

7.5. Ideology Analysis

Third year of philosophy ideology analysis 1989 / 1990

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(Editor's note: This course was compiled but never given. It was found in the legacy of Mr. T'Jampens. We have the impression that this course was not finished. The texts in a reduced font were added later by the editors).

Preface (01/10): the main theme: tradition and revolution.

The title of this preface was taken from *H. Barth, Revolution und (tradition (ein versuch zur selbstverständigung der philosophie))*, (Revolution and (tradition (an attempt at the self-understanding of philosophy)), in: *saeculum (jahrbuch für universalgeschichte* (Munich), 14 (1963), 1/10, in which we find one of the main theses of this third year course. -- Therefore we summarize the very solid article, at the front.

The central theme of the article is the revolution of 1789*, -- the so-called French revolution. -- immediately the question will arise in you, student/student, "what can our course 'philosophy', have to do with such a passing date and event?"

*The French Revolution (1789-1799) was an influential political upheaval in the late 18th century that abolished the absolute monarchy that had ruled France for three centuries and established the First French Republic. The power and privileges of nobility and clergy were pushed back en masse under pressure from radical political groups, the crowds in the cities and peasants in the countryside. The old ideas of absolutism, aristocracy and the power of the church were replaced by the principles of Liberté, égalité, fraternité, or freedom, equality and fraternity. The French Revolution brought about far-reaching and lasting changes in France, which spread throughout Europe. (source: wikipedia 2017)

Answer: did we not see, in the second year course, that the process, -- in ancient Greek 'kinèsis' (Lat.: 'motus', -- literally: 'movement') in the sense of "all that changes, resp. is changed" -- is central to the whole of ancient Hellenic philosophy? This, even with a Platon, who nevertheless has the (very undeserved) name of (wanting to) see only the 'eternal' (the transient).

Note: we saw that the so-called immutable ideas (= explanatory grounds, presuppositions), which make the being (the essence form) of the changeable things, which are invariably 'processes', natural, understandable, are not only present before and above, but also in the processes themselves.

Consequence: If "philosophy," at least for a Platon, exists in it:

(i) start from the changing phenomena

(ii) to trace the 'elements' (= presuppositions, 'grounds', principles) of it, why should this -- in 1989, two hundred years after the French revolution -- one might better say, "the French change (of things)" -- should be different now anyway? It is precisely this that Hans Barth, in deliberate article, explains to us somewhat.

(1). -- **Paul Hazard, La crise de la conscience européenne** (The crisis of the European conscience), (1680/ 1715), Paris, 1935, préface, says what follows. -- He delineates the "revolution" in the minds between 1680 and 1715. In these thirty-five years a formidable turnabout in mentality takes place, which Hazard outlines next.

-- "What a contradiction! What an abrupt transition! The rank, the discipline, the order (of which the authority took upon itself the assurance), the dogmata, which firmly

governed life: Behold what the XVII- d' centuryers put forward. -- The coercion, the authority, the dogmas: behold what those who immediately followed, the XVIII- d' centuryers, spit out" -- Hazard further explains:

(a). The XVII- d' centuryers are Christians; they put forward a deity-based order concerning law; they feel at home in a society, whose classes are unequally judged;

(b). The XVIII- d' centuryers are against established Christianity; mere "human nature" is, for them, basis of every possible legal order; they dream of only one thing: "égalité" (equal justice). -- "The majority of Frenchmen thought like Bossuet (1627/1704) 'l'aigle de Meaux'* (where he was bishop); *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (Discourse on universal history), (1681; a work conceived of history theologically). Suddenly they are thinking like *Voltaire* (1694/ 1778) *Candide ou l'optimisme* (1759); *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* (Essay on the morals and spirit of nations), 1760; a work conceived of history-philosophically-critically). In other words, a revolution".

*C'est Voltaire, au siècle des Lumières, qui a surnommé Bossuet l'Aigle de Meaux. L'aigle est l'un des rares oiseaux capables de voler face au soleil sans être ébloui (blinded). Or Bossuet était un évêque irrévérencieux (irreverent), seul homme religieux à tenir tête à Louis XIV, le Roi-Soleil, à qui il a notamment lu un sermon sur les devoirs des riches envers les pauvres. Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, nommé évêque de Meaux en 1681, n'a jamais connu ce surnom d'Aigle de son vivant. (source: le parisien 01 08 2012)

(2). -- *H. Barth* spins on what Hazard wrote. -- Between the Renaissance (between the trecento* (= the XIVth century in Italy) and ± 1640), of which the period in France between 1680 and 1715 was only the effect, and the French Revolution, which it prepared more directly, something is situated in the history of ideas which can never be underestimated, -- says Hazard, expressly quoted by Barth: "In the place of culture, which was founded on the idea of 'duty' -- duty to God, duty to the sovereign, the 'nouveaux philosophes' (*note* : During the eighteenth century, the term 'philosophe' took on a very narrow meaning: 'revolutionary thinker') attempted to establish a culture that would stand or fall with the idea of 'right': the rights of the individual, -- the rights of criticism, the rights of 'reason' (*note*: during the same period, the term 'reason' took on a very narrow meaning: 'critical' (i.e., investigating the foundations of all established) reason), the rights of the individual and the citizen." -

*The Trecento (Italian for 300, or for "mille trecento", 1300) refers to the 14th century in Italian cultural history, and more specifically to the period between Gothic and Renaissance. In addition, the Trecento is often considered the beginning of the Renaissance in art history. (source: wikipedia 2017)

Note - student/student, don't you have the impression that only with the Second Vatican Council (1962/1965) did what was already going on in the French intelligentsia in 1680/1715 penetrate into the Roman Church? Conclusion: cultural revolutions do not, in all parts, occur simultaneously.

Note -- Current sociologists and culturists will try to explain this time difference to you in terms of ‘pillarisation’. The Church of Rome, -- like other cultural groups, succeeded in isolating and, literally, “indoctrinating” its “flock.

By presenting this ‘doctrine’ -- even where it was merely a ‘human product of the mind’ (e.g. theologians) -- as (without differentiation between what is strictly God-given and what is merely human product of the mind) “divine”, the ecclesiastical authority succeeded in founding a “pillar” which lasted until the communication-teaching revolution (in which the infamous “media” (press, film, TV) played a major role), finally allowing the “revolution” of 1680/1715 to penetrate into all families, e.g., not to mention schools, not to mention the schools. -

Something analogous occurs with “the new theology” (the new catechesis): without making a strict distinction between what is “of God” and what is of new, liberal theologians, “church doctrine” is presented, to children, for example, and to student youth, as being “based on a bible reference”, for example.

Where every “new theologian” knows very well that some (not all, of course) of the basic ideas of today’s catechesis date only from either the Renaissance or 1680/1715 or later. -

Using a term from John XXIII (1881/1963; pope from 1958 to 1963; he started Vatican II a year before his death, in 1962): ‘aggiornamento’ (adaptation to the current cultural period).

Or using a furor-inducing term from Michael Gorbachev: “perestroika” (restructuring).

Or, as in China: ‘cultural revolution’ (= the little red book (1964) grows into the ‘cultural revolution’, from 1966 onwards).

(3). -- *The Archbishop of Cambrai, François de Salignac de la mothe-Fénelon** (1651/1715; *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699)) - One would certainly call him a “progressive bishop” nowadays - delivers a merciless criticism of the social abuses at the time of his episcopacy, in the book mentioned.

He, with a number of Christian and liberal thinkers, puts the rights of the (sovereign) people first. If the so-called “Christian” absolute French princes continue to allow themselves to be “worshipped” by the people as God’s direct representative, then, inevitably, a day will come when “le despotisme tyrannique des

*François Fénelon, in full François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (Château Fénelon in Sainte-Mondane, August 6, 1651 - Kamerijk, January 7, 1715) was a French writer, archbishop, moralist, pulpit and supporter of Quietism. Because of his social criticism, he is counted among the precursors of the Enlightenment. His ideas were a direct impetus for philosophers such as Voltaire and Rousseau. Because of his emphasis on feeling and his poetic style, he can also be considered a precursor of Romanticism. His most famous work is the pedagogical novel *Les aventures de Télémaque* (1699), written for his pupil, the Duke of Burgundy - le Petit Dauphin. The book was also published without his knowledge and caused him the anger of Louis XIV (1638-1715), because he had read in the book a condemnation of his reign. (source: wikipedia 2017)

souverains” (especially the absolute princes) turns into its opposite, namely “le despotisme de la multitude” (especially: after the French Revolution, what sociologists call “the modern masses”). In a purely Platonic sense (think, among other things, of Platon’s poilitia, the state (aka: the republic)) Fénelon says:

“La liberté sans ordre est un libertinage qui attire le despotisme. L’ordre sans liberté est un esclavage qui se perd dans l’anarchie”. (Freedom without order is a libertinage that provokes despotism. Order without freedom is an enslavement that kills in anarchy).

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Note: -- Freethinkers of all kinds sometimes dare to present it in such a way as to give the impression that “the church”(without differentiation of what was absolutist thought, and of what was popularly sovereign thought) was without question behind the “ancien régime”: a Fénelon brilliantly refutes this distortion of history.

(4). -- *Jean-Jacques Rousseau** (1712/1778) is at once the pinnacle of French lumières (= enlightened rationalism) and its complement by sentimentalism, cradle of romanticism. Besides “reason”, center of the one-sided enlighteners who dreamed of industrialization, Rousseau also puts the mind first. In particular: also through his/her mind man grasps a kind of reality. -- **Note:** -- as you know from your history lessons, Rousseau was for both an educational revolution (*Emile ou sur l’ éducation* (Emile or on education), 1762)) and for a simultaneous political revolution (le contrat social ou principe de droit politique (1762). Both revolutions are expressed in one chapter of his Emile, *Confession de foi du vicaire Savoyard*, (Confession of faith of the Savoyard).

Note: -- It is easy to forget the religious revolution, which Rousseau ushered in: he distinguished two types of ‘religion’:

(i) “historical” religion, which -- apart from human nature -- also relies on historical facts. -- e.g., the birth, suffering, death, nada Jewish appearances of Jesus;

(ii) the “natural” religion, which either abstracts from those historical facts or categorically excludes them. Basis: the natural landscape around us and our inner mostly sentimental experiences.

Rousseau concludes from this, e.g., that, in order to live “truly” religiously, one does not need religious instruction as a child: that child will, in time, either come to religion on his own or need absolutely none.

*Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712/1778) was a pioneering philosopher and writer. He exerted a profound influence on literature, pedagogy and politics. He composed seven operas and other musical works. With his love of nature, Rousseau was at the forefront of Romanticism. In his novel Emile, Rousseau expounds his views on human nature and proposes what he believes to be the ideal method of education. The philosopher-writer Goethe was one of his many admirers, but the philosopher Voltaire mocked him. Rousseau belonged to the Age of Enlightenment, In his autobiography he wrote about his many lies, delusions, his masochistic tendencies. (source: wikipedia 2017).

In 1749, the Academy of Dijon wrote a competition: “Has the founding of arts and sciences contributed to the purification of morals?”. Rousseau answers: far from purifying morals, the arts and sciences owe their existence to our vices and they serve no purpose except to reinforce them. Reason: they remove us from “nature. He wrote his “*Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes*” in 1755, an argument about inequality among humans. In it he argues that man is good by nature, in primitive state like a “noble savage”, (“bon sauvage”), and prior to any education. He becomes bad through experiences in society. Among other things, in his “*Emile ou de l’ éducation*,” Rousseau described his ideas of education. However, this did not prevent him from taking his five illegitimate babies to a foundling home and raising them there. He confessed: “je n’ai même pas gardé la date de leur naissance”.

Like Fénelon, but more pagan, Rousseau foresees the era of revolutions. -- H. Barth quotes, from *Emile*, 3: “ye trust in the present established order, -- without ever thinking that that order is subject to inevitable revolutions. (...). The empire-great becomes a little man; the rich man becomes poor; the autocratic monarch becomes a subject. -- Are then the sledgehammer blows of fate so rare that you can count on never having to deal with them? We are approaching the state of crisis (‘l’ état de crise) and the century of revolutions. Who can say what will become of you then? All that people have caused, people can destroy. Letters, which one can never erase, do not exist, except those letters which nature (*note*: the basic concept of enlightened rationalism) imprints. Well, that nature causes neither monarch nor empire nor empires”.

Conclusion. -- The Renaissance era, the “1680/1715” era in France, -- they prepared and foreshadowed revolutionary turns to the contrary.

(5). -- *De Tocqueville/ Joly/ Burckhardt/ Frantz.* -- Psychic minds like the four named in the title have repeated it abundantly after the French Revolution, during the century immediately preceding us. -

(1). Alexis de Tocqueville*, in 1850: “it is clear today: ‘the tide is rising’. We shall not have seen the end of the unprecedented revolution. But the child born now will, probably, never experience it either.” -

*Alexis-Charles-Henri Clérel, Viscount de Tocqueville (1805/April 1859) French political philosopher, sociologist, historian and statesman, theoretical founder of modern political liberalism, visionary: (source: wikipedia 2017).

(2). Also in France: Maurice Joly*, in 1864: “l’ère indéfinie des révolutions” (the never-ending epoch of revolutions) (in his conversation in the underworld between Machiavelli and Montesquieu).

*Maurice Joly (1829/1878), lawyer in Paris, journalist and writer. In his *Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu*, he describes, as a philosophical discussion, the purposes of politics - how Napoleon manipulated the economy, the media, the workers and everyone else to achieve a totalitarian regime. He writes that the emperor reduced the French people to a nation of submissive and unfree slaves. (source: wikipedia 2017).

(3). In Switzerland: Jakob Burckhardt*, the cultural historian of the Renaissance. In 1867: “die ewige revision” (the eternal revision). Thus he says : “the main phenomenon of our days is “das gefühl des provisorischen” (the feeling that everything is only provisional). -

*Jacob Burckhardt (1818/1897) Swiss cultural and art historian, known for his *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860). (Source: wikipedia 2017).

(4). In Germany: the opponent of Bismarck and proponent of a German and European federalism, Constantin Frantz*, in his *Naturlehre des Staates* (1870): “The provisional is the general characteristic of present situations: the widely contended determinations of the new, seem but a pause in the reversal itself.

*Constantin Frantz (1817/1891); philosopher, diplomat, political scientist, forerunner of European federalism. He challenged Bismarck’s policy of establishing a German national state gradually and by waging wars. He opposed the violence of war as a means of resolving conflicts. (source: wikipedia 2017)

Note: -- H. Barth says that two figures -- Joly and Burckhardt -- have also felt able to point out the root cause, namely, popular sovereignty. -- See here about this only Burckhardt. -

(a) The decisive new thing that has come into our world since the French Revolution is being allowed to change and wanting to change,--if it means the public good. -

(b) The new (*note:* in a stricter sense, now) results from equality, which since then lets the general - or at least very extensive - right to vote decide(...). -

Consequence: since then, state power has either been available only conditionally (insofar as it has been perpetually threatened by revolutionary lust) or, to that threat, it has been the despotic response. (...). -

(c) On the social side, without exception, an omnipotent state is put forward. Reason: that society of its own accord (*note:* without state intervention) would realize social desires - that's the way it should be"- is neither expected nor hoped for. As a result, we assign this task to the state. The state has the necessary means of coercion at its disposal or creates them. This, in order to cope with the task of comprehensive precaution, which requires an unprecedented power. --

(d) But rulers ('die streber') want to take control of and lead that all-powerful state. -

(e) the origin or, rather, the presupposition of this social program lies in Cesarism." -

Note: -- the term "cesarianism" means the fact that:

- (i) thanks to real or sham democratic means (e.g., a free election)
- (ii) a despot, absolute monarch/dictator or whatever, comes to power.-- something that, according to H. Barth, characterizes our twentieth century.

(6). -- *The philosophical processing of the continued revolution.* --

How do a number of - the main characters - sages, now, respond to this revolutionary structure of our current society? -

a. I. Kant (1724/1804)

Kant, the top figure of the German aufklärung (enlightened rationalism) - according to always H. Barth - sees it twofold:

(i) on the one hand, what he calls "the handed-down metaphysics," which, in its enlightened interpretation, is little more than a form of dogmatism converted into logical language, i.e. the will never to allow any basic examination of one's own presuppositions, -- with the aftermath of endless debate

between proponents and opponents of so-called “absolute truths,”--among whom the opposition “orthodox (orthodox)/non-orthodox (heterodox)” plays a decisive role.

(ii) On the other hand, what Kant calls “die kritische Vernunft” (critical reason), i.e., that type of use of reason and reason which investigates the foundations both of transmitted “metaphysics” and of its own propositions. Kant calls the characteristic of this “selbstkritik der vernunft” (reason also examines itself in the exercise of its powers; it subjects itself to criticism). --

Conclusion: on the one hand, dogmatism (refusal to allow one’s own presuppositions to be examined, “tested”), on the other hand, criticism (demand for presuppositions to be examined). -- This, according to H. Barth, is the essence of enlightenment.

This duality - he says - cannot simply be interpreted as something specific to the XVIIIth century, with its enlightened rationalism: instead of being limited in time and space, this duality is general.

An affirmation.

-- *Fr. Châtelet, Platon*, Paris, 1972, 22ss., says, in reference to what follows. -

(i) before Platon, as a thinker, acted, there were in the Hellas of his time and before:

a. forms of religion of all kinds, the opacity of which, as a philosopher of the “spirit,” he patently sensed,

b. established public opinions of all kinds, from which, since the death sentence of his extremely beloved teacher, Socrates of Athens (469/-399), he has emphatically distanced himself,

c. The pre-socratic thinkers, most of whom he knew thoroughly, but whose “dogmatism” he deplored. -

(ii) Platon founded, in the very strict sense, philosophy, -- says Châtelet.

Why? Because he demanded both from religion and from established public opinions and from his own thinking pastors justification, “vindication” of its propositions.

He is, therefore, known as the importer, on a general scale, of the hypothetical method, ‘hupothesis’, premise!

Either one starts from known ‘hypotheses’, like the mathematicians of his time and reasons deductively (‘synthetically’ in his language), or one searches -- from one’s own or others’ propositions -- for the still (at least partially) unknown ‘hypotheses’ (‘analytically’ in his language), -- what in the language of Jan Łukasiewicz* would be called the reductive method. - One may see the telling resemblance to Kant.

*Jan Łukasiewicz (1878/1956), Polish mathematician and logician. Devised, among other things, the trivalent logic (something is true, false or undecidable). Worked on the history of logic, including Aristotle’s syllogism.

Note: -- Now don't think that a serious man like I. Kant was unaware of the dangers inherent in the independently thinking "reason." -

In a text quoted by H. Barth (Faculty Struggle), the great illuminator says, "whoever leaves behind the wall of the church-only faith enters into the open field, the free field, of one's own judgment and philosophy.

Once he has escaped the control of clergymen, he is exposed there to all the dangers of anarchy." -

What a number of liberals, who invoke the Kantian "critical spirit" for example, seem to forget.

'Reason' as supreme court. -

Let us, now, go into a little more detail on the Kantian way of doing basic research. - Our epoch, Kant says, is the epoch of criticism proper -- through autonomous (thinking independently) reason. Everything should submit to it. -

a.-- The transitive (transitive) critique.

-- Religion, on the basis of its "sanctity:" -- legislation, on the basis of its "majesty" (*note:* inviolable authority), -- they usually want to evade critical examination. It is precisely because of this that they arouse justified suspicion. It is precisely because of this that they cannot claim undivided appreciation. Reason" only values what survives free and open scrutiny. -

Notes:-- Compare with Platon's objects of foundational inquiry: religion, established public opinion (not infrequently based on legislators). -

b.-- The looping (reflexive) critique. -

Reason" is itself in search of truth. It should, therefore, in all that it undertakes, subject itself to scrutiny - free, open scrutiny.

If an independently thinking enlightened mind does not do this, then he too cannot count on undivided appreciation. He makes himself suspect. -

Note: -- Compare with Platon's critiques, addressed to a number of predecessors in philosophy. -

Kant's conclusion. -- Nothing is so "sacred" (inviolable, -- (using a religious-historical word) "taboo" for scrutiny), nothing possesses such utility that it should evade basic scrutiny. -

A form of research 'historia' Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/ -425; father of historical research), would say, which - according to Kant - knows "no regard for the individual."

-- b. G.W. Hegel (1770 /1831)

Hegel*, the top figure of so-called German (= 'absolute') idealism, according to always H. Barth - also sees it twofold.

*Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, German idealist philosopher and is one of the central representatives of German idealism. He was friends with Hölderlin, Schelling, and Goethe. He is the author of *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1818), and was rector of Berlin University. Hegel saw reality not as static but dynamic, with new contradictions being cancelled each time. The key word here is 'lifting' (German *aufheben*), which means both lifting and abolishing and preserving. During the dialectical process something (for example, a moment) is first asserted, then denied, to finally arrive at a higher truth. Earlier, Fichte used the concepts of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis for this purpose, which, incidentally, it had again from Kant, and was later adopted by the Marxists. The Spirit developed from subjective Spirit (the individual human being) to objective Spirit (in history, the world spirit) to Absolute Spirit (in art, religion and science). The '(World) Spirit' reached its complete unfoldment upon reaching 'the Truth' or 'the Absolute' (knowing). Hegel's followers split into left and right Hegelians. Ludwig Feuerbach (see p. 11) became a left-hegelian. The right-hegelians, remained faithful to traditional Hegelian ideas.

-- (i) On the one hand, 'the positive'. -- The young Hegel gave the term 'stellar' ('positiv') an idiosyncratic meaning. Is 'positive'

(a) all that exists in fact, yes, is established (traditionally),

(b)1 insofar as it claims to be imperishable, "sacred" ("taboo: "inviolable") and the object of worship,

(b)2 and persists in this, if necessary by violent means, which inhibit the free testing of fundamental research, e.g.. -- In this connection Hegel thinks e.g. of all what the XVIII - d' century enlightened minds called "prejudice," "superstition," "philosophical dogmatism.

(ii). On the other hand, philosophy as criticism. -- The later Hegel - says H. Barth - says that philosophy is essentially 'critical': starting from a 'Masz' (measure, norm i.e. the lawful order of things), it subjects all the 'positive' to an assessment of its value. More than that: 'philosophy' - in the eyes of the 'committed' Hegel ('committed' in the sense of 'engaged in society') - is, first of all, theoretical, but, secondly, practical: the practical philosopher is, only, the actual thinker.

In other words: just as with very many ancient Greek thinkers, among whom there was certainly Platon, philosophizing was only worthwhile if it was ethical-political (and concerned both morals and society), so it is with Hegel: Hegel does not hesitate, for example, to deal with matters of conscience and political matters. -

Note: -- One sees it: like Kant, a duality, but in partially different terms.

Note: -- H. Barth draws attention to a philosophy-historical text by Hegel. -- to understand his text properly, first this: the patristics (33/800; the church fatherly philosophy) and the mid-century scholastics, (800/1450; the philosophy of church theologians) were types of philosophy, which, in fact, were theology of the gods. -

Descartes changes this: as a layman he thinks theology free, -- and now Hegel. -- for the first time since the Neoplatonic school (-50/+600; a pagan reaction against the encroachment of patristic Christianity), we come to

René Descartes (1596/1650; *Discours de la méthode -- pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences* (Discourse on Method -- for the proper conduct of reason and the search for truth in the sciences), 1637), the founder of modern philosophy -- rightly in the independent thinking philosophy.

This type of thinking realizes that it arises from 'die Vernunft' (reason) in an independent ('autonomous: church- and theology-free) way.

-- It knows very well that self-conscious thought is an essential feature ('moment', i.e. movable element, says Hegel) of truth,

-- that Hegel, when, like Descartes, he says "autonomous," means by this "theology-free," is clear, where he says: philosophy, with Descartes, enters its own, belonging territory; it thereby leaves philosophizing theology altogether, -- and this in principle (i.e., as one of the basic presuppositions).

With Descartes - says Hegel - we experience the beginning of that formation of the thinking spirit, which is typical of the "new age" (understand: the modern period). -

Note: This tendency, expressed here for the umpteenth time (by e.g. Hegel), is called 'laicism' (lay thinking, -- not without a sometimes very strong anticlerical connotation). -- which is not quite the same thing as 'desacralization', or, still, 'secularism' (secularization).

Hegel, though theology-free, still remains strongly 'sacred,' in the broader sense of that word. Only the actual 'nihilism' (the fact of designating all higher ideas, ideals and values as not higher, as a cover for 'lower desires') will profane through and through. The latter will be brought up e.g. by Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) and his interpreter, Martin Heidegger (1889/1976).

Chapter 1.-- the modern. 'New' dialectics.

H. Barth does not elaborate on the very precise way in which philosophy processes the deconstruction of tradition, la déconstruction de la tradition (to speak with J. Derrida), hand in hand with revolution.

One such processing is called "the new dialectic" (we borrow the term from P. Foulquié, *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949, 41/122 (*la dialectique nouvelle*), ((the new dialectic))), which exhibits two types, one philosophical (vrl. Hegel) and one disciplinary (e.g. Bachelard, Gonthier). -

Yet, by way of introduction, a striking text by a philosophical dialectician, Friedrich Engels.

Part 1.-- “What is reasonable is ‘real’ and what is ‘real’ is reasonable.

(pp. 11 to 23) Fr. Engels* (1820/1895) is, with Karl Marx* (1818/1883), the founder of scientific socialism,---both theoretical and practical. In his *Ludwig Feuerbach* und der ausgang der klassischen deutschen philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical german philosophy), Stuttgart, 1888, 1, he nods to this Hegelian thesis. It comes from Hegel’s *Grundlinien der Philosophie des rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im grundrisse, Vorrede* (Basic lines of the philosophy of law or natural law and political science in outline, prefac): “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.”(What is reasonable is real and what is real is reasonable). -- Since Marx and Engels were and scientific and philosophical dialecticians, when they re-established socialism, first of all in its communist form, we enter simultaneously and into the generally defined dialectic and into one of its most particular forms.

*Friedrich Engels was a German industrialist, social scientist, author, political theorist, philosopher and co-author of *The Communist Manifesto* along with Karl Marx.

*Karl Marx, German thinker of great influence in the political, philosophical and economic fields. Founder of the labor movement, of socialism and communism. Works: *Das Kapital*, and together with F. Engels: the *Communist Manifesto*. Marxism is based on their ideas.

*Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804/1872) was a German philosopher. He argued that God is a projection of man, an illusion he elaborated in his *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841) and which influenced Marx. Feuerbach belonged to the left-hegelians. They appreciated Hegel’s dialectic, but not his idealism and metaphysics. Hegel wrote that God became alienated from Himself when He created man. Feuerbach turned the claim around. He wrote that man became alienated from himself when he created God. He even claimed that believing in God and the holy family is the cause of all disharmony on earth. For Feuerbach, the soul is the product of the complex workings of the brain, which is the subject of physiology.

English begins by pointing out two interpretations. -

a.-- So e.g. Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770/1840) - as well as most of his subjects - interpreted the slogan - for that was what Hegel’s thesis had in fact become - as the canonization of the established political order (= despotism (Ia 04: the French absolute princes e.g.), the police state, the judicial powers, the censorship).

Note: -- We have just read Hegel’s writings: it is a true mystery how people like the Prussian monarch as well as many Germans of the time can give an interpretation which is diametrically opposed to the real thing. Isn’t this where our distinction, in terms of meaning, between meaning and purpose is wonderfully applicable? One who is diametrically opposed to the other. He who is diametrically opposed to the true meaning, interprets it as a founder of the meaning, -- not as a finisher of the meaning.

b.-- Hegel himself -- according to Engels -- interpreted it as follows. -- There was, for Hegel, a strict distinction between merely factually existing, ‘established’, on the one hand, and ‘really’ on the other. -- Again, one of those idiosyncratic word definitions to which many thinkers testify, of course. Although, this time, Hegel adheres to a pre-philosophical use of words. -

Think of a principal who has become old and is beginning to show senile features: doesn’t one say, at a certain point, that “his policy has become unreal”? That is: no longer consistent with the facts. Well, keep this in mind, and you will understand the following very well.

Engels comments -: “for Hegel, not everything that actually exists (is established) is without more ‘real’ “ is ‘real’

- (1) all that actually exists (e.g., all that we call “established tradition”),
- (2) To the extent necessary. -

Note: -- Hegel’s deduction type comes down to this:

- a. There is a totality of data,
- b. Within that totality there are an, in principle, infinite number of ‘moments’, i.e. elements-in-motion;
- c. Put totality first, and thou canst deduce any moment (element-in-the-process) and thus make it intelligible.

Once that some moment is deducible, by reason, dialectical reason, then it is necessary. -- One sees it: just as the senile director became ‘unreal’, so do all moments within the dialectical totality, as soon as they are no longer ‘deducible’ (= necessary) from that totality.

- **Note:** -- Situational thinking. -- Hegel is an enlightened-rationalist through and through. And yet: a part of romanticism is integrated by him (just as a Rousseau, who was thoroughly enlightened-rationalist, nevertheless, as a sentimentalist, merged an initial romanticism with a rationalism; (Ia 04).

The Romantics put life (among other things, as history, a fabric of changed situations) at the center. Hegel handled this perfectly, -- without falling into ‘irrationalism’.

English continues. - Some applicative models. -

(a) Model. -- The republic at Rome (founded in -509, by a revolution against the monarch, Tarquinius superbus) is ‘real’ (corresponding to the totality - or qua-sitototality (human totalities are always quasi-totalities) of the situation (= circumstantial totality) -

(b) Counter-model. -- But in -27, after a long struggle, Octavian receives, from the (republican) senate: the title of ‘August’ (making him ‘princeps’, -- is it called, in our parlance, ‘emperor’), -- title, which passes to all subsequent emperors.

Reason: the Senate, although republican, recognized that the republican form of government had become “unreal. -

(a) Model. -- The French monarchy was founded, with the cooperation of the early medieval clergy, by Chlodwig (Clovis; 481/511), founder of the Merovingian dynasty. She was, Hegelian dialectically, “really. -

(b) Counter model. In the XVIIIth century (1680/1715; Ia 01v.) it begins to become “unreal,” until, 1789, it is replaced by the “République Française”

Conclusion. -- The changeable situations involve model/ counter-model, i.e., in antique-Greek terms ‘harmony of opposites’ (i.e., the intertwining of model and counter-model). -- In modern-dialectical language: cover.

Which e.g. in political terms, can be a ‘revolution’. ‘Real’ is ‘reasonable’ (better: rationally justifiable). -

English continues.

a. Thus, in the course of development(process), all the former becomes “unreal,” for it loses its “necessity,” -- understand: the rational justification of its existence, its “reasonableness.

b. In the place of the dying reality (which is another word for “unreality”), comes a new, “living” reality.

This, -- **a.** Peacefully, if “the old” is wise enough to disappear, without opposition, with death;

-- **b.** Violently, if it resists the new necessity.

A revolutionary philosophy.

-- Always English.

-- **All1.** that is, within human history, ‘real’ becomes, over time, ‘unreal’, ‘unreasonable’ (no longer justifiable(b)),

--**2.** All that, in the minds of men, is ‘reasonable’ is destined ever to become ‘real’ (*note:* here Engels uses the term ‘real’ in the sense of ‘actually realized’, of course). -- Even if it contradicts (‘contradicts’) the established order - in appearance still ‘real’.

Engels - without saying it explicitly - quotes Mephistopheles’ words (in Goethe’s Faust): “all that exists is worthy of ruin”. Therein lies precisely - says Engels - the true scope of the Hegelian dialectic of history: it is revolutionary philosophy through and through. For it does away with the “final” (“positive” (Ia 09)) character of all the products of human thought - once and for all.

The Hegelian dialectical concept of truth. -

a. Prior to Hegel. -- ‘Truth’ is a collection of ‘finished’ (dogmatic (Ia 06: metaphysical) statements, which, once made out, had but to be memorized. -

b. Since Hegel. - ‘Truth’ is only the very process of knowing, which takes a long development

in the course of human history, goes through. 'Science', the hobbyhorse, since Descartes, of modern philosophers, is a process. Not a set of truths, laid down once and for all and, authoritatively, passed on. -

The "truth" about reality (here in an ontologically broad sense) rises, in principle, from stage to stage, higher and higher, -- without ever reaching a so-called end point by finding an "absolute truth" (understand: a system, which would include all definitive truths). -

Every phase (= phaseological aspect) is 'necessary' (because 'reasonable') and therefore 'real' (in the dialectical sense of 'deducible from the totality'), -- at least as long as the time, during which the circumstances (= situation) are the same, lasts, for to this it owes its 'origin' -- a 'chronology' or theory of time is inherent in every dialectic in the Hegelian sense. -- Rise and fall are, as it were, lawful.

The economic underpinnings. -- according to English. -

The analogy.

-- (a) the Western European bourgeoisie (understand: the capitalist upper class), through big industry, the competitive struggle, the world market, is practically volatilizing all the steadfast institutions deemed "inviolable" since time immemorial.

-- (b) the Hegelian dialectic, by not designating anything as "sacred" (i.e., final truth), makes all representations, which express so-called "final", "absolute" truth, as well as all situations, which correspond to such final representations, theoretically evaporate into all that exists. The Hegelian dialectic thus exposes impermanence.

Conservative/ revolutionary.-

Engels emphasizes it: there is, really, a conservationist side to Hegel's dialectic; namely, it recognizes the existence of well-defined phases of knowledge (science), of society, -- within the time, in which they are rationally deducible. --

But the conservative is relative (limited), the revolutionary, on the other hand, is absolute (unlimited). "The only absolute she tolerates" says Engels.

Systems Thinking. (p. 14/16).

We saw it: the totality - of all moments - is decisive. Hegel, therefore, sought in all his works to construct a total philosophy of all that ever evolved. Equally impermanent

as all human works is, of course, also Hegel's work. And, just as Platon's work gave rise to more than one interpretation, so too Hegel's work. Which does not prevent, in the case of both, a minimal and essential connection, of course.

-- *Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807).* -

Engels says that one can find a parallel (= analogy) in the embryology (individual development) and paleontology (collective development) of life forms, but, with Hegel, that individual and collective development applies to the individual "spirit" (e.g., in each human being) and the collective "spirit" (humanity as a whole).

Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of mind. In his *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel sketches the development of the (individual and especially collective) mind of mankind, through all the cultural phases known to him: the mind, which for Hegel coincides with god, shows itself in the phenomena, i.e. the cultural products, that each cultural period gives us. -

Note: -- Do not, therefore, confuse Hegel's "phenomenology" with, e.g., that of Edmund Husserl (the latter is purely descriptive and presupposes, e.g., no "spirit" ("God") appearing in the phenomena).

-- *Logik, -- Naturphilosophie, Philosophie des Geistes.* -

'God' - a very unclear and highly contested concept with Hegel -

(i) begins as the absolute idea (= universe concept);

(ii) thanks to his turning to nature (again, a very unclear and highly contradictory concept with Hegel) god alienates from himself (becomes different, yes, another),

(iii) but god comes back to himself -- from the alienation of nature -- by becoming spirit (third very unclear and very contradictory concept with Hegel). --

Logically, philosophically of nature, philosophically of mind, god 'develops' in reality. -

This concept of God is, of course, anything but biblical. This ambiguous conception of God led to Hegel being described as atheistic at times and as superstitious in one sense or another.

- *Philosophy of History.* -

The third aspect of God's "development," the fact that he becomes "spirit" in the human products of spirit, details -- as Engels rightly says -- Hegel in a multitude of sub-works: philosophy of history and history of philosophy, -- philosophy of law, of religion, of art, -- etc..

Engels: in all these cultural-historical fields Hegel sought to find the thread of development and to provide evidence of it. His encyclopedic learning -- his information (one would now say) -- entailed that he created, as it were, a gold mine of cultural-historical knowledge, -- with very original insights. -

Note: - Even now, whole sections from his work are more than worth reading, -- insofar as one eradicates there -- what is called English -- “gewaltsame Konstruktionen” (constructions that do violence to the data), more or less present everywhere.

These constructions are the result of Hegel’s systems thinking: he wants to put the total reality (his Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit are, in fact, an ontology) into one form. - “With all philosophers - says Engels - it is precisely the ‘system’ that is the ephemeral. Which, o.i., is very true.

Engels’ value judgment (p. 16 /17).

In addition to the value judgments already expressed above, this .-

A. -- philosophically.-- a.-- i.e., instead of seeking to construct an absolute system, as Hegel (who in this exceeded virtually all previous thinkers) sought to do, Engels, with Marx, drops this imaginary goal. -

(i) One first searches - thanks to the positive sciences - for the ‘relative’ truths lying within our reach (“die erreichbaren relativen Wahrheiten”). -

Note: -- We would call this method the method of inductive sampling, -- whether or not positive-scientific (pre-scientific knowledge can be very sound).

(ii) a. Thus, one arrives at a number of partial truths, which can be captured in a summary.

-- **Note:** -- Auguste Comte (1798/1857; following in the footsteps of J. L. D’alembert (1717/ 1783; with D. Diderot (1713/1784) publisher of l’ encyclopédie) father of positivism) devised something analogous to yank traditional philosophy out of its unpositivist stage. ‘Philosophy’ then becomes that summary of as many ‘positive truths’ as possible.

(ii) b. Engels retains Hegel’s dialectical scheme, -- to give that summary a “shape.

-- **Note:** -- for Comte, the “form” of that summary was sociology. In this, then, French positivism differs markedly from German Hegelian or Marxian dialectics.

- **b.**-- A second philosophical criticism of Engels is this. -

The picture (understand the description) which Engels gives of Hegel's dialectic -- we gave a summary of it Ia 11vv., is an inference from Hegel's method (viz. the dialectical method). -- But - says Engels - Hegel as a system-builder has, himself, betrayed that method

(i) in his *Logik*, truth coincides with the endless process itself (idea (= logical), nature (= alienation), spirit (= self-creation)) -- with all its cultural-historical phases.

(ii) but his actual 'system', in its elaborated form, does show an end of process. -

Thus Hegel himself claims that 'god' (= that absolute idea) should be realized in the monarchy of Friedrich Wilhelm III (Ia 11), which was based on a class society. This monarch stubbornly promised - according to Engels - such a class monarchy, but, incidentally, in vain. -

It comes down to this: 'god' becomes 'phenomenon' (visible) in the German, petty-bourgeois states of the time. The rule of the possessing classes adapted itself to this: it was limited and moderate, -- that 'rule'. In addition, Hegel attempts to 'prove' (to 'deduce' (Ia 12)) that the nobility was also 'necessary'. -

Note: -- Whether Hegel saw in it the end point of the universe process is debatable. It is possible that Hegel was simply deducing from the then transient situation. -

But for an Englishman, who

(a) wanted a positive-scientific philosophy (and not a merely Hegelian-speculative one) and

(b) was fighting for an ideal, classless society, the fact that Hegel's "god" ends up in such a petty-bourgeois class system is but a poor thing.

-- **(B).** - **Subject matter** ("positive"). -

Hegel's notion of an 'endless process' is, natural science-wise, open to discussion. -- The natural science of Engels' time (1888) did foresee an end: the earth, for example, may perish, -- at least it is "fairly certain" that its habitability will have an end. -

Engels concludes: if (note that deliberately chosen conditional sentence) this natural-scientific prospect is true, then human history shows not only an ascending line (what Hegel's optimism claimed), but also a descending line. -- Engels's dialectic is professionally substantiated.

Karl Marx on “universals” (general concepts) (p. 18/20).

As is well known, the “universals” (the scholastic-mid-century term for general concept (= universal set)) are a thing of controversy since protosophism (-450/-350), among the ancient Greeks. -

Mobilism or philosophy of change, present in all modern dialectics, gives the impression that from period to period, from culture to culture - everything is changeable and there are no general concepts. Reread what Engels says about the Hegelian method, and thou wilt have the impression that everything, but everything is “different” from period to period, from culture to culture.

Let us now listen to his friend and fellow thinker -- ‘hetairos’ the archaic Milesians would have said --, *Karl Marx* -- in a text of his, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, Berlin, 1953 (posthumously), s.7 (*Einleitung*), -- a draft work, which talks about the concept of ‘production’ (a basic concept in economics), another language sounds to us. -

(I) -- a sensible abstraction. -

Behold how we summarize the first part of Marx’s text. -

(i) “The ‘production’ in general is an abstraction, but a sensible abstraction, in so far as it really (*note*: we would now say ‘verifiably’) brings out the common, fixes it, and saves us, at once, repeating it.”

Note: -- When one sees Marx writing in this way, one imagines him a student of Aristotle, the abstractionist: a general concept is a representation of features, common(ly) to a collection of data; precisely because of this it is ‘abstract’, a model of the original, the multiplicity of data. - The saving underlines Marx.

(ii) “Meanwhile, this general - or the common separated by comparison - is itself a many-layered thing, i.e., something divisible into a multitude of characteristics.

(a) some of these characteristics are common to all periods; some are common to only some of the periods. -- (a) Some of these features are common to all periods; some are common to only some of the periods. One cannot imagine a ‘production’ without that”. -

Note: -- The novelty as against an Aristotle with his theory of abstraction, does not lie in the comparative method, by which the general is exposed. It lies in the diachronic comparison,

who, through the sequence of cultural periods, analyzes the development of modes of production and ...discovers identical features in all differences, -- so much so that one cannot conceive of a 'production' without that universal, which holds its own through the diachronic. -

Marx, as a true thinker, speaks of the very thinkability of production, through which the essential form, i.e. the distinctiveness, of all that is called "production" comes purely before our minds. -

Yet we listen further. For, here, Marx, warily, uses a Platonic term, viz. "production without more" (that adjective 'without more' occurs more than once in main Platonic texts, -- to denote the idea (e.g. of production')). -

(b) (...) "the features of knowledge, which apply to production as such, must be separated precisely so that, notwithstanding the unity (*note*: the antique term for 'resemblance'), which already appears through this that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature (*note*: Marx sees 'production' as the working of nature outside man by man), (are) the same - the essential diversity is not forgotten.

In this forgetting lies, for example, the entire 'wisdom' of modern economists, insofar as they 'prove' the 'eternity' and 'harmony' of existing social relations." -

Note: Another difference with the abstractionist Aristotle comes to light here: where Aristotle (and certainly the classical tradition) emphasizes immutability, Marx, as a dialectician to all immutability (which he does not deny), emphasizes change, process. Cf. Ia 13vv. -

Conclusion : Marx sketches us here a dialectical theory of abstraction. -

Note: -- We have put the terms 'wisdom', 'eternity', 'harmony' in quotation marks. Why? Because Marx, here, is apparently ironizing: as a dialectician, he sees all too clearly the differences, from period to period (Ia 14: chronology) and the 'eternal' (understand: unchanged, yes, unchanging) is for him a partial doing violence to the facts. 'Harmony' in a society knowing class struggle is, for Marx, a beautiful word.

-- (2). -- **An example.** -

Marx now gives us a sample of his economic analysis. -- "No production possible without a tool of production, even if this tool were only the hand. -- No (production) possible

without past, accumulated labor, even if this labor were only the skill, which, in the hand of the “savage” (*note*: the enlightened-rational word for archaic or primitive man), has been gathered and concentrated by repeated practice. -

Capital is, among other things, also a tool of production, also past, “objectified” (*op. cit.*) labor. -

Thus capital is a general, ‘eternal’ relation of production. That is, if I leave out precisely the specific, which, calculated, makes ‘production tool’, ‘accumulated labor’ only capital.”

Note: -- One feels that Marx, in order to establish his ‘Marxism’ as a theory, needs basic concepts, with universal scope. Thus, among others, the idea of ‘production’. To be sure that this theoretical idea is validly defined, he limits it to its “conceivability” - or, as he also says in Kantian terms, its “possibility”. - So e.g., in his interpretation, of course, is ‘production’ possible’ (understand: conceivable) without a tool? Answer: no. Consequence: throughout all cultural periods, however different, in order to find ‘production’ one will also have to find ‘production tools’. -

As in the Platonic dialectic, so here also, in the new dialectic of a Marx: one concept runs into the other. One can distinguish one concept from the other (essence), but one cannot separate the two (coherence). In Platonism, this is called the ‘dietary synoptic method’.

Thus e.g.: Is “production” possible (conceivable) without accumulated, objectified labor? Answer: No. Consequence: throughout all periods of culture - if one wants to analyze production - one will invariably have to find ‘accumulated labor’ as well. Otherwise one is not dealing with real ‘production’, but with something else. -

Again, an application of the Platonic ‘dietary synoptic method’ on concept analysis.

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Conclusion. -- Engels, Marx, -- they were men of praxis. But look closely: as true enlightened-rationalists, they believe that praxis, if it is to be “enlightened” (illuminated by reason), puts theory-making first.

Here, in this remaining draft, we encounter a wonderful applicative model of Marxist theorizing. Theory formation, which means thinkability (= creature form, universal idea).

Marxism and “physicism” (belief in nature). -

A. Braeckman, *The French revolution critically rethought (on Marx and the cuckoo’s egg of liberal historiography)*, in: *Streven* 1989:7 (April), 642/654, -- concurring therein with G. Comninel, *Rethinking the French revolution (Marxism and the revisionist challenge)*, London/ New York, 1987, distinguishes -- very correctly -- liberal materialism (understand: free market economy standing materialism) and socialist (understand: managed economy standing) materialism (a.c., 649v.).

For example, both types of materialism interpret ‘progress’ (a theme favored by the XVIII - d’ century enlighteners) as the result, among other things, of Class struggle. But, when it comes to the idea of ‘property’, Marxists and liberals, of course, differ.

We are interested, now, here, in the true nature of that disagreement. This is because it is fundamental and has a dialectical scope.

1. The XVIIIth century materialists, who took up the cause of the possessing class - the so-called Liberals - situated the presupposition of the right to exist (Ia 13: ‘reasonableness’) of actual property in “human nature”. This ‘nature’ (from the Latin ‘natura’, literal translation of the Greek ‘fysis’) was conceived as general, universal, i.e. all human beings, at least in principle, own.

Since the ‘fysis’, ‘natura’, nature, was something that is normative, guiding, and, therefore, rule for behavior, “owning property”, insofar as it is rooted in such a nature, was ‘inviolable’, basis of legal order. The XVIII - d’ century thinkers therefore called “property” “a natural thing”.

2. The Marxists, insofar as they were socialists and therefore disputers of the established property relations, were of the opinion that the actual properties were only (listen carefully to that ‘only’) the result of historically grown, yes, misgrown developments of all kinds. For Karl Marx, very specifically, this mis-growth consisted in the exploitative relations at work in the production process. -

Decision. -

(i) The possessing class, by way of the liberal materialists, is physicist, i.e., nature-believing.

(ii) the propertyless, through e.g. the socialist-thinking Marx, is historicist, i.e. history-believing. The difference is, immediately, obvious: a historical-dialectician like Marx had the process in mind. Liberals put nature first.

Our first ideology analysis. -

A lot has already been written about the term “ideology. There is more than one definition, of course. -- In that jumble of ideology analyses, let’s create some order. -

(1). - In older works, ‘ideology’ is the same as ‘science of ideas’(where the term ‘idea’ is either Platonic, resp. Patronizing (and thus presupposing the universal and higher (immaterial) in the singular phenomena (= data, ‘facts’)) or modern (especially since the XVIth century (and thus “representation within our consciousness” -

In short: Platonic idea is a presentation of facts. Modern-nominalistic - idea is a representation in our mind.-- ‘ideology’ then is the theory concerning the so-or-so ‘ideas’. -

(2). -- In the more recent works the non-Platonic conception prevails: ‘ideology’ is a system of ideas or representations, which is offered as the existence of facts, but in fact does not or not entirely correctly represent these same facts. -- The dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, for example, offers us one model of this more recent definition.

(i) any cultural system - the religion, the philosophy, the morality, the political science (state theory) etc. - which offers itself as ‘reasonable’ (Ia 13: justification), as a right to exist, but in fact formulates the material situation (the economic exploitation-relationships on the upside) in a type of theory, is typically ‘ideological’.

(ii) applied: it is clear that the theory, justification attempt, of the liberal materialists concerning the legal basis of actual properties does speak of ‘human nature’ (the right to exist), but in fact it obscures - ‘represses’, ‘suppresses’ (we might say with the Freudians) - the process of exploitation at work in the historical growth of those properties.

Such a “theoretical justification” is, in Marx’s eyes, an ideology. This is: a system of ideas or representations that is ostensibly high yes venerable theory, but is in fact based on barely concealed self-interest. -

Language analysis: one speaks of ‘nature’ in order not to have to speak of ‘(exploitation) process’. It is a form of rhetorical speech: by turning away attention one tries to maintain unlawful situations, yes, to give them a semblance of existence.

The idea “nature” and the idea “process.” -

We can now conclude this little chapter. -- On the one hand we saw, especially on the basis of Engels’ account of the Hegelian dialectic, the enormous emphasis which is laid on the idea ‘process’ (change, mutability). On the other hand we also saw - twofold - the emphasis on the idea of ‘nature’ (just now with the conservative, liberal materialists, but also a little before with Karl Marx, where he tries to prepare the nature of production, with its unchangeable nature of being (“production without more”), free from the mass of historical facts). -

Physicalism, process thinking. -

Behold the bipolar tension, between which our thoughts are strained, when we analyze modern thinking a little more deeply. -

Note: -- This justifies - Ia 01 - the fact that we have chosen, as our main theme, ‘tradition and revolution’. Traditional man will easily speak of the ‘eternal nature’ of things. The revolutionary man, on the other hand, prefers to speak of ‘change’, ‘mutability’.

After we have considered at length the mobilism (= process thinking), among others of Hegel, Marx, Engels (the dialectical form of mobilism), we will determine in more detail what the term ‘nature’, in language usage, can mean. -

(1). -- Since both ‘fūsis’ (according to W. Jaeger, Archaic Greek, identically with ‘genesis’, coming into being, literally: parturition) and ‘natura’ mean the process of coming into being, respectively the process of giving birth, it is plausible that ‘nature’ means: the essential nature of something, in so far as it determines the process of life by birth, --

(2). -- Since, in archaic cultures, the origin which is active and manifest in the birth, the genesis, of something is central - the myths are more often than not origin- and thus the nature(essence) of something - it is plausible that ‘nature’ means: the programming, which directs, ‘steers’ the course of the life of something, from birth, i.e. from the origin causing that birth (steering- or cybernetic definition of ‘nature’). One also says: nature as norm. Among other things of the process, which from the start is provided for in that nature. -

Conclusion. - One does not see too readily an absolute contradiction between nature and process. In fact they are concepts which belong together (Ia 20).

Part 2. -- The idea of “dialectics” (p. 24 to end).

We begin with a bibliographic sampling. -

-- P. Foulquié, *La dialectique*, Paris, 1949 (a well-documented and comprehensible survey, -- of the ancient dialectic (from Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465)) to German (absolute) idealism (especially Hegel)), -- then of the new dialectic (both purely philosophical and professional)), --

-- A. Marc et al, *Aspects de la dialectique (recherches de philosophie, II)*, (Aspects of the dialectic (Research in philosophy, II)), Paris, 1956 (a number of contributors on aspects),

-- D. Dubarle/ A.Doiz, *logique et dialectique*, Paris, 1972 (logistic investigation concerning the purely logical value of Hegel’s dialectics in particular), --

-- W. Biemel, *das wesen der dialektik bei Hegel und Sartre*, (the essence of dialectics in Hegel and Sartre), in: *tijdschr. v. Philos.*, 20 (1958): 2, 269/300 (with Hegel, dialectic is a whole ontology; with Sartre, it is only a feature of our human consciousness);

-- *Dialectica* 57/58, Neuchâtel (Ch), 1961 (giving an idea of what dialectical thinking, -- here especially concerning the limits of our knowledge (the scientific included), can explore), -- especially concerning Hegel:

-- G.A. Van den bergh van Eysenga, *Hegel*, The Hague, s.d. (Hegel’s major life stages, -- by a Hegelian);

-- R. Serreau, *Hegel et l’hégélianisme*, Paris, 1965-2 (a view, among others, of the enormous influence of Hegel);

-- H. Arvon, *le Marxisme*, Paris, 1960-2 (especially o.c.,11/40 (*la dialectique*); also o.c.,41 / 68 (l’aliénation (*note*: ‘alienation: usually ‘alienation’)).

Note: -- Part 1, just before this, gave us an insight into the method, especially logical (think of the Hegelian deduction (Ia, 12), which is the core)’ of a dialectician like Hegel (and also an Engels or a Marx). -- This little chapter wishes to proceed rather in an orderly fashion.

Part 2. A. The four main representations. (p. 24/ 59).

First premise. (p. 24/28).

To properly understand how the new dialectic got off the ground, one should start from the idea of “mathesis universalis” (comprehensive reasoning structure).

1. Apart from Platon of Athens (-427/-347), with his intention of a stoicheiosis, elementatio, systematic factor analysis, conceived hypothetically (expressible in conditional sentences), there are following thinkers:

Galenus of Pergamon (129/201; physician), somewhere, already wanted to prepare a comprehensive reasoning structure. -- *Raymundus Lullus* (Ramon Lull (1235/ 1315), with his *ars generalis*,

steers, in turn, as a Neoplatonist, toward an analogous order(s) doctrine. -- Order, orderly thinking, is, after all, central to such attempts.

2. With René Descartes (1596/1650), the founder of modern, enlightened-rational thought, begins a new approach to harmology, theory of order. -

Bibl. st.:

-- E.W. Beth, *The Philosophy of Mathematics (from Parmenides to Bolzano)*, Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 93/117 (*R. Descartes*);

-- M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses (une archéologie des sciences humaines)*, (Words and things (an archaeology of the humanities)), Paris, 1966, 64/72 (*l'ordre*).-

Beth, o.c. 103, says: "The mathesis universalis, which Descartes wished to build as a generalization (*op.*: generalization) of analysis and algebra, was to be at the same time an *ars disserendi* (*op.*: a method of exposition) and an *ars inveniendi* (*op.*: a method of discovery or heuristic). In doing so, he adopted, again, a notion that had been defended much earlier by Raymundus Lullus." -

(i) A letter from Descartes to Mersenne (20.11.1629) explains. -- Descartes thinks of the invention of a kind of esperanto, a constructed language. Like Platon, with his linguistic stoicheiosis, he sets out how the word roots of a universal language (and the corresponding characters) should be composed.

Note: there is, with Descartes, a kind of mathematism: the numerals and numbers serve him as a model in the construction of that general language. -

(ii) Beth: "One should establish, among human thoughts, an order of precedence, such as exists - by nature - among numbers. Then one could construct a language, which, in a very short time, could be learned." (Beth, o.c., 103). --

Foucault wants to deny that Descartes acted mathematically: this, however, seems undeniable. -

(iii) Beth: "Only true philosophy, however, would make the execution of this plan possible. For only it enables us to distinguish, enumerate and rank human thoughts." (ibid.).--

One can see that Descartes' ideal was, indeed, a total philosophy, according to mathematical model.-

(iv) Beth: "Would one once have at one's disposal an inventarium (*note* : a summative induction, a collection) of the singular representations (*note* : 'Ideas' in Cartesian language), from which all

thoughts are summed up, then a universal language would be possible, which would support the judgment to such an extent that error would be almost impossible.” (ibid.).

Here we have the artery of modern enlightened rationalism: getting a grip, via sign systems designed according to a mathematical model (language is a sign system), on human thoughts, in their totality,--and this in such a way that, reasoning quasi-machinally, one excludes all mistakes. A kind of reasoning machine, in other words.

Think of our current computers. This is the modern ideal of science. And also the modern ideal of philosophy.

Beth, o.c., 104, says that in his *géométrie Descartes* realized a specimen (= applicative model) of his mathesis universalis, “from which the fruitfulness of his conceptions can be seen.”

-- One can put it even more broadly: in 1637 *Discourse on Method (for the proper conduct of reason and the search for truth in the sciences, plus dioptrics, meteors and geometry, which are the tests of this method)*, -- a thick book of 527 pages, as *Alexandre Koyré, Introduction à la lecture de Platon, -- suivi de entretiens sur Descartes*, Paris, 1962, 166, rightly notes. The exposition (‘discourse’) on the method, on which he went so large, is dominated by Descartes’ idea of ‘mathesis universalis’. As we shall further specify.

M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses, 70, says that neither mechanism (conceiving of reality as an apparatus, “machine”) nor *mathematization* (reality, including that of the physics of his day (“mathematical physics”)) are essential among the enlightened rationalists, but rather the mathesis universalis, -- understood as “science universelle de (la mesure et de) l’ordre” (o.c., ibid), as Descartes designed them.

Even measurability (one of the mathematics to which reality is subjected), by means of a measure (measurement model), is only one application of the general theory of order. -- From this arise, then,

- (i) the general theory of speech (‘grammaire générale’; think of our linguistics),
 - (ii) natural history (think of our biology) and
 - (iii) the decomposition of wealth (‘analysis des richesses’); think of our economy),
- all three applications of the theory of order.

Note: -- (1) the term “(thinking) machine” can be defined dichotomously. -

a. Is ‘machine’ a material system, whose changes of state -- thanks to the laws, exposed by mechanics (theory of motion),-- in a broader sense: exposed by natural science concerning inorganic nature -- are predictable. -- The mechani(ci)sts understand the term thus. -

b. Is ‘machine’ a material system, whose changes of state are predictable (= mechanistic aspect), -- designed, manufactured and used as a tool by humans (think of the term appliance’). -- The opponents of modern mechanicism, such as the German biologist-scientist *Hans Driesch* (1867/1941; *Geschichte des vitalismus* (1905) or Jakob van Uexküll (1864/1944; ethologist and ecologist), take the term ‘machine’ in this narrower sense: they are called vitalists.

-- (2) Even Beth, o.c., 113, admits that the antique-medieval view, since Descartes (insofar as he is a mechanist) and Thomas Hobbes* (1588/1679; continues Descartes’ mechanicism) has been supplanted by the modern-mechanicist, to a serious degree. -- thus, for Hobbes, ‘language’ is a kind of calculator (“reason (...) is nothing but reckoning (that is adding and subtracting (...)”). Hobbes even applied this engineering viewpoint to state life.

*Thomas Hobbes, English philosopher, founding father of modern political philosophy. Author of *Leviathan*, the basis for modern Western political philosophy, in which he developed a theory of absolutism. In theology, his view that both man, God, Heaven and Hell are made up of dust and motion and for that reason obey the same laws of nature as other material things, proved very influential. Hobbes denied the existence of a non-material reality. Human life was also completely materialistic, mechanical and deterministic. Man has no immaterial soul or spirit.

Note: -- Who, of course, tried to work out the mathesis universalis is *GW. Leibniz* (1646/1716; like Hobbes, strongly under Cartesian influence), -- in his *De arte combinatoria* (1666). Cfr. e.w. Beth, o.c., 118 / 144.

The dialectic as mathesis universalis. -

As *H. Scholz, die wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos*, (Bolzano's theory of science.), 1937, 407, says: the idea ‘mathesis universalis’ (= sciëntia generalis) was variously interpreted, resp. reinterpreted.

A. -- Immanuel Kant

Kant (1724/1804; top figure of the German aufklärung and instigator of German idealism) was a fierce fighter of it. Kant’s work was influenced by, among other things, pietism (an ascetic way of life, typical of some Protestant sects (especially Lutheran), which in the 17th century, in reaction to dogmatism, returned to biblical experience), a tendency that dominated the schools where Kant studied and regarded mathematics as something unchristian.

- sometimes radically - rejected, I. Kant adopted a rather negative attitude toward the Cartesian theory of order.

B.-- the German idealists --

J. G. Fichte (1762/1814; influencer of Romanticism), Fr. W. Schelling (1775/ 1854; Romantic thinker),-- especially G. F. W. Hegel (1770/1831; under partial Romantic influence) --

(i) do share in the A-mathematics (even Anti-mathematics) of the pioneer Kant,
(ii) but nevertheless take up the idea of ‘mathesis universalis’ again. - cfr. E.W. Beth, o.c.,141, 145, 148, -- 169 (B. Bolzano (1781/1848; forerunner of the Austrian school (among whom E. Husserl) as a critic of that a-mathematism).

C. The Marxists -

K. Marx (1818/1883), Fr. Engels (1820/1895) - in turn, take the idea of “mathesis universalis” - this is the dialectic - from the idealists, but re-found it materialistically. It is the materialist-historical dialectic.

Note: -- H. Arvon, *Le Marxisme, Paris, 1960-2, 210/213 (conclusion)*, explains how Marxism has been able to become one of the integrating components -- in Platonic terms, ‘stoicheia’, elements -- of our epoch. All attacks on it prove unable to break its ‘power’. “The key to this apparent mystery is provided to us by the comprehensive coherence of a doctrine, which constitutes a comprehensive whole.” -

If Marxism, for example, were merely an economic, social or political doctrine, history would long since have dismissed it, -- like so many other non-comprehensive systems which do, however, present themselves as one or other means of reform. -- No: the resistance which Marxism mobilizes against the all-pervading passage of time has its origin in the fact that it contains a comprehensive conception of the world -- a complete philosophy.

Within the whole (totality) of it, all its parts are wrought together by an indissoluble connection.-- Marxism responds perfectly to the human desire to acquire a cohesive view of the world around us.”

Note: -- precisely that -- that mathesis Universalis, that all-embracing -- ontological-reasoning-structure of reasoning -- is the dialectic and with the German idealists and with the Marxists. -- We will explain this in more detail later.

Second premise. (p. 29/30).

With a Platon of Athens, one regularly discovers two levels of thought, --

(i) the archaic-primitive mythic pattern of thought and

(ii) the mind-philosophical hypothetical analysis of the elements (factors, which govern a domain. -

Could it be that behind the dialectic, as we know it, a mythical pattern of thought emerges? - *W.B. Kristensen, Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions*, Amsterdam, 1947 (see also his *Introduction to the history of religion*, Haarlem, 1980-3), teaches us a great deal about this point.

a.-- The demonic deities of totality. -

Thus e.g. o.c., 273, Kristensen says what follows. -- He talks about the polygodism (polytheism), which dominated the entire ancient world (the East, the Babylonians, Hellas, Rome). He notes, in it, a basic structure. "Salvation and calamity came from the highest deities: downfall and upfall (Ia 17; English matter, 13, harmony of opposites), the opposites, which make up the permanent life of the world and in which precisely the divine totality was seen."--Provided by publisher.

The will of these gods was fate, the moira (*note*: ancient Greek term for 'share in good and evil'), 'divine' but inhuman. 'Righteous', in the ordinary sense of the word, they were not: by their conduct the gods denied the laws, which they, nevertheless, had established for men. -

The ancients were fully aware of this "contradiction" in the "divine" being. Some of the most impressive pieces of religious literature we possess attest to this: (1) the book of Job, (2)**a** the Babylonian Lamentations, (2)**b** the bound Prometheus." -

b.-- The hidden harmony. -

Kristensen, o.c.,289 continues: "The ancients called Herakleitos of Ephesus (Ia 24) 'the dark one', and not without reason. For, in truly 'antique' (*note*: with Kristensen this means the mythical level) spirit, he considered the mystery of totality more important than the rational relations of existence (*note*: the secular, visible and tangible, side controllable by 'reason'). Says Herakleitos: "the hidden harmony ('harmonie afanes') is stronger than the perceptible" (Fr. 54). -

Note: -- Herakleitos, the father of the new dialectic , means the following: the 'harmony' (= insertion, order) of things and processes exhibits two views:

(i) that which we experience of it directly (as immediately given, -- visible, tangible, palpable, and, immediately, reasonable; the perceptible harmony or incorporation;

(ii) that which governs that visible and tangible harmony, the hidden harmony, over which both our perceptions and our reasoning ability have much less or even no control.-

Note: -- A thinker like Herakleitos, who among other things exerted great influence on the idea of change of Platon of Athens, was still very close to the archaic polytheism, -- with its treacherous contradictions, briefly described above. Can one consider Herakleitos' little text to be a philosophical transfer of that very fact? Kristensen suggests so.

Kristensen: "How important the idea of totality was also found in later times, is shown by the fact that it has never completely disappeared from religious and philosophical thinking - (*note:* note the two levels; with Max Scheler one could speak of 'conformity thinking': 'conformity' (model comparison between religion and philosophy) - until our days. -- for example, this idea -- religiously 'beheld' (*op.:* pre-scientific, pre-philosophical), but philosophically formulated -- returns in the dialectic of Hegel, in which thesis, antithesis, and synthesis form the trinity (*note :* triplicity) of the self-development of 'reason' (*note :* vernunft, 'divinity' (Ia 15))" (o.c.,289). -

One sees it: Kristensen, great specialist of the science of religion (not to be confused with theology, in the running sense), is formal.

Note: -- E.W. Beth claims that the dialectic, as introduced by Hegel e.g., can never be satisfactory to mathematical thinkers.

In an analogous vein, Fr. *I.M. Bochenski* also writes, *The logic of religion*, New York, 1965, 48/51. Grievous is his logistic attitude. Yet Bochenski says: such a dialectic is "fruitful

(a) as 'a set of suggestions',

(b) To the extent that they are subject to logically rigorous review. -

Platonic: as lemmata, semi-transparent hypotheses, which, in the course of analysis (testing against the facts), become clearer. -- Let us now, orderly set forth the four great axiomata, 'principles', presuppositions ('hypotheses' Platon would say).

Introduction.-

We are going to do as *P. Foulquié, La dialectique*, 62ss.. He adheres to I. Stalin's rendering, *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* (1937).--

Note: we said, with Scholz, that the new philosophical dialectic involved a re-foundation of the Cartesian-Leibnizian mathematising mathesis universalis, as it was set forth, simplified, in Descartes' *discours de la méthode* (1637), among others. -

Stalin's little work, in its French edition (1937), is apparently a rejoinder. Although one can criticize Stalin's presentation - specialists claim that it is merely a reverberation of Marx's and Engels' teachings, reinterpreted in the style of Lenin (1870/1924; founder of Marxism-Leninism) -, it seems to us that, as far as the essentials are concerned (that which matters), Stalin is very correct in his interpretation.

A. -- First lemma: the totality (p. 31/35).

Foulquié, o.c., 63, quotes the Hungarian Marxist *Georg Lukacs* (1885/1971; e.g. *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, (History and class consciousness,), Berlin, 1923). The thesis that the whole ('totality') is the principle - archè, principium - that governs the (sub)parts, is the doctrine par excellence of e.g. Marxism (as also in Hegelianism).

"It is not the priority given to the economic motives, in terms of the interpretation of history, that decisively distinguishes Marxism from 'bourgeois science' (*note*: non-Marxist science; Ia 21 v.: liberal materialists e.g.). No: it is the point of view of the totality". -

Note: -- This will surprise many a superficial connoisseur of Marxist dialectics. But we note it.

Organicism. -

With romanticism especially, a type of thinking called "organicism" emerges, in the modern life middle. That is, the organism - meaning the living totality - dominates all parts. One speaks - e.g. with Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the systems thinker - of 'organismic' thinking. - It is so clear: both Hegelianism and Marxism are 'organismic forms of thought'.

Interaction. -

Not only does the totality control the aspects, parts. -- Each part, however small, may in turn control the others. "Between the different parts of reality there is an active, interdependent relationship". (Foulquié).

Reverse organicism. -

We saw it: the whole controls the parts. But also vice versa: the parts - just one, some, all - control, in part, the whole.-- Conclusion: 'organicism' includes the three aspects: whole controls parts/part controls part/part controls whole. -

In which the term "controlling" is used in the ancient Greek sense: something controls something else, as an "archè" element that is "factor," in that the second something is not intelligible without the first.

Appl. Model. -- Hegel himself, in an early natural philosophy treatise, with which he habilitated on 27.08.1801, as a lecturer, tries to show that e.g. the solar system is a "peculiar" dialectical whole: no celestial body, precisely for this reason, may be thought of separately, but only in relation to the totality. -- thereby Hegel sought to demonstrate "reason in nature". Cfr. a. *V.d. Bergh v. Eysenga, Hegel, 70.* -

This is one (natural) scientific model of Hegelian dialectic. Compare with la 17 (where Engels' model is discussed). -- One does not forget that Hegel, from his youth, had an interest in nature. Living in Stuttgart he was already engaged in astronomy, surveying, botany, mineralogy. In Tübingen he was engaged with Linnaeus. There he took classes on anatomy, mathematics and physics. At Bern (Ch), during travels in the Alps, he studied geology and mineralogy. In Jena he became a member of physical societies (in 1803 he even became assessor of the mineralogical society). Since the winter of 1805 he gave lessons in mathematics three times. Cfr. v.d. Bergh, o.c.,71. -

Conclusion: although romantically influenced, German idealism was not as professionally alienated as it is sometimes portrayed.

Abstract-rationalist, yes; romantic-concrete, even more so. -- German romanticism criticized the all-dividing, "atomistic rationalism. Häring, a Hegel connoisseur, says that what connects the young with the old Hegel is the very vivid sense of all that is living whole. 'Life: among other things in this sense, was central to (German) Romanticism. -

Hegel tried to make this romantic main idea true in his dialectical way. Even all concepts are "lifted up" into the unit of life, -- as v.d. Bergh, o.c., 69, rightly says.

A. *De Waelhens, Existence et signification*, (Existence and meaning), Louvain/Paris, 1958,76, speaks of Hegel in an analogous sense: “The identity of (life) experience and its explanation is Hegel’s great discovery, the nucleus of what is called ‘Hegelian thought.’ One and the same human being lives and thinks while living.

Appl. Model. -- A certain Herr Krug had challenged Hegel. One misunderstood, after all, Hegel’s deduction type. It was thought, in an enlightened-rational sense, that “deduction,” also with Hegel, meant: to “deduce” from a-priorist, lifeless abstractions (“concepts”) a given: i.e., to interpret as necessary.

Krug wanted Hegel to demonstrate his art by, e.g., “deducing from the understanding” the existence of every dog and cat, even the existence of his penholder. Hegel answered Krug with a treatise entitled: “How the ordinary human mind conceives philosophy, -- made clear on the basis of the works of Herr Krug.”

(1802). -- Hegel’s answer boils down to this.--

a. - The existence, the fact, of dogs and cats (nature) or penholders (culture) is given. ‘Proving’ that they exist, in the sense of ‘actually being there’ (existence,-- in the ancient language), is meaningless. It is the beginning of the obvious. -

b. - Asked to: demonstrate, prove, that dogs and cats, respectively penholders

(i) cannot exist,

(ii) cannot be thought of,--

without the broad totality of moments (= movable elements), which reality, a living organism alike, is. - Cf. Marx’s analysis of the idea ‘production’ (Ia 19v.: precisely the same ‘deduction’). - It is about the living conceivability, intelligibility. “To point out and understand from the understanding of this living whole, the meaning and place of each part is something entirely different from proving its ‘existence’.” (*G.A. V.d. Bergh v. Eysenga, Hegel*, 68). -

Rationalism focuses too much on the separate fact and neglects the (dialectically defined) ‘reasonableness’, i.e. intelligibility, explicability, which invariably involves the whole, the life unit, in the understanding. Cfr. Ia 12 (appl. mod.).

Concrete thinking, with K. Marx. -

In an introduction to the critique of economics, Marx clarifies, admittedly in a materialistic way, what non-abstract, concrete thinking is. -- “It seems to me that the good method consists in beginning with the real and the concrete, which are the

be actual presuppositions. - Consequence: in economics, for example, “the population” is the basis; it is the (acting) subject (Ia 19) of the overall social act which is production. -- But beware: as soon as one goes deeper into this, one realizes that this is a mistake.

What is called “the population” remains an abstraction if, for example, one disregards the classes of which it is composed. In turn, these classes are an empty word if one does not know the elements on which they are based. These are, e.g., wage labor, capital, etc.

In turn, these presuppose exchange, division of labor, price formation, etc. ... -- (...) what we call “the concrete” is “concrete” only in that it is the synthesis (*op.*: union, existence together, fusion; Ia 20 diat. meth.), 23) of many features.

In other words: The unity in the multitude, it is for this reason that the concrete in our thinking comes through only as a synthesis process, as a result, -- at the end, not at the beginning. - This does not prevent the concrete from being the true starting point and, consequently, also the starting point in our direct understanding, in our representation.” -

Note: -- One sees it: ‘concrete thinking’ (and dialectics is concrete thinking, because it wants to reach totality) is seeing the coherence of a multitude of moments. Which does not, except through profound analysis, appear to be possible. Thus Marx.

Leninist appl. model. -

The thinking of a multitude comes through clearly, e.g., in Lenin’s definition of Marxism. -- *H. Arvon, Le Marxisme*, Paris, 1969-2, 41ss., says that Lenin sees Marxist thought as the aggregation of the three main currents of the XIXth century. English economics, French socialism -- they are separate moments. The “synthesis” is the fact that they were interpreted by Marx and Engels in terms of classical German idealist philosophy (understand: dialectics).

According to Lenin, Marx improved partial truths by making them complementary within a totalizing view. “By bringing them to ‘completion’ Marx has succeeded in creating a view of the modern world that encompasses all aspects of it and reveals its overall truth.”

Note: -- One may agree with this or not: what matters here is to grasp that Lenin means the dialectic as a vision of totality.

Stalinist appl. model. -

So far, dialectics is limited to description. -- But she can also work normatively. -- Foulquié, o.c., 62, quotes Stalin: “The single person (*op.*: the human person thought separately) is only an abstraction.

Reason: the few:

(i) (synchronous) depends on the effect, which the beings surrounding him exert on him;

(ii) (diachronic) he depends on all his past.

-- Consequence: one can only understand the individual if one situates him at the intersection of all the influences acting on him and of his reactions to his life center.” -

Note: -- As it says there, descriptively, this is still noncommittal. It becomes something else, when one sees a Stalin transforming this description into a collectivist social system.

Critical Consideration. -

There has been a lot of criticism of totalization as a method of thought. -- so among others from the defender of (individual) human rights, Bertrand Russell (1872/1970). After his Patronizing period Russell became a typical Anglo-Saxon nominalist. In nominalism, the earthly-perceptible and the individual are central. All that is not sensible and individual(singular) is suspect.

Such a way of thinking is called atomism, i.e. the division of the concrete unit of life into “atoms” -- grains of sand like -- what Russell particularly objects to is the priority - see Ia 31: organicism - of the totality - e.g. state science - over the individual. If one thinks through organicism, without a corrective -- says Russell -- one arrives unerringly at collectivism, authoritarianisms of all kinds, which, because of their “organismic” thinking, no longer take into account the rights of the individual. -- For Russell, the atomist, totality is an abstraction and the individual, the singular being, is real. -

Note: -- It is immediately clear that Russell is here expressing a truth, which must be understood as a necessary corrective to the organismic type of thought. If one emphasizes only the primacy of the whole (society, represented by those in authority), one has, in the long run, no basis for understanding the true rights, the right to exist, of the individual human being.

In other words: also the individual as a self-existing, autonomous, being, is from the understanding of concrete reality - somewhere deducible, and thus ‘necessary’.

B. -- Second lemma: the movement (“change”). (p. 36/41).

We saw it already (Ia 01: process, 13, the very process of knowing; 23, process): the ‘kinèsis’, Lat.: ‘motus’, change, process, is central in Hegelianism and in Marxism. -- as the ‘kinèsis’, process, was central to Platon’s thought (his teacher, Kratulos, was a Heraklitean).

The Platonic dialectic, -- but also, -- though differently -- the new dialectic (Hegel, Marx), -- they are a way of getting done with the “movement” (in the broad sense). It means that the narrative is a creature component of any dialectic. And that, immediately, historicity (the fact that things are actually processes with a history) is too.

Foulquié, la dialectique: “Everything constantly transforms itself: both the world of inanimate matter and that of life and thought. -- For this thinking, ‘state of rest’ would be equivalent to ‘death’. -- This is as much for the Marxists as for Hegel”. (o.c.,64).

Variological system of thought. --

Mobilism, process thinking, -- these are terms to designate such a movement thinking. - *H.J. Hampel, variabilitat und disziplinierung des Denkens*, (variability and discipline of thought), Munich/ Basel, 1967, 97, says that this type dates from the days of German Romanticism.

As a proof text he gives a text by Fr. W. Schelling (1775/1854; friend of Hegel, by the way, notwithstanding differences of opinion): “(...) Movement is the essence of science. -- If propositions are lifted out of this element of life, they die, -- just as the fruit is pulled loose from the living tree. -

Unconditional, i.e., once and for all valid sentences are contrary to the essence of true science, which consists in advancing. (...). Only a restless wheel, a never-quiet turning ...”. -

Note: -- Ia 28 we learned that the German idealists, after Kant, a.o. Schelling, did take over the idea ‘mathesis universalis’ from the Enlightenment Rationalists, but a-mathematically: not so much the idea ‘totality’ (which we find in the idea ‘collection’ and ‘system’, -- both perfectly compatible with Mathematism), but rather the idea ‘life’ as ‘movement’ these thinkers removed from the Mathematists: mathematics, certainly of that time, would not have known how to represent ‘life’ in formulas.

‘Variology’

Means “analyzing what is ‘varia’ (different things)”.

Note: -- One observes, at once, that the idea of progress’ peculiar to the XVIII - d’ century ‘philosophers’ (= enlightened minds), also here, recurs in romantic reduplication.

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der ausgang der klassischen Deutschen Philosophie, 1886-1, says among other things: “ (...) The revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy (...). The fundamental insight that the world is not as a complex of things finished, but as a complex of processes, --

(i) in it, both seemingly stable things and their idealized representations in our minds (we call them “concepts”) go through an uninterrupted change -- typical of what becomes and perishes (Ia 17:29) --

(ii) in spite of all apparent coincidences - and all momentary (= temporary) regressions - a progressive development is taking place. -- This great fundamental insight has, especially since Hegel, been so deeply rooted in everyday consciousness that, in its generality, it hardly encounters any contradiction.

Critical Remarks. -

(1) notwithstanding the clearly variological basic idea, we note, among the Hegelians and the Marxists nonetheless conservationist fractions. -

a. Among Hegel’s disciples, at least, three shades were distinguishable: conservative-Protestant theists (god-believers), pantheistic-enlightened idealists (“pantheism” consists in “god” coinciding with the universe), and, also, leftist youngHegelians.-

b. *Esprit* (Paris), XVI (1948) (mai - juin) - the well-known French journal - was entitled “*Marxisme ouvert contre Marxisme scolastique*” (open Marxism against ‘scholastic’ (here in the sense of ‘conservationist - closed’) Marxism). -

Conclusion: mobilism is not alone at work. In Hegelianism and Marxism, the fixist (one now also says “essentialist”) side also applies.

(2) We have, among others with Marx, this tension between nature (immutability) and process (change) - Ia 18vv. (sensible abstraction), 23 - noted. -- Engels, too, recognized this. According to Foulquié, o.c., 6b. Engels admitted that there are definite, irrevocable truths.

-- For example, (i) mathematical science is subject to historical development, (ii) but are there definitive mathematical results, --

Note.-- *F. Onseth, Fondements des mathématiques*, (Foundations of Mathematics), Paris, 1926, -- the work of a professional dialectician, also establishes this.

(3) At first sight, the idea of ‘eternal philosophy’ is diametrically opposed to this new dialectical idea. -- *Agostino Steuco* (= Augustine Steuchus) (... /1550), *De perenni philosophia*, Lyon, 1540-1, defends -- as bishop and librarian of the Vatican library a thesis, which he took from the Church Fathers (33/800), but re-founded, in the style of his time, the Renaissance. -

1. Pagan philosophy (= both the hieratic’ (= sacred) of the near and far east and the ‘classical’ of Hellas and Rome),

2. is the forerunner of both Old Testament and New Testament ways of thinking, as well as of the philosophy (thinking on a Biblical basis) that goes with it.-

In other words: there is an unbroken tradition. Since archaic times one and the same basic philosophy, with an unchanging, ‘eternal: essence, has prevailed over all mankind. -- Now pay attention: with this patristic position Steuco rejected both the rigid, closed traditionalism, present among contemporaries, and the ‘open’ enlightened thinking, also present among contemporaries. -

None other than the Cartesian G.W. Leibniz (Ia 27) stood up for Steuco’s thesis. He even defended the name ‘perennis philosophia’ (eternal philosophy). This answered - according to him - to a need. Cfr. *O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus*, Braunschweig, (History of idealism, Brunswick), 1907-2, III (*der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), (the idealism of the modern era), 172/179.-- also Otto Willmann, the educator who became Catholic, is the defender of this Steuchian thesis.

Narratology. --

Since the fifties of this century, narratology (a revival of the ancient theory of narrative, part of classical rhetoric (understood as literary theory)) has been updating our understanding of what narrative is. -- Hegel, Marx, -- they are narratologists *avant la lettre*: what moves, changes, is not susceptible to rigid description, -- it is susceptible to narrative. Yet, as with Herodotus and Thucydides, the two founders of ancient Greek historiography, narration is at the same time process description. -- This includes

-- if we follow the theory of Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-424; father of ancient Greek historiography) -- two aspects.

(i) What he calls, in his dialect, 'historiè', historia, the personal research such that one has information; to this end Herodotos used mainly two methods:

a. 'Aut.opsia', the fact that he was an eyewitness to the data (the 'substance' of his story),

b. 'Marturion', the testimony of others (themselves eyewitnesses or observers through others). -- A Hegel, a Marx, -- as dialecticians, will proceed in precisely the same way: to inform himself personally.

(ii) What Herodotos, in his professional language, calls "logos," ratio (lat.), i.e., the understanding of the data (its structure) and immediately, the story itself, as ordered (the plan, which governs the train of thought, -- the arrangement, as the rhetors say) and stylized (the design according to correct wording or text) representation. --

Here a Hegel, a Marx introduce their dialectic: they see the totality (see lemma 1) and, as we shall clarify later, they see, in the facts (data), the qualitative leaps and the tensions (thesis, antithesis, synthesis); -- these they record in an ordered and stylized text. - *Cfr. G.C.J. Daniëls, Religious-historical study on Herodotus, Antwerp/Nijmegen, 1946, 16, 100.*

Note: -- Connoisseurs of Thøekudides of Athens (-65/-395; second great historian of Greek antiquity), claim that his stories resemble axiomatic-deductive texts: he arranges the facts so that the event, which he recounts, exhibits logical order.

In other words: if one knows the premises (contained in the situation), then from them, strictly logically (as far as possible), the facts (the "outcome") follow. -- Compare this with Ia 12 (Hegel's deduction type), -- 17 (criticism), 24, 33.

Narrativism. -

Supposedly, by 'narrativism' one means the fact that only if (if and only if) data ('historiè') are understood and narrated ('logos') do they then become intelligible. Well, in their antique-Greek way (and very different from each other), Herodotos and Thøekudides (in passing, in Latin Thucidides) are 'narrativists': things and processes only become meaningful, if they are examined by them (historiè) and narrated from their 'understanding' of them

(logos). -- So also, in an analogous way, Hegel and Marx: for them, the mass of “brute facts” (that which Platon would call “anankè,” the substance insofar as opaque, but a brute fact) is comprehensible only if they have made them “dialectically” transparent in a logical account of the facts.

Bibl. sample :

-- *Poétique (raconter, représenter, décrire)* (Poetics (telling, representing, describing)), 65 (1986: février);

-- *J. Peck/ M. Coyle, Literary terms and criticism*, Houndmill / London, 1984 (a.o. and vrl. 88f.: ‘plot’, -- a term also common in literatological Dutch for our pure Dutch ‘entanglement’ (i.e., the structure of an event, insofar as it constitutes the driving force of the event being narrated) ;-- precisely that, that driving force in the event being narrated, interests a Hegel or a Marx, -- what Herodotos would call the ‘logos’).

Notes.: -- What Herodotos and Thokudides do as historians, the paleopythagoreans (Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500; paleopythagoreans (-550/-300)) did: they sought, in the movable data, the ‘arithmos’, the structure (to translate by ‘number’ is to falsify the term; it does succeed somewhat with ‘number-form harmony’) or - which amounted to the same thing - the ‘Psuchè’, the ‘soul’ (understand: the moving-naturally structured-force in the ‘movement’). -

A Platon did something analogous: the ‘fainomena’, the moving data, what becomes and what perishes, was only understood from a premise, namely the idea belonging to it, reaching above it, but working in it, which is the driving force of the event.

Historicity.

-- Existentialists (since Soren Kierkegaard (1813/1855; father of existentialism) have made us accustomed to the term “historicity,” i.e., the fact that our “being” (= reality) invariably takes the form of a history, which is ... narratable.

The ever-changing situations, inherent to our “in-the-world” being, carry within them a structure (“life destination” for example). It is precisely this that a Herodotos or a Thokudides, a Hegel or a Marx see. -- The existentialists emphasize, in the process, the fact that man, respectively humanity, is apparently at the mercy of fate and stands ‘alone’ (which, of course, is only one possible interpretation): we leave that aspect of their definition of historicity for them to deal with.

It is clear, after all that we wrote above, that the “historicity” (history character) so understood were self-evident to Hegel and Marx. -

Bibl. st.:

- A. Brunner, *Geschichtlichkeit*, (Historicity), Bern/ Munich, 1961;
- H. Arvon, *le Marxisme*, Paris, 1960, 34ss. (*la notion de historicité*).

C. -- Third lemma: the qualitative leap (p. 41/50).

Supposedly, with Herodotos, the ‘historiè’, we have collected the necessary brute facts. -- The ‘logos’ -- in those moving facts -- comes down, first of all, to (what Hegel and Marx call) ‘the qualitative leap’. -

Bibl. sample :

- P. Foulquié, *la dialectique*, 64s .(“...créateurs de nouveauté”);
- H. Arvon, *Le Marxisme*, 38s. (*le principe de la variation qualitative*).

On the surface, the third lemma boils down to this: the course (which constitutes the object of the dialectical narrative) exhibits, in time, gradual or abrupt quantitative changes, among which the gradual ones have the property, immediately, of involving a qualitative leap.

Appl. Model. -- The classic model is water (physical science type).-- Put water on a fire, in a forest, on vacation, and admire the third lemma: gradually the water captures the heat (= quantitative change in temperature, -- measurable via a thermometer). At some point, the water becomes “turbulent” (“turbulent” say the more recent physicists): it begins to boil suddenly (= qualitative jump). -

The medical-pharmaceutical model. -

Archaic sorcerers have known, since time immemorial, about poisons: they know, damn well, that their gradual dosage involves sudden changes for the person handling them (a too strong dose suddenly becomes, harmful, -- where a lighter dose is beneficial as a cure).

A psychological model. -

Tease someone, and you will find, in time, that suddenly the teasing appears too unworkable and that from being pleasant to the victim it turns into the opposite.

In other words: there are ‘thresholds’, ‘gaps’, ‘gaps’, and this with a gradual increase or decrease. -- Another example: a spectacle can appear interesting, -- until it lasts ‘too long’, then it turns into its opposite (‘harmony of opposites’).

Note: -- H. Arvon, *Le Marxisme*, 38s., says that Marx speaks of qualitative change (leap) in two ways. -

1. What we will explain better later, namely the contradiction ('contradiction'), is one model of such a qualitative leap.-

2. In passing, in *Das kapital (kritik der politischen oekonomie)*, (The capital (critique of political economy)), 3 Bde, Hamburg, 1872 / 1894, this basic principle of dialectics is discussed in the sense just described. -

A sum of money, an amount of money -- increases e.g. gradually (quantitative change), -- so much so that, suddenly, one can speak of "a capital" (qualitative leap). -- Marx literally says that "in this field (economic) - as in natural science - the law discovered by Hegel, in its *logic*, as correctly verifiable, is a law which says that merely quantitative changes, having reached a certain degree, transform themselves into qualitative differences. -

This text clearly proves the esteem in which Marx held Hegel's bourgeois philosophy.

Note: -- Engels also appreciates this "lawfulness. -- In a letter (14.07. 1858) to Marx, he expresses his satisfaction at finding "Hegel's assertion concerning the qualitative leap in the quantitative series" confirmed in -- at the time -- recent discoveries in physiology (Arvon, o.c.,39).-- In his '*Anti-Dühring*' (= *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft-philosophie politische Oekonomie. Sozialismus*, (Herr Eugen Dühring's revolution of science-philosophy political economy. Socialism), Leipzig, 1878) Engels gives a whole series of confirmations of this, -- from higher mathematics and chemistry.

Note: -- The Marxists, after these two founders, have -- in part -- reinterpreted their doctrine in this regard. -- A section among the Marxists sought in the dialectic more an "argument" regarding revolutionary intentions than a testable theory. They interpreted the "qualitative leap" in a revolutionary sense. Not reforms within the established system of society ('reformism'), but a violent transformation, i.e. a revolution, would accomplish - with one qualitative leap - the transition from the capitalist to the socialist system. 'Reforms' give only gradual quantitative changes, -- nothing more.

-- **Appl. Model** -- Stalin, *dialectical materialism and historical materialism*, says that this transition to a liberated laborers class

not by slow change, “reform,” but by revolution is possible. Cfr. Arvon, o.c.,39.

Not Hegel. But ancient Greeks.-

Marx writes that Hegel discovered the “law” of quantitative/qualitative change. This is false. -

1.-- *P. Foulquié, La dialectique, 65*, notes that, e.g., a micro-Socratic (of the so-called “Dialectic” direction (“dialectic” here in a partially different sense, i.e., aligned with discussion)), Euboulides of Miletos (-380/ -320; a megaricist), clearly understood conscious law. -

Appl. Model.-- the “soros,” the grain heap. -- Just one grain does not make a grain heap. That is evident. -- Neither do two. -- Gradual quantitative multiplication, by adding grains, one by one, makes the language of manners suddenly decide on a qualitative leap: “now one can speak of a heap of grain”.-- What the eristician Euboulides, in a protosophistic sense, tried to explain unprovably.

2.-- The tropology of Ainesidemos of Knossos (+- -50), a skeptic, saw it through the frequency of phenomena. If data, within one time span (interval), occur more frequently or less frequently, one establishes qualitative jumps. -

E.g., both the tail star (comet) and the sun are celestial bodies; yet, a tail star generates wonder and the sun does not. Reason: within the same time span, the sun is so frequent that one gets used to it (absence of wonder) and the comet is so rare that one marvels at it. -

Thus e.g.: the dosage. -- a small dose of wine e.g. “strengthens the soul”, one increases it gradually, then suddenly one observes the opposite (the reversal). -- Or small doses within a too short period of time! (frequency).

3.-- Not late, but early Greeks saw the lawful nature of quantitative changes, with qualitative leaps. -- Return we to the historian Herodotos (Ia 39).

-- *G. Daniëls, rel.-hist. study, 93v.*, gives us a herodotic model. -

A whole series of processes, -- including political processes (the formation of a state, for example), show -- what Herodotus calls -- ‘kuklos’ (cycle, circuit, loop): it starts small; it gets bigger; it reaches a maximum; then it suddenly turns into the opposite: reduction, disappearance (happening). -- In that ‘series’ there are clearly qualitative leaps, which Herodotus saw ready.

A surprising confirmation (p. 44/45).

M. Ambacher, Les philosophies de la nature, Paris, 1974 (vrl. o.c., 103ss. (*Les philosophies de la nature procèdent d'une expérience qualitativement constituante*)), ((The philosophies of nature proceed from a qualitatively constitutive experience), teaches us, among other things, that nature can be studied in two ways:

(i) nature seen from the Cartesian-Leibnizian mathesis universalis, -- with clear preference for the mathematical side;

(ii) nature seen from the dialectical - or more broadly: the qualitative - mathesis universalis, -- with clear preference for the qualitative side. -

The first type is called "exact" (mixture of experiment and calculation),

The second "dialectic". -

Now it happens, since the seventies, that, within the exact approach, space opens up for the dialectical.

Bibl. St.: *J. Gleick, La théorie du chaos (vers une nouvelle science)*, (Chaos theory (towards a new science)), Paris, 1989 (Eng. Orig.: *Chaos*, New York, 1987);

-- *G. De Gennes et al, l'ordre du chaos*, (the order of chaos), Paris, 1987 (24 specialists speaking on -- what is called -- the butterfly effect as a cause of disorder);

-- *H. Degn et al, Chaos in biological systems*, New York, 1987.

- *Ervin Laszlo, La grande bifurcation (une fin de siècle cruciale)*, (The great bifurcation (a crucial end of the century)), Paris, 1990, Tacot International ISBN 2-907308-04-1 (preface by Ilya Prigogine)

We all know the folk saying "how a dime can roll". Well, especially since 1970+, physicists - as well as other professional scientists - are discovering that the rolling dime may belong to the fundamental structure of the universe. -

Appl. model.

a. The counter model: determinism. -

Newton, - especially Pierre Simon de Laplace - Laplace for short (1749/1827) - defined "determinism" as follows.

Suppose a system is known exactly with respect to a certain state in which it is. This is called "the initial conditions" (= initial assumptions) of the study of the said system.

If that system is truly 'deterministic', then one can infallibly deduce from those initial conditions what the next states will be. In other words: the system, in its 'functioning', is predictable. Cfr. *G. de Gennes et al, l'ordre du chaos*, 139 (Laplace).

b. The model. -

The butterfly effect. -- It is a mathematically trained mathematician, who with the aid of the first computers studied the weather, who first, in the seventies, saw through this phenomenon. -- We explain this in more detail, insofar as the dialecticians' theory of qualitative jumps due to gradual quantitative changes finds in it an otherwise brilliant confirmation.

-- *James Gleick, o.c., 46ss. (la roue hydraulique de Lorenz)*, ((the Lorenz water wheel)), Describes to us, without too much professional scientific apparatus, the water-

wheel of Edward Lorenz. -

a.-- The first and, by the way, famous disorderly system, which Lorenz discovered, can be depicted mechanically (= mechanical appl. model). It exhibits, in the other hand, analogy (partial identity/ partial difference) with the convective flow, which constitutes a second picture (model). -

Willem Malkus, prof in applied mathematics at the m.i.t. (= Massachusetts institute of technology) -- years later -- constructed, in the basement of his lab, such a water wheel, -- to convince the skeptics among the peers.

b.-- a. One knows what a waterwheel is: a wheel with “blades” (trays, receptacles), which, once filled with flowing water, set the wheel in motion. Think of our watermills. -- Well, as a model of butterfly effect, it looks like this.--

b.1. From a water supply system situated above, water flows continuously into the receptacles, inside the wheel. -- If the input is very small, the receptacles do not become full enough to overcome the frictional resistance (of the stationary wheel): the wheel remains motionless. -

b.2. Gradual quantitative increase in supply causes fuller trays, -- with the result that the wheel begins to turn e.g. to the left. This at constant speed. -

b.3. Further quantitative increases in the supply cause an acceleration of the wheel movement. -- Over time, however, the filling of the trays is disturbed: sometimes the trays do not get filled enough. In addition, it can happen that the rotational movement turns in the opposite direction: the wheel can turn to the right (e.g. it starts to slow down, comes to a halt and turns in the opposite direction). -

Conclusion.

-- Edward Lorenz discovered that -- viewed over a longer period of time -- the rotational motion can turn into its opposite several times, -- without exhibiting a constant speed or a predictable motion .-.

The unpredictability of the system just described proves that Newton’s and Laplace’s definition of determinism is, at least in part, flawed. There is, within so-called fully deterministic systems, room for non-deterministic, ‘chaotic’ (= disorderly) processes.

Note: -- Suren Erkman, *Voyages en zones de turbulences*, (Journeys in turbulent areas), in: *Journal de Genève* 28.11.1987, explains the term “butterfly effect”. -

(1).-- **The parts** (sub - or hyposystems). -- As a meteorologist, Edw. Lorenz had to deal with the atmosphere. The partial movements of the air mass, the movements of the particles, which, in the form of ‘suspension’, float around in it, -- the temperature changes, the air pressure changes are governed by determinism and are, by strict law, predictable. -

(2).-- **The totality** (super- or hypersystem). -- The atmospheric system as a whole exhibits “sensitivity,” -- which here means that, to an extremely small stimulus, it responds with a sometimes extremely large reaction. This lightness begets the butterfly effect: the fleeting and erratic path, which a butterfly takes in the air mass today, causes air movements that will affect the weather, -- not tomorrow, but in a month, in a year.

Consequence: only if one is informed about the slightest sigh within the total atmosphere, one can predict rain or sun with certainty. Something that is impracticable. The result: the unpredictability, unless short-lived and approximate, of the weather. One does not know, literally, how the dime of the weather may roll.

Note: -- Add to this the fact that the information about the atmospheric system, which we in fact have at our disposal, regularly contains, smaller or larger inaccuracies (‘measurement errors’). Which adds to the unpredictability. -

Conclusion. -- Unintentionally, no doubt, the scientific journalist S. Erkman uses the basic terms of the first dialectical lemma, totality and parts. Cfr. Ia 31. This proves that what Fr. Bochenski calls -- ‘the set of suggestions’, at the base of dialectics, are nevertheless very useful again and again, -- even in natural science matters.

Crisis Theory. (p. 46/49)

A. Noiray et al, *La philosophie, t. 1 (abondance/ expression)*, Paris, 1972, 83/86 (crise), teaches us that the term “crisis” became common in philosophy and the professional sciences during the XIX- th century (liberal thinkers/ Marx (economic); Nietzsche / Freud (psycho- socio-, culturological); Husserl (historian of science)). -

- **Appl. Model:** The economic crisis. -

a.1. Classical liberal theory, in its economic optimism, sought to prove that economic crises are either impossible or transitory.

a.2. But the facts falsify, at least in part, that theory. Also: since the great ‘depression’ (= prolonged crisis), within the capitalist systems, between wo I (1918+) and wo II (1939), the crisis has been central, in economic theorizing. -

b. Karl Marx, as one of the first, tried to analyze the economic crisis in depth. He interpreted it as the result of overproduction. The capitalist system puts (profitable) production (Ia 18vv) at the center, especially since it has the means of production at its disposal (e.g. the machine). At a given moment there is overproduction. With the consequences of this for sales. For Marx, as a dialectician, this is a “contradiction” (more on this later): because production is so successful, it turns from being profitable into being loss-making.

c. The cycle theory (“cyclical view”) claims that there is an up-and-down: phases of prosperity alternate with times of adversity (“recession”), -- some three to four per century. -- However, since the great crisis of 1929, this has been, rather, falsified.

Note: -- The demonic or infernal cycle. -

What strongly dominates thinking about the economic crisis, among other things, is what follows. -- If overproduction, with oversupply of goods and services, then lack of sales (the market does not keep up), with formation of “stock” of unsellable goods. -

If stockpiling, then prices fall and also discards, with reductions in income and, therefore, purchasing power (reinforcement of stockpiling) as a result. “la crise est un cycle qui s’ étend” (the crisis is an expanding, an expanding cycle). -

Conclusion. -- an economic crisis has two features:

(i) it is a turn (turning point), which usually puts forward gradually increasing factors (production, purchasing power e.g.), within the economic process;

(ii) at the same time it is an independent process, i.e. exhibits factors, which are independent of the previous phase: this means that it involves a qualitative leap, creating something new, something different.

The concept of life crisis, --

Bibl. Sample : Ch. Zwingmann u.a., *zur psychologie der lebenskrisen*, (on the psychology of life crises), Frankf.a.m., 1962. -- the book shows us a series of ‘qualitative jumps’:

1. Growth crises (in children and adolescents

(including, e.g., crises, which lead to youth suicide);

2. Crises typical of middle age (unmarried, impotent, marital crises);
3. Crises, characteristic of the third age (premature aging, personality changes, climacteric, retirement, periods of mourning);--.
4. Crises, independent of age (seasonal crises, illness, -- dying). -

This brief enumeration, which does not reflect the richness of the book, is impressive: when the dialecticians claim that “being” (all that is real) is essentially “movement” (change) -- and this,-- in the form of gradual quantitative changes, with -- in time -- qualitative jumps -- then this is certainly borne out (= verified) with regard to the human life course.

Note: -- Already archaic mankind was well aware of human changes. Proof: the rites of passage, of which the folklorist-ethnologist *Arnold van Gennep* (*les rites de passage*) gave us an approximate description.

The archaic man - in connection with birth, sexual maturation (puberty) - this very certainly -, marriage (fertilization certificates), the process of death; in connection with illnesses, important events; in connection with birthdays (the calendar is, as it were, his life route) - has instituted rites, ceremonies (i.e. sacred or sacred acts), of which *H.F. Jans et al, Volkenkundige encyclopedie, (Ethnographic encyclopedia), Zeist/Ghent, 1962, 20 / 34* (religion and magic), says that they bring man over his crises. -

Indeed, what is called the “soul” in archaic language (possibly: soul substance, life force (in the Gospel of St. Luke, for example: “dunamis” (= Latin: virtus)), becomes, in the midst of the qualitative leap which life’s crises signify, soul-deep, lacking in life force.

Precisely in order to restore (“catharsis”: one assumes the previous phase, cleanses it (= the “catharsis”, purificatio, purification, in the narrower sense) and elevates it to a higher level (Christian-theological: grace assumes, cleanses and elevates nature)), -- precisely in order to provide for that soul distress, inherent in the identity crisis (“I don’t know who/what I am anymore”), archaic cultures instituted “rites”. -- They are, on a mythic-religious level, the first diagnoses and therapies.

Note: -- As one knows, the archaic magicians/magicians attached great importance to the lunar cycle. -- *Wilhelm Fliess, Die beziehungen zwischen nase und weiblichen geschlechtsorganen (in ihrer biologischen bedeutung dargestellt)*. (The relationships between the nose and female sex organs (presented in their biological meaning).), Leipzig/ Wien, 1897 (in French transl.: *Les relations entre le nez et les organes génitaux féminins (présentées seion leurs significations biologiques)*), Paris, 1977), is a strictly physiological study, of which none other than Sigmund Freud himself, however, in a letter of December 1896, claimed that “Fliess constitutes nothing less than the very pedestal of psychalysis.”

This judgment suggests that the strictly physiological character of the Fliessian text is clearly exceeded. And, indeed, the book works ‘revelatory’. First, the relationship (‘relationship’ = invariable relation) between the nose, mainly of the woman, and the sexual system. Which manifests itself in swelling, hypersensitivity, bleeding tendencies (during the lunar period).

Chapter VIII of the said work reveals to us that - with gradual quantitative changes - each time - every twenty-three and every twenty-eight days - a qualitative jump takes place (also in the ... man). The work teems with mathematically expressed observations.

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Conclusion: if the archaic/archaic people attached great importance to the lunar cycle, as to a cyclic ‘crisis’ (the rites on the subject prove it), then a Fliess may have lifted the veil on this.

Note: -- Among the works on the stages of life we have, briefly, mentioned: *J. K. Feibleman, The stages of human life (a biography of entire man)*, The Hague (the Netherlands), 1974, in which the individual is discussed, on a behaviorist basis (not exclusively), -with his stages of life.

Note -- The definition of life crisis.-

Ch. Zwingmann, Einführung, in: *Ch. Zwingmann u.a., zur ps. D. Lebenskrisen*, XI/ XVII, clarified as follows.

(1) Subjective. -- A life crisis involves expectation, but rather pejoratively: one fears a more or less profound deterioration.

The language used, for example, when one expects something to be happy, although uncertainly tense, will not mention ‘crisis’ - even if the change is very profound.

-- (2) Objective. -- Here, any valuation act is methodically excluded

(value-free contemplation) such that the pure process can be exposed as such. A ‘crisis’ is one type of change. With two ‘specific’ or species differences.

(i). -- Quantitative. -- Within a duration (interval), the ‘being’ in question changes faster than outside it (before and after) (process acceleration). -

(ii). -- Qualitative. -- The change, in contrast to the previous and the following process course, is unpredictable (Ia 45: disorderly system). In Zwingmann’s language: “die krise steht, therefore, sozusagen, unter einem fragezeichen” (the crisis (subjunctive: as crisis) is governed, so to speak, by a question mark). In other words: one never knows how the dime can roll on a life crisis.

-- *Appl. Model.*

From a medical clinical point of view - according to the proposer - the process of a “serious illness” is a phenomenon which, with gradual change, suddenly, involves a prognostic stage, which can either end in survival or death. The undecidability is expressed very clearly in that “either/or”.

Psychologically defining a (life) crisis is bound to be a more complicated affair than what follows, -- always using Zwingmann’s hand. But it puts on track. -

Human processes, as soon as they cause - individually, intersubjectively (between individuals), socially (in a social framework) - in the case of quantitative changes of all kinds, a qualitative leap in the drift life (think e.g. of our countless wishful thinking), a ‘substantial’ (*note*: more than superficial) dissatisfaction, can be labelled ‘crisis’.

In other words: as soon as the number of unsatisfactions changes (increases) to such an extent that the overall structure (= totality; Ia 31; // 46) of the psyché is “at stake” (understand: is in an unpredictable phase) and “one does not know how it will end”, there is clearly ‘crisis’.

-- *Conclusion*: What the chaos physicists characterize as a “disorderly or “turbulent” (impetuous, “turbulent”) system is evident here.

D.-- Fourth lemma: the contradiction. (p. 50/58)

By way of introduction. -- When dialecticians speak of “contradiction,” a logical remark is appropriate, as P. Foulquié, o.c., 67, rightly says. -- In logic one distinguishes at least four types of contradiction. -

a. -- the strictly contradictory contradiction.--

Appl. Model: ‘white/non-white’. -- When Hegelians say, e.g., that French absolute principality, just before the French Revolution, had become ‘unreal’ (Ia 12), this is diametrically opposed to ‘real’ -- in the sense of ‘justifiable’ --. When Marxists claim that the capitalist process of production involves ‘injustice’, this is strictly contradictory to ‘right’. -

Here the principle of contradiction applies: either there is injustice or there is justice, for example. One of the two can exist; not both at the same time. After all: something cannot be (so) and not be (so) at the same time. -- This plays e.g. in the proof from the absurd in which the model (affirmation) radically excludes the counter-model (negation) (in Latin: aut).

b. -- *The non-contradictory opposites.* --

Here we distinguish more than one type. -

(1). -- the privative or robbery denial. -

Appl. Model: “the proletarian does not have his subsistence minimum”. Understood: to which he is, normally, entitled. He is “deprived” of what needed to be there. The negation expresses a lacuna. --

(2). -- The contraire or ordinary contradiction.--

Within the same set, characterized by common properties, one can introduce a dichotomy (complementation) and label the two subsets as “negates” of each other.-

Appl. Model: “Except for white, all other shades of color - blue, red, green, yellow, orange, lilac, etc. - are ‘non-white.’ In this, black is, perhaps, the extreme, which, in the worst degree, is ‘non-white’. Hence the aphorism “white-black contradiction”. To indicate e.g. polarization between social groups. -- The whole subset of ‘non-white’ colors is contradictory to the ‘white’ color, of course. -

Note: -- The use of language nevertheless permits an expression such as e.g., “This wall is white and not white.” Namely, when it first reminds one of white, but, upon closer inspection, contains non-white elements. This is a chess-expressing affirmation-and-denial. --

(3). -- ***The (cor)relative negation.*** -- Here a mutual (symmetrical) relation governs the opposition. -

Appl. Model: the lord and the servant; both presuppose each other (without lord no servant; without servant no lord).

Yet we say, "He is not the Lord, but the servant." -- As the mother is not the daughter, yet both encompass each other.

Conclusion. -- Among many thinkers, negation is much theorized. But, in the absence of logical rigor, this sometimes ends up being wordy. Therefore, this logical introduction, -- mainly for the intention of a whole series of thinkers who think they have to belittle traditional logic, especially with regard to its principle of identity and contradiction. -

1.-- Either there is taseological thinking. The antique Greek 'tasis' means 'tension'. As soon as some dialecticians detect a tension, they use the term 'contradiction', which one must then understand, with a grain of salt.

2.-- Either there is differentistic thinking. 'Differentism' (sometimes 'differentialism') is that tendency which prefers to discover differences, gaps, everywhere. As soon as they discover any difference at all -- distinction and separation (note: the two are different), they emphasize this as a kind of unbridgeable, 'absolute: 'contradictory' gap.

The Hegelian theory of contradiction, better: negation.-

Hegel himself uses, very often by the way, the terms "affirmation", "negation" and "negation of negation". - Dutch-speaking Hegelians say "thesis/ affirmation/ summary". -- Often one says: "thesis/ antithesis/ synthesis". -

Note: -- For the second term of the triad one also says: *entfremdung* (larceny, -- usually: alienation,- -- after the French: 'aliénation' ('alienation')). This points to privation or robbery negation: in the negation the affirmation is robbed of itself ("sie Ist sich entfremdet" Hegel would say). -

For the third term, one also says: *aufhebung* (dissolution, -- with as shades: removal (ceasing to exist), elevation on a higher plane). This indicates the preservation of the previous, but changed in meaning. Consider the antique Greek "catharsis" (Ia 48), which is certainly model related to it. -

Note: -- For the second term one also says cover (subj.: to the contrary; examples of which: Ia 43, 45). Already present with Herakleitos of Ephesos (Ia. 24, 29): 'enantiotropè', also: 'strofè'. -

Now reread Ia 29v., concerning the history of religion. -- Immediately one also sees that Ia 15 (logik/ naturphilosophie/ philosophie des geistes) is one example

is of the famous Hegelian triad: 'God' is -as a kind of universe idea --(affirmation); then, having become nature, he is no longer himself ("Er ist sich entfremdet") (negation); then, finally, he has become spirit, again himself on a higher plane (negation of negation), i.e. no longer nature. -

Which, of course, is a very non-Biblical idea of God. 'God' is the universe process in three stages.

Notes:

(1) The "affirmation" plays, as it were, the role of the preserver: it is something idle, serving as a starting point for the following "moments.

(2) The 'negation' and the 'negation of negation' is not purely 'negative': in itself it is as 'affirmative' ('positive') as the 'affirmation', for it 'emerges from the affirmation', even though it is, to a certain extent, the negation of it (the 'affirmation', after all, just like the 'negation', carries the negation - somewhere - within it as a possible cleavage). -

H. Arvon, Le Marxisme, 15, rightly says: "Denial is the essential element of the dialectic. It is the forward driving soul of it. From the opposition of affirmation and negation comes the negation of negation. The negation of negation is the affirmation that manages to "overcome" the negation and does so in such a way that the negation is included in it (at least as far as its valid content is concerned). The negation of negation is, thus, a higher affirmation." -

Now: the examples will clarify this hypertechanical language. Above all, remember that the core of Hegelianism boils down to the process of or within a totality, with qualitative leaps, at gradual quantitative changes, -- a totality or its parts, which is full of 'splitting' i.e. contradictions, tensions, sticks, which make them change. In other words: without those 'contradictions', situated in the being itself, no process.

The dialectic of the lord and the servant (slave).-

H. Arvon, Le Marxisme, 12/16, gives us a summary of this Hegelian piece. -

(a) ***affirmation*** (the untrue freedom).

-- The gentleman -- think of the aristocrat of the ancien régime -- is, seemingly at least, the free man. For he controls:

- (i) the servant, the "mean" man, recognizing him as the master and
- (ii) nature ("matter"), thanks to the servant, which by

his labor governs nature, i.e. transforms it into something enjoyable. --

Consequence: The lord shows a self-consciousness appropriate to this control: in his own appreciation he is the ruler and this is confirmed by the appreciation of the servant, i.e. the ‘mean’ person who is subservient to him. -

(b) negation (dispossession). -- The “mean” man, the servant (slave), is the one who, thanks to his efforts, directly subjugates nature and, at once, as a direct master of nature, lives through joy of labor. -- Yet he is “deprived of himself” (“sich entfremdet”, he is himself in a way that deprives him):

(i) as a possession, nature does not belong to him (he does not rule over it);

(ii) the product created by him does not belong to him (he does not rule over it).-

Consequence: the servant lacks the self-consciousness of the lord. He knows himself to be twice unfree, “a mean man.” -

Note: -- It is clear that, in virtue of economic-social relations, the lord and the unfree are correlatives: in their opposites they presuppose each other.

(c) negation of negation (removal). -

(1). The gentleman, however, notwithstanding his awareness, suffers from an inner contradiction (“divisive”). -- Apparently -- at first glance, he is “the free one,” the ruling one. And yet, on closer analysis, his rule is rather dependence:

(i) as long as the servant acknowledges his lordship and

(ii) as long as the servant - in his service - controls nature for him, by his work, until then he remains the lord. In fact the lord is controlled both by the servant and by nature. -

(2) Yet the servant, though potentially the lord, is not the lord:

(a) an uprising would only reverse the roles, i.e. the roles of “lord”/“servant” would remain; only the individuals, who fulfill those roles, would be switched;

(b) the true way out is -- in Hegel’s view -- the stoic attitude to life. The servant finds this way out:

(i) on the one hand -- as a servant of life -- he fears death (he is controlled by his attachment to his life, -- not so much by the lord);

(ii) on the other hand, he feels constantly threatened, which causes him to detach himself from all that is outside him, to attach himself only to what is inside him, his personality. This appreciation creates true freedom. - Thus the servant is, for his lord, the signpost: to be free is

an 'ascetic', detached, form of life. This, -- with something haughty in it: though, economically-socially, the controlled, the stoic servant nevertheless controls the situation, in that, from his stoic 'self-consciousness', he views and values things from a height and, precisely because of that, disempowers them, as it were. -

Conclusion. (1) As H. Arvon, *le Marxisme*, 14, says, this dialectical description, in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, is only one type of description of consciousness and, in the long road, which "God" (as spirit) passes through, only one stage.

(2) The two first moments (confirmation and denial) seem valid as 'historia' (Ia 39), as research materials.

Hegel, living in a society, in which there were lords and servants, gathered information; also as a 'logos' (Ia 39), as a narrative of insight, Hegel's description seems valid: Hegel discovers a structure in the loose materials of his observations. The onset of the third moment - the 'aufhebung' of that social and intersubjective tension also seems valid. -

But whether the Stoic interpretation is such a brilliant achievement, we leave to you, reader/readers. It is true that the essence of Stoic philosophy and its after-effects up to the present day (Zenon of Kition (= Citium) (-336/-264) founded this philosophy), the invariably somewhat haughty "mastery" of what is outside of us by a detached attitude to life in opposition to it, is rendered pure.

Note: -- The stoicus/ stoica resemble, in passing, the fox who, because he could not control ('control') them, undervalued the grapes as "too green" and thus 'detached' himself from them.

The Marxist doctrine concerning the "contradictions". -

Stalin, in his text on dialectics, quotes Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Uelianof, nicknamed "Lenin" (1870/1924), the leader the Bolsheviks, who, within the Russian Communist Party, formed the majority). -- "Things and phenomena involve internal contradictions ('contradictions').

Note: -Remember our metaphor of "cleavage". -

(1). -- The reason is: they all have a negative and a positive side. So e.g. they have both a past and a future. So e.g. they all have both elements that disappear and elements that develop. -

(2). -- The Struggle of these opposites -- e.g., the struggle between old and new,

between what perishes and what develops, between what dies and what is born, -- that struggle is the inner content ('meaning') of the process of that development, -- of the turning from quantitative changes to qualitative changes (...). -

Dialectics in the proper sense of that word - said Lenin - is the study of the contradictions in the very essence of things."

The dialectic of classes. -

The Marxist doctrine concerning contradictions (splits) becomes clearer, when one analyzes an applicative model. -

(A).-- *Attachment (rack). -*

The initial phase is archaic times. The division of labor ("labor split") is the viewpoint that Marxists lift from the totality of archaic humanity.

(i) everyone can handle by himself all necessary and useful forms of labor (modes of production; ia 18 vv. , 47), such as picking, fishing, hunting etc.

(ii) The only division of labor is that of man and woman, each exhibiting a distinct type of labor. Social consequence of this economic situation: each person is independent of his fellow man and there is general equality. -- Yet man is controlled by nature (which is evident e.g. in the 'nature religions', with its subjection to invisible beings): the 'divine' power controls the situation.

(B). -- *Denial (courtship). -*

The second phase of cultural history now sees, in addition to gender, other divisions of labor ("specializations") emerge: one sees a society growing with priests, professional soldiers ("warriors"), farmers (= arable farmers, cattle breeders) ,-- slaves, "serfs," wage laborers.

(i) Not everyone can now handle all forms of work: there are now 'classes'.

(ii) As a result, from those economic situations (i.e., from the way people get their bread), social inequality arises in many forms.

(iii) gain point: the rationalization, which accompanies specialization, displaces, indeed suppresses, the nature-religious fear of the "divine powers" (nature is a field of activity, nothing more). --

But now sacralization is transferred to society with its class inequality: the upper class now comes across as "divine" (and, in Marxist view, "alien"): in this framework, an antagonistic structure emerges. "capital/ labor"(ploutocrat/ prometerian).

(C).-- negation of negation (summary). --

In a future phase, collectivization (“communalization”) of the means of production (= land for agriculture, workshops (factories, offices) for industry, the service sector) will eliminate the malady of class inequality. -

Immediately the deconsecration (“desacralization”), thanks to a kind of atheism, is continued. Not only nature, but also class society is stripped of its “sacred” (inviolable) appearance, -- in a thorough secularization (“secularization”), through which the archaic religion of nature and its theological remnants definitively disappear.

Thus arises a re-establishment of the archaic equality of all, but at modern levels of life. So that Marxism is not a “restitution” a primitivist return to an idealized primordial state, a natural man’s own), but an “aufhebung” (dissolution) of it (both a suspension and an elevation on a higher cultural plane). -

Conclusion. -- One sees that the same threefold scheme of thought is ambiguous (multi-interpretable): e.g., Hegel uses it to interpret his “god” in its (threefold) phases; Marx uses it to interpret society in its (threefold) phases.

Note: -- Herakleitos of Ephesus (Ia 24, 29, 52) is considered the first dialectician, although in archaic Greek frame of mind. -- Listen e.g. to the following fragment (Fr. 53): “

‘Polemos’, the battle (‘war’), is the father of all things, the ruler of all things: some he makes into deities, others into men; some he makes into ‘servants’ (slaves), others into freemen.”

One can see that, here, in a searching way, someone is speaking who sees the “contradiction” (the divisive nature of the struggle) and is at work in “opposing classes” (deities/people; freedmen/slaves). -

Fr. 67: “God is day/ night, winter/ summer, war/ peace, abundance/ famine. -- He changes like the fire, which, when one throws perfumes into it, takes the name of the perfume, which it exudes.” -

This somewhat resembles Hegel’s ‘god’, which evolves with his creation. Herakleitos’s style, with its ‘Systechies’ (pairs of opposites), perfectly captures the inner ‘contradictions’. -

Fr. 88: “It is one and the same in (us): alive and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old.

The first terms, if they turn into their opposite ('meta.pesonta'), are the second and these, if they turn into their opposite, are the first." -

This is, of course, the idea "turn-around". Which we have met more than once.-

Conclusion. -- for the umpteenth time, it is an ancient Greek, who paved the way (Ia 43).

Summary. -- With *H. Arvon, Le Marxisme*, 33ss., we can summarize.-- "Engels, in his *Herrn Eugen Dühring's Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (Herr Eugen Dühring's revolution of scienc), (= *anti-Dühring*), Leipzig, 1878, in his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, Stuttgart, 1888,

-- *Lenin*, in his philosophical main work, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* (1908) and *Stalin*, in his *dialectical materialism and historical materialism* (1937), -- they all clarified, in that order, the presuppositions of the Marxist method. (...). -

It amounted to putting forward four principles, on which dialectics rests: **1. Totality, 2. Movement, 3. Qualitative change, 4. Contradiction.**" -

Logically-methodologically expressed: if these four lemmata, then the data, to which they apply, understandable (to begin with: describable, definable).

Ideology Analysis. (p. 58/59).

Ia 22 gave us a first opportunity. -- One Marxist example.

a. In early December 1984, the Government of the People's Republic of China, on a Friday, put the scope of the ideological aspect of the Communist Party - ideology into perspective (i.e., pointed out its "relative," i.e., limited, constructive, character). On that Friday, viz., an editorial on the front page of the People's Daily advocated the thesis that viewed from the perspective of modernizing the teachings of Karl Marx is obsolete. -- This article aroused shock.

b. Marx died in 1883, 101 years ago. His works were written more than 100 years ago. -- Since the formation of his doctrine, tremendous changes -- the "process" of history -- have occurred. -

Consequence: some conceptions of Marx, -- as well as of Engels, of Lenin, no longer reflect the present situation. They did not experience the present time. They did not face the same problems. -

Consequence: the solution of contemporary questions presupposes works other than the Marxist and the Leninist. --

As a reminder, Mao Zedong (at the time: Mao Tse Toeng; 1893/1976) was the principal of an elementary school in Shangsha; in 1920 he became a Marxist. In 1921 the Communist Party of China was founded. In 1949, the People's Republic of China comes into being. -

Western diplomats were initially unsure how to interpret that text, of the article. It was the first time, however, that China, in a text, expressed so clearly and freely the relativity of what - until then - had been considered "absolute truth."

One suspected, then, two factors:

(i) The Chinese Communists have always spoken of socialism as Chinese (i.e., one's own national character was a paramount consideration, juxtaposed with the great principles of Western philosophy);

(ii) The ancient Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, whose Marxism and Leninism interpretations are clearly sidelined throughout the editorial in question, is a pragmatist. This means that he considers "doctrines" (i.e., an ideology) testable by results, -- without clinging to them as to untestable, "unchangeable" dogmata (which would be called "dogmatism" and automatically create ideology).

Ideology Analysis. -- What P. Foulquié, o.c., 76/122, calls the "scientific dialectic," also involves a critique of ideology, -- but in its way. -

(i). -- The Hegelian, the Marxian or Hegelianizing or Marxizing dialects originated "speculatively," -- by which is meant that they originated, at least in the main, outside the sphere of the stellar or positive sciences. -

Note: -- As is evident from what precedes, people like Hegel, -- Marx, Engels et al, though philosophical, nevertheless had a sense of the subject sciences, - which, at the time, were not so advanced.

(ii). -- The dialectics mentioned are too often a simplistic schematism (o.c., 77), into which the facts are fitted.-- That, too, is, of course, true. But from what goes before, it is clear that the founding figures did transcend and relax that schematism, -- we say, with the rhetoric, "platitudes", in time. -

Note: -- The biggest mistake, in my opinion, lies in this:

(i) that dialectics is called a logic (it is applied logic or method)

(ii) that it is seen as an explanation, where it is usually only description.

Edit: "1883, 101 years ago", so this text was written in 1984.

This text was not signed.

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