

8.4. Elements of Platonism, (121 p.)

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Contents and study notes : see p. 118ff.

Preface. -- We begin with the spirited poetic prose of a young Flemish poet, Reninca (*Wassend getij*, (Washing tide), II, Tielt, Lannoo, 1945, 71). While expressing her joy at becoming directly acquainted with Platon (Plato) of Athens (-427/-347), the first Ancient Greek thinker of whom we have preserved a set of fully-fledged texts, she is thinking of the Medieval poet-thinker Dante Alighieri (1265/1321; poet of the *Divina Commedia* (1307/1320), a work that transforms the main ideas of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225/1274; pinnacle of Medieval Scholastic philosophy and theology) into poetic form).

Platon and Dante.

-- Today we were introduced to Platon at school. That is a great, happy event! I longed to know him more than Dante, because in the darkness of the Old World he stands like a beckoning star. -

Platon, without the light of Christianity, -- Platon, from his own strength and from his own genius, found the secret of the soul: immortality;-- found the secret of the world: not matter but spirit! -

It is the same immortality which Dante, centuries later, would glorify in Platon's thoughts, turned into an epic. -- Platon is the naked mountain peak of humanity; Dante is that mountain peak in the dawn glow of deified humanity.

Platon is the solitary recognition-call of the soul to the mystery of the existing; Dante is the thousandfold echoing-call of the soul to Platon from the mystery itself into which it was absorbed. Platon and Dante! It is to rejoice! Yes, it is truly a fine, festive day today!

Modern and present reception.

The reception accorded Platon does not end there. -- Maine de Biran (1766/1824, precursor of (French) Existentialism).

Here is how he characterizes Platonism, with which he identified himself as a more mature man. -- "Man is situated between God and nature: his spirit testifies of God, his senses of nature. -

a. He can identify with nature, by merging his "I" (his personality, his freedom) into it, -- by surrendering to all the desires, all the urges of the flesh.

b. But he can also - at least to a certain extent - identify himself with God, by allowing his 'I' to merge with the working out of a higher power. -- Aristotelianism completely missed the latter; Platonism, however, recognized it and defined it. -

Christianity, by tracing it back to its true model, has brought it to fruition. (Maine de Biran, *Nouveaux essais d' anthropologie*), (New Essays in Anthropology). - Cfr. B. Halda, *La pensée de Maine de Biran*, (The thought of Maine de Biran), Paris/ Montreal, 1970, 131ss., where the author explains the Patronization, the soul of Maine de Biran.

The founders of XIXth. and XXth. century formalized logic (and mathematics at once) attest to the enduring Platonism.-

“Mathematical logic is, first of all, not the same as Neopositivism. In fact, its founders are not only not Positivists but, on the contrary, Platonists -- Gottlob Frege (1848/1925; Alexander North Whitehead (1861/1947), Bertrand Russell (1872/ 1970; at least when, with Whitehead, he wrote the *Principia Mathematica*; he later evolved), Jan Lukasiewicz (1878/1956), Abraham Fraenkel (1891/1965), Heinrich Scholz (1884/1956; founder, as theologian, of a Centre for logical studies) and others”. Thus I.M. Bochenski, *Geschiedenis der hedendaagse Europese wijsbegeerte* (History of contemporary European philosophy), Bruges, 1952, 270.

Conclusion.

-- Whatever thinkers like Nietzsche, Heidegger or Derrida may say of it, Platonism is far from dead. -- Did not a Whitehead say: “The whole of Western philosophy is rather a series of footnotes on Platon”. -

Admittedly, the Nihilistic tendency peculiar to a part of Postmodernism is stronger than ever: the reaction, however, is coming. Witness: Allen Bloom's; *The Closing of the American Mind* (French: *L' âme désarmée*, -- awarded the Grand Prix Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from the city of Geneva) denounces the fact that American students, more and more, know “the crude ideas of the media and of Pop Music” than the great classics, including Platon.

From grasping the meaning to actualizing it.

How do we understand “Platon and Platonism” this year?

a. It is first and foremost an introduction to the original Platonic texts, -- admittedly mostly by Platonists (one should not want to know better than specialists).

b. That is the first work: to understand Platon correctly as far as possible. That is historical knowledge.

But, in the spirit of Platon himself, who constantly followed spiritual life in society, we shall also engage in soul-searching: we shall actualize Platon and Platonism, yes, if need be, we shall re-establish them. Otherwise we fall into repristination (living in a past that is past).

Platon should be studied in his reactions to what happened in nature and in (cultural) history, in his days: gives contemporary answers to contemporary problems. Which does not prevent him from leaving behind superfluous 'milestones' that can be useful for us to think ourselves, in his spirit or not. Cfr Kurt Flasch, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter (Von Augustin zu Machiavelli.)*, (Philosophical Thought in the Middle Ages (From Augustine to Machiavelli.)), Reclam, 1986, departs, but concerning medieval thought, from the same healthy point of view: a philosophy is not simply derived from its time context; yet somewhere it is always a "child of its time".

Antique Greek Philosophy - C.J. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy, I (Thales to Plato)*, Leiden, 1950, 2, says that the term 'philo.sophia' (intimate dealings with wisdom) has two main meanings.

a. *The broad meaning* -- To seek 'wisdom', i.e. insight into nature (comprising the world, deity and humanity) so that one can live in it in the right way. Thus by Herodotus of Halikarnassos (-484/ -424), *Historiai* 1:30; by Thukudides of Athens (-460/-399), *Peloponnesian War* 2:40; by Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338). This could be expressed in the term "general development" (the so-called Harvard Principle).

b. *The narrow sense*-- This interpretation presupposes the previous one but deepens it. It becomes especially logical rigorous thinking. So with the Milesians, who practised fusiologia or fusikè, the study of nature. So with Puthagoras of Samos (580-500), who combined music, astronomy and arithmetic. So with the Eleates (Parmenides of Elea (-540/...)). - So also, and most certainly, with Platon.

Wisdom.

- De Vogel, o.c., 3, notes that 'wisdom' preceded philosophy. - Indeed

- ***Bibl.*** : W. I. Irwin, *Wisdom Literature*, in: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, 23: 601, gives an overview of the the sophiologies (i.e. wisdom systems) of the ancient Near East, Ethiopia, Egypt, Canaan, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Iran (in present language Iran is part of the Middle East).

Mesopotamia, from -2900 onwards, with Sumer (the Sumerians were discovered in the second part of the XIXth century) - think of S.N. Kramer, *L'histoire commence à Sumer*, (The history starts in Sumer), Paris, 1975,-- a book that gives splendid examples - and, afterwards, Akkad (more or less Babylonia and Assyria) - see G. Contenau, *Zo levenden Babyloniërs en Assyriërs ten tijde van Nebukadnezar*, (This is how Babylonians and Assyrians lived at the time of Nebuchadnezzar), Baarn, 1979 (o m. o.c., 205vv. (teaching poems, psalms, fables)).

Furthermore: Egypt, from -2770, a.o. with Imhotep and with Ptahhotep (+/- -2400,- - with a collection of proverbs about the “good life” together with its do-ability).-- Canaan (before the Israelites entered it),-- Edom (earlier already Arab territory) are famous for their “wise men”.-- From -1200, with the Judges (we think for a moment of the wise Solomon and also David (-1000/-950)).

F. Wendel et a, *Les sagesses de Proche-Orient*, (Wisdoms of the Near East), Paris, 1963, gives a collection of twelve reports on eastern forms of wisdom in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel.

-- W. Bieder, *Wijshedsliteratuur*, (Wisdom Literature), in: B. Reicke/ L. Rost, *Bijbels-historisch woordenboek*, (Biblical-Historical Dictionary), Utr./ Antw., 1970, VI: 65/70 (on the sapiential or wisdom books in the Bible),

-- C.A. Keller, *Wijshheid*, (Wisdom), *ibid.*, 63/65, defines ‘wisdom’ (in current language: ‘humanism in the sense of “higher education”, general development).

-- A. Volten, *Der Begriff der Maat in den Aegyptischen Weisheitstexten*, (The Concept of Maat in the Egyptian Wisdom Texts), in: *Les sagesses de Proche Orient.*, ((Wisdoms of the Near East), 73/101, speaks of ‘Maat’, an omnipresent soul substance (fine or subtle substance,--also ‘primordial substance’ or tenuous substance.): it governs everything (thus contains information), gives ‘life’ to e.g. the deities (it is thus life-giving substance).--

Volten insinuates that the pre-Socratics (the philosophers who preceded Socrates)- Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes (= Mileziërs), Puthagoras,-- Xenophanes, Parmenides (= Eleates),-- Herakleitos (= Dialectician),-- Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia (Later Physicists) - rationally developing ‘Hylozoism’ (the doctrine of the life-giving soul substance, throughout the cosmos) in the footsteps of Near Eastern sages; --

Hellas is indeed a ‘latecomer’ from -600 onwards, philosophia gets off the ground in Ionia, especially in Miletos.

M.J. Suggs, *Book of Wisdom*, in: Encyclop. Britannica, Chicago, 1967, 23: 600/601, talks about *Het boek der wijsheid*, (The Book of Wisdom), in the Old Testament, situatable between -150 and +50 (according to Suggs): he emphasizes the interaction between Hellas with its philosophy and the Bible with its hokma, wisdom such that within the biblical revelation typically Greek-wisdom elements are 'integrated'. One reason why some Protestants reject the so-called "Hellenic books" as a "foreign body".

By the way: the Jewish-Alexandrian theosophies, with Philon the Jew (-13/+50) in Alexandria, a multicultural city par excellence, -- with the Gnostic-Manichean theosophies (Saturnil, Basilides, Valentinus), -- later on especially the Eastern-Greek Church Fathers will continue this multicultural view. -

Note. - On Old Testament wisdom, G. von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, (Old Testament Theology), Munich 1961, is a very good book. In particular: *I (Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Ueberlieferungen Israëls)*, (The Theology of the Historical Traditions of Israel), 415/439, where a distinction is made between experiential wisdom, theological wisdom, apocalyptic and sceptical wisdom.

Note: -- The Christian East

The Christian East, including Russian Christians, especially through their liturgies, knows the sophiological element much better than we Westerners do. A witness: The thinker Vladimir Sergejevitsj Solovyof (1853/1900), who is an outspoken 'sophiologist', in the line, especially, of the Antique-Eastern and Biblical types of wisdom. -

"The philosophy of the Russians" - meant are Skovoroda (1722/1794), Florensky, Solovyof, Khomyakof (1804/1860), Berdyahev (1874/1948), Bulgakof (1871/1944) - lives from Divine Wisdom. This philosophy wants to be 'sophian' (meaning: wise). --

That is why these Russians reject the Western mechanized 'logic'. Bulgakov calls it "a mania Hegeliana" (meaning "Hegelian madness"). (Julius Tyciak, *Die Liturgie als Quelle östlicher Frömmigkeit*, (The liturgy as a source of Eastern piety), Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1937, 112; see also o.c., 120/123 (Solovjef's theory of wisdom)).

The Sophiological Basic Structure. - No one better than Otto Willmann (1839/1920; great Catholic educator), especially in his *Geschichte des Idealismus*, (History of Idealism), 3 Bde., Braunschweig, 1907-2, recognized the basic structure of Archaic-Antique wisdom. He distinguishes four points of view.

Starting point -

First premise: ‘Archè’, principium, - is the pre-existent (pre-existing, pre-constitutive) wisdom, i.e. the deity (in Paganism the deities with or without a law of the universe (think of the Egyptian measure); in the Bible Yahweh and, New Testament, the Holy Trinity). -

Second premise, traceable back to the divine is nature as realized divine wisdom. Indeed, nature (in the Antique sense of ‘universe’) is considered the ‘wise’ work of divinity, so much so that the careful study of nature virtually implies a direct encounter with the ‘wisdom’ which divinity has imparted to all that surrounds and carries us.

We find this still in Johannes Kepler (1571/1630): the laws of nature are God’s ‘ideas’ (i.e. basic patterns).

Third premise: informational (= cognitive) wisdom, which consists of our human mind - essentially related to divine wisdom for and in nature - becoming aware of this ‘wise’ structure. -

Fourth premise: the deontic, ethical-political, normative, practical wisdom, which consists in our human minds, having come to full awareness of the previous prepositions, living accordingly.

In conclusion, these four points of view dominate the Archaic-Antique and Medieval concept of wisdom. Mythical wisdom, to begin with, is structured in this way.

The biblical and the Greek philosophical types of wisdom further elaborate this mythical conception, on a rational and monotheistic level. Platon, after all, is fundamentally the philosophically oriented thinker par excellence within the Greek philosophies.

The ontology. -

The theory of the overall reality - if it is to be sofiologically structured - will have to realize the interconnectedness of the previous four viewpoints.

All reality has a pre-constitutive origin. It exhibits a ‘wisdom’ (sensibility, ‘rational structure’) which is accessible and comprehensible to the human mind.

It comes through in our minds, the ability to grasp reality as solidified wisdom.

It becomes practical wisdom insofar as we experience reality ourselves and work it out according to ‘wise’ models.

First sample. The platonic 'theoria' (transparency) (07/11).

The preeminent concept is the Paleopythagorean term 'theoria', best translated by our Dutch word 'transparency'.

Applicative model. Platon talks somewhere about the influence of the natural landscape on its inhabitants. Here is what he says about it: "A legislator, insofar as he has an eye for such things, will, when introducing laws, take into account the diversity of landscapes just described. This, after he has

a. examined them by observation, and

b. has gained an insight by doing so.

At least as far as we, humans, are able to do so".

This quotation shows us the two elements of the Platonic 'theoria', translatable by 'theory', insofar as one knows that it is not about mere "speculation-in-thoughts". The term "speculative thinking" is also appropriate, -- again insofar as one takes into account that it is not a "fluid, non-committal construction of ideas".

Historical explanation.

One of the forms of Platonic theory is to understand something from its historical origin (the so-called 'genetic' method). We apply this now. Immediately we are in full Platonism.

1. The Milesians. --

The beginning of all philosophizing were the Milesian "researchers". In particular: Thales of Miletos (-624/-545), his fellow thinker Anaximandros (-610/-547) and his fellow thinker Anaximenes (-588/524).

A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque (Théâtre/ Poésie lyrique/ Philosophie/ Médecine)*, (Greek literature studies (Theatre/ Lyrical poetry/ Philosophy/ Medicine) Geneva, Droz, 1975, 346, says: "However much they may differ from their (Milesian) predecessors and be distant from them in time, it is nevertheless certain that Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425; founder of land and ethnology) and Thøekudides of Athens (-465/-401; historian) worked in the line of Ionian (= Milesian) 'history' (understand: tracing, 'research').

And the kinship of Xenophanes of Kolofon (-580/-490; original thinker) with the mentality of the Milesian set-up is no less evident". So much for the reception received by the first philosophers.

Milesian method. -- River, o.c., 342, says that one must go back to the epic poet Homøros (Lat.: Homer; between -900 and -700) in order to understand certain later uses of language

Indeed, Homer uses the word “oida”, “I know by direct experience and therefore with absolute certainty”, in which the eyes - e.g. observing, the (possibly sharp) watching - play a primary role, but without excluding hearing or the like, -- on the contrary.

Herodotos,

Herodotos, in his turn, distinguishes between, on the one hand, ‘opsis’, seeing with one’s own eyes, and, on the other hand, ‘historiè’, checking, investigating.

Although historia - in non-Ionian usage - originally seems to connect to the questioning of eyewitnesses, its practical meaning is, from the beginning, broader: all research is meant.

“The opsis and the historiè are the two irreplaceable elements of all that Herodotos knows how to tell. He says both “I am informed because I have observed myself” (cfr 2:29) and “I am informed because I have heard (cfr 2:52; 1:20)”. (River, o.c., 345).

Thokudides,

Thokudides, although much more ‘critical’ (i.e. more discerning), goes down precisely the same road: yes, the same word ‘opsis’, which actually means ‘seeing for oneself’, indicates what he knows as an eyewitness and, also, what he knows ‘by hearsay’.

Note: The article *Remarques sur les fragments 34 et 35 de Xénophane* (Remarks on fragments 34 and 35 of Xenophanes), (o.c., 337/367) examines to what extent Xenophanes uses the same language. - possibly with other words (e.g. ‘dokos’, indirect but completely reliable knowledge) -. This only concerns us indirectly.

Especially Xenophanes was - contrary to the historians - concerned with the (indirect) knowledge of

a. the universe and

b. the invisible things (e.g. a deity). But even in that field he remains faithful to the notion of “though indirect yet radically reliable knowledge”. Which, with Platon, we will find again. In this sense Platon, at least this one predecessor, Xenophanes, continues.

Well - says Rivier, a very precise philologist - Xenophanes is radically Milesian. Which means that Platonism, insofar as it emphasizes the invisible and the totality of “all that is”, is then again somewhere very traditional. -

The Platonic method of ‘theoria’, through vision, i.e., through the visible and tangible data urgent insight, ‘understanding’ (if one will), is only the reestablishment of a then already ‘traditional’ way of seeing.

2. The Paleopythagoreans.

Puthagoras of Samos (-580/-500), apparently a very gifted shaman, is at the origin of a revival of the Milesian onset. The concept of 'soul' ('psuche') together with the concept of 'configuration' ('arithmos', very badly translated by 'number'; much better true 'numerical form') are introduced into the concept of 'nature' ('fysis') - which the Milesians had introduced.

This, on the background of some form of choreia, i.e. a song to the rhythm of a dance accompanied by instrumental music. -

This gives: mousikè, musical theory, arithmètikè, mathematical theory, geometria, space mathematical theory, and - last but not least - astronomia, celestial theory. After all, the dance was cosmically oriented, involving the heavenly bodies.

All this on the background of the "microcosm-macrocosm" idea: the dancing shaman follows well-defined geometrical dance steps, ordered in the numerical manner, while humming - the song or the "poetry" - and draws strength from the cosmos to cope with his shamanic task. -

Introduce into the life of such a shaman the Milesian philosophy of nature and ... one has the four primal skills of Paleopythagoreanism, but in the natural-scientific-wise spirit of a Thales and other thinkers.

***Paleopythagorean theory.* -**

O. Willmann, *Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung*, (The most important philosophical terms in historical order), Kempten/München, 1909, 20f., says:

"It is said that Puthagoras labelled himself as 'theates', Lat.: 'speculator'. -- Puthagoras adds: Those who come to the games - not for gain or fame but - to watch with understanding, are 'theatai', watchers.

So that Paleopythagorean theoria - from the Ancient Greek 'thea', direct beholding, and 'oran', seeing - includes: to perceive something

1. so that one grasps the rationally perceptible elements of it and/or
2. so that one perceives the sacred background of it.

We call the first form of theoria, for convenience, "empirical-rational" and the second "empirical-transrational". These terms are not ideal, but they are clear enough given the context.

W. Röd, *Geschichte der Philosophie, I (Die Philosophie der Antike), 1. (Von Thales bis Demokrit)*, (History of Philosophy, I (The Philosophy of Antiquity), 1. (From Thales to Democritus)), Munich, Beck, 1976, 57, confirms what Willmann advocates.-

Thus he says:

- a. to observe the factual data keenly, through the perceptive senses, of course,
- b. in such a way that the order(s) in the same data are clearly revealed, -- that is *theoria*, in the Pythagorean sense. -

That is still “empirical-rational.” But Röd very explicitly mentions an “empirical-transrational” language: “*Theoria* is (among other things) the observance of the initiate(s) of the suffering, dying and rising deity with whom he/she identifies.”

This refers to the praxis of the mysteries, in which, for example, the sensory perceptible images of the humiliated and exalted deity were literally ‘shown’ to those present by the officiating usher/woman.

In today’s ecclesiastical language, this could be called “religious theory”.

Note: As Willmann mentions, the Romans translated ‘*theoria*’ - very correctly, by the way - by ‘*speculatio*’, keen observation. *Theates*’ is translated by ‘*speculator*’, i.e. one who takes up the watch in order to observe suspiciously. Yes, the term ‘*watcher*’ would be appropriate here.

Which means that translating by ‘*speculation*’ - which in our current parlance (apparently influenced by medieval Scholasticism) means “precariously - gambling to form a hypothesis” - is at least misleading. -

Willmann also mentions that the Scholastics translated the empirically transrational meaning of *theoria* by ‘*contemplatio*’, (mystical) contemplation. This meaning still lives on in terms like “contemplative monastic orders.” But with this we are already a long way from the original Paleopythagorean meaning, which was still too close to the Milesian philosophy of nature.

3. The younger natural philosophers.

We mention one of them: Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428), who was very experimentally minded.

He invented e.g. the following experiment -- to prove that air was ‘something’: he filled a wine bag with air and squeezed it until it burst. In this way he made it clear to those around him that ‘air’ was something tangible, or at least that it could be ‘demonstrated’ as a tangible reality.

In the Greek of those days: “*Opsi adèlon ta fainomena*”. Translated and immediately explained: “The knowledge of invisible things is in the knowledge of things that show themselves” -- Always in the line of the Milesians.

Note: -- For more details on the Anaxagorean method (in the context of his philosophy of nature) see D. Gershenson/ D. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Scientific Method*, New York/ Toronto/ London, Blaisdell, 1964, in which both authors - Gershenson as a classicist, Greenberg as a theoretical physicist - try to prove with very convincing citations that Anaxagoras, centuries before our present natural sciences, already had a vague intuition of:

- a. a theory supported by fairly solid facts, including experiments
- b. a summary theory (in the present sense of ‘theory’, i.e. a system or coherent set of propositions) of natural phenomena.

For more details concerning Anaxagoras’ conception of science as an elaboration of the original Milesian, see Fritz Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, Rombach, 1971,-- o.c., 271,145; also o.c. 173 (145), where Krafft mentions Herodotos.

Note: Krafft, o.c., 271, also mentions the Atomician Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370) as an adherent of the postulate “Opsis adèlon ta fainomena” the cognitive access to invisible things are the phenomena (the manifesting things). This is yet another philosophical school that elaborates on the Milesian legacy.

The platonic theoria.

We return to what we started E.PL. 07, i.e. to describe what Platon’s theories are. Wilmann, o.c., 20, says that Platon defines scientific knowledge as “theorètike tou ontos”, the ability to look upon all that is, with understanding and explanation.

Which brings us straight into full Platonic ontology. Indeed: the Paleopythagoreans discussed nature in so far as it could be made transparent and understandable as far as it contained configurations, Platon tried to see the same nature, with its ups and downs (in ancient Greek: genesis kai fthora, literally: coming into being and passing away), in so far as it showed some content of real value (what he called the ‘good’). -

In other words: did something strike Platon as

- a. unreal (void, yes, nothing, unless illusion) and
- b. unworthy (not good, bad, evil, etc.), then he only distrusted, indeed, saw no possibility of science.

Second sample, -- The Platonic Theorem (vista) (12/16).

Thassilo von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, (The culture of the Greek), Köln, Phaidon, 1955, 90 and 120, mentions a lyric poet, Ibukos of Rhègion (= Rhegium) in S.-Italy, who in time came to the court of Polukrates, on Samos.

In passing: Platon mentions him *Faidros* 242c o m. - On Ibukos' name is a poem. -- "Eros, from his dark eye, casts again a moist glance, and, by a thousand deceptions, tries to entangle me in the inextricable nets of Kupris (...)". Kupris - also 'Kupro-geneia', the one born on the island of Cyprus - is Aphrodite, -- with Eros the goddess of love in all its forms, - also the most devouring.

The outcast element in nature. - The concept of fisis, nature, which already included eroticism, was not only grasped by deceived lovers and fiancées. Thinkers too dwelled on it.

1. The eleatic method. --

From about - 520 to - 400 the Eleatic school flourished. Parmenides of Elea (in southern Italy) - (540/...) - is its founder. Let us dwell for a moment on his two-fold ontology.

By way of introduction. -- As W. Jaeger remarks, already Thales of Miletos was concerned with "ta onta", the being, but then in the sense of "all that is available somewhere in all kinds of realities". Thales, and with him the whole Ionic-Milesian tradition, thought of the being within the framework of a very empirically oriented fusiologia, the study of nature.

a. Aletheia: the truth about all that is. --

Parmenides introduces a very new element in the study of nature: 'noein', identify, as a basic concept, 'Noèsis', identification, is the fact that our 'nous' (intellectus, in Latin, -- 'mind') becomes aware of the correct scope of a given, in its singularity or 'identity'.

For example, when someone becomes aware of the right scope of his situation, he 'nous', identifies that situation. He grasps its true essence -- in other words, "Eon" (Parmenides' dialect word for the generic Greek word "on" (being)) is the summary of all possible situations.

That is Parmenides' 'being'. Cfr. A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque, Genève, 1975, 307/322 (Pensée archaïque et philosophie présocratique)*,-- (Etudes de littérature grecque, Geneva, 1975, 307/322 (Archaic thought and pre-Socratic philosophy),--), o.c., 317s., gives all kinds of text-critical explanations.

B. Doxai: The sometimes mistaken opinions of all that is. -

The translation is wrong - says Rivier - if one equates the term, with Parmenides, 'doxa', Lat.: opinio, opinion, with 'error' or 'delusion'.

By the way, Parmenides was not yet a 'hypercritical intellectual'. He did, however, begin to see that the emerging philosophies were prone to error. 'Doxa' - says Rivier - is 'the running-around established opinion insofar as it is prone to all kinds of errors'. The term refers to possible errors.

Parmenides tries to show its origin: logically strict, after all, error begins with some wrong 'choix initial erroné' (O.c., 318), i.e., a wrong 'premise' (though the term 'premise' is not yet in his teaching poem). -

This is 'critical' thinking but within the Archaic mentality. By the way: instead of dissecting the reasoning error, Parmenides introduces a metaphor. "Day-and-night" - a pair of opposites or systechy (from the Ancient Greek ('su.stoichia', pair of elements) functions as a metaphor for logically valid and logically invalid reasoning.

Logic (eristics, dialectics).

The rigorous reasoning of Parmenides sets his pupil and defender, Zenon of Elea (-500/...), on the road to strict logic or doctrine of thought. -

Aristotle, for example, mentions one of Zenon's infamous reasoning schemes: "Neither you nor I (prove all that you claim); Zenon, like his teacher, seizes upon the premises and the deductions therefrom. Which is a very timid beginning of axiomatic-deductive method.

'Eristic'

This will be called - later on, but in the wake of the Zenonic method, among others - "everything that uses the argument on a logical level as a method". This then develops - also in time - into the dialectical method which can be characterized - 'identified', to quote Parmenides - as 'employing logical honest conversation as a method'.

Dialectics', by the way, is the name Platon himself gives to his method insofar as it indeed introduces dialogue as a logical method. -

Note. - At once, on the Archaic plane, something like ideology criticism is born: isn't an ideology a seemingly solid logically built system of reasoning that falters as soon as one sees through its presuppositions as unproven, indeed, unprovable?

2. The Heraklitean method. -

Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465) is rather a case apart. -

Bibl.; A. Rivier, *Etudes de litt. gr.*, 369/395 (*L 'homme et l' expérience humaine dans les fragments d'Heraclite*), (Man and human experience in the Heraclitean fragment), Herakleitos, in his fragments, with one exception (viz. Fr. 12 (o.c., 387/395)), situates human beings in nature, which he interprets in a remarkably coherent way. -

The fuis is governed by one comprehensive premise, the divine law of opposites. In other words, if people do not want to be outsmarted by nature, they should keep this divine law in mind.

a. -- The structure of a human life. -

In the spirit of the Milesians, Herakleitos too, although going his own way, was an observer of the whole of nature, especially that of men. Thus it is abundantly clear: a human life is structured by pairs of opposites (the same, incidentally, as the entire cosmos).

Examples of such “sullapsions” (Herakleitos’ term): health and/or illness, satiety and/or hunger, leisure and/or labour, waking and/or sleeping, -- yes, life and/or death.

The elements of such pairs of destinies are mutually exclusive - he who lives cannot be dead, for example - and yet, somehow, they are also mutually exclusive. Hence we connect these ‘sullapsies’ by ‘and/ or’. -

In passing: W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der Antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, 289, writes:

“The ancients called Herakleitos ‘the dark one’ and not without reason. For - in true Antique spirit - he considered the mystery of totality (note: ‘totality’, in Kristensen’s parlance, stands for ‘pair of opposites’) more important than the rational relations of existence:

“With this Kristensen wants to say the following: there is a peculiar - hidden for most people at least - merging (for the term ‘harmony’ means that) of opposites; this is more powerful than all our ‘rational fuss’.

For, no matter what we try to do, escape from “health/illness” or “leisure/work” etc., -- we cannot do it, even if we put all our minds to it.

b. -- *The doctrine of wisdom of the the universe.*

Through all these pairs of opposites Herakleitos now advances to - what he calls - the 'logos', the wisdom of the universe. Cfr E.PL. 06 (pre-existent 'wisdom').

"With 'God' everything is clean, good, just. But men consider the one unjust, the other just" (Fr. 102). Kristensen cites this excerpt, p.c., 289, to show that there is a kind of 'deity' behind these changes of fate - e.g. someone's health 'turns' to AIDS. -

Because Herakleitos labels this world law as 'divine', living through it in the daily vicissitudes and their "reversals" appears as making oneself feel a 'hierophany' (showing oneself holy), yes, a 'theophany' (showing oneself 'divinity').

Note -- It is clear that Herakleitos here is in agreement with e.g. Aischulos of Eleusis (-525/-456; the first of the three great tragic poets), where this poet speaks of the tragedy - inescapable 'anankè' (= yoke, necessity) - of human life, in so far as it is subject to the whims of divinely willed destinies.

c.-- *The few 'awakened'/the many 'sleeping'.* -

There are rare 'egregoroi', awakened ones - consciousness-raising ones - who keep a sharp eye on what their life actually holds, that law of the universe. Although the life of the unawakened is thoroughly moulded by the divine necessity of the opposites, they do not even seem to realise it from afar. -

Even more: Herakleitos here finds a kind of criticism of the vanguard ('intelligentsia') of his time. Even epic poets, geographers and ethnologists, natural philosophers and the like love to lose themselves in 'polumathiè', literally: verbiage. This, instead of concentrating on the only 'sophon', principle of wisdom, the law of opposites.

d.-- *Divine law, yes; 'humanism', no.* -

Rivier - for that matter also Kristensen - opposes a widely spread Modern opinion, namely that Herakleitos is a purely 'humanist' thinker, for whom "man" becomes the centre of nature.

"On the contrary - says Rivier, o.c., 384 - it is man who, whatever he does and whether he likes it or not, is governed by the law of the universe, the Logos, in that it exists before all other things and establishes what is 'real'".

In other words, Rivier's thesis is clear. Herakleitos must be understood -- not from the mentality of a Modern Rationalist, but from that of his time, the Archaic time, when religion was not yet repressed or suppressed.

Kratulos of Athens. -

However 'dark', Herakleitos was welcomed. So with Kratulos, an older contemporary of Platon who followed his teachings to the end of his young manhood. -
- "One cannot descend into the same stream twice" is one of the slogans of this sceptic.

Things change so quickly - such a view is called 'mobilism' (philosophy of change) - that it is impossible to know and pronounce any real truth of a lasting nature. While one maintains a 'truth', what one is talking about has already changed. -

According to Aristotle, this Heraklitean came to the point that it is better to say nothing and to retreat into silence.

Note: -- Whether Kratulos has correctly interpreted Herakleitos is another matter. Practically, certainly not. It is true that Herakleitos also emphasized 'moving' (Greek: kinesis; Lat.: motus), i.e. changing, but he did not draw a septic silence from this. -

In his dialogue *Theaitetos*, Platon criticises "reclusive thinkers", "averse to immediate reality". For Platon, dialogue and even political commitment to the polis, the city-state, are first-rate. Which proves again - in passing - that 'theoria' is very questionable, translated by 'contemplation' or even 'speculation' (given the current connotations of both words).

Conclusion.

With Eleatism, Platon taught one dimension of the Archaic thinkers, namely ontology, i.e. the study of the concept of 'reality' (called 'being' at the time: "something is", "something is so") in a logically strict way (which Zenon further elaborated with his logical discussion).

The emphasis was strongly on the 'motionlessness' (immutability) of being. -- If one then becomes acquainted with Herakleitos, one comes into contact with 'movement thought' (which Kratulos apparently suppressed very strongly), i.e. the "turning to the contrary". -

This led me to contrast the two tendencies -- Eleatism and Herakliteism -- with each other. Which should not be exaggerated.

Third sample -- the platonic theoria (transparency). (17/21).

As I said, the Platonic transparency method did not fall out of the sky. He himself was the result of a centuries-old tradition. It is therefore not surprising that he knew - as one of his methods of theoria - the “methodos gennetike” (we now say: the genetic method). -

We ourselves have introduced them in the two preceding chapters:

a. immediately we put our Platonism studies to full use (for we apply one of Platon’s methods);

b. at the same time we get acquainted with Platon’s premise, the traditions. Until now we have seen the Milesian natural philosophies and the couple “Eleatism/Heraklitism”. -

Now a fourth factor that makes Platon’s method intelligible, sophistry. -- In Socrates’ wake Platon struggled with it.

The Zeitgeist. W. Peremans, *De Griekse vrijheid* (Greek Freedom), Hasselt, 1978, 14, 19 (*The Crisis in a Free World*), gives the atmosphere in which something like Sophistics -- meaning First or Proto-Sophistics (to be distinguished from Second or Deuterosophistics (under the “Good Emperors”) -- could arise and flourish. -

In his *State* 8: 562v, Platon, as an observer of his time; describes the atmosphere: “I can well imagine that a so-called ‘democratic’ state in its desire for freedom will know no limits. (...).”

“Leaders who have nothing and subjects who have everything to say”: that is the watchword! Such a thing deserves all the praise and honors, -- both in public and in private. - The father gets used to being equal to his son; the son, in his turn, considers himself equal to his father: he neither spares nor fears his parents! After all, he wants to be “free”. - In such a state, the teacher fears the students and flatters them. Meanwhile, the gentlemen students look down in disdain on their professors.

The situation is no better with the home teacher. -- The young are on an equal footing with the old: they take on them in word and deed. And the old people just adapt to the young. They indulge in jokes and laughter: they do not want to give the impression of being petty and authoritarian, -- yes, they go so far as to imitate the young.

Note: Who does not recognize in this ‘theoria’ of human relations at that time characteristics that our time also shows since the cultural revolution?

Kallikles. -- Kallikles appears in Platon's dialogue Gorgias: he is of noble blood, but a pupil of the Sophists. Perhaps he is not a historical person.

In any case, he extraordinarily represents the mentality of the Athenian "jeunesse dorée" (i.e. the rich youth of about -420). (E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), Antwerp, 1967, 61). -

The opposites "law/ nature". -

a. Laws. -- The Sophists Hippias and Antiphon interpreted the laws, in the polis, as

1. the order of nature
2. laid down in terms of man-made laws, -- which in their view remains always defective.

Kallikles, on the other hand, sees them as brakes on the limitless free self-development of the will to power of some strong personality,--brakes invented by a "bloodless mass of weaklings" (sic.: De Strycker, *ibid.*). - Nature. -- Kallikles, taking as his premise the powerful personality, says that the "nomos fuseos," *lex naturae*, the law of nature, is such that:

1. the powerful impose themselves on the others by all means that "justify" the end,
2. the weak "by nature" are slaves in subordination to the powerful.

Animal Model.-- Nature in animals is still discernible in its undefiled state; in humans it is "decayed", "distorted". -- Notwithstanding the appearance of justice, among men, too, in fact, animal morals prevail.

"All the fundamental motives of the philosophy of Fr. Nietzsche (1844/1900) are here in seed" (De Strycker, o.c.62). - Which shows us that the study of Platon is anything but dilapidated, of course.

The sophistry. -

Bibl. :

-- J. P. Dumont, *Les sophistes* (Fragments et témoignages), (The sophists (Fragments and testimonies),), PUF, 1969 (with, among other things, (o.c., 247/251, a precious vocabulary);

-- G. Romeyer - Dherbey, *Les sophistes*, PUF, 1985;

-- E.R. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich/ München, 1977 (// The ancient Concept of Progress, Oxf. Univ. Press, 1972), 113/129 (*Die sophistische Bewegung und das Versagen des griechischen Liberalismus*), (The Sophist Movement and the Failure of Greek Liberalism).

Let us begin with a comprehensive characterization: "The really profound change in the mental life and at the same time in the culture of the Greeks was caused by a widely spread movement (...) sophistry. (Th.von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, 191).

The word “sophistes”, sophist.

-- Semasiologically (word meaning) the meaning group is interesting.--

1. -500/-400.-- ‘Sophistes’ means ‘wisdom teacher’ (a.k.a. naturalist),-- scholar, ‘intellectual’,

2. -400+.-- The term ‘philosophos’ is gradually replacing it. While ‘sophistes’ becomes the name for itinerant wisdom teachers, selling ‘aretè’, virtue.

Note: -- The clearly pejorative meaning dates from Platon and his pupil Aristotle: a certain number of Sophists, as well as a certain slant in Sophistics, were reminiscent of outsmarting techniques of all kinds, including and especially in speaking.

A good translation would be “fallacious”. Think of Aristotle’s work Reasoning’s of Sophists (Elenchoi sophistikoi),-- better translated by ‘sophisms’.

The Sofist performance. –

A Sophist travels from one polis to another. The length of his stay depends on the success he achieves. -- Two types of speech. -

a. School teaching. - This was given to ‘pupils’ in the strict sense (with lessons and exercises mainly in wordcraft). Yet this was not a school. -

b. Causes.- ‘Genos epideiktikon’, ‘demonstrative speech art’; was the name: an epideixis is actually a kind of rhetorical tour de force for a broad audience. -

Note: -- For more information on this subject, see the Course in Rhetoric.

Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410). -

Top figure. -- A Heraklitean.-- Introduction: the systechies (pairs of opposites) of his predecessors. Thus what we know of it, a.o. through Platon’s *Theaitetos*. -

The same wind is, for a strong and healthy person, beneficent, but, for a weak or sick person, it feels cold and sickening.-.

As far as direct knowledge is concerned, both the healthy and the sick are in “the truth”. subjectively, the same wind is beneficent and/or non-beneficial. -- in itself, i.e., objectively, the same wind is “harmony of opposites” (the union of opposing possibilities). Subjectively, however, only one of the two is experienced.

Protagoras generalizes this sample in reality: “Man (individual and collective) is the ‘measure’ (i.e. norm) of the truth about what is in itself contradictory.” -- What is called ‘truth relativism’.

The sensory impressions, however diverse, are all equally “true”, yet they are the reception of situations that are not all equally advantageous. For example, being healthy (and perceiving a strong wind as virtuous) is preferable, whereas being sick (and perceiving the same wind as calamitous) is to be shunned.

The situation of each person (individual) or of a group (the healthy, the sick, for example) is something that in itself, objectively, is different from the point of view of value feelings.

Note -- Protagoras imperceptibly introduces “objective value judgements” here. He does not even seem to have noticed this in his relativization of everything. -

So much for one sample in Protagoras’ thinking which does adopt Herakleitos’ “harmony of opposites”, but apparently evaluates it in a “humanistic” way, i.e. with the (individual and collective) human being as its starting point.

What a difference with the archaic-religious Herakleitos, who saw in it an objective, divine wisdom of the universe at work -- for “as to deities I cannot determine whether they exist or not, for both the obscurity of that fact and the brevity of a human life are some of the reasons why I cannot determine this”. (Fr. 4).

This is a prelude to ‘secularization’, -- to ‘desacralization’ (the denial of the sacred character) of the cosmos and life in such a deity-robbed cosmos. Something that is characteristic of true, thoughtful ‘Humanism’.

Gorgias of Leontini. (-483/-375). -

A most successful Sophist.-- A Zenonist (E.PL. 13).-- In his *On Nature as Non-ideal*, he parodies the Eleate:

- a. there is nothing
- b. if anything existed, it was unknowable
- c. if it was knowable, its knowledge to others was incommunicable. Gorgias tries to realise these three ‘nihilising’ propositions with a firework of arguments that enchants the soul.

Art of Enchantment. -

All art - painting, -- a tragedy, a speech -- are acts of persuasion.-- ‘Psuchagogia’, working, on the soul, is what Gorgias calls this.--

All art is a kind of deceit. A painting, for example, creates a delusion: the viewer has the illusion of seeing something real, “real”. Yet it is only a fiction. An invented, imaginary thing that foretells an ‘artificial world’.

Thus, those who experience the enchantment of a work of art learn about aspects of the world and life that they had never suspected. This then is the 'cognitive' or knowledge value of fictions.

Note: -- When Gorgias speaks of "magic", it is not in the religious sense, but in the sense of magic (illusionism). -

One should not confuse *apatè* with, for example, the performance of an Empedokles Akragas (-483/-423), a thinker who is usually considered to be one of the younger philosophers of nature, but who, like Puthagoras, has shamanistic traits.

With shamans, there is no question of '*apatè*', entrapment, but of real magic that does not 'cheat', certainly not as a game for the amusement of bystanders.

Note: -- Platon returns to Gorgias' *apetè* in the *Theaitetos* and the *Faidros*.- - Here is a sample of the 'philosophy' of Gorgias, who - note - for the rest was an honest man.

Asserting himself. -

According to Dumont, o.c., 247s., the main trait of the Sophist is:

- a. to be himself 'better', the better, and
- b. to make others 'better'. -

But 'better' in Sofist parlance usually means 'more powerful thanks to pinches'. The same is true of the term '*deinos*', which impresses,--again thanks to pinches.

It is as if life takes place in the souls and that one soul - through sophistry - influences the other, especially through all kinds of tricks. -- This type of assertion is at the origin of the fierce reaction on the part of Socrates and Platon, as well as Aristotle.

Final impression. -

E.R. Dodds, o.c., 124f., says: "Sophistics has the same characteristics as the Liberal thought of the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries. The same individualism, the same humanism, the same secularism, the same optimistic critique of tradition from the standpoint of 'reason' as a kind of court, the same great confidence in the application of 'reason' as the key to unceasing progress. -

In other words, Dodds sees sophistry as an Enlightenment movement. Reason' - not as Platonic theory but as 'rationality', i.e. reason directed solely at this earth and its objectives.

Fourth sample. -- the platonic theoria (transparency). (22/30)

So far we have gone over Platon's predecessors. Why? Because one has to put them first in order to understand the Platonic theoria (transparency) -- the last to come is Socrates of Athens (-469/-399).

In passing, with him begins a new period in ancient Greek philosophy:

- a. Socrates closes the pre-Socratics (Lat.: Praesocratici);
- b. he opens the Classical philosophy (-450/+200), a long period, which starts with what is called "the Attic philosophy" (-450/-320).

Socratic method and sophist method.-

Th. von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, Köln 1955, 194f., submarines beautifully.

a. "The contemporaries of Socrates did not see in him so much the fighter of the Sophists. With an 'instinct' for the correct state of affairs, they saw in his combat and in its method rather an outgrowth of sophistry. (...).

The fact that Socrates started from the same premises (in terms of method) as those of the Socrat Enlightenment should not be misunderstood). -

b. (...) The great difference lies in the conscientiousness. (...). By the same method as the Sophists, Socrates strove to banish the nihilistic relativism of the Sophists and to establish an ethics (a theory of conscientious action)".

In other words: Socrates attacked the Sophists, who appeared to be unscrupulous, with their own means but with the opposite intention. In doing so, he -- as von Scheffer says -- applied their method more brilliantly than they did, -- given his genius.

Aristotle on Socrates. -

In his *Metaphysica* M 4: 1078b 17/32 Aristotle summarizes Socrates' method as follows. -- At the same time he was the first to attempt to formulate general definitions for this purpose". In other words: logical definitions in the service of an ethic.-- "There are two points to be considered in the analysis of the virtues.

"There are two points that can justifiably be called 'Socratic' - according to Aristotle:

1. the inductive reasoning and
2. the general definitions. These, in turn, are two premises of 'science' (his starting point)". -

In other words, in order to arrive at universal, universally valid definitions, Socrates had to first take samples in order to

1. a summative induction and
2. generalize them into an amplificatory induction.

Appl. model. -- In the *Hippias minor* 373d/ 374c there is an example which we reproduce as follows. -

A. Summative induction. -

It is about the language of 'skill' (virtue).

1. Socrates asks the question: "When do we say that someone is 'a good (= skilful, sound) runner'? Answer "If someone can run fast or slow at will (because he has mastered running) and thus, if he loses, does not do so out of impotence, we say that he is a good runner. -- That is a first sample.

2. Second question: "When do we say that someone is 'a good wrestler'?" - Answer: "When someone can wrestle badly as well as well, and thus not lose because of the opponent's supremacy".

3. Question: "When do we say that someone "sings well"? Answer: "If someone can sing below his level, but does not do so because he has mastered singing, then he is 'a good singer'."

So much for three samples of language on 'skill'. Socrates can now summarize: "if - and only if - someone masters a domain in such a way that he can act both well (skilfully) and badly (unskillfully), then he is 'skillful in the matter'."

This summarizes the information, the 'knowledge' ('cognition'). That is summative or knowledge summary induction (some also call them 'Aristotelian induction').

B. Amplificative induction. -

Now Socrates can generalize the induction to all, yes, all possible cases of "controlling in such a way that one can act at will rightly or wrongly". -

But then he assumes that in the untested cases the same logical formula will apply. Which is one application of the "hypothetical method": as a hypothesis, one assumes, when generalizing, that an identical cause will be identifiable. -

This step is called 'amplificative' because it extends knowledge that has been gained and tested, and is therefore knowledge-expanding.-- Conclusion.-- This is 'science' in the Socratic sense, by means of induction, to construct a general definition (of the use of language).

Baconian induction. -

E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), 74, says that Socrates' method "is something quite different from what Modern science calls 'induction'". -- What are we to think of this?

-- De Strycker says: Current natural science observes the connection between two phenomena - e.g., a. boiling a bowl of water under normal conditions, b. evaporation of the boiling water at 100° C. -

Referring to Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/1626), e.g. in his *Novum organum scientiarum* (1620), De Strycker says that one of the things that can be observed is that:

If phenomenon 1 (the boiling of water) is modified, phenomenon 2 (the evaporation of boiling water) may or may not follow. The latter is called Bacon “*variatio experimenti*” (modification of the experiment).

Father Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 591, says that the Baconian induction is as follows.

a. One establishes a causal connection between at least two phenomena by means of an experimental method. This is established a limited (singular, better still because more certain, private) number of times. That is summative induction.

b. On the basis of the tested cases one extends to all, yes, all possible cases - here of the connection between boiling at 100° C. and evaporation - : one decides on a scientific law that contains a universal definition of such a connection. That is the amplificative induction.

Note: -- It is not excluded that Socrates acquired some understanding of this: reread E.PL. 10, which mentions the experiments proposed by Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (-499/-428) - in the middle of the fifth century B.C. - to convince the then Greeks of physical phenomena by means of the experimental method, -- in this context e.g.

1. filling a wine bag with air and closing it,
2. compressing the bag further until it bursts. -

Here again a. at least two phenomena, b. a causal connection between them, and this experimentally.

Here too **a**, summative induction (the singular or better still, private number of experiments), **b**, from which can be concluded generalization (further repetitions confirm the won rule: amplificative induction).-

Conclusion. The only difference between Socratic and Baconian induction lies in the fact that, in the experimental mentality of the early Modern sciences, Bacon applies the same induction structure not to (ethical) value judgements but to physical phenomena.

The ethical “argumentum a minore ad maius” (a fortiori). -

De Strycker himself gives “the porridge in the mouth”. Socrates - o.c., 74v. - reinforces or rather specifies his type of induction - especially the human and much more the moral induction - by reasoning as follows.

a. Consider the methods of the Greeks, e.g. in agriculture, shipping, health care, where one relies first of all on men of skill - craftsmen - for the reason of the “good result”.

b. “A fortiori” this should, in conscience, apply in two typically Socratic fields:

a. the education of children;

b. the management of the city-state.

Why “a fortiori” (= all the more) or “a minore ad maius” (= from the less important to the more important)?

Because - at least in his conscientious and civic-minded soul - education and civic responsibility are in a certain sense more important than agriculture, shipping or health care.

After all, the soul is at stake.

Not in order to enchant them - think of Gorgias - by means of enticing methods, but in order to teach them conscience, also in matters of state. -

But watch carefully: Socrates values physical methods. Only he wants to introduce the same rational spirit into areas such as paideia, culture, and politics. Immediately, Socrates establishes the ethical-political philosophy on an inductive basis.

The signifying element. -

Significa’ (Lady Welby) means “the dissection of meanings (in the broadest sense of the word) in the context of processes of understanding. -- the dialogic method is appropriate here. -

Th. von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, 196, says: “Socrates talked to anyone he happened to meet. He - like a spiritual midwife (as he called himself in the line of his own mother’s profession) -- with the appearance of “I know nothing” out of deliberate modesty - discussed at length with his interlocutor some coming topic - usually of a comprehensible nature - right down to the last conclusions, with a sharpness of reasoning such that the interlocutor at the end confessed that he knew much less about it than (the “knowing nothing”) Socrates.” -

Here is a sentence which, although heavily constructed in German, nonetheless makes clear in a single breath the symbolic concerns of Socrates.

The Antique State in Socrates' Life. -

Platon was once fiercely disapproved of for his conception of the state, which was actually misinterpreted. To anticipate Platon's politics, just this. -

“The individualism of the Sophists meant the dismantling of all ethics; the individualism of Socrates, however, gave a basis to the moral responsibility of the individual to the highest possible degree. It shifted in the individual the demands otherwise made by the state. Thus “the wise man” (Socrates) was forced to come into conflict with the State.

The death of Socrates - its causes and justification - are therefore open to very different interpretations. (...). - Deeply religious and as obedient as he was to every law of the State, he prepared with his ideas a very different, indeed an opposite world: perhaps he realized this himself. -

He condemned in the strongest terms the injustice done to him by the State in condemning him to death...and then, with characteristic obstinacy, he submitted to the judgment - a judgment from which he could escape. (Th. von Scheffer, o.c. 196). -

Note: -- It should not be forgotten that, in Archaic times, “the law” of the state authorities was “something very sacred”, -- so much so that, when the first Christians practiced a religion other than the state religion, they were ipso facto “outside the law”; -- this centuries after Socrates' times. -

Platon, as a “good student” of such a teacher, would inevitably - especially in the midst of a self-defeating “democracy” (E.PL, 17: the then deconstructing sphere) show the signs of such a state respect.

Socrates' aura. -

One saw Socrates everywhere: in gymnasias, on sports fields, -- at private symposia. Poorly dressed, barefoot, -- hideous.

And yet: an irresistible attraction, especially the youth came to him.

We think of Alkibiades and read his hymnos (song) on Socrates, -- this, in Platon's dialogue *Symposium*, as W. Windelband, *Geschichte der alten Philosophie*, (History of ancient philosophy), S. 108, says: “His effect on youth was ethical-pedagogical, -- a moral-spiritual ennoblement of Greek boyish love.” -

It is as if a core male radiance transformed the ‘ugly’ Socrates.

Pleasure, yes, but conscience above all, and religion too.

Socrates combated the lust for pleasure, among other things, and above all the lust for power, -- in the name of conscience and morality, -- yes, even in the name of religion.

Says Th. von Scheffer, *Die Kultur der Griechen*, 196: "As a Sophist (at least outwardly or perceived), Socrates values all-knowing highly; even he claims that "he knows nothing" (note: methodical doubt). -- But in order to achieve positive results, to justify ethical presuppositions and somewhere perfectly valid truth, he must appeal to a belief in deity.

Equally 'metaphysical' (note: transcending the visible and tangible reality), yes, almost 'mystical' (note: direct contact with the higher, which may include the divine) is the fact that this objective thinker reveals that he possesses an inexplicable 'daimonion' (note: an extraterrestrial spirit) within him, which in the form of a voice that warns him in time, protects him from calamities".

Note -- It is not only the enlightened rationalism of the Sophists that Socrates possesses! He is deeply ethical. He is deeply religious. Yes, he is psychically gifted with a destiny-defining 'daimon', -- which he calls his 'daimonion' (the diminutive). -- This prevents Socrates from being called a 'rationalist' and the founder of classical rationalism. But historians, especially of the Enlightenment-Rationalist persuasion, willfully conceal the aspect of religion and mantis (psychic ability).-- --

Note: -- The triad "pleasure/conscience/religion" we meet also in the life and thought of Maine de Biran (E.PL. 01), as well as of Soren Kierkegaard (1813/1855; basic figure of Existentialism) for whom it reads "aesthetic/ethical" (religious-Christian)". Which suggests that the structure of Socratic (i.e. Socratic thinking and living) is more than "an old cow in the ditch".

The death of Socrates. -

Bibl. : Romano Guardini, *Der Tod des Sokrates (Eine Interpretation der platonischen Schriften Euthyphron, Apologie, Kriton and Phaidon)*, (The Death of Socrates (An Interpretation of the Platonic Writings Euthyphron, Apology, Criton and Phaidon)), Bern, Francke, 1945. -- A fascinating and even beautiful book. -

Dealings with high nobility (Alkibiades, Kritias, Charmides), thorough criticism of democracy, unsightly appearance, non-conformism (disagreement with prevailing opinions) led to Socrates being disliked by many. His death sentence is therefore not fully explained, but made probable.

Platon, although coming from a high noble family (Charmides was his mother's brother, Kritias his mother's cousin), got to know Socrates from an early age. In time, he fell more and more under Socrates' spell. It became years of deep friendship - and - thought.

This largely explains why Socrates' death as a state condemned man marked Platon for the rest of his life. Therefore a word on his death.

R. Guardini (1885/1968; Catholic thinker), *Der Tod des Sokrates*, (Death of Socrates), 18, says that Platon depicted his revered friend several times and preferably in real life situations, -- albeit as an artist and a very independent thinker.

We certainly need not look for the purely historical Socrates in Platon's dialogues. Which does not prevent the *theoria*, unspoken in Socrates' method, from determining Platonic *theoria*. That is why we dwell on Socrates so extensively. -

In *Sumposion* he draws Socrates as speaking in the midst of a celebration about the highest realities -- in *Politeia* Socrates expresses a profound sense of responsibility for society both as a summary of all individual achievements and as a condition of possibility for each individual achievement. -

In four dialogues, finally - *Euthyfron*, *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Faidon* - he draws the friend-thinker in his confrontation with death, which he has to deal with as a consequence of vital convictions.

The Faidon on the last moments of Socrates.

Faidon 115a/118 of which here is a moving extract. -

When Kriton heard this, he beckoned to the boy who stood by him. The latter went away (...) and after a long time he came back: he led in the man who was to deliver the poison (...).

When Socrates saw the man, he said: "So, my dear, you know very well what must be done". To which the man replied: "As soon as you have drunk, walk around until the heaviness takes hold of your thighs; then lie down and the poison will do its work by itself.

Immediately he reached for the poison cup. -- And, Echekrates, Socrates took it, and did so gladly, without trembling or loss of color or features. As was his wont, he even looked the man straight in the eye and said, "What do you think of giving this drink to someone?

What do you think of giving this drink to anyone? Is it permitted or not?

The man: “We only give as much of it as we think the measure of a drink requires.

Socrates: “I understand that. But one may pray to the deities. Moreover, it is a duty to ensure that passing from this earth to the hereafter is a salutary one. That is the reason why I am praying now. May it come to pass. -

No sooner had he spoken than he began: in good spirits and in subjection (to the state) he drank the cup.

Most of us could until then control ourselves and suppress any weeping. However, when we saw how he drank and how he behaved after drinking, we could no longer do so.

My eyes, too, flowed unwillingly and abundantly with tears, and I had to turn away so as not to show them. For it was not for him that I wept, but for my own fate: henceforth I would have to do without a friend of such high standing. (...).

Socrates said: “What are you doing? You rare people! I sent the women away for that very reason: to prevent them from making a great fuss. -- I have always heard it said that one should die in holy silence. -

So control yourselves and stand firm. When we heard him speak like this, we were ashamed. The weeping ceased immediately. So Socrates walked around. When, as he said himself, his thighs became heavy, he lay down on his back - the man had so ordered.

The one who had brought him the poison touched him after a while and examined his feet and thighs. Then he pinched Socrates’ foot and asked if he felt it. Socrates said no. Then he squeezed the lower legs and went higher and higher, showing us how Socrates became cold and stiff. -

Then he groped him further. He said that if the poison reached the region of the heart, Socrates would die. -- The whole lower body had already become cold. At that moment Socrates uncovered himself (he was covered).

He spoke his last words: “Kriton, we still owe the god Askklèpios the sacrifice of a cock. Sacrifice it and do not forget it”. Kriton: “Rest assured. I will do it, perhaps you will want to say something”.

That question was not answered. Shortly afterwards, Socrates showed convulsions. The man stripped him: his eyes were broken. When Kriton noticed this, he closed his mouth and eyes.

So that was the end of our friend, Echekrates. A man of whom we may say that, compared with all his contemporaries and with all those we have ever met, he was the best and certainly the most intelligent and the most conscientious. -

R. Guardini, p.c., 19, summarises the four dialogues connected with the death of Socrates as follows. -

Platon does not portray Socrates merely “theoretically”. He sketches him “in situations”. ‘Existentially’, Guardini wants to say. Indeed: *theoria*, in the Platonic sense, can only be understood if one situates them in time and circumstances. In this well-defined sense, *theoria* is ‘historical’.

1. -- *Euthyfron* -- Socrates is already accused: in the street just before the court of the archon Basileus Socrates meets an acquaintance with whom the conversation already reflects the coming fate.

2. -- *Apologia*. -- Summoned before the great court of justice, Socrates refutes a number of accusations concerning his life’s mission.

3. -- *Kriton*. -- Socrates is already in prison. A friend comes and urges him, just before the execution of the sentence, to flee. Out of his own - stubborn - sense of duty he refuses.

4. -- *Faidon*. -- Socrates is on the verge of death. In stirring conversations with pupils, Socrates summarises his entire research and knowledge once more. From this dialogue comes the extract, translated above, concerning the last moments of Socrates.

Again: Platon theorises, that is one aspect of his *theoria*; but he shows *theoria* in its life situations. For that, a high figure like Socrates, in whom doctrine and life showed no discrepancy, was the ideal.

Concluding remark. -- We have seen *theoria* emerge, -- from a series of predecessors. Only Sophistics did not really fit in: like the later Sceptics, it already refused, in essence, to pierce through the immediately perceptible data to what lies behind them.

Fifth sample. -- the platonic theoria (transparency). (31/37)

We have seen so far only what the greatest predecessors - After all, there are a few hundred pre-Socratics - have taught Platon.

Now we turn to what his contribution becomes. We say 'becomes', because throughout his life Platon 'evolved': constantly new insights emerged which he made his own in one sense or another.

Fundamental to Platonism is truth. As it was for all its predecessors except in part the Sophists. - In Greek, our term 'truth' is represented by the word 'alètheia', literally: un.hiddenness, the fact that something shows itself as it is. Cf. E. PL. 12 (Parmenides' concept of truth).

Ontological truth. -

'Ontology' - one of the many Platonic concerns is "theory of reality". Whereby 'reality' is taken in the complete or absolute sense: nothing, absolutely nothing falls outside it. Thus, a night dream is 'reality' (even if the waking one says "My dream is something unreal").

Thus a science-fiction novel is 'reality' (even if it is interpreted as pure fiction). So is a wishful dream 'reality' (even though it is said to be disproved by 'reality'). Thus the absurd (the incongruous) is something indirectly 'real' (for mathematicians, for example, do not use the absolute - are of it as a means of proving something as real).

Conclusion.

Do not be like so many, even scientifically educated ones, who think that everyday language regarding 'reality(s)' - 'being' and 'being' - coincides with strict logically defining ontological language.

Everything that is not nothing is something and therefore 'real'. Real in the all-encompassing or transcendental (do not confuse with Kant's 'transcendental') sense of that word. Where outside not only is but even can be nothing. -- In other words, absolute nothingness is absolute or utter nothingness.

"True" -

In the ontological sense, 'true' is an attribute of 'reality' in the comprehensive sense. Everything is therefore 'true' ". What could 'true' mean here? Nothing except 'intelligible', 'sensible', 'non-narrative', 'non-absurd'.

Sometimes people say 'rational'. Good, but that term is too reminiscent of Ancient or Modern Rationalism.

The counter model. -

Supposing something were not directly and/or indirectly knowable and conceivable from any point of view, it would coincide with absolute nothingness. That (imagined) something would be absolutely nothing.

So one can conclude: something is ontologically true in so far as it is susceptible of direct and/or indirect knowledge. -- We do say “susceptible”, “knowable”, “conceivable”. To claim that “all that is” is “true”, i.e. knowable and conceivable in a minimal way, does not mean that it is therefore already factually known, factually thought.

Note - ‘Logical truth’ -- A judgement (statement, proposition) is ‘true’ in the logical, better ‘epistemological’ sense, in so far as it corresponds to the reality on which it expresses itself.

In epistemology, this is called “correspondence theory”, -- also “image theory”: the correspondence between sense and reality expressed in this sense is then called “correspondence” or “image. -- ‘ethical (= moral) truth’.

A conscience, manifesting itself in inner life and external behavior, is then in conformity with the ethical demands of the reality in which it is situated. One can also speak of “moral authenticity”.

Conclusion. -- Both epistemological (commonly called “logical”) and ethical truths are possible -- conceivable -- only insofar as judgment and conscience are situated in an absolutely sensible world -- in “true being”, as the ancients expressed it. -

By the way, what we just said is just another way of saying what is called sophiology (E.PL. 05v.: ‘wisdom’ is sense). Reality is wisdom.

‘**Aletheiologie**’ Some intellectuals like new names for old things.-- Bibl. :

-- Martin Heidegger, *Hegel und die Griechen*, (Hegel and the Greeks), in: Wegmarken, Frankf.a.M., 1967;

-- J.A. Aertsen, *Wendingen in waarheid (Anselmus van Canterbury, Thomas van Aquino, Gianbatista Vico)*, (Turns in truth (Anselmus van Canterbury, Thomas Aquino, Gianbatista Vico)), in: Tijdschr v. Fil. 49 (1987): 2 (July), 187/229. -

For Heidegger, the Existentialist thinker, ‘philosophy’, ‘aletheiology’, is “the bringing up of truth” “Die Wahrheit ist die Sache des Denkens”: the unconcealedness of being (as Heidegger interprets it in his personal way) is the object par excellence of thought (as he interprets it). -- *Von Platon bis Nietzsche*” (From Platon to Nietzsche),- a very popular expression today - one has next to “the truth” as e.g. Heidegger interprets it, of course. In the sense in which this - basically Postmodern - thinker understands it, this is of course entirely correct. -

But that does not mean that “von Platon bis Nietzsche” every thinker - starting with Platon - simply thought alongside reality. One reads, for example, the thirty first pages of this course: for Platon, the pre-socratists who are so much in favor of Heidegger were much closer than for Heidegger.

Intentionality. -

Reality is ontologically ‘true’ in such a way that epistemologically true judgements can be made about it and ethically true consciences are possible. -

All this presupposes that our judgment and conscience acquire direct knowledge of the data of reality. -- Since S. Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; greatest church father of the West), the term ‘intentio’, orientation towards, has been in circulation.

The medieval Scholastics (800/1450) have the following theory about the orientation of our mind (= intellect/ reason, spirit, will). -

Bibl. : Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, 1933-27, 494s.--

a. *The “intentio prima”*. -- When I see a girl playing with a doll, my attention - ‘consciousness’ has been the term used since R. Descartes - is directly focused on the immediately given reality. That is the “first” (“prima”) or still spontaneous orientation.

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b. *The “intentio secunda”* -- When, however, I think of the very attention I pay to the playing girl, then my knowing and thinking movement is loopy, reflexive. Instead of focusing on the first thing, it focuses on the first thing and especially on the given thing, my attention to it.

A thought (“ens rationis”). -

What do I discover when I trace myself in a loop? A something in my mind. For example, my attention for the playing girl. Let us call that an “ens rationis” a thought. -

This thought is twofold:

- a.** it is the focus of my mind on e.g. the girl;
- b.** it is also a subjective content, namely the notion of “that girl over there playing with her doll”.

That content is the representation, image, “correspondence” of what I perceive. That, then, is one example of not thinking outside reality, -- of epistemological truth.

Let us keep this in mind when we turn now to the ancient Greeks.

Note: -- The term “intentional” (“intentionality”) is used in more than one sense.

a. Franz Brentano (1838/1917; figure of the Austrian School) reintroduced the traditional concept of ‘intentio’ into psychology and philosophy, overcoming psychologism and immediately preparing the way for his pupil Edmund Husserl (1859/1938; founder of intentional phenomenology). --

b. Donald Davidson (1919/2003; philosopher, Univ. of California (Berkeley)) uses the term ‘intentional’ in a different sense: on the street, I see someone coming towards me;-- as long as I do not know that person’s thoughts and reasoning’s, state of mind and will, I can - behaviorally describing as a Behaviorist - ascertain his outward actions but, in fact, I do not really know what he is doing.

Well, an ‘intentional’ description style Donaldson presupposes that knowledge: “To know what someone does is to know the ‘reason’ why/why he/she does it”. It is a sort of ‘verstehende’ method (cfr Dilthey).---

Bibl. : F.Buekens, *Het filosofisch project van Donald Davidson*, (The philosophical project of Donald Davidson), in: Tijdschrift v. Filos. 51 (1989): 2 (June), 316/329.

-- Related to this is D.C. Dennett, *The Intentional Stance*, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 1987: insofar as man’s behavior can be interpreted in terms of his “intentional stance” (beliefs, desires, e.g.), Dennett refers to him as “an intentional system”. -

Conclusion. -- Intentionality, in Brentano’s case, views attention as a “subject-object relation” (I, subject, direct my attention to someone towards whom I am going, object).

The intentional description of Donaldson or Dennett views me, subject directed towards an object, from the outside to signify me as I am going towards someone, as an intentional system.

The noble yoke. “Kalon zugon”, literally: noble (clean, in the Platonic sense of “causing wonder and admiration”) yoke (merging). The term is reminiscent of “xu.zeuxis”, two-panel. In that term Platon records a whole tradition from before him.

1.-- Magically noble yoke. -

Bibl. :

-- Th. van Baaren, *Doolhof der goden* (Maze of the gods), (Introduction to comparative religious science), Amsterdam, Querido, 1960, 189/196 (Magic and mantis).

-- James Frazer (1854/1941; religious scientist; *The Golden Bough* (1890)), has tried to classify the methods used in all kinds of magic.

He arrived at a metaphorical method (he calls it 'imitative' (also: 'homeopathic'), and a metonymical method (he calls it 'contagious', 'contagious'). -

In the metaphorical or pictorial method, the axiom is "similia similibus": an original, e.g. an opponent, is worked on via a model, which depicts ('imitates', mimics) him, e.g. a wax doll with a needle in the heart area, of course from a distance, the magician counting on the fact that through the model - the worked doll - the original - the worked enemy - will be reached. -

In the metonymic or contacting method, the axiom "to touch is to draw in" prevails: one smears, with the saliva of a 'holy' (here meaning 'charged with life force', 'power-loaded') person, a stricken part of the body so that this part heals; -- one drinks water, into which the dust of a 'holy' place has been put, so that through this drawing in the whole body heals, -- thanks to this contact.

2.-- Other types of noble yoke. -

Here are some examples.

a.-- Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438; famous lyre poet). -

He labels "the all-seeing sunbeam" as the metron, the measure, of our eyes the moment we see something with it (Isthm. 5:67). -

O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I, 246, says: "Pindaros here anticipates an idea of Platon who says that light

- a. both the eye the image (representation) of things
- b. and things themselves their visibility.

Which is the speculative - meaning: theoretical - interpretation of the doctrine that "the like is known through the like". -- Indeed, the Latin "similia similibus" means "the equal things (original) by means of the equal things (model)".

b.-- The Paledpythagoreans. -

O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.idealismus*, I, 282, quotes Sextos Empeirikos (= Sextus Empiricus) of Mutilene (+/- 150): "The Pythagoreans teach that the mind, insofar as it is trained in mathemata, number forms, is the criterion (measure) of things.

In particular, as Philolaos of Kroton (-469/-399) said, the mind - insofar as it is 'theoria', insight - has an affinity with the nature of the universe, -- since of course "the like (original) is known by means of the like (model)". -- In Greek: "hupo tou homoiou to homoion" (through the model the original).

So says Sextos in his *Against the Mathèmatikoi*. -

Filolaos specifies in a fragment: both the things individually and in their relations are ‘harmonies of number form’, ‘arithmoi’ (configurations which fit well together and can be specified by numbers (E.PL. 09)) -of those that are number-form-harmonies harmonies are in our knowing and thinking mind ‘pictures’ (models of the original in the perceived things themselves).

Thus O. Willmann, o.c., 282. Willmann further elucidates: what constitutes things (= constitutive wisdom), informs the knowing-thinking mind (= informative wisdom); what gives things reality, that gives our mind truth. Read E.PL. 06:

a. nature as realized (= constitutive) wisdom;

b. knowledge as informative wisdom.

For the Pythagoreans, ‘wisdom’ was a con-figuration (geometric in nature) expressible in numbers and showing harmony (good unification). Just as it can be expressed, for example, in Archaic dances.

c. Of course, for the naturally religious Pythagoreans, that configuration was laid down by the deity in nature, in the order of the universe (= preconstitutive, pre-existent wisdom) and was

d. the same configuration the measure (= norm, rule) for action (= deontic, normative, ethical wisdom). -

Immediately we have the fourfold structure of the ancient sophiology or theory of wisdom, in which knowledge is that process by which - through encounter with things - a likeness (model) of the met (contacted) things (original) arises in our mind, which thus acquires ‘wisdom’.

c.-- Parmenides of Elea (-540/...).

Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Science of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, 1971, 237, says as follows. -- Fragment 5 says:

“For the (being) thought and being are the same thing”. Krafft: “Mind and being belong together, -- just like the eye and visible things. -

According to an ancient tradition, knowing and grasping something - in whatever form - only comes about because “what is equal is equal, knows (...). -- Thus also for Parmenides of Elea spirit and being are identical”.

After the above, Krafft ‘s text does not need much explanation: the text of the Eleaat reflects an ancient premise.

d. Platon of Athens (-427/-347). -

Says O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I, 439): “From the old premise - The equal (original) is known by the equal (model) - Platon, in his *Politeia*, connects his doctrine of the unity of being and knowing in the ideas. -

Thus the eye is able to know the sun because, of all the senses, it carries within it the purest form of the sun.

In other words: visibility (note: objective) and sight (note: subjective) are attuned to each other by the great Dèmiourgos (note: in Platon’s language the name of the divine being who created order (= cosmos) in the disorder of things). They are a xuzeuxis, a pair of horses, held together by a noble yoke. -- That noble yoke here is the light.

Read E.PL. 08, where ophis, seeing, is mentioned as a basic fact of the Milesian philosophy.

Note: -- One sees that the Ancient Greeks did know the concept of ‘intentio’, the fact that a subject (the eye) meets an object (what the eye sees): the Platonic term ‘pair’ brought together by a yoke (that which holds together) expresses this metaphorically.

The light of the good (= supreme value). -

We are now anticipating an exposition of the doctrine of ideas. Willmann goes on to say: “What the sun is in the visible world, in the world of ideas (the transcendental or intelligent world) the good without question is the idea of all that is good -- the divinity. It gives -- similar to what the sun gives:

- a. the things knowability (note: truth in the ontological sense; E.PL. 31vv.) and
- b. the souls knowingness. (...).

Note: In the world of ideas, a realm which by its summarizing power governs all possible instances of a set and/or a system, the same law prevails: the twosome, something can be known, and one possesses the capacity to know (object and subject of intentio), has its divine origin there.

Note: O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Id.*, I, 549, says that Platon’s most brilliant but obstinate pupil, Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322), the figure who dominated medieval highscholasticism (1200/1300), adopted the premise of “the same through the same” in the process of knowing.

Sixth sample.-- the platonic order(s) doctrine) (38/46)

We now have an approximate idea of what Platonic ‘theoria’, insight, is.

- The Milesian ‘historiè’ (exploration), which surpasses ‘opsis’ (direct knowledge),
- the Paleopythagorean “theoria” (the comprehension of phenomena in so far as they exhibit “arithmos”, harmony of points that can be represented spatially, expressed as numbers, as the case may be),
- the Eleatic “alètheia”, which passes through the “doxai”, the precarious opinions, to the knowledge of “being” (real, eternal reality), i.e. “truth”,
- the Heraklitean ‘dialectics’, which, through the couples of opposites, advances to a divine law of the universe (‘Logos’),
- the Socratic induction, which advances through the singular and/or private cases to the universal representation (the general concept). -

All these previous forms of thrusting through immediately given phenomena to an indirectly present reality have prepared the way for Platon’s conception of ‘theoria’, Platon’s contribution amounts to the brilliant summary of his predecessors, supported by his - later to be explained in more detail - doctrine of ideas. -

To sum up. - In very different ways our human mind is capable of:

- a.** to perceive phenomena, i.e., immediately evident, because given realities, (the perceptual element)
- b.** so that its background - which can be very diverse, as the list of Platon’s predecessors clearly showed - is gradually or suddenly exposed (the ‘transparent’ element). That is theoria, Platonically speaking.

Dialectic.

Strictly speaking, Platon’s dialectic comprises two elements.

- a.** a harmology, i.e. a theory of order, yes, a theory of order, which concentrates on the relations between the data, prepares the way, as Josiah Royce (1855/1916; American thinker) saw it very clearly and wrote it down (*Theory of Order*),
- b.** a theory of thought (logic), which derives inferences, strictly ordering, from propositions, deals with concepts (illuminated by ideas), judgements and especially reasoning. -

Of course, there is also the broader meaning of “Platonic dialectics”: it refers to the whole of Platon’s thinking, which, however, stands or falls with his order(s) doctrine, which we are now outlining.

Harmology, --

Bibl. :

- E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde* (The Philosophy of Mathematics), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 32v. (Stoicheiosis);
- E. De Strycker, *Beknopte geschiedenis van de Antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), Antwerpen, 103v. (Methods);
- Albert Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 123; 125/129 (Einheit/ Vielheit);
- O. Willmann, *Gesch.d. Idealismus*, I, 390/401 (Das pythagoreische Element);
- A. Mansion, *Kritische studie*, (Critical Study).
- *Ideeën en ideegetallen in Platon's metafysiek* (Ideas and idea numbers in Platon's metaphysics), in: Tijdschr.v.Phil. 6 (1944): 3A, 377/387.

The ontological concept of order. -

Let us begin with a quotation which, in a roundabout way, makes Platon's harmology felt. P.L. Landsberg, *Die Welt des Mittelalters und wir* (*Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über den Sinn eines Zilitalters*), (The World of the Middle Ages and Us (A Historical-Philosophical Attempt on the Meaning of a Cilital Age)), Bonn, 1925, 84/89 (Mathematik) -

The author says, o.c., 84f.: "The whole of reality exhibits 'ordo,' 'order(s),' -- as the realization of a plan. The opposite of 'ordo' is limited to the domain of freedom in so far as it opposes - in 'defection' - any order: only there does disorder reign. - There is first and foremost 'cosmos' (note: The Greek word for "ordered and immediately beautiful world").

- a. If one speaks of disorder, then only against the background of that cosmos .
- b. If opposing, "renegade" realities can create disorder, then only against the same cosmos background. --

The ontological primacy of all that is edifying applies here again:

- a. cosmos without disorder exists;
- b. disorder without a pre-given and comprehensive order is non-existent:

Conclusion - The premise of disorder is a, order, b. insofar as disturbed. One could not, viz., even notice, 'see' disorder as disorder, were it not for the notion of order that enlightens.

Applicative model. -

Not to remain in the general, a concrete example of the fact that Platon orders data. *Filebos* 18b/d.-- "Someone either a deity or a divine man - according to an Egyptian myth, his name was Theuth - noticed that sound was infinitely diverse ('many'). -- He was the first to recognize the following.

1. the vowels - in that infinite variety - are not one but many.
2. There are other sounds (semivowels), which, although not vowels, still have a certain sound value; of these, too, there are a certain number.

3. A third kind is distinguishable: we now call them consonants. -

Then he split up the consonants until he could distinguish each one separately, and did the same with the vowels and semi-vowels until he knew their number too. -- each of them and all together he called 'letters'.

But he recognized that none of us could understand a single letter without all the others, for he thought of the fact that there was a coherence here which made them one.-
- Therefore he assigned to them one science which he called 'speech' (grammar)". -

Note: -- In Archaic cultures, a cultural fact (an invention, a great feat, a heroic event) is attributed to a higher - 'divine' (either a real deity or a psychic (what was called "divinely gifted") - being. Thus, among the ancient Egyptians, the inventor/importer of hieroglyphic writing was considered a 'bringer of salvation', a 'savior'.

The god Theuth or Thoth is worshipped as the 'originator' ('Urheber' (Nathan Söderblom)) of the hieroglyphic system. -- Here Platon expresses a characteristic of his thinking: although beyond myth, he nevertheless linked himself to myth, being convinced that myths too have a 'rational' value.

Analysis. -

a. Note the arrangement: "vowels/ semivowels/ consonants" that form a kind of differential. Now, in Paleopythagorean language, a differential, as an ordered multitude of places with qualitative values, is an 'arithmos', i.e. a spatially orderable set of values.

b. Note the division of totalities into final elements. Note the reverse: the bringing together of such split-up elements under two perspectives

1. each individual (= element) / altogether (= collection),
2. an individual element/all other elements (= system). -

So that we see Platon's two great order propositions at work in the example of grammatical letters :

a. all (collection), o.k. similarity,

b. the whole (system), in terms of coherence. In other words: metaphorical and metonymical points of view. -

We will now explain this a little more, by returning to the terms and such, which were available to Platon at the time.

Note: -- The noticing of similarities is, in Platon's time, centuries old. -- A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque*, (Greek Literature Studies), Geneva, 1975, 347ss. (eoiKota), says what follows. -

A cognizance of the most ancient Greek literature - e.g. Homer's *Iliad* 1:47 ("Apollon descends from Mount Olumpos "as if he were the night"; meaning that he represents the irresistibility and terror of the balladic night); *Iliad* 3: 196 ("Priamos calls Odusseus 'like a ram', similar to 'the thick-coated male inspecting his flock'; indicating Odusseus' temperament and character) - ; a characteristic also of the whole of the subsequent literature is 'the use of comparison as a means of identification'.

Not as a superfluous padding of the text. -- Something out of which the analogical method will grow, relying on comparison and noticing partial similarity and partial difference. -- This - says Rivier - "paradigmatic way of thinking" is visible in the later "rational" literature, cosmology (universe description), health science, political doctrine, -- in the other subject sciences such as geography and history. --

Note: -- Let it be said once and for all: ordering is only possible on the basis of comparing. -

What Rivier says proves that, in Platon's time, the comparative method had been in use since Archaic times, in very many forms. -

Reread Platon's text above and think of comparing phonetic and phonological data.

Holism. -

'Holos', in ancient Greek, means 'total' (either as a collection: all; or as a system: whole).- 'Holism' is a rather recent term... for a very old matter. -

A definition: 'there is a totality when some singular fact is situable in a collection or in a system'. -

Platon's thinking is radically 'holistic'. The perspectives "all/whole" recur again and again, -- without him 'theorising' about it explicitly.

On this we refer to A. Guzzo, *Le concept philosophique de 'monde'*, (The philosophical concept of 'world'), in: *Dialectica* (Neuchâtel, CH) 57/58 (vol. 15:1/2 (15.03,1961), 89ss., where the author writes about Platon's concept of the 'cosmos', ordered clean whole. According to *Theaitetos* 205a the terms 'all' and 'whole' are 'equivalent,' in that both mean 'all parts'.

In the dialogue *Parmenides*, Platon regularly underlines that the reason for this equivalence lies in the fact that one cannot think “all that is one” (i.e. the unity in the multitude, i.e. the totality) without its “parts” and vice versa.- In *Filebos* 15d/ 17a, Platon confirms this thesis: nothing can be thought unless it is a definite number of its “parts”.

In *Filebos* 15d/ 17a Platon confirms this statement: nothing can be thought of except as the well-defined number of its well-defined ‘parts’. This is how Platon understands the concept of ‘cosmos’ - which has been a basic concept in Hellas since the Paleopythagoreans - as a well-ordered and thus beautiful unity in the multitude.

One senses that Platon’s concept of ‘parts’ means both the elements of a collection and the parts of a system.

The ‘equivalence’ of ‘all’ and ‘whole’.

When one reads Platon, one frequently has the impression that collection and system are intertwined. A word of explanation. -- Homer *Iliad* 1:47.

Apollon, bow in hand, quivered arrows on his back, prepares to strike death into the ranks of the Achaians; Homer says “he went like the night”. It is clear:

a. Apollon, as the slayer of men, resembles the irresistible and terrorizing night (which is a metaphor);

b. at the same time Apollon, precisely because of that - through that imitation of the death-seeking night, participates in its killing power (which is a metonymy). In other words: by resembling the killing night he shows coherence with it.

Resemblance and coherence, the basic concepts of collection (common characteristic) ... and system (common whole), are intertwined in such texts. -- In Medieval texts this is called “similitudo participata”, a similitude that contains participation (cohesion).

The ancient and medieval term for ‘coherence’ is regularly ‘participation’ (methexis, participatio).

Note - That Platon stands in a long tradition with all this is proved by Th.L. Heath, *A Manual of Greek Mathematics*, Oxford, 1931-1, New York, 1963-2, 38: “The first definition of ‘number’ is attributed to Thales of Miletos, who described it as “monadon sustèma”, a coherent set of units.

This definition is almost identical with the one of Eukleides of Alexandria (-323/-283; *Elements of geometry*), namely “a collection of units”. Eudoxos of Knidos (-406/-355) defined ‘number’ as “plèthos horismenon”, well-defined collection”.

By the way: *O. Willmann, Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I, 272, writes: the monas (= monad, unity) with the Pythagoreans exists for every number, because in Antique-Greek view the numbers from the two onwards are only really numbers, i.e. a multiplicity of units. Yet that same unity - which is thus in Greek terms no 'number' - is present in all numbers, namely as 'part' of a totality of 'parts'.

Plèthos. sustèma. -

Bibl. : M.A. Bailly/ M.E. Egger, *Dictionnaire grec-français*, Paris, 1903. -- The term 'plèthos' means 'quantity, number', -- let us say 'collection' (for a number is always a collection);--

a. indeterminate quantity but with the intention of determining it: "How big was the 'number' of sheep?"; --

b. certain quantity:

b.1 a small quantity;

b.2 a large quantity, an immeasurable plain, a mass of gold, a great multitude. The latter betrays differential (from small to large).

The term 'sustèma' means both 'collection' and 'system', but with predominance of 'system'. Physical: a bag of precious stones is a 'sustèma' - for the reason of coherence. Biological: the body of plant, animal, man is "sutêma". Culturological: sociological (every group of people (a crowd), every association (guild, league) is 'sustèma', legal (a constitution);--aesthetic a rhyme verse, a musical chord; doctrinal: an exposition that is coherent, a philosophical system.

Stoicheion' . -

Always according to Bailly/ Egger.-- General meaning: "all that is part of a line or rank (order)".

1. The hand that indicates, yes, determines the hour: sundial.

2. The letter not as a separate thing but as a sign that defines a syllable or a whole word (so in Platon's *Theaitetos* 202e: "grammaton stoicheia", the letters of the written word).

3. A factor, i.e. a part that co-determines something (so in Laws 790c, in *Theaitetos* 201: the factors that govern ('determine') the universe; the main points that govern ('determine') a description or story, that govern ('determine') a reasoning - think of Eukleides' *Stoicheia geometrias* (*Elementa geometriae*, *Elements of geometry*), in which point, line, plane and body are such elements. -

By the way: the 'rhizoimata', roots (literally), of Empedokles of Akragas (-483/-423) are called 'stoicheia' by Platon (*Sophistes*, *Timaios*).

“.

Stoicheiosis (elementatio). -

One could translate this by ‘factor analysis’. -

Bibl. : E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde* (The Philosophy of Mathematics), Antw /Nijmegen, 1944, 30, 42. -- A stoicheion, element, is

a. a ‘part’ (element and/or part) of a totality (collection and/or system),

b. in such a way that by putting that stoicheion, element/part, first, the other elements/parts and the whole (collection/system) become comprehensible (‘true’, sensible, conceivable, intelligible, possible).

Thus - strictly speaking also in reverse - the totality is an ‘element/part’ of each element to be put first, because although it is interlocked with it, it is distinguishable, yes, separable from these elements. -- This then is the factor-analytic or stochiastic method of Platon (and already of his predecessors).

The dual meaning of ‘element’. - Beth, o.c., 44, summarizes.--

a. The holistic meaning, -- ‘Element’ (‘factor’) always has to do with totality. In this it is situated. -

Note: -- Aristotle, noting the duality as a nuisance, distinguished ‘element’ from ‘principle’ (premise).

b. The hypothetical meaning.-- ‘Element’ in this sense (if element, then intelligible) is then the same as ‘premise’ (principle).

Note: -- Aristotle also continues the distinction: he uses the word ‘archè’, (Lat.: principium, principle) instead of ‘stoicheion’. Thus e.g. (holistically) “The letters are the constituents of a word” and (hypothetically)

“The letters of a word are, as constituents of a word, a premise of that word which thereby becomes intelligible”). -

Note that although distinct, the holistic and the hypothetical are inseparable.

Authority argument.

E.W. Beth, o.c., 44, quotes G. Milhaud, *Les philosophes-géomètres de la Grèce*, (The philosopher-geometrists of Greece), Paris, 1990, 341: “The point is, in Platon’s eyes, no longer a constituent of the line. It is no longer a ‘stoicheion’. It is a premise, an ‘arche’. -

The point he is criticizing is therefore the naive conception of the geometrical point as “a fragment of a line” (whereby the line is interpreted as the “sum of the line segments”).

Milhaud gets the point, but forgets that stoicheion is also archè.

Note: -- It is obvious, to those who know logic, that the hypothetical meaning of 'element' is a straightforward application of the basic premise "All being has - either within or without - its necessary and sufficient reasons (conditions, premises, 'grounds'). - 'grounds'". Those 'grounds' make something understandable.

Note: -- Sometimes the title of an ancient work can confirm what we just said. -- Aristoxenos of Taras (= Tarentum) (+ -375/.....), a musicologist, was a pupil of Aristotle but influenced, of course, by the musical philosophy of the Pythagoreans.

Titles of his works: *Rhuthmika stoicheia* (Elements of Rhythm. -- *Archai kai stoicheia harmonikès* (Propositions and elements of harmony). -

Which confirms the language of Aristotle, who introduces a distinction between 'archè' premise, and 'stoicheion', element.

Clarification. -

In English 'factor' (also 'parameter') is an element that is put forward to explain something. A factor 'governs' (the original meaning of 'arche' governs everything) a fact.

Appl. model.

a. "The fact that Elsie was very wise is a decisive 'factor' in her life course" (inner factor). -- "The fact that her parents were working farmers was a not to be underestimated 'parameter' in her life course" (external factor). -

b. Converted: "If one puts the factor 'Elsie was sensible' first, then her rapid rise becomes understandable" (the factor lies within her).-- "If one puts the factor 'Her parents were working farmers' first, then one understands that she was rising rapidly" (the factor lies outside her, but works within her).

Mathematical language. -

An element of a set is actually a factor of the set. -- Closer: factor is any of the numbers that determine ('control') a multiplication. For example, in the product '2bc' there are three 'factors'. To factor is to remove the factors from the 'complex'.

General epistemological.

Factor analysis is the method of detecting elements that make up 'correlations' (relationships that incorporate elements). See the case of Elsie above: rise, is a correlation of elements that 'explain' the rise.

The later Platon. -

The already mentioned Aristoxenos - *Harmony* 44: 1/15 - gives, on the authority of his teacher Aristotle, the contents of a speech “On the Good” by Platon at the end of his life.

To the surprise of many, he did not speak immediately of “the Good” (meaning all that is valuable) in human life but of the “numbers” of the Pythagoreans. These ‘arithmoi’ (number-form-harmonies) were the first elements in the framework of a theoria. -- Usually, in Dutch, one speaks of ‘idea-numbers’.

In passing: E.PL. 41 we have heard Guzzo speak of the ‘cosmos idea’ which, according to him, also counts as an idea. Well, this is of the same order: the concepts “one/many”, “greater/smaller” etc. - then basic concepts in mathematics - are decisive in the ordering, as we saw briefly; thus they are situated in the higher world of ideas as informative “elements. Let us briefly analyze Platon’s exposition.

A.-- The model. -

The linguist puts Platon first as a model. -- Not surprising, when we reread E.PL.. Language - according to Platon - is a whole. But, before tackling the totality, he examines the parts which he puts first.

These are:

a. words,

b. syllables,

c. sounds, of which a language can be composed. -

What is Platon driving at with this salutation?

B.-- The original. -

Natural philosophy may be described by what linguistics does: as the linguist dissects the whole language and its elements, so does the true natural philosopher: before describing the whole cosmos, he should trace the elements of which it consists. Thus the heavenly bodies, etc., belong to it.

Conclusion. - The later Platon, who is strongly Pythagorean, holds on to stoicism, factor analysis, which is based on the concepts of “all” and “whole” and everything that comes with it. -

Note -- In this context Platon speaks of the so-called idea numbers (today a subject of controversy), -- for example “the definite one” and “the indefinite two”. Which we will not discuss here. -

Note: -- It is as if the old Platon wanted to build a kind of “mathesis universalis” (R. Lull (1235/1315); R. Descartes; G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716); the more recent logicians).

Seventh sample. -- The Platonic Theory of concepts (47/49)

The Platonic dialectic begins, at least logically, with a harmology that provides the predictions of order and orderliness.

This dialectic continues - again if logically programmed - with logic (theory of thought).

The first chapter - better and more Platonic: 'element' are the concepts.-- So a word about that.

Global view.

V.Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon (Structure et méthode dialectique)*, (The dialogues of Plato (Structure and dialectical method),), PUF, 1947, 41 quotes the Seventh Letter: "As regards every reality, there are three aspects which make it possible to found science of it; that science itself is the fourth aspect.

The fifth aspect is the object itself insofar as it is knowable and real.-- The first aspect is the name,-- the second the definition,-- the third the 'image' (note: understand: copy).

The fourth, as stated above, is science. Note that the fifth aspect, apparently, is the 'eidos' or the 'idea' - both usually translated by 'idea' (also 'being-form' or even 'form' alone) - which is central to Platonism.

Applicative model. -

Immediately afterwards Platon himself says "Let us take an example to explain what I have just said. And - in passing - apply it to everything. -

1. First aspect 'Kuklos' (translatable by 'all that is round', 'circle') is the name in which 'something' is expressed as I pronounce 'kuklos'. --

2 Second aspect -- The essence (definition). A definition consists of nouns and verbs. In this case, "Anything that has extreme boundaries that are everywhere equally far from the centre". -- Thus the definition of being (form) is "all that is round, circular, circle (course)".

3. Third aspect. -- The circle first drawn and then wiped out by one who draws it; the round form first formed and then destroyed by a turner;--

This is the application of the pair of opposites "genesis (arising, ascending)/ phthora (passing away, descending); In Platon's view, something that is subject to that pair of opposites is not an enduring - 'real' - reality, for it is subject to the necessity of ascending and descending.

The term “image” is good in the sense that, in Platon’s eyes, a copy of e.g. “all that is round” is a real representation of the general concept, yes, of the idea.

But - in contrast to the idea “all that is round” - both our concept and a copy are bounded by time: once upon a time we have seen the concept “circle(s)” arising in our mind (whereas the idea “circle(s)” is eternal in Platon’s view, -- certainly pre-existent (“pre-existent”) to our concept of it; -- once upon a time a draughtsman or a turner has drawn something round or e.g. molded it in clay ... long after the pre-existent idea “round” had already existed “from all eternity”).

That is why, in Platon’s language, a copy is only an imperfect and flawed “image”.

In other words, the term ‘image’ contains a pejorative connotation. -- moreover: there are large and small circles! The specimens are either large or small. The idea is neither big nor small, but possibly big, possibly small: the differential is in the concept and much more in the idea itself.

The term ‘specimen’ is good, for it indicates that, out of the infinite size of the idea (and of the concept) all that is round about, one or more applications are brought to the fore, which the infinite collection of all possible circles, e.g., does not even remotely equal.

In other words: specimens are samples (E.PL. 23: summative induction). But they are no more than samples: they draw on the boundless wealth of specimens (and possible samples) inherent to idea (and even to our human understanding of it).

Aspect “science/ transparency/ true opinion” . -

These terms do not mean the same thing in Platon’s language. “‘True opinion’ does not go as deep as ‘transparency’ e.g.

An “opinion” - “doxa”, opinio - is not based on penetrating our mind to the very being itself. There is something accidental about it.

4. Fourth aspect. -- Namely: science, insight and true opinion. -- These three forms of insight -- according to Platon’s further text -- belong together. Reason: they are situated neither in the spoken word nor in material forms but in the souls. -

Consequence: science, insight and true opinion are not the first three aspects (i.e. name, definition, specimen), nor are they “all that is circular in itself”.

Note that both the spoken word and some material form are time-bound: a word begins and ends (comes into being and goes out of existence), a material form begins and (usually at least) ends or decays, whereas the eternal idea has neither beginning nor end. -

The human soul, in Platon's view, seems to be 'eternal' like the ideas. At least it escapes the arising and passing away of anything purely material (such as words or material bodies). With the result that science, insight and even true opinion share in that status (way of being) of the immortal soul.

Aspect of "real reality". -

Says Platon, always in the *Seventh Letter*: "Among the three - science, transparency, true opinion - the transparency is that which, from the point of view of affinity, comes closest to the fifth aspect. The other two are more distant".

Note: -- The "true reality" is not so much our understanding, which arises in our mind according to circumstances, -- which develops in our mind according to circumstances of all kinds.

These concepts, however strictly defined, are but images; indeed, copies of the idea. In this sense, every human conception is like material things compared to incorporeal things.

Even though the human concept of something - take 'justice' - is something that by its purely spiritual character rises far above the material world, it is, compared to the idea of 'justice', only a weak representation: one person interprets 'justice' as "all that the traditions of a people call 'justice'"; another interprets 'justice' as "all that I personally think about justice". And the two can be quite different. -

Yet - says Platon - both concepts converge in a single higher view of "righteous things", namely "all that is righteous in itself", i.e. independent of individual or collective interpretations. That "righteous in itself" is the idea of "justice".

Conclusion. -

a. An idea has something of our human concepts, because they are e.g. equally universal (according to size).

b. But an idea is something that is far beyond our concepts (according to its content): e.g. "all possible concepts" as well as "all possible applications" (understand: achievements,-- 'images; 'specimens) are contained in the idea.

Eighth sample. -- The Platonic Theory of Understanding. (50/52)

So far we have seen that Platon's theory of concepts - apart from samples (images - specimens), which refer to the scope of the concept, and, the definitions which reflect the content of the concept - appeals to ideas. -- The name such a theory of concepts deserves is, in fact, ideative method. -

Bibl. : Platon, *Der siebente Brief (An die Verwandten und Freunde des Dion zu Syrakus)*, (The seventh letter (To the relatives and friends of Dion at Syracuse)), Calw, Verlag Gerd Hatje, 1948, 37.

“What was said earlier in title, by way of example - thus Platon continues with the text quoted in the previous chapter of “all that is circular” applies now, of course, just as much to the rectilinear figure and drawing as to the circular one, -- to the concept of the good and the beautiful and the just -- to all that is corporeal (whether artificially brought about or naturally evolved), -- to fire and water and all such elements, -- to every creature of the animal world and to every individuality of the human soul, -- to all causes and workings. -

V. Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon*, (Plato's dialogues), 5, says: “This delineation of the field of philosophy gives the impression of encompassing the study of all that is but a slight object of knowledge.” Which, of course, is correct. Ideation is an all-embracing process that refers to everything that is not ideas themselves, whose whole is ‘kosmos noëtos’, world of ideas.

Application to artistic work. -

Bibl. :

-- O. Willmann, *Gesch.d.Idealismus*, I, 433f. (Die Platonische Idea);

-- P.Fierens, *Les grandes étapes de l' esthétique*, (The main stages of aesthetics), Bruxelles/ Paris, 1945, 36/53 (Platon).

A.-- O. Willmann,

basing himself on *Politeia* x, distinguishes a threefold character:

1. The idea, also called archetype (‘archetupos’), i.e. the paragon. Platon says ‘paradeigma’, Lat.: paradigm - pre-eminently of something, -- here of an image of a goddess;

2.1. The visual specimen (likeness, image) - in Greek ‘homoïama’, ‘eikon’, we take for instance the two Germanic goddesses Frigg and the later identified Freyja (both goddesses once gave her name to our ‘Friday’, the day of the eros (love drive): ‘fria’ is after all, in Old German, “to make love”).

2.2. The craft or artistic work, -- here e.g. a sculpture depicting the goddesses.

One can immediately see that the craft or artistic 'image' is in its own way a 'copy' or 'representation' ('likeness'), for both the idea 'goddess' and the two living goddesses (who are themselves 'representations', 'copies' of the idea) are depicted in it.

A. -- P. Fierens,

In the chapter on Platonic aesthetics (= theory of beauty, e.g. in art), a fourth aspect is distinguished, namely the artist's model. For example, the two young girls who - in order to inspire the sculptor - "stand or sit" as models. -

Even more: Fierens distinguishes a fifth aspect, namely the design -- in Fierens' language 'idéal' (which is misleading). This design of the goddess image that the artist has in his head, in his mind, is also a concept: it is not just a theoretical concept, but an artisanal and/or artistic concept of "something that has to be made".

Note: -- Let us imagine an artist in close contact with what is now called "New Age". A witch asks him to make a traditional double image - back to back, as Frigg and Freyja were portrayed - for her meetings.

a. The term 'back to back statue' is one term.

b. The notion of a back-to-back figurine that the witch carries in her mind is a second notion that does not necessarily coincide with that of the artist.

c. The notion of a back-to-back statue that he wants to create is a third notion. -
In all three, the idea of 'back to back sculpture' is represented.

Genesis of a design concept. -

The artist who wants to make serious work of the witch's proposal will consult books, articles (a handbook of religious science that deals with the idea of 'goddess', for example).

In these books he might find - if the book is well made, for instance - data about the concept of the 'function goddess' (Usener) or the concept of the 'causer' (Söderblom), i.e. the 'making love' in this case as the domain of both Germanic goddesses.

Furthermore: sculptures in a typical Nordic-Scandinavian style (Viking art). Also, since witches practice magic, information about the fact that both goddesses were magicians, who could influence fate for better or for worse, -- not without connection to the fact that they were also fertility goddesses.

Note: -- In Platon's time there was also the veneration of the Muses, goddesses who 'inspired' artists' work, among other things.

The concept of 'idea' . -

E. De Strycker, *Bekn. gesch.v.d. Antieke filosofie*, 95, n. 39, says: "The terms 'eidos' (op.: view, existence, -- literally) and 'idea' refer to an objective structure, -- not to a representation in our mind,. (...)". He adds a very important remark:

"For a craftsman to do a 'good job', he must 'look at the idea'; it must 'float before his mind'. It must be "present in his mind". - This is how, in the 16th century, the term 'idea' came to be used for "an ideal representation in the mind". Later still for any "concept". This has never been the case in antiquity. -

Note: -- In other words, from a pure Platonic idea, the concept of 'idea' degenerated, in W.-Europe, into a human product.

Update. -

Bibl. : Suren Erkman, *Ce gène qui photocopie l'ADN*, in *Journal de Genève* 26.03.1988 (The gene that photocopies DNA), in: *Journal de Genève* 26.03.1988.-- A gene, which is the originator of an image ('copy') of the human DNZ (deoxyribonucleic acid), has just been released. -

a. Scientists had already uncovered some such gene types in primitive organisms - viruses, bacteria or yeasts.

b. However, this is the first time that such a gene type has been isolated in a human cell.-- The DNZ is a very 'long' molecule found in each of our cells. It contains information.

Note: Translate by 'part-ideas' or 'ideas' - which allow each cell

1. to live and

2. to fulfil its functions.

Now, each time a cell division takes place in our body, this DNZ molecule is required to produce a copy of itself - a "photocopy" if you like - so that each of the cells that emerge from the cell division has all the necessary information at its disposal (...).

-

This is an announcement from the scientific working group at Stanford University that made the discovery. -

Note: -- The DNZ thus contains a pattern, an 'exemplary' (= exemplary) cause (as one began to say after Platon), called 'informations'. Well, that is one example of a real Platonic idea, which is thus not a product of the human mind, but is active in reality as an exemplar ('paradeigma').

Ninth sample -- The Platonic Theory of Understanding. (53/56)

Up to now we have been talking almost exclusively about Platon's conception. -- Now we introduce a comparison. In the dialogue *Hippias major*, 287th, Socrates (basically Platon himself again and again) asks a general question: "What is beauty?". Hippias of Elis (-.../-343), a sophist, replies: "A beautiful girl,-- that is 'beauty' ". -

Note: The Sophists, general rule, did not believe in truly general (= universal) concepts:

a. synchronic, all beautiful things, differ individually to such an extent that one can only 'produce' a kind of faded general image in the mind or imagination (but that is then a kind of artefact, an artificial thing);

b. diachronic, all things called 'beautiful' change, individually, to such an extent that, if one now says that something is beautiful, it may soon have thoroughly turned into its opposite - all that is ugly. -

Conclusion. - In practical terms, the word "beautiful" is a name, onoma, nomen, so that if we define it at all, we are only presupposing a word-based or nominal definition as something very imprecise and provisional.

In other words, it is impossible to give a true or realistic definition.

Explanation. -

Let us examine this sophistical phrase "A beautiful girl, -- that is 'beautiful'" with the eyes of a good linguist, who keeps in mind the tropes -- metaphor (resemblance), metonymy (coherence) and metaphorical and metonymical synecdoche. -- Basically, Hippias says a synecdoche (a metaphorical) out,-- not to admit that there is indeed a minimal and essential generality. In particular:

a. he refers to one concrete sample, some beautiful girl (which he may have in his mind);

b. but at the same time he is also referring to all the other beautiful things: 'co-signing' is the procedure of the 'sun.ek.dochè' (which literally means "I take one copy from the whole collection ('all'), but actually they all come with that one copy").-

Conclusion. -- Hippias hides his logical impotence behind the screen of a figure of speech, the synecdoche.

Now the synecdoche is not conceivable without the notion of 'collection' etc.. But precisely that basic concept of "all" (= collection) is Platon's position.

Actualization. -

Not about “old cows out of the ditch”: D. Nauta, *Logica en model*, (Logic and Model), Bussum, 1970, 258vv, briefly sets out the three main propositions concerning “mathematical thought products”.

a. Martin, with his formalism (= mathematised logic and, immediately, mathematics) is nominalist (like the Sophists, but modernized): the terms of mathematical language are “names”, nothing more.

b. Brewer, the intuitionist, is conceptualist: the terms of the logical-mathematical language are “valid constructions of the human mind”.

c. Cantor, Fraenkel, -- Platonists, of course -- are conceptualists, “logicians”: the mathematical-logical terms cover ideas, independent of what our human mind thinks.

Note: -- Karl Popper (1902/1974), with Imre Lakatos (1922/1974), Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, one of the four famous epistemologists of the XXth century, distinguishes something analogous:

a. the “first world” are the physical things that surround us;

b. the “second world” consists of the totality of human states of consciousness;

c. the “third world” consists of “all that is objective knowledge”. -

Popper - if one reads him carefully - gives the impression to some critics

a/ to be a conceptualist (objective knowledge are first and foremost “valid constructions of the human mind”)

b/ but at the same time a logicist (these valid constructions, once established, create problems independently of us, which are thus not constructed but discovered). Which basically boils down to a. conceptualism b, with a dash of logicism.

Abstractionism (Conceptualism). -

The term ‘conceptualism’ is apparently ambiguous: Nauta uses it to denote a kind of conceptualism; others to denote a variant of nominalism.

Therefore I prefer a clearer term, which is directly indebted to Aristotle and his theory of abstraction, i.e. abstractionism. -- To clarify this position, we take a diversion.

Russell’s abstractionism. -

a. G.J. Warnock (1923/1995), a Berkeley specialist, member of the Analytic or Language Analysis philosophy, criticized the generality of concepts. This, in the long Anglo-Saxon nominalist tradition since J. Locke (1632/1704), the top figure of the Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment, a Rationalism.

b. Bertrand Russell (1872/1970) - then still more or less Platonizing, apparently - responds to Warnock with a journal article *Logic and ontology* (1957). Here is what he says. -

1, Philosophy is much more than mere language analysis,-- by looking up, for example, variations in meaning in dictionaries. Which was a speciality of the language analysts of that time,--

2. Concerning the fact that, according to Warnock, there are only (outside our mind, at least) singular realities, Russell ironizes with a parable (a model of Warnock's original).

"Long ago there was a voice that lived on the bank of a river. Some say that river was called 'Isis' and the tribesmen 'Isidians'. But perhaps that is only a later growth of the original legend. -- The language of the voice knew the words "roach", "trout", "perch", and "pike", but not the word "fish". A group of Isidians who had gone down the river from their home town or further than usual caught what we call 'salmon'. -

A heated debate immediately ensued... Some claimed it was a kind of

Some claimed it was a kind of 'pike'; others that it was "something dark and terrible" and immediately that anyone who mentioned it should be thrown out of the vote. - At that moment a stranger appeared - from the banks of another river - whom the Isidians despised: "In our language - he said - we have the word 'fish' which applies to roaches as well as to trouts, to perches as well as to pikes.

And also to the animal that is causing so much controversy here". -- The Isidians were indignant: "What is the use, they said, of such newfangled words? For everything that we catch in the river we have, in our language, a word. For it is always either a roach or a trout or a perch or a pike. -

You may argue against this viewpoint with what is said to have happened recently in a lower part of our sacred river. But in our opinion, the economy of language (note: all useless words are forbidden) requires a law that forbids the mention of this event.-- Therefore, we consider the word 'fish' as a sample of worthless pedantry.

So much for Russell's biting irony about conceptual nominalism with his assertion of "superfluous . abstract - general terms".

'Abstraction'. -

One should not confuse 'abstract' with 'alien' (although that usage is in vogue).-- With Aristotle 'af.airesis' - e.g. *Anal. post.* 1:18,7 ("ex afaireseos", thanks to abstraction) - the fact that our mind "does not take into account the features that make something merely individual". -

Thus he calls poetry - think of the Homeric epic, of Aischulos' tragic poems - "more philosophical" (i.e. more directed towards the general) than e.g. Herodotos' historiography. Why? Because in poetry, singular persons, events, actions are discussed; but with the intention of transcending the unique towards a general interest (life problems).

It will be argued that historical works can also transcend the singular in a similar way. This is true. Yet the first thing in real, true historiography is not the general but the singular.

That is why, since the 19th century, it has been called 'idiography' (individuology). This, while a tragedy by Aischulos is primarily concerned with a general cultural problem - the 'ananke', i.e. the fact that people who still believe in primitive myths are compelled to commit 'insane' acts that are contrary to common sense and ordinary 'rational' thinking and acting, such as the victimization of Ifigenia in Aulis (a port in Boiotia) by Agamemnon, her blood father, at the request of the goddess Artemis.

The poet Aischulos could just as easily 'portray' the same general problem in a poem that depicts another piece of mythology". The historian, however, when writing about Aristotle's life, cannot just as well substitute another piece of history. He cannot simply 'abstract' from the unique Aristotle.

Back to Warnock's nominalism. -

The voice other than the Isidians who do have the word 'fish' can 'abstract' from 'roach' 'trout', 'perch', 'pike'. To say that a new fish is "a fish", the Isidians have to say - in the absence of the word "fish" - "a non-roach, non-roach, non-perch, non-perch pike".

As a result, instead of saving words (economy principle), there is a waste of words: after all, the term 'fish' sums up and . is more economical in terms of words.

Tenth sample. -- The Platonic Theory of Understanding. (57/60).

So far we have explained Platon's theory of concepts, first on the basis of his own theses on the subject, in the preceding little chapter on the basis of those who disagree with him, viz. the nominalists (from the earliest Sophists up to a Warnock et al.) and the abstractionists (from Aristotle onwards). -

Now we turn again to authentic Platonism. In particular: we tackle a problem that is decisive, namely the lemmatical-analytical method of ideation. The constituents stoicheia, elements - of this method are contained in the two sub-terms:

a. lemma', preliminary hypothesis, and

b. analisis', analysis. -- One can formulate it as follows:

a. one suspects a stoicheion, a factor, at work, but does not know it (the idea of it, the understanding of it are unknown) but suspects and at least situates it in a situation, a network of relations. In other words: a stoicheiosis, a factor analysis, has set us on our way.

b. One puts forward a hypothetical 'concept' (a presupposed 'idea'): "Supposing we knew precisely what 'x' is, we would (...)"

Note: -- Francois Viète (Lat.: Vieta; 1540/1603; one of the founders of modern algebra) is known for the fact that, instead of known digits (number theory), he introduced letters as 'unknowns' (letter theory).

Whoever proceeds in this way, proceeds Platonically: the letters are as many 'lemmata', 'x's', with which one works, although one only knows them through the network in which they are incorporated. -

This, to set the scene and, above all, to show that the lemmatic-analytic method is not an "old cow out of the ditch", but everyday reality in today's mathematics.

John Locke's critique of the idea of 'beingness'-

Bibl. : O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, (Outline of philosophy), Wien, 1959-5, 366.-- J. Locke (1632/ 1704; Anglo-Saxon Enlightenment-Rationalist of Empiricist tendency), as a good nominalist, radically questions the knowledge of being (essence, idea). -

To take pleasure in what passes as 'being', he observed that "the goldsmith knows better - without knowing the so-called spookily improbable 'essence' - what gold is than e.g. the abstractionist or - most certainly - the Platonist".

The answer from O. Willmann. -

We develop, more extensively than he does, his counter-argument. For it is more than worthwhile.

1.-- Locke's right. -

It is evident that a goldsmith, by virtue of day-to-day knowledge, has developed a very accurate understanding of 'gold'. The more details he knows, the more thorough is the experiential knowledge of the goldsmith. -

This is simply the inductive method of Socrates (Platon). And this in no way refutes Platon's thesis.

2.1.-- Locke's Error. -

The goldsmith - or the chemist - on the basis of empirical sampling - summative and amplificative induction - acquires a set of characteristics, the so-called physical-chemical properties of gold, --

The question arises: "What does the goldsmith and the chemist know about gold? That which the abstractionist and above all the Platonist - the ideationist - are talking about, namely the essence (essence, -- Platonic: the idea), formulable in a double-lined formula "all that is gold" (divisible into "all that is is" (the conceptual scope) and "gold" (the conceptual content)). -

More practically: that by which the individual properties in fact constitute a structure, i.e. a whole (system) composed of elements. - If you like: the essence is the metonymy (coherence aspect) of the loose elements. The many 'notae' (parts of the concept), Platonic: part-ideas, make up one and only one coherent idea.

Let us stop for a moment. -

Gold, aurum, is

1.1. a metal,

1.2. with the atomic number in Mendelejev's table of 79. It is

2.1. a metal that is practically unchangeable (resistant to all kinds of natural influences) and yet very malleable ("susceptible to all kinds of molding");

2.2. it melts at 1,063° C. (internat. thermometr, standard), it boils at +/- 2,600° C.

2.3. It is soluble in e.g. mercury.

3.1. It possesses a mass (through which, within the earth's atmosphere) gold 'weighs';

3.2. it possesses, in nuclear chemistry, eighteen known isotopes. And so on! -

a. For Locke, if he is consistent with his nominalism, these are loose, joined-up details.

b. For those who assume a true 'being', this is not possible: the being, which Locke wishes to ridicule, works as a true structure, i.e. it structures, orders, organizes the details into a physical-chemical structure, which is gradually discoverable.

In other words: the idea “all that is gold” is nothing other than the premise of the innumerable repeatable fact that the essential characteristics of “gold” are always perceived together. Such a certain (‘positive’) fact requires an explanation.

Anyone who explains the properties of gold by chance, explains a systemic coherence by chance. An explanation by chance is the poorest explanation in the world (if one can still speak of ‘explanation’).

2.2.-- Locke’s mistake. -

What is true - Locke’s thesis contains this - is that “being” does not become known through sense perception alone. In this sense, being remains “an obscure thing”. -- But this obscurity has a structure perfectly intelligible within Platonism. -

1. For the time being, neither the philosopher (abstractionist, ideationist) nor the goldsmith (or even the chemist, perhaps) can indicate from which basic property (main element) all the properties spring and involve their unity (cohesion). -

Consequence: “In so far the being is an ‘x’, a ‘qualitas occulta’ (meaning provisionally hidden property)”. (O.c., 366). -- Locke is sorely mistaken in imagining that people who believe in the essence of something already know all about that same essence by that very fact! -

2.- The lemmatic-analytic method - often shortened to “analytic method” - is a form of hypothesis formation. -- The goldsmith, indeed the chemist, start from the hypothesis that gold will, at least in the end, be very distinguishable from the rest of reality. -- This dichotomy (complementation):

a. the discriminable,

b. the rest so that the discriminated is not, indeed can be, that rest, comes down to the definition of the essence or being, which is nothing other than “that by which something differs from all other ‘being’ by virtue of preferably systematically related properties”. -

Thus: **a.** Up to now, the properties of gold have been ‘zusammengeratene’ (Willmann’s expression: ‘brought together’) and the essence is as yet a “black box”, of which one knows what can get in or what can get out, but not what the inside is;

b. But at the same time the philosopher - abstractionist or -ideationist assumes that, through patient analysis (the second aspect of the method), the factor that determines unity, coherence - ‘mastered’ - will one day be exposed.

From the nominal to the real definition.-

Bibl. : Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 498s. (Définition de mots et définition de choses). -

1. The verbal (lexicographical) or nominal definition. -

A borderline case is the stipulative definition, which introduces purely arbitrary meanings (e.g. when neighbors agree to call someone “the donkey”). -- A true verbal definition presupposes an existing linguistic system, from which it extracts the necessary and sufficient terms to name a new phenomenon that may arise, --

Appl. model. -- One can define the term “human soul” by saying “the soul of man as man is the principle of consciousness”, -- whereby one puts forward both “principle” and “consciousness” as already defined.

2. The business (scientific) or real definition. -

Here, not only an existing system of linguistic signs (semiological/semiotic) is presupposed, but also business contact with the reality to be defined. -- Not that this method is applied exclusively in scientific work! The “commonsense man” also works in this way. -

Appl. model. The real human soul can be defined in this way: one examines the soul life, by observation of behavior and by the ‘understanding method’ (by empathy through direct encounter). Thus it is established e.g. that the Cartesian definition, which as good as identifies ‘soul’ and ‘consciousness’, is no longer applicable to unconscious behavior, which anyone can establish.

Consequence: once starting from a provisional definition - “principle of consciousness”- one is forced, in the course of analysis (here empirical or even experimental research), to change the definition in function of business contacts.

Who does not immediately see that the business definition is basically the same phenomenon as the lemmatical-analytical method, which according to Proklos of Constantinopolis (410/485), *Comm. in Eucl.*, 1, was given by Platon to the Thasian Leodamas: one assumes the wanted as known, by means of a provisional understanding; one investigates the wanted in order to test the provisional definition against reality.

We always proceed in this way: we presuppose that what is sought - here “the essence” - is already vaguely given.

Eleventh sample.-- The Platonic Theory of Understanding. (61/68)

The further we progress in our investigation of the Platonic theory of ideas, the clearer becomes what R. Van Zandt, *The metaphysical Foundations of American History*, s-Gravenhage, 1959, 125, says.

He quotes Feibleman: “A survey of the history of philosophy reveals that, from one well-defined standpoint, there are only three radically different metaphysical (op.: ontological) positions, which can be taken by anyone at any place or time. Of course, there are more than three.

But all are merely variants of the fundamental three: Van Zandt mentions them: nominalism, abstractionism, theory of ideas.

The tension “identity/higher identity”. -

It has been the same for centuries now: one reader of Platon, situates the higher ideas in the phenomena themselves, while the other situates them above/before the phenomena.

Perhaps Socrates, in Platon’s *Faidon*, is saying the truth: “My starting point is that there is something which is itself -- in itself -- beautiful, -- good, -- great (and so with all other things). -- In my view, it is clear that if there is something beautiful outside the beautiful itself, then it is beautiful in that it participates in “the beautiful”. -- I maintain that this is so with everything”.

Bibl. : C. Verhoeven, *De bekering van Socrates*, (The conversion of Socrates), in: Tijdschr. v. Fil. 48 (1986): 4 (Dec.), 567/582 (in which the author talks about Socrates’ (read: Platon’s) discovery of the doctrine of ideas).

Another emphasis. -

“Platon outlines in the *Politeia* how the highest insight makes it possible to live in a good way (...). Only the contact with the idea of “the good” (...) can keep “virtue” from turning into “vice” (*Politeia* 6: 505a, -- 2:361e; *Sumposion* 212a; *Faidon* 69b).

It is by the grace of learning of that transcendent good that virtue rises above the level of decency and becomes an effective instrument for one’s own well-being. The ‘goodness’ of those who do not seek the good does not amount to much”. (V.Kal, *Transcendence and immanence (Over de mogelijkheid zich iets transcendent toe te eigenen en het te realiseren)*, (On the possibility of appropriating something transcendent and realizing it), in: *De Uil van Minerva* (Ghent) 6:2 (1989/1990: Winter, 118).

Yet another voice. -

“Ideas are prerequisites of knowledge (...). To interpret ideas as prerequisites is to experience that our faculty of knowledge is not capable of formulating this insight, but that our faculty of knowledge is in constant danger of destroying it (‘to destroy’) by trying to give it a ‘positive formulation’”. (V. Rossvaer, *The Laborious Game (A Study of Plato’s Parmenides)*, Tromso (Norway), 1985, 87ff. 83).-

Note: -- It may be known that Platon formulated something only with the greatest reluctance and put it down on paper with even greater reluctance, because, in his opinion, every formulation - given the inadequacy of every human language - degraded the objective truth, especially that concerning ideas. This is the typical Platonic ‘deconstructionism’.

The position of G. Vico (1668/1744). -

Vico is known for his *Principi della Scienza Nuova* (1725), a work that helped to launch the current philosophy of history, among other things.

A.-- In his Autobiography he says that, before all other thinkers, he valued two figures highly. Platon of Athens for his “incomparable metaphysical spirit” and Cornelius Tacitus (55/119; Roman historian) “because he represents the real man in his works of history, -- where Platon also conceives of that same man in his ‘true’, i.e. ideal nature”. -

B.-- Vico insisted on this systechie “ideal/factual”. He was, by the way, convinced that the duality “Platon/ Tacitus” (ideal/ factual reality) can be found in the philosophy of Francis Bacon of Verulam (1561/ 1628; *Novum organum* (1620)).

By the way: Bacon did criticize both the Intellectualist Rationalists, who ‘hovered’ above the facts with their products of thought, and the Empiricist Rationalists, who were submerged by the facts. He felt that only experimental research could overcome these two extremes. What may be called the beginning of healthy ‘experimentalism’.

The view of John of Salisbury (1120/1180). -

He was secretary, counselor and envoy of Theobald and Thomas Becket, archbishops of Canterbury and one of the privileged witnesses of the conflicts between pope and emperor, between archbishop and English king. He was mixed up in the whole cultural life of his time.

Well known is the Renaissance of the XIIth century.

By 'Renaissance' one understands here an actualization, yes, a real reinvigoration of the 'humanitas' (translation for the Greek 'paideia'), i.e. the well educated humanity (understand: to be human), such as, in Latin Antiquity, figures as M.T. Cicero (-106/-43; great orator-politician; Eclectic (= feeding on just about all strains) thinker) and Seneca of Cordoba (1/65; Stoic thinker), -- as P. Vergilius Maro (-70/-19; great Latin poet), P. Ovid Naso (-43/+74 poet), Q. Horatius Flaccus (-65/ -8; poet), -- D.J. Juvenalis (+60/ +130; satirical poet known for criticizing decaying Rome, they advocated.

Well, "the Humanism of the XIIth century was the precursor of the Renaissance.

Note: The 'great' Renaissance is situated at the end of the Middle Ages. (H. Davis, *Thomas van Aquino en de Middeleeuwse theologie*, (Thomas Aquinas and Medieval Theology), in: R.C. Zaehner, ed., *This is how man seeks his God*, Rotterdam, 1960, 110 (where, in passing, reference is made to Fr.B. Artz, *The Mind of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1953)). -

As a description of 'Humanism' one may apply: 'Humanitas', being human, but then understood as awareness of individual and social dignity of every human being (in principle, in disposition), -- also as 'development' (general education) thanks to a refined upbringing), -- even as transformation of the whole middle of life in such a way that the 'humanitas', the raised - refined human - being is facilitated (cfr. the term 'Humanismus' in: G.u.I. Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon* (Stichwörter zur Weltliteratur), Stuttgart, Metzler, 1984, 200f.) -

Note: -- We pause for a moment to define as thoroughly as possible the humanitas which John of Salisbury had in mind when he wrote his works. Only then will it be possible to understand what we are about to expound concerning practical action informed by 'ideals'. --

Bibl. : J. van Laarhoven, ed., *John of Salisbury, Entheticus Maior and Minor*, 3 vols., Leiden, Brill, 1987 (especially the introduction on life and works).

Problem statement. -

Let us begin by looking at the problem from more than one angle. -- One knows the infamous opposition "ideal/reality" (in ontological language: ideal reality/day-to-day reality).

“Ideal” is then something like “a concept - whether or not in the background of a higher idea - insofar as it is situationally thought. Reality’ is then “a group (collection/ system) of circumstances (who?/ what?/ why?/ counter-model or similarity/ paradigmata/ arguments of authority), which together make up the elements of what is now called “a situation”.

Symbol, -- utopia. -

Bibl. : Gertrud von Le Fort, *Die ewige Frau (Die Frau in der Zeit/ Die zeitlose Frau)*, (The Eternal Woman (The Woman in Time/ The Timeless Woman)), Munich, 1934. -

Here the term ‘symbol’ means

- a. the concept,
- b. insofar as it simultaneously encompasses a (higher) ideal. “Symbols” are signs or images (“Bilder”) in which “final metaphysical realities” are not known in an abstract way, but - as in a parable - are represented vividly.

Symbols are at once the language of the invisible spoken in the realm of the visible. At their basis is the conviction that there is a sensible order in all beings and things which is able to come through those same beings and things as a divine order. -- It is precisely here that one hears the language of symbols (o.c.,5). -

Note: -- The term ‘symbol’ here means, in von Le Fort’s parlance, something like “a visible and tangible thing (thus at once singular-concrete and ‘perceptible’) in so far as it represents either an abstract concept, or even an abstract ideal, or, rising above it, a real Platonic idea, as it were, in a visible and tangible manner. --

G. von Le Fort’s application applies to the idea of “woman,” The “eternal” (ideal) woman - in plain language: the ideal (in the very exalted sense) of concrete women - is such a transcendental concept “woman” conceived by deity.

The empirically determinable women somehow embody (‘realize’) the ideal womanhood (which is the idea). The high, yes, God-given idea ‘woman’ is at the same time in and yet above the singularly concrete women. -

Thus they are - in von Le Fort’s parlance - ‘symbols’ of the eternal (ideal) woman: they refer, even if they live low down, to something - “womanhood” - that illuminates her existence and design of life. -- After all this, one sees that von Le Fort is actually a Platonist, though she speaks a language that is not so immediately Platonic.

And now the term ‘utopia’.

Bibl. : R. Bouda, *Kulturkritik und Utopie beim frühen Nietzsche (Rationale und empirische Rekonstruktion eines Arguments)*, (Cultural Criticism and Utopia in Early Nietzsche (Rational and Empirical Reconstruction of an Argument)), Frankf. a.M., Lang, 1980 (since the XVIIIth century 'utopia' has even become a way of reasoning: one moves, thanks to rational 'reason', in an order of the world and life that is considered to be 'better' than the existing order. -

Bibl. : Wilh. Voszkamp, Hrsg., *Utopieforschung (Interdisziplinäre Studien zur neuzeitlichen Utopie)*, (Utopia Research (Interdisciplinary Studies in Modern Utopia)), Stuttgart, Metzler, 1982 (43 proposers commit 55 texts on the theme of all that is utopian since Ancient Greek utopias resulting in the brutal fact that, in spite of ultra-scientific thinking, it has not been possible to arrive at a generally accepted definition of utopia), *De Politeia* (a work on the ideal state by Platon), *De civitate Dei* (S. Augustine), *Gargantua Dei* (S. Augustine), *Gargantua* (Rabelais), *State of the Sun* (Campanella), *Nova Atlantis* (Bacon), *Oceans* (Harrington), *la Salente* (Fénelon), *la Polysynodie* (Bernardin de Saint-Pierre), *Troglodytes* (Montesquieu), *Découverte australe* (Restif de la Bretonne) etc. are the constructions of the mind that design some ideal society. -

One sees that, with such utopias - literally: "ideas taking place nowhere" - one does not get stuck in the realm of high ideas but in that of singular-concrete situations. For the imagining of "better societies" is constructed not with what the high idea "better society" offers (for that remains - as Willmann said - an 'x', a "qualitas occulta", -- in the language of the electricians "a black box"), but with the already decayed materials of what already actually exists.

The Existential Couple "thrownness/ design". -

Existential thinkers have designed a system that concerns us here. -- Man is first of all "thrown", i.e. he/she is situated in a system of circumstances of all kinds which he/she does not "design" (choose). He/she can, however, "design" circumstances, choose them.

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Says J. Wahl, *Les philosophies de l'existence*, (The philosophies of existence), Paris, 1954, 75: "The individual does not 'exist' but he 'has to exist' ". In other words, the individual is a task that he or she imposes on him or herself. -

Note: -- This is a form of utopian thinking, since one starts from given situations in order to design one's own.

Note: -- Utopias - existential ‘designs’ - can also be found in the most current cultural movements. For example: L. Abicht, *De nieuwe Amerikaanse utopia is links en feministisch*, (The new American utopia is leftist and feminist), in: *Streven* 54 (1986: 2 (Nov.)), 106/119.

Three novels - Marge Piercy, *Woman on the Edge of Time* (traditionally utopian), -
- Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Dispossessed* (SF classic and utopian at the same time), --
- Alice Walker, *The Color People* (realistic story, but with utopian overtones) - attempt, each in its own way, to draw an alternative, non-sexist society.

Ideologies. -

A form of design is the notorious ideology.-- The term dates back to Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754/1836), who launched the word in 1796 and made it more famous in his *Elements d'ideologie* (1801/1815) .

Since then, the term has been subject to all kinds of circumlocutions, of course. But the core around which everything keeps revolving is something like this: an ideology does differ from

- a. religion (in the traditional sense),
- b. philosophy and
- c. professional science, but in such a way that it takes on the appearance of them.

It is a system of thought that likes to assume “common allure” -- with the seriousness of a religion and the profundity of a philosophy. -

Bibl. :

- S. Breton, *Theorie des idéologies*, Paris, Desclée, 1976 (a philosophical study);
- M. Amiot et a, *Les idéologies dans le monde actuel*, (Ideologies in the current world,) DDB 1971;
- L.J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination*,. Chicago, 1972 (Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx as co-respondents to XXth century ideologies);-- --
- K.O. Apel u.a., *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, (Hermeneutics and Ideology Criticism), Frankf. a.M., 1971 (in depth);
- R. Laermans, *Marx on ideology* (The ‘Kapital’ cycle reread), in: *Streven* 54 (1986): 2 (Nov.), 130/138;
- K. Marko, *Ideologische Umrüstung* (Anmerkungen zum politischen Vokabular der Chruschtschow-Aera), (Ideological retooling (notes on the political vocabulary of the Khrushchev era)), in: *Wort und Wahrheit* XII: 5, 273/284 (An evolution in the Soviet Union);
- J. Huige/ P. Reckman, *Het rijk van de vrijheid* (Bouwstenen voor een nieuwe sociale ideologie), (The Empire of Freedom (Building blocks for a new social ideology)), Baarn Anthos, 1985 (an anarchist book that tries to glue together ecology, the peace movement, the women’s movement and other “social movements” from typically anarchic-small-scale situations into an ideology: from “the ashes of capitalism, ‘the (anarchist) empire of freedom’ will rise”).

The reverse way of thinking: 'Realpolitik'. -

One knows the systeche "moralpolitik/ realpolitik". -

Bibl. : E. Faul, *Der moderne Machiavellismus*, (Modern Machiavellianism) Köln / Berlin, 1961.-- Nicolo Machiavelli (1469/1527) was 'Humanist', but in a business sense. "Is -understand "for the state(s)" - all that is useful from the point of view of the state, 'good' or not 'good'?"

A realpolitiker answers: everything that serves the state is ipso facto, at least for the active politician, 'good'! You see, it is a restrictive judgement, i.e. the affirmation is subject to a caveat: "at least for the active statesman". -

It is also called 'state utilism', - from the Latin 'utilis', which represents usefulness. This state utilism gives priority to the concept of state welfare, possibly in the radical conscientious sense of the term, but it establishes that, in fact, an ethic - a morality - is in more than one case impossible, impracticable, without harming the state community.

In other words: the ideal is - in many cases - a mere utopia! With the emphasis on "taking place nowhere".

Note: -- As we know, "Realpolitik" is a very comprehensive concept: state policy, economy and above all military necessity - not without the emphasis on "being forced" - constitute the situation in which the ideal, however high-minded, must find its "topos", place.

Now everyone who follows actual politics a little knows that the Utopia of Thomas More (Morus (1478/1535; Humanist-Catholic, who would not renounce his faith under the pressure of the English sovereign and was beheaded for it) is unworkable to a sometimes very high degree. -

Conclusion.-- Renaissance Humanism included both a Machiavelli and a More. Which points to the radical dual nature of that cultural movement.

The opposing pair of John of Salisbury.--

Bibl. : Roll. Barthes, *L'aventure semiologique*, (The semiological adventure), Paris, 1985, 143s.-- Steller brings this up in the context of traditional rhetoric. John of Salisbury argues that, if one thinks carefully, one must keep two points of view in mind.

a. Thesis (positio, thesis), i.e. the situational view (understanding). E.g. "It is valuable to marry".

b. Hypothesis (causa, situation, practical context). E.g. “It is valuable for

Carine to marry”. If this Carine is a human being of flesh and blood, situated, then it is clear that the “principle of the value (= ‘goodness’) of marriage” is not so simple ... in its execution.

The Scholastics (800/1450) knew the oppositional pair “ordo intentionis” (the viewpoint of the (good) intention)/ “ordo executionis” (the viewpoint of the (good) execution of the (good) intention).

According to John of Salisbury, the discussion of the “thesis” - an abstract judgement - belongs to the “dialectics” of his time, whereas the discussion of the “hypothesis”, i.e. the totality of the circumstances to be considered (if one wants to understand an act), belongs to the “rhetoric” of his time.

In other words: in principle it is valuable to marry; but in fact it can also be of no value to marry. Imagine that our Carine is not thinking of marriage at all, -- that she feels called to a monastic life, -- or that she is a lesbian. These singularly concrete circumstances help to determine the “goodness” which Platon keeps talking about. -

Note: - John of Salisbury’s pair of opposites has stuck in Church-Scholastic thought: on the one hand, in contrast to e.g. The pair of opposites of John of Salisbury has lingered on in Church-Scholastic thought: on the one hand, in contrast to e.g. the positivist (who knows no ideals, but only positive facts) or the nihilist (for whom the ideals, values and ideas are ‘devalued’) or the cynic (who denies them shamelessly, scorns them as naïveté), Church-Scholastic thought holds on to a (possibly Platonic) norm (ideal); on the other hand, in contrast to some utopian way of thinking, the same tradition holds on to the fact that there are circumstances which permit what, without those circumstances, would be radically illicit: b. e. legitimate self-defense (one may, in conscience, kill the one who wants to kill first himself).

The latter -

Situational morality, perspectivism (Nietzschean, Marxist (think of Lenin’s ‘morality’)), contextualism - goes down very easily today.

The first -

High morality - is experiencing a profound crisis today. Since Marx, Nietzsche, Freud e.g., the state is, for the Anarchist, a fiction and, for the Positivist, a purely factual reality. The Anarchist rejects every State as evil; the Positivist, if consistent with himself, considers every State somewhere feasible.

Twelfth sample. -- The Platonic Theory of concepts. (69/74)

Light doctrine. -

Already with the Paleopythagoreans, among others, the ‘arithmoi’ (the numerically determinable configurations) are the ‘light’ that illuminates the nature of things. -- The model. -- Sensory perception is, in its essence, ‘opsis’, direct experience (E.PL. 08; 37), whether or not updated by ‘historia’, research. -

The original. -

Similarly, with the Pythagoreans and with the Platonists, there is direct perception of the human mind. “What the sun is in the visible world, that is in the invisible the highest and even all-encompassing idea ‘the good’ (understand: all that is valuable)”. As already indicated, E.PL. 37: the objective knowability (‘truth’) of the data, on the one hand, and the subjective aptitude for knowing, on the other, stand or fall with that mysterious transcendental ‘light’. -

Note: Later, S. Augustine (354/430) and S. Bonaventura (1217/1274) will rename the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine of light as ‘illumination metaphysics’. -

Note: reread E.PL. 05v. (the fourfold wisdom), see that this is another way of saying it.

The triad “mystical/ rational/ ethical”. -

In his *Geschichte des Idealismus*, III, 1032, Willmann says the following. -- The basic elements of a theologically grounded worldview and philosophy of life are:

a. The mystical element, which is surrendered by the all too worldly Enlightened Rationalism and obscured by some pantheistic Monism (which claims that everything is ‘god’ and therefore one); -- faith for the ordinary believer, mysticism for the psychologically gifted believer are the access to God’s ideas;

b. The rational element, which, in its investigation, is hindered by Empiricism (mere sense knowledge), Sensualism (the senses in themselves are, as it were, the world itself) and most certainly by Modern Materialism (which knows only the gross substance);

c. The ethical element, which, in its attempt to live in conscience, is educated and informed by the religious-mystical element as well as by the rational-investigative element, is hampered, among other things, by Autonomism (the self-satisfied enlightened spirit radically guides itself).

Note: -- We have put this threefold characteristic of all genuine doctrines of ideas first, because in that way the true purpose of what follows would be sufficiently clear to the mind.

Medieval - scholastic tripartite 'realism' . -

The basic term 'universalia' (universals) indicated the 'quinque voces'; the five designations (concerning general concepts). Genos' (lat.: genus), 'genus', (meaning universal collection), -- 'eidos', (lat.: species), 'species' (meaning private collection). These are the ordering concepts, which for Platon correspond to 'all' and 'whole' (E.PL. 41: holism). -

The rest:

- a. 'Diaphora' (Lat.: differentia, distinction, difference);
- b. idion' (Lat.: proprium, individual property);
- c, "sumbebékos" (Lat.: accidens, accidental property). -- These five terms are called 'universalia' because they relate to the universality, (generality) of the concepts.

The question of conflict. -- Contrary to non-experts of medieval thought, we have to say that the stakes of the discussion were very fundamental (as one Feibleman clearly said).--

1.1. Nominalism. -

Our words - terms (terminism) - do, indeed, exhibit a kind of 'generality', that of mere 'voces', 'flatus vocis' (what is uttered with the voice, i.e. names, sounds, -- breaths).

Thus in one word - 'cock' - we bring together all the singular representations of singular cocks that we meet (sound singularity).

In antiquity, the Sophists, the Kunics, the Stoics were of this opinion: there are only singular things, for which we invent names so that the same sound-form brings together more than one singular thing. But without being able to verify that identical features are present in the things themselves. -

1.2. Abstractness. -

Our concepts show a kind of 'generality' which is the summary of what is really identically present and thus verifiable (i.e. the general form of being) in the singular data. Thus we summarize in one word, - one term (which may be a plural of words): 'cock' is that which is identically detectable in all empirically determinable cocks.

2. Ideationism.

Both singular things and their general essence are present in our general concepts only insofar as we presuppose an idea of them, which justifies their content of valuable ('good') reality ('being'). Without the idea of a 'cockerel', 'cocks' will never appear in the nature around us as specimens of it.

Let us take a clear example. -

Every spring we have the spectacle of snowdrops bursting through the frozen or at least chilly snow with the warm beauty of their flowers. Seen through the eyes of Platon, the following happens.

This snowdrop here and that there and those snowdrops over there apparently show something that makes them distinguishable from the rest (the essence form). More than that: collectively, as a collection, they are very much identical.

And still, more: every time a snowdrop deviates from that ‘pattern’ (= essential form), we see that almost immediately. For example, a snowdrop was once run down by inattentive pedestrians but survived and ... it shows a deformed form.

The ‘pattern’ that we call ‘snowdrop’ is such that it not only summarizes as a collection, but also as a normative-axiological (making value judgements possible) allows us to label a snowdrop as ‘not beautiful’. In other words, it has partially lost its ‘value’. In Platon’s language: it still participates in the good (the valuable reality), but in a more imperfect form than all other, ‘normal’ snowdrops. -

In that deformed snowdrop, one can still see the shared form of being with the other snowdrops, but in such a way that that same form of being forces us to make a rather negative value judgment.

Note: -- “The involvement of the concrete in its idea is indicated by Platon in three terms: presence, participation, exemplarity. (E. De Strycker, *Beknopte gesch. v.d. Antieke filosofie*, (Concise history of ancient philosophy), Antw., 1967, 97). -

Applied:

a. in every snowdrop the idea of ‘snowdrop’ (better: “flawless and valuable snowdrop”) is present (‘parousia’, praesentia),

b. as a paragon (norm) - as an original of which the singular snowdrop shows us a (possibly distorted) model - and thus as a ‘paradigma’; (paragon-like form of being);

c. as a result of which we can say in summary: “This singular snowdrop - with all its congeners - participates in the comprehensive, valuable (‘good’) idea ‘normal and valuable snowdrop’.” Which includes ‘methexis’, participation, in the idea.

Explanation.

“The essence (note: understand: idea) of the circle is pure and perfect what it is. The circles of our world of experience, on the other hand, do not exhibit the same curvature at every point” (E. De Stryker, p.c., 96). -

This proves that, according to De Stryker, even a mathematical entity (= given) - which, according to Platon himself, is the best way to grasp the concept of “idea” (because a mathematician constructs his concepts - point, line, plane, body e.g. - to a certain extent himself) - once it is materially found in the world of experience, never quite corresponds to the definition, let alone to the idea (which in the definition is expressed in an approximate way).

In other words, this shows that even realized mathematical entities are susceptible to value judgements not only by the definition (which defines ideal entities), but much more by the idea (which is already represented in the definition imperfectly, not entirely ‘good’ (valuable)). -

So that, seen Platonically, e.g. the idea ‘circle’ is actually “universally valid and valuable circle”, present as original of all possible models that ‘share’ it. Which represents the three main features of the “idea/copy” relationship.

Explanation.

What is true of mathematical ideas/copies is true a fortiori (all the more so) of non-mathematical ones. -- Take the at first sight simple concept of “white”. One will hear it said: “That wall is white”.

But if one looks at that wall exactly, it soon appears that e.g. a fly has put its black dots on it: it is white - roughly speaking -; but - strictly speaking (and this is the method of theorizing) - that wall is not definitely white, but “approximately white”. Which means that the “white wall” specimen is actually a “not-so-good specimen of white wall”. -

Note: -- Until the end of his life, Platon insisted that only mathematics - though of his time, of course - provides the most direct route to the theory of ideas.

Apparently because it is only in mathematics that one gains any understanding of the ‘akribeia’ so necessary for the doctrine of ideas, strict accuracy which compares each instance of an idea extremely accurately with the idea in its absolute ‘goodness’ (perfection, value).

Note: Does one now understand the scope of the doctrine of light: did we not say, E.PL. 69 (37), that the idea “the good” (the unquestionably valuable real) works like a light which “illuminates” both the ideas and their copies? For every idea is one realization (copy) of the good, which, if it is what it is and should be, it ‘shares’. Again: medieval ‘realism’.

Now that we have dealt with the third view of concepts, ideationism, in some detail, we can explain what this famous ‘realism’ is. -- In the more mature phase, the Scholastics, at least the conceptual realists (the Nominalists excluded themselves), formulated it as follows.

1.-- *Forma ante rem.* -

Literally: “the form of essence for the ‘res’, i.e. what is given in experience.”-- This is apparently a Platonic remainder, for the Middle Ages situated the ideas “in God. -

Note: 1. For Platon, ideas were hypotheses (presuppositions) to explain how it was that a multitude of data could be summed up and judged according to ‘goodness’ (value). The idea was “all that is generally valid and good”. As an original to which the models refer. About which they provide ‘information’. -

2. Only later, much later, are ideas situated by some thinkers “in God” instead of in the purely scientific realm of hypotheses. It is only Albinos of Smurna (100/175; in the time of Middle Platonism) who situates these “hypotheses” in God.-- In the wake of this interpretation - a true circumlocution of great magnitude - the Fathers of the Church, who think Platonically, and some Scholastics situate the “forms for their copies” in the God of the Bible (Yahweh, Trinity).

Thus O. Willmann, *Die wichtigsten philosophischen Fachausdrücke in historischer Anordnung*, (The most important philosophical terms in historical order), Kempten/München, 1909, 68, can say: “Formen vor den Dingen, d.i. die Ideen, die vorbildlichen Gedanken Gottes” (Forms for the things, i.e. the ideas, the exemplary thoughts of God).

2.-- *Forma in re.* -

These are the identical realities found in all copies of a collection (“genus”), which can then be represented in a general concept.

3.-- *Forma post rem.*

This is the concept that our mind forms.

The three together -- before, in, and after things -- make up the more mature Scholastic realism.-- However, there were, as always, one-sided ways of thinking: some Platonic realists had an eye only for the forms of beings for the experienceable data, noting that some made the ideas into “beings” for things (which, if Platon is interpreted objectively, is hard to do).

Some mid-century thinkers were Aristotelians (assuming forms only in, not forms for, things); finally, some were Nominalists who, in fact, assumed no universal form -- neither in nor certainly not for things.

Application.

To clarify that the universals discussion in Scholasticism did touch upon essentials, the following.-- O. Willmann, *Abriss der Phil.*, Wien, 1959-5, 130, summarizes the Decalogue (Ten Commandments) as follows. -

1. The first three commandments.

God, as omnipresent authority, is “taken seriously” (this is the etymological meaning of ‘re.ligio’ (the opposite is ‘neg.ligio’))

- a. inwardly, by real conviction (first commandment), there
- b. externally, in all that is speech (second commandment)
- c. externally, in some liturgy (third commandment).

2. The six.... following ‘prohibitions

The traditional wording indicates the counter-prohibitions (‘avoidances’, taboos):

- a. reverence for parental authority and the children,
- b. avoidance in the context of living together:
 - i, do not commit ‘sin’ (= violation of the inviolable character) against the person (fifth commandment), the family and the home (sixth commandment), against all that is available (seventh commandment);
 - ii, do not commit sin against the right to truth (eighth commandment);
 - iii. do not sinfully desire sexual pleasure (ninth commandment) or possessions (tenth commandment).

O. Willmann notes that the first commandments pass from inner conviction via speech to behavior, whereas the last prohibitions reverse the order: from behavior via speech (eighth commandment; “do not lie”) to inner desires.

Nominalism, abstractionism, ideationism. -

For the consistent Nominalist, the formulas are “words”; for the Abstractionist, universally valid “verifiable concepts”; for the Ideationist, “God’s ideas.

Thirteenth sample. -- The platonic theory of language. (75/77)

True to our method, we bring out some curious points.

Bibl. :

-- B. Mojsisch, Hrsg., *Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter*, (Philosophy of Language in Antiquity and the Middle Ages), Amsterdam, Grüner, 1986;

-- W. de Pater/ W. van Langendonck, *Natuurlijkheid van de taal en ikoniteit (Platon en hedendaagse taaltheorieën)*, (Naturalness of language and ikonicity (Platon and contemporary theories of language)), in: *Tijdschr.v.Fil.* 51(1989): 2 (June), 256/297.

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Again: the pre-eminent question for Platon is: “How really ‘good’ (valuable) is a name? How is a name really ‘good’? (This points to existence and essence).

By way of introduction. --

R. Rehn, in: *Mojsisch*, o.c., 63/119, speaks about the connection “onoma (name)/ pragma (reality intended by a name)” and “onoma (name)/ logos (sentence, text, in which a name is incorporated)”. This, from Parmenides of Elea (-540/...) over Protagoras of Abdera (-480/ -410) and Prodikos of Keos (-465/...) to Platon and Aristotle.

Platon continues this tradition. This all the more so since D. di Cesare, in *Mojsian*, o.c., 1/16, talks about the linguistic conception of Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465), who notes that “a part of reality is a sign for that same reality”.

B. Mojsisch himself speaks, o.c., 35/62, of Platon’s dialogue *Sophistes* in which the “dialectical” use of language is discussed: where the Sophists, with their rhetoric, abuse the names, Platon stands for the really “good” use of them.-- About which more in the course Rhetoric.

The dialogue *Kratulos* - after the name of his Heraklitean teacher - is discussed in B. Mojsisch, o.c., 17/34, where it is claimed that the dialogue is not about etymologies (Ross) or about the enigma of language phenomena (Heidegger), but about the essence of language.

From the original, reality, the names are in principle ‘models’ (preferably really good models). Model’ does not mean a too narrowly understood imitation (‘mimèsis’, imitatio), but rather a useful representation of reality.

Stoicheiosis (factor analysis). -

Reread E.PL. 44 (Stoicheiosis) and 39 (application). Platon, in the *Kratulos dialogue*, takes painting as a model of the original language.

1.-- “This is also how painters work”.

If they want to work out a resemblance, they sometimes apply a layer of purple, -- sometimes also this or that color. But it also happens that they mix many colors: e.g. when they prepare a flesh color or something like that, -- I think: according to each portrait and its requirements. -

2.-- In the same way, we attach the irreducible sounds to things: sometimes just one sound - where necessary -, sometimes many at once (which then amounts to the so-called syllables).

We also connect syllables in turn (from which names and sentences are then formed). -

With these names and phrases we then continue to connect: something grand this time, something beautiful, -- a whole. -

Just as we, a moment ago, thanks to the skill of painting, put together the living being, so too, now, thanks to the skill of names - or art of speech (rhetoric) or whatever the skill may be called - we put together reason:

Note: -- One sees: it is the same ‘stoicheiosis’ (= holistic factor analysis) as in the Filebos dialogue (E.PL. 39). But here a model precedes, the painting.

The theme of the Kratulos.

1.1. Kratulos - in the Heraklitean sense - states that the names “by nature” represent reality, - especially the names of the primal language. -- There is, in the beginning, a primeval mankind, who founded a primeval language.

Herakliteans started from such a primal language to arrive at the true reality. Method: to etumon (the original meaning or, at least, the true sense of a word) through the now surviving words. To uncover the primal meaning in this way is ipso facto to gain insight into the true reality.

1.2. Hermogenes, a student of Socrates, on the other hand, says: “I, in my turn, arrive at no other proposition than the following: “The truth of a name is nothing but agreement and understanding. (...).”

No name, after all, comes “by nature” (“fusei”) to any given thing. That name springs from custom and usage (‘nomoi kai ethei’), -- from those who confer it and those who accustom their fellow men to it”. -

2. On which Platon takes a stand. He rejects both extreme propositions. - It is not from names that “really good” philosophy of language proceeds, but from that about which the names provide information.

After all, we often know that some words are not really good models of reality. What does that (un)consciously suggest? The fact that we have an ‘opsis’, a direct knowledge, of the real things (E.PL. 08, 37, 69), which can be improved by historia, research. Thus we compare the model (the name) with the original (the reality intended by the name).

Conclusion.-- If one knows the reality and through the names and directly, then the direct knowledge is still preferable.

The primal language.

A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 63f., says as follows. -- Platon argues that primordial mankind consists only of “wise men” (= those gifted with insight) so that its insights, laid down in the primordial words, are by that very fact “good models” and a source of matter-of-fact knowledge for all later generations, is to be rejected. -

1.-- Primal mankind, in order to be able to render things real, must, in any case, itself first possess in its mind the idea which acts as a higher light in those realities. -- Well, as the first in line, she could not rely on pre-existing and valid words. -

2.-- The hypothesis that the very first names of things “emanated from ‘god’” (‘god’ in the Platonic sense, -- not in the Biblical sense), is refutable, for the singular words refer to contradictory basic understandings of true being. One class of words expresses unceasing change; the other class, perpetual unchangingness. Thus, to claim that early mankind was “closer to the divine world” than we, later mankind, does not hold water.

The overall conclusion is:

- a.** indeed, there is arbitrariness in the use of words;
- b.** but there is nothing to prevent henceforth calling “straightforward” what is really straightforward. Linguistic consistency, once established, is a necessity.

Note: -- Curious: de Pater/ van Langendonck, a.c., 264, say that Kratulos’ thesis that words have ‘iconic’ value (pictorial sense) is upheld in re-established form by Ch.S. Peirce, while Hermogenes’ thesis that words are arbitrary creations is taken up by de Saussure (*Cours de linguistique*).

So that against the background of Platon’s Kratulos, one can still engage in language theory today. Again, “no old cow out of the canal”!

Fourteenth sample. -- The platonic doctrine of judgment. (78/83)

One might object: "Why dwell on what Platon thinks about judgment (the proposition, the sentence, the statement)? For an answer, see J. Derrida et al, *La faculté de juger*, (The ability to judge), Paris minuit, 1985.

The title of this work refers to I. Kant, the Enlightened Mind in Germany, and to J.F. Lyotard, the Postmodernist. -

The question six writers want to answer is:

a. The XXth century has as its main characteristic the dismantling of traditional ideals and values, thus it is in deep crisis and lacks any standard by which to judge;

b. What about the power of judgement that man thinks he has? Scientifically, aesthetically and artistically, ethically and politically, judgement is examined in this gloomy light. -- Perhaps a Platonic conception of the matter will help: just reread E.PL. 17vv. (the spirit of the age), from which it appears that Platon of all people has also lived through a cultural crisis. --

Judging requires as a prerequisite, among other things, the certainty that one can see the truth and, if necessary, prove it in an argument.

Bibl. :

-- A. Mate', *Kritische Studie : Platons semantische Lehre* (Critical Study : Plato's semantic doctrine), in: Tijdschr.v.Fil. 51 (1989): 4 (Dec.), 696/702;

-- L.M. de Rijk, *Plato's Sophist (A Philosophical Commentary)*, Amsterdam, 1986;

-- G. Prauss, *Platon und der logische Eleatismus*, (Plato and logical eleatism), Berlin, 1966. -

Which again shows how Platon is still, in all kinds of fields, read and thought through.

Pindaros. -

A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque*, (Greek Literature Studies), Genève, Droz, 1975, 292, clarifies how this lyric poet (E.PL. 35) understands a sentence. The 'onoma' noun usually - as a model of an original (a true event) is central. The 'rhema', verb, proverb, is an auxiliary expression, as a secondary model that highlights the main model, the subject: it happens that the verb is not even expressed or even that it is used merely 'amplificatively', the same with other words. -

So that the nominal and the verbal component (to speak with Chomsky) are only references to a reality and this so that the subject is almost everything. It is good to keep this in mind when examining Platon's theory of judgment, because it is very similar to what Rivier just said.

Platon. -

The stoicheiosis, i.e. the explanation of the totality that is an utterance, revolves around three elements: onoma (a word that means something (i.e. serves as a model)), rhèma (a further definition of the onoma, usually called “verb”) and logos (the meaningful utterance itself as the whole of the two). --

But, as with Pindaros, so with Platon: a logos, sentence, concerns a pragma, a fact, about which the sentence speaks. -

Note: -- In the analysis of judgment to which logicians accustom us, it is called this: the subject is the original (the not or less known); proverb is then what gives information about the original, the subject.

That is - in passing - a good analysis -- but - note - Pindaros and Platon are not actual semioticians! For them, the original, the unknown or lesser known, is not the subject - onoma - of the sentence, but “to pragma”, the matter on which the sentence expresses itself. And the whole sentence is “model” because it provides information about the pragma.

How then is the sentence to be understood? As follows. -- The onoma, subject, is a (preferably good) model of the pragma i.e. that on which the subject ‘strikes’.

Even more so: as in Pindaros, the subject is as good as everything. The proverb - rhèma - is a secondary model - via the subject - of the pragma, the thing about which. -
- In other words, a sentence “is not seen in terms of signification (semiotic/ semiologic), but ontologically, i.e., in terms of reality. Its centre of gravity lies outside him. Not in him, as in the signological view. -

Note: -- The intentionality (E.PL. 37: the noble yoke) is central. If you like - but in a radically objective sense - the view is phenomenological. That is why we have dwelt at length on the structure of the noble yoke: the like (original), here the pragma, the objective reality, is known through the like (model), here the whole logos (with onoma and rhèma).

And this is thanks to the light of the good, the truly valuable. The “really valuable” here is the fact that, although a sentence has a sign value (the sign theorists are really right), it is entirely in function (=service) of its being value (the ontological orientation of the one who expresses himself about some reality (the subject)).

That is why Platon defines 'sophistry' as "the skill of using words to present a deceptive, enticing false reality.

Cfr. E.PL. 19 (pejorative meaning: specialist in fallacies); 20 (magic art of Gorgias).
- The Sophists were the first real theorists of signs: the statement itself, apart from its ontological orientation, is one; the "pragmatic" use and also abuse of the statement is two.

But "philo.sophia", Platonic philosophy, is science - "theoretike tou ontos" (penetrating insight into being) - and thus immediately communicates really valuable data also through words, but now as signs referring to real reality.

Conclusion. -

In the midst of the deep crisis of values ("crisis of the good"), Platon restores the doctrine of judgement of a number of sophists: man, if he puts in the necessary effort, is indeed capable of making valid judgements.

And here we find the burning topicality of Platon's doctrine of judgement: Derrida et al. doubt whether, in the crisis of the XXth century, one can still pronounce valid judgements. With the necessary effort, yes! (Cfr. A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 124f.).

Appl. model. -

Eleatism (Parmenides, Zenon; E.PL. 12v. (The Eleatic Method) had, like Herakliteism, great authority: had it not introduced strict-logic thinking? That strict-logic - as we have seen (E.PL. 72 ('akribeia') charmed Platon. And yet: the logical analysis of judgements in which the verb (or noun) 'to be' occurred, led him to a formal break with Elea. -

Bibl. : A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 125ff.-- At a certain point in his development - he was constantly evolving - Platon sees the wrong definition of 'to be' (especially as an auxiliary verb).

Thus e.g.: "This wall is". - The Eleates - and many a thinker with them - saw in this a total identification: 'wall' and 'being' are one, and only one, the same. No - this is how Platon sees it: - "This wall is" means "This wall is (being one among a multitude of being)".

Here 'being' emerges as an idea: although 'being' is the light that shows itself in the wall among others, it does not only show itself in that wall as an omnipresent light: in all 'being' - also outside that wall - it is present as an all-embracing idea, in and at the same time above all being.

Identity theory. -

What Elea introduced stands or falls with what is now called 'identical' (or still 'analogous' (= partly identical partly non-identical)).

In other words: either it is about the fact that something coincides with itself (and that is total identity) or - certainly in logic as a theory of reasoning - it is about the fact that something partially coincides with something else (and that is analogy or partial identity).

Appl. mod.-- In the spirit of the Eleates, one reasons, with regard to judgments, as follows. -

a. "This is a yellow gentian." --

The 'onoma', subject, is 'this' (indicating the totality of a given); the 'rhema' (saying) is "a yellow gentian" (which again, but with new input, otherwise the expression would be a 'tautology' (saying the same thing twice), expresses the totality of the given).

b. "A yellow gentian can be found on the high mountains of the Alps and Pyrenees". The subject is "a yellow gentian" (apparently intended as a synecdoche: all other yellow gentians are included); the saying "is findable ..." expresses this time not the total identity, but part of it. --

The term "coincide with". When the great logical tradition speaks of 'identity', then, it is about 'coinciding with'.

a. 'This' and 'yellow gentian' coincide (total identical expressions).

b. "A yellow gentian" and "(is) found on the high mountains of the Alps and Pyrenees" do not coincide as a whole,-- but they do coincide partially. In particular, the place where a yellow gentian can be found is precisely the same as 'the high mountains of ...'.

In other words, both yellow gentian and high mountains are part-identical or 'analogous'.

Note: -- Now it is so that our explanation is not the Eleatic but the Platonic, namely, the Eleates (and with them an impressive number of thinkers) invariably confused total and partial identity; consequently, a phrase like "This wall is white" seemed to them to be an untruth (indeed: "this wall" and "(is) white" are not total-identical but partial-identical (analogical)).-- That very fact stands behind Platon's criticism of the Eleates.-

Note:-- In Platon's language, "identity" is easily "total identity" and "methexis", Lat.: participatio, participation (being part of), is the term for "partial identity" or "analogy". -- With that in mind, Platon's language becomes clear.

Identitive theory.-- .The term ‘identitive’ means ‘everything that has to do with identity’. Thus the terms ‘identical’ and ‘non-identical’ or even ‘analogous’ are identitive terms.

Bibl. : G.Jacoby, *Die Ansprüche der Logistiker auf die Logik and ihre Geschichtschreibung*, (The claims of logisticians on logic and its historiography), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1962. -- Jacoby, in Eleatische line, defines logic as follows. -

1.-- Logic begins with the definition of the term ‘logical’.

In traditional logic (which differs from logics in that it includes a harmology), when do we say that something is logical? Whenever that “something” is a valid inference (consequence, derivation, decision) from propositions (in Platonic language: hupotheseis, hypotheses).

The German ‘folgerichtig’ can be translated by ‘correctly’. “reasoned correctly”. Thus, someone is “consistent with himself” to the extent that he derives the correct - valid - inferences from his own premises.

2. -- Logic clarifies the term by a conditional sentence: “if then ...”. There are two main types of this.

A. Deduction, -- If A, then B. Well, A. So B.--

Model: if it rains on the alpine meadows, the yellow gentians get wet. - That is, logically quite correct, because necessary,

B. Reduction. -- If A, then B. Well, B. So A.--

Model: If it rains on the mountain pastures, the yellow gentians get wet there. Well, the yellow gentians get wet there. So it is raining on the mountain pastures. -

This is logically a conjecture: one establishes a fact (the gentians get wet) and, given a connection (if it rains then it gets wet), one concludes the ‘explanation’ (a lemma, a provisional hypothesis), i.e., it rains. -

In the deduction - well, it rains; therefore the yellow gentians get wet - there is logical necessity; in the reduction - well, the yellow gentians get wet; therefore it rains - there is logical probability; nothing more (non-necessary).

3. -- Logic says that the derivation puts identity first. -

‘Raining’ and ‘getting wet’ are a multiplicity, not identical. But through the causal process - raining begets wetting - they are one (exhibit unity in the multiplicity): the place of wetting gentians and the place of raining coincide.

Identical judgement doctrine. -

What has just been said of the reasoning, is actually already true of the judgment. -
- “This wall is white. The wall and (the color) white are a multiplicity, -- non-identical. But the place where the wall is and the place where white is coincide. There is identity. There is unity in that multiplicity.

The terms ‘one’ and ‘many’ are in antiquity synonyms of ‘identity’ and ‘non-identity’.

The concept of ‘being’ is identitive. -

As an auxiliary verb, ‘to be’ is an identitive verb. It expresses either total identity: “what is white is white” or “white is white”, or partial identity: “this wall is white”. -

Eleatism, while searching and groping, recognized this. Platon clearly understood the distinction between ‘identity’ (understand: total identity) and ‘partial identity’ (understand: partial identity, analogy).

Note. : -- This is also clear from the use of tropes, metaphors (the resemblance is the identity: “The alpine flower is there” (when someone shows a yellow gentian: the yellow gentian belongs to the collection of alpine flowers, which all have the same characteristic)), -- metonymies (the coherence is the identity: “The remedy for congested stomach is there” (when someone shows a yellow gentian: this flower, if taken via gentian drink, relieves the digestion, -- which shows that yellow gentian and digestion belong to the same system)).

Platon’s holistic thinking is identitive. And has two directions.

A. The factor analysis (stoicheiosis).

In stoicheiosis, ‘all’ (a collection) and ‘whole’ (a system) are broken down into elements and/or parts. The totality partly coincides (is part-identical) with the elements or the parts.

B. The induction. -

In the induction, the summative especially, samples are taken in ‘all’ (collection) and ‘whole’ (system) so that one examines the totality, probes, on at least one element or at least one part, thanks to direct knowledge,-- if necessary supplemented with historia, further research. -

Again: the totality partly coincides with the elements or the parts. There is also partial identity between the elements, as the case may be.

Conclusion. -- Once clarified, Eleatism is apparently a strong basis for the theory of judgement and reasoning.

Fifteenth sample. -- The Platonic Doctrine of Judgement, (84/88)

We live in what is called “a multicultural”. More than one culture, with its ideas and values, claims, as in Platon’s time, to possess “the truth”. -

Now, Zenon of Elea is known for a discussion scheme: “neither you nor I”. Each of these cultures does, to some extent, prove its “right”, but none gives convincing, decisive proof (= an “apodictic” proof, in Aristotle’s language) to all men.

Now the theses of such cultures are as many judgements. -- Let us see if Platon has not left something somewhere on the subject.

Bibl. : G.J. de Vries, *Plato’s beeld van de mens*, (Plato’s image of man), in: Tijdschr.v, Fil. 15 (1953): 3, 426/438, -- de Vries is a connoisseur of Platon who has a special eye for what may be called the restrictive judgment, i.e. the judgment with reservations. Says de Vries: As with Platon, every judgement always evokes its corrective judgement, which results in a restrictive judgement.

Appl. model. --

1. The judgment. -

“All the mourning play (tragedy) and merry play (comedy) of our life” Platon says somewhere. As he describes in the *Faidon* (the beginning). - Here, no doubt, sadness after a life full of disappointments is spoken of, but also joy. -- de Vries explains further. -- The reason: man, before he incarnated on earth, lived through “a blissful spectacle and sight” and, in the memory -- “anamnesis” -- of this, he seeks something like it again.

Conclusion.

- a.** Platon can conceive of life on earth as a ‘play’ (mourning and/or merry-making);
- b,** he sees it as a ‘mixture’ of mourning and gladness.

There is more: “man is a plaything of the deity”. In Platon’s eyes this is even the best aspect of man: he maintains this judgement “with the deity in mind and impressed by it”. -

In the same order of things - according to de Vries - Platon sees the artist’s life as a ‘game’. Yes, the *theoria*, the insight that penetrates into the essence of things, is actually “a higher form of play”.

2. The restrictive character. -

- a.** The supreme idea, namely the good (the value without more) is the only idea which is unmixed good,- the pure good. Here a restrictive judgment is unthinkable.

b. All other ideas are mixed, -- a harmony of “good and not good”. Ambivalent’ - two-faced. -- so the game.- ¬The game has positive meaning, but it always has negative meaning as well.--

Conclusion. -- de Vries says that Platon, at the sight of such a game situation proper to earthly life, adds to the hedonistic aspect (which the game always is) an ethical corrective: the conscientious life. The game that is our life should take into account that our life is also a series of moral decisions.

The memory of the pre-existent game (situated before this earthly life), the living through of the present earthly existence as a game, the preparation for the future, more noble game, can by no means replace the ethical seriousness of the choice for the moral good. -

Note: -- What de Vries calls “game”, it would be better to call “spectacle”, in which man is absorbed. Reread E.PL. 09 (Pythagorean Theory).

Note: -- Read E.PL. 25 (a-fortiori argument). Reread especially E.PL. 27 (Pleasure, conscience, religion).

Appl. model.-

de Vries, a.c., 430. -- In Platon’s eyes man is first and foremost immortal soul. Here the mortal body functions both as an instrument and as a representation of the soul. -- It is, on the one hand, a defective tool and a deformed image. Thus it can become a hindrance to the activity of the soul. Then it is “a prison” in which the soul is shut up - like an oyster in its shell - and from which it yearns to be liberated. -

Note: -- This is an expression of Platon’s so-called “dualistic view of man”: there is a gap between spirit and matter, between soul and body, in such a way that spirit and soul are overvalued and matter and body are undervalued. That, at least, is the current view.

Says de Vries: “These are perhaps Platon’s most famous propositions, but - like all his propositions - they have no more than limited validity”. (A.c., 430).

That this was Platon’s own opinion is shown, for example, in his last work, *Nomoi*, *Laws*, where he says: “Man should be grateful for three possessions: the deities, his soul and his body”. Which shows the high esteem in which he holds that which represents the lowest degree of reality, the body. -- Or still:

a. The soul must take care of itself (remember the psuchagogia, which will be discussed later) (*Faidon* 115b);

b. the soul should equally take care of all that is inanimate; -- it may not shirk this responsibility. In the body it does yearn - like a bird gazing upwards - for the vision (= insight) of ideas, but - on the other hand - a premature liberation by suicide is impermissible. -

Note: Again, that balance between under- and over-valuation.

With Platon there is in a certain sense “an escape” from the grip of this earthly life. But with him this liberation is “becoming equal to the deity as much as possible” - that is the deification element - and this in an activity that remains within earthly life.

Thus, for example, the search for pure, unmixed - meaning: one-sided - theories, e.g. by turning away from the body, can quickly lead to “hubris” (Lat.: *arrogantia*, crossing the border), -- an attitude that does not want to take into account the limitations of human existence.

So too, for example, is an excessively strict training of the body with the aim of controlling it undesirable. Cfr de Vries, a.c., 430.

Still numerous other examples of moderation of one judgement by another judgement speaking in the opposite sense can be found in Platon. - For example, we think of the fact that Platon sees two factors at work in the whole cosmos and in being human:

a. nous, Lat.: *intellectus*, sense, intellectual consultation;

b. *anankè*, everything our mind finds incomprehensible but has to take into account. In modern terms: both rational and irrational.

Note: -- It is as if a steering sense of purpose, in its judgements, fed back to him at every deviation.

Conclusion. -

1. The highest idea the good is absolutely valuable and the source of shared, “participated” value.

2. Apart from the good, nothing is absolutely valuable -- not even Platon’s own (value) judgments. They are, in his view, equally dichotomous - a mixture of true and false. Every judgement must be put into perspective by another. -- in other words, the totality -- not the elements or the parts -- is only the right view of things. Which brings us back to stoicism: our individual insights are but samples within totalities.

The method of opposing hypotheses. -

The moderation of one insight by another, preferably an opposite one, can be found in the dialogue Parmenides,--

Bibl. : A. Diès, trad., *Parmenide*, Paris, 1974. -

The second part of this dialogue, which is highly philosophical, consists of a series of postulates. A long series of hypothetical reasoning's, if you will.

a. If “the one” (i.e. all that brings unity to the multitude by means of similarity and coherence) exists, what follows logically from this both for the one itself and for what the one is not? (o.c., 31/36),

b. If the one does not exist, what follows logically from that both for the one itself and for the rest? (o.c., 37/40).-- If one wishes: the method of model and counter-model. Platon 's text says, 135e : “Good so” replied Parmenides. “But there is something else to do

a. To postulate, in each case separately, that the given exists and to examine what inferences follow from that hypothesis is not enough.

b. One must also presuppose the non-existence of the same fact. That is, if you wish to complete your reasoning exercises. -

Here, by the way, in the style of the Eleate Zenon of Elea, is the method. -- A little further on, the text says: “The great masses do not realize at all that, if one does not examine a fact from all possible points of view, one cannot possibly reach the truth and come to an immediate understanding. -

Note:-- This ‘pragmateia’ (Parm. 136c), method, is clearly at work in the examples of de Vries cited above. But in the Parmenides it is worked out in all its logical sharpness.

Note: -- *Bibl.* : J. Kuin, *Newman en de via media*, (Newman and the via medi)a, in: *Streven* 20 (1993) 3 (Dec.), 267/269.-- It is about J.H. Newman (1801/1890), the cardinal, who in 1837 published a work: *Lectures on the Prophetic Office of the Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism*, republished under the title *The Via Media of the Anglican Church*, Oxford, 1990. -

It is a peculiar work: what Newman argues with all conviction, is refuted in the same book. After the Anglican position (1837) he defends the Catholic position (1877). Not as a logical exercise, but as a word and counterword concerning two convictions, the Anglican and later the Catholic, which he cherished.

Oppositionalisms.

Bibl. : J. Muurlinck, *Anthropologie voor opvoeders en hulpverleners (Ideologische manipulatie of zelfbepaling)*, (Anthropology for educators and social workers (Ideological manipulation or self-determination)), Bloemendaal, 1981, 17/19 (Oppositionalism).

This work on agogics gives us a new term for an old case: “Oppositionalism arises when one strongly opposes a certain term or concept and places another term or concept opposite it, to which absolute validity is attributed”. (O.c.,17).

Platonic: one concept is confused with a kind of absolute unworthiness, the other with absolute value (the good).

Appl. models. --

(1) Biological/ psychological. --

The one's absolutize the role of predisposition: at birth, in an individual being (biological and/or psychological), all or nearly all life possibilities are fixed (predetermined). -- The others exaggerate the role of the environment: an ennobled being is, in its life course, entirely or almost entirely 'determined' by the environment.

Note: -- Platonic: both stoicheia, factors, are situated in the totality of real life, in which they are interwoven with other as well as with opposite factors. Practical: both disposition and center of life determine, each in its own way, the individual.

(2) Sociological. -

a. Some people absolutize human individuals: they and they alone are the producing stoicheia (elements) of the relations in a society (e.g. of the relations between the possessing and the non-possessing classes, between the rich and the poor). The others absolutize “society” and its relations as the only working factor.

Note: Platonic: situate both factors in the totality of life, and you will see that both play limited roles. -

b. Those who are alone absolutize the individual subject ('I') as the agent of all structures. -- The others see the structures as the effecting factors of the individuals. Subjectivism and structuralism are thus diametrically opposed. -

Note: -- Platonic: both the one and the other have their own, irreplaceable role. In Platonic language: there is 'koinonia', interwovenness, existence within a totality of its elements. One sees it: the stoicheiosis and the samples of induction!

Sixteenth sample.-- The Theory of Definition and Classification. (89/94)

Definition and classification are forms of judgements. but they concern concepts. Therefore, here is the place to say a word about them. -

G.Groot, Peter Sloterdijk, *cynic*, in: Streven 1985: Jan., 322/336.-- Steller says that the Kunische (= Cynical) language is satirical.

He quotes a 'definition' (?) in this connection: "When Platon drew up the definition which says that man is "an unfeathered two-legged animal" and won acclaim for it, Diogenes of Sinope (-413/-327; Kunish thinker, who was regarded as the 'ideal' of the Kunics) plucked a cock bare and brought it to Platon's school, saying: "Behold Platon's man!". Therefore they added to the definition: "with flattened nails" (A.c, 329). -

One can practice "cheerful science", like Nietzsche, following such an anecdote, of course. But let us examine what effort Platon puts into defining and classifying to see if this anecdote is not a Kunish invention.

Let us begin with a non-satirical writer.

Bibl. :

-- Al. Koyré, *Introduction à la lecture de Platon*, (Introduction to the reading of Plato), New York,, 1945-1; Paris, 1962-2, 22/35 (Menon).-- Koyre draws attention to the method, -- in the context of the *dramatis personae* which Platon writes (for his dialogues are conceived dramatically).

The *dramatis personae* are in the Menon: Socrates the ever central interlocutor; -- Menon, a Thessalian condottiere (gang leader in the service of a party or a state) with his nameless slave. -

Anutos (who later accuses Socrates in court). The theme: 'aretè' virtue (understand: virtue (that by which someone is virtuous)), -- more narrowly: manliness.

A. -- Part I: -- Defining it as a skill. -

Every Greek - Menon first - knows (thinks to know) what 'virtue' is. And so Menon answers: man and woman, child and old person, free and slave all exhibit a type (kind) of viability, 'virtue'. "Every situation, every action has its own virtue" (o.c., 23).

But Socrates (= Platon) with his logical rigour points out that Menon only lists types (species) (a kind of classification, if you will), but the general nature (= beingness, being-form) remains unmentioned.

“Define virtue without question”. But Menon does not even understand this requirement. To which Socrates replies: “For all six kinds mentioned to be defined as virtue, they must have something in common, namely one and the same ‘ousia’, (Latin: essentia, essence):

To which Menon who thinks he now understands: “Virtue is the aptitude to command. In which one recognizes the condottiere. From his military experience angle he sees ‘virtue’.

Socrates on that: by part Menon defines the totality! Well, there are other kinds.

Note: -- One recognizes Platon’s holism: ‘all’ types of virtue should be able to be summed up in one universal definition (induction).

B.-- Part II. -- Defining ethics. -

The second reproach Socrates addresses is: Menon thinks ‘specialist’, ‘unidimensional’. He does not even involve conscience,-- ‘justice’ in commanding.

Now reread E.PL. 85 (with the references therein): Socrates and Platon were deeply shocked at the sight of so many experts without any ethical concern. The decay of democracy opened the door to unscrupulous practices.

So too here:

- a. aptitude for command, yes;
- b. but not without conscience.

Commanding - with conscience - is the ‘true’ (meaning conscientious, ‘righteous’) form of commanding. -- In modern terms, ethic-free command is, for Platon, an ‘abstraction’ in the sense of ‘para.frosune’, i.e., it avoids the question of conscience. In Menon’s sense, ‘virtue’ - ‘virtue’ rather - ‘andreia’ is manliness, which without much conscience sometimes takes on cynical forms. This can be seen daily in the behavior of ‘tyrants’ (dictators), who are fit to rule, but are without conscience. --

Note: Platon says somewhere that the typical tyrant is like the unscrupulous criminals who work out in broad daylight what can be experienced in some night dreams. They exchange the conscience-free atmosphere of the night dreams with the conscience-bound behavior during the day.

Conclusion. -

1. To define is one thing. That in itself is a skill.
2. To define conscientiously is to include conscience in the general definition. Thus the act of a human being becomes a human act as the medieval Scholastics said (actus hominis, actus humanus).

All this is now very clear from the sequel. -- Menon, thinking he has finally grasped the point, replies: "Socrates wants a general definition. Good! Look: "Virtue is both the desire for good things and the ability to do them. -

To which Socrates, correcting himself, with an eye on "a really good definition", replies: "Look at the thief/thief:

- a. They covet good things; moreover, they have the ability to acquire them;
- b. But they have no conscience. -- they are capable of coveting and acquiring, but not of coveting and acquiring with conscience".

Note: By this Socrates means that they are "virtuous" (fit, able, "skilled", i.e. equipped with "technè", specialization), but they are not "virtuous". Socrates summarizes brilliantly:

- a. Your definition, Menon, has one term too many, the word 'good' (in Socrates' eyes, no one desires non-good things, at least not consciously).
- b. Your definition has one term too few, namely, the word 'righteous' (= conscientious), for true virtue includes conscience.

Note: Read now E.PL. 67 (Realpolitik) the Realpolitiker is one case of virtue without too much virtue. -- We all, perhaps, know such people: "A very good teacher! But he has no conscience: you never know how to hold him".

Competence is 'aretè', preparedness for a task. Conscientiousness is also 'aretè', equal to the task, but with an adjective, 'morality'.

Note: -- The problem Platon deals with in the Menon is basically ancient: in Archaic cultures one encounters the black-magician(s):

- a. he (she) is expert in occult matters ('virtuous');
- b. but he (she) has no conscience (and is therefore also called 'black').-- Reminiscent of the words of the serpent (Satan) to Eve in the earthly paradise: "You shall be like:

- a. deities (i.e. knowledgeable),
- b. versed (literally, 'known') in good and evil (i.e., unscrupulous) (Genesis: 3:5).

Note: -- The skill of 'defining' is still relevant today. In passing reference should be made to J. Royce, *Principles of Logic*, New York, 1912-1,1961- 2, where explicit reference is made to the Platonic method of definition. (o.c., 12). -- Which indicates recent reception.

Note: -- Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue (A Study in Moral Theory)*, London, 1981, contains, among other things, a severe critique of Western Enlightened Rationalism. After the collapse of medieval Scholasticism (800/1450), under the ‘critical’ influences of R. Descartes (1596/1650, intellectualist Rationalist) and J. Locke (1632/1704, empiricist Rationalist) and their contemporaries, an ethics emerged that led Western man to regard all that is virtuous with suspicion.

Whoever, indeed, now comes across as ‘virtuous’ risks being written off as backward or puritanical.

Well, MacIntyre argues that only a return to an ethics of virtue (i.e. a theory which includes ‘competence’, ‘expertise’ and also conscience) can save us from the crisis of ethical values.

Note: -- The Platonic differential reads:

homo technicus purus	homo platonicus	homo moralis
suitability	suitability	without suitability
without virtue	- virtue	- virtue

The last type is sometimes called, in the walk, “the good man,”-- but without virtue.

The definitional and the typological enumeration.--

The concept of enumeration is, in logic, a basic concept. -- Platonically speaking, it appears in two forms.

A.-- The synoptic method.

The term ‘sun.opsis’ literally means ‘to see at the same time or together’. Thus, among other things, ‘summary’.

Appl. model.-- Menon, E.PL. 90, lists six types of virtue: men/women, children/elderly, freemen/slaves all get somewhere “through life” (which is “aretè”).

Other model: the horse, the dog, the cat are types (species). -- “Passed through life” and “animal” are the sunopses, the summaries, of the two series. -- Now where is the defining summary?

a. In the terms “to live, to... getting through” (the enumeration of these two elements reflects the content of Menon’s concept of ‘arete’, life skill).

b. The term ‘animal’ is already a covered enumeration, e.g. “living, being, biological body” (a being that lives in the form of a biological body is an animal). As J. Brun, *Platon et l’Academie*, PUF, 1983, 45, says: “The sunopsis goes from the many to the one”.

Another term, with Platon, is ‘sun.agogè’, to bring together (*Faidros* 266b). “That is what I am in love with, *Faidros*, -- with divisions (‘diareseis’) and summaries (‘sunagoga’). This, in order to be able to speak and think,” says Socrates, *Faidros* 266b. -- This brings us to the second type.

B. -- The diairetic method..

Di.aireisis” is “to go from the one to the many”. Lat.: divisio, division. -- To separate a collection into its subsets, -- of a system into its parts is ‘di.aireisis’, division. -- Now reread E. PL. 70 (universals). -

One goes from the ‘genus’ (universal collection) to the ‘species’ (subsets) or ‘types’. Thus the general concept of ‘animal’ can be divided into the enumeration ‘horse, dog, cat, ...’. -- One sees that enumeration also occurs here, but it has a different meaning. -

Conclusion -- The defining enumeration talks about the elements that make up a definition; the typological or specific enumeration talks about species that make up a genus.

Which proves again that holism dominates Platon’s thinking: ‘enumeration’ is only possible hand in hand with stoicheiosis, factor analysis, and its method, induction with its sampling in totalities.

Dichotomies. -- ‘Dicho.tomia’ means “to cut in two”. -

Bibl. :

-- D. Parrochia, *Un modèle formel des processus dichotomiques platoniciens*, (A formal model of platonic dichotomous processes), in: *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 91 (1986): 3 (juil/ Sept.), 354/364. -- The author attempts, in a formalized way, to bring clarity to Platon’s dichotomies.

We limit ourselves to examples. -- In the *Faidros*, for example, Platon speaks of ‘mania’, getting outside oneself, ‘trance’. The dichotomy is: human and divine mania. The divine is, in a famous enumeration, classified as follows predictive (prophetic), purifying (exorcising, cathartic), poetic and erotic transports. -

Another example: the sense of beauty is classified in the dichotomy “innate/acquired” (whereby the innate is characterized as the uncontrolled and the acquired as the controlled).

The uncontrolled sense of beauty - ‘beauty’ has a very broad meaning in Ancient Greece: to be absorbed into - is classified as gluttony, drinking, sex. Indeed, whoever lives in this way “goes up in pleasure” (which he finds ‘beautiful’).

“Kenning”. -- Note the dot under the first ‘e’ of that Old Norse word (ed.: not possible in the computer program Word). -- In Old Norse literature, a dichotomy or notation is used to poetically characterise a fact.

Appl. mod. -- “Fleina brak”, the yawning of arrows, or “flein brak” (arrow vulture). -- A term is defined by a twofold nominal compound (i.e. nomen, (name) word + nomen in the genitive) -.

The term “fleina brak” or “fleinbrak” is such a term for a battle that is thereby (om- or described). By the way, each part of such a notation can in turn be defined by such a dichotomy. (Cfr. G.u.I. Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon* (Stichwörter zur Weltliteratur), Stuttgart, 1984, 224).

Which proves that Platon’s dichotomous method reaches much further than at first sight.

Note: -- J. Royce, *Principles of Logic*, N.Y., 1961-2, emphasizes that Platon’s definitions are particularly served by the fact that no concept exists in isolation. The concepts form a system. Singular or private notions may, superficially, appear to be unrelated. -

E. De Strycker, *Bekn. gesch.*, 98, says: Platon calls the interrelation ‘koinonia’ (communio, community). Thus ‘three’ shows ‘koinonia’, connection, with ‘odd number’ (it is an odd number), -- ‘snow’ with ‘winter cold’ (snow forms a system with winter cold). -

Note: -- Later Platonists have projected this system of thought into the world of ideas: “kosmos noëtos” (Lat.: mundus intellegibilis, world of knowledge and thought).- - Which again demonstrates Platonic holism.

Note: -- Defining and classifying are, of course, done in the light of omnipresent ideas. Yet defining and classifying is not an operation on the ideas themselves. But it is a processing of the concepts, which are ‘models’ (pictures) of the ideas.

Thus Menon defines in the light of ideas (light that is rather dark for him), but obviously from his singular experience (condottiere).

Socrates, Platon define the same concept of ‘aretè’, fitness to live, but also in the light of ideas (the same, by the way) and ... also from singular experience. Yet there is significantly minimal mutual understanding, dialogue.

Seventeenth sample. -- The platonic theory of reasoning. (95/104)

We begin with a fundamental observation.-- “The practice of science itself is (...) not the starting point of principles, but the search” of principles -- the search for “the cause” of “the phenomena. -

The later (meaning the phenomena) one has; the earlier (meaning the cause) one must find: (W. Klever, *Een epistemologische vergissing ?* (An epistemological error?), in: B.Delfgaauw e.a., *Aristoteles (Zijn betekenis voor de wereld van nu)*, (Aristotle (His meaning for today’s world)), Baarn, 1979, 39).--

Klever adds, a.c., 42, “In this Aristotle elaborated on the older Platon--who evolved in that direction.” -

Note: -- Apparently Klever is talking about non-axiomatic science in the quoted text. For axiomatic, presuppositions, are precisely ‘principles’ from which one departs, -- preferably in as deductive a manner as possible. Reread E.PL. 82: Axiomatic-deductive science differs from reductive science.

That Platon paved the way, even very early on, is most clearly shown by the inductive method which he already inherited from Socrates (E.PL. 22v.). The older Platon evolved rather in the Pythagorean sense. But until then... -

Why do we begin with a text on ‘beginnings’? Because the word “principle” is the translation - one of the possible translations - of the Ancient Greek word “archè”, principle (E.PL. 44). Now that word ‘principle’ is - at least in Greek - fundamental to all reasoning.

The term ‘archè’ presupposes that governs,--

According to the *dictionary of Bailly/ Egger*, 281, the general meaning of ‘archè’ is; “something that (co-)determines something else or itself”. In other words: ‘factor’. -
- The derived meanings can be arranged as follows.

A,-- Authority, power, command. -- Public office. -- Thus “hai archai”, government (those who control a group). O.g. metonymy: domain, territory, -- empire, principality (over which is ruled).

B,-- Beginning, - principle. -

Thus in Iliad 22:116: “the beginning (origin) of a quarrel”. End, ultimate limit.

Thus: the end of a cord (where it begins); the beginning of a branching, e.g., where a watercourse begins to run in two directions (splitting beginning). -- Preposition: “praxeon archai kai hupotheseis (Demosthenes)” (prepositions and foundations that govern actions).

By the way, the extreme of something implies that if one grasps that - extreme, one “controls” that something.

Conclusion. -- The term “archa” includes the phenomenon of “control”: e.g., actions are controlled by their presuppositions and bases.-- But at the same time, “archa” also includes “to make intelligible”, to explain. Indeed: whoever wants to understand a territory, for example, would do well to take into account what that territory ‘controls’ (and this word is taken in many different senses).

The oldest known Greek philosophical text.

Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547) says: “The archè, the premise, of the being is ‘a.peiron’ (Lat.: infinitum, the smoothly flowing through all the being). This archè is such that in that from which things originate, they also perish. And necessarily so. For they make reparation to each other for their iniquity, -- according to the legal order of time. (Fr. 8 1). -

Whatever the correct interpretation of this fragment, it is clear that the decisive term ‘archè’ already occurs in it - so early. The idea is the following: “By what are the being governed, and therefore by what do they become intelligible?” By the ‘archè’, Lat.: principium, which here is something malleable, formless, that is open to all forms and thus appears ‘fluid’ (flowing).

Note: -- The search for a principle, a premise, is still current. -- Thus *Philosophie und Begründung*, (Philosophy and justification), Frankf.a.M., 1987, testifies to this: ten writers discuss the problem of ‘justification’ and/or foundation as the work of philosophizing par excellence. Especially the question of a ‘final’ ground (=basis, premise) appears as a first matter. -

This question is acute because there is now more than one tendency that claims that asking for a “last ground” (an archè that governs all other archæ) is meaningless. Even all ‘founding’ (trying to justify one’s assumptions) is meaningless, in the eyes of some. “The world is there, without any ‘ground’.” -

Other events: R. Macken, *Kuniek*.-- The First Congress of the “Institute for Ultimate Reality and Meaning” in Europe (25/28.09. 1985), in: *Tijdschr.v.Fil.* 47 (1985): 4 (Dec.), 690/692. Again: “ultimate reality” is last archè that ‘controls’ the rest.

The term 'foundationalism' (also: 'fundamentalism' or 'integrism')

This indicates that, in contrast to a certain current septic movement that doubts every 'foundation', one nevertheless holds on to preferably solid and traditional assumptions of all kinds. The phenomenon of 'multiculture' certainly plays a role here: one current believes that its 'foundations' are the right ones - the only ones, even - while the other claims that its own are the right ones - the only ones, of course. And then 'proclaim' it with conviction.

By the way, Platonism, which is not so quick to make "only right" judgements, but usually takes up "restrictive" positions, is as good as completely outside this type of "foundationalism". Which does not mean, however, that for Platon there are no foundations. On the contrary: on the mythical level, think of his popular belief; on the philosophical level, think of the ideas as supreme presuppositions, especially the idea of "the good" (value-without-more).

Needless to say, the principle of necessary and sufficient reason (or ground) plays a very decisive role here, "The principle of sufficient ground means nothing other than that everything needs a ground". (C. Schoonbrood, *Het beginsel van voldoende grond*, (The principle of sufficient ground), in: Tijdschr. v. Fil, 1956:4, 577), --

In the language of Ch.S. Peirce (1839/ 1914; American Pragmatist) this sounds as follows:

a. the astonishing fact *f* is established (observation stage);

b. if premise *v* were true, then fact *f* would no longer be astonishing (i.e. raise questions), but would appear 'natural' 'understandable'. Cfr. W.B. Gallie, *Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, 1966, 98.-Cf. E.PL. 31 (ontological truth, i.e. intelligibility), - 45. --

Note: According to H.J. Hampel, *Variabilität und Disziplinierung des Denkens*, (Variability and disciplining of thinking), Munich/Basel, 1967, 18, the principle of necessary and sufficient reason was introduced into philosophy only by G.W. Leibniz (1646/1716).

Nevertheless, it is - pronounced or not - the pre-eminent principle even of the pre-socratic people. And for Platon, "Nothing is without reason".

Note: It is said that G.E. Moore (1873/1958, in his *A Defence of Common Sense* (1925), nine years before K. Popper, questioned foundationalism: all founding comes to an end and not all knowledge needs to be 'founded'!

Note: It is striking that, with the crisis of the ‘foundations’ of our entire culture, the notorious ‘reason’ of the Enlightenment-Rationalists has been compromised. For proof (among many other texts): H. Parret, ed., *In alle redelijkheid (Standpunten over het denken, spreken en handelen van de redelijke mens)* (In all reasonableness) (Viewpoints on the thinking, speaking and acting of the reasonable human being)), Meppel, Boom. -

A series of articles on ‘reason’ and its ‘status’ (in Platonic language: its ‘real value’).

If it is true that ‘reason’ is the basis of philosophy, science and even ‘reasonable life’ then the crisis of that reason and its ‘reasonableness’ is very serious for ... the rationalist. -

But - fortunately - Platon does not rely solely on ‘reason’ in the present sense of that word. The word ‘spirit’ in the sense of

- a. intuitive mind and reasoning ‘reason’,
- b. mind (susceptibility to all kinds of value) and will (the ability to engage), is the real foundation with Platon. So that his thinking escapes the “crisis of (rationalist) reason” at least in part.

The Platonic model for the original “really valuable reasoning”. -

What is so far certain, after all that we have said above.... is that a first model for “really valuable” thinking was found by Platon in language.

Read again E.PL. 75vv. (theory of language: primal language), - also 39 (Filebos model), 76 (as the painters, so also the language: there the model of the model(language) is painting).

But listen: “The hypothetical method is borrowed by Platon from mathematics (E. De Strycker, *Bekn. gesch.v.d. Ant. fil.*, 103).-1 - E.PL. 72 (‘white’ =/ “approximately white”) already gave us the run-around: the mathematical akribeia, accuracy, is one of the features of Platonism as a method.-.

Wasn’t theoria - E.PL. 09 (Pyth. theoria) - “watching with understanding”? Was it not translated by the Romans by ‘speculatio’, to spy? Doesn’t the watcher look very closely? Is it precisely for this reason that the translation of theoria by our current ‘be-or behold’ (which lacks this precision) not strongly inadvisable? -

But mathematics as a model of the original - Platonic reasoning - was more than mere precision, yes, exactness: it gave the method which is very rightly called “the hypothetical method”.

Bibl. :

-- W. Klever, *Dialectisch denken (Over Platon, wiskunde en de doodstraf)*, (Dialectical thinking (On Platon, mathematics and the death penalty)), Bussum, Wereldvenster, 1981, 43/48 (The State);

-- E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (The Philosophy of Mathematics)*, Antw./ Nijm., 1944, 29/56 (Platon);

-- L. Brunschvicg, *Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique*, (The stages of mathematical philosophy), PUF, 1947, 43/70 (Le mathématisme des platoniciens); (The mathematism of the Platonist),

-- Fr. Krafft, *Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft, I (Die Begründung einer Wissenschaft von der Natur durch die Griechen)*, (History of Natural Science, I (The Foundation of a Knowledge of Nature by the Greeks)), Freiburg, 1971, -- 295/327 (Die Rolle der Mathematik in der platonischen Wissenschaft), (The Role of Mathematics in Platonic Science).-- 328/356 (Die Mathematische Naturwissenschaft Platons), (Plato's Mathematical Natural Science)).

We begin with an observation. -

Fr. Krafft, o.c., 295, says: in the time of Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547) until +/- - 400, the (then) mathematics could not be thought away from philosophizing. Krafft demonstrates this with examples from astronomy, geography, harmony, (plastic) art, -- technology (e.g. town planning).

The assumptions are: the 'fusus', (nature) can be represented, in its comprehensible content, by mathematics (understand: arithmetic, geometry, -- harmony - and proportion theory). -- This exhibits two inductive phases.

a.-- Summative induction, -- Material things exhibit, apparently, determinable and verifiable forms and relations.

b.-- Amplificative (knowledge-expanding) induction. -- From these determined mathematical representations one can conclude to not immediately observable data, as the form of whole countries or continents, -- the form, distances, velocities of planets, - the number of planets or of worlds. -

Note: -- First observation: This apparently is done by "transfer", i. e. by analogy reasoning: one takes as a model earthly, physically determined forms and relations; from there one reasons about the original which is too far away.

One counts on the model, which is accessible, being able to provide information about the original, which is not directly accessible.

Second observation. -- Fr. Krafft returns to it several times: Preplatonic mathematics is twofold :

a. the 'physical', which sees the mathematical 'entities' embodied in nature;

b. "reasoning", which situates the same or other mathematical forms and relations outside (possibly above) visible and tangible nature.

If the extension of knowledge through analogical reasoning was one point, the extension of knowledge through reasoning mathematics and its applications to ‘fusus’ (nature) was a second and, therefore, a point of enormous importance. -

Bibl. : B. Vitrac, *L’odyssée de la raison*, (The odyssey of reason), in: Le Courrier de l’ UNESCO (Voyage au pays des mathématiques), ((Journey to the land of mathematics)), 1989: Nov., 29/35.-- Vitrac, author of *Médecine et philosophie au temps d’Hippocrate* (Medicine and philosophy at the time of Hippocrates), (1989), says what follows. -

a. The ancient mathematical texts from Mesopotamia (Iraq/Iran) and from Egypt contain, like the ancient Chinese, issues solution,--what may be called ‘situational’ mathematics, with a ‘theoretical’ (i.e., reasoning) bias.--.

b. Antique ‘reasoning’ mathematics - especially from Eukleides of Alexandria (-323/-283) and onwards - contains axiomatic - deductive texts :

1. From ‘axiomata’, prefixed notions (= definitions), one arrives at “derived propositions” by derivation;

2. from derived propositions one then derives further derived propositions. -

Note: What is striking here, compared to our present-day mathematics,

i. the geometrical orientation (even number theory, statics, astronomy is basically a study of geometrical figures (note: see E.PL. 09: configuration));

ii. the philosophical background: in other words, one was never only engaged in ‘definite’ (‘positive’) science and was concerned with its positioning within a whole pattern of life and world views. -

Note: -- P. Damerow/ R.K. Englund/ H.J, Nissen, *Indrukken in klei* (Het begin van het getal), (Impressions in clay (The beginning of number)), in: *Natuur en Techniek* (Natural Science and Technology Monthly) 59 (1991): Sept., 696/707, confirms what Vitrac says about Mesopotamia. “Our analysis of the archaic numerical signs and the rules for their use refutes the view that the signs stood for ‘abstract numbers’”. (A.c.,705).-

The authors adhere - in passing - to the view of the gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer, who in 1912 psychologically dissected arithmetical operations and thereby came to the conclusion that, for the awakening to a truly abstract number understanding, a child knows ‘number analogue’ (what looks like an abstract number is an analogue of it (a primitive model)).

Wertheimer’s research was continued and... confirmed among primitive peoples. What one might call ‘proto-mathematics’.

Listen, now, to what Platon says, *Politeia* VI, at the end.

“I imagine that you know that those who are engaged in geometry, arithmetic, or similar science, put things first. -- So, for example, they put forward such notions as ‘pair/unpair’, ‘figures’, three kinds of ‘angles’, in a word, everything that belongs to that field to which they devote their investigation. -

They put forward these ‘hupothesis’, presuppositions, pretending that they really knew them, for they do not justify them either to themselves or to others, -- believing that they are ready for anyone. -- Once they have put forward such propositions, they deduce what is deducible from them. Thus, thanks to a proper order, they arrive at what they had in mind for their research work. -

Note: -- It is immediately obvious that Platon means here axiomatic-deductive mathematics. Which shows that it already existed, at least in part, in Platon’s time. So already before the time of Eukleides of Alexandria.

The types of knowledge. -

Where, now, does Platon situate this axiomatic-deductive method? To this end we read again *Politeia* VI, in fine. -- Platon begins with a dichotomy. First, of course, there is the visible and tangible world; then there is the world of knowledge and thought. In Greek “horaton/ noèton”.

The visible and tangible world. --

1. The first kind of ‘images’ (‘eikones’), which constitute the contents of the visible and tangible world, is called ‘eikasiai’, reflections.-- An animal or a plant casts shadows in the sun. When they come to water, the water reflects their eikasiai, reflections. When they approach a dark but smooth and sparkling surface, another eikasia, reflection, appears. --

2. The second kind of ‘images’ (we know that they are ‘pictures’ or copies of the ideas) are of course the reflected things themselves.-- The reflected animal or the reflected plant or also a man-made object (artifact), as Platon himself adds. The invisible world. -- This too is divided into two domains.--

1.-- The things of which the axiomatic-deductive sciences speak are the first kind of ‘realities’ which populate the world of knowledge and thought.

The soul - if it is to grasp this part - puts forward hypotheses, -- not in order to “ascend” from such hypotheses to some principle - think of the term “archè” (E.PL. 95,- - especially 96: last ground); no: in order to arrive at derivations (“descend”) from such hypotheses. To this Platon’s words themselves. -

Note: -- This is clearly the axiomatic-deductive science and its object (in this case the mathematical entities).

2.-- The things that Platon’s philosophy is talking about now (his “dialectics”), are apparently of a different order of reasoning. Listen: “If the soul wants to grasp the second part of the world of knowledge and thought, it puts forward a hypothesis in order to arrive, after that, at a hypothesis-free ‘principle’. -- In this case, it does so without recourse to (the) ‘images’ discussed in the first section. No: in the course of this kind of research, she allows herself to be led only by the ideas themselves”. - There again, Platon himself.

Note: -- W. Klever, 45, says that with Platon two methods become clear. -

A. The forward (progressive) - ‘synthetic’ - method.--

One has to start from something - a hypothesis - to be able to ‘think’. But in the forward style one does not dwell on the justification - deepening theoria - of what is presupposed. One goes ‘forward’ - preferably, as in the then axiomatic-deductive mathematics - already ‘by deduction’.

B. The backward (regressive) - ‘analytic’ - method.

In the Platonic dialectic (that is the name of his philosophy); fundamental research is - what is now called - central. Starting from one or another hypothesis - so Platon apparently does not think without hypotheses - one reasons in the direction of ‘hypotheses principles’, ‘foundations’) that justify, ‘substantiate’ the initial hypothesis.

Until one arrives at an ‘an.hupotheton’, a hypothesis-free hypothesis. For this, apparently, the idea of “the good” (all that is really valuable) comes into consideration. It is, as it were, the last foundation of all that exists and is conceivable.

Man repeatedly assumes something to be true and real (“a hypothesis”), but prematurely: in the next step of knowledge, he then unmask this as “appearance”, until he arrives at the good.

Note: -- E. De Strycker, *Bekn. gesch. v.d. Ant. fil.*, 103v. (The hypothetical method), says -:

A. The deductive or synthetic method.--

The ordinary approach of mathematicians is what Platon calls ‘sunthesis’, literally: concatenation, construction. They start from unproven propositions - ‘archai’, principles - which they consider irreducible and evident. So they do not - in Platonic language - have to “account for it”.

B. The deductive or analytic method. -

Already E.PL, 60 has introduced us, in the Platonic sense, to ‘analysis’, literally: solution, in one particular form, lemmatic analysis (a deduction which pretends to know the unknown). -- Thus one can have a ‘logos’, pronunciation, and look up the ‘stoicheia’, the elements, of it (think of E.PL. 79: subject and predicate make up the sentence). That is one model of ‘analysis’, inference. -

Generally speaking: ‘analysis’ is:

- a. to find a well-defined proposition,
- b. to find from it the propositions that make it provable. -

For example, in the Socratic-Platonic sense, the proposition is: “Virtue is teachable”; the proposition to be looked up in support of that statement is, e.g. “Virtue is a form of insight”. If one adds to this that insight is ‘teachable’, it is at least probable that “virtue is teachable”. -

By “analysis”, i.e. reduction of the first proposition to the two previous ones, the proposition is “made true”. In Platonic language: “logon didonai”, to give an account, to justify from premises. -- Well, philosophy as a dialectic is invariably to justify, to trace justifications. -- foundation. Philosophy is analysis, i.e. investigation of foundations.

Conclusion. - What De Strycker says is very similar to what Klever says in his own way. Only there are partly other terms.

Note: One now reads E.PL. 87: The method of opposing hypotheses is one application of analysis.

Only that there the emphasis is on the verification of the guesses, with the result that analysis is at the same time verified by synthesis (deduction). So: both analysis (reduction) and synthesis (deduction). -- Other example of hypothetical method: (the proof from the absurd. Again and analysis (one asks for a counter-model) and synthesis (one tests it by deduction).

But please note: the lemmatical-analytical method is also both analysis (the lemma) and synthesis (if one works out a test of it by deduction) or analysis (if one looks for a proposition of that lemma in order to test it).

Deduction/ reduction. -

Now reread E..PL. 82. -- Logic clarifies the term 'logical' with the conditional sentence "if... then". "Well, according to Jevons (1835/1862) and in his wake J. Lukasiewicz (1878/1956), both logicians, there are fundamentally two main types. -

1 -- Deduction. - If a, then b. So a. So b -

Model. -- If insight, then learnable. Well, insight. That is Platon's forward, 'synthetic' dialectic. With the difference that already a hypothetical sense comes first: "if A, then B".

If A is then established in the facts - e.g. by showing that virtue stands or falls with insight - then, by virtue of the link "AB", the reasoning is completely irrefutable. For it follows from the axiom "if A, then B", from which it derives.

2.- Reduction. - If a, then b. So a.-

Model.-- If insight, then learnable. Well, learnable. So insight. -- That is the backward, 'analytic' dialectic. Here is another situation: the axiom may apply, but it is not necessary! After all, there are things that are learnable but not insight: think of trained dogs (that learn but without (human) insight). As long as the established fact "something learnable" is not unambiguous insight, the axiom is of no application.

But it may apply. It is a conjecture, a pure hypothesis. Awaiting forward or backward testing. -

Conclusion. -- Actual and, moreover, really good logicians -- in other terms -- continue the Platonic hypothetical method.

Socrates' after-effects. - L. Brunschvicg, *Les étapes*, (The steps), 50, says that already Socrates worked hypothetically. He systematically and methodically led his interlocutors back to the presuppositions - usually unconscious - in their judgements. But it was their individual 'hypotheses' (personal, unconsidered beliefs). -

Platon in his general dialectic extends Socrates' hypothetical method to all possible 'beliefs' (understandings: judgements).

Eighteenth sample. -- The Platonic conception of philosophy (105/107)

So far we have accumulated materials to arrive at an approximate description of Platon's concept of 'philosophy' - the other name is 'dialectics' (but in the strict philosophical sense). -- Thus we saw at the end how Platon takes mathematics as a model. To bend that model immediately in his own sense, of course, since instead of forward (deductive) dialectics (proper to the axiomatic-deductive mathematics of his time), he founds a backward (reductive) dialectic.

Already the Paleopythagoreans assumed:

- a. denote everyday life,
- b. to be interpreted in terms of 'arithmoi' (numberform harmonies): "Therefore all other things are held together by it: wages, testimonies, elections, contracts, times, periods. In general, it is impossible to find anything in everyday life that does not participate in the harmony of number forms.

Thus Sextos Empeirikos, *Against the Mathemationists* vii: 106, sums up the opinion of the Pythagoreans. -- Socrates resembles this - as is evident from his appearance at the agora, the public place, in Athens, to engage in discussions about cultural problems of the time, which weighed on daily life.

Platon followed in his footsteps. Only Socrates and Platon did not do it, or at least not only in terms of 'arithmoi', number form harmonies.

They did so in terms of 'real value' or 'valuable reality'. - Is something really valuable ('good')? To what extent is it really valuable? -- Or still: How really valuable is something? How is it really valuable? These were the so-called "critical questions" that were raised, outspoken or not. This on the basis of Platon's ontology, which used 'being' and 'the good' - two transcendental concepts - as basic concepts. -

Note:-- This starting point is irrefutable. Reasoning from the counter model:

- a. one does not start from the critical question of "how really valuable" or "how valuable really".
- b. Immediately the question arises: "How really valuable is such a premise".

In other words: there is tragic irony! One can only attack Platon by subjecting him to his own starting point - valuable reality or not. All possible 'criticism' is that.

Conclusion. -- Philosophy, for Pythagoreans and Platonists, is to bring life to (full) awareness (= consciousness) of itself and the rest of the being. --

In particular: mathematical reason.

a. Mathematicians apply them to spatial and numerical mathematical entities and their applications (e.g. music).

b. As far as Platon uses mathematical reason, he applies it to life. When, already alive, living persons e.g. speak, experience something in their minds, decide on something with the will, then the following comes to light - thanks to *theoria*, fathoming, i.e. watching carefully until the “grounds” (presuppositions) are exposed - 1.

1. What presuppositions these living persons carry consciously or unconsciously within them,

2. what conclusions follow from them (i.e. ‘analysis’ (reductive reasoning) and ‘synthesis’ (deductive reasoning)). -

Conclusion: the straightforward logic of mathematicians, yes, but applied to vital or life situations.

A first implication. -

If so, the axiomatic-deductive structure cannot apply to a philosophy of life. But the inductive method, which takes samples (specimens, parts) in order to obtain, to a certain extent, a view, *theoria*, of the totality. Totality, which is dealt with in *stoicheiosis*, factor analysis. -- *Stoicheiosis* and induction go hand in hand.

A second implication.-

If so, Platonism cannot be a closed system. We, Modern Westerners, have become accustomed to “big systems” since the rise of Modern thought. -

Already the Paleopythagoreans knew that they were fallible (hence they did not call themselves “*sophos*”, wise men (i.e. gifted with full insight), but “*philos*”, attuned to wisdom). -- “He is always on the road and can make no worse mistake than to think that he has reached the end point, even in a very limited matter. (E. De Strycker, o.c., 92). -

“The system - insofar as there can be talk of a system - is thus essentially unfinished. It consists of a number of converging lines -- aimed at one point that lies beyond our reach” (Ibid.). -- That one point is apparently “the good (being)”. This is: all that is really valuable, as well as all that ‘participates’ in that really valuable (*methexis*, *participatio*).

The mixture “nous (spirit)/ anankè (spiritlessness)”.

Bibl. : G.J. de Vries, *Plato's beeld van de mens* (Plato's image of man), in: Tijdschr.v.Fil. 15 (1953): 3, 426/ 436. -

In a very brief sketch of what Platon thinks about the human body, sign and infrastructure of the soul, de Vries refers to a duality, which strongly dominates Platon's philosophy.

1. Platon, after Anaxagoras of Klazomenai (E.PL. 10; 24), who postulated a ‘nous’ (= universe-governing spirit) to explain movement and order(s) in the whole cosmos, postulates that the universe, as a cosmos, i.e. as a harmonious whole, contains purpose.

De Vries translates ‘nous’ by “reasonable insight gifted with purpose”. -- The human body, for example, in Platon's science of man, clearly shows the signs of purpose in all its forms (which does not prevent his contemporary thoughts on the subject from coming across as outdated, of course). --

2. But Platon knows all too well that this is only one side of our world and human experience. What the ancient Greeks called ‘ananke’, necessity, involves two things:

a. one does not understand it and it comes across as purposeless, absurd, incongruous,

b. but one does not escape from it. In short: unavoidable senselessness. Says de Vries: “The anankè, unavoidable co-cause (note: nous or meaninglessness), which has only negative meaning because its ‘reason’-less existence hinders a perfect forming of the whole according to the divine example”. (A.c.,427). -

De Vries summarizes: sensibility, and ‘anankè’, meaninglessness, are the two forces that Platon sees in, the universe.

Conclusion. -- If a thinker like Platon sees explicitly two contradictory ‘forces’ (understand: factors of motion) in the whole universe, one should have no illusions about it: philosophy will partially fail in its desire to explain. -

Also: Again and again we will find that duality, which reminds us of Herakleitos' contradictory thinking (E.PL. 14: the hidden harmony). Already Herakleitos, who got to know Platon through his teacher Kratulos (E.PL. 75), was convinced that the invisible ‘harmonia’ (= fusion) of opposites - e.g. health - and/or - disease - was stronger than the visible and tangible ‘harmonia’, which we can create with our human mind - nous. Platon thus ‘reacclitifies’ very clearly.

Nineteenth sample.-- the platonic conception of philosophy. (108/109)

To philosophize is:

a. to become aware as a living person - in - society/ cosmos,

b. in the absolute light of “all that is precious reality” (the good being),

c. in the painful realization that many things are ‘anankè’, meaningless necessity. -

This is what the previous sample taught us. Now another aspect. In particular: the aporetic.

Appl. model. -- Let us take the scheme of the *Theaitetos*. -- The key question to which the dialogue wants to provoke an answer is: “What is knowing, -- especially in human affairs?”. As we saw above (E.PL. 90), ‘knowledge’, in the Platonic context, when it concerns human beings, is always “theoria, also of the ethical aspect”. In this sense Platonic epistemology is more than today’s general epistemology.

Even more so: ‘virtue’ in the ethical sense is such a ‘knowledge’ (i.e. insight of a professional and moral nature). As a result, whoever ‘knows’ ‘righteousness’ in this specific way, cannot help but act, both competently and ethically.

Knowledge is first examined as perception. Reread E.PL. 19, where the theory of knowledge of the Sophist Protagoras is discussed, -- with its inherent relativism (what is objectively the same is subjectively different). - Further research: knowledge as ‘doxa’, opinion, - opinion, individual opinion. Based on ‘justifications’. -

Result.-- All raised definitions of ‘knowing’ are rejected as not really good definitions. The investigation gets bogged down in this. In other words: no positive answer.

The explanation. The reason for this dialogue getting bogged down is certainly that Socrates’ method - the maieutics (midwifery) - aims at bringing the individual assumptions of the interlocutors to full consciousness. As we E.PL. 104. -

But it is quite possible that, in this dialogue as in others, Platon himself subjected his own presuppositions ... But it is quite possible that, in this dialogue as in others, Platon himself wants to submit his own premises ... “to a justification” (“logon didonai”, to account for) in this form. -

His doctrine of ideas plays a major role in this: Knowledge through the light of ideas apparently plays no role in this aporetic dialogue: one does not get that far with any interlocutor.

The concept of “aporetics”. -

The term ‘aporia’ in common parlance, means “to be without a way out” (Xenoph. *Anabasis* 5:6,10).-- Transitive: (Platonic) “impossibility of advancing to full theoria”.

Note: -- When this stage of enquiry is considered final, ‘aporetic’ means the same as ‘scepticism’.

Bibl.: R. Allen, *Plato’s Parmenides* (Translation) Oxford, 1985. -- The Parmenides dialogue is also ‘aporetic’. In the following way. -- Reread E.PL 87. -

In this dialogue the hypothetical method is applied:

a. hypothesis 1: “The one is”;

b. Hypothesis 2: “One is not”. But both hypotheses lead to incongruity.

Aporia (philosophical). -

‘Aporia’ in this context means “a knot into which the pure reasoning faculty, for the knowledge which proceeds in the light of ideas, entangles itself. -- Such a dialogue explores a question in all possible directions. But he does not arrive at any “really good” answer.

Apparently Platon lets the reader of the dialogue suffocate in his ‘aporia’. To force him, in a Socratic sense, to investigate presuppositions: “How is it that I, -- that we, the research community, cannot find any ‘really good’ definition?” “Is it not because I, -- we, do not have the right -- really good -- premises?”. Always that Socratic.

Conclusion - If there really are Socratic dialogues, then the aporetic ones. Which points to a gap in the Socratic. A gap which apparently Platon rather than Socrates realised.

Aristotle rightly attributes to Socrates a. induction and b. (general) definition (E.PL. 22) but not the theory of ideas, which is unambiguously attributed to Platon. Which - in passing - does not prevent Platon who is a literary man from putting the discovery of the theory of ideas in his mouth (E.PL. 61; Faidon).

Note: -- For more ‘technical’ explanations see V.Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon.*, 24/31 (Les dialogues aporétiques). From this we take one element: the value judgements on “good/not good” (e.g. “clean/unclean”, “conscientious/unscrupulous”, “religious/unreligious”) are made by some, -- not on the basis of true insight (doctrinal ideas), but on the basis of superficiality.

Twentieth sample .-- The Platonic conception of Philosophy. (110/113)

To philosophize is

- a. awareness of oneself-in-society-and-cosmos,
- b. in the absolute light of the supreme idea “the good” and in the tragic realization that the universe and society (with life in it) are “mixed” (harmony of good and evil).

Which, within the purely Socratic method, leads to ‘aporia’, -- with, at best, an examination of conscience about one’s own individual or collective preconceptions.-- Now a step further: the inclusion character of Platonism.

Appl. model. -- Bibl.: A.R. Henderickx, *De rechtvaardigheid in De Staat van Platon*, (The justice in Platon’s State), in: Tijdschr.v.Fil. 6 (1944): 1/2, 23, 32.-- Steller cites there the group of opinions.

A. -- Cephalos thinks that dikaiosunè (righteousness, i.e. to have conscience) includes speaking truth honestly;

Polemarchos thinks that ‘conscience’ consists in ‘doing good to his friends and evil to his enemies’;

Thrasymachos thinks that ‘justice’ consists in the stronger ones gaining advantage;

Glaukon says that ‘dikaiosunè’ is interpreted as a ‘lesser evil’;

Adeimantos states that the appearance of ‘dikaiosunè’ is a source of all possible earthly happiness. --

All these very different opinions - the habitat par excellence of the Sophists and a number of young people, who therefore do not know what they have to abide by - are only possible - according to Platon - because the light of the supreme idea “the good (being)” does not come through as an informative element. -

Which leads Henderickx to conclude: “In a first stage Platon takes stock of the prevailing opinions on dikaiosunè. As “pure wheat” he retains from this sorting out:

a. dikaiosunè is a skill (concerning justice i.e.)

b. it is an “aretè,” a (good) quality of the soul.-If the dikaiosunè - and - the - adikia (iniquity) - note the pair of opposites in the souls themselves - is situated in the... If the dikaiosunè - and the - adikia (iniquity) - note the pair of opposites in the souls themselves - are situated in the....

For example, not the trade middle (Kefalos), not the circle of friends (Polemarchos), not the shame-free mentality of the polis (Thrasymachos), not the compromise mentality (Glaukon), not opportunism (Adeimantos)”. The evil is too deep.

B. Bibl. : P. Lévêque, *L' aventure grecque*, (The Greek adventure), Paris, 1964-3, 366s. – The author marvels at the immense after-effects (“reception”) of Platonism after Platon. He tries, now an outline of it, to find an explanation.

1.-- The fact. -- Platonism, from the outset, implies a contradiction: it is at once mathematically precise knowledge and consciousness-expansion (‘enlightenment’),-- and business-reasoning and mystical; -- it is also so attuned to inclusion and ‘rich’ that the most diverse systems of learning have taken root in it.

1. In antiquity, for example, Aristotelianism departs from Platonism to both transform and deform it.

The “New Academy” (note: since -265 (with Arkesilaos)) holds probabilistic (note: only the probable is attainable) theses, in which of course Platon himself would hardly have recognized himself.

Neoplatonism (note: 250/600) - the splendid offshoot of Hellenism (note: after 320 the Late Hellenistic culture emerges) - elaborates in particular the ascetic (note: favoring mortification) trait of Platonism together with the mystical ascent to ‘the one’ (which is God).

2. What is even more striking is the fact that the great spiritualistic religions of the ancient world incorporate Platonism. -- In the first century A.D., for example, Philon the Jew (25/50), in Alexandria, ventured a synthesis of the Platonic Academy and the Old Testament. --

The Christian Fathers of the Church (note: 33/800: Patristics) see in Platon the first degree of a “wisdom” which reaches its perfection through the Christian Message. The greatest Church Father, Augustine of Tagaste (354/430), would not be himself if, before his conversion, he had not adhered to Neoplatonism as a kind of faith.

3. -- The Middle Ages -- Islam as well as Judaism and Christianity -- fed on Platonism.

4. -- The Renaissance -- however paradoxical -- places the “liberation of thought” in the sign of Platonism.

2 -- The explanation.

-- If the Platonic message has had a fertilizing effect on Western thought, this is due, in part, to the fact that Platon gave thought itself a wonderful life of thought. -

1. Before Platon, the thinkers - except Socrates - expressed themselves in tracts of prose or in didactic poetry.

2. He abandons that form and founds philosophical dialogue, -- a form of conversation that is a real dialogue,-- with real characters. There are, for example, the incomparable Socrates - Platon's teacher and more and more Platon himself - the great Sophists, his opponents, the sophisticated young people with their naivety and with their great interest (...).

A world where nothing is lacking, not even the luminous presence of the woman, in the person of Diotima (Note: *Platon's Supper* 201 d). A world in which the Athenian, the Spartan, the Cretan live side by side with the stranger. In which the puny slave (who must solve the question of the square number) converses with the free men who indulge in philosophical leisure.

Without the text's author being in the foreground, the truth, found in its completeness, gradually emerges -- in the course of the argument in which the opponent -- according to Socratic method and this one at its best -- is pushed to the limit.

This Platonic method of containment entails that Platon, at the most sensitive moments, uses myth as the only means to allow the soul - which is immersed in the body - to penetrate transcendental (= transcendental) realities with a daring glance.

All opposites meet in the Platonic Enclosure: from a quick dip in the Ilis(s)os River to the celestial bodies revolving in harmony, -- from a festive circle of friends to the hard problems of the city-state, -- from the sensitive evocation of the smiling beauty of youth to the strictures of a dead life.

If the great master of the Academy has had such an impact over the centuries, it is because he has put into his dialogues the whole delicacy of his conscience, the fear of his problems, the strength of his aspirations, which represent a world that is undoubtedly the richest that antiquity has left us'. So much for a historian's 'eulogy'.

Dialoguing philosophy. -

Let us begin with a fallacy. V. Tejeras, *Nietzsche and Greek Thought*, Dordrecht/ Boston/ Lancaster, M Nijhoff, 1987, deals with the question of whether Nietzsche's Socrates is indeed in accord with Platon's Socrates. What Tejera plainly denies. Nietzsche's Platon interpretation - it is a true interpretation in the sense not of sense but of sense - is based on an unexamined Platon. But this is only of marginal importance: the author aims at a dialogical interpretation of Plato.

Second sample: Tejera says: --

a. Platon, as a literary man, transforms historical characters into literary products. This has long been known. Although, according to connoisseurs, there is always a true historical core present.

b. Platon, even when he lets Socrates speak - in his name, so to speak - does not always reflect his own thinking. So that it remains difficult to extract Platon's own philosophy always with absolute certainty.

c. The dialogue form does not result in a treatise, but in an insight - a theoria - in the making. --

Note: -- Which indicates for the umpteenth time that Platon is much more a Heraklitean than is usually assumed, because people identify him a priori with an Eleate. Platon, -- according to Tejera -- is an aporetic before all else, -- not the elaborator of a closed system.

Second sample: -- Apart from Tejera as an 'authority argument', there is e.g. J. Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*, Chicago/ London, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1898 (1965-1).

The work is a commentary on the Meno dialogue (E.PL. 89vv.). -- But the introduction is interesting: the author says that we should read Platon in a dialogical way. The dialogue is constructed as a drama. The drama is more than literary embellishment (which would make it a sham drama). The emergence of the theoria is literally 'dramatic', i.e. it is interwoven with the acting persons and their maturation process. Moreover: Platon supposes that a "really good" reading of his dialogues proceeds in such a way that the reader himself becomes interwoven in the dramatic-philosophical thought event. -

Which, again, is more Herakleitos than Parmenides: Parmenides is too much of a 'stasiotes' for that.

Twenty-first sample. -- Platonic esotericism. (114/117)

“Deconstructing the self-evident”. -- such is the parole of a J. Derrida, who certainly does not bring solutions to real questions of life, but who does teach ‘reading’, -- reading texts.

Above all, Derrida emphasizes that when one reads a text - literary text, but scientific or even philosophical text, for example - one must pay attention to what is not expressed in the text, but nevertheless ‘co-determines’ that text: the forgotten, -- the repressed, indeed, the repressed. For it is this that sometimes gives it its true meaning. -
- This is the form of ‘really good’ reading we are going to do now.

By way of introduction. -

“The creation of the Academy as a permanent society for the prosecution of both exact and human sciences was, in fact, the first establishment of a university. (*Encycl. Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, vol. 18, 21).

It is possible to see the ‘akadèmeia’ as a proto-university. After all, ‘science’ - in the firm (positive) and in the philosophical sense - was truly a design of Platon. This is clear from the whole of what is set out in this introductory course. Theory of order and logic, though not separately elaborated, dominate Platonism all too clearly.

Sun.ousia’ means “to exist together”.

Thus Platon says e.g.: “He tou theiou sunousia” dealing with all that is divine. A guest meal, ‘sumposion’, is one form of sunousia, being together. Yes, childbearing, according to Platon, takes place “in the form of intimate sunousia” (“Hè tè̄s paidogonias sunousia”, literally: the togetherness proper to childbearing). -- All this makes the meaning - existential, ‘lebensnah’, close to life - felt. -

Well, the lessons that Platon gave were understood as ‘sunousiai’, being together - literally: being together. According to a late Neoplatonian, Aristotle, who once studied at Platon’s Academy, spoke in this sense. -

The Seventh Letter formally confirms this: the Platonic student studies individually first and foremost, but not without “intimate fellowship” with the “fellow students”, “so that the spark of insight springs” from one student to another. -

This is an example of filia the so valued ‘bond of friendship’ between people.

21. The Platonic esoteric dialogues. -

The term 'esoteric' is used to denote praxis and especially doctrine reserved for the initiated. It is opposed to "exoteric" or "public".

The theses of the Tübinger Schule have brought this aspect of Platon up to date since the years 1959/1963. -

Bibl. .:

-- H.J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles (Zum Wesen und Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie)*, (Arete in Plato and Aristotle (On the Nature and History of Platonic Ontology,)), Abhandl. Heidelberg. Akad. d. Wissensch., phil. - hist. Kl., 1959: 6, Heidelberg, 1959 (Amsterdam, 1967);-

-- K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon (Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs)*, (Protrepticism and Parenesis in Plato (Studies on the Form of Platonic Dialogue)), Stuttgart, 1959;

-- *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre (Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaft in der platonischen Schule)*, (Plato's Unwritten Doctrine (Studies in the Systematic and Historical Justification of Science in the Platonic School)), Stuttgart, 1963.

-- An excellent French work on the subject is: M. D. Richard, *L'enseignement oral de Platon (Une nouvelle interprétation du platonisme)* (The oral teaching of Plato (A new interpretation of Platonism)), Paris, Cerf, 1966.-- Especially o.c., 7/15 (Préface) and 235/242 (Conclusion) give an overview.

The School of Tubingen states the following propositions. --

1. It has always been known that Platon gave a purely oral teaching, in which evidently more and other things were said than in the written dialogues. The Faidon and *the Seventh Letter* are clear on this point.

2. Besides Faidon 276a/e and *Seventh Letter* 344b/c, other indications of antiquity are known. -- Together with these testimonies, the allusions within the dialogues themselves give rise to the following propositions.

2.1. The novelty is that the Tübingen School maintains that the essence of Platonic philosophy is to be found only in that oral teaching, -- that for Platon this oral teaching contains the only true Platonism. It is the original where ... the written texts, as models, refer to.

2.2. As Gaiser shows, the written texts are merely 'protreptic' (exhorting) and 'parenetic', (encouraging): they draw people to the sunousiai, the lessons themselves. Thus it is told that an Axiothea, a woman from Flious, after reading Platon's *Politeia*, comes to Athens dressed as a man in order to attend Platon's sunousiai (Themistios, *Orat.* 23).

The Tübinger Schule thus provoked a huge discussion that casts Platon and the entire ancient Greek philosophy in a different light.

Greek philosophy in a different light. Ancient philosophy is above all an oral matter. The written texts, for example, were primarily intended to be recited. They were read aloud.

Thiasos.-- ‘Thiasos’, “noisy group celebrating an offering to a deity (shouting, singing, dancing)”.

J.P. Lynch, *Aristotle’s School*, Berkeley, 1972, claims that the philosophical schools of antiquity were ‘thiasoi’, religious societies.

-- G. Hanfmann, Muses in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford, 1950-2, 583, also claims that the Pythagoreans, Platon and Aristotle set up their schools in the form of thiasos in honor of the Muses, the goddesses of poetry, literature, music and dance, - later also of astronomy, philosophy etc.. -- Which Lynch confirms.

Mustèrion. -- ‘Mustèrion’ (Lat.: mysterium), something mysterious. -- More precisely: a religious celebration that takes place in secret, in a closed circle. -- In Sumposion 210a Platon describes philosophy as a ‘mystery’.

Which surely means that it is something reserved for the initiated. -- One of the characteristics of a ‘mystery’ is that its ideas and practices are never entrusted to written texts. -- That would explain why Platon also acts like this.

“Like a distant echo of oral teaching.” -- *Faidros* 275d/e says that a written thing “rolls in all directions”. Indeed he offers ‘akroamatic’ (= exoteric) teaching. “Like a distant echo” of what is said orally and in closed circles.

The playful Platon. -- Now reread E.PL. Drawing up a literary text is, for Platon, *Faidros* 265c, 276b, “a game to the deities”. To produce philosophical texts is a proper and even religious form of ‘entertainment’.

Thus, his *Timaios* is a story - in itself not without probability - intended as a representation of the birth of God-Cosmos. Something in the nature, immediately, of a sacrifice to the goddess Athena (*Tim* 26c).

It resembles a sacred celebration (*Laws* 644d) a text, after all, is both mimesis, imitation, and methexis, participation, of “the divine play that was the ordering of the whole cosmos”.

Platon himself repeatedly stresses that one should not take his literary plays too seriously. He then considers with irony, his own dialogues as a game which reflects the amusement of the deities in creating the world". (P. Hadot, Préface, in: Richard, *L'enseignement oral*, (Oral teaching), 14).

Note: -- Thus far a sketch of the opinion of the Tübinger Schule, -- without its 'reconstruction' of the so-called "secret doctrine" of Platon. Why without? Because apparently that reconstruction is very doubtful.

"It becomes much more difficult when one wants to reconstruct that teaching from later, written testimonies which are in many ways historically unreliable (e.g. mixed with other influences).

And it becomes even more questionable when one wants to consider this reconstructed teaching as the actual core ("qualitatively the most important") of Platon's philosophy and from there interpret the dialogues in a more systematic way". (C. Steel, *Literatuuroverzicht*. (Literature Review), -- (Neo-) *Platonica*, in: *Tijdschr.v.Fil.* 46 (1984): 2 (June), 323,-- where steller discusses the book by H. Krämer, *Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica*, Milano, 1982, -- a work of the Tübinger Schule but more updated.

Indeed, the reconstruction ventured by the Tübinger people amounts to a kind of stoicheiosis, as we explain it. But it does not help much, except complicated reasoning. C. Steel, a.c., *ibid.*, says: "W. Wieland, *Platon und die Formen des Wissens*, (Plato and the forms of knowledge), Göttingen, 1982, is right when he writes that two pages from a random dialogue contain more philosophical content than anything one has been able to construct from the indirect tradition".

Conclusion.-- Fr. Schleiermacher (1768/1834; the Romantic hermeneutic) was convinced that the dialogues contained the true teachings of Platon and was averse to the "esoteric" Platon. Schleiermacher's theory of dialogue is rather reinforced by the dispute about the esoteric Platon.

Note: -- More serious is J. Bernhardt, *Platon et le matérialisme ancien (La théorie de l'âme-harmonie dans la philosophie de Platon)*, (Plato and ancient materialism (The theory of soul-harmony in Plato's philosophy)), Paris, Payot, 1971), in which it is substantiated how Platon evolved with regard to Atomistics (= 'materialism'), Sophistics and especially Herakleitos' concept of "harmony of the opposites" (as a basic insight which somewhat shakes up the whole Platonism.)

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Study notes 1.

Preface (01/06).-- Modern and Present Reception.-- Ancient Greek Philosophy (alg. ontw./ logical strand).-- Wisdom. The Christian East. Sophological ground structure (pre-existent/ natural/ informative/ normative). Ontology as those four points of view together.

1.-- The Platonic theory (07/11).

Thanks to observation (sharp) come to see through (presuppositions). Historical explanation (genetic method of Platon).

1. The Milesians.

2. The Paleopythagoreans ('theates', Lat.: speculator, one who observes keenly in order to understand).

3 The Younger Natural Philosophers (Neo-Milesian).

Platonic theoria: developing the disposition to 'scientifically (= dialectically) perceive all that is, so that one understands and explains it. Especially the 'good' (the real and the really valuable) in the data.

2.-- The Platonic theoria (12/16).

The outwitting element in nature.

1. The Eleatic method (truth / opinions). Logic and dialectics, Eristics.

2. The Heraklitean method (the divine law of opposites, e.g. in human life). Kratulos, Platon's teacher.

3.-- The Platonic theories (17/21).

The spirit of the age (degenerate democracy; Kallikles; sophistry).-- The 'sophist' ('intellectual'). Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontinoi (art of enchantment).-- To assert oneself (rationality in the service of the will to power).

4.-- The Platonic theoria (22/30).

Socrates.-- Virtue, defined in definitions by induction (sampling). Summative and amplificative induction (Baconian interpretation of it: experimental; Anaxagoras of Klazomenai: experimental method).-- Socrates' a-fortiori argument.

Significant side. -- Socrates and the state. His aura.-- Enjoyment, yes, but above all conscientious enjoyment and religiously based. Death of Socrates: Platon's despair since.

5.-- The Platonic theories (31/37).

Truth (the manifesting things themselves). Ontology: the real reality, studied in its sense (truth).-- Intentionality (subj./obj.) with Platon: the noble yoke (the equal (original) by means of the equal (model) . This in the light of "the good" (= really valuable).

Study notes 2.

6.-- *The Platonic theory of order* (harmology) (38/46) -- The chapter begins with a summary of what has been said about theories.-- Memorise this well (it is the summary of Platon's predecessors and at the same time an outline of his epistemology (ontology).-
- Dialectics is, strictly speaking, both order and logic. In the service of theoria, the insight into reality and real value.

Kosmos (order, clean (eliciting) order).-- App: model: phonetics (theory of sound) which examines the elements/parts of all the elements (collection) and of the whole (system) of language.-- Comparative method. -- Terms: unit/number; number (collection), whole (system); -- stoicheion, element and factor.

Stoicheiosis (= theory of order, factor analysis): both holistic and hypothetical at the same time (element and premise at the same time). -- Also the later Platon (Paleopythagorean). -- Archè, principium, principle.

7.-- *The Platonic theory of concepts* (47/49).

Logic.-- The concept of 'kuklos' (circle, round). -- The aspects: name (= term)/ definition (= concept);-- 'image' (= copy), thanks to sample. -- Science (transparency, true opinion), sees the three at the same time. -- Above and in all that the idea that is reflected both in the term concept and in the specimen and in the science about those two.

8.-- *The Platonic theory of concepts* (50/52)

Logic.-- The ideative method.-- Appl. model.--

1. idea.

2.1. copy (image),

2.2. craft or artistic work. To be added: artist's model and design.-- The Platonic idea: an objective reality present in all its copies and determining its pattern.

DNZ as information of processes, a good example of idea.

9.-- *The Platonic theory of concepts* (53/56).

Logic.-- What is the beautiful. "A beautiful girl". -- Synecdoche as the evasive answer of the Sophist.-- Formalism. Conceptualism. Logicism. (Mathematical).

Popper. -- Abstractionism (conceptualism) (Russell). What is 'abstraction'? Certainly not 'ideation', which penetrates to the idea, before and above but also in the phenomena.

10.-- *The Platonic theory of concepts* (57/60).

Logic.-- The lemmatic - analytic method as ideational method: 'gold' (Locke / Willmann). From the nominal (verbal) to the real (business) definition.

Study notes 3.

11. - *The Platonic Theory of Concepts* (61/68).

Logic.-- Identity of something: in it, but actually also above and before it. Methexis, participatio, participation (having part). Transcendence / immanence. -- The 'images' ('specimens') of a high idea build them down (Platonic deconstructionism). Vico, John of Salisbury on "ideal/reality". G. von Le Fort: sense. Utopia, Ideologies, Realpolitik. -- Back to John of Salisbury: thesis/ hypothesis .
The idea is an ideal.

12. - *The Platonic theory of concepts* (69/74).

Logic.-- Doctrine of light (mystical/ rational/ ethical)-- Mid-century Scholastic tripartite realism.-- Nominalism/ abstractionism/ ideationism.-- Snowdrops.-- Forma ante, in, post.-- The ten commandments as a model.

13.-- *The Platonic theory of language* (75/77).

The essence of language: iconic or not? The primal language.

14. - *The Platonic theory of judgment* (78/83).

Logic.-- Pindaros' judgment. Noun/verb aligned with the case. - Platon: the sentence (judgment) is about something. - Identity theory: coinciding with oneself (total id.), with something else (partial or analogous id.). -- logical: if, then (de- and reductive) according to partial or total identity. The concept of 'being' as an identifiable concept.

15.-- *The Platonic theory of judgment* (84/88).

Logic.-- Platon's restrictive judgement: one assertion evokes the other, opposite. Moderation. Method of opposing hypotheses (Parmenides)-- Oppositionalism.

16.-- *The theory of definition and classification* (89/94).

Logic.--

1. Defining as a skill : talking with Menon about 'virtue(ivity)' requires logical rigor (the general of definition from samples).

2. Defining ethically : expertise without conscience is no longer human, is illusion,-
- more nothing than something. "Look at the thief". -- Summing up : synoptic/ diairetic.
Dichotomies. Idea : indefinable.

17.-- *The Platonic theory of reasoning* (95/104).

Logic.-- Archè, principium, principle, presupposition (hypothesis)-- What governs something must be presupposed as a hypothesis. Then that something becomes intelligible.

Fundationalism.-- The principle of necessary and sufficient reason or ground.

Linguistics,-- more so, mathematics as a mode of reasoning.