of suffering from it (with the neurosis that goes with it), works it out both sexually and socially, shamelessly, ‘cynically’.

(2) A bit further on Platon writes: “What we, with all this, wanted to establish is this:

(i) in each of us - even in those who appear to be perfectly self-controlled - there is a type of terrifying, wild, law-breaking desire;

(ii) that fact is made clear to us by the dreams”. Cf. methodologically: FLC 105 (theoria); 120 (fathoming). Of which we have, here, yet another application.

(3).-- Somewhat further, again, Platon describes the genesis (process of becoming) and of the criminal and of the tyrant.

“(a) Beforehand, (the unlawful, counternatural desires) only received their free course in the form of the dream, during sleep. For the tyrant was then still subject to the laws and to his father and, in his soul, democracy reigned.

(b) Henceforth, however, he will - tyrannized as he is by the ‘eros’, the minstrelsy (FLC 126 (*eros is not agape*); -- 112/114 (*boy love*)) - exhibit without interruption that type of man which he became, sometimes, in the night dream.

He will therefore shy away from no murder, from no forbidden food, from no crime. Eros, living in him in a tyrannical way -- in complete disorder and liberation from all bonds, by being in him autocratic -- will drive such unhappy type of man, whose soul he has taken possession of -- as a tyrant the city-state --, to dare anything,-- this, in order to provide him with food, him (note (eros) and the band of desires which surround him, namely, those desires which come from outside him - through the bad associations - and those desires which, arising in himself, from a disposition which is concurrent with his own, have broken the bonds and set themselves free. Is not that now the life which such a man leads?”.

*Note* -- Strikes a certain resemblance to the Freudian libido, primal lust, but with this great difference that this primal lust is tyrannical, power-hungry. ‘Sex’ is, in such a case, means rather than ends,--means in the service of the will to power, i.e. the lesser lion.

(4).-- Last citation.-- “Summing up: is an utter criminal he who, in full day consciousness, exhibits the behaviors of man in the sleep-dream state.”

*Note* - That this proposition, which, like all of Platon’s propositions, must be weakened by counterexamples (FLC 56; 63), contains an element of real life truth, becomes apparent e.g. when one reads Sabine Paugam, *Crimes passionnels*, Paris, 1988.

This young lawyer defends criminals, whom she approaches with the “*verstehende method*” (FLC 05); she can therefore somewhat penetrate into the soul life of her clients/clients. Well, some elements remind of what Platon says.

***The conscious repression, resp. unconscious repression.*** (174/175)

For Platon the great monster and the lesser lion run, in part, into each other. Therefore we place a text from his *Seventh Letter* (ed. Calw, 24f.) here after, as a concluding remark.

**1.-- *The glorious death of Dion.***

We have seen it higher: Dion, in Sicily, as a follower of Platon, put his philosophy into action. He was, among other things for this reason, cowardly murdered by the tyrant Dionusios and his followers. But in Platon's eyes this was a glorious death.

(i).-- "For, to one who pursues true values both for himself/herself and for the state community, every suffering is something justifiable and admirable. ('clean') whatever he/she may suffer."

(ii).-- Platon, on this, sets forth how a number of high ideas inform us from an ancient, Archaic tradition, concerning the direction, which we should give to our lives.

"No one among us is immortal. And, even if such a favorable fate were to befall us here on earth, he/she would not therefore be blissful, as, wrongly, the illiterate people believe. After all, there is no real evil and no real good for those beings, who have no soul (note: FLC 116: the immortal soul). This distinction applies only to every soul, whether it lives with a body or without any body.

***Consequence:*** one should always live in truly convinced faith of these ancient traditions, which - as you know - reveal to us that:

1. we possess an immortal soul,
2. that soul receives a judge in retaliation for what it does,
3. once it is separated from its body, it must pay the greatest penalties for its crimes.

***Conclusion.***-- For this reason also, one must regard even the suffering of great crimes and iniquities as a lesser evil than the practice of them."

***Note.***-- One sees that the pagan Platon here is not so far from the Biblical revelations on the subject.

**2.-- *Consciously suppressing or unconsciously repressing***

Platon now briefly explains how under the strong influence of the great monster and the lesser lion, man can consciously suppress or unconsciously repress these revealed truths.

"But all these are points of learning, which the purely money- and property-minded man, who, at once, is poor in 'the gold of the soul,' does not even hear.

And supposing he/she does hear them, he/she listens to them with derision. One tries, after all, to get at nothing unless at everywhere, as much as possible, like a mindless animal shamelessly,-- this, in order to be able to eat or drink or to satisfy his/her craving, peculiar to the animal- repulsive love,-- something which, if one speaks with insight, does not deserve such a noble name.”

**Note.**-- One sees it: food/drink, ‘love’, money and property (FLC 135 (English’ term ‘Materialism’)). These are almost all elements that, together, make up the great monster, in which the lesser lion, as somewhere Platon explicitly says, also feels at home.

Which proves that Platon had indeed acquired some kind of beginning of systematic psychology. If not, e.g. here -- as elsewhere -- the naming together would not be detectable, -- a Platonic tradition which Engels, the Marxist, claims belonged to the Roman Catholic use of language, up to his time.

But we listen further to *the Seventh Letter*: “Such a one is a man struck with blindness, who cannot see the following points:

(i) the proper connection between the sensual enjoyments so coveted, on the one hand, and, on the other, some crime,--which amounts to an unheard-of mischief that goes with every injustice;

(ii) the fact that everyone, who has committed an injustice, must, according to a destiny which cannot be escaped, carry with him the consequence of every crime,-- first here above the earth, as long as he walks on that earth, -- then also below that same earth, when he has finished the honorless and thoroughly unhappy earthly voyage of life to the eternal heimat.-- These and other points of learning I, for Dion, once set forth: I could, apparently, penetrate his heart with them.”

**Note.**-- Leibbrand and Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn*, (The madness), 60, translate the term ‘para.frosunè’, in Platon’s *Sophistès* 228, by ‘Vorbeidenken’, to think of something beyond it. This is peculiarly similar to something like ‘repression/oppression’. ‘Para.fron’ is he who thinks past the truth and its consequences,-- i.e. insane, without common sense (FLC 35),-- which the ‘little man’ in all of us is not.

As one knows, with Freud, repression (oppression) is a basic concept. But there is one difference: with Freud, established morality represses the urges.

## **2.C.c.-- *The little man (spirit).***

**a.** FLC 115 taught us, already, to pay attention to ethical effects of the “little man” in us: both the less noble desires and the desire for money (“nobler desire”) are valued at its proper value by our mind. This, by introducing sense of measure (sofro.sunè) or, much more, by cultivating the sense of balanced life (dikaiosuné) - the all other ethical good gifts summing up ‘virtue’.

**b.** FLC 35 situated, somewhat, the ‘nous’ (‘intellectus’, mind) in the whole cosmos: what is ‘logos’, rational mind, in us, corresponds to what, on a large scale, cosmically, comes across as “caused by mind, i.e. reasoned-objective behavior”, immediately “the little person” in us is the ability to sense the ‘anankè’, the unreasoned-ineffective - the absurd - as diametrically opposed to our mind.

This is a kind of peripheral function: just as a doctor knows what is ‘healthy’ by being busy with what is unhealthy, ‘sick’.

Yet we look, now, at further main aspects of what, both with Platon and with his pupil Aristotle,-- but in a very different way, the only thing they call ‘eternal’, in the mortal soul (FLC 103 (the soul as a whole);-- 99).

The main role, with Platon, proper to the mind, is, however, the contemplation of ideas. Something we have regularly encountered in the preceding pages. Platon puts “ideas” first, both for singular data -- inanimate (e.g., tables, beds), biologically living (e.g., plants such as trees or animals such as horses), souls -- and for abstract properties (such as valuable (“good”), beautiful (which compels admiration and astonishment), -- large/small (quantitative characteristics), -- pious, righteous (ethical characteristics)).

One cannot, therefore, claim that Platon only presupposes ideas, as explanatory principles (‘causes’), where purely material things (bed, tree, horse, human body) are concerned: the high ethical properties presuppose ‘ideas’ just as well.

**Conclusion:** the notorious dualism which opposes ‘this’ world (with its material realities) to ‘that’ world (with its immaterial realities) to explain the doctrine of ideas is not valid at all. This does not prevent the doctrine of ideas from being expressed in this incorrect way very often.

**A.-- *The ideation as insight into the “true” nature.* (177/188)**

We can best start from the ideation of the soul.-- *Politeia* 611c gives us a summarized articulation of this.

But in order to understand the Platonic text properly, we must, first, dwell on the Glaukos myth. We give here one of the versions (FLC 148: two versions; 152: myth as a narratological genre). We prefer to do this because this myth is a deification myth (FLC 22 (Solovjef); 24 (Christian deification)). She must have appealed strongly to Platon, somewhere.

**1.-- *The Glaukosmythe.* (177/179)**

***Bibl. sample:***

-- J. Schmidt, *Griekse en Romeinse mythologie* (Greek and Roman mythology), Helmond, 1968+, 113.

**a. *The sea god Glaukos***

Originally the sea god Glaukos was but a poor fisherman in the city of Anthèdon, in Boiotia (Beotia,-- in central Hellas). This is his ‘mortal’ and not yet ‘deified’ mode of being and appearance.

**b. *The deification process.***

There are two versions. One says that he became immortal and, therefore, deified through a magical bath. The other speaks of magical herbs. It is this version, which Schmidt, o.c., gives. The process proceeds in two mythical phases.

**(i).-- *Phase 1.***

On a certain day Glaukos brings his catch ashore. The fish, however, he laid on magic herbs,-- once sown (in mythical primeval times) by none other than the god Kronos (Lat.: Cronus).

This -- incidentally said -- is a chthonic (= telluric) or earth-bound deity, -- more accurately expressed: a Titan. He ruled, for a time, the universe (he was of the ‘whole-governor’ type), -- this, as the youngest son of the two primeval deities viz. Ouranos and Gaia, i.e. Heaven and Earth.

His universe rule lasted until the Olympian (i.e. sky-space bound) god Zeus removed him from that position of power. This, notwithstanding Glaukos, as Titan, could assume a giant appearance.

To Glaukos’s great surprise, then, the fish laid on the magic herbs began to flounder to leap seaward and sink into the water depths.

Excited by that miracle sign, he himself ate some of the magic herbs: he, too, felt himself, irresistibly, driven seaward,--at such a point that he immersed himself in them for good.

**(ii).-- Phase 2.**

*Note.*-- Before we continue the myth, an explanation.--

The elaborators of the second phase of deification are, likewise, earthbound beings.

**a. *Tèthus*** (Lat.:Tethys), daughter of the Primal Couple, Ouranos and Gaia. Literally, “tèthus” means “nourisher. She was considered a goddess of fertility, situated in all the waters around the globe,-- visibly made present in the countless springs and fountains.

**b. *The Nereids***, one type of sea nymphs, are the fifty daughters of Nèreus (older than the Supreme Sea God Poseidon, deity, who, in addition to the sea waters, also controls the rivers, streams and springs) and of Doris, daughter of Okeanos. The name “nymph” means that they, like all “numfai,” literally, “still veiled and, therefore, either unmarried or newly married young, extremely beautiful women,” represent magnificent female figures.

The Nereid myth tells that they live, deep in the (Mediterranean) sea, in a shining palace. Nereus, their ancient father, they make life “glorious” by practicing “choreia,” the unity of dance, instrumental music and poetry (song).

But they are made visibly present in the flickering, glittering waves on the sea surface. In that case, their mode of appearance is that of ‘mixed beings’, in this case: half woman (upper body) half fish (lower body).

***Conclusion.*** - With Tethys and the Nereids we find ourselves, once again, in the chthonic (= telluric) world of the deities and nature spirits bound to the four elements (they ‘inhabit’ the earth, the water (in this case), the air (the sky) and the fire (especially the mountains of fire)).

Glaukos was stripped of his mortal-bodily shell by Tèthus and the Nereids. Thus his mode of appearance was henceforth that of a mixed being:

**(i) *the upper body*** was that of a distinguished, very elderly man,--with sea-colored hair and beard (within the Archaic-Tellurian cultures the symbol of distinguished wisdom);

**(ii) *the torso***, which culminated in a fish tail, was covered with seaweed.-- Yet, at once, the Nereids, under the direction of Tèthus, crafted, immortalized Glaukos shared in the mantic (FLC 105;120;148) or seers’ giftedness, peculiar to earth-bound deities and spirits. Also: he was found, in Archaic Hellas, by all sailors (who sailed his territory), if they approached him with deep religious shudder (reverence), to be a savior (‘sotèr’),--in their daily cares and troubles.

As a deified man who was familiar with the sea, after all, through the magic herbs and the manipulation by Tethus and the Nereids, his life force - the Greeks called it among other things 'dunamis' (sometimes also 'fusus', (occult nature); FLC 149 (by erroneous border crossing Narkissos causes his life force to diminish) - had been raised to a divine level.

*Note.*-- Partly because of the attention paid to the changes in life force the actual 'myth' differs from both fable and fairy tale as well as (medieval) legend.

Life force' (one of the meanings of the religious-historical term 'soul' ('soul dust') - see e.g. FLC 32v. (helic pluralism) -) is, after all, one of the most thoroughly basic concepts of the Archaic religions,--also of the Antique Greek. Subtle' (rarefied or particulate) processes form the Ariadne thread of virtually all true myths.

## **2.-- The idea 'soul' with Platon. (179/181)**

If we read, briefly, *Politeia* 611c, we are faced with one type of theoria (FLC 106), penetration. But strangely enough the focus of analysis is on one type of 'fusus', natura, nature (in the sense of 'being nature').

Nature' means, in Platon's language, first of all the individual nature of someone or something. To which we will speak a little more in a moment. But here 'nature' means the invisible side.

**(i).** What we can perceive of the human soul (perception is always the starting point of theories), according to Platon, is only the state (mode of being) in which it is on earth, at one with its body,--even more so: affected as it is by all kinds of calamities.

But that state is only one of the many, possible (imaginable) states, namely the mode of being accessible by her present mode of 'appearance' (phenomenal aspect).

**(ii).** What, in Platonic language, is called "the true nature (mode of being)" of the soul of man, that precisely we grasp, for the time being, only by means of 'logismos', reasoning.

Through this type of reasoning (for Platon has a plural of reasonings) "the little man" in us (for that is what this is about) reaches the 'dia.theaton', one of the forms of 'theoria', viz. a theory working to the hilt, which is not guided by sense perception alone ("en toi paronti fainetai"), but, through the very perceptible phenomena, especially of a psychological nature (we are in the middle of Platonic 'spiritual science'), pierces to - what Platon calls - the "true fusis, natura, nature (way of being)" of the soul.

With the result - says the text - that “the soul comes out much ‘cleaner’ (understand : commanding admiration) as also two soul properties, ‘righteous’ (understand : conscientious) and - the opposite - ‘unrighteous’ (understand : unscrupulous) behavior.”

***Platonic myth usage.***

1. At this moment of ‘logismos’, deepening reasoning, Platon inserts a comparison.

Let us recall how one of the versions of the change of appearance (noted by P. Grimal, *Dictionnaire de la mythologie Grecque et Romaine*, Paris, 1988-9, 167 (4: Glaucos) tells us that Glaucos, after being transformed by the sea nymphs, led by Tethus, was given broadened shoulders, a mighty appearing fish tail, a beard (green as the patina of bronze).

Well, listen how Platon “mythizes”: He who sees the sea god Glaukos with the mere senses (one form of theoria, in the sense of “attentive - inquisitive looking”), cannot without great difficulty gain insight into his “archaia fisis”, his true (in the sense of “controlling his whole being”) nature (insight = second type of theoria). For “the old limbs of his body are partly broken down, partly damaged”.

**Note** : note how Platon distinguishes both weakening and damage. “All his limbs are, by the sea currents, worn down; also mussels, seaweed and small stones grew attached to them”. Also: he is more like a beast than what is “his true nature”.

2. In the same way the soul, if we perceive it in a state (mode of being) - it is indeed “perception”, even if it is called “logismos”, obviously reasoning -, state, which was caused by countless mischiefs.-- We rather examine (always: theoria) in the soul that by which it - with all that is divine, immortal, eternal - is related.

**Note**-- Whoever, mantically gifted, notices a Glaukos, like e.g. a Menelaus, a Greek on his way back from Troy, must not, naively, let himself be deceived by the first ‘view’ (= animal,-- or rather ‘mixed being’) of Glaukos: his vision must, through that (first) observation, learn to think (‘logismos’) of the true essence (‘nature’), which shows itself in that form.

The conclusion is clear: ideation, the process by which our mind grasps an idea, differs both from the ordinary, coarse matter, sensory experience (e.g. one sees the 'poor fisherman Glaukos) and from the extra-natural (mantic) perception (e.g. Menelaus sees, with his psychic ability, a kind of shadow, Glaukos). And the coarse matter and even the tenuous or subtle (fine) matter no longer belong to what the nous, the logos (the little person in us) shows: our mind is both itself incorporeal and gives off on incorporeal data.

Which does not at all mean that it becomes alien to the world and to perception. Far from it. Situated in the essence core of the coarse and fine matter types of perception, our mind 'sees' the 'true', 'original' nature.

### ***Catharsis*** (181/184)

'Catharsis' means, usually, '(purge)'. The effect of a medical purge, menstruation, the pruning of trees (cutting away), becoming liberated from a psychic-moral pressure (e.g., by watching a play) etc. are called 'catharsis'.

Especially sacred rites (acts), which 'cleans' a 'stained' (by e.g. an ethical error) from his (sin) stain are called so. Herodotos (FLC 151), Hist. 1:35, Platon (e.g. *Kratulos* 405a) use the word in this sense.

The structure (essentiality) of a catharsis is expertly made clear to us by W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der Antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected Contributions to the Knowledge of Ancient Religions), Amsterdam, 1947, 233/266 (The Ritual Cycle).

For example, the Roman 'lustratio' (purification sacrifice), which consisted of the prince (or his representative) walking around the people with sacrificial animals three times, is interpreted as a 'purification' of a religious nature. Immediately 'circumambulation' became synonymous with 'cleansing'. But that is the outside.

Kristensen strongly emphasizes that a sacred cleansing:

- (i) presupposes the existence of something (e.g., the people of Rome),
- (ii) that somewhere is 'unclean' (stained) - e.g., by disease, sin - and thus exhibits 'death', i.e., lack of life force (FLC 179). The 'cleansing' (e.g., in the form of a threefold cycle) is, therefore, "a communication of resurrected life"(o.c.,238).

***Kristensen, cites an Egyptian model*** (o.c. 239v.)

In ancient Egypt, among other things, water was the cleansing agent (drawn in the pictures, as a jet, over the sovereign). A series of hieroglyphs, meaning “life,” depict “water” (for cleansing) in many cases. The caption reads:

“Thou art cleansed as one who lives and thrives. Thou renewest thyself as thy father Re (the sun god) renews himself. Thou dost celebrate the periodic festivals like thy father Tum (also a sun god)”. (Seti I, at Karnak).

It cannot be expressed more clearly that ‘cleansing’ is ‘communication of life’,--of the life, which is present in the cleansing agent, water e.g.. ‘Water’ (note the quotation marks) possesses, in the sacred interpretations, present in one form or another among all the ancient peoples, “a creative and renewing power, which, by ritual sprinkling, can be transmitted to others.” (Ibid.).

**Note.**-- This explains somewhat how a Thales of Miletos could come to put ‘water’ first as the ‘primal substance’ (FLC 33).

It also explains, for example, how the first Christianity had the basic rite of baptism, which is a life-giving sign, performed through water: the ritual purity which results from it includes “living, thriving, being renewed”.

It is more than the removal of impurity (in this case: original sin, personal sins that may have occurred): it is “splendor, glory, divine life”. And, if other materials are used - incense, for example - the essence is the same: the ‘incense’, for example, is then the bearer of life. Cfr. o.c., 240

***Conclusion:***

(i) Something, (ii) which is unclean, i.e. without (divine) life, (iii) is (iii)a stripped of that uncleanness (the strict catharsis), (iii)b with the result that, by life-supply, revival, ‘resurrection’, renewed life is the result (the broader catharsis).

***Transitive*** (182/184)

M. Müller/A. Halder, Hrsg., *Herders Kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel / Freib.i.Br./Wien, 1959-2,136 (Platon), says: “Knowledge (note: Platonic understanding):

(i) admittedly begins after experience within the range of the sensuous,

(ii) concerns, however, not that sense itself. It is, rather, a form of ascent of the spiritually gifted soul into the realm of that which transcends the senses,-- the ‘a-priori’ (note: that which must in all cases be put first).

In this way, (ideal) knowledge is ‘Loslösung’, the detachment, ‘catharsis’, from the sensory experience - understand: the (actual) body and the points of interest, which are situated in the temporary and the (material) things. It is, at once, the purely spiritual (note: immaterial) theoria, insight into the forms of being, which are situated outside matter and (earthly) history.”

These heavy German sentences come down, in clear English, to this: just as in the sacred rites man, as possessor of life force, is released from what weighs upon him,--so that he passes from death (impurity) to life (deification), so too - in the theories proper to the spirit - does he pass from a previously dead (impure) world to a previously living (the divine-spiritual) one.

This, accurately expressed, is the Platonic theory of knowledge: it is invariably more than a mere theory of knowledge concerning perception and ideation. It is one aspect of the overall deification of earthly humanity. If, at least, this is what it wants to focus on (FLC 109 (concepts of freedom); 30 (unrestrained freedom); 117 (both free and unfree)).

***Platon’s Seventh Letter*** (ed. Calw. 24)

The letter gives us an example of the failed and successful attempts on his part to achieve this catharsis among politicians: “Of the truth of (these, my) teachings (note: on politics) I tried to convince first Dion, then Dionusios, finally all of you. (...).

A glance at the life histories of both Dionusios and Dion (...): Dionusios did not respond; he leads, today, a pitiful little life; Dion did: he died a glorious death”.

In other words: true Platonism is knowledge theory, but situated in the overall catharsis or cleansing process of the deeper personality (“soul” called; FLC 115; 121).

This is why we said that the Glaukosmythe (FLC 177) must have appealed strongly to Platon, and we have highlighted it thickly. She is not an afterthought.

***Appl. model.***

Platon, Seventh Br., Calw, 33f. gives a method of this. We saw that the nous, intellectus, spirit, is “philomathes,” eager to learn. Well, in order to test people, who are situated high on the social ladder, concerning ‘filomathia’, sense of learning, Platon has left the following information.

**(Introduction)** “(...) I thought I should, above all, ascertain (note : verify) whether Dionusios was really fond of philosophical thinking and living (...). As is well known, there is a well-defined way of making a thorough assessment in such cases,--a method which, in itself, is not unbecoming and which, in particular, is appropriate in the case of great empires (...).

Such gentlemen must be made aware of the proper scope of the study as a whole; furthermore, they must be told what sum of effort they will have to make,--what effort is involved.

**(Elimination)**

**(i)** Suppose, after all, that an empire-born man has heard all these hints and is at the same time a true friend of science (note : Platonism),--namely, that he possesses a mind ripe for the appropriation of “science,” --that in that mind a spark of divinity is present.

Well: in that case he firmly believes that he has found the entrance to a realm of miracles,-- firmly believes that he must now climb up,-- firmly believes that he cannot live, if he tries any other way. All his energies he puts in (...).

**(ii)a** Those, however, who, in their ground, are not true followers of science, but possess only a touch of superficial make-believe, like those who have let the sun bronze only the outside of their bodies,--that type of people is, in the end, crushed by the conviction that such a thing is too heavy for them, even “not doable”,--that they do not possess the innate aptitude to accomplish such a thing properly.

**(ii)b** There are, however, some among these pretenders who delude themselves that they already possess the whole field of knowing and do not even need to go deeper into the matter.

**(Conclusion):**

This then is - evidently and reliably - a method of testing as far as gentlemen with a lifestyle situated high on the social ladder are concerned.”

**Note.**-- This well-drafted text is unquestionably clear: not every individual, certainly not among the powerful of this earth, possesses the necessary and sufficient mental conditions to come to true filomathia, sense of learning, the nous (intellectus) or “the little man in us” proper. There is a whole personality process required before that happens.

**To summarize:** the purification process either fails (Dionusios' closed "soul"; the pretenders, who delude themselves) or succeeds (Dion; Dion's relatives and friends, at the same time Platon's friends-thinkers).

**Broaden:** not only empire giants, all people exhibit this shifting process.

**Note** -- Platon, Republic vii:539b, cites a fourth cathartic type: "You have noticed - I think - that young people, when they have had a taste of the dialectic (note: the art of reasoning, not necessarily only the Platonic, but also e.g. the Proto-sophistic), abuse it, indeed turn it into a kind of game: they use it to "question" everything without ceasing.

They imitate those who prove them wrong by, in turn, proving others wrong. They resemble a pack of young dogs: they rejoice when, with their reasoning, they pull apart and tear apart all those who approach them.

After, however, having thus demonstrated the wrongness of others countless times, -after having seen their own wrongness demonstrated countless times, they soon become accustomed to regarding none of the convictions they held before as credible.

**Consequence:** they themselves and, immediately, the whole of so-called 'philosophizing' are discredited by public opinion". (R. Baccou, *Platon, La république*, 298).

**Note:** -- It is clear that the fourth processing type of Platon's dialectic is typically Sophist. This amounts to one of the many degenerate forms of 'dialectics' (FLC 49), -- of which we can experience many models today, e.g. in the famous Contestation movement.

**Note:** -- *Platonic reception theory*. (185/186)

G.u.I. Schweikle, Hrgs., *Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 365f., defines, within a literatological (literary theory) framework, the term "Rezeption":

(i) Comparative-historical literatology understands 'reception' to mean the way in which individual works or styles (a Rationalist or a Romantic work) are processed - on an international scale - in the form of dissemination, influence exerted on an audience, tradition-building, etc.

(ii) Since +/- 1965, 'reception' has meant -- in a general-literatological sense -- any mode of processing literature,-- but not without a special attention to the presuppositions (what a reader(s) expects from a book or article,-- the cultural level at which a literary work is read,-- the individual capacity for understanding etc.) peculiar to an audience.

-- Hans Robert Jauss, *La jouissance esthétique (Les expériences fondamentales de la poïesis, de l' aisthèsis et de la catharsis)*, (Aesthetic enjoyment (The fundamental experiences of poiësis, aisthèsis and catharsis s), art. published as translation of Jauss' *Aesthetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik*, I, München,1977,1)), in: *Poétique (Revue de théorie et d'analyse littéraires)*, 39 (Sept. 1979), 261/274, relies, among other things on Aristotle (Poëtika iv (1448b)) to include the 'catharsis', as Aristotle conceives it, in the reception: the person who, as a spectator, watches a play, can be moved by what is shown ('imitated') on stage: he/she, in such a case, identifies with the characters, lets the urges stimulated by the scenes run free in him/her,-- in order, finally, to feel enlightened by shaking them off in a pleasant way,-- as if he/she has gone through a catharsis, a healing process.

**Note.**-- One sees that, in this case, Aristotle understands 'catharsis' in a diurnal-psychological sense;-- in this thoroughly different from his teacher Platon (Platon is still in the full sacred tradition).

But from what is said about 'reception', just now, it can be deduced that the non-secularized catharsis (FLC 181), continuation - purification of the Archaic-mythical, as Platon, in the doctrine of ideas and souls, conceives them, also belongs to reception.

Consequence: the four types of processing by an audience (empires, others), which Platon distinguishes among others, are a real theory of reception in the making.

**Note.**-- It is known that Platon, besides having been a pupil of one Kratulos (a follower of Herakleitos of Ephesos), became very familiar with Paleopythagoreanism mainly through Archutes of Taras (FLC 78; 103).

Well, here is the reception method of -- what one tradition ascribes to -- Pythagoras.-  
- Young people, who wanted to become members of his 'hetaireia' (thought society), were, before being admitted to "the first initiations to a new life" (that was Pythagorean philosophizing), subjected to a thoroughgoing (the Pythagorean form of theoria).

Its structure can be schematized as follows:

(i) **the phenomena:** (cf. with Dilthey's 'Ausdrücke' (FLC 06v)), such as e.g. facial expression, manner of going, postures of all kinds, all habits were carefully ('akribeia') examined;

(ii) **the principle of life** (cf. Dilthey's 'Erlebnisse' (FLC 06v.)), which expressed itself in the said series of phenomena, was probed as follows, among other things:

- a. the soul tendencies,
- b. the deep root of the character,
- c. the suitability or otherwise of the mind. (Cfr. Mario Meunier, trad., Hiéroclès, *Commentaire sur les Vers d'or des pythagoriciens*, (Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans), Paris, 1925, 106s.).

Whether that tradition is, in its entirety, historically correct, does not matter: what is certain is that the Paleopythagoreans appear to have had a method of reception, which is a distant forerunner of our current factor analysis (which checks correlations; FLC 70).-- Immediately Platon had a model.

**Note.**-- This chapter is entitled "The ideation as insight into the true nature". -- Another example, next to that of the "true nature of the soul", was "the true nature of lust".

(a) In *Republic* vii (538) Platon says that all that is honesty, conscientiousness, etc., are "presuppositions ('principles')" which are related to the soul.

(b) Well, from W. Leibbrand/A. Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn*, Freib./München, 1961, 68f., 72, it appears that our capacity for ideation (the little man in us) can at once also discern the true nature of the sense of lust.

1. In *Filebos* Platon says that both our sense of lust and our mind (fronèsis) are directed, together, to the good (FLC 58ff), i.e. value-without-more (the idea that illuminates all ideas)

The sense of lust viz. - of which e.g. a quickly passing feeling is only one model - is the motive, resp. the motive to act (life). But within the totality of life, the feeling of lust is only one factor. If this factor goes hand in hand with spirit, then it is morally good; if not, then the experience of lust is unjustifiable in conscience.

### **Conclusion.**

(i) Wanting to exclude all experiences of lust Platon considers "narrow-mindedness!"

(ii) To consider all experiences of lust good is what he calls nonsense.

2. In *Laws* (732nd) Platon had already defended the thesis that lust, smarter experiences and desires are integral elements of the human being.

But the true feeling of lust he describes there as “joy experienced at the righteous (i.e. all that, in conscience, is justifiable) and a feeling of uneasiness (displeasure), lived through at the thought of the unrighteous (the unscrupulous).”

In *The State*, Platon calls “the true feeling of lust” a component of “health.

**Note i:** One can see that Platon nowhere espouses a one-sided intellectualism (giving a decisive role to the intellect,--with minimization or, even, elimination of the other human soul faculties).

**Note ii:** The term ‘true’ (‘a.lèthès’) means either ‘spiritual’ (incorporeal, immaterial; FLC 32 (Spiritualism; 100), for the deepest human soul is neither coarse nor even fine material, or ‘conscientious’ (ethically lofty, ‘ideal’), for as a feature of the soul’s true nature, the true sense of pleasure is openness even to the highest values.

One has taken both meanings of ‘truth’ as a reason for labeling a Platonic or Platonizing philosophy as anagogic (upward, directed toward the higher) (FLC 135 (Idealism)).-- Ideation is its basis.

**B. -- *The ideation as insight and in the individual as well as in the universal nature.*** (188/197)

With these two other functions of “the little man” in us, we come closer to what we can call ‘abstractive’. As a top figure of ‘Abstractionism’ we can cite Platon’s student Aristotle: Aristotle starts from singular (divided, individual) data - e.g. this horse and that horse - in order to reach, to isolate, the universal idea ‘horse’ via ‘abstraction’ i.e. the elimination of purely singular features.

Platon had done this to him, but from his anagogical perspective.

**B.1.--** The ideation as insight into individual nature’ (188/197)

***Bibl. sample:***

-- F.Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes, I (Die Geschichte der europäischen Rechtsidee im Allertum und im Frühmittelalter)*, (History of Natural Law, I (The History of the European Idea of Law in Allertum and the Early Middle Ages), Zollikon - Zürich, 1954, 132ff.;

-- A.R. Heynderickx, *De rechtvaardigheid in De Staat van Platon* (The justice in ‘The State’ of Platon), in: *Tijdschr. v. Phil.* 6 (1944): 1/2, 83v..

We rely, with both authors, mainly on *Politeia* (Republic) ii: 368ff.. -- The basic text, there, reads, “Nature has made each of us equal to the other, yet different according to disposition.” (Vert. Baccou, 118).

The term 'nature', here, means, as with the first Milesians (Thales), the whole of real things,-- past, present and also future (an all-embracing, 'transcendental', meaning, which one finds already in the inspiring Muses of a Homer (-800/-700), the great epic poet).

In that moving whole of 'being' (Thales of Miletos) one situated - besides the visible things - also the invisible ones: Thales e.g. situated in it the 'daimones', the nature spirits, and the deities.

This comprehensive meaning was still alive at the time of Platon: he too situates the individual nature of human individuals within the process of production ('fusus' = production, conception, causation) which is the 'fusus', natura, nature.--Here, seen from Platon, is the traditional background.

### **1.-- *The division of labor.* (189/192)**

This term is well known to us, twentieth-century people, since the Marxist analyses of a class society based precisely on 'Arbeitsteilung' (Division of labor).

But listen to Platon, Politeia ii: 368f, where he defines the nature of justice - here: conscientious behavior, as far as all kinds of divisions are concerned - in the context of the 'Polis', civitas, (city) state.

What can be called, with Flückiger, "the platonic law of nature", basis of every society, stands or falls with the fact that each individual can live a professional praxis, which suits his individual nature. Cfr. Politeia 370ff., 432v., 442ff..

#### ***Flückiger nevertheless notes the following:***

(i) in describing the 'genesis', the process of coming into being, of the 'righteous polis' of a society justifiable in conscience:

**a.** he does take the actual nature of the individuals as his starting point, his "element" (stoicheion),

**b.** but this factual nature is not yet the overall norm (the whole of the presuppositions) of a society. It is one element, a basic element. Nothing more.

(ii) Flückiger rightly sees in this the basic difference between a Platonic and e.g. a Sophistic social theory. Later, the Stoics and the Epicureans will also put forward an analogous 'autarkeia' (autarcia, complacency) .

Platon does know the individual, but not the 'autarkic' (as we already saw, in passing, FLC 27 (individual/type); 30 (individual/individualism),-- 99 (concept of soul)). The individual, however individual, is and remains situated within a society.

**Note** -- P. Ducrey, *Histoire de l'antiquité (Les origines de la cité Grecque)*, (History of antiquity (The origins of the Greek city)), in: *Journal de Genève* 12.10.1985, teaches us that, still, the process of the formation of the Greek (city) state - "à l'origine des états modernes" (at the origin of modern states), (says Ducrey) - is largely an unexplained mystery.

Ducrey, in the wake of more recent works

-- H. van Effenterre, *La cité Grecque (Des origines à la défaite de Marathon)*, (The Greek city (From the origins to the defeat at Marathon)).

-- F. de Polignac, *La naissance de la cité Grecque (Cultes, espaces et société)*, (The birth of the Greek city (Cults, spaces and society)).

-- Claude Mossé, *La Grèce archaïque d'Homère à Eschyle*, (Archaic Greece from Homer to Aeschylus)).

characterizes a "polis" as an initial political "cell," which includes: at least one city, a territory, a government, a popular assembly, a people, a court,-- further: army, production and barter, deities and religion, art and leisure culture, historical awareness, -- philosophy.

Main characteristic: the ancient Greeks are the founders of a political system in which the people (democratic aspect) had a profound say and in such a way that they succeeded - as well as they could - in making such a system 'work'.

Well, with this idea 'polis', Greek society, in our mind, we will better understand Platon's concern for a constitutional state, a polis, in which 'justice' is considered importable (cfr. FLC 115: The doctrine of virtue as the basis of an orderly society),

**Note** (190/191) We know already, since W. Jaeger's *Theologie der (Antike) Griechen*, (Theology of the (Ancient) Greeks), that, except for the Skeptical philosophies, all Greek forms of thought ended in a 'theo.logy', a doctrine concerning the deity (think of the deification idea: FLC 22 (Solovjef); 177 (Glaukosmythe)).

But there is much more: religion was at the front,--at the beginning, as the inspiration of Archaic and even later Greekism.

Thus it is quite possible that the labor division idea, as Platon advocated it, has a very religious origin.

**(i)**-- Hermann Usener (1834/1905; German classicist (= specialist of Greco-Latin culture) and religious scholar -- known for his *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, (Investigations into the history of religion), 3 Tle, 1889/ 1899,-- *Götternamen*, 1896,-- *Kleine Schriften*, 1912/1914 -- has left us a very curious and universally applicable concept, 'Funktionsgott'.

Is 'function deity' any deity whose domain of action is very limited to precisely one well-defined 'function'.

Thus e.g. in FLC 150 we saw how the goddess Atè has as her strictly own ‘work-domain’, within which she, as a causer, is active, the ‘atè’, divine judgement.

FLC 148 we saw, very casually, how the goddess Nemesis has as her causal domain all that is distributive justice.

FLC 177 showed us that Kronos was for a time ‘ruler of the universe’ and thus had as his function domain all past, present and future ‘beings’ (to speak with both the Muses and Parmenides of Elea (-540/... ; the first ontologist)).

FLC 178 showed us the group of deities and spirits connected with water: they ‘control’ (have as their field of function) everything that has to do with (sea) water.

Thus the goddess Nikè, Victoria, victory, is the ruler of ‘the domain’ of victories.

In India, e.g., Vayu (Vajoe) is the god whose sphere of function is the wind.

**(ii).-- *Georges Dumézil* (1898/1986)**

He elaborated on Usener’s idea of ‘function deity’: he is known, as P. Grimal, *Georges Dumézil vient de mourir*, (Georges Dumézil has died), in: *Le Figaro Magazine* 18.10. 1986, 178/180, repeated it once more, as the man of “la tri-fonctionnalité des sociétés indo-européennes”, (the tri-functionality of Indo-European society). In a whole series of works, conceived in a structuralist spirit, Dumézil tried to show that Indo-European cultures stand out for a triad (triplicity):

**i.--** the prince-priest, together with the “scholars” (in Rome the “domain” of the god Jupiter),

**ii.--** the soldiers (in Rome the domain of Mars),

**iii.--** the producers (farmers etc.; in Rome the functional area of the god Quirinus).

The leadership functions, the function of resilience, and the functions of the foundation of prosperity were the sphere of activity of ‘function deities’, -- which Usener had already exposed, less structurally admittedly.

**Conclusion.--** Viewed historically of religion, it cannot be otherwise than that a Platon, who, especially in his last period of life, showed a growing respect for the popular religions, was somewhere in the mental reconstruction of the (Greek polis) society guided by this religious dominant.

Listening now, with the latter in our minds, to what he advocates as ‘natural law’ (so to speak Modern).

***The polis as a society of specialized 'functions'* (191/192)**

“Do we lay in thought the foundations of a polis. They will be, apparently our needs”. Thus Platon speaks.

F. Flückiger summarizes as follows.-- A polis arises because each individual is dependent on the help of others. Which is the opposite of the Sophist and even of the Stoic and Epikorean “autarkic” (self-satisfied) man.

***Appl. models.***

(1).-- The basic need par excellence, according to Platon, is the nutritional need (FLC 118;124). The next two basic needs are those of ‘dwelling and clothing.-- These and analogous needs make me, as a separate human being (an individual), with his limitations, dependent on the farmer, -- the mason, the weaver, the shoemaker.

(Even if I try to live as a ‘marginal’ (living on the edge of a polis), the basic needs mentioned above force me to seek out the terrain where both I and the farmer, -- the bricklayer, the weaver, the cobbler live, -- the living space of the polis. The needs for basic materials, all of an economic nature, betray my need for common living space.

***Platon summarizes,*** “In this way, one renders service to another, -- one in respect of this need, another in respect of another need.-- Now, in view of the fact that there are many needs, many join together in the same dwelling place and move in.-- Thus a common living space arises, which we call ‘polis’(city-state).” (Pol. 36ge).

Note.-- Replace the names of ‘farmer’: ‘mason’, ‘weaver’, ‘shoemaker’ by ‘functions’ and you have the ‘political’ society-theoretical, description in religious-historical language.

***2.-- The split of the two sexes.* (192/194)**

We know that Platon, e.g. in his treatment of the myth of the androgynous, was also concerned with the duality of the sexes.

One aspect we highlight here, somewhat in keeping with Flückiger. According to this legal historian Platon joined the heroic literature on the Amazons in dealing with the social functions proper to female nature.

***a.-- The heroic literature concerning Penthesileia and the Amazons.* (192/193)**

Heroic literature’ is divided into parts, i.e. the heroic passage (somewhat akin to a fairy tale), which unfolds both in the heroic song (short) and in the heroic epic.

The Antique Greek term 'hèros', heros, hero, meant:

1. Lord, leader, aristocrat (nobleman),-- viz. when speaking of the Greek army leaders, during the siege of Troy (= Ilion, Pergamo) (+/- -1400/-1100), in Homèros' Iliad and Odusseia (two epics);-- in second instance, when Homèros means any soldier,-- in third, when he designates honor man who attests to a certain 'nobility' (high ethics) o. g.v. birth (classadel), courage or disposition (souladel).

2. 'Hèros' also means, as from Homeric times, a demigod.-- Thus Platon, Laws 738d, situates 'heroes' among the deities or--whatever he says--'daimones', but above earthly men.-- 3.

3. 'Hèros' means, further, any 'deified' man (of which there are many types).

*Note*-- The feminine of 'hèros' reads 'hèroinè', -- 'heroine' if you will.

*Note* -- Note that hero, resp. heroine does belong to the type of heroic literature, but at the same time represents a piece of mythology (FLC 152).

The reason is simple: a hero, a heroine testifies to a 'soul' (FLC 116: especially a 'mortal' soul or life-force), which displays more life-force than the ordinary, average person -- a fact which, in Pagan eyes, indicates deification (a deity, male or female, is 'divine' precisely because of a particularly high degree of life-force, up to and including immortality). The 'heroic deeds', the 'heroine deeds' are the expressions of this (FLC 05).

*Note*-- By the term 'heroism' one can indicate "all that reveres heroes/heroines". The far left ("Hero of the Soviet Union") or the far right ("Er war ein grooszer Held", (He was a great hero), in Nazi-speak, honorary title for 'very deserving man') still honor heroic literature today.

Penthesileia (also: Penthesilea) was, at a certain time, one of the princesses of a purely female polis. This empire was situated on the edge of the known world (Caucasus, Thrace, Danube plain). The ruling class was exclusively female. Men were, exclusively, tolerated as slaves. Foreign men took care of fertilization. Male children were mutilated for life. Girls, well cultivated, were nevertheless deprived of the right breast,-- so as not to be hindered in archery or lance throwing. Hence the name a.mazon, without breast. The main business of the Amazons was warfare, -- but hunting was also in their favor.

**b.-- *The polis function of woman.***

Since Platon, in his ideation of individual nature, pays particular attention to the individual suitability for some (preferably as specialized as possible) occupational praxis, is, in his eyes, the gender difference of nature (which he, as a biological fact, of course, cannot deny) not so much an opposition of (biological) natures, but rather a very secondary fact.

Platon rather has an eye, in his *Politeia*, for the fact that both women and men have the same natural ability to work. Consequence: both sexes can, thanks to 'paideia' (education), be made suitable for precisely the same professional praxis.

That Platon does see the biological difference between natures is shown by their behavior: men can e.g. - "by nature" - handle forms of work that require greater physical strength. According to *Politeia* 455d, this serious difference in nature meant that women played a second-class role in almost all fields of culture.

Military service - according to Flückiger - applies, in Platon's polis, as much to (young) women as to men. Flückiger, O.c.,133, adds that Platon, here, has an archaic model in mind: the heroic stories about the Amazons, led by her beautiful Penthesileia, who came to the aid of the Trojans: they were invincible until leader Achilles sent Penthesileia to her death with one pull,--with which he, in a non-Homeric way, fell in love, admiring her soulful, supernatural beauty.

**3. - *The Platonic theoria concerning individual nature.* (194/197)**

We summarize, now, methodologically.

**a.-- *The 'fainomena'***, -- Visible and tangible fact: the multiplicity of human needs and the multiplicity of their satisfactions thanks to a multitude of skills, worked out into occupational capacities.-- Behold - Diltheyan - the 'Ausdrücke'.

**b.-- *The 'archè' (the principle)***.-- The element (stoicheion), which Platon prepares for, is individual nature, which, although partly equal in all, is also partly unequal (which is 'analogy').

Thus Platon writes, *Pol.* 370, which follows: "No one is, in his nature, perfectly equal to another. Everyone has, again and again, a different nature ("diaferön tèn fusin"), which makes him / her suitable to other professional activities ("ergou praxeï")."

**Conclusion:** in a righteous (meaning: conscientiously arranged) society, it is appropriate that “every single person - at the right time (“en kairöi”) - exercise a profession praxis, which is according to his nature (“kata fusin”), and, thus, that he/she not engage in anything else.” (Pol 370c).

**Note.--** In concluding, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, that there is a ‘righteous’ order within society, Platon moves from the ‘stellar’ (positive) description to ethics, -- here the ethics of society or ‘doctrine of law’.

If one will: from the order of mere facts to that of what is proper, conscientious. This implies that “the little person” (the spirit) in us, our deeper soul, is attuned both to facts (positive aspect) and to norms (rules of conduct: ethical-political aspect).

***The singular in each of us.***

**(i)** One can of course interpret the unique, sole, singular, individual, singular - whatever one wants to call it - in more than one way.

**(ii) a.** There are details, which singularize someone. Platon, for example, finds it singularizing to note that one has a full head of hair while another has a bald head. But he finds it, in short, ridiculous to delineate the idea of ‘individual nature’ only to such a - in cohabitation, i.e. in the practice of daily life - trivial aspects.

**(ii) b.** But whether the nature of a physician differs from that of, say, a carpenter - this question he considers more useful: a physician, after all, is - if he is this in depth - someone with the soul (understand: deeper personality) of a physician, and a real carpenter possesses something like a carpenter’s soul. (Pol 454c). So that, again, soul science, Platonically understood, becomes much more decisive than the rest of human-descriptive science.

***The “lesser lion” within society.*** (FLC 136)

The desire to be valid, in itself, without deviation, the noble desire, does express itself in a very special way in the professional praxis.

Platon expresses this as follows: “One produces **(i)** more, **(ii)** better, and **(iii)** with greater ease, if each individual - according to his aptitudes and within a reasonable time - can respond to just one occupational praxis.” (Pol 370).--

This is the basis of a in conscience accountable professional fierceness, so characteristic of many people, who are “in the (full) life.”

***Characteristic of two young intellectuals.***

What we have said so far with Platon about the individual belongs more to what is now called “ergology”. But there is, concerning individuality, in Platon more.

-- E. Montier, *A l'école de Platon*, (In the school of Plato), Paris, 1935, 109 (Phèdre/Lysis), gives us, in his terms, a characterization of the soul of two young people, Faidros, after whom one of the most famous dialogues (on ‘beauty’, i.e. on what enforces admiration and astonishment) is named, and his somewhat older friend, Lysis.-  
- Let us listen to Montier.

**(i) -- *Inner description of Faidros.***

(FLC 120: character b.; 156, Dionus; 158) “We are going to meet -- in the Faidros -  
- again Socrates as the leader of the discussion, but, at once, we get to know another disciple of the master (Socrates), the extremely captivating Faidros of Murrhinos, whom we already noticed in Kallias’ dwelling and whom, later at the supper, we find with Agathön.

In the dialogue, named after him, we shall be able to trace Faidros (note : the observation, first degree of theoria),--in all the youthful spontaneity of his soul,--of his fiery temperament, of his lively imagination. Everything awakens his attention, everything provokes, in him, excitement, everything drags him somewhere. He asks questions, he replicates,--he exclaims loudly, becomes angry or is endeared. He is absorbed in eloquence, beauty seduces him. Again and again new problems arise in his mind”.

**(ii).-- *Character description of Lysis.***

“With Lysis, who is a little older, Faidros is friends.-- Lysis is, however, less naive. But he is sincere. He comes across, therefore, as sympathetic and attractive.

He is one of the strongest personalities -- and one of the liveliest -- among Socrates’ students. He is an exuberant one,--up to the point of rashness. Extremely intelligent, he is also extremely impressionable. Often unjustly, he is on fire, while at the same time, he responds to every possible form of incorrect reasoning he encounters. With pleasure he bites into something, without paying attention.

This, only to suddenly realize that he was wrong,-- only to resume, with charming honesty, once he has returned to the starting point (of the discussion),-- with Lysis asking questions, raising objections, disputing in such a way that he is pushing the point.

***In conclusion***, he is still really young at heart, with all the exaggeration and all the misguided reasoning, but also with all the wonderful clarity of young people's candor."

***Note -- The dramaturgical aspect in Platon's characterizations.***

One knows what a drama is (FLC 143: the mimetic, i.e., in stage portrayal, story): it is an action, forming a certain whole (totality), portrayed by actors in dialogue form. 'Dramaturgy' is either the activity of the dramatist (and the director) or (especially) that literatology (literary theory) which deals with drama.

Well, D. Barbedette, *Platon et le Néo-Platonisme d'Alexandrie*, (Plato and the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria), in: J. Bricout, dir., *Dict. pratique des connaissances religieuses*, t. 5, Paris, 1927, 619, says in this regard what follows.

(i) Platon's works - dialogues and letters especially - are both belletrise (FLC 62 : Humanism; 74), i.e. literary art form, and philosophy.

***Consequence:***

a. The form(s) is that of dramatic dialogue, as practiced by the brilliant Antique Greek drama writers,

b. The content is provided by each individual, who participates in the conversation reasoning (defining, elaborating hypotheses or criticizing).

The 'harmony' (integration) of both aspects means, in fact, that each individual represents both one dramaturgical character and one philosophical reasoning at the same time. As in a Greek theater play.

(ii) This literary hybrid has, besides its advantages, also drawbacks. In order to get rid of these - according to Barbedette - Platon gradually gives up this style of writing.

In his *Politeia*, therefore, each individual gives a long exposition and in his *Laws* the dialogical philosophical style has even disappeared completely.

***Note***. - We dwell briefly on this dramaturgical element, first of all because it is a main feature of Platon's works, but also because the singularization of individuals by means of a single main feature concerning temperament (character) and by means of a single philosophical position may turn out to be very poor. It remains too much with the typical (FLC 27).

## **B. II.-- *The ideation as an insight into universal nature.***

We have, so far, invariably adhered to the term ‘nature’ (fusic) to denote the object of ideation, characteristic of the little man in us (our mind). We are going to get, again, confirmation of that language, *Politeia* x:597v.. -- Behold, as accurately translated as can be, the text.

(1) -- Finally, there are three modes of being of ‘the bed’.

(i) First of all ‘the bed’, which is the very nature of the bed and of which we say - I think - that ‘God’ is the causer. Who but Him could it be?

(ii) Then ‘the bed’, which a joiner somewhere carpenfers.

(iii) Finally, “the bed,” which some painter puts on a canvas.-- Thus, the painter, the cabinetmaker, and “God” are three realizers of these three modes of being of “the bed.

(2) -- Now, ‘God’ -- either He does this of His own accord or some necessity compels Him to do so -- worked out only that ‘bed’ which exists in ‘nature’ (“en tèi fusei”). Only this truly being (note: in the real sense of that word ‘actual’) bed did He bring forth (‘ephemera’), which, incidentally, is one of a kind.

Two or more of that type of ‘bed’ were not brought forth by ‘God’ (‘eputeuthèsan’), nor will they be brought forth (‘fuosin’). The reason for this is the following. Supposing He had made, even if only two copies of these single beds, then - above these two copies - again a single bed would appear, in which these two copies would find their ‘eidòs (note : idea, idea, being form). But immediately this single bed would be the truly being bed and not the two copies of it.

This ‘God’ knew and, since He wanted to be the causer of the truly being bed - and not some creator of some copy - He brought forth the sole nature of ‘the bed’ (“mian fusei autèn efusen”).

Consequently, we give Him as the name ‘fut.ourgos’, originator of nature. Or something of that nature? With good reason! For He caused the nature (‘fusic’) of e.g. this specimen (note : of that nature), as for that matter of all other things.-

And the joiner: shall we call him the craftsman of the bed? And the painter: shall we call him, too, the craftsman and designer of this bed? Absolutely not! It seems to me that the name that best represents him is “the one who represents what the other two have produced”.

**Notes:**

(1) For the painter, one sometimes translates by 'imitator', but this is a poor translation, for, in Platon's eyes, painting is certainly more than exact rendering, 'imitation', of what is present in the nature that surrounds us, visible and tangible.

(2) One sees that 'eidos' or 'idea' (Platon uses the two Greek words) is by no means far removed from 'universal collection': this bed, here and now, that bed, there and soon,-- they are 'elements' of the unique collection 'bed'.

(3) The term 'fusus', natura, nature, Platon,--apparently following a long philosophical tradition, --that of the Paleo-Milesians (Thales of Miletos (-624/-545),-- Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547),-- Anaximenes of Miletos (-588/-524)), who repeatedly speak of the 'fusus' or, also, 'genesis', the process of generation (FLC 188v. ), which brings into being all being (the past, the present and the future)

(4) That ideas also exist of objects, designed and worked out by craftsmen, appears from e.g. Kratulos 389a/390a.

(5) The term 'futourgos', cause of nature, which Platon indicates as representing the role, function (FLC 190v.), which God plays (as Platon conceives Him outside the biblical revelation), brings to mind Nathan Söderblom (1866/1931), *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens (Untersuchungen über die Anfänge der religion)*, Leipzig, 1926-2, 93/156 (Die Urheber).

There this eminent religious scholar is talking about figures, who only remotely remind us of our Biblical Yahweh or Trinity, but who, at the same time, still deserve somewhere the Biblical name 'God', for the reason of the extremely high, yes, all-transcending 'function', their own. That function is not the Biblical creation, but it goes somewhere in that direction. This is also why we have retained the term 'causer' (here: of nature) in the translation.

(6) FLC 31 we pointed out that while Platon is the founder of an ideocentrism, he is not the founder of a theocentric idealism. Only centuries later, with Albinos of Smurna - according to Father De Strycker - does God become the one who, in his spirit, is the bearer of the ideas, the models, of creation. Yet one cannot escape it: God' (the Creator, the Urheber) here brings forth the nature, the essential form, of things themselves. Does this not somewhat anticipate Albinos of Smurna?

***The dialectical method.***

This is what we were talking about in FLC 49/69. It includes the diairetic method, which makes a multitude (collection) one by paying attention to one or more common traits. These are, then, laid down in a definition (FLC 50).-- Politeia x: 596a explains this method.

(i) Wilt thou have us proceed from this point here, in our investigation, by our ordinary method?

(ii) a. We are, indeed, in the habit of presupposing a well-defined form of being -- and precisely one -- for every collection of distinguishable objects, in so far as we give the same name to them.

Let us take, for example, the collection which you prefer. Thus there is a multiplicity of distinguishable beds and tables.

(ii)b. Are we not also in the habit of saying that the originator ('causer') of these two pieces of furniture keeps the eye on the creature form, the one wants to carpenter the beds, the other the tables,-- things we use? Does this not also happen with the other objects? It is, after all, obvious: the creature form, -- no craftsman makes it, right?

**Note** -- Again, as in previous text, there is:

(i) set theory -- who does not think, in this, of the re-foundation, on a mathematical -- logistic basis, of it by Georg Cantor (1845/1918: Mengenlehre) --,

(ii) but also, again, the reference to the one who is the causer of the collection.

Rightly says F. Flückiger, *Gesch. d. Naturrechtes*, I, 133f. :

(1) Although Platon assumes the - among other things politically (FLC 188ff.) viewed - fuis (nature), he does not dwell on it.

(2)a He exposes, in the individual, something that is general.

Does there exist, e.g., a set (note : collection) of distinguishable people, who are 'brave' or 'righteous', then there is evidently something that extends beyond the individual ("etwas Ueberindividuelles").

In this, these distinguishable people participate equally (note: this is called "participation" or "participation" ("methexis")). That identical wants to be indicated with terms, i.e., 'bravery', 'justice'. This more-than-individual indicates, in all its instances, something that is identical.

For to be brave or to be righteous means:

i. not merely the virtue of somewhere one man,

ii. but something that is determinable ('verifiable') both with this man here and now and with that man there and later.

(2)b 'bravery' and 'righteousness' are something that is there (note: in the sense of 'given'),--irrespective of the fact whether there is, e.g., one single person who is brave or righteous.

**Note** -- Flückiger adds that there is a second reasoning for the independent existence of the ideas of "valor" and "righteousness": a single person can be valiant (or righteous) in different degrees ("to a great extent", "but little righteousness"). This refers to quantity over quality. Yet, in our view, the quantification of a trait is another, new idea in itself.

### ***Conclusion.***

(1) The qualities - in whatever degree - such as e.g. bravery, righteousness etc. (again - typically Platonic - soul qualities), are visibly present in the individual, who is a copy ('element') of it: they are recognized in it as a phenomenon.

(2) Yet these qualities - Flückiger speaks too much in terms of 'concepts' (but Platonically they are, apart from concepts in our consciousness, actual properties, which become visible as behavior) - indicate a type of 'reality' of a general nature, but spread or spreadable over a plurality of specimens.

Flückiger, like many interpreters of the Platonic idea, limits reality, proper to such properties, in its generality, to mere 'conceptual' (we say 'conceptualist', 'reality'). What Platon misinterprets is. Platon always thinks first of actual, daily ascertainable qualities. Only then does he think about the way in which they, a kind of image alike, are present somewhere in our minds. Insofar as they are present in the mind of the knowing-thinking human being, they are, indeed, purely comprehensible, "conceptual" (aspect that the so-called conceptualists overemphasize).

Platon's dialectic method is more and different than combinations of concepts. She is absolutely no 'theory', in the present sense. She is reality contact: in the brave man, a reality, a real bravery - not a conceptual one - is at work.

Platon's dialectic method is also different from later Neoplatonic dialectics: some later Neoplatonists, differing in this from Platon, to whom they did dare to appeal, considered the "fainomena" (the visible and tangible, material world) as "void," as a "sham world. Platon did not. Witness his commitment to education, to healthy political life. Witnesses are his own texts.

Some Neoplatonists shared the world and commitment alienation of a number of Kunish (Cynic) thinkers and spoke of a 'cosmos noëtos', mundus intelligibilis, a world of ideas and ideas content, situated all too far from this earth and its life, from this cosmos and the life in it.

*As an aside*, in that type of Neoplatonism, clearly, un-Greek, Eastern influences were at work.

***Ideation is at once, abstraction.*** (202/203)

Since the idea is a universal phenomenon, rooted in a universal property (-reality), - since the abstract, universal concept is the representation of it in our mind, ideation is at the same time abstraction.-- Let us take, as an applicative model, the idea 'horse' (which Platon himself quotes).

(1) The singularization (individualization) of the idea in one specimen of it is ascertainable thanks to individual characteristics (which, as we saw, together make up the individual nature (FLC 189;195: détails, soul)). For example, here and now this horse is (i) small, (ii) grey-haired, (iii) alive and kicking, (iv) purchased last year, etc.. This makes it distinct from all other (= dichotomy, complement) horses, which share the same general nature.

(2) The Abstractionists - e.g. Aristotle - let all these singular traits of knowledge fall away, by what they call 'af.airexis', abstractio, literally: getting rid of (dropping, not paying attention to). Thus only the universal traits of knowledge are left. These are recorded in an abstract universal concept.

***But 'abstraction' is not an ideation.***

An Aristotle, as an abstractionist, does proceed abstractively (what we have just described), but not ideatively (that is Platonic dialectic).

(a) *In Platon's view*, (i) no singular horse, (ii) no group (= private collection) coincides with all actual, indeed all possible (= conceivable) horses.

The idea 'horse' is not merely the finite collection of all actual horses; it is the infinite collection of all possible horses. Note: those possible horses precede the actualized (phenomenally determinable, 'actual') ones, for after the paragon (model) of the possible (imaginable) the actual, actualized horses are made.

***The 'fusus', 'genesis'.***

In modern Dutch: de productieproces van de feitelijke paarden wordt, letterlijk, bepaald door de idee 'paard'. That idea is so pre-existing and 'powerful' (determining the production) that every actual, determinable horse bears witness to it, because it is made according to that pattern.

***As an aside:*** only from here is it understandable that Platon, when speaking of ideas, 'natures' ('fusesis'), refers to a deity, which he labels 'fut.ourgos' nature-maker, (FLC 199: causal belief).

Let it be said once and for all: Platon is a realist. He is not talking about concepts (unless secondary). He is talking about natures, which are and remain situated in nature (the overall process of production (FLC 189)),--about the pattern according to which those natures, that natural process, operate. That is about ideatively determined nature-processes.

Something like that does not interest e.g. the cynic (as a nature- and culturepessimist). The abstractionist is not interested in this either (he only looks at the elimination of individual traits).

The conceptualist is not interested in this either (he stares blindly at "concepts").

Basically, some Neoplatonists are not interested in this either (they look away from the natural process as worldly strangers,--into a 'transcendental sphere').

But that interested Platon.--

**(b) *In Platon's eyes,*** every singular horse, every group of singular horses (= private collection) is summed up in the unity of the unique 'idea' (e.g. that of 'horse'). This one, only, unique, but all possible copies of the idea governs the process of nature (nature), insofar as its realization is at stake: where a horse is received in the mother's womb, there the idea 'horse' (the pattern, the working model) actively acts as a structuring agent. Thus for all possible horses.-- That is Platonic theory of ideas.

**Note -- Actualization of the idea.** (204/205)

E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), 95, n. 39, says: “The terms ‘eidos’ and ‘idea’ (note: the words, by which Platon speaks of the model) denote an objective structure,--not a representation in our minds. This structure is ‘perfect’ what it is: it is the ideal type of its representations in the concrete world.

If a craftsman is to do a good job, he must “look at the idea”; it “must float before his mind; it must be present in his mind.”--Provided by the author.

Thus, in the XVIth century, one came to use the term “idea” for “an ideal representation in the mind” and, later, for any “concept.

This, however, was never the case in antiquity”. -- So one sees the evolution of meaning of the term ‘idea’. But also its betrayal,-- conceptualistic, abstractive.

Yet the original meaning, under other forms, is still current.

**A model,--**

**Bibl. sample:** S.R., *Çe gène qui ‘photocopie’ l’ADN humain*, (The gene that ‘photocopies’ human DNA), in: *Journal de Genève* 26.03.1988.

A gene, which is the causative agent of the image (‘copy’) of the human DNZ (deoxyribonucleic acid), has just been released.

**a.** Subject scientists had already uncovered some such gene types in primitive organisms, such as viruses, bacteria or yeasts.

**b.** But this is the first time that such a gene type has been isolated in a human cell.

The DNZ is a very “long” molecule that resides in all of our individual cells. It contains the information (note: feel free to translate by ‘(partial) ideas’), which allow each cell (**i**) to live and (**ii**) to realize its functions (= roles).

Now, each time that a cell division takes place in our body, this DNZ molecule is compelled to produce a copy of itself - a “photocopy” if you will - so that each of the cells that emerge from the cell division has all the necessary information (note: (partial) ideas) at its disposal.

The production of such an image (‘photocopy’) of the DNZ molecule is a delicate operation. Indeed, if erroneous information is introduced, it will cause either the malfunctioning or the death of the cell. (...).

So much for this communication from the scientific working group at Stanford University, which made the discovery.

**Note:** It is indeed about fisis, genesis, in the research of Stanford University, -- namely, cell divisions. And therein a pattern, a paragon (an ‘exemplary cause’ they said after Platon), is at work.

We say, “at work.” The information is active: it determines (works out) how the cells will look, how they will live or die (in case of failure), how they will function.-- Well, that very thing is a Platonic idea.

***The “functioning” of ethical ideas.*** (205/207)

(1) Supposedly, someone makes the decision to “act bravely.” This ethical quality is more than the mere extra-human process of nature.-- As soon as I decide to act courageously, I activate the energies which are active in the idea ‘courage of life’. More than that: then I have a pre-existing model (paragon),-- whether or not bound to concrete-individual models (‘copies’), which I can see around me, for example. For these models too are merely copies, ‘eidola’, images, or also ‘mimèmata’, imitations, representations, of the one, unique idea ‘bravery’, which is the same in all copies, -- even though there are numerous détails (FLC 202) which make each individual model distinguishable from all other models of bravery.

(2) Karneades of Kurene (= Cyrene; -214/-129; belonged to what is called ‘the third Academy:-- a Skeptical form of Platonism) has left us, according to Cicero’s *De fato* (on fate), a -- in this context useful -- model of thought.

We have already touched upon Platonic conceptions of freedom: FLC 109 (autarkic freedoms); 117 (degree of freedom; 125 (free sex); 131 (Liberal freedom); 183 (will to catharsis)).

Well, we listen to the skeptical Karneades on the subject.--

(1).-- The Stoics claim: “If all phenomena (events) are brought about by the process of production, which is called (fate), then nothing (no phenomenon, no event) is in the power of free will.”

(2).-- Karneades opposes this: “It is true that every event has a cause. But it has not been proved anywhere that one cause is not -- eventually -- active independently of another,-- so e.g. our will.

Well, it is an observable fact that our free will causes some phenomena, events, without external, prior (‘fatal’) cause. -

Thus the process of generation, ‘nature,’ which the Stoics presuppose and call (fate), does not generate all phenomena (events).”

**Bibl. sample:** M. Conche, *Carnéade de Cyrène* (-214 /-129), in: D. Huisman, dir. , *Dict, des philosophes*, Paris, 1984, 478/480.

How Carneades, a Pseudo-Platonist, conceived and elaborated the generation of his results, independent of the natural process, Fate included, is shown by an appearance of his at Rome in -156.

M. Conche describes this as follows.

(1). His eloquence could be judged from two of his speeches, which he gave while staying in Rome as an envoy from Athens. They were of such a nature that Cato persuaded the Roman Senate to allow the Athenians’ request,-- so that “their dangerous envoys, among whom Carneades, would no longer stay in Rome”.

(2).a. The first day Carneades had, in a splendid manner, set forth all that one, in the wake of Platon, Aristotle,-- Zenon (of Kition;-336/ -264; founder of Stoic thought), Chrusippos (the Kilician; -280/-207; second founder of the Stoa), could bring to bear in favor of justice (= conscientious living).

(2).b. The second day he had, in no less splendid manner, laid to rest all that he, the day before, had asserted: he had shown that “righteousness” is only a “word,”--as every individual--especially every Roman--desires only what is of use to him.--Till there Conche.

**Notes:**

(i) This Skepticist method - called ‘dialectics’ (FLC 185: “a gang of young dogs”) - is in fact an eristic or technique aimed at redoubt for redoubt’s sake. One developed for and against so that a suspension of judgment (‘ep.ochè’), i.e. not being able to make any judgment, was caused. Such a thing - a fundamentally Nihilistic reasoning technique - was not yet known to his Roman audience of the time.

(ii) The freedom lies not only in the fact that Carneades freely, uncaused, took the decision to hold those conferences. Rather, the freedom lies in the playful manipulation of arguments for and arguments against. Thus one “plays” with reasoning,-- abstracting from real life, which cannot advance with such a thing.

We saw FLC 88 how Fr. Nietzsche, among others, defines Nihilism as the “winnowing away of the higher ideas” (which are thoroughly different from the human ‘concepts’ (Conceptualist), from the ‘abstract notions’ (Abstractionist).

Well, in Carneades we have a Platonist (he was even leader of the Academy founded by Platon), who first brilliantly defends the idea of ‘justice’ (we know how dear this idea was to Platon), ... only to then, cynically, raze it to the ground,-- by claiming that, in fact, people’s behavior is such as if that higher idea did not even exist.

From “higher idea” he brings them down to a “mere word. If that is not, to his Roman audience, paving the way to a type of skeptical nihilism!

Well, such a thing takes place in freedom: nothing, certainly not a (Stoically conceived) Fate (which he does not even seriously believe in), not even the Nature (the process of production of all being, -- past, present, future) particularly emphasized by the Antique Greeks, Nature, which he did not seriously believe in as nudging free acts.

There is one Platonic idea that can explain such a thing, viz. ‘para.frosunè’ (FLC 175: beyond-thinking): Carneades either represses (unconsciously) or suppresses (consciously) -- the latter being the most likely, given his high philosophical-rhetorical formation.

***The light of the higher idea ‘justice’*** (i.e. conscientious living).

This implies that ethical ideas, certainly the higher ones, provide in themselves, in the very nature of their being, for human freedom.-- Here lies the profound difference from e.g. being received, in the womb of e.g. a horse (FLC 203),-- which is a mere process of nature, without intervention of freedom.

The idea ‘justice’, however, affects the life process, but differently from the idea ‘horse’. We have tried to make this distinction, to be situated in the idea itself, on the basis both of Carneades’ doctrine of freedom and, above all, of his application of that doctrine to freedom,--in a Nihilist form.

The Nihilist shows us, acutely, how an ethical idea, in itself, carries its opposite, the unethical idea, as thanks to freedom as possible.

### **General conclusion.**

Xenokrates of Chalkèdon, leader of the Academy (from -338 to -314), once attempted to give a brief definition of the idea.

O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus*, (History of Idealism), I, 433, gives them: “Aitia paradeigmatikè, exemplary (= exemplary) cause (= presupposition),- ton kata fusin aei sun.estoton, of all that,- according to its nature (‘fisis’), invariably exists together”.

**In other words:** (i) one proceeds from what according to its nature (= form of being, form of life) invariably exists together (so e.g. all that is gold);

(ii) that system-unity (that ‘together.existence’) has an explanation, aitia, causa, cause;

(iii) but that cause does not refer to the existence of all that belongs together according to its nature; it refers to the model, the paragon, according to which it is what it is.

In simpler terms: a number of specimens of something (e.g. all that is gold) - the ‘elements’ of the ‘collection’ (gold) - belong together, although spread over the whole of the earth’s crust, because they display one common property (namely, to be gold). The ‘cause’ (element to be put first) of this is the model (‘gold’). That model, active in the generation of what exists according to that model (‘kata fusin’, secundum naturam, according to its nature is the idea (here, in this case: ‘gold’). The generation (of ‘gold’ e.g.) can continue endlessly, in the process of nature (infinite collection).

The idea, after all, includes not only all actual copies (all that is actual gold), but all possible copies.-- We said: ‘system unit’. Indeed, apart from the collection unit (all copies exhibit, each separately, the one property, here: ‘gold’ (distributive structure)), there is the system unity, namely the fact that the generation process is the same for all specimens, which, therefore, have one common origin. They have this origin collectively (collective structure).

**The ideation.--** We have, now, the little man in all of us, behind us.

(i) FLC 177/188 gave us the insight into the true (understand: either immaterial (spiritual) or ethically high) nature;

(ii) FLC 188/197 gave us the insight into individual nature; FLC 198/208 gave us the insight into universal nature.

But as F. FLückiger, *Geschichte der Naturrechtes*, (History of Natural Law, ), I, 136, strongly emphasizes, Platon makes the idea ‘nature’, through his style of thinking, evolve from ‘empirical’ (sensory) to ‘metaphysical’ (ideative).

**C.-- The ideation as method.** (209/217)

The little man in us is, in a certain sense, a natural fact, an ability, a disposition.-- But, like everything in nature, the spirit in us is, at least in its elaboration, susceptible to formation and especially to method.-- Before we expound, however, this aspect, a word about the noble yoke.

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Idealismus*, I, 439f., relying, among other things, on *Politeia* (e.g. vi: 490), points to an analogy reasoning.

(1) Platon, as so often, taps into an Archaic teaching that says, “the like is known by the like.” In terms of current model theory, one could say, “The original (that which is unacknowledged, at least in part) is known by the model (that which is, at least in part, borrowed).”

(2) Platon applies that.

a. The eye, by virtue of the fact that, among all our faculties, it best approximates the sun’s form of being, is capable of knowing the sun. The universe-founding deity has:

(i) the ability to see and (ii) all that is visible through the eye, attuned to each other.

This makes them similar to the animals of draught, within a span. Each, in pulling, is attuned to the other, ‘united’, by a yoke which holds the two animals together. In the same way, the light of the sun plays the role of a ‘noble yoke’: it attunes the eye and what is visible through the eye to one another.

b. Analogously, the light which emanates from the good (the value without more; FLC 58; 63) harmonizes:

(ii) to what in things constitutes nature (the true,-- the individual or the universal). Attuned to each other as they are, they betray in their way a noble yoke, the light of “the good. This is, in passing, said to be the core of a light metaphysics.

Now, the formation of the little person in us - the method which should be taught to him - is nothing other than the sharpening of this ‘intentionality’ (Brentano, Husserl) of our spirit towards things in their nature.

***Applicative model.***

The ideation of ‘all that is gold’.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- V. Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon (Structure et méthode dialectique)*, (Plato's dialogues (Structure and dialectical method)), Paris, 1947, 1/12 (*Les étapes de la démarche dialectique*), (The steps of the dialectical approach).

-- Platon, *Der siebente Brief*, Calw, 1948, 36ff..

As Goldschmidt rightly says, the knowledge of something (a 'being' or reality) has, fundamentally, three preparatory aspects -- in which, said in passing, that knowledge is already at work, of course -- namely, the designation (short for name), the definition of understanding (always in one language or another), and the contemplative.

What in the *Seventh Letter* is called the fourth aspect, V. Goldschmidt, o.c., 4, calls 'la science' (science). But the translation Calw., 36, says literally, "die vollständige geistige Erkenntnis" (the full spiritual knowledge).

Platon, in the same *Seventh Letter*, mentions a fifth aspect. The translator of Calw., o.c., 36, renders this as follows: "das Objekt (Idee), was eben erst sich - durch die Tiefe der Vernunft - erkennen lässt und das wahre Urbild des Dinges ist" (the object (idea),-- something which only - thanks to the deepening of the mind - allows itself to be known and which is the true paragon of the thing).

We rank differently, to make it clearer: the noble yoke provided

(i) *The subject*, - here named as 'the science' or 'the full-fledged spiritual knowledge'.

(ii). *The object*, - here named twice,

(1) 'the beholding specimen'.

(2) 'the object' (in the stricter sense), viz. the idea or "the true paragon" (viz. of the beholding specimen),-

(iii) The use of language - expressed here as;

(1) "the designation" (shorter: the name) and (2) "the concept definition.

In these the soul, the subject in the "noble yoke:" records in linguistic forms what it thinks and grasps.

### *Applicative models.*

Now that we have a scheme at our disposal, in which the little person in us suddenly becomes much clearer, we look at a few applications.

### *The ideation of the circle and of gold.*

We take two types of ideation, one mathematical, the other non-mathematical, because, in terms of defining, mathematical ideations have a certain edge.

#### *A.-- The soul.*

V. Goldschmidt, rightly, emphasizes that what Platon calls 'epistèmè', scientia, science,-- 'nous', intellectus, mental insight,-- 'doxa alèthès', opinio vera, true opinion,- - all three are to be situated in the soul,-- Modernly expressed, in the subject. Cfr. o.c., 4.

**B.1.--The contemplative copy.** (210/212) "To eikos horomenon" (literally: the visible picture) is what one, in "beholding teaching," shows.

(1).-- Platon, *Seventh Letter*, Calw, 36f., himself gives us the example of “all that is round, circular”.

He writes: “Circular form’ is e.g. a singular, word-signified fact which bears the name we have just mentioned”. The vivid specimen is the ‘image’ realized in a geometrical body (of the idea ‘circle form’).

**a.** It falls within the range of our external senses. That ‘image’ (‘representation’) is the work of e.g. the draughtsman or the turner (genesis,-- ‘fusus’ or ‘genesis’, words which in Archaic Greek mean causation’ or ‘production’ (FLC 189; 203),-- here by the draughtsman or the turner). But -- Platon adds -- one can e.g. wipe out or destroy that work (perish,-- ‘fthora’, destruction, downfall).

From the Paleo-Milesians onwards it is emphasized that the systechy ‘arise / perish’ (up and down) is a striking feature of what goes on in nature (FLC S9: tragedy). This characteristic - impermanence - Platon underscores in just about all earthly instances of an idea (which is itself imperishable).

**b.** A second characteristic of the specimen is its imperfection, its faultiness.-- Platon underlines this in the drawn circle. A circle drawn on the ground shows in almost all points - in one way or another - a piece of straight line, - which is not allowed according to the geometrical definition (about which later). And what was sufficient for a sophist like Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410; his Materialism led him to conclude that there are only imperfect circles,--without any idea expressible in a definition) to question the foundations of a theoretical geometry. “I never see, with my senses, the definition or, certainly still less, the idea. I see only material circles.”

This is how one might describe Protagorean geometry. Protagoras remained stuck in the contemplative specimens.

(2).-- We add, here, the applicative model ‘all that is gold’. By comparison.-- “Ho chrusos” is ‘gold’. One can show a gold ‘statèr’, coin; one can show a ‘chrusoma’, a gold object, ornament. Or a lump of unworked gold. They are pictorial specimens of the idea ‘gold’.

**a.** This too was once created (certainly the worked objects) and will, perhaps, one day decay.

**b.** They are, again and again, specimens, which - practically certain - never represent gold in its purity.

Every atom of gold can combine with some atom of another chemical element. Invisible fingerprints adhere to a jewel called “of gold.” Mantically gifted people (so-called sensitives or “clairvoyants”) “feel” or “see” in and around that so-called purely golden jewel, the persons and actions that once had to do with it (the ore-finders, the manufacturers, the salesmen).

**Conclusion:** just as the material depiction of the ideal circle is never a perfect geometrical circle, so too is ‘what gold is’: it is always ‘mixed’ with the rest. And thus never the realization of the pure idea ‘gold’. The imperfection is the second characteristic.

### **B.II.-- *The idea (the paragon).*** (212/216)

The specimens -- circles, golden samples -- are scattered in the nature surrounding us. This dispersion however does not prevent even the simplest child, when it has developed, according to Piaget, a sufficient sense of ‘collection’ resp. ‘system’, from thinking these specimens together. This thinking together is the first manifestation (‘fainomenon’, phenomenon) of the ideation in the strict sense.

The child, in question, then proceeds, unconsciously, Platonic:

(i) to express it in Platonic language: “it looks at the form of being, idea or eidos, in and, at the same time, above the specimens” (“apoblepei pros kuklon, pros chruson”: it looks at the circle (without more), at the gold (without more)), -- and discovers:

(a) the similarity (common properties; collection) and

(b) the connection (common properties, but collective understanding; system) between all actual (and, over time, all possible) specimens. A Piagetian psychology of the developing ‘reason’ (structural reason,-- well, that is) has as its absolute condition of possibility “the beholding (looking at) of the idea”.

(ii) To use a second Platonic expression: that same child takes the idea, the eidos (term, which the Phenomenologists, genre Edm. Husserl, still use, though purely descriptive) as a ‘standard model’, as a ‘paragon’ (in Platonic Greek: ‘paradeigma’, still circulating as ‘paradigm’). When we decide whether something is ‘circular’ or ‘made of gold’,-- whether something is ‘good’ (valuable) or ‘beautiful’ (compelling admiration and wonder),-- whether someone is ‘brave’ (FLC 205),-- whether something is a ‘horse’ (FLC 202: ‘horse-essence’), we take, again and again, as the standard the idea corresponding to the phenomena mentioned.

**Note -- Light metaphysics.**

According to M. Müller/A. Halder, *Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Basel/ Freiburg/ Wien, 1959, 98, “light metaphysics” is that doctrine according to which “the light” is the premise of both reality (“being”) and of the knowledge, the insight, of that same reality.- Insofar as this light metaphysics talks about the light of our spirit, “the little man in us”, one speaks of “the doctrine of illumination” (Illuminati).

From Platon onwards, one or another light metaphysics developed in many forms, including that of Saint Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest Church Father of the West).

Well, it is abundantly clear that the doctrine of ideas is the essence of it:

(i) if there was not the idea, -in the circle, drawn there on the ground;-in that piece of gold, on the arm of the beautiful lady,-- in all things in and around us, then both that circle there and that golden bracelet and all material or earthly-psychic things would be lightless, opaque, inaccessible to our mind (‘anankè’ (FLC 35), ‘absurd’.

(ii) If, in our minds, the little man in us, there were not an attunement (FLC 209: noble yoke), directed to that light in the realities, then we would, - then the developing child of a Piaget would have no insight. It is because our minds are light(end) somewhere themselves that we can (premise, possibility condition (FLC 54: hypothetical method)) discern the light(end) in things in and around us.

What Platon (and with him all Platonists) call ‘anankè’, the absurd in and around us, is ‘darkness’, labyrinth, maze (Umberto Eco).

What is called ‘our soul’ in Platonic language no longer finds its way in there. The “soul of the developing child” (a common expression) gets lost in it.

**Note.** - FLC 177/188 (the “true” nature),-- FLC 188/208 (the individual and the universal nature) taught us, with high precision, what exactly the idea, in the strict Platonic sense (not in the Nominalist sense (prevalent since the XVIth century)), is.-.

Here we are concerned with its proper place in the method of ideation.

**Note.-- Transcendence and immanence of the idea.**

One has, wrongly, accused Platon of having conceived of ideas as not merely “immanent” (present in their copies), but especially “transcendent” (reaching above the copies, transcending the copies).

O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Id.*, I, 441, says on this subject: the phenomena, i.e. the specimens of the one idea, are, first of all, sensory data, situated in the immense natural process, for which the ancient Greeks, from Homèros (IX-th e. B.C.) onwards, from the Paleo-Milesians (FLC 189), lived through such an admiration.

Yet, however imperfect (‘imperfect’, ‘mixed’), these very same phenomena, in their ‘phenomenality’, i.e. their sensory accessibility, show us their idea. Admittedly in the extremely poor-limited form of precisely one specimen (one singular element of the total collection),-- in the narrow form of precisely one (inductive) sample,-- but this sample then, Platonically indicated as a specimen of the idea, in it and above it. The idea, after all, works itself out in all its copies.

**Consequence:** according to Willmann: every specimen, however poor, however obscure, possesses an inherent truthfulness. But, as FLC 188 indicated in passing, ‘true’ here means, in Platonic language:

- (1) that which corresponds to our thinking in reality
- (2) that which is immaterial, indeed, ethically superior. This is, in passing emphasizes the anagogic (upwardly directed) concept of truth, peculiar to every authentic Platonism.

**Consequence:** the phenomena have real informative scope. They have, in other words, something serious to say to our thinking mind (they carry - to speak topically - a message (information and communication theory)).

Willmann underlines the fact that - as, more or less in the spirit of van Savigny (FLC 06: a maximum of details), our thinking deepens in the phenomena - the phenomena gain in informative value.

**Conclusion:** to think, as e.g. a Nietzsche, that the doctrine of ideas involves “world flight” and the so hated “two-world doctrine” (J. Sperna Weiland, *Oriëntatie (Nieuwe wegen in de theologie)*, (Orientation (New Ways in Theology)), Baarn, 1971-5, 23 (“Christianity ‘Platonism for the people’, according to Nietzsche”), is a radical mistake, -- not to say a willed (and therefore culpable and intellectually dishonest) misrepresentation of the doctrine of ideas.

**Note.-- The idea as ‘collective structure’.** (215/216).

John Locke (1632/1704; Anglo-Saxon Enlightener of the Empiricist streak), the man sometimes called “the founder of the Enlightenment (‘Enlightenment: ‘Aufklärung’),” as a Nominalist (Conceptualist), felt inclined to question the knowledge of the form of being.

O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propädeutik)*, Wien, 1859-5, tells, briefly, that Locke, in order to delight himself concerning the knowledge of beings, remarked that “the goldsmith knows better what gold is than the philosopher.”

O. Willmann’s reply is worth analyzing. (O.c., 366).

(1) Platon’s method faithful, we must, first, note that Locke is right: the goldsmith, much more than the philosopher, goes deeper into the essentials ven the phenomenon of “gold”. The more details he knows about it, the better the understanding. That,--that is pure Platonic method.

(2) But Willmann points out a second fallacy of the ‘Father of the (Anglo-Saxon) Enlightenment!

(i) Goldsmith, in conversation with the philosopher (of Realist allure, at least), can enumerate a series of properties, soundly, tested for years.

(ii) But, when the philosopher speaks of the essence, Platonic: the idea “all that is gold”, he means “that which makes (= premise) that the many properties enumerated by Goldsmith constitute a single idea (beingness, essence).

In other words: he means the collective or system structure, present in the idea ‘all that is gold! Thus the goldsmith (or possibly the chemist) will say that gold, ‘aurum’ (Lat.), is a metal with a well-defined ‘mass’ (which gives it ‘weight’ within the earth’s atmosphere),--with, in nuclear chemistry, eighteen known isotopes;--a metal which is virtually ‘unchanging’ (stable to the forces of nature). to the influences of nature), yet, notwithstanding that, very ‘malleable’ (deformable) and with a melting point at 1,063° C. (internat. thermometr. standard),--as well as with a solubility e.g. in mercury; yes, it boils at 2,600° C.. As an atomic number it has, in Mendelejef’s Table, 79. And so on “with the (emphasized by von Savigny, for cultural-historical Hermeneutics) maximum of details”.

(A).For the Nominalist-Conceptualist Locke, these “details” are a loose, joined-up multiplicity

(B). For Willmann, the Platonist, they are not a collection of individual properties, but a system of related properties (o.c., 365).

In other words, all these, -- and many other, 'détails' form a coherence: in nature, if it is truly a sample of 'gold', they invariably (and by virtue of a chemical 'structure' (another name for idea)) occur together! Locke, with his ironizing of the idea, cannot justify this. Willmann is right to insist on this. Platon was a systems theorist avant la lettre.

**Conclusion.**-- The idea 'gold' is nothing but the presupposition of the millionfold repeatable fact that the essential characteristics of gold are always perceived together. That 'certain' ('positive') fact requires an explanation. To see the properties as facts brought together by chance, as Locke insinuates (whether he would still do it so easily after our present systems theory is a question), is to 'explain' the systemic coherence by chance (everyone knows that to explain a series of repeatable facts by 'chance' is the worst of all possible explanations).

What is true, in Locke's remarks, is the fact that 'the essence' of gold is not sensible and - in that narrow sense - 'obscure' and, for the moment, remains so.

**Willmann, *ibid.*, explains this 'unclarity' as follows.**

(i) The philosopher, like the goldsmith, cannot indicate from which ground property (principal element) all those gold properties spring and, among other things, involve their unity (understand: coherence)

(ii) Willmann says: "Insofar (i.e. if one does not penetrate to that unifying factor (FLC 70: factor analysis)), the being (note : Platonic: the idea) is an 'x', a 'qualitas occulta' (note : a hidden property)."

FLC 53/54 (the lemmatic-analytic method) taught us one aspect of the Platonic way of thinking, viz:

(i) the hypothesis (which is a main point),

(ii) but with unknowns in it (which is one variant of the hypothetical method).

When the goldsmith or, as the case may be, the philosopher deals with gold, they start with "a set of loose properties," as the nominalist-conceptualists put it very correctly.

But at the same time they invariably presuppose that this loose bundle of properties forms an ever-joining whole. If not, they will never, ever arrive at "gold" as its unity. They must, at the very least, assume that they are, in fact, together.

Note: p. 217 does not exist

note p. 218 does not exist.

**Note** -- The scope of the ideative method.

Platon himself -- V. Goldschmidt emphasizes it -- has given us the universal scope of the ideative method in clear words.

*The Seventh Letter*, Calw, 37, says: "What has just been said -- by way of example -- of 'all that is circular', applies, now, of course, as much to the rectilinear figure and drawing as to the circular,-- to both the conception of the good (FLC 58) and that of the beautiful (FLC 59) and of the righteous (FLC 115), -- for all that is grossly corporeal (whether artificially produced or created in nature),-- for fire and water and all similar elements,-- for both every creature of the total animal world and for every individuality of the human soul,-- for all causes and workings."

Up to there, translated as clearly as possible, Platon's own words. Says Goldschmidt, o.c., 5: "This delineation of the domain of philosophy gives the impression of encompassing the study of 'the omni scibili' (note : of all that is but objects of knowledge)."

### **C.I.-- The name (*designation*). (219/221)**

We grasp, now, the two linguistic aspects.-- 'To onoma', nomen, the name (appellation), is the term, within a language system, created by the linguistic ability of a language group,-- term, which is connected with precisely one fact.

#### **Two remarks.**

(1).- Platon says: the name is created in an agreed (= conventional), yes, arbitrary way. Nothing prevents - he says - henceforth calling 'rectilinear' what is now called 'round', and 'round' what is now called 'rectilinear'. The consistency of understanding these terms will be precisely the same, notwithstanding these changes and reversals of name.

(2) - Platon's second consideration regarding language use concerns the primal language.--

Herakleitos of Ephesus (= Heraclitus of Ephesus; -535/-465; the first 'dialectician') had, at the time of Platon, a number of disciple followers.

Among them was a certain Kratulos, once a teacher of Platon (a dialogue of that name survives).

**Bibl. sample:** A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 1922, 63f . Gödeckemeyer expounds on what follows:

#### **a.-- The Heraklitean theory of language.**

(a) It assumes a primal humanity (Archaic humanity). This primordial humanity founded a primordial language (Archaic language).

(b) The Herakliteans proceeded from that primordial language in order to penetrate to the true "being" of things.

**Method.**-- ‘To etumon’, the original (or, as the case may be, the true) meaning of a word.-- Common words must be examined for their ‘etumon’, their meaning in the primal language. Once this primal meaning has been discovered, one has ipso facto (immediately) an insight into the ideas, coming through in these primal meanings.

**b.-- The platonic critique.**

**(1). The hypotheses** (FLC 54ff. ).

Platon, true to his ‘hypothetical method’, asks back to the postulates....

**a.** First hypothesis: every given thing has a name naturally due to it.-- This naturally due name has been, in the course of time (since primordial mankind), frequently modified, faithfully preserved until the present language.

**b.** Second premise: Archaic mankind was closer to the divine world than we are. As a result, they possessed a more thorough knowledge than we, later humanity. The primordial words, created by that primordial humanity, correspond to the idea, the true essence, of the things intended by them.

**(2) The criticism.**-- Platon rejects the Heraklitean primal theory for the following reasons.

**a.** Platon rejects the idea that primeval mankind consisted only of ‘wise men’ (i.e. men with insights into ideas) -- such that their insights into the nature of reality, laid down in the primeval words, were ipso facto so correct that their primeval language could become, for all later generations, a source of factual, real-world knowledge.

**b.** Primal humanity - in order to be able to represent things ‘objectively’ (= truthfully) in primal words - must, in any case, itself first possess the idea of realities in its mind. Indeed, as the first humanity to give names, primal names, to things, that primal humanity could absolutely not count on already existing and ‘sensible’ (understand: ideally valid) words.

**c.** The hypothesis that the very first names of things emanated from ‘God’ (FLC 198v.) - in the Platonic, not in the Biblical sense of that word - is falsifiable according to the following reasoning.

The singular words refer to contradictory basic understandings of ‘true being’. One class of words expresses incessant change (in ancient Greek: ‘kinesis’, motus, ‘movement’ (in the broad sense of ‘change’)); the other class expresses enduring unchangedness (in ancient Greek: ‘stasis’, among others).

**Note** -- Platon here refers to the seemingly unbridgeable contradiction between:

(i) the Heraklitean ‘dialectics’, which saw in the very nature of natural things changeability, i.e. even reversal into the opposite (think of one and the same landscape appearing cold in winter and warm in summer), on the one hand, and,

(ii) on the other, the Eleates, with Parmenides of Elea (-540/ ... ) and especially Zenon of Elea (-500/ ... ) at their head, who were called in Greek ‘stasiotai’, literally ‘immutability advocates’.

The Archaic thinkers - usually called ‘Pre-Socratics’ - took a long time to bridge the two, seemingly irreconcilable positions (in their extremism they were irreconcilable). Platon, among others, really contributed thoroughly to this end.

### **Conclusion.**

a. Here, again, Platon’s meliorative (underlining the good) theology (FLC 152: Revolution in Archaic Theology) is apparent.

He assumes that ‘God’ cannot give rise to truly contradictory (contradictory) understandings within the same language system. ‘God’ must, nonetheless, have a sense of language and especially thought coherence.

Further: reread FLC 80 v. (factors analysis of language),-- in order to grasp that - in Platonic interpretation - every language must be a real system, i.e. a contradiction-free whole both of terms and of statements (e.g. reasoning’s).

b. Conclusion: the method of the Herakliteans (via a primal language, somewhere along ‘etymological’ lines analyzable in our present language, to destroy the ideas of phenomena) is falsifiable.

**Consequence:** we must ourselves, without this detour, try to grasp the essence of things.

### **C.II.-- The definition of concepts. (221/227)**

Platon, apparently, already possessed an initial theory of judgment and reasoning.

V. Goldschmidt, o.c., 6, rightly emphasizes that the basic elements of a definition - in the sense of “concept definition” -- are “to onoma” (the noun) and “to rhèma”, verbum, the verb. One could now speak of nominal and verbal composites.

Platon emphasizes that the definition, as far as language phenomenon, exhibits precisely the same agreed-upon and arbitrary features as the ‘names’, discussed above.

We introduced FLC 209 and 210 a seemingly illogical classification.-- First we spoke of one applicative model. Then we cited two ('kuklos'/ 'chrusos'). But we added that there was definitional difference.-- We will now elaborate on this. After all, it touches on a basic understanding.

**(1).-- *The definition of 'all that is circular'.***

1. Here we can cite a high authority, Giovanni Battista Vico (1668/1744), known for his (*Principi della Scienza nuova* (1725), one of the works that helped shape today's philosophy of history.

**a.** In his Autobiography, he says that - before all other thinkers - he esteemed two figures, Platon of Athens (-427/-347), "with his incomparable 'metaphysical mind', and Cornelius Tacitus (+55/+119; the Roman historian), "who represents actual man, in his history books, where Platon conceives of that same man also in his 'true', i.e. ideal, nature."

Vico admired this systechy 'ideal/factuality' (see FLC 61/66, where we examined this problem both in Platonic and Medieval terms).

Vico thought that the duality 'Platon/ Tacitus', 'ideal/ factuality', could be found, among others, in Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626; *Novum organum scientiarum* (1620; starting point for the experimental sciences; cfr. FLC 90),-- thesis, for which some statements of Bacon himself do argue.

**Conclusion:** Vico is someone who updates, reestablishes Platonism.

**b.** For Vico, what he calls "philology" (science of language, literature and history) is "the science of human acts" (R.Lavollée, *La morale dans l' histoire*, (Morality in history), Paris, 1892,132).

Well, one of Vico's main theses reads: we, as human beings, understand best, in the strict sense, what we ourselves have created,-- e.g. mathematics, which is a human construction. "A human act", to speak with Vico

**2.** When we, now, with Platon, seek a definition of "circular," we can fall back on "a human act," i.e., the axiomatic-deductive (Platonic: "synthetic" (FLC 51v.)) construction. Among other things, of the following definition: "that which, seen from its ends to its midpoint, is everywhere equally removed"(Zev. Br., Calw,36). Such logical-mathematical constructions make defining easy. If the mathematician, thereafter, reasons consistently, then that definition is applicable to all possible instances. Which is the main feature of a universal, i.e., good, definition.

**(2).-- *The definition of “all that is gold”.***

**a.** All empirically knowable data compel a non-constructive definition. As Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 498, says, every empirical definition starts both from at least one specimen (if not one simply does not speak of it) and from a for the time being very ‘nominal’ (verbal) definition,-- to arrive, gradually, thanks to growing verification (with the necessary ‘correctives’ or improvements), at a ‘real’ (factual) definition. Which is a profound difference from the logical-mathematical entities and their definitions.

**b.** Here we return for a moment to Locke’s remark (FLC 215): the goldsmith knows the definition of gold better than the philosopher. By what reason? Because he handles gold by craft. Likewise, the chemist, who, by chance, handles gold in the laboratory, knows better what gold is than the philosopher,--because he handles it scientifically and experimentally.

In both ways of definition, however, one will have to be satisfied with a set of - loose - characteristics. Why? Because one does not know the ‘essence’ (the idea) of gold, unless one approximates it, through a number of related characteristics. For example, one can, within the framework of a Mendeleev (his table), define ‘gold’ as “what has as its atomic number 79”. But that is one characteristic.

Admittedly characteristic, i.e. “de omni et solo definito” valid: “atomic number 79” applies:

- (i)** to all specimens (de omni definito, to all that is defined by it) and
- (ii)** only to those copies (the solo definito, only to what is defined by it).

Even though the hidden idea ‘gold’, situated in and at the same time above all the copies, remains a ‘black box’ (an ‘x’ or ‘qualitas occulta’ says O. Willmann), -- a ‘black box’, as the electricians say (when they cannot see into a wire connection, within the ‘box’), it is nevertheless the case “that the craftsman looks at the idea (FLC 212).”

This, thanks to an empirical (based on experience, possibly on experiment) definition of properties, which applies to all possible instances and, thus, as a definition, is ‘good’.

**Note -- To which the definitions correctly refer.** (224/227).

Platon counts both definitions and appellations ('names') among the linguistic aspect, in which the soul (the subjective side), confronted with the phenomena (specimens of some idea) (the objective side), expresses its insights in the linguistic system.-- Remains to determine correctly what is correctly defined.

**Bibl. sample:** O.Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I, 433ff. (the platonic idea);  
-- P. Fierens, *Les grandes étapes de l'esthétique*, (The major stages of aesthetics,), Bruxelles/ Paris, 1945, 36/53 (Platon).

**(A).--** Relying on the detailed analyses of Politeia x, Willmann distinguishes a threefold:

**(i)** The idea or archetype ('archetupos', first paragon of something);  
Consider the idea 'goddess';

**(ii)a. Some manifestation of something;**

Think of the two Germanic goddesses Frigg and the later Freyja identified with them several times (both goddesses once gave their name to our 'Friday', the sixth weekday, dedicated to the 'function' (FLC 190; 199) of 'minnedrift' (fria = making love) );

**(ii)b. Some craft or artistic sculpture(carving)**

This of both goddesses e.g..

**(B).--** P. Fierens, in his chapter on the Platonic aesthetics (doctrine of beauty and art), distinguishes a fourth aspect, viz. the 'model', here in the stricter sense of 'artist's model', viz. the young girl who, in order to 'inspire' the sculptor, "stands or sits as model", -- as well as a fifth aspect, viz. what Fierens calls 'l'idéal', the design, of the sculpture to be carved.

**Note:** this design is a concept. It is an intellectual content. But it is not a theoretical concept: it is the concept of what the sculptor wants to work out.

It is true that his theoretical concept of 'goddess' and what a young witch recently asked him to do, namely a double statue - back to back - of Frigg and Freyja, do run into each other, if one will. But the concept of a back to back statue is a concept.

That the two - theoretical - and design concept - are not the same is shown by the artist's behavior:

**(i)** for the theoretical concept and 'goddess' and 'Frigg, resp. Freyja', as well as 'back to back image' he will consult two different books or articles (a handbook of religious science, which deals with the idea (not the concept alone) 'goddess' and also with the functions of resp. Frigg and Freyja; a manual on sculpture;

which somewhat sketches goddesses, in Nordic-Scandinavian style (think Viking art),-- books, which e.g. say that both Nordsche goddesses were magicians ('witches', 'sorceresses'), which includes sacrificial priesthood,-- that they were goddesses of fate (favorable and unfavorable (or emergency) fate) (as magicians), -- that they were, at once, goddesses and of the amorous drift ('love') and of fertility,-- books that say what is right e.g. Viking art or Nordische art.

(ii) For the craft and/or artistic concepts - as far as these are not contained in the foregoing - the artist is dependent both on the guidelines of the commissioner and on his own 'spirit' (artist's mind), also called 'inspiration' (in Southern mythical language: 'Muse').

Here the individual character comes to the fore,--one of the characteristics which distinguish it from (what is often called) "theoretical-universal concepts". That singular essence of design concepts is underlined by P.Fierens, among others. Such notions can be indicated, moreover, as applicative models of the theoretical 'regulatory models'.

### ***Applicative Model.***

***Bibl. sample:*** Al. Koyré, *Introduction à la lecture de Platon*, (Introduction to the reading of Plato), New York, 1945-1; Paris, 1962-2, 22/35 Ménon).

Koyré (1892/1964; the eminent thinker and historian of sciences and philosophy) draws attention, in his book, to method.

(i) Koyré emphasizes the fact that Platon writes dramas (FLC 197): in the dialogue Menon, the dramatis personae are:

1. Socrates, the ever central interlocutor,
2. Menon (a Thessalian condottiere (gang leader, employed by a state or party), an unnamed slave of Menon and
3. Anutos, who will later accuse Socrates in court (FLC 36).

(ii) Theme of the dialogue: "What is 'aretè'?" (note: 'aretè, virtus, manliness and, more broadly, 'virtue' (translating by 'virtue' is incorrect)).

a. Every Greek, Menon foremost, knows - thinks he knows - what virtue, viability, is. And Menon goes on answering: there is the virtue of man and woman, of child and old person, of free and slave. "Every situation, every action has its own virtue." (A. Koyré, O.c., 23, cf. FLC 190: polyfunctional aspect).

b. But Socrates, with his logical-strict mind, points out that Menon defines only types(species), not a general nature (FLC 198/208).

He gives a typology (FLC 27), a range of types of virtue. Nothing more. Socrates insists, "Define virtue without more."

Menon, with his 'micrology' (= a term used by Hegel to denote narrowness of mind,-- 'small-mindedness'), does not understand this. Socrates replies: "For the six types mentioned to be defined as 'virtues', they must have something in common, namely one and the same 'ousia' ('essentia'). This is the condition of possibility (premise, hypothesis) of the fact that they can all be called 'virtues'.

**c.** To which Menon, believing he understood: 'Virtue is the fitness for command'. One recognizes the condottiere! He is speaking, 'defining', from his perspective (angle of view).-- To which Socrates corrects.

**(a)** Again: Menon defines totality (all virtue) by means of a part (precisely one type); well, there are all other types of virtue!

**(b)** Menon thinks 'specialist' (functional): he does not even involve, in commanding, justice (FLC 115: the balanced personality), i.e. conscience.

Socrates, at least as much Platon, are personalities, deeply shocked by the absence of ethical concern around them. The decaying democracy opened the door to unscrupulous, conscience-free ways of thinking. So here Menon, the condottiere: that one is fit to command is one; but - says Socrates (Platon) - to command conscientiously is a second, the true (FLC 188) way of commanding. 'True' in the sense of 'conscientious' (ethically superior).

In Modern words, for Platon, the pure, ethic-free aptitude for command is an 'abstraction', in the sense of 'para.frosunè', preempting the question of conscience (FLC 175; 207). In Menon 's sense, 'virtue' is a form of 'andreia' (115: masculine virtue),-- which, without conscience, sometimes takes cynical (shame-free, because conscience-free) forms, as one can see daily in the behavior of tyrants, who are fit to rule, but have no conscience (FLC 171 : the tyrant, like the (conscience-free) criminals, lives by day in the midst of the night dreaming).

'Defining' as soon as it concerns human acts is ethically co-defining. That is the 'true' (the totality of the human being co-defined) definition.

**d.** Menon, in the “opinion” of having finally caught it, replicates, “Socrates wants a general definition. Good! Look: ‘Virtue is both the desire for ‘good’ (valuable; FLC 58) things and the aptitude to acquire them’”. -

To which Socrates, improving, replies:

**(a)** “Your definition has one term too many, namely, ‘good’ (valuable), for - and here we have a typically Socratic proposition - no one consciously desires ‘unvaluable’, in his eyes ‘worthless’, things.”

**(b)** your definition has one term too few, namely ‘righteous’, for the aptitude to appropriate ‘valuable’ things is, in itself, not ‘true’ virtue (i.e. ‘virtue; FLC 114: ‘After Virtue’). Look at the thief/ dievegge:

**i.** they covet ‘valuable things’, **ii.** and, in doing so, possess the fitness to acquire them;-- but they have no conscience; they are fit only to acquire, -- not to conscientiously (‘righteously’) acquire” -- Thus the dialogue continues.

Definitions apply to concepts, not to ideas.-- Let us, now, summarize both models,-  
- that of the sculptor of the double statue Frigg - Freyja and that of Menon.

**1.--** When the sculptor defines, general concepts or individual or design concepts,-- he does define in the light of ideas, so e.g. the idea ‘goddess’, the idea ‘sculpture’, the idea ‘Frigg/ Freyja’ etc. (see above), but he does not define ideas, he defines concepts. Those concepts are merely ‘pictorial specimens’ (applicative models), in which ideas come through, but without coinciding with them.

**2.--** When Menon, under Socrates, defines, he does define in the (with him very poor) light of ideas (especially condottiere - ideas, such as ‘fitness to command’, ‘desire for valuable things’, ‘aptitudes to acquire them’), but he defines concepts, - general, especially private and especially his own, individual, i.e. condottiere concepts).

Although the perspectives of witch and sculptor, of Menon and Socrates, at least initially, differ greatly, yet there is mutual understanding. We have touched, of this, the basis, FLC 37 : Platonically speaking, there is a minimum-essential common sense (= the little man) in all human beings,--as common understanding. This thanks to the common light of ideas, which remain indefinable.

**D. *The reflective-introspective side of the little person.* (228/245)**

FLC 120 ('Character description'), 137/140 (appl. model) already gave us a first insight into the introspective, resp. Reflective method, within Platonic thought.-- Following, now, precisions.

**1.- *The element of 'Socratic maieutics'.* (228/231)**

In the Theaitetos 161st and elsewhere Platon himself mentions the term 'maieutikè technè', the skill proper to the midwife. In a metaphorical (metaphorical) sense that term is excised from the Socratic question-and-answer method.

(1).- The questions - asked primarily by Socrates, in Platon's dialogues - do come from outside the soul. But they provoke the inner soul work: also, the answers come from within the soul.

(2).-The premise.-- This method, within Platonic thought, is based on the thesis that the thought life is a dialogue of the soul with itself. According to A. Koyré, *Introduction à la philosophie de Platon*, (Introduction to the philosophy of Plato), 15, n. 1, every external authority is, thereby, "put in brackets" (which does not imply that Platon, in thinking, does not accept authority; this external authority is methodically suspended). 'Philosophizing' is, then, the methodical working out of that inner dialogue". - But, says Koyré, *ibid.*, 'philosophizing' is, secondly, a dialogue - from soul to soul - with fellow thinkers. To speak with fellow human beings is to extend the inner dialogue outwardly. In the process, the narrowness (the 'perspectivities') of an (autarkic, complacent; FLC 30; 189) individual soul, thanks to the testing of one's own insights against those of others, is broken.

**Conclusion.**-- the inwardness, the speaking to oneself, is first-rate, but not exclusive (self-satisfied).

**Note.**-- O.c., 20, Koyré returns to this.-- (a) Platon's great pursuit was "the true science" (FLC 188; 214; 226: anagogical ideal (both immaterial and ethically lofty)). This, as a corrective to a deteriorating society.

(b) Yet such a 'true science' is not found so much in text and (linguistic aspect), in books. The soul - always the soul - does not get 'the true science' forced upon it from outside: it is in itself, thanks to itself (thanks to inner work) that it reaches the set goal.

**Applicative model.**-- In the *Menon dialogue* we meet, of this, a model of the maieutic method, but on the background of the Reincarnist doctrine (FLC 104: anamnesis).-- We explain this briefly.

(a).-- Menon, along with Socrates, notes that he knows nothing concerning the true nature of (ethical) virtue. But, like many of his contemporaries, he responds with a then fashionable counter-question: “Well we know nothing about it. But how does one come to seek that of which one knows nothing at all?”.

Note: this fashionable question is taken very seriously by Platon. According to him, there is always a lemma (FLC 53), a preliminary insight (a model with some unknowns), which prompts testing(further analysis).

(b).-- Platon, through Socrates, refutes the objection, in two ways:

(i).-- As more than once, he puts forward a myth (FLC 152), viz. Reincarnism (FLC 104). The immortal soul once existed before, in a world, in which it “beheld” the ideas (as a light, which for lights). After the shock of birth she may come to remember.

**As an aside:** As a philosopher, Platon sees in this myth nothing more than a lemma, a provisional solution.

(ii).-- In addition to an appeal to a myth, Platon (Socrates) engages an experiment. To test.-- From *Menon* 81st to 84a Socrates interrogates a slave. Not by means of ‘didachè’, learning from the outside (think of the authoritarian method), but thanks to ‘anamnesis’, evocation of previous knowledge, from previous lives (in the other world), Socrates provokes in the illiterate, but Greek-speaking slave a fundamental theorem of the then mathematics.

He draws a square in the sand. The slave knows the name of the square. But not much more.

(1) **Aporia**’ literally means ‘getting stuck’, not being able to get out anymore. Here: coming to realize that, instead of knowing, one does not know.

(2) **Episteme.**-- ‘Epistèmè’ is literally ‘any form of knowing’. Here Platonic: ‘the true science’, (which the soul holds). Thanks to the realization that he does not know, the slave begins to search with Socrates. Thereby helped by the maieutic, not ‘didactic’ (= authoritatively transmitted) method.

Socrates, at some point, enlarges the side of the square.

“S(S): Is something that is four times larger (= more voluminous) than something else the double of it?

Sl: No, by Zeus!

S: Then what is it?

Sl: The fourfold of it!

S: So, by doubling the line (note : side of the square, which Socrates had drawn out), thou hast not a double area, but a quadruple?

Sl: So it is.

S: Four times four is sixteen, is it not?

Sl: Yes”.

**Note.**-- One can draw this out on this paper according to the Pythagorean geometry of the time. One knows that the Paleo-Pythagoreans worked with so-called square numbers (in Latin ‘quadrati’, squares.) -- numbers that they drew out, space-wise.

The illiterate slave (Sl) first answers Socrates’ (S) questions incorrectly,-- only to answer them correctly, as shown in the above excerpt from the dialogue.

**Note** - One should actually reproduce the entire excerpt, which applies Socrates’ maieutics to the slave, to understand this very clearly, but it occupies many pages. Here it comes to give a sample of the maieutic method.

**Conclusion.**-- Koyré, o.c.,26, summarizes: “The slave had never learned mathematics. Also: he begins by being mistaken. Yet, gradually, he manages to give correct answers to Socrates’ questions. Which provides ready proof of the fact that he knows those answers,--no doubt without realizing it.

Indeed, Socrates’ questions teach him nothing (note: in an authoritarian, externally imparted way); they do nothing but call back into his consciousness,--then awaken in his soul, a kind of dormant and unconscious knowledge, of which it was already in possession.

**Critical remark.**-- Something which Koyré, in the mentioned passus, does not address is the question whether this application of the maieutic method can, indeed, must also be interpreted in other than the reincarnist way. The Reincarnian anamnesis doctrine is only one of the possible presuppositions that explain mentioned experiment, of course.

Also: Koyré, o.c.,25, n. 3, says that Platon himself emphasized the purely “mythical” (understand: not yet philosophically clarified) character of the anamnesis. Something also recognized by E.W. Beth (FLC 80), who emphasizes that, initially, Platon tries to explain a lot based on Reincarnism, to, later, valorize much more the ‘stoicheiosis’.

That another hypothesis (FLC 51ff.), another factor (FLC 70ff.), put forward in that hypothesis, is conceivable, appears from what a J. Piaget (1896/ 1980; Structural Psychologist) has taught us concerning logical, resp. mathematical thinking ability,-- which in the Platonic stoicheiosis or factor analysis--in the way of the time, admittedly--was already discussed.

It could be, in particular, that the 'stoicheiosis faculty', which has been imparted with 'the little man' in all of us - thus also in the nameless slave of Menon - made the slave realize that the doubling of the length of the sides did not imply a doubling of the square area but its quadrupling.

That a depth memory, from a previous life, -- from the contemplation of ideas, somewhere in an 'ideal world', before this life,-- from the learning process that was gone through, in a learning system for mathematics (the two hypotheses are, Platonically speaking, perfectly conceivable), before this same life,-- that such a depth memory can be part of the cause of the auto-implicative knowledge of the nameless slave -- 'auto-implicative' seems to us, here, a better word than 'reflective-introspective': he means 'encompassing one's own soul input', -- which is perfectly possible. But not clearly and conclusively proved, perhaps not even provable, by the Socratic maieutics.

Platon must have realized this very well. But perhaps, in order to get auto-implicative learning into it (in the unruly minds, all around him), he simply wanted to latch on to a circulating doctrine, Reincarnation. Nothing more.

## **2.-- The element of "microcosm /macrocosm". (231/232)**

O. Willmann, *Gesch.d. Id.*,I, 441, adds, to our little chapter on the reflective side of the little man in all of us, an ancient pattern of thought. Ethnologists have, viz., established that virtually all Archaic cultures, however 'Primitive', see the human being -- both individually and collectively -- as a summary representation ('similitudo', likeness) and participation (participata' taking part in the cosmos) of the total reality,-- here designated by the term 'cosmos'.

Willmann bases himself on the *Faidon* dialogue, among others.-- The soul -- invariably the soul -- carries within it the 'traces' of truth (to be understood Platonically). By turning away from both this material world and from what is sensory perception, the soul literally traces the truth which can be found in its innermost being.

Immediately it comes, of course, to itself.

One application: The Delphic proverb ‘Gnothi seauton’ (Know thyself) thus receives a renewed interpretation: self-knowledge is knowledge of the universe,-- since our soul, in its depths, carries the truth about the universe.” Thus O. Willmann.

### **3.-- The element ‘mania’ (invasion and rust state). (232/238)**

The soul is, indeed, so deeply engaged in the cosmos that Platon, in about two places (*Faidros* 265 a/b and *Timaios* 86b), dwells explicitly on intoxication.-- *Faidros* 265 a/b is more detailed than *Timaios* 86b).--

**Bibl. sample:** G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe (Esquisse d’une théorie générale des relations de la musique et de la possession)*, Paris, 1980, 267 / 315 (Musique et transe chez les grecs).-- What we give, here, is a kind of introductory overview.

#### **(A).-- General typology.**

In the *Faidros*, Platon distinguishes, fundamentally, between two radically different types of “intoxication”. so among others, The pathological intoxication.

1. In the *Timaios*, written much later, Platon speaks first of the ‘nosèmata’, diseases, of ‘to soma’, the body. Only then does he broach the diseases the ‘psuchè’, soul, own. The soul’s own disease is, according to him, ‘a.noia’, sensory perversion (literally: ‘absence of ‘nous’, spirit).

Soul sickness exhibits - always according to him - two types:

‘*a.mathia*’, ‘ignorance’ (understanding : o.g., sentence perversion, which puts the ‘nous’, spirit, out of action);

‘*mania*’, rust state;-- so e.g. extravagant forms of pleasure or pain.-- He says no more about this in the *Timaios*.

2. In the *Faidros* Platon is more elaborate.-- Years before the *Timaios* he says that there are two types of intoxication.

a. The intoxication can spring from a human disease

b. The intoxication can, however, also spring from god-given mediumism (aka: “mediamism”).

Herein Platon distinguishes four main types, which we will, briefly, explain.

#### **(B).-- Special typology.**

Three terms, more or less synonymous, typify ‘intoxication’.

a ‘Mania’, intoxication (often mistranslated by ‘rage’ (intoxication can take that form, of course) or ‘madness’ (sensationalism, insanity) (intoxication can be, among other things);- ‘mania’, intoxication, is a plural of out-of-ordinary-mind activity-stepping states.

**b.** ‘enthousiasmos’, ‘spirit drive’, literally: to be ‘driven’ (= drift) by a deity (‘theos’) from within (auto-implicative). ‘Spirit’ is, in older Dutch, ‘psychic working force’.

**c.** ‘Epipnoia’, inspiration. (*Faidros* 265b; *Laws* 811c), i.e. the intoxication seen in its result, i.e. the deity present in the soul (here to be understood very broadly: ancestor soul, some nature spirit, a strict deity)

(i) generates an ‘intoxication’, i.e. an exceeding of ordinary human potentialities (cf. ‘Human Potentialities’) and

(ii) gives of its knowing resp. ability something in.

**a. Note.--** What escapes Rouget (and many others) is the cathartic structure (FLC 181, 186) at work in the God-given ‘mania’:

(i) the ordinary knowing and reasoning is assumed;

(ii) it is purged of its defects, gaps, (the strict ‘catharsis - or purification aspect);

(iii) it is elevated to a higher level - the god-given.

**b. Note.--** The term ‘katoche’, - Rouget, who, apparently, does not know by his/her own experience - Herodotos would say ‘aut.opsia’, thanks to his/her own direct experience - what Platon’s expression ‘kat.echein’, hold in his/her grasp, means, translates too lightly by the French ‘possession’ (possessedness).

‘Katochè’, possessio, can mean ‘possession’ to us, but then the term was ánd more neutral ánd broader. Here: ‘mania’, intoxication, exaltation of the mind, is - in virtue of ‘enthousiasmos’, deity presence - one of the forms of “being in the grip of (that) deity”. -- We shall see this now.

**a -- The mantic intoxication.--** According to Platon, the god Apollon is here present in the soul. Thus, for example, in the soul of Puthia, the clairvoyant lady who at Delfoi (Delphi) pronounced her ‘oracles’ throughout the Greek world and who was known and especially appreciated, even by the most developed spirits,-- also in the time of Platon.- - The result: clairvoyance.

**b.-- The telestial intoxication.--** Platon says that here Dionusos, the god known for his extravagant states of rust, works therapeutically within the soul.

***Explanation.***

(i) Someone commits, towards a deity (= within its function (sphere of action; FLC 190)) a fault;

(ii) this establishes, in the heart of the ‘offended’ deity, a kind of ‘resentment’ (ressentiment (FLC 148: ‘deeply shaken’); 161 (resentment)), which provokes an ‘atè’ (FLC 149) or deity-judgment;-- this expresses itself in some -- non-normal (paranormal) -- calamity,-- which becomes occasion for some therapy. Platon situates among the afflicted what he calls ‘Bakchanten’ (Dionysian-possessed people),--also called ‘Korybanten’.

Rouget, o.c., 283, believes that this type of “intoxication” can be interpreted as follows:

a. it applies to people, who -- more easily than others -- get out of their psychological equilibrium;

b. Those who are mantically gifted perceive the resentment of a deity as the ‘cause’ and a ‘result’ of a ‘intoxication’ called ‘divine’ (god-induced madness) as the ‘effect’;

c. the therapy includes:

(i) a set of rituals (note: recorded sacred or ‘we’ acts), including a musical ‘motto’ (a verse, but musical), which expresses itself (slowly or quickly) in a dance;

(ii) this ritual seeks, deliberately, to re-initiate the pre-existing (and pathological) mania, intoxication, but, this time, governed by the ritual;

(iii) Platonically speaking, this ritual wants to bring the ‘sick’ back into conformity with the overall ‘movement’ of the cosmos (FLC 232: universe knowledge), which - again Platonically (and Paleo-Pythagorean) speaking - is an ordered movement;

(iv) the decisive factor, however, does seem to be the sacrificially elicited forgiveness of the deity who ‘caused’ the ailment.

The result: therapeutic beneficial effect.

**c. -- *The poetic (poetic) intoxication.***

Here it is the ‘musai’, the Muses, who even at the time of Platon and Aristotle - also by the ‘scientifically educated’ of that time - are worshipped in a kind of ‘brotherhood’, who found in the soul present ‘real’ (not wooden-rational) poetry, -- brimming with ‘inspiration’ --; ‘rationally’ constructed poetry does not even consider Platon, who is very much set on pure mental activity, to be ‘real’ poetry.

In his Ion 534b, Platon says that whoever ‘recites’ e.g. the Homeric Iliad, is usually, inspired by the soul of Homèros himself.

The result: true poetry,

**d.-- *The erotic intoxication.--*** This ‘frenzy’ (in the very broad sense) is caused either by the god Eros or by the goddess Aphrodite.

The result: real love urge (FLC 112/114: boy love and other 'eros'-types).

*Note*-- Regarding 'therapy' Platon, as we saw, much too briefly (FLC 111), had his own views.-- Note: the soul triad 'big monster/ less big lion/ little man' plays, in his therapies, the decisive role. The emphasis is on 'spirit' and 'spiritualization'. So that, through Platon's depiction of e.g. the celestial intoxication, we may suspect that he was not so intent on it.

*Note*-- Yet Platon is and remains honest: as Rouget says, he does not characterize the intoxication briefly outlined above in terms of 'insanity'. Neither retrograde amnesia, -- nor (what would be worse) foaming at the mouth or twisted eyes or backward tilting head or concave body are cited as features of the four types of intoxication.

*Conclusion*: although very mind-bending, Platon does not lapse into e.g. Enlightened Rationalism in this matter.

*Note* -- Rouget uses the French term "trance" to translate "mania" (in English: "trance"). The word seems to come from the Latin 'transitio', switch (to another area of reality).

Anyway we have a good Dutch word 'roes' (something intoxicating brings you out of your 'ordinary' soul state). One thinks of the buying behavior of many of our contemporaries, which was investigated and described by Ernst Dichter (a student of Freud, but who examined marketing psychoanalytically):

(i) not 'consciously' (logically deliberating), except for a sometimes very small part,

(ii) not 'subconsciously' either (e.g. out of fear of the unknown or because one has taken prejudices from someone),

(iii) but rather 'unconsciously' (characterized by Ernst Dichter as -- what he calls - - "the real automatic reflexes"): who does not remember ever having bought something that in antique Greek terms could be called 'mania', unreasoned urge? The Dutch 'roes' is best translated by 'unreasoned urge'.

This is our last word concerning the 'elements' (factors) at work in the depths of the soul.

*Notes.*-- That Platon, as a traditional-believer, believes in the operation of deities, we have already met (FLC 177ff. 198). This is evident from what immediately precedes, again.

***Bibl. sample:***

-- E. De Strykker, *Bekn. gesch.*,(concise history), 111/114 (Theology);

-- W. Jaeger, *A la naissance de la théologie (Essai sur les présocratiques)*, (At the birth of theology (Essay on the pre-Socratics)), Paris, 1966,10s. (Platon);

-- A.E. Taylor/ Ph. Merlan, *Plato*, in: Enc. Britann., Chicago, 1967,18 (Natural Theology).

Here, now, in short, an outline of Platon's 'theology',-- term, which was created among other things both by Platon and by his pupil Aristotle ("From this perspective Platon's philosophy comes across as reaching its zenith in a theology, -- in particular: in *Politeia* and *Laws*" (according to W. Jaeger, o.c.,11 ).

***A.-- 'To theion'***

"All that is divine" ("the divine"), is contrasted, in many Platonic texts, with "human, mortal, visible. In the full sense, ideas are something divine ("ideocentrism"). But all that is related to ideas or resembles them (metonymically, metaphorically), Platon also calls "somewhere divine." Thus, e.g., the soul, the understanding of beings, philosophy.

***B -- The many deities.***

Polytheism is, essentially, extra-biblical. Yet even Jesus, on occasion, uses the term "deities" (so e.g., in St. John's Gospel). 'Deity', in Platon's definition, is "a being, which possesses life force (FLC 179) to such an extent that it is simply immortal (from there: "the immortal deities"). In doing so it is structured just like us: 'deity' possesses both soul (better: is soul) and body (note: a subtle body). Both, divine soul and divine body, are a single form of being,--and this for eternity.

***Astro.theo.logy.***

Are in special degree 'divine', in the sense just described, the heavenly bodies ('astra' = heavenly bodies). They consist of a supremely perfect soul and a supremely subtle body; they are thereby eternally blissful. This aspect of Platonism - as P. Festugière says - will come through very strongly after Platon in the Hellenistic-Roman period. The 'atral' deities, after all, stand above the all-too-local polis deities (for the 'oikoumenè' (entire inhabited world), which emerges after Platon.

### ***World or cosmos soul.***

The deities are structured hierarchically (= rank order). The top of that hierarchy is the total cosmos. This is “like a visible living (because possessing life force) being, which includes all that is visible” (*Timaios* 92c).

The cosmos is “deity,” but perceptible with the senses. Which involves a ‘deification’ of even the gross substance. The cosmic deity is also dual: that immense ‘body’ is animated by the cosmic or world soul.

**Note.**-- The ancient folk belief finds here its Platonic expression: the ‘world-soul’ is providence, which assigns to each being its function (FLC 190) (‘destiny’),-- the basis of a Platonic destiny analysis.

**Note.**-- When Platon, in a number of passages, speaks of ‘ho demiourgos’, the Demiurge or Universe Orderer, it is most likely that the universe soul, insofar as it establishes order, is meant by this.

**Note** - As already stated (FLC 31): it is only with Albinos of Smurna that the truly theocentric system of ideas emerges.

### ***Laws x.***

One point must be emphatically set forth here.-- As Taylor/ Merlan, a.c., 33, set forth, Platon founds instead of a purely mythological theology (or rather: alongside and above it) a physical or natural-philosophical theology.

The myths, in Platon’s view, tell all too inflammatory histories (which can be lived through, among other things, in the licentious night dreams (FLC 111,172)).

Yet Platon does not lapse into the other extreme:

- (i) ***atheism*** (not even believing in polytheistic deities),
- (ii) ***immoral universe governance*** (seeing the universe as governed or ordered in ways that cannot be justified in conscience),
- (iii) ***immoral sacrificial belief*** (believing that one can “bribe” deities by making sacrifices - without ethical reversal (FLC 234)).

These three dissenting views are ethically irresponsible and politically harmful (the latter: community life will, over time, suffer).

**Note.**-- The ‘anankè’, the nonsensical appearing disorder (FLC 35), visible and tangible in the natural and especially the moral ills in and around us, is the result of evil and disordered souls including the souls of ‘evil/disordered’ deities. In this sense Platon is not a pantheist, who would assume a vaguely cosmic deity.

**Note.-- The ethnopsychological update.**

Ethnopsychology is the coexistence of psychology and ethnology (ethnology).

1. What “wronged” Platon in the mythical religion and ditto theology, is the fact that, with the mere hypothetical method, copied from the mathematicians of the time (FLC 51/54), though adapted to the non-mathematical data of life-in-the-cosmos, he could not so easily dispose of the mythical stage,--which he knew to be through-living,-somewhat like a through-living plant.

2. Precisely the same problem, but with one new factor, viz. Enlightened Rationalism (Descartes;-- Locke, Voltaire, -- Kant), literally pinches the present psychological ‘science’ among others.

“Disons les choses clairement: la psychiatrie occidentale s’est révélée incapable d’assurer la santé psychique des membres des sociétés traditionnelles,-- tant dans leur pays d’origine que dans la migration.-- Ceci est un constat, mais ses conséquences -- tant scientifiques qu’économiques -- sont considérables. A l’heure actuelle, l’on peut raisonnablement penser que plus de 80 % des habitants de la planète recourent à des techniques thérapeutiques traditionnelles,-- telles shamanisme, la possession, les voyances, les guérisseurs syncrétiques divers”. (Tobie Nathan, *Le sperme du diable*, Paris, 1988,13).

**Note.--** T. Nathan is the author of *Psychanalyse païenne (Essais ethnopsychanalytiques)*, (Pagan psychoanalysis (Ethnopsychanalytic essays)), Paris, 1988,-- a work that builds on his *La folie des autres*, Paris, 1986.

What Platon did with his (all too brief) description of intoxication, that -- exactly -- Nathan does in the aforementioned works: describe the technical foundations of healing methods within the Archaic-Primitive (and therefore “mythical” thinking) cultures (especially the culture of Maghreb. As a prof in clinical and pathological psychology at the Université de Paris VIII, Nathan directs the *Nouvelle Revue d’Ethnopsychiatrie*.

**By the way:**

-- G. Devereux, *Femme et mythe*, (Woman and myth), Paris, 1982 (especially bisexuality),

-- as well as *Baubo (La vulve mythique)*, (Baubo (The mythical vulva)), Paris, 1983,

Both are works of ethno-psychoanalysis. Devereux continues as the leader of this tendency (using Structuralism as a method, as J.P. Vernant proposed it, in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, (Mythe and thought among the Greeks), I/II, Paris,1971).

Cfr. also G. Welter, *Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paléopsychologie)*, (The primitive beliefs and their survivals (Précis of paleopsychology)), Paris, 1960.

#### **4.-- The element of imagination.**

The introspective method puts us in touch with our inner self. It includes the maieutic method, the micro-macrocosmic method, the method of intoxication, -- but also the imaginary or 'fantastic' method.

We do say 'method', because one can methodically activate the imagination, respectively the imagination (i.e., the creative imagination),-- to see,-- to test, what the result is.

For example, does not the "phantasm" (representation "built up" by the imagination) already play a role in the epistemology of Scholastics (i.e. the result of some sensory experience)? And the Freudians: who among them does not constantly talk about 'phantasms' as sometimes 'more real' than visible and tangible realities?

#### ***Bibl. sample:***

-- Ray L. Hart, *The Imagination in Plato*, in: *International Philosophical Quarterly*, v, 3 (1965:Sept.), 436/461;

-- Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Cours de philosophie, I (Psychologie / Logique)*, Paris, 1933-27, 1 25/132 (Les images), (Image); 132/141 (L'association des idées), (The association of idea),; 161/170 (L'imagination créatrice), (The creative imagination).

-- Gaston Bachelard, *L'eau et les rêves (Essais sur l'imagination de la matière)*, (Water and dreams (Essays on the imagination of matter)), 1947-2;

-- id., *L'air et les songes (Essai sur l'imagination du mouvement)*, (Air and dreams (Essay on the imagination of movement)), Paris, 1943;

-- id., *La terre et les rêveries de la volonté*, (The earth and the dreams of the will), Paris, 1948;

-- id., *La terre et les rêveries du repos*, (The earth and the reveries of rest.), Paris, 1948.

This extremely minute sample from the total bibliography concerning the imagination shows that we have here a very important 'element' (in the Platonic sense: 'factor' for explanation) at our disposal.

Hart's interpretation. -- Hart begins with a "truism" (at least for those who really try to understand Platon).-- "a seminal thinker" (a germinative/ germinal thinker).

**a.** It is doubtful that a single point of doctrine from Platon's teaching can be formulated in such a way that it corresponds under all points of view to every statement made by him on that same point in his dialogues (FLC 49).

**b.1.** This applies to such main points as the teaching concerning ideas, the soul, or the Good.

**b.2.** A fortiori (all the more) this applies to the 'eikasia', the imagination. Nowhere else does one find a systematic exposition of it. It remains only 'sketches'.

Yet there is a second reason why Hart does not expect a full treatise on the imagination: the ontological complexity of all that is imagination. The terms by which Platon designates what our imagination grasps are:

- (i) 'fainomena', phenomena (data that show up, show themselves);
- (ii)a. 'eikones' or 'eidola', images
- (ii)b. 'skiai', shadows;
- (iii) 'fantasmata', fantasy images.

What precisely appears in the 'fainomena'? What precisely is depicted or shadowed in 'eikones', 'eidola' or, still, 'skiai'? What is correctly imagined? In other words: the reality gradation and/or the reality type,--that remains very obscure. Or, at least, very unspecified.

Hart sees four possible interpretations, according to the contexts, in which Platon is speaking.-- The fourth, which he advocates as the one that perhaps best corresponds to the whole Platonic view, he outlines as follows.

1.-- The mind of man, insofar as it is reason, grasps - from the overall reality - only what is unchanged, resp. unchanging 'being'.

2.-- Fortunately, there is the imagination.-- Our mind, insofar as it is imagination, grasps only 'ta fainomena', all that shows itself, -- to be understood as 'genesis', becoming (FLC 189), -- at the same time also 'fthora', downfall (decaying), both at work in 'ta gignomena', the becoming things.

Hart uses, here, a term very common since A.N. Whitehead (1861/1947), 'process' (in Greek: 'kinèsis', which we usually translate by 'movement', but which, actually, means 'change', 'course';-- in Latin: motus).

***In conclusion***, all that 'mobilism' (the term for the opinion that there is only change, mutability) can wish to say is, according to Hart's interpretation, the most probable interpretation that Platon wished to give to the 'eikasia', the imagination.

Since, now, Platon, the older he became, the more he took seriously changing to the 'fusus', nature, it must be assumed that what the imagination grasps, represents somewhere realities, of all types.

***Overall conclusion.--*** If we summarize the four aspects of the introspective method, insofar as Platon explains them somewhere, we cannot make an undivided judgment.

**a. *The maieutic side***

This captures perhaps **a.** the reincarnation fact, certainly **b.** the fact that every human being (represented in the ‘slave’ as ‘Untermensch’ for every right-minded Greek citizen) possesses something in himself, which provides insight.

**b. *The micro-macrocosmic side***

This seems to be realized e.g. in the telestic intoxication, which brings the sick or ill man back into harmony with the macrocosm.

**c. *The intoxication side***

This is, apparently - as can be seen from its results - a reality-filled side of our inner life (although it is viewed with suspicion by the spiritual scientific and/or spiritual philosophical Platon,--under the point of view of ‘enthoesiasmos’, deity dwelling).

**d. *The imaginative aspect***

This seems, with the maturing Platon, to gain in reality value.--.

**Result:** not so bad.

Since that result is not so bad, small bibliographical note follows.

The person who, at this moment, most strongly and successfully advocates the introspective or reflective method is Paul Diel (1893/1972), an Austrian-born thinker and ‘curative psychologist’, for whom e.g. Einstein, in 1935, did not conceal his admiration, and his school (doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists).

This school called itself ‘motivational psychology’, after P. Diel, *Psychologie de la motivation*, (Psychology of motivation), Paris, 1947-1; 1964-2.

In this work Diel tries to give introspection, especially purified from our psychiatric aberrations (neuroses psychoses) and from our ‘cynicism’ (our shameless behavior), a solid basis.

As he concluded in his *Psychologie curative et médecine* (Healing Psychology and Medicine), (FLC 154v., 136 (Sloterdijk)) -- in the meantime republished under the title “*Psychologie, psychanalyse et Médecine*” (Psychology, psychoanalysis and medicine), (Paris, 1987) --, introspection is in principle the only psychological method worthy of the name,-- provided that the obfuscations, imbibed by both deviations, are eradicated,- - by a strict self-purification (FLC 181).

That Platon himself, personally, could engage in introspective method is already evident from FLC 137v . The second radical defender of introspective method is Paul Ricoeur (1913/2005). For example, in his *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d’herméneutique)*, (The conflict of interpretations (Essays in hermeneutics)), Paris, 1969, 233.

There Ricoeur situates our subject, the introspective or rather “reflective” method, in a long series.

**a.-- *The name.***

“The philosophy of the subject -- it is claimed -- is threatened with disappearance. Good for you. But that type of philosophy business was always contested”. (O.c.,233).

‘Subject’ here means “the subject, I, that we all are, insofar as it is turned inward and, from there, looks at both the world and the whole of being.” This is the typically ‘Modern’ subject,---since the Nominalists and especially since Descartes. -

**b.-- *The tradition.***

That tradition may not always be called “philosophy of the (Modern) subject.

**(i). *Antiquity (and the Middle Ages).***

The Socratic ‘cogito’ (I think) -- central to Platonic philosophy -- Ricoeur summarizes in the phrase: “Bear well for your soul’s care.”

The cogito, I think, of St. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; the greatest church father of the West,--with enormous influence on the Middle Ages, who either did not always interpret him correctly or identified him) is summed up in “the inner man as open to earthly realities and to higher (understand: divine) truths.”

**(ii). *The Modern Age.***

The Cartesian “cogito” (R. Descartes (1596/1650; “father of modern philosophy”) means that, confronted with the Skepticism of the Late Scholastics (Nominalism), Descartes, remaining Nominalist, still wants to achieve a kind of way out of absolute doubt: “since I think (i.e. am aware of my inner life), at least one thing is beyond doubt, namely, that inner, but absolutely certain fact that I think. From there Descartes tries to literally ‘construct’ (using geometry as a model) both professional sciences and philosophy understood as such.

The Ich denke (German for cogito) of Immanuel Kant (1724/1804; pinnacle of the German Aufklärung) plays an accompanying role: all my inner representations are included in the fact that “I think them”.

Extremely ‘reflective’ (and thus model for some Romantics) is the Ich denke of J.G. Fichte (1762/1814; founder of Absolute or ‘German’ Idealism): the ‘Ich denke’ - Fichtean understood - literally ‘founds’ both one’s own being and that of nature around us.-

**Note:** Jean Nabert (1881/1960), Ricoeur’s paragon, draws inspiration from Descartes, Kant and Fichte.

Finally, Ricoeur mentions Edmund Husserl (1859/1938; founder of intentional Phenomenology), who “tried to work an ‘egology’ (I-science) into his Phenomenology.”

***Three major challenges have subjected the reflective method to severe criticism.***

If the reflective method succeeds, then we all know ourselves,--at the end of that method. Well, as P. Diel, among others, and emphatically says, self-knowledge is extremely difficult (according to him, because we are disturbed by our vanity).

***What, after all, is precisely determined, that ‘I’?***

(a) For the Depth and Unconscious psychologists, part of the presuppositions of our consciousness, center of the reflective method, lie outside that same consciousness,--in the subconscious and unconscious.

(b) For the Structuralists, a number of factors, which determine the ‘subject’, insofar as it behaves consciously, lie outside that conscious behavior, namely in the ‘structures’, which are at work e.g. in language formation: a child, for example, applies the rules of language as perfectly as the adults around him, whom it ‘imitates’, without having consciously learned the rules.

**Note** -- Now reread FLC 235 (E. Dichter): some of the factors which determine our buying behavior can, with the reflexologists, be called “automatic reflexes”,-- i.e. from a sphere which we are not aware of, nevertheless also determine our own behaviour.

(c) For the Hermeneuticists and Interpretationists (W. Dilthey (1833/1911: Geisteswissenschaften; FLC 06); Ch. Peirce (1839/1914; Interpretationist) all human behavior, including conscious behavior, is only knowable through signs (“symbols”) and not directly, as the Consciousness Thinkers believe.

If we, therefore, want to know ourselves, we must experience and especially interpret the expressions of that ‘I’ which lies too deep and too hidden. So even of our ‘I’ our knowledge is indirect.

There is one answer: if our knowledge of ourselves was radically and totally indirect,-- if the factors which co-determine our conscious, inner life, determined our consciousness radically and totally, how could there still be any consciousness, which is always at the same time self-consciousness?

***In conclusion***, our self is -- at least in part -- directly accessible to us, and -- at least in part -- the factors which determine it lie within itself.-- That is the partial truth of the introspective-reflective method.

### **Conclusion.-- 'Spirit'**

We have, systematically, instead of 'reason' -- which is just about always done -- introduced the term 'spirit' to denote what is at the heart of Platonic thought and life.

'Reason' sounds far too Enlightened-Rational,--which Platon, if one means Modern 'Reason', certainly was not. 'Mind' has, notwithstanding the fierce criticisms from the Materialist side (not to exclude the Irrationalist), still retained something of the higher (anagogy: FLC 188), which is only exposed, if one possesses a sense of the sublime.

### **The question arises: what precisely is "spirit" now?**

#### **Bibl. sample:**

-- R. Guardini, *Lebendiger Geist*, (Living mind,), Zürich, 1950, 102/107 (The term 'mind');

-- J. Scher, ed., *Theories of the Mind*, London/New York, 1962.-.

Both books treat 'mind'. We summarize the essentials.

#### **R. Guardini.**

(1) First a very broad meaning, mentality (so the spirit of the Benedictine order; the spirit ven the Renaissance period).

(2) Narrower definitions.

a. Antique-Middle Ages: 'spirit' is that which extends above the gross yes, even above the 'subtle '(FLC 31v.) or 'smug' substance.

**Note.**-- This can go (says Guardini) to a Dualism, which presupposes a kind of gap (deep separation) between substance and spirit.

#### **b. Modern:**

**b.1.** 'mind' is Enlightened-Rational 'subject' (since Cartesian cogito philosophy);

**b.2.** 'spirit' is Romantic-playful 'subject' that imagines itself above the mediocre mass of mortals (think of the genie worship of the Stümer-und-Dränger);

A variant: Kierkegaard's 'spirit' as the human being who, although 'thrown' into a world that exists for him, nevertheless designs this world (together with a design of himself, springing from a deep freedom).

German Idealism (early nineteenth century) left us with a twofold definition of 'mind': i. Objective mind (Hegel) is all that is cultural performance; ii. Subjective mind is what 'produces' those cultural products.

J. Scher et al -- Scher succeeded in getting thirty-five professional scientists and philosophers -- inter- and multidisciplinary -- to collaborate on this wonderful book.

(1).-- 'Spirit' is what distinguishes man from what is beneath him (creature form).

(2).-- Biologists, philosophers, methodologists (introspectives, memory analysts, sociologists, mathematicians, hypnosis practitioners, paranormologists) explain this in more detail.

***Platonic 'psychology' as 'soul-science'.***

Whether one understands 'mind' in the Antique-Middle Ages or in the more recent sense, Platon is and remains 'a seminal thinker'.

In 1934, C.G.Jung (1875/1961; depth psychologist) published his *Wirklichkeit der Seele*, (Reality of the soul,), (Zürich). In it he denounces - what he calls - the Modern "objectivity" (secular-positive bias towards all that is non-earthly, non-touchable and visible realities.

He speaks with regard to this 'blindness' (e.g. concerning the soul, both as an entity and possessing inner life) of 'modern naivety', a crass expression, indeed.

In 1969 Ch. Baudouin (1893/1963) published his *l'âme et l'action, (prémises d'une philosophie de la psychanalyse)*, (the soul and the action, (premises of a philosophy of the psychoanalysis)), Geneva, 1969-2. O.c., 193, tries to give both the 'objectively perceptible' (language and tenor) and the subjectively perceptible (consciousness and desire) - introspection and behavioral observation, thus - a place that is as scientific as possible,-- consciously - o.c., 132 - linking up with Jung's *Wirklichkeit der Seele*.

In 1984 Kl. Kremer, Hrsg., *Seele (Ihre Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhältnis zum leib und zur Menschlichen Person)*, (Soul (its reality, its relation to the body and to the human person)), Leiden / Köln, 1984. appeared.

In that work the soul becomes central,--as the animating element of the body and as the core of personality ('selfhood' is also said there).

Platon and Neo-Platonism, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas,-- the Bible, represent the Antique-Middle Ages view;

I. Kant, L. Wittgenstein, C.G. Jung the Modern -Actual,-- interpreted by specialists, who thematize not only the past, but its after-effects to the present.

Last but not least: D. Bombardier/ Cl. Saint Laurent, *Le mal de l'âme (Essai sur le mal de vivre au temps présent)*, Paris, 1989, consciously wants to "réhabiliter le mot 'âme'" (restore the word 'soul').

These four signs on the wall for 'Modern naiveté' concerning the soul may, here, suffice,--to show that, when the reader(s) of the preceding pages ask themselves, "To what end does this cultural and philosophical-historical detour?" the detour may be a very fruitful detour.

"Detour," yes. And thus a delving into a distant past. 'Detour,' too. But to view -- from a sufficient distance -- our time. -- Later one will also view it from a distance, as many contemporaries 'view' Platonism.

#### ***Chapter IV.-- Elements of platonic sociology (“politics”).***

As we saw, FLC 98, we can look at life and the life course in three parts. After the soul (person/personality) now comes the turn of living together.-- We can be very brief here.

**a.--** We saw the soul basis of society FLC 188/197 (ideation as insight into individual nature).

**b.--** Fragments of society we saw e.g. FLC 127/135 ( the ‘possessive man’) and FLC 136/140 (Platon’s state-civil sense of honor).

These two ‘dots’ are - in themselves - at the same time, sociologically speaking, masterful insights into living together. Yet an explicit, direct treatment is appropriate here. Hence this chapter.

#### ***The ‘existential’ encounter.***

FLC 57, among others, taught us that Platonism is ánd a kind of mathematical-logical thinking ánd, at the same time, a vital-situated life,-- with the result that Platonism, if true to its founder, never becomes a closed system (FLC 49), but a kind of inductive sampling, logically illuminated, in the sometimes bizarre (FLC 35: anankè) sometimes very logical reality.-- Precisely because of the radical absence of closed system an existential encounter acquires all the more meaning.

***Appl. Model.--*** Al. Koyré, *Introd. à la lecture de Platon*, (Introduction to the reading of Plato), 84, gives us perhaps the encounter par excellence in Platon’s life course, namely his acquaintance with Socrates and his fate.

FLC 228/231 (Socr. maieutics) taught us that Platon methodologically except from the mathematicians (FLC 51 ff., 75 (stoicheia) ,-- 72 (“a system of units”)) - learned from Socrates. Which FLC 50v. also proves: the diairetic-synoptic method, applied to the concepts.

But there was a shocking, - ‘bizarre’, fact: Socrates, so revered by Platon, was sentenced to death by influential fellow citizens. For Platon, this had to come across as ‘ananke’, as a fate, which, however mysterious and ‘mysterious’, was nevertheless an inescapable ‘fact’.

***Explanations.*** Koyré lists the possible ‘elements’ that could make the fact comprehensible: stupid coincidence,--unfortunate coincidence of circumstances,-- political cuckolding (the old word for ‘manipulation’) --(because of Socrates and the Socratics) a clumsy defense.-- No doubt all this played out,-- says Koyré.

But there is more,-- says Koyré again.-- As a thinker, someone who philosophizes, Platon had to go deeper into that. Why? Because Socrates, precisely as a thinker,  
(i) found no real place within the Athenian 'polis' of the time and  
(ii) because he 'thought', very personally thought, did need to be sentenced to death.

**Note:** -- Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425; founder of historiography) held that, in order to explain the facts which come to light through 'historia', inquisitio, research, one must seek, in those facts themselves, a 'logos', a necessary and sufficient condition (cf. FLC 75: á element á principle).

Well, in that 'logical investigation' (the two together, Herodotos saw among other things, such negative, 'evil', factors (elements/premises) that - as Koyré, o.c., 86, says - the 'polis', the city-state, itself in its intimate functioning, represents something evil.

All actual forms of political system - monarchy, aristocracy (nobility), democracy - come down, in fact - not in the expectations of their conceivers and founders (FLC 64/66: thesis / hypothesis) - ... to a kind of autocratic rule (either of one man or of a group or of the masses) and, therefore, to a kind of veiled or open despotism.

Logically - Herodotean - expressed: if polis, then 'despotism'. If 'despotism', then a polis, which in its functioning itself, is mysteriously, unlivable, 'bad'.

**Conclusion.**-- Platon's discovery, in the condemnation to death of Socrates himself, of that 'despotic structure' must be regarded as the greatest shock, which definitively traumatized the young, overconfident aristocrat that Platon was,-- a 'trauma' ('injury'), from which Platon fundamentally never quite recovered. But which made him think all his life about what living together, within the Greek polis (he hardly knew any other system):

- (i) in fact was and
- (ii) could be in theory.

"That the problem of the polis plays a first-rate role in Platon's thought and works,--this everyone knows (or, at least, everyone should know)." (A. Koyré, o.c., 83).

"One could say that Platon's entire work is somewhere politically underpinned." (Ibid.). These propositions of Koyré we now so quietly understand. The existential shock of Platon's life explains these propositions.

We know that Kratulos (Cratylus) - a follower of Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465) - was Platon's teacher of philosophy.

Well, Fr. 53 (in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Griechisch und Deutsch)*, (The Fragments of the Pre-Socratics (Greek and German)), I, 1922, 88, says: "Polemos, the struggle ('war'), is, on the one hand, the 'pater', the father (procreator), of all things and, on the other hand, the 'basileus, the controller, of all things.

**Consequence:** he made some to be deities, the others to be men' (note : subjects), - the some to be slaves (note : subjects), the others to be 'free'."

As Herodotos saw the relation "despot/subject",-- so, before him, already the 'dialectician' Herakleitos saw the relation "free/slave" (think of Hegel's circumscription to "lord/slave").

Platon must have known both as far as that teaching point is concerned. FLC 36 taught us that Platon, for "public opinion," did not have that much respect (the "cuckolding" in it taught him that the power struggle, which previous thinkers, in Hellas, talked about, continued). FLC 37 made us realize that, even in the intellectual field, class distinctions work, but, eventually, fall away.

But above all what FLC 171(226) taught us about the criminal/tyrant is now given a cultural-historical background: for him, thinkers like Herakleitos and Herodotos have already clearly noticed the same basic structure "lord/slave" (FLC 77) in the facts themselves, as "logos", as a principle which "governs" those facts.

**Conclusion.** In his 'existential encounter with Socrates, the teacher, he meets, just as 'existentially' (i.e. involved in it body and soul), - what he, with predecessors, thinks to be! - the structure of beings of the 'polis'. Here, in passing, individual and society literally merge.

***'Political thinking' as typically Greek.***

Koyré, o.c., 83ss., rightly observes that philosophical and sociological ('political') thinking run together extremely strongly, in Hellas. "No Greek - and especially not an Athenian - was capable of having no interest in politics".

Applied to Platon, with Koyré:

(i) the young noble Platon had to participate, by birth, in city-state life (by holding public offices e.g.);

(ii) the cultural ideals of Platon - learning to dialogue (FLC 49), the transfer of culture (FLC 185v.),-- i.e. the formation of "conscientious people: thanks to joint philosophizing - relate to the formation of an elite, capable of really conscientious government.

**Note** -- As we have already noted, the cynics (Antisthenes of Athens (-445/-360; founder) are among the cultural pessimists, who - instead of commitment - cultivate introspection and marginality.

Yet, as Koyré, o.c., 85, says: also an Aristotle and later the Stoics (Zenon of Kition (-336/-264; founder)) and the Epicureans (Epikouros of Samos (-341/-271; founder)) will seek an analogous way out, viz. withdraw into private life,-- to devote oneself to metaphysics and professional science (Aristotelianism), to - in the line of the first cynics - raise the ethical requirements high (Stoa) or to live a life of refined pleasure, far from the entanglements of society (Epikurean ideal).

In his *Theaitetos*, Platon typifies that kind of “thinker”: “He does not know which road leads to the ‘agora’, the assembly of the people, -- where precisely the court of justice or the council chamber or all the other halls, where consultations are held, are located (...). And that he does not know all this, he himself does not even know. (...)

Only with his body does he, in the polis, have a place and an abode. For his mind, after all, society amounts to nothing but narrowness and nullity, -- something which it takes no account of.

It unfolds itself everywhere in order, as Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438; great lyrical poet) says, “to probe the abysses of the earth”, and to test its reach against the limits of the depths of heaven, its attention fixed on the stars,-- in order to fathom the nature of each piece of reality -- both in the smallest detail and as a whole.

All this without ever letting himself be brought back to what is the immediate reality”.

**Note**-- One sees it again: Platonism is anything but worldliness. Quite the contrary, in fact.

As *F. Flückiger, Geschichte des Naturrechtes*, (History of Natural Law, I, 125ff., explains, in Athens especially, state doctrinal texts were in circulation both from large groups (parties) and from smaller groups or individuals.-- Among the larger groups two come to the fore.

**A.-- *The Protosophist Theory of State.***

The Proto-sophistic situates itself -450/-350. Its sociological presuppositions may be summarized as follows, with Flückiger, o.c., 121/125.

**a.** Society consists of free, loose individuals.-- Something against which a Platon responds with others (FLC 30: healthy but not unrestrained individualism).

**b.** The dual law.-- The legal (and at its root the ethical) order(s) shows two aspects.

**b.1.-- *The raw natural law.***

Actual human nature ('fusus', but in the Socratist sense) is such that the deepest motive of such behaviors as love and friendship or hatred is lust (all that is pleasurable or useful provides lust).-- The same actual human nature exhibits a second tenet: the will to subdue one's fellow man (will to power). This,-- because the other controls provides lust.

*Note* -- One sees that here, in Modern words, a kind of naturalism is at work: nature, purely positive (stellar), without any ideal, preferably seen in its unholy misery-producing nature of being, is central.

**b.2 -- *The positive law.***

The rest -- state organization, laws -- do not spring directly from that actual nature, but from human choice and agreement among themselves. In Antique Greek 'nomos', product of human intervention.

*Note*.-- Platon, of course, also recognizes, in his way, the raw natural fact and the culture-founding role of free agreement. But he develops, in the line of Socrates, his own higher (anagogical) concept of nature (FLC 177: true nature; similarly 188;-- 188: individual nature; 198: universal nature).-- The term 'nature' is ambiguous.

**B.-- *The conservationist theory of the state.***

**a. *Society.***

This consists of, traditionally grown, classes, the noble class and the common people.

**b. *Law is based on oligarchy.***

'Oligarchy', government by a small number, rejects both one-person government (despot, tyrant) and democracy. The basis: 'patrios politeia', the ancestral, tradition-bound governmental morals and laws.

In -404 the Oligarchs, for a year came to rule. To hold their own, during that time, they had to take despotic measures, -- measures, which they disapproved of in others. Kritias, their leader (of the Thirty), said, "Whoever wants to favor the position of the ruling group, has only one choice": get rid of the others, who could be dangerous; -- Which was not said without cynicism.

As might be expected, “Platon knew little good to say of the Oligarchy” (F. Flückiger, o.c.,147). This,--though he was related to Kritias, the head of the Thirty. The reason is obvious: FLC 37 taught us Platonic conviction that also the ordinary manual worker can participate in the high world of ideas, and FLC 229 taught us that also the illiterate slave can have his own insight.

**C.-- *The socratic theory of the state.***

We reproduce the opinion of F. Flückiger, o.c., 127ff.

**Given:** The cosmos, in which we have to live, exhibits an all too large dose of unscrupulousness and misery (FLC 251: Herodotos, the very believer, established this as a kind of “structure”).

**Requested:** a method of purifying the cosmos and, immediately, life in it (FLC 161: ‘catharsis’).

**(a). - *Archaic humanity*** - says Flückiger - put forward - with its own effort and appropriate social framework - above all one or another ‘deity’ (to be taken very broadly: ancestor soul, real high deity (as with the oldest Paleo-Pythagoreans), hero) as a source of delights as an ethically high-minded and, in time, ‘blissful’ human being.

Summarized in a kind of slogan: “honor the deities and hold morals and law for inviolable (‘sacred’)”.

**(b).- *The ‘mysteries’*** (i.e. a kind of religion, in small groups) are emerging: they start from the same premises, but bring a corrective. What the traditional religions mean only really succeeds if, at the same time, through these ‘mysteries’ (of which not much is known in view of the strict rules of secrecy), one learns a method which amounts to initiation, that is, initiation into some higher, ‘divine’, ethical, high and happy life.

According to people like Flückiger and others - not without serious reasons - Socrates of Athens (-469/-399) would have started from the Archaic religion and, above all, from the mysterious in order to proclaim philosophically, as far as possible, the same basic doctrine. It is certain that his greatest pupil, Platon, in more than one passus, speaks as if only an initiation makes true Platonic philosophy possible.

***To summarize.***

**(i)** If initiated, sufficiently philosophically trained and educated in this sense, then knowing about ‘virtue’ (conscientious living), happiness(bliss),-- immediately liveable.

(ii) If a population, within a society, contains enough such individuals, then on the way to a conscientious 'state' and a, over time, 'blissful' community.

Note realistically the 'if - then' formulation. Both Socrates and especially Platon were well aware of the radically conditional nature of their intent.

**Note** -- Rightly F. Flückiger, o. c., 1 27, writes: "On the basis of his basic principle 'if know, then virtue(ility)'" (Platon in his *Protagoras* 375c), Socrates became the 'father' ('Urheber') of Rationalist ethics and pedagogy. Immediately he inaugurated a mentality which, over many centuries, has exerted a powerful influence".

Taken literally, this statement is partly correct but it is open to criticism.--It is a fact communicated more than once by ancient writers that Socrates -- in his own words -- was inspired by a daimonion, daimon, theos, a supernatural being (FLC 233: epipnoia),- especially to avoid certain unfavorable lo cases.

And now the consideration : how can a true Rationalist, in the current sense of that word, in our present use of language, still accept something like 'rational', let alone: 'Rationalist' (Enlightened)? --

How then should it be interpreted? For what Flückiger says is correct. One has thought past the 'daimonion' (and the mysteries) (FLC 175) and turned a mystery-religious reality into a merely 'Enlightened-rational' one.

### ***The Platonic attempt at communion.***

To introduce the mystery-religious-philosophical method into the whole of society - an acute case of 'rhetoric' - was, therefore, if we are right, with e.g. a F. Flückiger, the great intention of Socrates and even more of Platon.

It is well known that Platon designed a kind of (very detailed) theory of the state in two times. First there is the text of the *Politeia* (The State) and, then, of his late work *The Laws*.

**Main impression.--** Equalization, in the name of 'isonomia', the fact that everyone is -- Platonically: radically equal by law. Convergence, in the name of 'koinonia', community being, the fact that as many data as possible should become common in society.

Such, according to F. Flückiger" who discusses this in great detail, is the main point.

These two characteristics are summarized in the understanding (“etatization”).-- Let F. Flückiger summarize: “Common property,-- common property of and women and children,-- equalization of all occupational classes into one unique class,-- equalization of both sexes (FLC 192/194),-- just one type of education and this only by ‘the state’,-- just one and the same standard of living for all (also applying to the lowest strata of society),-- just one and the same religion, morality, education, etc.” (O.c.,159).

Democrats like us think that Platon must have been dreaming somewhere, of course.

**Note.-- Two correctives.**

**1.--** In his second draft, these extreme demands for sanitation of community life are mitigated (probably by the fact that Platon himself became aware of this “utopian dream”,--just by living like everyone else).

**2.--** Those who are “perfectly versed in the knowledge of the good (FLC 58/69: relativization)”, the “philo.sophoi”, actually: experts in value(s) doctrine, should, in one way or another, besides the knowledge, also “obtain” political power. Only then can understanding, the pre-eminent condition of equalization and communion, be called truly ‘feasible’. In *Politeia* 499c Platon, explicitly, himself sees only one possibility: the concurrence of particularly fortunate circumstances,

**Decision.--** Platon himself must:

(i) first found himself in a kind of dream phase,  
(ii) which was accompanied from the beginning by a relapse into the immediate realities (FLC 249),--relapse, which, with time, increased.

**Note:** The Absolutist monarchs and politicians - in the Middle Ages and the Modern Era, among others - literally “fed” on that side of Platon’s writings.

Is Platon, at once, a supporter of a political Absolutism? The answer, logically, must be: radically no. But how then to explain this Absolutist circumlocution? Because the readers have overlooked the two correctives just cited. And the softening in Laws and, above all, the acute awareness, nourished by personal experience, that “particularly fortunate circumstances” as good as never, unless extremely limited, occur, prove, black on white, that Platon wanted to program anything but a pure Absolutist “state”.

### ***The disadvantage of unsystematic thinking.***

We saw it more than once: representing Platon in one closed system is not possible (FLC 49, 239, 246 ).

1. This has an advantage: one keeps it to ontological samples, like a professional scientist, in an experiment, takes samples from a whole, which he does not oversee. The whole remains, then, an 'x' or, in Latin, "qualitas occulta". (FLC 216). A lot of current thinkers, the Postmodernists on cap, applaud this.

2. But unconnected thinking also has drawbacks. And here we have one.-- Reread, now, carefully FLC 227 ("Definitions apply to concepts (and, subsume, terms), not to ideas). What has Platon, now, in fact, done when, out of justifiable concern to save an unholy Sicilian or Athenian democracy" he wants to lay out a "patrios politeia," a surrendered state structure -- though in his style, somewhat, re-founded -- in the most outrageous details?

He has articulated the high, pure idea of the 'polis' (meaning: society ordered by a constitution) - against his own doctrine of ideas - and situated it in earthly conditions. To formulate the indefinable and the unrealizable (unless imperfect) yet again, for the umpteenth time, in a detailed utopian description and yet try to realize it in actual circumstances, is to betray the idea (FLC 211: becoming/decaying), 212 (imperfection), -- FLC 64 (thesis (ideal)/ hypothesis (actual situation)).

***Decision.***-- Platon has nevertheless attempted to work out the unrealizable as nevertheless achievable (thanks to the concurrence of particularly fortunate circumstances,-- so he says himself; he thus feels it) ...on paper, in mere words,-- which he, in his Laws, then partially mitigates (he thus clearly feels it,-- that the unfeasible is not doable).

Fortunately, his thinking contains one great corrective: FLC 63 taught us that, since apart from the highest idea the good (the value without more) nothing is without more valuable, and thus his own statements too are not without more valid, but require correctives. His two drafts of a (patrios) politeia are not without value.

Paradoxically: in this, then, Platon is systematic. This is the only conclusive thing in his 'system'.

### ***Does Platon indoctrinate?***

One of the main theses of a certain stripe, since a few years, is ‘indoctrination’ (together with ‘image of man’ and ‘image of society’). Indoctrination is the fact that someone, through his theoretical speaking, insidiously influences his fellow man in his thinking. Which is a form of rhetoric, of course.

What exactly can be literally ‘indoctrinated’ into fellow human beings? Some image of society, some image of man. By ‘image’ one then understands a concept that is imposed and, above all, does not take into account the singular circumstances (tightness).

J.-M. Benoist (1942/1990, collaborator once of Cl. Lévi-Strauss) belongs to -- what is called -- ‘les Nouveaux Philosophes’ (the New Philosophers), -- a term, which, in Paris, is emerging,-- some 1977.

#### ***Bibl. sample:***

- G.Schiwy, *Les Nouveaux Philosophes*, (The New Philosophers,), Paris, 1979;
- R.Ruyer, *La Gnose de Princeton. (Des savants à la recherche d'une religion)*, (The Princeton Gnosis. (Scholars in search of a religion)), Paris, 1974;
- id., *Les cent prochains siècles (Le destin historique de l'homme selon la Nouvelle Gnose américaine)*, (The next hundred centuries (The historical destiny of man according to the New American Gnosis)), Paris, 1977;
- S. Bouscasse/D. Bourgeois, *Faut-il brûler les nouveaux philosophes? (Le dossier du 'proces')*, (Should we burn the new philosophers? (The file of the 'proces')), Paris, 1978;
- B. Angelet, *The 'nouveaux philosophes': a countercurrent? A Parisian philosophy of power?*, in: *Cultural Life*, 45 (1978): 5 (June), 454/462;
- J. Freund, *The 'nouveaux philosophes'*, in: *Cultural Life* 46 (1979): 2 (Feb.), 174/184.

To stay with Benoist;-- He published three books, among others:

- *Marx est mort*, (Marx is dead), Paris, 1970,
- *La révolution structurale*, (The structural revolution), Paris, 1975,
- *Tyrannie du logos*, (Tyranny of logos), Paris, 1975.
- J. Hector, *Jean-Marie Benoist, Les deux versants du discours platonicien*, (The two sides of the Platonic discourse), in: *Techniques Nouvelles (Bruxelles)* 16 (1976): 5,3.

J. Hector says of this what follows:

“The three books of J.-M. Benoist in question undoubtedly have one characteristic in common: the never-ending position against every ‘doctrine’ (‘system of teaching’).

The author showed, to begin with, the way in which Karl Marx’s criticism was obscured by the Marxist system. Thereupon he set to work to revalue the structural against Structuralism is. In *Tyrannie du logos* we find a new ‘reading’ of Platon’s dialogue *Gorgias*, in which one sees the language of desire set against the language of order”. In essence, Benoist accuses Platon of not having realized something (“l’impensé de Platon”).

By 'speaking' (logos), as he did, e.g. about his 'patrios politeia' (his ancestral constitution,--in a reformed form), he betrayed his most intimate, his unconscious 'desire', namely to outdo and control his fellow man through his 'doctrine' (system of teaching) and to 'indoctrinate' him with yet another image of man and society.

***Judge for yourself, after all that has gone before, to what extent Benoist is right.***

**1.** That Platon cherished ambitions, -- that we know (FLC 136/138). To what extent they were unconscious, we see less clearly than a Benoist.

**2.** That he took a stand against Proto-sophistics, also in political matters, is a fact. But whether he did this in an indoctrinating way we see less clearly than Benoist.

Another clock.-- Fr. Châtelet, *Platon*, Paris, 1972, 22ss., says, in summary what follows.

**(i)** For Platon there were:

**a.** the religions, of which he saw very clearly "the dark side" (FLC 238),

**b.** the established public opinions,--of which he very clearly distanced himself (FLC 36,248),

**c.** the pre-Socratic thinkers, whom he knew thoroughly and from whom he distinguished the wheat from the chaff.

**(ii)** But, as Châtelet rightly says, Platon founded, in the stricter sense, Philosophy. Why, because he:

**a.** distinguished in man 'spirit' (nocturnal aspect) FLC 176vv: 'the little man' -,

**b.** spirit, which apprehends the higher (anagogical aspect) -- FLC 188 -- in some way.

This higher grasping mind is distinguished, with Platon, by the fact that it demands -- of religions, public opinions, thinkers -- a justification, justification. Instead of speaking dogmatically, emotionally or superficially, Platon wanted a use of language that - according to the hypothetical method (FLC 54vv) - was well aware of its presuppositions, the conscious and preferably the unconscious. And that systematically reinforced this in the interlocutors. In other words: Platon is doing basic research. Can one now distinguish with Benoist so sharply and so surely the 'doctrinaire' Platon?

**B.-H.L.** -- This is how the other 'New Philosopher', Bernard Henri Lévy (1948/...), is referred to. He wrote among other things.

-- *La barbarie à visage humain*, (Barbarism with a human face), Paris, 1977

-- and recently ; *Les derniers jours de Charles Baudelaire* (The last days of Charles Baudelaire), (1988)).

G. Schiwy, o.c., 75/77, cites, from *La barbarie à visage humain*, views, which directly concern our Platondup.

(1).-- B.-H. L. claims that, in order to understand today's Capitalism, one must have a different scheme of thought than the Marxist one. "Capitalism" (FLC 130) has, for a long time, conquered the world. Platon already - reread his *Politeia*, our Modern *Das Kapital* (note: a work by K. Marx) - taught the higher value of following Archaic concepts:

"Unity always prevails over division (FLC 253: Flückiger's summary)".

"Conflict serves harmony".

"In identity (note : the unity of many things) lies the right understanding of the world.

It is precisely to these things that Capitalism will lead the world, for it is - to adopt the thought of Nietzsche (FLC 132) and Heidegger (FLC 132) "nothing but the highest stage of Platonism."

Marx and Max Weber (1864/1920; famous for his study of Capitalism) both got it wrong in their explanation of the (Capitalist) system.

Already the Benedictines (note: Benedict of Nursia (480/547; founder of the Benedictine Order) regarded labor as a command".

**Note:** B.-H. L. falls into precisely the same shortcoming as Nietzsche and Heidegger, namely to draw one uninterrupted cultural line from Platon to our days and a.o. to present-day Capitalism.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nietzsche and Heidegger are 'Differenz- or verschildenkens' (differentists; FLC 13) and thus, in fact, should have a sharp eye for the distinctions that everyone can see between Platon and e.g. Capitalism, they nevertheless draw a 'grandiose' line of identity from Platon to Capitalism.

Now reread FLC 127v.: after that reading, can one interpret Platon as an originator (someone at the origin) of Capitalism? Anyone who is honest simply cannot.

B.-H. L. - Schiwy, *ibid.* - continues.-- "If history has an end point, a finish, it is terror (reign of terror) without any limitation, barbarism ('la barbarie',-- the title of B.-H. L.'s work).

Barbarism,--that is Capital itself,--Capital everywhere and always,--Capital in its truth, in its full unfolding of power. It comes down to the fullness of the “identity” (note: see above) peculiar to the “state,” as Platon describes it in his *Politeia*, namely, Tyranny. Do not God or nature exist,-- exist only the Modern factory, the Modern state, the Modern city.

Die and make die,-- behold, henceforth, the pure expression of man - being,-- of Nihilism (FLC 132).”

**Note** -- It is true that, if both descriptions of the state, as Platon once wrote them down; were to be realized outside of his frame of mind, they could, no doubt, lead to something like our Modern Capitalist system. But, in that case, one does the same as the Enlightenment Rationalists (FLC 252): one thinks past the rest of what Platon once said and wrote and pulls a few great excerpts from their framework. “Donnez-moi deux lignes d’un auteur, et je la fais pendre” (dixit Cardinal Richelieu).

(2).-- B.H. L. argues that the totalitarian state, in its Stalinist and Fascist forms, is, ultimately, also a kind of corollary to Platon’s image of the state, in the *Politeia*. He refers to Carl Schmitt (1888/1985; theorist of the Nazi state), who already recognized that both totalitarianisms were no mere coincidence in the context of our Western (cultural) history.

B.-H. L. develops, in *La barbarie à visage humain*, 155/168 (*Crépuscule des dieux et crépuscule des hommes*), ((Twilight of the gods and twilight of men), a conception of (political) power. Here is how he does it.

(i) Platon, in an infamous myth, defines the essence of the politician, the statesman, as “the divine shepherd; -- yet listen to the terms of B.-H. L. -- “who observes the affairs of human cattle” (“le bétail humain”) (o. c.,159). To render Platon in this way is to distort the typically Platonic style: ‘cattle’, as B.-H. L. understands this, never understood Platon in this way (except in the eyes of those he detests, the tyrants and despots).

(ii) A. Comte (1798/1857; father of Positivism), in his analysis of the Modern State, sought to interpret that State as the outgrowth or, also, the reflection of belief in the one God (Monotheism). S. Freud, the Psychoanalyst, in his old days, wrote *Das Unbehagen in de Kultur*, (The uneasiness in de culture), in which he tried to make it clear that the deepest social bond between human beings was, since always, one religion or another.

**Note** -- These assertions are all more or less true. But a Platon nevertheless sees it thoroughly differently from a Comte or a Freud: Platon was deeply religious; Comte and Freud were not.

***In short***, the main idea of B.-H. L. is that by placing religion at the center of society either the state (the rulers) identify themselves with the venerated deity, as ‘rulers’, or that state, in its secularized form, still surrounds itself with a ‘sacred’ aura (= halo).

***But what is it with Platon on this point?***

**a.** It is true that some texts - *Politeia* 502b, *Politikos* 294b e.g. - speak of the possibility of an autocratic ‘sage’ embodying Platon’s utopian ruler.

**b.** But this must be situated in the Platonic context ‘koinonia’; FLC 56. If not, one distorts the Platonic representation.

**(i)** E.J. Dalcourt, *The Primary Cardinal Virtue: Wisdom or Prudence?*, in: *Internat. Philos. Quarterly*, v. iii (1963): 1 (Febr. ), 55/58 (Plato), says that, with his fourfoldness of virtues (FLC 115), Platon has **(a)** assumed, **(b)** purged (especially of its too mythical contents; FLC 238, 256) and **(c)** elevated to a spiritual-philosophical level an ancient conception, peculiar to all Greeks - already Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438; great Archaic lyricist), Nem / ode 3, mentions it as commonplace.

**(ii)** This quadrilateral, now, forms the structure that Platon found useful for his *Politeia*, his theory of society and state.

To us Moderns, this may seem somewhat alienating. Platon, in any case, knew what he was doing: he wanted a society” led by a rock-solid “state” (governing). Which is thoroughly ethical, i.e. conscientious. In particular: the ‘virtues’ are, by him, used as means of shifting.

If society, respectively the ‘state’ is to be ‘perfect’ (listen carefully to what Platon says: ‘perfect’ (whereby he knows that perfection is not of this earth)), then they must literally ‘radiate’ wisdom (in the upper layer, the truly governing), courage (in the second layer, the military) and self-control (in the lower layer, the farmers and artisans). The fourth virtue, justice, in his utopia radiates all (FLC 190), since all play an irreplaceable role.

**Note.**-- One sees the triad of “great monster (self-control)/ lesser lion (courage)/ little man (wisdom)” again shining through here.

**Note.**-- F. Flückiger, o.c. 140ff., speaks of the ‘sacralization’ that Platon, according to his Protestant interpretation, would have introduced.

(i) Indeed: FLC 198 taught us that the (universal) nature or essence of something -- so e.g. of society, its rulers -- is rooted in -- what he calls -- a ‘futoorgos’, originator of nature, -- a ‘deity’ (see, for more precise deity concept, FLC 236).

(ii) Indeed: FLC 184 taught us, with the clarity of sunlight, how Platon, the old and mature Platon of *The Seventh Letter*, conceives of so-called ‘sacralization’ (a word, which today’s psychologists, sociologists and culturologists use to denote the artificial, ‘manipulating’ form of sacrality).

Re-read, without Flückiger’s bias that ideative thinking is natural-necessary next to the issue, FLC 184, and you will see that, for Platon, the sacral aura, which surrounds the ruler, insofar as he is ruler, is more than a rhetorical artifice to mask the manipulations, which our rulers commit.

In any case: Flückiger does not even seem to know the Seventh Letter,-- with which he could have explained the Platonic theory concerning the divine origin of all authority as authority (not of all authority practices, of course),-- not in his mentality, but in the Platonic, of which he presents himself, in his text, as an honest interpreter.

**Conclusion.**-- When in the course of our Western cultural history Absolutists, Dictators, Despots (Enlightened or not) have appealed to Platon in order to “justify” practices typical of them, they think, as we have already established (FLC 175,-- 252, 258) of the totality of what Platon once bequeathed.

### ***The Platonic Critique of Democracy.***

Beginning with what Flückiger, o.c.,148, says:

(i) “Platon’s vehement criticism of the actual forms of constitution - especially democracy - certainly supported itself, in détails, on correct observations (FLC 106).

Examples of fatal popular discourse (‘demagoguery’), of the decay of law and morals at the time,--of these many testimonies have survived outside Platon.”

(ii) Nevertheless, according to Flückiger, one cannot help feeling that his attempt to present democracy as a form of decay, -- a form of decay which, as a natural process, necessarily proceeds, contains a generalization which is ‘ungerecht’, irresponsible; -- Flückiger refers to the benefits which Platon’s father city, Athens, with her democracy, spread over the then Hellas and over the whole planet in terms of liberation from the restraints of undemocratic forms of government.

**Note** -- We believe that Flückiger here reflects very correctly.-- But where he thinks he may attribute the Platonic rejection of the actual conditions in this same Athenian democracy only to:

- (i) the radicalism of his own political theory and
- (ii) the pride, Platon's own, where he thinks he alone can grasp the true essence of the state, there we cannot follow Flückiger.

He would have to prove that no other ground is present why Platon so categorically rejected the abuses of the Athenian (and other) democracy of the time.

Flückiger, o.c.,145ff., relies on one text in particular (not to mention his idiosyncratic interpretation), viz. *Politeia* viii.-

- (a) Repeatedly Platon maintains that all actual state-systems are defective.

Reread e.g. FLC 247, and you will see that even a much-traveled and open-minded Herodotus, without any Platonic theory of ideas, comes to analogous conclusions: there is something very dangerous in all political factual systems.

(b) Especially in viii of *Politeia*, Platon, true to his method, tries to design a kind of picture of the (natural) process (FLC 188v.), which perhaps - we know that Platon's basic method (FLC 256) was the hypothetical method - can explain the political degeneration process.

(1) Ideal, yet factually non-existent state Platon called 'aristokratia', the fact that those who are in fact the best (not yet the without more good, of course) - 'aristoi' - are in control of the government. Even Flückiger, o.c.,145, admits that Platon sees in it only the relatively (note: thus: not 'without more') best form of government.

(2) The relatively ideal form degenerates into 'timocracy', characterized - not by wisdom, as in the case of 'the best' - by ambition (the lesser-great-lion type) and, out of ambition, by possessiveness (the great monster).

-- Next stage of decline: the ‘oligarchy’ (FLC 250v.: something analogous).  
-- As, in the ‘aristo-kratia’ (not to be confused with the historically ascertainable ‘aristocracy’) the soul, o.g. its wisdom, expresses itself,  
-- as, in the ‘timo-kratia: the soul, by virtue of its honorific and related, expresses itself,  
so, in the “olig-archia,” literally: the government by “few,” the soul expresses itself by virtue of its possessiveness,--visible in a new upper class, namely, a possessive bourgeoisie.

It “praises and admires the rich, but despises the poor” (*Politeia* 551a). The soul of the oligarchy is branded by Platon by the term “thèsauro.poiòs anèr”, (“der Mann des Geldsackes” rightly translates Flückiger, O.c.,146). Formation of mind says nothing to the man of oligarchy;--which does not prevent even this degree of decay from also having “good qualities,” as Platon explicitly notes.

-- Timokratia, oligarchia, -- ‘dèmo-kratìa’, -- what is translated by us ‘democracy’ -  
- wrongly.

Why wrongly? Because Platon is not dealing purely with phenomena that can be determined historically (in his language: ‘phenomenally’), but with a construction of the mind, as he likes to do. It is true that he incorporates historically determinable ‘evils’ in it.

The reign of the possessive upper class is never lasting: it prepares, through an ‘atè’ (FLC 149., cf. 128), a ‘negative dialectic’ (in the terms of the Frankfurt School), its own demise. In particular: the wealth, ever-increasing, of one class, is opposed to the ever-increasing poverty of the other class. If only because, in that (natural) process, people with a noble soul, but who do not want to bow to wealth, fall into that poverty (*Politeia* 555c/d).

Within the upper class itself a similar process of degeneration continues: the descendants of the laboring rich - brought up too weak - become self-indulgent and even neglect the political position of power.

**Result:** either a violent revolution of the poor or the coming to power of the mass of the poor because one or more rich people feed the desires of the masses,--among other things in order to remain in power.

Again: the soul, with its lower desires (‘the great monster’), expresses itself politically in the form of society and government, ‘dèmo-kratìa’. -- One sees, at once, quite clearly, that Platon in virtue of his psychology (with especially its threefoldness (FLC 116)) structures a limited number of facts, which he could establish, in a typology (typology).

In my opinion, one should not see anything more in this 'evolution' of types of government. Only then one sees in it what Platon himself must have seen in it.

(3) The extreme degree of polis-degeneration is the 'turannis', 'tyranny', better: absolute despotism. The basis - again the soul - is, as Solon of Athens (-640/-558; lyricist) already recognized, the fact that the desires work themselves out in such a way that both the written and the unwritten laws are reduced to 'nihil', nothing-to-value (FLC 131v.; // cynicism). This, within the breeding ground of 'dèmo-kratia', as Platon understands this technical term (again: not historically determinable democracies).

The transition from dèmo-kratia, the system expressing lower desires, to 'turannis', the system expressing nihilism, takes place on the basis of - what we now call - 'particracy', the decisive influence of parties. One or another party leader - whether or not supported by the masses - draws all the power to himself.

"In an analogous way, Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410; top figure of proto-sofistics (FLC 249)) and others had already painted the emergence of the turannis." (Thus F. Flückiger, o.c.,148).-- Which proves that Platon here incorporates a circulating scheme of thought into his typology as a part of his view.

#### ***General conclusion.***

To assess the proper value of Platon's typology, reread FLC 27 (the idea 'type').-- A theory of types -- psychological, sociological, culturological -- is of inestimable value heuristically, viz. as a finding aid. But it is virtually never totally verified. Why? Because it simplifies, schematizes. To interpret it as a guide to action - we say: to interpret - is to risk a great deal in practice,--which will never or as good as never correspond to it.

#### ***An argument.***

That our thesis, i.e. Platon outlines types, makes sense, is evident from a text by Platon, *Seventh Letter* (ed. Calw, 9). In it Platon describes, resp. recounts, instead of developing a theory of types. -- "After a short time the absolute rule of the Thirty (FLC 250) and the whole political system connected with it was overthrown.

Once again, a streak of my heart, albeit a little cooled, led me to participate in the political activities of the restored republic (while, in the process, keeping individual and domestic interests in the background).

Also within this system there were - as is natural after such upheavals - many things for which one had to be disgusted. One should not, in fact, be surprised at all when, in times of revolution, strong retaliatory measures were taken against the other party on behalf of one party. Meanwhile, it is an undeniable fact that the democrats, who had regained power, still showed much moderation.

But a new star of misfortune was to befall me in my political career: the calamity persecuted Socrates (FLC 246: bizarre fact), who, for many years, had been my friend and teacher, again,--even under the restored democracy. Indeed, some spokesmen among the democrats brought Socrates to justice: they accused him of the most exasperating wickedness,-- something that flagrantly contradicted Socrates' true way of being (FLC 251v.).”

### ***Total Conclusion.***

We have, all too briefly, taken a sample you in Platon's sociology (and political science). We hope that it has given the reader a good insight into what Platonism is in terms of sociology (especially political science).

We dwelled at length on the unmistakable errors of interpretation which are still in circulation today, despite the fact that there have been excellent specialists who uncovered the real Platon.

(i) They prove the topicality, yes, actualization, of Platonism.

(ii) But they commit literatological or textual errors, If one wants: wrong readings of Platon. In what sense? In the sense that when one reads an author, the first question is always: what type of text right - typology, report e.g. - do I have before me?

By not asking that question or by answering it wrongly - partly due to prejudice (Nietzsche, Heidegger want to fight Platonism as “the malady par excellence of the West” (which they certainly did not prove rigorously)), partly due to hasty reading - we have the bitter result: even solid thinkers and specialists have, sometimes insistently, interpreted Platon radically unplatonic.

**Chapter V. Elements of platonic culturology. (265/274)**

Always back to our basic scheme, concerning humanities (philosophical anthropology), FLC 98: soul (person (corporeality)) / society (state) / culture.

**Bibl. sample.:**

-- Fèbvre / E. Tonnelat / M. Mauss / A. Niceforo / L. Weber, *Civilisation (Le mot et l'idée)*, (Civilization (The word and the idea)), Paris, s.d. (about 1930) (a work giving the history of the terms 'culture' and 'civilization');

-- A. Hilckman, *Geschichtsphilosophie/ Kulturwissenschaft/ Soziologie*, (Philosophy of History/ Cultural Studies/ Sociology), in: *Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte)*, (Saeculum (Yearbook of Universal History)), 12 (1961): 4, 405/420 (a humanities-philosophy approach: is there a science of 'Kul-tur' and what is 'Kultur'?).

-- Br. Malinowski, *Une théorie scientifique de la culture*, Paris, 1968 (// *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays*, The University of North Carolina Press, 1944) (an approach from anthropology, which includes prehistory, folklore, physical and cultural humanities).

-- J. Goudsblom, *Nihilism and Culture*, Amsterdam, 1960, 55/103 (The Concept of Culture / Culture as a Factor in Behavior / Explaining Culturology) (an approach also from anthropology, but greatly broadened).

-- D. Roustan, *La culture au cours de la vie*, (Culture throughout life), Paris, 1936 (a very fascinating and readable work on cultivation, written by Roustan, inspector général de l' instruction publique).

Behold a small sample.

**To a first definition.**

Is the idea of 'culture' now a clear and scientific concept or a vague-nominal one or, even, a 'misunderstanding' (as Hilckman asks the question)? It is only from 1750 onwards that terms such as 'culture' and 'civilization' appear (says Hilckman). What is certain is that, with us, the words 'civilization' and 'civility' appear in the course of the XVIII -th century (after 1750).

A first separate articulation of 'culture' would, according to Hilckman, be found with:

(i) G.-W. Leibniz (1646/1716; Cartesian Rationalist), in his *Novissima Sinica* (both the phenomenon as a totality and the diversity of cultures were clear to him) and

(ii) G. Vico (1668/1744; Italian solitary philosopher), in his *Principi di una Scienza Nuova* (1725), a work with great after-effects.

**Note.**-- Whether Antiquity had no word for what we, since the XVIII century, have called 'culture' is not so certain. W. Jaeger did not choose the title "*paideia*" for nothing: this word has a wide range of meanings.

But certainly Platon, where he typifies the totality of a society by means of some "soul" with desires (e.g. FLC 261/263, the stages of degeneration), has in mind, with great sharpness, what we now call "civilization" resp. "civilization". It is not because a word is absent that one does not see the matter itself at all. Does Vico, for example, not indicate what we call 'culture' and 'cultures' with the term 'nazioni', nations?

W. Nölle, *Völkerkundliches Lexikon*, Munich, 1959, 85, defines 'Kultur' as follows.-- The word comes from the Latin 'colere', to care for, revere. It is, therefore, related to 'cultus', worship.

"Nurturing, development and perfection of plants, animals and human life form", -  
- such is the description. Not bad, because neutral -- neither pejorative nor meliorative -  
- and broad enough. But why should the care of lifeless nature, e.g. in the natural landscape in which we live, not be included?

People like Hilckman narrow the term "culture" to "shaping human existence" (a.c., 409). He says that this term includes such things as the techniques and economy, the form of society, - what he calls - 'das Geistesleben' (the spiritual life), i.e. law, sciences, arts.

Yet -- he immediately adds -- what makes a culture first and foremost 'distinguishable' from all that is non-culture is the ethical, i.e. that which the people of a cultural circle ('Kulturkreis', -- term of Leo Frobenius and adopted by his pupil A.E.Jensen; 'Kulturkreislehre' (1898) (L.Frobenius (1873/ 1938)) label as in conscience ('moral') good or evil. It is evident that religion (FLC 258: Comte, Freud) would best be mentioned with it.

"Too long the unity (note : cohesion) of a culture is founded in the common acceptance of the same spiritual and ethical values" (A.Hilckman, a.c.,413).

**Note** -- Which brings us back to FLC 58ff. (the good): the Platonic ideas are values;-  
- theory of ideas is at once axiology and, at once, foundation of philosophy of culture.

**Note:** Since A. Comte (FLC 258) sociology has also been considered a science of culture. To which Hilckman, rightly, responds: social life is already present in animals, but what we call "culture" is not yet.

***One remark.***

Now that we have clarified, more or less, the concept of culture, we can employ it as a “lemma” (FLC 53v.), i.e., as a known with unknown factors.

One remark, before leaving. In 1843 two cultural histories appear,-- One by a certain Kolb and another by a certain Klemm. Both authors still adhere to - what is called - the ‘humanist’ ideal concept of ‘culture’.

Klemm in particular, however, includes within the sphere of ‘culture’ also material well-being. In his *Allgemeine Culturwissenschaft*, (General cultural scienc), Leipzig, 1843-1, 1855-2, especially, it appears that one involves not only the ‘higher’ culture, reserved for the non-manual working class, but also the ‘lower’ culture, property of the manual working class, in a, general concept of ‘culture’.

“It is, therefore, ‘culture’, when man cuts off the thick branch of the tree, sharpens it, thereon, with a stone or in the fire, and uses it, afterwards, to repel something or to bring down animals. (...). Culture is the result of the interaction between men and nature and, henceforth, of the interaction of men with each other”. (Gustav Klemm, o.c., ed. 2, 37).-- For more data see J. Goudsblom, o.c., 59/62 (Towards a General Concept of Culture).

Also the broad-minded D. Roustan, 31/57 (*Culture et métier*), ((Culture and profession)), thinks in an analogous way: all adults are - in our industrially-serving society - engaged in some occupation (professional work) either as a clerical worker or as a manual worker (which becomes less distinguishable from the past): must this necessarily lead to being hindered in cultural progress and self-development? No,-- according to Roustan.

***Platon situated within the ancient economy.***

We quote here J. Lajugie / P. Delfaud, *les doctrines économiques*, (the economic doctrines), Paris, 1982-13, 6/7.

***1.-- The division of labor.***

The division of labor in the Hellas of Platon’s time is purely sociological and not professionally (‘professionally’) based.

**a.--** The ‘higher’ cultic languages (thinking, magistracy, military service) are the work of the free.

**b.--** The ‘lower’ cultural tasks -- the economy (production, trade, consumption) -- which concern material needs, are the work of peasants and artisans, sometimes including a high percentage of slaves and slave women.

## **2.-- The implications.**

(1) The economy -- between, say, -400 and -300 -- is characterized by some degree of barter economy. But, even in that time after Platon, there are no specialized economists.

(2) The thinkers - 'filosofoi' - as belonging to the 'free', the upper class, are concerned only with at most ethical, certainly political objectives. This we have been able to observe, for example, in Platon.

*Note:* This makes us feel how imaginary even a Platon is, when he - in his ideal state - thinks he is drawing only from the source of a philosophy of mind.

Was he not - with just about all ancient thinkers - the result of an economic-social system? Does his acceptance - as 'legal', yes, 'natural' (in the necessary process of nature; FLC 189) - of e.g. the slavery of tens of thousands of people in his daily environment not come across as an 'automatic reflex' (with Ernst Dichter, a pupil of S. Freud, we do not situate the 'automatic reflexes' in the conscious, nor in the subconscious (which sometimes or more often comes to the conscious surface anyway), but in the unconscious (of Platon e.g.)?)

If depth psychology, regarding Platonism, is ever in its place, then certainly here. He who, with Socrates (who said: "Is the life which one does not think through, become aware of, worth living?"), wanted to carry through the investigation of foundations - think of the hypothetical method, which subjects all the factual to a questioning of the premises (FLC 256) - all along the line, must here be caught in a flagrant repression, resp. suppression (FLC 156: Dionusios' model; especially FLC 175: thinking beyond reality). The Platon of the upper class has ignored this division of labor.

(3) Thinkers like Platon and Aristotle - according to Lajugie/ Delfaud - did talk about economic data, sideways, but only partial aspects and as far as they fit into the framework of thought of the free.

*Appl. model.--* In his 'ideal state', for example, private property, insofar as it involves the upper class, is viewed with suspicion. Platon therefore proposes its abolition.

Reason: the upper class may not - out of pure self-interest - govern, administer and perform military service against the common good. In this sense Platon proposes: common ownership of goods - including women and children. Think of the "communes" of our days. It is "the state" that should provide for the livelihood of all citizens. Lajugie/ Delfaud say that, on the basis of such a text, Platon passes as the "ancestor of communism".

a. In fact, Platon's so called "communism", understand: living in "commune", is very limited. Only the upper class - thinking rulers, magistrates, professional soldiers - live like this. She is, thus, relieved of a thousand and one worries.

b. The lower class - peasants and artisans - as inferiors (although Platon, very nobly, grants them self-control) - may continue to keep private property (with its cares).

**Conclusion.**-- Benoist, the New Philosopher, spoke of "l'impensé de Platon" (the unthought of Plato), (FLC 255), that which Platon himself never thought of. We have, in regard to Benoist's application of this in itself very sound depth-psychological idea, previously rejected it. But, if there is an application somewhere, then it is with regard to the total cultural system, in which Platon, like all of his contemporaries, of course considered the dichotomy "free / slave, resp. slave woman, normal.

***Does Platon, on this point, go free?***

Read FLC 248: Herakleitos, whom he had known through his teacher Kratulos, had, however, very clearly - we still have a remarkable fragment on this point - thematized the dichotomy of "free / slaves, respectively slaves". And this on a philosophical level.

**Result:** the very high-minded - one doubts this if one does not want to see the sunlight - Platon thought of the dichotomy in question beyond ... out of "automatic reflex" (to speak with Ernst Dichter). With his unconscious mind he was still walled in by the 'system'.

**Note** -- Slavery is a very complex phenomenon: the Marxists e.g., as Enlightened-Rationals, think a bit too Socialist about it. Proof: read carefully and without Enlightenment-Rationalist bias W. B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der Antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of the ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, 201/229 (The Antique conception of service. Prisoners of war, but religiously (Archaic, of course) interpreted, -- see, in brief, what Kristensen, substantiated with information, asserts.

This is more and different from mere secular sociology or even culturology. Religion -- FLC 258 -- but then, Biblically, a demonic religion forms, apparently, the background.

### ***The Platonic Study Program.***

Platon's idea of "culture" (although he does not possess a separate word, the matter is obvious to him) may be one-sided - non-economic - but it is and remains a brilliant continuation of what his predecessors, particularly Socrates, had begun.

#### ***Bibl. sample:***

-- R. Rufener, Uebers/Erl., *Platon (Der Weg zur philosophischen Bildung)*, (Plato (The Way to Philosophical Education, ), Zürich, 1962.

The booklet contains, in addition to an introduction, the translation of Book vii of *Politeia*. "This Book vii treats - says Rufener, o.c.,3 - an object, which we may call a main concern of Platon, namely, the education to real philosophizing."

With O. Willmann, *Gesch.d. Idealismus*, I, 441, we can define its structure in more detail.

**(1).** To the extent that the phenomena, i.e. the visible and tangible things and processes

**(i).** are not mere representations and indeed defective representations of the ideas,  
**(ii).** but that the same ideas are at the same time present in the phenomena and work themselves out in them, to the same extent do the phenomena possess an intrinsic truth content and, precisely because of that, have an informative value for the human mind.

**(2).** The deeper our mind - nous, intellectus,-- dianoia, reason (precipitating) - penetrates into the phenomena, namely into the "theoria" or fathoming of the phenomena (FLC 105), this informative value increases.

Willmann continues: this insight forms the prelude to the scheme of the platonic curriculum (in the *Politeia*).-- Agreeing with Rufener, Willmann says what follows.

**A.--** The student encounters the sensory world, the collection of the 'phenomena'.

**B.--** In two steps the theoria, the fathoming, penetrates.

**B.I.--** The "guards" of the polis (i.e. the professional soldiers) receive an education which develops both body (in gymnastics; FLC 102) and soul (in the musical subjects, i.e. literature and music).

**Note:** Platon is regularly referred to as a 'dualist' by people who either never read him or read him wrongly -- i.e. someone who separates the soul from the body ... and considers it above the body to such an extent that he is called someone who does not appreciate the body. This is, again, apparently a fiction.

**Note.-- To what end are 'musical subjects'?**

Willmann insofar as all that is clean and valuable ('good') - FLC 58/69 explains this pair ready - , in the sphere - the musical sphere - of works of art, literary and musical - is to be seen, the student/ studentess (note : also the ladies of the 'guards' (military) are supposed to go through the same curricula) with the commitment of the ... 'soul' (always that psychological background), to feel at home in - what Platon calls - "the representations (note : applicative models, FLC 200/203) of all that is the beautiful without more, respectively the valuable without more (note : the idea of the good).

**Note.--** How, now, can one accuse Platon of 'worldliness' or so - as e.g. a Nietzsche does -, when one learns this? Truly worldly people -- the Cynics, for example -- would expel gymnastics, literature and music; Platonics would not.

**B.II.--** The theoria or deepening of the visible and tangible world acquires, among the thinking rulers - one speaks, o.g.v., also of 'philosopher princes' -, a second degree.

**a.-- The 'peri.agogè' or turn. (271/273)**

Platon knew with clarity that ... the last presuppositions - always the hypothetical method - of the visible and tangible world in and around us are realities,- realities, viz., which appear rather 'abstract'.

This is why he introduces the quadrivium, the Paleo-Pythagorean 'mathemata', learning subjects (note: the term 'mathesis', now 'mathematics', stood for what we would now call 'learning process'), namely, in addition to music, which already appeared at the military stage, number and space mathematics (arithmetic, geometry) and, certainly in his older days, when cosmology became clear to him in its full value, astronomy (cosmology,-- 'astro.nomia').

The reversal consists in the student(s) learning to move away from immediate sensory impressions,-- in order to penetrate to the abstractions of mathematics (in the Paleo-Pythagorean sense: study of the essentially musical 'harmony' (beautiful, i.e., commanding admiration, and good i.e., valuable, being joined together), insofar as this harmony reveals itself in abstract numbers and ditto geometric 'forms').

On the way to something that transcends time and space, of course. Which somewhat justifies the accusation of 'dualism'.

### ***'Der Zauber Platons'***

P.K. Feyerabend, Uebers., K.R. Popper, *Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde*, (The open society and its enemies), Bern, 1970-2, I (Der Zauber Platons), says that, for a great deal of Absolutism and Fascism, Platon's ideal state served as a model.

Although this is refutable, if one interprets Platon correctly (FLC 259), Popper, the epistemologist-cultural theorist, in his *The Open Society and its Enemies*, is partly right.

We explain this.-- FLC 254 we have shown that Platon, against his own high doctrine of ideas" sought to "indoctrinate an image" (FLC 255). Now see how he did that.

#### ***Censorship regarding musical activities.***

##### **(i).- Precedence.**

Only in rare-favorable circumstances do conscientious rulers 'rule' through and through.

##### **(ii).- Consequences.**

Platon's aim: the sanitation of the evidently very sick Greek democracies.- One of the means: censorship.-

#### **(A).-Cultural policy on children's literature.**

The fabulists, for example, must be purged: what educates the little ones is preserved; what degrades them is banned. Foster mothers and, of course, mothers are ordered to tell the little ones only the stories deemed good by the state. Thus the noble soul of the child (sometimes: "the clean soul of the child") is formed far more profoundly than their bodies become it by mothers' or foster mothers' hands.

The tales then in use belong, in Platon's aim, for the most part, to be rejected as unsuitable. Thus *Politeia* 377c.

#### **(B) Cultural policy on adult education.**

##### **(B).1. -- Literature censorship**

(i) Even the great writers of Archaic or early Hellas -- Homèros, Hèsiodos,-- Aischulos (the tragedian) -- meet Platon's ideal state requirements only in part: only by -- always assumed by -- a thoroughly conscientious government, text-shortened edition may be recited, viz. where the doctrine of ideas really comes through.

(ii) The writers who are still alive are given, as regards work to be written, precise directives.-- Thus, e.g., the playwrights: only actors, who reflect the pure world of ideas, are allowed on stage; actors, who have a degrading effect, are advised against (*Politeia* 395f).

**(B).II.-- Music censorship.**

‘Music’ -- here in the Antique, especially Paleo-Pythagorean-Platonic sense (we emphasize it): ‘music’ was considered the essence of the overall reality,-- which in the ‘choreia’, instrumental music, poetry(text) and dance, was evoked and lived through, so to speak,-- ‘music’ therefore, in that strict sense, was, again: by (supposedly, in very rare cases achievable) conscientious rulers, censored.

***Appl. models.***

**(i) *The keys.***

Only two - the Doric and the Phrygian - keys are considered admissible. Reason: for professional soldiers (‘sentries’) and their ladies, they express (a) military honor and soldierly courage or (b) male self-control (think ‘the lesser lion’ and ‘the great monster’).

**(ii) *The musical instruments.***

Only two - the lyre and the kithara - are considered permissible. One exception the reed flute is allowed for shepherds on the outside. -- Thus Politeia 399d.

***Conclusion.***-- We think to dream: think of Scorsese’s Christ film (in which Christ lives through an amorous affair with Mary Magdalene, -- “to make him appear as ‘human’” Scorsese said in front of the TV screen);-- think of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic verses (in which the ‘prophet’ of the Islamite’s acts in a brothel);-- think of de Sade’s film adaptation of porn works.

On the one hand, musical freedom -- also for the Platonic and, certainly, for Platon himself (he claimed it for Socrates, for example) -- is a basic fact. On the other hand, on hearing Platon’s ‘prescriptions’, one cannot get rid of the impression that in most applications of censorship arbitrariness, manipulation (‘cuckolding’), will operate.

To find the measure (Aristotle’s category theory says that ‘property’ (here: musical freedom’) and ‘measure’ (here: censorship) are always inseparable),--that is archly difficult. In any case: Platon, by “descending” into the applicative models of the idea ‘polis’ (‘politeia’ means ánd ordered state community ánd constitution) has shown the way to a number of power-hungry people.

When Karl Popper speaks of “Platon’s magic,” he is, fundamentally, if correctively, right.

***b.-- The high flight of dialectics.***

Once “turned away” from the earthly coarse, dark realities, the phenomena, by the musical and much more by the mathematical activities, one can approach the highest upper layer, the thinking rulers.

These are profoundly schooled in the Platonic dialectic, whose essential core is the ideation sketched above (FLC 176/245: the little man, “spirit”), i.e., to grasp through the tactile and visible phenomena the real, but limitedly accessible *eidos* or *idea*,-- literally: the existence of the phenomenon, insofar as it is determined by a paragon.

*Note* -- Fr. Châtelet, *Platon*, 27, illuminates the enormous richness exhibited by the Platonic dialectic: “Platon’s richness allows other approaches than the politico-logical one (note: the one Châtelet chooses in his book). (...). This, because Platon had to give an answer to the questions provoked by e.g. religion, epistemology (theory of knowledge), logic, art, the cosmology of the time (...), the question of individual salvation”.

***Final point.-- The so-called “rationalism” of Platon.***

Paul Rabbow, *Paidagogia* (Die Grundlegung der abendländischen Erziehungs-kunst im Kampf des Irrationalen und Rationalen), (*Paidagogia* (The Foundation of the Occidental Art of Education in the Struggle of the Irrational and the Rational)), Göttingen/Zürich, 1959, clarifies, in a study encompassing Protosofistics, Socratic and Platonism, under point of view of pedagogy (which is of course culturological reality), two main points:

(i) The struggle of Socrates and Platon, with their “reason” (better: spirit), against the “irrational” tendencies in and around them (of which a flavor of FLC 238) and

(ii) the fact that Socratic-platonic pedagogy has become “Quell und Ursprung” (source and origin) of Western pedagogy. This, either as a model or as a counter model (consider Karl Popper’s rejection).

Whether Platon is a ‘Rationalist’ was already touched upon FLC 252, viz. in his boundless reverence for Socrates, who ... heard a very un-Rationalist ‘daimon’, like an inner voice, within him.

***‘Rationalism’ has two main meanings:***

(a) the fact that mind determines man (so e.g. with Platon) and

(b) the fact that, in the XVIIIth century and beyond, ‘reason’ (as a professional-scientific-aggressive instrument) wants to determine the whole culture. The latter is certainly not Platonic. On the contrary. Therefore: avoid the term ‘Rationalism’ when talking about Platonism.

## **Chapter VI.-- Elements of Platonic philosophy of history (historology).**

### **Bibl. sample:**

-- A. Brunner, *Geschichtlichkeit*, (Historicity), Bern / Munich, 1961 (the facts, whose sum we call 'history', are examined according to the eventual laws, which govern them,-- the factors, which cause them and the possible purpose, towards which they are directed);

-- R. Lavollée, *La morale dans l'histoire (Etude sur les principaux systèmes de philosophie de l'histoire,-- depuis l'antiquité jusqu'à nos jours)*, (Morality in history (Study on the main systems of philosophy of history, -- from antiquity to the present day)), Paris 1892 (in which Platon (O.c., 30/40);

-- O.Brunner, *Abendländisches Geschichtsdenken (Zur Vorgeschichte des Historismus im 12. Jahrhundert)*, (Occidental Historical Thought (On the Prehistory of Historicism in the 12th Century)), in: *Wort und Wahrheit* ix (1954): 7-July), 505/514.

With G.J. de Vries, *Critical study: Platon and history*, in: *Tijdschr. v. Philos.* 8 (1946): 4, 483/490, we belong, in this difficult context, to distinguish between:

(1) **historical knowledge (information)**, through which we know the facts that constitute history,

(2) **historical sense**, through which we understand the role which facts play in our existence and our thinking, and

(3) **philosophy of history**, through which we understand history as a whole.

Conclusion: what we are discussing now will keep these three aspects both distinct and separate. For example, what would "speculating" about "history" be worth without the greatest possible mass of knowledge about the facts? How could anyone, who has no sense of the facts that make up history - we have history and we make history - ever feel anything about, for example, the theology or philosophy of history?

### **The Enlightenment-Rational phase.**

From the most primitive cultures we have at least fragments of the three aspects mentioned.

However, it is only since the 18th century that one speaks explicitly of the philosophy of history. In *Geschichtsphilosophie auf neuen Wegen*, in: *Die Welt der Bücher (Literarische Beihefte zur Herder-Korrespondenz, 1955: 4 (Weihnachten), 169/177*, one specifies this fact as follows.

a. **Giambattista Vico** (FLC 265: cultures as 'nazioni'), in his **Scienza Nuova** (1725-1, 1730-2, 1744-3) supplements the traditional theological view of history (Divine Providence leads us) with purely 'philosophical' views.

**b. Voltaire** (1694/1778; importer of the English Enlightenment into France (Lumières)) attempts, in his *Candide* (1755), to “destrue” the traditional theology of history (with its teleological view: God’s Providence makes the history we have and make a purposeful event), in Enlightenment-Rational fashion, “destroys” (to use a Heideggerian term).

In his *Essay sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations* (Essay on the morals and minds of nations) 1756), he aims to establish a philosophical history (with its positive or firm, valorizing the mere observed facts).

In the spirit of the Enlightenment (Anglo-Saxon countries), le Siècle des Lumières (France), and the Aufklärung (Germany), a Voltaire seeks to dismantle traditional values and replace them with a revolutionary “liberation of man from age-old bonds.”

### **c. The Romanticism**

Romanticism, especially in Germany, will then elaborate this even further as “historical consciousness” But, instead of reason, peculiar to the Rationalists, the Romantics emphasize life (FLC 1. 05V.), as the main factor in the facts of history.

#### **‘Historicity’ (history character).**

The title of August Brunner’s work is ‘*Geschichtlichkeit*’. What does one understand by this? Two things.

(a) The fact that we, having history, are shaped by the past, making history, living in the present, designing history, living with an eye to the future. With Heidegger: the three “temporal ecstasies. Or, in Existentialist terms: thrown into a pre-given world, we co-design that same world.

(b) The fact that perhaps the greatest number of factors, or at least the most important factors, which co-determine our life course - object par excellence of this Platonizing course - are almost totally unknown to us.

#### ***Appl. model.***

Now reread, from here, FLC 84/97. There it is about a Platonic analysis of the main theme of Fr. Kafka’s works. Not only the ever major-or for the most part unknown-factors of the psychiatric aspect (FLC 85/87), but especially the totally unknown-factors of destiny-analytical nature (FLC 87/97) - Kafkaesque people feel ‘guilty’, but of what? The unknown as a ‘model’ for the interpretation of our lives!

### ***Destiny analysis.***

Life within the pressing straitjacket of the three moments of time - from the past (sometimes with its heavy weight,-- think of the effect of childhood for example), in the very narrow moment, called 'now', towards what 'comes: towards us' - is, thus, characterized by temporality,-- especially for the reason of our ignorance. -- Yet this temporality is not simply pure 'anankè', nothing but -- for our very poor mind -- opacity (cfr. FLC 35).

### ***Bibl. sample:***

-- R. Guardini, *Vrijheid, genade, lot*, (Freedom, Grace, Fate), Antwerp, 1950,-- esp. pp. 159/268 (The Fate);

-- P. Boutang, *Ontologie du secret*, (Ontology of the secret), Paris, 1973 (esp. pp. 21/44 (Destin));

-- Lili Foldes, *Léopold Szondi et l'énigme du destin*, (Leopold Szondi and the enigma of fate), in: *Sélection de Readers Digest* (Zurich), 1986, juillet, 98/104.

The fact that articles and books are being written about destiny - the collection of our destinies - should make us all think about an approach, either professional or philosophical, to such an important theme.

### ***The platitudes***

These are raised by Romano Guardini (1885/1968; Catholic educator, but with very broad interests; well known is his *Das Wesen des Christentums*, (The essence of Christianity), Würzburg, 1958-5).

(1) The elements of destiny experience Guardini believes can be summed up to essentially three: necessity (which resembles Platon's 'anankè' (Guardini is a Christian Platonist), fact, chance (external factors),-- the elements of destiny in ourselves (internal factors).

(2) The religious character of destiny (a typically religious-Christian interpretation, of course: for an Atheist e.g., 'destiny' is 'god-less') and the fact that the person(s) is the bearer(s) of destiny.

(3) Getting destiny into his power: destiny contains 'thrownness', i.e. the suffering side (we literally 'suffer' a part of our destiny), but it also contains, if we want, 'design', i.e. the active side (we can, at least, partly, 'improve' our destiny e.g. or live in such a way that we can't be forced to live in a way that we can't be forced to live). (here Guardini thematizes, among others, the Stoic (haughty) attitude, Fatalism (resignation, because one assumes that "one cannot change anything anyway"),-- Humor (one can look at one's fate with a sovereignly benign humor) ).

(4) Biblical revelation and destiny analysis: our destiny receives an unprecedented new illumination - according to Guardini - thanks to God's revelation: he even thematizes "destiny in the life of Jesus" (O.c.,199 /217): Jesus, like everyone else, was subject to "necessities," to "facts" and "coincidences"; but He also responded in full freedom and backed by the grace of His Heavenly Father; the idea of "Providence" and the Biblical idea of "Judgment" (FLC 91), as well as, in a digression, the tragic (FLC 99) are brought up.

*Note* -- Boutang's approach is:

- (i) much more complicated and
- (ii) more one-sided.

The mysterious disposition, which always characterizes fate, is, however, an undeniable fact. But that remains, fundamentally, negative.

Much more positively, like, incidentally, Guardini, but as a physician (neurologist, endocrinologist), psychiatrist and educator, Leopold Szondi (1893/1986) - whose *Schicksalsanalyse* (1944) is well known - deals with the problem of historicity, which characterizes us.

*Appl. model.*

**A. A 'destiny case'**

This, combined with a 'fate belief', decides Szondi's 'fate'.-- We are in Volhynia (note: present-day Ukraine),-- 1916.

Medical student Szondi serves as a soldier in the Austro-Hungarian army. One day his group is under attack by Russian soldiers. He feels a shot somewhere. Falls to the ground and waits to get up until when the battle is over. Afterwards he finds that the bullet got stuck in his backpack - in a book. The title: S. Freud, *Traumdeutung* (Dream interpretation).

**B. This 'incident'.**

A term characteristic of any destiny analysis -, especially The Favorable End (another destiny analysis term), reinforced in him the already present conviction that we are all "destined to a task somewhere". What's more: from that moment on, Szondi took it upon himself to devote his entire life to deciphering the riddle that is human destiny.

**Conclusion:** both the passive side (incident) and the active, enterprising side merge together here. -- Szondi analyzed - in this context - hundreds of family histories (including that of Dostoevsky).

Goal: to examine which elements determine the attraction, respectively the susceptibility, and choice in the direction of something (a friend, a spouse, -- a profession, -- even a disease).

Thus, Szondi noted that there is a relationship: if family lineage, then some basic choice". Thus for Dostoevsky: the occupational preferences and psychological ailments of his ancestors run through him (his epileptic personality) and are reflected in his novel *actants*.

**Conclusion:** there is such a thing as a "familial or pedigree unconscious.

**Note** -- Just as a Herodotos (FLC 151) sees omens that anticipate sequels -- he calls that the 'logos,' the intelligibility, of the historical data -- so does Szondi: through the many obscurities of fate, Szondi sees the 'logos,' the intelligibility, of that fate,--at least in part.

### ***Philosophy of History.***

What is the 'logos', the 'rationality', of individual life, that is what philosophy of history seeks to discover in social life, indeed, in cosmic life, -- in the totality of all that happens.

### ***Historicity in Platon.***

- (i) Does Platon possess far-reaching historical knowledge?
- (ii) Does he have a historical sense and does he grasp the role of time and temporal events?
- (iii) Does he engage in philosophy of history on a comprehensive scale? Behold the three basic questions, which de Vries sees.

### ***An applicative model.***

Our thesis is that Platon does see the history character of man (in the three aspects), but limited by the culture of his time, of course.

Bruno Snell, Hrsg., *Platon, Mit den Augen des Geistes (Protagoras/ Euthyphron/ Lysis/ Menon/ Der vii. Brief)*, (Platon, With the Eyes of the Spirit (Protagoras/ Euthyphron/ Lysis/ Menon/ The vii. Letter)), Frankf. a .M., Hamburg, 1955, 217f., gives us the text contraction of the dialogue Lysis (Lysis).

In it it is abundantly clear that the historical character also of the nobility, to which he belongs, is clearly before his eyes, and in such a way that he accepts a progression (which brings him into the vicinity of the XVIII-th and XIX-th' century 'historicity conception'). -- We now give, somewhat abbreviated, Snell's analysis.

### ***A.-- The figure (foreground).***

The dialogue is famous. The world, from which Platon stems,-- the circle of noble Athenian youth, is encountered on the sports field. She knows herself to be 'beautiful' (commanding admiration) and 'skilful'. Although imprisoned in aristocratic traditions, that youth nevertheless lives in a bright and cheerful manner.

**Theme.**-- Socrates, in this dialogue, thematizes the essence of friendship,-- a theme, which both in Ancient Greece and, particularly, for Platon, was held in high esteem by the Paleopythagoreans.

***The method.***

Socrates, like a hobbyhorse, implements the method: first of all, coming to terms with the interlocutor(s) that one - actually (Platonic: as far as the idea is concerned) - does not know (well);-- then in a more positive sense, getting to the bottom of the matter (theoria).

**A.1.-- *The conversation with Lysis.***

Socrates brings this one to the point where he confesses, "I do not know (well)." More than that: only the one who knows, i.e. the expert (understand: the philosopher), inspires around him trust and friendship. The consequence -- that to which one recognizes this -- is: one lets the expert go on,-- out of friendly confidence.

**A.2.-- *The conversation with Hippothales.***

Socrates shows him how one builds true friendship: not by flattery, by making one's sense of honor boast; but by bringing up one's faults in such a way that -- however -- insight, coupled with hope, arises that Hippothales may learn something.

**A.3.-- *The conversation with Menexenos.***

The dialectical 'destruction' (Heideggerian term, which proves the non-knowing of the interlocutor) performed by Socrates embarrasses the noble youth. Their heads 'spin' from it. But positively, affirmatively, as Socrates always is, his "destruction" leads to the incipient realization that they begin to grasp what "true" (FLC 188, 214, 226, 228), i.e. spiritual and high-minded, "friendship" might be. Their philosophical zeal is, thereby, stimulated.

**B.-- *The background.***

Snell touches, here, directly on historicity, as it was palpable at the time.-- The background is the splendor and brilliance of noble culture.

(1). The place, where Platon situates the dialogue, the gymnasium, is characteristic: the gymnasium reminds the then Greek and Greek of the past, -- in which the sporting contests gave the aristocrats the highest honors.

(2)a. Hippothales raises -- in verse -- a song of praise to his "beloved" Lysis.

He does this in the form of Pindaros' (FLC 259) tribute songs: the praise of the ancestors, as victors in sporting contests, the praise of Lysis' family, as of divine origin, - the use of myths, taken from the history of the family tree, prove it.-- But times have changed: Ktésippos finds all those Archaic titles of nobility "old-fashioned stuff". In his words, "something that dates back to the time before Kronos (FLC 177), the primordial deity", -- "something about which -- in the present time -- only 'old wives' chatter".

**Note** -- One of the most remarkable contributions to the concept of historicity has been provided to us by metabletics. Think of J. H. van den Berg, *Metabletica of Leer der veranderingen (Beginselen van een historische psychologie)*, (Metabletics or Doctrine of Change (Principles of a historical psychology)), Nijkerk, 1957, in which the changes of mentality, an important part of our historicity, are discussed. Consider, also, M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses (Une archéologie des sciences humaines)*, Paris, 1966, in which:

- a. general grammar,
- b. natural history (precursor to present-day biology),
- c. wealth analysis (the beginning of today's economic science), under the aspect of "archaeology of knowledge", i.e., the study of generational and cultural gaps, insofar as they are reflected in the speech of the named subjects,--"gaps" which, in turn, help to determine the historical character of these subjects. See also his *L'archéologie du savoir*, (The archaeology of knowledge), Paris, 1969.-- It is evident, after Snell's text contraction, that the Lysis dialogue exhibits a metabletic, indeed a law archaeological model.

(2)b. Returning to the conversation with Menexenos, Snell notes: at the beginning of the conversation, Socrates says that a good friend is more valuable than a buckler (horses e.g.) or the gold of the great king (of the Persians) or all the other things, which many, usually, aspire to.

Snell: that is a thought from Archaic lyricism. Pindaros,--also Sapfo (the Archaic poetess - lesbian,-- between -700 and -500, on the island of Lesbos) and Anakreon of Teos (-560/-475; lyricist) poems in that style.-- Which, in Platon's day, came across as an anachronism (no longer belonging in his epoch).

***Snell's conclusion.***

(1) The earlier writers, even when they esteem what others esteem, do not themselves esteem so highly, know clearly to what they give some precedence (note: they have, as if in a fixed view, preferably traditional, rooted, 'a handhold').

(2) In Platon's dialogue *Lysis*, a question mark is placed behind every transmitted certainty. Instead of certainties of life: a problem.

Note-Read now, briefly, FLC 109 (although streamlined in virtue of a typology, this description certainly contains facts from Platon's experiences).

All this leads Snell to summarize: "It is undeniable, in this respect, that although Platon still appreciates "the old gloss and the magic that emanates from it, he nevertheless values the dialectical analysis of the idea of 'friendship' above all else".

In other words, there is a minimum of Platon's belief in progress and, at once, a minimum of actual philosophy of history.

Margaret Mead (1901/1978; Culturalist ethnologist), *Culture and Commitment (A Study of the Generation Gap)*, New York, 1971,--a well known work on the generation gap, teaches us to see three types of education (culture transmission).

(i) The post-figurative culture is such that practically only the elders, the adults, intervene in parenting (if one wants tradition-based parenting).

(ii) Co-figurative education sees both children and adults also learning from their peers.

(iii) Pre-figurative culture also sees adults learning from youth and children. According to M. Mead, the education of our time is depicted in this triad.

Now, if one compares FLC 109 and FLC 280/282, it seems that this triadicity is also represented in Platon's works. Which proves the timeliness of the Platon study.

**Note** -- E.R. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike (und andere Aufsätze zu Literatur und Glauben der Griechen)*, Zürich /München, 1977 (Eng. orig. : *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, Oxford, 1973), provides a further example of Platon's belief in progress: the term 'technè' (disciplina, professional science) acquires, in the course of the V-th century B.C. (Platon: -427/-347), a new meaning, namely, that of "systematic employment of mind in some field of human activity."

In Platon's *Hippias maior*, 281d, Socrates agrees with the Proto-sophist Hippias regarding the very clear progress, observable in "all technai" (in all professional sciences).

By the way: FLC 238 (mythical stage/dialectical stage) and FLC 256 (foundations research: subject sciences/ dialectics) prove blatantly a typical Platonic belief in progress.

***“The ancients” in Platon.***

One group of expressions, in Platon’s language, might raise doubts concerning our thesis.

-- J.Pieper, *Ueber den Begriff der Tradition*, (About the concept of tradition), in: Tijdschr.v.Filos. 19 (1957): 1, 21/52, clarifies to us the terms.

**A.--** Short texts like “The ancients” say that the deity controls beginning, middle and end of all things (Laws 715e);-- that something like ‘spirit’ controls the whole of the world (*Filebos* 30d);-- that, after death, the good may expect something much better than the evil (*Faidon* 63c).

**B.1.--** Hoi palaioi, antiqui (also: maiores), the ancients;-- also called: hoi archaioi, those who represent the ‘archè’; the beginning/the principle,-- such is the class name.

**B.2.--** Negative: “the Ancients” are not those advanced in age, opposed to youth, as less experienced.

**Positive:** the “ancients” are closer than all of us to “the origin” (archè). What is this “origin”? The deities.

Consequence: what “the ancients” say is ‘theon dosis’, deity gift. What they do is ‘handing down’ (better: passing on).-- That is why, with Platon, who is very godly, “the ancients” “to d’ alèthès autoi isasin”. Knowing what is true.

‘Philo.sophia’ was the Paleopythagorean term for purely human, not divine knowing. Platon also thinks this way: human knowing, compared to god-given wisdom, is only approximation. Nothing more.

**Notes** -- (1) The “ancients” are always nameless. (2) There is, certainly, something mythical’ in this Platonic view. The expression: ‘Palai legetai’, ‘From time immemorial it is said’, points to a mythical primeval age, which and stands at the beginning of time’ continues constantly current (think of Mircéa Eliade’s view of ‘the primeval age’).

‘Ancient wisdom’ is eternal: it was there **(i)** in the beginning **(ii)** and now and **(iii)** always and throughout the ages of ages. The expression ‘primeval time’ means ‘origin time’. But that ‘origin’ is transcendent and yet at the same time in every moment of the passage of time.

**Conclusion:** Platon’s theory of ideas is the rational translation of primordial time (pretty much the collection of all ideas worthy of the name).

### ***The steering impact.***

1. Ever since Norbert Wiener (1894/1964), with his famous work *Cybernetics* (1948), made steering science prevalent again, the term and idea ‘cybernetics’ has become one of the main theories.

**Proof:** Fr.J. Varela, *Connaître* (Les sciences cognitives: tendances et perspectives), Paris, 1989 (Eng. or.: *Cognitive Science (A Cartography of Current Ideas (1988))*, 27/34 (première étape: les jeunes années), in which the role of the young steering science within Cognitivism is explained.

2. We wrote there a moment ago: ‘again’. Why? Because the idea of ‘steering’ something by something was already very common among Archaic Greek thinkers,-- without, however, the mathematization and technologization which are associated with it today.

Proof: E.W. Beth, *Natuurfilosofie*, (Philosophy of Nature), Gorinchem, 1948. The author -- an eminent logician and natural philosopher -- o.c.,35/37, briefly but soundly sets forth the basic idea. Both human society - sociology - and the overall cosmos - ontology - are governed by one legal order(s). The great Archaic thinker Herakleitos of Ephesos (FLC 248, 269), in an excerpt says : “All human laws feed on the one divine law.” According to Beth, who follows excellent connoisseurs in this, this includes:

**a. *That law (moderation) is like a rule,***

which governs the ‘normal’ course of things;-- think of the current expression ‘rule mechanism’;

**b. *That law(moderation) is like a rule,***

which also governs the abnormal, ‘deviant’ course,-- and in such a way that, to every deviation, a response is provided which includes a compensation,-- ‘restoration’, ‘corrective’--, to undo the deviation.

**Note** -- The Aristotelian application, e.g., to constitutions, we, FLC 09, have touched upon.

Thus -- what Beth et al. call -- cosmic harmony is founded.

According to Beth, o.c., 36, Platon, *Timaios* 32a, alludes to the said regulating mechanism: “All such things become the cause of diseases, when the blood does not sustain itself from food and drink, but from wrong (note ; deviant) things takes its weight against the laws of nature.”

Beth explains : “The ‘disease’ is, here, the penalty (note : punishment) following with necessity a ‘transgression’ of the cosmic law”. As Beth rightly points out, ‘natural law’ is to be understood here in the Archaic-Antique sense,--not in the current one.

Beth further explains, “For example, Cicero (-106/-43; Roman thinker-retor) writes: “Pythagoras (-580/-500; founder of Paleopythagoreanism) and Empedocles (Empedokles of Akragas (-483/-423; Pythagorean Younger Natural Philosopher) declare that one and the same order of law exists for all living beings. They proclaim that non-punitive punishments hang over their heads, by whose hand a living being has been violated.” (Cicero, De republica 3,11,19).-- Observe carefully the diagram:

(i) there is purposeful order(ning), (ii) by violence there is deviation, (iii) the “punishments not to be meted out” are the restoration of the legal order(ning).

Even Anaximander (Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547; contemporary of Thales of Miletos, the founder of Antique philosophy), according to Beth’s interpretation, is said to have already formulated the scheme,--and in the oldest philosophical text we possess: “That, from which the origin of things is, therein also is, necessarily, their ruin. For they give to each other penance and retribution according to the order of time”.

**Note carefully:**

- (i) order(ning),
- (ii) arising is taken as deviation (perhaps because one ‘being’ arises at the expense of another (and, thereby, wrongs it).”
- (iii) decay is restoration (as penance and retribution).

One who, to our great surprise, is not mentioned by Beth, is Herodotos (FLC 151, 181 ((i) order(ning), (ii) sin stain as deviation, (iii) reparation by rites of purification”.-  
- Read carefully FLC 151: (i) the ‘nature’ (= order), (ii) boundary crossing (= deviation), (iii) ‘fthonos’, displeasure of deities (= corrective).

An application is contained in the Narkissos myth: (i) there is a ‘boundary’ (order, rule), (ii) by his ‘exaggerated’ (= deviated) happiness, strengthened by his self-conceit (= ethical deviation), Narkissos violates that order, (iii) Nemesis, the goddess of the distribution of goods, responds with her corrective (FLC 148v.).

One should not think now that the cybernetic structure (rule(ing)/ deviation/ repair) is no longer put first.

Beth, o.c.,36, quotes R.W. Emerson (1803/1882; Idealist American thinker).

Closer to us : K. Menninger/ M. Maymon/ P. Pruyser, *Het leven in balans (Een nieuwe psychiatrische zienswijze)*, Utrecht/Antwerp, 1967 (Eng. or.: *The Vital Balance*, New Vork, 1964), develops a “theory of human behavior” (o.c., 89/ 143), which is steering.

Mental illness is considered part of the order “ordered life course/disorder (= abnormality)/ (eventual) recovery”. ‘The vital balance’ is the harmony in the life course. The background here is formed by the systems theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, within which the cybernetic structure is a component.

Superbly does J. Piaget, *Le structuralisme*, Paris, 1968-2, 8/16 (la totalité, les transformations (what corresponds to the concept ‘order’)/ l’auto-régulation (what corresponds to the couple ‘deviation/ feedback (recovery)) explain how a ‘system’ (system), which is purposeful, in its ‘transformations’ (= transformations), is governed by a self-regulating mechanism.

### ***Back to Platon.***

Beth taught us to see at least one text extract as one application of the steering structure. But there is a great deal more.

#### ***A. The idea of “seal.”***

O. Willmann, *Geschichte d. Ideal.*, I, 28 (speaking of the Apollonian sphere of thought), explains the Antique Greek idea ‘seal’ (‘sfragis’): the seal, imprinted in a soft matter, gives, to that matter, a creature form (Willmann compares with the musical meaning, among the Ancient Greeks: seal or ‘nomos’, lawfulness, is the core idea of e.g. a song)

#### ***B. The platonic idea***

This is one transmissive application of the idea ‘seal’. Why? We saw that the Platonic idea is

- (i) is both transcendent (rising above the phenomenon)
- (ii) but also immanent (contained in the phenomenon, which is one copy of it). This thanks to ‘methexis’, participatio, participation of the phenomenon in the idea.

The transcendent side is the seal, in the sense of stamp, with which one presses the seal into the susceptible matter. The immanent side is the seal, in the sense of the imprinted stamp.

Because the idea is present in the phenomenon, it is the ‘nomos’, law(maturity), the rule(ing), of it. Just as a song is ‘regulated’ by its main idea.

***Conclusion:*** The theory of ideas itself is, in itself, one of the most curious applications of archaic-antique cybernetics, which was a kind of commonplace,--as what goes before has made clear to us in part.

***In summary***, two-fold is the control of our destiny, even that of the entire cosmos.

(1) FLC 283 taught us that on the mythical level Platon believed in prehistory, i.e. the supratemporal origin of a number of things (communicated to us by the ‘ancients’, the ‘those who were closer to the origin’).

(2) We have just learned that on the dialectic level things and their processes are governed by ideas.

***Conclusion:*** a Platonic philosophy of history has here a first frame of thought.

***The function (role) of our freedom in the cosmic event.***

Our life course -- the object par excellence of this course -- is governed by a divine combinatorics, on the one hand, and, on the other, by human freedom.

**A.--** One does not forget that, with regard to historicity, Platon responds again and again against some Protosophist, who had claimed that historical events (including human history) were merely the outgrowth of blind chance.

FLC 35 (quoted for the umpteenth time) taught us that Platon, at least provisionally and/or partially, agreed with this view (the ‘anankè’, that which, although opaque to our minds, nevertheless determines our fate).

**B.--** In Laws x he elucidates this difficult point, but in a very optimistic sense.

-- R. Lavollée, *La morale dans l’histoire*, (Moral in history), 31s., takes this passus for a piece of philosophy of history.

Platon distinguishes two factors, which partly (i.e., in part) determine our life course.

***Factor 1: the divine combinatorics.***

“The ruler of the world (note: the deity, in the vague Platonic sense) - so says Platon’s spokesman, the Athenian, to Klinias - designed, with a view to the proper situating of each part, that whole which he considered most suitable and best for the triumph of good and the overcoming of evil.

This view of the whole was the premise when he designed the comprehensive configuration (‘combinaison’) in which the individual spaces and places, which each being, according to his own traits, would occupy and maintain, could be placed.”

***Note.--*** Now reread FLC 70ff. (stoicheiosis): it is clear that Platon, here, applies his totality thinking.

*As an aside*, ‘combinatorics’ is ‘configuration theory’ (a number of elements of a collection are assigned, each, a place, within a totality of places (this totality is called ‘configuration’)). FLC 189, which taught us Platon’s functionalism (every being, here: citizen of the state, has, within the polis, its ‘function’ (role)), fits perfectly into this philosophical framework of history. Platonic natural law rests on it.

***Factor 2: human self-determination (freedom).***

Without saying how factor 2 can be harmonized with factor 1 (FLC 49 (239, 246) is applied here again: the unsystematic aspect of Platon), Platon continues: “But (the world ruler) has left to us all free will,--regarding the factors which govern our individual properties: ordinarily, after all, every man is such as he likes best, namely: according to the inclinations, to which he yields, and the properties, which his soul exhibits.”

**Note** -- Although he can be reproached for not recognizing the interrelated existence of structures - for that is the divine combinatorial aspect in fact (expressed in a term which has been in use for some years) - and subjects (FLC 242v.) - ‘subject’ being the Modern name given by the Structuralists to our self, in so far as it determines itself (i.e. chooses,-- if need be, against the structures) -, it must be said that Platon at least gives the two factors a respective place. He does not, in this respect, lapse into Oppositionalism (FLC 67ff.), i.e. one-sidedness.

***Geopolitics and Ecology.***

Platon, in Laws v, speaks primarily as a legislator.

‘Geopolitics’ is the analysis of (international) politics and geography.

‘Ecology’ is the analysis of the relations between environment and man.

Listen to what Platon says, through the Athenian: “the influence of the landscape must not be forgotten. For example, there is the fact that some regions can lead more than others to create the best or the worst people. In other words, legislation must not contradict nature. For example, all kinds of winds and excessive heat waves affect the inhabitants in such a way that they sometimes exhibit bizarre behavior, accompanied by violent mood swings.

In other places floods play such a role. Look still elsewhere: there the nature of the food (FLC 118, 124), which is possible taking into account the soil, plays a role; note that the food influences not only the body (which is strengthened or weakened by it), but also the soul, with analogous effects.(...).

A legislator, insofar as he has an eye open to these things, will, in introducing laws, take into account the diversity of landscapes just sketched, -- after he has examined them - thanks to observation - and, consequently, arrived at an understanding, -- at least insofar as this is possible for us men.”

Lavollée, O.c., 39, notes here that Platon thus clearly articulated Montesquieu’s theory concerning the influence of climate centuries in advance (Montesquieu (1689/1755; philosopher of history).

### ***The basic structure.***

We saw that, on a limited scale, Platon saw steering schemata at work, which help to determine our course of life.

Does the totality of all creation (and eventual decay) also display a cybernetic scheme?

-- O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Id.*, I, 409, sketches us this scheme.

-- “In *Politikos* (Statesman) and in *Laws* -- but also several times on occasion --:

- (1) set forth the primal condition of the human race,
- (2) at once, its decay below the level of initial perfection (note : the primal condition proper),
- (3) of that initial perfection there still remain, fortunately, traditions and divinely given laws (note: as a kind of remnant of witnesses);-- these act as a basis and as cultural objects useful in the life of the later generations, at the same time they are a kind of guarantee with a view to a better future”.

**Conclusion:** this is abundantly clear, with this Platonist (Willmann was a Platonist through and through), the scheme, which we, FLC 284 ff. learned, reads:

- (a) initially ‘paradise’,
- (b) at least partial decay,
- (c) at least partial recovery.

**Note,** It is in phase (b), ‘decay’, that Lavollée, o.c., 37, situates the series (types) **1.** aristocracy (royal type), **2.** timocracy (Sparta, Crete: warlike type), **3.** oligarchy, also ‘plutocracy’ (property type), **4.** democracy (the rabble), **5.** tyranny, (FLC 261/263). Which makes those types. doctrine more intelligible, of course (the context is sometimes decisive).

### ***A developmental psychological tome.***

One of the most interesting aspects of the historicity of us all is the fact that each of us goes through an incessant change from birth.

Books like :

- G. Jacquin, *Grandes lignes de la psychologie de l'enfant*, (Outline of child psychology,), Paris, 1955 ;
- M. Montessori, *Les étapes de l'éducation*, (The stages of education), DDB, s.d.
- Fr. Poggeler, *The empowered human being (Anthropology of adulthood)* 1966;
- Ch. Zwingmann, *Zur Psychologie der Lebenskrisen*, (On the psychology of life crises), Frankf.a.M.,1962;

Not to mention Piagetian phaseology, all such works have clarified to us the historical character of our life course.

Question Do we find something similar already with Platon? -- Answer: yes!

For example, in *the Seventh Letter*, Calw, 8, he says: "When I was still in my youth, I did as many young men do: I wanted, as soon as I could decide for myself, to take up a career in state administration. But a number of miscalculations thwarted this (...)"

We already know something about this from the above.-- "(...) As for my opinion on the matter - so says Platon, Seventh Letter, Calw,13 - already the thought of "the heart of young rulers" frightened me: they are always so changeable. Their inclinations, after all, come and go; they become at odds with themselves. But as for Dion: his innate firmness of character and the maturity, which he testified to for his age, were sufficiently ready to me (...)"

This could be further examined by means of texts. of course. A born connoisseur of men like Platon must have lived through the phases of life and consciously himself (text 1) and have observed them in others (text 2).

**Note.**-- Yvon Brès, *La psychologie de Platon*, (The psychology of Platon), Paris, 1973-2, esp. 261/372 (*Le verbe législateur*), (The Legislative Ver), mentions, with the aging Platon, a kind of decay time, compared to the "desires" of his youth. If young desire is the measure of vitality, Brès would have no difficulty in referring to Platon's years of maturity as a "decline."

But the fact is that his later works testify to the same philosophical power: a seminal thinker, a germinative thinker (FLC 239) he remained. "The only Socrates pupil. who did not push the teachings of his master in a unilateral-Rationalist direction" (Christ Schmid). Which indicates vitality.

***Study notes. FLC***

One of the ulterior motives of the ‘philosophy’ course at the HIVO is the reestablishment of the teacher’s position of authority, which, under the influence of, among other things, ‘socially critical tendencies’, has lost a great deal of ‘authority’.

The way out of this crisis of authority, which is proving very difficult for a number of teachers, is not a ‘restitution’ (simply restoring) of the earlier, strongly ‘authoritarian’ methods of authority, but a higher formation of the mind, through which the teacher automatically commands authority, awe.

In this, a philosophical formation certainly plays a leading role. From the very beginning, for example, ancient Greek philosophy was invariably an instrument of education, a “paideia” (humanitas).

(1) The first year of Philosophy aimed at a thorough logical-methodological education, -- based on both ontology and harmology (theory of order).

(2) The second year of Philosophy aims at a more thorough appropriation of the person who dominated the West for more than 2,400 years by his thorough approach to the human problems of life, namely Platon of Athens (-427/-347).

Not without reason, A.N. Whitehead once said that “all Western philosophy was but a series of footnotes on Platon.” To become more thoroughly acquainted with the Platonic way of thinking is, at once, to begin to feel at home in the main tendency of our culture.

***The preface.***--FLC 01/07 has as its purpose to make you familiar with a series of figures and the currents in which they are situated, and to make clear to you on which basis the title of the course “philosophy of the life course” can be founded, if one knows a little bit about the XIX-d’ and XX-st’ century philosophies.

(i) Romanticism shifts the emphasis from Enlightenment-Rationalist reason to life, in the broadest possible sense of that word (cosmic, biological, human, extraterrestrial).

(ii) The so-called ‘Irrationalism’, which springs from J. Schelling, especially in Germany, is, in essence, a broadening of the concept of ‘reason’. Instead of being merely comprehensible thinking, (Romantic-Irrational) reason becomes ‘definite’ (positive): it takes root both in the positive sciences and, above all, in the history of ideas and culture.

(iii) Three philosophies, especially prevalent in the early XXth century - Marxism (Praxis), Existentialism (Existence), Pragmatism (Testing) - elaborate the concept of life (which began Romantic-Irrationalist):

(i) the Marxist, through 'praxis', seeks to make the idea of 'economic democracy' (which is more than political-social democracy, prevalent since the French Revolution) 'true' (i.e. viable).

(ii) The Existentialist, genre Kierkegaard, seeks to make the idea of 'becoming a Christian' 'true';

(iii) the Pragmaticist tests one or another idea against what the professional science or day-to-day life gives as a result, when said idea is applied,--in an experiment.

Formally as 'philosophies of life', the thoughts of H.Bergson, Spiritualist Evolutionist, and those of W. Dilthey, Historicist, can be labeled.

**Bergson** launches the idea of '*philosophie nouvelle*' (new philosophy'), (thinking, -- the famous 'reason', is nothing but life, cosmically understood, but culminating in the human mind ('intuition'), which comes to (full) awareness of itself: reason is situated in life itself).

**Dilthey**, one-sidedly centered on spirit (soul, subject), defines 'life' as that which something lives through (Erlebnis), - expresses this lived through, in behavior (something in the Behaviorists' sense) (Ausdruck),-- which is then understood by Verstehen (Verständnis): thus arises the Life Hermeneutic Science of Mind.

***The guiding idea of this year.***

That guiding idea can be read from FLC 15 through 34 (the Biblical definition of "life" according to VI. Solovjef). Why? Because we, in this course, have to get beyond all the life indications touched on above (those of the more or less vaguely Pantheistic Dilthey included),-- beyond the Heathen Platon as well.

We teach and take classes at a Church institution. This implies that somewhere "the flag must cover the load": the Bible, whether or not interpreted by the Church, is and remains one of the most fundamental data ('facts') of the West.

If we want to understand the West, including the Atheist West, we must know that Christianity, which evolved out of Judaism, once overran the Roman Empire, including its culture, within a few centuries. The Church's Middle Ages - as the "Histoire Nouvelle" has recently clarified once again, after Romanticism - live on to this day,-- and do so in sometimes unsightly details of our lives.

But the biblical indications of life do not fall from the sky. Just as the Old and New Testament writers tapped into the cultural life of their time (e.g., in the use of language), so did a Solovjef.-- Therefore, FLC 07/15 (the definition).

**A.-- *The definition of "life"*.**

07/15 give us three types of definition.

**A.I.-- *The biological definition* (07/08).**

**1. *The form of being***

(in Platonic language: idea) 'life' stands or falls with

**a.** interaction/communication with an environment (living center),

**b.** phases such as origin / growth / reproduction / decay (something the Pàleomiles (e.g. Thales v. Miletos (-624/ -545), the first 'philosopher' stricto sensu) already saw (expressible in the system 'genesis / fthora' (origin / decay; rise and fall)). These phenomena,-- Diltheyan: Ausdrücke, become intelligible (= necessary and sufficient conditions) if one puts 'life' first, which contrasts with 'lifeless'. Antique Greek: the phenomena are summarized and explained in a principle (= element that is presupposed).

**2. *The essence form 'biological life'***

This is ambiguous. Something which already exhibits the characteristics of 'self-reactive totality' can be a soul (Animism), a principle of life (vital principle; Vitalism) or, still, a structure (Organicism).

**A.II.-- *The general and thus philosophical definition.***

For the philosopher, biology is one condition of possibility, but nothing more. Life is established - and the experiences of mankind confirm this - also in not strictly biological phenomena (Archaic or Biblical concept of life). Organic, psychic, human life exhibit independent permanence (or better, self-perpetuating independence; life becomes different, but not something else).

*Note.*-- Such abstract definitions have the advantage of being general (biological or general shorthand). But they have the disadvantage of constituting only a frame of thought.

**A.III.-- *The evolutionary definition.***

Mankind did always have the impression that the cosmos -- and especially life -- evolves. But it is still people like Lamarck or Darwin who have given this a scientific form: transformism (as opposed to Fixism (as far as this mentality tries to ignore evolution)).

-- Again, the same reasoning structure, logically speaking:

**(i) Phenomena**

(Lebensausdrücke,-- Diltheyans), viz. testamentary and hereditary changes,

**(ii)** summarized and explained (explained) by evolution, life development, -- the principle (the element which must be put first, if the phenomena are to be understood).

**Note** -- It is already the second time that we come across this structure of reasoning: it is important, because it is the reasoning structure of Platonism.

**Ambiguity.**

Interpretation teaches us that sometimes more than one explanation (interpretation) is possible for one given fact.-- Just now we saw: A life gives more than one explanation (soul/principle/structure). Here: evolution: either Lamarckian leaps or Darwinian gradualness. -- Also that viz. ambiguity ('multi-interpretability'), is typically Platonic.

Note the 'easy' scheme of thought : "lower = simpler", -- which is contradicted by a number of facts. The general category (fundamental concept) of 'change' (the opposite of what the Fixists hold) is divisible into e.g. re.volution, in.volution, e.volution. Examples: escalation, complexification (Teilhard).

**Evolutionisms.**-- Call 'Evolutionism' not only the biologically sound doctrine concerning life forms and their stages of development, but also -- and this is confusing -- philosophies, which, for all being and for being as a whole, presuppose evolution. Spencer, Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin,-- the last Scheler,-- they are, each in his sometimes very idiosyncratic way, 'Evolutionists'. Note how Scheler, in order to clarify 'evolution', takes an originally Freudian concept of 'sublimation' so broadly that it applies even to the ratio of 'electron to atom'.

**Note** -- Remember well FLL 13 (assimilism (concordism)/ analogy (partly equality partly difference seeing)/ differenti(al)isme) and Willem Vogel's remark on the subject.

The artery of a philosophical theory of evolution: the emergence of new life forms, which are biological or extra-biological forms of being (ideas; ST 03).

Remember, in that context, well what M. Blin says (FLL 13/15).

Schematically: living center --- life + living center --- life.

With this, in your memory, have been refreshed some basic ideas, which you have already acquired, more or less clearly.

**B.-- *The Biblical definition of “life” (Vl. Solovief).***

Now that we have an understanding of what the more recent sciences, and philosophies of life and its evolution have uncovered, we can, from a biblical point of view, attempt to incorporate these data into a biblical synthesis.

Since Solovjef did this in an at least rudimentary way - and conscientiously carried out this impulse to modernize the Bible - we take him as our guide.

But first, a brief comment on “Christian realism. The Russian Christian Realists begin with G. Skovoroda (1722/1794; ethicist, mystic). Apart from a P.Chadayev (1796/1856; psychologist; anthropologist; philosopher of history), an I. Kireyefsky (1806/1856) and A.Khomyakof (1804/1860; leader of the so-called Slavophiles), the purport of the Russian Christian-Realists counts Vl. Solovyef among its most famous and gifted representatives.

The term “Christian Realism” is, among others, opposed to “Christian nominalism”. Instead of losing ourselves in profound reflections on these two abstract terms, we will give an example.

We are all familiar with the story of the hemoroïssa (the woman who suffered from hemorrhaging for twelve years; Luke. 8:43/48) The pericope (piece of Gospel narrative) tells that the woman in question, believing that not only Jesus’ body, but what was immediately related to that body, his garment, was “power-bearing,” touched his garment. St. Luke, to denote ‘power’ (life force), uses the Ancient Greek term ‘dunamis’ (Lat.: *virtus*). This term can be found in just about every language across the globe. This indicates that somewhere it must correspond to an experience of a - still so subtle - reality (hence the term ‘realism’).

1. For the Christian-Realist, genre Solovjef, the Gospel story can therefore be interpreted literally: Jesus really healed a woman; his life force was a paranormal (used to say ‘miraculous’, ‘miraculous’) reality.

2. For the Christian-Nominalist, the Gospel story can be interpreted “symbolically. As the story has been handed down, it carries, after all, far too many unmodern elements (e.g., that vague, unverifiable notion of ‘life force’) that are unverifiable by today’s professional sciences (Scientism) to be taken literally. What is told there are words, ‘names’ (Lat.: *nomina*),-- nothing more.

We have to translate them into modern terms, which hold up at least somewhat in the eyes of the modern sciences (ethnology,-- psychology (e.g., Psychoanalysis), sociology (e.g., the Marxist or the Anarchist), culturology (e.g., the Nietzschean) etc.).

***In Commonsense language:***

(i) the Christian-Realist says: “It is quite possible that all this is scientifically very obscure and remains so for the time being. But ... it works (the result)”.

(ii) The Christian-Nominalist says : “As long as I - with my Modern - scientific reason - do not thoroughly see it through and master it, until then I believe as good as nothing about it”.

In the first case: the rather naive-believing expectation that it solves problems (pragmatic); in the second case: the critical-scientific reason, which wants to master phenomena.

***The rising volition.***

(i) FLC 15/16 is a kind of summary given by Solovjef himself. Remember well FLC 16: the points a, b, c, d, and e summarize the volatility achieved so far concerning ‘life’.

(ii) 16/30 (Special Characteristic) goes over, in more detail, the distinguishable forms of being (Platonic: ideas), findable in creation. Remember well the easy slogan at each stage of evolution (as a mnemonic device).

***Note*** -- At FLC 19v. (The animal surplus value) the following remark:

**a.** It had already been discovered that the red blood pigment (‘hemoglobin’) was present, e.g. in the pod-bearing plants (in symbiosis with bacteria, - in the root nodules, where these are active, there is a red blood pigment).

**b.** However, recently, Australian and French researchers discover red blood dye in a plant of the elm family (elm trees).-- The red blood dye is a protein substance, which, in vertebrates, allows the red blood cells to fix oxygen.

***Hypothesis. 1.***

The discovery of red blood pigment and in symbiotic and in non-symbiotic plants suggests that and plants and animals are descended from the same common biological ancestor.

**Hypothesis. 2.** If the gene of the red blood dye were to be found in all plants, this opens up, for agricultural engineers, the possibility of establishing artificial symbioses, -to allow, without nitrogen fertilizers, cereal and corn plants to take up nitrogen from the air.--This to “refresh” the idea of zoophite’ (obsolete).

**Note.**-- Regarding the human form of being, the exposition lapses into two parts.

**(A).**-- FLC 20/22.-- Spirit and spirit-controllable language are the two key features emphasized by Solovjef.-- ‘Spirit’ is, apparently, the ontological (= transcendental, all-encompassing) faculty in our souls.

Solovjef dwells, at greater length, on the opinions of certain Modern Enlightenment Rationalists (Hume, Darwin), who regarded Primitive humanity as “savages,” more animal than human. He agrees with this only very partially (it is clearly a ‘lower’ cultural level). But he radically defends the non-animal among the ‘savages’.

**(B).**-- FLC 22/26.-- Solovjef, as belonging to the Greco-Patristic world of thought and life (which differs quite a bit from the Roman Catholic one, as far as Westernized), naturally dwells at greater length on the idea of ‘deification’.

**a.** As will become clear later from the remainder of the course, this idea is central to Greek Paganism: many ancient Greeks felt that the level reached by actual human beings, especially in the efficient solution of the great problems of life, which all revolved around the concept of the life force (situated in the soul), remained below all expectations (human and cultural pessimism).

Therefore they turned to what, in all mythologies (= sacred histories), surpassed that actual humanity, namely the deities of all kinds. ‘Divine’ may almost always be translated by ‘superior’, ‘supernaturally (= paranormally) gifted. Deification’ must, then, in the same sense, be translated by “increase in life force(soul).”

The increase, which, in the real Christian life, is attainable, regarding life force, is called by the traditionally faithful theologians “state of sanctifying grace” (not without the “bodily” (understand: instrumental) graces). One who is in a state of sanctifying grace possesses divine, Trinitarian, life-force and transcends, in principle, actual humanity.

**b.** Note how, with the Greek and Eastern Fathers of the Church (33/800), Solovjef does start from the Pagan idea of deification (including and especially that of the Late Roman Emperors), but, biblically backed up, thoroughly opposes this ‘puny’ form of divine life-force supply.

**Note.--** FLC 27/30 is a chapter on the systechy (oppositional pair) “individual/ type (= species)”. Apart from the fact that this pair is very fundamental in biology and human science (as Fr. Lahr rightly underlines, it is the occasion to briefly bring up V. Uexküll and especially A. Gehlen (“Man as the ill-adapted animal”).

Immediately it is the first formal encounter with one of the main theses of Platonism: “The individual is individual, but not ‘autarkic’ (= self-satisfied, i.e. situable outside any society.)”.

**a.** FLC 31/34. The theocentric Idealism (better: ‘theocentric theory of ideas’, because the term ‘Idealism’, in the history of philosophy, is also excised from forms of thought, which are far from Platonic).

As we shall see, with Platon there is a prelude to ‘theocentric’ thinking. But the ‘God’, who ‘brought forth’ the ideas (he doesn’t quite know how and so on), is by no means the Supreme Being, known to all peoples, and even less the Biblical (Three-Eye) God.

Consequence: according to Father De Strycker, it is only centuries later, with Albinos of Smurna, that a truly and fully theocentric theory of ideas gets off the ground.

**b.** FLC 31/34 discusses the archly difficult problem of what “matter” (substance) actually is.

**1.** There is the by our modern sciences - especially if they follow the so-called ‘Materia-list method’ (as e.g. Fr. Alb. Lange (1828/1875), *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Gedeutung in der Gegenwart*, (History of materialism and criticism of its interpretation in the present), 2 Bde., Leipzig, 1866, takes this view) - determinable, so-called ‘coarse’ matter; there are the various types of ‘rarefied or subtle’ (the Church used to say: ‘subtle’) matter.

**2** Further: sometimes ‘matter’ is interpreted very poorly, other times as the overflowing source of all realities (the ‘rich’ interpretation).

**c.** FLC 33v. talks about the way in which Solovjef situates the ideas (being forms) in the non-ideal realities. This is similar to FLC 13/15 (Blin).

**Note.--** The ease with which a true Christian Platonist integrates evolutionary theory into his framework of thought proves, once again, that the Darwinists, the Humanists, etc., who still dare to claim “that they do not believe in God, ... because they adhere to evolutionary theory”, have a profoundly poor grasp of what God and theology are. Are in the same case those who see the doctrine of evolution as a danger to faith.

### ***The common (shared) mind.***

FLC 35/48 deals with a first encounter with Platon.

#### ***A. The Platonic conception.***

(FLC 35/38).-Remember almost verbatim p. 35v. (cosmic duality 'anankè / nous' or "incomprehensible / intelligible"; human duality "great monster and lesser lion / small man"). Why? Because this, a common thread alike, will run throughout the course.

Common (= pure logical working) sense, public opinion, and group or class thinking are three aspects of human thought. None of the three is "common sense." However, common sense is common sense insofar as it is, in principle (= in disposition, potential), common to all human beings - including the "savages" (FLC 21v.).

#### ***B. The Commonsensist views.***

FLC 38/42 deal with a number of Modern thinkers i.e. common sense.

Cl. Buffier; Th. Reid;-- they, confronted with the Enlightenment rationalists, defended common sense and, at once, exposed Enlightenment elitism (and all elitisms, the intellectuals' own) as a one-sidedness.

Remember very well the fact that Reid's Commonsensism is in fact a foundational study and one of a humanities (which anticipated Dilthey's; FLC 05).

#### ***C. Two Models of Common-Sensing.***

FLC 42/48 (Psych. and sociol. model) aim at testing the theses of Platon and the Modern Commonsensists against facts.

#### ***D. A Defence of Common Sense (G.E. Moore).***

FLC 46/48.-- Intent: a XX-st. century follower of Anglo-Saxon (language) analytic Philosophy, Moore, has defended, in an original way, a Commonsense philosophy. There are, after all, a growing number of thinkers, who - consciously or unconsciously - believe that real philosophizing consists in the first, if not the only place in thinking and speaking differently from the others.

Moore gives, of this, striking examples. This wanting to be different from everyone else is a type of 'autarkic individual' life. Cfr. FLC 30 (Individuality and individualism). One thinks for example of the Genius cult of the Stürmer und Dränger (end of XVIIIth century), into which a number of Romantics also fell. "As long as 'it's different from the others'".

**Note** -- The first two chapters, the dialectical method (FLC 49/69) and the "stoicheiosis" (factor analysis) (FLC 70/90), are two method learning chapters. Why? Because Platonism, before it tries (it never succeeded) to be a closed system thinking, is first of all a method,--a method, which is and will remain today perfectly valid and applicable.

Even those - think of Nietzsche - who make it their life's work, in a nihilistic spirit, to raze Platonism to the ground, still do this - if they still want to think really (i.e. one of their presuppositions is a conscious position) - entirely within the two-part Platonic method (which is a form of tragic irony).

It will be noticed, in going through both of the aforementioned chapters, that they are, for the most part, a repetition, in Antique-Greek parlance (Platonic), of what we, in the first year (logic/methodology) have seen.

Immediately it is, for the HIVO students / HIVO - student women, a sample of what it is to do with history of philosophical thinking. Just think of von Savigny's Hermeneutics (FLC 06: information gain based on a maximum of détails). But do not lose yourself in the details: go through them all carefully,--in order to remember precisely the essentials, the main features, which constitute the core of the method. - We shall now indicate those main features.

### ***Chapter 1.-- The dialectic method (49/69).***

Introduction (49). -- Platonism is, in fact, inductive method. For, although Platon, in the mathematical-logical sense, held closed system thinking to be an ideal, he has brought it only to fragments of a system (= realization).

These fragments amount to samples, rather haphazardly, according to circumstances (= situative aspect), in the reality of life, situated in the overall cosmos (= fysis, natura, nature).

The general characteristic (49v.)-- The Platonic dialectic is:

(i) out of concern for the soul (= psychagogy), which is the source of life-force (S.T. 05; 07),

(ii) learning individual-personal thinking,--not self-satisfied (autarkic), but "as hetairos/ hetairè' (thinker/ thinker's mate), in intimate coexistence" with "fellow thinkers.

(iii) thinking which illuminates both definitions (diairetic-synoptic method) and principles (= elements, presupposed or to be presupposed).

***The further description.***

FLC 50/69 brings us in more detail what both the introduction and the general characteristic summarized.--

**a. - *The diaeric-synoptic method.* (50/51)**

This is a method to either classify or define concepts (see first year course)

**b - *The hypthetic (lemmatic-analytic) method* (51/69)**

Note.-- Recall Jan Lukasiewicz's scheme (first year): either deduction (if all, then some or at least one) or reduction (if at least one or some, then (probably) all).-- Well, with Platon these are called sunthesis (deduction) and analisis (reduction).

1. The forward (progressive) dialectic, as in mathematics, proceeds from as-fixed 'hypotheses' (= elements, which have already been postulated) (it is 'sunthesis', composition (literally), constructive thinking).

2. The backward (regressive) dialectic - Platon's real discovery, as a philosopher carrying out fundamental research (e.g. of the mathematical axiomata) - starts from premises (scientific or everyday), -- not in order to "construct" (= sunthesis) reasonings with them, but in order to ask what new, unsuspected premises these premises, in turn, rest on (= analisis).

One sees the analogy between deduction / sunthesis and reduction / analisis.

When you understand well what is written on this page, concerning forward and especially backward dialectics - it is logic and method doctrine -, then you understand the very essence of Platonism, in its 'one aspect'.

The text of the course briefly outlines the components.

**BI. - *The hypothetical method in mathematics at the time* (51/54).**

1. The 'sunthesis' (axiomatic-deductive method; with 'proof from the absurd; 51/52).

2. The 'analisis' (52/53), i.e., when the mathematician seeks the correct premises.

**Note** -- This is where the lemmatic-analytic method is situated in the stricter sense (53/54: the proposition is inapplicable, but still one works with it 'synthetically' (deductively)).

**BII.-*The hypothetical method in the Platonic dialectic* (54/69).**

(i). -- The Platonic sunthesis (deduction) (54/57; with the explanation of J. Royce;-remember very carefully FLC 56/57 (the systemic coherence), for these pages are always, in Platonic texts, applicable).

**(ii).-- *The Platonic analysis (reduction)* (57/69).**

In other words: the typical feature of philosophy (as opposed to everyday or scientific thinking), namely, thinking back to the (secret, unconscious) presuppositions, also called ‘foundations’, from which we start.

**a.** The Paleopythagoreans had already thought in this direction: they had taken the truth, present in things, in our mind, in our behavior, as their first presupposition; immediately they had discovered that this (ontological) truth stood or fell with what they called the unity, i.e. the similarities and the coherences (cf. distributive and collective structures), in things themselves, in our mind, in our behavior.

If they put these two ‘transcendental’ (all-encompassing) concepts first, they could move forward. They sought true unity.

**b.** Platon, following Socrates, goes on to add two transcendentalities:

- i.** Being without more, i.e., “reality” (in things, in our minds, in our behavior),
- ii.** The value without more (he calls it, in Antique Greek, the good), i.e., in things, in our minds, in our behavior.

If Platon started from these foundations, ‘axiomata’, presuppositions, ‘hypotheses’, then he could philosophize rationally justifiable. See FLC 57v.. -- FLC 58/69 gives, of that, -- of that duality ‘being - the good’ (reality/value), examples. Memorize at least one of them; if not, your answer on an exam or in a conversation will be too abstract. - Platonism seeks real value.

***Relativization.***

FLC 60/69 gives some examples of this. To put it another way, “relativization” means “to recognize that any reality outside us (things), any proposition (our mind), any action (our behavior) never exhibit the absolutely real and the absolutely-valuable of being (the reality without more, in which they are situated) or of the valuable (the good) without more, of which they are only applications, parts, aspects.

Remember well the example of relativization introduced by the Middle Ages Platonist - Humanist, John of Salisbury, under the name of ‘thesis (= ideal)/ hypothesis (= actual reality)’.”

FLC 64/66. “Should one marry?”-- “Should Carine marry?” -- Remember well what ‘Oppositionalism’ is and why it is utterly incompatible with Platonism (FLC 67/69).

**Chapter II.-- *The stoicheiosis (factor analysis) (70/97).***

This is the second basic aspect of Platonism as a method.-- It amounts to a harmology (theory of order).

By way of introduction we say that a factor (= stoicheion), in the typical dialectical sense, as it was very well grasped by the late E. W. Beth, among others, means the following.

***A stoicheion, elementum, factor, is:***

(i) an element of a totality (either distributively: element of a collection; or collectively: element of a system (sub- or hypo- system); -- Platonic: this is the comprehensible, diairetic-synoptic meaning; -- think of the whole man and the factor spirit in him;

(ii) A stoicheion is to be put first if the totality is to be understood, to make logical sense ('intelligibel'), conceivable, 'possible'; -- then the Greeks call it 'stoicheion', element of a whole, 'archè (S.T. 03), principle ('princiep');-- Platonic: this is the hypothetical meaning (the stoicheion is the hypothesis, to be put first if a totality is to be understood).

**Note.--** Whoever, therefore, wants to understand something of the core of Platonism, look to FLC 50vv. (diairet.-synopt. and hypoth. meth.) and to FLC 70vv. (stechiotic meth.), and he/she sees that both aspects run together.

**Note --** We saw, S.T. 12, that already the Paleopythagoreans thought they had to presuppose - e.g. for both their musical activities (dance/song (poetry)/music), concentrated in a 'choreia' (the mentioned triad), and for their intellectual work (arithmetic, geometry, -- description of the universe (astronomia)) - that such a thing as true unity, i.e. the truth about the unity (similarities and connections), exists.

Well, precisely this aspect 'true unity' in the Platonic system of thought is called 'stoicheiosis', factor analysis. Also in view of true value (Platonic: reality ('being') as far as the good), one must put the true unity of the data (things, mind, behavior) first (which makes us understand that the aging Platon became more and more, in his individual way, Pythagorean).

To return, briefly, to FLC 67/69: one can only correctly grasp the true value of e.g. disposition, biologically, if, among other things, one grasps its true unity (here: with the environment).

The pages 71/97 are nothing but examples, explanations,-amongst others Philological (history and language and literature) explanations, of that understanding.

### **1.-- *Two appl. Mod.***

Remember very carefully FLC 72: Thales' definition ("a system of units"), for it is the core idea of factor analysis (71/72).

### **2.-- *Semasiologies*** ('sustèma: 'plèthos')

Note -- Platon's language "all / whole) (unity)" is in that vein.

Note -- Platon's leaning to Socrates' s dialoge system (with the regression to hypotheses and definitions (72/74).

### **3.-- *Semasiologies*** ('archè', 'stoicheion' (remember the latter especially)

Note -- principle v. ful. reason or ground... - summary of stoicheiosis (remember very well) (74/75)

### **4.-- *Applications.***

**a.** The systechy (pair of opposites) (76/80).-- **b.** Language as a sign system (81/82).  
Comparison with the Cartesian analytic method (82/84);-- remember the still very current 'mathesis universalis' (general, but preferably mathematically formulated theory of order).

### **c. *The existential analysis in Kafka's works*** (84/97)

psychiatric composite (85/87): the world of (sin) guilt; Old Testament composite (87/97; remember FLC 94: schematization (If sin guilt, then punishment), because this schema is universal).

## **Chapter III -- *Elements of Platonic Soul Science*** (98/245).

This chapter will be particularly long. Reason: the soul -- especially as a source of life-power (S.T. 05; 07; 10) -- is so central to every Platonism that the most thorough possible knowledge of it (with psychagogy included) is inevitable.

**Introduction.**-- We are, however, going to give more than the psychology. The triad "person(corporeality)/society/culture" will serve as a guideline (98/99).

### **1.-- *The soul as a being and as a principle of life*** (99/104).

#### ***Four aspects***

(a) The soul as an individual being (99).

(b) The soul as an intermediate between imperishable (ideas, deities, immortal souls) and imperishable (mortal souls) realities,--resulting in the tragedy of the soul (99/110; Note.-- Spiritualism (FLC 32; 100).

(c) The soul as source of life (100/103;-- the soul in itself and in the lich. reflected,- with the educ., psychagogical consequence (appl. mod.)).

(d) The soul as an eternal, immortal being (103/104; death, afterlife, birth shock;-- anamnesis doctrine).

## **2.-- *The main features of the human soul life* (105/245).**

What preceded is a kind of special ontology of the (human) soul. This constitutes, now, the background information for what follows, the description and explanation (as far as possible), on a Platonic basis, of our daily soul life.--

**Note.--** Not without reason did we (FLC 35/48) speak of the common sense. Do not expect, therefore, an experimental or any kind of professional scientific, Modern psychology. The Antique thinkers addressed themselves to the common man and woman.

But, having familiarized yourselves with the detailed exposition, which we are now going to summarize, judge whether you, with this non-scientific psychology, can do anything in everyday life.

**1. Introduction.--** Two triads (mind/will/desire and big monster (lower desires)/less big lion (higher desires)/small man (mind)) will serve as easy-to-remember guidelines, - to get lost in the maze of both everyday life and the Platonic or Platonizing explanations of actual soul-life.

### **2.a.-- *The triad “mind/will/desire”* (105/114).**

This chapter begins with a Platonic theory of methods. -- Puthagoras (Pythagoras) had launched the term “theoria,” fathoming. The Paleopythagoreans worked out a psychagogy (soul formation) in his wake, in a musical and vocational sense.-- Platon continues to work in this direction, but very personally.

(i) The phenomena, -- here particularly the day-to-day behavior, are the basis (empirical basis).

(ii) The fathoming in terms of the visible and tangible phenomena -- FLC 07; 10; etc. - attempts to grasp 1. the principle, 2. the element, which governs the phenomena (S.T. 13). Whether that ‘principle’ (= explanation - summary) is an idea or an extra-natural phenomenon does not matter much (theorizing or mystical contemplation). FLC 105/106 expounds this briefly; FLC 120v. specifies it on the basis of Euagrios’ teaching.

FLC 106/110 gives, of the Platonic theoria, three appl. Models.

FLC 110/114 specifies in what sense one should interpret the triad ‘mind/will/desire’,--in a tragic sense (conflictologically; remember the idea ‘conflictology’, for it dominates part of current psychology).

**2.b.-- *The triad of “great monster/ lesser lion/ little man”*** (114/ 245).

This will be the most extensive, but perhaps the most fascinating chapter. In any case: the day-to-day applications - for those who, at least, Platonically educated, want to look in and around themselves are “legion” (unutterably numerous). That is also why - for the sake of everyday usability - we have elaborated it, up to and including its modern offshoots.

(i) Platonic soul science is a virtue theory psychology (114v.).

(ii) Precisions concerning the triad (115v.; remember very carefully FLC 116).

**2.c.-- *Explanations concerning the aforementioned triad*** (117/...).

The wealth of insights, in the Platonic texts and after him, is so great that we treat the three strata separately.

**2.c.a.-- *The great monster (the unholy desire)*** (117/136).

Note well : the term ‘un.noble’, here, is only principled. In fact, as said higher (ennoblement: FLC 110v.: transformation; 112: ernoblement), the unedible is ennobled by the small man. This is the very positive side of non-Nietzschean misguided Platonism.

**1.--** Patristic model (Euagrios’ monastic psychology: eagerness (gluttony)/unchastity (fornication)/ possessiveness (greed)/ soporificity (117/121).

**Notes.--** (1) Biblical value; (2) method (119/121)

**Updating notes.--** Based on a comparison with the psychology of Ed. Spranger, characteristic of Platonic soul science, she is:

**a.** Axiological (oriented toward value tendencies),

**b.** Structural (directed at the one or few factors within the totality (=structure of the soul),

**c.** Culturological (situates the expressions of the soul within the total civilization) (121/124).

**2.--** Further details concerning the great monster (= primal urges) (124/135).

(i) Sleep problem (124).

(ii) Nutrition problem (124v.).

(iii) Sexual problem (125/127: sex/ eros-agapè/ sexual revolution).

(iv) Economic problem (127/135: Greek capitalism/ Marx. interpretation v/ Modern capitalism (Life-hermeneutic/ cultural-historical (self-satisfied Individual/ Nihilistic tendency)/ Psychoanalytic interpretation (small-profits-compl.)).

Note how we underline the term ‘...problem’: our culture, like that at the time of Platon, can safely be approached from Platonic psychology in order, very quickly, to uncover main problems.

This proves, by the way, brilliantly, the extract of Fr. Engels, the antithesis of Platonism: summary view of the great monster (135v.).

**2.c.b.-- *The lesser lion (the noble desire)* (136/175).**

An indistinguishable role is played by the urge for money,-- either successful (honor, urge to see, self-preservation urge,-- urge for vain glory, pride), -- or unsuccessful (‘frustrated’ = anger and resentment (grudge), sadness and homesickness, listlessness (life’s desire)).-- Followed, of these, a whole series of appl. models.-- These are interrupted by a brief literary-theoretical explanation (story, myth).

**1.--** Platon’s sense of honor (136/140: reflective or introspective method (cf. FLC 120)).

**2.--** Bombo’s sense of honor (140/142: ethnological model). Actualizing explanations.

**(1)** Narratological explanation (143/147: narratology (143); Narrativism (143/ 154). Remember well Platon’s broad definition of narrative (merely wordy and dramatically depicted).

**(2)** Characterization of Platon’s soul-science: it is desire psychology (146v.).

**3.a.--** The Narkissosmythe (148/153: two versions (148v.); interpretation (149/151: atè (divine judgment:149/151), kuklos (circle:151v.).

**Note** -- Literary theory concerning myth (152v.:myth, -- mythology/myth analysis).

**3.b.--** The vanity (154/159: Diel’s theorem (154v.); Platonic model (155/157: Dionusios).-- Psychoanalytic explanation (158v.: Narcissism: egoism; egocentrism).

**4.--** Patristic models (159/164: a. vain glory; pride; b. anger/ resentment (resentment) - Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s Ressentimentology (162v.) -; sadness/ homesickness; acedia (compare. with G. Gezelle (vertijloosheid), (165), with J.P Sarrtre (nausee: life’s reluctance (165/168)).

**Summary view.--** 169/170 (Adler’s Individualps.; the problem (cf. S.T. 16v.) of power).

**Note** -- Platonic psychiatry (170/173).-- Platonic works apparently give some psychiatrists insights of a precious nature. To give an example of this, we will briefly consider the way in which Platon explains the crime, possibly that of the power-hungry tyrant: the crime is the night dream carried out in full day consciousness.

Immediately we get a glimpse of dream interpretation as practiced by Platon.

**Note**-- The phenomenon of the (conscious) suppression. resp. the (unconscious) repression.-- With Platon the suppression, resp. repression boils down to pre-empting the higher ideas (= values) (para.frosunè) (FLC 174v.).

**2.C.c.-- *The little man (mind)* (176/245)**

**a.** The “little man” in all of us comes through, among other things, in the sense of measure and balanced life,--also in any reasoned purposeful behavior.

**b.** But this same ‘little man’ shows itself, Platonically speaking, especially in the process of ideation, i.e. in the ‘beholding’ (understand: direct grasping) of the true nature or idea (creature form). We indicate two applications of this,-- the contemplation of the idea ‘soul’ and of the idea ‘sense of lust’ (though the latter we touch only briefly).

**A.-- *The ideation as insight into ‘true’ nature* (177/188).**

One appl. model we work out, Platonic, is the grasping of the idea ‘soul’ as incorporeal, ‘spiritual’, yes, ‘divine’ reality.

**(1).-- *The Glaukosmyth* (177/179).—**

The core of the myth boils down to a deification process.-- The soul, hidden in the poor fisherman:” Glaukos,

**(i)** is taken, to begin with, as it is, “poor”.

**(ii) a.** it is purged from that poor bark (“catharsis”) and

**(ii) b.** elevated to a higher level, the divine. Consequence: once deified, because he receives life force (S.T. 05; 07; 10 (psychagogy); 14) in his soul, which deifies him, he can, in human problems, act savingly.

**(2).-- *The idea ‘soul’ with Platon* (179/187).**

The theoria, fathoming, of the soul resembles (analogously) what happens to Glaukos.

**(i)** The phenomenal side (perception).

**(ii)** The ideal side (ideation). In sensory perception an ideative process is at work, which, in the case of man, seen in his behavior (‘Behaviorist’), penetrates to an incorporeal - spiritual, yes, in Platon’s eyes, divine nature (= way of being).

Apart from that fathoming (theoria) in itself, there is, at once, the fact that whoever practices such fathoming deifies himself.

**Note -- Platonic myth analysis** (180v.)-- There is analogy:

(i): the (mantic) seeing described in the myth of Glaukos (of the appearance of the deified Glaukos) is only one form of ‘theoria’, viz. that which sticks to the mantically perceptible appearance;

(ii) the ideation thrusts through to the true (spiritual - divine) nature.

**Note**-- The catharsis process (181/184)-- Again, there is analogy.

(i) The sacred catharsis (purification) takes something with too little life force in the ‘soul’ (present even in inorganic realities)-- to purify it out and raise it to level (see above Glaukosmythe).

(ii) In the process of ideation:

(a) a sense-perceived higher being (man) is taken as he is,

(b)1 but to be purified and

(b)2 to be elevated on a higher, ideative, plane.-- That this goes hand in hand with a deification process is shown e.g. by the filomathia, the sense of learning, in man, once one tries to teach him something (appl. model)-- In that connection: the Platonic - prepared by the Paleopythagoreans - doctrine of reception (185v.).

**Note** -- The “true nature” (idea) of lust (187).

**b**-- The ideation as individual and universal insight (188/ ...).

This is the singularizing and abstracting (universal) aspect of ideation: from this and that horse to - what Platon once called - the ‘horsemanship’.

**B.I.-- The ideation as insight into singular nature** (188/197).

Model par excellence: the nature of individuals in an Antique-Greek polis. Platon situates this within the ancient-Greek concept of fisis or nature

(1) ‘Fisis’ (= genesis) meant, first of all, the (in principle) transcendental totality of all past, present and future ‘being’, within the process of reproduction in and around us.-  
- What we, today, still call “nature”.

(2) ‘Fisis’, nature, means, further, ‘being’, form of being (Platonic: idea), i.e. that by which something is distinguishable from the rest, within the total ‘nature’ (first meaning).

**(1).-- *The division of labor* (189/192).**

The rule, Platon said, in a well-ordered polis, is “one individual --- one occupational praxis.” This is what the so-called Platonic “natural law” of division of labor is based on.

*Note:* Again: although individual, yet the individual is not ‘autarkic’.

*Note:--* Theological model.-- The mythical-theological model which, apparently, Platon had in mind is the idea of ‘function deity’ (H. Usener; G. Dumézil) (190v.).-- Just as each individual deity (group) had one sacred ‘role’ (function), so too each individual in the Platonic state.

*Note:--* This aspect is, somewhat, reminiscent of the Functionalist ethnologists: they saw the interdependence of the individual areas, resp. persons, within the same culture; a cultural element -- e.g., a weapon, a mode of dress -- has a function.

**(2).-- *The split of the two sexes.***

Platon has several texts on man and woman.-- Apart from his text on the androgynous (male-female duality, by which both sexes are dependent on each other, yes, somewhere both sexes are in themselves (think of C.G. Jung’s animus / anima), there is his processing of the Amazonian myth.

**a.** The heroic literature concerning Penthesileia and the Amazons (192v.).-- A purely female polis is, mythically-heroic, conceivable.

**b.** Platon’s interpretation of the function within society of the woman shows us that the woman, in principle (by nature), can play the same roles in the state as the man,-- soldier service included.

**(3).-- *The Platonic theoria concerning individual nature* (194/197).**

Again, the dichotomy ‘phenomena / principle’.

**a.** The phenomena are the myriad needs and satisfactions of need within society.

**b.** The principle is the individual nature, which works itself out in that multiplicity.-

**(i)** The singular in each of us (195: details, yes, but especially the soul).

**(ii)** The validity in the individual functions (195v.).

**(iii)** Characterization (singular understanding) of two young intellectuals (*Faidros*, *Lysis* (196v.).

**(iv)** The dramaturgical moment (197: Platon saw, gradually, that the dramaturgical structure of his dialogues could weigh heavily on the individual in his figures).

## **B. II.-- *The ideation as insight into universal nature* (198/208)**

**Introduction.:** the three ways of being of the bed:

1. The being ('nature') of "the bed" (general), in God (=Platonic deity).
2. The singular bed that the carpenter makes and
3. the equally singular bed that the peeler paints.

Note: 'God', with Platon, in this context, is the causer of the idea (= universal nature)

### ***The dialectical method.--* (200/203).**

Given an actual, given collection of things, which deserve the same name. That identical term means, through our mind, the universal form of being (= idea), spread over all the elements of said collection

The general concepts in our mind are not the ideas, but rather their representation in our mind.

**Note:** 'Abstraction', from a set of identical things I abstract a general 'concept' which is not the idea).

### ***Actualization of the platonic idea:***

The DNZ as a model governing whole sets of processes. (204vv.)

How do ethical moral ideas function? (205/207)

Free will is provided for in the idea itself.

Conclusion: a definition of the idea: Tone, present in all copies (207v.).

## **C.-- *The ideation as method* (209/227).**

This chapter is of interest to teachers Every teacher works with a visible specimen (e.g., a piece of gold, a circle), the phenomenon. To that applicative model she attaches the name ('gold', 'circle'). She explains that name in a definition (essence definition)).

**Note:** The name and the definition form, together, the use of language. - In the mind (subject) of the children, therefore, 'science' (full-fledged spiritual knowledge) comes into being. Why? Because, with the teacher, the children through the specimens all see singular things, phenomena) the idea, reaching above it (never is one specimen all specimens; only the idea is that), yet present in it (each specimen is truly one singular idea).

**Note:** the universal idea illuminates its copies: light-metaphysics (213)

**Note:** The idea is both transcendent (reaching beyond the copies) and immanent (visibly present in all copies) (214)

**Note:** The idea is the coherence of all common properties (collective structure), though this may not be so clear (215 v.). - Phenomenon, designation, definition, -- idea, insight are broadly explained.

**d.-- *The reflective-introspective side of little man* (228/245).**

We are strictly speaking 'human' because we carry ideation (the true (= higher, incorporeal, lofty) nature, the individual and universal is, in us,-- because we know that ideation as a method (specimen, name and definition lead to insight into the idea). We are it also thanks to our introspection (with the reflective method as application).

1. Socratic maieutics (228/231) rests on that inner source of knowledge.

2. That we are a microcosm in the macrocosm (231v.) is one aspect of it.

3. That we, in that inner life, know states of intoxication and inspiration (232/238: manticism, teletics, poetry, eroticism), is one, for the philosopher of mind Platon, aspect of it that requires some reservation. Note - Platon's concept of deity (236v.). Note - Ethno-psychology (238).

4. Our imagination (resp. imagination) is another aspect (238vv.).

**Conclusion.--** The reflective method (its limited validity (P. Diel; P. Ricoeur) (240/243).

**General Conclusion:** 'mind' (244), Platonic psychology as soul science (245).

**Chapter IV.-- *Elements of Platonic sociology (political)* (246/264).**

a. The 'existential' encounter (Platon / Socrates' death) (246/248).

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d. Platonic critique of democracy (260/264).

**Chapter V.-- *Elements of Platonic culturology* (265/274).**

a. The definition of "culture" (265/267).-- vrl. Since Kolb and Klemm

b. Platon within the Antique economy (267/269), i.e., 'free / slave'

c. Platonic program of study (270/274; his cultural politics).

**Chapter. VI.-- *Elements of Platonic philosophy of history* (275/290)**

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***Table of Contents***  
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**A.** Definition (biological, philosophical),

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The value of common sense ( Commonsensism) (35/48).

Platon 's theses on the subject ( common sense/public opinion/groupthink) .

***Chapter I.-- The dialectic method*** (49/69).

Two features:

a. concepts run into each other (dietary-synoptic));

b. premises are either known

(If A, then B. So B: 'sunthesis')

or unknown

(If A, then B. Well B. So A: 'analysis' (lemmatic-analytic method). With all kinds of applications,

***Chapter II.-- The Factor Analytic Method*** (70/97).

Prepositions, (synthetic or analytic) are always elements within a system,

Consequence: 'stoicheiosis', factor analysis, is the systemic side of dialectics.

Relations are central.

***Note carefully*** : Platonism is first and foremost a dual method.

When one says that the theory of ideas is the core, one is mistaken: the theory of ideas is a consequence of the method (ideas are elements, which one must put first, if one wants to understand the phenomena).

***Pay attention***: what follows is a study of Platonism conceived as a human science. For teachers who are humanities scholars, this is the appropriate form of philosophizing.

***Chapter III. --Elements of Platonic spiritual science*** (98/245).

**1.** The soul center of Platonism -as being and principle of life (life force) 99/104).

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***The big monster*** (117/136: feeding urge /erotic urge /nightly need / possessive urge).

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***Chapter VI.-Elements of Platonic historiology*** (275/290).

Vr1. the concept of historicity.

***Note carefully:***

Chapters III to VI are applications of the Platonic method. The method is decisive.

Everyone must know chapter IV (historiology).

Everyone chooses what he/she prefers outside of that, as an individual piece.

17 04 1989

Deo Trino et uno gratias maximas Mariaque amorum maximas