

8.1. Elements of philosophy 1 st year 1990/1991

First year : Elements of Thought and Method teaching. (ETM)
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The title

The term ‘element(s)’ comes from the Ancient Greek ‘stoicheion’, stoicheia’ (Lat.: ‘elementum/ elementa’),-- literally: “explanatory constituents” of something (the theme). Is -- in the Ancient Greek sense -- ‘element’ all that, as a whole or as a part, makes something intelligible (‘meaningful’, ‘explainable’).

Applicative models (examples)

(i) The Ancient Greek *Eukleides of Alexandria* (Lat.: Euclid of Alexandria; -323/-283) titled his famous geometric work “*Stoicheia gèometrias*” (Elements of geometry).

(ii) *St. Paul* (5/67), the “Apostle of the Gentiles,” mentions, among other things in his *Galatians and Colossians letters*, “the elements of the world,” -- by which he means “all that, as a whole or as a part, makes the world, as we experience it, intelligible.

He thinks, apparently in the context of Antique - Late Antique then - theosophies (i.e., philosophies that presuppose some transrational (extra-natural) realm), primarily of a number of “spirits” (high entities (beings) who help control the course of our world, such as it is.

(iii) Close to us: *Bourbaki, Eléments de mathématiques*, (Elements of mathematics), Paris, Hermann, 1939+. ‘Bourbaki’ is a group of young French mathematicians who, inspired in part by Georg Cantor’s Theory of infinite sets (1880), co-founded “the new mathematics”.

Propedeutics.

In the narrower sense, the Ancient Greeks understood “elements” to be the basic data (elementary understandings) that make something - e.g., geometry, logic, or thought theory - understandable.

This course is “propaedeutic. Pro.paideia’ or still ‘pro.paideuma’ therefore means ‘introductory or elementary instruction’. So e.g. in *Politeia* 536d (one of the many dialogues of *Platon* of Athens (-427/-347; founder of the *Akadèmeia* (Lat.: ‘academia’, Academy)).

Propedeuticism suited an audience that virtually never heard anything serious about logic (philosophy).

Now there is more than one way to make philosophical logic (theory of thought and method) understandable.

1 -- This course first of all provides information, intelligence, i.e. insights into data. Not in the dilettante sense (superficially, enthusiastically, as he/she is, the dilettant(s) thinks he/she knows something about everything),--not in the specialist sense either (the specialist, as opposed to the generalist, is supposed to “know everything about something”).- But in the generalist sense, -- something which at Harvard University is called “the Harvard Principle”: Specialists -- e.g., in education -- are supposed to take care of their general education so that they do not fall into -- what MacLuhan called -- “vocational idiocy” (one-sided knowledge of subjects).

2-- This course provides, further, method, i.e. reasoned approach or approach to a cultural domain. Not fashion (i.e. wave of interest that, also in, some philosophical circles, comes and goes),-- nor ‘ideology’ (i.e. convinced, but reality-averse thought construction).

Note. - In anticipation of what will be further explained, we can already say this about method. A.N. Whitehead (1861/1947; with B. Russell one of the founders of formalized logic) once said that “the whole of Western philosophy is but a series of footnotes on Platon”. This is not surprising, if one knows Platon’s thinking style well: Platon’s method, after all, is the hypothetical method.

(i) Either Platon, with Socrates of Athens (Lat.: Socrates; 369/-399; Platon’s teacher), stumbles upon pre-existing presuppositions (in Greek: ‘hupotheseis’, presuppositions, principles) and subjects them to examination (e.g. the ‘hypotheses’ of his most notorious opponents, the Protosophists (-450/-350));

(ii) either he, with his teacher, walks around Athens e.g., takes samples of reality there and, in order to make them intelligible (“explain”), Platon puts forward hypotheses (postulates, axiomata), -- which can then themselves be tested again.

The Course.

We proceed as the ancient mathematicians already did, in solving problems.

Given.-- Actual thinking (reasoning) and the theories (logics) that exist around it.

Asked.-- What are the ‘elements’ (totalities or parts), which make the actual thinking of human beings (us included) and the meta-language theories (‘meta-language’ is language over language,-- e.g. the language of logicians) intelligible? The whole course exhibits this dual structure, the given and the requested, the sought.

Philosophical logic.

This doctrine of thought and method is a part of philosophy (philosophizing).

Linguistic comment.

Linguists claim that the Dutch word 'wise' meant - originally - 'knowing, informed, informed'. Is a 'wise' one who knows, who is informed and has insight (concerning life and cosmos). Thus, the verb 'teach' could be understood in this sense.

Religious History Comment.

According to some religious scholars, our Dutch word 'wijs' (wise) is meaning related ('analogous') to e.g. the Anglo-Saxon 'witch', with the Russian 'vietchii' ('sacred' or wise man, male magician) and 'viëdma' ('sacred' or wise woman, female witch). - Indeed, magicians/magicians, within an archaic (primitive) civilization, were those who passed as 'knowing' (informed). - Yes, the Sanskrit 'Veda' (the name of sacred books in India) would be meaning related. 'Veda' is 'knowing'.

C. Castaneda, De lessen van don Juan (The teachings of don Juan), Amsterdam, 1972, which deals with an American who was apprenticed to an Indian magician, still testifies to this religious-historical fact: don Juan is the one who knows and, immediately, communicates that 'knowledge' (as a 'sage' he under-'points out'). In the Archaic (Primitive) culture, after all, the magician indeed knows a great deal more than the ordinary Primitive, both through giftedness (psychic ability) and through training under the guidance of an instructor.

***'Philo.sophia'* (philosophy)**

It is said that Puthagoras of Samos (Lat.: Puthagoras; - 580/-500; founder of the Ancient Pythagorean School (Paleopythagoreanism)) introduced the term 'filo.sophia', interest in wisdom. The Greek terms 'sophos' (resp. 'sophia', wisdom), i.e., 'wise', on the one hand, and, on the other, 'filos', i.e., befriending or coveting (seeking), are, by the Paleopythagoreans, joined into one word.

(i) According to E. Dodds, English expert on antiquity, Pythagoras would have displayed the traits of a Siberian shaman ("we man").

(ii) In all cases, the Paleopythagorean school was convinced that our "knowing" is very limited,--that, therefore, philosophy is an advanced "knowing," also "very limited

Man on this earth has only samples from the totality of reality stage of,-- not that totality itself. This is the inductive aspect. These samples are 'explained' and made intelligible by hypotheses (assumptions), which are themselves subject to error.-- This is Paleopythagorean fallibilism (fallibility belief).

Now, within an Archaic-Primitive culture, public opinion, magicians/magicians very particularly, are convinced that the essentials (the core) of "knowing" come from higher beings (deities, souls). -

In an analogous vein, the Paleopythagoreans were convinced that only deities possess full wisdom and that wisdom succeeds fully only if it is supplemented by the higher insight of higher beings.

At some point that type of philosophy will be called 'theo.sophia', theosophy, god-guided philosophy. One can also speak of 'mystical' or 'mystical' philosophy. The term "mystical" then refers to the fact that man (including the thinker) works independently, but not without the corrective (means of improvement) of a higher being who is far more gifted with insight. The worship, by the schools of philosophy, of the Muses ('Mousai'), originally mountain spirits, is one of many signs of this.

Myth and Philosophy.

One does not misunderstand the Paleopythagoreans: they are known for the foundation of their type of:

(1) Music, i.e. 'choreia', dance skill (which included both song (poetry) and instrumental music and especially dance),

(2)a. Cosmology, i.e., universe description ('astro.nomia', celestial body science),

(2)b. Number mathematics ('arithmètikè', arithmetic) and space mathematics ('geomètria', geometry).

From the order of enumeration, it is clear that the Paleopythagoreans were first and foremost musical thinkers, engaging in the universe, the cosmos, through "choreia. Number and space were merely the instruments, the infrastructure.

In passing: If Dodds is right (Pythagoras was a shaman), then that musical aspect is but normal. The Siberian shamans, as culture bearers, were also musical, but also in service to the community. Whatever the Paleopythagoreans were.

What is now called “the mythical stage of culture” rests on a metonymy: myth, the sacred story, is one of the main elements of Archaic-Primitive life, after which it can be named. In the strict sense, myth is the story in which the supernatural life force, called by the Ancient Greeks “dunamis” (Lat.: virtus), is central, -- yes, the story, for those who know the primordial religions, controls.

One can translate ‘dunamis’ by ‘soul’, but then mainly understood as ‘soul force’ or ‘soul energy’. The term ‘soul substance’ is also good, as long as one knows that ‘soul substance’ or ‘fluid’ means not only substance (matter), but also and even especially energy, power, strength.

All that is life force and goes together with it (deities as carriers of life force; magic as manipulation of life force(magic)), is discussed in the myth. Beings, processes, energies,---such is the threefold content.

‘Myth Analysis’

is the rational examination of myth. Current myth analysis exhibits three main tenets.

(i) Those of us who see the wisdom story (= myth) as simply outdated (an infant stage of culture, merely prescient).

(ii) Others see in it hypotheses, which, in all cases, must be tested against reality.

(iii) Still others assume that some myths are the only means of knowing in cases where purely ‘rational’ philosophy (and professional science) fall short. Thus e.g. Platon of Athens: where his philosophy fails to provide insight, he turns to some myth (which he then takes as a mere hypothesis).

From Thales of Miletos (-624/-545; first Greek philosopher), leading figure of the Milesian school, there are clear signs of criticism of the traditional myths of the Greeks.

Indeed: in the place of some myth, now comes rational inquiry, “fusikè historia,” the inquiry into true nature. The so-called mythical stage is superseded, indeed surpassed, by the rational stage of philosophy, rhetoric and professional science.

The Paleopythagoreans, now, lived both in the mythic stage (which was very musical) and in the initial, beginning rational stage. Hence the ambivalence of their philosophy. Platon and part of Platonism (the Neoplatonists first and foremost) also exhibit this same duality, myth and ‘reason’ (‘rationality’).

The ancient Greeks as a cradle.

You will have noticed: the Ancient Greeks! Indeed.

(i) Some contemporaries want to see the subject “History” abolished. They even want to forget everything that is “Antique” and, in particular, “Ancient Greek”.

(ii) Others, including the Existentialist Martin Heidegger (1889/1976; known for his Nazi beliefs), see particularly in Antique-Greek thought for the Socratic-Platonic revolution, a hitherto unparalleled cultural display. Which is a form of ‘pristinisation’ (tendency to return to the past).-

What is the truth of the matter? The truth: that if one knows nothing of the Ancient Greeks (and their cultural history), one will find many things - even today - incomprehensible. In other words, Ancient Greece is one of the main premises of our way of being -- let us take a closer look at it.

a.1. *O. Willmann, Abriss der Philosophie (Philosophische Propädeutik)*, (Outline of Philosophy (Philosophical Propaedeutics)), Wien, 1959-5, 13, says: the root of our current theory of thought (logic) or applied theory of thought (methodology) is Antique Greek.

a.2. *E. W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano)*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)), Antwerp/ Nijmegen, 1944, shows convincingly that our mathematics, to a great extent, follows in the footsteps of the Ancient Greeks.

a.3. *J. Rosmorduc, De Thalès à Einstein (Histoire de la physique et de la chimie)*, (From Thales to Einstein (History of physics and chemistry)), Paris - Montréal, 1979, has our physics and chemistry begin with the Ancient Greeks.

a.4. Medicine, forerunner of our present human sciences, begins with the Ancient Greeks: *O. Willmann, Geschichte des Idealismus, 1 (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus)*, (History of Idealism, 1 (Prehistory and History of Ancient Idealism)), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 302, says: “Pythagoras called ‘healing science’ (understand: medicine) ‘the highest degree of wisdom, peculiar to men’ among human achievements (*Iambli. Vi. Py.*, 82).” ‘Maintaining and restoring health’ is, in Pythagoras’s view, task of wisdom.

Conversely, ‘wisdom’, including in the form of ‘sophrosunè’, soul health, is at once the main condition of health. The Paleopythagoreans, from their musical point of view, considered philosophy to be one big health science and even medicine.

a.5. *R. Barthes, L’aventure sémiologique*, (The semiological adventure), Paris, 1985, vrl. o.c., 86/165 (L’ ancienne rhétorique), proves how we, today still, in the field of the theory of signs (information and communication sciences, a.o. in our techniques of persuasion) are and influenced by and can learn from the same ancient Greeks and the eloquence traditions which they once founded.

As far as philosophy is concerned, the founding role is overevident to the Greeks. Even the notorious “Dekonstruktionists” (thinkers who “Destruktion”, as Heidegger says, on the whole Western tradition) admit that, even today, we think “Greek” through and through.

Final sum.

The Antique Greeks -- their rhetoric (eloquence), their professional science, -- their philosophizing -- along with the Bible are the basic element that makes our current problems much more understandable.

Note.-- *Historia Spécial* (Paris), 1990: juillet/ août, is entitled “*La Grèce antique*”. See here how the editorial puts it.

“*Ancient Greece brought up*” (*Figaro littéraire*, 02.04.1990), --
“*The thousand and one Parthenons*” (*L’Express*, 1990: avril),--
“*Not yet so foolish, those Antiques*” (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1990: mai),--
“*The hidden presence of the world’s youthfulness*” (*Le Quotidien de Paris*, 1990: avril).

When one finds such a title in the magazines, the fact that a fascination still emanates from ancient Hellas is unmistakable.

Fifteen centuries of Judeo-Christian civilization failed to erase from memory the weighty heritage of the Ancient Greeks. Zeus, Athens and Poseidon,-- the Parthenon and the Caryatids,-- the Olympic Games and the Delphic Oracle,-- Pythagoras, Socrates, Platon, Aristotle,-- Hippocrates.

Rational thinking,

which is still ours, at the beginning of the XXI- st century, takes its roots directly in the Greek mentality. Mathematics, astronomy,-- medical methods, (...).

They came up with axiomata and theorems, with history science, -- with philosophy. With tragedies and comedies, with their own alphabet, with medical diagnosis and setting fractions. They constructed temples and theaters, roads and colonnades, gymnasia and schools.(...)-- So much for the editorial.

conclusion.

After what precedes, we already somewhat situate the subject of the First Year of Philosophy: thinking, both theoretical (logic) and practical (applied) (methodology), as especially - not only - the Ancient Greeks taught it to us.

Sample 1.-- Ontology. (08/11 - 08/71)

Before we tackle the actual logic and methodology doctrine, we must uncover its “foundations” (= presuppositions, hypotheses). A first foundation - we mean: of traditional logic and methodology - is what is called reality theory or ontology. Also called ‘metaphysics’.

The Eleatic School.

Parmenides of Elea (Lat.: Parmenides of Elea) (-540/ ...) is the founder.

a. Our senses can deceive us. But our “sense of being” (mind and reason, as well as spirit) cannot. At least not if one proceeds methodically.

b. Only ‘being(de) is; while ‘non-being(de) is not’. That ‘being(de)’ is sole and inward, one, undivided, yes, indivisible. Also in time: it is eternally now. While all that arises and perishes, more not ‘is’, than ‘is’.

Behold some of the main thoughts.

Apprentice: Zenon of Elea (Lat.: Zenon, -500/...). Known as a defender of his teacher-thinker. One of Zenon’s logical techniques is: “Neither thou nor I prove anything”.

Consequence: both opposing sides have arguments for but also arguments against. Undecidability. Undecidability.

Ontology.

In ancient Greek, ‘being’ reads ‘on’. Its genitive is ‘ontos’. Hence the name ‘onto.logy’, i.e. bringing up ‘being(the)’.

A doctrine of reality which uses the terms ‘being’ and ‘being’ (being) introduces a nuance, namely, it thinks in terms of complete or partial identity. This is called ‘identitarian thinking’.

Application model (example).

When I say “That girl over there is so beautiful anyway,” I am identifying “that girl over there,” (subject, original) with “yet so beautiful. The word “is” indicates an identification, identification. But here it is only partial: as a female appearance, that girl over there is “yet so beautiful”.

Beyond that feminine appearance, “that girl over there” can be anything but “yet so pretty.”

As an aside, partial identity - i.e. all that is partly identical partly different (non-identical) - is also called “analogy. Thus, ontologically speaking, there is an analogy between “that girl over there” and “yet so beautiful”.

It does come across as unusual to see things under point of view of “identity,” but it pays off.

The identitarian character of ontological speech is even more evident when we briefly consider the so-called 'tautology'. 'T' auton', the same thing. 'Tautology' is saying the same thing more than once. For example, "The truth is the truth." Or more mathematically: "a is a" ($a = a$). Whoever speaks in this way is clearly up to identitive speaking: something, after all, totally coincides with itself ('reflexive relation', looping relation),--is totally identical with itself. No longer "analogous.

Reality as testability. Resp. findability.

Why does philosophy first of all but also and very strongly even logic or method teachings concern themselves with 'reality' - 'being(de)'? Because the concern to investigate, to examine, dominates both branches of knowing. Investigable, verifiable, are only 'realities'. All that is real is in any case testable (verifiable (confirmable) or falsifiable (deniable)). By what? Why? Because/ because all that is provable and, after investigation, findable, is somewhere real.

In other words something that would not be "something" (real) (what an incongruity, absurdity!), one could never find and so or so find. Investigation into the real value of such a thing would prove impossible.

Ontology,

As the Eleates founded it, so, at once, is reality, (testability, findability,--i.e., examinability) viewed under just one point of view, identity (the overall or the analogous).

Explanation.

Parmenides, because he identified 'being(de)' and immutability (eternity) too much, comes to label all that becomes (= arises and, eventually, perishes), as rather 'non-being', unreal. Something against which Platon, who nevertheless strongly Eleatizes, protested. Ontology defines 'reality' as 'non-nothing', as 'something'. In any case. "Becoming is not being" can thus be said only in the non-ontological vernacular. The ontologist will say that "becoming" is one possible form of "being.

One can hear people say, "I dreamed last night. But what an unreality the dream is!". And yet: ontologically, the dream is "non-nothing," but in a staggering way (for our day-to-day consciousness).

It is said that the concept of being is "all-encompassing" ("transcendenteeL"). Nothing falls outside of it. All and everything of everything.--that is 'being(de)'.

Conclusion.

Is “really” all that is “non-nothing” in the strictest sense of the word. Once again: ontological language is not a language of manners, which has other rules of play. To analyze this ‘non-nothing’ as testable, discoverable and findable in identitive terms,-- this is traditional ontology in some of its main features.

Note.-- The term “ontology” was introduced only late: Johannes Clauberg (1622/1665; Cartesian) formed the word ... for a matter that had long existed and was known.

Aristotle on the subject.

Aristotle of Stageira (Aristotle of Stagira, nicknamed “the Stagirite” (-384/-322)) was one of many disciples of Platon. He says that metaphysics is “the doctrine concerning being as being”. In other words: “the doctrine concerning being in so far as it is itself, i.e. ‘being’“. Everyday language: “the doctrine concerning being as being. One may also say, “the doctrine concerning reality as such or as such.” -- What does one mean by that?

(a) the original (subject) is being, reality.

(b) from that ‘original’ or ‘subject’ one seeks a (thinking) model, i.e. something that provides information about the original or subject. The model here and now is the very being of being or reality.

(c) This resembles the tautology just mentioned: one seeks from being what that being itself can be,-- the essence, the essence form, of being. One searches for an insight in what being now could be. That model is then proverb (that which one says of the subject).

Aristotelian characteristic.

In his thirteen books (A/N) of his ontology, he typifies what, for him, is ontology.

1. “First philosophy” -- What he called, in the Antique sense, ‘physical’ (all that studies extra-human and human ‘nature’ (‘fysis’ in Greek; ‘natura’ in Latin), -- what we now call ‘psychology’, included), is in his eyes ‘second philosophy’. On this substructure Aristotle now constructs his ‘first philosophy’, i.e. a theory of being.

2.a. “Doctrine concerning the ‘arche’ (= hupohesis)”.

The first thinkers, in Milesia, with Thales sought one or more ‘archai’, principia, ‘principles’ (better: propositions), which made the reality of nature understandable. Aristotle does the same: his metaphysics is a theory of prepositions, but broader and deeper than those first ‘natural philosophers’ (in ancient Greek: ‘fusio.logoi’ or ‘fusikoi’).

By the way: All philosophers looked for one or more ‘archai’, presuppositions, which made what they experienced concerning nature (= the whole of reality) understandable. Platon in particular emphasized the hypothetical method.

2.b. “Wisdom” or “philosophy”. - *ETM 03* we have already clarified this. Ontology is, in the purest sense, wisdom, resp. love of wisdom. This was one of the main theses of Paleopythagoreanism and Platonism.

2.c. ‘Theologike’, doctrine of deity.-- ‘Being,’ in the eyes of Parmenides (*ETM 08*), was something divine. Aristotle also preserves that in his time already traditional fact. - - “To build on tradition is, with Aristotle, a method” (according to Otto Willmann). We see this clearly depicted in his characterizations of the main subject of his philosophy.

Aristotle is the great systematicist on ontology. In this he was a pioneer. Later antiquity, the Middle Ages (S. Thomas Aquinas first), the Moderns,---they all refer, in terms of theory of reality, to the giant Aristotle.

As an aside, the first systematic textbook on ontology is by *Francis Suarez* (1548/1617; one of the top figures of Spanish Scholasticism): *Metaphysicarum disputationum tomi II*, Salamanca, 1597.

Note.-- It was not expected that we would, as is often the case, present yet another systematic ontology. No: as Platonists, we reject any radical systematics.

Why? Because we have only samples (inductive method) from reality,--not the whole of reality itself. Constructing a radically closed system of ontology is therefore pointless.

General Conclusion.

With this we close the previously historical section.

(1) It is clear: ontology is theory about reality. Reality without more. - Subject science is concerned with one or more points of the total reality and is, by that doing, specialized. Yes, so specialized up to and including “vocational idiocy” (MacLuhan). Such a thing is impossible for the true ontologist.

(2) ‘Being’ is all-encompassing, for it means all that is not-nothing (‘something’ in, the broadest sense of that word). Even the absurd is still ‘something’, namely something that is meaningless, incongruous, and therefore impossible. This is what the proofs of the absurd (e.g. in mathematics) are based on.

Sample 2.-- The ontological method. (12/15)

One can apply some method of being research (reality analysis) in more than one way. Here and now we stick to the American Pragmaticist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839/1914).

Bibliographic Sample.

-- K. Oehler, *Uebers., Ch.S. Peirce, Ueber die Klarheit unserer Gedanken (How to Make Our Ideas Clear)*, Frankf. a. Main, V. Klostermann, 1968, vrl. 105ff.;

-- Elisabeth Walther, *Hrsg., Ch.S. Peirce, Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und andere Schriften*, (The consolidation of conviction and other writings), Baden - Baden, s.d., vrl. 49ff ...

Peirce on the subject talks about founding (justifying, justifying) an opinion. He distinguishes three wrong methods and one right method. The right one is not directed at idiosyncratically maintained opinions, not even at righteously cultivated opinions (which take on board what others, contemporaries or predecessors, claim), not even what, according to our feeling, comes across as 'reasonably justifiable' (and which means the cultivation of preconceived, 'apriorist' propositions). No: right opinion founds itself on 'the real' (that which is real). Which amounts to ontology.

A.1.-- Method of tenacity.

Peirce's little example.-- "I remember that one day, in all seriousness, people tried to persuade me not to read a certain newspaper after all,--for fear that, influenced by that newspaper, I would change my opinion about free trade (...).". (E. Walther, o.c., 49).

Indeed: the wayward one trains himself in it

(i) a problem

(ii) 1 invariably

(ii) 2 in precisely the same way. His view he/she then sees himself as "the (true) reality". This fundamentally simple method, because - according to Peirce - it reinforces narcissism (self-importance, self-righteousness), is that of many.

Peirce cites here that attitude of the ostrich: unpleasant stimuli it fends off by burying its head in the sand. Likewise the obstinate: he takes his tough ('tenacity') opinion for 'reality'. Which makes him 'unreal', i.e. out of tune with reality.

A.2.-- Method of authority.

One does not confuse, in Dutch, "sincere" (such that one honestly confesses) with "orthodox" ("right-believing"). The orthodox believes that the only-safe justification for one's own - personal - opinion lies in the social or 'common' (common) sense. As Peirce says, the social disposition, present in every human being, no matter what, is the source of the rectitude method.

1. Synchronous.

Take e.g. the totalitarian state (Nazi state, Soviet state): the individual citizens of the state give up their own views - they even give up the right to their own views - as soon as they think totalitarian. The contemporaries who belong to e.g. the "Party" or to some "Nomenklatura" (list of the most important Soviet citizens), are "in charge" (= authority).

Those in power excel by one striking means: the suppression of information (sources)! Thus, unconsciously, one represses the inconvenient truths. Thus one suppresses, above all, consciously the same inconvenient truths.

Books - having and reading magazines, books -, radio broadcasts, in a word: all that could bring in inconvenient information, could have precisely the same effect as that which the obstinate fears, namely, to start doubting (those who are "in charge"). The Inquisitions now so deplored by the Roman Church - there were three of them - are one form of rectitude or orthodoxy. Anyone who does not exhibit the correct "doctrine" ("doctrine") is ipso facto suspect, -- explicable, condemnable.

"The method of authority - said a resigned Peirce - will always dominate the great mass of people.

2. Diachronic.

In this case we are not dealing with 'exemplary' (exemplary) contemporaries - e.g. party people - but with predecessors in time: ancestors in an Archaic-Primitive culture, great figures or movements in the Classical or Modern or Postmodern cultures. The power of habit (the established) simply drives people to hold on to what they have been taught.

Whether synchronically or diachronically the authority man - the 'authoritarian' man - sees what the group, led by the others (who know), thinks, as 'reality'. But - again the same paradox - precisely by secluding himself within a group (a 'column' one would now say) the 'rightist' man risks becoming unreal (alienated from reality). We saw this, for example, in the authoritarian systems again and again, -- whether they were religious or merely political.

A.3.-- Method of apriority. A priori method.

The term “a priori,” as presupposition, is an old one, which Peirce updates in a new context. Listen we how he typifies.

(1) The so-called “natural” (evident,--at least experienced as evident) preferences are quietly allowed. But let the people, “under the influence of” their/their preferences, come to dialogue with each other. Preferences are one-sided. But in dialogue those different preferences come through as a great bundle of perspectives (think Nietzsche’s Perspektivism) on the same theme (Elis. Walther, o.c.,52).

(2) No problem so far. More serious reservations arise in Peirce when he observes that adherents of the aprioritarian method label their opinions -- even in dialogue form and jointly -- as “reality”,-- when they identify (i.e., assimilate) their type of thought with “reason” without question.

Peirce reproaches not only Platon (*note*: in some pages Platon, indeed, gives that impression), but also the great Moderns Descartes (founder of Modern philosophy; René Descartes (1596/1650)), Leibniz (the Cartesian; Gottfried W. Leibniz (1646/1716)), Kant (the great critic of Enlightened Nationalism; Immanuel Kant (1724/1804)), Hegel (the dialectician, teacher of Marx; Georg Fr. Hegel (1770/ 1831)) that they overvalue their own preferred views as “agreeable to reason”.

To what extent Peirce, in his critique of the four greatest Modern thinkers, is right, we leave open: Peirce establishes that, in one form or another, even these celebrated thinkers succumb to “preconceived” (yet never tested, let alone verified (found correct)) notions.

An example.-- The assertion that man always acts selfishly. ‘Selfish’ (egoistic) means, here and now, that some courses of action give man, more pleasure than others.-
- That assertion rests on no established fact in our world. Yet it passes as ‘the only ‘rational’ theory’ among a great many people.” (Elis. Walther, o.c.,53).

Decision.-- As in the two previous cases: there is a risk that, despite all dialogue, one becomes ‘unreal’, Platonic: ‘parafron’, thinking beside reality. Cfr *Platon, Dialogue of Law* 649d, *Sophistes* 228d (parafrosunè).

Note.-- What is called “Pluralism” (equal rights of opinions and cultures) or “Democracy” (equal rights in all areas, thinking included), has its basis here: the individual or private - preferably the universal - preferred ideas apply as good as absolutely. The term ‘multiculture’, so beloved in Postmodern and, especially in New-Amendments, perhaps, at this time (1990), best expresses the preferred method.

B.-- Scientific method.

All three previous methods suffer from one major flaw: reality is interpreted, interpreted, by some form of subjective (individual subject, I; collective subject, we) understanding. Which may be quite correct. But which lacks review (*ETM 09*). Platonic: the insight is, initially, in such cases, only a hypothesis, a presupposition. Nothing more.-
- Peirce: if we label something as ‘true’, this presupposes that in doing so we rely on something, i.e. on a reality.

1. Is “real,” in Peirce’s view, something over which our thought movements (notions (conceptions),--judgments, reasonings) exert no influence whatsoever, but which -- conversely -- influences, indeed determines, our thought movements. “Das Sein sein lassen” Heidegger once said. Letting reality be itself. What is also called ‘objectivity’, reality. In this way one gets out of the autism of methods.

2. Is ‘real’ - ‘real’ - all that invariably remains what it is in itself, independent of our thought movements. Peirce calls this ‘external permanency’ (existence independent of our subjective view). Parmenides, in passing, puts it this way: ‘being according to itself’ (kath’heauto).

In short: Peirce identifies “reality” with everything that has characteristics (facts), insofar as these are independent of everything that we imagine them (to be).

Cfr Kl. Oehler, o.c.,80 ff. (Reality/ Realität).

It is clear that Peirce calls “scientific” what is ontologically valid. A more or less unconscious ontology underlies what he says.

One note: just about all people exhibit the four types of thinking (objective, - idiosyncratic, straightforward, aprioritic), - according to the point at hand.

Sample 3.-- Phenomenal, rational, transempirical/ transrational (16/19).

We saw, *ETM 09*, that all that is real is, ipso facto (by that fact itself), testable (so or so findable). Now there is great debate as to what test is correct or should be. Broadly speaking, there are three propositions.

Bibl. st.:

-- *I.M. Bochenski, Philosophical Methods in Modern Science* (// Dt.: *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethode*), Utr./Antw., 1961, 77v. (What does 'verifiable' mean?);

-- *Ant.-Augustin Cournot (1801/1877), Matérialisme, vitalisme, rationalisme (Etude sur l'emploi des données de la science en philosophie)*, (Materialism, vitalism, rationalism (Study on the use of the data of science in philosophy)), 1875.

A. -- Hans Reichenbach's thesis.

H. Reichenbach (1891/1953) is one of the best-known figures of Neopositivism (= Logical or Language Positivism; also Logical Empiricism). In 1928 he founded, in Berlin, the *Gesellschaft für empirische Philosophie*. In 1930, with *Rudolf Carnap*, he founds the journal *Erkenntnis* (*Annalen der Philosophie*).-- He has compiled, in an empiricist spirit, a list of testing possibilities which, ontologically, is of great significance.

a.-- The technical review.

A Positivist (= Empiricist) is very difficult to convince. However, when he is offered a technical possibility to test something for reality, he is very easily convinced.

In some cases, however, this is impracticable (not "impossible" in theory). For example, the temperature of the Sun, as of any star of that type, is very high, especially in the core. But measuring them, with some instrument (a thermometer), is impracticable. Conclusion: technical testing is impracticable.

b.-- The physical ("physical") review.

A Positivist can still be convinced if one can prove that something is wholly and completely according to the laws of nature.

An amusing example: if you lie in the sun as a beach bum, you soon discover that the sun does indeed give off heat. So far this has not been in conflict with any natural law. The logical empiricist can therefore accept it as 'real'.

c.-- The logical review.

A Positivist, although very empiricist (material evidence convinces him), does not disdain logic and methodology. When it is proven that something (concept, judgment, reasoning) contains no incongruities (absurdities, contradictions, contradictions), he believes it to be "real" - amusingly so: he who is bronzed in the sun, shows, for the moment, no logical contradiction (is contra-diction-free).

d.-- *The transempirical review.*

Reichenbach himself - according to Bochenski - gives the following example.-

The statement of a follower of a religious sect claims : “Cats are divine entities”. For Reichenbach, as a good Logical-Empirist, it is clear: whoever wants to prove the “reality” of such a thing, must have transempirical tests somewhere. In any case: when these do not conflict with technical, physical or logical certainties, then - we say ‘can’ - a Logical-Empirist can, in principle, assume that there is some ‘reality’.

Note.-- A.-A. Cournot -- “le géomètre-philosophe” (in the style of the Scientist XIXth century) -- once spoke of “transrational,” i.e., that which exceeds all that reason, reason, can make certain.

Decision.-- The intention of the Positivist, in this theory of verification, is to keep our thought movements (concept, judgment, reasoning) testable. This entails having the ability (practicability) to determine whether such a thought movement is true (real, verified) or false (false, defalsified). Which is pure sense.

B. -- *Phenomenal, rational, transempirical (transrational).*

So what lies behind such an empiricist attitude? The following triad,

1. -- *Phenomenal viewpoint*

‘Empeiria’, immediate experience (perception), said the ancient Greeks. What they called ‘fainomenon’ (phenomenon, phenomenon, better: that which is immediately given) - plural: ‘fainomena’ -, is the only thing that is assumed and declared ‘real’ in a purely phenomenal attitude.

Thus the Ancient, Middle Ages and Modern Sceptics: the Sceptic (Sceptic) doubts everything except phenomena (he is Phenomenist, Phenomenalist). These, as immediately evident, are “certain.

The Phenomenologists, in the style of Edmund Husserl (1859/1939), doubt everything except the “phenomena” experienced in their own soul life. The American Behaviorists (Thorndike, Watson) and the Russian Psychoreflexologists (Pavlov, Bechterev) doubt everything except external (and therefore observable to everyone, in principle) behavior.

This way of thinking is called, in traditional-Biblical language, “earthly” thinking. This earth and its observables are pretty much all about certainties.

2.-- Rational viewpoint.

Apart from 'empeireia' (direct observation), basis of any Empiricism (Positivism), there was, for the Ancient Greeks, 'logismos', reasoning.

The Rationalist, in the stricter sense, adheres, apart from phenomena, to what is rationally provable.

Indeed: our 'ratio', reason, rationality, exceeds - and very rightly so - phenomena. Reason, in that limited sense, is at home in the imperceptible. There is something 'unearthly' about consistent Rationalism in that it transcends narrow Empiricist boundaries.

3.-- Transempirical (transrational) point of view.

It is immediately clear that the sect lady, who declares cats to be 'divine beings', is certainly not phenomenal, but also not simply rational - both positions are, traditionally, 'earthly' (Biblical), 'secular' (= secular, worldly) -, but trans-empirical, trans-rational experiences and reasoning. All religions - insofar as they still are today, in view of the rapid Modernization - rely, in its essence, on transrational grounds, 'realities'.

Decision.

The concept of 'real' has, in the course of the history of philosophy, acquired at least three variants. What is obvious to anyone who can perceive is 'real' in the phenomenal sense. What is obvious to anyone, who can reason, is 'real' in the rational sense (one can point to Empiricism as one type of this). What, however, is "obvious" to anyone, who knows transempirical perceptions and transrational reasoning, is "real" in the transrational sense.

Reread the order of Reichenbach's list: after the phenomenal (technical, physical) the rational (logical); after the logical (which is already transempirical', in a sense) the transempirical.

Topicality.

Some, under the influence of Enlightened rationalism, think that the transempirical-transrational no longer has a role to play, -- given Modernity.

But do we listen, patiently, to what Prof Pedru Radita, a specialist in Gypsy culture and history, revealed recently (mid 1990s). In particular: Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena were gypsies. Elena, for example, was a renowned illiterate, who once sold sunflower seeds.

According to Gypsy leader Pedru Radita (he emerged, in Romania, after Ceausescu's fall), duplicity was a main trait of the Ceausescu's.

a.-- Nicolae and Elena were mortally embarrassed about their origins. More than that: when they had power in their hands, they tried to eliminate the entire gypsy world. In doing so, they were supported by a traditional anti-Gypsy commensalism, which had been present in Romania, among other countries, since the XIIIth century.

b1.-- It is known that many Gypsies still live, to a high degree, in the mythical stage and know magical praxis (*ETM 05*). "In 1964, Nicolae and Elena, therefore, visited a black-magician (*op.*: a magician, who, if need be, does not shy away from crass, indeed immoral, practices) in Egypt.

For a heavy payment - ten thousand dollars - he promised, by means of 'occult' (= extra-natural, paranormal) work, to make the Ceausescu couple emit a magical power so that e.g. the people, at the sight of the Ceausescu's, automatically cheered". Thus Radita. The magic power was promised, on this occasion, for a quarter of a century.

b2.-- In renewal for one year, the Ceausescu's visited the 'wise' man. Now - December 1989 - the conductor (leader) was on an official visit to Iran. Immediately the visit to the mage in Egypt was postponed.

Consequence - says Radita - : when Nicolae appeared on the traditional balcony on December 20, the magic no longer worked. "Behold the explanation for his fall". Thus increasingly Radita.

Explanation.

(i) That the Ceausescu's were gypsies,--that they went to Egypt, at a 'wise' man's house,--that they were regularly acclaimed --all this is phenomenally ascertainable and, in principle, provable (= testable). That they were overthrown, the whole planet knows.

(ii) That their behavior -- e.g., consulting supernaturally gifted people is somewhere rationally explicable, will be. That their fall was caused by something is historical wisdom,-- rational.

(iii) That the regular acclaim was due first of all to the 'wise' man and his inaction,--that their fall was due solely or at least principally to negligence on renewal visitation,--that exceeds and phenomenal and rational. A transrational fact may have worked. But who will provide the rigorous rational evidence of that?

Sample 4.-- Tropology (tropology): metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche. (20/ 27)

Originally in ancient Greek, ‘tropos’, trope (trope), means turn. Within a text, ‘trope’ means a sayswiize (turn of phrase),

Bibl. st.:

- A. Mussche, *Dutch poetics*, Brussels, 1948, 34/75 (The image);
- H. Morier, *Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique*, (Dictionary of Poetics and Rhetoric), Paris, 1981-2, 670/742 (*Métaphore*), 743/793 (*Métonymie*), 1102/1119 (*Synecdoque*);
- Nicoals Ruwet, trad., *Roman Jakobson, Essais de linguistique générale*, (Essays in general linguistics), Paris, 1963 (*note*: thorough analysis of metaphor and metonymy; R. Jakobson (1896/1982; American linguist (linguist), of Russian descent, founded, in 1915, the famous Moscow Linguistic Circle, within which Russian Formalism (on text) got off the ground);
- *Groupe Mu* (‘Mu’ is a Greek letter) (= J. Dubois et al.), *Rhétorique générale*, Paris, 1982-2 (vrl. 91/122 (*Les métasèmes* **1**. Synekdoche (102/106),- **2.a**. Metaphor (106/117) and **2.b**. Metonymy (117/120)).

Note: in a textualist vein, “metaseem” (Fr.: “métasème”) is called “a stylistic or sayings figure, which replaces one semeem (= linguistic expression) with another semeem.

Note.-- Not only in textual science (language and literature), but in all human sciences and contiguous philosophical subjects, the trope is in the foreground. Consider, e.g., Jacques Lacan (1901/1981; French psychoanalyst, who strongly idiosyncratically reinterpreted Freud), who adopted Jakobson’s definitions.

A.-- The metaphor.

C. Stutterheim, jr., *The concept of metaphor*, Amsterdam, 1941 (in A. Mussche, o.c.,40, quoted) indicates, brilliantly, the method, which is hidden in e.g. a metaphor, a metonymy or synecdoche.

A colorless saying is **(i)** replaced and **(ii)** especially condensed into a colorful metaphor.

a.-- Colonel A. fought, in Aceh, as bravely as a lion.

Colonel A. was, in Aceh, as brave as a lion.

An analogy (partial similarity, partial difference) works here: Colonel A. exhibits at least one trait (common trait), which is also found in the lion (‘bravery’). Partial Identity

b.-- Colonel A., in Aceh, fought like a lion.

Colonel A., in Aceh, was like a lion.

The analogy allows for substitution with an abbreviated expression.

c.-- Colonel A., in Aceh, was a lion.

Here one sees the identitive nature of the verb “to be” (*ETM 08*) at work: since there is partial identity (analogy), one can substitutively shorten the speech and say, “Col. A. Was a lion.

Not only verbs, but also nouns are identitive.

d.-- Colonel A., the lion of Aceh.

Colonel A., that lion! Colonel A., the lion!

After a series of transformations (transformations), suddenly, the metaphor, clear and logically one hundred percent sound, appears.

Model Theory.

Model theory speaks in terms of ‘original’ (= subject, theme) and ‘model’ (image; - saying, identifying). Cfr *ETM 10*.

The “model” (image, representation) provides information regarding the original, which one seeks to characterize.

Applied here: about the original, Col. A., in Aceh, the text speaks in terms of “lion” as a model (of the original). In other words, the unknown Col. A, in Aceh, the original, becomes better known through the known, the lion model.

Applicable model.

G. Fricke, Volksbuch deutscher Dichtung, (Folk book of German poetry), Berlin, 1938, 372, cites, From Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900; Nihilist thinker), an otherwise not unknown poem, *Ecce homo* (the Latin words, with which, according to the Gospel, Pilate shows the tortured Jesus to the people),--”behold man.”

Ja, ich weisz woher ich stamme!
Yes, I know where I’m coming from!
Ungesättigt, gleich der Flamme,
Unsaturated, just like the flame,
Glühe und verzehr’ ich mich.
Glow and digest myself.

Licht wird alles, was ich fasse,
Light becomes all that I approach,
Kohle, alles was ich lasse:
Kool, all that I leave behind:
Flamme bin ich sicherlich!
Flame I surely am!

Analogy dominates this short poetic text.

Nietzsche believes that he is comparable to a consuming flame, which leaves only burned material (“Kohle”) behind,--he believes that he “is” that flame. “Flamme bin ich”. Although he carries through the ‘Destruktion’ (Heidegger) of the great -especially Platonic tradition, he is nevertheless very traditional in applying analogies,-- here the metaphorical analogy.

B.-- The metonymy.

We take Aristotle's model.

- a.--** Eating apples causes, in part, health.
Eating apples is part cause of health.

The analogy, here, is metonymic: between eating apples and health exists, after all, a connection, indeed a causal (causal) connection. No longer the resemblance, as in the metaphor, but the connection is the analogy (partial identity) here.

Note.-- It is seen that the set (a set of elements with identical traits (common properties), which invariably represent similarity) is the basis of metaphor.

The system (system), i.e. a set of elements with one identical trait (common characteristic), i.e. belonging to the same totality (whole), is the basis of metonymy. In particular: the apples, eating them, the healthy effect,-- these three form a dynamic system or coherence.

- b.--** Apples cause, in part, health. Or apples make someone healthy.
Apples are health(y).

Tropes are **(i)** replacements (of one seem by another), **(ii)** that enclose shortening. Here: eating apples and those apples themselves form one conjunction (of the act (the eating) and the object (the apples eaten)); that is a first metonymy; eating apples and the effect health form one conjunction (of cause and effect); that is the second metonymy.

- c.--** The healthy eating (of apples).
The healthy apples.

The transformations, in Stutterheim's style, lead to a perfectly logical foundation of metonymy.

Note.-- Notice how the verb 'to be' conveys not only resemblance, but also coherence. 'Being' is both metaphorical and metonymic. In other words, the concept of 'being' includes both collection and system (system).

Model theoretic.-- About apples, -- about eating them (original, subject) one speaks in terms of health (causative) (model, proverb).

Applicable model.

Heribert Menzel (1906/ ...), *Die Fahne der Kameradschaft* (The flag of comradeship), (in: G. Fricke, *Volksbuch deutscher Dichtung*, Berlin, 1938, 408). Here both resemblance and coherence, with the emphasis on coherence, are shown.

The poem is, in itself, not that thunderous, but it allows, in an “existential” (strongly lived, moved) way, to sense the metonymic connection (coherence).

1. In dieser Fahne, Kamerad,
Sind du und ich verbunden.
Wo sie uns leuchtet, Kamerad,

Ist Deutschland auch verbunden.

In this banner, comrade,
Are thou and, I connected.
Where this (banner) is our light,
comrade
Germany is also connected.

2. Wo, immer, die Fahne weht,
Kamerad trifft Kameraden.
Wer treu und froh zur Fahne steht,

Ist in den Kreis geladen.

2. Where, too, the banner flies,
Does one comrade strike the other.
Who faithful and happy around the
banner stands,
Is welcome in our circle.

3. So ist nicht einer heimatlos
Und ohne Ziel und Streben.
Wer schwor, der sucht die Fahne bloß

Und tritt ins helle Leben.

3. So is nobody without a home
Nor without purpose and striving.
Wie (the oath of allegiance) swore,
He's just looking for the banner
And enters into the bright life.

This poem has Nazi background: one main idea, Germany; one coherence, the banner (as a figure of speech). In this poem we find a metonymy that is “on the way”. The experience is metonymic, because one experiences the flag as a unity - of - many, who serve Germany as ‘comrades’. But the expression is only metonymy in the making: one says “In the banner we are united” and not “That banner,--that is us”. “Die Fahne der Kameradschaft” becomes “Die Fahne” without more, when the metonymy becomes complete. Seen this way, that poem is not very successful: the shortening substitution is too little.

C.-- *The synecdoche.*

This Antique-Greek term ‘sun.ek.dochè’ means Co-ordination. The question is: what exactly is co-meaning?

K.A. Krüger, Deutsche Literaturkunde (in Charakterbildern und Abrissen), (German literary studies (in character sketches and outlines)), Danzig, 1910, 155, puts it as follows.

Either the collection is exchanged with one of its elements (“das Einzelne”, the singular, is the element). Either the system (whole) is exchanged with one of its subsystems (parts). But in such a way that in hst naming of the one the other is co-meaning (= co-meaning). This abstract, but correct phrasing becomes clear in the examples.

Metaphorical synecdoche.

“Apples are healthy” could just as easily be interpreted by “An apple is healthy.” Why? Because in sentence 2 ‘apple’ stands for ‘apples’ (i.e. as one element of the whole collection of apples) from sentence 1. All unmentioned apples (complementation) are, after all, by analogy (similarity analogy), co-measured in the term ‘apple’.

An inspector, visiting the school, says, “A teacher is, in the morning, on time at the school door.” He means, of course, through this one case (element), the universal collection of teachers.

The metaphorical synecdoche can also be reversed: the inspector sees one teacher, who commits an error (the specimen or element) and says, “Well, that’s just how teachers are.” In the universal collection the elements are co-meaningful, -- here: that one teacher-in-fault.

Metonymic synecdoche.

One can name one part (subsystem, hyposystem: and co-mean the whole (system, system). Or conversely, -- a prospective buyer of a store says, when negotiating, “What do you charge for taking over the threshold”?

The merchant says “threshold,” but he also means the whole (the whole store), of which the crowded threshold constitutes the economic value. One can also turn it around: “What dost thou ask for the whole house?”, where co-significance is of course the threshold (the store), a part of the whole.

A pastoralist says that he has the care of five thousand “souls. In the term ‘souls’ the (whole) people are co-meaning, of which the immortal souls are only one aspect. Conversely, the priest can say that “he is concerned with the people” (co-significant: their souls as a formal object (specialization) of his life as a pastor)

Conclusion.

The identitive scope of ‘to be’, as a verb can be clarified as follows.

a. Metaphorical synecdoche: “One teacher -- that’s all teachers” (conversely, “All teachers, -- that’s this here and now”).

b. Metonymic synecdoche: “The threshold,--that is the whole house” (conversely: “That house there,--it is the threshold (substandard, coined: which is the value of it).

The term ‘being’ is, besides, testability, also collection and system (supported on similarity and coherence as connection (= relation, relationship). The total and especially the partial identity’ is expressed by ‘being’.

Model Theory.

The co-meaning (original) is spoken of in terms of the named ('meant') (model), which provides information about the co-meaning.

Tropological.

Thus speaking, because it conceals and says only sideways, it shortens while it replaces. It thus contains a metaseem, replacing one semeem (the co-meaning) with another semeem (the clearly meant or stated). Cfr *ETM 20*.

The "being," not one-sided. Not poly-sided either. But identitive.

The great mathematician-logician Gottlob Frege (1848/1925) and the Languagepositivist Bertrand Russell (1872/1970) argued that the terms "being" and "being" suffer from many interpretations or meanings that they are completely useless - especially in the exact sciences.

Argumentation.

The descriptive meaning.

1. Total identity:

"Gretel is Gretel now" (remember Pilate's words, "What I have written, that I have written").

2. Partial identity (analogy):

"John is a boy" (belongs to the collection of 'boys'); "The threshold,--that is the whole house" (belongs to the whole of the house).-- Further meanings:

a. bare existence (actual 'being'): "God is" (in the sense, of "God actually exists");

b. "Gretel is a girl" (has the beingness of 'girl') (we have here the couple 'existence (actual existence)/ essence (beingness)).-- Expressing a value judgment (= axiological) meaning: "To be honest is good (morally good)."

Conclusion.

The terms "being" and "being" (and their equivalents) are so many-sided that they thereby become vague and totally useless for any exact or even just accurate thinking.

The answer.

O. Willmann, Abriss, Wien, 1959-5, 453, gives the Aristotelian answer to that objection.

Aristotle, where he speaks of comprehensive notions -- 'on', ens, being,-- 'einai', esse, being,-- 'unity', etc. - says very explicitly, as an ontologist, that they are so general (transcendental or all-encompassing,--applicable to any given thing) that, in describing something singular or particular or even just universal (in the non-all-encompassing sense), they are useless.

Cfr Metaph. 10: 2; Peri Herm. (= the interpret.) 3, in fine.-- Frege and Russell could have known that.

A sample of redundant naming of ‘Sein’, ‘Seiendes’, -- ‘Dasein’, etc., can be found in some pages of Heidegger, who accuses the traditional West of having “forgotten being”. ‘Seinsvergessenheit’ he says.

That is possible. But whether ‘being’ will emerge from this centuries-long oblivion when, in Heidegger’s style, one repeatedly ‘juggles’ with the terms of ontology, especially ‘being(de)’, that is another question.

In this sense, Frege and Russell are certainly surplus to requirements.

The answer.

Dr. Simo Knuutila/ Prof. Jaakko Hintikka, ed., The Logic of Being (Historical Studies), Dordrecht, 1985, addresses our issue.

Antiquity (e.g. Aristotle’s doctrine on the “categories” (= basic concepts, fundamental concepts), the Middle Ages Scholastics (e.g. the Middle Ages theories on predication (saying) and the theory concerning the analogy of St. Thomas, the top figure of the Church Middle Ages), the Modern Times (e.g. Imm. Kant, the Aufklärer, who claimed that “actual existence is not a predicate (saying)”) are discussed.

This book critiques the thesis that the notion of being and being is totally useless, because overly ambiguous.

In our terms, the refutation of Frege/ Russell comes down to this:

- a. ‘Being(de)’ is not polynomial (it expresses, apart from testability (existence/ essence), connections (metaphorical and metonymical));
- b. ‘Are(de)’ is also not univocal (it expresses, apart from testability, differences and gaps between data)
- c. Being(de)’ is analogous, i.e. it expresses both multiplicity (non-identity) and unity (identity) simultaneously, except when it expresses total identities (such as “Gretel is Gretel”).

Cfr *ETM 08*: ‘be(de)’ is identitive, i.e. expressing total identity and - usually - partial identity.

The answer.

A third response to Frege/ Russell is what follows.

Frege and Russell consider themselves the representatives of Modern rationality (*ETM 05*). Well, the neo-rhetoric of e.g. a Chaim Perelman (1912/1984; prof of logic, ethics (moral philosophy) and metaphysics at the ULB (Univ. Libre de Brux.), until 1975) postulates that, apart from the exact type of reason (rationality), prevalent in the professional sciences, there is a non-exact but very valid type of reason (rationality).

Natural, everyday reason possesses an accuracy of its own, which, of course, does not have the exact degree of akribeia (accuracy), specific to mathematics and the mathematical sciences (the paragon of precision), but which, nevertheless, allows people to understand each other in everyday language with excellent and extreme precision.

1. As *an aside*, traditional ontology also leaves everyday language use and rationality, but, usually, does not go so far as to introduce a mathematical akribeia. In this sense, the ontology sits between exact and everyday rational language use.

2. There is more and something paradoxical: in order to make the correct ('exact') meaning of the mathematical and mathematised expressions intelligible, a prof or a textbook of mathematics or mathematised science uses... (don't be surprised) uses the common language, which everyone uses. This common language, whether or not combined with specialized languages, is therefore not so useless.

Decision.

For (1) ontological reasons (Aristotle warns against "redundant" use of "being" and "being"); Knuutila/ Hintikka analyze historical language use) and

(2) neo-rhetorical reasons (Perelmanian critique of the one-syllable language of reason and rational behavior in the name of a 'new rhetoric', which, although not using exact languages, nevertheless claims - and rightly so - rational akribeia (precision)), we argue that 'being' and 'being' - as well as all terms which, with a different sound, express the same thing - are identitive and thus usable ... to some extent.

One example.

A Mariologist, at the time, spent an entire class proving (!) that Our Lady, Mary:

(i) was indeed "being" and

(ii) so also 'one', 'true', 'good (= valuable)'.

If one knows that all that 'is' exhibits unity, truth (meaningfulness, intelligibility) and 'goodness' (in the sense of 'value'), then it is a cold deductive trick to deduce that e.g. Mary, like all that existed, exists and will exist, is ontologically one, true and 'good'. Like the redundant language of a Heidegger, the language of this Mariologist was also redundant. At the risk of degenerating into 'ontological sawing'.

Sample 5.-- Ontological concepts are transcendental concepts. (28/35)

We are in the process of ‘founding’ the theory of thought and its applications (methods), i.e. providing it with a foundation (premise, hypothesis).

The first point in it - after the introductory concepts - is the theory of concepts. After all, logic, at least traditionally, begins with a theory concerning the concept (concept, thought).

1.-- General theory of concepts.(28/31).

Ch. Lahr, *Cours de philosophie*, I (Philosophy course), (*Psychologie/ Logique*), Paris, 1933-27, 491, says that a concept is “a representation in the mind (= mind and reason as well as spirit) and that is the representation of some object of thought or knowledge.”

Phenomenologically (i.e., taking into account what prioritizes direct experience) it would be better to arrange this definition (conceptualization) differently:

- (1) an object (= given, something, matter),
- (2) insofar as it is present in our minds in the form of a representation (representation, picture) of it.

Or, with the Eleates (*ETM 08*): “(1) are(s), (2) insofar as in our mind.” Insofar as “reality” appears in our minds, there is an understanding of that reality.

Note.-- Why do we slightly improve on Fr. Lahr’s formulation? For the reason of our ontological basis! *Silvio Senn, An sich (Skizze zu einer Begriffsgeschichte)*, (In itself, Sketch for a history of concepts), in: *Philosophica Gandensia*, New Series, 10 (1972), 80/96, emphasizes that, from *Parmenides’ Poem of Doctrine* -- 8: 29 -- objectivity is the big bet.

Or, as *ETM 15* taught us, “scientific method,” which is attuned to reality. “Being (...) keitai kath’heauto” (Being is provable in itself (Cfr. the German ‘an sich’; literally “according to itself”).

Incidentally, how could we ask about the truthfulness of our contents of knowledge and thought (concepts) if we only had a representation in our minds, without any contact (whatsoever) with that which is represented? No: the reality itself (“cath’ heauto”) is present in our minds in the form of conceptions, which reproduce it more or less correctly.

G. Jacoby’s point of view.

G. Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung*, Stuttgart, 1962, argues first that traditional logic and its applications are all based on

- (1) realities (“effects” he says)
- (2) to the extent that they are identitably analyzable.

What is “identitive” we do not need to say now. M.a.: G. Jacoby, connoisseur of traditional logic, emphasizes, with the great tradition, that

- (1) reality (= ontology),
- (2) examined for its total or partial identities, constitutes the essence of logic.

The term.

Do not confuse “term” with “word”: a term can include a whole bunch of words. The term is the spoken or written expression (articulation, wording) of a concept.

In the language of the Pragmaticist Ch. S. Peirce: the thinking sign (= understanding) is recorded in speaking or writing signs.

For example, the term “pretty girl”, when expressed in words, includes more than one word, but forms one term.

Content and scope.

In Middle Latin: *comprehensio* (content) and *extensio* (extent).

A -- *The conceptual content.*

That is what our mind knows and thinks (Peircian: the thinking sign). Thus e.g. “beautiful girl”.

B. -- *The scope of understanding.*

That is the collection of data (“toeds” in G. Jacoby’s language; “being” in Eleatic language), the content of which can be asserted, “said out”. Thus, e.g., all pretty girls, which correspond to the content “pretty girl”,--in which that content can be verified (*ETM 09*: testability).

Decision.

Content and size are easily represented in the phrase: “all that is pretty girl” (**1.** “pretty girl” in the middle is content; **2.** “all that ... is” is size). The words “all that ... is” denote the collection, to which the term “refers”; the words “beautiful girl” denote the common property (what is identical (part-identical) in all girls, however different).

Henology.

‘Them’ in Antique. Greek means “one. ‘Henology’ means the doctrine concerning all that is one. -- Well, we can say the same also henologically (unity doctrine): “in the multiplicity of the beautiful girls (extent), the concept content ‘beautiful girl’ is the unity (content).

Content/ scope.

It will be obvious that the richer the content the poorer the scope: the content “girl” refers to many more singles (elements) than the content “pretty girl” whose scope is clearly smaller.

The conceptual dimensions or scope.-- transcendental (universal/ particular / singular); (all/ some but not all /just one)

Traditionally, two main types of conceptions have been distinguished, namely, “categorical” (non-comprehensive) and “transcendental” (comprehensive) concepts.

a.-- *The categorical concepts.*

‘Category’ in ancient Greek means ‘(basic) concept’.

a.1.-- *The singularized (individual, singular) concept.*

The proper name, usually capitalized, is the term that reflects that precisely a single individual (element of collection) is meant. ‘Singleton’.

a.2.-- *The particular concept.*

This refers to more than one member of a set, but not to all,-- but to some elements of the set.-- For example, “Some girls are pretty”.

a.3.-- *The universal (general) concept.*

Such a notion captures all, yes, all possible elements of the scope of a concept.-- For example, “All girls, worthy of that name .

Note.-- Why do we correct ‘all’ by ‘all possible’? Because ‘all’ less clearly expresses that we are talking about ‘all possible’ cases (instances, elements). Which, as it happens, implies an ‘infinite collection’.

Note.-- It has always been known that - outside our mind especially - the things realized are singular. But Romanticism (late XVIIIth century and later) had a special eye for all that was individual (a culture, a personality, a popular custom, etc.).

They cultivated an idiographic (representing the unique, the only, the singular) theory of concepts. One has, on the other hand, put forward (what is called) a nomothetic theory of concepts (the classical-traditional one).

‘Nomos’ in ancient Greek means ‘law’, rule that applies to all cases. ‘Nomothetic’ means “all that puts the universal (if need be: private) first”.

Note.-- Professional sciences such as history- science and geography contain a very large dose of idiographic concepts: Napoleon e.g. or the Scheldt (there are no more than one Napoleon’s or more than one Scheldt’s!).

Cfr. M. Müller/ A. Halder, Herders kleines philosophisches Wörterbuch, Basel/ Freiburg/ Wien, 1959-2, 28 (Romanticism and its idiographic theory of concepts).

b.-- *The transcendental or all-encompassing concepts.*

ETM 09 taught us that (and how) e.g., the concept of being(the) is all-encompassing.

One does not confuse the Scholastic “transcendentel” with, e.g., the Kantian “transcendental” (that which is situated before every consciousness of reality, while still constituting the possibility condition (= presupposition) of consciousness).

‘Transcendentel’ is one kind of ‘universal’. All that is(is) includes everything and everything of everything. This, in that it is non-nothing, but something. If not, it was absolutely ‘nothing’ (the absolute nothingness).

c.-- The “transcendentel/categorical” relationship.

This point was already touched upon *ETM* 27, “Usable ... to a certain extent”.

a/ One says e.g. “A beautiful girl is ‘something’ that ...”. In such a sentence, the term ‘something’ (its(his)) makes sense, because it awaits categorical precisions.

b/ When one says that “a girl is something,” one lapses into redundancy (redundancy), -- unless one wants to show that the concept of “something” (his(de)) includes that, too, in its comprehensiveness.

One can thus also sell ontological humor: “A girl is something.” Which, of course, everyone knows.

II.-- Ontological (transcendentel) theory of understanding (31/35).

O. Willmann, Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung, Kempten/Munich, 1909, 61f., mentions the traditional list of the “transcendentalia”.

A.-- 1. On, ens, being.-- To this we immediately add the main content of ‘being(de)’, viz. existence and essence (*ETM* 25), i.e. actual existence and being.

2.a. Ti, aliquid, something,-- i.e. being, insofar as it is distinguishable from something else.

2.b. Pragma, res, thing,-- i.e. being, insofar as it exists in itself, independent of subjectivity (*ETM* 15); think ‘real’, actual, and ‘reality’, reality.

2.c. To this we add: morphe, forma, (creature form, i.e. being insofar as it is distinguishable from the rest by its mode of being -- by possessing its own ‘being(s)’ or essence.

Note -- The concept of ‘form’. -- One does not confuse with the spatial mathematical form, which, e.g. in geometry or mechanics, is contrasted with the ‘content’ or ‘matter’ (substance). Thus: a golden figurine (figurine = form; gold(s) = matter, substance).

The creature form or form in short, in the case of the golden statue, comprises and geometrical configuration (arrangement of parts) and matter.

As an aside, the creature form has, traditionally, three roles (functions):

a. by its creature form, something has its own view (eidos or idea), its own ‘being’;
b. that same form of being governs that something, acts as a principle (presupposition), viz.

b1. that form is directional (cybernetic) and introduces purposefulness (teleology) - something is purposeful because it possesses a form of being -;

b.2. that form is normative (‘metron’, mensura, measure, or mode, measure) - something is governed in its behavior (course) by its creature form.

In summary, form provides distinctiveness (from the rest, dichotomy, or complement) and governs both goal-directed progression and behavior.

B.-- 1. Hen, unum, the one.

Everything that possesses a form of being (something is, a thing is), shows resemblance and coherence. See above *ETM 20 (metaphor: resemblance)*, 22 (*metonymy: coherence*), 23 (*synecdoche: resemblance and/or coherence*).

That the concepts of ‘collection’ and ‘system’ (system) are applicable to all that is, is due to the unity in all that is. Note: the unity in the multitude! For there is multiplicity: differences of all kinds, gaps of all kinds. Yet our sense of reality (ontological capacity, insight into being) succeeds in developing unifying points of view. The tropics are one clear example of this.

In other words: being (reality) is identitive. The henology (unity theory) or, better, the harmology, (order) theory, is the branch of ontology which deals with the unity-in-the-quantity or also the multiplicity-in-the-unity. It is one of the main premises of logic.

2. Alèthes, verum,

the true (better: the sensible, intelligible, knowable and thinkable).-- ‘True’ in the ancient languages means, in addition to “corresponding to reality” (logical truth,-- better: ‘epistemological’ truth), also “what testifies to spirit” and, thus, is intelligible,-- non-absurd (‘ontological’ truth).

One also distinguishes this ontological truth from the ethical (deontic, normative) : a behavior is “true” to the extent that it “makes true” the rules of conscientious behavior, e.g., respects them, turns them into real.

The gnoseology (doctrine of knowledge)

is the philosophical subject whose object is ontological truth. ‘Epistemology’ (science theory) is one branch of it.

What is commonly called 'rationality' - both in the sense of 'being endowed with reason' and 'being sensible/understandable' - has its basis here. If reality - being(s) - were not, in the Antique sense, 'true', i.e. sensible, intelligible, bearing witness to spirit, then there would be no question of the whole Modern 'rationality'. Since reality itself is 'rational' ('true'), it can be analyzed rationally. Mind and reality fit together.

3. *Agathon, bonum, the good (valuable).*

Everything that is is, in one way or another, amenable to appreciation. In other words, in Antique language, it is a "good," -- something that represents value.

As an aside, this is why we have defined the term "mind" as (intuitively grasping) reason and as (discursive, expounding) reason, but also as mind (feeling of value).

The theory of value or axiology is that branch of philosophy whose object is all that is "good" (value).

Historically grown.

The list mentioned by *Willmann* (and added to somewhat by us) did not suddenly appear out of thin air.

In his *Geschichte des Idealismus*, III (*Der Idealismus der Neuzeit*), Braunschweig, 1907-2, 1036, Willmann says that the transcendentalisms arose from:

(1) the philosophy of the Paleopythagoreans (*ETM 03*), which studied all that is under the point of view of unity (identity) and 'truth' (intelligibility, rationality),-- points, which for the Pythagoreans were intertwined (he who knows the unity-in-the-many, knows at once the essence of things) and

(2) the philosophy of the Platonists, who study all that is, under point of view of value (goodness) and being(s),--points, which, for a Platonist(s), run together (he who knows being, knows value)

The Mikrosocratic (Small-socratic) Eukleides (= Euclid) of Megara (-450/-380), one of the rarest of the rare to assist his thinking companion Socrates of Athens at the last, put the transcendentalia of "being(s), unity, truth, goodness" at the center of his highly Eleatic philosophy.

Existence/ essence.

'Being(de)' exhibits a duality. *M. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik*, (Introduction to Metaphysics), Tübingen, 1953, 138, says: "(In Platon's language) 'ousla' (essentia + existentia) can mean two things:

- (1) 'Anwesen' (presence) of something that is 'present' (given), and
- (2) this present (given) in the 'what' of its being ("im Was seines Aussehens").

P. Fürstenau, *Heidegger (Das Gefüges eines Denkens)*, (Heidegger (The Structure of a Thought)), Frankfurt a.M., 1958, 118, adds, “Here lies the origin of the distinction between ‘existentia’ (*note*: actual existence) and ‘essentia’ (*note*: mode of being).-- ‘Daszsein’ and ‘Wassein’ “. The terms ‘existentia’ and ‘essentia’ have been handed down to us as a pair of opposites (systechy) by the Scholastics (800/1450).

Appl. model.-- Let us take the “heroes” (actors) from the Late Antique adventure novel of *Hèliodoros of Ephesus* (= Ephesus; between +300 and +400), *Aithiopika* (literally: Ethiopian histories). A very beautiful (Platonizing) love story is woven into it, whose actors are Theagenes and Charikleia.

Ontologically - and for once not redundantly (redundantly) - one can ask a twofold - not a “double,” for she is one - question.

(a) “What”. -- “What are Theagenes and Charikleia?”. Possible answers: “They are Greeks lost in Egypt” or “They are the heroes of a Late Antique adventure novel”.

(b.) Or (= that).-- “Do these heroes actually exist?” -- Possible answers: “Yes, because the text of *Aithiopika* deals with them (throughout even)” or “Perhaps they are merely a fiction (imagined reality) of the author of *Aithiopika*.”

In summary: (1) what something is and (2) whether something is there (that it is there). So that Platon did see correctly, when he defined the content of the concept of being (i.e., of all that is “real”) as “being there” and “being so”--as “what is there” and as “that it is there.

“Dasz ueberhaupt etwas sei” (that there is something without more).

Note: this sentence by Max Scheler (1874/1928; with Husserl co-founder of the Phenomenological method) betrays not a duplicity, but a duality.

(1) One cannot, e.g., say “that there is without more ...is,” except to isolate existence.

(2) Nor can one say “... Something ...”, unless to isolate the essence. The Paleopythagoreans speak in that case of a ‘su.stoichia’, a duality (pair). Though distinct (multiplicity), yet they are never separate (unity).

From this depend testability and what goes with it (*ETM 09*). Whatever existence something (an essence) has,--an imagined one or one verified outside our minds, ‘existence’ is always there.

Being Insight.

To “that there is something without more,” answers our understanding of “being” (our reality understanding).

M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, I, (Being and Time), Tübingen, 1949-6 (1927-1), 17, puts it as follows.-”To be human (‘dasein’) is **(i)** to be **(ii)** in a certain way, viz. **(a)** while he himself ‘is’, **(b)** man immediately understands ‘something like being’.

In commonsense language:

(a) because we ourselves actually exist (“we ourselves” = essence; “actual existence”: existence),

(b) realize - know, understand - somewhat what being generally is. (‘being generally’ = subject; ‘what (it is)’ = saying, model).

In other words: because we ourselves ‘are’ reality, we have been given a minimal and essential insight into what being is without more.

Of course, it can be argued against Heidegger that he tries to interpret the concept of being very ‘reflexively’ (loopily). *ETM 04* taught us Paleopythagorean fallibilism (fallibility consciousness): we do not possess the whole, the totality of reality, but only samples (= inductive method).

Heidegger places, initially, very strong emphasis on the fact that our being-with-others-in-the-world is “the” access “par excellence” for an ontology.

That is a-priori possible. But the fact is and remains that we, as ‘existents’ (= as people in this world), are only one small part of the universe,-- universe, which is another name for “the totality of all that is.”

In other words: the “existential analytic” (i.e., the analysis of our being-with-others-in-the-world), as the basis of an ontology, is only a sample among many possible other samples.

Positive thinking.

(1) ‘Positive thinking’ has the meaning in New-Amendments of “imagine the things of life to be good, successful, and you will see that they will turn out that way in reality.” The power of our knowing and thinking contents over our destiny.

(2) But “positive thinking,” in the XIXth century, has two meanings:

a. A.Comte (1798/1857; founder of “la philosophie positive” (*Positivism, ETM 16*), which emphasizes positive (i.e., subject-scientific ascertainable) facts.

b. W.J.Schelling (1775/1854; Romantic thinker), who emphasizes the “positive” (i.e., ascertainable by history) facts.

Both of them, knowingly, put the aspect of “existence,” proper to “being,” first, but understood primarily as “existing outside of our mind.

Sample 6.-- Digression: categories (platitudes). (36/42)

We interrupt, entirely briefly, the thread. We pause to consider that we need basic concepts (“categories,” philosophical; “platitudes,” rhetorical) in order to think (and act).

(1) So far we have gained ontological foundational or basic concepts -- ‘being(the)’,-- truth (meaningfulness, intelligibility,-- ‘rationality’),-- goodness (value),- - especially unity (identity) --.

(2) But both in rhetoric (eloquence), where basic concepts are called ‘topoi koinoi’, loci communes, commonplaces, and in philosophy, where, since Aristotle especially, they are called ‘katègoriai’, praedicamenta, basic concepts (think of the distinction between ‘categorical’ and ‘transcendental’), we have many other basic concepts at our disposal. They are, as concepts, of more limited scope, but of richer content (*ETM* 29) than the comprehensive (ontological, transcendental) and, therefore, much more useful.

Now reread *ETM* 30 (*embrace*).-- Categorical notions (platitudes) are general notions. Yes, usually very general. So that many subordinate notions are included in them. They have summary value.

Role in learning.

Learning - especially learning philosophy and basic research in the professional sciences (which we will now be doing for three years) - stands or falls, to a very large extent, with - what is called today, in line with Thomas Kuhn (epistemologist) - “paradigmata,” textbook examples.

The Ancient Greek ‘para.deigma’ means ‘model’, ‘paragonal model’. But not so much a singular or private model or paragon, but a general model,-- much more general than many other general models.-- Now how this works, we will explain briefly.

Example.-- In antiquity, the Paleopythagorean Archytas of Taras (Archytas of Tarantum) is attributed, perhaps erroneously, to a list of categories, which we certainly find in Aristotle.

A. Ding (*ETM* 31),-- ‘hupostasis’, substantia, selfhood (substance).

B. Relation (relation ,-- ‘pros ti’, relatio).

C. In addition to these two basic concepts, the list shows a number of concept pairs or pairs.

Here they follow:

1. Quantity/quality (how large/characteristic).
2. Place/Time,
3. Activity/ passivity (acting/ idly observing or undergoing),
4. Situs/ habitus (this Latin translation of Greek terms is the usual (modern application: thrown into a certain situation I adopt a certain attitude, reaction).

Notice how often we use these and other fundamental concepts to explain something, for example. Or we assume them: if we say “That doesn’t click between those two”, then we assume the basic concept of ‘relationship’ (e.g. between two married people).

Note: it is not because we do not explicitly name such commonplace fundamental concepts that we do not have them. They play the role of (sometimes very unconscious, indeed secret and insidious) presuppositions (in Platonic language: hypotheses; *ETM 02*).

Application.-- What fundamental concepts are presupposed (assumed) in the following sentences:

1. He loves his wife eagerly”;
2. “John arrived there just in time”.
3. “He just let him do it”;
4. “Thrown into the modern world, we design some modern way of living”.

Concepts and concept pairs.

With *R.R.Skemp, Mathematical Thinking*, Utrecht/ Antwerp, 1973 (// *The Psychology of Learning Mathematics*, Penguin Books, 1971), one can distinguish, concerning basic concepts, between singular and composite categories (which Skemp sometimes calls ‘structures’ sometimes ‘schemas’)).

Let us dwell, largely with Skemp, on its smallest form, namely, two-lessons - Greek: ‘dyads’ -, pairs, couples. The Paleopythagoreans had a word for this: ‘sustoichia’, systechy. Literally ‘su-’, the union of, and ‘-stoichia’, elements. It should be noted that the Pythagorean term ‘systechy’ often has a connotation. When two terms (elements) of a duality are each other’s’ opposites (negates of each other), then there is systechy in the sense of pair of opposites.-- Let us now turn to some applicative models.

(a).-- synchronic models.

The elements here are simultaneous.

I.-- Mathematical models.

1. Look at the elements, one by one, of following set (series) and note the analogy of the elements: (1/2, 2/4), (1/3, 2/6), (1/4, 2/8).

What we call with Ed. Husserl, founder of intentional Phenomenology, called “the identical general” in a multitude of data, -- with Georg Cantor, founder ven Modern set theory, “the common property of a set of elements”, -- with the mid-century Scholastics “the analogy, one type of identity”; is here, in this case, “is equivalent (equivalent) to”. Thus, e.g., $1/2$ is equivalent to $2/4$, etc..

2. Analyze the analogy

And this in the sequence (6,5), (2,1), (9,8), (32,31). The secret premise here is “is (one unit) greater than”. Solving such little questions in today’s mathematics amounts to prepositional analysis. Typically Platonic for another.

II. -- Non-mathematical models.

1. The pair “calf/cow, foal/horse, chick/chicken”.

However non-identical, the pairs here show one identical aspect, namely the proposition “is young from”. If one presupposes that the relation “is young of” is at work, then this series, obscure at first sight, becomes transparent,-- ‘true’, i.e., testifying to reason, understandable, ‘rational’.

2. The pair “Antwerp/ Belgium, Marseille/ France, Rotterdam/ Netherlands”.

This exhibits, upon awareness of the secret premise, the trait “is port of”. The questionable character lies in the fact that, in these sequences, one conceals the common characteristic, which is presupposed.

(b). -- Diachronic models.

Here the elements are not simultaneous, but one after the other.

Processes - ancient Greek: ‘kinèseis’ (‘kinèsis’ is singular), Lat.: ‘motus’, course - can be seen as applications of systechies.

1. “Our colleague is the successor of the previous director” (successor to),
2. “That cold stone there in the morning sun becomes warm” (cold turns into its negate (opposite) warm),
3. “Suddenly Erna fell from the high mountain into the depths” (height/depth).

Note.-- In mathematics and more generally in logistics (mathematics theorized), that “process” is called transformation (transformation), the core of the concept of function.

Informational scope.

Time and again we have encountered general concepts - categories, platitudes. What learning value do such - more often than not purely presupposed - basic notions have now?

a. –Backward information.

Regressively, we are facing summative induction here.

(i) First, one goes through a set of data (the elements of a collection) one by one, noting, over and over again, precisely the same property (trait). Think of a teacher checking whether he has indeed corrected all the notebooks.

(ii) One can then say:

1/ “Every element separately - every sample - shows the same trait”(the teacher: “every copy is improved”);

2/ “All elements collectively exhibit the same property (the teacher: “all copies are improved”).

The thinking operation “from each individually to all collectively” is called summative generalization (= summative induction). Or: from all samples one concludes to the collectivity of those samples. Summarizing is essential.

b.-- Forward information.

Progressively, this retrospection turns into a ‘prolèpsis,’ anticipatio, or ‘prolèmma,’ an anticipation of what the future, concerning the same data, may bring. The ancient Stoics (-320+) and Epicureans (-320+) called a common feature of a series of experiences ‘anticipation.’ Once one has grasped such a category or collection of categories, one has, from now on, a paradigm, an already pre-existing exemplary model at one’s disposal, which is valid for the cases to come.

Skemp, o.c., 41v., mentions the major difference (and thus distinctiveness) in learning outcome. In a competition on immediate memorization of data, in which one group tackled the memory exercise without commonalities and the other with commonalities, it turned out as follows: without: 32%; with: 69%.

This can be called the heuristic or finding value.

Conclusion: -- Summarizing (summative induction) and possessing a paradigm (heuristic anticipation) together make up the information proper to fundamental concepts.

A philosophical application.

An outline (composite primer) on cultural and philosophical history is a precious commodity.

(i) History can be interpreted as a series of transformations of elements (e.g., teachings of philosophers).

(ii) But the choice of the elements in question differs from philosophical tenor to philosophical tenor.-- Thus, moderns choose different tenets than postmoderns.

As an aside, after Antiquity (-600/+600) and the Middle Ages (800/1450), modernity emerges after +/- 1450. If one takes the American Beatnik's as the norm, then postmodernity gets off the ground around 1950. -- Now we compare both historical schemata.

(a) *The modern scheme.*

A set of presuppositions led the Moderns to strongly value, indeed exclusively advocate, professional science and basic research of professional science in particular.

a. *Antique philosophy.*

Since, in the eyes of the Enlightened Rationalist, a Thales of Miletus (*ETM 05*) begins to think 'rationally' -- he was not only the first philosopher but also interested in all kinds of professional sciences -- one takes him for the beginning of "ancient Rationalism," insofar as it 'demythologizes' (strips away the myths) and reasons 'earthly'. -- This from -600 to +600.

b. *Medieval philosophy.*

From 800 to 1450, in the West at least, the Church dominated thought, in a noticeable and strongly reverberating way. It aligned itself primarily with religious (Pythagoreanism, Platonism,--also the Stoa) and even "theosophical" (*ETM 04*), i.e., magical-mystical, ways of thinking, such as Neo-Platonism in its variants.

For this last reason especially, the Middle Ages are rather scorned, indeed ridiculed (among others, as "the dark Middle Ages") by the moderns, excluding the Romantics.

This does not prevent the Scholasticism, in all kinds of further living transformations (re-foundations), e.g. Neothomism (after S. Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274), top figure of Middle Ages thought), from surviving to our days and being appreciated, e.g. by the Vatican, as the philosophy par excellence. This,--against the 'Enlightenment'.

c. *Modern Philosophy.*

The rising Modern professional sciences - mathematical physics first and foremost as an 'exact' science - think of Copernicus, the Polish canon, who founded heliocentrism (1473/1543), of Tycho Brahe (1546/1601; teacher of Kepler; known for his Introduction to the 'New' Astronomy (1588/1602) and Johannes Kepler (1571/1630; cosmology), especially to Galileo Galilei (1564/1642; exact natural science) - founded, suddenly, amidst the Late Middle Ages uncertainties (with the necessary Skepticism), certainties.

In that vein, René Descartes (Lat.: Cartesius; 1596/1650) revived philosophy.--

In the same vein goes John Locke (1632/1704; father, in the stricter sense, of the Enlightenment (= les Lumières, die Aufklärung, the Enlightenment)), but this applies primarily to the Anglo-Saxon countries. The name “rationalism” links up with the enormous emphasis on “reason”, the earthly ability to reason, -- reason, which acts as a norm, in the place of the Church’s authority, and regularly comes into conflict with “faith”. Since the XVIIIth century we have lived, gradually more, in an increasingly radical “Enlightened” climate. In education, the term “clarification after the dark middle ages” has surfaced.

Conclusion -- After the mythical, yes, magical-mystical ‘faith’ the demythified, yes, anti-mystical and anti-mystical ‘reason’ (the word not in the broad philosophical sense, but in the narrower Enlightened sense). Behold the hypothesis (the set of presuppositions) with the cultural-historical scheme, peculiar to modernity (i.e. Modern culture). The concepts ‘reason’, ‘rational’ e.g. are ‘categories’ and, immediately, platitudes of modernity. Immediately, the above three-phase scheme is a kind of ‘historical paradigm’.

(b).-- The postmodern schema.

Starting from partially different presuppositions, especially concerning ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ (of which both the limits and especially the mistakes are made (think of the environmental pollution caused by the applied professional sciences)), together with the emphasis on the - possibly pre-scientific life - called irrational by the Enlighteners - and on the magical-mystical side of that same life, the Postmoderns arrive at a different cultural-historical scheme.

(1) Remains somewhat preserved above Illuminated scheme.

(2) But correctives are inserted. We emphasize, briefly, two additions.

a. Archaic (= Primitive) thinking (ETM 03).

Ethnology (ethnology) gradually discovers a pre-rational stage of thought and life in which natural life, carried by magic and mysticism and recounted in myth (ETM 05), predominate.

Where the Enlightened mind rejects this as pre-rational, indeed irrational, Postmodernity peruses it as a different, no less valid form of “reason. Cfr ETM 18: *transempirical or transrational viewpoint*.

b. Eastern thought (Orientalism).

Among other things, since some beatniks (1950+), in the USA, Eastern philosophies - Indian, Chinese, Japanese, have been given great authority.

One thinks e.g. of Hinduism and Buddhism (e.g. Zen Buddhism), as well as Tantrism (Tibet). For the Enlightener 'pre-rational', yes, 'irrational' (and thus invalid, unless as poetry; but for the Postmodern and a different form of rationality and a beatific corrective to the one-sided 'rational-Enlightened' life.

Conclusion -

(a). The Modern thinker, since Descartes and Locke, seeks to get out of the "quagmire of religions" through science and reason as guides to life.

(b). The Postmodern thinker, however, seeks to get out of "the morass of 'rationalism'" by "pushing the boundaries."

If the Rationalist is exclusive regarding (professional and 'philosophical') reason, the Postmodernist is inclusive, including: things that are 'rationally' (in the Enlightened sense) unacceptable and can be eliminated (think of the religious persecutions of Marxism in the Communist countries), appear to him/her as not so 'irrational' and despicable.

Well, on the contrary: by the magical-mystical nature-boundness of man ... consciously suppressing or ... unconsciously repress, the Enlightened Rationalism of Modern times has violated man's overall flawlessness and, immediately, inhibited 'possibilities' (Potentialities) in the deeper layers of man. Hence the sentiment of profound unsatisfactoriness and opacity of the 'rational' life, since industrialization e.g...

Again: new categories, new platitudes, new paradigms! In short: a new hypothesis, in Platonic terms. And thus also a new cultural-historical paradigm.

Model-theoretic observation.

ETM 38 taught us that solving mathematical problems can involve uncovering common properties such as (secret) prepositions.

Well, something analogous occurs here as well.

1/ The original is the unknown, which becomes the subject of the sentence.

2/ The model is the known, which provides information about the original, by being similar to it (*metaphorical model*; ETM 21) or related to it (*metonymical model*; ETM 22).-

Both cultural-historical schemata are models, which inform us about their originals (Modern presuppositions, Postmodern presuppositions). Modernity and Postmodernity are depicted in these schemata.

Sample 7.-- The alethic ('physical') modalities. (43/49).

We resume the thread of the exposition on page *ETM* 35.

We now have the basic ontological concepts (and the notion of 'categories (see digression)) - are(de), with its content,-- one, true (meaningful and good (valuable) -. But we can also take a 'modal' view of the concept of reality and acquire an eye for "the modalities."

One distinguishes:

(1) alethic or physical modalities, i.e. Real, on the one hand, and, on the other, a number of modalities, which introduce a notion of the 'way' in which something can be 'real'. These are, strictly speaking, 'modalities' (then Ontological modalities).

The alethically most important are 'possible' (against which 'impossible' as the negate) and 'necessary' (against which 'non-necessary' or, also, 'accidental' or 'contingent', as well as 'necessarily not' (impossible)).

(2) Distinguished are also ethical (moral) modalities, viz. "obligatory (should)/ non obligatory (may)/ obligatory not (may not, forbidden)." In short: "must / may / may not". These moral modalities we will discuss later.

The alethic modalities bear this name because they express 'alèthes' (verum, true) in the logical sense. They are called 'physical' because they indicate reality as realized or realizable, respectively unrealizable reality.

A -- The everyday use of words.

Very generally speaking, the term "modality" in everyday language designates parts, aspects of something.

(i) So there is something.

(ii) There are parts or aspects of that something: these are 'modalities' of it.

Appl. model. -- Legally (legally) speaking: a legal act - e.g., a marriage contract - gets a "clause" added as an aspect or component. This is a modality of it.

Speech (grammatical) modalities.

Take, as a sample *G.S. Overdiep, Modern Dutch Grammar*, Zwolle, 1928, 13v.. Distinguish between objective and subjective modalities.

a.-- Objective modalities.

A rationale is reflected in a statement.

a.1.-- Single sentence.

i. Dubitativus, doubt expressing modality: "Would a girl fall out of the tree?"

ii. Interrogativus, interrogative modality: “Does a girl fall out of the tree there?”.

iii. Potentialis, possibility expressing modality:

“Possibly (probably, possibly) a girl will fall out of the tree.

iv. Realis, factuality indicating modality

“A girl falls out of the tree”.

a.2.-- Compound (or full) sentence.

i. Conditionalis, condition-expressing modality: “In that case (or: if ..., then) a girl falls from the tree”.

ii. Irrealis, non-factuality expressing modality: “In that impossible case, a girl falls from the tree”.

iii. Concessivus (concession): “Though it seems impossible, yet a girl falls from the tree”.

Note -- ETM 37 taught us that categories (= basic concepts) do not necessarily have to be expressed, but that, as hypotheses (presuppositions), they are active and informative. So too are modalities: many language users do not know the term (and the theory surrounding the term) ‘modality’. Yet they speak as if it were radically familiar to them. This is clear from the sentences above. Modalities stick out, mostly, as hidden, - sometimes insidiously hidden - presuppositions in our language use. The Platonic hypothetical method (*ETM 02*) is excellent for exposing them.

Note -- Other speech arts speak directly of the verbs, which represent modalities, i.e., “must,” “must not,” or “may,” “may not” (which is ethical) or “may,” “may not” (possible, not possible) (which is alethical or physical). In this case, it is not about concealed (and presupposed), but about explicit modalities.

b. -- Subjective modalities.

Overdiep says that one expresses a subjective attitude - an interpretation or meaning. Thus the modalities of feeling.

Appl. model. -- The optativus or wish phrase: “Should a girl fall out of the tree”. But there is more: wonder, favoritism or hostility, acquiescence or annoyance, calmness or excitement etc. are either explicitly omitted or subsumed (hinted at).

Such modalities are more likely to be located in the realm of our value judgments.

Logistic modalities.

Logic or computational logic, which has emerged since the last century, is divided into branches.

(1) The “classical” logistcs.

This is called ‘bivalent’: it knows, with respect to judgments (also: statements, propositions, -- hence propositional logic), only two values (*ETM 33*: the good, which is interpreted here in logistic ‘values’), namely ‘true’ judgments and ‘untrue’ (‘false’) judgments.

By the way: the ancient Stoics (= Stoics, Stoics; from Zenon of Kition (Lat.: Zeno of Citium; +/- -336/-264) onwards) worked out their own logic, which differs rather from the Pythagorean-Platonic one; they worked with the logical validity values ‘true/false’. E.g., “The city of Rome exists”(as verifiable, this sentence is true); “The city of Rome does not exist” (as falsifiable, this sentence is false).

(2) The “modal” logistcs.

This one is more valuable.-- In addition to the values ‘true/false’, it knows the values ‘possible/necessary’. Things, with which already Aristotle worked.

Conclusion.-- It is abundantly clear from the actual language of computational logic that a minimum of ontological notions are either explicitly employed or inexplicitly presupposed. Thus here the ontological ‘goodness’ (value).

But the employment of modalities is also of ontological origin and essence.

Now one understands better why, at all costs, for every logic and its applications, we presuppose ontology: that ontology is - explicitly or not, with or without consent - presupposed in logical language use. Then do it very explicitly and in an admitted way.

B.-- The ontological language.

G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logstiker auf die Logik und ihre Geschichtschreibung, Stuttgart, 1962, categorically reduces the many modalities (strictly logically speaking) to necessity and the negatives (negations) attached to them: necessary and **(i)** not-necessary or **(ii)** necessarily not.

Identitive: an identity (beingness, being-form, being(s)) is either experienced as necessary or experienced as necessary-with-negatives.

Note.-- The terms ‘problematic’ (possible/impossible), ‘assertoric’ (real/unreal) and ‘apodictic’ (necessary), according to Jacoby - mix logical (necessary, possible, impossible) with ontological (real, possible (accidental, non-necessary), unreal) modalities and obscure, their analysis.

God was labeled as necessary, his “ideas” as possible, and the actual world as real. From there the traditional list of modalities.

The concept of “perhaps,” “probably.

Here we face a submodality of “possibility. Do we begin with a situational description of a possibility-in-the-form-of-probability. This,--to make the issue feel very sharp.

The sentence “It is probable that “naked Cicciolina” (*note: Ilona Staller, porn star in Italy but of Hungarian origin, member of the Radical Party, since June 1987 people’s representative*) - for the reason of her nude performance in Viareggio, near Pisa, on 19.06.1987 - is facing a trial “for assault on public morals”.

As an aside, la Cicciolina is a paradoxical figure. Before TV she claimed to be a Catholic who, although she does not always attend Sunday Mass, nevertheless goes to confession every week. But she is convinced that the taboos (she is against the classical meta-physics, which founds such taboos) on sex are fundamentally hypocrisy.

She certainly has one argument for this: whenever she, in the past, faced a lawsuit somewhere, she threatened to reveal the names of famous sex partners. Whereupon nothing came of the lawsuit.

More than that: the show in question in Viareggio saw a flood of reserved seats, including quite a few journalists, -- so much so that the Show organizers had to look for a venue sensitively larger than Il Gabbiano (The Seagull), where the porn star regularly performed.- Among the local politicians, a Socialist councillor sided with her.

But there are counter-arguments: article 528 of the Italian penal code prohibits “immoral displays”; among local politicians, both Communists and Christian Democrats voted against her; an Italian pressure group “for the defense of moral values” announced that he would “do everything possible (*note the modality*)” to prevent “naked Cicciolina” from actually sitting in parliament.

Behold an (all too) concise situation description.

What flows logically from such a situation (which has since evolved, of course)? We stand still before a differential (gamma, range) of possibilities: It is, - very (extremely), really, little, not at all, likely that “naked Cicciolina” is going through a process. Or: it seems that ... etc. .

Note: in this case we are facing a situation, which one estimates and from which one deduces (derives). If one wants, hypothetically: “if (= given) all the elements of the total situation, then very (extremely), real or little, utterly unlikely that la Cicciolina will face a lawsuit”. - If one calls “dialectics” - with Platon - the fact of inferring logical inferences from presuppositions, then this is a case of situational or, more broadly, historical (inferring from historical situations) dialectics. Cfr. *ETM 02*.

The interpretation (interpretation) of a term as “likely.

What was said a moment ago seems abstract, alien to life even. Yet it is not!

Bibl. st.: John Cohen, *Chance, skill and luck (The psychology of guessing and gambling)*, Utr./ Antw., 1965, 165v..

a. The interpretation test

It is performed by ten-year-old girls.

Given: “What does the sentence “It will probably rain?” mean?

Asked: the proper sense especially of the adverb ‘probably’.

b. Results.

Here are some of the answers.

Girl 1.-- “The word ‘probably’ means that it could or might rain. Or: that it is very likely or that it will not rain either”.

Girl 2.a. “It is very plausible that it will rain.-- I suppose it will rain (...).-- I am not sure that it will rain (...).-- I do not know whether it will rain yes or no.-- I believe it will rain.”

Girl 2.b. “It might rain.-- I think it will rain.-- I’m sure da it will rain.-- I doubt it will rain”

Girl 3. “It could be raining heavily. There might be thunder and lightning. -- It would be fun: ye will probably have a lot of fun with it. He will probably come and get you”.

Note.-- The trial organizers, presumably, did not take into account that the question is ambiguous:

(i) what does the sentence (...) mean and

(ii) what think ye personally: “Will it rain now or not?”. In any case: the children carried out these two interpretations, as the answers show.

Statistical induction.

The results are samples. If one summarizes them (*summative induction; ETM 39*), one arrives at percentages (subsets.)

(i) About half of the girls interpreted the phrase as “It is more likely than not that it will rain.

(ii) about forty-five percent say, “It is almost but not quite certain to rain.”

(iii) About five percent: “It might as well rain as not.”

Group 1 estimates correctly: “more plausible is that”.

Group 2 overestimates: “almost but not quite sure it is”.

Group 3 underestimated: “Just as well it can and it can’t”.

Again, a differential or range that goes from underestimating over correctly estimating to overestimating.

As an aside: if the result of joint sampling was one hundred percent (“all elements of the total collection”), then one would say “universal induction”; now, however, it is not one hundred percent (some elements of the total collection; subset); thus one says “statistical induction.

Note.-- This test now applies not to a situation, but to words (linguistic test). Here one deduces from words what the interpretation should be. Mere words have been separated from the total life situation. The dialectic now refers only to language.

The term “impossible,” resp. “incongruous” (“absurd”).

Mathematicians in particular use the term “incongruity. Let’s turn to that modality for a moment.

Appl. model.-- “Round Square”.

How to prove that such a thing can be said with words (nominally), but cannot really be thought (real)? In other words: one does speak the contradictory terms, but cannot possibly really think them as real.

Ch. Lahr, Logique, 495, explains.

Lahr divides the verbal or nominal totality into its parts.

a. Surface: if one assumes ‘surface’, then one only establishes that ánd round (circle, circle) “n square, both, are a surface. .

b.1. Geometric form of the lines: the round line is impossible to merge with the four straight lines of the square (Proof 1).

b.2. Length of the lines drawn from the center and of the circle (round) and of the square: with the circle they are all of the same length (radii); with the square they are different (which is contradictory or radically opposite to ‘all equal’).

B. Russell, in 1905, says: “It is false that there exists one and only one x which is at the same time round and square.” (*D. Vernant, Introduction à la Philosophie de la logique, (Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic), 94).*

Try to prove that non-felt pain or actual infinite number are also impossible. That they contain inner contradiction.

Appl. mod.-- “Two plus two is e.g. five”. -- How demonstrate -- “prove” is a heavy word -- that this is “impossible” (inconceivable, incongruous, absurd)?

a. Simply describe.

i. Nominally (‘nomina’, in Latin, is ‘names’, i.e. sounds, ‘words’) this is possible: saying “Two plus two is five (e.g.)” is without hindrance.

ii. Real (= businesslike; cfr ‘res’ as objective reality; *ETM 31*) is somewhat different:

ii.a. “two plus two” and (for example) “five” thinking at the same time, but as separate concepts,-- that goes;

ii.b. but thinking “two plus two” as “five” (e.g.), i.e., as the sum of the two separate terms,--that does not go.

b. Id:

Supposing that “two plus two would be five after all” (= counter model), it would follow that the numbers and the number operations would no longer have any identity (sub-divisibility). They would not be identifiable. It would follow, rightly so, that e.g. “two plus two can also be seven”,--that “thirty-five plus two can also be one hundred and thirty”.

Reason: once the identity at one point may be cracked, it may also be cracked in all other cases (a collection knows, here, bifurcation (complementation)). If, in a universal collection - of numbers, for example - one element loses its identity, all the others lose it at once, for they form a single system (coherence).--We shall see later: “what is, is” and “what is so, is so” (law of identity). Well, this is cracked here, in this absurd aggregation.

c. Paleopythagorean.

The connoisseurs of antiquity - e.g. W. Jaeger - tell us that, from Paleopythagoreanism onwards, the concept of “harmony” i.e. interconnectedness,-- immediately also “coherence” without contradiction (contradiction), becomes one of the basic concepts (“categories”; *ETM 36*) of ancient Greek thought and life (e.g. in Greek art). Well, seen in this way, “two plus two equals four” is harmonious, but e.g. “two plus two equals e.g. five” is disharmonious. They cannot - the parts, viz - be joined together without contradiction into a single totality, called a ‘system’ on our days.

Note.-- One also says - for Pythagorean ‘harmony’ - ‘consistency’, i.e. absence of contradiction, contradictionlessness.

Decision.-- Immediately we have seen two examples of what Reichenbach calls “logical testing” (*ETM 16*).

Sample 8.-- The being(s) and the nothingness. (50/57)

We deviate - very briefly - from modalities in the strict sense, in order to dwell on what - according to some thinkers - is also a “modality” (possibly of a part of all that is, possibly of all that is), namely “nothing”.

a.-- The traditional doctrine

Bibl. st.: *Désiré Mercier, Logique*, Louvain, Paris, 1922-7, 107s..

In Latin, “nothing” is either “nihil” or “nil.

(1) The classical theorem on this subject

These were: **a.** there is all that is (= being(de)); **b.** outside of that ‘being(de) there is absolutely nothing (in business or real language); one also says in nominal (merely verbal) language: “outside of being(de) there is only absolute nothing” (explicitly thinking that that ‘absolute nothing’ is in fact ‘absolute nothing’ (*ETM 09: ‘being(de) is transcendental*). After all, ‘being(de)’ is all that is non-nothing. Absolute nothingness - to use that nominal term, which is a mere figure of speech - is nowhere discoverable and ... findable (*ETM 09*).

(2) The classical theorem

This was further: there is indeed what can be called “relative or relative nothingness” (as opposed to “absolute or absolute nothingness”). Within that relative nothingness one distinguishes, mainly, two types.

i. *Nihil negativum (negating nothing).*

One denies being (never being the absolute).

Appl. mod.-- Someone looks for “something” in a room and finds (strikes) “nothing. He/she says: “In that room there is nothing”. It is clearly a relative nothing: one finds nothing special, -- e.g. no objects (notice the negation of ‘objects’: ‘no’ objects).-- Strictly ontologically there is something: air, -- perhaps bacteria in that air etc.. One therefore says, “That room is empty”.

ii. *Nihil privativum (robbing nothing).*

One denies being. But then ‘being’, which, normally, ideally, should (‘ought’ to) be there.

Appl. mod.-- All that is evil -- physical evil (e.g., a natural disaster) or ethical (moral) evil (sin, unconscionability) -- is the fact that something is not there that should have been there, i.e., the physical or ethical good (value). The privative nothing expresses disappointment (“frustration”). “Here is nothing that we expected”. It is a valuation negation.

Digression.

Bibl. st.:

-- O. Vernant, *Introduction à la philosophie de la logique*, Bruxelles, Mardaga, 1983, 92ss...

-- B. Russell, in his *Principles of Mathematics*, London, 1937-2.

Russell emphasized that there is obvious contradiction (“inconsistency”) in claiming that an object called “A” does not exhibit any “being. “The expression ‘A is not’ e.g., must always be either false or meaningless”. Argument from the preposterous: supposing that A was nothing (= the counter-model), then the phrase “A is not” could not even be uttered. For “A is not” implies that there is **(i)** a term ‘A’, **(ii)** whose being is denied.

Corollary: “A is” -- Vernant’s comment: talking about an object (= calling that object e.g. ‘A’) seems possible only if and only if that object possesses a minimum of ‘being’.

Unless -- he says -- one reinterprets the terms as a ‘flatus vocis’ (a mere air displacement by means of the voice; i.e.: purely nominal).

Note.-- Classical theologies say several times (and traditional catechisms immediately), “God creates everything out of nothing.”

Indeed, the Biblical (strict monotheistic) Godhead - Yahweh, Trinity postulates that:
(i) God creates (does “being”) everything outside of him and
(ii) that nothing outside of Him is not created.

We have here again a nominal expression “God creates everything out of Himself, i.e., out of nothing outside Him.” “All out of Himself” is factual (real); “nothing outside Him” is also factual.-”Out of nothing” is nominal.

It should be noted that this is really Creationism (belief in creation) and not necessarily Emanatism (the assertion that everything that exists outside of God, is natural and beyond his free will, “flows out of him” (‘ekroè’, emanatio, outflow).

Note that it is not said that “God created or creates all being,” for he creates only what is outside himself; he himself is uncreated.

Nor does this prevent the created, especially free and independent (‘autonomous’) beings, from possessing true ‘creativity’. Created creative ability is ‘participation’ in God’s creativity.

Conclusion.-- God creates everything out of nothing - outside - Himself, i.e. out of His own infinite being.

b.-- *The non-ontological language.*

There are, now, several modes of speech, which deviate from the classical use of language.-- We take a few samples.

b.1.-- *Psychoanalytic language.*

Some of the followers (and interpreters or circumlocutors) of S. Freud (1856/ 1939; founder of Psychoanalysis) speak as follows: "Life, one of whose essence nuclei, perhaps even the essence nucleus itself, is 'eros', eroticism (in the extremely broad sense such that even a baby would live through some 'eroticism'), is essentially and from the outset marked by 'nullity', yes, 'annihilation'. This expresses itself, from the depths of the unconscious and/or subconscious, in:

- i. 'death drive' ('Todestrieb', the desire to kill oneself) and
- ii. the desire to kill others (e.g., maim, hurt, and so on); what is called "attack urge" or "aggression. Cfr. *Ch. Rycroft, Dictionnaire de psychanalyse*, Paris, 1972, 132.

G. Bataille (1897/1962).

R. Devos, *The tears of Eros (An introduction to Georges Bataille)*, in: *Streven* 1987 (July), 933/935, notes that in G. Bataille's last novel, *Les larmes d'Eros* (transl.: *The tears of Eros*, Nijmegen, 1986), the proposition resounds: "Eros and 'thanatos' (the Ancient Greek word for 'death') exist in one. Pleasure and sorrow - e.g. - exist in one: pleasure is sorrow and sorrow is, somewhere, pleasure. "In eroticism, that which is (so-called life) only acquires its meaning because this being crosses the border into that which is not (so-called death)."

Behold the thesis of Bataille who was already a Nietzsche supporter in 1923.

According to Bataille, life, which is strongly eroticized, is unbearable because it ends in death. He believes that one can verify such a statement through art and its history, from its pre-history up to and including Surrealism (an art and life movement, which got off the ground +/- 1924 and lives on until today).

Note -- It is immediately clear that to express life through "what is" and death through "what is not" amounts to an ontologizing metaphor,--a figure of speech, which is impossible to make sense of in the ontological, but only in the conversational sense (and even then). A certain frustration -- see nihil privativum -- is expressed in such speaking. Nothing more.

In the vernacular, it may sound like this: “Life ends in ‘nothing’, -- in ‘nothingness’, ‘in the nothingness of death’ (so speaks the disappointed and embittered, resentfully). It is the privative nothingness of negative value judgments. If need be, turned into theories. In what can be called “negative thinking” (*ETM* 35).

b.2. -Disappointed time living.

One sometimes hears it proclaimed as follows: “The past is no more; the future is not yet; the now is a kind of zero boundary between the two.” In Heideggerian parlance: the three temporal extremes are negatively articulated. Where it is clear that labeling the now as a zero boundary is a figure of speech. In fact, the now may be a moment of misfortune or miscalculation, but it is not a zero boundary in the strict sense of the word. One does not live through the absolute ‘zero’ (as a pure boundary). There is at least a minimum duration.

Cfr *B. Kuznetsov. C. Fawcett/ R.S. Cohen, ed., Reason and Being*, Dordrecht, 1986.

Circumstantial: “Life is three times ‘nothing’”: earlier is now ‘nothing’; later is now (still) ‘nothing’; the now is ‘nothing’“.

b.3.-- Heideggerian ‘nothing’.

Bibl. s.: R. Regvald, *Heidegger et le problème du néant*, (Heidegger and the problem of nothingness,), Dordrecht, 1987.

The ‘nothingness’, in a certain language of Heidegger (1889/1976; Nazi-minded existential thinker), is called “das ganz andere zum Seienden” (the whole other compared to being). Insofar as one can understand Heidegger, with his profundities and poeticism, in doing so, it seems to boil down to this: within reality (‘das Sein’), -- yes, within the very being of that reality, a kind of negation is somehow at work, but a kind of active negation. Nothingness, in this sense, is then embodied by being itself.

Perhaps we, ordinary people, can understand this, when we remember that - in Heidegger’s initial thinking - ‘Dasein’ (= being human) is a ‘sein zum tode’: a being that gives out on death.

This, like the previous interpretations of “nothing”, strongly resembles frustration thinking, confronted with relative nothingness in the form of privation, deprivation of what ought to be. Whereupon Heidegger, who is working on the ‘Destruktion’, the dismantling, of the whole Western way of thinking (in Nietzsche’s wake), will say that we do not understand him correctly and are overly traditional in our interpretation.

Conclusion.-- The aforementioned thinkers, with their ‘nothing’, nowhere give examples that go beyond the traditional framework of ‘negative’ and ‘privative’ nothingness,-- even when they summarize the total sum of negative and privative nothingness, within being (reality), as Heidegger does, in the term ‘Nichts’, nothingness, as active negation within the very being of all that is. As summative induction (*ETM* 39; 47) not bad. But often too poetic and profound.

Note -- “Differenti(al)isme”,

Difference and gap thinking, opposite to ‘Assimilism’ (similarity and coherence thinking) and also to ‘Identivism’ (identitarian thinking; *ETM* 24v.; identitarian thinking thinks and difference and similarity as well as gap and coherence at the same time)

Bibl. st.: *Fr. Laruelle, Les philosophies de la différence (Introduction critique)*, (Philosophies of difference (Critical introduction)), Paris, 1986, 60ss. (*Le différence de Heidegger par rapport à l'idéalisme*), ((Heidegger's difference from idealism)), 121ss. (*Derrida entre Nietzsche et Heidegger*), ((Derrida between Nietzsche and Heidegger)).

There have been, since Nietzsche (1844/1900; philological thinker, incurably mentally ill since 1889), thinkers - M. Heidegger, Gilles Deleuze (1925/1995), Jacques Derrida (1930/2004); ‘grammatologist’ (emphasizing the written), who emphasizes ‘la déconstruction’ (the deconstruction) everywhere) - who invariably emphasize what differs and what separates. Which is as one-sided as invariably emphasizing similarity and coherence. This may explain why Heidegger defines nothingness as “the completely different compared to being. If only being is different. If only there is a gap.-- Perhaps one can speak of nihilism here, the tendency to emphasize the void, the nothingness, that is being (reality).

Bibl. st.: *Magazine littéraire* (Paris), No 279 (1990: juillet/ août), le nihilisme (Tourgeniev, Dostoievski,-- Schopenhauer, Wagner, Nietzsche, Heidegger,-- de Sade, Flaubert, Jarry, ‘Dada’, Céline, Dubuffet, Cioran, Jaccard, -- Rorty,-- Vattimo), is an issue devoted to (the actuality of) Nihilism, which “expounds on the active negation within reality” exercised especially by human beings, free beings.

For Nietzsche, Nihilism was the disease of European culture: individualism (egocentrism), atheism and what goes with it pessimism (spleen, Schwermut, dreariness) are its components. ‘Negative’ thinking, attached to disappointments, showing ‘the nothingness of life’.

c.-- *The pleasure and reality principle according to S. Freud* (1856/1939).

We saw just now how reality - “what is”; “being(s)” - disappoints. How some thinkers generalize their sampling of “nothingness” into a pessimism of nature and especially culture.

Let us now turn our attention to - what since 1955+ (the beginning of Postmodernity) has been called - ‘sex’. Here a Freud, with his new sexology, can serve as a guide for us.

(Our whole psychic apparatus (meaning our soul life) - according to Psychoanalysis - is governed by one big premise, namely the so-called ‘lustprinzip’ (lust principle): “Giving ourselves pleasure - experiences of lust - and avoiding experiences of lust”.

(Dina Dreyfus, *Freud (Psychanalyse: textes choisis)*, (Freud (Psychoanalysis: selected texts)), Paris, 1963, 172/175 (*Principe de plaisir et principe de réalité*), ((Principle of pleasure and principle of reality)). The fact, visible and tangible to all (*phenomenal; ETM 17*), that our behavior, at least for a large part, exhibits the seeking of lust and the avoidance of unpleasantness, proves - according to Freud - that there is a not immediately given presupposition at work in it, namely, the lust principle (*rational; ETM 18*). This governs us from our unconscious and subconscious layers.

An example.

Freud, in his *Die Zukunft einer Illusion*, (The future of an illusion,), London, 1948, himself explains.

“We spoke a moment ago of the hostility to civilization. This is caused by the pressure it exerts,--by the mortifications, which it demands of the instincts.

Suppose the counter-model: all prohibitions are lifted! Under this assumption, one could take possession of any woman in one’s taste; one could kill without hesitation one’s rival or whoever stands in one’s way; one could deprive one’s fellow man, without his consent, of any property.

How ‘clean’ such a thing would be! What series of satisfactions would, in that case, provide us with life!”. (*M. Bonaparte, trad., S. Freud, L’avenir d’une illusion*, Paris, 1976-4, 21).

Note -- ‘Hèdonè’, in Antique Greek, is ‘lust experience’. ‘Hedonism’ is that attitude of thought and life that places the experience of lust at its center. An Epikouros of Samos (Epicurus (-341/ 279; founder of Epicureanism), by Antique standards, advocated such a thing. Freud, consciously or unconsciously, seems to be presupposing that humans strongly presuppose hedonism.

Already *ETM 14 (preferred method)* points out that the proposition that man, in some selfishness, is attuned to pleasure, “rests on no established fact in our world” (Ch. S. Peirce). So that the “rationality” of such theory is questionable.

In any case, it is one-sided: there is also a clear thrust toward self-sacrifice at work in human behavior. But up to there.

Note -- It is noteworthy that Freud, in his lyrical description of a world without ethical standards and sanctions, takes a one-sided male point of view (“macho”; “phallocracy”). For example, how would women react in an unethical world? It appears to some present-day women that Freud “represses”, indeed “suppresses”, the female point of view: how often, after all, does the woman, resp. the mother appear in his works as “the object” (of desire,-- male desire then)?

(B)-- Our soul life, according to Freud, is also governed by what he calls “realitätsprinzip” (reality principle). Listening to the text.

“But, under the pressure of the great educator, which is necessity, it does not take long for the strains of the self to replace the principle of lust with a modification: the task which consists in shunning what provides unpleasantness, imposes itself as emphatically as that which favors lust. The I learns that it is necessary to abandon immediate gratification (...), to learn to bear some painful things (...)” (D. Dreyfus, o.c.,173).

An example.

Die Zukunft einer Illusion affirms: “But the first difficulty (*note*: on the road to an unbridled hedonism) can - in truth - quickly be discovered: my neighbor has precisely the same desires as I do and he will therefore not treat me with more reverence than I pay him.” (M. Bonaparte, o.c.,21).

Note -- Not conscientious (ethical), but purely social facts act as a corrective of unrestrained expression, in Freud’s reasoning. It is the “mimetic effect” emphasized by R. Girard that acts as a counterfactual:

- (i) I act self-centered-lustfully;
- (ii) that paragon sees my neighbor and he mimics (imitates) it;
- (iii) consequence: conflict of competing, unrestrained desires.

Note -- Here it is one of the possible places to mention a trait of attractiveness/obviousness of 'being' (= reality): 'resistance':

A. Destutt de Tracy (1754/1836), Maine de Biran (1766/ 1824) bring up this aspect of 'being'.

W. Dilthey (1833/1911; founder of the hermeneutic Geisteswissenschaft) discusses it in much greater detail.

Nicolai Hartmann (1882/1950) maintains that when we experience resistance - literally: collide with it - we immediately acquire certainty about the aspect of "existence" (*ETM 33: existence*) of any reality.

Max Scheler (1874/1928; axiologist) goes so far as to claim that "resistance" is reality itself.

Note.-- It is so clear that Freud, with his description of the 'reality principle, describes the 'resistance' in the form of that on which our lust needs collide (o.g. Freud's imitation principle). He calls this 'necessity': indeed, the self, with its lust desires, is literally 'compelled' to give up the immediate need gratifications and postpone them for (much) later.

(C).-- The soul life can now experience more than one way out.

(C).1. S. Freud himself gives one: "On a closer look: if the obstacles due to civilization fell away, only a single man could enjoy unlimited happiness,--a coercer, a dictator, who has monopolized all means of coercion." (M. Bonaparte, o.c., 21).

Opn.-- That then is the wishful thinking - phantasm - in its realized, accomplished, immediately lucky form.

(C). 2. A G. Bataille (*ETM 52*), however, who experiences that same life of lust as something unbearable (as if aiming at death), seems to adhere to the counter-model of Freud's primal leader: failed (at least gradually failed) wishful thinking, which remains fundamentally unrealized. With as form of reasoning: if absolutization (i.e. sticking to it through thick and thin) of the unbridled desire, then 'absolute' (utter) disappointment (frustration).

Which confronts us with the privative nothing: "It is but nothing in the actual world". According to the utopia of wishful thinking - which so often, according to Platon, appears in our deep night dreams - the (privative) nothing, is the sign of something that should have been there, but is not.

Sample 9.-- Being(s) as inviolable ('sacred'). (58/64)

This touches the premise of the so-called Ethical (moral) modalities (*ETM 43*: obligatory/not obligatory/not obligatory). The act of a free person e.g. can be obligatory, not obligatory or obligatory not.

Since a modern tradition, one expresses this in a systechy (pair of opposites) in German: 'Sein/ Sollen'. Translated: "what is/ what ought to be". What 'ought to be', what 'proper' is, is morally, in conscience, validly justified. What is improper is in conscience invalid, irresponsible. We will now deal with this ontologically.

We start from a statement by Max Scheler, the value phenomenologist. "To solicit, to assert, of a duty is, always already, an appeal which proceeds from a being and which addresses itself to a being which has will and has insights." (*A. Brunner, Die Grundfragen der Philosophie*, (The fundamental questions of philosophy), Freiburg, 1949-3, 78).

Scheler speaks as if an appeal takes place when we are confronted with 'his(the)' - always understand: 'reality' -- the following analysis can make this clearer.

Respect for reality as reality.

We saw (*ETM 33*) that 'being' is both factual being (existence) and being (essence), the mode of being, in one. -- This pair 'existence (fact) / essence (structure of a fact)' should be taken (interpreted) as it is. At least to begin with, namely when reality as given (= as real) enters our awareness (consciousness): afterwards the free human being reacts according to his individual presuppositions, of course.

We express this in phrases, of which we shall see further that they are the premise without question both of traditional logic and of mathematical logic (logistics), namely "all that is, is" and "all that is, is so".

A Positivist like Auguste Comte (1798/1857; *ETM 35*) taught every professional science to have "respect for the facts and their structure" A Hermeneutic thinker like Martin Heidegger (1889/1976; *ETM 15*) taught as many people as possible to "let being be itself." -- This fact (*ETM 17*) is phenomenal.

But what comes to light if we probe for the premise of this obvious fact - the basis of all scientific knowledge, for example? Rationally (*ETM 18*) we come up against an attitude of reverence that is active in us.

A reverence, which somewhere deep within our souls informs us of the true nature of all that is real.-- So much for the side of the subject -- ourselves.

But what comes -- rationally reasoning -- still exposed,-- this time from the side of the object? Something like an inviolability active in the given, the 'being(s)', reality itself.

All that is 'holy' (sacred, in itself) is immediately inviolable. All that is inviolable is at once, 'sacred'. One cannot, in substance, separate these two words.

In a term "taboo" borrowed from some Far Eastern primitives. To put it briefly and day-to-day: reality, as fact and as mode of being, commands an essential, minimal reverence, is - in itself reverent.

The counter model.

Supposedly: you are confronted with someone who denies the evidences themselves. It is then said: "to deny the sunlight". Because the sun is phenomenal, directly given, to everyone, it is unscrupulous to deny it,

Freudian: to either unconsciously repress or consciously suppress its readiness (evidentness).

Our Flemish folk say, "He/ she doesn't want to have known". Which indicates lack of 'conscience'.

Such people do violence to reality; they do not give it justice. They are guilty of lack of respect for the (obvious) reality. They do not let the respectful nature of real things come through.

The ontological honor.

Respect for the facts (Comte), letting being be what it is (Heidegger), -- therein consists the honor of an "honest" thinking person. Honesty is also presupposed in what we, from the subject, describe. An honest person places his (point of) honor on being able to handle reality. Even if it turns out to be 'negative' (*ETM 57*),--up to the radical frustration of our lust.

The disappointed person cannot avoid it: he/she is confronted with the sacredness of 'being'. The counter-model pointed out: whoever is guilty out of vanity - false sense of honor - is living through some kind of guilt somewhere deep. For he/she fell short. Was below the standard demanded. - Something that Paul Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, (Healing psychology and medicine), Neuchâtel, 1968, 133/151 (*La vanité*), strongly explained.

Digression.

The 'unreal' man.-- It is Hegel, among others, who spoke of 'wirklich/ unwirklich'.

Thus, in his 'dialectical' interpretation the French kingship, at the end of the XVIIIth century, had become 'unreal' and therefore 'irresponsible'. What "justified" the French Revolution. -- Thus we say of a head teacher, when he/she can no longer cope with his/her task, e.g. due to premature aging, that he/she has become 'unreal' and that staying on is no longer 'vernünftig' (reasonably justifiable) - would Hegel say.

If we go into this in more detail, we find that the pair of opposites "appearance/reality" is appropriate here. An apparent or false reality is not, or no longer is, the reality that can be confused with it. But as a 'sign' of it, it does refer to it in such a way that - if one is not careful - one confuses appearance with reality.

The vanity.

P. Diel, in the above-mentioned work, 133ss., deals somewhat with what we commonly call 'vanity'. He sees in it, unlike Freud e.g., the true essence of psychic deviations. But these deviations have an ontological scope. Let us consider.

a. *Objective and subjective vanity.*

(1).-- *The objective vanity.*

We have seen, in Hegel's wake, two examples of objective vanity just now. Something - an institution, a person - is 'vanity' to the extent that it is void, indeed non-existent, notwithstanding the appearance of the contrary. It is 'nothing' (*ETM 50: nihil negativum or, especially, privativum*), although it has the appearance of being 'something'.-- To foil something is to make it unreal. To make it come to nothing.

(2) *The subjective vanity.*

Vanity, self-righteousness, 'narcissism', arrogance, conceit, etc.-according to the psychologist Diel-are the observable phenomena (*ETM 17*) of what rational (*ETM 18*) must presuppose as its condition of possibility, namely, the fact that a person is vain.

He/she identifies, in that case, with an appearance, which does not correspond to the subjective, individual reality, but one does not want, in the process, to know it. One puts one's "honor" in appearing to be something one is not. Which amounts to false honor.

Which leads Diel to conclude that introspection or self-perception is

- a reflexive or looping form of perception - knows its great danger precisely in this. One looks beyond one's own, the vain sense of honor, reality, in order to dwell in a void view of oneself. In Platonic terms: 'para.frosune', delusional thinking which thinks in addition to reality, for reasons of unconscious repression and/or conscious suppression of it.

b.-- Neurosis and cynicism.

Always according to Diel, o.c., 163/166 (*la nervosité*), 162/163 (*la banalisation*) -- we denote in a Platonic sense. Platon, in more than one dialogue, classifies man's actual behavior into three types.

(i) The large sample.

Inertia (including in the forms of sleepiness and laziness), eating and drinking, sex, and enrichment-seeking together constitute "the great monster" in human behavior.

(ii) the lesser lion.

The lion continues as a "proud," honor-seeking animal. The lesser lion in our lives is our honor-seeking behavior.

(iii) The little person.

This is our behavior insofar as it springs from reality sense, called 'nous', intellectus, spirit (= reason, reason,--will and mind).

b.1.-- The neurotic/ neurotic.

In French one can say 'le nerveux' or 'la nerveuse'. Indeed, the behavior of the neurotic/neurotic shows great, insatiable nervousness of all kinds, which normal people do not have. He/she appears, according to Dielian analysis, to be so 'ashamed' (sensitive to honor) of the big monster above all that the whole life of the soul is spoiled by it: one simply doesn't dare to confess oneself as a 'big monster'. But somewhere one knows very well that one is a 'big monster' (even a big lion). Such is one's vanity.

One consequence: from the very beginning, the neurotic/ neurotic is embarrassed in front of his fellow human beings, who see through this somewhere. "What will they think of me?". Human respect - in French 'respect humain' - governs, in part, behavior.

b 2 -- The cynic/cynic.

According to Diel, the shameless lie ill in the same bed, but differently. - Inertia, the urge to eat and drink, sex, the urge for enrichment, and vanity (exaggerated sense of honor) - things that we - according to Platon - shamelessly live through in our deep night dreams - are clearly prioritized as life's purpose ('design'). Cynicism 'shamelessly' affirms itself as a 'great monster' and, above all, as a 'lesser lion',

against any sense of reality ('spirit'). Stricter expressed: and the big monster and, above all, the lesser lion

- (i) affirm their identity (that which they are),
- (ii) put this through
- (iii) Against every obstacle. "Let them think of me as they will."

"The cynical behavior - says Diel - consists in fooling the fellow man, while one - cunning as one is - circumvents the punishments emanating from e.g. a certain public opinion. (...). Succeeding to the outside world is the only goal in life (...)" (O.c.,163). List, yes, but - says Diel - also violence are 'means', which are justified by the absolutized goal.

Human regard is, in the deepest depths of the cynic(s) soul, absent. However, the cynic(s) does act as if he/she is acting from a human perspective.

By comparison: neurosis is a sign of hypersensitive honor, cynicism is a sign of honorlessness, regarding ethical values. The cynic is, however, very honour-sensitive regarding self-assertion -- assertive, eager to assert himself, to push through. He/she is, after all, vain.

b.3.-- Dandyism.

The 'dandy'-- since the XIXth century a cultural phenomenon -- is a mixture of neurosis (shame) and cynicism (freedom from shame). By clothing, aristocratic demeanor, the dandy hides his shame; by to the unscrupulous he/she pushes through. Such a thing is twice "unreal.

- a. behind the aristocratic appearance is a very non-aristocratic soul (nothing);
- b. Behind the shame-free behavior is the "nothingness" concerning conscience. The reverence for true reality as true reality has been weakened.

Right/ Injustice.

Bibl. s.: A. Brunner, S.J., *Die Grundfragen der Philosophie*, (The basic questions of philosophy), Freiburg, 1949-3, 271.—The author attempts, in a simple way, to make clear what "law" is.

Note -- Modernity and, at least as much Postmodernity (*ETM 39vv.*) stands or falls with the following 'rights'.

- i. "Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen" (27.08.1789; The French Revolutionaries).
- ii. "Déclaration des droits de la 'femme et de la citoyenne'" (1791; Olympe de Gouges).
- iii. International Declaration on Human Rights (10.12.1948; UNO). iv. Declaration on the Rights of the Child (20.11.1959; UNO).

According to Brunner, the basis is man's own form of being as a free being bound to the sanctity of "being(s). Man is supposed to live up to "the moral order". But man is dependent on his environment.

Consequence:

- a. human beings have an obligation to act conscientiously,
- b. but within some society (social character). .

Brunner: everyone must have at his disposal the means to achieve that high moral goal. With his destiny as an ethical being comes the claim to actually having the necessary or useful means at one's disposal. What is his "right" - this claim - becomes his "duty" with his fellow man. Every fellow human being is, in principle, obliged not to be a hindrance.

Conclusion.-- Every human being has well-defined inviolable, "sacred" rights, which legitimize the claim to what is necessary or useful.

Note.-- Morals/legal theory.

Some thinkers give the impression that conscientious action is merely a matter of social authorization: they make morality (ethics, moral philosophy) a part of legal theory (as if community were the basis of morals). No, "law" is one variant of "conscience. Therefore, real law is justified in conscience and enforceable in conscience.

Appl. model.

What was said a moment ago seems "theoretical. But look, Imagine: a teacher. This one is obliged to educate pupils, "if duty, then - with regard to fellow men - right". Insofar as a teacher has a duty to carry out his task, within society, she has the right to all the means (better: all the aspects) necessary for this purpose. For example, the elementary support of the parents. Think of the teacher's position of authority, much needed with respect to the pupils, who show far from a mere sense of being formed.

As an aside: The pleasure feeling contemplates, in the child's soul, several times in relation to the "Realitätsprinzip" (*ETM 56; Freud*).

Counter model.-- Misarchy (Nietzsche).

'Misarchy' (miso, I despise; archia, authority) is authority contempt. A phenomenon that is not so rare in our days of 'contestation'; on the contrary, many teachers suffer deeply from it.

More so in the eyes of:

(i) blinded people, who show lack of understanding of the need for an atmosphere of authority in the classroom, and

(ii) Anarchizing contemporaries (who adhere to an ideology) seem to make the teacher just about the only “human being” who has no rights, only duties. They undermine - subversively or not - the atmosphere. In doing so, they of course discredit the teacher, but fail to see that they immediately discredit the students, who also have a right to education. This, because as future adults in an evolved society they have present and future duties.

Conclusion.-- The sacredness of “being(s),” reality, is not a merely theoretical matter. Every moment of our lives, we live in reality,--not in appearances or nothingness.

Desacralization (desecration).

The cynical bias of e.g. the Antique Protosofism (-450/-350; a nihilizing cultural movement in the Greek world), of e.g. the Modern enlightened rationalism (*ETM 40*; “*die zynische Vernunft*”) have had as a result that the eye for the inviolable or ‘holy’ character of all that is, in its existence (factuality) and its essence (way of being), has ebbed away. In this climate, a healthy ontology, which still plucks up the courage to discuss the inviolable in all that is, is a necessity against this atmosphere of time.

Note.-- Many a modern thinker confuses “secularization” (secularization) with desecularization.

In the strict sense, “secularization” is the fact that what was previously the property or privilege of one clergyman or another - think of the Jewish rabbis and scribes, of the Christian clergy (who, in the course of the Middle Ages, piled up law after law, privilege after privilege), of the Islamic “ayatollahs” (with their enormous spiritual position) - is transferred to “laymen. Which amounts to laicization.

Idealization, then, is first and foremost a social event.-- We are not, however, talking here about re-socialization, but about the sacredness of reality as reality.

If ever laicization was “lawful,” it was because/ because some clergy committed injustice - infringing on the inviolable right of the other members of the society they led.

Sample 10.-- Ontological judgments are transcendental judgments. (65/ 71)

We are in the process of “founding” the theory of thought and the theory of method, as already stated, *ETM* 28.

The second point therein is the theory of judgment. After the theory concerning concepts, after all, classical logic develops a theory concerning judgment (statement, ‘proposition’, sentence).

1.--- General theory of judgment.

Ch. Lahr, Logique, 501, says: “The judgment part consists in affirming something of something - “kategoroin ti tinos” (in Aristotelian language) - When we say “It is a hot summer”, we discover, according to, Lahr, two or more concepts - here: ‘summer’ and ‘hot’ - and a statement around it. That about which something is asserted is the subject (subject) and that which is asserted about it is the predicate (predicate). -- Thus always Lahr.

In the indicated sentence, “It” is the tentative subject, anticipating “summer.

Platon.-- Bibl. st:

-- A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 127f.;

-- J.B. Rieffert, *Logik (Eine Kritik an der Geschichte ihrer Idee)*, (Logic (A Critique of the History of its Idea), in: M. Dessoir, Hrsg., *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, II (*Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*), (Philosophy in its individual fields), Berlin, 1925, 27.

Already Platon had come to the conclusion that all thinking proceeds in such a way that:

(i) of a subject - ‘onoma’ (literally; name), nomen

(ii) a proverb is asserted, where the proverb is called ‘rhèma’, verbum.

(1) If the saying fits the subject, then this is an affirmative sentence;

(2) if it does not fit in, then this is a negative sentence.

All full thinking is, therefore, judging.

Note -- O. Willmann, Abriss, 52ff. (*Die einfachen Denkformen: Begriff, und Urteil*), (The simple forms of thought: Concept, and judgment), 72ff. (*Urteilklassen*), 80ff. (*Das Urteil als Form des diskursiven Denkens*), (Judgment as a form of discursive thought), makes it clear, in all of this, that Platon, when he claims that all thought is judgment, is talking about purely discursive thought, in which, intuitive thought is paramount.

Intuitive (‘contemplative’ in the intellectual sense) our thinking is when it grasps concepts. Discursive it is, when it articulates concepts among themselves, in a ‘discursus’, literally: ‘exposition’. It is for this reason that, in traditional logic, the concepts, as intuitions, come first.

The proposition.

As concepts are expressed in terms, so are judgment and ‘sentence’ (statement, ‘proposition’): the judgment sentence (proper translation of ‘proposition’) is the articulation in language of a judgment. The articulated judgment consists of at least two ‘terms’ (*ETM* 29) and a statement (‘proposition’) concerning their relation.

Id.

Cfr. *ETM* 24v., where some examples can already be found on p. 25. A judgment expresses either a total or tautological identity or a partial or analogical identity.

a.-- Total identity.

Consider “a is a” (logistic: “if a, then a”). The first ‘a’ is subject (original); the second ‘a’ is proverb (model). The ‘relation’ here is reflexive (= loopy): a is compared to itself and forces the decision - judgment - that “a is a”.

Note.-- To this equates a creature definition. “Man is a living being gifted with spirit” defines (describes the creature form of) man. Notice the reversibility: “A living being gifted with spirit is a human being”.

b.-- Partial identity.

Let us now take an analogical judgment: ‘Jan comes home in a moment’. Subject ‘John’ (original); saying ‘just came home’ (model). From the unknown ‘John’ we get a representation (= information) via the known ‘just came home’.

Here there is no reversibility as in the tautological or definitional judgments. So don’t say “What comes home this minute is John,” because there are many people, who, at any given time, “come home this minute”! -- This regarding the affirmative judgments, of course.

Note.-- As *O. Willmann, Abriss der Phil.*, Wien, 1959-5, 59, says: the Antique Greeks distinguished between “logos apofantikos”, assertion (in the sense of establishing, descriptive assertion), and “logos sèmantikos”: more than establishing sense.

A prayer, a command, a wish, etc. are “semantic” statements (“semantic” in the Antique Greek sense, then).

The judgment is an interpretation (interpretation).

P. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations (Essais herméneutiques), (The conflict of interpretations (Hermeneutic essays),), Paris, 1969, 8, emphasizes that Aristotle regards judgment as ‘hermeneia’, interpretatio, interpretation (meaning). “Dans la mesure même ou (le jugement) dit quelque chose de quelque chose” (to the extent that the judgment claims something about something). The title of the doctrine of judgment: ‘peri hermeneias’, on interpretation (de interpretatione).-- What is its premise?

The model-theoretic nature of judgment.

The task: to identify something (a given), i.e. to determine its (total or partial) identity. The something one identifies is the unknown or original. It functions as the subject of the judgment sentence.

To identify it, one uses known data (information) or models. These function in a sentence as sayings.

Appl. model.-- “That mountain over there, in the Alps, is over four thousand feet high”. The unknown, when one wants to provide information, is “that mountain over there, in the Alps”. The model, the known, is the measurement model -- here the meter --. To specify that mountain, in its identity, I then say “is more than four thousand meters high”. In other words: I speak about the subject in terms of the saying. But such a thing is interpreting, interpreting. Aristotle saw correctly.

The comparative nature of judgment.

The interpretive nature of judgment is even more evident when one recognizes that the judgmental person - unconsciously (usually) or consciously - employs the comparative or comparative method. Cfr. *Ch. Lahr, Logique, 226s. (Le jugement et la comparaison)*.

(1).-- All thinkers...

admit that part of the judgments, i.e. the thoughtful ones, arise due to comparison. In particular: the original is compared with the model and one decides on identity (affirmative) or non-identity (negative).

(2).-- Not all thinkers ...

agree that even the unthinking (spontaneous) judgments, in unspoken ways, put comparison first.

a.-- Thomas Reid (1710/1796; top figure of the Antirationalist Commonsense philosophy),-- Victor Cousin (1792/1867; Eclectic thinker) among others, claim that the unthinking judgments only allow a comparison of concepts in retrospect.

Phrases like “I exist”: “I suffer”:-- “It is cold”: “The snow is white” etc. arise before the one who thinks or utters them is “reasoning”. Something like this in the sense of “I, compared ‘with ‘existence: entails that I exist”. Or: The weather, compared ‘with ‘cold’, implies that “it is cold”.

Here one identifies explicit reasoning comparison with all comparison, including non-explicit, intuitive comparison without discursive reasoning.

b.-- Aristotle and a host of ancient thinkers,
 -- *Antoine Arnauld* (le Grand; 1612/1694) and *Pierre Nicole* (1625/1695), the drafters of *Logique ou Art de Penser* (Logic or Art of Thinking), (1562; a work in the spirit of R. Descartes),
 -- John Locke (1632/1704; founder of the English Enlightenment (*ETM* 40, 41)),
 -- Paul Janet (1823/1899; Spiritualist sage,
 they all claim that unconsidered judgments too are comparatively founded. Says Locke: “A judgment is the sensation of a relation either of fitting together or of not - fitting together

Note:-- Affirming or denying judgments - of two ‘ideas’ (contents of consciousness), already observed and compared with each other.”

Note:-- Everything stands or falls with the distinction, without separateness, of intuitive and discursive comparison, of ‘reason’ and ‘reason’.

Quantity (scope) of judgments.

Now reread *ETM* 30 (*comprehension, scope*).-- Starting point is the subject.

a. It is e.g. transcendental.-- “Being is both existence and essence” (*ETM* 31: *the transcendentals as the subject of a sentence; 33v.*).

b. The topic may be categorical.

i. “Just one bird was observed” (singular, individual, single).

ii. Some birds exhibit a period of migration” (private).

iii. “All birds by definition have wings” (universal, general).

Quality (content) of judgments.

As already mentioned, there are either affirmative or negative judgments, concerning total or partial identity.

Appl. model.-- *J.H. Walgrave, Is Christianity a humanism?*, in: *Cultural Life* 1974: 2 (Feb.), 147/156.

Three answers are possible to that question - according to the proposer - logically speaking.

(1) Christianity is a humanism.-- Which means, “All Christianity is ...” Affirmative and universal.

(2) Christianity is not a humanism. Denialist and universalist.

(3) Christianity is, in one sense, well, in another sense, not a humanism. Partly denying partly affirming and universal.

In Walgrave’s language: a ‘saying’ (= judgment) can:

1. Affirmative (affirmative),

2. Negative (negative) or

3. Being Restrictive (subject to change).

Note: Both subject and saying are susceptible to more than one interpretation. Thus the Secularist or Desacralizing interpretation of Christianity will answer in the affirmative, the Sacralist interpretation will tend to negation.

II.--- *Ontological theory of judgment.*

We “found” logic and its applications. In it, what are called the laws of being or reality play the role of presuppositions of an all-encompassing or transcendental nature.

Already *Parmenides* (*ETM 08, 11, 28*), the Eleate, in his *Doctrinal Poem* (= didactic poetry), 8/16, mentions the second ontological law of the di.lemma (logical dichotomy): “(It) is or it is not” (to understand: there is no third possibility). What was later denoted as contradiction or contradiction principle.

Parmenides captured early on that reality is governed by lawful axiomata (presuppositions), which are so universal, i.e., universally valid, that all statements presuppose them.

II. 1.-- *The identity or single-issue law.*

‘Singularity’ is identity (think ‘singularity map’), where ‘singularity’ means that something coincides with itself, whole and all.

A.-- *The content.*

Even logicians and logisticians, who deny (misconstrue) any precedence of ontology, still accept its traditional principle. -- “Being(s) is(are)”. Or still: “What (is) is (is)”.

Cfr ETM 58.-- Platon, in his dialogue *Sophistès* 254d, puts into the mouth of the stranger “Auto d’ heautoi tauton”. Which means so much as “every thing, insofar as it is compared (confronted) with itself, is the same (identical)”.

More recently, with G. Jacobi, one can say, “Every reality (‘being(de)’, is with itself totally identical, i.e. coincides with itself completely.” Which designates the essence form (*ETM 31*), i.e., that by which something is distinguishable (discrimineable) from the rest,--while it is not distinguishable from itself. Something is, after all, itself and not something else.

Note -- Worded as a tautology, it sounds “A is A”. -- Mathematically expressed: “A is equivalent to (= equivalent to) A”.

Counter-model: imagine that - per absurdum (in an incongruous assumption) - ‘A’ could nevertheless, in some insidious way, be non-A, then the logician, logistician, mathematician can no longer formulate any notion, pass any judgment! For a state has been created, where everything can be something other than itself, at any time. Nothing possesses an unadulterated identity anymore.- Which is absurd, incongruous.

B.-- *The scope.*

The subject of the identity law is “being(s), what is”. Well, that is transcendental (all-encompassing). Every categorical subject - whatever - is an application of it. If I say, “A fact is a fact” (in the spirit of A. Comte b. v.), that very statement is one application.

II. 2.-- *The law of incongruity or contradiction.*

We have met the consistency principle just now (*ETM 69*) at Parmenides.-- “What is (so) cannot (impossibility as a modality) be at the same time (and under the same point of view) not (so).” Or “Being(s) and non-being(s) cannot be simultaneously affirmed”.

Note.-- In order to understand this basic statement properly, one should dwell for a moment on the negation (negation).

D. Mercier, Logique, Louvain / Paris, 1922-7, 107s., summarizes this as follows.

a. *Negative denial.*

Cfr. *ETM 50 (nihil negativum)*.-- Three types.

i. Contradictory negation:

“white/non-white”,: “lawful/unjustified” e.g. -- The absolute form of this: “being(the)/not being(the)”. Opposed to real as real is radical unreal, absolute “nothing”. -- It is this form of negation that is at work in the principle of contradiction.--

ii. Contrary negation:

“white/non-white”: but now as the extremes of a set of colors, classified according to the complement (dichotomy) “white/red” (“White is not red” e.g.).

iii. Correlative negation:

“mother/ daughter” (“The mother is not the daughter”, although without a mother there is no daughter).

b. *Privileged denial.*

Cfr. *ETM 50 (nihil privativum)*.-- “That lady does not see” (normally she does see, but she is ‘deprived’ of something she ought to have).

So much for a brief typology of negates.

The contradiction principle is the primal dilemma: all dilemmas are but precisely one application of this all-embracing principle. Reason: being(s) is absolute; beyond it there is absolutely nothing.

Note -- Beware of stylistic devices. -- “This wall is white and not white” means, practically, that, years after it has been whitewashed, its original white color has become ‘debatable’ and is therefore ‘white’ in an impure degree. Nothing more. Such statements go perfectly with the principle of contradiction. They are a ‘saying’, namely the restrictive one (*ETM 68*).

II.3.-- *The law of excluded third party.*

This law is, fundamentally, a precision of the second law.-- “Either something is (so) or it is not (so)”. In Latin “aut” (not “vel”): “Est, aut non est” (It is or it is not (understood: there is no third possibility). The subject “(so) are(de)”, - the original, is separated from its (so-called) (counter) model by an utter (absolute) disjunction (separation, gap). And in such a way that no exchange model is available. -- Daily: it is something or it is nothing, but understood as “absolute nothing”.

The law of being and the sacred.

Reread *ETM 58 (his(her) as sacred)*.-- We hereby stand for the presupposition of a logical ethic (morality).

a. *The model.*

Reality as reality, as evidently ‘there’, speaks to us as if it were some ‘high’ authority (= authority). She speaks to us, in the process, in our conscience. She lays claim to reverence for what is real and, immediately, to our honesty: “Be so honest with the given and with yourself as a conscientious being that you confess “what is, that is,” “what is so, is so.” “What is not so, is not so”. Etc.

What is (so) is inviolable as a given: it can be denied, denied, (lack of reverence and honesty), but it must not be denied. And violated. Desecrated. We face a fundamental taboo.

Note.-- ETM 11 (doctrine of deity) taught us that, since Parmenides, all that is his(de) is something divine. Aristotle also sees this: for him ontology (first philosophy) is ‘theologikè’, a theological science.

In the phenomena (*ETM 17*), i.e. in the immediately given things, something comes through of an absolute seriousness, with which one never plays. Yet this is something transempirical (*ETM 17*).

In its rational processing (*ETM 18*) something comes through that is transrational (*ETM 18*). Our thinking is mastered, if it is conscientious and not ‘unreal’ (*ETM 60*), i.e. estranged from reality, by ‘parafrosunè’, repression and suppression, by something that transcends our thinking (‘transcends: ‘transcends is also said).

b. *The counter model.*

Not wanting to “know” this. -- See *ETM 54: nihilism*. See also *ETM 60: vanity*. -- We note that not every human being respects the laws of being.

Sample 11.-- Harmology (theory of order) (72/76)

As stated above, we “establish” (“foundation”), i.e. lay the foundations, of the doctrine of thought and method.

1. The first premise...

is the theory of being (metaphysics, ontology,--not without reason, by Aristotle, called ‘first philosophy’ (*ETM 10*)). We have given the essence of it, namely the basic concepts and basic judgements, which logic and the teaching of methods also use. With ‘being’, i.e. reality (‘not-nothing’), we take root in the testable, i.e. all that can be found and, immediately, found. Cfr. *ETM 10*. Logic and methodology do not, after all, hang out in the rarefied and merely informal.

2. The second premise...

The term ‘harmology’ is related to the Antique Greek ‘harmonia’, literally interlocking, fitting together. We have made it ‘harmony’, i.e. the beautiful and exalted form of fitting together. Not surprisingly: the Paleopythagoreans - *ETM 03* - (-550/-300), in their musical attitude, sensed the world and life as ‘cosmos’, all that adorns, ornaments,-- beauty.

Since then, “harmony” in the sense of “union that founds beauty,” has become an integral part of many Greek philosophies and functioned as an ideal when sculpting, painting or erecting buildings. The Greek plastic arts attest to an (un)conscious theory of order.

Note.-- Note that what so-called “Modern” mathematics calls “order(relation)” is only one aspect of the Antique Greek concept, order(ning): namely, the relationships between the elements within a set (= equivalence relationship). Think of the relationship between “just one/some/all”.

The identity of philosophical ordering.

Called “identitive” all that is interested in either total identity (reflexive or looping relation of something to itself) or partial identity (analogy, partial identity) or the negation of both. Cfr. *ETM 25, 66*. We can express this in the form of a range (gamma, differential: totalidentical - partialidentical (analogical) - totally different (= totally non-identical).

Which is expressed e.g. in the “logical square”: all - some do - some don’t - all don’t (none).

It is abundantly clear that the comparative or comparative (= confrontational) method - *ETM 67* - is at work here: how else would one see similarities and correlations (= connections)? Note: do not confuse 'compare' with 'equate'. In more than one instance one uses the term 'compare' in the assimilationist sense, i.e. equate. Here it is used in the sense of:

- (i) more than one given ('are(the))
- (ii) 'confront' each other to see what connections are provable and findable.

Relation.

Some logicians and logicians claim that classical logic has no regard for relations. What precedes must have long since cured the reader(s) of that fundamental error. Revisit, under that viewpoint, *ETM 20/27 (topology)*, especially *ETM 26 ('being(the) as not many- or one-sided, but identitive)*.

Constantly, in previous ontology, we have involved, i.e. compared, confronted data with each other in view of connections, i.e. relations.-- This we have said once and for all.

Note.-- That the classical Greeks had a fine eye for relations is evident e.g. from *ETM 36* and following (the categories, under which the relation is explicitly mentioned; the *systechies*, which constantly play a role (*ETM 37*)).

Conclusion.

The ontologically based harmology is, in fact, a relational science.

Bibl. s.:

-- Descamps, *La science de l'ordre (Essai d'harmologie)*, (The science of order (Harmology essay)), in: *Revue Néoscholastique*, 1898, 30ss.;

-- Franz Schmidt, *Ordnungslehre*, (Order theory), Munich/ Basel, 1956.

Schmidt, o.c., 11., says: "The entire metaphysics (ontology) of the West - from Platon of Athens (-427/-347) to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844/1900) - can be seen as a science of order.

Consequence: every metaphysical system occurs as one of the many ways in which one can imagine order(s).

Which only confirms what already, in the XIII century, pinnacle of Church or Scholastic thought, S.Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274) says: "Sapientis est ordinare" (It is the philosopher's own to order).

Which but repeats what *S.Augustine* (354/430; top figure of Patristics) says with his treatise *De Ordine*, On Order.

Not only ontology, basis of thought and methodology, -- also logic and methodology are orders.

Josiah Royce (1855/1916; idealistic thinker), in his *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1912-1 (1960), 9, says that logic is a normative - prescriptive - science of order. He makes every effort to show that the traditional, 'formal' (= concerning the form of beings) logic is only a part of 'the science of order'.

Note .-- *Our psyche (soul life) and ordering.*

People who deal with madmen - psychic madmen, in whatever form - and/or with possessed people, soon discover that it is the organizing mind (understand: intellect (intuitive) and reason (discursive), mind (feeling values), will (choosing values)) that lapses in paraphrosunè, thinking alongside, with such beings -- which, according to Platon, we do especially during the night dream and, by day, in crime. Cfr. *ETM 61*. -- Let us consider, briefly, a few articles on the subject.

1.-- *R. Declerck, Dr Olga Quadens, This is how you should be able to work*, in: *Eos* (Techn. for Man), 12(1984: Nov., 119.

Human consciousness and sleep - especially some phases very similar to waking states (rem sleep) - are related. Note: rem = Rapid Eyes Movement.

The following happens: out of 'noise' (i.e. disturbing disorder) our brain system - instrument of our mind - creates, like a self-ordering system, order. In the disorder of our perceptions, namely, our brain creates order. It thus shows, phenomenally (*ETM 17*), that in this order-establishing activity a presupposition is at work (rational; *ETM 18*), namely, the mind as a self and what it perceives, organizing system.

Curious observation: Ulf Merbold, a test subject, showed, during the first two months of his stay in space, "at a state of zero gravity", a strong increase in braking activities. Thus O. Quadens in the Q&A, a.c.,119.

Says Dr. Quadens, who often worked with astronauts in the preparation phase: "Biochemists (*note*: chemists who study life phenomena) see the workings of the brain too much as a biochemical whole.--We see the brain, admittedly, as a biochemical structure within which information circulates. But there is much more: the observations, which man acquires during the day, are arranged and ordered in this skeleton (*op.*: frame of mind) during rem sleep. (*Ibid.*).

2.-- Liesbet Van Doorne, *Schizophrenia can be cured in many cases*, in: *De Nieuwe Gids* (Ghent), 07.12.1984.

Here we are in full psychiatry (care of the soul and mentally ill).-- It is about a study day, in Kortenberg, of domestic and foreign experts. Observations:

i. Schizophrenia - term denoting split personality - e.g., a person imagining that he/she is Napoleon; the schizophrenic/ schizophrenic is himself/herself and at the same time, in a crisscrossing way, someone else; in both diagnosis and treatment, too many unknown factors ("elements"; *ETM 01*) are still at work;

ii. Schizophrenia is defined, by the experts, as "the disease in which one isolates oneself from reality." - Compare with what we, in Platonic mind, have called 'para.frosunè', delusional thinking ("*thinking beside it*"; *ETM 60*: the unreal man).

As *an aside*, in traditional-psychiatric terms, 'psychosis' (soul disease) is distinguishable from 'psychopathy' (one trait disturbs, usually, behavior) as well as from 'neurosis' (nervous disease).

Writes Van Doorne: "(Schizophrenia) is a psychosis that arises because one wants to create order in the disorder of his life. One can no longer participate in "the order of life" in which one is in, and one adapts one's own order.

Perhaps this explains the fact that schizophrenia occurs, in the main, in young people from the age of sixteen: it is then that many demands are made on the person. One has to define a career, build relationships. The relationship with the familiar family is going to change. All this gives rise to confusion and tension.

The disease manifests itself (...) because the young person isolates himself and, for example, can no longer keep up at school. Or those who are already at work can no longer meet the requirements there.

In the attempt to create order in one's own life - which therefore no longer conforms to the order of life around it - thinking is disturbed and one enters psychosis.

Expressions of schizophrenia include delusions ("I get irradiated when the radio plays"), hallucinations ("One hears voices"), and stress (*note*: overload (sense)).

One left the contact with the environment. The emotional life becomes blunted. There is a loss of initiative. One withdraws into one's own 'inner world'. This results in mutism (not speaking) and a deviant body motor system - either a total lack of movement or an exaggerated and frequent repetition of a certain movement.

Note -- (1) Those who deal with possessed people discover precisely the same phenomena. This explains, perhaps, why the experts say that there are "too many unknown factors" at work. And this refers us to *ETM 18* (trans-empirical/ trans-rational aspect, i.e. one or another person or group of persons, in the unseen, traverses the mind).

(2) In existential terms: the schizophrenic/ schizophrenic is thrown, situated, against his will, in an actual order, which says to him 'nothing' (*ETM 50: the purely negative and especially the frustrating privative 'nothing'*; *ETM 57 (resistance)*); well on the contrary; he/she then designs, as best he/she can, an order of his own, situates himself in his way. Cfr. *ETM 37 (situs/ habitus)*.

This is all the more true since we have found ourselves since + 1855 in the Postmodern multiplicity, indeed, sometimes contradictory multiplicity ('pluralism') of multiculture (culturality; *ETM 41*) and its many confusions.

Decision.-- From what precedes, it is abundantly clear that a theory of order or harmology is more than a mere "intellectual" occupation, good for specialists in logic or method theory.

Now, when we design such a theory of order, based on Primitive, Antique, Middle Ages (Scholastic), Modern or Postmodern data, we should know that in addition to scientificity (*ETM 15: Peirce's 'scientific method'*, which attunes to "what is real"), we are also editing mental health.

One knows that the Paleopythagoreans, perhaps more and with more insistence than the other Ancient Greeks, were fond of order/order. Their sense of the numerical and spatial mathematical side of reality -- they founded arithmetic and geometry -- was accompanied by a philosophical concern for health,-- *sofrosunè*, soul-health (*ETM 06*). Did they already have the connection between clear thinking and psychic health so clearly in mind? In any case: we know what is at stake with an order doctrine.

Sample 12. -- Harmology: relationship theory. (77/79)

Beginning, we but immediately with an example.

Ch., S Peirce (*ETM 12*), one of the great founders of the logistics of relations, designed, in imagination, a “closed system”, each member of which is either a teacher or a student. However, in such a way that no one can be both at the same time.

The relation “teacher/teacher” he labeled “colleague. The relation “pupil/student” he called ‘fellow pupil’.-- The relation “teacher/student” was called ‘pupil’. And the relation “pupil/teacher” was called “teacher. The latter comes across as ‘invented’, but we take it as “termini technicians” (technical terms).

In order to facilitate the move to logistics, which is the mathematical (= mathematical) logic, Peirce introduced letters - abbreviation symbols - instead of the terms ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ etc. In order to be able to calculate logically with them. In other words, to be able to implement a ‘calculus’.

G. Jacoby, Die Ansprüche der Logistiker, 53/55, argues first that the phenomenon (*ETM 17*; // 55, 58, 60, 71, 74) of “mathematical logic” - rationally speaking (*ETM 18*) has as its premise - willy-nilly - identity (*ETM 25*), the core of traditional ontology.

Note -- For those already too unfamiliar with logistics, the following remains.

Erwin Schroder (1841/1902; his *Algebra der Logik* (1890/1895) is a founding work) and, even more clearly, Ch.S. Peirce are the founders.

In passing, we note some possible symbols.-- Some note for “relation between a and b” ‘aRb’ (‘R’ = relation); others write ‘r ab’ (read “the relation ‘r’ between ‘a’ and ‘b’); still others express the same in ‘B(a,b)’ (read “the relation ‘B’ between ‘a’ and b”).

To generalize, one then takes terms like ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, etc., such that one can say “For all cases (instances) of ‘x’, it is true that ...”. Let us now consider some types of relations.

1.-- The reflexive (looping) relation.

Logicians express themselves as follows: “the relation of something - e.g. ‘a’ - to itself”.

In ontology one says exactly the same but differently “something coincides (totally) with itself”. The term “relation”-compared to everyday language-is employed metaphorically (*ETM 20*) in logistic language, in the sense that a relation in everyday language presupposes more than one term, whereas the total identity of something with itself, of course, represents only one term. The loop form is the symbol of this. In technical language ‘reflexivity’.

Note -- Something of this is found in the reciprocal verbs: “I look at myself,” “I see myself standing there already,” etc.

2.-- The non-reflexive (non-reciprocal) relations.

We take some samples.

a.-- The reciprocal (symmetrical) relation.

One does not confuse “reciprocal” with “mutual” (as in the responses to New Year’s greetings). The relation of both sides is reciprocated by the other.

Example-- ‘Mutual marital fraud’ - a familiar term; -- ‘by mutual consent’. -- Still: “proceeding from both sides”; “word and counterword” (as in a slamming argument);-- in natural science “work and counterwork” (= action and reaction), if from both sides.

Note -- It should not be thought that this remains a mere theory of life and worldliness.-- One knows terms like “Marriage Encounter”. In a certain philosophy, far from the world of natural sciences, as e.g. in the works of *Fred. J. Buytendijk* (1887/1974; Dutch physiologist and psychologist; known among other things for his beautiful work ‘*The women*’), one concept is central, namely the encounter, i.e. the mutual acquaintance of more than one person which takes place at a deeper level over time. If, in a ‘meeting group’, a gesture, a word, receives no response, there is no real meeting. - The same is true in a marriage relationship. An unrequited love lacks precisely the ‘symmetry’. The ‘each other’ is not there (*ETM 50: nihil privativum*; “It is with true love nothing”).

b.-- The transitive (transitive) relation.

Between two or more terms of the relation there is at least one intermediate term.-- In mathematics: the relation of a over b to c.

In everyday life: “The friends of my friends are also my, friends”. More subtle example: “She married him for the reason of his possession” (she - through him - possesses).

c. -- The clarity relationship.

The essence here is ‘addition’ (= one-syllable relation).-- E.g. “My girlfriend and I”. On both sides of the relation there is just one term. -- in this case: I and my girlfriend.- - The one-syllable relation becomes ambiguous in two ways: ‘one-syllable’ and ‘many-syllable’.

Just one teacher, on the one hand, a multitude of pupils, on the other.-- Many Nazis, on the one hand, one Fuhrer (Leader), on the other.

Note.-- One can dwell on the number of terms involved: dyadic (twofold) is a relation, if it includes two terms; triadic (threefold), if there are three. one says: ‘n-adic: if it involves ‘n’ terms.

E.g., “I give you this booklet” (I/you/booklet).

An application.

The clarity relationships play a fundamental role in interpreting or making sense of things.--One may recall that King Baudouin of Belgium, for conservative Catholic reasons, did not want to sign the law voted by Parliament on abortion.

For days and weeks Belgians (not to mention foreigners) interpreted the same fact in more than one sentence. This indicates a “one-sentence relationship”.

Sociometrics.

Jakob Levi Moreno (1889/1974) is the founder of psychodrama - reserved for doctors. In it, the actors allow psychological (and, perhaps, physical) ailments (including conflicts) to permeate the group. This, thanks to a stage play eg.

Normally this becomes a - what the Ancient Greeks called - ‘catharsis’, purificatio, cleansing process, purification process. Also: ‘growth process’.

In such a growth group one pays attention first of all to the relations. On the reflexive (what the participants think about themselves),-- on the reciprocal (action and reaction, on which there is another action),-- on the transitive (“Would you introduce me to her?”). It becomes an analysis of communication and interaction.-- The scientific approach to such a society-in-the-small is called ‘sociometry’.

General Conclusion.

The theory is “arid. But life is ‘juicy’. -- When we get into relations -- if they are lasting, relations grow into ‘relations’ -- then this can be rationally examined in the theory of relations. The opaque life ‘anankè’ called by Platon - becomes more transparent through it.

Sample 13.-- Harmology: relations, logistically speaking. (80/89).

As already said: ‘logistics’ is mathematical logic.-- Before we continue with the actual philosophical harmology, we dwell, very briefly, on the connections - connectives, ‘functors’, ‘modifiers’, -- joint signs -, which are as many relations, as they have become, in recent logistics (logistics did not actually get off the ground until the middle of the XIXth century), commonplace. Not that precise knowledge of them is necessary to think correctly. But they are a most welcome clarification of ancient intuitions.

1.-- The encompassment (implication).

On the face of it, the fact that “something, contains something,” is a matter of whole (total) or partial identity.

E.g., “Something involves (‘implies’) totally itself” (= total-identical implication). -- “Something partly (does, partly does not; *ETM 68: restrictive relation*) entails something else” (= part-identical entailment).-- “Something (utterly) does not entail something else” (= negated entailment) .

Now reread *ETM 68* regarding the “quality” (content) of a judgment: the content, in its three basic types, is the secret premise.

With this, the identitive basis is abundantly clear. For either total or partial identity is declared or it is denied (the negate). She is invariably the stake.

As an aside: why an Aristotle called ontology the ‘first’ philosophy, apparently now even more strongly than ever. It is, after all, the doctrine concerning the ‘archai’, principia, presuppositions,-of an all-embracing nature, i.e. always, no matter what, at work.

“Own to, inherent to,

We look at the encompassment in reverse.

(1) “Something encompasses (totally, partially, or (totally) not) something”.

(2) “It is proper for (inherent in) the second something to be the first something (total, partial or (total) not).”

Take a concrete (*categorical; ETM 36*) example.

“If it rains, this includes (= in part) that the sprinkled things become wet”. -- “It is inherent (in part) in (sprinkling) things, if it rains, that they become wet”. One says precisely the same thing, but the saying (model) of the first judgment becomes the subject (original) of the first.

Conclusion.-- “Own (inherent) to,” is actually encompassing.

Semiotic.

Since Ch. S. Peirce (*ETM 12*) and a.o. *Ch. Morris* (1901/1971; *Foundation of the Theory of Signs* (1938)) the theory concerning the sign ('theory of signs') has been called 'semiotics' (where others, following Ferd. de Saussure (1857/1913), use the term 'semiology').

Long before the theory of signs, signs were used in praxis - e.g. in mathematics. As soon as logic became a 'calculus' it went the same way: it introduced (abbreviated) signs. -- to be able to calculate with them.

Application.

(a) *The implicator '.*

(in Peano's pasigraph) or, especially, '--->' - An inference (consequence, 'inference', implication, entailment) is then 'drawn' as follows: "p). q" or "p --> q". Which is an implication. In the sign system of J. Lukasiewicz (1878/1956; Polish thinker and logician) one writes 'Cpq' (in colloquial language: "if p, then q"). Which means that p implies (involves) q. Or that q is proper (inherent) in p.

(b) *The bi-implicator*

(*ETM harm 78* (a reciprocal relationship -- or symmetry) "p <====> q" or still "p ≡≡ q" (in Peano's pasigraphy: "p).(q)" expresses -- what is called "equivalence" (equivalence, evenness).-- In colloquial language: "if p, then q and vice versa" (q is proper to p and vice versa, or "if and only if p, then q").

Appl. model.

J. Royce, Principles of Logic, New York, 1961, combines (pairs) the terms 'singing' and 'dancing' to "Singing and dancing, involves dancing" (*note* : it is meant here purely 'combinatorially'). In other words, "Singing and dancing includes dancing". If we introduce the characters 'x' and 'y', it becomes: "xy (the logistic product) --> y" (in Peano's language: "xy). y").

In colloquial language: "xy involves (o.m.) y". Or: "(o.m.) y is inherent in xy". Or: "If xy, then (o.m.) y"

2.a.-- *The reflexive relationship.*

In their sign system, logicians usually neglect total identity in this context, but it is more ontologically appropriate here.

Take Royce's example, which combines the terms "singing" and "dancing". "Singing like singing", "dancing like dancing". More abstract: "x as x", "y as y". That 'if' means that one is talking about the (total) identity of e.g. singing, dancing, -- x, y, etc .

To anticipate: "encompassing as encompassing" -- "unrhyming as unrhyming", "negation as negation", "sum or product as sum or product". "As something" is "something as such-or-such".

The incongruity.

The contradiction (inconsistency, contradiction) is the counterpart of the reflexive identity.-- So e.g. non-singing as non-singing, -- $-x$ as $-x$ are diametrically opposites. So, e.g., also “singing èn dancing” and “non-singing-and-dancing as non-singing-and-dancing”. -- Semiotic: “ x is irreconcilable with the negate of x ” or still “ x or (= aut) x (negate)”, because both terms are totally non-identical.

Note -- Other name: “exclusive (strict, dilemmatic, exclusive) disjunct.

As an aside: the Latin ‘aut’ is ‘either, or’.

2.B.-- *The non-reflexive relation.*

Logistics has two types.-

a. *The logistic product.*

The phrase “singing and dancing at the same time” (= “singing and dancing”).-- Semiotic: x and y are combinable to ‘ xy ’. -- Other name: conjugal, represented by the conjunctive ‘ \wedge ’. Thus e.g. “ $x \wedge y$ ”(= “ x and y at the same time”).-- In Lukasiewicz’s language: ‘ Axy ’ (= “ x -and- y ”).

b. *The logistic sum.*

“Singing and/or dancing” involves either singing or dancing (alternately, alternatively) or singing and dancing.-- Semiotic: “ $x + y$ ”. -- Other name: disjunctive, whose disjunctive is ‘ \vee ’. Thus e.g. “ $x \vee y$ ” (= “ x and y and xy ”).-- In Lukasiewicz’s language play : ‘ Dxy ’.

The denial:

Consider the negative (merely descriptive) and the privative (disappointing) nothing (*ETM 50*).-- Royce’s model: “Instead of singing and/or dancing, one can also do nothing.” -- Semiotic: the binary term ‘1 or 0’. If one designates x , y , xy or $x+y$ with ‘1’, one designates its absence with the sign ‘0’.

Note.-- Other name: “inclusive (alternative, inclusive,-- divisive) disjunction”.

Casually in Latin: ‘*vel*’, meaning ‘and/ or’.

Note -- A negate (disavowal, negation, negation) is represented, in Lukasiewicz’s system, by the negator (negator) ‘ Nx ’, ‘ Ny ’, ‘ Nxy ’, ‘ $Nx+y$ ’ (instead of $0x$ or $0y$, etc.).

Note -- Some formalized systems work with ‘ I ’, i.e. ‘incompatible with’ (e.g. ‘ $x I y$ ’ is “ x incompatible with y ”), and its combinations.

Decision.-- The total (reflexive) identity (and its negation) or the partial (analogical) identity (and its negation) are the bearing conceptions, ontologically speaking, behind these logistic “values” and “signs” (“symbols”).

Note -- The axiological or value relations.

ETM 33 (the transcendental “good” (value)) briefly drew attention to the object of value judgments (“evaluations”).

In passing, here are a bunch of “connectives” mentioned.

1. Refusing judgment: “neither one good nor the other” (if, e.g., two goods (values), then none of them).
2. Exchange solution: “if, e.g., more than one good, then one good and not the other.
3. Variety: “if more than one good, then now one then the other”.
4. Preference: “if more than one good, then rather one than the other”.
5. Aggregation: ‘if more than one good, then all’.

The viewpoint of J. Royce.

Royce, *Principles of Logic*, 74, says: “The actions (*op.* of something) constitute a set of data (entities’), which are, in any case, governed by the same laws as those by which classes (*op.*: concepts) and judgments are governed. The so-called ‘algebra of logic’ can be applied to it”.

Indeed: through a mathematization, one can “treat” the life acts of e.g. humans as the concepts and judgments. First introduce signs - abbreviations. Then ‘combine’ (establish mutual connections), as we just did. That gives a kind of ‘algebra’, a ‘calculus’, an arithmetic that clarifies the acts of life,--just as through a general theory of relations, the opaque life - ‘anankè’, that which happens to us without our seeing it - becomes clearer (*ETM-harm 79*). To speak with Platon, more ‘nous’, intellectus, spirit, comes into our lives.

Again, the encompassing.

There has been a lot of discussion about the implication.-- We started with it. As we end, just this.

The encompass can interpret all connectives.-- For example:

- A. The reflexive relation: “if x, then x” (“x if x”).
- B. The non-reflexive relations
 - a. Incongruity: “if x, then not -x”.
 - b. Non-contradictory exchange solution: “if 1, then not 0”.
 - c. Sum: “if x+y, then either x or y or both (= x+y)”.
 - d. Product: “if xy, then and x and y (simultaneously, together)”.

One sees it: reflexive (total-identical) or non-reflexive (partial-identical or denied) relations!

An applicative model.

Apply what we have just learned to a paralogism (wrong reasoning;-- to be distinguished from ‘sophistry’ (deliberately wrong reasoning)).

Note -- One can prove something directly (direct proof), but one can also prove it indirectly (indirect proof). The proof from the absurd (e.g. in mathematics) and the “argumentum ad hominem” (literally: argument played out against someone) are types of this. Here the premise of the God-believers (*ETM 51*) is played out against them. In particular: the undeniable fact of nothingness - private nothingness, then; - namely physical and ethical evil (*ETM 51v.*) - is turned against the existence of God. One also sometimes encounters this kind of ‘argument’ in courses of logic.

A.-- Omnibus wording.

See here, in order, the reasoning parts of “if ye assert this, then it follows what ye refute”.

Proposition 1.-- If God exists, then He is good and all-powerful.

But either, if God can prevent evil, but will not, then He is not good or, if He will prevent evil, but cannot, then He is not omnipotent.

Proposition 2.-- Evil can only exist either if God can prevent it but will not or if He wants to prevent it but cannot.

Proposition 3.-- Well, evil exists.

Conclusion.-- So God does not exist.

As one can see, the structure of valid reasoning is such that from prepositional phrases at least one post-sentence follows (encompassment, implication of the post-sentence in the prepositional phrase(s)). The prepositional phrase(s) contain at least one post-sentence.

Here: if the three prepositions, then the one post-sentence.-- The prepositions begin with the God-believing premise: “if God exists, then ...”. From this follows, if not paralogical reasoning, “therefore God does not exist.” From the affirmation of God flows, through reasoning, the negation of God;

B.-- Logical syntax.

This term from semiotics (signology) means the fact that one does not look (so much) at the content of what the judgments say, but at the logical relations of the sentences among themselves. These are then cast in a symbol-shortened form, rewritten.

a1.-- Rewriting the sentences.

‘God exists’ = p;

‘God is good’ = q1;

‘God is all-powerful’ = q2.

‘God can prevent evil’ = r1;

‘God wants to prevent evil’ = r2.

‘Evil exists’: s.

a2.-- Rewriting of conjunctions.

Now the sentence connections.-- The entailment (implication) $=$. (Peano's pasigraphic way).-- The inner contradiction (contradiction) $=$ w (which answers to the Latin 'aut'), viz. or (in the sense of dilemma).-- The negation $=$ p (negation of p).-- Behold the connectives.

b.-- The logical syntax (coherence) of the reasoning.

See what it becomes, if one examines the 'skeleton' of reasoning

VZ 1: $p).q1 \wedge q2 \wedge r1 \wedge r2$ (negate)) . $q1$ (negate) w $r2 \wedge r1$ (negate) . $q2$ (negate)

VZ 2: $r1 \wedge r2$ (negate) $\wedge r2 \wedge r1$ (negate)). s

VZ 3: s

NZ: p (negate).

The whole reasoning, now: $VZ 1 \wedge VZ 2 \wedge VZ 3$). NZ.

Read: if VZ 1, VZ 2 and VZ 3, then NZ.

The encompassing governs everything. The other connectives (conjunctions) serve only to connect what the encompassing governs.

C.-- Logical semantics and pragmatics.

Consider that set of connected signs (the syntactic aspect). Now, if one were to 'fill in' with other sentences than the ones, of which they are the syntactic representation, in a number of cases it would succeed (come out right).

Semantics, in semiotics, means that, starting from the syntactic signs, one checks the sentences themselves with their meanings. Reason: the purely syntactic signs mean all sorts of things! -- Pragmatics, in semiotics, means that one examines the intentions with which the sentences are spoken (or thought): here, namely, the refutation of the claims of the God-believers.

Note -- "Epistemological vetting".

'Epistemology' means 'science theory', a part of gnoseology (knowledge theory).-
- The gnoseologist dwells on the question of whether, yes or no, the sentences, which are uttered, contain truth (ETM 32v).-- What we will do now.

C.1.-- Theodicy.

Literally, "vindication, defense, of God." The term, which denotes an ancient matter, comes from the Cartesian G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716). The object of that branch of theology (= theology) is the relationship "God/evil": how to 'reconcile' the existence and being of God (i.e. reconcile the co-existence in one and the same 'being' (= total and even contiguous reality)) with the fact of disappointing 'nothingness', i.e. physical and especially moral evil?

C.2.-- 'Antilogia' ('criticism').

Zenon of Elea (*ETM 08*), the founder of "eristics," i.e., logic and method theory, insofar as they deal with reasoning according to strict logical rules, is known for his method.

He proceeds as follows.

1. He puts the theses of his teacher Parmenides first.

2.a. First 'antilogia' (literally: 'contradicting'): the opponents of Parmenides refute, in their own way, his theses.

2.b. Second "antilogy": Zenon refutes the refutators (naysayers). It happens that he notes that "neither they nor he" can rigorously prove anything. What Aristotle has noted as a logical process, summarized in the phrase "thou, counter-speaker/ opposer, neither prove all (= all your assertions, propositions) as I do". Shorter: "neither thou nor I".

Cfr. *Cl. Ramnoux, Parmenide et ses successeurs immédiats*, (Parmenides and his immediate successors), Ed. du Rocher, 1979, 158ss. (*Techniques de formalisation*).

For centuries and centuries people have been arguing about the "God/evil" relationship. No one has ever produced an "apodictic" (i.e., all reasoned people radically convinced) proof,--neither on the part of the God-believers nor on the part of the God-lovers. A kind of stalemate, then.

C.3.-- Theorem of mythologists.

'Mythology,' here, means "theology outside of biblical context, based on mythical experience" (*ETM 05*).

Perhaps the works of *W.B. Kristensen* on the mythical theology concerning evil in the universe and in humanity remain the most revealing (*Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions*, Amsterdam, 1947;- *Introduction to the history of religion*, Haarlem, De Haan, 1980-3).

Main thesis: the deities of non-Biblical religions, even the highest ones, are "harmology of opposites"; they themselves are, a mixture ('*harmonia*', *intermingling*; *ETM 72*) of good (physical/ethical) and not good (physical/ethical); its workings in the cosmos exhibit this same mixture:-

S.Paul counts those deities among the (principal) "elements of the world" (*ETM 01*), in which he does not place too much trust, as a Biblically minded person. Those invisible beings are, to a large extent, responsible for the nature-bound and also for the evil that springs from freedom.

So not some Supreme Being, of whom there is some knowledge, in Primitives e.g. (think of the 'Oermonotheism' of Lang and Schmidt). Of that Supreme Being one claims, in radical Pagan circles, that it is not responsible for the evil in the cosmos. Which is one of the aspects by which it rises above the finite, lower deities,--as "exalted."-- So much for a Pagan point of view.

C.4.-- *Biblical Thesis.*

What Oermonotheism hesitantly, gropingly grasps, that rises crystal-clear grasped from the *Bible* (*ETM 51*). Old Testament (Yahweh), New Testament (Holy Trinity): a Supreme Being is above all suspicion. At most, Yahweh, the Holy Trinity tolerates evil. Well on the contrary:

a. the immanent, built into creation itself, God's judgment (= intervention of God),
b. the transcendent judgment of God (God's intervention, direct, outside the natural course of created things) contain a corrective (modification for the better) of evil.

Think of vengeful sin, still punished within the framework of this earthly life. Think of the Last Judgment, in a (distant) future, where God will bring order.

C.5.-- *Theodicy.*

Philosophical theology, a foundation of Early Greek thinkers, - "theologia fusikè", theologia naturalis, 'natural theology' (distinguished from the mythical and the Biblical) - can interpret it as follows.

1.-- *The artery of reasoning.*

Reread - *ETM-harm 84* - the text.

A single word 'only': "(VZ 2): Evil can only exist...". That little word would first have to be proven by the God-denying.-- Well, it is simply put forward as an axiom,-- without proof. The atheist - consciously suppressing/ unconsciously repressing - circumvents this primal question: "Wouldn't the existence and being of God somewhere go hand in hand with the evil in the world?". So viz. that God is good and omnipotent after all.

Platonic: the God-denier commits 'para.frosunè'; he/she thinks beside the issue.

2.-- *Argumentum ad hominem.*

We take the atheist at his word.-- He claims two things at once:

a. God does not exist; **b.** evil exists.

What the atheist, during that reasoning, does not seem to grasp is that “evil exists anyway, even if God does not exist.” That “nevertheless” escapes him.

Further Clarification.

The secret premise of proposition 2 (“With evil can exist only if ...if ...”), is “All that is has a sufficient reason (in itself or outside it).” The so-called principle of (necessary and) sufficient reason or ground.

Since, in the atheistic hypothesis, God does not exist and evil does exist, He cannot qualify - as a (necessary and) sufficient explanation - of (the origin of) evil.

Conclusion: for evil to exist, in a godless universe, an explanation outside of God is necessary. Evil has its origin, therefore, blatantly in the universe itself,--not in a God, who does not even exist! -- well, that right there is the thesis of the God-believer.

Concluding sentence: “If, being godly, you assert what you assert, it follows that what you refute follows.” Antilogy of antilogies!

3.-- The origin of evil.

Let us now take the hypothesis of the belief in God.

(i) (Un)consciously, the atheist assumes that only a kind of meddlesome and even “authoritarian” God can exist (*note:* which also seems to be the premise of quite a few God-believers, if one sees them busy).

Such a God does not tolerate the autonomy (as moderns like to say) in what He created Himself. Such a ‘Supreme Being’ - who still bears the unconscious traits of the ‘cosmic elements’ (= the divinities of the pagans) - must continually intervene - like a disciplinarian - in the very course and structure of his creation. Among other things, in the form of preventing the physical and, above all, the ethical evil that springs from the autonomous will.

(ii) The God-believer, loosed from that Heathen rest, however, realizes - especially in the face of evil - The autonomy of creation.

(a) Physical.

The non-free creation is, in its way, independent. Consider the physical laws that can be established (*ETM 16:* physical testing): a stone, e.g., falls,--even if by chance someone walks right under it.

(b) Ethical.

The free-choosing creature (*ETM--harm 83:* value judgments)--in its freedom of ability (even though there is no freedom of may; *ETM 58*)--can decide both outside God and against God.

God's dilemma.

'Dilemma' is a fork in the road (= one faces contradictory choices (*ETM-harm* 82)). Either He, creating, founds physically independent and ethically free beings and, then, neither can nor may He continually intervene ('interventionism') or He founds physically unautonomous and ethically unfree beings and, then, the result is a number of unfree, subject beings, in whom any self-development is impossible from the outset.

"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me."

The problem of theodicy is abundantly clear in the fate of Jesus.

He incarnates, lives as a human being, rises, after his investiture at his baptism in the Jordan ("This is my beloved son"; understand: the prince, whom I prefer as coming sovereign), ... to die the death of the cross, in an autonomous - according to the Bible, given up to Satan and other "elements of the cosmos" - world.

Crucified, He undergoes and lives through the far-reaching independence of creation. He utters a cry, "My God, my God, why hast Thou 'forsaken' me?" Understand: "why hast Thou left me to autonomy estranged from Thee?"

The Heavenly Father's response to this is, according to Scripture, glorification. Jesus shows himself as the 'beloved son' (= prince, ruler,--with, without or against the 'elements of the cosmos') both in the underworld ('descent into hell' or 'ascension into hell') and on earth (the appearances as the risen one) and in the rest of the cosmos ('ascension' in which, according to tradition, he shows himself to the 'cosmic' rulers).

But with this the Bible situates the solution of evil, as far as it goes together with a good and almighty God, in the transempirical (transrational). Cfr. *ETM* 17v.

Unhappily:

- (i) phenomenal, i.e., in the immediately obvious data, and
- (ii) even rational, i.e., reasoning through from the obvious data ...
- (iii) the domain of the transempirical with strict logical arguments difficult or even unprovable.

So that it remains a matter of antilogy and antilogy of antilogy: the unbeliever cannot refute the fact of glorification and the believer cannot prove it rigorously.-- Already Zenon had realized: "neither thou nor I".

Sample 14.-- Harmology: structure/ collection - system. (90/97)

We dwelt on the conceptions of “relation” (ontological and logistic).

Now comes a chapter on the structure - i.e. a network of relations - and - what goes with it - the collection and the system (system).

Bibl. st.: *D. Nauta, Logic and model*, Bussum, 1970, 175vv..

The structure -- according to that work -- is the total (whole) or the entire network of relations between elements.-- To this we add ourselves, immediately: the elements of a mere collection or of a system (system).

The concept of a common characteristic.

A multiplicity can be brought to unity when it consists of elements (multiplicity) which show at least one common characteristic (unity). Or to put it differently: elements which are certainly non-identical (different/separable), but which are, in a certain sense, identical, because they show one and the same (group of) characteristics. Analogy, therefore, i.e. the fact that they are partly identical, partly non-identical.

Distributive and collective structure.

One could also say metaphorical and metonymical structure (*ETM 24; please reread*).

Do we say that, as soon as there is relation, there is minimal and essential (= essential) structure. ‘Network’ has a minimum - the relation between two elements and an - infinitely - expandable maximum, of course.

Note -- A certain language -- in well-defined scientific and philosophical circles -- concerning ‘structure’ uses that term in the stricter sense of “fixed (unchanging, ‘invariant’) relations. -- Good to know.

1.-- *Distributive structure.*

‘Distributive’, from Latin ‘distribuere’, to distribute.

Best speaks to our minds the mathematical model. In particular: in mathematics, one can replace the expression “ $ax + ay + az$ ” with “ $a(x + y + z)$ ”. One sees that the common term ‘a’ is spread, distributed, among the three distinguishable terms. This is a crystal clear clarification of the notion of ‘spread’ (over a multiplicity).

‘Likeness’

One of the key features of the dispersion structure is ‘exchangeability’ or likeness. The ‘a’ from the three expressions ‘ax’, ay, az is exactly the same.

And convertible (interchangeable, alike). -- Thus - to quote Husserl's little example again (*ETM 38: the identically general*) - the red, spread (distributed) over all (possible) relde things, insofar as it is merely red, can be exchanged. That red is, after all, identically in itself.

Some applicative models.

Those familiar with cologne and perfumes may know that, for really sexy women, musk scent, peculiar to Tibetan mountain bucks, is sexually stimulating,-- that, for really sexy men, latex from the hevea plant (from which rubber is produced), is also sexually stimulating,-- that, when one has given oneself over to one or both of the aforementioned scents, mentha piperita, the aroma of peppermint, is soothing. The three odors differ, thus, thoroughly; yet all three are "odors": fragrance (hevea, musk, -- meha piperita),-- just like a (x, y, z).

Distributive structure-- Those familiar with more recent physics know that energy, mass, and speed of light are three physical (physic) realities, which, however belonging together, are highly distinguishable. So n (energy, mass, speed of light). Again: distributive structure.

Look at the market: a young salesgirl offers a young man a young plant for sale. So young (salesgirl, young man, plant). Distributive.

Note-- Platon, already, noted that 'all' constitutes a 'whole' (in his sense). The mid-century scholastics (800/1450) called a collection 'omne' (literally: something that includes all the elements).

2.-- Collective structure.

'Collective' means 'together'. Solidary.-- Take a goldfly: all the parts of that sweet little insect differ from one another -- legs, wings, torso, thorax, etc.-- but together -- collectively, solidly, 'collectively' -- they form the one goldfly.

Note -- Non-unity.

Unlike the elements of a collection, the elements of a system are non-everything, at least not always. Far from it.

Some applicative models.

The scents -- hevea, musk,-- mentha piperita -- are, collectively, one system: the collectivity of strongly different scents collectively acts first to excite, then to soothe.

As elements of the ‘collection of fragrances’ they are unified; as elements of a sequence system they are very non-unified: the first two act as either feminine or masculine stimulants, the latter working in the opposite direction. So: hevea (pungent) x musk (pungent) x mentha piperita (calming).

Who is not familiar with Einstein’s physics formula “ $E=mc^2$ ” (energy is the mass multiplied by the square of the speed of light)? As mere elements in physics, energy, E, mass, m, and speed of light, c, are one and the same. As elements in the overall system of nature, however, they are far from being identical. What is expressed in the structure of the physical formula -- in which one must not interchange the signs E, m, c^2 -- is not simply the same.

The young girl selling young plants is a system, the selling and buying system -, in which the elements - girl, plants, young man - are absolutely not one and the same, interchangeable. The social role, after all, of selling and buying differs thoroughly, and the role of the saleable product differs from the deeds of selling and buying.

Note -- Already Platon noted the difference between “all” and “whole,” and the scholastics had their own term for collective, i.e., “totum,” a set that shows a coherence.

Application: the expression “all people,” e.g., differs quite a bit from the expression “the entire person” and, even, from the expression “all humanity.”

General Decision:

(1) In the set, the common property is distributed, but identically and immediately, general.

(2) In the system the common characteristic is not spread over separate elements, to is it “the cement of it”, identical for all parts (hypo-systems, sub-systems) is the collectively shared structure (network), which, at once, in a shared way, is general.-- Identical-general in both cases, but in a different way (distributive, collective). Behold, as clearly as possible, similarity and difference of both.

Note.-- It is now seen; that the metaphor rests on the collection and the metonymy on system. Which is abundantly clear in the metaphorical and the metonymical synecdoche (*ETM 23v.*).

Consequence: it can be said that the collection is characterized by a metaphorical structure and the system by a metonymical structure.

Note.-- The Antique Greek number concept.

A set is a number (elements), which may be expressed in a number. Let us consider, for a moment, *Eukleides of Alexandria* (-323/-283; *ETM 01*), in the thirteen books of his *Elements of geometry*. In books 7/9 he deals with the mathematics of numbers (arithmetic).-- True to his axiomatic-deductive method, he begins with definitions (determinations of concepts).--

a.-- The first: “Unity - in Greek ‘monas’, monad - is that according to which every being is called one (single).” -- That is called, now, ‘element’ (at least in mathematical language).

b.-- The second: “Number (form) - arithmos, number form, because the Antique Greeks saw every number as geometric (*ETM 31: geometric form is not ontological being form*) - is the set - plèthos, crowd, set, collection - that arises by the aggregation of units (‘monads’).

Note that ‘aggregate’ is, at the same time, certainly in the Paleopythagorean sense, “to form a geometrical figure, a configuration.” Consequence: in Ancient Greek, ‘number’ is only applicable to more than one monad (unit). ‘Number’ is invariably a set (and geometric system) of at least two elements.

Bibl. s.: Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft*, 1 (*Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur*), (History of Natural Science, 1 (The Founding of a Science of Nature)), 319.

Conclusion.-- The two concepts - collection, system - run, mathematically - number-mathematically (collection) and space-mathematically (system as geometric form) - into each other.

Current systems science (systematology). The concept of ‘set’, thanks to the ‘new’ mathematics, is usually well known. Which is not the case with ‘systems theory’. Therefore, a brief explanation.

1954: Foundation of the Society for General Systems Research. Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901/1972), Kenneth Boulding (economist-sociologist), Rapoport and others are the founders of an organization to promote research on all systems.

Bibl. st.: -- *F.E. Emery, ed., Systems Thinking (Selected Readings)* Harmondsworth/Baltimore, 1969-1;

-- *P. Delattre, Système, structure, fonction, évolution (Essai d'analyse épistémologique)*, Paris, 1971;

-- *D.D. Ellis/ Fr.J. Ludwig, Systems Philosophy*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962.

-- Particularly inspiring-ontologically speaking-is *Leo Apostel et. al., The Unity of Culture (Towards a general systems theory as an instrument of the unity of our knowing and acting)*, Meppel, 1972 (mathematical, communicative, and artistic activities are interpreted systematically).

Note. -- L. von Bertalanffy, *Robots, Men and Minds* (Psychology in the Modern World), New York, 1967, 61, says:

a1. the organizational needs inherent in our complex manufacturing processes (e.g., man-machine systems, armament research),

a2. *N. Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the machine*, New York, 1948-1,

b. L. V. Bertalanffy, 1930+, who sought a general systems theory, are at the origin of a general systems theory.

Note.-- Already *Aristotle, Polit., V, 5*, uses a kind of cybernetic language: a constitution e.g. has to 'telos' (purposefulness), but can be deviated from ('par.ek.basis'), yet also linked back ('rhuthmosis', 'ep.an orthosis'). Cfr. *O. Willmann, Gesch.d.Id., III, 1035*.

Typology.-- D. Nauta, Logic and Model, 173v., distinguishes three levels concerning system.

1.-- 'Concrete' systems.

A crystal (physical), a living organism (biological), a factory (culturological).

2.-- 'Conceptual' systems.

All abstractions,-- constructions of our mind (o.c.,175), such as e.g. schemata (*ETM* 39) of concrete systems (an atomic model, representation in mind and on paper of the concrete atom), the diagram of a curriculum,-- a mathematical point-set, -- a logically constructed number system.

3.-- 'Formal' (or language) systems.

Programming languages for computers,-- the whole of logistics (logical calculus (*ETM--harm 80*) or some part of it. Clearly, with such a scheme, a general systems theory is outlined.

Note.-- What does Nauta understand by "formal"? Any language (= sign system), in which

(1) of concrete realities

(2).1 a comprehensible (conceptual) representation (reconstruction)

(2).2 is shown symbolically,

is called by Nauta et al. "a formal or linguistic system". In it, relations (*ETM--harm 80vv.*) and structures, respectively, are represented "syntactically" (*ETM--harm 84*).

Note -- 'Formal' ontological, is much broader: every 'forma', form of being, is a 'formal' matter.

As *an aside*, the term ‘formalized’ rather than ‘formal’ is, in my opinion, clearer. A formalized system contains (a) a sign system, (b) which is axiomatically-deductively (about which later) ordered.

Targeted System.

One type of system is the teleological system.

Beginning with the Antique Greek term ‘archè’, principium, that which governs something (‘principle’, ‘principle’).

If something is controlled by something, then that controlling ‘element’ must be taken into account,-- both in terms of knowledge of it and dealing with it.

Teleological becomes a principle, when it governs the ‘praxis’, the activity in its course. So say we: ‘regulates’. This ‘regulating mechanism’ is the core of goal-directed systems, which are ‘directed’ by their ‘principle’ towards a goal. Which brings us into the vicinity of steering science (cybernetics).

Appl. model.-- A school class.

This system consists of the teacher(s), the students, the classroom, the classroom infrastructure (board, chalk,-- lecterns,-- books, etc.). It is governed by one idea: to mold students culturally. The goal, before it is realized, determines, in the form of the result, the whole classroom activity and its course.-- In other words, it is a goal-oriented system.

Purposeful order(s).

ETM-harm 72vv. gave us an approximate insight into the notion of “ordering.

Bibl. st.: *D. Mercier, Métaphysique générale (Ontology)*, Louvain/ Paris, 1923-7, 536.

The text of the great Neoscholasticus says, “to order is:

(i) take data one after the other and

(ii) to place them (*note*: situate them) according to the same unifying principle (...).

The order(s) is the unity in the multiplicity or, still, the unity in the diversity.

Mercier then immediately moves on to purposeful ordering: “Order is the placement (*note* : arrangement) such that different data are, each, in their place and respond to their respective (*op.*: each among them own) destination.

Shorter: order is the accurate arrangement of data according to the relations their purpose imposes on them.” (O.c.,539).

One also says ‘functional’ relationships (that live up to the function or role in achieving the goal (outcome)). ‘Functional systems’ would, therefore, be a good term.

Organic (organismic) systems.

Note.-- The German Historical School.-- F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861; jurist), the founder;-- K.F. Bekker (known for his *Organismus der Sprache* (Organism of language), (1827-1; 1841-2), Jakob Grimm 1785/1863; with his brother Wilhelm founder of Germanic philology) Leopold van Ranke (1795/1836; leading figure in German XIX-d'century historiography).

This school places - instead of the unhistorical (understand: non-traditional) thinking Enlightened Rationalism (*ETM 41*) - the idea of 'life' (instead of the Rationalist 'concept') - especially as a "living organism" - at the center.

She espouses an organic world and life view (people now also say "organismic"). She defines:

- (1) the set governs the singular element (or its private part)
- (2) More to the point, the system governs the individual portions.

Well, in the view of that school, the collection, resp. the system (the totality) is the goal that 'defines' ('determines', 'controls') an 'organic' reality,--whether this organismic reality is a legal system, a people, a culture, a language, a fairy tale, a historical movement, or whatever.

Note.-- Apart from the clearly Romantic background, this view parallels the systems theory of L. Apostel et al. (*ETM-harm 94*).-- Analogous to a biological organism, a cultural organism is teleological.

L. v. Bertalanffy, *Robots and Minds*, 53/115, opposes, with the German Historical school, the mechanical model (paragon), springing from the Enlightenment.

"*Toward a New 'Natural Philosophy' (The Open System of Science)*" is his title.

The "new" scientific point of view - says v. Bertalanffy - is: the world (universe) "as organization", as an organized whole.

Here he emphasizes the notion of "organized complexity" (O.c.,58).- All levels of reality and science exhibit something like this: the atom (physical), the living being (biological), the psychosocial mass phenomena (peculiar to our current culture) (cultural).

Only way out - says v. Bertalanffy - a truly general, all-level systems theory. Cfr. o.c., 61ff.. In doing so, he repeats the distinction between mechanistic (peculiar to cybernetics) and organic system (which he very emphatically advocates).

Note -- Collection and system in the great tradition.

We already noted it, but, briefly, some more explanation.

A.-- The ideas “all” and “whole” in Platon.

Connections (likenesses or correlations) play a leading role in Platonic thought.

A. Guazzi, *Le concept philosophique de ‘monde’*, (The philosophical concept of ‘world’), in: *Dialectica* 57/58, Neuchâtel (CH), 1961,89/107.

The author starts from the question “Is ‘cosmos’, world, with Platon, an idea?”. Platon left no explicit affirmation in this regard, but, since his cosmology (universe theory) is a ‘physical’ (natural philosophy) reissue of his ‘dialectic’ (= method), it can be affirmed.

The ‘idea’, with Platon, is the pre-existing pattern, which makes a multitude of phenomena one: however distinct, all daisies in nature exhibit one and the same basic pattern, which makes them summarizable. That pattern is the idea ‘daisy’.

Guazzo departs from *Platon’s* harmology: the ideas “all” (think of “all men”) and “whole” (so e.g. “whole man”) are, fundamentally, equivalent ideas. For they mean “all parts” (in the Platonic sense: all elements, all parts; dialogue *Theaitetos* 205a).

More than that: the one (all that shows unity) is not conceivable without the ‘parts’ (elements, subsystems) and, conversely, the ‘parts’ are unthinkable without the unity, the ‘one’. Thus *Platon* himself, in his *Parmenides* (passim, i.e. throughout the text).

Note.-- This is confirmed by *E.W. Beth, De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides ut Bolzano)*, Antw/ Nijm.,1944, 29/56 (Plato), where the ‘stoicheiosis’, elementatio, literally: ‘parts analysis’, is discussed, which is nothing but a theory of sets and systems avant la lettre.

B.-- The scholastic doctrine on the subject.

Lahr, *Logique*, 493, says:

(i) the general concept (“all people”) is distinguishable from the collective concept (“all humanity”).

(ii) O.c., 499: The classification (typology) is twofold.

a. One can logically classify an ‘omne’ (“all copies”).

b. one can also classify a ‘totum’ (“the whole specimen”), but ‘physically’, -- think of the parts of a plant.

Note.-- As stated above, encompassment relies, in part, on collection and system. Cfr *ETM-harm* 83. “If collection/system, then encompassment “. -- Cfr *ETM* 25 (*synecdoche*).

Sample 15.-- Harmology : sign (symbol) and model. (98/105)

Beginning with the names.-- Drawing theory, 'semantology', 'semasology' denote general drawing theory.-- *ETM--harm 81* we know that the names 'semiotics' (Peirce, Morris) and 'semiology' (de Saussure and the Structuralists) are common.

The three semiotic aspects.

One can view a sign or symbol threefold:

a. syntactically (*ETM--harm 84v. ; 94 (formalized thinking)*):

b.1. semantic (*ETM--harm 85*) and

b.2. pragmatic (*ETM--harm 85*).

Give us a humorous example to make these three aspects easy to remember.

a. Syntactic.

Perhaps one once heard something about the unusual West-Flemish priest Van Haecke. One day he combined from the name of a priest, called 'Faict', the following Latin phrase: "Faict ficta facit" (translated: "Faict commits imaginary things").

Syntax of letters: the collection 'ficta' and 'facit' has the same elements as 'Faict', a five-letter name, simply moved (made into a different configuration) by Van Haecke. A typically 'combinatorial' (elements connecting) activity. - So much for the sentence in itself.

b.1. Semantic.

One can also situate this combinatorics in life ("Sitz im Leben"). The sentence "Faict occupies himself with imaginary things" refers, possibly, to the - according to Van Haecke's judgment imaginary - activities of Faict. That sentence reflects a reality outside the sentence itself. It contains a description, indeed a value judgment.

b.2. Pragmatic.

Still the "Sitz im Leben," but now differently: what intention did Van Haecke have in formulating that sentence? What result was he aiming for? Perhaps he wanted to make those who grasp the word play laugh (humorous pragmatics). Or he wanted to criticize Faict's pastoralism (pastoral pragmatics). This too is situated outside the sentence itself.

Note.-- A sentence is a compound sign: immediately we have the three aspects that each sign can have.

Syntactics.

The relations (*ETM--harm 77;80*) between the elements of a sign, internally, and between signs themselves, externally, are the object of syntactic semiotics.-- Thus, one distinguishes 'syncategorematic' (incomplete) and 'categorematic' signs.

The name of a person, for example, is, on its own, without any additions, a complete sign to indicate someone. An incomplete sign only really works if it is thought of together with other signs: for example, the first name and surname in a complete address (with street, street number,-- municipality, municipal number, -- if necessary, indication of the name of the country).

Structuralism.

-- Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris, 1931-3 (1916-1);

-- J.M. Broekman, *Structuralism* (Moscow/Prague/Paris), Amsterdam, 1973;

-- O. Ducrot et al, *Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme?*, Paris, 1968.

--- Concerning Structuralist theory, concerning syntax: *Rol. Barthes, Eléments de sémiologie*, in: *Communications (Recherches sémiologiques)*, Paris, 1964 (No. 4), 114/140 (*Syntagme et système*).

De Saussure himself defines his “sémiologie” as follows: “une science qui étudie la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale” (a professional science, which studies the life of signs within the framework of social life). Cfr. *Cours*, 33.

Sign he defines as follows: “Le signe linguistique unit non une chose et un nom, mais un concept et une image acoustique” (the linguistic sign does not connect a thing and a name, but a concept and an acoustic ‘image’). For de Saussure, the whole sign - “le signifié” (that which the acoustic sign means, i.e. the concept) and “le signifiant” (the acoustic sign) - is a mental or psychic thing (*Cours*, 98).

Note: The common language calls ‘sign’ the acoustic, i.e. audible to the ear (internal or external) sign - e.g. the word ‘tree’. De Saussure, however, calls ‘sign’ both the word and the concept together. So e.g. ‘tree’ (the word) and the concept that corresponds to it (the concept ‘tree’).

Conclusion: for de Saussure, the life of the characters, within a society, plays itself out entirely in the psyché (soul life).-- What we should note well.

Relations: syntagmatic and associative.

Cours, 170ss. (*Rapports syntagmatiques et rapports associatifs*), (Syntagmatic relations and associative relations).-- *De Saussure*’s semiology is essentially an applied theory of relations. Applied namely to direct and lateral ‘speech’ (language use).

A.-- The syntagm.

Literally (in ancient Greek): “something assembled”. -- De Saussure means the linear order of words-and-thoughts.

He calls this “the chain(s) of language use.”

A linguistic syntagma consists of at least two units (elements). E.g., “re-lire” (reread); “contre tous” (against all); “la vie humaine”(human life); “Dieu est bon” (God is good); “s’ il fait beau, nous sortirons” (if the weather is good, we go out).

A linguistic term - e.g., “bon” (good) - only acquires “value” within such syntagmas (syntagmata), as “Dieu est bon” (God is good), by being opposed to what precedes and what follows.

This is the basis of the famous theory of the Structuralists that a sign only acquires meaning within opposites. -- We invariably find ourselves in full relation theory.

B. -- *The association.*

Note that other Structuralists, instead of ‘association connection’, speak of ‘paradigmatic connection’ (‘paradigm’; cfr *ETM 36 (other meaning)*).-- De Saussure now situates himself outside ‘reason’ (language use).

The meaning-related words (“acoustic images” he says) connect (“association”) among themselves in memory. This is how groups form.

For example, the word ‘enseignement’ (education) will unconsciously - Structuralism is, here, related to depth psychology - evoke a crowd of other words: ‘enseigner’ (teach); ‘renseigner’ (inform). Or also: ‘armement’ (to arm), ‘changement’ (to change). Or still: ‘éducation’ (education), ‘apprentissage’ (learning).

Conclusion: all these words, in the associative context, have something in common.--See structural theory of language use in a nutshell.

Semantics.

The relations (*ETM-harm 77; 80*) between what, in everyday language, is called sign and that which is signified by it, mentally or extramentally (outside our soul life), are the object of logical semantics. If one will: the relation ‘sign/ signified’. Which differs from ‘signifiant/ signifié’, above. So pay close attention.

G. Frege (1848/1925; German mathematician) introduced the pairing “Sinn/ Bedeutung”. ‘Sense’, in its meaning, is the knowing and thinking content (concept). Thus e.g. ‘morning star and ‘evening star’ (two ‘sentences’, concepts). ‘(The) indicated: in Frege’s language, is that which is ‘indicated’, ‘intended’ by the concept. Here, in this case, the planet Venus (and morning and evening star).

Note -- Note that in the given example the pairing “content/ extent” (*ETM 29*) does not quite hold true: the content ‘evening star’ refers to Venus in a different position, cosmologically, than Venus’ position as ‘morning star’. Classically-logically, this involves two contents and two circumferences.

Note -- One sometimes hears it said, “Signs are not ‘realities,’ but they do denote ‘realities.’”

Circumstantially, this is correct. But, strictly ontologically, it should be noted that also the sign - even if purely psychic, like ‘le signe’ of de Saussure - is a type of ‘reality’, i.e. psychic ‘reality’ e.g. (which is non-nothing). Cfr *ETM 10*.

A semantic definition.

J.H. Walgrave, Around the problem of symbolism, in: Tijdschr. v. Philos., 1959: 2, 298/316, talks about Suzanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, Harvard Univ. Press, 1957-3 (work dealing with the renewed interest in symbolism, in the broadest sense of that word, in philosophy). Walgrave brings up the most general definition: “A concrete representation which - by its being known - carries consciousness over to the knowledge of something else (...)” (A.c.,299).

Two comments:

(i) This definition strongly reminds us of one of the meanings of the word ‘symbol’, as it is used e.g. in religions. For example, an image of God is the ‘sign’, signifier, symbol, which ‘transports’ the consciousness of the believer Primitive to the knowledge of “something else”, namely a transempirical, transrational reality.

Cfr *ETM 18*. After all, in the consciousness of the Primitive, who knows his religion a little, the image is “the deity who is visibly and tangibly present in it, although she herself remains invisible, intangible.” “In and at the same time above” the phenomenal reality.

(ii) Walgrave says ‘concrete’ (representation).-- As if an abstract sign from mathematics or logistics does not also “transfer consciousness to something else” viz. the knowing and thinking content that corresponds to it (*ETM-harm 80vv.*).

Conclusion: we omit ‘concrete’, and the definition is correct except for the term ‘representation’. A signpost is not a representation. And yet he is a sign. -- So: “something referring to something (else)” will be a more sound definition,-- an ontological definition, working with the term ‘something’, ‘something else’ etc. (*ETM 10*).

One application.

Return, briefly, to the semiology (sign theory) of de Saussure (*ETM-harm 99*): and the (acoustic), ‘image’ (practically: the word used) and the concept belong together. Why? By what, rather? Because they refer to each other, even if this is within the psyché (soul life).

Peirce’s Drawing Theory.

Situated in a truly general doctrine concerning the sign, a triad of “thinking, speaking and writing signs” is presupposed.

i. The concept (with what goes along with it, such as an “image” in the imagination) is - for Peirce - in itself a sign.

ii.a. The linguistic sign or word is the second sign.

ii.b. The written linguistic sign is again a sign.

They refer to each other. For “something refers to something”, “puts on the way to”.

Again, the embodiment (ETM--harm 80, 83).

We said: there has been much discussion about ‘implication’. Wouldn’t it be because it was not recognized that the implication is just another form of ‘sign’, i.e. reference, put on the way to,?

(i) Reflexive.-- “a involves (implies or refers to) a”.

(ii) Non-reflexive.-- “The parts (elements,-- in Platonic language) include, refer to the whole (collection or system) and vice versa.” -- This is how we organize data. Identical, i.e. reflexive, (total identical) or non-reflexive (part identical, analogous).

The tropological interpretation.

Do we resume ETM 20vv..

(i) Metaphor; “Colonel A., in Aceh, fought like a lion”. “He was there like a lion”. Understood: if one knows how he fought and also if one knows how a lion acts, then “he fought like a lion” (comparative, i.e. similarity exposing implication). Both thought together - A., the colonel, and the lion, imply a resemblance. On which the metaphor rests. But then A is ‘sign for’ (referring to) the lion (and vice versa).

(ii) Metonymy.-- “Eating apples causes health in part”. Or “(...) is partly cause of health”. - All those who understand the connection between eating apples and health see that eating apples implies coherence. This is: refers to it as a sign.

(iii) Synecdoche.-- “Apples (= an apple) are healthy”. Who sees that “all” apples implies “just one” (as a specimen) (is sign of it and thus refers to it)? And vice versa.

Who does not see that ‘all’ parts of the house of sale also include, as parts, the ‘threshold’,--thus referring to it, standing ‘sign’ for it? And vice versa?

Again: either similarity or coherence.

Conclusion.-- A sign is either metaphorical (collecting,-- in virtue of distributive resemblance) or metonymical (disruptive,-- in virtue of collective connection); also: synecdochic (co-signifying in the form of resemblance between elements of a collection or in the form of coherence between the parts of a system).

Sign and structure.

This brings us to *ETM-harm 90*.-- A sign refers to, - involves - the relation i.e., to something (else) either in the form of the distributive structure or in the form of the collective structure.-- We are in the midst of a traditional relation theory.

The map and the signpost.

Those who find the previous two pages too “abstract” take an application.

(a) A map is a metaphorical (resemblance-based) sign of the landscape “depicted” on it.

(b) But a signpost is a metonymic sign: it does not rely on resemblance, but on coherence. It refers to a destination which it ‘designates’, -- ‘to which, like a good sign, it refers’.

Note.-- A certain language calls the metaphorical sign “iconizing sign,” while the metonymic sign is called “indicative” (indicative) sign.

Model Theory

The (unknown) original - subject in the judgment (*ETM 67*) - implies (implies), when comparing the two, the (known) model - predicate in the sentence.


And vice versa.-- The model, however, is twofold: metaphorical (resemblance-based) model or metonymic (coherence-based) model. But then the model is dual ‘sign’ and refers to its (dual) original. And vice versa.-- Or the sign is a synecdochic sign.

Heuristic (= informational) value.

He who sees a sign relationship, his mind is put on the road to insight, truth. Acquires information concerning what the sign meant.

A Paleopythagorean application.

Cfr *ETM 03*-- *ETM-arm 93* (numberconcept) taught us, without drawing (understand: drawing), an Antique idea about 'number'. - We are now going to show, very briefly, how a drawing can be a sign.-- One knows that the Oldest Pythagoreans already possessed an initial theory of numbers. They also had a notion of 'squares' (a square number).-- Here is how they, who never separated geometry from number theory, 'depicted', 'drew' the square number.



Note.-- (1) It is clear, upon careful observation, that each drawing "refers to the number indicated below it." There is "sign" in front of it.
(2) If so, then space mathematics (configurations) is a model for number mathematics. And vice versa.

Which in Modern mathematics, since the Renaissance, has turned out to be a main idea (think Cartesian coordinates).

As an aside: (3) the drawing shows that multiplications (1x1; 2x2; 3x3; (etc.) can be translated into contractions: isn't '4 x 4 = 16' equal(worthy) to '1 + 3 + 5 + 7' (i.e. the affected sequence of odd numbers)?

In other words: aggregation refers to multiplication and vice versa. Aggregation and multiplication are 'models' for each other.

It has been rightly pointed out, on account of current model theorists, that the above drawing - however old - is one of the earliest testimonies to an ancient model theoretic understanding.

Pragmatics.

The relations (*ETM-harm 77; 80*) between the sign and the one who notices and/or uses it are the object of logical pragmatics. Especially the intended results (what is typically 'pragmatic') of the encounter between sign and with the sign have become the object of (pragmatic) attention.

Thus, a sign can be used - pragmatically employed - by someone as a signal for someone (else).

Significa.-- Lady Victoria Welby, court lady under Queen Victoria (1819/1901) started, in 1896, the signfica research. 'Significa' is concerned with the human means of expression,-- especially seen as means of understanding between those who use those means of expression as means of understanding.

There once existed a Significal Circle, whose members were *G. Mannoury* (1867/1956) - a mathematician (foundations research), compiler of *Handbook of Analytical Significa* (2 dln, 1947/1948, and of *Significa* (1949)

-- *L.E.J. Brouwer* (1881/1966); *Foundations research on mathematics*;
-- *Fr. J. van Ginneken, S.J.*, prof in literatology (*literary studies*) Univ. Nijmegen;
-- *Frederik van Eeden* (1860/1932; physician,-- orator, poet, writer,-- sage; very gifted in occult (transempirical-transrational) field);
-- further Dr Godefroy, Prof Clay, Prof Westendorp Boerma, Prof Fischer and others. Especially the psychological and sociological aspect of the signification kept the attention going.

Rhetoric.

We will deal with rhetoric separately.-- Here now a little word.-- Anyone who knows a little about traditional rhetoric knows that it is semiotically structured.

1.-- *Semantics.*

The one who does publicity,--who addresses people (e.g., in front of the TV), has “something” (a message, information) to tell someone else. This means: his words (gestures, what he shows) refer to something (to give information about it). The ‘invention’, (heuristic rhetoric) gives as a result that semantic content.

2.-- *Syntax.*

The so-called “arrangement” (= ordering) of the message, in text or images, syntactically-logically connects the parts of the text or display. Which gives harmological rhetoric.

3.-- *Pragmatics (significal).*

The ‘design’ (= stylization, stylistic care) - within the text - and the ‘recitation’ (hypocritical rhetoric) interpret what the publicity, the orator intend as a result, namely, to come to real understanding concerning the message (which in mnemonic rhetoric is well memorized), ‘to persuade’, ‘to come across convincingly’.

Decision.-- A good theory is practical. A good theory of signs is very practical. We see this abundantly clear from the application on rhetoric.

Note -- Teaching is one type of rhetorical action: it would be worthwhile to examine teaching as an act semiotically:

- i.** the message (invention);
- ii.** the arrangement (of a lesson e.g.),
- iii.** stylize the message - imprinted in memory - and really recite it.

Teachers are thus semiotically engaged (“engaged”). A semiotic insight might clarify this.

Sample 16.-- Harmology: similarity and coherence in psyché. (106/111)

“If the soul listens,” the living all has its “language and sign,” (so G. Gezelle once said). We are going to see that now, but harmologically.

We take two psychological examples.

1. -- Théodule Ribot (1839/1916)

He was both an experimental psychologist and a philosopher. His still valuable book, *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917-10, 171/182 (*Les sentiments et l'association des idées*), (Feelings and association of ideas), teaches us that the mind too - understood as a capacity for value (*ETM* 33), which values all that is, somewhere positive or negative - has identities.

(i) Phenomena (ii) can be approached rationally. Which we have been doing for all these pages now. But (i) phenomena (ii) can also be approached axiologically (value theorem). Value is exchangeable (‘convertible’) with ‘being(de)’, i.e. with reality.

1.A.-- Facts.

The data of empiricism (experience), which Ribot gives us, are typically - after previous pages no longer “accidental” - twofold.

A.1.-- Similarity.

“A mother may, suddenly, feel a sympathy rising within her. This, -- for e.g., a young man, who resembles her son or, more simply, who has the same age.” -- Thus Ribot.-- We say, after what precedes: “the young man is ‘sign’ (metaphorical model) for her son”; “by virtue of a certain resemblance, the young man ‘embodies’ her son (and, immediately, ‘right to sympathy’)”.

Second model: “Similarly, there are fear reactions which are called ‘unconsidered’ (‘instinctive’). But an observation, penetrating a little deeper, can reduce them to a similar explanatory ground - as the case of the spontaneously sympathizing mother, where resemblance played out.”

So again Ribot.-- We can rephrase, “a given is a ‘sign’ (metaphorical model) for the mind as a capacity for shock”; “the given, o.k. similarity (to previous shocking experiences), ‘embodies’ as a reaction something analogous.”

A.2.-- Boundary (coherence).

(i) -- “The lover in love transfers the feeling which, originally, was caused by the person himself-from his ‘mistress’ (lover) to her clothes, her furniture, her home.”

Rephrased, “the things of the mistress stand ‘sign’ for her person herself, as metonymic models”; “those things” imply (a reference to) the one who is related to them, -- here as possessor e.g. .

(ii)-- “For the same reason, envy and hatred cool their anger on the inanimate objects that belong to the enemy(s).”

(iii)-- “In the absolute monarchies, the cult of the sovereign is transferred to his throne, to the emblems (= signifiers) of his power.”

Thus again Ribot.-- It is clarified: “the inanimate objects -- they may be a throne, emblems or whatever -- which belong to the same whole, metonymically speaking, ‘contain’, as ‘signs’ (here: metonymic models), (a reference to) the beings, which are related to them.”

Note.-- What psychologists and sociologists call ‘fetishism’--a psychologization and/or sociologization of an originally religious science understanding-is evident here in Ribot’s examples. A ‘fetishist(s)’ identifies the object of someone and that someone himself. Feeling.

1.B.-- Clarifications (“statements”).

Ribot, speaking of similarity cases, says: “The explanation of many of these cases is situated in an unconscious state, which is not so easy to grasp. But if this state penetrates consciousness again - the will plays a role in this (but very indirectly) - it illuminates the whole.”

Says Ribot, “One knows that the association of thought contents (‘thoughts’) was reduced to two basic laws: the similarity law and the adjoint- or correlationlaw.”

Note.-- The similarity law bears as its premise the notion of “collection” (distributive structure); the adjoint law the notion of the whole, the “system” (collective structure). Or still: metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche.

Ribot thus hits upon a basic concept (*ETM 36: categories*), namely “transference” (“transfert”). In particular: “transfert par contiguité” (transfer in virtue of correlation, coherence and “transfert par ressemblance” (transfer in virtue of similarity).

As an aside: Freud, founder of Psychoanalysis, known for borrowing heavily from genius predecessors, did not fail to incorporate Ribot’s concept of transference into his system of thought. Listen: Ribot calls these two laws “descriptive rather than explanatory.”

Yet - he immediately adds - they reveal “quelque chose en sus” (“something up there”).

He says: several writers have pointed to an often hidden but effective influence. “Une influence” souvent latente mais efficace. Let us just say that ‘hiding’ or ‘latent’ means the ‘un(der)conscious in our soul life’.

2.-- Charles Baudouin (1893/1963)

He was a Swiss psychoanalyst, with years of experience on child analysis, in Geneva. Main work: *L'ame et l'action (Prémises d'une philosophie de la psychanalyse)*, (Soul and action (Premises of a philosophy of psychoanalysis)), Geneva, 1969-2.-- Let us listen to this very gifted child analyst.

2. A. -- Facts.

Again, clearly distinguishable two types.

A.1.-- Equality model.

In his *Etudes de psychanalyse*, Baudouin dwelt on a certain Berthe, who, at some point, suffered from arm neuralgia (a kind of nerve pain in the arm). Behold the phenomenon.

Psychoanalysis, in Freud's view at least, looks for the rational explanation first and foremost in the value relations (“les tendances”) emanating from the unconscious and subconscious.

1. Thus Baudouin, upon patient analysis, stumbled upon the fact that Berthe, un(der)consciously, mimicked the whole situation of her classmate. Which implies resemblance. More than that: coincidentally, that classmate also bore the same name, Berthe. She identified with that Berthe. Which is one possible application of identity.

2. What exactly was Berthe imitating - mimèsis (R. Girard) - Berthe? Not her classmate, but the ‘happiness’ of it. That Berthe - paragon after all had had, for a time, an arm-disease ... which had given her a lot of free time. As a result - and this is where the psychoanalytic shoe pinches - this same Berthe had been able to work her way up to “an educated woman”. Precisely that-in-Berthe - coherence model - mobilized a kind of (un(der)-conscious) imitation - perhaps in a healthy sense - : like Berthe - paragon, Berthe - imitator wanted to become an “educated woman” (an ideal). Berthe-1 acted as a metaphorical “sign” (model) for Berthe-2, who wanted to be like her. Behold the value stretch.

3. Further explanation.-- The mechanism.

(1) “One grasps, immediately, the reasoning of analogy (“raisonnement par analogie”), which had driven to identification and to pathological imitation.” -- Thus Baudouin.

In other words: the un(der)conscious reasoning mind (mind and reason) completes unconsidered, yes, forgotten or so, ‘mechanisms’, i.e. processes not controlled by itself. Here of a logical nature (in the form of harmology).

(2) Says Baudouin:

(i) the memory of 'Berthe' and her arm belong to the strictly individual sphere;

(ii) but the un(der)conscious mechanism by which that memory 'works' (causes), namely by 'producing' the symptom (the arm pain) - literally says Baudouin - belongs - at least in depth psychological perspective (= interpretation) - to "a primitive layer" (one knows that, since Freud et al, the Psychoanalysts like to refer to 'the primitive in man' as an explanation.

In summary, a value proposition (axiological moment) employs (analogical) reasoning (logical moment) to achieve its goal.-- By "logical aspect" we mean, above all, applied logic, of course.

A.2.-- Coherence Model.

One can also say, with Ribot, "adjacency model.

Ch. Baudouin, *L'âme enfantine et la psychanalyse*, (The child soul and psychoanalysis), I (*Les complexes*), Neuchâtel/ Paris, 1950-2; II (*Les cas*)/ III (*Les méthodes*), Neuchâtel/ Paris, 1951, is a veritable gold mine concerning psychological experience and interpretation. In II/ III (*Les méthodes*), 162, the author states what follows.

(a) The child is not a miniature adult, but rather a being in some preliminary stage of adulthood.

As an aside, this is confirmed by others.

(b) "It was found that - especially young - children were profoundly changed ... only because one or two of the parents themselves had undergone 'psychoanalysis'. And this without the need to treat the little subject itself".

To which Baudouin adds a statement, "This is explainable:

(a) if, on the one hand, one presumes that the ailments of the child in question were not yet firmly established, and

(b) on the other hand, if one puts first that the traumatizing (ailment-causing) situations, which had begotten those ailments, depend essentially on the living center,-- especially the family environment.-- By changing this living center one can change the whole coherence ('tout le tableau')."

Precising by analogy (partial identity): when a teacher is struggling with 'problems', then, following what Baudouin says, it seems obvious that immediately the whole class sphere "gets into trouble", -- that some 'sensitive' child picks up something in his soul of what the teacher is struggling through in his soul,-- that the teacher -- to put it somewhat brutally, but clearly -- "infects" one or more (susceptible) pupils with his 'maladies'.

More to the point, if such a child enters treatment, then, immediately, the infecting teacher should also be involved somewhere in that treatment.

2.B.-- Clarifications (explanations).

Baudouin relies on it: the facts on the matter are “irrécusables” (irrefutable). “However inadequate the explanations are (provisionally)” he says.-- After the phenomena the rational (or even transrational) explanations.

Baudouin thinks that the individualpsychological approach, within the depth-psychologies of C.G. Jung (1875/1981), can perhaps offer another (also valid) explanation.

In other words: Baudouin is inclusive - not exclusive - of interpretations other than his own. Which brings us to *ETM 08 (Zenon)* - “neither thou nor I” (here reversed: “neither I nor thou” (can explain everything)) -- to *ETM-HARM 86 (assertion/ antilogia/ counter-antilogia)*.

Cited *Frances Wickes, The Inner World of Childhood*, New York/ London/ Appleton, 1927, 17. Wickes says that, in early childhood, between, on the one hand, the un(der)conscious of a child and, on the other hand, the un(der)conscious of e.g. the parents, a kind of “identity” (sic) exists. Ontologically: a partial identity, of course. Here and resemblance identity and coherence identity.

Appl. model.-- A child lived through -- in his dream (confirming Freud’s intuition that the dream was perhaps the ‘royal way’ of analysis) the conflict lived through -- not of himself, but -- of his father (Fr. Wickes, o.c.,26).-

Another child (Wickes, o.c.,2S) lived through a feeling of insecurity (it knew it was unsafe somewhere). Analysis revealed that it was merely an “intuitive perception” of his parents’ objectively insecure situation.

Baudouin is rather aloof with respect to such ‘irrational’ factors. But he is formal: “There is no doubt about it: a child understands, somewhere, the atmospheres in his environment” (o.c., 162).

“Intuitive perception”(Wickes), “spiritual osmosis” (Benoist-Hanappier) or, even, “mystical participation” (L.Lévy-Bruhl (1857/1939; ethnologist, who studied the Primitives - somewhat equating the Postmoderns in this (*ETM 41*) - with much more open (understand: inclusive) mentality), C.G. Jung),-- these are several names for the same ambiguous (*ETM-harm 79*) phenomenon.

J.L. Moreno (ETM 79).

His *Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama (Einleitung in die Theorie und die Praxis)*, (Group psychotherapy and psychodrama (introduction to theory and practice)), Stuttgart, 1973-2, 14, mentions something that can give us an idea of what “mystical participation” is.-- It happened among Pomo-Indians (California west coast).

In a village, an ethnologist became the witness to a Primitive form of ‘psychodrama’. -- An Indian -- all appearances after he was dying -- was brought into the village. Immediately the wise man (*ETM 03*) or ‘shaman’ (‘medecine man’) appeared, with his helpers.

1.-- Information.

First of all, he enlightened himself: the man who had brought in the “sick one” said:

- a. this one had encountered a turkey cock, something he had never seen before;
- b. on which it was overwhelmed by feelings of fear.

The ‘wise’ man withdrew, only to reappear after a while.

2.-- Action

2.1.-- He, with his helpers, portrayed the situation that had caused the shock of mind.... This,-- depicting as accurately as possible every détail.-- Thus the ‘wise’ man - - in the midst of a group of friends and neighbors -- played the role of turkey cock,-- made circles around the “sick” just like a bird beating its wings wildly.

2.2.-- But there was one big difference: he did this in such a way that the “sick person” could gradually realize that the turkey-cock was actually nothing bad and thus that his fear of it was unfounded.-- Result: the man improved visibly and healed completely.

Comment.

(1) It is abundantly clear: the resemblance plays a leading role. One imitates the traumatizing event,--as accurately as possible.

(2) In this, among many others, neighbors, friends, the person involved - the patient - also participates (which is cohesion).

These two similarities and coherence, are the supporting pillars of a therapy. ‘Mystical participation’ is present here: not Westerners, but Primitives participate in a fluidic, life-force-related way (*ETM 05: mythical life-force is ‘fluid’*). Which, perhaps, in children is still true, even in Modern living framework. Cfr *ETM--harm 75 (order)*

Sample 17.-- Harmology: contradiction theory. (112/124).

Until now - except in the ontology concerning the (negative and/or private) nothing - *ETM 50* - the emphasis lay on the identical (similarity, coherence). A balanced harmology now shifts the emphasis to the study of opposites.

Ordering is also seeing opposites.

That true ordering, in addition to seeing similarities and connections, is also exposing opposites - distinctions, separations - is already evident, centuries ago, from the definition of *St. Augustine*, in his great and highly influential religious and cultural-historical work *De civitate Dei* (On the State of God).

In it he defines the essence of ‘order(s)’: “Order is the configuration (*note* : placement, situating) which designates to things - by comparison - as fitting together (‘parium’) and not fitting together (‘dis.parium’) data their due place.”

This definition has remained famous. The great Church Father borrowed it from the equally great orator and rhetor (rhetoric teacher) M. T. Cicero (-106/-43), who himself was still, in part, in the Ancient Paleopythagorean and Platonic tradition.

Note two things:

- a. order(s) is ‘place’, situate, i.e. configure;
- b. order(s) is the placement of matching (identity) and non-matching (non-identity) data. In other words: the placement of what is identity and what is non-identity.

Basic Differential.

First, we give the basic scheme of all order.

Total Identical:	Partially Identical	Totally non-identical:
Similarity (metaphorical)	Analog (partly identical, partly not identical)	Distinction (metaphorical:
Coherence (metonymic) (synecdochic)		Separation (metonymic) (synecdochic)

In other words, something is either totally the same (e.g., the reflexive identity of something with itself (a behelst a) or analogous or totally non-same.

Now reread *ETM 20/27* (tropology) for a moment, and thou wilt recognize that tropology, in linguistic form (stylistically), reproduces the basic differential, above,--at least as far as the partial identities are concerned especially.

The concept of “differential”.

(1) What the Ancient Greeks called ‘dia-stè-ma’, (Lat.: intervallum), interval (interval), is, in a sense, the ground plan of all comparing,-- comparing being the thinking movement par excellence active in ordering:

outside (between, within), outside
border 1 border 2

Expressed in terms of “arranging”: whatever is within the interstitial space is interstitial.

As an aside, this diagram is one of the basic insights of topological structure, in mathematics. Consider a coherent ball of clay. One can deform it topologically (the geometric “shape” is changeable). But the mass, if topological, may not change as a coherent whole. It remains, thus, within (between) its extremes of malleability and deformation.

(2) Second key feature: the differential places (orders data) such that a set of ‘values’ (data) is placed e.g. negative on the left and positive on the right or vice versa (as in our basic differential).

Inequal/ divergent/ similar.

(1) Aristotle uses the term “homoiotropos”, convergens, concurrent or interlocking, among others, to name analogous data.

(2) However, one can contrast this with divergent and parallel data (divergent, parallel data).

As an aside, Kard. J.- H. Newman (1801/1890) made the notion of “convergence” one of his forms of argumentation, viz. inductive sampling can be such that it does not strictly prove (*ETM 08: neither do ye nor I; 110 neither do I nor do ye*), yet taken collectively - a form of summative induction (*ETM 39*) - points in the same direction and, thus, converges.

Think e.g. when tracing the perpetrators of a murder: after some time a number of loose details point to one and the same perpetrator e.g.. Without thereby already possessing strict evidential value.

Historical note-- Aristotle, in his *Katègoriai* (Lat.: *Liber de praedicamentis*), Fundamental Concepts, sets forth:

- a. how we employ terms to designate the “being” (data),
- b. how we, in doing so, avail ourselves of e.g. ten categories (*ETM 36v.*), how these categories put forward ‘elements’ as **i.** contradiction(savings), **ii.** Movement ((=change)) in the form of whatever change, **iii.** succession/ simultaneity (diachrony/synchrony).

In his *Metaphysics*, book *Delta*, he completes this “hypothesis”: he lists as “elements” that are presupposed: one/ many, same/ not-same (the latter: difference), equality/ inequality,-- opposites, earlier/ later, quantity/ quality, relation,-- completeness, boundary, configuration, whole/ part, etc..

Although in a major break with an Aristotle, the enlightened Rationalist David Hume (1711/1776; top figure of Empiricist Rationalism; *ETM 16*: parallel with Logical Empiricism) nevertheless exhibits very similar basic conceptions.

As an Associationist thinker concerning comparative method he extracts, from the internal and the external experiential data, ‘elements’ such as - synchronically - resemblance and adjacency (= adjacency, coherence, apposition, contiguity, contact) and - diachronically - order - (omen/continue; e.g. in the process ‘cause’ (= omen)/ ‘effect’ (=continue)).

Auguste Comte (1798/1857; founder of Positivism, i.e., a rather intellectualizing, French form of Empiricism) sees, likewise, that “the facts” (*ETM 35, 58*) - like “elements” - are connectible (“associable”) through their similarity (synchronical) and their succession (diachronical).

Bertrand Russell (1872/1970; the famously liberal human rights advocate), after turning his back on Platonism, also saw it in an analogous way.

Opposition theory.

It should be noted that we have already encountered this teaching in another form, i.e. *ETM 50v*. (absolute or relative nothingness).

Beginning with a literary model.

The contrast is, in addition to being a logical phenomenon, also a literary process. Let us listen to the Byzantine liturgy, during Holy Week, namely during “the holy and great Wednesday”.

Bibl. st.: *E. Mercier, La prière des églises de rite byzantin*, (The prayer of the churches of Byzantine rite,), II (*Les fêtes*), Cheve-togne, 1948, 127.-- “While the sinner - a prostitute - offered you, Lord, an extremely costly perfume, the disciple - Judas, the traitor - came to an ‘agreement’ with the administrators.

With great pleasure she poured out what she had bought for a lot of money. With great haste he sold the one who can be paid with no price. -- she accepted in Jesus “the Lord.” He took a stand against “the Lord.” -- Thus she became free, while Judas proceeded as a slave of the inheriting enemy (Satan).

Terrifying is Judas' lowliness. Exalted is the prostitute's repentance: grant it to me, Savior, who entered death for us, and save us all.

Miserable is Judas' fate: as he watched the prostitute kiss the feet of Jesus, he was contemplating how he would inflict the treacherous kiss on Him.

She loosened the hair from the knot; he got tangled up with his soul: instead of pouring out precious perfume, he incubated within himself a repulsive malice. Covetousness prefers what is not preferable: shield our souls, Lord, from such a thing."

Stated: the very same words are said, but not in that oppositional form. Result: the empowering impression of the text is lost, for the most part.

Let us, now, turn to the logical structure of the contradiction. Let us take, for this purpose, as a guide *D. Mercier, Logique*, Louvain/ Paris, 1922-7, 107s..

In Neoscholastic terms, the Cardinal distinguishes a plural concerning 'opposition'.

a.-- *The transcendental contradiction.*

This is, of course, about the contradictory opposition.-- Example: 'being(the)' and 'not being(the)'. This is being(de) as not being(de). And vice versa.

This inconsistency (the absolutely contradictory or utterly non-concurrence) of e.g. white as contradictory to all that is non-white -- the latter understood as "as non-white" -- is immediately apparent. The contradiction is utter.-- In dilemmatic form: white or non-white (where 'or' in Latin is 'aut').-- There is no intermediate term (*ETM 71 (law of excluded third)*) between unrhyming things.

b.-- *The categorical oppositions.*

'Categorical' means "all that is non-transcendental" (*ETM 30v.*).-- Here one establishes a plural.

b.1.-- *The contraire or ordinary contradiction.*

Here again a dichotomy, but now within the elements of a set (or the parts of a system): one or more of its elements are not the other elements; one or more of its parts are not the other.

Appl. model.-- Take the color gamut of the rainbow: the white is not the rest (the opposite,--not in the contradictory, but in the counterfactual sense, of all non-white shades, e.g., purple or black: these are, in fact, simply different, each separately). They exist simultaneously in the rainbow.

-- “White” and “non-white as non-white” do not exist simultaneously. Consequence: something cannot be white and non-white at the same time and under the same point of view. But the rainbow can be simultaneously white and red and black and blue. Reason: these colors are simply - contrairally, not contradictorily - each other’s opposites.

Another example: a man is unscrupulous in his business, but very conscientious in his marriage: both traits exist together in the same man; but where he is unscrupulous, thither it is impossible to say that he is conscientious (which would be an incongruous contradiction, i.e. an absolute contradiction): there they do not exist together. For what is unscrupulous is unscrupulous.

b.2.-- *The correlative or mutual opposition.*

Here a reciprocal relation is at work (symmetry): the terms (elements, parts) are distinct, yes, separate, but they are only possible (meaningful, conceivable, real; *ETM* 32 (*‘true’*), 43 (*‘possible’ as a modality*)) within the reciprocal relation in which they exist,

Appl. model.-- “Father” and “son” exist only because the father has a son and the son has a father. Yet the father is not the son and vice versa.

‘Double’ and ‘half’ go together: the double exists only if there are two halves. Yet the double is not the half.

‘Knowledge’ and ‘object of knowledge’ do not exist without this mutual relation. Yet knowledge is not the known object of knowledge, but only the knowledge of it.-- Thus: symmetrical opposition, giving rise to its own dichotomy (complementation).

b.3.-- *The privative (the expression of what lacks) opposition.*

Consider the privative suffixes, in speech: -less, -free. Thus e.g. unemployed, senseless,--shameless, shameless. Think of privative verbs: to peel an apple is to rob it of its skin. -- The negate (disavowal) expresses, here, a gap, i.e., the deprivation of what should, normally and/or ideally, be there.

Appl. model.--”That lady does not see”. -- She is, in the exercise of the sense of sight, deprived of an active faculty which man has normally or ideally.

When one says, “A stone does not see,” this is not a privative negation, but a *contraire*. With a stone, not seeing is not a gap.

Conclusion.-- The word “not” is ambiguous. And so is the contradiction.

Note.-- The restrictive contradiction.

Reread *ETM* 68; 70.-- Don't we sometimes say, "Here is contradiction and no contradiction". "That woman is conscientious and not conscientious": "He is his father's son and not his father's son". "She sees and she does not see," and such statements more?

The contradiction - contradictory, counterfactual, reciprocal, robotic - can be ignored (or affirmed) with reservation. It is, in such cases, about shades, 'nuances'. To a toned-down contradiction.

Taseology (tension theory).

The foregoing seems life-altering. Yet the opposition is more than that. We already saw this in the text of the Byzantine liturgy (Judas opposed to the prostitute).

For reasons of (vital, existential) importance, we now dwell on the "tension" as an application of the contradiction theory.

'Tasis' in ancient Greek means 'tension'.-- Play and conflict are two uses of tension. They play a gigantic role in the cosmos and in society. Therefore, a structure analysis (*ETM-harm 90: structure*). 'Structure' is the network of relations.

The structure of tension.

Think of a soccer field: the two equipes play to get their hands on the ball and control it.-- Think of two boys, fighting over the same ball.

Competition, rivalry also exhibit this structure: two firms compete against each other for the same sales territory. Two students do their best to be first in class.

What basic structure, in all these cases, is at work?

- (1) There are always at least two "camps.
- (2) There is one and the same 'stake' (the soccer, the ball, the sales pitch, the first place),-- 'stake' being that which is at issue in the game, the conflict, the competition, the rivalry.
- (3) The camps place an opposing interest in the same stake.-- Prettily put, "there are too many applicants for too few objects."

In play, for example, this is even deliberately organized. If not, it is no longer "play".

Mechanical model.

Among other things, mechanics talks about forces. These can come into a tension relationship. Think of the upward force, in a mountain of fire, working against the compressive force of the wall of the crater,--while it "negates" the downward forces of gravity.

The upward force wants the lava out; the downward force of gravitation wants it in and the sideways of the walls impedes in the process, more downward than upward.

Structural analytics: in that contraction of forces, the “stake” is the lava (just one given) and the “camps-with-opposite-directions” are the forces (more than one in number). Consequence: tension.

Human model.

Mimetism (imitation, imitation thinking) - ‘mimèsis’, imitatio, imitation, reproduction, in Antique Greek and Latin - by René Girard (1923/2015), French culturologist (culturalist), is one of the theories in which tension is central.

He labels the theories of the three great, ‘(culture)critical’ materialists - K. Marx, Fr. Nietzsche, S. Freud - as questionable and, in Freud’s case, outdated.

His desire theory says: the fundamental desire (nature desire) in man is not sex desire or killing desire (*ETM* 52vv.), but the imitation desire. All human behavior, according to Girard, is borne of the mimetic hypothesis (presupposition), which is misunderstood (‘méconnaissance’) by men themselves and by some theorists. This imitation desire therefore remains virtually unconscious.

Which, in passing, is one application of the Platonic notion of para.frosunè, thinking beside reality (*ETM* 61; 74).

Freud’s lucid moment.

Now read *ETM* 56 first: “my neighbor has precisely the same desires as I do.” Girard quotes Freud: “The little boy shows a great interest in his father: he would like to become and be what his father is, -- yes, replace him under all points of view.-- Softly expressed: he makes his father his ideal.

This attitude toward the father - or toward any man in general - has nothing idle or feminine about it: it is, essentially, masculine. And it is, moreover, very easily reconcilable with the Oedipus complex which it helps to prepare”.

Thus literally Freud himself. Freud saw mimeticism in purely erotic terms (not in its overall broadness), - in a clairvoyant moment.

Identification and mimetism.

Says Girard: “There is an obvious similarity between identification (*note*: identification with someone one looks up to) - especially identification with the father - and the desire to imitate: both consist in choosing a paragon (...). This choice can be fixed on any man (...), who then takes the place normally accorded to the father in our society, that of a paragon”.

Note -- Reread, now, ETM- harm 103 (the imitation of Berthe 1 by Berthe 2).

The tension “father/son”.

Bibl. t.: H. Robinson, *Renascent Rationalism*, Toronto, 1875, 171.

There Robinson dwells on the structure of the conflict. Within one and the same and common (*note*: similarity and coherence) situation - the convergent aspect - mutually exclusive value relations (‘tendencies’) - divergent aspect - are at work: they are based on imitation (convergent at first sight), but then an imitation which aims at one and the same object (‘stake’) (divergent).-- Such a thing sometimes happens between son and father.

The Oedipus Complex.

One knows the more than central role - one might say - with Freud and the Freudians of this kind of ‘complex’, i.e. structure, giving rise to tension.

Girard on the subject “The little boy becomes aware that the father is standing in the way of his access to the mother. His identification with the father takes on, as a result, a hostile tinge and ends up coinciding with the desire to replace the father, even with the mother. -- This identification is, in other words, ‘ambivalent’ (*op.*: two-valued, two-faced) from the beginning.” (O.c., 252). So much for Freud’s own text again.

Immediately it is made clear how “la rivalité” - the rivalry, yes, the envy (jealousy) - arises: by imitating his father in his relation to his mother and, rivalry-wise, repressing him, the son creates, unconsciously, the Oedipus complex. Thus the theory of Girard, who reproaches Freud for not seeing (or only seeing sideways) the mimetic urge. “It is the father who shows to the son what is desirable precisely because he himself desires it (the mother).” (O.c.,253).

The structure

This one is clear:

- i.** only one “object” (stake), the mother;
- ii.** only two candidates, the father and the son. Imitation is the conflict-generating factor.

Note -- ETM 59 (P. Diel) taught us that vanity can also play a role.

The notion of “complex.

Bibl. s.:

-- Ch. Baudouin, *L'âme et l'action*, Geneva, 1969-2, 97/141 (*Esquisse d'une théorie des complexes*); (Outline of a theory of complexe).

-- J. Jakobi, *Complexe, archétype, symbole*, Neuchâtel (CH), 1961 (translation of *Complex, Archetypus, Symbol*).

The depth psychological reality ‘complex’ is defined, best, as “tension, preferably conflictual tension between more than one tendency (value attraction) within the soul.” Here the tension becomes something psychological’.

Case in point: a tendency in us “wants” (“desires”) a pleasure object, e.g., a man -- outside -- of marriage,--which, within biblical revelation e.g., or in other cultures, which impose strict standards on marriage, is forbidden by standards of conscience.

- i. The same stakes, i.e., the extramarital man;
- ii. but two tendencies, an enjoyment- or hedonistic value-giving and, at the same time, e.g. by education or by own feeling, an ethical (= moral) value-giving,-- in Freudian language “two desires”.

Tension, as described by us above, is thus a structure-invariant(e),- namely, unchanged in its core, tension reverts to very different areas of reality. Which appears by (summative or amplificative induction).

Playing is not fighting.

Robinson tends to see a kind of conflict already in play.-- Yet through analysis of the phenomena (*ETM 17*), the difference is itself apparent.

1.-- When two soccer teams, centered around exactly one ball, are at play, tension arises: the desire of one party to “have” the one ball is diametrically opposed to that of the other party, who wants to “have” the very same ball.

2. -- However, when clearly e.g. a rule of soccer is violated, the referee intervenes. That is still ‘playing’, even if it is sometimes ‘rock hard’. But perhaps with a dose of ‘violating’ the rules of the game.

3.-- Do some players, however, become ‘brutal’, i.e. use real violence, then the referee will be faced with ‘urge to attack’ in the stricter sense - aggression - . Then playing becomes ‘fighting’. It then becomes what quarrels, slapping then, and wars of all kinds show: the tension becomes real conflict tension. That makes a phenomenal difference.

Conclusion.-- Tension is better not called “conflict.

Conflictology.

A conflict, *stricto sensu*, is an opposition involving violence.-- Again, a structure is apparent.

(1) An 'identity' - e.g. a man, a gang - exhibits 'assertiveness' i.e. self-conscious resilience (which is normal in a way, especially in our Modern aggressive society). This is, in Platonic terms, the lesser lion (*ETM 61v.*). In the language of Paul Diel 'vanity'.

(2) The stakes on the occasion of which this moneyed urge is fully awakened are **a.** rest (night rest), **b.** eating and drinking, **c.** sexual life, **d.** wealth (together, in Platonic language, the great monster). -- what is also called: the materialistic values of life. Fr. Engels (1820/1895; thinker of K.Marx) still writes in this sense.

(3) The degree of asserting the identity in question is such that one perseveres, if need be by physical and moral force (fist-power, cynicism (*ETM 61 v.*)): one exercises force without much conscientiousness. 'Morality' is 'weakness' in the struggle of life.

In Platonic terms "the little man," i.e., the man who lacks "spirit," i.e., the sense of "all that is higher values" (which is also called "spiritualism"). Insofar as the violent person/worse person does exhibit 'spirit', this 'spirit' is in the service of the lesser lion and the greater monster.

Applicative model.-- In short, the structure is

- i.** one's own identity (way of being)
- ii.** persevere against the rest.

Do we now read *P. Sigaud, États-Unis. - Les autorités montent en ligne contre les gangs de jeunes* (United States. - Authorities go online against youth gangs), *Journal de Genève*, 13.07.1990). In that article, the difference between play and conflict (violence) is clearly expressed, and in the way a Platonizing psychology designs it.

Here is the text.-- "Americans have learned to live with the general issue of violence under many forms: Big-banditism, crime syndicate, drug trafficking

However, a few months ago, they came to realize that a relatively new phenomenon was emerging, and this because of its worrying scale: the 'gangs' of young people between fifteen and twenty years old, who use gunfire to demarcate whole districts of the city, within which they lead an organized life (...).

Samples.-- According to the latest analyses, the 50 states -- Alaska and Hawaii included -- are affected by this toxic malady.

a. Los Angeles. This California city is the oldest action area of the youth gangs. Number of people involved: some 80,000, divisible as follows: 59% Hispanic-Americans, 39% Negro-Americans, 2% Asians; only 72 whites. All these gangs together have, in 1989, 554 crimes on their books (burglaries, hold-ups, armed thefts, all forms of extortion, drug offenses, murders).

b. Chicago. In second position. 15,000 youth divided into 125 gangs. Vast majority Negroes, outnumbering Hispanic-Americans. 1989: 72 crimes (12 more than in 1988).

c. New York. Only about forty corridors. According to a number of sociologists, this is due to the far-reaching fragmentation of the population into a multitude of ethnic groups.

d. Boston. Some forty gangs, in which some 2,000 youths. 80% blacks, 13% Porto Ricans. 1989: 9 murders (three times more than in '88).

e. Washington. 1589: 434 crimes, the record.

These samples lead to an induction (generalization) - *ETM 39* (also *47, 54, 113*) - : the plague is becoming generalized.

Statements (interpretations).

ETM-harm 79 taught us the one-verb relationship (among other things in interpreting). -- Cfr. also *ETM-harm 111*.--

1.-- A policeman.-- “It is always the same issue: soon they will still allow the children who are still at the hopscotch game to own a firearm. If guns and revolvers could not be bought so easily, the young people would settle their disputes differently.”

2.-- A psychiatrist.-- Armando Morales (prof in psychiatry Univ. California).-- This one sees it twofold.

a. The neglect regarding the life of mind, from which many young people suffer, works: “The gang replaces the family structure, which the gangsters almost never knew.

Note.-- This is yet another case of the privative nothingness (*ETM 50* (// *70,78, 82, 84*), i.e., the absence of what is expected (“frustration,” which, here, leads to an urge to attack; the so-called “frustration - aggression”), which traditional ontologists talk about.

b. “They have, moreover, the impression that in the USA - society there is no place for them. The ‘gang’ gives them a place based on hate and brutal violence.” -- Thus Morales.

Note.-- Again: the privative nothing, a vital gap.

The gang.

These young people are not ordinary thugs. Nor are they murderers wanted by all police stations.-- What are they?

a. They exhibit “rites,” “codes,” “customs. In Washington, gang members dress in black hooded sweatshirts. In Pine Bluff (Arkansas), one must have committed a burglary approved by “the leader” to become a member of the Folks. In San Antonio, local terrorists have had the audacity - without blinking an eye - to hand out business cards to police officers - following a carnival celebration - stating “all kinds of vandalism.”

Note.-- This proves what we have seen *ETM 61 v. (cynicism)* - see also *ETM 64 (desecration)*.

b. Morales: “The number of members varies from five to several hundred. But this has little relevance.

c. Everything depends on the field of action, on the objectives pursued and on the personality of the leader. What is decisive is the behavior of each member, the mentality that unites.- Thus Morales.

The leader.

“The Man,” -- the nickname of Rayful Edmond (25), is now in the Marion (Illinois) jail.

Between 1986 and 1989, he was the top figure in the trafficking of cocaine and crack (a drug) throughout the District of Columbia.

Headquarters: his grandmother’s house in a Negro neighborhood. Together with about 20 relatives, he controlled 20% of the drug trade there.

Weekly proceeds: \$2,000,000. -- The gang had +/- 150 members.-- From Los Angeles they received, monthly, 700 kg. of cocaine to (...).

For three years, The Man led a princely life: trips to Las Vegas, a Jaguar, a magnificent villa, opulent furniture, a \$45,000 bracelet.

To all the children of his ward he distributed banknotes of 100 dollars. To his many admirers he donated gold earrings.

“I was the King, the King,” he said in his cell. “Everywhere I had friends. As soon as I get out of prison - in a year or two - I’ll open a nightclub”.

Conclusion.

Crimes, in all their forms, put first: opposing interests that become violent in response to some commitment. Those interests--identity--continue against the rest. That was the structure (*dmharm 117. -- 121*). about which we just spoke.

Oppositionalism.

Bibl. s.: J. Muurlink, *Anthropology for Educators and Social Workers (Ideological Manipulation or Self Determination)*, Bloemendaal, 1981, 17/18 (*Oppositionalism*).

The term is new, but the matter it denotes is ancient. “Oppositionalism” arises when one strongly opposes a particular term or concept and places another term or concept in opposition to it, to which absolute validity is assigned. (O.c.,17).

In Platonic terms: one conception is mistaken for utter unworthiness (*ETM 50: privative nihil*) while its opposite model is mistaken for value without more (the good, in Platon’s language).

Appl. model.

One sees something like this in a number of biologists and/ or psychologists.

a. The ands “absolutize” the role of predisposition: at birth, in an individual biological being or in an individual soul, all or almost all life possibilities are predetermined,--established.

b. The opposing, better: ‘oppositional’ view exaggerates the role of the living center: an individual being is, in its fate and course of life, entirely or almost entirely ‘determined’ by the environment in which it is situated.

Note.-- Now reread, briefly, *ETM 68 (restrictive)*.

In Platonism, as a matter of principle, there is no place for “oppositional thinking”: since Platon it was recognized that against every assertion (affirmative) one can, practically always, put an opposite opinion (negative). From what? Why? Because/ because in real life seemingly absolutely opposite things are intertwined. ‘Koinonia’, interrelatedness, was called that. Common sense already regularly establishes that a unified being is determined both by disposition and by the environment. The real is usually a hybrid.

Appl. model.

a. The ones, the Modern subjectivists, including Descartes, highly absolutize the individual subject (= the self).

b. Recently, the Structuralists, among others, with Saussure at their head, have to a great extent been absolutizing - what they call - the structures (in casu: the rules by which our individual lives are determined, usually in an unconscious way).

Restrictive: both the I (‘subject’) and the structures both play a role. -- ‘Koinonia’, interdependence, of both.

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