

8.5. Elements of platonic psychology

Higher Institute of Pedagogy
Course Philosophy Second Year 1991/1992

VII-th - Olympiadelaan 25
2020 Antwerp

Contents and study notes: see p. 115

By way of introduction.-- This section of the Second Year Course follows the Elements of Platonic Philosophy, in which the basic structure of Platonic thought was set forth.

In order not to complicate matters too much, both parts are set out separately. Therefore nowhere will reference be made to the invariably presupposed first part.

The dialogical nature of Platonic philosophizing.

Janne Lundström, *De gevangene van de regenboog (Vijftig Afrikaanse dilemma-sprookjes)*, (The Prisoner of the Rainbow (Fifty African Dilemma Fairy Tales), Leuven/The Hague, 1991, provides samples of what is thought to occur only in African fairy tales of the 'dilemma-tale' type, namely a story about good and evil which ends with questions such as: "Who among the characters is most entitled to the love of the girl?". Or still: "Who among the four sons is entitled to the inheritance?".

Anyone who knows even a little Platonic dialogue knows how many aporiai, unresolved questions, can turn up at the end of a dialogue. In other words: the dilemmatic method is an African application of an unconsciously Platonic aporetic method.

Or even truer: what Platon does in his dialogues - stimulating the hearers or readers to think personally, e.g. in the form of argument and counter argument - is just one example of a way of thinking which is spread across the globe.

The keynote: not merely scientific 'psychology' but also and even especially 'spiritual science'. Not that Platon, personally, did not insist on logic and science! That's what the Logic course (First Year) taught us.

Platon was too little of a 'rationalist' to believe only in positive facts - he calls them, in Ancient Greek, 'phenomena'. Above all, he and Socrates adamantly held to what the Archaic folk religions around the globe thought they saw: that the essence of a person is invariably his 'soul'.

The last centuries the belief in a 'soul' (however to be interpreted) has been challenged with power. Yet the Western mentality gets rid of that 'soul'.

In evidence thereof what follows.

In 1934, C.G. Jung (1875/1961; depth psychologist) published *Wirklichkeit der Seele* (Reality of the soul), In this book he denounces - what he calls - "Modern Objectivity", which out of "secularism" (the secularization, the mere adherence to everything that is "earthly reality" (visible and tangible things)) radically rejects or puts in brackets everything that exceeds the immediately obvious or the rational decisions therefrom (the transrational aspect). In connection with this 'blindness' (sic.) concerning the 'soul' both as an entity (i.e. as an independent being) and as an inner life, Jung speaks of "Modern naïveté".

In 1969 Charles Baudouin (1893/1963) published *L' âme et l'action (Prémises d' une philosophie de la psychanalyse)*, (The soul and action (Premises of a philosophy of psychoanalysis) Geneva, 1969-2, in which he tries to show that both the objectively-observable (i.e. in this case: language and mood) and the subjectively-perceivable (i.e. in this case: consciousness and desire) in a strictly scientific psychology can indeed be assigned a place;--if one wants: a scientific processing of introspective and behavioral psychology. in this case: consciousness and desire) in a strictly scientific psychology can indeed be given a place;-- if one wants: a scientific processing of introspective and behavioral psychology. O.c., 132, Baudouin connects himself with Jung's *Wirklichkeit der Seele*.

In 1984 Kl. Kremer, Hrsg, published *Seele (Ihre Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhältnis zum Leib und zur menschlichen Person)*, (Soul (Its reality, its relation to the body and to the human person)) Leiden/ Cologne, 1984, in which, of course, the soul again plays a central role, both as an animating element with regard to the body and as the core of the per-person(lity).

Platon and Neoplatonism, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas,-- the Bible represent the Antique-Medieval modes of thought.

I. Kant, L. Wittgenstein, C.G. Jung represent the Modern-Actual mentality.-- This work is made by specialists.

1989: D. Bombardier/ Cl. Saint-Laurent, *Le mal de l' âme (Essai sur le mal de vivre au temps présent)*, (The evil of the soul (Essay on the evil of living in the present time), Paris, 1989, deliberately wants to rehabilitate the term 'soul',

Conclusion. If we now embark on a Platonic and Patronizing "soul" science, we are not entirely outside our actuality. On the contrary.

In this sense we are not 'Modern' (wanting at all costs to present something radically non-traditional), but Postmodern, i.e. we independently connect to the Platonic tradition.

The concept of 'spirit

In view of the fact that the term 'spirit' will be used frequently, we explain its use -- semasiology -- in its main features.

The term 'reason' frequently occurs to those who speak of Platon. This translation of 'nous' (Lat.: intellectus, reason) or 'logos' (Lat.: ratio, reason) is not necessarily bad.

But today it has an overly enlightened, rationalistic connotation. That is why we prefer the term "spirit", which preserves something of the higher - the anagogic which always comes through in Platon's thought and life and which opposes the "catagogic" (downward) of his time.

As an aside, the term "the exalted" conveys something of the atmosphere in which "spirit" is bathed in Platonism.

Bibl. st.: R. Guardini, *Lebendiger Geist*, (Living Spirit,-), Zurich, 1950, vrl. 102/107 (*Der Begriff 'Geist'*);-- J. Scher, ed., *Theories of the Mind*, London/ New York, 1962."

1. Beginning with Scher: thirty-five professional scholars and philosophers - inter- and multidisciplinary - collaborate on this wonderful book. 'Spirit' is 'all that distinguishes man from what is beneath him', his 'form of being' or - Platonic - 'eidos'.

Biologists, philosophers,-- methodologists (= introspectives, memory analysts, sociologists, mathematicians, hypnosis practitioners, paranormologists) explain this in more detail.

2. Guardini.-- First the very broad meaning: the mentality. Thus e.g. the spirit of the Benedictine order or of the Renaissance period. -

Now the narrower meanings.

a. All those who as rarefied, finely-grained reality rise above coarse matter: thus Primitives call 'soul' all that a human being e.g. 'exudes' of life force;-- thus the 'shadow' of a deceased person is his 'soul' (she is neither radically incorporeal ('spiritual') nor coarse matter, but - materially - in between).

b. All that is purely incorporeal is 'spirit'. Thus the incorporeal soul of man.--which does not exclude a subtle (the Church says 'subtle') soul(s).

Distinguished from these are the typically Modern meanings of 'spirit -

a. 'Mind' is "the Modern-Rationalist subject or I" (since the Cartesian "I think - philosophy").

b. Spirit' is also - later, for a number of Romantics - "the Romantic-playing subject" that may

(not always, far from it) above the mediocre mass of mortals (as is the case with the supporters of the Sturm-und-Drang movement).

To be distinguished from this, to a certain extent, is the Kierkegaardian meaning of "spirit": is "spirit" that human being who, although thrown into a world that exists for him/her against his will, nevertheless "designs" this world (together with a "design" of himself/herself as a freely choosing and deciding being), while he/she thereby knows himself/herself to be personally responsible before God.

Note--The Absolute or German Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, especially Hegel) left us with a use of words :

- a. "Subjective mind" is all that culture produces;
- b. "Objective mind" is all that culture is as a performance of that culture-producing 'mind' (economy, politics, religion education system, etc.) In other words: here 'mind' is either culture-producing or culture.

Conclusion: When we employ the term 'spirit' in its Platonic or Platonizing sense, one or other of the meanings just mentioned may well be included more than once.

Dialectics.-- Like any word, so does 'dialectics': a multitude of related meanings! Perhaps Fr. Schleiermacher's (1768/1834; Hermeneuticist) description is the best:

"Dialectic is the skill of:

- a. of a distinction, indeed a dispute, in thinking
- b. to come to an understanding."

As he says "die Differenz aufheben" (to abolish the difference, -- where 'abolish' means both "to do upholder and "to raise to a higher level").

Cfr K1.E. Welker, *Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher*, (Schleiermacher's fundamental assessment of the history of religion,), Leiden/ Köln, 1965, 15ff. (Dialektik).- Something that is intended in Platon's dialoguing, but in many cases - aporetically - fails.

The so-called Platonic 'logocentrism'. --- 'Logocentrism' in the sense of J. Derrida (1930/2004; Deconstructionist) means what follows.-

All those who in the opinion that they occupy a superior position, which makes them have an all-embracing (transcendental) overview so that they stand above the singular concrete situations, act as if they have "the (absolute) truth" at their disposal,--are in other words logocentric. He/she imagines him/herself to be the centre of logos, thought truth.

This implies that such 'thinkers' 'think' beside reality: after all, they are just as situated as those whom they 'lecture'.

Derrida et al. do exaggerate when they open a kind of 'witch hunt' against people who appear to them as 'logocentric'. From now on, it suffices that someone tries to justify - 'justify' - a point of view, to see a whole army of 'dismantlers' combing his/her behavior as 'logocentrism'.

As if those antilogocentrists themselves somewhere "justify" their behavior from preconceptions that . in their case, of course, should not be understood as if they were selling their truth as the truth!

Bibliographical sample: L. van Tuijl, transl., *Poe, Lacan, Derrida, The stolen letter*, Amsterdam, SUA, 1989.

1955: Lacan, the maverick psychoanalyst, interprets Poe's story (*The Purloined Letter*). Years later, Derrida analyzes Lacan's interpretation as "dogmatic" (Lacan's truth as the truth).-

Ph. Buyck/ K. Humbeeck, ed., *Deconstructie (Small Zoo for children of today)*, Second Series, Restant xv/4, Antwerp, 1987.-.

Among other things, it is revealed how the well-known article *La pharmacie de Platon* (Plato's Pharmacy), can only carry out the dismantling (la déconstruction) of Platon's so-called 'dogmatism' because it simply ignores the elements that demonstrate the non-dogmatic nature of Platon's way of thinking. Which boils down to this: the deconstructionist!

J. Derrida, Limited Inc., Northwestern University Press, Evanston (II.), 1989.-- Austin is known for his language act thinking. Derrida builds him off.

In 1977 Searle, also a language thinker, builds off Derrida's opinion. Derrida builds off Searle.

Fortunately, Derrida opens his mouth more clearly: those who call him 'anarchic' or 'too lax' are misunderstanding Derrida. He does not introduce 'arbitrariness' or 'a general negation of truth' with his reductionist thinking. It is a 'popular belief' to think that Derrida erases all distinctions between 'true' and 'false'.

P. Couttenier, ed. *Guido Gezelle, En stoort de stilte niet*, (And does not disturb the silence), Leuven, Davidsfonds, 1987.-- Gezelle is often dismissed by detractors as a "prophet" who "speaks on behalf of truth, beauty and value". Yes, "on behalf of God".

Steller shows that a non-decreasing reading of the same Gezelle teaches that he is at times also 'aporetic' and thus not a self-confident prophet "in the name of truth". So read carefully.

Not 'logocentrism' but inductivism.

Platon's true thesis comes down to this: Socrates is known as the importer of the inductive method. -

a. The summative part includes the determined phenomena as far as showing one and the same trait; as e.g.: all determined, 'verified' cases of 'justice' show the trait "conscientious person";

b. the amplificational part includes the hypothesis - not the absolute certainty - that all cases of righteous action yet to be verified will also exhibit the trait "conscientious person".

That there can be no question of 'logocentrism' if the inductive method is rigorously adhered to is shown by the fact that the summative part is and remains decisive: verified cases are always only a part of the real cases. One has only a partial truth, from which one may start hypothetically guessing the total truth.

Note--The fact that a number of dialogues end aporetically, i.e. without resolution of the problem posed, exposes another aspect of Platon's non-logocentrism.-.

That is precisely why we opened these lessons with the reference to the dialogical character of Platonic philosophizing (E. PL, PSY. 01: dilemma-protocols). He who speaks with fellow men is not 'closed' ('dogmatic'), but 'open' to another's partial truth -

Remark-- There is another reason: anyone who puts forward ideas, in the strict Platonic sense, in order to provide the relationship between those engaged in dialogue, whether successful or not, with a common point of view (if only) which escapes every individual human being or every private group of human beings (for that is essentially an 'idea'), undermines in principle every logocentrism.

Conclusion. So we can approach Platonic psychology without much care and learn a lot from it, just by reading texts and comments (preferably from experts) without any preconceived ideas.

Remark Before we formally start with Platon's psychology, I would like to mention this : it concerns a healthy anthropology (philosophical anthropology). -

Biblical sample..:

-- C. Schavemaker/ H.Willemsen, ed., *Over de wijsbegeerte van de mens*, (On the Philosophy of Man), Alphen a/d Rijn, 1989 (twelve chapters - texts - including one on Platon);

-- R. Bakker, *Philosophical Anthropology of the Twentieth Century*, Assen, 1981, from many other works and articles.

Note--When one talks about "humanities," three names can safely be mentioned: Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen and Helmuth Plessner. Modern humanities stands or falls with these three. Plessner described them as the 'foundations' of human sciences (including history).

What is contemporary anthropology all about? G. Haeffner, *Philosophische Anthropologie*, (Philosophical Anthropology), Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1982, indicates: language, humanity (between persons (= intersubjective) and between groups), corporeality and spirit (including self-awareness, freedom),-- 'historicity' (= the fact that man changes along with cultural history), -- religion, -- meaning of being human.

We will meet all these aspects during our dwellings with Platon and the Platonizing tradition.-

Where will the difference be? In what is called "(scientific) human and world view". Precisely the same questions and answers differ when they are raised in the fifth - fourth century B.C. from when they become themes in our late twentieth century.

But that is precisely what is interesting: it demonstrates the 'historicity' of all kinds of themes. One understands one's own time much better when one dwells in a previous time.

Appl. model.-- Platon as an Ancient Greek speaks e.g. of "human 'fusus', nature". What this means is that, following the Milesians, who placed nature at the center, he situates man in the whole (and the collection) of all that has 'nature',-- in this case both human nature (the collection and the totality of all that is 'man' as nature (form of being)) and nature without more (what for him is 'being' and 'goodness' (value) in one).

If you will: how truly valuable is being human?

By the way, this point of view is still valid, even though it is situated in another human and world view, ours.

Personality, society, culture -- these three determine to a great extent our view of mankind and the world.

Bibliographic sample: Z. Barbu, *Samenleving, cultuur en persoonlijkheid*, (Society, culture and personality), Utr./ Antw., 1973. This book says that the concepts of 'personality' (psychological), 'society' (sociological) and 'culture' (culturological) themselves, in turn, put forward the concepts of 'order/ structure and system'. Which brings us into full harmony (order theory)! Barbu's tripartite structure also appears elsewhere as a basic division.--

Thus e.g. Talcott Parsons/ Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1951, posits as the framework of thought for a theory of action (praxeology) the threefold division.-

Similarly, J. Goudsblom, *Nihilisme en cultuur*, (Nihilism and culture,), Amsterdam, 1955, 74) 77 (Society, personality and culture) - following in the footsteps of Talcott Parsons/ Shils on the other hand - deals with the phenomenon of 'nihilism' (= crisis of values).

Similarly, Mikhail Bakhtine, *Esthétique de la création verbale*, (Aesthetics of verbal creation), Paris, 1984 (translated from the Russian), in which the proposer, going against Structuralism, posits the triad in question: language use, particularly dialogue, is defined in terms of 'voices',

- a. the voice that speaks (personality),
- b. the voice spoken to (society),
- c. the voice of the culture within which the speech is situated.

Thus, in the wake of Bakhtine, Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Baktine et le principe dialogique*, (Mikhail Baktin and the dialogical principle), Paris, 1981, and id. *La conquête de l'Amérique (La questin de l'Autre)*, (The conquest of America (The fate of the Other)), Paris, 1982.

Remark- Platon knows this triad clearly: in his exposition e.g. of the utopian ('ideal') state, he speaks of the singular nature, the universal nature (through which the individual is situated in society) and the higher (ideal) nature (ideal of culture).

Edward Montier, *A l' école de Platon*, (At the school of Plato,), Paris, Education Intégrale, s. d., 40s., says concerning the sense of Platon study what follows. Not only to know what Platon thought twenty centuries ago, it is worthwhile to attend the 'sunousia', meetings and dialogues. Also and especially even to learn to think for oneself without more (...).

Also in order (...) to reveal what one has to think about never-ending questions. Also because one concludes - with Platon - from the effects to the causes, from the visible and tangible to the invisible, from the sensory, perishable and vain world to the incorporeal, only real and lasting world,--to the ideas of which the data of experience are but the 'pictures' (= imperfect specimens) (...). -

Behold how this very Catholic book views the great Heathen Platon, in the middle of the twentieth century.-

One note Montier says "twenty centuries" back. It should be "twenty-five centuries". Apart from that scattering, what he says is still correct

First sample.-- values psychology. (09/11)

"Tell me what values - real values - thou hast in view, and I will tell thee what soul that betrays". Such is the slogan one might preface to characterize Platonic or Patronizing psychology (or rather 'soul' science). Therefore a word about 'value', embodied in 'goods' - about feeling value etc.

Bibliographical sample: L. Lavelle, *Traité des valeurs*, I (*Théorie générale de la valeur*), (Treatise on Values, I (General Theory of Value)), Paris, 1951 (including, as a fascinating chapter: *La valeur dans l'histoire*,-- o.c., 33/181);--

P. Schotsmans, *De waardeleer als uitweg uit onze beschavingscrisis*, (The doctrine of value as a way out of our crisis of civilization), in: *Onze Alma Mater* 1986: 2, 105/120 (showing that the axiology or theory of value is in full bloom).

The objective side.

Our starting-point is Platonic, namely, the noble yoke. On the one hand there is the object, all that is valuable; on the other hand there is the subject, all that feels value ('appreciates', 'estimates', 'values' etc.)-- Both together Platon calls "the noble yoke".

Well, ontologically it is so that all that is, is at the same time somewhere amenable to value judgments (as, incidentally, ontologically all that is, is at the same time 'true' (in the Antique sense), i.e., amenable to true judgments). This is the all-embracing, 'objective' element. -

Appl. model.-- We are thinking of a borderline case, namely, all that is purely 'fantasy' (imaginary, yes, imaginative product). As e.g. Franz Rottensteiner, *The Fantasy Book* (An Illustrated History from Dracula to Tolkien), New York 1978, tries to depict it.

Well, it appears from that book that pure imaginations in art (literature, plastic, etc. m.) 'attracts' many people, i.e. comes across as valuable, as a 'good' (in Antique language) -

The imagined, after all, is "non-nothing," something, "being"--i.e., appreciable in one way or another.

Note -- This explains, among other things, Platon's appreciation-with-preservation of the Greek and other myths. Many myths are, in his eyes, 'lies'. Yet he uses them, e.g., to make ideas feel more real (if necessary he changes them partially so that they have 'usefulness' in his logical approach).

The subjective side.

Let us take the other side of "the noble yoke"-- Max Scheler, axiologist par excellence, says: "There is an irreducible intentional feeling. (There is an irreducible intentional feeling).----.

Note-- With Scheler there is a strong irrational element to this: sense-perception or purely rational knowledge is completely absent from the sensing of value;-- unless afterwards and from the outside. Thus Scheler practically denies the radical unity (which he elsewhere postulates in man as a person): the sense of value is both reasoning and sensing (at least in the case of material things) and intimately interwoven with this sense of value. This at the same time.

Comparative method.-- Let us compare for a moment, in Schelerian vein, states of mind, will reactions and aims with value sensing,

a.-- I get up happy this morning: this feeling 'happy' only makes sense if somehow the next few hours seem 'valuable'.

b.-- I get up this morning 'depressed' and in a bad mood: this feeling "depressed mood" only makes sense if somewhere something is very unappreciative.-- But I rise above it: with my will I react because I see 'value' in the fact that I overcome this mood.

c. -- I strive to succeed in life: this purposeful striving for will only makes sense if I see value in "succeeding in life".

Conclusion: Moods, acts of will and aims are not in themselves pure value judgments. No: the value-feeling is its presupposition, 'principle', 'principle', of it, -- in the realm of value.

Scheler's scale of values.-- Max Scheler classifies values.

a.1. hedonic life values.-- The sense of pleasure, so central to e.g. Sigm. Freud distinguishes between "pleasant/unpleasant" (// pleasure and pain).

a.2. vital life values.-- The biological element as a value: so healthy (sick), young (aging), strong (weak),-- alive (died).

b.1. cultural personal values.-- Especially three meet Scheler:

a. aesthetic value (clean/ugly),

b. legal value (right/wrong) and

c. epistemological value (true/false,-- in sciences and philosophical methods).

b.2. sacred personal values.-- All that is either 'holy' or 'unholy'.-- With the end result in the felt value: either 'bliss' or 'despair'.

Note -- This list is only informal. One can make many other classifications.

The ethical values - conscientious/scrupulous - are outside of Scheler's list. Why? Because 'ethical' (= moral, moral) is conscientious or unscrupulous valuing. 'Ethics' is conscientious valuing.

Remark-- There exists at least one psychology of values in an explicit way, viz. the humanities (cfr W. Dilthey) psychology of values of E. Spranger (1882/1963). -

"The meaning of the human being lies in the system of values that he has made his own. The personality is formed by the experience and pursuit of values which direct all human behaviour, including thinking, feeling and willing.

So if one wants to 'understand' man (Note: Spranger's psychology is *verstehende* or comprehensive psychology), one must get to know his value system. If one knows what man values, one can say who he - (Note: values psychologically speaking) is" (Bigot/Kohnstamm/Palland, *Leerboek der psychologie*, (Textbook of Psychology), Groningen/Djakarta, 1954-5, 430).--.

The result.-- Spranger's types ("life forms").--

The theoretical person puts insight, knowledge etc. first as the main value around which the other values are arranged: "He/she would rather buy a book than a bed".

This is how Spranger

the economic man ("What's in it for you?"),

the aesthetic man ("I'll make something beautiful out of it"),

the social man ("I fight for the rights of the disadvantaged"),

the power man ("I'll definitely push that at the next meeting"),

the religious man ("I serve God above all").-

It should be noted that Spranger's typology of value perception is not exhaustive but inductive. It certainly needs to be supplemented. Yet for us, Platon-students, it is decisive: Spranger is unconsciously a Platonist in the field of psychology.

Why? Central to Platon's work are ideas, among which the all-encompassing ideas are 'being' (reality) and 'the good' (an outstanding value).

To summarize: real (= being) value (= the good) make up the whole of nature,--also the nature of the human soul insofar as it puts real values first, already alive. We shall therefore see that:

a. the great monster (values: night life, food (including drink), sexual life, economic life),

b. the lesser lion (sense of honor, need for money) and

c: the little man (ideas)

are basically 'valuations'.

Second sample.-- Beauty psychology. (12/14)

It is, in essence, simple: if being (real) and good (value), together "real value" are decisive for the soul and its manifestations in life and the cosmos, then "clean" is all that is "real value".

A person - man, woman, child - who is already alive (all that is really valuable, aiming, betraying a "psuchè kalè", a clean (= noble) soul.-.

Appl. model.-- Aischulos, the first tragedian, Sept. 1011, says: "He died where it is 'clean' ('noble') to die for a young man."

Reason: such a martial or noble or whatever death amounts to "valuable reality" or "real value".

In Ancient Greek, the opposite is "to aischron" (= the ugly, the base).

In other words: the view of life and the world - so we said (E.PL.PSY. 07) - is also decisive for the right understanding of a term, -- here of the term 'clean'.

Translated in Platon's psychology: everything that is merely - we emphasize: merely (= one-sided) - the big monster (night, food, sex, profit) and/or the lesser lion (honor), is in essence 'ugly' (unkind, immoral).

Everything that represents "the little man" with his idealistic and idealistic trait, even if it is from the big monster or from the less big lion, is "clean" (noble, moral).

The Platonic theory of beauty.-- We deliberately avoid the term "aesthetics," because it has connotations that are incompatible with the Platonic theory of beauty.

Bibliographic Sample:

-- Wl. Tatarkiewicz, *Geschichte der Aesthetik, I (Die Aesthetik der Antike)*, (History of Aesthetics, I (The Aesthetics of Antiquity)), Basel/ Stuttgart, 1979,-- 127/132 (Der Aesthetiker Sokrates),-- 139/167 (Die Aesthetik Platons).-- We reproduce the summary.

"Clean," -- in Antiquities.

The ancient Greek word is much broader than ours. Everything that commands admiration and astonishment, because it is unusual, is 'beautiful'. A landscape, a goddess statue, a usable vessel, an impressive 'mania' (rapture) are clean to the extent that they are not everyday occurrences. A 'divine' landscape, a beautiful statue of a goddess, an exceptionally useful vessel, a particularly impressive mania ('trance') are - note the quality words or the adverbs - clean. This both purely technical and 'artistic'.

Appl. model.-- Bibliographical sample: Th. Zielinski, *La religion de la Grèce antique*, (The religion of ancient Greece), Paris, 1926, 57s.-- "Suppose we meet, some day, a man whose appearance is that of the deities made by our sculptors. In such a case, one thing is certain: we would all bow down - willingly - and pay homage to him/her, as if he/she were a higher being".

The 'barren' Aristotle speaks! What proves that something 'divine' clings, in the view of the time, to sculptures depicting deities. It is precisely this 'divine' degree of valuable reality (the beauty of good being) that is the beauty of it. Zielinski tells this anecdote in connection with what he calls "the self-disclosure of the divine in beauty".

Conclusion. Aristotle's reasoning lays it bare: is clean what - among other things by its divine degree - is unusually "really valuable".

Appl. model.-- Return to Aristotle's teacher, Platon.--

The 'clean' man.-- True to his basic premise, Platon says what follows.--

a. Is "attractive" a clean soul - meaning: a soul which enforces admiration - in a clean body - meaning: a bodily appearance and reality (including health) which enforces admiration.

b. The more frequent case. What is charming and beautiful is a clean soul in an unclean body. Whereby the 'ugly' Socrates, in whom the soul came through brilliantly, is a model. Platon had a boundless admiration for Socrates as a 'spirit'.

Note-- The other two possibilities

a. ugly soul in ugly body and

b. ugly soul in clean body are obvious with this.

Since in Platon's humanity the soul is decisive, a beautiful body cannot save the ugliness of the soul, the core of the person(s).

The objective element -- All that which is really valuable in a higher degree, i.e., ontologically, is beautiful.

Note

-- Bibliographical sample: Emil Utitz, *Asthetik und Philosophie der Kunst*, (Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art), in: E. Becher u.a., *Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, Berlin, Ullstein, 1925, 605/711;--

-- E. Utitz, *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, (Foundation of the general science of art.), I u. II, Stuttgart, 1914 u. 1920; -- id., *Asthetik*, Berlin, 1923.-- Utitz belongs to the Franz-Brentano-Schule (Gegenstandslehre: the objective aspect is given full weight).--

Here is what Utitz says about beauty: "Is beautiful everything that reflects values which provoke a feeling of satisfaction". In passing: in our midst A. Janssens, *Kritische studie*.-- Prof. E. De Bruyne on work of art and aesthetic experience, in: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 8 (1946):1 (febr.), 86, on that objective side of beauty already drew attention with Utitz' terms: "Die auf Erweckung eines Gefühlserlebnis zielende Darstellung von Werten". (The representation of values aimed at arousing an emotional experience),

Whether Utitz knew it or not, he is very close to Platon in this view.-- Whoever might harbor doubts about this, should read H. Albrecht, *Deutsche Philosophie heute (Probleme / Texte/ Denker)*, (German Philosophy Today (Problems / Texts / Thinkers), Bremen, Schünemann, 1969, 164 (Aesthetik).-- Who is not aware of this?

There it is stated brightly: "The aesthetic object does not acquire its ontological meaning through something outside itself. No: it is wholly itself. It is not involved in anything outside of itself, neither imagined nor factually given." -- Steller immediately adds: "With this basic insight, every modern aesthetics, insofar as it wants to do justice to phenomena, should start.

The subjective element.

This has already been mentioned: "some kind of case experience", but this in so far as it reaches a definite degree.-- Let us listen to Utitz, *Aesthetik u. Phil. d. K.*, 612.

Supposed to be a midnight fire.

a. First impressions apply e.g. the disaster,--also the helpfulness and techniques of the firemen.

b. When the worst is over, a moment may come in which we forget the sad.-- Then the overwhelming sight of the fire "in seiner grausigen, wilden Schönheit" (in its grisly, wild beauty) may arise in our minds -- quickly or preferably years later (an artist's soul differs from the rest). Thus Utitz.

Note--This theme is inexhaustible, of course. M.F. Fresco, *Philosophy and Art*, Assen/Maastricht, 1988. This work is Platonizing. H. Roeffaers, in *Streven* 1988, Nov., 187, says of it that this Platonic point of view is "good yardstick" for the aesthetics 's up to the XVIII - the century;--that thereafter the art appreciator becomes decisive.-- Which is only partly true.

Third sample.-- The harmonious soul. (15/16)

We return, briefly, to E.PL.PSY. 13 (The beautiful man). There we saw that body and soul form a unity. Unity" is here another word for "harmony". More precisely, this is about the inner harmony of the 'beautiful' human being.

The concept of harmony. - 'Harmonia' means "all that has the parts in some interlocking". 'Harmozo', I put something together. Not what we understand by this is the first meaning! Thus, the joining of soul and body is 'harmony', -- inner harmony.

As Tatarkiewicz, *Die Aesthetik der Antike*, (The Aesthetics of Antiquity,), says: Platon called 'clean' all that:

a. possesses its own form of being, through which it correctly 'joins together' (= inner harmony) all the elements of which it is composed, and through which

b. it is assigned, by virtue of that form of being, a place of its own within the whole cosmos (this is an integration which means external harmony).

In conclusion: form of being in a cosmic context - this is the summarizing expression for "cosmic harmony".

Remark-- Note: the form of being or 'eidos' (literally: being) is twofold: form of being is that by which one is distinguished from the rest of the universe; form of being is also and at the same time that by which one situates oneself in that same universe.

Remark--It is clear that we are now practicing 'stoicheiosis' (factor analysis): a totality (all = collection and/or whole = system) contains a number of elements 'stoi-cheia') which are joined together (and thus show harmony).

The beautiful harmony.-- The fusion of elements into a coherence can be such that its real value comes through strongly: at that moment it compels admiration and astonishment and the Ancient Greek says that it is 'beautiful' ('kalè').-- Something that still comes through in our language regarding harmony.

Harmony, especially beauty, is "from heavenly regions". It characterizes the clean soul (understood: in a clean body, both situated in the clean cosmos).

One knows the hackneyed song Platon is a "dualist". I.e. he thinks body and soul apart and he despises the body (as "a dungeon").

When one e.g. notices that Platon wants to work out the harmony in soul and body, is this the famous dualism? When one hears him recommending gymnastics and dance - musical methods - in order to work out this harmony, is that dualism?

Bibliographic sample: G.Rouget, *La musique et la transe (Esquisse d'une théorie générale des notions de la musique et de la possession)*, (Music and trance (Outline of a general theory of the notions of music and possession)), Paris, 1980, 267/315 (Musique et transe chez les grecs);--

G. van der Leeuw, *Vom Heiligen in der Kunst*, (Of the Sacred in Art), Gütersloh, 1957, 21/84 (*Die schöne Bewegung*;--on the sacred dance). - Rouget dwells on a description by Platon.

As an aside, the term "mania" means "being away," no longer being oneself (which can take many forms: anger, infatuation, hubris, possession, etc.), -- rapture ("trance," from the Latin "transitio" (transition from one state to another)).-- We follow Rouget's translation.

Reintroducing a possessed man to the universe.

Platon describes the condition of someone who has lost his 'harmony' (inner and outer).

"There are those who, in some soul-quench, in consequence of the resentment of a deity, suffer 'divine madness (Note: mania):--

So much for the diagnosis. Now the therapy. "They cure it by devoting themselves to ritual dance: a type of dance, which starts with a musical motto and then develops into a real dance." -

Now Platon's explanation: "The reason: music and dance, through the effect of their own movement, reinsert the sick man into the general movement of the cosmos. Moreover, healing is ensured by the benevolence of deities favoured by sacrifice". -

One sees it: the lost harmony (visible thanks to the 'divine' (the Bible would say 'demonic') mania) is regained thanks to ritual musical techniques.

Says van der Leeuw, o.c., 77: "Expression of the divine is, by nature, in a very special sense, the prerogative of the art of dance. Body movement often expresses more of the totality and background of life than words or sounds." -

Remark-- At once we understand better what, for Platonic psychology, the expression "being-form in-cosmic-connection" means who has lost his 'good' being-form, who has lost his harmony with the cosmos is no longer 'himself'.

Fourth sample.-- Soul and works of art. (17/19)

Bibliographic sample: H. Wagner, *Asthetik der Tragödie von Aristoteles bis Schiller*, (Aesthetics of Tragedy from Aristotle to Schiller), Würzburg, 1987.-- Steller talks about the theories concerning tragedy (tragedy): from Platon to Hegel there are two theories. One is the Aristotelian one: it defends tragedy against Platon's attacks.-- Hegel's theory of tragedy is the first of the two.

C. Verhoeven, *Het medium van de waarheid (Beschouwingen over Plato's houding tegenover de poëzie)*, (The medium of truth (Reflections on Plato's attitude toward poetry), Baarn, Ambo 1988. -

The opposition "poetry/philosophy" dates from long before Platon: Xenophanes of Kolophon (-580/-490), Herakleitos of Ephesos (-535/-465) preceded him in "appreciation" of poetry.

The case was this: the Archaic man took poetry as truth. Philosophy gradually detached itself from poetry and claimed for itself truth or just a piece of truth.-

What does Platon have against poetry? That it takes the medium so seriously that the actual reality is forgotten. That medium is language, - which is far removed from reality.

Philosophy, on the other hand, as Platon conceives it, aims not at words and wordcraft, but at the direct experience of reality in its value.-

Consequence: the comedy (the comedy) because it refuses to be 'serious', Platon allows. It is as Ludwig Landgrebe, *Pleidooi voor een niet-esthetische kunstbenadering*, (Plea for a non-aesthetic approach to art), in: *De Uil van Minerva (Ghent) 7(1990/1991): 2 (winter)*, 69, says:

"Plato's philosophy already poses - without making art a special theme - the basic problem which, in any philosophy of art, must necessarily be posed: the question of the truthfulness of art."

"In the context of the question of the truth that man needs in order to know what he must do to live rightly, the art becomes for him

- a. who was hitherto undisputed mistress of the Greeks,
- b. to a problem."

Consequently, art is only of real value in Platon's eyes insofar as it teaches the art lover - his soul, that is. - the objective truth about life and the meaning of life.

A person can be an expert art lover, and yet lack conscience. One can be a great artist, knowledgeable, and yet through his works misform fellow men in their conscience.-- The soul is at stake. It needs truth.

Soul and beauty.-- Platon -- we saw it just now -- does *theoria*, i.e., to observe something keenly so that one discovers its real value (what the Romans call 'speculatio').-- To translate by us 'theory' (abstract formulation) or by 'speculation' (contemplative life) is not very correct translation.

A. Platon's predecessors.

a. Platon reacted among other things and above all against Protophilism (-450/-350), which reduced 'beauty' to "everything that subjectively appears to be pleasant". - Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375) said that 'beauty' is above all "all that which presents something deceptive ('illusory') ('apatè', illusion) so that one is enchanted by it ('goeteia', magic). - - Subjectivism, then.

b. Platon was inspired by

a. the Paleopythagoreans: 'beautiful' is "all that represents cosmic order, preferably expressed in musical and mathematical form";

b. Socrates: works of art should first and foremost be useful in solving true life problems;

Consequence: a good artist is of course an expert (he must know his trade), but not without a conscience. - Ethics therefore prevail.

B. Platon's concept of beauty.

Starting point.-- Nature insofar as it reflects ideas, is a 'cosmos', an 'ornament', beauty.-- That high beauty becomes phenomenal, i.e. visible and tangible, in order, arrangement,-- harmony, symmetry, measure (boundary awareness) etc.

The actual world.-- The things of our immediate experience-- nature things, culture things--

a. are but individual specimens of general ideas,

b. imperfect representations of ideal ideas.

In the things in and around us, therefore, we see the 'high' ideas in dismantled manifestation.-- Therefore, the world as it is, is not very encouraging. We have to do with 'dismantling'.-- Disorder, bad order, disharmonies, asymmetries, boundary violations and so on.

Beauty.-- The idea is unquestionably "beautiful," i.e. if we saw it, an immense sense of wonder would arise in us, The idea is the real value in a high degree.

Art is the reproduction - as pure as possible - of true value, preferably in its high degree.

(creativity, individual feeling) are only justifiable insofar as they do not hinder the exposure of beauty as an enhanced degree of real value.

Dichotomy.-- A dichotomy dominates the artist world.

a.-- *The true artist* practices 'good' art in so far as he exposes the form of the essence, in a cosmic context - specific to what he wishes to work out - in the amplified, admiring and astonishing degree present.

b. -- *The untrue artist* deviates from this rule: he mirrors creature form -- in cosmic context -- without too much real value in amplified degree.

He is basically "lying" with his possibly brilliant works.

This leads to the following conclusion: the true artist mainly appeals to the small human being who thinks personally; the untrue artist appeals to the big monster and the lesser lion. This is seen from a psychological point of view.

To illustrate.-- There was a justified reaction from the artistic world against Platon's radical separation between dialectics (philosophy of a scientific nature) and art (poetry). -- A few hints to grasp Platon's theory of art.

a.-- *Homeric poetry.*

i. Platon does not cease to express his fondness for the great poet. "Homer is the greatest and the most divine among the poets" (*Ion, Faidon, Timaios, State, Laws*).

ii. But the Iliad with Achilleus is inferior to the *Odusseia* with Odusseus, for Achilleus is more conscientious than Odusseus. For the education of youth, high quality and not 'beautiful' (in the non-ideal sense) texts should be presented: Homer's example proves it! For under the splendour - apparent splendour - of his texts, all too often ... falsity, unbridled passion and many other immoral things about which young people should be warned (Cfr. H. Perls, *Plato (Seine Auffassung vom Kosmos)*, (Plato (His conception of the cosmos),), Bern / Munich, 1966, 96f.).

b.-- *Pastime.*-- Mediocre and mean people, when drinking together, call upon flute players,-- to pass the time.

Well-bred people, however, have no need of flute-players, dancers, or harp-players: they have enough of their own wealth, and avoid, when drinking together, "those silly things and childish scatters"! (Ibid.).

Fifth sample.-- Big monster/ less big lion/ little man. (20/24)

We have used the metaphor several times because it is so eloquent.

G.J. de Vries, *Plato's image of man* in: Tijdschrift voor filosofie 15 (1953):3, 432, says it clearly: "The soul consists of a large monster, a lesser lion and a small man."

As already mentioned

- a. the large sample has as 'values' night life, nutrition (dietetics), sexual life and economic life;
- b. the lesser lion is aimed at the value 'honour' (validation);
- c. The little person cultivates as a value "all that is truly valuable" (the good).

Dichotomy.-- R. Baccou, trad. *Platon, La république*, ari, Flammarion, 1966, 413, says that the Paleopythagoreans already knew a psychological dichotomy:

- a. an 'alogon', an aspect of soul life which, in itself, is without ('a-') 'logos', spirit;
- b. a 'logikon' a soul aspect that testifies of, logos, spirit.-- In *Politeia* x Platon follows a very similar dichotomy :
 - a, the 'alogiston', the mindless soul aspect (which includes the great monster and the lesser lion);
 - b. the 'logistikon', the element 'spirit' in the soul. Cfr. Baccou, o.c., 367, 481.-

This only shows that Platon makes the two- or three-way division dependent on the point of view that governs the division.

Tripartition.-- In *Politeia* iv (Baccour p.c., 187, 413) Platon gives the tripartition.-- To which Baccou says: Platon is not speaking here of the really valuable nature of the soul, per se, which is exposed in the disembodied state (before birth, after death), but of the incarnated soul. After death the great monster and the lesser lion dry up, as it were, to leave only the little man, -- element which constitutes the "true nature" of the soul.

Sociological scope.-- The common people, -- the average man, is characterized by the great lion, -- (what Platon in his utopian state calls "the guards" (a kind of order keepers) exhibit the traits of the great monster and of the lesser lion, -- (what he calls) "the leaders" are characterized by the great monster, the lesser lion and the little man,--

This shows that Platon and individual and society (later we see that culture is correspondingly) are seen from the soul, in embodied state, and its value system.

Ethical scope.-- We know the "ethicism" (one might say "puritanism") of Socrates and Platon, -- in their legitimate reaction against the then degeneration of Athenian democracy.

The term "arete", Lat.: virtus, usually translated by "virtue" (better, much better would be "virtue", (viability), therefore reflects the triad. The "true value" - aretè, virtue - of someone is situated from the highest, the good, the value-without-more. From there a scale of values is constructed which literally 'situates' the values of the great monster and the lesser lion, i.e. gives them a precisely determined place.

a. -- The divine - imperishable aspect.

Nous' (Lat.: intellectus) or also 'logistikon', reasoning ability, is "everything that is 'philomathes', eager to learn, that shows a willingness to learn". -- The deeper nature of the soul is exposed here for a moment.

We do say 'for a moment', because to really 'define' the soul (in this it resembles the ideas) is not to be done (as H. Perls, Plato, 116, makes clear).-- Meanwhile this: the soul as it was before its (re)embodiment, i.e. open to the higher world of ideas, comes through in the inquisitiveness and intellectual-ethical interest.

b. -- The mortal-perishable aspect.

This seems to come down to what Platon calls "the mortal soul" (his statements on the subject are not always coherent). The immortal soul, after all, as a real living reality, appropriates a body, in the mother's womb, by founding in it a mortal soul (principle of life) which endures until death. In Platon's eyes, the body, in itself, is rather inert (sluggish),-- lifeless and motionless.

b.1. -- The noble or "clean" urge for money.

In ancient Greek: 'thumos' (Lat.: animus), i.e. breath of life, animating power;--also: 'thumoeides' (literally: that which exhibits the essential nature of 'thumos').

In our current language usage, the term "temperament and/or character" would be correct. Thus when we say: "In life one must have temperament, character to persevere".

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Thus: perseverance.-- The lesser lion, after all, evidences a sense of honor and of validation which make the soul persevere, up to and including anger, rising up and so on.

b.2. -- The base, innocent desire.

In the Antique Greek: 'epithumia', desire, craving,-- up to and including passion, the passionate craving or 'primal urge';-- also 'epithumètikon', (which exhibits the nature of epithumia).

Sometimes, but then denoting a part of the whole 'philochrèmaton', greedy, possessive,--especially money-hungry.-- The values at which desire is directed are: night life (including actual night rest), eating and drinking (E.PL.PSY 19 tells us that the Greeks liked to "drink together" e.g. with or without women - pastimes), sex life (among which family foundation takes precedence in Platon's eyes, of course), economic life (among which enrichment certainly plays a role).

Terminology note.

Analogy is inevitable even in strict philosophical language, if not one would have to introduce too many separate terms.

De Vries, Plato's image of man, 431, says: the term "desire", typical of the big monster, Platon also applies to the "desires" (partly of other, nature) peculiar to the lesser lion and also to the lesser man. In other words: sometimes "desire" is narrow (the big monster), sometimes it is broad (e.g. the desire to learn inherent in the little person or the desire to be golden inherent in the lesser lion).

Imagery.

One can be surprised that Platon uses the terms 'monster' or 'lion' - animal terms - with respect to man, whom he esteems so highly, especially as a soul.

Who does not know the Negro Whitney Houston, the Soul singer? At twenty-seven, she has more consecutive number one hits than Elvis Presley or The Beatles.

Curiously the big lioness in her is so controlled by her little person that, surrounded by immense success, she has not become a 'vanity' after all .

"If one begins to lose one's head and believe in all the hype, one grows into a monster." Now, I don't want to become a 'monster'. I want to be a nice person"----.

According to the actress in an interview (D. Friedman, Whitney, in: Elle (London), 1991: January, 12/19).

Don't these words become particularly meaningful from Platon's psychology?

Psychology of Nations. -- Just as for the four degrees of knowledge -- eikasia, doxa, dianoia, noesis -- regular applications or variants occur in Platon's texts (H. Perls, *Plato*, vrl. 29/36 (*Die vier Stufen der Erkenntnis*), (The four stages of knowledge), discusses this thoroughly), so too for the soul twofoldness or triplicity.-

An example.-- Baccou, o.c., 187s.-- In short, Platon's text boils down to this.

a. In every single person of a society - polis - the same characteristics reappear as in the society in question.

b. The origin (explanation) of collective traits lies in the individuals who are reputed to exhibit them.

So e.g. the scientific sense (the little man) stands out in Athenian society,-- the Nordic peoples (e.g. Skuthen (= Scythians) and Thracians) stand out because of their perseverance (the lesser lion) and the Egyptians and Foinicians (= Phoenicians) because of their business mentality (the big monster, as far as economically oriented).

In other words: as for the degrees of knowledge, so for the degrees of soul! Immediately we learn to read Platon where we would not expect it. Also noticeable is Platon's penchant for hierarchies (orders of value).

To recap.

A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 82f., says as follows: -- In every human soul -- at once reflected in society (and culture) -- three aspects -- in Greek 'merè', parts -- are present.

1. One factor is attuned to life issues. He is also called "vegetable", (vegetative) soul".

2. Another factor is, in an adrift way, attuned to honor. It is also called "animal (animal) soul".

3. The third factor is attuned to truth. It is also called the "human soul".

Note--As in more than one case, also here: one did not attach too much importance on the tripartition "vegetable/ animal/ human" for "monster/ lion/ human". Yet the tripartite division reveals something of the mentality of Platonizing thought.

Two triplets.

Platon has another - incidentally parallel classification (or rather: ranking).-- In particular: "desire (lower)/will (higher)/spirit (highest)".

Compared to what is also called "covetous/ proud/ reasoned" (it is noticeable that the two series are not without connection to each other.

By mentioning the will, Platon raises the question of the freedom of the will.--In order to understand this better, we must dwell for a moment on what follows.

So one end is the ghost. The other is the great monster. Well, the autocrat - tyrant - is predominantly controlled by his great monster who 'tyrannizes' him.

This tyrannical control makes the tyrant an unfree person. Nevertheless - according to Platon - such a person is at the same time also free to a certain extent, since he himself to some extent chooses the values which are specific to his controlling soul aspect.

Decision.-- The faculty of will, which Platon situates in the triad "desire/will/spirit" is mixed: both free and unfree (certainly in the case of a tyrant).

Remark - We believe that, even today, so many centuries later, psychologists haven't come much further concerning the right dose of "freedom/unfreedom". Somewhere Platon remarks that also children and even animals 'want'.

Ethics.

Bibliographical sample: A.R. Henderickx, *The justice in the state of Platon*, in: Tijdschr. v. Phil. B (1944): 1/2, 81/134;-- id.,7 (1945): 1/2, 19/34.--

From the articles mentioned it appears that - as is the case more than once - Platon has more than one enumeration of 'virtues' (viabilities). There is namely a five-part 'canon', rule, but mostly a four-part one. -

But this four-part enumeration is divisible into a three-part enumeration with the fourth virtue as its summary,-- 'Virtue' here meaning "the right working out of the soul aspects."

a. The great monster, 'epithumia', desire, becomes sensible thanks to the 'sofrosunè', the pensive mind, which grasps the right sense of the coveted values (night life, food/drink, sex, economic life).

b. The lesser lion, 'thumos', lust for money, becomes sensible thanks to the 'andreaia', which grasps the proper sense of the values that the lust for money aims at (honor).-- Correctly translated : "pensive courage"

c. The little person, thanks to 'nous', spirit, possesses 'sophia', wisdom, which grasps the correct sense of all the data with which she is confronted.

The summary virtue is called 'dikaiosunè', 'righteousness'.

It would be better to say "conscience, in so far as it grasps the true meaning of each value". As a result, "justice" summarizes the three previous virtues: it exercises the "stoicheiosis", the factor analysis of the totality of values, to which each of the three soul aspects attunes us.

As Henderickx says: thanks to justice we create 'cosmos' (harmony).

Sixth sample.-- soul and deity. (25/27).

We are beginning to gain a clearer understanding of Platon's theory of the soul. The soul is value, beauty. It is, however, divided, indeed, discordant within itself. One could call this - with a sense of nuance - the tragic situation of the soul, which is naturally attuned to the higher things, but which, upon (re)incarnation, ends up in many low and lower things.

"The good" (value-less) and "the divine".

a. The all-encompassing (and highest) idea is "goodness.

The good in itself. The dialectic after a long way comes to call that 'good', 'god', 'deity'.

We write 'god)' with a small first letter. Because, in Platonism, it is absolutely not about the transcendent God (Yahweh, Triune deity) of biblical revelation.

Platon is fully situated in polytheism (polygoddess).

b. The all-encompassing idea of 'goodness'

And, at once, 'deity' is the 'measure' - understand: rule of conduct, norm - of conscientious (righteous, wise) action.

'Virtue' is therefore ... "real value" together with "deification". Thanks to imitation - one wants to be a representation - of the all-embracing and highest 'good', one shares in that 'good'. At the same time there is imitation and participation with regard to deity, - deification.

The true stakes of an incarnation.

Fr. Schneider/ J. Rehmke, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (History of philosophy), Wiesbaden, 1959, 38, situates the soul triad in total humanism.

A biological body comes into being in the mother's womb. An urge to (re)incarnate incites a soul - although it is in itself eternal, unformed, immortal, disembodied - to connect with a body which has become mortal, impermanent.

In itself the soul is only life, i.e. movement of its own nature: from now on it is engaged in a type of life which 'moves' by virtue of being moved.

From the moment of conception, the soul is caught in a struggle to live up to its high nature by means that are obviously beneath that nature. That is the tragedy of the noble soul.

The fork in the road.

This is a crisis situation: it can go up, it can go down! That, Platonically speaking, is the risk of living.-- In the *Timaios* 89d/90c Platon gives an outline of that risk.

Platon aims at 'psuch.agoigia', soul formation. In this sense his 'psychology' is by no means a purely 'stellige' (positive, merely establishing facts) psychology.-- We already saw this when the ethical aspect was discussed.

1. Man - whether he acts wise (righteous) or unwise (unrighteous) - activates the three soul aspects. Without this 'kinesis', literally 'movements' (understand: activations), they are in a state of 'decay'.

2. The most noble aspect of the soul, the spirit (the little person) was given to us by a deity to serve in us as 'daimon', the spirit of happiness.

Note-- Do not translate 'daimon' by our current 'demon' or 'devil'. Back then, 'daimon' was the principle of either 'eu.daimonia' (successful life) or 'kako.daimonia', (failed life).

The noblest aspect of the soul elevates us from this earth ... to "heavenly" (ouranios) kinship. Reason: man - literally Platon says - is 'a "futon", a plant, not of earthly but of heavenly nature.

Decision.--Psychology has its primacy in this.

Catagoric.-- This is: downward. If one surrenders to the values of the great monster -- desire -- and to those of the lesser lion -- the urge for money, then all life's presuppositions -- 'dogmata', basic beliefs -- become 'mortal' --

Remark- In other words: the actual life literally forms the thinking of the presuppositions. - Platon "Such a person immediately becomes, if it could be, whole and all mortal: when one has developed those aspects, after all nothing remains except what is mortal".

Anagogic.-- That is, upward.-- If, however, one has attuned the values to which the "filomathia", wisdom, is attuned, and cultivated the true conceptions--especially if one has practiced thinking of immortal and divine values--then, if one arrives at the truth, it is inevitable that, to the extent that human nature can share in immortality, one can enjoy it completely.

Reason: Such a person continually serves what is 'divine' - to theion - by keeping the daimon that inhabits, in excellent condition,-- with the result that he/she is happy in a thoroughly different way. So much for - as literally as possible - Platon himself.

The current concepts of materialism and idealism. -

That the Platonic basic psychology has been thoroughly incorporated, is brilliantly proved by a text of Marx's colleague Friedrich Engels (1820/1895; with K. Marx founder of scientific socialism).

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, (Ludwig Feuerbach and the Exit of Classical German Philosophy), Stuttgart, 1888, ii, in fine, he says what follows.-

The occasion for this work was C.N. Starcke, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Stuttgart, 1885.-- Engels reproaches Starcke, in typical Marxist language, for understanding the terms 'materialism' and 'idealism' in a 'papist' (meaning: clerical) sense.

"The 'Philister' (Note: petty-bourgeois-pettiness) understands 'materialism' to mean
1.a. eating, boozing, 1.b. peeping, carnal lusts, 1.c. pecuniary greed, stinginess, usury, swindling,

2. acting spoiled (= arrogant).

In short: all those sordid bad qualities to which he secretly surrenders himself.-- By "idealism" the same Philister understands belief in virtue "general love of man," and, without more, belief in a better world.--

He boasts of such things - in the presence of others - but - for himself - he believes in them at most as long as - after the materialistic excesses to which he habitually indulges - he has to endure natural catcalls or bankruptcy, singing his favourite song: "What is man? Half animal, half angel".

Commentary.-- Note the enumeration of the essence traits:

1.a. to 1.c. coincides with the big monster (food/drink, sex, economy,-except nightlife);

2. Converges with the lesser lion. There what Engels, cynically, caricatures as "idealism" (here in the sense of "belief in ideals") coincides with the little man.--

Note- Peter Sloterdijk, *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, (Critique of Cynical Reason), Frankf.a.M., 1983, 2 Bde., claims that cynicism has begun to become prevalent in the West since Enlightened-Rational thought.

Marx and Engels are very clearly situated in its wake. Texts like the one quoted above prove black and white that Sloterdijk may well be right.

Spiritualism. -One of the definitions of 'spiritualism' is: "belief in deity and immortal soul". What we have just heard from Platon clearly shows that Platon advocates one type of 'spiritualism'.

Seventh sample.-- soul and happiness. (28/31).

Platon states that conscientious living and 'happiness' - meaning 'successful living' - are identical. If one understands this in the way he does, this is in itself correct. Let us consider this for a moment.

Bibliographic sample: R. Mauzi, *L' idée du bonheur dans la littérature et la pensée Française du 18e siècle*, (The idea of happiness in 18th century French literature and thought), 1960;-- Happiness is the title of a collection of thirty-one works on the various aspects of the concept of happiness, insofar as they are discussed in French literature of the eighteenth century;--.

H. Schumann, *Die Seele und das Leid (Vom Mysterium des Glücksinns im Dasein)*, (The Soul and Suffering (On the Mystery of Happiness in Existence)), Dresden, 1922-9;--

R. Veenhoven, *Data- book of Happiness*, (Daten - Buch des Glücks), Dordrecht, 1984.

This sample from the literature on happiness proves that the concern of the ancient Greeks with eudaimonia, with living happily ever after (do not confuse this with our present-day 'happiness' (understood as a 'feeling of happiness')), still appeals to people. An eudemonology or theory of happiness is 'eternal': it interests all people in all times.

The meaning of life.-- "Meaning" here means "destination," "purpose. Our lives -- so everyone but the desperado feels -- must be directed toward something,-- must have a purpose,-- must "have meaning." -

Bibliographical sample: Rudolf Eucken, *Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker (Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschheit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart)*, (The views of life of the great thinkers (A history of the development of the problem of life of mankind from Plato to the present)), Leipzig, 1907-7;--

id., *Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, (The meaning and value of life), Leipzig, 1914-4.

The titles in themselves of this Nobel laureate show it clearly: there was, there is a type of philosophizing that deals with the meaning of life.

Psychagogy and sense of life. Bibliographic sample: Trui Missinne, *Need for meaning and psychotherapy*, in: Streven 1989: March, 502/511.-

Writer begins her article: "Meaningfulness" - so writes D.Debats in his foreword in D. Debats, ed., *Psychotherapy and Meaningfulness (A spectrum of visions)*, Leuven, Acco, 1988 - is a central fact in human existence.(...)

This typically human need for meaning has long been relegated to the background in psychotherapy. Since about ten years, however, there is a renewed interest in questions of meaning of the client in therapy (...)" Even in the world of art, the question of meaning is heard.

In Joepie 352 (22.02.1981), 44/45, Kate Bush is interviewed. Kate Bush is a singer of the quieter kind. Her first musical experiences were mostly traditional Folk (especially Irish). The readers of a major English music newspaper once proclaimed her "singer of the year".

In the interview about the title etc. she says: "Sometimes a strong doubt about myself arises in me. I think that, if one is honest, one must, on occasion, go through it. At last I have been able to convince myself that "the true meaning of my life" is music. But the question arises in me whether it is "worth it"".

Note-- What follows about Platon's sense of eudaimonia will show how thoroughly Platonic Kate Bush's statement is:

- a. first: the conviction that the meaning of her life is the music,
- b. then: the question of whether it's worth it. The two of them together!

"The good had to be done because it is good."

This very Platonic statement comes from the peace activist Daniel Berrigan. *D. Berrigan, To Dwell in Peace (An Autobiography)*, San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1987, talks about "living in peace", of course. That autobiography states at some point what follows.

The limitations of human beings as they are actual - 'phenomenal' humanity (as Platon would say) - compels Berrigan to state that he seeks 'a peace which this world cannot give'. What he does not refer to as flight. -

Over time, Berrigan discovered a common thread in his life: "The good had to be done because it was good." Which involved: going through much that was unpleasant, - discovering and cleansing values,-- unmasking lies.

Conclusion: on the one hand, disappointment; on the other hand, hope.

Remark-- Indeed: doing good in today's world as it (cynically) is, one can only do that good if one does it for oneself, not for the result achieved in people. If one examines Platon's life and striving, one comes to a very similar conclusion. And paradoxically: precisely then one is truly 'happy' and the meaning of life is truly achieved.

Platon on happiness.-- In his *Nomoi* (Laws), Platon says that on this earth one does not have to do with deities but with human beings, who are of

to "feel happy" rather than to "expect grief".-- Which is still true.

The 'eros' of fortune seeking.

Man is a creature in search of happiness, - in virtue of 'eros', urge for joy in life.

There are two variants.

a. The means-ends relationship.

We take hard work as 'ananke', necessity, because of the prosperity it creates. We take a medicine to get health out of it.

b. The absolute good.

The good - the value without value - is the all-embracing and immediately highest idea. Everything takes part in it and it reflects everything somewhere. Cfr E. De Strycker, *Concise history of ancient philosophy*, 114vv.

Genesis/ fthora.

Genesis' has come into being. 'Phthora' is decay, degeneration.-- A. Henderickx, *The Justice in the State*, Tijdschr. v. Phil. 6 (1944): 1/2, says in this regard what follows.

Platon sketches the genesis of the Greek polis, in a thought experiment.--

a. Beginning.

The main rule of Platon's thinking on this subject is: "to hautou ergon", each man his work (task within the whole). There are two prepositions:

1. the good work is the working out of the individual nature of each one (one is a good tailor, another is skilled in agriculture, etc.);-- in other words, when someone takes up a work for which he has no individual aptitude and aptitude, he corrupts more than he builds up;

2. the good work is the one work of one person; in other words: one individual, one specialization in society; otherwise individual nature - fysis - fragments itself into a multitude of not good works.

b. Growth and degeneracy.

Such a polis, society, increases. At some point it appears that artificial, surplus needs are being created... with a whole army of 'experts' living off these artificial needs. All sorts of superfluous things are put on the market - in Athens, for instance - resulting in a multitude of sumptuous articles.-- With the growth, a degree of degeneration has crept in.

c. Purification (catharsis).-- The moment of "purification" has arrived. With his teacher Socrates, who urged the austerity of life, Platon feels called upon to put the articles of opulence before the great monster

(nocturnal life, eating/drinking, sex, wealth) and the lesser lion (power struggle) to moderate,--through his dialectical philosophy. The question arose: "What is the point of all these articles of wealth, all these displays of power? Is that true happiness? Is not all this superfluity turning life into something partly meaningless?".

The philosophy of enjoyment.-

On that background now what follows.-- Many want to 'enjoy' life.-- But the visible and tangible phenomena are twofold.

a. As 'being' (real value), they are indeed blissful. The pleasure attached to them is meaningful in this sense.

b. As 'non-essentials' (unreal value) they are questionable. Their nullity prevents the eudaimonia, the happy life.--

Note--As Fr. Schneider/ J. Rehmke, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, (History of Philosophy), 39f., says: From this flows with Platon the suspicion towards all that arouses lust and deceives the happiness-eros.

The suicide as doctrinal touchstone.

The Platonic theoria, the entering into true reality, is often misinterpreted as world-flight. There is a dose of other-worldliness in Platon. But look: suicide to get out of the misery of this earthly life he rejects radically. The happy life is not to be reached that way.

Platon - says Schneider/ Rehmke - is on this point Paleopythagorean. The immortal soul, in so far as it desires the unimpeachably valuable, enters the sphere of the blessed,- -in so far, however, as it aspires the unreal valuable, ends up in a new earthly existence by virtue of inferior reincarnation,-- rather animal in nature.

In other words: the kuklos, cycle, of incarnations continues but brings no real eudaimonia.

Not either/or but both/and.

Schneider/Rehmke summarize using the Philolaos dialogue:

"The best life is that which is a mixture of the honey of lust and the healthy, matter-of-fact, pure water of the understanding of true value". Which confirms the motto for the umpteenth time: thanks to wisdom - sophia, which as a harmonizing virtue is at the same time dikaiosunè, righteousness - we grasp the right value and of the values of the big monster and of the values of the less big lion, which are not worthless, but have to be 'integrated' (righteousness) in a higher insight.

Eighth sample.-- Soul and dream ability. (32/33).

Platon is also an onirologist -- dreaming has always been something to which people have attached great importance (or not) throughout the centuries.

Bibliographical sample: W. Henzen, *Ueber die Träume in der altnordischen Sagaliteratur*, Leipzig, 1890 (proving how old the accurate analysis of dreams in the North is);--.

Enc. Planète, *Le mystère des rêves*, (The mystery of dreams), in which two volumes: A. Michel, *Naissance de la science des rêves*,-- Stevens et Moufang, *Le dossier fantastique du rêve*;--

W.Dement, *Sleeping and dreaming (Observation, research and cure of sleeping disorders)*, Rotterdam, Lemniscaat, 1976;--

P. Esser, *De wereld der dromen*, Kampen/Kok, 1962;--

K.Weiszäcker, *Psychotherapie tussen Jung en Steiner (Working with dreams)*, Zeist, Vrij Geestesleven, 1988;--

F. Froböse-Thiele, *Träume eine Quelle religiöser Erfahrung?*, (Dreams a source of religious experience), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck/ Ruprecht, 1957;--

Al.Borbély, *Das Geheimnis des Schlafs*, (The secret of sleep), Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1984,-- This, from a mass of texts.

We know that psychology for Platon is psychagogy, i.e. soul education.

Already his rhetoric, theory of understanding, is so coloured. Platon: "One must find kinds of speech adapted to kinds of souls" (according to Rol. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1985, 145).

What these types of souls are, we know fairly well by now. But it becomes even clearer with what he says about the night dream. Immediately we are fully into one of the aspects of the great monster, the night life.

The controlled side.

The state of alertness, as far as it is controlled by the small human being, makes that the big monster - as vice versa - and the less big lion - as the noble urge for money - are kept within limits that can be justified by our mind.

Our triumvirate, for the umpteenth time, plays the leading part.

- a. good habits are learned through education and self-control thanks to our minds.
- b. noble desires are learned by the mind, thanks to the ennoblement of our moneyed desires,
- c. insight in the good is learned again thanks to our mind which is attuned to it.-

Conclusion: "craving/ money drive/ mind", leads to "good habits/ noble desires/ insight".

The uncontrolled side.

The uncontrolled side of human consciousness may, of course, also come through during the day, i.e., when one is in a waking state or is driven. The great monster and the lesser lion, however, more often come through in the sleeping state.

Because our mind then, as it were, goes into a state of wakefulness. Says de Vries, *Plato's image of man*, 432: In sleep the spirit rests and no longer (entirely) controls the unlawful desires of the mortal soul, which then indulge themselves.

The great monster then satisfies his lust and in that twilight state dares anything, - freed and loose as it feels from all shame and insight.

For example, no reaction of diffidence prevents that aspect of the soul from being represented in the dream by a mother or by any other being,--animal, human or divine. This, of course, applies especially to the "sex" department peculiar to the great monster.

Therapy.

Platon - says de Vries - sharpens contraceptive habits.

a. Our minds may entertain positive -- in Platon's language "good" -- conceptions, - just before falling asleep.

b. The same mind can refine the urge for money by avoiding - just before sleep - anger or resentment, the result of disappointed desires and/or urges for money (whoever goes to sleep angry or with resentment, prepares his dreams accordingly),

c. The same mind can teach the lower desires - nightly desires, urges to eat and drink, sexual desires, dishonest economic practices - the "good" measure (e.g. by avoiding one-sided and excessive control: "qui fait l'ange, fait la bête" who makes the angel, makes the beast).

Note--What we have just mentioned - all too briefly - indicates the start of a Platonic depth psychology. A depth psychology which, as far as feelings of value are concerned, is certainly broader than e.g. the Freudian, which nevertheless strongly, all too strongly emphasizes the sexual and the aggressive. -

More than that: with Platon there is no predominance of the exultation which comes through so strongly with many present-day psychologists or psychotherapists. Platon moderates the lower urges. He warns against excessive asceticism and control. But he doesn't open the floodgates of free expression. His spiritualism as well as his ethicism are too strong for that. He cools down the honey of pleasure by the businesslike water of the mind!

Ninth sample.-- The method. (34)

Up to now we have virtually thrown ourselves into what Platon says. But a word about the method would not be out of place.-- We rely on A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, 1922.

Given: the problem of the soul.

Asked: a method. Namely how will e.g. Platon make spirit clear from daily experiences?

By acting on well-defined observations of people's behavior in everyday life (sic). What is 'theoria'. But not without a hypothesis: as Platon put it: "One and the same being cannot do contradictory things at the same time".

1.-- Platon establishes on occasion:

A heated man, in spite of being very thirsty, does not drink. Theorem: if one puts spirit as the decisive factor - stoicheion, element - first, then such controlled behavior becomes understandable. Spirit' here is that part of the soul which keeps a firm grip on the lower desire (the need to drink, the aspect of the big monster). Thanks to insight in thirst.

2.-- Platon suspects

That is theoria, precise consideration of something - in and behind such an act of control more than mere reason and/ or intelligence. The decision itself is more than insight. "The observation that the decision which springs from the human spirit, in the struggle with desire (i.e. thirst), is supported by the will, must serve to distinguish - apart from desire and spirit - a third faculty, the will." This is literally Gödeckemeyer.

Says Gödeckemeyer immediately afterwards, commenting on Platon: "For the will is not identical with desire, since, enlightened by the spirit, it opposes it.

Nor is this same will identical with the mind, since it is active in children and even in animals, -- both beings who do not yet possess a mind.

Note-- Children do possess mind - Platon knows that too but 'mind' here means "full exercise of mind". 'Will' in the higher human sense does not possess the animal either - Platon knows that too but he means the fact that animal behavior - think of the hunting of predators - displays a kind of 'will' which is undeniable: the energetic effort of the animal betrays a kind of 'will'.

Tenth sample.-- The soul as "being" and "principle of life" (35/37).

Hitherto we have come to know Platon's concept of the soul primarily as a principle of conduct. "Tell me what thou dost find 'truly valuable' ('good'),---tell me what thou dost find 'wonderful' (exceptionally valuable, 'beautiful'), and I will tell thee what soul thou hast." Such is the practical summary of the foundations of Platon's soul science.

The rest of what precedes is to go into more detail about the various elements that one considers 'really valuable' or 'beautiful'. In other words: the different values or beautiful things.

In one chapter, namely "Soul and Divinity" (25/27 supra), we touched upon the soul as an "entity" in itself, i.e. as a being among the other beings of the universe. With the ups and downs to which the soul is susceptible (anagogic/catagogic).-- Now we shall look more closely at the soul as an entity.

H. Perls, *Plato*, 116, notes that - in the *Faidros* dialogue 246a - Platon refuses to continue the historia, the investigation, concerning the soul with the intention of strictly defining that soul.

"In other words: the soul does not allow itself to be defined" According to Perls literally.-- What then is defined'? Our human-earthly concept of 'soul'. Not the idea 'soul'!

Meanwhile, Platon -- cfr Perls, o.c., 116,-- 70 -- does use terms like "movement" (in the sense of "life"), "pure thinking" (such that the senses do not play unless a subordinate role in scientific inquiry) to characterize the soul.

Above all, he applies the term "principle" - archè, principium, presupposition - to the soul: the soul is, indeed, "principle" of the whole man in so far as it is one element which must be presupposed for the totality of man - if it is to be understood.

The soul is strictly spiritual (immaterial).

Platon goes on to be the first Greek thinker to presuppose the soul - insofar as immortal - as strictly incorporeal.

She is not 'apeiron', smug like the primal substance (which the first thinkers spoke about as universe substance).

She is 'dunamis', force, which causes '(life) movement'.

It is, after all, above all 'idea', i.e. the only indirectly perceptible principle behind all our typically human behavior.

Remark: The triad "apeiron/ dunamis/ idea" (matter/ energy/ idea) reminds one of the present triad "matter/ energy/ information", which may be considered as one of the basic terms of the present natural and human sciences. The difference is mainly in the other view of life and the world, of course. Cfr E.PL.PSY. 07.

The human soul as a source of life.

Everything that is 'a.psuchon', inanimate, is in Platon's eyes 'lifeless'. -- This shows itself in the theoria, the thorough going into them, in the fact that what is soulless is moved, 'activated', from without.

If there is 'life' in such a thing, then a process of inspiration must precede it. However that process may be interpreted,-- The soul is moving from within, (and may be moving), -- as in the mortal soul in our body).

Animated body.

What I really am is soul, She is my actual 'eidos', my real form of being, by which I am and remain distinct from the rest. -- But my soul reflects itself in my body which is a participating image of that soul.

The soul of man is individual.

Platon, following in the footsteps of Orphicists and Paleopythagoreans, is reincarnate:

a. before the (re)embodiment she is already unified, individual; e.g. she is not a pure 'ekroè', emanatio, effluent (understood as a fragment of soul substance or as a fragment of universe- or world-soul);

b. after death she remains united (and does not merge into a vague cosmos).-

Conclusion.-- The soul is, in the ordinary sense of that word, a "being.

As de Vries, Plato's image of man, T.v.Phil.15 (1953): 31, 426/438, explains, according to Platon

a. radically combat unbridled individualism (think of the Protosophist individualism that degenerates into relativism),

b. but is the individuality of man equally radical to recognize.-

Remember what we E.PL.PSY. 30 said: in society, individuality and social being appear at the same time. Think of the dialogues, in which around a common theme every interlocutor plays an individual role.

The mind both general and individual.

a. In principle, what spirit is, is common and universal in each of us. That is the signifying or understanding aspect that characterizes each one of us.

b. But each individual can assert this identical and general-common spirit in his own way (a.c., Says de Vries: "That a Socrates and a Theaitetos - in spite of their union in common acquired insight - each in his own way, through difference of age and temperament, realize reason in himself, is an enrichment of the philosophical life which Plato does not want to miss.

Despite the pursuit of "unity," diversity remains a positive value. (A.c., 434),--

Note-- There is, for Platon's mythical side, another reason: each person tries to represent in his/her own way in earthly life the deity he/she followed during the journey along the celestial axis during which the upper heavenly regions were inspected.

The inequality of souls.

E. De Strycker, *Concise History of the Antique Phil.*, 109, says what follows. -

The souls are unequal under point of view of real value. Which entails that, upon (re)embodiment, they end up in distinguishable bodies. -

a. The most perfect souls are given the control of the heavenly bodies and share in it her own immortal life.--

Note--This is one of the numerous points where Platon engages in 'mythology',--for lack of rational data.

b. The less perfect souls are assigned a mortal body. They are separated from it by death and, after a certain interval, enter the cycle of (re)incarnations again (which can also be called 'soul transfer').

Note-- The expression "the body" requires clear clarification. As Perls, o.c., 70, clearly states: the idea of "body" encompasses not only the individual body but also the complex in which our body is situated, namely heaven and earth, i.e. all that ordinary people call "the cosmos".

O.c., 116, Perls returns to this: 'body' is all that is similar to it (i.e. what is also in its way body), yes, all that is material. -- Why? Because Platon situates everything in the whole, which is the cosmos. However individual, our body takes part in the rest of the cosmos (also in its materiality). Even the 'anankè' the necessity, i.e. all that is irrational but must be taken into account, is included.

Eleventh sample.-- The soul as immortal being. (38/40).

Let's start with a Platonic myth.

Bibliographical sample: F. Farwerck, *De mysteriën der Oudheid en hun inwijdingsriten*, (The mysteries of antiquity and their rites of initiation), I, Hilversum, Thule, 1960, 47.

a. The "mysteries",

i.e., rites intended for initiates and concerning life, survival after death and resurrection, have always, in limited circles, had great authority in antiquity,

Especially when the official religions were challenged by Scepticism, the mysteries attracted many people,-- from all classes of society at the time.

Some evidence suggests that Platon also had an affinity with certain aspects of the mysteries that were prevalent in his time.

b. The myth of Er.

There was the son of Armenios (a Pamphylian).-- He had died "a clean death" in a battle.-- His body, however, did not perish: after lying on a stake for ten days, he regained consciousness.

His story: "My soul has left my body. She has gone on a 'journey' with a numerous company. It arrived at a certain place, where two mysterious entrances led to the bowels of the earth. They were situated close to each other. Opposite were two openings that led to heaven. In between were the judges.

They ordered the "righteous" (meaning those who had lived conscientiously) to go up along the "heavenly" road at their right hand.

The 'unrighteous', however, they ordered to go down the road on the left.

As I approached, I was told that I was a messenger who was to give an account of the "other world" to terrestrial mankind. I am requested to take in all that I saw and heard".

Among other things, he then saw that the spirits of the heavens and the underworld, and those on their way there, met one another and exchanged information about the earth and the regions of the dead.

He also provided explanations of the various (planetary) worlds,--of the punishments inflicted on the damned.

That's what Er had to say. -

Remark-- New Age (New age) repeats, - in a contemporary but very similar way, such 'experiences' (e.g. in clinics, after treatment with chemical substances).

Note-- Farwerck notes that Er did not make a "visit to the other world" "in the flesh": though he was convinced that he had been there somewhere--with his soul having gone on a (soul)journey--and that he had returned somewhere.

Very similar stories can be read in an excellent historical work, viz. Carlo Ginzburg, *De Benandanti* (Witchcraft and rites of fertility in the 16th and 17th centuries), Amsterdam, B. Bakker, 1986 (especially o.c., 41 ff.: the radical conviction that one has travelled with the departed soul). The context of what Ginzburg tells us, in a scientific way, is of course quite different. But the phenomenon of the "departed soul" is identical. This gives food for thought as to its 'reality'.

The Reincarnation.

In the light of what has just been said, one understands a little better what follows.

Note-- New Age makes the case to a great extent that the soul existed before and reincarnates. This provokes a reaction on the part of the Catholic Church: either one is Catholic or one is reincarnate.

It is especially followers of Origen of Alexandria (185/254; Greek church father who tried to 'reconcile' Neo-Platonism and Christianity) who, centuries later, provoked the reincarnation struggle within the church.

Note-- One element in that discussion is the fact that, for the Bible, the cosmos had a beginning in time. For some Antiquities, it was eternal, with no beginning, no end. Also the soul, as an immortal being, is eternal. This gives reincarnation a characteristic of its own.

1.-- As genesis, arising, and phthora, perishing, our mortal life ends in death.

Note-- Apart from the death of Socrates, which made a huge impression on Platon, there is the fact that he himself - -361 - was imprisoned by the Sicilian tyrant Dionusios and was immediately in great danger of death. Thanks to a scientifically oriented Pythagorean, Archutas of Taras (-430/-348), he was saved from death.

2.-- The nadir interim is devoted, among other things, to contact with deities and to a more direct perception of ideas. A coming reincarnation receives a part of its formation.

3.-- The birth shock is caused by the reincarnation: resistances and happiness reduction arise.

Note -- De Vries, *Plato's image of man*, 430, says what follows.

1. Birth brings a severe shock to the incarnating soul.
2. But the possible harmful effects of that shock can already be absorbed prenatally, -amongst other things by uninterrupted rhythmic movements.

The memory - or 'anamnesis' theory.

It is certain that the conviction of having lived before springs, in a minimal number of "gifted" people, from clear memories,--which are almost never susceptible of rational proof, of course.

E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano)*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)), Antw./ Nijmegen., 1944, 29vv, tells us that Platon, a.o. concerning mathematical data, has two methods at his disposal,-- the stoicheiosis (factor analysis), and the anamnèsis, memory.

The 'memory' of a past existence lives on when, in contact with phenomena, one grasps ('contemplates') the idea of them somewhere. In addition, the fact that one has once, before the embodiment, 'contemplated' the idea, awakens again. However vague this may be.

Remark--We can refer -amongst a mass of books and articles- to two works concerning reincarnation.

1. P. Thomas, *La réincarnation (Oui ou non?)*, Paris, Le Centurion, 1987.--

The term "Pascal Thomas" is a so-called "name" of a collective of Christians from the French city of Lyon. Central is the belief in the resurrection. They compare this with current beliefs, - des 'croyances' such as reincarnation.--

Conclusion: there exist a plurality of reincarnisms both in the East and in the West, each time revealing strongly divergent views. A number of misunderstandings and oversimplified interpretations are corrected.

Both - Christian belief in the resurrection and reincarnation - are compared: the differences are such that they are incompatible.

2. Rudolf Passian, *Rebirth or the immortality of the human soul*, Rijswijk, Elmar, 1987 wants to clarify the theme in a 'scientific' way. What is certainly disturbing is that the author says "that the prospect of repeated earthly lives does not attract him in the least". This is possible, of course, but whether this strengthens the 'objectivity' of the book is another matter.

Nothing like leaving out one's own subjective opinions when claiming to be 'scientific'.

Twelfth sample. (41/43). The soul as a principle of life, not as a resultant.

Bibliographical sample: J. Bernhardt, *Platon et le matérialisme ancien (La théorie de l'âme - harmonie dans la philosophie de Platon)*, (Plato and ancient materialism (The theory of the soul - harmony in Plato's philosophy)), Paris, Payot, 1971.

Steller claims that although no one can work Platon's texts into a closed system, his thinking is nevertheless a system in the making.

How so? As Platon is confronted with dissenters, he attempts to

- a. to incorporate in his 'system' that which fits into his framework so that
- b. he nevertheless maintains his presuppositions, but updated, 'rectifiés' (improved).-- But such an adjustment would - according to Bernhardt - be so profound e.g. in the case of the soul as the 'harmony' of the body - that Platon's system is no longer (entirely) itself.

The Faidon on the soul as body harmony.

R. Guardini, *Der Tod des Sokrates*, (The death of Socrates), Bern, 1945, 134/136, gives a summary of the thought of that dialogue.

a. Introduction.-

b. Introduction and two chapters.

Socrates states that the existence of the thinker - philosophos - is fundamentally nothing but one long dying process. Which only makes sense in so far as something in the thinker survives death, namely the soul.

b.1. Kebes and Simmias then come into play,-- Socrates argues that dying is the dialectical antithesis of being born: both -- being born and dying are traits of something beyond both, viz. the indestructible soul.

Consequence: Death is only a phase and loses its tragic character.

This is reinforced by the fact that 'knowing' is fundamentally interpretable as remembering (anamnesis): the remembering soul must have existed before its incarnation. If so, it survives bodily death.

b.2. After an interlude, part 2 begins.

What is actually capable of dying? Only that which is composed. What is composed of elements? Well, all that is 'soul' is singular, not compound, because spiritual (meaning immaterial).

What is 'spiritual' in the universe? The ideas. They without more are immaterial. But our immortal soul is related to it and therefore immaterial as well. Which is strengthened in her by her absorption in all what is real value (the good) and beauty.

This is followed by a second, profound interlude. Although Socrates' words have made a great impression on everyone - remember he is a condemned man facing death - Kebes and Simmias are not yet convinced. Whereupon Socrates urges them to reason against it.

(a) Kebes: it has been shown that the soul survives a single body: what tells us that, having 'worn out' a multitude of) bodies, it does not itself 'die' when leaving the last one?

(b) Simmias: isn't the soul rather to be understood as the harmony - understand the configuration of the elements - of the body? In other words, will it not, like everything which is merely 'harmony' (aggregation of elements), in time disintegrate with its elements, which are disintegrating?

To which Socrates:

(ad b) Simmias' objection does not hold, for the soul is a principle that precedes, and not a resultant;--which must be shown especially by the fact that it controls both the great monster and the lesser lion -- the "urges" -- (such a thing is not possible if the soul depends on the body);

(ad a) Kebes' suggestion does not hold either, because the soul is a realisation of the idea 'life' and as an essentially living thing, it never dies.

c. Conclusion.-- If the soul is of such high rank concerning valuable reality, it follows that it is entitled to the highest care. Which Socrates reinforces through the mythological painting of what the afterlife has to offer in terms of soul spaces.

Simmias' reasoning.

a. ***The model***,-- The harmony of a lyre.-- The harmony -- interlocking -- of a tuned lyre is also something we do not see,-- something 'incorporeal' and something very beautiful and divine. This, while the lyre itself and the strings are 'bodies', material forms of being,-- composite elements,-- earthly and of the same nature as all that is perishable.-

Suppose someone beats the lyre and cuts its strings. To which he argues, "like you, Socrates": the harmony of the lyre still exists and does not decay -- look, it is impossible that the lyre is still there once its strings are broken (...).

b. ***The original***.-- The soul is, analogous to the lyre, also such a fragile harmony.-- Our body is, as it were, stretched and held together by the elements "hot/cold", "dry/moist" and similar things.

At the same time, our soul is only a "mixture" of those elements,--only a "harmony" formed by those elements as they are woven into a coherent whole in all beauty and measure.

Consequently, if the finding is that our soul is a kind of 'harmony', then it clearly follows that, inasmuch as our body falls below or above its proper tension - think of the proper tuning of the strings of the lyre - as a result of illness or other ailments, our soul inevitably - though very divinely according to its essence - immediately disintegrates, just as all other 'harmonies' disintegrate.

Bernhardt calls this interpretation 'materialistic'. Indeed: he who denies all immaterial being does observe that a dead body differs from a living body, but, instead of appealing to a "soul's inspiration" in order to make this comprehensible, he simply states that the soul is nothing but - merely - the structure (the present word for "harmony") which "structures" the material parts of our body, making them into a coherent whole - a "harmonia". Which is precisely making alive in the eyes of the materialist.

The deep impression. -- Says Platon's text.-- "When we heard both of them assert this, we were -- we admitted it to each other afterwards -- all in an uneasy mood. For it seemed to us that after what had been said before (Note: Socrates' argument) had convinced us so firmly, we were again confused and fell back into disbelief. And this not only with regard to what had already been said, but also with regard to what could still be said afterwards. For we feared that we were completely incompetent "judges": the question itself (Note: Whether the soul is immortal or not) could well prove to be simply insoluble.

Note -- In such passages of Platon we are, as it were, touching with the confusion of the time concerning the immortality of the soul, after the Archaic popular belief in the nadir realities had been abolished, yes, dismantled.

Note -- Guardini, o.c., 190, says that Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, (Thus Spoke Zarathustra), reasons in the sense of Simmias: the body is not something to man; the soul is something to the body; man is without more body.

Thirteenth sample.-- the soul as 'openness/ closedness' (44/50)

Hitherto we have seen the essentials necessary to understand Platon's texts as they should be understood,-- from now on we may deal with special problems.

Remark--In essence Platon's psychology is at the same time a kind of "psychiatry" and/or "psychopathology" (theory of diseases and disorders).

Bibliographical sample: W.Leibbrand/ A.Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn (Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie)*, (Madness (History of Western Psychopathology)), Freiburg/ München, 1961, 59/76 (*Platons Beiträge zur Psychopathologie und Trieblehre*).

This work summarizes:

- a. in a first period (Sophistes dialogue) Platon still very strictly separates body and mind;
- b. in between there are separate remarks which mainly concern the therapy of the soul;
- c. in the *Timaios dialogue*, there is interaction between body and soul (separation gives way to interaction).

Even more: a physical cause of (mental) ailments is not yet mentioned in the Sophistes,-- but it is in the *Timaios*.

Which proves that Platon has since evolved and processed things he emitted before.

Sophistès 228.-- Leibbrand/ Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn*, 60, translate the term 'para.frosunè', in Platon's Sophistès 228, by 'Vorbeidenken', - literally: 'to preside over something'.

The term 'para.fron' in the ancient Greeks meant 'insane, without common sense'. In other words: everything that is not the little person in us.

Note

1. With Platon, the term 'mind' ('reason', -- 'spirit') invariably has the strong connotation of 'value-insight', appreciation or so.

Already with Socrates it was noticeable that he thought strongly 'rationally': 'virtue' was 'reason' (that is how it is usually put). But one forgets that with Socrates (and Platon) 'reason' is always "ethically open mind". In other words: reason concerning conscience values. Seen this way, it is only normal that 'virtue' is identified with the so understood 'intellect'.

2. One cannot get rid of the impression that, with the Ancient Greeks and with Socrates and Platon, the term 'para.fron' means 'who (unconsciously) represses or (consciously) suppresses'.

Re-reading *Sophistes 228* now with that twofold remark in mind, it seems that we will understand much of Platon's psychology better.

"Something participates in a movement, aims at something and, of course, tries to reach this goal -- what will it be if, each time it starts, it misses the mark? (...).-

We know that the soul enters into false knowledge only involuntarily. (...).-- Such a false 'knowledge' is - seen from the truth - when the soul makes an effort for it and yet a deviant judgment arises, nothing else than a *parafrosunè*, ein *Vorbeidenken*, a thinking apart from the matter itself".

Remark--It is as if, in this text, Platon had an archer in mind, who clumsily, 'inexpertly' (think here of incompetence concerning values), repeatedly aims beside the truth and misses the target.

Reception theory.

It is clear that Platon has in mind here the 'reception' of truth. - The term 'reception' classically meant the after-effects of e.g. a book or even an author.

Since +/- 1965 'reception' has meant any way of processing literature, but with special attention to the predilections of the recipient.

For example, 'presuppositions' are things like

- a. what a reader expects from a text,
- b. the level of culture at which a text is read,
- c. individual capacity to understand, etc.

(Cfr G.u.I. Schweikle, Hrgs., *Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 365 (Rezeption)).

The Paleopythagorean theory of reception.

Bibliographic sample: Mario Meunier, trad., *Hiéroclès, Commentaire sur les Vers d' or des Pythagoriciens*, (Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans,), Paris, 1925, 106s..-

Whether what Hierocles of Alexandria (fifth century A.D.; Neoplatonist) says in every detail is historically correct regarding the Paleopythagoreans (-550/-300), we leave in the middle. The core must be correct. Well, the Ancient Pythagoreans had a method of penetration with regard to recruiting thinkers (*hetairoi*):

- a. the souls,
 - b. the deep root of character and
 - c. the degree of intellect (who doesn't think of: big monster/ less big lion/ little man?)
- were probed as the phenomena through which the true soul became visible.

Applicative model 1.

Seventh Letter (ed. Calw, 24f.).

The glorious death of Dion.

Dion, in Sicily, has as a faithful follower

Platon 's theory of the utopian polis or society his philosophy into action. For this reason among others he was cowardly murdered by the tyrant-dictator - Dionusios and his followers.

In Platon's eyes this is a "clean death" (E.PL.PSY. 12).

i. "For to one who pursues true values both for himself and for society, every suffering one endures is something justifiable and 'clean,' whatever he may suffer." Thus Platon's text.

ii. Platon hereafter explains how a number of high ideas from an ancient - 'Archaic' tradition inform us as to the direction we should give to our lives."

He says: "None of us is immortal. Even if such a favorable fate were to befall us here on earth, we would still not be blissful (as falsely believed by illiterate people). For there is no real good and no real evil for those beings who have "no soul" (Note: "no human, immortal soul").

The distinction in question only applies to every soul (whether it lives with a body attached or without any body)!

Remark - Now that we know for whom these truths, these correct judgements, are intended, Platon gives them content: "Consequently, one should always live in truly convinced faith of these ancient traditions. These, as you know, reveal what follows:

1. we possess an immortal soul;
2. the soul, in retaliation for its deeds, gets a judge once that it lives separated from its body;
3. For its crimes, which it has committed, it will receive the greatest punishment.

Note--What is striking is that what Platon says here regarding Pagan traditions sounds biblical, so to speak.

2. *The inglorious counterpart.*

Here Platon explains how one can repress or suppress these high ideas - truths.

In other words, the reception that one, with his value capacity - intellect - prepares, can also be the opposite of e.g. a Dion.

Thus Platon says: "But all these are points of learning which the purely money- and property-minded man (Note: one of the aspects of the great monster) - one who is at once poor in the gold of the soul - does not even 'hear'!

Yes, supposing such a person does hear these points of learning, he/she will listen to them with a smile. Such a type of man, after all, does nothing but grasp as much as possible everywhere - like a mindless animal - shamelessly. -

This, in order to eat or drink (Note: one aspect of the big monster). Or in order to satisfy his/her desire inherent in the animal-repulsive 'love' (Note: third aspect of the big monster). Such a "love" is something that, if one speaks with insight, does not deserve the noble name "love".

Remark--Platon is sometimes accused of not having written an actual treatise on psychology, as opposed to Aristotle. Good, but those who read him with insight, i.e. with an eye to values - and "the beauty" that goes with them - see that he did indeed have systematic concepts at his disposal: e.g. here! Greed for money, greed for food and drink, sex,-- the three great aspects, with the nightlife of the great monster.

Platon continues: "Such a person is a man struck with blindness who cannot see the following points:

i. The proper connection between the sensual enjoyments so coveted, on the one hand, and, on the other, one or other crime, -- which amounts to an unheard-of mischief that accompanies every injustice;

ii. the fact that everyone who has committed an injustice must, according to an inescapable destiny, carry the consequence of every crime with him/her,-- first here, above the earth (as long as he/she still walks the earth),-- then also below the same earth (when he/she has finished the honorless and thoroughly unhappy earthly life journey to the eternal heimat).

These and other learning points I once set out for Dion: apparently I was able to penetrate his heart with them.

Summary:

a. when Platon speaks of 'ancient' doctrines, he understands by the term 'ancient' not "what is of old" alone, but especially "what is close to the deities";

b. what we saw above (E.PL.PSY. 26) - fork in the road: catagogic (closed for noble truths)/ anagogic (open for noble truths) -, is here very clearly present;

c. the catagogic type, which is 'blind' (value-blind with regard to higher noble values) is 'kata.fron', thinking outside of reality and as a result of repression: the little person in that case is very 'small'.

Applicable model 2.

Again, *Seventh Letter* (Ed. Calw, 24).-- The Antique concept of catharsis includes

- a. taking what is,
- b. accept it as it is,
 - b1.** purge (which is 'catharsis' in the narrower sense) and
 - b2.** on a higher plane, level of life, elevate.-

Platon had something like this in mind when he had to deal with 'unruly people'.-- Like all effects - education - such a cleansing process (= a + b1/b2) can succeed or fail. Like politicians.-- We are listening.--

"Of the truth of the said doctrines (Note: concerning utopian politics) I tried to convince first Dion, then Dionusios, finally you all (.....).

A look at the life history and of Dionusios and of Dion (...). Dionusios did not respond to this): he now leads a miserable life. Dion did: he died a glorious death".

Note-- Thinkers like Nietzsche present Platon as an alien "mystic" : now see what is left of this delusion, when one sees how he tried with all he could employ, even such tough politicians as Dionusios, to "purge" the tyrant.

One can see that Platon clearly noted the shifting process that he initiated with his teaching and action.

Seventh Letter (Ed. Calw. 33f.).

This text introduces us to the method. The 'nous', intellectus, mind - better: mind as a sense of values is inquisitive,-- filomathes, what wants to learn. (Introduction).

"I thought I ought to ascertain first of all whether Dionusios was really keen on 'philosophical' (Note: Translate: attuned to real values) thinking and living.

(...). As is well known, there is a well-defined way, in such tests, to make out something thoroughly.

A method which, in itself, is not unbecoming and is particularly appropriate in the case of great empires. (...).

Such gentlemen must be made aware of the proper scope of the study as a whole. They must also be told what amount of effort they will have to make,-- what the stakes will be.-- (screening).

1. For supposing that an empire major has heard all these hints, and is at the same time "a true friend of science" (Note: Platon's philosophy),--namely: supposing that he possesses a mind ripe for the appropriation of "science," --that, in that mind, a spark of the deity is present,--in that case he firmly believes that he has access to a kingdom

of wondrous things,--he firmly believes that he should now strive for the higher,-- he believes that he cannot "live," if he tries another way. All his energies he puts in (...).

2.1. Those, however, who in their soul-ground are not "true followers of science" (Note: Platont's theory of values), but only possess a touch of phantasmagoria - similar in that to those who have let the sun bronze only the outside of their bodies - that type of person is finally crushed by the conviction that such a thing is "too heavy", even "not doable", for them -- that they do not possess "the innate aptitude" to do such a thing properly.

2.2. There are, however, a few among these ignorant people who delude themselves that they already possess the whole field of knowledge and thus do not even have to go into the matter in depth.-- (conclusion). -- That is then - clearly and reliably - a method of testing, as far as it concerns gentlemen with a high social status".

Conclusion - Platon, as well as Aristotle, possessed a rhetorical theory of reception and method. It applies, in the first place, to his own 'science' (= dialectics), i.e. rational insight into values (in particular "the beautiful").--The rhetorical theory of the world is not the same as Aristotle's.

It appears that Platon did not share the naivety of many current educational optimists regarding education or rather 'educatability'.

Why not? He lived in the midst of the crisis of values from which the Greek world at that time was beginning to suffer - the Sophists were the obvious symptom - and thanks to his efforts (e.g. in Sicily) he knew "what time it was".

Note-- Politeia vii, 539b. -- "Surely you have noticed -- I think -- that young people, when they have had a taste of the dialectic, abuse it,--yes, make a sort of game of it. They use it to 'question everything' without ceasing.

Those who prove them wrong, they imitate, by proving others wrong. They are like a pack of young dogs: they howl with jubilation when, with their reasoning, they tear apart and tear apart all who approach them.

However, having demonstrated the wrongness of others in this way countless times,

After having seen their own errors demonstrated innumerable times, they soon become accustomed to regarding none of the beliefs they had previously held as credible.

Consequence: they themselves and immediately the whole of the so-called philosophical enterprise are discredited by public opinion". (R. Baccou, *Platon, La république*, 298).

Note--This is also a processing type,--a fourth, in addition to the positively inclined (the "open"), --the refusers, the powerless, the self-deluded.

Note that the type of 'dialectic' shown here is typically Sophistic. It is a form of degeneration. Contesting - one might almost say 'contesting' or even 'deconstructing' - is its main characteristic.

Remark-- Immediately it appears again that Platon, concerning the effect of his dialectics (the theory of values centered around "the good" as central idea) ... did not harbor many illusions in a democracy in decline.

Note - Socrates, Platon in his wake, wanted to re-establish democracy on sound value theory as a basis.

Those who are "perfectly versed in insight into the good", the philosophers, actually "experts in true values", should in one way or another acquire political power as well as knowledge. Platon likes to see such educated people - think of Dion - in the upper class, in the political class.

But in *Politeia* 499c, Platon himself sees only one possibility for realization: "the concurrence of particularly fortunate circumstances". In other words, Platon himself sees very clearly the utopian nature of his project of society.

Reason: the people are not amenable to it. The reception is too small, because the little man in the people is very small! He suffocates under the mass of the big monster (night life, sex, eating/drinking, possession) and of the lesser lion (honor).

Platon recognizes that his "clean policy" - kallipolis (*Politeia* 527a) - was dreamed by him in a euphoric state. "It is not going in". This sentence is also repeated by a growing number of today's educators and teachers.

In conclusion, because of the extreme smallness of the little person, most people overlook the really valuable things. They exhibit 'para.frosune', thinking beside the matter,-- in that they repress them unconsciously or even consciously suppress them.

Fourteenth sample.-- Soul and stages of life. (51/52)

E. Lehmann-Leander, Hrsg./ Einamely, *Aristotle (Analytiker der Wirklichkeit)*, (Aristotle (analyst of reality)), Wiesbaden/ Berlin, s.d., 50, says:

"We know that Platon was an excellent observer of people. The artistic power of his pen has left us enchanting portraits of young people - so in the *Lysis - or Charmides dialogues*. He also knew what old people are - so Polemarchos (*Faidros 257b, Politaia*) or the interlocutors (Nomoi) aptly painted." -- It is not that the author is overflowing with Platon worship. On the contrary.

Seventh Letter (Ed. Calwl 8).

"When I was still in my youth, I did as many young men do. I wanted, as soon as I could decide for myself, to take up a career in state administration. But a number of miscalculations thwarted this (...)"

Platon, notwithstanding his eternal, unchanging ideas, lived through and clearly saw in others an evolution,--a kind of "historicity" of the individual in his soul-life.

A little further (Seventh Br., 13): "As for my opinion on the matter, the very thought of 'the heart of young rulers' frightened me: they are always so changeable. Their inclinations come and go; they contradict themselves.

But as for Dion, his innate firmness of character and the maturity which he testified to, for his age, were sufficiently ready to me (...) That is a beginning of differential psychology.

Edw. Montier, *A l' école de Platon*, Paris, 1935, 109s., sketches with Platon, Faidros of Murrhinos, a comrade of Lysis.

He is all the spontaneity of young people,-- fierce of temperament, gifted with vivid imagination.-- Everything interests him, everything carries him away. He asks questions, replicates,-- exclaims, becomes furious, becomes tender.

His linguistic skill carries him; what is beautiful seduces him; again and again new questions impose themselves on his mind.-

Faidros is one of the strongest and liveliest personalities among Socrates' pupils. Exuberant to the point of impetuosity. Very sensible and very impressionable at the same time. Often gets excited about something wrongly. Ventures on all false trails of reasoning and entangles himself in it to the delight of seeing.

Is, without paying attention to anything endlessly in discussions. Suddenly he realizes that he is reasoning wrongly. Then starts again. With a disarming honesty (...) Asks questions, presses objections and counter-reasoning.-- A real young person,-- with what that implies of self-confidence and lack of logic, but also with all the juicy and crystal-clear openness of young people.

Here is a 'portrait' made on the basis of what Platon says in his dialogues about Faidros of Murrhinos. That sympathetic figure is, after twenty-four centuries, still alive!

A statement.

Perhaps the following text sheds some light on Platon not only as a psychologist but as a connoisseur of men.

In his *Theaitetos*, Platon typifies a type of 'thinkers'.

"He does not know which road leads to the 'agora,' the public place,--where the court or the council chamber or all the other halls where deliberations are made are located. (...).

And that he does not know all this, he himself does not even realize it(...). Only with his body does he have a place and a place to stay in the polis, the society.

For his thinking, society amounts to nothing but narrowness and insignificance, - something that is not taken into account. His thinking unfolds everywhere - in order, as Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438; great lyricist) says, "to probe the abysses of the earth" and to test its scope against the limits of the depths of heaven, -- turning his attention to the stars in order to fathom the nature of each piece of reality, both as regards the smallest detail and the whole.

All this, without ever allowing themselves to be brought back to what is immediate reality." -

Note--It is clear that the true Greek that Platon was is speaking: "No Greek--especially no Athenian--was capable of taking no interest in politics." Thus Al. Koyré, *Introduction à la lecture de Platon*, (Introduction to the reading of Plato), Paris, 1962,83.

An Aristotle (with a sense of science), later the Stoics (out of haughty astringency) and the Epicureans (out of self-indulgence) will live up to Platon's image of the repentance and marginality of "the thinker".

What was it again that a Nietzsche said? Platon the 'unworldly'. One wonders how the classical philologist Nietzsche read the texts.

Fifteenth sample.-- Soul and mindset change. (53/61)

Beginning with a ***bibliographic sampling***: P. Verhaaghen, *Individual development and historical context (A problem for developmental psychology)*, in: Streven 1989: Oct., 58/70.

The article says that, within the actual psychology, a sub-science exists, the developmental psychology, which occupies itself with the description and explanation of the changes, within the life-course of individual or group concerning psychological life.

Three perspectives therein:

- a. the phases of life of an individual (age-dependency) which we checked with Platon in the previous chapter -;
- b. the marking individual experiences (think of the shock Platon underwent when his beloved teacher Socrates was sentenced to death and effectively entered that death lucidly);
- c. the marking collective experiences (think of the dismantling of the Archaic-religious substructure of culture in Platon 's time).

Note--We do not dwell here on what history and historiography is.

However, reference should be made to R. De Keyser, *Vragen over de zin van geschiedenis in onderwijs en samenleving*, (Questions about the meaning of history in education and society), in: *Onze Alma Mater (Leuven)* 1991:1, 5/30,-- especially a.c., 19 (The Historical Method).

As a method includes historiography:

- a. - What Herodotos of Hallikarnassos (-484/-425; work: *Historiai* (Investigations)) calls 'opsis' (direct observation) and 'historia' (investigation, detection), i.e. the collection of the data (information);-what is called heuristics (invention) -;
- b. the sifting of the data;-what is called historical criticism;
- c. the formation of the text, i.e. the articulation of the reliable data; - what is called the historical synthesis.-- This last thing - the sorting out (criticism) and formulation of the text (synthesis) is what Herodotos calls 'logos' (responsible text).

Further: M. Dakeshott, *On History and Other Essays*, Oxford, Blackwell 1983.-- Dakeshott -- known for his *Experience and its Modes* (1933) -- defines "historical knowledge" as "a type of inquiry and interpretation -- i.e., heuristics and criticism, respectively, synthesis -- in terms of

- a. a notion of "the past",
- b. A conceptual conception of "event and relationship between events" and
- c. a notion of 'change'.

The concept of historicity.

'Historicity' or 'history character' of something - a person, a culture etc. - means:

1. the fact that something is shaped by the past (= having history), living in the present (= making history), with a view to the future (= designing history),
2. the fact that something "within those three times-extases" (past/present/future) that determine its life course, does not know or even realize the greatest number of factors and perhaps the most important.

Remark-- In existential terms: "I am thrown into a course (within a context that pre-exists) such that I co-design that course (within the same context that I thus co-determine).

Bibliographic sample: A. Brunner, *Geschichtlichkeit*, (Historicity), Bern/Munich, 1961 (the facts we call 'history' are examined in such a way as to clarify laws, factors and purpose);--

L. Landgrebe, *What is historicity?*, in: *De Uil van Minerva* (Ghent) 4:1 (1987: Autumn), 3/16 (Ranke, Dilthey, Toynbee, Heidegger).

Note-- In the Modern sense, the notion of historicity can be dated mainly from Giambattista Vico (1668/1744 (known for his "corso ricorso", the repetition of culture circle loop) and his *Scienza nuova* (1725-1). Vico was Platonizing.

Voltaire (1694/1778; introduced the English Enlightenment in France), with his *Candide* (1755) and his *Essay sur la moeurs et l' esprit des nations* (Essay on the morals and spirit of nations), (1756), introduced historicity as revolutionary liberation from age-old bonds.

Romanticism - especially German - introduces the notion of life and history, but no longer governed by enlightened 'reason'. - Cfr. Fr. Engel-Janosi, *Weltgeschichte im Ganzen (Universalhistorische Versuche von Vico bis Spengler)*, (World History as a Whole (Universal Historical Attempts from Vico to Spengler)), in: *Wort und Wahrheit* xix (1964) 11 (Novemb.), 685/697;-- R. Schmidt, *Die Geschichtsphilosophie G.B. Vicos (Mit einem Anhang zu Hegel)*, (The Philosophy of History of G.B. Vico (With an Appendix on Hegel)), Würzburg, 1982.

Note--One of the main problems is the relationship "determinism/freedom". -

Bibliographical sampling: -- J.Poortman, *Indeterminism or determinism? (A reflection on Ph. Kohnstamm's Free Will or determinism)*, Assen, 1949;

-- J. Earman, *A Primer on Determinism*, Reidel, 1986;

-- Ilya Prigogine, *Une nouvelle alliance de la science et de la culture*, (A new alliance of science and culture), in: *Le Courrier de l'unesco* 41 (1988): mai, 9/13 (*chaology questions traditional determinism and introduces historicity*).

Note-- Futurology or "prospecting" is the scientific approach to what the future might be.

Bibliographic Sample:

-- A.C. Clarke, *Profil du futur (Un panorama de notre avenir)*, (Profile of the future (A panorama of our future)), Paris, Planète, 1964;

-- Fr. Polak, *Hopeful Future Perspectives*, Zeist, De Haan, 1957;

-- Annie Battle, *Les travailleurs du futur*, (Workers of the future), Paris, Seghers, 1986 (writer consulted "people who try to know what the future of humanity will be" in the USA, Europe, Japan, China, USSR). This subject is part of historical analysis.

Platon and historicity.

Bibliographic Sample:

-- Sue Blundell, *The Origins of Civilization in Greek and Roman Thought*, London, 1986 (the theories on the origin of the human species (part II) and the beginning of human culture (part I) show that primitivism (the fortunate existence lies in the past (a.o. the concept of the 'golden age') but also belief in progress can be found in antiquity);

-- E.R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1972.--

So much for the philosophies of history.

Now the historiography: Grant Michael, *Klassiker der antiken Geschichtsschreibung*, (Classics of ancient historiography), Munich, 1974 (transl. v. English work);

A. Patzer, *Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker*, (The Sophist Hippias as Philosophical Historians), Freiburg/München, 1986 (a work that is controversial, but shows that history of philosophy did attract attention).----

Note--This is to point out the context in which Platon's notion of historicity should be situated.

G.J. de Vries, Critical study *Platon and history*, in: *Journal of Philosophy*. 8 (1946): 4, 483/490, distinguishes three aspects.-

1. Did Platon possess information (heuristic aspect)? Yes, he knew the facts that made up his history like a good intellectual at the time did (he was also well-travelled).

2. Did Platon possess a historical sense? Yes, he was very acutely aware of the role that facts play in our human existence and thinking.

3. Did Platon have a historiology (philosophy of history) at his disposal? Yes, he gradually - and continuously - formed an idea of history as a totality in which we are contained.

Platon on the history of mentality.

Bibliographic sample: -- T. van Houdt, *Mentality history between dream and deed*, in: *Streven* 1991: May, 713/724;--

W. Frijhoff (professor in Rotterdam) is well known for his practice and promotion of the history of mentality (1985 : SUN, Nijmegen, put the historical series of tracks on his command;

-- G.Rooijackers/ T. van der Zee, ed., *Religious Folk Culture (The Tension between the Prescribed Order and the Practice of Living)*, Nijmegen, SUN);

-- E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou (A heretical village in the Pyrenees 1294/1324)*, Amsterdam, B. Bakker, 1984 (discussing the villagers and their lives);-

-- L. Abicht, *The world of Fernand Braudel*, in: *Streven* 1988: dec., 226/238 (Braudel is the founder of mentality historiography).

Note-- R. Lavollée, *La morale dans l'histoire (Etude sur les principaux systèmes de philosophie de l'histoire)*, (Morality in history (Study on the main systems of philosophy of history)), Paris, 1892 (o.c., Platon, 30/40), typifies as follows.

a. Platon invariably responds against the Sophists who claim that what happens is blind chance.... Which Platon admits in part, in that our reason understands only part of the facts rationally ('anankè', what we, without understanding it, take in anyway).

b. Platon, *Laws* x, posits two factors.

1.-- The divine combinatorics.

"The ruler of the universe - Note: deity in the non-Biblical sense - designed, with a view to the proper siting of each part, that whole which he considered the most suitable and the best for "good" to triumph and "evil" to overcome. This view of the whole was the premise when he designed the comprehensive configuration in which the individual spaces and places that each being would occupy and maintain according to his own characteristics could be placed."

Note-- One sees that here Platon and his stoicheiosis, factors analysis, and his theory of order (configuration theory) comes through.

2.-- The human self-determination (freedom) -- "But the sovereign of the universe has left to us all free will as to the factors which govern our individual qualities. Indeed, each person is usually as he/she likes, that is, he/she is according to the inclinations to which he/she gives in, and the qualities which his/her soul displays".

Remark- Although embedded in a cosmic order (E.PL.PSY. 15) the soul, always central, is nevertheless individual and free to some extent.

Applicative model 1.

The diachronic structure "beginning/development (decay) / recovery (adjustment, 'catharsis')" occurs in Platon in at least two forms.

a. The development of the polis. We already saw this, briefly, E.PL.PS 30v. (Beginning, growth (degeneration) and purification ('catharsis') of the politeia, society).

Let us not forget that Platon, on this occasion, places the individual in the foreground, at least in part, as an individual and free to choose. And as a soul! The soul is called "individual nature". Platon's psychagogy is formally situated here.

b. The development of mankind.-- O.Willmann, *Gesch.d. Id.*, I, 409, outlines the scheme. "In Politikos and in Nomoi (= Laws) but also more than once on occasion, the

(1) set forth the primal condition of humanity,--

(2) immediately the decay benden the level of the initial perfection (Note: a "golden age" in the beginning).-

(3) Fortunately, traditions and divinely given laws have survived from that initial perfection (Note: testimony). These act as a handhold and as cultural objects useful in the life of later generations. At the same time they are a guarantee for a better future. Thus Willmann as a commentator of Platon.

Remark-- One sees that Platon holds both primitivism (a golden age in the beginning) and progress belief (a better future) at the same time.

Note-- A political variant occurs with Platon: Lavollée, o.c., 37, points out. The state evolves as follows:

1. aristocracy (royal type),
2. timocracy (ambitious - warlike type (Sparta, Crete))
3. oligarchy (= ploutocracy) (property type),
4. 'dèмократia' ('demos' to be understood as mob),
5. tyranny (dictatorship).

This theory of types is at least partly cultural-historical in Platon's eyes. It is an applicative model of phase (2) 'decay'. -

Note--As with several of Platon's predecessors, behind this diachronic scheme lies a steering or cybernetic structure, viz.

- a.** normal course,
- b.** abnormal course,
- c.** restored normal course. Cfr E.Beth, *Philosophy of Nature*, Gorinchem, 1948, 35/37 (where that structure is explained).

Herodotus, among others, knows this structure very well and incorporates it systematically into his *Historiai*. - Platon - according to Beth, o.c.,36, applies the structure in question among other things to disease (*Timaios* 32a) as an 'abnormality'.

Applicative model 2.

Bibliographic sample: Bruno Snell, Hrsg., *Platon, Mit den Augen des Geistes* (Plato, With the Eyes of the Spirit), (*Protagoras, Euthyphron, Lysis, Menon, Der vii. Brief*), Frankf.a.M./ Hamburg, 1955., 217f..

Steller gives a textual contraction of the Lysis dialogue. Platon belonged to the nobility: he establishes that this upper class also evolves. It appears that he considers this change of mentality as progress.

A.-- Foreground ("figure").

The Lysis is famous. Platon's environment, the circle of the aristocratic Athenian youth, can be found on the sports field. They know themselves to be 'clean' (commanding admiration). And 'skilful'. Although imprisoned in strict aristocratic traditions, these young people live in a bright and cheerful manner.

Note-- One feels the atmosphere of the lesser lion, the noble honor.

The theme of the dialogue: the essence of friendship.

A detail: Hermias of Atarneus (in Musia, Mysia) had the misfortune to conspire with king Philip of Macedonia; he was lured into an ambush by the Persian ruler and sentenced to death. Having arrived on the rack he asks for a "last mercy", i.e. to be allowed to send a message to the members of Platon's Academy (= school) who were well known to him. It reads: "Inform my friends and fellow thinkers that I have done nothing that is philosophically unworthy and irresponsible".

Aristotle wrote in his honour the *Hymnos* in honour of virtue, so deeply was he affected as a friend. Cfr E. Lehmann-Leander, *Aristotle*, Wiesbaden/ Berlin, s.d., 28.-- This, to show the high importance of *filia*, *amicitia*, friendship. Already the Paleopythagoreans held friendship high.

The method.

It is Socrates' maieutic method: to make the interlocutor understand that one does not know - actually, i.e. as far as the idea of 'friendship' is concerned - and then to 'get to the bottom of' the matter in a more constructive sense (= *theoria* in the proper sense).

A.1.-- Lysis.

Lysis gets to the point where he says, "I don't know."

It comes down to the fact that only the one who "knows" (the thinking one who sees through the real values), creates trust, the basis of friendship, around him. One lets him, according to his higher insight, act, for, with a group of comrades, the little Lysis had come running out of the sanctuary, -- crowned with flowers on the occasion of the feast in honor of the god Hermes, patron deity of youth and sports.

The boy is causing a problem. Hippothales has become attached to him! Everyone notices how he is very fond of the boy,--how he flatters him with compliments. Hippothales risks disfiguring Lysis's gifted soul.

It is on this singularly concrete background that one must understand Socrates' response concerning the high value and degree of 'friendship'.

To those young noblemen he spelt out the lesson: genuinely valuable friendship does not rest (solely) on similarity, as Empedokles claims,--nor (solely) on difference, as Herakleitos advocates. No: we love another with true value because he/she possesses something 'good' - something of true value - which we do not have.

Remark-- Socrates, the very rational one, sees friendship first and foremost from the point of view of its usefulness. However, this very rational point of view is modified thanks to Platon's doctrine of ideas: in the truly valuable friend we meet the idea of "the good" (all that is of real value, encompassing and supporting).

In itself, without the background of that idea, i.e. higher reality, a fellow human being is a "mè on", a non-thing (understand: something that is more nothing than something).

With the idea in the background, however, that same fellow human being is "dechomenon", something that "catches" the dynamic presence of the idea, makes it visibly and tangibly present.

Note-- Tell me, then, how befriended thou art--existence and essence--and I will tell thee what soul thou and thy eventual friend have!

Human relations played a leading role in the world of Paleopythagoreans and Platoanists: we now see better why.

A.2.-- Hippothales and Menexenos.

Not by flattering (i.e. making the sense of honour - the lesser lion - rebel), but by bringing up shortcomings in such a way that both disappointing insight (sophia, wisdom) and hope arise at the same time, Hippothales will establish true friendship!

The nobles, through Socrates' reduction of their one-sided, delusional 'insights', are stimulated to real 'philosophizing' about friendship, understood as high-minded, spiritualized friendship.

B.-- The background.

Bruno Snell, in his commentary, touches here directly on 'historicity' in the form of a change of mentality, as it was perceptible at the time. Namely the background and the splendor of the noble culture that was waning.

B.1.-- The use of language.

On the conversation with Menexenos, Snell notes: at the beginning of the conversation, Socrates says that "a good friend is more valuable than a buckler - horses - or the gold of the great king - the Persian monarch - or all the other things, which many commonly pursue."

Snell: that language comes from Archaic lyricism. Sappho of Mutilene (between -700 and -500; inter-female religion, called 'lesbianism'), Anakreon of Teos (-560/-475), especially Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438) are the great lyric poets. They wrote poetry in that style -- which, in Platon's day, came across as an anachronism, as no longer belonging in the present epoch. Change of mentality!

B.2.-- The ancestral past.

a. The place where Platon, deliberately, situates the dialogue is the gymnasium. Well, that place of sport reminds the then Greek and Greek of the past, i.e. the time when sporting contests gave the aristocrats the highest honours.

b. Hippothales raises in verse a song of praise to his "beloved Lysis." He does this, truly, in the form of Pindaros' hymns of homage: extolling the ancestors as victors in sporting contests,-- extolling Lysis' family as of divine descent,-- employing myths taken from the history of Lysis', noble family's pedigree prove it. -

But times have changed: Ktésippos, who delicately and kindly ironizes Hippothales' love for the boy Lysis, finds all those Archaic epithets "old-fashioned stuff".

In his words: "Something that dates back to the time before Kronos". Or still: "Something that only "old wives" talk about in the present time".

Note -- Kronos is the name of the primordial god who ruled the universe before Zeus.

The great void.

Says Snell: **a.** the earlier writers, even if they do not themselves value what others value so highly, know clearly and unequivocally what they gave priority to in their value judgements. They had a fixed scale of values, rooted as they were in a firm tradition.

They had a hold.

b. In Platon's dialogue *Lysis* a question mark is put behind every transmitted certainty. Instead of life certainties a problem. Instead of the vital fullness of beliefs "the great void" of beliefs.

Snell's summary.

"It is unmistakable that, although Platon still appreciates 'the old brilliance and magic that emanates from it', he nevertheless values the dialectical (Note: seeking the real value in it) analysis of the idea of 'friendship' more highly.

Remark--This proves that Platon, however solid in tradition, is not merely absorbed in the glorification of a - for him and many contemporaries - dead past. On the contrary: he sees his dialectic, among other things, both as a replacement of vanished certainties and as progress.

Note --One of the most remarkable contributions to historicity analysis is metabletics. Consider J.H. van den Berg, *Metabletica of leer der veranderingen* (Metabletics or doctrine of change), (*Principles of a Historical Psychology*), Nijkerk, 1957, which discusses changes of mentality, an important part of historicity.

Think also of Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses (Une archéologie des sciences humaines)*, (Words and Things (An Archaeology of the Humanities), Paris, 1966, in which general grammar, natural history (forerunner of today's biology), empirical analysis (beginning of today's economic science) were analysed. This, with a view to the "archaeology of knowledge", i.e. the study of generational and cultural gaps in so far as they are reflected in the use of language (Foucault was a Structuralist) in the aforementioned subjects.

These 'gaps' also determine the historicity of these subjects. See also his *L'archéologie du savoir*, (The archaeology of knowledge), Paris, 1969. -- It is clear that, in the *Lysis*, a metabletic, resp. law archaeological element is present. As in practically all Platon's dialogues.

Decision-- E. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich/ München, 1977, 22f., insinuates that Platon for the reason of his presupposition of immutable-everlasting ideas, "cannot know an open future" -- Dodds misinterprets: Platon was constantly evolving with the evolution of his time. He was by no means a simple primitivist.

It is not because an idea in itself is immutable that it does not create an open future for us who are caught up in history!

Sixteenth sample.-- The soul between "the ancients" and "techne" (62/68)

J. Pieper, *Ueber den Begriff der Tradition*, (On the Concept of Tradition), in: *Journal of Philosophy*. 19 (1957) 1, 21/52, explains the Platonic expression "the ancients".

1 -- Such brief texts as "The ancients say that," -- that the deity controls the beginning, middle, and end of all things (Laws 715e),-- that "spirit" controls the totality of the universe (*Filebos* 30d),-- that after death the good may expect something much better than the evil (*Faidon* 63c), occur.

2.-- "Hoi palaioi, antiqui (also: maiores), the ancients,-- also called: 'hoi archaioi', those who represent the 'archè', principle/ beginning. That is the sentence subject.

Negative: "the Old" are not the advanced in age, opposite to young (less experienced).

Positive: "the ancients" are closer to the origin (archè). What is that origin? The deities. They are the origin of everything.

Consequence: what the ancients say is "theon dosis", gift of deity. They deliver; better: they pass on. Through the ancients. Also: "to d' alèthes autoi isasin", what is true, they know.

Note-- Already the Paleopythagoreans were phallibilists: all earthly-human knowing is not (divine) sophia, wisdom, but only (human-earthly) philo.sophia, being somewhere at home with wisdom.

Note-- Thinking like this is typical mythical thinking. "Palai legetai", traditionally said, introduces a mythical sense. From the beginning (where 'beginning' means both inception and principle) something is valid and that continues for all eternity. In other words, the divine origin is transcendent and therefore present in the beginning and now and always (in time). -- The primeval time is everlasting 'time'.

E.R. Dodds, *Der Fortschrittsgedanke in der Antike*, Zürich/ Munich, 1977, says that the term 'technè', disciplina, professional science, skill, acquires a new meaning in the course of the V-th century (-500/-400) - Platon: -427/-347 - that of "methodical employment of mind in a field of human activity". Thus in *Hippias maior* 261d. There Socrates agrees with the Sophist Hippias on the very clear progress observable in all 'technai', skills, subjects.

Conclusion.-- Is Platon mythical primitivist, he is at the same time progressist believer: the ideas present in those subjects, were there from the beginning, but they come through thanks to progress.

A touching sketch of our animated body.

When one reads Platon one must pay attention to at least two restrictions:

- a. sometimes he means what he writes as a 'hupografè', a (preliminary) sketch;
- b. sometimes a dose of irony or humor is present.-

Bibliographic sample. Alfr. Weber, *Histoire de la philosophie européenne*, Paris, 1914-8, 85s.-- Steller summarizes a passus from the Timaios.--

1.-- The little man.-- Seat of the mind is the round head,-- round, since this form -- the most perfect of all -- is the only appropriate design (...). - The head is situated at the top of the body to make the whole organism controllable. The body has legs to go with it, arms to operate it.--

2.-- The lesser lion.-- Seat of the noble desires is the chest, just below the head so that the desires are in the grip of the mind, removed from it by the neck so that no confusion may arise.

3.-- The great monster.-- Seat of the impure desires is the abdomen, removed from the noble desires by the diaphragm.

3.1. In order to subject them to the mind and the noble desires, nature has placed them in the hepatic region, a polished and shining organ, destined to reflect the images of our thoughts like a mirror.-.

The liver contains a sweet substance that it secretes when our desires are subject to the spirit: it contains a bitter substance with the disordered desires in it. Sometimes it develops the prophetic faculty.

3.2. The unusual length of the coiled bowels is also not without ethical significance: it prevents the food from passing through the body too quickly, with the result that the soul is not subject to an uninterrupted and uncontrolled craving for food. This would stifle the soul's sense of wisdom and the voice of conscience.

Final sum.

a. Man as a miniature of the cosmos is spirit, contained in a soul, clothed by a body in which everything is intended and testifies of spirit.

b. The body is an institution of improvement and education so constructed as to achieve the ethical perfection of the soul. - So much for Weber.

He adds that this text is an - outdated - example of the classical theory of purposeful order in the universe,-- "with a grain of truth", but also resulting in a brake on scientific research on the subject. - That is the too contemporary historicity of this Platonic text.

Seventeenth sample.-- Soul and imagination (64/69).

Preliminary remark.-.

Paul Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' d' herméneutique)*, Paris, 1969, 233.-- Ricoeur is the radical defender of the introspective or "reflective" method.

Centre is - what he calls with a Modern name - "the subject" or "I". One characteristic serves as the basis of all certainties, namely the fact that the subject - I, you, we, etc. - is capable - in addition to looking at the outside world (consciousness) - also (and at the same time) of living inwardly (and even of interpreting the world and all 'being' from there).

This way of thinking is also called "the philosophy of the cogito", - after R. Descartes (1596/1650; father of Modern Philosophy), who saw the starting point of all certainties in the fact that man is conscious of himself: "I think, -- understand: I am conscious of something" is in the Latin 'cogito'.

Well, Ricoeur explicitly says that his style of thinking begins with Socrates. The Socratic 'cogito' -- central to all Platonic philosophy -- reads "Take good care of the soul." From that historical starting point with Socrates departs a centuries-long 'reflective' way of thinking,--until today.

Note-- Whoever is the equally radical defender of that method is the Austrian psychologist Paul Diel (1893/1972) and his school (especially in France).

Works: *Psychologie de la motivation.*, Paris, 1947-1;1964- 2; *Psychologie curative et médecine*,--while republished under the title *Psychologie, psychanalyse et médecine*, Paris, 1987.

According to Diel, introspection is actually the only real psychological method,--on a twofold condition, namely, that our self-consciousness is not clouded by psychiatric or neurological aberrations (a neurotic fritters away his self-knowledge) and/or by cynicism, which puts itself on a pedestal (and fritters away self-knowledge just as much).

In this chapter, we will focus on the self-knowledge of Socrates and Platon, on the imagination -- thanks to introspection, we know that we imagine or imagine 'things' - phantasms.

Bibliographic sample: R.L. Hart, *The Imagination in Plato*, in: *International Philosophical Quarterly* v.3 (1965): Sept., 436/461.

-- Hart begins by stating what every connoisseur of Platon has known for centuries: Platon holds well-defined views on the in- and imagination, but never systematizes them. He confines himself to 'hupografai', sketches with inductive value.

Hart has a second consideration: all that is 'eikasia', to imagine or imagine something. The term 'eikasia', which also means 'image', is not ontologically simple! This is evident from Platon's use of language.

Platon's terms.

1. 'Fainomena', phenomena, phenomena - i.e. data of experience (actually: data that show themselves, that appear);
2. 'eikones', 'eidola', images, phantasms,--what one imagines;
3. 'skiai', shadows, '-shadows', even 'phantoms',
4. 'fantasmata', fantasy images.

Hart 's question: what right shows itself in what Platon designates by no less than five terms?

The psychological interest.-- Tell me what fancies thou hast and/or cherishes, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast!

Platon's interpretations.

Hart sees four. Depending on the context. The fourth that Platon gives, is perhaps the one that best corresponds to the whole of Platonic philosophy.

See how Hart outlines that fourth interpretation.

1.-- The spirit of man

This grasp of overall reality is only what is unchanged, resp. unchangeable. What Platon calls "to ontos on" what is really 'real'.

2.-- Fortunately, there is the in- or imagination.

Our mind, insofar as it is imagined, understands only "ta fainomena", all that is immediately - given to the senses. Well, the "phenomena" of our sensory experience are marked by a systechy, a pair of opposites: "genesis (becoming, arising)/ fthora (going down, decaying)".

What in Platon's Antique Greek is called "ta gignomena", the becoming things, is so structured. That is (in passing) "mè on", rather nothing than something, but susceptible ('dehomenon') to the presence of "to ontos on", that which is really being.-

Note-- Hart uses the current term 'process' here (prevalent since A.N. Whitehead (1861/ 1947) as a translation of the Ancient Greek 'kinesis', Lat.: motus, 'movement' (in the sense of ('change')).-

To conclude: the imagination is the domain of 'mobilism' -- Well, the older Platon became, the more seriously - i.e., as the more real - he took everything that changes. So, somewhere, imagination does grasp reality. This is one of the most difficult issues in Platonic philosophy.

The interpretation of Mircéa Eliade (1907/1986: scholar of religion).

Here is what M. Eliade, *The myth of the eternal return (Archetypes and their repetition)*, Hilversum, 1964, 16, writes:

"Even the ideal state - *Politeia* - of Platon has its heavenly archetype (*Politeia* 592b, 300e). The Platonic 'forms' are not astral in nature. But their mythical sphere is, nevertheless, on the super terrestrial plane. (*Faidros* 247, 250)".

Note--It is noteworthy that Eliade does ascribe "a mythical sphere" to the "forms", i.e. the ideas, but not an "astral mode of being".

What does that mean? That means what?

a. "Astral mode of being" is one of - distinguished in the West - fine or rarefied modes of being. Usually one speaks of "coarse" "etheric" (less fine or "subtle") and "astral" (more fine, subtle) types of matter.

Note--"Subtle" is the traditional church word for "rarefied or finely crafted.

b. "Mythical sphere" means that the Platonic idea, in the total sphere of reality, occupies a place which can easily be confused with the contents of the myths.

A little example.-- M. Eliade, o.c., 29, says: "In Greece the marriage-rites imitated the example of Zeus, as he united with Hera in secret (*Pausanias* ii: 36, 2).

Diodorus of Sicily, (v:72,4) assures us that hierogamy (Note: the sacred rite of marriage) was imitated in Crete by the inhabitants of the island.

In other words: the ceremonial sexual union found its justification in a primal event that had taken place "in that time":

Note-

1. Eliade speaks of the marriage celebrations in Antique Hellas, as Platon must have known them.

2. There is the visible and tangible union of e.g. a young couple. There is the mythical paragon before their minds: what Zeus and Hera did "in those days" (that is the mythical primeval times), they imitate in order to share in it and thus in the marital bliss of that divine couple.

3.-- The reason: in itself their sexual union is "mè on", rather nothing than something, an unreal sham reality; as imitation and participation in the divine couple it is "ontos on", an actual reality", - which then also brings marital happiness.

The analogy "myth/ idea".

Platon, *Faidros* 246a, sets us on our own way -- It deals with the true essence of the soul,-- especially its immortality.

What did Platon put in Socrates' mouth? Listen: "So far as immortality is concerned, that will suffice. As for the idea of the 'soul', here is what can be said about it.

a. What that idea is, that to say, is the work of an exposition which is wholly divine work and long lasting in nature.

b. What is a picture of that idea, that to say is the work of a human and less elaborate exposition. Let us proceed, therefore, according to the latter method.-

The image in question is that of some 'dunamis', life-force, resembling ('xumfutoi'), viz. that life-force which connects a winged coachman with his buckle".

Note -- Those who speak in this way no longer speak like the highly rational Socrates but speak mythic language, which works with 'images'. If such a mythic language can be a model of the original, the idea, this presupposes that the model shows analogy with the original: the winged coachman-with-span speaks through imaginary content about an idea which is the pure domain, object, of the pure mind.

Or still: one speaks of the soul - its idea - in terms of a mythical story.

Decision.-- From Platon's text itself it is clear that Platon was ready to take account of the analogy (partly equal partly unequal nature of being) between idea and myth.

Application to hierogamy and its ritual representation.

Eliade gives two ancient testimonies concerning the rite of marriage.

a. The invisible paragon is hierogamy, the paragonal "holy" (understand: charged with life force of a higher, divine nature) marriage.

Remark The myth-teller, who told the myth for the first time, can only do this because he 'saw' the marriage-rite of deities, - through his imagination - at one moment or another. He tells what he, imaginatively (so they say), 'saw' to others, who (understanding this) in their turn 'see' it happening in their imagination.

b. The visible marriage of a couple, who 'believe' in that myth (without belief, i.e. serious absorption as a source of successful life, the myth in the rite does not 'work'), sees in imagination, as they imitate, the scene in which they participate

Now we have to reason for a moment.

a. The idea of "sacralized (= ritualized) marriage" is

a. universal (all, yes, all possible sacred or ritual marriages are summed up in it) and

b. ideal (ritual marriage is, in its idea, exalted, without flaws, blissful, successful). It is that marriage that believers seek, -- at least one copy of it, theirs.

b. The showy act of Zeus and Hera is precisely one mythical specimen of the idea 'hierogamy'. Other peoples, tribes, groups have their own mythical copy.

Well, all these specimens are seen and imitated in imagination. But the mythical specimens - pictures - are not the idea but a picture of the idea, which is never exhausted by it, for the idea includes an infinite collection of specimens, mythical (showing) and ritualistic (imitating).

Conclusion.-- Platon rightly says that the idea is grasped by the mind and the image by the imagination and/or by the senses.-- Eliade, in Platon's wake, explains much more thoroughly than Hart, who does not even seem to suspect the scope.

The interpretation of Henry Corbin.

Bibliographical sample: J.-L. Vieillard-Baron, *Henry Corbin* (1903/1978), in: D. Huisman, dir., *Dictionnaire des philosophes* PUF, 1984, 615/618;

R. Du Pasquier, *Religion: les vraies valeurs de l' Islam*, (Religion: the true values of Islam), in: *Journal de Genève* 29.12. 1990.

Corbin is a French Islamologist of high repute. He is also an esotericist (aware of occultism). - Corbin illuminated the imaginal area of reality.

He situates it between the actual high ideas ("kosmos noetos", mundus intelligibilis, thought-content or ideative world of ideas), on the one hand, and, on the other, the sensory things.

One should not confuse, in Corbin's language, between 'imaginal' (a term he forged) and 'imaginary'. The imaginary realm of reality includes fictitious, imaginary 'realities', while the imaginal realm includes things like visions ('faces') of mystics and prophets, like soul experiences of all kinds.

Corbin has taken that view from Sohrawardî, *La théosophie orientale*,---the work of a Persian Platonist.

Du Pasquier considers this insight of decisive importance for the real understanding of religious phenomena. In which he is, in our opinion, more than right.

The Enlightenment Rationalist, who does not even suspect this, lacks precisely this insight.

Note-- An extremely thorough and fascinating little book about things and experiences is Ernst Schering, *Die innere Schaukraft (Träume, Erscheinungen des Zweiten Gesichts und Visionen des Johannes Falk)*, (The inner power of vision (dreams, apparitions of the Second Face and visions of John Falk)), Munich/Basel, Reinhardt, 1953.

Falk is a XVIII-th century figure who, as a result of an imaginary - in the book one says 'eidetic' - experience, devoted himself to the neglected youth. -

Steller links up with Jaensch, *Ueber die Verbreitung der eidetischen Anlage im Jugendalter*, (On the distribution of the eidetic system in adolescence,), in: *Zeitschr. f. Psychologie* 87 (1921);

-- id., *Ueber den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und die Grundlagen der menschlichen Erkenntnis*, (On the Structure of the Perceptual World and the Foundations of Human Cognition), 2 Bde.

-- id., *Die Eidetik und die typologische Forschungsmethode*, (Eidetics and the typological research method), 1933-3.-- Already Viktor Urbantschisch, *Ueber die subjektiven optischen Anschauungsbilder*, (On the subjective optical images), 1907, has brought up the theme.

The main theme of Schering's book is: the "inner ability to 'see'," allows one to "see" in pictorial images, what others only ascertain through rational thought (o.c., 14, 39).

Or still: (as Falk himself says in his *Schlüssel zum platonischen Märchenbüchlein*) (Key to the Platonic Fairy Tale Booklet), "The idea, namely, was interpreted by us as seeing with 'the inner eye', -- as a belief in something invisible, -- as a way to a higher revelation than that which is accessible to us through purely sensory perception."

Note - This citation of Falk does not make it so clear whether Falk distinguishes the idea, *stricto sensu*, from the contemplative image (o.c.,142). It does, however, show the Platonism which is never far in this matter.

Or still: where the eidetic 'sees' forms (understand: images), like a Goethe, the non-eidetic 'constructs' it all, like Schiller (o.c., 143).

In reference to this systechy (pair of opposites) Schering says: "It sheds new light on the relation Platon/ Aristotle" (o.c., 144), as it does for the relation Goethe/ Herder and Kant/ Swedenborg (o.c.,146; 144).

Also: "The opposition 'eidentitarian/non-eidentitarian' about what the first 'sees' and the second does not, is also behind many trials against heretics: one thinks of Joan of Arc (1412/1431), who according to the trial acts was an eidentitarian" (o.c.,146).

Conclusion. "Tell me what fancies ye have and/or cherish, and I will tell you what soul ye have" seems to be true after all! Rational, imaginary, -imaginal (eidetic(in)), ideative are four variants.

Eighteenth sample.-- Soul and mania (rapture). (70/76)

We have already addressed this theme - sample - E.PL.PSY. 15vv. (Cosmic harmony of soul).

Bibliographical sample: J. Pigeaud, *Folies et cures de la folie chez les médecins de l'antiquité greco-romaine (La manie)*, (Insanity and cures of insanity among ancient Greek and Roman physicians (Mania)), Paris, 1987.

W. Leibbrand/ A.Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn (Geschichte der abendländischen Psychopathologie)*, Freiburg/ München, 1961;

C.A. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, Zürich, Rascher, 1949.

The "microcosm/macrocosm" element.

O. Willmann, *Gesch. d. Ideal.* I, 441, speaks in passing of an Archaic structure.

They have also been identified by contemporary ethnologists: already Primitives like the Pygmies see man as a representation ("similitudo" in Middle Ages Latin) and participation ("simi-litudo participate") of/ in the cosmos, the totality of all that is. -

Willmann relies on the *Faidon*: the soul - invariably the soul, of course - carries, within itself, the traces of truth, in the Platonic sense.

By turning away and away from this earth (the material world) and from all that is sense, the soul, literally, traces the truth present in its inwardness.

Immediately she comes to herself: "The Delfish proverb 'Gnothi seautor', 'Know thyself', thus gets a renewed interpretation: self-knowledge is knowledge of the universe, since our soul carries in its depths the truth about the universe". Thus O. Willmann.

Note-- So the "turning away" from this earthly world way is absolutely not world-flight, but the way of situating oneself and the earth in cosmic context via what may be active within us.

Note-- One may sometimes meet this ancient thought in the most unexpected places: Dr J.-E. Emerit, *L'acupuncture traditionnelle*, Paris, Guy Trédaniel, 1986, 45, says that, in our body, there is an energy circulation at work which refers to the zodiac so that - as he claims - the acupuncture somewhere shows an astrological structure. We do not pronounce here on the value or otherwise of Emerit's system: we note that a scheme of thought present throughout the planet also occurs in his case.

Remark--The Nepalese and Tibetan singing bowls (bells and gongs) - so the supporters of its application claim - refer to the cosmos (including the planets).

Again: we note the thought scheme "scale sound/ cosmos".

The element 'mania', expansion of consciousness.

The soul, especially when it is internalized, is so deeply involved in the cosmos that Platon dwells several times on the 'mania', intoxication, trance.

As an aside, G. Rouget, *La musique et la transe*, (Music and trance), Paris, 1980, 267/315 (*Musique et transe chez les Grecs*), also touches on our problem here.

A.-- A set of psychological, resp. pathological terms.

Faidros: Platon distinguishes fundamentally between two radically different types of mania, including the pathological form. In other words: Platon does not simply approve of all that is mania.

Note-- Timaios, a late work: he distinguishes 'soma', body, and 'psuche', soul, Both are susceptible of abnormalities. The body for 'nosèmata', diseases (ailments, maladies). The soul for 'a.noia', loss of reason (absence of nous, spirit), in which he distinguishes two kinds: 'a.mathia', ignorance, subsisting, of course, o.g. loss of reason, and 'mania', rust state, again subsisting o.g. loss of reason,--putting out of action, to some extent or entirely, the spirit.

In the *Faidros* Platon is more elaborate.-- He distinguishes two types of intoxication, mania.

a. the sickly intoxication; as just mentioned.

b. the god-given intoxication (which can be translated by e.g. our 'mediumism', 'mediumism', but with the shading of 'being-away')

Before outlining the typology of the 'divine' roses, we will briefly consider a number of terms...

a. Mania -- Becoming outside oneself,-- which may take various forms, such as anger ("He/she is outside himself of anger"), 'madness' (senselessness, insanity), expansion of consciousness (positive state that causes other things to penetrate to the very consciousness expanded by it).-

b. Enthousiasmos, spirit drive (the spirit becoming 'adrift'),-- literally: 'and', becoming driven ('drift') from within, by a 'theos', 'thea', (god, goddess).

By the way: the Dutch term 'geest' can, apart from intellect - and - reason, also mean 'consciousness-expansion' (think of spirituous beverages e.g.).

c. Epipnoia, inspiration (*Faidros* 265b, *Laws* 811c): during the intoxication a supernatural being - deity, hero, daimon - gives data, information, in such a way that the knowledge exceeds the ordinary human possibilities ('Human Potentialities', as the Anglo-Saxons say).

Note-- 'Katoche', to be controlled.-- Rouget translates 'kat.ochè', to be controlled by something, by 'possession', which actually means 'possession'.

But it's not that simple: one who is "controlled" by a very sensible entity lives through "katochè", but does not behave like a "possessed" at all. The term often simply means "being led" from within by an entity.

Note--What Rouget also fails to see well is the 'catharsis', cleansing.-. In a state of intoxication, inspiration, being mastered, the day-to-day ability to know:

- a. accept it as it is,
- b. Purged of its associations ("cleansing" in the stricter sense) and
- c. elevated to a higher level, thanks to divinely given information, which comes through more easily precisely because the ordinary use of reason is more or less switched off (what Platon calls 'turning away' from this earth) and loses its extended inconvenience to make way for an expanded awareness of things. This can also be called 'mind expansion'.

B.-- The four types of god-affected intoxication.

We now give a brief account.

B.1.-- The mantic (prophetic) intoxication.

'Manteia', powers of prediction (metonymically: consulting predictors/prophets), powers of oracle.-- 'Mantikos', all that is connected with oracle.

For example, Puthia, pithia, of Delphi, the clairvoyant lady who pronounced her oracles for many, was highly esteemed throughout the Greek world - even by intellectuals. According to Platon, the god Apollon is at work here, the result: clairvoyance.

B.2.-- The teletial intoxication.

'Telesma', a.k.a. religious rite.-- 'Telestès', one who initiates.

Teletè', initiation ceremony, solemn mysteries (understood as rites of initiation).

According to Platon, here the god Dionusos, the god of extravagant rust, is at work therapeutically inside the soul.

Explanation. Someone commits an error with respect to a deity, within her 'function' (field of work or causation) so e.g. marriage (as mentioned above).

This creates a kind of resentment in the heart of the 'offended' deity, something that normally triggers an 'atè', a deity judgment or retaliation.

This manifests itself in some - not normal - calamity, which may be hidden under the mere semblance of a thoroughly 'natural' calamity (about this, in the end, only the mantis (mentioned above) decides), who 'sees' right through, the scaling-biting appearance of the 'hidden' evil (calamity) (a form of theoria).

By the way: Why is it that if a higher being - god(s), hero, daimon - is 'insulted', quasi-automatic resentment and calamity ('atè') follow?

Because in that biblical world 'forgiveness' is a rarity (think of the mechanisms that the psychoanalysts expose - not in the extraterrestrial world but - in the unconscious and subconscious layers of our psyche: there too real forgiveness of insults etc. - 'frustrations' - is rather rare).

Note-- Among those afflicted by an "atè," deity resentment, Platon mentions "Bakchanten," - also called "Korybanten," i.e., Dionysian-occupants.

Rouget, o.c., identifies this type of 'intoxication' as follows:

- a. it applies to people who get out of psychic balance more easily than others;
- b. the cause: mantically gifted people feel the resentment of a supernatural being with as a result the - in ancient, past-believing Greece - 'divine' intoxication or even madness.

Therapy.-- Such states are the trigger for therapy.

Rouget says in this regard:

- i. a set of rites (recorded or even exceptionally at least freely chosen sacred or we actions) including a musical motto (musical verse) that is expressed slowly or quickly in a dance;
- ii. this ritual deliberately aims to re-start the previously encountered intoxication, but this time governed by the ritual. Platonic view: E.PL. PSY. 15! The ritually controlled intoxication resituates the disturbed intoxication in the overall 'movement' (life energy) of the universe (harmony).
- iii. The ritual is endowed with the 'efficiency' (effectiveness) of sacrifices that soothe (reconcile) the resentment of an extra-natural being: the being who caused the causes becomes 'forgiving' (in the non-Biblical sense).

Note-- C.A. Meier, *Antike Inkubation und moderne Psychotherapie*, (Ancient incubation and modern psychotherapy), Zurich, Rascher, 1949, explains this mechanism more thoroughly than Rouget: "ho trosas iasetai" (what caused the calamity will recover) result: therapy.

B.3.-- The poetic intoxication.

'Poièma', a. work, gewrocht, b.1. handiwork, manual gewrocht, b.2. mind-work, mind-effected gewrocht (so e.g. invention (*Politeia* 474e), poetry (*Faidros* 60c)).

Here it is the 'Mousai', (from 'montsai', mountain spirits) or Muses (with or without Mnèmosunè (literally: expanded consciousness), the goddess of the expanded awareness of things) who are actively involved.

By the way, some people think that, even in the time of Platon and Aristotle, there were brotherhoods in whose framework even scholars worshipped the Muses.

Platon distinguishes two types of poetry:

- a. the rational, 'wooden', 'constructed' poetry and literature;
- b. the inspired, real poetry.

Note--In his *Ion* (e.g., 534b) Platon says that whoever recites verses of Homer, for example, is usually inspired by the soul of the poet himself.--.

In the *Ion* he goes on to say that a (real) poet or literary person does not work by means of 'technè' rational expertise, skill, science, professional knowledge, but by means of a "theia dunamis", a divine energy (effect): poets are in an intoxication, like e.g. the Korybants do not 'dance intellectually' - not 'emfrones' - !

Poets are 'entheoi', (spirited), 'hieroi', power- and energy-charged,--in all cases they put the earthly workings of the mind (partly) out of action to provide space for the Muse(s).

Also in *Nomoi* (719) the poets are 'ekfrones', outside themselves (as far as the earthly side of the mind is concerned). Result: real literature.

B.4.-- The erotic or minstrel.

Eros', infatuation;--'love'. Causing beings: either the god Eros (the god of love) or Aphrodite (the goddess of love).

Platon, *Faidros* 249d and onwards unfolds his description of the true, i.e. spirited eroticism.

For example, he says: "Whenever someone sees earthly beauty, while at the same time the memory of the 'true' (Note: higher) hero of beauty arises in him/her, such a person acquires wings, again equipped as he/she is with upward pointing wings and full of impatience to fly upwards but unable to do so - like a bird one looks in that case to the sky and forgets what is below - . In such a case one looks like being gifted with all that is necessary to be considered in a state of 'intoxication'.

Platon, although a follower of spirit, nevertheless wrote a lot about 'eros', not only in the sense of 'desire for happiness' but also in the sense of sexual intoxication. We will come back to that. The result: truly lived eroticism.

Note-- With regard to therapy and even to the experience of roses of all kinds, Platon is correctly understood if one starts from the concept of catharsis:

- a. he is open to all phenomena, even the sickly or intoxicating ones;
- b. but introduces catharsis, purification: the soul triad "big monster/ less big lion/ little man" plays here again and again, even if he does not say it explicitly. This can be felt where he describes the eros!

Thus he concludes *Faidros 245b/c*: "What we had to prove is (...) that the deities caused the intoxication in question in order to obtain the highest degree of 'eu.tuchia', literally 'good fortune'.) It is true that this proof will not convince the 'deinoi', the cynical minds, but it will seem credible to the 'sofoi', the 'wise', i.e. the sensible ones".

He adds, "What is necessary first of all, concerning the nature of the soul, nature which is both divine and merely human, is the direct knowledge of its states and external behavior and the sense of objective truth."

Note--For "sensible people" this is still true in 1991! Direct perception--not prejudice--paired with a sense of objective truth!

Note-- Ernst Dichter, a student of Sigmund Freud, known for his breakthrough on marketing (salesmanship) in the USA, closely examined buying behavior.

Many of us buy - for example in a department store

- a. Not 'conscious' (in the sense of 'logically calculating and/or deliberating', except for - a sometimes small part),
- b. also not 'subconsciously' (out of fear - according to Dichter - of the unknown or out of adopted prejudices),
- c. but rather "unconsciously" (what Dichter calls "the real automatic reflexes").

Isn't that "mania", intoxicating behavior? Poet situates the factor(s) of such an "unreasoning urge to buy" in the unconscious. Perhaps Platon as an Ancient Greek would mention 'deities', 'heroes', 'daimones', (including ancestral souls).

Mania' remains the external manifestation.

Ethnopsychology.

"Let us be clear: Western psychiatry has not been able to ensure the psychological health of members of traditional societies, both in their country of origin and during migration. This is an observation. But the consequences - both scientific and economic - are considerable. Today, it is reasonable to assume that more than 80% of the world's population uses traditional therapeutic techniques, such as shamanism, possession, clairvoyance, and various syncretic healers. -- Thus Tobie Nathan, *Le sperme du diable*, (The devil's sperm), Paris, 1988, 13.

T. Nathan is author of, among others, *Psychanalyse païenne (Essais ethnopsychanalytiques)*, (*Pagan psychoanalysis (Ethnopsychanalytic essays)*), Paris, 1988,-- *La folie des autres*, (The madness of others), Paris, 1986 (on which the previous work builds).

People like Nathan and others describe the - sometimes technical - foundations of Archaic-Primitive and Classical - in any case non-Western - diagnostic and therapeutic methods. Especially those specific to the cultures of the Maghreb.

A professor of clinical and pathological psychology at the Université de Paris VIII, Nathan directs the *Nouvelle Revue d' Ethnopsychiatrie*. (New Review of Ethnopsychiatry). He is far from alone. G. Devereux, *Femme et mythe*, Paris, 1982 (work that deals primarily with bisexuality);

id., *Baubo (La vulve mythique)*, (The mythical vulva). Paris, 1983, are works of 'ethnopsychanalysis'.

Devereux continues as the leader of this line,--using as a method a kind of structural approach (we think of J.P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, I/ II, Paris, 1971; we also think of an older work, more classic in nature, viz. G. Welter, *Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paleopsychologie)*, Paris,1960.

The term 'ethno.psychology' includes:

- a. Ethnology (cultural studies of primitive civilizations),
- b. but with as a strongly influencing - auxiliary science 'psychology', (possibly: psychoanalysis, with what then becomes 'ethnopsychanalysis'),-- There is also 'ethnopoetics' (the poetic praxis of the primitives), 'ethno-economics', (the economic praxis of the primitives) etc.

The term "guérisseur synchrétique" means those immigrants who practice their "native" methods in Western cultures.

Remarkable: the very rational and logical Platon wrote texts that can be of great use to ethnopsychology.

Nineteenth sample.-- Soul and Magic.(77/82).

Bibliographical sample: A. Bernand, *Sorciers Grecs*, (Greek Sorcerers), Paris, Fayard, 1991, 118/121 (*Chants et enchantements*); 121/124/ *Chants magiques*);

W. Leibbrand/ A Wettely, *Der Wahnsinn*, Freiburg/ München, 1961, 64ff (Seelische Behandlung). -

This brings us to the *Charmides* 154v. dialogue. But first some background information.

A. Bernand, *Sorciers Grecs*, 118ss., says: the 'epoidè' is 'magic song' (enchantment,--we think of the Latin 'incantatio'). The etymology already indicates it: epi + ogidè.

If the ancient Greeks were magicians/magicians, it is because they lived by singing -- from childhood they heard Homer's *Iliad* and *Odusseia* recited in rhythmic verse. In the theatres they heard the rhythmic-singing verses of their great dramatic poets.

The people in the fields sang all the time: farmers tying sheaves, grape-pickers,-- they had their songs just like the shepherds. At home, the songs of the weavers and spinners were heard, as well as those of the feeders. The children were made familiar with the songs of the mothers. Sailors sang their 'rhupapai' (sea shanty). Soldiers, on solemn occasions, sang the paian (a polyphonic song) in honor of the deities.

People sang during the banquets. At a wedding the girl would hear the "humenaios" (an accompaniment song) as she was being escorted to her lover; during the wedding the "epithalamios oidè" (wedding song) would resound.

A 'thrènos' (mourning or lamentation) accompanied the funeral.-- Against this background Bernand situates what follows.-- Let us not forget that the religious and civic celebrations also had their 'hymns'.

Platon. Bernand continues.

The 'epoidè', magic song, becomes with Platon a method of education (even a means of education in the civil sense). In *Nomoi* 2 he foresees - utopian of course - that the soul of the children will be methodically influenced by songs, - "in reality they are magic songs that act on the soul" (says Platon) - , in the form of choral songs, dances accompanied by song, dance songs to the accompaniment and under the direction of the Muses, Apollon and/or Dionusos.

Note-- One can see that Platon, for all his logic, does not become a dry-stock.

But Platon also mentions that songs - magical songs then - can also influence the body in its health. Well, through the soul among other things. Let us now consider the Charmide texts.

Appearances deceive and beauty lies.

a.-- Beauty.

Kritias notices a group of young men storming in. They are waiting for the beautiful Charmides. When Charmides enters, even Socrates is enchanted by his eros. Whereupon Chairefon says: "Well, Socrates! How do you find the young man? Is not his face beautiful?"

To which Socrates: "Extremely beautiful". Chairefon: "And yet! Were he to disrobe, thou wouldst say, "His face is nothing. So thoroughly beautiful is his whole body".

Socrates: "How irresistibly you describe him (...)". -- Socrates, however enchanted, would not be Socrates if he did not add: "If Charmides is also 'well-built' as regards the soul!".

b.-- Appearance.

But... Charmides suffers from headaches!-- The text: "Kritias told him that I knew a cure. Then Charmides looked at me (Socrates) in a way that I cannot put into words. He made a gesture as if he wanted to ask me questions.

All those present came to stand in a circle around us. At that moment, noble friend, I saw through the opening of his robe a beauty that set me on fire. I lost my powers of reasoning (...)'.

The health food.

"When Charmides asked me if I knew of a remedy for a headache (...), I replied that it was actually a plant (a leaf), but that a magic song belonged to it - 'epoidè tis toi farmakoi' (where 'farmakon' is anything that changes something for better or worse).

If one recites it at the moment one uses the plant, then the remedy makes one healthy. Without the magic song, the remedy does not control (what it should control)".

Remark-- Here Socrates expresses the essence of magic: it touches the 'archè', the presupposition or 'principle' of e.g. being sick or healthy.

It is also for this reason that, in the mysteries, the essence is a subtle form of sexuality (cf. Thassilo von Scheffer, *Mystères et oracles helléniques*, (Hellenic mysteries and oracles), Paris, Payot, 1943, 14: one identifies with a higher being through eroticism); for sexuality touches life in its 'archè', origin, premise.

It may seem surprising but magic is different from what very many people think about it.

Socrates explains the pharmakon + epoid.

Charmides: "I will write down the magic song as you dictate."

Socrates: "Now I shall be able to speak freely about the magic song - how it is put together - for until now I did not know how to explain its power".

Holistic.

In the context of, among other things, New Age, the term is 'in'. Holos' in Ancient Greek means 'whole'.

Now we know - among other things from Platon's method of stoicism, which examines a totality for its elements (parts) - that the concept of "all/whole" (= totality) belongs to the foundations of Platonism.-- We shall now see this at work.

Holistic Health.

Do not think that we are alone with that topical word on the subject. Y. Brès, *La psychologie de Platon*, PUF, 1973-2, 287ss. (*Médecine, psychiatrie, psychologie structurale*), uses it to characterize Platon's passus which we are now discussing.

Socrates then says: "For the effect of power is such that it not only makes the head healthy".

Model.-- "You may have heard of 'good' physicians: if someone who has an eye complaint goes to them, they say that it is not possible to do it if you only attack the health of the eyes. They also address themselves to the head when it comes to putting the eyes in order.

Original.--"In the same way, Charmides, this magic formula works. I myself learned it during my army service from a Thracian physician, student of Zalmoxis. Zalmoxis - it is claimed - and his followers also make 'immortal'".

Note.-- Zalmoxis (also: Salmoxis) is a god among the Getai, a Thracian people (according to Herodotos 4:94-6). Whether Platon invents in the text we are discussing is not so clear, and in fact it has virtually no relevance.

Socrates: "The Thracian said that what I said earlier about the doctors, the Hellenic doctors were right. Socrates is now going to explain this.

The physical aspect.

Socrates further quotes the words of the Thracian: "But Zalmoxis - our prince who is a god - says: just as one may not wish to heal the eyes without healing the head, nor the head without healing the whole body, so too one may not heal the body without healing the soul.

It is precisely because the doctors of the Hellenes are unable to cope with most diseases that they fail to see the whole (...). If the whole is in a bad state, no part of it can possibly feel good.

The soul aspect.

"For everything has its origin in the soul: good and evil for the body and the whole man! It flows from the soul as it flows from the head towards the eyes. That origin must be treated first of all and with the greatest care, if the head and the whole body are to do well."

Note-- Leibbrand/ Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn*, 64.-- Soul therapy is a truly Platonic concept ("psuchèn therapein").

Kriton: Socrates receives the greatest secrets in the dream in which a beautiful woman in white clothing appears to him: after the blotting out of the physical damage, the care of the soul is given a decisive role.

Lachès: The soul formation of young people is discussed. Just as an organ, for example, must 'participate' in beauty (the absolute beauty is present in it) in order to be 'clean', so the soul must participate in virtue(s) in order to be 'virtuous' (this is the reasoning of the younger Platon).

Hippias minor: the concept of "iasthai tèn psuchèn" healing the soul, is explicitly introduced as a term.

Gorgias: Socrates acts here as a soul healer. Besides the doctor, the paidotribes, the gymnastics teacher, acts here as an equally important 'educator'; he is 'healer' of the soul.

Protagoras: the Sophist as soul therapist comes into play here. Just as the doctor is insufficient for the body, so is the sophist with his half-truths. The soul needs the "good" teaching,--among other things, to be cured of its ills.

Conclusion "Although Platon himself was not a physician, it seems that he was well informed about the medical theories of his time and the therapies used by the different types of physicians. The number of medical references in his works proves that medicine was for him a continuous object of reflection". (Y. Brès, *La psychologie de Platon*, 268).

Note-- Already the Paleopythagoreans considered their philosophy to be at least partly 'medicine': a philosophy that did not cause health was not a philosophy to them.

In other words, Platon stands in a tradition of the seriousness of life with regard to thinking and theorizing: sanity must prevail.

The magic song.

All that precedes, serves to 'foundation' the working of magic (to indicate the presuppositions). For magic works with 'dunamis', (Lat.: virtus, force, life-force) in such a way that an effect emanates from it.

Charmides' text continues: "The soul, however - so says the Thracian physician - is treated by means of well-defined magic words. These are "clean sayings"

Note-- Now reread E.PL.PSY. 12 (clean): is 'clean' "all that commands admiration and astonishment". Indeed: if magic ever had any authority, in other cultures than our enlightened rational one, it is because its results commanded admiration and astonishment. In Greek, the results provoked the exclamation, "Wonderful!" the exclamation.

Socrates: "For by such utterances 'thinking power' is created in the soul. If this is created and brought about, it becomes easy to bring health also to the head and other limbs of the body".

Note-- Translators who know nothing about magic translate 'contemplation', where we - just now - wrote 'power of thought'.

It is obvious that this is nonsense: how can reflection in the rational-psychological sense - as the word is used in our language - make us healthy as Platon describes it here? Let us think here of "positive thinking", the term commonly used in New Age, which refers to the power of suggestive thought. Only then does Platon's text here make sense.

Socrates: "When the Thracian taught me the remedy - farmakon - and the song - epoidè, he said: 'Do not let anyone fool you into treating the head with this remedy who does not first open his soul to treat it with songs...'"

Just as Jesus healed the haimo.rhoöusa (haemoroïssa, the woman who suffered from hemorrhaging for years) by means of his "dunamis" (Jesus' divine life force) and did not do so without faith on her part, so too did this pagan Thracian. The magical power of thought only gets off the ground insofar as it is preceded by 'faith', i.e. an unprejudiced openness to the action of the dunamis present in the remedy and the song -- that's Platon.

Psychosomatics.-- Commentary by Leibbrand/ Wettley, *Der Wahnsinn*:

"It strikes us as astonishing that the psychosomaticians of today have not yet placed this Charmide text at the beginning of their expositions.

The magic structure.

Bernard, *Sorciers Grecs*, 121. Truly a strange conversation! Socrates gives Charmides a magical consultation, treats him like a healer and teaches him a bit of philosophy. Socrates acts as healer, musician and magician at the same time.

In doing so, he acts as a disciple of Zalmoxis,--one who was human and 'god'. Bernard adds: "The use of a farmakon, a 'means', the announcement of a magical song, the reminiscence of the Thracic origin of the method, the will to pass on an important secret, -- all these elements belong to the structure of the consultations of magicians/magicians.

Like the papyri magicae - a set of documents from Antiquity concerning magic -, so also with Socrates: a. a praxis (understand: an action), b. yes, but not without a logos (understand: explanation), with a view to healthification".

Y. Bres.-- O.c., 291ss.-- Brès talks about the Charmide text in his very Freudian way. Without questioning whether the presuppositions of a Freudism are sufficient to correctly interpret the presuppositions of the Charmide text.

First of all, notice the mocking undertone: Socrates' reaction to Charmides's headache is described by Brès as "un amusant prétexte 'médical'" (an amusing pretext of a so-called medical nature).

Kritias makes Socrates "go on like a doctor". And so on. Would the French expression "la facilité du mépris" not be applicable here: those who do not understand something well - and this is abundantly clear from Brès' exposition - get rid of it by mocking the theme.

But then again, Bres admits - without realizing that this affirmation conflicts with the amusing one just now - that "Socrates presents a holistic theory of therapeutics which contains very 'modern' nuances".

Note--What Brès seems especially not to grasp is that Plato is not a systematicist, but an inductivist (he takes samples and tries to generalize) and then a, very informal inductivist who does not shy away from contradictions with himself.

Twentieth sample.-- Soul and night. (83/89)

Let's go back to some more detailed aspects of our life according to Platon. Thus: the great monster as far as the night is concerned.

According to *Theaitetos* 158d we spend half our lives sleeping. Which makes the extent of the phenomenon of 'night' already partly perceptible.

Note-- Night life - sleeping included - has partially shifted for us current humans due to modernization.

a. On the one hand: what enormous sum of effort does contemporary man not make in order ... to be able to sleep. What an enormous pharmaceutical industry has not devoted itself to this! One can speak of a gigantic 'sleep problem'.

Consequence: "Tell me how thou sleepest, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast".

b. On the other hand: how people nowadays increasingly spend the night not sleeping! "The night of the mayor" has become an established title.

Discos and nightclubs only flourish "when it gets (very) late". Here, too, there is a huge network of money-making activities around not sleeping at night! If only for the reason of the night work so feared by many.

When Platon, in his descriptions of the life of the soul - the term 'psychology' is a bit 'heavy' in our present sense - systematically brings in the night, he has hit upon a main problem.

Appl. model: la dolce vita on Sicily;

Let us take up again a part of the *Seventh Letter* (Ed. Calm, 10f.) -- The morals -- if that word was still applicable to them -- deeply shocked Platon.

In -467 Platon travels to Sicily for the first time,-- to try out his utopia on politics somewhere.

"What greatly disappointed me here, however, again on my first appearance, was the "blissful life" prevalent in those regions. This consists in the "Italic and Sicilian roast."

Twice a day one indulges in lavish meals and at night one is not alone in bed. In short: they literally get caught up in the pleasures that go with such a lifestyle (...). They indulge in excessive eating and drinking and in lust for which they surrender themselves in bed.

Note-- With this, we are fully into the big monster: nightlife, sex, eating/drinking.

One understands, when one reads that, why Platon, following in the footsteps of Socrates, evolved so "idealistically". Why he designed the utopia of the "ideal society".

One can find him naive or prudish (= moralising), but one cannot think away the reason for it without falling into.... para.frosunè, thinking outside reality.

Appl. model: the turannos, the tyrant.

Already after la dolce vita on Sicily Platon mentions the turannos, the dictatorial power.

"Such societies are governed sometimes by an absolute autocrat - turannos - sometimes by the power of the money aristocracy ('plutocracy') or by the rule of the rabble ('demokratia'). Immediately they fall from one revolution into another.

The powers that be cannot even hear the mere name 'constitution': by that I mean "a legal arrangement which, under a law applicable to all, guarantees freedom and, in application of that constitution, equality."

Note-- One feels the urge to legislate! To regulate or keep morals in good - actual worthwhile - ways.

In *Faidros* 248d/e there is a list of souls who fall under the necessity of Nemesis adrasteia (the inexorable Nemesis, the goddess of just destinies).

Perhaps the list is partly a kind of game. In any case: it confirms what Platon also says elsewhere, when he's not joking, about the tyrant. The tyrant is at the bottom - at the very bottom: even the craftsman and the peasant (seventh last) and the sophist and the popular leader (eighth last) are higher in the order of values! For the tyrant stands ninth and very last.

Note--There are still "thinkers" and "writers" who dare to claim that Platon's ideal conception of the state--Politia and Nomoi (Laws)--is at the cradle of our twentieth century Nazi and Soviet dictatorships!

When one reads the 'appreciation' he has for such systems, one wonders if those thinkers and writers do not see that, if - we do say: if - the dictatorships of our century invoke Platon, these 'distort' what he meant.

That they literally - in the Derridean sense - 'finished' (deconstructed) Platon. If Platon criticized the 'demokratia', then certainly the Sicilian one with its "dolce vita" in the political class.

Appl. Model 1: the criminal.

Bibliographic sample: D. Anzieu, *Oedipe avant le complexe ou de l'interprétation psychanalytique des mythes* (Oedipus before the complex or the psychoanalytical interpretation of myths), in: D. Anzieu et al, *Psychanalyse et culture grecque*, Paris, 1980.-- The article - o.c., 9/25 - deals with a fifth 'myth' (= mythical element), namely sexual intercourse with the mother.

1.-- Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425).

Historiai.-- Tells of a 'tyrant' - Hippias - who attacks Athens with the Persian army. For this reason he is banished from his 'father city'. But subsequently he has a dream in which he involves his own mother in incest. From this he decides - typical for a tyrant's soul - that he, who subjugated his mother by seduction in the night dream (model), will enter Athens (original), restore his power there and die of old age. It is usually said that the mother 'imagines' the father city.

Sophocles of Kolonos (-496/-406),

The text of the drama (around -430) says: "Many people, in their dreams, have had sexual intercourse with their mothers". These are the words of Jokaste, the wife of Labs and the mother of Oedipus.

Note-- *Die Traumdeutung* (1900) by S.Freud is only a psychoanalytic circumscription of an ancient tradition.

Platon.-- Bibliographical sample: Robert Baccou, introd./ trad., Platon, *La république*, Paris, 1966.-- O.c., 333; 334; 337; 338.--

The Platonic dream interpretation.

As always, Platon is also here an informal inductivist: he does not work out a system in this respect. But he opens roads, which allows an English Platonist to call him "a seminal thinker".

Politeia ix, beginning, briefly discusses the 'unlawful' (understand: unscrupulous) desires. This, in connection with the genesis (= process of becoming) of the criminal (i.e. the tyrant).

This is about those desires that wake up during sleep.

a. In sleep, the spiritually gifted, gentle part of the soul (capable of controlling the other part of the soul) comes to rest.

b. This, while the animal and wild part of the soul - in so far as it gorges itself on food and drink - as it were shivers (from desire-climax) from all sleepiness and goes out to find satisfactions for its desires".

Note--It is abundantly clear: a. the little man; b. the big monster!

Sex and killing.

Platon: "As thou knowest: in such a state this soul aspect (Note: the great monster in its nocturnal form) dares anything,-- freed and unshackled as it is from the bonds of every shame and every real insight.

a. Thus it does not hesitate -- in imagination (E.PL.PSY. 65) -- to commit sexual intercourse with its own mother or with anyone else,-- man, deity, animal.

b. She does not hesitate to stain herself with any murder,-- without abhorrence with it anything on. -

To sum up, there is no madness, no shamelessness that this soul part is not capable of -

Note

1. In eating anything, Aristotle (Eth. Nicomach. H:6,114b) notes the eating of children's corpses.

2. Curious is the link "madness/shamelessness".

Paul Diel, *Psychologie curative et médecine*, Neuchâtel (CH), 1968, 107) 111 (neurotic behaviour), 111/113 (*cynical or shame-free behavior*) - themata resumed o.g., 162/ 167 (*Nervosité et banalisation*) - harbors a very similar duality. There are, according to Diel, two main forms of psychopathology:

a. the neurotic, who suffers from the aberrations one has and lives through (a soul-disease which is noticed because the psychologist, resp. neurologist/psychiatrist is called in);

b. the trivializer or cynic, who - instead of suffering from it - blatantly takes on and carries on deviant behavior and life. In other words: the syndrome, namely the deviations, are the same, but the neurotic suffers from them and goes down with them, while the cynic works them out shamelessly in the sexual and/or social field as 'natural'.

The great nightmare in all of us.

Platon (a little further): "What we wished, with all this, to establish is this:

1. There is a type of terrifying, wild, law-abiding desire in all of us-even those who appear to be perfectly self-controlled;

2. This fact is made clear to us by the dreams".

Note-- Elsewhere Platon will point out the fictionalism of the dream images. But here it appears that these "fictions" are more to him: "Tell me what night dreams (or day dreams even) thou hast, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast."

The soul of the criminal or the tyrant.

Platon (a little further):

a.-- "So far

Hitherto, (the unlawful, unnatural desires) were given free rein only in the form of the dream during sleep.

Reason: the tyrant was still subject to the laws and to his father, and in his soul democracy reigned.

b.-- However, from now on

From now on, however, he - tyrannized as he is by the eros (Note: life drive) - will without interruption exhibit the type of man he sometimes became in the night dream.

Then he will shy away from no murder, from no forbidden food, from no crime. Eros, who lives in him in a tyrannical manner,--in complete disorder and liberation from all bonds by being in him an autocrat, will drive such an unfortunate type of man (whose soul he has taken possession of as a tyrant the city-state) to dare anything.

This, to supply him with food, him (Note: eros) and his band of lusts that surround him. Specifically: those desires that come from outside him (through the evil societies) and those desires that arise within him from a disposition that goes along with his own -- and have broken the bonds and freed themselves.

Is that not the life such a person leads now? Summarize: is a complete criminal the one who in full day-consciousness exhibits the behaviors of man in sleep-dream state".

So much for Platon's difficult text.

Note-- a. The main idea is clear: the criminal-- in this case the tyrant-- lives by day as one lives in the immoral night dreams. The great monster who in the night dream indulges himself freely and shamelessly does not leave him,--not even during the day, when he acts rationally.

b. The great monster is ruled by 'eros', the urge for life, but which works itself out in a 'gang' of desires - sex, killing, enrichment. So it is not the healthy eros or life and happiness drive, but the eros insofar as overwhelmed by the tendencies of the great monster.

Note--This is reminiscent of S. Freud's libido or life drive. That libido, too, is a kind of primal lust that can exhibit all kinds of, even criminal ('perverted') forms of behavior.

Note-- Platon moralizes. But one can, e.g. as a lawyer of criminals, also apply the understanding method: thus Sabine Paugam, *Crimes passionnels*, Paris, 1988 (this young lawyer tries to penetrate the soul).

Notes.-

1. A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque*, (Greek Literature Studies), Geneva, Droz, 1975.-- O.c., 67/72.-- Steller claims that the great Greek tragedians (Aischulos (-525/-456), Sophocles (-496/-406), Euripides (-480/-406)) bring a common structure to the stage. What 'drives' the characters (e.g. to their downfall), is indicated by the term 'eros', life instinct.

This eros is a. a force, b, which becomes a drive in the soul. It is twofold.

i. She is inward (psychic) and seems innate, "natural" (in the very nature of the heroes of the stage).

ii. It is at once external, like a higher power, infiltrating and driving forward the natural urge.

River called them "divine" - in the Antique sense of "wanted by deities, put upon", yes, "démonique" (demonic power).

This eros, the urge to live, 'drives' both the deities and the people, who are animated by these deities.

But in both deity and humanity this eros works itself out as a disease - nosos. Something pathological resides both in the gods and goddesses and in beings controlled by those higher beings, who feel this as 'aische', something shameful.

By the way: the anankè, the necessity, is involved both with deities and with people! They don't want the eros somewhere, but they don't escape from it (have to take it as something irrational).

As a result, this eros is not lived through as an intrinsic feeling or so, but as something that is imposed from outside, as a fate.

More than that: in view of its disastrous consequences as a catastrophe. In other words, there is an insane-shameless eros at work in the whole cosmos.-- Platon speaks in an analogous sense, apparently (although in the text just discussed he does not explicitly bring up the divine and demonic aspect).

2. Appl. Model 2: Vampire, werewolf.

What is described in "Elements of Platonic Psychology" 85vv. is something reminiscent of vampirism and werewolfery.

1. Vampire.

a. 'Vampire' is a biological term: a number of bats (Z.-Am.: Indonesia) suck blood from small wounds;

b. 'Vampire' is a legal term: a man commits sex with women while killing them and, especially in the neck, sucking some blood ("The Vampire of Düsseldorf");

c. 'Vampire' is an occultist term: a buried person whose corpse does not decay, but emits blood sweat

(Blood flows from the corpse into the coffin: while in the surroundings especially women become anemic (may die of exhaustion),-- so in S.O.-Europe;

d. 'Vampire' is an occultist term (in a broader sense),: some people come across as very exhausting such that, when one is so close, one develops a heavy feeling of fatigue and exhaustion (the 'blood soul' in the veins and arteries empties);

e. 'Vampire' is a sociological term: a woman who uses her seductiveness to 'exhaust' men, especially financially, is a 'vamp'. Such are the main elements of what is called "vampirism".

2.-- Werewolf.

In French, loup-garou.

a. Werewolf' is an occultist term: someone -- with his own psychic and even physical traits -- dreams while sleeping about sex, blood (he eats rabbits, babies, etc.),- - sort of like Platon describes it (and the other ancient Greeks cited);

b. 'Werewolf' is an occultist term: someone changes into an animal at night - a wolf or some other preferably bloodthirsty animal - and so, disembodied and transformed, goes on a rampage (which he recounts the following morning as "a bad dream");

c. 'Werewolf' is a psychiatric term: a person suffers from the delusion(s) that he is a werewolf (lycanthropy);

d. 'Werewolf' is a magical-religious term: for example, Herodotos tells of the Neures (present-day eastern Poland) what follows "These Neures seem to be a people of sorcerers.

At least that is how it is told by the Skythians and the Greeks living in Skythia. Every Neure is said to change once a year into a wolf for a few days and then to become human again".

Which is interpreted by religious scholars as a type of totemism (totem belief, where one believes in an animal).

It may be surprising that we dwell on this double aspect but anyone who knows a little about vampirism and werewolfery or has heard about them in works of art (books, films, videos), will very quickly feel that Platon's depiction is real.

Thus the 'tyrant-criminal' as Platon describes him, from the night dreams, seems truly a werewolf:

There is, of course, a mass of literature on the subject: a single work is recommended (for not too sensitive souls), Guy Endore, *The Werewolf of Paris* (1933),-- French: *Le loup-garou de Paris*, NéO, 1987 (a masterpiece).

Twenty-first sample,-- Soul and Nutrition, (90/93).

We have already read it several times: Platon mentions eating and drinking as one of the 'stoicheia' or 'archai' (elements to be put first) of soul life:

"Tell me what and how ye eat and drink, and I will tell you what soul ye have." Do not think that food (drink included) would be an the serious thinker's "unworthy object".

Michel Onfray, *Le ventre des philosophes (Critique de la raison diététique)*, Le livre de poche (Biblio-Essais), it teaches us that ;

1. Diogenes the Canon (-413/-327)

Diogenes was a somewhat younger contemporary of Platon, a 'distant' pupil of the austerity-driven Socrates, and fought the great monster and the lesser lion by means of a counterculture of the time.

Onanism (primarily male self-gratification) -- uncooked food,-- abolition of marriage and the shameless practice of sex (ancient Greeks did not eat and drink in public just as they kept their sexual lives strictly private,-- which Diogenes of Sinope abolished), where women and children were "commonplace," -- contempt for any enrichment.

Such are the main features of the 'asceticism' (mortification) of the notorious Kunieker ('kuon' means 'dog', so that 'Kunisch' actually means 'dog'). Yet Diogenes considered himself a 'diatètès', an arbiter of lifestyle.

Note-- Needless to say, Platonically speaking, Diogenes at least partially experienced during the day what the night dream freedom taught him. -

2. - P. Sartre, the Existentialist (1905/1980),

Sartre was also somewhat of a counterculturalist, guzzling a liter of alcohol a day, swallowing two hundred milligrams of amphetamines, masses of aspirin,--not to mention the coffees, teas, and other "fights" he devoured!

Note--Also needless to add that, Platonically speaking, such a thing counts as 'unworthy'.

The feeding problem.

We speak, in the previous chapter, about the night problem. The food problem - present - is no less important. With as extremes: sitiophobia (food refusal; think of anorexia mentalis) ... gluttony!

The poor of the Third and Fourth Worlds are sometimes grossly deficient. The "rich countries" waste. We do not talk about the books, articles and broadcasts on how to eat what you want and still remain "thin"!

Holistic 'dietetics'.

Platon, when doing factor analysis (stoicheiosis), invariably has "all/whole", the totality or the 'holon', in mind. Here again, for the umpteenth time, when it comes to food and drink.

1.-- Harmony.

Harmony" is actually "ordered reality", the insertion of sometimes contradictory things. Man is a "universe-in-small" in the midst of the universe-in-large. He is both representation (likeness) and interaction (cohesion).

Remark-- In this, e.g., the four "elements" - "rhizomata" of Empedokles of Akragas (Lat.: Agrigentum) (-483/-423) linked as pairs of opposites (systechies) play a role: "cold/warm" and "dry/moist".

Sometimes the so-called "Hippocratic fluids" are mentioned: "blood/mucus" and "yellow bile/black bile". Sometimes they are also thought to be reflections of the Empedoclean elements.

Remark-- One should not attach too much importance to such links (orders: the Greeks were born "harmologists", (order theorists). What the ancient Greeks saw at work was the relationship between "microcosm and macrocosm".

Harmony of opposites.

When it comes to dietetics for instance, the ancient Greeks regularly surprise us by the ease with which they integrate illness into their view of life and the world. Illness is, after all, a lack of harmony! And yet: both the large cosmos that is the universe and the small cosmos that is mankind, comprise both health and disease. W.B. Kristensen called this "harmony of opposites". This is: "the union of good (health) and evil (disease)".

'Hubris' (Lat.: arrogantia). border crossing.

Everything has its 'measure' or 'boundary' (in the sense of 'demarcation').

To transgress that measure - Lat.: mensura - or norm is to transgress boundaries; 'hubris', (hybris). Platon gives us a little example of this, *Politeia* iii:406a/c.

Hèroodikos, a trainer in sports exercises. He is incurably ill, but he moves heaven and earth to prolong his life against the course - the course determined by nature - of his illness.

Platon's value judgment is typically Antique Greek: such a thing is boundary crossing! As he says elsewhere (*Timaios* 89c): "Every living creature

considered in itself has, by virtue of its individual nature, a predetermined life span unless, of course, what it has to accept, by virtue of "necessity", is added to its fate".

Note-- The concept of ananke, counterpart of sensible efficiency and purpose, frequently recurs with Platon, as with the great tragedians. It is closely connected with the Antique-Greek religion. Here again: the pair of opposites "necessity/ purpose". Harmony of opposites.

Harmony (possible of opposites) in dietetics.

First, a sort of definition.

a. Basic idea. Everything that orders life has to do with 'daiatètikè', modern translation: dietetics.

b.1. We already saw: 'daiatètès' is 'referee' (actually: the one, who orders life by right).

b.2. The verb 'daiatao' means, "I establish order in either my own life or in other people's lives".

b.3. "Hè diaita" is "self-chosen lifestyle". And "to diaitema" is "self-chosen lifestyle".

As you can see, the orderly approach to life and life design - life style (as they like to say nowadays) - is the core.

Note--This archaic concept then includes things like "living outside", "living at home", "feeding oneself with intelligence" and the like. Also - but then due to one's own shortcomings - 'regime' prescribed by a doctor.

Our current narrower concept of dietetics.

a. From what precedes - among other things concerning the behavior that springs from the big monster - it appears that also concerning food (eating/drinking) a measure, a limit, exists. Otherwise the right harmony - the balance - is disturbed.

b. From a text of Platon it appears - again - that the idea of "the beautiful" (which enforces admiration and astonishment) is central. The diet of the body should be governed by a general theory of beauty as a principle. In this, body equilibrium is one of the presuppositions of the right order within the soul.

Note-- Here one becomes aware that 'dietetics' in the Platonic sense is much more than kitchen prescriptions of all kinds, as it is in our time.

Remark--It is therefore not surprising that the ancient Greek physicians could not monopolize 'health' as can be enforced now e.g. through the doctors' order. Even from excellent health care providers. This 'scientific' monopolizing began with... Enlightened Rationalism.

The soul of the starving Iks.

Platon is "a seminal thinker" (= he sets out).-- Following Colin Turnbull, *Les Iks (Survivre par la cruauté)*, Paris, Plon, published A. Maurice, *Ethnology*.

L'insoutenable rire des Iks, (The unbearable laughter of the Iks.), in: *Journal de Genève* 03.07.1987,--

A German thinker once said, "Der Mensch ist was er iszt" (Man is what he eats)! That is still true.

The Iks live in a few shifting 'villages' in the mountains (N.-Uganda). Turnbull lived for two years among these approximately two thousand displaced people. He knows their language.

The tragedy began when, decades ago, their habitat was reclassified as an animal reserve (!) and other peoples flocked in, with state officials letting them get away with it.

Since then they 'live' without any fixed conditions of existence. Their 'little man' is day in and day out focused on just one problem: 'How can I get food today? By picking and poaching or hiring themselves out to neighbouring herdsman tribes, they literally survive.

Before that - about half a century - the Iks lived by a rich cosmogony (doctrine of the origin of the cosmos), rites, skills, clan laws, refined family system (with wealth of feeling and economy).

Now that they establish that their Pagan deities are 'nothing' (as far as solving vital problems is concerned), they mock them. A rest of family life replaces their previous morality, namely as far as the rest still serves for something: survival! The family system looks like this now :

- a. once one is in one's early thirties, one is 'elder(e)' and one is already declared dead (at the first illness one is left behind)
- b. man and woman are, within 'marriage', practically not connected to each other anymore, except for survival;
- c. from the age of three a child is thrown into the "struggle for life",.

Turnbull never saw one sign of geniality during those two years. Never did he see anything given as a gift. "It serves no purpose". So say the Iks.

Turnbull speaks of absolute individualism: "Each to his own". -- Tragic is the constant, but in the long run insufferable laughter of the starving Iks: nothing is serious anymore! The absurdity of their fate forces them to call naked existence itself "a laughing matter". Everything is 'desecrated'.

How the soul of a glorious people degenerates through starvation into a form of "great monster"!

Twenty-second sample,-- Soul and sex life (94/102)

Of course, an enormous amount has been written about Platon 's writings on sexual life.

Bibliographic Sample:

-- S.J. Ridderbos, *Eros bij Plato (after his Symposium and Phaedrus)*, Kampen, Kok/ Agora, 1988 (in which both texts with commentary;-- they are mainly stories but are philosophically stimulating and difficult to summarize;-- the proposer believes that the term 'eros' is broader than infatuation: as might be expected, "the little man" gets the leading role (*Sumposion*: "the good" makes eros really valuable; "wisdom" (which with Platon ultimately revolves around "the good") makes eros of real value; still: Ridderbos notes that in both dialogues it is almost exclusively about "eros among men" (homoeroticism)).

-- W. Schmid, *Die Geburt der Philosophie im Garten der Lüste (Michel Foucault's Archeologie des platonischen Eros)*, (The Birth of Philosophy in the Garden of Delights (Michel Foucault's Archeology of Platonic Eros), Frankfurt, Athenäum, 1987 (ties in with M. Foucault, L' usage des plaisirs, concerning Platon's Sumposion);--

-- Y. Brès, *La psychologie de Platon*, PUF, 1973, 215/260 (L' amour éducateur) (in which the proposer says:

a. the term 'eros' has a broad meaning with Platon;

b. Brès, however, studies eros in the narrow sense (as sexuality and feeling) with Platon, noting what follows

b.1. sexual pleasure is always presented suspiciously and disconnected from tenderness;

b.2. the women appear mainly either as disdainful courtesans or as masculine women or as annoying shrews or as high-class mother figures who have an inspiring effect;

b.3. homoeroticism provokes contradictory judgments in Platon (which, according to Brès, point to an inner conflict in Platon himself)).

The great monster comes up here in one of its most pervasive aspects.-- We can safely say that Platon is addressing "the sexual problem" here.

Sex.-- The present word "sex" comes from the Latin "sexus" ("virilis" (male)/ "muliebris" (female)). Our "of both sexes" reflects the same thing.

From the fifties onward, the American term "sex" emerges. The new concept is: a (sometimes total) freedom of sexual intercourse ("free sex"),--with a strong Anarchist or Libertarian slant.

Porno-sex.-- The newly acquired, anarchic or misarchic (ordeminate) freedom regarding sexual life gives rise, meanwhile, to very diverse forms of praxis.

Read *Cosmopolitan (It's a Woman's World)* 1990: February, 86/89 (*The Sex Effect*), and ye will see and read very beautiful gymnastic exercises - pictures and texts.

An American doctor's "sexercises" prove that a woman who imagines that "sensuality (the ability to enjoy lovemaking) is not teachable is wrong! "Lie down with your feet side by side and knees bent. Fold your hands behind your head. Tense your abdominal muscles and come with your upper body to your knees.-- Repeat twelve times. Good for stomach and breasts".

In other words: prescriptions! - But read something else: e.g., *Porno in Western Europe takes on 'unacceptable' proportions*, in: *De Nieuwe Gids* (Ghent) 30.04.1991.-.

Two out of three German schoolchildren regularly watch porn videos. Half of all Italians - including a significant number of women - say they read or watch porn products often or occasionally.

These are the facts brought up at a hearing in the European Parliament, where several speakers referred to 'a growing pornography of Western European culture'.

The initiative came from the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights, whose Chairwoman, Christine Crawley, said that the abuse of women and children by 'the sex industry' was reaching unacceptable levels. She estimated the business figure of this industry (!) in the European Community to be ... sixty billion B.Fr.

The term "pornographing" comes from Ursula Ott, who claimed, "Out of ten crimes committed by young people, one is related to pornography. (Ott is an editor at *Emma* (the largest feminist magazine in Western Europe)). The power of the sex industry is great: Ott said that *Emma* came out with a special issue to pose the problem and that many newsstands refused to sell it.

Reason: the sex industry bosses were against it!

Decision.-- When Platon, in his time of decaying democracy (with profound cultural crisis), situates sexual life in "the great monster", he is, again, "a seminal thinker", a thinker who opens the eyes on a vast question.

Eros and the West.-- **Bibliographic sample:** D. de Rougemont, *L' amour et l'Occident*, (Love and the West), Paris, 1938.

In his famous work, De Rougemont (+1985) talks about the whole battle between the degrading and the ennobling interpretations, in the full Middle Ages, of the primal drive "eros / sexus". The ennobling interpretation speaks of "love" and is well known (in the school books about medieval literature).

Less well known is the degrading aspect. In Geneva, for example, the 'burnt' medieval texts were performed live in one of the theatres in the course of 1988. Realizer: Richard Vachoux. Title: "Les chevaliers de la Table Ronde (Estaminet courtois)".

"The texts chosen by R. Vachoux break with the idea one has of the brave knights, - "on their knees and at the feet of their lady".

The poems, prose pieces, and comedies which Vachoux selected, bear witness to a shameless horniness,--let them be written by Charles d' Orleans, Pierre Duo, or Courteline." (*Celestes troubadours*, (Celestial troubadours), in: Journal de Genève 21.08.1988).

A. Adam, *Les Libertins au XVIIe siècle*, Paris, 1964, teaches us that already in the full XVIIth century - the century of the great Classical culture - the freedom concerning sexual life was already strongly 'libertine', i.e. anarchistic-libertarian.-

Decision.-- Europe has not been confronted with the sexual issue since yesterday.

Hellas: between ennoblement and degradation.

Read A. Rivier, *Etudes de littérature grecque*, Geneva, Droz, 1975, 235/242 (Observations sur Sappho), and thou wilt be confronted with 'lesbian' praxis but framed by a religion and a will to educate. The girls whom Sappho raised in her 'society' lived through, truly erotic, -- interwomanly. With feeling ('mainolai', 'thumoi'). But also with a rule of law (institution) and a religion as presuppositions.

Entry into the group ("mousopolon oikia") is legal-religious. The 'exit' is 'adikia', violation of law, when it is not seriously justifiable: i.e. with a view to marriage it is justifiable,-- with a view to another circle of a competitor of Sapfo) it was considered a violation of law.

Note--So it was for homophily between men: a strict legal order governed such practices.

But read Maria Daraki, *La sagesse des Cyniques grecs*, in: Cl. Mossé, prés., *La Grèce ancienne*, (Ancient Greece) Paris, Seuil, 1986, 92/112, and thou wilt find thyself in the deserving counter-culture of the Kunish philosophers!

Here's an example:

Krates de Kunieker

He was of a wary disposition -- renounced his position, renounced his property,-- delighted to imprint on the Greeks the image of a thinker who publicly engaged in sexual intercourse!

The traditional books of the history of philosophy conceal such details in such a way that the purely ascetic (and thus edifying) image of Kunish philosophy remains.

Copulated Krates's audience with Hipparchia, Diogenes always masturbated himself into the audience. Which, of course, the 'classical' textbooks of philosophy history again conceal.(O.c., 93;97).

The Cynics (Latin for 'Kuniekers') thought of themselves as "heavenly dogs", for in them/herself they thought certain deities were visibly and tangibly present, who presented to them/herself what they dared to do in public.-.

Cfr supra E.PL.PSY. 66 (imitation/participation in divine couple,---but 'cynically' (shamelessly) redirected into a caricature).

Which refers us to the decisive importance of the imaginal, element in soul life (E.PL.PSY. 68). O.c., 98s.-- Add to this the suicidal element, which Maria Daraki depicts by the words "désir de mort" (desire for death) (O.c.,100).--

Last significant détail: the women, like Hipparchia, committed a kind of 'unisex'; they behaved rather like men ('masculines') (o.c., 104s. (Les femmes cyniques: des hommes)).

Note--Current Kunish thinkers are largely walking in the same footsteps: in addition to Sloterdijk, there is Georges Bataille (1897/1962), a thinker--if one disappplied that word to him who thinks like Nietzsche--obsessed with sex, in its crudest forms, and with violence.

Some saw in him a new Marquis de Sade (1740/1814; "le libertin demoniaque" (according to Simonne Debout Oleszkiewicz)). Which did not prevent an international colloquium from being held about him in June 1985 - at the Maison Descartes, Amsterdam (Cfr J. Versteeg, ed., *Georges Bataille (Actes du colloque international d'Amsterdam)*, (Georges Bataille (Proceedings of the Amsterdam International Colloquium), Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1987).

Conclusion. - The ancient Greeks were already wrestling with sexuality. That struggle continues, sometimes in very similar forms, in our Post-Christian culture. Platon, in one way or another, when he introduced the term "great monster", must have suspected something of that struggle from a negative point of view.

The verdict of Claude Calame.

Bibliographic sample: Nathalie Thurler, *Antiquité grecque.-- L'homosexualité comme partie de l'éducation*, (Greek antiquity -- Homosexuality as part of education), in: *Journal de Genève* 18.12.1986.

Claude Calame, prof in Greek Fac. des Lettres, presented his findings.

a. To sum up: the Antique Greek homoeroticism - a fact that no one denies anymore - is very close to the rites as known to Primitive tribes in the "initiation into the full life" of young people. Moreover, it has an analogous educational value.

b. Partial aspects.

1. The divisions of the ancient Greeks themselves on this matter.

a. Satirical writers like an Aristophanes of Athens (-450/-385; older contemporary of Platon) condemn full of ridicule and insulting language the raw-biological drive in, that form of 'eros';

b. Others, like Platon, of course recognize the raw biological side, but strive for refinement: such an eros may be the prelude to a form of mania, intoxication, which can be directed towards the higher things - especially the world of ideas.

2. Some aspects.

a. The sexual duality of adolescence in youth is central to all of Greek society.

M. Foucault (Structuralist) notes that the sense of beauty is always involved.

b. The homoerotic relationship between an adult and an adolescent is at the heart of Greek initiation into full life. To the extent that Calame, dares to claim that she can be considered the forerunner of the later school.

3. Partial statements

a. A psychosocial approach shows that the strict separation of the sexes in Greek civil and military life and the fact that an unmarried man was only allowed to have relations with a prostitute, make the Antique Greek homoeroticism understandable.

b. The iconographic approach mainly shows the ritual aspect as well as the promoting role of the greedy 'erastes' (lover), who was almost always a married person, towards the 'eromenos' (the loved one), who was after 'affective life'.

c. The statistical approach shows that every violent act in question - whether it be girls or boys - was sentenced in the same way.

Note-- Sapphism (lesbianism) - according to Calame - is partly different because that form of eros is also intended as an initiation into married life, just like male homoeroticism.

But here, a kind of "boarding school" was the formula. The difference lies in the fact that the lesbian relationship ends with marriage,--unless the lesbian herself, in her turn, wants to establish a "sunousia," a community, in which she and a girl are lesbian models. So much for prof Calame.

Note--This shows that what Platon has tried to achieve regarding male homoeroticism is merely the re-foundation on the Platonic level of a "tribal" (understand: Primitive-Archaic) tradition.

The Platonic interpretation of male homoeroticism.

Bibliographic Sample:

-- Thorkill Vanggaard, *Phallos (Symbol und Kult in Europa)*, (Phallos (symbol and cult in Europe)), München, 1971 (21/47: Paiderastia);

-- H.I. Marrou, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity,), Paris, 1948, 55/67 (*De la pédérastie comme éducation*), (On pederasty as education); , ;

-- A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, 1922, 56f., 61/68 (Die Schulgründung).--

The Greek term 'paid.erastia', translated by us as 'boy love', is something fundamentally different from what we understand by the term 'boy love' in our cultural context. It is an ancient, sacred institution that was subject to strict legislation in several Greek cities and thus an integral part of ancient Greek culture. Only then is the main premise of Platon correctly understood to be present.

Is Gödeckemeyer speaking.

First of all: not every eros is 'clean' (meaning: it compels admiration and surprise because of its real value (the good in it)).

That is the Socratic-Platonic 'critique' (value judgment) of the actual fact. In other words: one can be an 'expert' eroticist, and yet fall far short of the standard of 'true' (understand: ideal, conscientious) eroticism.-- Cfr o.c., 56f..

Teaching' (school) for Platon was, admittedly, partly like that of the Sophists: a teacher gives lessons - stiffly if necessary - and this in return for ... something that was not 'Greek' until then, i.e. payment.

This cold money relationship was not, for Platon, a real 'teacher/student' relationship. Real Platonic philosophy was, of course, teaching and learning, but in the context of a 'sunousia', a living and thinking community, full of friendly relations. With homoeroticism.

Now reread for a moment E.PL.PSY. 74 (Erotic or Minneroes), to have the right background.

The charm.

Platon describes this phenomenon in his *Faidros*, where he speaks of a kind of "psychology of temptation". An unreal value or 'good' can nevertheless display 'allure' and come across as something seductive. He is referring here primarily to physical 'outward' beauty.

The actual 'temptation' (word preferred by the Netherlands) consists in the fact that one

a. (incentive) by something that appears to us to be 'attractive' ('tempting') by its outward appearance,

b. (response, reaction) is attracted in an unbridled way. This, without in the least considering the little human being and the question whether the problem-free response to such a thing is in conscience justifiable ('lawful' says Platon).

Note-- Always the same ethos! Eros, yes! But not without conscience! And this is the ethicization of Socrates.

The memory.

This 'catagoric' (downward) process continues until the moment when, among other things, the hypothetical (merely assumed) deeper memory - anamnesis, reincarnation memory

a. in and at the same time above the attractively seductive phenomenon, e.g. the beautiful fellow-student,

b. the higher, "anagogic" (upward) value, namely the beauty in itself, the absolute or absolute beauty, the beauty-without-more (the enhanced degree of the value-without-more) comes through. This is then the idea of "the beautiful-without-more".

Note-- The term 'sublimation' (common in psychoanalytic circles) conveys something analogous, but without the idea of "the clean-without," of course. That is why we prefer the term 'ennoblement'.

The specifically philosophical mind.

What we have just described boils down to the fact that

a. eros, even homoerotic,

b. spends on the idea.

Those who know Platonism a little see what happens. In such an ennobling way, eros becomes man's greatest blessing, the source of "the highest goods".

Elementary/upper school.

The possible "big monster" of temptation remains the basis, the infrastructure. Without 'eros' below, philosophy above will not get off the ground.

Thus the actually philosophical "enthusiasm" (*mania dialektikè*) gets off the ground. This is what Gödeckemeyer, p.c., 67f., calls "the noble eros", or "noble love". By which 'love' is meant in the Antique-Platonic sense, of course.

Note-- Culture transfer.

Platon was apparently convinced that 'paideia', culture, is transferable, 'communicable'; if between teacher and pupil(s), between pupil(s) and pupil(s) the relationship of "lover/lover" exists.

The element of "compelling admiration and amazement" (the experience of beauty in Ancient Greek) is, after all, at work in homoeroticism.

Théodule Ribot (1839/1916; French philosopher and experimental psychologist) provided us with two basic concepts in this regard.

a. Someone who is 'in love' wants to resemble the 'loved one'. This is 'transference by resemblance (metaphorical transference).

b. That same person, however, wants to resemble the 'loved one',--also to philosophize with him. This is 'transference' by way of coherence (metonymic transference).

This allows us to understand much better the psychological mechanism proposed in the following text by *Platon (Seventh Letter, Calw, 35)*.

"From repeated conversations - dialogues - on philosophical subjects as well as from close living together, the idea suddenly springs up in the soul. Compare this to a spark of fire from which a light is ignited.

The idea will then find its own way".

Apparently nourished by the depths of the eros which is present in the great monster and constitutes its lifeblood, one lives in a small group, in which one engages in dialogue, a philosophical life which leads to 'science', i.e. Platonic dialectics (the little man).

Which shows that, unlike Aristotle who evolved in a very 'rationalizing' way, Platon absolutely did not become an "arid rationalist".

Note--As Gödeckemeyer also notes Edw. Montier, *A l' école de Platon*, Paris, s.d., 122/125 (on the rider, the little man, and the two horses, the lesser lion and the greater monster): though primitive Catholic, yet very positive towards the ennoblement of the 'low' eros.

Eros and 'agape',

Bibliographic sample: D.N. Morgan, *Love (Plato, the Bible and Freud)*, Englewood Cliffs/ N.J.), 1964;

Anders Nygren, *Erôs et agapè (La notion chrétienne de l' amour et ses transformations)*, (Erôs and agapè (The Christian notion of love and its transformations), Paris, 1944/1952.

Two main concepts: pagan eros and biblical agape.

'Agape' is the New Testament word for "love of God and neighbor". With an undertone of "mercy" or, as the Eastern Christians

Anders Nygren, as a Protestant, naturally tends to value Pagan eros rather negatively (the well-known nature and culture pessimism of Protestants).

Although it appears from his book that in fact the Christians - certainly in Patristic times - did not emphasize the contrast so sharply.

The concept of catharsis. -

1. Both Platon and the Bible know the unreserved point of departure, viz. one takes what is given, viz. the primal urge ('eros'), as it is,-- rather searching, sometimes very good, sometimes very bad.

2. Both Platon and the Bible have the caveat concerning the uncontrolled forms of eros. To purge them out 'catharsis' or 'purification' in the narrow, negative sense).

3. Both Platon and the Bible seek to elevate the given, after purification, to a higher plane: ennoblement!

The difference.

Euagrios Pontikos (Evagrius Ponticus) (345/400), the Church Father with very great influence, notwithstanding the non-Christian part of his works, was a Platonist to a very high degree (certainly concerning monastic psychology). In his *Logos praktikos* (= Practical exposition), 3, he says it clearly: the difference lies in "the kingdom of God as 'gnosis tes hagian Triados' (= knowledge of the Holy Trinity)". (A. Guillaumont/ C1. Guillaumont, éd. *Evagre le Pontique, Traité pratique (Le moine)*, t.II, Paris, Cerf, 1971, 500/501).

Paganism is incorporated by Christianity into the self-revelation of the Holy Trinity. This 'incorporation' usually follows the scheme of catharsis, as outlined above.

The disagreement.

The catharsis scheme is an equilibrium position. This, of course, provokes extremes.

a. One is familiar with the Puritan tradition within the Christian churches,--primarily inspired by St. Augustine (354/430; greatest Church Father of the West), who became a monk after his playboy life and never quite came to terms with the sex he practiced. 'Sin!' Deadly sins!' Such is the summary.

Some Neoplatonics, whose views are echoed in S. Augustine, were also averse to matter, body, sex and ... woman,

b. One knows, however, also the other extreme tendency, which "condones" everything! And nowhere does neither conscience nor (especially) "the knowledge of the Holy Trinity" enter into the debate. The healthy truth lies in the middle.

Twenty-third sample.-- Soul and economy. (103/108)

"Tell me what economic activity thou art engaged in, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast." If that saying is ever true, then as far as economics is concerned.

A.R. Henderickx, *The justice in Platon's State*, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 6 (1944) 1/2, 83, says: "Platon makes a first communal coexistence begin on the basis of the inadequacy of the individual to meet his necessary needs (*Politeia* ii: 369b; *Nomoi* iii: 676a/680e).

Many things are needed and so it comes about that "while one calls to the aid of another for this and another for that, necessity brings many together in one dwelling place so that one helps the other". This living together is now called 'polis' (city, city-state).

Note-- This is the external reason. But this reflects an inner reason: the nature of each individual differs. One is adapted to this form of work, the other to another form of work.

"One produces more, cares for it better, and works with greater ease when each produces only one product, namely that which he/she is naturally suited to and does so at the appropriate time without interfering with anything else" (*Politeia* ii:370c).

What is at stake here in choosing, is the 'fusus', the nature, of man, even at this low stage (Note: the first lineamenta of a district, village or city) of community life". Thus Henderickx, a.c.,64.

The labor problem.

a. There are people in every community who do not like to work.

b. There are those who cannot find work.

c. There are very many who do not find the work appropriate to their individual nature.-- It was so in the time of Platon. It is still so. Perhaps more so than ever before, given today's affluence. The points 'a, b, c' are radically Platonic.

They make up the essence of the labor issue. Where 'issue' means 'a lingering question'.

Again, Platon, who to some is unworldly, paved the way for seeing ('theoria') the problem. As "a seminal thinker".

Note--It is sometimes heard: Hegel introduced economics into philosophical thought. It is clear, to those who read the *Politeia*, that Platon very sharply involved economic activity in his dialectic.

The capitalism issue.

Labour and soul ideally go together, but vice versa: soul and labour also go together. Platon has outlined a type of genesis of capitalizing

Moved by the idea that one understands the scope of a factor - stoicheion archè - all the more easily if one sees it at work to some extent in its genesis, Platon deals first of all with the genesis of the 'state' (Note: 'politeia', 'polis') and of justice (Note: conscience) in it". (A. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Munich, Rösl, 1922, 71).

2. "Socrates has recounted the origin, growth, destruction and purification of the polis in order to establish, in parallel with this genetic description, the same stages of development of justice (conscience)". (A.R. Henderickx, *The justice in Platon's State*, in: Tijdschr.v.Phil. 6 (1944) 1/29 93),

This points to the historicity (E.PL.P5Y. 55) of the soul as involved in economics. In other words: the then Greek 'capitalism' (to use a Modern term for an Antique phenomenon) has grown historically and the "soul of the capitalist" has grown with it.

The soul of the capitalist.

What does such a 'soul' -'centre of all Platonization'- look like? Or rather: how does Platon draw the external behaviour, in which it shows itself (E.PL.PSY, 34: daily observations)? We quote H.Arvon, *La philosophie du travail*, (The philosophy of work,), Paris, 1961, 5.

"The desire for wealth - Platon, *Laws*, observes - deprives us of all leisure and prevents us from engaging in what is not our individual enrichment.

Supposedly, the soul of literally every citizen was simply absorbed in such material goods. In that case it would be utterly incapable of devoting any care to anything that was not a daily pursuit of profit.

In this hypothesis, everyone is ready to deepen or exercise for himself eagerly any skill or activity concerning material goods. In this case, all other skills or activities are ridiculed.

Look: this is the one and only reason why no society is prepared to make an effort when it comes to the sciences or, more generally, to a sense of all that is beautiful and good.

As a result of the voracious appetite for gold and silver, every man, on this supposition, is ready to employ, without distinction, all means and methods - both proper and shameful - if only to become richer". So much for Platon himself.

1.-- Analysis from non-Platonic standpoints.

Arvon uses -- misrepresents -- this text of Platon as the telling proof of Platon's contempt for manual labor. "The nobility of the idea (...) is the antithesis of the ungodly character of a working of matter,--an act which presupposes an imperfect and unfinished reality". Thus Arvon.

a.1. Arvon does not situate this text in the whole - the system - of Platon's statements, but in his own perspective (Marxism/Gauchism he knows well).

a.2. As de Vries says: every statement of Platon must be interpreted together with the correcting statements, because Platon usually expresses himself in restrictive (containing reservations) sentences.

b. According to Platon e.g. one-sided contemplation of ideas is a form of hubris, border-crossing, and thus *parafrosunè*, unreal thinking next to reality.

According to Platon also a slave, the lowest degree in Hellas, is perfectly capable of *theoria*, penetrating into something up to its idea (which implies high esteem for this lowest degree). The reason is that Platon does not know a simple 'elitism' (preference without sufficient reason for one class): "The object of knowing and judging of the philosophers and their subordinates (Note: in Platon's utopian state) remains the same for all. Only the way in which they know it differs markedly".

A.R. Henderickx, *Justification in the State of Plato* 7 (1945): 1/2, 27). -- In *Politeia* 596v. he speaks of the carpenter who makes a bed: with the eye of his mind (the same mind as that of the thinker-dialectician focused on the idea 'bed' the carpenter makes the material bed.

Conclusion: Arvon attributes to Platon an antithesis "idea/handiwork" that is inconsistent with Platon's texts themselves.

2.-- Analysis from Platonic premises.

a. Platon's text is an illustration of his hypothetical method: supposing that every citizen in the polis acts in a general possessive way, what follows?

b. But there is more: the hypothetical reasoning incorporates day-to-day

observations regarding the behavior of capitalists at the time. The text is reasoning. But it is also descriptive. Capitalism at the time is described as an element of the great monster of unbridled desire.

The aim of the text is not to scorn manual labour in the name of theories of ideas; the aim of the text is to denounce the uncontrolled pursuit of profit both logically (hypothetical) and empirically (descriptive).

It is a Platonic critique of capitalism (to use a current word now). And this through the representation of the soul. With its desires.

Note--This is reinforced by historicity. With the rise of shepherds, importers and exporters, sailors, changers, wholesale and retail traders, day laborers, the polis has grown to such an extent that it is 'telea', grown to what it ought to be. Thus *Politeia*.

Glaukon, one of the interlocutors, calls it "a state of pigs": he desires more pleasures! What this amounts to is a 'bloated society': superfluous luxury goods are added to the basic necessities. Which then brings with it a colourful procession of 'experts' (artists, servants and the like).

This unhealthy expansion of the state in turn demands the expansion of the possession of fertile land. Which in turn implies wars of conquest.

Capitalism involves imperialism.--

Conclusion-- Beginning policy and specialization (each his skill) go together. Swollen polis, in a further growth phase, and opulent expert crowd also go together. In which economy usually proceeds without questions of conscience.

The soul evolves hand in hand with the growth of society.

What the schedule gives:

a. arise,

b. growth,

c. destruction ("swollen state"),-

with the need for 'purification' ('catharsis') to purge away that 'corruption'. What Platon, with Socrates and in his wake, considers his task.

Cfr A.R. Henderickx, *The justice in the 'State' of Platon* 6 (1944):1/2, 63vv.. -- To the ruin of the polis belongs the capitalism morass of the great monster.

Note -- So much for an aspect of the great monster, capitalism. That the soul is at stake is also shown by what Ch. Odier, *Les deux sources - consciente et inconsciente - de la vie morale*, (The two sources - conscious and unconscious - of moral life,), Neuchâtel (CH) 1943, 130, writes. Odier's title reads:

"The small-profits complex."

The primal urge - eros proper to the great monster - which interprets all things in terms of "economic gain", can assume paradoxical forms. Platonically, the same economic idea, 'the pursuit of profit', can manifest itself in very different, indeed apparently opposite, phenomena.

Note-- The term "complex" means, in effect, "conflict between more than one psychic tendency". Which, among other things, gives rise to an "idée fixe", a compulsive thought. Which we will now see.

Psychoanalytically, Odier sees the small-profits complex as follows.

a. The small-profits complex is quite frequent.

b. Its essence consists in what follows.

1. It springs from the possessive urge to take, get or get back. "Besoin captatif".

2. This desire tends to become methodical (proceeding with deliberation) and even chronic.

3. This urge focuses on what is insignificant (incidental, accidental, minute).

Odier further notes that this possessive - in itself not so bad - form of avarice goes well with a benevolent, giving tendency ("tendance ablative").

This sometimes grows into real mildness, into a wonderful unconcernedness when it comes to large expenses or losses!

Odier: "The small items of a budget are more important - for this compounded behavior - than the big ones. Minimal losers cause a more severe shock to the mind than the big ones".

Applicative models.

1. A Parisian, when he travels by rail, invariably does it in wagon-lit (very expensive). If he takes the bus, he invariably goes a long way on foot (ultra-small savings),

2. A very good man

a. showered his wife with jewels and fur coats,

b. becomes extremely furious when she accidentally posts one letter too many.

3. A civil servant shamelessly tells how he can't resist stealing staples at work: "I rejoice in it. It's like a small victory over a powerful and invisible enemy" he says.

Remark--Other model: a very wealthy lady of nobility does not want her domestic staff to be registered in the R.S.Z. ("It costs too much to give that to those Spanish ladies"). But she receives each year very expensive high guests in all possible luxuries. ("One must not be too stingy").

Psychoanalytic statement.

The phenomenon of the "small-profits complex" and the idea that lies within and above it, Odier, as a psychoanalyst, identifies as follows

a. Petty theft often betrays a stage propensity from childhood (typical Freudian explanation). Possession or also 'complaining' ('kwerulantism') express themselves in this way.

b. The adult Ueber-Ich (the actual moral assumptions of one's behaviour which are situated in the unconscious or subconscious) condones theft.

However, the more this same Ueber-ich (= the actual demonic conscience) mercilessly punishes the big thefts, the easier it is to justify the mini-robberies.

Note--As already noted in the insertions, it appears that what the Psychoanalysts call "Ueber-Ich" ("conscience") is not the pure ethical conscience that springs from our spirit (the little person), but a demonic conscience.

C. Odier knew very well the thoroughly honest state official. But this one was not very clever: he confused "the state" (note the abstract word, which Psychoanalysts are so fond of using) with "the father", (again: the abstract word). His father - represented in "the father", had answered his demanding with great greed and avarice.

Remark-- The Ueber-Ich is apparently the Psychoanalytic name for the 'conscience', as it actually functions, i.e. "thinking next to it" (Paraphrosunè).

One of the hallmarks of that demonic conscience is false generalization. My father was insufferable. So all fathers are insufferable!

Another characteristic: comprehensive systems are (wrongly) identified with "the father" (who is then "my father", of course). From "my father" over "all fathers" or "the father" to "the state"!

Decision.-- Platonically speaking: there is something wrong with the faculty of order (the harmological faculty): what is not something is identified with that something.

Another trait, Platonic in nature, is to reason wrongly: "If my father is insufferable (in my childhood), then all fathers or the father is insufferable.

And, on the same track, "If my father and all fathers or the father, then also the state (which is my father, all fathers, the father)."

Note-- Psychoanalysts find this type of 'conscience' in Primitives (where demonization is clearly present) and in children ('infantile stage').

But Platon would rejoice at the Psychoanalysis of the small-profits complex!

Twenty-fourth sample,-- Soul and Honor. (109/114)

We leave the realm of base desire (the big monster) and enter that of "noble" desire (the lesser lion).

The names by which one translates are "courageous part" (also: "emotional aspect"). 'Courageous' to assert or defend what? The honor, the prestige. Yes, the self-preservation. The assertiveness.

Other name: "furious part". 'Furious' for reason of what? For reason of dishonor, disgrace, shameful situation.

Another name: "sad part". "Sad" why? Because of what? Because, because the honour is not there. Because, because one is disappointed ('frustrated').

Note-- Euagrios Pontikos, the Christian monk, who took Platon's spiritual science as his basis, misplaces here "the demon of vain glory" or "the demon of pride."

Why? Because he calls honour, courage,-- anger, sadness,-- vain fame or pride a sin of the 'spirit'. Which is Platonic nonsense: the spirit in us, the little man, susceptible to 'theoria', to grasping real reality, of true beauty, is precisely that ability by which we (and the great monster and) the lesser lion in, overcome its exaggerations and keep it in its proper measure.

Note-- W. Jaeger, *Paideia (Die Formung des griechischen Menschen)*, (Paideia (The Formation of the Greek Man), Berlin/ Leipzig, 1936-2, I, 31.

Jaeger points out the historicity of honor and the sense of honor. Honor is concentrated in the 'aretè' (virtus of the Romans), virtue(ility): he who has lost his honor is no longer a 'virtuous' person.

And conversely, he who is not virtuous (= a man in his place) lacks honor. But Jaeger thinks he can discern an evolution (with Aristotle). In Homeric times the "own value" is laid in being "honored" by one's fellow men.

Note-- Ethnologists know, by now, well how Primitives are honorable,-- outwardly.

For example, one who has worked in foreign lands and yet does not bring wealth to e.g. Nigeria, "loses his dignity". "People will laugh at his mother. His mother will die of shame. His family will be ashamed of him".

Jaeger says that it is only the later philosophers who learn to situate honor in man himself,-- to a great extent independent of the environment.

Heroism, heroism.

-- S.N. Kramer, *L'histoire commence à Sumer*, (The story begins in Sumer), Paris, 1975 (o.c., 242/257: *Le premier Age héroïque de l'humanité*), (The First Heroic Age of Mankind).

-- H. Munro Chadwick, *The Heroic Age* (1912).

A number of peoples have left us a literature in which honour, defended to the hilt, is central. We call this 'heroism'. Epic literature, for instance, is full of 'heroism' (with 'strong' individuals, 'leaders') and 'glorious deeds'.

Note-- Even the canonizations in the Catholic Church exhibit heroic traits: one is "holy," worthy of the "honor of altars," if one demonstrates the heroic degree of faith and virtue.

Note-- Attend November 11 ceremonies, and thou shalt hear speak of "the heroes who fell on the field of honor."

Sport has its "heroes": didn't J.-L. Domacq write not *Sirènes*, *sirènes*, Paris, 1985 (in which the author talks about the "heroes of the car" ("les héros de l'auto") who earn their honor in car races with millions of spectators).

The art and film world has its heroes ("heroes of the screen", for example).

Note--What goes before are "healthy" types of heroism. There are also sickly ones: is not Lord Byron (= George Gordon, Lord Byron (1788/1820) the creator of "the Byronic Hero"? In particular: a character who is magnificent, powerful, -- attractive and terrifying at once,-- in the nature of Satan,-- Milton's Satan e.g., Goethe's Faust, Nietzsche's Uebermensch,-- titanic and cosmic.

The Liverpool fans - skinheads among them - who make the football fields unsafe want to achieve 'fame', if necessary by means of deadly riots. "We will later be looked upon as heroes. We are proud of it.

Two "heroes" of the Heysel Stadium drama following the Liverpool/Juventus match testified to this. A "hooligan" wants some form of "honor" (e.g. his football club, but especially his own group honor).

Until 1985, a thousand people were killed and three thousand five hundred wounded on international football fields! Where others are "ashamed" in their place (vicarious shame), they boast.

This very incomplete list of forms - types - of the lesser lion proves

- a. that there is "an honor problem" (in what does one pin one's honor (feelings)?),
- b. that from the Sumerian primeval times to the present day that problem remains a social case of first rank. Platon has - again - seen correctly.

Platon on "the lesser lion".

Honour is everywhere.-- Thus in the dialogue *Euthudèmos*, which essentially discusses the sophistical method.-- Socrates, in the course of this dialogue, gradually comes to identify the main features of "the sophistication of the sophists". Thus first of all: "The skill of a Sophist is the ability to refute what is true and what is false, -- along with the art of extracting it from any discussion. Socrates explicitly calls this 'eristics'" (Monique Canto, trad./intr., *Euthydème*, Paris, Flammarion, 1989, 21).

As an aside, according to Canto, the *Euthudèmos* has become overly studied in the last thirty years!

Note-- That honor, springing from sophist eros, is central is evident almost throughout the dialogue. For example, when it comes to the 'epideixis'. This is a 'demonstration' of sophistical skill. The Sophist "demonstrates" his skill e.g. in a teaching system or a skill (e.g. fighting or waging war). Hence the name "genos epideiktikon", epideictic or demonstrative 'eloquence'. One of the features that stand out, in this dialogue, is the fact that Sophists claim to be able to talk about anything and everything 'convincingly'... talk about anything. Which of course testifies to 'tharros' (= tharsos), daring, self-confidence, self-assertion,--one of the forms of 'thumos', the lesser lion.

Platon on "the lesser lion".

The Seventh Letter (Calw, 13ff).-

The occasion.-- It concerns the first Sicilian voyage (-389). Dion's relatives and friends appeal explicitly to Platon's wisdom, as a thinker in the political field.

Platon's answer.-- In a reflective analysis (E.PL.PSY. 64: introspective method) Platon expresses a knowing of his own soul.--

"So I pondered the situation and weighed whether I had 'the duty' to travel off. How I would put things on board. At that moment the following consideration was decisive: "I have a duty to go to Sicily.

Of "Now or never I must risk it". At least if one wanted to realise one's ideas concerning State laws and constitutions. Even if only one man had been fully convinced of the truth of my idea of the 'ethical restoration of the State', I would still have achieved all the salvation in this world that lies in this idea.

Note-- One sees that Platon was anything but a world fighter.

Platon: "It was precisely this thought and this courageous feeling that made me decide to leave my beloved home. Not the motive which the delusions of some people have attributed to me.

a. Respect for myself made me decide to do this. I refused to give the impression that I only possessed a certain 'strength' in the theoretical field, whereas, when it came to practical work, I was nowhere to be found.

b. Nor should I be suspected of betraying my friends, especially Dion. For I was bound to him by the ties of hospitality and of long-standing relations. Moreover, he was really in a not inconsiderable situation".

Note-- Platon beautifully dissects his sense of honor and his sense of honor concerning loyalty to friends (E.PL.PSY. 58: friendship).

A "painting hypothetical".

A "painting hypotype" is a literary procedure (figure of speech): one "paints" an absent reality as if it were present.

We're listening.

"Supposedly: Dion falls into deep suffering or he is exiled by (the tyrant) Dionusios and the rest of his political opponents.-- In that case I imagined that he -- fleeing somewhere -- comes to me and says: "Platon, as a beaten man, as an exile, I come to you. Not that I do not have an army of foot soldiers or cavalry to defend me against my enemies. No, it is because I need a teacher and an ethical and political orator, an area in which (as I am well aware) you have a mastery beyond reproach.

This, to guide young men in the way of good and righteousness. This also, to make their hearts one in the firmness of friendship and alliance.

But, having been abandoned by you quite in all under that point of view, I have been driven out of Syracuse - immediately through your fault - and am here as a fugitive.

For you personally, my unfortunate situation means even the smallest damage. More serious is the fact that you have betrayed philosophy. About philosophy you have, in other circumstances, the mouth so full of praise and you criticize, again and again, the fact that "the rest of humanity" feels nothing for 'philosophy'.

Then - along with me - has not philosophy also been abandoned? Without you presenting the slightest excuse?

Had we lived in Megara (Note: in Hellas itself), you would undoubtedly have come off as a political adviser in the execution of the plans for which we called upon you, or you would have had no honorable nature. On the contrary, to evade your task by pretending that you are aware of the great distance, the long voyage, and the magnitude of the effort required - by attempting to create the appearance of a lack of character - is to fail.

Supposedly: Dion had spoken to me like that, could I have made a valid point? Absolutely not.-- That's why I traveled..."

Note--Reading E.PL.PSY. 56: "Notify my friends and fellow thinkers that I have done nothing unworthy of philosophy and unaccountable to it" let it be known, on the scaffold, as a last mercy granted by a tyrant, Hermias of Atarneus, in Asia Minor, a pupil of Platon.

Philosophy" and "friendship" ran together! Almost everywhere in the world at that time, after years of Academy, there were "philosophical friends" walking around who did not forget each other, certainly not in the solemn moments of their sometimes hard lives. They did not feel alone anywhere.

Note--Philosophy was, in the Academy, more than 'academism' with ease, far from life, from a chair debating 'conceptions' without--what has been called since the Existentialists: "commitment, effort, involvement".

'Commitment' is precisely one of the main values of the lesser lion, making it a noble desire (to commit oneself courageously).

E. De Strycker, *Bekn. gesch. v/d Ant. fil.*, 90, says about Platonism: "Philosophy has to do with life problems. It searches for answers which are objectively founded, but therefore do not cease to concern life and therefore include a decision or choice". Such a decision is a matter both of the will and of the lesser lion at the same time. For this is the ability to commit oneself to something.

A Platonist thinker, Alfred Fouillée (1838/1912), in his *L'avenir de la métaphysique fondée sur l'expérience*, (The future of experience-based metaphysics.), Paris, 1889, 272, writes: "True morality (= moral solidity) is not 'wanting to believe', -- even less is 'wanting to maintain something, despite doubt'. It is "the will to act in the midst of uncertainty about a value which, although 'certain' as a pure ideal, appears uncertain as a fact to be realized".

What did Platon say again? "Now or never, one must venture out ". By the way: Fouillée is known for his 'idée-force' (power-think),--a concept he developed in *La psychologie des idées-forces*, (The psychology of forceful ideas), Paris, 1893. It goes, in it a working hypothesis (a 'lemma') alike, ahead and influences the result,--"like the hypothesis during an experiment in a laboratory" (says Fouillée).

Note-- Action psychology.-

"Tell me if thou dost dare to venture upon anything, and I will tell thee what soul thou hast". Théodule Ribot (1839/1916) introduced a form of psychology that bears the French name "science de l' action".

Charles Baudouin, *L'âme et l'action (Prémises d' une philosophie de la psychanalyse)*, (The soul and action (Premises of a philosophy of psychoanalysis)), Geneva, 1969, 11 ties in with this.-- "Now or never"! Indeed: the lesser lion in us contains in a nutshell a psychology of action.

Conclusion.-In so far as Platon described "his own lesser lion" as "doing nothing that is unworthy of philosophy or unaccountable to it," the little man is already present in it.

Spirit in Platon's thinking is the will, insofar as informed by 'theoria', to enter sharply into the essence of data.

We have said very little about it yet,--about the little man. And yet, that little man - Platon is far from being naive about the real people as they actually are - was present throughout the whole of the preceding account. Present as the light - perhaps a tiny, tiny light - of the ideas that come through in our understandings, distorted it is true, but still somewhere susceptible. Doctrine of ideas - as it turns out now - is anything but looking away - *parafrasunè*, thinking aside - from the actual life.

The texts of Platon himself, the whole structure of his conceptions - we do not say "of his system", for that Platon was too aporetic (E.PL.PSY. 01) - have made it clear to us.

The fact that in spite of the explicit texts, the structure of his speech, Platon is still worn out as a world fighter (Nietzsche), proves that some present-day 'thinkers' don't even really read Platon. Or do they read him already "by thinking beyond reality"? In a state of "*para.frosune*"? One must assume so.

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8.5. Second year of philosophy (1991-1992).-- Study notes.

The main theme of the year.

a. We live in a Post-Christian and even more and more Post-modern culture. Consequence: Christian and Modern 'values' (ideas in Platonic language) are more and more 'devalued' (they lose their validity).

b. This poses a very acute problem for educators - parents, teachers, etc. - namely, what ideas, what values do we impart to rising young people?

This problem - although in a partially different context - was lived through by (Socrates and) Platon, by Soloviev, by Kierkegaard and others.

The subcourses of the second year therefore deal with the current problem of education to values (ideas) in the mirror of the models of the mentioned figures.

1 -- Platon's Philosophy,--

It is Platon's masterpiece. The soul and - what he calls in his language - "the good" (i.e. the higher all-embracing values) were central to the Archaic culture of the Greeks (albeit in a purely pagan form). Both elements - the soul and the good - were subject to a profound crisis, partly due to the emerging philosophies (first and foremost the Proto-sophistical one).

The reasoning faculty at work in these philosophies - 'reason' (as it was called) - is after all increasingly limited to the purely phenomenal (that which this earth and the visible and tangible cosmos show immediately in a perceptible manner). One can safely call this, with a current term, 'secularization'.

The soul and the good become more and more problematic, yes, objects of ridicule. Finding an answer to this challenge was Socrates' and especially Platon's intention.

The acute aspect of the problem at the time was:

a. the emerging 'reason' (reasoning ability within purely visible and tangible horizons) formed more and more 'experts' (technè, epistèmè,-- skill, science). But

b. with ever growing neglect of conscience (= justice, in the language of the day).

As Socrates said to Menon: the thief is an expert (he has technè and epistèmè, skill, science). But: he has no gramme of conscience. So he is a human being, but he lacks humanity.

This paradoxical example brilliantly sums up the situation at the time. It is as if one would translate into: 'He/she is an expert teacher with no conscience'.

1991/1992. -- Study notes. 02.

The 'soul', in the Socratic-Platonic sense, is our (higher) value capacity or: ideas capacity).

Consequence: the really valuable (= the good without more) - not the deceptively - scalding valuable - and the 'beautiful' (meaning: the really valuable in a stronger degree so that it compels admiration and astonishment) are central in Platon's psychology. All the samples that we will take in that psychology, will only be illustrations of what we just said.

2.-- The cosmology of Vl. Soloviev.

In the course of the XVIIth, XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, Russia experienced a profound cultural crisis.

The traditional values of a degenerated Eastern-Platonizing Christianity and nationalism are gradually being devalued by the seeping in of Western Enlightenment-Rationalistic ideas and values. This takes the form of a life-and-death struggle between Slavophiles and Oksidentalists.

Soloviev, in this respect on a par with Postmodernity and even New Age, endeavors to establish a position which transcends both positions, which in his view are untenable because they are one-sided. He calls this " the realm of god and man", a revival of the Russian tradition on a Modern and even Postmodern basis.

3.-- The elements of rhetoric.

Ostensibly it is about eloquence (publicity) and literature. But there is expert eloquence and expert literature,--with or without conscience.

The text is inspired by Sören Kierkegaard, who wanted to initiate a revival of Christian eloquence and literature around the dual concept of "Christian existence" i.e. to be a real Modern Christian and not a mere imaginary Christian.

4.-- Elements of Platonism.

This text serves as a reference when some of us want to know more and more precisely about Platon's philosophizing. We say 'philosophizing' and not 'philosophy'.

Why? Because Platon spent his entire life evolving with the emerging questions in the Greek milieu. A closed system - which he did as a logician - is therefore not even to be sought in his case, let alone to be found. He is an 'aporetic': many questions remain unresolved. Sometimes as hot potatoes. Which the thinking people of the time did not dare to think about unless they were desperate.

Study notes03 .

Elements of platonic psychology.

Inamely -- 01/08.-- Dialogical.-- Not psychology "without soul". -- Spirit (Ancient and Modern meanings).-- Dialectics (as a method of understanding).-- Platon not "logocentric" (self-willed) but inductive (sampling).-- Platon's psychology as a human science (philosophical anthropology), with three dimensions (psy., socio., culturo.logies).

1.-- Values psychology (09/11).-- The noble yoke (subj.-obj.). Scheler (value-feeling, scale).-- Spranger 's psychology of values.

2.-- Psychology of Beauty (12/14).-- 'Value', for Platon, is "all that is good". Either "the good" (self) or what has something of "the good" in it (participation, methexis, participation).-- Always on the basis of ontology: Platon calls 'good' "all that is really good".-- What Platon calls "nothingness" is "all that is more nothing than something" (i.e., the relative or relative (not the absolute) nothingness). 'Being' is, in his language, "all that is really (and not beguilingly - deceptively) real" (in Greek: "to ontas on", which is being in a being way).

Good' (= value) is therefore "all that is really (= not deceptively) valuable". -- 'Clean' is "all that is truly valuable in a degree such that it provokes wonder".

Remember these basic concepts, and you are off to seriously understand the whole Platonic psychology. Why? Because Platon defines the quality of the soul as follows: "Tell me what thou dost consider 'good' (valuable) and especially 'beautiful', and I will tell thee what (quality of) soul thou hast".

In other words: the value judgements - 'evaluations' - reveal the deeper (choices of) the soul. It is a kind of axiological (value judgement) depth.psychology.

Depth' here means "that which the soul, as an indefinable reality in us, hides, in such a way that we do not become aware of it except through value judgements, whether or not expressed in words and/or deeds (indirect psychology)". Appl. mod.: "the beautiful man".

3.-- The harmonious soul (15/18).-- 'Harmony' is 'merging'. The clean harmony,-- and the counter-model in the possessed.

4.-- Soul and Works of Art (17/19) -- Literature, indeed works of art in general, are, in Platon's ontological view, merely representations of realities (not those realities themselves).

Study notes04 .

Consequence: Platon looks at what the non-dialectically formed is called 'clean', to immediately ask the question, "Clean, yes, but really clean or deceptively clean?".

Always that ontological question, "Is it nothing (more nothing than something, notwithstanding appearances) or is it something?".

The "good" artist may be an expert (a good writer, a gifted sculptor), but he is "really good" only if he is not only an expert but also a conscientious one, and therefore does not impress false, unreal value judgments on the souls of art lovers.

Appl. mod.: Homeric poetry, Platon admires Homer. But... he calls the immoral pages in his works by their name "next to the real reality"! And thus to be rejected as a means of educating the youth.

With this the basic insights are ready. Now the typology or type theory. There are types of souls that betray themselves in their value judgments.

5.-- Big monster / less big lion / little man (20/24).

The value judgements of the big monster (nightlife/ food/ sex/ economy of the less big lion (honor) and of the little man (insight in the real reality, value, beauty) differ thoroughly. They betray, in depth, a different type of soul(s) each time.--

Dichotomy, but especially tripartite.-- Society as a reflection of that basic tripartism.-- Ethical-religious side (divine-mortal: the little man; noble-mortal: the lesser lion; infernal-mortal: the great monster).

Ethno-psychological.-- Plant, animal, human soul.-- Parallel: desire/ will/ spirit.

Virtues doctrine: prudence (the great monster controls), prudent courage (the lesser lion controls), wisdom, source of prudence (the little man),-- wisdom as balance of the three (righteousness).

6.-- Soul and divinity (25/27).-- The psychagogical aspect.--

The truly good, in Platon 's Greek eyes, is called "divine" (clean in a psychic way). Catagoric life (downward). Anagogic life (upward) - Deification as anagogic life.

Note.-- Fr. English on 'materialism' and 'idealism' (basically Platonic determined).-
- Spiritualism (deity and incorporeal - immortal soul).-- This prepared the question of the soul as a 'being' (entity).

Study notes05 .

7 -- Soul and Happiness (28/31). -

The concept of happiness ("happy life").-- Eudemonology (theory of happiness).-- The meaning of life: a happy life. -- The good for its own sake.-- Platon on happiness.-
- The 'eros', urge for joy in life.

1. The Greek city-state: each individual 'succeeds' to the extent that he finds the appropriate role in society. Degeneration (as an aspect of growth. Catharsis, necessary).
2. Enjoyment as a form of happy living. Real or unreal enjoyment.

8. -- Soul and dream ability (32/33). -

Onirology.-- The night dream.-- Controlling. The uncontrolled indulging (in the dream). Nocturnal side of Platon's depth psychology.

9.-- The method (34).-- Platon's method:

Theoria. This is: accurate observation, one of the functions of the soul, in such a way that the invisible aspect is nevertheless revealed somewhere.

10.-- The soul as essence and principle of life (35/37). -

The indefinability of the soul.

1. Soul as "movement" (moving oneself, living), as "pure thinking" (coming to a deeper understanding through sensory perception). That is the soul in itself.

2. Soul as the principle of the body. This is the soul in its inspirational role.-- Strict spiritualism of Platon: he is the first to make 'immateriality' ready.

The individuality of the soul. While the spirit, part of that soul, works both individually and universally.

Inequality of souls (see typology) -- The expression "the body" means "the body and all that goes with the body, namely the whole material cosmos. (System).

11.-- The soul as immortal being (38/40). -

The myth of Er (exit of the immortal soul) 'sailing journey'. Reincarnation. Anamnesis (memory).-- Note.-- Ecclesiastical-Catholic reaction.

12.-- The soul as a principle of life, not as a resultant (41/43). -

The in essence very materialistic interpretation of the soul as "harmony (integration) of the parts of the body". Or as "configuration" Faidon dialogue about it. Aporetism (undecidability).

13.-- The soul as openness / closedness (44/50). -

Psychiatry in Platonic texts.-- Para.frosunè, i.e., thinking beside the real reality;-- also: delusional thinking, madness.-- Basis of reception theory (see: pragmatics): open or closed minds (models: Dion, Dionusos.)

Study notes06 .

-- The term 'para.frosunè', ernevens thinking, covers in itself the concepts of "(unconscious) repression/(conscious) suppression".

Spirit' as a sense of values (but then the real values). Curiosity.-- Crisis of values (among others with those who know Platon's dialectic). Utopia of Platon (the ideal state).

14.-- Soul and stages of life (51/52).

Historicity (two meanings

a. historical science: provable authenticity of a fact (e.g. the historicity of Jesus' miracles);

Platon is not only a 'philosopher' but first and foremost a 'connoisseur of man'. Because he is interested in the "immediate reality" of the people around him in the polis.

15.-- Soul and mindset change (53/61).

Developmental psychology.-- History/history(enis) science (heuristics/criticism/synthesis). - Historicity (having/having history) as "thrownness/design" (existential).

Determinism/freedom.-- Futurology (prospective).-- Platon and historicity. Information/ historical sense/ historiology. Platon' s mentality-historical mind.

- Divine combinatorics/human freedom.

The Platonic scheme: "beginning/ development/ (eventual) decay/ recovery (catharsis)".

Humanity development: and primitivist and progress believer.

- Cybernetic structure. -- Appl.model: Lysis. Foreground: friendship. Background: old/ new (the great Metabletica law archaeology).

16 -- The soul between "the ancients" and "techne" (62/63),

"The ancients say that..." "Of old, it is said that..." Deity proximity, not a flight into the distant past! New subject science of Platon, now 'obsolete'.

17-- Soul and Imagination (64/69).

Introspective (= reflective) method with Platon.-- Phenomena,-- phantasms, shadows, fantasmata. Platon interprets in- and imagination rather suspiciously (they do not give the actual reality but only the in- or imagined reality). -- M. Eliade on 'archetypes' (religion).

Note --- Myth and idea with Platon. H. Corbin: The imaginary world (of visionaries) more than imagination.

Study notes07 .

18.-- Soul and mania (rapture) (70/76).

Man as microcosm in the macrocosm.-- Mania as consciousness expansion. Sick and divine 'intoxication! Terms: mania, trance,-- enthousiasmos (inspiration, god-awareness), epipnoia (inspiration), katochè (being controlled, possessed).-- The four types: mantic (prophetic), telestic (therapeutic), poetic,-- erotic.-- Platon's concept of catharsis.-- Ernst Dichter : our ruddy shopping behavior. - Ethnopsychology.

19.-- Soul and Magic (77/82).-- The epoidè, the magic song.

Platon on education by epoidè, (the soul of the children is touched).

Appl. model : Charmides. Clean but with a headache! The health food:

a. a leaf (plant),

b. a magic song (epoidè) that "makes the farmakon" work. Holistic healing. The whole body. The whole person (body + soul).

Structure of the magical song: 'dunamis' (life force) activated by 'clean' (really valuable in a higher degree) songs.

Psychosomatics.-- Magic: praxis + logos (= explanation).

20.-- Soul and Night (88/89).-- The night problem.

La dolce vita in Sicily.-- The turannos (tyrant, dictator),-- yes, the criminal without more. Sex in the nightmares (incest). Killing in the night dream.-- The link "madness/shamelessness (cynicism)" (both, in Platon's view (psychiatric' cases).

Structure of the crime: what belongs in the night dreams is realized during the day, when conscious.--

The role of 'eros', here as the life drive (goddess-given/human).

The vampire and the werewolf (sex + killing).

21.-- Soul and Nutrition (90/93). -- The nutrition problem.

Holistic dietetics (harmony/ harmony of opposites (hubris, boundary crossing)/ harmony regarding dietetics).-- The current narrower concept of 'dietetics!-- The starving Iks ("It serves to nothing").

22.-- Soul and sex (94/102).-- The sexual problem.

The West, like Hellas, between ennoblement and degradation.

In passing: Antique and contemporary Kunism (Cynicism).-- Cl. Calame: the Antique-Greek homoeroticism. Platon's circumscription: charm, memory (= spirit), specifically philosophical inspiration (the noble eros).

Culture Transfer.-- Eros and Biblical 'agape' (catharsis).

Study notes08 .

Christianity recognizes that the mere eros is already in need within the framework of Paganism:

a. a prudent and purified sense of honor (the noble lesser lion) and, as the ground of all purification, to

b. the little person, i.e. the spirit that is able to recognize "the real reality" (to ontas on, what is on being), and of course immediately "the real value and beauty".

But this same Christianity, at least in its balanced will of purification, introduces the 'knowledge' (in the biblical sense: "the intimate intercourse") of the Holy Trinity, which transforms 'eros' from within into 'agapè', quiet love of God and neighbor. The magic of 'eros' remains, but it becomes more objective.

23.-- *Soul and economy (103/108).*

The labor problem.-- Platon: every individual seeks somewhere a form of labor which suits his very individual nature.-- The capitalism problem of the time (the soul of the capitalizing).-- Arvon's misunderstanding.-- Psychoanalysis: e.g. the small-profits complex (with Platonic critique of the basic concepts of Psychoanalysis).

24 -- *Soul and honor (109/114).-- The problem of honor (heroism).*

The eristics of the Sophists as a model of unreal honors (power-measuring thinking instead of truth-thinking).-- Platon's commitment to the realization of his own philosophy: "Now or never I must risk it". Philosophy without commitment is philosophy betrayed (Hermias of Atarneus). Philosophy is friendship based on studying together at the Academy. Platon's action psychology.

Conclusion.-- With this, the great features of Platon's knowledge of mankind have been gone over. He never, like his brilliant but arid pupil Aristotle, wanted to work out a system of psychology. For that Platon was too much focused on the "immediate reality" of the people around him.

Which doesn't prevent many, when they (don't) read him, from still thinking - beside his actual reality - that he is "worldly and earthly fugitive" and "worldly and earthly thinker".

Now judge for yourself if this is true. -- Just remember, "How real is such a judgment about Platon? How is it real? (This is: "In what way is it right what it is?"). By answering those questions, you transcend Platon's frame of mind and still stay in it somewhere!