8.6. Elements of rhetoric (language arts).

Part I, p. 1 to 176

Introduction. (01/06)

The term 'elements', in Platonic language usage means the points that one must put forward, if one wants, to understand something. Here: the points which control all that is linguistic must be put first, in a treatise on the use of language, if one wants to understand 'linguistic competence'.

As this is an introduction, the term 'elements' is used in the propaedeutic (limiting itself to the 'elementary' main issues) sense.

1.-- *An initial sketch. (01/04)*
A growing complaint.

"At the college, one in three young French people no longer speak their own language. A report from the Inspection générale tells us that, at the intake to the sixth form, four pupils out of ten can be labelled as 'illiterate'. In particular, they cannot even read or write down with 'understanding' a simple and brief account of facts directly related to their lives.

Which means that they do not have the necessary achievements to integrate themselves, at a minimum level, into our society". (*Anne Vallée, Expression écrite: zero!* in: *Sélection du Reader's Digest* (Zurich), 39 (1986): avril, 5/14).

Dr. G. Geerts, Enkele beschouwingen over taalvaardigheid en cultuur, (Some reflections on language skills and culture,), in: *Onze Alma Mater* 38 (1984): 2, 87/99, says among other things: "Here and elsewhere, past and present, one complains that 'they' cannot 'write.' (...). I could fill whole pages with texts in which I have found the complaints I have just mentioned. So 'they' can't 'write'.

Nor can 'they' speak! (...).-- The 'new illiteracy' has been analysed by *Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism* (1978), as one aspect of anti-intellectualism". (A.c., 87v.).

The factors at work.

What should one put first as 'elements' (= factors)? Certainly the Sturm-und-Drangaspect of Romanticism (1790+), with its 'genius' cult and its individualism; -- the older Positivism, with its aversion to the linguistic aspects;

The Beatnik and Hippie phenomenon (1950+), with its idiosyncratic anti-intellectualism (the so-called Counterculture);-- the great linguistic confusions of the New Rhetors (= linguistic scientists) themselves, with their sometimes all too new and even more hyper-sophisticated terminologies of all kinds.

So much for some of the main "elements-in-negative-sentence".

But the main element in the negative sense is the fact that, in the course of the 19th century, the intelligentsia (the vanguard) has begun to dismantle, la 'déconstruction', the rhetoric handed down, -- instead of bringing it up to date, indeed, re-establishing it. One understands now, after the linguistic decline, what one has just done by abolishing the five- to twenty-six-century-old rhetoric! It was a cultural mistake.

The topicality of rhetoric.

A sampling of the bibliography reveals the rhetorical frenzy we are currently experiencing.

Jutta Müller-Bäznen, *Rhetorik (Riskieren sie die grosze Lippe)*, (Retoric, (Risk the big lip),), in: *Cosmopolitan (Für die Frau)* 1985: 10 (Oct.), 128/133, breaks down, in that mundane women's magazine, a case for learning to perform in public,--one of the aspects of time-honored rhetoric.

A.C., La persuasion,-- cela s' apprend, (Persuasion can be learned,), in: *Journal de Genève* 23.02.1989, teaches us that Gérard Mentha, marketing prof at the Universite de Genève, is setting up an accelerated course in rhetoric for non-university students. *Modèles de discours pour les dirigents et cadres d' entreprise*, (Sample speeches for managers and executives,), Paris, WEKA, 1987, provides a set of elaborate models ('common places', 'lieux communs'), very traditional but nevertheless updated.

Bottom line: women, non-graduates, corporate executives, -- they are all, now, presented with 'rhetoric', as if, a hundred years ago now, this profession had not been abolished.

"Van den Vos Reynaerde".

We, Flemings, have a Middle Ages (= XIII-th century) animal epic, *Van den Vos Reynaerde* (Of the Fox Reynaerde).

Bibl. st.: *P. De Keyser, Van den Vos Reynaerde*, Antwerp, 1943 (a scholarly work); *R. van Daele, Where went Reinaert*, in: *Onze Alma Mater* 39 (1985): 2, 169/ 183.-

As an aside, Prof De Keyser says that "the spirit of our masterpiece is indeed the spirit of the primitive - particularly Germanic - animal tale" (o.c., 8).

This remark is important: the linguistic skill that the fox invariably displays is anything but biblical. It is clearly pre-Biblical.

See here how *M.L. Tarsot, intr./adapt., Le roman du renard*, (The fox nove), Paris, Renouard, s.d., specifies this. "Thus - with honeyed words - Reinaert left the court of King Nobel: for the umpteenth time he had managed to win the general confidence of his lord. Those who

possess the linguistic skill of, the fox, are - still today - welcomed everywhere where one believes their words". (O.c., 116).

The author summarizes: the human 'spirit' - insofar as it is identified with the ability to outwit - gets the better of the use of violence.

In the episodes (sub-narratives), this main proposition of *Van den Vos Reynarde* is fulfilled in a purely assertive ('positive') sense, i.e. without many ethical remarks.

Model theory: the satire that is the Middle Ages work depicts all classes of society (the original) with its figureheads (the second original) in animals (the model).

The pejorative connotation.
Gustave Lanson (1857/1934, French literary scholar), quoted by Tarsot, says : "Spirit in all its forms (...) - industrious will, skillful play, cunning action, lying, hypocritical action, arguing with fallacies - .

Spirit', at work both in serious criticism and in everyday banter, understood in the above sense, is stronger than any brutal show of force: such is the repeated spectacle that Van den Vos Reynaerde offers us .(...).

Something like that elicits all kinds of sympathy (...). The undisguised sympathy which Reinaert the Fox elicits from his readers (interpreters) shows that they are in advance of the profound and real indignation experienced by the victims of Reinaert's crimes (...).

So 'natural' do they think it that he employs 'spirit',--that 'spirit' which nature bestowed upon him." (Ibid.).

With what is commonly called "hollow rhetoric" (i.e. the slavish and uninspired application of rigid rhetorical rules), the "reynasty" is rhetoric in the pejorative sense. This double form of degradation of linguistic competence - one moral, the other stylistic - has contributed in no small way to the disfavor of rhetoric.

Definitions.
Semasiological (theory of meaning) can be summarized with *Roland Barthes, L'aventure sémiologique,* Paris, Seuil, 1985, 85/165 (*L' ancienne rhétorique*).

A. *'Rhetoric'*
as praxis (action) is 'fluency' (the ability to say and/or write well, i.e. to create understanding),--'being in tune' so that a message (= what one advocates) is accepted.

Rhetoric

is also instruction in language skills,--with sometimes an emphasis on the techniques of persuasion (on which Barthes seems to lay fierce emphasis).

The ancient 'rhetors' (= language teachers) set up this tradition, which was later continued by ordinary teachers.

B.2. *'Rhetoric'*

is, after all, a 'protoscience' (science in its initial phase). We say:

> **(i)** on linguistic behavior (original)
> **(ii)** speak in terms of a theory about that same linguistic behavior (model).

Insofar as such a theory talks about language and language use, it is, at once, a metatheory,--a metatheory about language.

As an aside, this course is general rhetoric, but focused on discourse theory (which is special or applied rhetoric).

Further characterizations.

(1).-- *P. Larousse, Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siecle*, 15 vols., 1866/1896,-t. 13, 1143, says: "The r(h)etoric is the doctrine concerning eloquence, where 'eloquence' is understood as "l' art de persuader", the art of 'persuading' or convincing." *Géruzez*, author of the article, adds to this the dual method of the rhetoricians.

a. Rhetoric is inductive : it relies on the great masterpieces of rhetoric in the course of cultural history,--resulting in an interesting historical material on the subject.

b. Rhetoric is also prescriptive (normative) because it sets forth precepts, maxims, which, expressed in Platonic language, are the hypotheses (axiomata) of 'good' (sound) speech and writing.

(2).-- *R.R. Bolger, Rhetoric*, in: *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1967, 19, 257/260.-- Different from Géruzez, but not yet thereby contradictory, Bolger says: "Rhetoric is the name traditionally given to

a. language use as a skill (= 'art'),

b. Based on a system of ordered knowledge".

Bolger Explains: the Older Positivism (*A. Comte* (1798/1857; *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830/1842), which was language- and rhetoric-unfriendly, gradually evolved into Neo-Positivism (= Language-positivism) - 1930+ - "which drew attention to the importance of the analysis of language use" (a.c., 259).

We now have what Platon would have called a 'hupografè', a sketch, of what rhetoric could be both as praxis and as theory:

a. language proficiency, **b.** language teaching.

2.-- *A bibliographic sample. (04/06)*

From a confusing mass of texts on rhetoric we take samples, true to the inductive method.

2.a.-- *The Ancient Greeks.*

Apart from e.g. a *Herodotos of Halikarnassos*, *Historiai*, in which the clear traces of a rhetoric can be found (his duality "historia (the collection of data)/logos (the drafting of the final text)" proves it), the Early Sophist *Anaximenes of Lampsakos* (-380/-320) is mentioned, with his *Peri rhètorikès* (On Rhetoric), a small work that appeared slightly before Aristotle's rhetoric. *Platon of Athens* regularly mentions rhetoric, but e.g., his dialogue *Gorgias* discusses Protosophist rhetoric at length,

Concerning Aristotle, about whom an enormous amount has been written, it should be mentioned: *E.E. Ryan, Aristotle's Theory of Rhetorical Argumentation*, Montréal, Noësis, Ed. Bellarmin, 1984,

2.b.-- *The Antique-Middle Ages Rhetoric.*

Ch.G. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (Interpreted from Representative Works), Gloucester (Mass.), 1928 (standard work);

Further: *H.I. Marrou, Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquite*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, 1948,-- 81/98 (*Les Sophistes*), 268/ 282 (*L'enseignement superieur: la rhétorique*); (Higher education: rhetoric).

J.W. Atkins, Greek Rhetoric, in: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 1950-2, 766f.;

E. von Tunk, Kurze Geschichte der altgriechischen Literatur, (Brief History of Ancient Greek Literature,), Einsiedeln/ Köln, 1942, 40/51 (*Die Redekunst*);

R. Stock, Eloquence, in: *Helicon* (*Anthology of Greek and Latin Writers*), Antwerp, s.d., 243/306;

C.Rehdantz, Demosthenes: Acht philippische reden, Hft 1, Leipzig, 1865-2, 13/16 (*Kurze Geschichte der Redekunst*), 109/133 (*Rhetorischer und stilistischer Index*).

With regard to medieval rhetoric: *E.R. Curtius, La littérature européenne et le Moyen Age,* (European literature and the Middle Ages), latin, Paris, 1956 (the German original of Curtius' standard work dates from 1948).

2.c.-- *Current Works.*

O. Reboul, La rhétorique, Paris, 1984;-- *L. Bellenger, La persuasion*, Paris, 1985;--

M. Waller/ G. Stuiveling, Moderne welsprekendheid (*Handboek voor mondeling taalbeheersing*), (Modern Eloquence (Handbook of Oral Language)), Amsterdam/Brussel, 1968-3;

Chaïm Perelman, Rhetoric and Argumentation, Baarn, 1979 (pioneering-degree with regard to *Neo-Retoric*);

H. Morier, Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique, Paris, 1981-3 (extensively debated).

H. Lausberg, Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik, Munich, 1967-3;

H. Elentsen, Moderne Rhetorik (Rede und Gespräch in der Wirtschaft und im Offentlichen Leben), (Modern rhetoric (speech and conversation in business and public life)), Heidelberg, 1975.

Note -- With regard to the fundamental research of prepositional analysis) *H. Plett, Hrsg., Rhetorik (Kritische Positionen zum Stand der Forschung)* (Rhetoric (critical positions on the state of research), Munich, 1977 (theme: the transmitted rhetoric as research method (after the Symposion in Essen),

1. literary-theoretical, **2**. pragmatic (= result oriented), **3.** action-theoretical (= praxeological). **4**. cultural-historical.

G. Vardaman, Effective Communication of Ideas, New York, 1970;

J. Kopperschmidt, Allgemeine Rhetorik (Einführung in die Theorie der persuasiven Kommunikation), (General rhetoric (introduction to the theory of persuasive communication)), Stuttgart, 1973;

G.Fauconnier, Algemene communicatietheorie (*A survey of the scientific theories of communication*), Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1981,-- (o.c. o.c., 19/27 (From rhetoric to general theory of communication).

Which shows that, today, classical rhetoric can be situated within some communication theory.

Further: *Rol. Barthes, L'aventure sémiologique*, (The semiological adventure,), Paris, 1985,-- vrl. 85/165 (*L 'ancienne rhétorique*), (The old rhetoric), -- a work dealing with the semiology of *F. de Saussure* (1857/1913; *Cours de linguistique générale* (General linguistics course), (Payot, 1972)), the precursor of Structuralism;

Umberto Eco, La structure absente (Introduction à la sémiotique), (The Absent Structure (Introduction to Semiotics),), Paris, 1972,-- vrl. o.c., 154/166 (*Le message persuasif: la rhétorique*), (The persuasive message: rhetoric), is a work in which the second theory of signs, that of Ch. S. Peirce (1839/1914; the founder of Pragmaticism), is discussed.-- Which shows that today rhetoric can be situated within a theory of signs (either semiological structuralist or semiotic - pragmaticist).

Still: *K. Lehrer/C. Wagner, Rational Consensus in Science and Society (A Philosophical and Mathematical Study*), Dordrecht, 1981;

H.W. Schmitz, ed., Essays on Significa (Papers Presented on the Occasion of the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837/1912)), Amsterdam/ Philadelphia, J. Benjamin, 1990; -

H.W. Schmitz, De Hollandse Significa (The Dutch Significance) (A reconstruction of history from 1892 to 1926), Assen/Maastricht, Van Gorcum, 1990. Which shows that rhetoric is reducible within some theory of understanding.

Sample 1.-- The main elements of the rhetorical act . (07/23)

We say 'act'. This is an act of language. After all, every rhetoric is an applied theory of action or praxeology (Ancient Greek: 'praxis', action, deed).

(1) Someone - the messenger - has 'something', a message (notice, information, announcement), to say.

(2) He/she wants to get this message accepted by someone - the message receiver - by means of means of understanding.

Acting rhetorically involves actively interacting with one's fellow man.

Do we call such a thing, with the Significi, an act of language?

What, now, are the major components - 'stoicheia', elementa, constituents - of such an action? Aristotle saw four. But since the Protosofist Hippies of Elis (-470/-400) five have been in circulation. Thus *J.P. Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs (Etudes de psychologie historique)*, (Myth and thought among the Greeks (Studies in historical psychology), I, Paris, 1970, 106s. (*Mnémotechnie d'Hippias*). Hippias emphasized the role of memorization.

A. ***The text*** (textuological rhetoric), supported on the invention (information retrieval; heuristic rhetoric), the arrangement (text ordering; harmological rhetoric), the design (stylization; stylistic rhetoric).

B. ***The recitation of the text*** (dramaturgical rhetoric), supported by the memorization (mnemonic rhetoric) and the acting of the text (hypocritical rhetoric).

A.-- *The textual rhetoric. (07/14)*

Let's take a borderline case.

A famous advertising poster depicts a bowl of fragrant soup with a fox around it. In itself, without text, this already says something : the message comes across.

But add two pieces of text :

a. the bowl says 'Royco' (a brand), **b.** the fox says: "There is chicken in this". On impact the message comes across much clearer - which is to say, more clearly! Thanks to the text element! In other words: the total linguistic act of that publicity contains both image-sign and text-sign.

Bibl. st.

P. Larousse, Grand dict., 1143;-- *A. Langlois, Le style (La chose et la manière) du XVIIe au XXe siècle*, (Style (The thing and the way) from the 17th to the 20th century), Bruxelles, 1925, 56/ 58;

R. Barthes, L'aventure sémiologique, 4, 121, 123. Two-part textuology.

"Herodotos of Thourioi (Lat.: Thurium) herewith submits from his research ('historiè') the exposition ('apodexis')".

This is how the Historiai of this reporter begin.

Two aspects are mentioned:
a. 'historia', the gathering of information,
b. 'apodexis' the text.

Reference should be made to *G. Daniëls, Religious-historical study on Herodotus, Antwerp/Nijmegen,* 1946, 16, 100, where it is said that 'historia' is "the free investigation of knowledge in everything connected with man" and 'logos' (another term for 'apodexis') "the bound narrative".

Or still: 'historia' is "unformed informational material-" and 'logos' is "formed narrative material" (Pohlenz; Schadenwald), Also to *Claude Calame, Le récit en Grèce Ancienne,* (Storytelling in Ancient Greece), Paris, Klincksieck, 1986, where a translation reads: 'historia' is 'Erkundung' (Erbse); 'apodexis' is 'Darlegung' (idem) (o.c., 202); or still: 'historia' is 'recherches' and 'apodexis' is 'exposé' (o.c., 187).

D. Teuffen, Herodot, Wien/ Munich, 1979, 18, 20, confirms. In no way does 'historia' mean what we understand by 'historie', history. If one calls Herodotos "the father of historiography", then this title only reflects a part of his writings.
"He does not write 'history' only. His 'historia' is broader: it wanted to include everything that could be subjected to an account. In doing so, he spared no effort. --

Indeed: like the founder of Greek philosophy, Thales of Miletos (-624/-545), the founder of Milesian natural philosophy, Herodotos was "a true Ionian, a kind of 'Universalgenius'" (Teuffen, o.c., 20).
As is now the Harvard principle - general education - his premise was: "He was an ethnologist, also a folklorist, -- a naturalist and geographer, a statesman and religious scholar, -- also a writer and storyteller, and yes also a historian." (Teuffen, o.c., 20).

Totally in the spirit of a Thales. Nature' ('fusis', Lat.: natura) both of humanity and of the 'nature' surrounding humanity kept his attention going. Cfr Teuffen, o.c., 24.

Demokritos of Abdera (-460/-370: main figure of Atomistic philosophy) - who "apparently did not suffer from excess of modesty" (*F. Farwerck, The Mysteries of Antiquity and their rites of initiation*, Hilversum, 1960, 34) - writes:

"This says Demokritos.--I have roamed over more territories than any contemporary, with a view to the investigation of remote regions.(...). In a summary account no one has surpassed me. In proof not even the Egyptian arpenodaptai

(***note.:*** name of the Egyptian sages, respectively philosophers), with whom I lived in exile for eighty years". -- It stands out: **(1)** research**, (2)** representation (with evidence).

Three-part textuology.

Over time - especially under Sofist influence - the 'representation' (text) split into two parts.

Géruzez (Larousse) justifies the triplicity on the basis of a philosophy of 'mind': "All mental work comes about through invention (heuresis, inventio), arrangement (taxis, also: diataxis, dispositio) and design (lexis, elocutio)".

The Latins describe:

a. "invenire quid dicas" (find what thou wilt say;-- build up the message),

b.1. "inventa disponere"(arranging what is found in an orderly fashion; -- the sequence or 'plan'),

b.2. "ornare verbis"(to express in stylized style; -- the design of the formulation).

One can distinguish a business part **(a)** and a word part **(b,1/2)**.

A.1.-- *Heuristic rhetoric.*

All business elements - the raw data material, 'data' in computer language - are provided by the invention.

If we are talking about a treatise, then we find here the brutal logical (= 'pisteis', probationes, evidence) and pathetic (= emotional arguments) materials.

"Hot off the presses."

A contemporary example of raw material offers us, for instance, the American *CNN - Cable News Network*, led by Ted Turner -

Bibl. st..-- *J. Maclean, L'actualité en direct*, (Live news), in: *Reader's Digest* (Sélection) (Zurich) 1989: Nov., 45/48;

A.Borgognon, Golfe et médias aux Etats-Unis: *'1'effet CNN' sur le paysage médiatique américain,* (Gulf and media in the US: 'The CNN effect' on the US media landscape), in: *Journal de Genève* 07.03.1991;

id., *Golfe et médias aux Etats-Unis: CNN: Etre là ou se déroule l'évènement*, (To be where the event is taking place), in: *Journal de Genève* 08.03. 1991;

D. Wolton, CNRS, Guerre du Golfe: méfions - nous de l'information - spectacle, (CNRS, Gulf War: let's be wary of the information – show), in: *Reader's Digest* (Sélection) (Zurich) 1991: march, 38/39.

Since June 1980, CNN, from Atlanta as its center, has been trying, preferably 24 hours a day, to make the world aware of everything that makes history, during the course of the events themselves, by means of direct reports. "Reinforcing information" is the motto (= definition).

Since the Gulf War (02.08.1990/ 01.03.1991), more than one body has questioned the very validity of this slogan.

Not that CNN isn't a world success: more than a hundred countries vote for it or, since the Gulf War, it is impossible to imagine the USA - media - without CNN.

a.1. The facts are only very partially reproduced (a.o. for reasons of military censorship). They are updated by comments (among others by 'specialists' in the field). They are repeated ad nauseam.

a.2. Overly quick interpretations accompany the facts.

b.1. The viewing public continues with their daily work and is only indirectly involved.

b.2. The viewers are usually not experts in such a way that their observations of the image- and text-signs degenerate to - what D. Walton, CNRS, calls - 'peeping'. With all the nasty consequences this entails, i.e. distorted information of all kinds.

Above all, the conception of meaning (= the truthful perception of reality) as distinct from the foundation of meaning (= the interpretation from one point of view or another) suffers from too narrow a range of reporting. That the sense of meaning can only be laid down in restrictive judgements is shown by the radical divisions which the intelligentsia (the intellectual vanguard),-- the parties and governments displayed, during the course of the Gulf War.

Many viewers, for example, blamed the Americans for "wild bombing" -- without remembering that each bomb cost "a bomb of money" and thus had to be dropped with extreme economy if the USA government was not to get even deeper into debt.

'Thinking' was too absent in the course of the CNN rush. The Dutch term says it clearly: thinking AFTER the facts!

Conclusion.-- What Herodotos and Demokritos call research, i.e., the collection of the separate elements of information, they distinguish from the text, the bound representation. With reason,-- with great reason.

CNN resembles too much a student who has collected a mass of data on the subject (notes, cuttings, sheets) for a treatise, without arriving at a coherent text.

A.2.-- Harmological rhetoric.

Text formation uses materials (research material), but exceeds this stage thanks to - what the Old Dutch call - 'arrangement'. This is the logically ordered sequence of text parts, the faithful elaboration of what one has to say (message).

"In his assessment of the Erotikos of Lusias, Platon finds the worst thing open to criticism, in the case of a rhetor, the absence of a plan:

"Every statement should be ordered as if it were a living being. It has its own 'body' so that it lacks neither head nor feet, but

(1) a middle and

(2) 'extremes'

(*op.:* beginning and end), which are arranged so as to fit together and with the whole". (*V. Goldschmidt, Les dialogues de Platon (Structure et méthode dialectique*, (Plato's dialogues (Structure and dialectical method), Paris, PUF, 1947, 1).

The citation is from *Platon's Faidros* 264c.

The classical threefold division - beginning, middle (= 'corpus', body (literally)), end - is Paleopythagorean.

Herodotos speaks in just the same sense, but more applied to the order of the story.

Cl. Calame, Le récit en Grèce ancienne, (Narrative in Ancient Greec), Paris 1986, 76, mentions "the preconceived scheme of the narrative" in Herodotos. And, o.c., 73, he notes that sometimes Herodotos explicitly refers to the arrangement, e.g. when he introduces a digression (which is precisely a violation of the correct order) or when he takes up "the thread of the story" again.

Digressions.

The Dutch term "uitweiding" - originally meaning "grazing outside the meadow" - has two meanings;

a. stray from the subject;

b. treat something "in the broad" (at length).

Bibl.st. *-- G. Aalders, Critical study: modern criticism of Platon's Nomoi*, in: *Tijdschr. v. Philos*. 15 (1953): 4, 607/636.

A.c., 609v., says the author: *Nomoi* (Laws) is not a strictly philosophical text;

Consequence: The order of the text parts is looser.

"Platon repeatedly allows himself to be tempted into digressions which have only a rather loose connection with the course of the argument as a whole.(...). In the older Greek literature such a form of 'composition' (*op.:* arrangement) (...) is anything but rare". (Ibid.).

Anecdotal Kunism.

Kunism (Cynicism) is an ancient Greek philosophy originating with Anti-sthenes of Athens (-455/-360), who founded a kind of 'counter-culture'. It lives on today, e.g., in *Peter Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft*, Frankf.a.M., 1983, 960 S. (Nederl.: *T. Davids*, transl., *P. Sl., Kritiek van de cynische rede*, (Critique of Cynical Reason,), Amsterdam, 1984). - The 'anecdote' is a very short piece of text.--

The Antique cynics, in their/their antique culture, want to break the established arrangement, in a "fragmentarism" (chunky text). "Sloterdijk's style is rhapsodic and impressionistic. The long-windedness of the logically developed argument is alien to him". (*G. Groot, Peter Sloterdijk, Cynic*, in: *Streven* 1985: Jan., 334).

We find, at least in part, this dispersed-arranged appetite in many Postmodern works.

The difference with the inductive sampling method lies in the fact that induction still holds either to a collection or to a system (system). The cynic sticks to uncollectable and/or unsystematic fragments.

A.3.-- *Stylistic rhetoric.*

Our minds are gifted with a sense of beauty. Also: the final processing of the information materials-in-text form is called 'shaping', stylization.

Bibl. st..- *H. Suhamy, Les figures de style*, Paris, 1983-2:
P. Barucco, Eléments de stylistique, Paris, 1979.

The first work sets out the stylistic devices - including the tropes (metaphor/ metonymy, synecdoche); the second the current theories.

Definition.

"The style is the way one expresses the thought through the language". (J.Broeckaert). The 'lexis' (Lat.: elocutio) or also 'hermeneia' (Lat.: interpretatio) uses sayings.

Applicative model.-- The 'huperbaton', Lat.: inversio.-- The inversion of the parts of the sentence is a 'figure of speech' (stylization).-- E.g.

(1) the purely logical-pathetic content may read, "A pretty girl is delightful";

(2) the stylized logical-pathetic content sounds e.g. as follows: "Delightful! A beautiful girl" or "A beautiful girl is delicious". Thus the ancient Greeks already discovered numerous stylistic devices.

Definition.

The whole of the parts of the text that have been updated by stylised sayings is called 'style'.

Bibl. st.-- *R. Bruzina, Eidos (Universality in the Image or in the Concept?)*, in: *R. Bruzina / B.Wilshire, Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, The Hague/ Boston, 1978.

The same 'message' (message, logical-pathetic content) can be 'encoded' (converted into text) in more than one way. By way of evidence.

Situation: Negro Africa sees a new religion coming in with the Whites. Reaction: this can be expressed in more than one way. This gives two 'styles'.

(1).-- *Negro-African style*.

The chief priest informs one of his sons that it is necessary to send him to church (we are in Western Africa).

"I desire one of my sons to join these people, to be my eyes there.-- If there is nothing in it, come back. But if there is, bring me home my share. -- The world is like a mask that dances: if thou wilt see that world, do not remain in one and the same place.-- My spirit informs me that those who, today, are not the friend of "the white man" will say tomorrow, "If only we had known!"

(2) *Western style*.

"I send you as my representative other these people,--just so that, if this new religion arises, continues, you will be safe. One should always move with the times. If not, one stays behind. I have the vague suspicion that those who do not come to terms with the Whites today will, in time, bitterly regret their lack of prospects. -

From: *Chi nua Achebe* (Nigerian writer), *English and the African Writer,* in: *Transition* 4 (1965): 18, 18/19), which discusses two styles in English as far as written/spoken by Negro Africans.

"Traduttore traditore". -- "To translate is to betray."

H. De Vos, Einl./ Erl., Ernst Jünger (1895/...), *Lob der Vokale und Sizilianischer Brief an dem Mann im Mond,* (In Praise of Vowels and Sicilian Letter to the Man in the Moon), Brussels, s.d., 19f., gives an application.

Latin version: "Nulla unda tam profunda, Quam vis amoris furibunda".

German translation.-- "Keine Qualle/ So tief und schnelle/ Als der Liebe/ Reissende Welle". Literally translated into Dutch: "No wave is as deep as love that reaches beyond itself.

But neither the German nor the Dutch reproduce the Antique-Latin mysterious atmosphere. Even if they translate the logical-pathetic content as well as possible, the style, the way of saying, is different,--yes, untranslatable.

Stylization of philosophical text.

Returning to *P. Sloterdijk, G. Groot, P. sl., Cynic*, *Streven* 52 (1985): Jan., 322, notes the huge sales success of a juggernaut of 960 (German), 871 (Dutch) pages of philosophy.

Says Groot: "Did the fact that this book, despite its philosophical character, was provided with many, mostly well-chosen illustrations perhaps contribute to its enthusiastic reception?

(1) The surprising and witty illustrations seduce the reader (and potential buyer) into amused browsing and at the same time have an intriguing effect: "What may lie behind this wondrous concatenation of the most diverse, mocking, unmasking and sometimes scabrous (*note:* 'oblique', offensive) pictures and engravings".

(2) This is not to say that the reception of *Sloterdijk's magnum opus* was entirely uncritical. In particular: in Germany opinions differed widely: what was hailed by some as 'the new light in the somewhat withered German philosophical landscape' was condemned by others as 'obscure irrationalism and muddle-headedness'.

In conclusion, the text sign is strengthened by stylization through image signs to a rhetorical power. Here philosophy and rhetoric clearly run into each other and even then well-considered!

B.-- *The dramaturgical rhetoric (14/22)*
The merely readable text is limited to what precedes. But - especially in a culture of oral communication such as that of the ancient Greeks - the recited text requires further elements.

The text is one thing. The recitation and the acting of the text is two. As we saw, reciting is acting, i.e. acting on an audience, even if it consists of only one listener.

Dramaturgy' is the theory of acting.

B.1.-- *The mnemonic rhetoric...*
"Memoriae mandare" (commit to memory; memorize the message).-

Bibl. st..-- Besides the already mentioned Géruzez (Larousse), Langlois, Barthes, among others *J.P.Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs, I*, (Myth and thought among the Greeks), Paris, 1971, 80/123 (*Aspects mythiques de la mémoire et du temps*).

Poets like Homèros (Lat.: Homer (between - 900 and -700)) recited their texts - thousands of verses long - from memory.

The Sophist Hippias of Elis, who attached great importance to memorization, apparently possessed such a phenomenal (exceptional) memory even in his time, already the 'classical era'.

Cfr *J. P. Dumont, Les sophistes*, Paris, 1969, 145s. *Mnèmosunè, the goddess of expanded consciousness*.

Vernant, the historical-psychologist, emphasizes that Hippies' memory is a secularization

(secularization,-- desacralization) is of the message which springs from the goddess Mnèmosunè (Lat.: memoria) and her Muses.

It seems to us that the correct translation is not so much 'memory' as 'expansion of consciousness' (one of the "altered states of consciousness").

Cl. Calame, Le récit en Grèce ancienne, 70s., says that from Homer to Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (-518/-438; lyre poet) the whole of archaic literature is prompted (inspired) by 'Mnèmosunè' the Muse, the Muses, who, thus, regard the lyricist as her interpreter and guarantee his expertise.

Vernant thus explains. The reciter and the seer (mantically gifted) bear witness to the same ability, through which the deity, the very source of knowledge, reveals realities that escape the mind of the average person.

More than that, the wisdom ('sophia') or knowing, imparted by Mnèmosunè, has all-encompassing scope. "The same formula which typifies in *Homer (Iliad 1:70)* the skill of the seer Kalchas, is applied to Mnèmosunè in *Hesiod of Askra* (-800/-600; poet), *Theogonia* 32, 38: she knows and expresses in song "all that was, all that is, all that will be." (O.c., 82).

This all-embracing formula will lead the later philosophers (think of Parmenides of Elea (-450/...)) to ontology (the doctrine of 'being(the)', which is all-embracing).

Introduction: purification, elevation on a higher plane. Enlightened-Rationals easily think in this regard that the inspired-text creator-remains passive. Listen to Vernant, o.c.,84. The 'divine' (i.e. psychic) giftedness does not exclude the absolute necessity of a learning process concerning the gift of the seer, accompanied by rigorous training.

Conclusion.-- The natural basis (insight, exploration) is put first by the deity, but purified and elevated on a higher plane (which is a kind of 'catharsis' (purificatio), purification (to speak with W.B. Kristensen)).

In other words: the supernatural ability thanks to inspiration is purified, elevated nature.

Tradition.-- Vernant further explains. The improvisation (speaking out of turn) of the poet and visionary does not exclude their remaining faithful to a heritage preserved from generation to generation. On the contrary: the very rules of oral presentation require both a firm and a mature voice.

set of subjects and stories and a predetermined, standardized form of utterance (handed-down sayings, already established word-figures (= configurations of terms), established lines of verse).

In other words, with Julia Kristeva we can speak of an Archaic 'intertextuality' (the fact that the later texts repeat the previous ones partially or entirely). So that inspiration and tradition, processed by one person, go together.

Note.-- As is well known, the Bible, Old and New Testament, also posits an analogous structure.

Bibl. st.: *C.A. Keller, Inspiration*, in: *B.Reicke/ L.Rost, Biblical-Historical Dictionary ii,* Utr./Antw., 1969, 402/404. The sacred writers, for example, are considered to have been inspired by God's Spirit,--so much so that the actual text creator is not man but deity.

Note -- The inspiration includes 'mediumness' (mediumism, medial giftedness), i.e., the fact that the earthly man who obtains an expanded consciousness through deity is suitable for it.

Bibl. st. *J.M. Verweyen, Die Probleme des Mediumismus*, (The problems of mediumism,), Stuttgart, 1928 (a thorough work);
Erik Pigani, Channels (Les médiums du Nouvel Age), Paris, 1989 (*The New Age* ('New Age') emphasizes, since the actress Shirley Mac Laine, the fact that New Age, apart from ordinary 'spritist' media, exhibits a new type of medially gifted people, inspired by "cosmic entities").

'Rewriting'. -- *Michel Lafon, Borges ou la réécriture,* Paris, Ed. du Seuil, introduces an interesting concept:'réécrituré.
Lafon takes Jorge Luis Borges (Buenos Aires 1899/ Geneva 1986) as a model. It has long been known that Borges makes copious scholarly or mock citations of texts. Lafon emphasizes the fact that Borges, moreover, exhibits numerous hidden citations either his own or those of others.-- That whole thing Lafon calls "rewriting.

Note.-- Intertextuality (cfr Julia Kristeva (1941/...; psychoanalyst-semiotician)) exhibits yet another form, namely that advanced by Jacques Derrida (1930/2004), the text-meaning-thinker ('grammatologist').

Bibl. st..-- *S.IJsseling, My 'favorite'*: *Jacques Derrida*, in: *Streven* 1987: April, 594/ 606.
Derrida has a predilection for dictionaries, as did M. Heidegger (1899/1976; German existentialist), and he likes to play all sorts of games with them. He is convinced that and

literature and philosophy and even sciences, yes, the whole culture is composed of words, -- which are susceptible to combinatorics, i.e. to linking them (to figures, configurations), and this within a chain of meanings.

Derrida is talking rather about a type of "playing with words" here. Which is a metaphor.-- One such phrase is "citing.

Says IJsseling, a.c., 603: "Writing implies quoting (,...) and it also implies being able to quote. This quoting is always accompanied by a removal from the real and linguistic context, a tearing out of context, and thus also by a change of meaning.

This citability or repeatability is essential for a text as a text. It also explains why Platon and many others after him had such a great reluctance to write and it means that no author can completely control his text (...) neither in its creation nor in its understanding or the effects that are achieved. It always gets out of hand.

To which IJsseling refers to Derrida's Signature, event, context. IJsseling says in this context: "Thus, on the one hand, Derrida must be very honored by the fact that he is mentioned in many publications, but on the other hand it must be a horror to be confronted with concrete quotations. Heidegger, according to his own testimony, suffered greatly from this". (Ibid.).

Conclusion. - **(1)** It is true that we are constantly quoting - "rewriting" (Lafon) -. This can already be seen in primary and secondary schools in those essays which bear witness to readability and memory (children who read a lot find it easier to write because they have language (terms, phrases and sentences, full sentences) which they consciously or even more unconsciously remember).

(2) Whether this recollection of quotation is 'always' 'deconstruction' of what is quoted, we leave for Derrida to decide. What is certain is that when Derrida observes that he is being incorrectly quoted, he himself nevertheless grasps the meaning of what he wrote or said, and that he must therefore also, in principle, put this grasping of meaning before those who quote him.

In my view, not all quoting is betraying, giving meaning. So that we come across two types of interpretation: grasping (grasping the reality) and giving meaning (giving another meaning to what is quoted).

Applicative model.-- *John Marenbon, Early medieval Philosophy (480/1150) (An Introduction)*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, appears to be an elaboration of *Marenbon's From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, in which the proposer dissects the previously scarce texts of that period for

a. the glosse ('glosse' or 'glos' is a piece of text written between the lines or on the side),

b. the manner of citation and rendering,

c. the way in which the anthologies were put together.

Marenbon has thus proven that the Middle Ages led a much stronger thinking life than e.g. the Renaissance or Enlightenment rationalists imagined.

Conclusion.- The citation study thus yields results.

The weight of current readership.

Cl. Calame, Le récit en Grèce ancienne, 69, says what follows.

Every classical philologist (specialist in ancient, especially Greek-Latin culture) knows it: it is possible to write a twenty-page study on a poem by Sappho of Lesbos (-700/-500) or by Theokritos of Syracuse (-315/-250), merely citing the interpretations of previous philologists.

Such a study essentially contains **a.** summaries, **b**. explained with a few improvements which refer to subordinate points. We are faced here with the accumulation phenomenon, peculiar to our culture.

Improvising -- Is reciting a text "at the fist", at the very moment it is being formed, conceived. This implies that one has the main - at least - elements of a message in mind, but recites the final text (sequence of thoughts and stylization) unprepared.

In 1920 *André Breton* and *Philippe Soupault* jointly published *Les champs magnétiques*.

The texts in it are the product of "automatic writing". Put on their way by Freudian psychoanalysis, both authors allowed to emerge in their inner being what is also called "the inner word or voice".

Anyone who listens to what arises in his inner self as words, phrases, can create texts in this way,

As a Freudian, they interpreted these 'inspirations' as the language of the unconscious and subconscious part of the soul (think also of Lacan on this subject).

This technique of the Surrealists is also found in the New Age.

B.2.-- *The hypocritical rhetoric.*

"Agere et pronuntiare" (acting and pronouncing; acting out the message). The Antique Greek term 'hupokrisis' means 'acting'. However, it does mean, very secondarily, also 'feigning' (hypocrisy).

'Hupokritikos' means 'all that has to do with acting'. The Latins, aware of the praxeological character of rhetoric, insofar as dramaturgical, rightly translated 'hupokritikos' by 'actio' acting.

Bibl. st..-- In addition to the sources already mentioned -- Géruzez (Larousse), Langlois, Barthes -- reference should be made to *Charles Bell* (1774/1842; famous nervous physiologist), *Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts* (1806), in which he speaks of the muscular movements that, usually, accompany feelings and urges;

Charles Darwin (1809/1882*), Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals* (1872), in which - our ethologists right - the 'expression' is discussed, among other things in connection - intertextually - with Bell*;*

E.W. Straus, The Sigh (An Introduction to a Theory of Expression), in: *Tijdschr. v. Phil.* , 14(1952): 4, 474/695, which emphatically mentions Bell and Darwin. Bell, after all, is known for an analogical scheme: "Expression is to passion what language is to thought" (Expression stands to passion as does language to thought). The schema expression/passion = language/thought. This schema belongs to the basic performances of acting, of course.

The action includes diction (elocution) and gesticulation (gesture). It is underpinned by

1. the overall appearance of the actor(s) - e.g. one may be dressed in such a way as to alter the acting: look at a Punk -,

2. the material infrastructure - a lawyer, for instance, while pleading will say: "Behold the weapon of crime!"; teachers use the blackboard; tables, computer screen images are enlightening. All this forms one complex, a 'unity' (as the ancient Greeks said).

Woordheater' (Tine Ruysschaert).

In *Uit-Magazine* 5 (1990): 12 (Dec.), 15/16, a reciter explains, "The power of the word."

Tine Ruysschaert stands alone on stage and only utters words. It is neither speech nor theatre, she says. I play the various roles all by myself.

(...). I'm playing Tijl Uilenspiegel. The first part is set in the 16th century. There is torture. Heretics are burned at the stake. Girls are thrown into the water on accusation of 'witchcraft'.

During the interval of the try-out a woman came up to me and said: "This is terrible! -- I've 'seen' so much: I can't stand it (...)". I answered her that she was seeing much more cruel images on television every day.

"Yes" - she replied - "but that passes. Thirty seconds later you have a different image. But the word has a much greater power -- you never lose that".

On TV, you can work with effects - imposed situations in which your own imagination no longer works - but with words, you set the imagination of your listeners to work. They 'see' it all 'happening', even if I am all alone on stage and hardly have any scenery or props.

Of course Tine chooses her texts. Not every text is suitable to be put on stage. They have to contain "recognizable things": from yourself, from life, from history. But above all they have to be "good texts", by great authors who write very well. "In this way I want to make literature accessible. Not by reciting the text statically but by playing the characters. For each role I have a different attitude, a different voice. So it's not about acting in the classical sense. I play them all in one person, with a costume. I bring 'word theatre'. What a mime does with gestures, I do with words".

Long texts are learned by heart -- "That's purely a matter of trained memory. (...). I have read Tijl Uilenspiegel by Charles De Coster (...) three or four times. I indicated the passages I definitely wanted in it. In the end I was left with forty-two typed pages of text. Together with the director, Ronnie Commissaris, I read and reread them, tried out interpretations, tried out poses and movements.

After a while, you read it easily. Then comes the real life. The text begins to take root in your mind. When the time comes, I often go for a walk in the woods or by the sea: then I repeat the text over and over again. I make note of any hiccups. That way, the moment arrives when the text is 'ready'.

Mathematical theatre.

It is known that the Paleopythagoreans (-550/ -300) were musical thinkers: the choreia, dance, instrumental music and song (poetry) in one, was central.

They dissected this into a subject, 'mousike' (Lat.: musica), musical theory. -

By the way: 'mousikè' refers to 'mousa', a muse, i.e. a divine (or psychically gifted) being that grants an expansion of consciousness. -

But the Pythagoreans situated the musical activity in the whole of nature, which they interpreted as a musically perceptible 'cosmos' (graceful arrangement). Hence a second subject, 'astronomia', the theory of the heavenly bodies.

Both -- musical activity and cosmos -- were made intelligible by the Pythagoreans through mathematics,-- better: numberform harmony.

Premise of all beings were **a.** the number, in numbers (the unit and its multitudes), studied in a subject, 'arithmetike', number mathematics; **b.** the spatial form, studied in a subject, 'geometria', space mathematics.

Conclusion.-- The acting that is visible in the choreia was made intelligible by them from mathematics,

Synthesis images.

Bibl. st. -- *Edmond Couchot, Images (De l'optique au numérique*), (Images (From optical to digital),), Hermès, 1988;

Cedos, Recherche en infographie (L'homme de synthèse obéit au doigt et à l'œil), (Research in computer graphics (The synthetic man obeys the finger and the eye),), in: *Journal de Genève* 21.05.1991; --

Th. Meicenat, Interview.-- De l'art sans l'aide de Dieu, vraiment? (Art without God's help, really?), in: *Journal de Genève* 25.05.1991 (interview with Raymond Bellour, film and video biologist,-- known for his L'Entre-Image).

(1) Known is the cartoon. **(2)** Infography knows, however, the simulation via ordinator,

a. *Rotoskopie.*--Presentation: a person in the flesh walks down the street, talks, etc. (acts)--equipped with electronic collection equipment. Rotoskopie uses these materials to create the image of an acting human being on the computer screen.

Appl. model.-- Max Headroom, host of an American television chain.

b. *Synthesis image*.-- The starting point of this 'Computer Animation' is arithmetic ('numerical synthesis'): first there are numbers processed in algorithms; these are projected onto the screen.

It takes, today, about twenty minutes to make a single picture: if one needs twenty-four pictures per second, it takes months of work to make a film of minutes.

The first synthesized image film -that became world famous is the film *Appointment in Montreal (*1987): one sees e.g. Marylin Monroe talking to Humphrey Bogart. Since then, technical progress has been made continuously.

Conclusion.-- The synthesized image actor - his body, his clothes, yes, his underclothes, his gestures and words first arise in the mind of the computer scientist, who 'codes' (translates) them into numerical simulation on the screen.

Note.-- Those who gave special priority to acting were the Anarchists: *H. Arvon, L'anarchisme*, Paris, 104/115 (*La propagande par le fait*), ((Propaganda by deed)), shows it clearly.

Sergei Nashajef, *Der revolutionäre Catechismus*, is well known, in which 'Pandestruktion' (destruction of all) is advocated. Netshef says: "The mere word has value in the eyes of the revolutionary only insofar as it is immediately followed by the 'act': the life of the people must be invaded by a series of hopeless, senseless attacks" (o.c., 105).-- In other words: attacks are an efficient form of acting-with-retorical-value!

Note.-- *H. Arvon, Le gauchisme,* Paris, 1977-2, 97/98 (*Le spectacle*), where 'agitating' celebration is discussed.

One may be familiar with the theory of creativity of Georges Sorel (1847/1922; Proudhonian): following in the footsteps of Nietzsche and Bergson, he proposes that 'pure reasoning' always comes to nothing, whereas 'action' is creative.

The Postmodern 'Performance'.
Bibl. st..-- *H. Bertens/Th. D'haen, Het Postmodernisme in de literatuur,* (Postmodernism in literature), Amsterdam, 1988.-- The celebration of "the energy" (Fiedler, Sontag), together with the cultural revolution of the sixties, typify the Counterculture that gets off the ground in the fifties (with the Beatnik's). -
This is where the 'performance' is situated.

Structure: **a. a** fact (the theme) - e.g. degeneration due to greed - is the content;
　　　　　b. the form in which this content is cast is a 'game', acting, which, while being acted, creates its own rules.

Consequence: a performance is unrepeatable. If one repeats it anyway, one starts with pre-existing rules!
The 'Fragmentary' novel (R. Brautigan), the 'Ludic' novel (A. Robbe-Grillet), Living Theatre, Body' Art (Gilbert, George) are elaborations of this.

The rhetorical 'structure':

We have, now, at our disposal a very old scheme of thought (paradigm, textbook example) which, after what we have seen, proves its, extremely strong vitality ('vitality'): even the most Modern or Postmodern data can be illuminated by it.

Mouth.

Empowerment - being disempowered - has been in since the cultural revolution of the Postmoderns.

The agogists (pedagogues, andragists),-- the agogicists (the theorists of agogic behavior),-- all of them have been talking in recent years -- under the influence of Beatnik's, Hippie's and Yippiels (New Left, New Left, Gauchism), among others -- about empowerment.

To break free from the grip of one's fellow man in so far as this has an alienating effect on one's identity. What used to be called 'scheming' is now called 'manipulation': a number of contemporaries seem to have only one single fear, namely not to be manipulated. Indoctrination' sometimes plays a major role in this: one sees the ghost of indoctrination wandering everywhere.

Well, no better way to counteract cuckolding/ manipulation, resp. indoctrination - and with ourselves (why not investigate our own manipulations first?) as well as with our fellow human beings - than the time-honored rhetoric, which offers us a perfectly workable structure, with five sections.

The 'structure' of educational and parenting behavior.-

A teacher goes to school. Let's dissect rhetorically.

1.1. There is a message (message), namely the lesson content.

1.2. That message has a sequence (the plan of the exposition).

1.3. It is preferably expressed in a stylized language and performance.-- Behold the textuological rhetoric.--

2.1. A well-prepared lesson consists of minimal memorization, spiced up with fluent improvisation (if only because a student suddenly raises a finger and asks an unforeseen question that disturbs the programmed text).

2.2. Teaching is acting: a teacher who never expresses feelings (expression) - stuttering diction, lame gesticulation, faint appearance, lame infrastructure - will certainly have a different effect on the little audience she has in front of her than a teacher who does not have all these dramaturgical elements.

Conclusion.-- The act of teaching and educating is greatly clarified thanks to the basic rhetorical structure we have gone over.

Sample 2.-- The significal approach. (24/27)

The premise (premise) of the Significi can be summarized as follows :

1. If, especially in a multicultural society (a civilisation in which the foundations (assumptions) are radically debated), there is a lack of good understanding, then many, if not all abuses will result from this;

2. Consequence: let us turn the investigation to the phenomenon of 'understanding' and all that is consistent with it or all that is related to it (especially language). This type of research was called 'significa' by Victoria Lady Welby (1837/1912). This view got off the ground around 1850. It is still more 'topical' than ever.

In 1892 Frederik van Eeden (1860/1932; belonging to the 'Tachtigers'; (they peaked around the 1880), -- physician, philosopher, orator, -- poet and prose writer; converted to Catholicism; very gifted in the occult (think of his dreamology or onirology)) - at a lecture on psychotherapy (applied psychology) - to know Lady Welby.

By the way: E. Walther, Hrsg., Charles S. Peirce, Die Festigung der Ueberzeugung und andere Schriften, (Charles S. Peirce, The Consolidation of Conviction and Other Writings), Baden-Baden, 1965, 143 (*Ueber Zeichen,-- aus Briefen an Lady Victoria Welby*), (About characters,-- from letters to Lady Victoria Welby), reports that this lady -- once a lady-in-waiting at the court of Queen Victoria (1819/1901) -- maintained international relations at a high level.

What does the significa dissect? "The significance in all its forms and thus at work in every possible sphere of human interest and purpose". So says Welby.

The Significal Circle.

Frederik van Eeden comes to the Netherlands with Welby's concept. With Gerrit Mannoury (1867/1956), De Haan, Brouwer it comes to a significal thinking society.

Father J. van Ginneken, S.J. prof in literatology Univ Nijmegen is member from 1919 till 1923. Further: Dr Godefroy, Prof Clay, Prof Westendorp Boerma, Prof Fischer and others.

The meetings took the form of Socratic exchanges of views - 'dialogues' (Platon). In the spirit of Welby, they dwelt on communication research,-- linguistics (pragmatic (goal-oriented),-- psycho- linguistic and sociolinguistic).

In other words, all that is understanding.-- In 1926, due to a lack of response, the Circle was disbanded.

This does not mean that the concept, which is a sign of the crisis of understanding in which we find ourselves since +1850, did not resonate.

This is how, around 1935, a broad significal movement started in the Netherlands.

Note -- If we look at the title of *J. Habermas' Theory of Communicative Behavior* (1981), we will see that Habermas develops an analogous theory of rapport - 'consensus' - (set against, among other things, Postmodern 'fragmentarism' (Fr. Lyotard) and 'deconstructionism' (J. Derrida: E.R. 16v.), both signs of misunderstanding and linguistic dispute).

The language act, sociolinguistic.

G. Nuchelmans, Proeven van Analytisch filosoferen, (Trials of Analytical Philosophising), Hilversum/Amsterdam, 1967, 13/29 (Philosophical analysis of language acts), says that the term 'language act' dates mainly from the significi (meaning researchers),--referring to *G.Mannoury, Significa (An Introduction)*, The Hague, 1949.

An act of language is an act of understanding - situated in space (synchronically) and time (diachronically) - through linguistic means.

When, after listening attentively to a lecture, we say: "The speaker said nothing new during the whole lecture", we are expressing our understanding of her 'message' compared to what we already knew before the lecture began. The speaker's act of language is felt to be dramatically "superfluous" (even annoying). She has made a mistake, regarding the information already present in her audience. Mannoury emphasizes the relativity of the linguistic act.

Appl. mod: Think of your neighbor police officer.

(a) As a neighbor, he may have a "friendly" (based on equality and confidentiality) relationship. You may even be "intimate" or "family" with him. (Common form of language).

(b) Yet, one day, he is on duty with his colleague. You are caught by both of them at an offence. Your neighbour looks at you with pity, insinuating that "he can't help it, considering his colleague". He speaks to you in a distant way. As a civil servant (official language form).

The sociological context of his speaking to you (and vice versa) sometimes changes the act of speaking very profoundly. At the same time, it also changes the form of understanding.

The Karamazof brothers.

This last novel by Fyodor Dostoefsky (1821/1881) was meant to be the first part of a trilogy about the multiculture (1679/1860), in which Russia and the West", were touched.

(a) The four Karamazof brothers are grounded on especially their somberly haughty and self-indulgent father. Which brings one dispute after another.

(b) As if this bad family relationship wasn't enough, Dostoyevsky shows us a deeply divided and discordant Russia (and, at once, the West): the old monasteries and startsy (charismatically gifted), the Russian nobility, the women, up to and including the half animal, half devil Smerdjakof and the 'occidental' idolaters make up, together, one big multiculture with its misunderstandings and its diminishing forms, which is becoming ever more 'infernal'.

All this in the background of the ancient Orthodox Church holding up the ideal of an understanding type of Pentecost in the midst of a Babelian language confusion (understand: language dispute series).-- Truly a significal novel.

Language Analysis.

Analytic philosophy especially specialized in - what can be called a deepening of the significa - dissection, in the first place logically, but also pragmatically e.g. of our use of language.

"Sentence (pronunciation) is a step beyond the realm of language as a system of signs, opening up to another world, that of language as a tool for communication. Sentence is the smallest unit of language" (Em. Benveniste (1902/ 1976), 1962).

To which J.R. *Searle* (1932/...), known for his *Speechacts* (1969), responds: the smallest unit of communication is not the sentence, but the cause of the sentence, i.e. the act of speaking, as e.g. in assertion, questioning, promise, command etc..

To speak a language is, according to Searle, to write such acts according to well-defined rules, so-called rules of language use.

Here we refer briefly to the language analyst J.L. *Austin* (1911/1960), known for his *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford, 1962). Austin was one of the first analysts to focus on the action or language act character of at least part of our speech.

For example.—

a. Language in the 'constative' sense, i.e. as a means of establishing (finding) a fact, 'represents' reality (the 'referential' (rendering) aspect).

b. Language in the 'performative' sense (the strict, pragmatically intended act of language) changes reality.-.

Conclusion.-- There are, besides descriptive (descriptive) statements, linguistic acts. Which does not prevent the distinction between the two from being sometimes very unsightly.

Appl. model.

That descriptive and more-than-descriptive statements intermingle is shown by the following example.-- Someone says to you, "I promise to intervene with your pattern."

(1) If he/she is telling the truth, this statement is a representation of reality (descriptive).

(2) But it is immediately clear that

a. he/she is committed to you (which is a change of reality between you and him/her),

b. that he/she is imposing himself/herself on your employer (which changes the reality between him/her and the employer).-

To use Austin's English: the changing of reality, inherent in linguistic acts, is 'illocution'.

Linguistics (linguistics).

Under 'linguistics' are summarized:

a. phonetics, which has two functions, namely phonetics, i.e. the physical and physiological study of the sounds of speech, and phonology, i.e. the study of the sounds of speech as elements within the language system;

b.1. syntax" i.e. the decomposition of the parts of speech and sentences (= sentence structure, word association) in so far as they can be 'joined', i.e. ordered together;

b.2. semantics, i.e. the study of the meanings of words (also called: semasiology), theory of meanings.-

Note -- These terms should not be confused with those which represent the semiotics of formalized language (syntax, semantics, pragmatics), although there is a clear analogy.

Bibl. st.: M. *Baratin / F. Desbordes, L'analyse linguistique dans l'antiquité classique, I (Les théories),* (Linguistic analysis in classical antiquity, I (Theories),), Paris, Klincksieck, 1981, in which the origin of language,-- the classification of the grammar, the description of the parts of speech,-- the sound aspect,-- the sign theory, the meaning and the reference to reality (reference), the analogy, the deviations concerning the use of language,-- the eloquent, professional and philosophical languages are discussed;--

S. J. Smith, Sprache und Denken als sprachphilosophisches Problem von Locke bis Wittgenstein, (Language and thought as a problem in the philosophy of language from Locke to Wittgenstein,), The Hague, 1968;--

O. Ducrot / Tzv. Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage,- (Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Language Sciences), -giving the linguistic stretches, the fields of application, the basic concepts.

Conclusion - The substratum is language; the superstructure is - significally seen - the establishment or re-establishment of understanding between people. Seen in this way, 'language' is an agent of understanding.

Sample 3.-- The communication learning approach. (28/31)

R. Barthes, L'aventure sém., 95, mentions that Aristotle's Rhetoric exhibits an information-learning structure.

1. *Rhetoric 1* treats the messenger/messenger as the source of a message (information),---so e.g., the orator with an argument;

2. *Rhetoric 2* talks about the message receiver/message receiver as the end point of a message: the audience and the doctrine of drift are brought up for discussion here;

3. *Rhetoric 3* deals with the message as carrier of a message; here both the arrangement (E.R. 10) and the design (E.R. 12) are discussed.

As anyone can see, today's theory of communication is an update of an ancient Greek structure.

Bibl. st..- *G. Fauconnier, Algemene communicatietheorie*, (General communication theory,), Utr./Antw., 1981;

Colin Cherry,, On Human Communication (A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism), Cambridge (Mass.) / London, 1966-2 (a foundational work);

R. Scherer, Philosophies de la communication, Paris, Sedes, 1971 (a basic work).

J.R. Pierce, Symbols and Signals (Nature and Operation of Communication), Utr./Antw., 1966 (Pierce draws inspiration from *Claude Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication* (1949));

Ev. Dennis/J. Merrill, Basic Issues in Mass Communication (A Debate), New York, MacMillan, 1984 (pros and cons of thirteen hot topics).

Rhetoric as meta-language.

Semantics teaches us that the realities about which we express ourselves in sentences are the "zero stage" (there is no sign yet),--that those sentences themselves constitute the "first stage" (object language) (there are signs in which reality is spoken of), --that the sentences one utters over the sentences which constitute the "second stage" (meta-language), as "language about language" (signs about signs).

R. Barthes, L'aventure sém., 86, therefore defines rhetoric as the meta-language over the language of speakers.-- This implies that a theory of signs is peculiar to information or communication theory.

Semiotics/ semiology.-

Bibl. st..-- *Ch. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs*, in: *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, Series I, No. 2,* Chicago, 1938 (Morris elaborates on the semiotics of Ch. Peirce (1839/1914; Pragmatist thinker);--

B. Toussaint, Qu'est - ce que la sémiologie? (What is semiology?), Toulouse, 1978 (Toussaint draws his inspiration mainly from Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/1913; linguist at the origin of Structuralism), who designed a semiology (the study of signs within a society).-- This introduces us to the two types of theory of signs.

Semiotics: syntax / semantics / pragmatics.
A teacher says to a pupil: "What do you mean by "a square"?

a. *Syntactic*: the order of the words that make that sentence a meaningful (= information-containing) whole is checked by syntactic semiotics,

b. *Semantic:* the meaning (= information, message, content) that is put into that sentence by the teacher, in the hope that the learner(s) will 'get it' (= sentence summary), is object of semantic semiotics.

c. *Pragmatic:* the tenor (purposefulness) of that phrase, put into it by the speaker who wants to achieve a result, is examined by pragmatic semiotics.

Semiology: the signified (signifier)/the signified (syntagma/ association).
"What do you mean by 'a square'?" -

a. The signifying (the signifier; signifiant, Sa) is the acoustic (audible) sign (the signifying sounds that make up the sentence) (term); the signified (signifié, Se) is because the acoustic sign signifies (concept).

b. The syntagma is the sequence of signs (cf. syntax). The association (later also called 'paradigm') is the one to which either the sound sign (term) reminds us or its content (concept) also reminds us. For example: 'square' refers to 'foursquare' and to 'front and back' (as a term, Sa), -- to 'rectangle', 'circle' (as a concept, Se); 'understands' reminds one of 'standing' (term) and of 'not understanding' and 'understanding' (concept).

It is clear that anyone who makes a speech, for example, must take both theories into account.-- For example, someone who talks about Islam evokes 'associations' (paradigms) in some listeners / readers which may have an unfavorable effect, especially since the Gulf War (02.06.1990 / 01.03.1991) has left unpleasant feelings and memories in some people.

General Theory of Computer Science.-- A.J. Ayer (1910/1989; Language analytic thinker) has emphasized the generality, in the universe, of the information process.

Inorganic nature exchanges matter, energy and information (the hidden prescriptions ('instructions') or 'ideas' (as Platon would say), at work in matter and energy).

Organic nature (plants, animals, humans) elevates this general process to a higher plane: the calf, newly born, is 'informed' such that it 'instinctively' seeks the mother's udder to suckle milk, warm milk.

Human nature - says Ayer - exchanges not only business information, but also wishes, commands, moods, indeed, mistakes.-

To conclude: communication is an omnipresent process, of which we, in rhetoric, analyse the human type. *Cfr. Pierce, Symbols and Signals*, 11 (pointing this out).

Two main types of communicative.

G. Fauconnier, General Theory of Communication, points out how frequent - in recent years - communication theories have become.

a. *Phenomenology*

The descriptive, strongly psychologically oriented method of Edm. Husserl (1859/ 1936; founder, within the Austrian School, of intentional phenomenology or phenomenon description.

Furthermore the Comprehensive method ('Verstehende', Comprehensive method,-- founder: Wilh. Dilthey (1833/1911: methode der Geisteswissenschaften)), which tries to penetrate to its 'soul' (spirit, subject) through the expressive signs a living being shows.

E.g. *M. van Schoor, Bestaanskommunikasie*, (Exist communication), Bloemfontein, 1977. Here, message exchange is a matter of people engaged in intersubjective and social situations: a 'communicator/communicator' communicates something (communication, message) in a 'medium' (code, signs), in which the communication is contained (words, gestures), to a 'receiver/receiver'. Communication' here is expressed in terms of 'encounter' (acquaintance between persons).

b. *Modern information communication techniques*

Electric communication (and its technological analysis) - inspires a widespread theory of communication (which plays a role in Cognitivism, among others).

The focus here is not on living people who get to know each other, but on machines: the 'source' (sender) of a 'message' 'encodes' (converts into characters), according to a 'code', information, which the 'recipient' (receiver) 'decodes' (i.e. understands from the transmitted text language). Communication' is here technically and mechanically expressed in terms of 'encoding/decoding'.

Ethological approach.

Bibl. s..-- A. Haymer, Vocabulaire étnologique (Allemand/ Anglais/ Français), Berlin / Hamburg / Paris, 1977, 191s..

The behavioral biology - ethology - establishes means of communication between man and animal. Communication (including interaction) includes tactile actions - the mother animal looks after her young by touching them, chemical actions - the smells that are released from both bodies, for example during mating, - optical deeds - the eye notices movement and mimicry -, acoustic - the cry of the female is noticed by the hearing of the male.

To conclude: ethology is one aspect of a generalized theory of information: in touch, reception of smells, seeing, hearing, animal and human exchange information on the biological level of life.

Psychodramatic approach.
Jacob L. Moreno (1889/1974) founded group psychotherapy.

Bibl. st..-- J. Moreno, Gruppenpsychotherapie und Psychodrama (Einleitung in die Theorie und die Praxis), (Group Psychotherapy and Psychodrama (Introduction to Theory and Practice),), Stuttgart, 1973-2.-
He distinguishes three psychiatric revolutions:
1. Philippe Pinel (1745/1826; *Traité médico-philosophique sur l' aliénation mentale ou la manie* (A medical-philosophical treatise on insanity or mania), (1801)), insists, instead of merciless insane treatment, "gentle handling" of it. "Pinel frees the insane from their / her chained condition";
2. Sigmund Freud (1856/1939 Psychoanalysis) founded, next to the one-sided medical treatment, the actual psychotherapy, stricto sensu;
3. Moreno, with his sociometry, sociatry (psychiatry through social communication) and psychodrama (playing with problems), replaces - from about 1914 - the one-sided individual psychotherapy.
Moreno: "The therapeutic group is (...) not only a branch of medicine and a form of society, but also the first step into the cosmos." (O.c.,3f.).
He uses the terms 'cosmos' and 'cosmic' to indicate that man, apart from society (sociatry), is also - as is now emphasized by e.g. Holism (in e.g. New Age) - part of the total cosmos (universe). Apparently the (hyper)sensitivity (the clear perception) plays a key role in this.

'Cosmic Communication'.
1. Moreno, of course, like everyone else, assumes the ordinary 'conversational' ('dialogical' he says) form of communication, which employs the logical-pathetic language.

2. "Language - however important it may be in the development of individuals and groups - is always only the essentially logical (...) form of understanding.

So claims Moreno.

a. In the world of the baby and the child, non-linguistic -factors play -a major role.

b. In the so-called groups, a type of communication that transcends language has been designated as the method.

Conclusion: "The language represents only a part of the whole psyché". Thus spoke Moreno. The "cosmic communication" is again a piece of a generalized communication theory.

Appl. model: "Es war wie eine Katharsis;

O.c., 14f..-- As a young doctor, Moreno founded the Stegreiftheater (1921), -- in Vienna. "In order to test the therapeutic possibilities that lie in a well-structured living out of soul conflicts under the direction of a physician." A young actress was at her best in the roles of saints, heroines, gentle romantic figures. A theatre poet married her. One day, the husband complains that his marriage is unbearable: the apparent angel of a woman had turned into a real shrew.

To which Moreno replied: "If we made them play the part of street daisy, for instance". "She played the role with such genuineness that one did not recognize them anymore (O.c., 15). The audience was even fascinated.

The husband then observed that the fits of rage decreased in number and duration. "She often suddenly began to smile when she thought of similar scenes in which she had played a part" (ibid.).

More than once she smiles even before the attack occurs "weil sie genau weisz wie er sich abspielen wird" (because she knows exactly how the tantrum will play out).

It was like a catharsis".

('Catharsis' is

a. in the sacred sense, an occult act that purifies and elevates on a higher plane,

b. in a theatrical sense, the feeling of liberation following an experienced play).

Moreno perseveres: he gives the woman roles to play that were perfectly in line with her marital situation. The husband, as a result, gained a better understanding of his wife's true nature. He immediately became more patient.

Whereupon Moreno proposes them to perform together: the couple improvises dialogues that reflect both of their problems (family, childhood events, wishful thinking, plans).

A few weeks later, marital discord had returned,--yes, the public was living the catharsis.

Sample 4.-- The pragmatic approach. (33/38)

Bibl. st..-- *Fr. Latraverse, La pragmatique (Histoire et critique)*, (Pragmatics (History and criticism),), Bruxelles, Mardaga, 1987 (discussing the goal- and result-oriented aspect of language acts within semiotics and also -- more generally -- logic and applied logic);

H. Stachowiak, hrsg., Pragmatik (Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens), (Pragmatics (Handbook of Pragmatic Thinking)), Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1989. This last work is part III, after the parts I and II (which are historical).

Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, in fine, especially talks about - what he considers in his perspective to be the means par excellence of instilling in people some "purely rhetorical conviction"

The enthusiasm.

Bibl. st.-- *J. Sprute, Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, (The Enthymeme Theory of Aristotelian Rhetoric), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck / Ruprecht, 1982.-- 'Enthumema' means "all that is present in the mind".

Hence: all that is unspoken, yes, on- or subconscious.

Syllogically speaking: a concluding speech of which the person who recites it leaves out at least part (it is implicitly accepted). According to Aristotle, such concise closing speeches are much more popular with a certain audience than long-winded 'reasonings' which come across as superfluous.

Eco's "open work".

Umberto Eco, L' oeuvre ouverte, (The open work), Paris, Seuil, 1965.-- Eco (1932/2016; semiotician) claims that e.g. already the Baroque works (+/- 1560/1660), but especially a number of more recent works of art show an 'openness', i.e. a susceptibility to ambiguity. and this in their very structure. One could transform the title of his book into "*The open structure*".

Appl. models.-- *P. Boulez, Third sonata for piano*: the fourteen parts can be 'combined' at will by the interpreters - just like a set of chips; in this way their 'configuration' is loose.

St. Mallarmé, Livre: the reader(s) can, arrange the chapters at will.

Calder's "movable sculptures": each part is loose and can be pushed together with the others.

So are the novels of James Joyce.

Eco calls this "the richness of a work". A 'richness' that works with a fixed structure obviously do not exhibit. Which does not prevent the latter from being open to many interpretations (perspectivity).

Conclusion: whether it is through an open or closed structure, anyone who destines something

for a fellow human being, will find a way to turn that fellow human being into a giver of meaning. With Eco, apart from making sense (i.e. accurately perceiving what the author means), sense-making ('hineininterpretieren') predominates, of course.

In the case of the loose structure, the reception of the work is central. The pragmatics is immediately more 'reception-oriented' than in the case of the closed structure. This brings us to the reception theory, on which, in essence, every pragmatics should be focused.

Reception theory.-- *G.I. Schweikle, Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 365 (Rezeption), teaches us that 'reception' has two meanings.

1. An older meaning (comparative literatology),: the dissemination and (after) effect of a work.

2. Since +/- 1965: the reception prepared by the reader. It is in this sense that we use the term.

Bibl. st..-- *W. Reese, Literarische Rezeption*, (Literary reception,), Stuttgart, Metzler, 1980 (the antecedents situated before +/- 1965: Marxist theory (F. Mehring, K. Kosik), Structuralist theory (Prager School), Hermeneutic theory (Gadamer) e.d.m.);-.

R. Segers, Het lezen van literatuur (*Een inleiding tot een nieuwe literatuurbenadering*), (Reading literature (An introduction to a new approach to literature),), Baarn, Ambo 1980 (the overall event that includes both the presentation of a work and its processing by the public, --with the emphasis on the reception);

G.Grimm, Rezeptionsgeschichte (Grundlegung einer Theorie), (Reception history (foundation of a theory), Munich, Fink, 1977 (including the problem of the relationship between the author's intention and the reception);

M. Buursink,e.a., De wetenschap van het lezen (The science of reading), *(Ten years theory of reading)*, Assen / Amsterdam, Van Gorcurr 1978.

Opm.-- The Konstanzer Schule.

The professors of the University of Constance, H. T. Jauss and, in his line, W. Iser, introduced the new branch of literatology, which has since unleashed a veritable craze. With a whole set of theories and sometimes hyper-sophisticated notions, let us stick to the rather simple analysis.

Japanese speed reading.

Bibl. st..-- *A. Lacroix, Elle peut lire 200 pages par minute*!, (She can read 200 pages per minute!), in: *Madame Figaro (Spécial Japan), Ed. internat*., No. 163, 05.12.1986, 130/132, 134, 136.

It is known that e.g. Napoleon and Kennedy were speed readers. But what the new Japanese reading acceleration method, based on tradition, shows, surpasses in an amazing way what we, Westerners, know.

1.-- *Yokohama (Tokyo).*

In the classroom, one hears only silence. The pupils - back perfectly straight on the chair, eyes closed - concentrate.-- For each pupil/pupil on an easel a sheet of white paper with a black dot in the middle.- - The pupils are asked to write down their ideas.

"Yooo?" ("Ready?").-- "Hai!" ("Go ahead!").-- The teacher presses the stopwatch: fifty dark gazes (...) suck themselves to the point (...). Without blinking. With staring eyes. (....) In ever complete silence. In the meantime, time goes on (...).

"Rest!" says the teacher : the stopwatch marks one minute.-- The name of this exercise: "Exercise in concentration on one point for students-beginners in speed reading".

The previous speed reading methods come from the USA and France (+/- 1965): they allow to read three to four times faster than the average.

The Japanese method allows you to work sixty to seventy times faster : e.g. four books of two hundred and fifty pages each in eight minutes. Let's see what result that can give.

2.-- *Miki, the fourteen-year-old girl.*

The N.H.K. (Japanese national TV) opens its cameras on Miki. A book of two hundred pages is brought open before her. -- The eyes suddenly stare,-- opened very wide. The pupil expands (...) and starts moving at full speed: from bottom to top, from left to right. Meanwhile, the pages fly by (.) Just one minute: Miki closes the book,-- closes her eyes for a moment. Opens them: "It's a writer's history...".

Conclusion: Niki has a reading capacity of 60,000 to 80,000 letters per minute. This puts her in between the second and first degrees of speed reading (....).

Explanation.-- The major difference between our and the 'Eastern' reading method: the reestablishment, on a present level, of ancestral meditation modes. -

One interpretation says that our mind, thanks to the alpha waves, is all receptive: everything goes in and the memory is like a blotting paper that absorbs and stores everything.

By the way, this is typical of what is now called 'New Age', i.e. the re-establishment of Archaic methods within Modern and Postmodern living conditions.

Immediately we have in mind the basic premise of any 'reception': reading, fast reading in our world of texts.

The 'reception', viewed phenomenologically.

Bibl. st.. Edm. Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Fünf Vorlesungen), (The Idea of Phenomenology (Five Lectures),), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1950;
Alph. de Waelhens, Existence et signification, Louvain / Paris, 1958;
Arn. Metzger, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik (Das Problem des Relativismus und seiner Ueberwindung), (Phenomenology and Metaphysics (The Problem of Relativism and its Overcoming),), Pfullingen, Neske 1966.

The intentional.'phenomenology'
(origin: the Austrian School) can be characterized as follows:
a. There is the given, 'phenomenon' (Antique Greek : 'fainomenon'), i.e. all that is immediately given (evident, apparent);
b. There is the 'subject', someone who notices, 'perceives' ('experiences') the given.
From the 'meeting' (aggregation) of the two - object and subject - arises the consciousness, of the given,-- in Middle Ages language "de intentio", the directing of the attention (awareness) to the given. On that basis of "immediate givenness" ("immediatism") one can design the notion of "representation", description of the phenomenon, or, in short, "phenomenology" (Greek: the "logos", bringing up, of the phenomenon).

Appl. model.-- We revisit Miki, the fourteen-year-old Japanese girl who reads accelerated:
a. the phenomenon (on which her attention is focused) is the text of the book handed to her;
b. the subject is herself, whether or not meditatively reading (i.e. observing what is printed).
The meeting, meditative or not, of text and reading girl is the source of information, the acquisition of truth about something (in this case: the text).
What she says - that will be explicitly discussed later. - can be labelled a 'report'. This is a 'phenomeno.logy', the bringing up of the phenomenon.

Note -- Now re-reading E.R. 09 ("Hot of the needle"): one wonders what value just such a report can have.
1. In a fourteen year old (with the lack of maturity),
2. after such an accelerated 'reading' (with the lack of afterthought).

Poetry as 'phenomenology';
In Miki's case the phenomenologist is the reader. But let us consider the case of the author of the text: can e.g. a poet in a poem
a. a phenomenon
b. render it according to its essence (= 'essence form', 'eidos', i.e. that by which it can be distinguished from the rest of reality), 'describe' it, or (if it concerns an event) 'narrate' it?

Bibl. st.-- *H. Kimmerle, Rainer Maria Rilke and phenomenology (On the cooperation of poetry and philosophy in a paltry time)*, in: *Tijdschr.v.filos*. 49 (1987): 2 (June), 275/ 296.

As an aside: "paltry time" is Heideggerian, i.e. "dürftige Zeit". After - what Heidegger calls with Nietsche - "the death of God", i.e. the fact that Modern and especially Postmodern times no longer take the time-honored Western values seriously (the crisis of established values,-- ideas, ideals and 'values').

R. M. Rilke (1875/1926: Austrian poet) was, e.g. in his poems, sensitive to the evolution of mentality, -- not without nostalgia for a culture with unity around the same values. So that "paltry time" means "culture-in-value-crisis".

Kimmerle typifies 'phenomenology' as giving a description such that
a. of a fact (and its 'being(s)')
b. an 'image' (representation) arises in the mind.

As an example he gives *Der Panther (Im jardin des Plantes,* (The panther, in the garden of plants), Paris) -- "Sein Blick ist vom Vorübergehen der Stäbe - so müd geworden, dass er nichts mehr hält. - Ihm ist es als ob es tausend Stäbe gäbe - und hinter tausend Stäben keine Welt.-- Der weiche Gang geschmeidig starker Schritte, - der sich im allerkleinsten Kreise dreht, - ist wie ein Tanz von Kraft um eine Mitte, - in der betäubt ein großer Wille steht.-- Nur manchmal schiebt der Vorhang der Pupille sich lautlos auf (dann geht ein Bild hinein, - geht durch der Glieder angespannte Stille) - und hört im Herzen auf zu sein.". (*R.M. Rilke, Ausgewählte Werke*, (Selected works), 1, S. 172ff.).

Translated: His gaze has grown so weary of the passing of the bars that it holds nothing. To him it is as if there were a thousand bars and behind a thousand bars no world. - The gentle gait of lithely strong steps turning in the tiniest circle is like a dance of strength around a center, in which stands a great will, stunned.-- Sometimes but silently the curtain of the pupil slides open (then an image enters, passes through the tense silence of the limbs) and ceases to exist in the heart.-- Thus Kimmerle translates.

Kimmerle adds: "Of the panther's appearance almost nothing is mentioned. The pupil is the only part of the body that is mentioned.

And yet we see the panther in its cage clearly before us. And at the same time we see the sadness and resignation of his captivity.

How can - what Rilke wants - better succeed: to show the inner life of things? How could one better describe the essence of the panther in the cage? Surely that is what Husserl (*note:* Edm. Husserl (1859/1938; the founder of intentional phenomenology) always wanted: to give a description by which a picture of the being arises for our mind." So much for Kimmerle on the strictly phenomenal slant.

But he goes further than that: a whole culture is, very briefly, typified in *Der Panther*.-- "However much Rilke is with things with his description, the people are nonetheless involved (*op.*: involved).

Who has captured the panther, put him in his cage and made him an object of contemplation? Man has made the panther no longer what it is in itself.

The sadness of its existence reflects something of the melancholy in all things which have been deprived by man of what they are in themselves,--which have been turned into objects, and which show in their interior this impoverishment and this mutilation of their real being. Things are no longer what they were: gravity and strength and eternity, measure of man's adequate (*note* : adapted) attitude towards the greatness of events.

With things, people are also "die Schwindenden", the wasting away. The control of nature turns into the loss of the essence of things and people, of the world.

The naming of things in the poem is the only way to save them,-- to save what is still salvageable. The 'Weltgehalt' (*op.*: the grip on the world) thus grasped has the mode (*op.*: Heideggerian expression for 'mode of being') of 'Weltverlust' (*op.*: the slipping away from the world).

The being which the phenomenologist was so anxious to see turns out to be an un-being". (A.c., 292/293).

Final sum.
a. Miki gave a phenomeno.logy of the text.
b. Rilke's text gave a phenomeno.logy of a reality.
c. Kimmerle gives a 'phenomeno.logy' (very brief, of course) of Rilkian phenomenology.

Semantic zero stage: the tiger in his cage. Object language: Rilke's text. Meta-language: Kimmerle's text on the object language.

Sample 5: The interpretive approach. (39/46)

We deliberately use the term 'interpretation theory' because we have two 'great' interpretation theories at our disposal, the Peircian theory of interpretation and the Diltheyan Hermeneutik.

Bibl. st.--

1. *Peirce.- W.B. Gallia, Peirce and Pragmatism*, New York, Dover, 1966;

Theresa Calvet de Magalhaes, Signe ou symbole (Introduction à la théorie sémiotique de C.S. Peirce), (Sign or symbol (Introduction to the semiotic theory of C.S. Peirce), Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981;

K.-O, Apel, Hrsg., Charles S. Peirce, Schriften I (Zur Entstehung des Pragmatismus), Frankf.a.M. 1967, Schriften II (Vom Pragmatismus zum Pragmatizismus), ibid., 1970,

Philosophie, Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 10 (1986 printemps), *La métaphysique de Peirce (numéro spécial)*.

2. *Z. H. Diwald, Wilhelm Dilthey (Erkentnistheorie und Philosophie der Geschichte)*, (Wilhelm Dilthey (epistemology and philosophy of history),), Göttingen, Musterschmidt, 1968,

O.Pöggeler, Hrsg., *Hermeneutische Philosophie (Texte von Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ritter, Adel, Habermas,. Ricœur, O. Becker, Bollnow)*, Munich, Nymphenburger Verl., 1972;

P. Ricœur, Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d' hermeneutique), (The conflict of interpretations (Essays in hermeneutics),), Paris, Seuil, 1969.

Appl. model.--

W. Biemel, Zeitigung und Romanstruktur (Philosophische Analysen zur Deutung des modernen Romans), (Timing and Novel Structure (Philosophical analyses for the interpretation of the modern novel),), Freiburg / Munich, Alber, 1985, teaches us one of the most pressing aspects of 'interpretation'.

In Heideggerian spirit Biemel dissects five novels in which "time" is interpreted differently each time.

A. Stifter, Der Nachsommer, (The aftersummer), makes 'time' feel like repetitive sustaining.

G. Flaubert, Madame Bovary denotes 'time' as a future, which one anticipates, but which, as a fate, proves to be meaningless.

Th. Mann, Der Zauberberg, (The Magic Mountain), characterizes 'time' as contrasting with the everyday calculation of time time enchants, but causes the everyday calculation of time to weaken.

W. Faulkner, A Fable, makes 'time' appear as an omnipresent presence that makes it possible to rise above the present moment with a view to a view of history.

M. Vargas-Llosa, La casa verde, (The green house,), sees 'time' as an accumulation of intertwined, simultaneous things, without historical structure.

1. same time.

2. non-similar interpretations. Ambiguity of e.g. time. but of virtually all data.

The worst thing is that more than one proposer thinks he understands the meaning of 'time', where he, concerning time, makes sense. Two types of meaning, interpretation.

Nominalism / Realism.

Note: the 'term' time is the same for the five novels, but the 'concept' it indicates is not the same.

Which Euripides of Salamis (-480/-406; third great playwright, a familiar to Anaxagoras of Klazomenai and to Socrates of Athens), Foin. 499vv, makes it say:

"If 'good' and 'wise' were the same everywhere, there would be no more dispute among men. In fact, however, only the words that people use are common, while their meaning varies from place to place."

1 The nominalist (who sticks to the 'nomen', the term) holds: there are no provable general concepts. There are only general 'names'.

2. The realist, however, is well aware that the 'names' are interpreted very differently, even contradictorily (in this he agrees with the nominalist), but he maintains that there are indeed general concepts, which circulate under different names. But he in his turn establishes that these general notions are then differently interpreted.

3. What led a Platon of Athens to conclude that what constitutes the basis of understanding, unanimity, which cannot be denied to some extent, are 'ideas', i.e. models of the data, which are interpreted both in different terms and in different concepts. This is Platon's theory of ideas.

This triad - Nominalism / Realism / Ideology - is still relevant today. It is the sign that man is a transmitter of meaning, an interpreter. Especially in our post-modern age, which is characterized by multicultural situations, this character of interpretation is striking.

Peirce's theory of interpretation.

Man is, according to *Peirce*, "an interpreter". In his: *The Fixation of Belief, in: Popular Monthly xii* (1877), 1/15, he sets out how, among other things, four distinctive types of interpreting -- occur.-- Given their importance for pragmatic rhetoric -- anyone preparing a text for fellow human beings would do well to take these types into account -- , here is a brief sketch.

1.a. *The idiosyncratic* .

'Tenacity', idiosyncrasy, is the main attraction: the idiosyncratic interprets other people's opinions or objective facts on the basis of one's own prejudices, i.e. individual preconceptions. One "gets nothing in" that does not conform to those singular "hypotheses" (to speak Platonically). In fact, the individualistic one does not even listen! Informs himself one-sidedly.

1.b. The Righteous.

Authority' (what others prescribe) is the premise. Note: in Dutch, 'rechtzinnig' is not the same as 'sincere' (a subjective quality by which one spends what one takes in). Thus the traditionalist: "It has always been so".

Learned - 'orthodox' or right-thinking - people are guided by a presuppositional system, doctrine: what Marx, Mao, -- Hitler, Mussolini etc. taught is 'true! If one wants to get anything into it, one has to start from their collective prejudices. -- Actually, that is a form of willfulness. Only that here the other takes precedence, while the self-willed one just now gives himself precedence.

1.c. The Preferred.

"A priori" is that which is obstinately or righteously put first. The difference is that one remains susceptible to the opinions of one's fellowmen; indeed, the "aprioritical" thinker is found above all in places where free dialogue and discussion are the primary objectives. Endless arguments "in complete freedom of opinion" make one partially forget the matter at hand.

This is especially evident in the endlessly drawn out fundamental research, resulting in the fundamental crisis in which we live. One's own 'preference' (identified with what "reason" or so clearly dictates) is decisive. Not the consensus.

2. The scientifically established

External permanency', independent of any singular investigating subject and thus recurrent - durable - evidence is the norm. Not what happens from the inside. External', external, i.e. situated outside the subject and his unexamined propositions. Here the essence and the existence of the given self is, objectively speaking, the presupposition.

Stubborn, self-serving, pro-choice opinions are at best hypotheses that need to be tested against 'external' data, situated outside those opinions.

The scientifically-minded allow themselves to be convinced only by tough, time and again testable results of research. What Herodotos calls the 'historia', research, is the sole premise of what he calls 'logos', text, that which is said about the matter itself. Or with Husserl "zu den Sachen selbst" is the motto.

Hermeneutics.

Peirce's theory of interpretation, as we have made it feel for a moment, is only a part of a general theory of interpretation.

See also E.R. 29 (general information theory, supplemented by E.R. 31, 32). Peirce sees the whole of reality as one immeasurable network of information transmissions to which interpretations react.

When a plant experiences light, it reacts... with its type of interpretation: the sunflower turns its 'face' towards the sunlight.-

Bibl. st..-- H. Arvon, La philosphie allemande, Paris, 1970, 116/118.--

1. *Hermeneutics as an auxiliary science.*

Traditionally and still today, hermeneutics is an auxiliary science of law and theology: ancient texts - legal texts, biblical texts - originating from a past - a bygone culture - have to be reinterpreted, i.e. interpreted in a new way, if they are applicable later.

How should we, for example, interpret the Gospel texts within our Postmodern multiculture? Is the Bible, for example, still the only book that is sworn to, or are e.g. the Indian Veda texts for us, without denying the Bible, also - even evangelically seen - valuable?

In other words, should we interpret the Bible exclusively (exclusivism) or inclusively (inclusivism)?

2. *Hermeneutics as a general method.*

Since Dan. *Schleiermacher* (1768/1834; *Dialektik* (1839)) 'hermeneutics' becomes the name for a whole philosophy: the epistemology becomes the theory of interpretation. He emphasizes the fact that the 'Verstehen' (understanding) - the interpretation - of a text or even of a pre-textual data (the semantic zero stage) is only complete when the message (content, information) is incorporated ('integrated') into the whole life of the interpreter(s).

In other words: a fact - including a text - is situated in the philosophy of life as conceived by (German) Romanticism.

Cfr. *Vitt. Santoli, Philologie und Kritik (Forschungen und Aufsätze)*, (Philology and Criticism (Research and Essays),), Bern/ Munich, 1971, 83/101 (*Philologie, Geschichte und Philosophie im Denken Friedrich Schlegels*), (Philology, History and Philosophy in the Thought of Friedrich Schlege).

Since then, this broadened interpretation was taken over, with the necessary reinterpretations, by the Historical School, whose founder is F.K. von Savigny (1779/1861; "by mass knowledge of details 'understanding' the text and what this text is about") and by *Wilhelm Dilthey* (1833/1911; *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the Humanities), (1883). It lives on intensely to this day.

Note. - Although Peirce's theory of interpretation is broader (it is cosmic), it should be noted that Peirce himself is strongly dependent on Jos. Schelling (1775/1854), the pre-eminent Romantic thinker, who influenced this whole approach.

Rhetoric / hermeneutics.
Bibl. st..-- Kl. E. Welker, Die grundsätzliche Beurteilung der Religionsgeschichte durch Schleiermacher, (Schleiermacher's fundamental assessment of the history of religion,), Leiden/ Köln, 1965, 23/32 (Hermeneutik).

Schleiermacher defines rhetoric as "the skill of correctly reciting one's own thought contents"(o.c. 26); hermeneutics, however, is "the understanding of a thought content"(o.c., 17), "the skill which consists in correctly understanding what another says"(ibid.),--not without the help of grammar, dialectics, art theory, humanities (o.c.,25).

Clarity as applied logic.
Bibl. st. : *I.M. Bochenski, Philosophical methods in modern science*, Utr./Antw., 1961, 93/95 (*Two basic forms of the conclusion*).

Following in the footsteps of W. St. Jevons (1835/1862) and J. Lukasiewicz (1878/1956), Bochenski argues that all arguments are reducible to two logical ground types.
1. Deductive : if A, then B (= hypothesis as axiom); well, A; therefore B.
2. Reductive: if A, then B (= hypothesis); well B; therefore A.

Take a look at the reasoning types - interpretation types that Peirce describes.
1. The self-willed, the self-righteous, and even the preferred ones reason deductively, but their axioms are either individually (self-willed) or collectively (self-righteous) or individually and/or collectively debatable.

2. The scientifically minded reasoner (interprets) either deductively (but in such a way that he knows that his propositions are merely axioms) or reductively.

The latter Peirce explains as follows. A fact, which causes astonishment, is established. E.g. "This child has been learning badly for some time". Well, if it is postulated that it has been watching too much television for some time, then this fact becomes 'understandable' (makes logical sense). Thus, there is serious reason to conjecture -- nothing more, as long as no testing by inductive sampling has been done -- that the hypothesis of "watching too much TV" contains truth (provides information).-- Those who reason in this way are reasoning reductively.

Note.-- One can, of course, also study the modes of reasoning and interpretation e.g. sociologically. Thus *Uli Windisch, Le raisonnement et le parler quotidien* (Reasoning and everyday speech), (1986). The author uses sociological research to establish how differently ordinary people in our Western democracies interpret things. E.g. when it comes to migrants.

Note -- The "Erklären"/"Verstehen" debate.

In 1858 *Johan Gustav Droysen* (1808/1884; known for his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (History of Hellenism), (1877/1870) started the still ongoing dispute among specialists about natural scientific explanation (in short: 'Erklären' in German) and spiritual scientific interpretation (which is also a type of explanation, i.e. making comprehensible) (in short: 'Verstehen'). This is done through his *Grundrisz der Historik* (Basic historical principles), (a manuscript).

With Droysen and Dilthey the emancipation of the humanities begins (in which they are joined by Neo-Kantians such as Windelband and Rickert and by the English historian-thought leader R.G. Collingwood).

a. *Explaining science*

(make understandable) is then called 'causal' (causal) explanation. Linguistically this is expressed in sentences introduced by the conjunction 'because': "Because this water reaches 100° C., it boils! "Because the punk smokes hashish, he goes into delirium". Etc.

b. *Explaining the humanities*

'Verstehen' (understanding method) is then called explaining by means of interpretations of a human nature. This can be represented linguistically either by "because" (when it concerns unconscious or subconscious causes) or especially by "because".

Like this: "Because the girl was radiantly in love, she braved rain and wind. When she saw the clouds coming up, she said: 'What do the clouds care, as long as I see him?

"Because he suffered, in his childhood, a trauma (unprocessed soul trauma) - his mother was a strict puritan, he now reacts so negatively to all that is sex" (says the psychoanalyst).

For further information: *G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding*, London, Ithaca, 1971;

J. Manninen / R. Tuomela, ed., Essays on Explanation and Understanding, Dordrecht, 1975;

K.-O. Apel, Die 'Erklären/Verstehen' - Kontroverse in transzendental-pragmatischer Sicht, (The 'explaining/understanding' controversy in a transcendental-pragmatic perspective), Frankf.a.M., Suhrkamp, 1979.--

It should be noted that von Wright and Apel emphasize the consensus between proponents of Erklären and Verstehen. Which in turn makes the Significi right.

Applicative model.-- The natural scientific explanation by causal induction (also called "Baconian induction": if cause, then effect; well, effect; so cause) and the humanities understanding by motive induction (also called "humanities induction": if motive and/or motive, then action; well, action; so motive and/or motive) are both real explanations (they make sense), but they are to some extent mutually exclusive. They are types of statement.

Bibl. st.. -- Ch. Lahr, Logique, Paris, 1933-27, 606.--
By 'type' we mean a collection of (life) forms that invariably exist together, although from one or more points of view they exclude each other.

Bibl. st..-- Ph.Kohnstamm, Personality in the Making, Haarlem, 1929, 11/21 (*'Understanding' as a scientific method*).-- "When I enter a modern dance hall, (...) I am faced with a problem, I am looking for an explanation. I do not understand why (***note:*** better would be "why") most young people in the prime of life (...) move to and fro in such a sinister manner for so long to the tones of lugubrious music, with the clearest signs of boredom on their faces.
The most obvious 'explanation' that these movements come about
a. under the duress of some tyrannical power,
b. For the sake of bread or
c. for fear of serious unpleasantness, proves untenable upon inquiry.
These movements are not carried out under 'force majeure' but entirely voluntarily". (O.c., 13). So much for Kohnstamm's problems in the twenties of our century (the rise of Jazz and Foxtrot).

A. -- *Natural Science Statement.*
Let us now return to E.R. 21 (Mathematical theatre). The rotos-copy and the synthesis images (computer animation) put forward a scientific explanation: the Jazz and the Foxtrot can now be simulated numerically. This offers one and only one true explanation.

B. -- *Humanities Statement.*
"What I really do, (...) is to go and talk to these young people to find out why/why their behavior has this - for me strange - stamp. I try to come into inner contact with them (E.R. 36: encounter), to experience their lives with them". (O.c., 13).

Notes.-- Kohnstamm set us on our way.--

A.-- *The expression of the inner self as an intermediary between experience and understanding*.

Bibl. s.-- H. Diwald, W. Dilthey, *Erkenntnistheorie und Philosopphie der Geschichte,* (Epistemology and Philosophy of History), 153/170 (*Der Ausdruck als Mittelglied zwischen Erlebnis und Verständnis*). (The expression as a middle link between experience and understanding)).

Dilthey like all human scientists describe behavior, externally observable behavior. However, in contrast to behaviorists and reflexologists (Pavlov), they try to penetrate to the inner self ('spirit', 'soul', 'subject'). By means of signs i.e. the expressions to the outside world of the inner lives.

Hence the threefold: experience (of our fellow man) - expression of it - understanding (by us), i.e. interpretation. - This is the basic structure of Hermeneutics.

Note -- Kohnstamm's first impression is that "these young people are acting under the 'compulsion' of a tyrannical power". If it is known that musical groups explicitly summon spirits (up to Satan) or employ paranormal means to create music and/or 'capture' audiences, then the term 'entirely voluntary' is certainly, by restrictive judgment, to be tempered as 'entirely voluntary' they are not. Don't they remind you of possessed people? Science in the true sense does not exclude any hypothesis, even if it is impossible or difficult to test. From this point of view, the New Age people are more advanced. Cfr. 16 (inspiration).

Or one remembers E.RF. 18 (Surrealistic improvisation): the unconscious and subconscious soul life can also be put forward as a hypothesis. The dance then becomes an "automatic movement/movement". Again involuntary (at least in part).

This too is hermeneutic induction, which attempts to penetrate the world of motives (non-conscious) and motives (conscious) by means of sampling through compassion.

B.-- *The axiom of equality of essence.*

According to Kohnstamm, the natural scientist, for instance, does not consider the process of boiling water as 'essentially similar' to the water he regards at a distance, taking natural laws as his starting point.

The spiritual scientist, on the other hand, knows that he can experience something analogous in his inner being to what he can perceive, through expressions, of the inner life of his fellow men. He does know that people can differ greatly psychologically, socially, culturally,-- biologically.

Yet it is an axiom, with limitations, that there is similarity.

Sample 6.-- The abc - theory of personality (Ellis / Sagarin). (47/49)

We will now briefly discuss one type of - incidentally limited - theory of interpretation, namely the 'ABC theory'--.

Bibl. s.-- A. Ellis/E. Sagarin, Nymphomania (A study of the hypersexual woman), Amsterdam, 1965, 137vv. This book gives both the rule (theory) and the application (nymphomania).

As an aside, the nymphomaniac is a woman who is driven from one man to another.

Kent traits: **a.** radical lack of self-control ("If the urge arises, I must satisfy it quickly"),

b. insatiability ("Constantly I must go to bed"),

c. compulsivity ("Even if I wanted to, I can't master it"),

d. self-loathing ("I'm a slut").-

Behold the fact -- the demand: an explanation, natural or spiritual, of the phenomenon.

The structure of ABC-theory.-- The basic scheme.

A is a fact to be processed, e.g. a good news, a disappointment.

B is the set of presuppositions - idiosyncratic, straightforward, or also preferential and scientific (to classify with Peirce (E.R. 40)) - that, inevitably, governs reaction, in whole or in part.

C is the interpretation.

The diagram is an incentive (A) / response (BC) diagram.

The authors -- psychologists/psychiatrists -- distinguish two main types based on ambiguity: the same A (fact) can elicit a plurality of BC (presuppositions/reactions).-- They clarify.

I.-- *Common sense.*

The term is used by Ellis and Sagarin themselves as "common sense" (not to be confused with "common sense").

I have, at point A, experienced something that I will never forget,--an unfortunate event. But, at point B, I say, "I can handle the severe sexual disappointment (e.g., "I can't achieve orgasm"). I will always regret A, but I can bear it. Consequence: at point C I live through tempered feelings of disappointment, regret, annoyance. Nothing more.

II.-- *The neurosis.*

(A) I have experienced something that I cannot possibly forget. (B) I can never get over something like that. It's so awful. Something like that makes a person a worthless person. (C) I suffer from intense, unbearable moods ('emotions') - worry, dejection

(depression),- anger, hostility,- smartass (melodrama) prey. - The author literally say, "At point B, the neurotic is deluding himself."

It is not the failure/misjudgment (A) alone (a necessary but not sufficient condition), but the ill-considered presuppositions (concerning the failure/misjudgment) (B) which give rise to the neurosis in the form of nymphomania (C).

A list of prepositions.
Ellis/ Sagarin, o.c., 191v., mention a number of erroneous presuppositions, which they call "irrational ideas" (using the term "ideas" in the typically Modern sense of "conceptions" and not in the Platonic sense of "patterns of actual phenomena").-- For example:

1. One should, in all possible respects, be competent, adapted and above all successful in order to be able to refer to oneself as a "valuable human being".

2. It is horrible and disastrous when things do not go as one would like.

3. Problems and disorders of fellow human beings completely confuse you. That cannot be avoided.

4. As soon as something comes across as dangerous, either in appearance or in reality, then one should be "terribly worried" about it and constantly think "It may end badly":

5. There is always just one good, right and perfect solution to human problems. It is disastrous when this one perfect, ideal solution is not found.

6. It is easier to avoid certain life problems than to face them courageously.

7. Man's happiness depends on elements outside him/her: he/she himself/herself has little or no power over what gives rise to worries and concerns, obstacles and disappointments.

8. A person's past is, in a decisive way, decisive for his/her personal behaviour: if something happened in that past that made a deep impression, it will invariably have the same influence.

9. It is essential for an adult human being to enjoy the esteem, indeed the affection, of practically every person of any significance in the environment.

10. One must always depend on someone. One needs a strong personality one can rely on.

11. Some people are bad,-- cunning, mean. They should be punished severely for their wickedness.

Conclusion.--"Sentences! Phrases!!! Phrases that emerge from the deeper soul -- the unconscious or subconscious (Freud).

The ABC - theory logical.

"If A and B, then C", is the hypothesis. -- In the praxis (= reductive reasoning) of research, this can be formulated as follows: "If A and B, then C. So (to make C understandable) A and B". Which can then be tested by inductive sampling in the structure 'ABC'.

Other applicative model.

Bibl. s.-- *Léa Marcou, Le goût (Une affaire d'apprentissage)*, (Taste (A matter of learning) in: *Que choisir/Santé* (Paris) 1991: janv., 18/21.

I have always been a fan of sweetbreads, kidneys and brains. All that is inside the body and directly evokes the animal". Says Monique, a young woman. The disgust is evident in her use of language. On the other hand she states that she is now fond of "fruits de mer" (small sea creatures): something she didn't want to know about in her childhood.

Nicole has an unquenchable aversion to tripe. This, since the time when, a few hours after having eaten them, she fell ill.

Sociologists, psychologists show that our taste preferences and our rejection in this regard are influenced by our family, indeed our whole culture,--by our personality. (A.c.18).--

Note -- We cite this text to show that the term 'B' (the prepositions) either relates to events - think of Nicole's bad experience - or is acquired as a result of education - think of Monique's change of taste - or, as it were, emerges from the deeper soul - think of Monique's disgust of all that is "the animal".

Decision.-- To decide from C (the established fact: here "the taste") - via research - to A (Nicole's bad experience) and/or B (Monique's disgust, Monique's education) is a delicate work.

The term "B" as "mentality.

One is familiar with the term 'history of ideas' (better: history of ideas).

In 1960 the Middle Ages connoisseur Georges Duby brings the term (history of mentalities) into circulation (*Histoire des mentalités*, in: *Ch. Samaran, éd., L' histoire et ses méthodes,* Paris, Pléiade, 1960, 937/966).

One can, indeed, call the presuppositions in the mind (B) the 'mentality'. It then becomes: A (given: pre-textual (semantic zero stage), text (object language), theory (meta-language)) is signified (C) via the mentality (B).

The diagram may seem a bit wooden, but it clearly specifies the theory of interpretation (Peirce) and/or Hermeneutics (Schleiermacher, Dilthey).

Sample 7.-- Suggestion theory.

Bibl. st.-- *P.-C. Jagot, L'education de la parole (Comment convaincre, séduire et captiver par une élocution claire at assurée*), (The education of speech (How to convince, seduce and captivate by a clear and confident elocution)), St. Jean de Braye, 1975;

Bertold Stokvis, Psychologie der suggestie en autosuggestie (A significh-psychologische exposition for psychologists and doctors), Lochem, De Tijdstroom, 1947;

Mia Kloek-Piee, Het woord geneest (Suggestie en autosuggestie), (The Word Heals (Suggestion and Autosuggestion)), Lochem, De Tijdstroom, s.d.. This brings us into a new field of communication theory.

Two observations.

"Eloquence did not mean exactly the same thing to the ancient peoples as it does to us. They did not think of it merely as a word art, an artistic skill.

The main thing was the authority of the spoken word, its wisdom and power, its success.

The "eloquent" word of the popular leader made the impression on the listeners of absolute validity; it had authority because one felt that it revealed a law of life. It was as irresistible and valid as the law of life itself. It was not a "fine sound" that existed for only a moment: once uttered, it endured.

It created a new condition,--converted itself into reality. Eloquence' was, therefore, nothing less than a creative force and a life energy. Its essence was the mystery of creation and life' (*W.B. Kristensen, Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der Antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, 129).

In other words: the 'eloquent' word was charged with 'power' (Ancient Greek: 'dunamis', Lat.: virtus), the supernatural energy that constitutes the infrastructure of mythical thinking.

Let us now turn to the Biblical sphere: "The foundation of the Old Testament's statements about "the word" is faith in its creative power.

The utterance of a word always has an effect; it brings to life that which is meant (...). As in the Old Testament, the word - centered in and around Christ - often works independently (...)". (*C.A. Kaller, Word*, in: *B. Reicke/L. Rost, Biblical - historical dictionary, VI,* Utr./Antw., 170, 88, 90).

In other words, the word of God is the pagan word but elevated on a supernatural level (catharsis).

The doctrine of suggestion.

Founder of the doctrine of suggestion is the French physician A.A. Liébault (1823/1904; following in the footsteps of James Braid (1795/1860), the investigator of hypnotism). Emile Coué (1857/1926; French pharmacist), a pupil of Liébeault, who was able to bring the masses to insight by his method, was at first ridiculed by "established science". Only slowly did the medical world, for example, begin to realise the value of the Coué method.

Suggestion/car suggestion.

Suggestion is a process of communication, i.e. what the Ancient Greeks called 'kinesis', (Lat.: motus).-- Its course may be outlined as follows.

a. A suggestor/ suggestrix, source/broadcaster of information, changes

b. a 'suggestion' (content, message) from c. with a suggested.

Two applications.
Autosuggestion.

a. The autosuggestor / autosuggestrix changes - loopwise ('reflexively')

b. a content of

c. with the auto-suggested, i.e. self.

2.-- The mass suggestion.

O.c., 216/226, Stokvis provides an insight: mass suggestion is the same process, but with the following features

a. homogeneous tendency of a multitude of individuals,

b. by their being together as a decisive factor.

Further description.

O.c., 31, Stokvis says that suggestion stands or falls with "psychic resonance". This is the highly dispersed possibility of influence between people insofar as they go through a common experience.

Which refers us to Kohnstamm's equality axiom (regarding 'Verstehen') (E.R. 46).

But o.c., 33 ff, Stokvis explains.

1. The suggestor/suggestrix must be able to instil faith and trust in

    a. the possibility (the hypothesis) and

    b. the elaboration (an act with result,-- pragmatic aspect) of something like 'suggestion'.

2. Only then does the suggested respond to thoughts, feelings, wills of the suggestor/ suggestrix.

Consequence: the suggested feels the content coming from him/herself. Which then is the element of 'autosuggestion' present in all suggestion (hetero-suggestion then).

Conclusion.-- From the source's point of view: the suggestor begins by acting hetero-suggestively. From the suggested, however, it begins as hetero-suggestion but ends as autosuggestion: as in telepathy, the understanding is such that what is "foreign" is lived through as "its own possession.

Which refers us to the "cosmic communication". (L. Moreno; E RH 31).

The logic diagram

Do we fit the suggestion process into what precedes, it looks like this.

A is the suggestor/ suggestrix with what he/she is suggesting.

B is the 'attitude' (suggestibility, i.e. susceptibility to suggestive processes).

C is the fact of the suggestion. So that we have again a form of interpretation, determined among other things by the axioms of the suggested.

The process, logically: if A and B, then C,-- It seems simplistic, but we just think in (good or bad) schemata.

The classical physician as paradigm.

According to Stokvis, the established physician is a textbook example.

Prescribing a drug, recommending a diet, treating the patient with equipment, prescribing medicinal baths for example, or imposing a magnesium cure: "in all (these forms of treatment) this factor - Stokvis means suggestion - plays a major role". (O.c., 33).

Moreover: "Even in the thorough examination to which the patient is subjected at the beginning of treatment, a strong suggestive moment is hidden. The suggestive element can never be excluded from any form of psychotherapy". (o.c., 34).

Note.-- In classical-rhetorical terms: there is a logical -pathetic effect from the one who suggests. In the terms of Ellis and Sagarin: the influence is "rational - emotive".

Deepening

But thoughts and feelings and willingness to participate are only one aspect. - Stokvis explains this by means of one type of suggestion, namely the suggestion by means of a material object.

But mind you: suggestion also can be done without any material object (think of the gaze (fascination), of the laying on of hands (magnetism)).

Let us listen: "In the form of a prescription, the patient is given something that comes from the doctor and is materialized in the form of a medicine: -- thus literally Stokvis. And further: "Thus the patient swallows something of the pure chemical constituents of the medicine. But at the same time, psychologically speaking, he/she takes in something that embodies the personal knowledge and mental powers of the physician.

In this way he/she introjects something from the doctor, something from his/her suggester/suggestrix". (Ibid.).

The purely psychological concept of 'introjection'.

The reception by the patient(s) - the intended result (pragmatics) - is described by the term introjection.

"This introjection mechanism is only possible:

1. if the (patient) identifies with the doctor, 'identifies'. And this introjection and identification mechanism can only take place then,

2. if the bond exists by sympathy". (o.c., 34v.).--

In other words: identification and 'sympathy' are the premises of introjection, a kind of 'infusion', i.e. the taking into one's own 'bosom' and processing another's suggestion.

Note -- The explanation of introjection.

a. Stokvis falls back on psychology, and in particular depth psychology (o.c., 112v.): the necessary and sufficient value-attractions - sympathy, - respect, awe, - yes, 'libido' - towards the treating physician bubble up somewhere from the Eros, i.e. sexuality in so far as it is - at least according to Freud and others - the source of life's lust.

b. But other explanations are conceivable. Think of the haimorhoïssa, the blossoming woman, in the Gospel of Luke, who 'touches' the skirt of Jesus (the garment Jesus is wearing is a material object), with the result that Jesus, sensing this, turns around and asks who touched him,--'for a dunamis, life force, went out of him and he sensed it'. The garment contains something of Jesus.

Ethnomedicine.

Stokvis jumps - like more than one (in-depth) psychologist - to ethnology (cultural anthropology) -- "If the patient takes the medicine, then the same process takes place - besides the biochemical resp. the biological effect of the medicine - as with that Bedouin who once ... . swallowed the paper on which the prescription of a European physician was written (during the German occupation in World War I (191.4/1918)) and got better as a result". (Ibid.).

With New Age (the New Age) we are experiencing an invasion of ethnogenesis. At the time of Stokvis this was very new, of course.

Deepening.

Stokvis: "With this the Bedouin merely repeated what the sorcerer who conjured up the demons had taught him.

This magical attitude, which is still present in some peoples of nature, is a very important factor in the development of the human race,

occurs in the most uncamouflaged form, is to be found - in considerable rudiments (Note: undeveloped forms) - in the culture man.-- One speaks of a psychodynamic action, in addition to the pharmaco-dynamic action of the drug". (o.c., ibid.).

In other words: as e.g. the ethnopsychologist (or primitivologist) *G.Welter, Les croyances primitives et leurs survivances (Précis de paleopsychologie),* (Primitive beliefs and their survival (Précis of paleopsychology), Paris, CAC, 1960, says: if one wants to understand a lot in Modern (and Postmodern) Man, it is well to put first the testimony of the 'savage', the 'nature-man', -- better: the 'primitive' (or the archaic man). Especially if one takes into account a number of subconscious and unconscious elements in present-day mankind.

And Dr. Stokvis, private lecturer and head of the Experimental-Psychological Laboratory of the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Leiden, adding: "This purely magical, respectively psychological effect of the drug can, however, sometimes even be attributed the lion's share" (ibid.).

Note.-- One watched: the Bedouin, who ritually eats the prescription when he visits the marabou, eats a text, the magic word, from the doctor. Speaking of "the power of the word"!

Note.-- The term 'fetishism' may be mentioned in this context.

1. -- In the ordinary psychological sense:
The patient experiences something of the doctor in the medicine or in the prescription for it and ... 'honors' it. Just as a lover 'worships' a gift from his beloved ... because there is something of the beloved in it.

Reference should be made here to Theodule Ribot (1839/1916; French experimental psychologist), *La psychologie des sentiments*, Paris, 1917-10, 171/182 (*Les sentiments et l'association des idées*), where he speaks of 'adjacency', i. e. the basis of a metonymic perception: the fiancée is not a metaphorical model (based on resemblance) but a metonymic (based on cohesion) model. Her clothes, her furniture, her house exude something of her,--at least in the eyes of the person in love.

2. -- In the religious history sense:
The 'fetish' (especially in West Africa) contains 'life force; -- is 'power bearing'. As such, the charged object can radiate health-giving life force and can e.g. be worn as an 'amulet' (evil-repelling, salvific) object.

Note.-- Mia Kloek-Pirée, *The Word Heals*, 22, observes that there is a thorough distinction between the phrase of the Stoics (= Stoics, Stoics (founder: Zenon of Kition (= Lat.: Citium) (-336/- 264), in Latin: "Non dolet" (It does not hurt), on the one hand, and e.g. the Coué method, on the other.

The Stoa did not "deny" without a tinge of pride that "does not want to be known". A Coué, on the other hand, acknowledges the pain, i.e. departs from the fact, which he does not want to deny in his brutal reality, but he elevates it on a higher plane by saying - in French "ca passe" (It does pass).

In other words : Coué does not indulge in dramatization (as the neurotic / neurotic does (E.R. 47v.)). Nor does Coué consciously suppress (as the Stoic does). No: he (1) puts forward the brutal fact, (2) elevates it on a higher plane (by positive thinking,-- suggestive thinking then) in order to overcome it there. - Which is "catharsis" (purificatio) (E.R. 15).

The signifying structure of suggestion.
Lady Welby stressed it: rapport is the problem par excellence. In which she may be exaggerating, but still conveys a basic axiom.

That every suggestion - including autosuggestion - involves somewhere good understanding, either between persons or between functions (powers, roles), may be seen from H. Gris / W. Dick, *Les nouveaux sorciers du Kremlin*, Paris, 1979, 107/116.

There is talk of father and son: Krivorotof (Krivorotov) known for their "healing hands" (which terminologically speaking is strictly speaking "magnetism"). These two Georgians (Tbilisi) heal in this way a limited number of ailments.

What interests us here is the structure of understanding, which is precisely the same as in any suggestion, but which has been particularly well summarized by H.Gris and W. Dick.

1.-- Les nouveaux sorciers, 112s...
Father Krivorotof discovered his (...) giftedness in 1929. He suffered from severe cross-eyed headaches (migraine). The doctors were not able to cure him. He himself, however, - he had already tried hypnosis (note: magnetization - suggestion with a kind of sleep (Greek: hupnos) as an external sign) - was convinced that the powers of the mind and of faith are unlimited; (...) he put his right hand on the crown of his head -- and since then the ailment disappeared without trace.

A few preliminary remarks.

a. Although he is a seasoned hypnotist, Krivotorof does not use hypnosis during his treatments: in his opinion, it disables the will of the subject. he wants the patient to cooperate with him in fighting the disease.

b. In the course of the years he also established that, in order to heal a fellow human being, he himself must feel completely healthy and strong. To this end, he extends his hand to the vicinity of the patient(s) while drawing his attention to a feeling of health and strength. If, for any reason, he cannot enter into that state of mind, he simply does not practice.

Nobody is perfectly healthy and strong. Krivorotof, however, thinks feelingly -- scanning the ideal sphere.

Platon would here speak of 'idea' -- in,-- to come into direct contact with that sphere of health and power (which is present in creation,-- the 'cosmos', as New Age is so fond of saying -- as a power-laden 'model' 'paragon').

2.-- The method.

a. In a silent room - in order not to distract the attention (E.R. 35: concentrate, - in always complete silence) and of the patient(s) and of the healer, the Krovorotofs make the person to be treated sit or lie down comfortably. During some minutes he/she enjoys a peoples rest. So that he/she relaxes consciously the muscles, first of the face, then gradually those of the whole body up to the feet.

The healer(s) then assume a comfortable position, - sitting or standing next to the patient(s).

b. The patient(s), meanwhile, draws attention, whole and entire, to the treatment process.

When the attention of both - patient and healer - is firmly focused on the origin of the ailment (note: the origin of the evil is, since the Primitives with their mythical mentality - origin myths - central), then the healer allows a new energy to flow into the body of the patient,-- which develops a warmth in the diseased organ.

The duration of such a session ranges from one minute to about twenty minutes. This, according to the advanced stage of the ailment and the degree of preparation of the healer.

c. After each treatment both Krivotorof' s feel
1. tired and

2. even exhausted. as if their bodies were transferring energy to the patient(s). "We believe that it is through energy transfer that our strength and health interact with the patient(s)".

"The Soviet Semyon Davidovich Kirlian (famous for his photography of the aura) had already told us: "Alexei Krivotorof has the power to heal. That is undeniable". Kirlian was treated by Alexej in 1956. When Kirlian took pictures of Krivotorof's hands, he discovered that, at the moment he focused his attention firmly on the healing process, an energy aura appeared around the hands that was many times stronger than normal.

3. -- A review.

Krivotorof's abilities were repeatedly tested and proven by Soviet scholars.

In 1956 - when Krivotorof's fame began to increase - the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Georgia ordered a review.

A committee of seven doctors, chaired by the academic Pyotr Kavtaradze, was appointed for this purpose.

To begin with, this committee carried out a diagnostic examination of thirty patients suffering from various ailments (slight paralysis of the arms and hands due to a surgical operation, chronic cross-headedness, severe back pain, nervous system disorders).

As a hypothesis, the committee members proposed that the healer convinced his patients/patients through the word, which amounts to "healing by (auto)suggestion".

 Therefore, they deliberately selected several sick people who knew neither Russian nor Georgian.

The thirty sick people were entrusted exclusively to the care of Krivorotof for one week. This, without any treatment from the Clinic of the Republic of Georgia in Tblisi.

Final Summary.-- The report read, "We have found that the results were positive (note: in Karl Popper's parlance, 'verification') in all cases, -- even of the sick who could not speak to Krivorotof:

a. the condition of each one had improved,

b. several were cured".

Note.-- Now reread E.R. 56 (the method) for a moment: even if there is no common language, a minimal and substantial understanding arises even those who speak another language want to cooperate with what the healer is doing.

Education process and (auto)suggestion.

Stokvis, o.c., 35 : "Mutatis mutandis (op.: after having changed what needs to be changed) the same process (op.: the suggestive introjection mechanism) takes place in education, when parents or teachers give thought contents or representations to the children".

Id., o.c., 21: "Education and suggestion take place partly through the same mechanisms. The educator acts here as a suggestor/ suggestrix".

So far, two clear statements. -- One could analyze this in much more detail in the context of a complete pedagogy. But, after all that has been said, everyone can draw more than enough conclusions on the matter: "something" emanates from the teacher (as something emanates from the pupil).

What appears to be of decisive importance here is the autosuggestive method of the teacher: "The autosuggestion, -- that is to say: possessing a leading thought which the person carries with him" (M. Kloek Pirée, The Word Heals, 109).

Which reminds one of Sören Kierkegaard (1813/1855; father of Existentialism), where he says that "really ('authentically') existing" (i.e., existing as a responsible adult human being) only begins when one possesses a thought that guides one's entire life. For which one lives. That one wants to "make true". That one can also inflame one's fellow-beings (which is contagious). Unfortunately: a negative autosuggestion or just suggestion is easier.

Bibl. st..-- Maryse Starace, *De l' intuition à la voyance*, (From intuition to clairvoyance), Périgueux, 1981, 229/230. The author, a gifted one who does mantaics. Here's what she says.

There is a French proverb: "Un mensonge répété mille fois devient "une vérité". (A lie repeated a thousand times becomes a truth.). Such a sentence should make us think. After all, one can cause a lot of harm by repeatedly saying something derogatory to someone.

When adults say to a child or an adolescent: "You are a loser. those so-called adults push the child, the adolescent, into failure, by instilling in the mind of that little or less mature, impotent being the idea that he/she is doomed to fail.

Even adults, although in principle capable of defending themselves, are sometimes ruined by the same "power of words". So much for this Southern French visionary.

Sample 8.-- The method. (59/3).

After all that precedes, the question of method arises. We have so far seen the 'structure' of the rhetorical language act in its five (at least three) phases / aspects. Then we have looked more closely at the informational structure that lies within it. Both structures (= states relations) will dominate the rest of this textbook. Without repeating this.

The method.

Role. Barthes, o.c., 118/120, says: "Rhetoric must always be read (op.: interpreted) within the structural play of its burins, namely grammar, logic, poetics (op.: the doctrine concerning prose and poetry),--philosophy. It is the play of the system -- not each of its parts individually -- that is historically significant." -- Now let us translate that into more useful terms.

1.-- The mythical mind.

Imagine: in ancient Hellas, long before the later rhetors were at work, you, as an Archaic Greek, consult a sorceress. Let us call her Kirkè (Lat.: Circe).

You present her with a problem: your child is sick.

Look what Kirkle is doing.

a. The phenomenon itself,--that which shows itself immediately, e.g., a swollen stomach region- -interests her. She examines the whole phenomenon attentively.

b.1. She thinks of similar phenomena which she has seen and examined in her practice (and that of her teacher). She pays attention to all (possible) phenomena of the same or similar nature. She collects.

b.2. She also thinks about what this phenomenon is, in its entirety: Did the child perhaps have too much contact with other people - children perhaps - who had something similar?

Conclusion: the whole (system) of all possible such (and other) phenomena receives her investigative attention. With the result that, after some time, she arrives at a coherent representation (= understanding) of the problem.

In the language of the Milesian thinkers: thanks to historia, research, she comes to logos, to understanding. What the Paleoythagoreans will call 'theoria' (insight).

2.-- Philosophical thinking.

Bibl. st: W. Jaeger, *Paideia (Die Formung des griechischen Menschen)*, (Paideia (The Formation of Greek Man),), Berlin / Leipzig, 1936-2, 206/248 (Das philosophische Denken und die Entdeckung des Kosmos).

Giorgio Colli, *Die Geburt der Philosophie*, (The birth of philosophy), Frankf.a.M., Europ. Verlagsanst., 1981 (all that precedes the strictly speaking genesis of Platonic philosophy is the subject,--starting from the mythical-sacred 'sophia' (insight));

O. Willmann, *Geschichte des Idealismus, I (Vorgeschichte und Geschichte des antiken Idealismus),* Braunschweig, 1907-2 (vrl. 217/238 (Hervorgang der Physik aus der physischen Theologie);

W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der antieke godsdiensten*, (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947 (esp. 231/290 (Circle and Totality)).

Let us take the founder of Greek philosophy, Thales of Miletos (-624/-545). He is known as an olive grower.

Inquisitive minded as he was, he dwelt on

a. the phenomenon itself, the cultivation of olives, of which he carefully examines the whole,

b.1. similar phenomena, at other breeders e.g. or in other regions, whereby he pays attention to all (possible) phenomena of the same nature (collecting attention),

b.2. the totality of all similar phenomena, so that he gains an insight into the whole system of all (possible) such phenomena.

In summary.-- Whole (the whole phenomenon), all (all whole phenomena),-- whole (the whole of all (possible) whole phenomena).

This makes understandable what is told of him:

a. first version, i.e. he foresees a rich olive harvest for the current year, borrows all the oil presses in Miletos, -- and, when the pressing season arrived and they urgently needed oil presses, lends them out at a (usurious) price he enforced;

b. second version: long before the olives are ready to ripen, Thales buys the entire olive harvest of his father's city in order to sell it later at an extortionate price.

By the way, this is a kind of early capitalist phenomenon within the Greek city-states: they monopolize (all the oil presses; the entire olive harvest) in order to make a profit.

The fusiologia or fusikè.
Thales, in the same exploratory spirit, dwelt on the 'fusis', natura, nature, i.e. the totality of all that is. It was also called 'genesis', process of becoming.

1. The on, ens, being, in its entirety (the whole being),

2.1. immediately all (possible) being,

2.2. at the same time the whole of all possible being that constitutes nature,

are subjected to a historia, inquisitio, investigation of a new kind, in order to arrive at a new logos, ratio, insight: philo.sophia, philosophy, in the wake of mythical thinking, 'sophia' wisdom, and of merchant wisdom, was born.-- But it is not yet all.

Investigating its origins.
1. Mythical.
Kirkè examines the phenomena (and at the same time all similar phenomena its system) for its 'origin' (archè, principium). She wants to find out how the phenomenon that shows itself in the swollen stomach area of the baby, originated, before she can take healing action.

By the way: we saw this at work in Georgia (E.R. 56), where the Krivorotof's magnetize the patient in search of the 'origin' (to undo).

She connects to the 'origin' of healing itself, a cosmic energy that acts healingly through her intervention, perhaps a goddess.

Translated Platonically: it seeks the premises (origins) and of the malady and of its elimination.

Just like the Krivorotofs still in the full twentieth century. They too come into 'contact' with the sphere of the healthy and the health-giving.

2. Philosophical.
The fusikoi, physicists, naturalists, in Miletos (Thales, Anaximandros, Anaximenes form a society of thought, 'hetaireia'), also called fusiologoi (who aim at a logos, a coherent insight, concerning nature) - they too - do as Kirkè : they investigate - historia - the being, viz. what was, what is - to onta (the now available being) what will be - think of the Muses and Mnèmosunè (E.R. 15) - on its origin.

I.e.: on its presuppositions. In order to arrive at a coherent picture of it, a 'logos fusikos', an insight into nature.

Again, 'origin' is multifaceted.
a. 'Origin' means first a temporal fact.-- What did the beginning in time look like of nature? As Kirkè asks, "When did that child begin to exhibit such a phenomenon?" Origin is beginning.

b. 'Origin', however, also means something that sustains itself through all moments of time (i.e., something eternal) that is not temporal. What constitutes the whole course of nature as a whole? 'Origin' is 'principle' of the whole event that is nature, of the whole genesis.

Diogenes Laertios (+/- 200/250) managed to summarize in his time "As 'archè', proposal (origin) of all being, Thales proposed "the water" and the 'cosmos', universe, he (proposed) as being animated and full of daimones, extraterrestrial beings".

This may well be a very accurate representation of what Thales saw as the 'origins' of the whole of genesis (fusis). Which points to building on the pre-war traditional 'wisdom' from which the so-called mythical man lived.

After him comes Anaximandros of Miletos (-610/-547), who proposes as 'archè' (he apparently uses that word), principle, "to apeiron" the void (Lat.: infinitum'), i.e. that which of itself knows no form or limit, but derives these from whatever configuration, 'form', is. This then is everything that populates nature: the rocks, the water, the air, the fire, -- the plants, the animals, the people, -- the extraterrestrial beings. That formlessness that can assume all forms, is then called "the primal substance" out of which all being comes into being (becomes comprehensible).

It is strange: the primal principle easily shows divine traits somewhere.

Anaximenes of Miletos (-588/-524) comes later: the primal principle that makes everything understandable is for him 'aèr', the in and out-breathable air that gives life, or 'psuchè', soul, i.e. what makes life. In this way, the whole of nature is somewhere 'animated' and full of 'breath of life'.

Conclusion.- All that is philosophy, thereafter, will exhibit that same basic pattern (structure) except among the Skeptics, who adhere only to phenomena.

In particular, the Dialecticians (Hegel, Marx,--each in his own way) and the Neo-Dialecticians,--nowadays the theorists of dynamic systems (think of the School of Brussels, headed by Ilya Prigogine (1917/...)) show, as a basic structure, something analogous.

The rhetoric. -- If rhetoric is studied according to that pattern of thought, it looks as follows.

1. A single rhetorical phenomenon - a good preacher e.g. - is situated as one member of all (possible) rhetorical phenomena (collection theoretic knowledge expansion) within the totality of all (possible) rhetorical phenomena (system theoretic knowledge expansion).

2. This is then examined for its 'origins' (E.R. 14/18).-- The rhetorical structure (E.R. 07/23) is a possible summary of the whole of all (possible) rhetorical phenomena.

Actually, this method amounts to induction, generalization.

a. The one phenomenon, multiple phenomena are the sample/ samples.

b.1. From that singular or private case(s) (= summative or knowledge summary induction) one extends - generalizes - to all (possible) cases of rhetoric (set theory induction).

b2. From there one commits another knowledge extension : one situates in the system all (possible) cases of rhetoric (systemic induction).

Both these last inductions are called 'amplifying' inductions, i.e. knowledge expanding inductions.

Note.-- Stoicheiosis, elementatio.-- The thus dissecting of a whole (= all, whole) from samples is called, in Antique Greek, stoicheiosis. The whole phenomenon of 'eloquence', with all its aspects,-- all (possible) phenomena of the same nature,-- the whole of all (possible) phenomena of that nature,-- all this examined for its presuppositions,-- that is stoicheiosis, system theory.

The totality and its parts are central.
Thus where Platon analyzes language - the entire language phenomenon, all possible language phenomena, the whole (system) of all possible language phenomena. Cfr E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van Parmenides tot Bolzano),* (The philosophy of mathematics from Parmenides to Bolzano), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 30, 36vv. where Platon's method is explained.

Note.-- The dual 'how' of rhetoric.-- This traditional method allows us to answer two how-questions.

1. How is a rhetorical phenomenon 'rhetorical'? This is descriptive: one dissects how something is rhetorical.

2. How rhetorical is a rhetorical phenomenon? This is evaluative or value judgement : the phenomenon is analyzed for its content of real rhetoric. From the being to the content.

Note -- It is customary to contrast two methods, yes, to play them off against each other. -

1. The genetic method - methodos gennetikè (with two n's) - dissects something from its inception (Cfr. O.Willmann (1839/1920; Catholic educator and thinker), *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, 1959-5, 51, 414).

2. The structural method dissects - following de Saussure - something as far as the sign (value) is concerned (semism) and this within the total system of signs (system theory), but purely synchronically (i.e. outside of the time course).

Both methods are one-sided,-- parts of the method outlined above.

Sample 9.-- Ancient magical rhetoric (64/66).

One of the oldest forms of language act is the magic language act, which is often misunderstood by moderns and even postmoderns. Nothing better than a sample to understand it.

1.-- The rule.

Bibl. st..-- TH. P. van Baaren, *Maze of the gods (Introduction to comparative religious science)*, Amsterdam, Querido, 1960, 189/196 (Magic and mantis).

The author says: the English scholar Hildburgh has rightly pointed out that - in many (not all) cases - magic is not a matter of imitating but of demonstrating. While the magician calls divine beings for help, he (she) drastically, i.e. with act, 'shows' which help is exactly expected.

2.-- The applications.

Van Baaren himself goes on to cite.-- A Japanese custom.-- E.g. a fire breaks out. The magician(s) pours out a bowl of water. This,--

a. clearly convey an information ("help us") and thereby establish rapport,-- to

b. immediately begin extinguishing the fire.

A second example.

Bibl. st..-- R.P. Trilles, *Chez les Fang (Quinze années de séjour au Congo français), (Among the Fang, Fifteen years in the French Congo),),* DDB, Lille, 1912.

The author was a missionary from 1892 onwards in West Africa (where he stayed among the jungle pygmies as the first white person). There he got to know the Fang, a people,--with among others the 'ngil', i.e. the black-magician ('sorcier', clearly to be distinguished from the 'féticheur', (we man, literally: 'fetish man'), who is a white-magician and deeply honored by the population, whereas the ngil evokes deep contempt).

O.c., 178/182 (*La danse du ngil*), shows how the magical dance proceeds. Note how - musically, through 'choreia' (E.R. 21: Palaeopthagorean model), i.e. dance, instrumental music and song (poetry) - the ngil dancing establishes rapport not only with fellow initiates, but with extraterrestrial beings.

The ngil gathers the fellow initiates around him. No uninitiated -- certainly no woman -- may be present. He begins with a lively -hurried dance step,--a bit like our polka dance.

CHANT D'INCANTATION DU NGIL

LE NGIL.
Par les cendres consacrées de la victime offerte, Des esprits errants de la nuit, Qui vont parcourant la sombre forêt, Sans arrêt, jamais.

LE CHŒUR.
yô yô ja-mais.

LE NGIL.
Esprits des morts qui n'ont pas vu les sacrifices funéraires.

LE CHŒUR.
yô yô ja-mais.

LE NGIL.
Morts qui n'ont point encore passé, Passé le fleuve des larmes.

LE CHŒUR.
yô yô ja-mais.

LE NGIL.
Le fleuve des larmes et des soupirs.

LE CHŒUR.
Le fleuve des larmes et des soupirs.

LE NGIL.
Le fleuve du grand repos.

LE CHŒUR.
Le fleuve du grand repos.

LE NGIL.
Esprits de la nuit, sombres esprits, nos protecteurs.

LE CHŒUR.
Nos protecteurs.

LE NGIL.
Toi, mon fils, sois gardé, toi, mon fils, sois gardé toujours.

Dancing he recounts his 'power' (= life force) and the effects of it. Foot stomping the bystanders accompany him with their frenzied "yo, yo, ngil, yo, yo", (which means: "Heil! Heil! Long live the ngil!").

We translate the French text. Please note that this ancient, 'tradition-bound' song contains parts that appear unclear even to Trilles. Perhaps the dancers themselves are not even sure of the original meaning of what "the (folk) custom - "la coutume" - offers.

Ngil.-- By the consecrated ashes of the offered victim. Wandering spirits of the night. Walking through the gloomy forest. Without ceasing. Never.
    Choir.-- Yo yô, never.
    Ngil.-- Ghosts of those dead who didn't see the burial offerings.
    Choir.-- Yo yô, never.
    Ngil.-- Dead ones that have not yet been touched. Crossed over into the stream of tears.
    Choir.-- Yô yô, never.
    Ngil.-- The flow of tears and complaints.
    Chorus. -- The flow of tears and complaints.
    Ngil.-- The flow of the great calm.
    Chorus. -- The flow of the great calm.
    Ngil.-- Ghosts of the night, gloomy spirits, our protectors.
    Chorus. Our protectors.
    Ngil.-- Thou, my, son, be guarded,-- thou, my son, be guarded, always.

Note -- The initiation of a ngil is accompanied by the ritual killing of a victim, often a female relative. The ashes are mixed with herbs and kept as a 'fetish' (power-laden object, used for magic).
    Even Thales of Miletos knew the fusis, nature populated with extraterrestrial beings. One sees this belief clearly playing a leading role here. The song recalls what Platon would call "the criminal nightmare". Indeed, the black magician - being 'black', i.e. a child of nocturnal crime - lives even during the day as if the night never ended, with her crimes of all kinds. Hence the Fang's hatred of such dark figures.

Note.-- Bibl. st..-- G.P. Baker / P.M.S. Hacker, *Language, Sense and Nonsense (A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories of Language),* Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1984.-- The author s distinguish four main aspects.
    a. Linguistically-analytically, the meaning of a sentence is revealed thanks to its truth representations.
    b. Language ability is based on an un(der)conscious knowledge of language rules.
    c. The astonishing fact that one never hears sentences nevertheless understands.
    d. The distinction between 'sense' (meaning) and 'force' (power) in a statement. E.g. "Do I do it?" and "Definitely I do it!" have a very identical meaning but a different 'force'. This is clearly evident in the text of the ngil.

Sample 10.-- The antique-Greek rhetoric (i). (67/71).
1.-- The Homeric rhetoric.

"Often Homèros (Lat.: Homer, an Archaic poet, +/- -900/-700, supposed author of the *Iliad* and the *Odusseia* (Lat.: Odyssea))-the great epic poet-has been considered the founder of rhetoric.

Ernst Curtius (1814/1896; known for his *History of Greece* (1857/1861)) has rightly remarked that almost half of the Iliad and more than two-thirds of the Odusseia are speeches by acting persons,--often of considerable length. Especially the 'listen-rich Odusseus' (Lat.: Ulysses) (...) is a masterful orator". (M. Weller/G. Stuiveling, *Modern Eloquence,* Amsterdam/Brussels 1968, 38). -- Indeed: in Homeric culture the 'agora', at that time the assembly of the people or the army, is central.

The army or people's assembly of sacred law.

Sacred' or 'consecrated' ('religious') means that the nature - fusis - of the gathering is controlled from an 'apophatic' (= occult, not clear to the masses) world. Think of the 'daimones' of whom Thales, the first philosopher, speaks: they literally populate the whole of nature.

Since the rise, especially among us, of Modern and Postmodern anticlericalism, 'sacred' easily sounds 'authoritarian'. Yet it is far from that simple.

A.-- The convening.

a. Agamemnon, the prince of Mukènai (Lat.: Mycenae), leader of the Greeks (= Achaians) army before Troy (= Ilion, later Pergamon,--a city dating from at least -2000, in Asia Minor), receives in a divine dream the order to gather the people (= the soldiers). Thus Il. 2:1vv.

Note -- Biblical revelation also has such phenomena as Joseph, Jesus' foster father, who is ordered to flee to Egypt.

b. Tèlemachos, Odusseus' son, gets the inspiration - because of the goddess Pallas Athene who addresses him in the appearance of Mentes - to convene the agora. Reason: Athena wants to denounce literally the shameless suitors who are eating up the palace of his mother, the princess Penelopeia (= Penelope), who made her 'holy' marriage for the marriage deities in memory of Odusseus, her husband and the true prince of Ithakè.--

Well, the agora, after discussion, disperses without decision: it only learns that if conscious suitors continue in their blindness - the typical 'tragic blindness' - an 'atè', i. e. a divine judgment - similar to a fate - will befall them. Everything comes down to a God-given warning (Oduss. 1:289f.).

B.-- The meeting structure.

The person authorised to speak receives the Zeus sceptre: in the mentality of the time this means that he is under the direct protection of the Supreme God, Zeus, and can therefore act freely as a spokesman. Being protected by Zeus is immediately inviolable (one also says 'sacred' in the sense of 'power-laden'). On some islands of the Pacific this is called 'taboo' (tapu).

Even if the speaker-with-the-scepter-of-Zeus turns against the leader of the army himself, he is inviolable. (No one may offend him for his impertinence, if one may so speak).-- In this way the Archaic-sacred world anticipated the later more deconsecrated, desacralized freedom of speech.

Appl. model.-- Diomedes e.g. turns, in full agora, against Agamemnon with the words: "Atride (op.: Atreides, i.e. Atreus son), against you, first of all, I belong to take a stand because of your lack of insight,-- as it is 'themis', Lord, in the agora". (F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes, I (Altertum and Frümittelalter),* Zollikon - Zurich, 1954, 14).

Explanation.-- Themis is the name for the oldest, sacred legal system in Hellas, when the Archaic Greeks still honored the chtonic (Lat.: telluric, i.e., earth-connected) Mother Goddess religion. This, before the legal system that centered on the Olympic or ouranic (i.e., celestial-spatial) deities.-

That Themis law was about:
a. the family with the family as the center,
b. the sibbe (joint kin),--
c. the home and hospitality,--
d. the dead.
Cfr F. Flükiger, o.c., 20.-- As religious phenomenology so often observes : 'themis' is:
a. the visible and tangible legal system,
b. the deity controlling that system, viz. as function goddess here. The 'function' (Usener) or sphere of action of Themis (sometimes identified with Gaia, the Earth Mother) was life, especially as a source of fertility, -- the earth and the subterranean,-- the night (o.c., 29).

Themis is, to speak with Nathan Söderblom, 'Urheberin', 'Causer'; She founded once, 'in the beginning', the legal system that constitutes her 'role' ('function') within the whole system of gods and goddesses.

In short: in the earthly legal system Themis makes her appearance. She, as the founding goddess, is the 'transcendent' (apophatic) side; her system is the 'immanent' (secular) side. Both sides form a unity.

Some thinkers and historians, who 'hineininterpret' our secularized legal systems in the Archaic systems, clearly misunderstand a fact and an undeniable fact: the aristocratic (and therefore limited to the noble upper classes) legal system of the Homeric Greeks was at once sacred and democratic. That speech and minimal rhetoric developed in such a middle is therefore normal.

2.-- The rhetoric of the later polis.

After Homeric times comes the actual 'polis', city-state. With its typical democratic rhetoric. -- The agora is no longer, as before Ilion (note: the name of Troy in Greek times), the assembly of the army, but the public assembly. The freedom of speech is no longer that of aristocrats alone, but of all free citizens -- except for slaves.

With the polis of the 'politai', citizens, a new, also sacred legal system emerges, based on the Zeus religion (Zeus is the counterpart of Jupiter in Rome for instance). The goddess of law is now 'Dikè' (literally: 'law'). No longer in the name of the Mother Goddesses around Gaia, the Earth Mother ("Terra Mater" in Rome) but in the name of Zeus and the sky-space deities surrounding him, strongly male of essence, justice is spoken now.

The older lower layer, once defeated in a theomachia, a battle of the gods, is mentioned in the same breath as the more recent upper layer: "It is Themis and Dikè". Thus a synthesis arose, a union, of old and new. Thus law, in Hellas, was 'founded' on a twofold sacred basis. Thus one 'spoke', -- with that duality as a background.

Until, among others, the Proto- or First Sophists (Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410), Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375)) undermined this sacred basis and secularized it.

The role ('function') of Hermes.

Bibl. st..-- W.B. Kristensen, *Verzamelde bijdragen tot kennis der Antieke godsdiensten,* (Collected contributions to the knowledge of ancient religions), Amsterdam, 1947, 125/148 (The divine herald);

P. Grimal, *Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine*, Paris, PUF, 1988-2, 206/207 (Hermès).

The place occupied by the god Hermès or also Hermeias in the field of eloquence in the strictly Archaic sense is clear from the fragments of mythology at our disposal.

According to Herb. Jennings Rose, *Hermes*, in: M. Cary et al., ed., *The Oxford Classical Dictionary,* Oxford, 1950-2, 417, Hermes is one of the oldest and 'primitive' figures in the Greek deity world. Usually, in the Zeus system, he plays a very subordinate role (after the subjugation of the chthonic deities). He plays the role of messenger on behalf of the deities to earthly mankind.

Kristensen, who discusses him at length, compares him - clearly not unjustly - with Nairo-sanho (from the Mazdean religion (Iran)) and with Apis (= Mnevis) (Egypt), both of whom were also 'messengers'.

Hermes -- according to Kristensen -- is actually comprehensible if one refers to him as the mediator between this, earthly, phenomenal world and the other, apophatic, extraterrestrial world (of deities etc.).

Mediator, yes, but as possessor of (underground) life force which he, mediating, passes on.

a. Thus he is 'fut.almios', giver of life concerning the plant world.

b. As someone who carries a ram on his shoulders - e.g. in the mysteries (= secret rites) of the Earth Mother - he galvanizes the (animal) life he founds on earth.

c. As "angelos", messenger, he plays a role concerning the souls of people. His title is then "Hermès psuchopompos", Hermes the soul's guide, who places the souls either to the realm of the dead as the eloquent one. (...). Eloquence is good counsel in the Antique sense accompanies or brings back to earth.

"He was also the god of the word, 'logios', the linguist, and this in the first sense: advice that imposes itself and reveals itself to the hearers as a 'new power'". (O.c., 141v.).-- Thus Hermes possessed, among other things, the gift of the magic word.

Greek eloquence had a signifier, the already mentioned (E.RH.68: Zeusscepter) herald staff or scepter, which the princes and the judges, among others, wore in their function.

Three names and formations of that staff-der-language skill were in circulation:

a. the ordinary staff ('skèptron');

b. The branching pole or 'kèrukeion' (two branches bent or twisted together);

c. the short tree branch or 'rhabdos' (so e.g. the magic wand of the sorceress Kirkè; Odusseia 10:238).

"Hermes appears to be the typical possessor of all these objects; he granted them to the human scepter-bearers." (O.c., 143). Kristensen says: all the sceptres are associated with "the herb of life", which possesses and communicates the life force.

Whenever the life, or possibly the survival, of e.g. the people was at stake - in the agora, the public assembly - the life-giving or life-enhancing power of the word that gives advice and of the living staff were of decisive importance. The god Hermes played the role of mediator.

Thus, in both the Law of Nations and the Law of Zeus, Hermes, as the 'life giver' (as Nathan Söderblom would say), had a leading role to play, on the basis of the rhetoric of the time.

Rhetoric and Antique-Greek life.

In the background of these sacred beings are the three great types of ancient Greek eloquence.

A. The "genos dèmègorikon".

(also: "genos sumbouleutikon"), the political eloquence. In the public assembly - the Greeks did not have an actual parliament (indirect representation of the people) but the public assembly (direct democracy) - life issues were discussed: economic (finance, trade), legal (legislation), military-strategic (war/peace, foreign relations).

B.I. The "genos dikanikon".

judicial eloquence. - Originally, there were no lawyers proper at the court. The accused and the persons concerned pronounced their defense speech themselves. However, a 'logografos', scribe, would, if necessary, draw up the text which was then read off. This 'forensic' eloquence had as its stopping point the people's court.

B.II. The "genos epideiktikon",

The "demonstrative" speech had its place in front of an audience that was fond of eloquence - in the open air or in a hall. The party speech, the mourning speech, -- the show off speech belonged to this 'genos', genre. The purest linguistic skill experienced its purest effect here.

All this makes it clear: rhetoric is rooted both in religion and in the life of the Greeks, which is governed by religion.

Sample 11.-- The antique-Greek rhetoric (II).(72/80).

By way of introduction.-- We saw -- E.R. 60 -- that Thales of Miletos sought to enrich himself by the olive harvest.-- Note that in doing so he had to persuade either the owners of olive presses or the olive growers, thanks to his language skills. This then was typical economic rhetoric.

But there is more. - An anecdote shows the political language skills of Thales. Ludia (Lat.: Lydia, Lydie), a region in the vicinity, under the leadership of Kroisos (Lat.: Croesus (-560/-546), the wealthy monarch) threatens at some point the Twelve Ionian Cities, along the Kleinazian coast, including Miletos. Thales recommends an alliance. Only Miletos enters into an alliance; the other cities thwarted Kroisos.-- This involves rhetoric,-- political rhetoric.

1.-- Eleatic - Parmenidean rhetoric.

Parmenides of Elea (-540/...) a Southern Italian city, is the first ontologist: being is; not being is not (so he says). This seems banal, but - let us not forget - he does not mean the worn-out everyday concept of being, but reality as it is "kath' heautèn" (in itself).

This is very new indeed. It is true that Mnèmosunè (and with her the Muses) held "all that was, is, and will be" in her all-encompassing consciousness (E.R. 15, 61), but this was put at the service of poetry and, among other things, epic tales.

Parmenides posits the same time-series but to elaborate it logically.-- Not without reason G.Elisabeth M.Anscombe, *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein,* Oxford, 1981, argues that "Parmenides' statements can be interpreted as the foundational text upon which all Western philosophy is but a set of footnotes."

Initial eristics.

Parmenides had a pupil, a 'hetairos' (fellow thinker), Zenon of Elea (+/- -500). He defended his master by means of fundamental research.

The opponents postulated that being (= reality) was a multiplicity somewhere; the Eleates that it was unity somewhere, but Zenon notes that neither the opponents nor his teacher provided decisive evidence for what they claimed.

This provides us with a first scheme of discussion: "neither you, nor I, prove to a strict logical conclusion what you claim". In time, this will develop into what is called "eristics".

By this we mean, here, an application of the ABC theory (E.R. 47).-.

A, the given, i.e. here 'being' (reality),

B. is hinted at by the opponents of the Eleates from their multiplicity hypothesis, and by the Eleates from their unity premise,--which

C gives, i.e., a disagreement, an opinion quantity. Of which Zenon notes that both opinions - if examined on its premises - foundations - (also a 'historia' or formative work) - provide logical, insufficient evidence.

What already the subtle Aristotle observed, as E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde*, (The Philosophy of Mathematics,), Antw./Nijmegen, 1944, 19, clearly demonstrates.

In short, one object gives rise to at least two opposite interpretations. This will reappear later in the actual eristics.

2.-- Sicilian agonistic rhetoric.

W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I, Berlin / Leipzig, 1936-2, 399, says: "The judicial act is called 'agon' in ancient Greek. In Greek it is invariably

a. a battle of two camps

b. in a legal form'. That this is true is now immediately apparent.

Regime change.-- Around - 485, two Sicilian 'turannoi', 'tyrants' (coercive, dictators), Gelon and Hieron, after dispossessing them, deport a number of populations to populate Syrakuse and, immediately, provide mercenaries - soldiers with a plot of land.

In 460, however, they were driven out by a democratic revolution. The brand new democracy wanted, immediately, to introduce 'iso.nomia', equal rights, the artery of Greek democracy. But one does not have to have much imagination to see what kind of disputes, quarrels etc. the deportees were facing on their return to their homes.

The courts cracked under endless litigation. Where... language skills, of course, played a major role.

R. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologigue*, (The semiological adventure,), 90, also says that Western rhetoric, stricto sensu, begins with agonistics, i.e. power-minded rhetoric played out before the court.

Koraks of Syracuse (+ -500/-400).

The need for logographers (text drafters) was acute. This, for lack of actual lawyers. Fortunately Empedokles of Akragas (= Agrigentum) (-483/-423; Pythagorean thinker still known today, in occultist circles, for his teachings on the 'elements' (earth, water, air,-- fire)) had a fellow thinker, Koraks of Syracuse.

He began by providing texts to those involved in the redistribution processes (logographic work).

More than that: with his pupil, Teisias, Koraks published a first "technè rhètorikè", a text on language skills. The two were thus "rhetors.

The content, according to 01. Reboul, *Introduction à la rhétorique (Théorie et pratique),* (Introduction to Rhetoric (Theory and Practice),), Paris, PUF, 1991, 14, was:
a. a set of practical rules,
b. with examples.
The definition of both: "Rhetoric is persuasion edifying doctrine".

The oldest schedule.
A forensic reason consists of:
1. "to pro.oimion" (= Lat.: prooemium, exordium), preface, introduction;
2. "hi agones" (controversiae in Lat.), debates;
3. "ho epilogos" (Lat.: epilogus, peroratio), ending.

Note.-- One can recognize in it the Paleopythagorean 'trias', threefoldness.

The 'eikos', which is all probability.
Preposition par excellence - especially when, like the Eleates, one argues strictly logically - is the true. But factual life sometimes moves much more in the realm of the merely probable. What has the appearance of truth, then, is commonplace among Koraks and Teisias.

Appl. model.-- The Korak argument.-- The rhetor Antifon (-480/-411; conservative aristocrat) among others addressed this.
1. All that is "all too likely" turns out to be in fact improbable.
2. All that is in fact "all too unlikely" is possible cover for something likely.

The two terms "probable/all too improbable" acquire their (semantic and especially pragmatic) meaning when one gives them their "Sitz im Leben", i.e. when one situates them in the full (judicial) life.
For example: someone is suspected of murder. To which he replies: "It is true that the hatred I felt for the victim makes the murder I have been accused of probable. But isn't it even more probable that I foresee the suspicion before committing the crime, and consequently that I am careful not to commit it? So it is unlikely that I committed the murder".

However, one can also reason the other way round: "That last 'improbability' can be the reason why you commit the murder! So you are the likely killer".

Compare with what happened just now: A, a murder, becomes via B, more than one interpretation (probable / improbable), to a 'language dispute' about what is true and what is not.

The logistics begin.

Koraks' reception.-- As already mentioned, Teisias (Lat.: Tisias) of Syracuse was Koraks' contemporary. He also had other - and influential - pupils: Gorgias of Leontinoi (Gorgias of Leontini) (-480/-375), the formal founder of the prone speech,

Isokrates of Athens (-436/-338), the famous rhetor, rivaled as an educator with Platon (whose philosophy he found too specialized),-

Lusias (Lat.: Lysias) of Athens (-459/-380), democratically minded rhetor, theorist of a few hundred forensic reason.

Conclusion: all sounding names in the ancient paideia.

3.-- Protestant rhetoric.

First, let us briefly explain the concept of 'eristics'.-- 'Eris', in ancient Greek, meant among other things 'armed scuffle',-- 'discord', 'dispute',-- 'situation of competition'.

Platon uses the term "hè eristikè technè", the skill of either strict logical or e.g. legal reasoning and counter-reasoning.

By the way, apart from the Protosophists, there is a Kleinsocratic school of philosophy which is explicitly 'eristic' in its approach, i.e. the School of Megara, with e.g. Eukleides of Megara (+/- -400), Euboulides of Miletos and others.

Protagoras of Abdera (-480/-410).

Protagoras (Lat.: Protagoras) is the head of Sophistics (-450/-350), a movement of 'enlightened - rational' minds.

In his praxis - and, to a certain extent, also in his paideia - two things prevailed: property formation and political influence. Also: concerning pragmatics (efficiency of rhetoric) he insisted on 'eu.boulia', 'efficiency', 'pragmatism' (in the sense of "I take things at their usefulness with a view to achieving a goal (= result)").

Premise: on A, a given, B, one can think this way while the other thinks the opposite, C, with the result that one can defend the for and the against on any topic. Protagoras's eristics, interpreted in this way, amount to "the skill of triumphing in a discussion".

Gorgias of Leontinoi (-480/-375).

Second leading figure of Sophistics. He broadens the concept of "literature" as it was understood at the time. -

a. Until then the Greeks identified 'literature' with Poetry (cf. E.R. 21 (choreia)), be it the epic of Homer and Hesiod, the dramatic of the tragedians (Aischulos, Sophocles, Euripides), the lyrical of e.g. Sappho.

What we now call 'prose' amounted to unadorned everyday language.

b. Gorgias introduces the 'epideictic style' : he gives his 'prose' the characteristics both of rhetoric as a purposive text and of 'rhetoric' as a poetic or, at least, poetic text.

As an aside: Isokrates' prose goes in precisely the austere, matter-of-fact, and therefore opposite direction.-- For the rest, Gorgias' rhetoric is very similar to that of Protagoras: he defends everything,--even if it were by concealment.

He did so in his eulogy to Helene, the wife of Menelaus, the prince of Sparta in Homer's Iliad. She allowed herself to be 'cheated' by Paris, the son of the Trojan prince Priamos. The Achaians (Greeks) unleashed a ten-year war to get Helene back.

Against the Greek value judgments, Gorgias defended her conduct: either she was compelled to it by a godly fate, or she was violently chequered, or she allowed herself to be persuaded by seductive words, or her temper was too strong for her. Finally, in Gorgias' eristics, she was innocent (by force of will) in all four hypotheses.

Gorgias concealed the fact that there was at least one more hypothesis, namely that she had gone along voluntarily.

One sees it: A. via opposite interpretations (B) leads to C, opposite statements.

Note,-- W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I, Berlin / Leipzig, 1936-2, 364/418, dwells at length on Protosfistics,--so called in contrast to Deuterosophistics (under the Roman 'Good Emperors' (second century A.D.; those Sophists were, in fact, orators, strongly literary oriented)).

What, later, is called "enkuklios paideia" (higher, general education), is due to the Sophists,--even though they have not yet formally connected the four "mathèmata" (learning subjects the Pythagoreans: mousikè,-- astronomia, arithmetikè, geometria) with their three learning subjects, namely, speech (grammar: word, language), dialectics (eristics: reasoning), rhetoric.

With this, the Sophists laid the foundations of intellectual life,--resulting in "an education which is still largely the same today" (according to Jaeger).

The whole rhetoric significally.

Significa deals with the word meanings as far as part of understanding. Let us now consider that for a moment.

1.-- The ratio of rhetor to student.

One example.-- Koraks -- provided he pays -- teaches Teisias, "the skill always in the agon, especially on the court, to be right". One pithy detail: the fee is payable as soon as Teisias wins his first plea.

But Teisias does not plead! He immediately, like his rhetor, becomes a rhetor himself. He does it even more brilliantly.

Consequence: he pays nothing.

Lawsuit.-- Sophisticated eloquence comes to mind now.

1.-- Teisias finds there a 'dilemma' (double lemma, premise), the 'logical syntax' (structure) of which is as follows. thesis (propositio).-- Your demand for payment is unfounded (= lacks the necessary and sufficient reason).

Argument (pistis, probatio).

1. Model.-- Either I furnish you, Koraks, with conclusive evidence of the fact that I owe you nothing. In which case, you waive your claim.

2. Counter model.-- Either I provide you, Koraks, with inconclusive evidence.-- That would be my first plea, -- which I would lose. But the deal was, if I win my first plea, I pay.

2.-- Koraks poses a counter dilemma.

Thesis.-- My claim for payment is well founded.

Argument.

1. Model.-- Either thou, Teisias, dost not furnish the convincing evidence to support thy refusal to pay. In that case, of course, you must pay.

2. Counter-model.-- Either thou, Teisias, does furnish, the convincing evidence. In which case, it is your first (and won) plea. And our deal stands. So pay up.

2.-- The degrading language.

Bibl. st.-- Jacqueline de Romilly, *Quand les mots changent de sens*, (When words change their meaning,), in: Revue des deux mondes (Paris), 1991: juin, 7/21.

The meaning of the terms is constantly shifting. According to the writer, this is because of our lifestyles, goals and neglect, yes, because of the great crises we are going through.

She cites, in addition to Thoukudides of Athens (-455/-395; historian: *The Peloponnesian War*), of Sophist origin, and Isokrates of Athens, the rhetor, Platon of Athens. "Deceptive slogans make it. Shameful slogans they dismiss as "stupidity. (...). Self-control is ridiculed and simply abolished: it is given the name 'cowardice'. Moderation and economy in spending are then called 'boorishness' and 'cowardice'. (...).

When such slogans have robbed the 'virtues' as these just mentioned of all meaning and, at the same time, 'cleansed' the souls of young people who live by them - it seems that one wanted to initiate these young people into 'great mysteries' (op.: important secret rites) - they quickly introduce presumption, anarchy, profligacy, shamelessness (....)". (*Politeia* 8: 560d).--

Note.-- Platon, contrary to Thoukudides, who ascribes these significant shifts only to the Peloponnesian War, and to Isocrates, who attributes them to the development of politics and its repercussions on education, situates the disaster in the soul of the young people, who learn one main slogan, as J. de Romilly formulates it, namely "it is forbidden to forbid anything" ("Il est interdit d' interdire" (a.c.,18)).

According to the writer, this is the true name of the signification, the 'reduction', of the values handed down, which Platon refers to by the names of 'virtues'. - Referred to by yet another name: 'nihilism' (i.e. the transmitted values are 'nihil', nothing). Nihilism, which can take all kinds of forms -- from passively crying wolf to actively "overthrowing everything".

The mythical explanation.
Bibl. st..-- W.B. Kristensen, *Contributions to the Knowledge of Antique Religions*, A'm, 1947, 103/124 (The Divine Deceiver).

Kristensen (1867/1953), a Norwegian, who teaches religious studies in Leiden in 1901, is perhaps one of the least naive of religious scientists: he does not allow himself to be misled by modern or even classical prejudices (see his *Introduction to the History of Religion,* Haarlem, De Haan, 1980-3 (1955-1), his *The Meaning of Religion (Lectures in the Phenomenology of Religion),* The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1968).

The main insight one encounters again and again with Kristensen is 'totality', i.e. harmony of opposites. Harmony' means integration, and 'opposites' "ethical good and evil" and "eudemonological good and evil".

By the way: 'eudemonolgy' means 'theory of luck', from the Ancient Greek 'eu.daimonia', to have a good (eu)daimon (luck creator/happiness cause).

Thinkers such as Marx ("Religion is opium for the people"), Nietzsche ("Religion is worldliness"), Freud ("Religion is neurosis") think that religion, -- mythical religion certainly, coincides with one or other form of 'naivety'. We will now see what this is about.

Hermes as "harmony of opposites".

We saw that Hermes was 'logios', the linguistic one (E.RH.70). Pious ancient Greeks, however, also called him 'dolios', the conqueror. This brings us close to Reinaart the Fox (E.R. 03): the 'Fox' was also an 'outcast', -- within Old Germanic religion.

Says Kristensen, o.c., 122: in Pellene, a city in Achaia (Peloponnese), Hermes was worshipped as "the trickster". Read : 'worshipped'. The pious believers of that pagan time saw in the treacherousness of their deities one of the basic propositions of life, indeed of the whole cosmos.

Appl. model.-- Kristensen, o.c., 120.-- Pandora, i.e. "the all-sufficient (goddess)." -
a. Prometheus outsmarts the deities: he takes from them "the divine fire" (according to Kristensen : "the life principle in the cosmos").
b. Whereupon the deities punish Prometheus. They deal with the people who are in solidarity with him through the 'messenger' Pandora: Hephaestus, the god of 'fire', forges "a beautiful woman"; Athena and Aphrodite bestow her with gifts. But Hermes gives her his own 'gift' in the highest degree - he is called 'charidotes', giver of gifts: in the very soul of Pandora he places the power to outwit, through which she can seduce, cunningly operate, grossly deceive. And, as messenger of life, he brings them to earth.

People welcome Pandora with joy, until they discover that she is the "harmony of opposites". She is the cause of, among other things, death. Pandora is (what the Germans call) "eine Lorelei".

Appl. model.-- Hermes as thief worshipped.-- All the pious worship him thus. But very especially the dishonest businessmen, and still most the thieves. Ploutarchos of, Chaironeia (+ 45/ + 125; Platonist) mentions the sacrifice to Hermes Charidotes on the island of Samos.

Every worshipper/worshipper was allowed to "steal and loot". " Apparently (according to Kristensen, p.c., 123) this curious custom was one of the "sacred sacrificial acts" at the sacrifice to this Hermes. Indeed: those who took part in the celebration imitated, while acting, the outcast Hermes by actually stealing. Thus they revealed his nature.

"A type of cult that is over-familiar" says Kristensen (he means among religious scholars). Note, with Kristensen, that, in Antique Greek, 'kleptein' means not so much 'stealing' as 'outsmarting'.

Appl. model.-- One deity outsmarts another.-- Outsmarting, by word or deed, is an essential characteristic of Paganism.,-- Orestes, son of Agamemnon and Klutaimnestra, famous thanks to the tragedian Aischulos (Oresteia), kills his mother.

The Erinues, Erinyes, the spirits of death, subject him to an "atè", a deity judgment. In order to involve his mind completely in "the other world," they make him insane.

But the gods Apollon and ... Hermes respond to this as 'saviors' ('soteres', salvations).

a. Apollon, the god of catharsis (E.R. 15.55) or sacred cleansing, cures him by a sacred act.

b. Hermes, as a messenger from "the other world", brings him back among the living.-- Whereupon the Erinues raged: "Thou, Apollon, hast stolen from us the mother-murderer ('ex.eklepsas'). Such an act was called 'theft!

Finally, we reread the preceding paragraphs on the crisis of word meanings, especially in the context of rhetoric, and the mythical theology does not appear to be at all at a loss for words! On the contrary!

A Teisias who outsmarted his teacher, in respect of the fee he had solemnly promised, could easily pass as "a Hermes pious man". He possessed both 'gifts' of the charidotes, the gift-giving Hermes : he was logios, linguistic, and... dolios, conqueror. The latter by means of the former.

Perhaps no part of Greek mythology is as significant as the Hermes myth, which strangely enough is not to be found in any book on rhetoric today. This myth clearly proves that degenerate rhetoric also takes place in the background of the omnipresent religion in Hellas.

Sample 12.-- The antique-Greek rhetoric (III). (81/85)

Let us consider for a moment the two Great or Macrosocracy Men, Platon and Aristotle. Both of them redefine the concept of rhetoric from their own point of view.

Platonic rhetoric.

O. Reboul, *Intr*., 25/31, says that Platon raises the essence of rhetoric mainly in two dialogues.

a. The Gorgias.-- The Sophists and, covered, Isokrates are subjected to an examination in the invented characters of the dialogue. Not that these characters do not represent real figures somewhere (= mimetic conception)! But Platon, true to his artistic nature, invents dialoguing characters in order to make some thesis or other ready.

b. The Faidros.-- The actually Platonic rhetoric is brought up : "speaking and thinking in the service of the (Platonically deduced) dialectic" is its essence.

In the Gorgias dialogue, a rather sympathetic Gorgias, rhetorician and sophist, accompanied by Socrates, speaks: "rhetoric" is defined as "the skill of imparting one or another conviction by means of some belief (= preconceived opinion) in what is conscientious ('righteous') or not conscientious ('unrighteous')". Without being too much concerned about the abuse that students might make of it.

Come, then, to speak two disciples of Sophists. One, Polos, defines "rhetoric" as "the ability to act with impunity, if necessary without conscience".

The other, although student of a Sophist but not a Sophist himself - he only holds the Sophists in contempt - criticises the democracy of the day, with its "iso.nomia" (literally: everyone is equal thanks to the law), because it "disenfranchises" the able and the powerful by preventing them from asserting themselves.

The 'fusis', i.e. - here in the Socratic sense - the situation of life of man before any legislation establishes order - involves "the so-called right of the able and the strong". A certain Kallikles is speaking who is aiming at 'turannis', dictatorship.

Note.- What Antique rhetors call 'deinotès', efficiency of linguistic skill, comes through in all the types of those subjected by Platon to a 'historia', examination.

Further explanation.-- Bibl. s.-- Alb. Gödeckemeyer, *Platon*, Müchen, Rösl, 1922, 45ff.-- The author expounds as follows.

Al.-- Philosophize.

Rhetoric in the service of Platonic philosophy involves first clarifying the essence of that kind of philosophizing.

Filia. Friendship.

By the way, friendship was considered a very high value in Antique Hellas. The Paleopythagoreans, among others, integrated friendship in their philosophizing. Also Platon.

Says Gödeckemeyer: "For the Socratic Platon - speaking in the *Faidros dialogue -* it was quite natural - he was an aristocrat and a beggar by birth - that instruction in philosophy should be

a. is an interaction of teacher and pupil, as e.g. indicated by sophistry,

b. but above all a working together in friendship".

Anagog.-- 'Catagogic' is what brings down; 'anagogic' what exalts.

Among the ancient Greeks, 'filia' often - not always - included a strong erotic streak. It was Platon's aim to free friendship from this. To this end, he ennobles 'love'.

a. By means of the thought that it is more than and different from mere sensual desire, it should grow into a kind of inspiration - mania - in the nature of mania, intoxication, characteristic of prophetesses, "mystics" (= initiates), poets.

b. Still more: it had to arrive, in the course of time, at an insight ('contemplation') into the models of all realities, the ideas of them, which become experienceable in the phenomena but nevertheless refer to something that already existed before and which is of a higher level of reality. With this last characteristic the actual philosophical mania is reached.

With this last characteristic, Platon introduces the infamous 'chorismos', transcendence, "transcendence of all that is directly given". In particular: the teaching thinker, in his teaching mission, is not out to have erotic contact with young people, but rather to awaken the souls of those same young people to all that is 'higher',--all that is divine, among other things, the 'ideas' in and at the same time above the things we see and hear and touch.

Incidentally: For Platon, too, friendship remains a form of "mania", an experience of intoxication, namely in so far as it rises above purely objective and calculated reasoning. But it is not "intoxication of the senses"--in this sense it is "afophatic": in words of the day it cannot be accurately described.

Gödeckemeyer continues. To give oneself over to paiderastia, boyish love, without that element directed towards the higher, is to miss the destination of earthly existence. To philosophize in all honesty and without ulterior motives, however, is to promote that destiny.

Yet Pagan Platon values the paiderastia - not to be confused with our present "pederasty", from which all religion has disappeared - so highly that even those who - in the context of such a paiderastia - may not cherish a truly philosophical intention but still aspire to something honorable, may not reach the highest level of earthly existence but still "do not remain without reward". (O.c.,57).

To conclude, "For to be trapped in the darkness of the subterranean way of life is no longer the fate of all those who have already taken the upward road to some extent: rather, they will know a life in the light and will at once be thoroughly happy (...)."
Thus Platon, who in such texts shows his adherence to Archaic-sacred preconceptions.

Note -- It should not be forgotten that, in some city-states of pagan Hellas, paiderastia was a sanctified institution by law, entailing both rights and obligations for the "lover" and the "beloved".
Thus, for example, the honorable lover had to see to it in time that the loved one could get a good and suitable wife,--or at least help to do so.

By the way: Paganism is not the same as 'conscience-free'. Conscience' in Paganism is determined, 'governed', by other presuppositions than those held, for example, by the Bible.
Thus it is conceivable that Platon, seeing the actual life, attempts to carry through therein precisely -- without beforehand either radically condemning or radically condoning -- a catharsis (E.R. 15, -- 33, 55, 80).

A2.-- Rhetoric.
For Platon, the philosophizing just sketched is the pre-eminent presupposition of the 'true' (understand: the ideal striving) rhetoric.
a. Together with Socrates he had begun to examine the actual rhetoric (of the Sophists),--particularly on the ethics (whether or not it was conscientious) in it. The result was rather negative.
b. But with the passing of time both realize that this (sophist) rhetoric also had positively verifiable features which had eluded them before.

Psuch.agogia.-- The guidance of the soul - the soul is, as with e.g. the Pythagoreans, the value par excellence - , in Antique Greek: psuchagogia, becomes the premise - one could almost say "the definition" - of true rhetoric.

It should be noted that the term 'true' has at least two meanings:

a. what corresponds to reality,

b. what corresponds to the ideal of that same reality.

Dialectical basis.

a. Socratic induction - coming from samples to a metaphorical or metonymical broadened understanding - was the dialectic of Socrates. His method of reasoning.

b. Platonic dialectics was the same Socratic method of generalization but updated by situating the (general) concepts of Socrates in the ideas of the things of experience. Not without an element of 'anamnesis', the surfacing in the conscious life of insights from past lives (reincarnism).-- In this methodically - rigorous way the soul can be formed.

Rejections.

Are so rejected next types.

a. The language skills of the Sophists and not sufficiently philosophically trained rhetoricians who learn a linguistic skill (useful in court or in the agora) which is limited to the technique of the most perfect arrangement (E.R. 10: harmological r.) and an equally perfect design (E.R. 12: stylistic r.), lack that Socratic-Platonic element ... soul formation.

b. The purely written speeches, which in themselves do not represent anything ridiculous (here Platon is obviously going against the prejudices of the nobility of the time), contain a text which contains precisely the same content for every possible reader(s). They lack adaptation to that same reader(s). This text is not "alive": it only records what was written at one moment. -- Here we come up against Platon's rejection of all that is merely written. Which is a kind of "grammar" (theory of everything written).

True rhetoric.-- Rather, this is that kind of linguistic skill which is practiced in a limited circle (which encourages significa or rapport). Such a linguistic skill states

a. the truth about things and

b. the dialectic method first. It is psuchagogia, attuned to the formation of the soul,-- soul which proves to be very impressionable.

B. The 'akademeia' (academy).

Gödeckemeyer, o.c., 61f..-- During a journey through Egypt, Platon meets in Kurene (Lat.: Cyrene) the famous mathematician Theodoros of Kurene (-460/...), with whom he familiarizes himself with the mathematics of the time.

While travelling through southern Italy and Sicily (= Greater Greece), he got to know the structure of the Paleopythagorean communities of thought ('hetaireiai').

It is said that in Platon's mind the idea arose of founding a school himself. "In order to make his own interpretation of rhetoric a living reality".

For this purpose he bought, in -387 or -386, a piece of land,--in the vicinity of the gumnasion, gymnasium, which was situated in 'Akadèmeia', the name of a site. There he founded his school "with perhaps the Faidros dialogue as its programme" (O.c., 62).

The structure.
Lower school: study together, relax, have a monthly guest meal.
Upper school: learning to work scientifically.

The affective climate: the eros, love,-- the filia, friendship, proper. These kept as healthy as possible thanks to the "light of divine ideas".

Daily task: dialoguing, i.e. learning to express oneself in a logical way and immediately learning to think together with others, fellow thinkers.

Last intention: to form solid statesmen "who lead 'the soul of the people' in 'good' (understand: based on real values) directions".

In order to re-establish the decayed democracy. In the eyes of the ancient Greek, who lived entirely in the context of the polis, this was the "highest reality" (o.c., 69f.).

Conclusion.-- Platon knows more than one type of rhetoric:
a. that of the logographers, who elaborate texts written for others,
b. that of the Sophists and their disciples, who think very pragmatically, i.e. purposefully. To this he applies catharsis, purification on a higher plane:
a. he takes them for what they are,
b. from a divine, apophatic reality (which with Platon is purged of the impure (unscrupulous) trappings of the Greek myths) cleansing and purifying them.

The light of divine ideas thereby precedes,-- what is called 'light metaphysics'. By this term one understands the fact that a "higher" light is the presupposition and of all reality and of all real knowledge of that same reality.

Sample 13.-- The Greco-Latin rhetoric. (86-90)

By way of introduction.-- Bibl. st..-- O. Willmann, *Abriss d. Phil.,* 16f..-- According to the connoisseur of Aristotle, Willmann, Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322; the "Stagirite"), the founder of the Peripatetic school, put logic -- in Aristotle's case referred to principally by the term "analutika," analytics -- at the service of:

a. the invention (it is then called 'dialectics', in the narrower sense than with e.g. Platon) and

b. logical, rigorous, 'valid' thinking itself. -

Hence the name 'organon', thinking instrument.

Notes.-

1. Dialectics is one application of logical rigor; it puts "ta endoxa" the established values first. It subjects these to a 'historia', an investigation,--by examining their pros and cons. In order to arrive at some scientific insight. -- The main part is "ta topika", the topics. The possible sources of knowledge where arguments can be found (heuristic rhetoric) are discussed.

2. - Rhetoric, again in a much narrower sense than e.g. Platon's, according to Aristotle's own terms, "parafues ti tès dialektikès", something very closely related (of an analogous nature) to dialectics. By means of enthymemes (syllogistic reasoning in an abbreviated form) an orator - for that is what Aristotle calls the actor of rhetoric - seeks to gain the approval of an audience.

As already noted (E.R. 28), Aristotle's rhetoric is divided into three parts:

a. the speaker (source of message),

b. the person addressed (recipient of the message), and

c. the speech (message), seen as sequence of thought contents and stylization of them.

Note.-- R. Barthes, *L' aventure sémiologique*, 94/96 (*La rétorique aristotélicienne*), emphasizes that with Aristotle rhetoric and literary theory ('poetics') are separate. Something that is later revised.

Reception.-- Aristotle forms the basis on which Marcus Tullius Cicero (orator and rhetor; -106/-43) will elaborate a strongly Roman rhetoric.-- Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (35/96; rhetor), in his *Institutiones oratoriae* (93/96), further elaborates this thrust in an educational sense.

Immediately we find ourselves in the Hellenistic - Roman period after -322.

Welcome.-- Two samples.

1. Thierry of Chartres (.../1157) belongs to the Early Scholastics (1000/1200). The Humanist renaissance of that time had the Platonist Thierry as its remarkable representative. He did pioneering work on logic and - in that context - dialectics and rhetoric. The Aristotelian Rhetorica ad He-rennium (-86/-62), more or less attributed to Cicero, and Cicero's De inventione are Thierry's sources.

Bibl. st..-- K.M. Fredborg, ed., *The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries by Thierry of Chartres*, Toronto, Pont. Inst. of Md. St., 1988.

2. Simon Dupleix (1569/1661) worked out, at the time, a *Logique*, which connoisseurs characterize as 'Post-Middle Ages'. Book VII explains the traditional, strongly Aristotelian dialectic (with the topics).

Bibl. st..-- S. Dupleix, *La logique ou art de discourir et raisonner* (1607), Paris, Fayard, 1984.

Rhetoric as literatology.-- R. Barthes, *L'aventure sém.* 95, 100/ 101 (La rhétorique généralisée).-- A change of conception of great magnitude takes place under the Augustan epoch (Emperor Augustus lives from -63 to +14).

a. Already Gorgias of Leontinoi (E.R. 75) and Platon (in his artistic dialogues) mixed rhetoric and poetics.
b. Aristotle, strongly scholastic, strictly separated them.

But the Augustan period sees the confluence of rhetoric and poetry. Rhetoric' becomes the general science of literature at that time. Writing and speaking well, broadly interpreted, becomes the theme.

Romans like Horace (-65/-8; Roman poet, known for an *Ars poetica*),-- Ovid (-43/+17; Roman poet,-- Tacitus (55/119; Roman historian, known for his sometimes controversial *Dialogus de oratoribus*, which most now assume is his work);

Greeks like Dionusios of Halikarnassos (rhetor at Rome (-30/-8)),-- Ploutarchos of Chaironeia (-5/125; Platonizing thinker and historian),-- the treatise *Peri hupsous* (first century A.D.),-- they are all witnesses to the fact that the concept of "rhetoric" is understood in the broad sense.

Rhetoric as general education.-- Already Isokrates of Athens (E.W. 75) identified philosophy as "general education," -- in the service, with him, of rhetoric.-- "Under "the good emperors" of the second century -- from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius (96/180) -- the Roman empire experienced a period of rest.

It is to this that Hellenic rhetoric owes a fresh revival. (E. Kalinka/O. Schönberger, Hrsg., Philistratos, *Die Bilder (Griechisch deutsch),* Munich, E. Heime-ran, 1968, 7),

The cradle of this revival was the also revived cities of Asia Minor, -- Ephesos, Miletos, Smurna). Later also Athens. "This new linguistic movement spanned the overall literary art. It acted -- as once did Protosofistics (-450/-350) -- as the center of cultural life. (...) Its name, too, was connected with the Protosophical movement: Philostratos who wrote its history in his Life of Sophists called it 'second sophistry' (Deutero.sophistry)". (Ibid.).

The term 'Sophist' thus acquired an all-embracing radiance. Aristeides proclaims: "The rhetor - i.e. orator, sophist - should be righteous. He himself should live conscientiously. He should encourage others to do so. He should be, in the full and complete sense, "a king". (O.c., 8).

Remember that the term "king", in those days, evoked a high opinion. Something like we would say now: "something regal".

The epideictic or graceful reason (understand: speaking and writing) is for the Deutero-sophistician a basic concept. This implied that e.g. Aristeides in two 'reasons' attacked Platon concerning the first-rate value of beautiful speech and writing. Immediately he tried to re-establish the rhetoric criticized in Platon's Gorgias dialogue (E.R. 81, 84).

Even philosophy of the time was incorporated into its new cultural ideal by the whole movement. -- Dionusios of Halikarnassos was considered one of the predecessors who wanted to revive "the old rhetoric": "To become a new Demosthenes (op.: greatest orator), -- a Thukudides (op.: the historian) or a Platon was the wish of every Deuterosophist." (O.c.,8). In other words: the past, but updated!

This new rhetoric, -- hence also the name "Neo-Rhetoric" (but not in the sense of a Chaïm Perelman) was of great influence throughout the then Roman-Hellenistic Empire.-- The period is known as a time of peace. Thriving trade relations -- especially in the Middle East -- characterize it. -- It is the time of the oikoumene - the unified inhabited world -, with one and the same culture from Spain to Syria.-- In this one should situate the rhetoric of the time.

From 100 to 400, therefore, this new rhetoric predominated throughout the Hellenistic-Roman world. Ecumenically speaking, it was true: "The same figures of speech were taught by S. Augustine, in Latin Africa, by the Heathen Libanius (Libanios of Antiocheia (Syria; 314/393; rhetor)), by S. Gregorios of Nazianze (329/389; Patriarch of Constantinople, where he presided over the First Ecumenical Council (381)), in Eastern Hellas". (R.Barthes, *L' aventure*, 101).

Note.-- At some point the terms were used as follows:
a, 'sophist' is the school director appointed by the emperor or the city council;
b. 'Rhetor' is the teacher - educator.

Textuology.-- What we call 'text' today is only one side of literature. But it is decisive. That the formation of texts was one of the main concerns of Deutero-sophistication appears from H.I. Marrou*, Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité*, (History of education in antiquity), Paris, Seuil, 1948, 239. The author mentions the 'progumnasmata', pre-exercises,--as an elementary rhetoric,--a 'pre.rhetoric!

1.-- Secondary education.-- Marrou lists the text types.-- narrative ('muthos'). -chreia (lat.: chrie,-- a rigid discourse),-- gnome (lat,: sententia,-- a discourse whose theme is a fact or statement),-- kataskeue (lat.: confirmatio,-- an affirmative proof) and anaskeue (lat.koinos topos (Lat.: locus communis, 'commonplace', a piece of text (or 'perikope') that can be incorporated as a component into a variety of text types (description, narrative, speech, treatise).

2.-- Higher education.-- Marrou continues.-- enkomion (lat.: laudatio, eulogy,-- a text about deeds and sayings of a character) and psogos (lat,: vituperatio, eulogy about the same),-- sunkrisis (lat.: comparatio, comparison, parallel),-- prosopopoiïa (lat.: prosopopoeia, Dutch: prosopopee, -- outlook description depicting one's external appearance and observable behavior) and ethopoiïa (lat.: ethopoeia, vernacular: ethopee, -- description of the soul reflecting the inner (temperament and character), ekfrasis (Lat.: descriptio,- description),-- thesis (Lat.: propositum or propositio,-- thesis one defends),-- nomos (Lat.: lex,-- discussion of law). -- conclusion an impressive list of text types.

Reception.-- Bibl. st..-- Noël/ Delaplace, *Leçons françaises de littérature et de morale (Avec préceptes du genre et des modèles d' exercices),* (French lessons of literature and morals (With precepts of the genre and models of exercises)), Bruxelles, 1844, 552 pp..

Note the title: like all Antiques, the Deuterosophists in front, also in full XIXth century! Textual science goes hand in hand with ethical and political education.

Note also that the 'precepts' on text types (without which exercises are blind) are not offered without the 'exercises' (without which the precepts are empty).-- The book lapses into two parts.

1.-- Prose.-- Narrative, 'scene' (= 'tableau', i.e. pictorial form of description) and description,-- definition (here broader than the merely logical : a value judgment - e.g. of a judge - is also called 'definition' (i.e. of the value of an act)),-- fable, allegory (detailed description of the model of an original which it elucidates).

Religious morality and lay morality ("philosophie pratique" called).-- Letter (a text type that includes all kinds of types).

Discourse, -- oratorical (i.e. concerning the discourse) fragment, discourse introduction and conclusion (the latter "concluding speech").

Philosophical dialogue (Platonic type), literary (= bellettristic) dialogue.

Character description (// ethopoeia), portrait (and view and soul description together), parallel (political, literary, ethical comparison).

Poetry.-- Here follows the same list as for the prose,-- the letter excepted (letter in verse seems non-existent).-- Addition: lyrical fragment.

Final sum.
a. Aristotelian rhetoric is only a small part of this literatology.
b. And prose and poetry belong together within one comprehensive 'theory of literature', descendant of the Late Antique 'rhetoric' in the sense of Deuterosophism.

***Reception.*--** For secondary education, once upon a time, Ch.-M. des Granges/ Mlle Maguelone, *La composition Française (Livre du maître),* (French Composition (Master Book)), Paris, 1930, was considered authoritative in France.

Story, description,-- portrait (outward and inward description), letter.

Of course, still in the full XXth century, the ethical-political formation is included: the pupil draws up essays on "la morale" (ethical and civic contents or "values").

Finally: literary dissection, literary evaluation ("critique littéraire").

Omitted: The speech!

Sample 14.-- Current literatology (literary theory). (91/93)

The more recent literary theory gets off the ground from 1940+. In France from 1950,-- with names like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida,-- Julia Kristeva, Philippe Sollers, - A.G. Greimas and others;-- in other countries names like Noam Chomsky, René Wallek, Austin Warren -- even Ch.S. Peirce (USA) sound. - Max Bense, R. Jakobson, T. Todorov and many others.

Bibl. s.;-- T.A. van Dijk, *Tekstwetenschap (Een interdisciplinaire inleiding),* (Text Science (An Interdisciplinary Introduction),), Utr./Antw., 1978;

T.A. van Dijk, *Modern literary theory (An experimental introduction),* Amsterdam, 1971;

M. Delacroix/F. Hallyn, *Méthode du texte (Introduction aux études littéraires),* (Method of the text (Introduction to literary studies), Paris / Gembloux, 1987;

R. Wallek/A. Warren, *Theory of Literature*, New York, 1942 (Fr. transl.: *La théorie littéraire*, Paris, Seuil, 1971),--a book which, especially since 1949, has been used as a foundational work in virtually all countries;

Tel Quel, *Théorie de l' ensemble*, Paris, 1968 (notions of writing and text, further unconscious, history, labor, trace, production, scene, lead to an updating and re-founding of traditional literary theory;

V.Bohn, Hrsg., *Literaturwissenschaft (Probleme ihrer theoretischen Grundlegung),*(Literary studies (problems of its theoretical foundation)), Stuttgart, 1980;

Har. Fricke, *Die Sprache der Literaturwissenschaft (Textanalytische und philosophische Untersuchungen)*, (The Language of Literary Studies (Textual Analytical and Philosophical Studies), Munich, 1977;

L. Bredella, *Das Verstehen literarischer Texte*, (The understanding of literary texts), Stuttgart, 1980;

G. Pasternak, *Interpretation*, Munich, 1979;

A. Wijzenbroek, *De kunst van het begrijpen (Een structuralistisch-hermeneutisch model voor de analyse van literair proza),* (The art of understanding (A structuralist-hermeneutic model for the analysis of literary prose),), Muiderberg, 1987 (both the French and the German basic theories are discussed);

J. Kuin, *From literary theory to literary philosophy*, in: Streven (Antwerp), 1980, March, 537/547 (on the Chicago School, which, in the face of the one-sided textual analysis of American New Criticism (1915+), emphasizes data situable outside the text and, in the face of Left Wing and Counterculture (1945+) with its irrationalism, emphasizes rational scientism concerning textual dissection).

C. Pichois/A. Rousseau, *Comparative Literature*, Utr./Antw., 1972;

P. Brunel/Cl. Pichois/A.-M. Rousseau, *Qu' est-ce que la littérature comparée*, (What is comparative literature), Paris, 1983.

There is even a work that commits a meta-language (language over language) over literary theories: H. Göttner/J. Jacobs, *Der logische Bau von Literaturtheorien*, (The logical construction of literary theories,), Munich, Fink, 1978 (the Sneed theory).

Let's not forget the issues of the French magazine *Poétique* (Paris), with a.o. *Poétique (Raconter, représenter, décrire),* (Poetics (Telling, representing, describing)), No. 65 (février 1986).

Further dictionaries such as: *H. Mahlberg, Literarisches Sachwörterbuch*, (Literary non-fiction dictionary), Bern, 1948 (outdated but very useful);

G. u. I. Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon (Stichwörter zur Weltlitaratur)*, Stuttgart, 1984 (an extremely full book);

H. Benac, *Nouveau vocabulaire de la dissertation et des études littéraires*, (New vocabulary for essay and literary studies,), Paris, 1972;

H. Benac (Br. Réauté/M. Laskar), *Guide des idées littéraires*, Paris, 19882;

J. Peck/M. Coyle, *Literary Terms and Criticism*, Houndmils/ondon, 1984 (with an overview of the major theories of liturgy o.c., 149/168 (*Critical Positions and Perspectives*)).

The new rhetoric.--Read for a moment E.R. 86v. (Aristotelian understood rhetoric). Rhetoric in the narrower sense of persuasive skill still exists and is even being re-established (it is a part of current literatology).

Bibl. st.. -- Umberto Eco, *La structure absente (Introduction à la recherche sémiotique)*, (The absent structure (Introduction to semiotic research),), Paris, 1984, 154/158 (*Rétorique ancienne et rétorique moderne* (defines 'rhetoric' as distinct from logic (with its apodictic (strictly provable) and dialectic (logically probable, 'plausible') arguments): rhetoric gives 'plausible' proofs in the form of enthymemes (abbreviated conclusive arguments));

Chaïm Perelman/Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité d' argumentation (La nouvelle rétorique)*, PUF, 1958 (Perelman's Neo-Retoric builds on Aristotle, Isokra-tes, Quintilian, but in an updated sense and with a great deal of attention to justifying value judgments);

R. Hegselmann, *Formale Dialektik (Ein Beitrag zu einer Theorie des rationalen Argumentierens),* (Formal Dialectics (A Contribution to a Theory of Rational Argumentation),), Hamburg, Meiner, 1985 (inspired by Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Arguments, Cambridge University Pr., 1958) and Chaïm Perelman's Neo-Retoric).

State of the art.-- See how O. Reboul, *Introduction à la rétorique*, Paris, 1991, 91/98 (Aujourd'hui : des rétoriques), summarizes. --

1. Broadening.-- The present rhetoric includes, besides the theory of posing - see E.R. 07/23 (The main elements of the rhetorical act)-- i.e. invention and arrangement, stylization,-- memory work and recitation, a theory of the reaction of the reader, resp. hearer - see E.R. 24/58. What was somewhat dealt with in the grammars of the Antiques.

More than that: the broadening also applies to the three ancient types of eloquence (E.R. 71: political, legal and demonstrative speech). The verbal rhetoric is enriched with publicity theory (propaganda, advertising,-- 'marketing') and the non-wordly is broadened into the realm of the poster, film and music, yes, into the realm of the unconscious and subconscious soul life,-- always insofar as all these realms bring a message to the man and build an understanding (significa).--

For example, one can consider a nightdream as a message emerging from our unconscious and subconscious soul life, and analyze the rhetorical elements in it.

2. Unification.-- The current term 'rhetoric' also sometimes undergoes unification.
Bibl. st. *--* G. Genette, *Figures*, 3 vols., Paris, Seuil, 1966/ 1972;

id., *La rhétorique restreinte*, (Restricted rhetoric,), in: *Communications* 16,1.-- Here the term 'rhetoric' is restricted to 'stylistics'.

So in H.Morier, *Dictionnaire de poétique et de rhétorique*, Paris, 1981-3.

So too with J. Cohen, G. Genette, Rol. Barthes and the Groupe Mu. Rhetoric' here becomes the theory of the linguistic processes - e.g. stylistic figures (think of the tropes (metaphor, metonymy, - synecdoche)) - that turn a text into a literary text. See above E.R. 12/14 (stylistic rhetoric).

The term "literary criticism".
It means "applied literatology." -- 'Criticism', in the healthy sense, logically means "a responsible value judgment".

The literary critic:
(a) dissects a text or a message in one form or another (a poster, for example),
(b) however, in such a way that he arrives at a well-founded value judgment.

Consequence: all tendencies that literary theory exhibits, recur in literary criticism. Internal (text) critiques (New Criticism (1940/1960); British Criticism; Russian Formalism; Structuralism);-- external critiques (Feminist, Marxist, Post-Structuralist, Phenomenological-Existentialist, Psychoanalytic, Socialist-Realist critiques) are the two major types of viewing a text or message carrier.

Sample 15.-- The ambiguity of the text phenomenon. (94/110)
We are certainly not going to develop this chapter fully (we couldn't even do that). But we are going to suggest the ambiguity for a moment by listing some prominent theories.

The term 'corpus'. - One of the meanings of the term 'corpus' (= literally 'body') is "a limited collection of texts". Anyone who has to read a number of books and/or articles as a 'final project' (= dissertation), will have to process a 'corpus'. That is the fact.
The question - think of the structure of mathematical problems - is: from what perspective (angle of view) can one study such a set of texts? At least, one wants to do so as scientifically as possible.

Literatological auxiliary sciences.-- The surviving 'rhetoric' and in the narrow (especially Aristotelian) sense and in the Late Antique broad sense has been enriched in recent decades by a whole series of auxiliary sciences.-- We are going to give a 'flavour' of these for a moment.

The science of language (linguistics).-- This subject science has become unprecedentedly extensive.-- Just this. Charles Bally (1865/1947; pupil of F.de Saussure (1857/1913; the semiologist)), in his, *Le langage et la vie*, (Language and life), Geneva/Lille, 1952-3, 13s., talks about traditional rhetoric and the linguistics associated with it. -

(1) Until about 1800 - he says - language was never studied for its own sake. Indeed, whether it was grammar or rhetoric (narrow or broad) - we add "dialectics" -, one always wanted, by means of language teaching:;
a. provide a logical formation,
b. learn to write and speak with 'style;
c. to teach, above all, literary culture through "the great classical writers".
Until 1800 the ideal of Deuterosophism is clearly recognized (E.R. 88). This indicates the enormous after-effects ('reception') of the Late Antique Sophists. This is why we have dwelt on it for so long.

(2) From 1800, however, much changes.-- Bally, with all enduring reverence for that "classical" tradition, notes: the undervaluing of the language spoken daily. (In French, the disdain resonates more strongly: "le langage vulgaire" (vulgar language).
According to Bally, however, that language is "la seule véritable parce que la seule originelle". (o.c., 13). Bally is clearly 'language populist' here.

One can discuss what would be "the only true language": isn't there rather a multitude of languages, among which the vernacular language in which what is called "the common sense" is at work?

Bally continues: Bally has every respect for the standpoint of his teacher de Saussure. But he reproaches the inspirer of the Structuralist emphasis on semiology (theory of signs) for his one-sided rationalist view of language.

Three things are suppressed there:
1. The speaking subject (I, thou, we are the language users),
2. The whole situation in which is spoken (e.g. I, you, we are teachers with children whom, after puberty, we can hardly control) and which can make the words we use understandable,
3. The non-logical side of concrete-singular speech (E.R. 31: cosmic communication; E.R. 51: suggestion): a neurotic speaks differently from a psychologically healthy one.
All this Bally reproaches in the name of natural language, insofar as it is not 'literary' and 'artistic' and situated in real life, not so much written as spoken.

Decision.-- More recent literatologies would do well to take Bally's position seriously if they are not to fall into a one-sided understanding of language.

By the way: *Inexpressionism, Germano Celent*, Paris, 1989, talks among other things about the Italian art critic Celent (Arte povera, Inexpressionism), who favours populism in art: "art and everyday life flow into each other". Which is precisely what Bally claimed about language.

Two basic auxiliary sciences.-- Phenomenology on the one hand and the theory of signs (semiology (de Saussure), semiotics (Peirce)) on the other hand dominate -- each in its own way -- many literatologists. Examples.--

1. Phenomenological method: R. Lanigan, *Speech Act Phenomenology*, The Hague, 1976 (criticism of the Language Analysis of Austin, Searle, Grice; construction of a phenomenological description);
Analecta Husserliana, Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition, No. XIX (deals phenomenologically e.g. with the sea as an element within our human existence).

2. Semiotic-semiological method: R. Scholes, *Semiotics and Interpretation*, Yale University Press, New Haven / London, 1982 (in the wake of Todorov, Genette, Barthes et al.; reference should be made to his *Structuralism in Literature*, Yale, 1974).

Note -- Reference should be made to the Logic and Methodology Course, which talks about two basic methods, Phenomenology (Husserl) and Formalism.

Note - *Deconstructionism*.-- J. Derrida (1930/...) is the central figure of this 'deconstructionist' philosophy. He has written extensively on all possible subjects. Let us mention *De la grammatologie*, Paris, 1967.

Derrida is a Structuralist who elaborates on Nietzsche and Heidegger, who want to do away radically with the great Western tradition - especially Platonism (and Platonising Christianity) - in his 'grammatological way.

Bibl. st..-- H. Servotte e.a. (ed.). *In het licht van de letter* (In the light of the letter), *(Six exercises in deconstruction),* Leuven, 1988 (work influenced by Derrida, P. De Man, Ph. Lacoue - Labarthe a.o.);

Chr. Norris, *Deconstruction (Theory and Practice),* London/New York,1982 (Deconstruktionism has a growing following in the USA);

J. Llewelyn, *Derrida on the Threshold of Sense*, London, 1986 (a thorough introduction);

M. Lisse, Le motif de la déconstruction- et ses portées politiques, in: Tijdschr.v.fil. 52 (1990): 2 (June), 230/250.

Note.-- J. Kuin, inl./vert., T.S. Eliot, *The Function of Criticism*, Kampen, 1989 (a work representing the antithesis of 'dismantling' reading and writing).

Note.-- Individuologie.-- Bibl. st..-- R. Mortier, *L 'originalité, (Une nouvelle catégorie esthétique au Siècle des Lumières)*, (The originality, (A new aesthetic category in the Age of Enlightenment)), Geneva, Droz, 1982.

The concept of 'singular' (individual, singular) finds one of its applications in the concept of 'origin(s)'. Is 'original' everything that does not originate from something else? The problem was already known in Ancient Greece.

In the West, after the Middle Ages, a Modern concept of 'originality' emerges ('thinking autonomously' - the battle cry of Modernity - encompasses 'finding its origin in itself').

Mortier examines originality as understood by the XVIII-d' century Enlightened minds in the fields of art and literature.

Note: If it is true that texts and works of art are 'original', we conclude from this that there should be a method adapted to the singular. Groupe Mu (J. Dubois Centre d' études poétiques, Université de Liège), Paris, 1970-1, 1982-2, vrl. 145/147 (Approche du phénomène de l'ethos : généralités), reasons as follows:

"If a text is something 'absolute' (read: singular), i.e. independent of the rest and - in its uniqueness ('Einmaligkeit') - not comparable with any other text, then such a text is impervious to a so-called 'universal' (read: concordist, assimilist (smoothing out all gaps and differences) method, -- but then such a text is susceptible to an 'intuitive' method geared to the singular.

Note.-- This is analogous to the standpoint of 'spiritual science' (in the line of Bentham, Ampère, Mill, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833/1911; *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (Introduction to the Humanities), (1883)) designed the concept of 'Geisteswissenschaft'.

Later it was refounded by W. Windelband (1848/1915) and H. Rickert (1863/1936; *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Cultural science and natural science), (1916).

The duality 'idiographic' (individuological) 'nomothetic' (general) comes from Windelband. In other words, according to Groupe Mu, idiography is the method used to grasp texts in their singularity.

Application model : The film 'Zelig'.

Bibl. s..-- J. Botermans*, Een volstrekt unicum voor allen*, (An utterly unique experience for everyone), in: Spectator (Ghent) 05.11.1983, 39. Says the author :

"(1) It's getting tedious but I have to use a superlative again: Woody Allen's Zelig is utterly unique. (...). The vast majority (in terms of film offerings) is flat commercial crap, with the occasional standout and rare highlight in between.

So Zelig is unique. And a huge success in the United States.

It is a stroke of genius: although the character has never existed and even, as a striking character trait, shuns all demonstrative individuality and flees, it nevertheless brings a character to life and 'proves' his authenticity (note: the fact that he apparently really existed) and existence with all sorts of means typical of the art of film.

(2) 1 What's so special about that? Movie characters are always imaginary, unless it is a biography. That's the point: Zelig is a (false) biography in the guise of a (false) documentary,--about someone who never existed.

(2) 2 But what you're going to be interested in is such that the scenario ultimately seems a bit thin. As a result, the uniqueness lies mainly in the form. Thus Zelig is more of a curiosity.

In form, Zelig is a kind of TV survey: chunks of old film of all kinds, pieces of newsreels to situate the era, testimonies of people who knew Zelig, assessments by renowned people who give their opinion about him and try to define him as a phenomenon.

All fantasized, because, no matter how believable he's going to seem, Zelig (Woody Allen himself) didn't exist."

Note.-- In passing, Zelig as a temperament and character is a kind of chameleon: he changes shape according to the people he is with.

Ch. S. Peirce would say: his opinion is that of others ("authority method"). Losing oneself in the crowd, not standing out,--flowing right along with the others,-- very particular: sharing the opinion of those one meets individually. 'Conformism' can also be said.

In this sense, Zelig is a satire (mockery) of a widespread human tendency : to run along, like a herd animal, with the others.

Deep psychological: Zelig is 'driven' (motivational behavior) by the on- and subconscious urge to be liked by others at all costs.

"A malleability that has always been so skilfully abused by demagogues (understand: people's men) of all kinds". (J. Botermans, a.c.).

Decision.-- A paradox: to make a work of art as individual as possible out of a person as little as possible;

Allen Stewart Koenigsberg, nicknamed "Woody Allen" (was born in Brooklyn, N.Y. 01.12.1935) reflects somewhat on Zelig: isn't he known as an excellent comedian, but in the timidly complicated genre?

Epistemology.-- Bibl. st.. Käte Hamburger, *Wahrheit und ästhetische Wahrheit*, Stuttgart, 1979.
Th.W. Adorno (1903/1969; until 1933 professor in Frankfurt (Frankfurter Schule)), following in the footsteps of Hegel, states that literature is determined by its truth content. But what is meant by the term 'truth' when it concerns the 'truth' of a text, especially an art text? This is the question that Hamburger tries to answer.
L. Verbeeck, *De literatuur naar de letter* (The literature to the letter), *(Philosophical reflections on Umberto Eco' s De naam van de roos*, (The name of the rose), in: Tijdschr.v.fil. 47 (1985):1 (March), 15/41;
Th. Van Veldhoven, *Teken, waarheid, macht (On The Name of the Rose, by Umberto Eco),* in: Tijdschr.v.fil. 47 (1985) 1 (March), 42/70.

Eco, the famous semiotician, writes books in which 'fiction' (imaginary realities of all kinds), in Mannerist style, plays a strong part. In response to this, Verbeeck begins by noting that:

1. children as art and literature lovers clearly prefer "the real thing" : "Would Winnetoe really have existed?".

2. while adults seem to favor fiction. Let us correct: "Fiction is rather a matter of some adults : literally enchanted by purely imaginary 'realities' (the ontological meaning of 'real' as 'non-nothing' comes through very strongly here), some contemporaries prefer to seek out 'thin-headed works'.

Two extremes.

1. M. Collot, *La poésie moderne et la structure de l' horizon*, (The modern poetry and the structure of the horizon), PUF, 1988, reproaches literary Structuralism - apart from the neglect of the person who creates art ("the subject") and of the history in which the person moves - also the neglect of "la référence", the "reference", i.e. the reference to reality (outside the work of art).

If works represent reality, then the Structuralist claims that this invariably amounts to a 'distortion' of reality (and is therefore an illusion).

If works suggest the same reality, they are written off by the Structuralist as 'twisting' write-ups of previous texts (and thus as 'intertextuality'). Art, especially literature, is a form of 'délirer', deliriousness, i.e. thin-headedness.

Note.-- J. Derrida, the deconstructionist, represents an extreme in this: e.g. in his *Marges de la philosophie*, Paris, 1972, he claims that the whole Western tradition suffers from logocentrism.

The 'mimesis', the representation of reality, invariably betrays the belief in 'logos', i.e. thinking, speaking and writing as truthfully reproducing language. What needs to be 'dismantled'.

2. M. Foucault, Parrèsia (Speaking boldly and truth), Amsterdam, *Crisis Research*, 1, 1989, represents then the other extreme. At the end of 1983 this (Post-)Structuralist, at the University of Berkeley (Cal.), gave lectures on 'parrhèsia', boldly speech (as it happened in Greek-Latin Antiquity).

Someone or a group, convinced of the truth despite the danger associated with it, feels it is their duty to 'criticise', if necessary in the face of an absolute despot.

Curious: J. Foucault himself wanted to be such a truthful speaker. But he did so purposefully, namely as an outspoken critic of a society 'distorted' by power relations.

Aesthetics.-- 'Aesthetics' i.e. the theory concerning beauty (and art), was introduced, as terminus technicus, by Al.G. Baumgarten (1714/1762; ll. of the Rationalist Christian Wolff) in his *Aesthetics*, 2 Bde, 1750/1758.

As early as 1735, in his Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, Baumgarten started from the premise of an individual subject that treats beauty as beauty.

Bibl. st..-- O. Pöggeler, *Die Frage nach der Kunst (Von Hegel zu Heidegger),* Freiburg/ München, 1984 (a book that clarifies possibilities and meaning in our present time of all that is art, on the basis of Hegel (Winckelmann, Creuzer), Schopenhauer, Hölderlin (Heidegger), Paul Celan (Van Gogh, Brancusi), a.o. with regard to architecture);

F. Koppe, *Grundbegriffe der Aesthetik*, Frankf.a.M., 1983.

Koppe: **a**. thoroughly criticizes the aesthetics of Positivism, Formalism, Structuralism, Materialism, Psychoanalysis,

b. designs its own aesthetics: following in the footsteps of Dewey (but with a greater eye for what is actually aesthetic), Koppe sees 'art' in the fact that the needs of everyday life are not expressed in everyday language but are transferred into a non-ordinary sphere. What everyday life lacks, that 'more' offers art.

Appl. model: metaphor.

Bibl. st..-- Paul De Man, *Allegories of Reading (Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust)*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven/London, 1979.-

Following in the footsteps of Derrida, who has the greatest resonance in the USA, De Man deals with transference (metaphor) in literary and philosophical texts. What strikes many is that he also preserves the traditional method of reading texts.

Note.-- Since R. Jakobson (1896/1962; Russian Formalist) the tropes - metaphor, metonymy - have been central:

H. Osterwalder, T.S. Eliot: *Between Metaphor and Metonymy (A Study of His Essays and Plays in terms of Roman Jakobson's Typology),* Bern, Francke, 1978. The work deals with the renewal of methodology in dramaturgy (= study of drama).

The triad "psychology/ sociology/culturology".

One can also see art and text from a psychological (possibly Psychoanalytical), sociological and culturological point of view.

Bibl. s.-- T. Todorov, *Mikhtine et le principe dialogique*, (Mikhtine and the dialogical principle), Paris, 1981.-- Bakhtine criticizes Structuralism which overemphasizes language and language use as a system - in - itself.

He proposes in its place a human triad:

a.1 the voice that speaks (i.e. the person, the 'subject' or 'I')

a.2. the voice to whom it is addressed (i.e. the person - in - society) and

b. the 'voice' (in the metaphorical sense) within which one speaks (i.e. the culture which forms the living framework). Together with other human scientists (e.g. humanists and spiritual scientists) we put this threefoldness first.

Psychology.-- We select haphazardly, among the boundless number of studies on the subject, a few examples.

Lou Andreas-Salomé, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, Amsterdam, Arbeiderspers, 1987.

Lou Salome (her husband's name was Andreas), of Russian origin, got to know Nietzsche personally through Paul Rée in 1882. With both men she - the man-hater - lived a kind of chaste love affair.

From this encounter (E. RH. 30) she describes Nietzsche's texts as an image of his personality: like a Zenon of Elea (+/- -500), ll. of Parmenides, whose teachings he vehemently defended, Nietzsche defended one or another thesis, while just as stubbornly confronting them with one or another opposite thesis (one perspective - to use Nietsche's language - evokes, by contrast, the other). Behold one of Nietzsche's psychic tendencies.

Note - Derridians become unwell from that method. But who will have better knowledge ('cognition' in the sense of possession of solid information): Derrida pinning himself to what he considers to be a suspect text (the text itself already does not belong to the person writing it) or Lou who knew Nietzsche very personally? Perhaps Derrida could do as Nietzsche did: try to defend the opposing view as fiercely as his own.

Psychanalysis.

Bibl. st..-- John E. Jackson, *Passions du sujet (Essais sur les rapports entre psychanalyse et littérature), (Passions of the subject, Essays on the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature),* Paris, Mercure de France, 1990.

S. Bonzon*, Essais: Jackson et la littérature sur le divan*, (Jackson and literature on the couch), in: Journal de Genève 19.01.1991, sees in the book two kinds of psychoanalysis at work:

a. to illuminate - through the decision to write - the value attributes (desires, expectations) to the work within the destiny ("le destin") of the writer;

b. the exposure of the 'signs' (indications), within the text itself, in which the writer reveals himself somewhere with his drive, loneliness, possibly with his hate, etc..

Sexology.

Bibl. st..-- Phyllis Trible, *God and gendered language*, Hilversum, Gooi and Sticht, 1988.

In the USA this work belongs to the classics. Trible, professor at the Union Theological Seminary, N.Y., wants in this book - with the help of rhetoric (a.o. stylistics) - to question the Old Testament about remnants of female language use. "Man and woman He (Yahweh) created them" (Gen 1:27) is the motto. The metaphor of the 'womb' (repeatedly applied to God) is exposed. Books like the Song of Songs and Ruth,--yes, the Paradise story are discussed 'feministically'.

Sociology.-- P. Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire*, (What talking means), Paris, Fayard, 1982.

Not so much the words themselves, as Austin and other linguists advocate, but especially the social system within which speech is spoken - with its prevailing power relations - dominate, as basic presuppositions, the speaking of a 'subject' and the hearing, resp. listening, of a partner or an audience. -- Which, of course, is situated outside the text.

Appl. mod.: Ernest Mandel, *Meurtres exguis*, (Expected murders), Paris, 1987.

Starting point: Marxist sociology. Mandel is the theoretician of the IV International. Author of a Traité d ' economy marxiste.

Theme: the 'polar' (detective novel), of which he examines both the success and the development. The police novel is also called "the opium of the new middle classes".

Indeed: it started with highwayman stories, continued with whodunit and the Serie Noire USA -- style,-- up to and including the sociological detective stories since 1968.

Mandel reads through the phenomenon of the 'polar' until he discovers the 'hypothesis' at work. This hypothesis, according to Mandel, is the feeling inherent to the middle classes that bourgeois-capitalist society is an opaque mystery.

Who, for instance, disentangles the mechanisms that make oil prices rise - and fall? What lies behind the fact that our daily bread suddenly becomes much more expensive?

To conclude: the middle-class is embroiled in an inextricable middle of life.

Note.-- In the polar, in other words, the middle class meets a model of the original (society).--

In passing: Mandel refers to Ernst Bloch (1885/1977; *Das Prinzip Hoffnung; Pacifist*) -- "There is nothing surprising in the fact that educated people are, as it were, possessed by mysterious histories : after all, doesn't the whole of bourgeois society function as a great mystery?". This is Mandel's reasoning.

Soviet-Socialist Realism.

Sociology as a literary science is one thing. Sociologism is two: the sociologist claims that the sociological 'science' (which then degenerates into an ideology) can 'explain' anything concerning literature and art. In other words: sociology is "put before the horse" in sociologism.

Bibl. st..-- L. Trotzki, *Literature and revolution*, Amsterdam, Arbeiderspers, 1982; H. Siegel, *Sowjetische Literaturtheorie* (*1917/1940*), Stuttgart, Metzler" 1981.

Lev Trotzki (1879/1940; revolutionary theorist) wrote, in 1923, the book on "socialist" literature and art: fierce criticism of what went before; Marxist theory. All art has the task of representing "reality" (= realism) from a socialist perspective. A basic book in the Soviet Union of, at the time.

Siegel's work discusses the development from sociologism to doctrinaire-authoritarian Leninism-Marxism. This in the line of men like G. Plechanof, V. Vorosfsky, A. Bogdanof.

Social Criticism.

The New Left founded social criticism, where the term 'criticism' is not neutral but New Left, Gauchism, reflective.

Bibl. st..-- Cl. Hülsenbeck et al, *Het rode boekje voor scholieren*, (The little red book for schoolchildren), Utr./Antw., 1970.-- Basis: the Anti-Authoritarianism. Of which the following example, o.c., 22/29 (Authority).

Scene 2. Authority at school.
Speakers: teachers, head teacher, principal.
Silencers : pupils.-- "I didn't ask you anything." "Do you do that at home?". "No, you sit there!". "You do that somewhere else but not here, friend!". "You're a guest in my classroom!". "You pick up that bread". "You could be much better than 2B". "You get out".

Thus depart 'critical' teachers who want "All power to the people". It is clear that art and literature must be squeezed through that 'democratic' framework.

Anyone who follows the PCP (Politically Correct Persons) doctrine in the USA over the last few years knows that Gauchism comes to equally authoritarian 'measures' once it has "seized power" at e.g. a university.

Appl. model.-- Stephan Thernstrom, professor at Harvard for 25 years, the most esteemed specialist in the USA in the history of race relations, decided to give up his course '*Peopling of* America'.

What did they accuse him of? Only this (blamed the PCP): he used terms like 'Indian' (which was labelled 'racist') and 'Oriental' (which was labelled 'imperialist').

Decision --- The 'contestants' of the Sixties --- the Hippies and the Yippies --- have, in the meantime, conquered 'power' at universities, call themselves 'PC' and 'PCP; and, following in the footsteps of Foucault, Lacan and Derrida, vilify 'the Great Books' (= Platon, Augustine, Rousseau, even Homeros) which up to now have formed the basic works for the 'freshmen' (the first-year students).

Semanalysis.-- Julia Kristeva (a Bulgari; 1941/ ....) in her *Sémiotikè (Recherches pour une sémanalyse*), (Semiotikè (Research for a Semanalysis)), Paris, 1969, creates a variant of sign theory (Peirce's semiotics; de Saussure's semiology). Semanalysis identifies the phenomenon of 'text' as a work product. Thinking, speaking and writing is 'labor' (a Marxist term).

Bibl. st..- Paul Claes*, Het netwerk en de nevelvlek* (The network and the nebula), *(Semiotic studies),* Leuven, Acco, 1979 (a work in which Structuralism is brought up but 'critically' (Greimas' theory of stories e.g. is attacked),--with Kristeva's semanalysis as the premise).

Appl. model: phenotext/ enjoyment text.-- This systechy (pair of opposites) governs sem analysis,

a. Phenotext.-- What we, on the surface, hear while reading is only 'phenotexte' (an expression from biology (phenotype)). It is the result of the 'labour' of a subject (person, I) - in - communication and - interaction with others.

b. Genotext.-- Think of heredity theory with its term 'genotype'. - The text, in its 'depth' (a Structuralist term), is the 'true' text. After all, the person always thinks, plays and writes as a member of a social class (Marxism) and moved (consciously) or driven (unconsciously) by the unconscious and subconscious layers of the soul (Freudism).

Consequences.
1. A person may, as a member of a class and on the basis of unconscious or subconscious dispositions, consciously conceal or distort.
2. Someone un(der)consciously distorts the reality he/she thinks he/she is talking about.

Sem analysis "reads between the lines" (through the "surface" she reads the "depth").

Culturology.

The third member of the triad.-- 'Culture' is a term that revolves around 'education' ('paideia' W. Jaeger would say),-- with the necessary and sufficient educational values.

Bibl. st..-- M. Bakhtine, *L'œuvre de Francois Rabelais et la culture populaire au Moyen Age et sous la Renaissance*, (The work of François Rabelais and popular culture in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance,), Paris, Gallimard, 1982-2.

M. Bakhtine (1895/1975) discusses the texts of Rabelais, insofar as he was inspired by the comic folk culture of the Middle Ages. This popular culture expressed itself in texts (sayings) and actions of all kinds,--among others to distance itself from the rulers of the time. Laughing, simply and at celebrations - carnival, fools' parties, donkey parties, charivari -, even to the point of coarse laughter (the grotesque), in order to neutralize the tragedy of life while laughing, is one characteristic.

Bakhtine claims that one only really understands Rabelais if one starts from this populist culture.

Note.-- Culturological literatology of this kind recalls e.g. Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, Benjamin Whorf who saw language-and-culture 'in one'.

Surely it is abundantly clear that without an understanding of the cultural context of a work of art or a text (message), that work of art or that text (message) will remain largely unspoken, indeed, unreadable.

Think for instance of Endgame by S. Beckett (Nobel laureate): Hamm and Cloy, both 'burnt out' (their end of life was already in the beginning of their lives), live in "the void" (meaning: the absolute sense of purpose and meaninglessness), which culminates in their death. Isn't such a play a "model" for the "original" that represents more than one contemporary?

Paranormology.-- Paranormology (H. Bender) talks about things that are neither normal nor abnormal. They fit neither the traditional Biblical nor the Enlightenment-Rationalist view of life and the world.

Didn't Elle (USA/Canada) 1991: *August, Mystics in Our Midst, Modern Mystics* (pp. 54/64) write, "When did the occult become so ordinary?"

And did Michel Danthe, *Culture ésotérique*, in: Journal de Genève 15.12. 1990, not write: "Esotericism (note: the interest in the occult) fascinates some people and infuriates others. Often, too, it leaves Rationalist minds indifferent.

And yet the esoteric tradition is present throughout many cultures,- - beginning with our own".

Bibl. st..-- Eugenio Garin, *Moyen âge et Renaisance*, (Middle Ages and Renaissance), Paris, Gallimard, 1990;
Fuad Rouhani, trad*., Le livre divin*, (The divine book,), Paris, Albin Michel, 1990.

The first book deals with the transition period between Middle Ages and Renaissance : Garin observes that "a formidable explosion of esoteric texts" is visible. If magic, astrology and alchemy were of major importance during the "dark" Middle Ages, they come to light - full light, by the way - during the beginning of Modernity. Magic even becomes the common property of all the great thinkers and scientists of that transitional period,--as a sign of "the divine power inherent in man".

The Divine Book is a masterpiece of Persian mysticism (understand: the paranormal type of contact with the divine and/or the deity).

The scenario: a benevolent father summons his six sons and asks them what they would like to have most of all. The most perfect virgin, excellence in magic, a miraculous chalice, the elixir of life, the Seal of Solomon, mastery of alchemy are the most fervent wishes. The father: "All these are flat material goods. However, as a caricature of them, they betray an inextinguishable spiritual thirst which is only quenched in the mysticism of God.

Note.-- However controversial, paranormology (and its stronger degree, occultism) captures a portion of reality. In this sense it is 'objective'.

Who could really understand - 'read' - occultist (and mystical) texts, without a really solid paranormological-occult knowledge? This is all the more urgent, now that since a couple of decades in particular, we have seen a wave of occult movements, ideas, figures, all summarized in the term 'New Age'.

This fully justifies paranormology (plus occultism) as an auxiliary science concerning a serious part of art (there is also esoteric art) and literature.

Chaology. - Who does not know the name of Prigogine, the ULB's leading authority on disorder theory? Who does not know that, in the meantime, the concept of disorder (preferably deterministic or at least limited) is beginning to assert itself in all kinds of cultural domains?

Texts - scientific first, non-scientific afterwards - appear, with the regularity of a clock: they presuppose knowledge of disorder-in-order.

Just one *bibliographic sample*: Délires *chaos*, in: Actuel No. 133/134 (juillet / août 1990, 148/159, 242.

Disorder in the press, in art (music, among other things), in drawing and painting,-- in the sciences, in the most insignificant moments of our daily life. Such are the themes of the article. With illustrations.

A.c., 159.-- "Science has long been suspicious of beauty: a 'good' scientist had to be absorbed in arid formulas;--especially he was not allowed to yield to artistic intuitions. The doctrine of disorder has completely overturned these prejudices.

In *Chaos*, New York, 1987, James Gleick depicts the astonishment of the pioneers of chaology when they saw on the screen of the ordinator the psychedelic spirals, the stirring plant life, the fireworks and the galaxies of points.

All those explorers, by changing parameters, by transforming colours - in a groping way, so to speak - out to find order in disorder, - they all discovered that they were artists' souls somewhere.

Oshri goes even further: "The artist and the professional scientist cherish analogous methods: both are creative spirits". A bit further: "For years Oshri was a disappointment: as a child he had to choose between two 'passions', drawing and mathematics.

He chose to draw but on computer screen. -- says Oshri: "We are now reaching the meeting point between science and art,-- thanks to the ordinator.

I have developed a design around this history of encounters: Pieces of Mind. It is an animated film in which I conceive the human mind as a fragile object with its 'strokes', its borderlines, its fluctuations".

Art as order in chaos.
Bibl. st..-- L. Zonneveld, *Olga creates order in chaos*, in: Panacea (Magazine for conscious healthier living) (Lage Vuursche) 2 (1990): 40 (July), 63.

Artist Olga van Rhede is a painter. Apart from the fact that she sees being an artist as a process of maturing and becoming aware, she puts a purpose in her work: "creating order as an artistic counter sound in this hectic society". She overcomes suffering and exaggerated bustle by a "contemplative attitude".

History Science.- Hitherto we have regarded text (art) as a synchronic matter. Now we look in diachronic perspective.--First a metabletical explanation.

Bibl. s.-- G. Shapira, trad., Edeltraud Danesch/Othmar Danesch, *Le monde fascinant de la flore alpine,* (The Fascinating World of Alpine Flora), Zurich/Munich, 1981.

The work speaks, o.c., 12/19 (*Les premiers botanistes des Alpes*) of the change in mentality. Which, in simple words, is the object of metabletics (Van den Bergh).

The Renaissance - according to the claimants - changes "the view":

"un regard nouveau" occurs. As a result, the first description of Alpine flowers dates back to Johann Müller (Rellikon, Aargau). In a long poem - we recall that a Parmenides of Elea also wrote the first ontology in verse - he describes the ascent of the Stockhorm (1536).

He mentions e.g. the gentiana lutea (the yellow gentian, -- on the alpages, the Alpine meadows, above 1,000 M. altitude), from which the famous digestive drink is still made), the veratrum album (in German : Weisser Germer), the nigritella nigra (= n. angustifolia; German : Schwarzes Männertreu; French : orchis vanillé).

Conrad Gesner (°1516 Zürich) made the first drawings. Gesner was a humanist. He wrote a treatise on botany: Descriptio montis fracti (literally: Description of the split mountain). With the permission of the mayor Nik. von Meggen he climbed Mount Pilatus, whose summit is divided, in 1555. Height: 2.132 M..

The metabletic phenomenon.

1. For a long time climbing was forbidden: at the bottom of the mountain - so the myth goes - the mortal remains of Pilate, the Roman governor, were to be found. "If someone threw a stone in the lake and, immediately, disturbed the eternal rest of the 'holy one', a snowstorm would destroy the whole area", the myth went. -

2. Gesner subjected the myth to a 'rational' examination. "I am willing to assume with pleasure that Pilate never came to that place, and even, if he ever came, that he, after his death, did not possess the ability to establish good or evil among men" Gesner said. "The myth has no rational basis whatsoever". Thus Gesner, who dared to climb the mountain.

Historical semiotics (semiology).

B. Mojsisch, Hrsg., *Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter,* (Philosophy of Language in Antiquity and the Middle Ages), Amsterdam, Grüner, 1986 (Bochumercolloquium 02/04.06.1982);

U. Eco, *Semiotics and Philosophy of Language (Advances in Semiotics),* Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1984;

id., *Latratus canis*, in: Tijdschr.v.filos. (Leuven) 47 (1985): 1 (March), 3/14.

What we just saw with regard to alpine plants, namely a change of mentality, we also see, for example, in the theory of signs: - the alpine plant is a plant that is not a plant of the past.

According to Eco it looks as follows: from the Corpus Hippocraticum (Hippocrates of Kos (-460/-377; founder par excellence (he was far from alone) of the 'philosophical' healing method, which took the place of the mythical healing method)) to the Stoa (founder: Zenon of Kition (+/- -336/-264)) - According to Eco - a distinction is made between the theory of language, which deals with verbal signs ('onomata', nomina), and the theory of signs, which deals with natural signs ('semeia', signa).

Already the Pythagorean Alkmaion (= Alkmeon) of Kroton (-520/-450; physician) distinguished between 'aithanesthai', direct knowledge (perception), and 'xunienai', indirect knowledge in the sense of what is experienced, understood.

According to Alkmaion, we know hidden things only indirectly, through 'tekmeria' signs, symptoms. - The theory of signs until the Stoa conceives the theory of natural signs in an analogous way: "if disease, then symptom; well, symptom, then disease"; "if fire, then smoke; well, smoke, therefore fire:'

This is how the reasoning of signs in nature goes. But the word signs have a different structure: they refer to actions (data) a bit like a definition refers to the defined. "If word, then it meant by it" and "if it meant by a word, then the word".

In his *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, Eco has tried to show - he says in Latratus canis, 5 - that it is only since Saint Augustine of Tagaste (354/430; greatest church father of the West), explicitly willed by him, that the first general theory of signs emerges.

The signa, signs, include, with Augustine, both natural and verbal signs. But the way in which they are signified in the human mind remains floating: both reasoning and equivalence (a definition consists of a model which perfectly coincides with the original) remain unclear.

The Postmodern Fracture.

Postmodernity" means the emergence of a certain mentality - already at the end of the 18th century, with the Sturm und Drang - which questions the meaning and value of modernity (since the Renaissance).

Which, again, is a metabletic phenomenon. The Postmodern sense of self, nature (the cosmos) and fellow man is different from that of a Galileo or a Descartes or a Locke, who believed in the "meaning of (cultural) history" as the work of reason (hence the term 'Rationalism') which in science (hence the term 'Science' or 'Scientism') and in applied science (hence the term 'Technicism') laid the foundations of progress (hence the term 'Progressism').

O. Guitard, trad., Jerrold Seigel, Paris-Bohème (1830/1930), shows us in the Parisian (and international) bohemia, i.e. a number of aestheticizing idlers who want an 'alternative' society and culture, a further run-up to Postmodernity. Indeed: the bohemian(ne) wants everything but to work, as everyone in the Modern system must do, if he is to 'exist' ('make a living').

What follows, i.e. all kinds of 'alternatives', retains somewhere this "great refusal", typical of Postmodernity.-- This negative definition is, by the way, almost the only one that is generally valid. For the Postmoderns, in their/their Anarchism, diverge in the most diverse directions.

The "New Roman".

"Le roman nouveau" is well enough known. Just this about it.

a. The traditional novel - as a story - contains a course of life that makes 'sense'. There is an 'intrigue' (knot, i.e. where the story tension fully begins) which, in time, leads to a denouement. In this we recognize a continuous passage of time, in the order of the actual course of life. The space in which the scenario (the event) takes place is continuous. Psychology is the dominant perspective.

b. The 'new' (we say: Postmodern) *novel* - as a story - contains fragments (fragments) of some course of life (cf. 97: Zelig), shows neither knot nor complications or denouement as a coherent whole (at once the course of time is also 'fragmented'),-- plays out or in discontinuous places,-- shows fragmentary interpretations (which replace the traditional psychology of the novel).-- A metabletic fact.

Sample 16.-- Literary typology. (111/115)

There are types of texts, works of art.-- This extremely obvious fact does not prevent occasional heated discussions when it comes to defining those types -- types, 'genres' -- Therefore, first a logical definition of 'type'.

Bibl. s.-- Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 606s..--
'Typology' means:
a. the study of the types of data (e.g., plants) within a system or collection,
b. the listing (with or without explanation) of the species.

Starting point: singular data - individuals - that can be examined for similarity/ coherence (common characteristics) and especially for difference/incoherence (specific differences/ gaps).

Practical: **a**. types always exist together within the same set (system) and assume each other;   **b**. Yet they are always mutually exclusive.

Basis: the induction. From the identified similarities-and-differences, coincidences-and-gaps (= summative or summary induction) one decides to generalize (= amplificative induction).

Now summative induction is invariably a statistical induction: within the same collection (system), the data are never zero or one hundred percent the same, but there are percentages.

Amplification-analog induction.
'Analogy' means "partly similar (coherent) partly different (incoherent).
In the Antique Greek language: part-identical.
Ch. Lahr, *Logique*, 608/611 (L' analogy) notes that the term 'analogical' is metonymically applicable to one type of induction.

Appl. model.
a. Established fact (= sample): the planet Mars resembles the Earth (round shape, axis rotation).
b. Knowledge expansion (= amplification): as the earth has an atmosphere, so also - perhaps (hypothesis) - Mars has an atmosphere.

In other words: as an inductive act, 'analogy' is a reasoning that
1. on the basis of established similarities (correlations)
2. decide on other similarities (connections) that have not (yet) been established.

Application.-- One reads a text and notices a number of characteristics of it - e.g. strongly charged with feelings ('lyrical' genre) -.

One is struck by similar texts that are also lyrical. One compares with other kinds of texts which - apparently - are not lyrical - e.g. a text from a maths book. They conclude that there are at least two types of texts. That is induction.

But - and here begins the endless discussion between 'specialists' - now follows the analogical induction: this lyric text has for example as characteristics a. the veneration of the minnow goddess Aphrodite, b. partnership within a 'lesbian' community, c. within the lesbian relations nevertheless a direct preparation for a good marriage (in passing: these are the main characteristics of the poems of the ancient Greek poetess Sapfo (-650/-550) who had a school open in Mytilene).

Well, I have here the next text, apparently of a lyrical-erotic nature; so it will (perhaps (hypothesis)) have the same characteristics. - Now everyone knows that e.g. in our time a sacred-erotic community of thought and living as Sappho founded it, no longer exists and that 'lyric-erotic' poetry will be of a different kind.

The difficulty of literatological induction.
Which (text or corpus of) texts will one now take to label them as 'Typical' - typical lyric e.g.? Antique Greek or contemporary? Depending on the choice, the definition may differ substantially. That's why defining and redefining never ends.

In conclusion, we will give you a few essentials. Let's not get lost in endless hyper-sophisticated whining, which is largely arbitrary.

Bibl. s.-- Käte Hamburger, *Die Logik der Dichtung*, (The logic of poetry), Stuttgart, 1957-1;
P. Cadiot, trad., Käte Hamburger, *Logique des genres littéraires*, Paris, Seuil, 1986 (French translation of previous work).

As an aside: the term 'logic' here means a. applied logic and b. logic applied to the classification (= typology) in genres.
Hamburger, relying on pronunciation theory, distinguishes two main types, the fictional (= mimetic) - epic, story, drama, film - and the lyrical, with mixed types. Her work remains a monument .

J.-M. Schaeffer, *Qu'est-ce que un genre littéraire*?, (What is a literary genre?), Paris, 1989 (work that very rightly emphasizes the multiplicity (and contradiction) of the presuppositions that govern defining).
More useful as a dictionary: Br. Réauté/ M. Laskar, éd., Henri Benac, *Guide des idées littéraires,* (Guide to Literary Ideas), Paris, Hachette, 1988.
Less general works: H.G. Tan, *La matière de Don Juan, et les genres littéraires,* (The subject of Don Juan, and the literary genres), Leiden University Press, 1976

(The theme of 'Don Juan' can be found in various types of texts, especially in the theatre, less so in the novel);

H. Servotte et al, *Hedendaagse Britse literatuur (Contemporary British Literature) (Novel, poetry and drama since 1945),* Louvain / Amersfoort, Acco, 1989.

Essentially literary and non-essentially literary types.

A handbook: J. Gob, *Précis de littérature Française*, Bruxelles, 1947.

After introductory notions (scientific, philosophical 'aesthetic' (read: bellettristic) texts) and an exposition of linguistic competence (finding/arranging/shaping (= Aristotelian-engineered rhetoric), poetry, set exercises (description, story,-- treatise)), the author discusses the types of text.

He distinguishes - in my opinion quite rightly - two main types of literary texts.

-- a.-- The essentially "literary" texts,

i.e. texts that can be considered "belles lettres" (and therefore bellettristic in nature). The aesthetic element predominates: it is mainly and in the first degree a question of experiencing beauty. Thus: description (e.g. a poetic description of a beautiful landscape), narrative (think of the novella, the novel),-- lyricism (an emotional poem for instance), drama (e.g. a play by Aischulos).

-- b -- The accidental (accidental) literary texts,

i.e. texts which pragmatically, i.e. from the point of view of the intended result, do not in the first place aim at the experience of beauty: didactic texts (= explanatory texts,-- practically: treatise), among which the philosophical and the historical texts are treated equally, as well as text criticism. The author adds a remark on satire and the press. -

Decision.-- Decisive here is not, as with Käte Hamburger, a theory about the statements, but the presence or absence of an aesthetic intention.

As a presupposition of typology this is equivalent to e.g. Hamburger's presupposition,

Appl. model.-- Nothing like a singular text.

Bibl. st..-- J.-G. Lossier, *Poésie.-- Sur les pas de Sappho* (Poetry -- In the footsteps of Sappho), in*: Journal de Genève* 22.06.1991.-- We simply quote the author .-- "Far from her native region, le Valais (German: Wallis, in S.-Switzerland), Pierrette Micheloud finds her homeland where the Hellenic Light shines,-- in a collection of poems full of scents of roses, myrrh and melissa.

It's about the landscapes of Sapfo. (...)" -- The author is talking about Pierrette Micheloud, *Elle, vêtue de rien*, (She, dressed in nothing,), L' Harmattan.-- In half-poetic language he continues, "Between a woman and nature the bond is so strong that only a woman can purge from the fullness of the hours "the drop of eternity". Almost joyfully she endures the anguish that her soul sustains "like a mountain wind that blows on the oaks". P. Micheloud places this verse by Sapfo at the beginning of a chapter to make clear where her inspiration comes from".

Two excerpts.

Sous l' aile de ton épaule - Ma tête enivrée - D' ambroisie. Douceur - De laisser l' heure couler - Rivière limpide.

Untranslatable. (Her the thought is apparently the following: "I rest under your shoulder drunk with 'ambrosia'. I let time flow like a clear river: so softly do I feel everything.

Note.-- 'Ambrosia' is the food of the deities as the nectar is her drink,--according to Greek mythology.

Lossier quotes a second verse: être, rayonner - Notre ascendance divine. Je suis là guettant - La plus infime percée - De cette présence d' être. J' allume de force - Les pierres sous l' eau muette.

Thought

1 : radiating our divine origin through our very being; thought

2: I watch keenly in the direction of the breakthrough of that being-presence; thought

3: I feel compelled to light the stones under the still water.

Final comment: a pagan view of life.

Says Lossier: "The essence is a passion which the beloved ('l' aimée') seeks everywhere like a rapture. She runs together with envy,--the envy which Sapfo expressed at the time in one of her odes.

The poetic in it springs from a "dawn situated in a time before there was life".

The aphorisms are interwoven in the context of Sapfo's Aphrodite religion. The imagery is that of Sappho who, even in a completely pagan world view, united earth, sea and sky to one whole.

Intertextuality.-- We used to say 'tradition': Micheloud in her lesbian poetry resurrects archaic poetry in current language.

Definition.-- To give a strictly scientific definition of lyricism we consider almost impossible. Why? Because lyricism belongs to those realities which are somewhat phenomenal (insofar as lyricism becomes externally perceptible behavior),--yes, even rational (our mind, when it is mind, is also reason and reason), but essentially transempirical (not directly sensible) and even trans-rational (mere earthly reason and reason fall short).

Nevertheless, an approximate description - thanks to an enumeration of necessary and sufficient features - is possible so that the essential form (= that which distinguishes lyricism from the rest) becomes clear(er).

1. Character 1.-- Subjectivity.

Lyricism is called 'subjective' insofar as it departs from someone who relates himself, his surroundings and his fellow men to himself as a being of mind.

Character 2.-- Sensory responses.

Lyricism" is a term which, since the Romantic period (end of the 18th century and later) and Symbolism (middle of the 19th century and later), includes the lively expression of emotional reactions. For example, passions (drives such as love, hate, lust, envy, jealousy), strongly felt emotional reactions such as enthusiasm for an ideal, anger about an injustice, mourning for a dead person. But also subdued meditations on, for instance, the meaning or senselessness of life -- that's the content, the material.

2. The wording.

Either verse or prose. On at least one condition: aesthetic phrasing. With F. Koppe, *Grundbegriffe der Aesthetik*, (Basic concepts of aesthetics,), Frankf.a.m., 1983 (E.R. 100), we define 'aesthetic' as non-ordinary. As non-banal. Unless the banality deliberately suggests something 'non-ordinary'.

There are many more concrete forms. To illustrate the form of wording the following.

a. The ode, since Pindaros of Kunoskefalai (Boiotia; -518/-438; ancient Greek lyricist), is a song, whether or not accompanied by music (the lyre e.g.) with as its theme the celebration of a deity or hero(s) or of fate.

b. The elegy is a gentle, often wistful response to themata such as love and death.-- But there are, of course, numerous variants,-- up to and including Pop songs and street songs.-- So much for design.

In conclusion, a type is defined as far as one can enumerate content (themes + emotional reactions to them) and design (wording in non-ordinary language).

Sample 17.-- Text type: scientific rhetoric. (116/120)

"Scientific research is based on verifiable, verifiable facts that can be tested and discussed intersubjectively - through dialogue.

Literature would be the opposite: fiction need not concern itself with truth or untruth, objectivity, efficiency. Interpretations are always personally coloured".

This is how J. Gerits introduces his book review of Hugo Brandt Corstius et al, *Forensen tussen literatuur en wetenschap*, (Commuting between literature and science,), Utr./Antw., Veen, 1990. The work in question deals with a number of professional scientists who are also literary. They say about the relationship between science and literature. "Is one doing something different when one is doing science than when one is doing art? Some reduced both activities to the same thing or almost so; others - most of them - made a clear distinction.

Thus Hélène Nolthenius (1920-2000) (professor of music history and novelist) said: "Science is my profession. Being a writer is my vocation. The same subject is sometimes the reason for writing a scientific essay, sometimes a novella".

This is also the case with Hella Haasse, who writes biographies in which the facts are verifiable and the whole text is nevertheless 'fictional': there is a difference between a scientific and a 'literary' (bellettristic) biography.

The opinion of G.-G. Granger (1920/ 2016.).

Granger is a convinced Enlightenment rationalist, who in his *Pensée formelle et sciences de l' homme,* (Formal thinking and human science), Paris, 1967, 21/24 (*Rhétorique et contenus*), tries to make the following point true.

1.-- Scientific language

This is radically distinct from 'rhetorical' language; the latter locks itself "into a universe of words" (o.c.,21).

2.-- Scientific work

This work uses language not only as a means of communication between scientists, but also as a means of interpretation between scientists and the data observed so that the objects of the world of observation become 'maniables'.

Rhetoric, on the other hand, uses language only as a means of influence between subjects,--if only to arouse in speaker and hearer an aesthetic experience.--

Decision.-- Science is more than words, 'nice' words: it is businesslike, also in its communication.

Scientific rhetoric 1.

"Does one do something different when one is doing science than when one is doing rhetoric?" is the question. The answer is a restrictive one: yes and no.

The first type of rhetoric in science is science education. Specifically: the teaching of science.

Appl. model: geometry.-- The teacher enters the classroom. Shows - ostensive or deictic method - e.g. a metal square. Draws a square on the board. Pronounces the name 'square'. Passes the metal square around from pupil to pupil, so that it is looked at, yes, handled. "Handled" made.-- What's happening now? Rhetorically speaking, two things.

A. Regarding means of interpretation.

To 'interpret' is a. to isolate a given (preferably in the ontological sense) b. from the totality of all that is ('being'), -- to give it a name and make it 'manageable' -- e.g. the geometrical concept 'square', once well defined, gives rise to the introduction of a formula for calculation "side x side" (the surface area). Immediately the square becomes rationally manageable.

B. Regarding restraint agents.

The metal square brought into circulation, the drawing on the board, the word 'square', -- the calculation formula, -- all this is contained in the process of understanding that is the lesson about the square, between teacher and pupils.

The pupils learn to interpret in the same way as the teacher does -- through this process of understanding. The concept of the square, with the complex of things that go with it (metonymically) and are similar to it (metaphorically), has entered the minds of the pupils: the 'message' (information about the square) has 'gone in'.

Scientific rhetoric 2.

Not only education in science is throughly structured rhetorically - and is thus a text type in itself: scientific work is also, at least in part, rhetorical.

a.-- Subversive scientific rhetoric.

Bibl. st..-- M.A. Finocchiaro, *Galileo and the Art of Reasoning (Rhetorical Foundations of Logic and Scientific Method),* Dordrecht, Reidel, 1981.

Galilei's work - *Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, ptolemaico e copernicano* - is thoroughly discussed,--among other things Galilei 's notion of "scientific revolution".

It is as if Galileo, starting from his 'hypothesis' of 'rationality', hypothesis which, in addition to real rationality (the basis of real, so-called Modern science, includes a strong dose of undermined - inflammatory objective), put forward 'rhetoric'.

Not surprisingly: didn't George Sarton teach us that Galilei, out of pure prejudice against the astrology of the time as he understood it, didn't even want to . investigate - yes, investigate (which is the most innocent of all methods) - whether or not the moon had any influence on the tides.

Conclusion: a Granger, as an Enlightened-Rationalist, does not even seem to know such facts.

b.-- Rhetoric within the phases of a scientific revolution.

Thomas Kuhn (1922/1966) - together with Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend one of the 'great' epistemologists of our time (cf. A. Chalmers, *Wat heet wetenschap*? (What is called science?), (On nature and status of science and its methods), Meppel / Amsterdam, 1981, 114/127 (*Kuhn's paradigms*) - describes the concept of 'paradigm' in his *De structuur van wetenschappelijke revoluties*, (The structure of scientific revolutions), Meppel, 1976-2, 135.

Translated: textbook example of a scientific method. "If we survey the extensive experimental literature (...), the suspicion arises that something like a 'paradigm' (note: from the ancient Greek 'paradeigma' paragon) also underlies observation." -

What a person 'sees' depends 1. both on the object he is looking at 2. and on what he has learned to see from his previous visual-conceptual experiences.

In the absence of such training, there exists only - in the words of William James (1842/1910; American Pragmatist) - "a blooming, buzzing confusion".

The great psychologist of religion that James was, here brilliantly articulates - in a metaphor - what Granger calls 'unmanageability'.

From blooming confusion to manageability

a. What Kuhn forgets is that the first to "see" what is to be seen has seen without a prior paradigm and captured it in a concept.

b. But come: we adhere to the one who sees only after there were those who saw before him.

Appl. model.-- A teacher teaches what a camera obscura, the closed box inside a camera (metonymically: the camera itself), is.

Without the visual aspect (seeing a camera), without the conceptual (= comprehension) aspect that goes with it, by the teacher referring to the object with the term "camera obscura", the pupil(s) actually "sees" (experience of at least one specimen) and "understands" (formulation of the general concept) "a blooming confusion" an unprocessed" and "unmanageable" thing,-- e.g., a cabinet.

Conservation process.
The learner sees an object, grasps its general understanding. By introducing the term - the name (Platon would say) - into the learners' language vocabulary, the teacher situates the "camera obscura" phenomenon in the language system.

Immediately, communication and understanding grows between the learners and the other language users. All language users pronounce the same word, once they are confronted with the fact.

In conclusion, the learning process is the fact that a fact, named and clarified in a concept, is accepted in the mind of the ignorant thanks to means of interpretation and understanding. The teacher has taught the learners a paradigm,--which is pure rhetoric. From teacher to learners.

Kuhn's model.
The case of the camera obscura is a model. Now the original: the rhetoric between professional scientists. O.c., 36.-- "At one time or another -- between 1740 and 1780 -- electricity theorists were for the first time able to accept without question the foundations of their field.

1. From that moment on they threw themselves into more concrete and hidden problems, and they reported - more and more - their results in articles addressed to other electricity theorists instead of in books addressed to the developed world in general".

In other words: what the first had seen and laid down in understanding, a new paradigm, is now passed on by means of persuasion (means of interpretation and understanding) so that it finds acceptance among fellow thinkers.

2. 'As a group they achieved - Kuhn continues - what
a. astronomers in antiquity,
b. movement researchers in the Middle Ages,
c. physicists-opticians at the end of the 17th century,
d. historical-geologists reached in the early XIXth century.
In particular, they had produced a paradigm that proved capable of leading the research of the whole group.

Except with the help of 'wisdom after the fact', it is difficult to find another criterion (opm.: distinguishing agent) that so clearly declares a field of study to be a science."

Immediately Kuhn formulates, unspoken, that a paradigm, first of all, has to find its entrance - "it has to enter" -, before the scientists as a group can find in it a textbook example of how to work and ... that this is done by writing for their peers in order to convince them. Which is pure rhetoric.

Decision.-- Granger commits a terminological error. He confuses "hollow rhetoric" - "hollow" in the sense of "containing as good as no real information" (what communication scientists call "redundancy") - with "rhetoric-without-more". After all, a term can be loaded with value judgments in three ways :

Meliorative, neutral, pejorative.
This differential could have saved Giger from his Rationalist prejudice.-- We systematically use the term 'rhetoric' in this course neutrally so that now and then good rhetoric can be found, now and then bad rhetoric. In Granger's case, only bad scientific rhetoric can be detected, because he uses the term pejoratively.

Application of the ABC theory.
"If A and B, then C" sounded the E.R. 49.-- Applied: A is an object, a phenomenon. For example, Lorenz's waterwheel. B is the paradigm, i.e. the proposition in the mind so that A becomes understandable. In this case the concept 'chaos' ('deterministic disorder' one also says). C is the understanding of A thanks to (as application of) B.

Here: Lorenz's water wheel turns in one direction... ...until suddenly, unpredictably, it turns in the opposite direction.

Now we know that Lorenz wanted to clarify this model of the original, weather phenomena as at least partially unpredictable (because subject to 'butterfly effects' (small causes, large consequences)) to ... disbelieving colleagues. He wanted to introduce his paradigm, which went against the generally accepted determinism, by a detour (an image, a model)

This was rhetoric in the true sense of the word: backed up by means of interpretation and understanding, a phenomenon clarified by a concept, indeed by a mechanical model, the water wheel, was 'seen' and 'understood' by other scientists.

Decision.-- If not pejoratively misunderstood, the term "rhetoric" is the correct word for such communication processes.

Sample 18.-- Text type : philosophical rhetoric. (121/125)

It is evident that - except in sciences - in philosophical texts the rhetorical bias is at least equally present.

Let us think of the fact that many philosophers do not address themselves to fellow-thinkers but to the wider public. This wider public is then not specialized. This implies that the texts in which the philosophers address that audience, are "vulgar". This, by the way, is also the case when - as often happens - either scientists or vulgarizers disseminate 'science' to the wider public.

'Vulgarize' means to:

1. about an original - either the authentic scientific or the authentic philosophical texts -

2. speaks in terms of a model -- an easy-to-read text.

Especially in scientific vulgarization - but also and increasingly in philosophical vulgarization - the model can differ quite a bit from the original. If it does not even become a caricature of it.

Vulgarization is a very widespread form of "making it happen" and thus of rhetoric. Rhetoric that is on the edge of sciences and philosophies.

Let us now consider rhetoric in the actual business of philosophy. In particular: in the teaching of philosophy and in philosophical communication between thinkers.

Bibl. st.: Sam. IJsseling, *Rhetoric and philosophy (What happens when one speaks?)*, Bilthoven, 1975 (a basic work);

id., *Mimesis (Over schijn en zijn),* (Mimesis (On appearances and being)), Baarn/Schoten, 1990 (in which the relation "philosophy/rhetoric", in the form of basic problems (fiction, illusion, mirror and example, intertextuality, interpretation (hermeneutics), context), is again discussed).

R. Harvey, transl., *Michel Meyer, From Metaphysics to Rhetoric*, Kluwer Acad. Publ., 1989 (after the collapse of linguisticism - think of the Structuralist craze - of the Sixties, comes rhetoric (as a new paradigm?));

M. Charles, *L' arbre et la source*, (The tree and the source), Paris, Seuil, 1985 (Charles is director of the journal Poétique and the author of *Rhétorique de la lecture*; "la source" means "the commentary," "l' arbre" means the rhetoric).

Here are a few works on the subject. There are more and more.

Therapeutic Positivism.

A central figure in 'language positivism' is Ludwig Joseph Wittgenstein (1889/1951). Born into a family in Vienna. Studies mechanics in Berlin (1906), in Manchester (1908). In Manchester he became interested in aeronautics.

Discovers the question of the foundations of mathematics (studies Frege and Russell). In 1921 his first work *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* appears. 1920/1926: teacher in ... several primary schools in Lower Austria.

In 1929 Wittgenstein resumed his philosophical studies at Cambridge. He became a professor of philosophy there (1930/1936; 1939/1947). His second major work, *Philosophical Investigations*, appears in 1949.

This curriculum vitae says something about person and soul.

Recent work on Wittgenstein: Dan. Nicolet, *Lire Wittgenstein (études pour une reconstruction fictive)*, (Reading Wittgenstein (studies for a fictional reconstruction)), Paris, Aubier;

G.-G. Granger, *Invitation à la lecture de Wittgenstein*.

By the way: the works that want to 'facilitate' the reading of Wittgenstein - think of 'vulgarisation' - are increasing. - Reason: a.o. what H. De Dijn, *The Creation of Wittgenstein*, in: Our Alma Mater : 44 (1990): 4 (Nov.), 328/345 writes:

"The Tractatus is the condensed elaboration of an original and comprehensive philosophical vision. The text is short but extremely difficult. It is not surprising that there are far-reaching differences of opinion among the commentators,--even concerning the most important passages." (A.c., 330).

"In summary, the general thrust of the Tractatus boils down to this:
a. all treatable philosophical problems should be eliminated by language analysis
b. about the deeper questions one should keep silence". (Ibid.).

Bertrand Russell responded to the work: Wittgenstein affirms what he himself feels is 'truth',-- without logically rigorous arguments -- to which Wittgenstein replies, "Arguments would spoil the beauty of truth, as a flower is stained by muddy hands."

In other words: the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus introduces aesthetics.

Another aspect: "Wittgenstein was usually unforgiving towards students who, in his opinion, made stupid or superficial remarks. At the same time he was aware that his listeners often did not understand him: 'I show my students fragments of an enormous puzzle landscape in which it is impossible for them to find their bearings'.

"Wittgenstein was unforgiving and demanding to the point of everyday contact, from which one often left exhausted. Most of those who loved him also feared him. He did not seek much contact with colleagues. He preferred the company of young male students. He found the philosophical articles of the leading journal Mind less interesting than certain popular crime stories. (...)

It is only now - forty years after his death - that people in wider circles are beginning to appreciate somewhat the depth and radicality of his thought." (A.c., 333w.)

And around 1930 Wittgenstein begins to realize that his Tractatus could be improved, indeed revised: he discovered that, apart from the hyperstrict mathematical-logical and empirical use of language, there were other uses of language. For example, the everyday language of everyone.

Explanation.-- We do not despise ordinary people in the name of the hyperintellectual like Wittgenstein. Therefore we make his problem comprehensible.

1. The concept of 'beginning' and 'end'. I can ask for the beginning and the end of e.g. a lesson. In fact, one then does the following:

a. there is a time frame, namely the official hour system which functions as an independent frame of thought;

b. in it we situate the beginning and the end of all kinds of daily activities and events.

2. The concept of "beginning and end of the universe". -- Do we also have a time frame in which we can situate the beginning and the end of the universe? To which Wittgenstein replies that since there is no time frame that includes the universe (which he tries to make true), the question of "beginning and end of the universe" is a meaningless question and thus not allowed.

Paradigm.-- Wittgenstein generalizes this case to all cases of philosophy concerning fundamental problems. Meaningless speech is the textbook example.

Final sum.-- What many thinkers have found meaningful for centuries, Wittgenstein finds meaningless. "It is paradoxical that this loner -- unwilling to make any concessions whatsoever to an audience -- with great contempt for academic philosophy -- is today not only a central figure in contemporary philosophizing but even seems to appeal to a wide audience." (A.c., 328).

Not surprisingly, Wittgenstein deliberately places himself outside "the great stream of European and American civilization."

Rhetoric.
1. Wittgenstein warns himself:
"This book is written for those who are sympathetic to the spirit in which it is written. This spirit is - I believe - a different one from the spirit of the great stream of European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization is strange and unsympathetic to the writer (...).

So I write for 'friends' who are scattered all over the world". Thus the preface to Philosophical Investigations (1949).

In other words: Wittgenstein knows the limitations of his rhetoric:
a. among traditional people, in Europe and the USA/Canada, his word is not accepted;
b. it is accepted by his peers. His rhetoric is geared to that.

2 That's the reason for:
the absence of traditional argumentation and the presence of aesthetic influence: 'Wittgenstein was acutely aware of the kinship between his "philosophical reasoning" and an aesthetic "showing".

G.E, Moore, *Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930/1933* (in his Philosophical Papers, London, 1959, 315) says: "All that aesthetics does is to draw your attention to something, to place things side by side. To which Wittgenstein added: "The same kind of reasons were realized (...) in philosophy". (De Dijn a.c., 338).

Therapy.-- This is then a sketch of 'therapeutic' Positivism: it is a method of healing such that it 'solves' all philosophical problems - understand: of a traditional nature. He was convinced that he stands as a physician with a sick person whose mind has been affected by ... traditional thinking.

Final sum.-- Wittgenstein wants a swap solution. Like the whole Counterculture, like Postmodernism. Like all alternatives. But in his highly individual and archly difficult way.

An analogue.-- Manfred Thiel, *Der Nihilismus (Heidegger und die Sophistik),* Heidelberg, Elpis, 1986, is an extract from M. Thiel, Karl Jaspers (Deutschlands Weg in der Emanzipation), Heidelberg, 1986.
The work reflects the controversy between two Existentialists, Heidegger and Jaspers (1883/1969): "Heidegger claims for himself a totally new style of thinking (...). I, on the contrary, live as someone who tries to live up to the 'philosophia perennis' (traditional philosophy)". Also, Heidegger is arch difficult, because anti-western in a radical way.

A second analogue.

P. van Tongeren, ed., *Nietzsche als arts van de cultuur* (Nietzsche as doctor of culture), *(Diagnoses and prognoses),* Kampen, 1990.

As a thinker-not-quite-the-other, Nietzsche apparently saw himself as a 'culture doctor': traditional culture since Platon and Christianity was, in his eyes, a sick culture.

Sickness: apart from the cultural factors mentioned, Buddhism, even democracy and science, especially nihilism (as he understands it).

Like a Wittgenstein: at first not accepted in traditional circles, Nietzsche is accepted by National Socialism,-- by Existentialism, Structuralism (including Deconstructionism).

In other words : a Postmodern achievement. Negative : "the great refusal" (of all that is Western) - cfr. E.R. 110 -; positive : "misarchy" (to use Nietzsche's own term : contempt for all that is authority).

The four great fields of culture - science, art, ethics and religion - are discussed. There has been talk of "a Nietzsche boom of almost global proportions" just as there was for Wittgenstein.

Note.-- Cultural physicians are emerging more and more: H. Veldhuis, *No understanding of the other (The critique of Emmanuel Levinas on Western philosophy, in particular on the thinking of Husserl and Heidegger),* Utrecht, Faculty of Theology Rijksuniversiteit, 1990.

Husserl and even Heidegger, according to Levinas, take Antique-Greek thought even further, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary. The Bible with its transcendent (all-transcending) God stands behind Levinas's critique, of course.

R. Burggraeve, *Man and fellow man, responsibility and God (The metaphysical ethics of Emmanuel Levinas),* Leuven / Amersfoort, Acco, 1986.

Levinas (1905/1995), in his *Totalité et infini*, (Totality and infinity) The Hague, Nijhoff, 1961, denounces the disregard for fellow human beings - 'l' autre' - in Western thought, including Husserl and Heidegger. He labels this as "the violence par excellence".

Opm. - Rhetoric.-- J. Van de Wiele, *Book review*, in: Tijdschr.v.filos. 50 (1988): 4 (Dec.), 726v., says: Levinas is 'stiff-headed', 'headstrong'. Moreover: "We have the impression that Levinas' philosophy is characterized by a sometimes irritating logophilia (...). In reality, one stands alone before the propelling tide of rhetoric". (A.c., 727).

Sample 19.-- Text type : theological rhetoric. (126/131)

'Kerugma', in ancient Greek is "to proclaim something with a loud voice". "Kerugmatic theology" is therefore "proclaiming theology". At the time, people spoke of "consecrated eloquence". The Bible teaches us that "the word of God" is both insight (information, 'light') and power (energy, life force). Whoever 'proclaims' participates in God's self-revelation in insight and power.

Sören Kierkegaard (1813/1855; Danish Protestant religious philosopher) - in the context of degenerate Christianity - reestablished "sacred speech".

It is true that he is best known for his reception after 1918, from which Existentialism emerged. But this is of little interest to us here.

Bibl. Hans Friemond, *Existenz in Liebe nach Sören Kierkegaard*, (Existence in love according to Sören Kierkegaard), Salzburg/ Munich, Pustet, 1965;

R. Jolivet, *Introduction à Kierkegaard*, Abbaye S. Wandrille, 1946;

H. Redeker, *Existentialism (A passage through philosophical frond territory),* Amsterdam, 1949, 47/64 (Kierkegaard);

A.C. Overboom, *Kierkegaard's individual more than a seeker of himself*, in: Tijdschr.v.fil. 48 (1936) 3 (Sept.), 416/448.

S. Kierkegaard saw himself, in addition to degenerate Christianity, especially in the philosophical field confronted with

a. the aesthetic form of Romanticism (end of the 18th century and later) which withdraws from the daily - 'real' - tasks in order to dwell in a make-believe world constructed by artists without any life commitment,

b. with the constructions of thought of Modern thought, especially that of Hegel with his Absolute Idealism,--constructions of mind which neglect the individual-concrete man.

Both existential presuppositions, i.e. the presuppositions which encompass his commitment to practical life, form the background to his existential Christian rhetoric, in which the individuology (E.R. 96) is given its Kierkegaardian application: purely in terms of general logic, man belongs to the species "man (he)", but in terms of individual logic man is always a single individual, the individual. And this as an individual - in the midst of a reality alienated from God - confronted with what God, via biblical revelation, expects of him.

A.-- The background.

Kierkegaard's own basic premise is that the human being that we are individually, time and again, 'exists'. 'Existence' here is not understood without question in the Platonic sense of "actual existence" contrasted with "beingness" (existence/ essence). Nor (certainly) in the sense of J.-P. Sartre, in whom 'existence' is contrasted with 'essence' (where 'essence' means as much as 'unreal ideal').

To 'exist' as a human being, -- as an actually existing human being then, is to form oneself in the struggle for true life. In this sense God does not 'exist' (for He must not seek His way); nor does the animal 'exist' (for it is driven by instinctive certainties). Only man 'exists'. - Philosophical-theological anthropology is thus central to Kierkegaardism.

"Man -- to put it in Kierkegaard's language -- is a compound of infinity and finitude,-- of what is temporary and what is eternal,-- of freedom and necessity." (Friemond, o.c., 12).

Or still: "Man is spirit. What is 'spirit'? Spirit is being oneself. To be oneself is to be in a relationship to oneself". (O.c., 12). In other words, because man, as an individual, reflects on himself while committing himself to something in life, he is a reflective being.

Introspective thought form.-- Overboom, a.c., emphasizes: Kierkegaard's introspection - introspection, reflection - is central, but it is always thoroughly embedded in a relationship, to fellow human beings and to God. Which is everything except "individualism" (which is what superficial informants about Kierkegaard keep thinking).

B.-- The modes of existence.-- According to Kierkegaard, man can "exist" in different ways.

B.1.-- The 'aesthetic' (= pleasure-seeking) existence.

We have already seen: some Romantics took refuge in a world of beauty. For the hedonistic man attuned to - possibly refined - enjoyment, life, with the others and all that the world has to offer, is 'of value' insofar as life, the others and all that the world has to offer "seem pleasant" (Friemond, o.c., 43/77 (*Das ästhetische Stadium*), (The aesthetic stage).

The temptation is great, in every human being, to flee into that 'unreal' (estranged from reality) mode of existence.

B.2.-- The 'ethical' (self-powered-ethical) mode of existence.

Note carefully: Kierkegaard does not condemn conscientious behavior (content of morality). He does condemn self-possessed conscientious behavior.

The 'ethical' man, in Kierkegaard's sense, regards life, others and all that the world offers as 'valuable', in so far as this is justifiable "in conscience", even if it does not come across as pleasant. A high sense of duty is the defining characteristic.-- Cfr Friemond, o.c., 77/104 (Das ethische Stadium).

B.3.-- The religious man.

Kierkegaard mixes, to a great extent, general religious and Christian-religious. This distinction is certainly valid to a certain extent:

a. the non-Biblical religions practice 'religion', i.e. reverently observe extraterrestrial powers (beings, forces, processes), but without the input of any Biblical nature;

b. Biblical religion, however, presupposes, purifies, and above all exalts on a supernatural level all that the Heathen religions included. Kierkegaard, as a philosopher (and not as first of all a theologian), pays particular attention to God and to what the Biblical God evokes in terms of 'existing'.

The biblically religious man considers 'valuable' all that favors his God-relationship as an one-for-God -- Cfr Friemond, o.c.1 105/140 (*Das religiöse Stadium*).

Do not think that Kierkegaard stands alone with his three stages.

a. B. Halda, *La pensée de Maine de Biran*, (The thought of Maine de Biran,), Paris / Montreal, 1970.-- Maine de Biran (1766/1824), with his concept of "I want" one of the precursors of (French) Existentiaism, went through the "three stages" without realizing it beforehand. First he lived a rather indulgent life ('aesthetic stage'); then the will to live conscientiously awoke in him ('Stoic-ethical stage'); finally God's grace touched him ('mystical stage').

b. P.-L.. Landsbeig, *Die Welt des Mittelalters und wir (Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über den Sinn eines Zeitalters),* (The World of the Middle Ages and Us (A Historical-Philosophical Attempt on the Meaning of an Age)), Bonn, Cohen, 1925, 105/120 (*Eine christliche Weltanschauungspsychologie*), (A Christian Worldview Psycholog) Landsberg (1905/1944; Personalist thinker), following in the footsteps of S.Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard, distinguishes three fundamental attitudes:

a. Epicureanism (Montaigne), a philosophy of enjoyment;

b. Stoa (Epictetus), a haughty moralistic way of thinking,

c. patronizing Christianity (Platon, Jesus), a transgression. of both previous modes of existence.

C,-- Kierkegaard's rhetoric.

Central to this is the task of "reintroducing Christianity to Christendom", as he himself puts it.

C.1.-- The rhetorical structure.

How to make Christianity - the pure message of the Bible - accepted again by Christianity, i.e. by the people in its midst - the Copenhagen milieu - in whose midst there was much pseudo-Christianity, much 'heathenism' and degeneracy?

Direct and indirect communication.

Cfr. Friemond, o.c., 24/26 (Die indirecte Mitteilung).

1. Directly communicable are only "objective truths" (the results of objective research,- "systems", such as Hegelian). Here pure logic and logical communication prevail.

2. A truth, however, for which 'I' - 'you', 'we' - live, from which one lives, is communicable only indirectly. This is an existential truth, i.e. an objective truth in so far as I want it to play an active part in my practical life - my 'existing'.

As soon as someone expresses such a truth of life in "objective terms" - purely cool reasoning - and at the same time tries to have it accepted - which is "communication" in Kierkegaard's language - such a truth loses its "existential" character.

The 'neighbour' - the biblical term for 'fellow human being' - if he/she wants to make the biblical truth his/her own in an individually experienced and 'sincere' way, should come to the same or at least a similar attitude in life (choice, effort, 'engagement', involvement).

In other words: someone sees that a fellow human being is really - 'authentically' - living a Christian life and is, at once, 'edifying' (i.e. gives rise to real Christian existence); he/she is impressed by this and is immediately compelled to choose for or against it; in the best case, he/she learns in his/her turn, in an individual way, to live a Christian life.

C.2.-- The rhetorical method.

Cfr. Friemond, o.c., 26/31 (*Die Methode Kierkegaards*).-- Existential communication requires its own method.

a.-- Psychologization.-- Friemond, relying on the texts and the context, rejects the attempts to interpret Kierkegaard simply psychologically -- including psychoanalytically. It is necessary: "There is hardly a biography of Kierkegaard that is free of such tendencies." (O.c., 27).-

Pierre Mesnard, for example, characterizes Kierkegaard in his attack on the Danish state church (a symbol of Christianity gone mad) as "a disturbed personality" (according to H.B. Vergote, *Sens et répétition (Essai sur l' ironie kierkegaardienne),* (Meaning and Repetition (Essay on Kierkegaardian Irony)), Paris, Cerf, 1982).

b. -- Sociologists

They do capture some facet of Kierkegaard 's personality-in-society, but that is highly inadequate.

Note. - Mesology' means 'study of the center of life'. The Vergote quoted above places great emphasis on this: without the Copenhagen middle, Kierkegaard simply cannot be understood.

Even figures of great value like Jean Wahl and Pierre Mesnard misrepresent Kierkegaard - Wahl in German, Mesnard psychologically - by interpreting him outside his midst.-- This indicates how poorly e.g. the Structuralist thesis of "the text and only the text" (and then only semiotically-semiologically) can turn out.

c.-- Phaseologization.

'Phaseology' is "the study of the phases (stages) that something goes through". Friemond indicts a number of Kierkegaard scholars who believe that one can blot out fundamentally distinguishable phases in Kierkegaard's life and writings.

Kierkegaard himself is explicit : "(...) What I am in truth as a writer,--that I am and have been a religious writer,--that my total activity as a writer concerns Christianity, namely, to become a Christian (...)".

This is Kierkegaard's own characterization of his non-evolving authorship.-- Friemond: he continuously wrote aesthetic and philosophical works that were reflected in edifying-religious works. If at all costs one wants to speak of 'development' (the catchword of phaseologists), then "from less real believing to more real believing". So far the wrong interpretations.

Now the structure of the rhetoric.

(A) Observation.-- Kierkegaard: "The majority of Christendom is 'an unheard of illusion'. Specifically, the majority of actual Christians "think" (imagine) "to be Christians; while in essence -- at best -- practicing ethical (conscientious) paganism

(Nothing should be approached with more care than self-deception (as to whether or not one is a true Christian). This is the premise par excellence.

Further, he applies Socrates' method: he seeks out actual, degenerate Christendom where they can be found,--

in Copenhagen itself. Socrates also went into the agora to meet the Sophists where they were active.

(1) Kierkegaard exercises himself in true Christianity: without experiencing Christianity himself, progressively more - one is not already a Christian, but one becomes one -, he cannot work exemplarily.

(2) In the wake of this he applies the indirect method: for if one attacks a delusional Christian directly, one strengthens him in his delusion, yes, one embittered him.

Kierkegaards work.

(1) Aesthetic (and philosophical) works are meant to be read. If one likes to read them, one attracts attention.

(2) The edifying works serve to confront the aroused attention with the God of Christianity. In order to call for choice.

Whether that intention succeeds or fails is unpredictable. After all, one has no direct control over the free will and commitment of one's 'neighbor'. Conversion to God is in any case a logical matter: the person addressed must understand with his mind what the message is. But conversion to God is more: the whole spirit - reason and intellect, but also mind and especially will - must confirm what the intellect has understood.

In conclusion, there is no question of 'irrationalism'.

The danger of vanity -- "To be able to really help my neighbor, I myself must have come to a deeper understanding than he does. First I must understand what he understands. If I do not do this, my deeper understanding is of no use whatsoever....

All real helping (...) begins with a kind of humiliation: the one who helps, should first and foremost feel smaller than the one he wants to help. He should understand that 'helping' is not 'ruling' but 'serving'. (Friemond, o.c., 31).

Note.-- This does not imply that the Antique-Greek rhetoric is worthless.

Bibl. st..-- J. Smit, *The Epistle to the Galatians*, Boxtel/ Leuven/ Brugge, 1989.-- The author claims that Paul applies the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (an Antique work) in this. The design of Paul's letter is that of a political speech.

Paul tries to address the question: "How do the Christians of the Gentiles share in God's promises with the Christians of the Jews (who have a head start thanks to the divine promises to Abraham)?

Sample 20.-- Handling Theory 1 (text handling), (132/134).

The following samples have one purpose: to learn how to write a treatise (e.g. a final paper, a thesis).

As in the preceding section, we proceed inductively, i.e. by sampling.-It is as M. Canto, éd., Platon, Euthydème, Paris, 1989, 181, says: there is the 'legein', reading-, of a text and there is 'surtgrafestha'; drafting a text oneself. When, however, one is drafting, -- or rather preparing -- a treatise, one does the two simultaneously. One reads, with intelligence, and one composes one's own text, with chunks.-- That is not always easy. Therefore, an example.

The methodical exposition of a learning system.

It happens that one has to expound - either as a whole or as a part - a doctrine."-- The work of three pupils of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857/19131), who analyzed language as a system of signs in circulation in a society, is well known since the frenzy of Structuralism. Ch. Bally/ A. Secnehaye/ A. Riedlinger, publ. *Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique*, (Linguistics course,), Paris, 1916-1, 1931, 7/11 (*Préface de la première édition*), explains how, after the death of their master, three pupils methodically, the testimonies, of the living teaching of their professor, developed into a real book.

The method.

The method is the reasoned equation.

1.-- The given and the requested (wanted).

The ancient Greek mathematicians already systematically applied this twofold 'truism'. De Saussure had died before his work was published. The 'corpus', i.e. the total collection (result of summative induction) or inventory of the texts, consisted, in 1913, of very scarce notes.

"It was necessary to resort to the notes drawn up by students - during three series of conferences at the University of Geneva (1906/1907; 1908/1909; 1910/1911)." So much for the given -- now for the requested. The task was: to draw up, on the basis of the corpus, a faithful representation of de Saussure's doctrine,-- both in its parts and in its whole (the system).

2 -- The elaboration.

The (working) hypothesis or premise was: there is a strict system in the available texts (corpus).--

The methodical comparison - application of the comparative method - of the available texts had to reveal the system.

2.1. Content.

"What were we going to do with these materials? A first text-critical work was necessary for every course and for every detail of it. One had to compare all versions in order to arrive at the idea,--an idea of which we possessed only echoes and even sometimes contradictory echoes. For de Saussure belonged to the type of people who are constantly renewing themselves." -

2.2. The form(s).

The publishers then pose the question of style (stylistics). -- "And then? The form of the text specific to oral education - often in conflict with the form specific to the book - presented us with the greatest problems".

Four possible environments.-- As befits Structuralists, Saussure 's students design -- before elaborating -- a collection of possible text forms. In particular:

a. publish everything in its original (unedited) form,

b. publish just one course,

c. extract the original parts of the text (in which de Saussure differs from the other linguists),

d. draw up a new text from the totality of the corpus - including the personal notes of de Saussure.

Behold the a-priori possible choices.

The empirical choice from the sum of possibilities.

The authors explain. We dwell on their reflections because this is an aspect specific to almost all treatises.

a. To publish everything in the original form of the text. The repetitions, inevitable in a loose exposition, -- the overlaps (by which parts of the text are partly identical), -- the changing wordings, -- all this would have given to such a publication a disparate look". (O.c . 9). In other words: there would have been no stylistic unity.

b. To limit oneself to just one course.-- And then : which of the three? In that case, one omits the richness in the other courses.-- Even the third, the most complete and definitive, would not give a complete picture of de Saussure's theories and methods. (Ibid.).-- In other words: the whole system would not be present in it.

c. Issue certain particularly original portions of text. -

"Although this pleased us at first, it soon became apparent that this method would disfigure the thought of our master. For only fragments were produced. And this of a construction of which the scope only becomes apparent when it is there in its entirety". In other words: the system again (and not its fragments).

d. A reconstruction of the coherence: of all the portions.
"This way out, we believe, is also more rational:
i. on the basis of the third course
ii. draw up a reconstruction - intended to show coherence ('synthesis') - and
iii. but in such a way that use was made of the totality of all available textual materials,--including the very scarce notes by de Saussure himself". In other words: it has become a commemoration in which a personal-individual element certainly plays a role (which is the case in every representation).
"We ventured on a re-creation which was the more precarious as it was to be, at the same time, an utter reproduction of de Saussure's thought.
From such work of comparison and reconstruction, the book emerged". (Ibid.).

Note.-- We touched briefly on the Structuralism that emerged from de Saussure's semiology, E.R. 29.

Bibl. st.: H. Aarsleff, *From Locke to Saussure (Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History)*, London, Athlone Press, 1982;
P. Wunderlich, *Saussure - Studien (Exegetische und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Werk von F. de Saussure),* (Saussure - Studien (Exegetische und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Werk von F. de Saussure),), Tübingen, G. Narr, 1981;
M. Frank, *Was ist Neostrukturalismus*?, Frankfurt, 1984.

Aarsleff's book traces the history of language theories from J. Locke (1632/1704; the great Enlightener), Leibniz, Condillac, Herder, Humboldt, Wilkins, Bréal, Taine, Wordsworth to de Saussure. This shows the decisive significance of Et. (Bonnot de) Condillac (1715/1780; *Traité des sensations* (1754), Sensualist thinker, influenced by J. Locke).

Anglo-Saxon Empiricism stands behind this (in discussion with e.g. Leibniz). The emphasis is on the fact that language is the premise of human knowledge and culture.
Immediately it must be evident from this that our human knowledge, when it expresses itself in language, is socially determined. At once it also appears that de Saussure e.g. and vrl. Taine ... without once mentioning him. Which gives pause for thought about the great founder of Structuralism.

Sample 21.-- *Trafficking theory 2 (topical (commonplace theory)) (135/137).*

Bibl. st.: R. Barthes, *L'aventure sémiologique*, Paris, 1985, 142s. (*Les lieux communs*),-- 143ss..(*Les lieux spéciaux*);

E.A. Curtius, *Europaische Literatur and Lateinisches Mittelalter*, (European Literature and Latin Middle Ages,), Bern, 1948; G.u.I, Schweikle, *Metzler Literaturlexikon*, Stuttgart, 1984, 442f. (Topos).-- 'Topos' in Antique Greek, means "place where one can find something". In rhetoric and dialectic it is then called "commonplace" (Lat.: "locus communis").

Development.
a.1. In heuristics (E.R. 09) or theory of finding, "topos", (common) place, means "a general or private point of view that serves as a premise for finding thoughts (arguments)".

Note -- In Aristotle's *Topics* one finds twenty-eight examples like this: to prove a model (theorem) one takes e.g. the detour of the counter-model or looks for something similar (second model), - which can be applied an infinite number of times.

a.2. This Antique method grows in later Antiquity, in the Middle Ages, in modern times (Renaissance) into what are now called 'clichés'. These are predefined models of behavior (e.g. text formation). E.g. "The world is bad", -- which can be repeated an endless number of times,

Opm.-- A.C. Zijderveld, *De tirannie van het cliché*, (The tyranny of the cliché,), Deventer, 1982 in which a sociological analysis is made of the cliché as a cultural phenomenon: "A cliché is a traditional form of human expression which - as a result of the fact that it is used over and over again in social life - has lost its original, often ingenious power of meaning". We have in mind such colloquialisms as "Birds of a feather" or, in French, "The extremes are touching". -- If you will: the worn out form of commonplace (the pejorative meaning).

b. The Enlightenment-Rationalists of the eighteenth century, because of their criticism of tradition and their urge to innovate, ridicule the commonplace.

b.1. Nevertheless, people usually continue to use the platitudes, for the reason of its value, and new platitudes are introduced (as e.g. "One manipulates us", in New Left circles). -

b.2. Literatology (from Curtius (1948) onwards) and, more broadly, calfurology updates and reestablishes the study of platitudes.

All the traditions prevailing in a society in all kinds of cultural sectors - textual and extra-textual - are objects of analysis. Say, we: "established or even customary habits".

Can you imagine a psychoanalyst who does not use as platitudes "the Oedipus complex" or "the Es, the Ich, the Ueber-Ich"? Every profession has its platitudes which have become established habits. Listen to the positive scientist : "What are the facts" That stop sentence is always there.

Universal and private platitudes.

a. The general topoi
These belong to the ontology. Think of the modalities: "necessary/not-necessary/necessary not (impossible): This illustrates the pair of opposites "being(the) / nonbeing(nothing)". Being(de) in its turn is always the couple "existence/ essence" (factuality/ way of being).

It has been so since Platon. These transcendental, all-encompassing commons were called "topoi koinoi" (loci communissimi).

b. The private platitudes
These belong to the parts of reality. -- They were called "eide or idia" (species, propria).-- Thus, e.g., economics, politics, psychoanalysis, etc., have their own platitudes.

For example, a traditional theologian will reason as follows: Scripture is the first platitude, the Church Fathers the second (less authority), theology the third (even less authority). That is where he looks for his arguments. These are the "places of finding. This is how people in court reason: "Let a crime go unpunished: a whole series of crimes will ensue".

Originality as the resurrection of commonplaces.
Look at people who want to be or act original : on closer inspection one sees that they actualize (singularly make real) a pattern that may be worn out.

Bibl. st.: F. Brunetière, *Histoire et littérature*, 3 t., Paris, 1893/1898.
Brunetière (1849/1906), in t. 3 (*Théorie du lieu commun*), says: "I bring here the paradox that the commonplace is the very condition of literary inventiveness (...). I am talking about the novel, the theatre, poetry: nothing is created from nothing (...). Several generations must have lived off the same concept in order for a masterly hand to transform it. Originality, par excellence, does not consist in drawing something from one's own being, but in the fact that one puts one's own stamp on what is commonplace....

To be creative (imaginative) is not to find something outside the commonplace: it is to renew that commonplace through redirection".

Note -- We refer here to J. Kristeva, *Sèmiotikè (Recherches pour une sémanalyse),* Paris, 1969: we repeat, either slavishly or originally, what others have already said before us. In other words: every text refers to previous texts,--is 'intertextually' intelligible.

Note.-- "It may be said that the art of music -- in its development and history -- rests to a great extent on the principle of variation.

The tone poet creates with a fact - the theme - that is itself a creation.

Actually, the theme is already a variation on the silence (present in the possible pauses) or on the twelve notes of the scale.

One end of the art of variation is the "da capo" (the simple repetition of a theme). The other are the variations without a theme (the 'creatio ex nihilo' (creating from nothing)), as Webern did in his opus 27 (*Variations for piano*)". (J. van Ackere, *What they made of their theme (The art of variation),* in: Streven 1982: Jan., 338).

One can see the commonplace as a theme on which endless variations are possible". "One could also speak of variations on the same theme in the visual arts. For example, the different versions of the Last Supper (by Tintoretto),-- the series on the motif "la cathédrale" or "les meules" by Monet.

On the variation forms in literature, see e.g. H. Petri, *Literatur und Musik (Form- und Strukturparallelen)*, Göttingen, 1964.

Furthermore: R. Queneau, *Exercices de style*, J.Weinheber, *Variationen*, F. Chabrin, *Paroles tissées* (with music by Lutoslauski). Or still: the variation structure in D. Buzzati's short stories (*Sette Piani* (Seven Floors), *I Sette Messageri* (The Seven Borders), Crescendo), in which each separated paragraph is a variation on the motif of the first (knocking on the door)." (Id., 351).

As the author rightly says the same theme expresses the different temperaments: "On the same theme of Schumann's - plucked from his Bunte Blätter - his wife and his friend both write variations". (A.c., 339).

Sample 22.-- Treatise theory 3. (138/139).

Bene currunt sed extra viam" once said S. Augustine ("They walk well, but off-piste"). This happens when texts are drafted without first having a clear idea of both the given (that which is available from the start) and the requested (that which is sought).

For example, a professor gives the subject "Jean-Jacques Rousseau". Immediately the question arises: "What did the professor say?

For instance: **a.** he did not say anything (then you have a given but you determine the task, the wanted);

b. he added: "Find out what role the established society plays with Rousseau in the education of the child". In that case, your task has already been determined and the question clarified.

This is what can be called "the task hermeneutics", the most accurate understanding possible of subject and task.

Opm.-- P. Brunel et al, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature comparée*?, (What is comparative literature?), Paris, 1983, 115/134 (Thématique et thématologie), distinguishes between thematics, as a method, and thematology (translation of the German Stoffgeschichte or even Motivgeschichte, i.e. the study of themata).

Appl. model.-- P. Brunel, dir., *Dictionnaire des mythes littéraires*, Ed. du Rocher, 1988, is an encyclopedic work on a number of recurrent themes in bellettry.

Thus, e.g., M.-J. Bénéjam-Bontemps, in o.c., 1188/1207, talks about Satan in literature ("*Satan, héros romantique"*).

Brunel calls such themes 'motives'. But with that we find ourselves in - the study of the platitudes under the themes.

Note.-- Elisabeth Frenzel, *Motive der Weltliteratur*, Stuttgart, Kröner, 1988;

id., *Stoffe der Weltliteratur*, Stuttgart, 1961, talks about stories (legends, myths, -- novels) which are often repeated: 'story motifs' are data which regularly crop up. For example: determining the true identity of a foundling, the deceiver who is deceived himself (harmony of opposites), the tension between love and class difference.

Macro- and microthematics.

K. Bertels/ D. Nauta, *Inleiding tot het modelbegrip*, (Introduction to the model concept,), Bussum, De Haan, 1969, 86v., draws attention to the difference in scale regarding history studies.

L. Fevre, just before World War II (1939/1945), broadened the historiography that was too focused on purely political history to "histoire des mentalités" (history of mentalities).

Fernand Braudel (1902/1985; "le pape des historians"), a pupil of Fèvre, took up this broadening of the theme of history in an even broader framework:
a. micro-history ("what evolves with the hour or the day"),
b. medium-term history (a development over decades),
c. long history ("from Homer to Goethe").
One sees the theme vary!

F.R. Ankersmit, *Two forms of narrativism*, in: Tijdschr.v.Filos. 50 (1988): 1 (March), 40/81 (cf. his Narrative Logic, The Hague, 1983), draws attention to Carlo Ginzburg's "*micro-story*": an unusual amount of attention is paid to seemingly unimportant details in order to present this as "real history".

That goes towards the monograph. Thus in C. Ginzburg, *The cheese and the worms*, Amsterdam, 1981.

Note.-- Let us think of W. Windelband (1848/1915; Neo-Cantian axiologist), *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (History and science), (1894), with his notion of 'idiography' (abundantly expounding the singular).
Jacques Derrida, known among other things for his *Grammatology* (1967), is known for his small thematic studies: e.g. on a detail text (a footnote for example) situated in a voluminous text he devotes an unusual amount of attention in order to demonstrate "real textuology".

Decision.-- Inductivism.--
The detail - a small thing -
a. is similar (metaphorically) to other details (all similar details) and involves generalization,
b. is related to the rest (metonymically) (the whole context) and encompasses the whole. Thus details shed light (metaphorically by resemblance, metonymically by coherence) on what lies beyond those details.

But that's induction: the details are samples in collections and systems.
As Ankersmit says: microthematics a. in the place of and b. within the framework of macrothematics, means that extensive themes may be seen in a fundamentally different light.
By delving into one day's World War at the Yser Front (1914/1918), a historian can shed a profoundly different light on the entirety of the First World War and on the collection of the two World Wars. - The theme, which is given, is thus decisive.

Sample 23.-- Trafficking theory. (problems/ problematology). (140/141).

Let's start with the background.

M. Meyer, *Logique, langage et argumentation*, Paris, 1982;

id. *De la problématique (Philosophie, science et langage),* Liège-Brussels, 1986, deals with language. The "question/answer" system is the pre-eminent preposition on which Meyer lays emphasis : that is the problematique of language.

C.J. Macmillan/ J.W. Garrison*, A Logical Theory of Teaching, I (Erotetics and Intentionality)*, Kluwer, 1988, emphasizes the essence of learning activity: to teach something to another is "to answer questions which the hearers (should) ask about a theme". This is called 'erotetics' (from the ancient Greek 'erotao', I (under) ask), theory of asking.

Actually, a text, including a "treatise" is an answer to questions that are asked or should be asked.

Bibl. st.: M.Roustan, *La dissertation littéraire*, Paris, s.d., 5/42, talks at length about the problem, i.e. the questions that arise (or should arise) in response to the theme.

P.R. Bize/ P. Goguelin/ R. Carpentier, *Le penser efficace, I (Le fonctinnement mental),* (Effective thinking, I (Mental functioning)), contains a chapter "*Les étapes préparatoires de la problémation*" (The preparatory stages of the proble), and II (*La problémation*) - Paris, 1982 - betrays a new term: 'problemation'.

The problem mode.

"Status quaestionis", Fr.: "l' état de la question", is the state of the problem that the theme raises.

A method. How do questions arise in our minds? Among other things, and above all, by listening to others.

Herodotos of Halikarnassos (-484/-425), influenced by the Milesians (Thales a.o.), adopts a democratic approach: "He, the enthusiastic, though not naive admirer of democratic Athens, allows everyone who has something to say on the subject to speak,--without showing any sympathy or antipathy". (D. Teuffen, *Herodot*, Wien/Munich, 1979, 65).

Platon of Athens proceeded in the same democratic manner: think of his inventory of (prevailing) opinions on justice (= conscientious living), in his *Politeia* (as A. Henderickx, *De rechtvaardigheid in De Staat van Platon*, (The justice in The State of Platon), in: Tijdschr. v.Filos. 7 (1945): 1/2, 19/34 (vrl. 32), dissertation).

There all opinions are discussed, even those which Platon will thoroughly reject. In this way one builds up a problem, one learns to discover questions.

Model.-- J. Kellerhals, dir., *Figures d'équité (La construction des normes de justice dans les groupes),* (Figures of fairness (The construction of norms of justice in groups)), Paris, 1988.

Given: the resources of a group are distributed equitably.

Asked: what are the premises - "les normes" - of such an equitable distribution?

The reasoning is as follows: if A (propositions), then B (law distribution); well, as a lemma (working hypothesis) B; therefore A.

What in Platonic language is called "analytic method",-- language of Jevons - Lukasiewicz "reductive method".

The work provides four answers to that question;-

a. Relativism. Method : one compares the factual propositions that govern the discourse.

Conclusion: they are so different from each other that they are purely 'relative', i.e. they depend on situations (there are no general rules).

b.1. Economism. The interests of individuals and groups are calculated in figures, from which distributive justice is derived in the most equitable way possible.

b.2. Functionalism. The 'functions' (= that for which the riches ultimately serve) dominate the invention of the rules of distribution.

b.3. Interactionism. This is the own hypothesis of Kellerman, professor at the Univ. of Geneva. The 'factors' of interest in division are conceived as 'interacting'. In other words: they form a system in which no single factor may be privileged or undervalued.

But these factors are numerous: status (gender, race), social status (rich, poor), feeling (disdain, respect), nature of economic values (money, services, protection), objectives (each to his own (= model of harmony), competitiveness of the group), type of group (family, professional group), privileges (promotion of talent, reward of effort), distribution processes (democratic deliberation, recourse to outsiders, authority), etc,

Note.-- Actually, this is a problematic book.-- Ch. Widmer, *Ethique (Justice pour un, justice pour tous)*, in: Journal de Genève 28.01. 1989, says: "In fact, the book leads us nowhere: it pays particular attention to all shades of fact".

In other words: three theories are refuted as inadequate and one's own theory is endless. Consequence: the book amounts to a new problem state.

Sample 24.-- Treatise theory 5 (theme : types). (142/144).

Bibl. st.: O. Willmann, *Abriss der Philosophie*, Wien, Herder, 1959-5, 10.

The Middle Ages Scholastics (800/1450) distinguished two main types of topics, i.e., assignments consisting of a word or set of words (concepts) and assignments consisting of a sentence or sentences (judgments). In which one discerns logic, which deals with concepts and judgments (including reasoning). One can also speak of antepredicative and predicative tasks (predicate = phrase in a sentence).

A.-- Antepredicative themata.-- "Quaestio simplex de uno vocabulo" (= one vocabulum).

For example, "Labor". "The Proverb".

The data is 'simplex', singular. But all the more comprehensive, because

a. All that is 'labor' and the totality of labor (set and system) are subjects or

b. all that is proverbial and the whole of all that is proverbial (collection and system) are discussed.

The question is the existence and the being (essence and existence) of the given - not easy! -Till there the themes that comprise one concept.

Note.-- The Scholastic wording does not explicitly mention composite comprehension themes.

1. E.g. "Labor and leisure" or "Labor, leisure and play". The conjunction "and" does not mean that one first writes about e.g. "labor" and then about "leisure". It is about the relation between labor and leisure. Which is a harmological (=relativistic) subject: the relation between work and leisure (again, dual: similarity and difference (set with subsets); coherence and incoherence (system with subsystems)).

2. Likewise, "Labor or leisure." "Or labor or leisure." Here is the relation: not the two at the same time! Also: "Labor and leisure;" "Learning and leisure. Here is the relation: the two at once! Or still: "No labor". "No labor and/or leisure". This is the negation (negation) that refers to a framework in which the negation can be situated (which again is a relation).

So if one receives a treatise that .... one thinks carefully what exactly is expected (the demand is somewhere in the given).

Note.-- The conjunction "as". "The labor as labor" means "the labor as such" or still "the labor as such".

This is the looping or reflexive 'relation' (total identity of something with itself). Such a theme requires entering into what is the essence -- the essence form -- of labor, i.e., that by which labor opposes what is not labor,-- that by which labor differs from the rest.

Note -- The conjunction "as. Take "Labor as a livelihood". Or "Labor as a factor in health". -- Here the 'if' is not reflexive, but restrictive: we are not talking about work in its entirety, but about work in so far as one earns one's living through work or acquires health.

A title of a book.-- Tzvetan Todorov, a Bulgarian living in France, wrote *Nous et les autres, (La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine),* (Nous et les autres, (French reflection on human diversity)), Paris, 1989.

The precise analysis of the title is only possible through the reading: the relation between the French and "the others" is a theme in so far as these "others" are "different", i.e. have a different cultural system. More precisely: "To what extent can the French integrate those who are different?

"*As the father, so the son*." -- This is seemingly an antepredicative theme, but actually it is a phrase, "As the father is, so is the son." Which is a predicative theme.

As an aside: translating into other sentences is a possible analysis: "The influence of (the father's) behavior is such that his behavior founds a similar behavior in the son".

Actually, the meaning is broader: "So the mother, so the son or the daughter". In other words: one wants to say: "So the parents, so the children". One mentions the part, but means the whole (which is a trope : metonymy). A synecdoche of the metonymic type!

Content/ scope (range).-- Concepts have content and scope (= range).

Bibl. s.: G. Booij, *Lexikon of linguistics*, Utr./Antw., 1980-2, 38 (range).

"So the father, so the son". Or : "The apple doesn't fall far from the tree" (again a trope, a metaphor: apple = child, tree = parents).

But look: this is not always the case. "A père avare, fils prodigue" (On a miserly father follows a wasteful son).

In other words: the scope of "So the father, so the son" is only a subset of all the numbers of "parent-child relationship". So pay attention to the scope of the content (all/not all/not all).

B.-- Predicative themata.-- "Quaestio coniuncta de propositions aliqua" (a theme that is compound and consists of a judgment).-- From an original, the subject (subject), a saying, the model of the original (predicate), is said.

B.1.-- One-sentence statement.

For example, "Arbeid adelt" (Work nobles). As already noted:

translate into another form, namely, "Labor as a source of nobility" or still "Labor in so far as it nobles". It is a relational subject. Or also: "If labor, then (always, not always) nobility". In that interposed "always, not always" is hidden the extent to which the content is applicable. For not all labour nobles!

B.2.-- Multisentence statement.

We take one model at random. E. Gun, Eva Braun (mistress and wife of Adolf Hitler), Rotterdam, s.d.. We quote the motto.

Note -- A motto is a text - e.g., a maxim - placed somewhere at the beginning of a text to indicate the purpose - the proposition that one wishes to illustrate.

In Gun's work:

(**1**) Friedrich Nietzsche: "Ein Held musz frei sein".

(**2**) Adolf Hitler: "Das ist das Schlimmste an der Ehe: sie schafft Rechtsansprüche! Da ist es schon viel richtiger eine Geliebte zu haben. The burden falls away and everything remains a gift. Das gilt natürlich nur für hervorragende Männer.

One sees it:

(1) Nietzsche's statement, rewritten, says "If hero, then duty free".

(**2**) Hitler's statement as a clarification of Nietzsche's: "If marriage, by giving rights to the partner, is 'a burden' and if taking a mistress relieves you of this burden (whereby everything remains a gift), then having a mistress is something for men of stature (not for others)".

One can see that Nietzsche's notion of heroes and Hitler's notion of "men of stature" make up the common understanding of both statements. In particular: heroes or outstanding men may afford more!

Note.-- Philosophically there is both heroism or hero worship behind it. What we also find with the Skinheads. What's more: the Nazis worshipped Nietzsche as their forerunner. This is among the presuppositions of the quoted sentences. A somewhat in-depth treatise may go into this, even if it does not seem to belong to the theme. It is part of the problem of the presuppositions unspoken in the theme.

Sample 25.-- Negotiation Theory 6.

Commonplaces also exist for the development of a discourse text.

There are three main general places:

a.1. existence (the existence or non-existence of something),

a.2. essence (the being of what exists).

Together these two make up the essence, i.e. that by which something is distinguishable (discriminable) from the rest. The essence or 'form' (understand: creature form) is the actual object or subject of a treatise.

Once one has understood the given and the demanded, one can fix oneself on whatever illuminates the form of being.

Rhetorically speaking, this is:

a. Obtaining information (heuristics; E.R. 09),

b. Organizing information (harmology; E.R. 10) and

c. even, though this is rather the latter updating, stylizing ordered information (stylistics; E.R. 12).

In other words: this is the textual rhetoric,--applied. We call this "text development," for convenience.

Opm. - R. Barthes *L'aventure sémiologique*, 142:

a. existence: "An sit?" (whether it exists?) To which the answer is: "That it exists");Application: "An fecerit?" (Did (the culprit, the culpritess) do it, yes or no?"),

b. essence: "Quid sit?" (What is it? To which the answer: "So it is or still "So it is").

Note.-- The circumstances.

In all rhetorical text theories and examples one finds the so-called circumstances method. This is a set of truisms that are useful for just about any topic.

Appl. Mod.: Let's take a sample: McLaughlin, Robert. *What? Where? When? Why? (Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explantion),* Dordrecht, 1982.

The title of this treatise speaks volumes for those familiar with traditional rhetoric: what, where and when (= space and time), wherefore/why,--these are truly 'classical' platitudes. Namely: the being (the form of being insofar as essence), denoted by 'what', - the being (the form of being insofar as existence), denoted by 'where and when', - the explanation (the propositions of essence and existence), denoted by 'why / why'.

Note.-- So if you are faced with a theme (with problems), remember these three "topics" (another name for "platitudes," and you will already have a beautiful, discursive scheme.

Sample 26.-- Handling doctrine 7 (enumeration : definition / classification). (146/148). We now turn to enumeration and its two main uses, namely, definition and classification.

One can only enumerate as far as one:
a. a collection and b. a system (system) of which all or not all elements or parts are enumerated.
b. What summative induction presupposes:
    a. list separately the elements of a set and the subsystems (parts) of a system
    b. in which it is repeatedly apparent that they have ... or show one or more common characteristics (for the system this is the fact that they belong, in all distinctions, to one and the same whole or system). Which allows "from all (elements, parts) separately, to all (elements, parts) together.
This is the definition of "summative induction", i.e. that generalization or generalization which concerns the "sum" (Lat.: "summa" is "sum", "totality"). One can also speak of "summative induction".
Since the drafting of texts in a treatise constantly involves definitions and classifications (classifications), we'll go over them briefly.

Analogy -- Is 'analogous' (similar) to everything which is both different and similar. Ch. Lahr, S.J., *Logique*, Paris, 1933-27, 612, emphasizes a main requirement of enumeration (defining, classifying), namely, that the things to be enumerated should be both similar and different. Which is analogy.

Appl. model.-- Janina Kharma, *Gastronomie pharaonique*, in: Journal de Genève / Gazette de Lausanne 10.02.1992, draws attention to an English botanist-archaeologist, Delwen Samuel, who has been studying the eating habits of the ancient Egyptians since 1990. She distinguishes two types - types (classification) - of eating habits, namely the eating habits of the rich classes and those of the less well-off classes. Notice:
a. both belong to the same collection, the Ancient Egyptian eating habits, and to the same system, the Ancient Egyptian eating culture;
b. but. given the differences in possession. they diverge into two major types (subsets. sub-sets or sub-systems). Which allows for a typology (theory of types).-

As Lahr underlines, both classes must be such that they exhibit traits which include the other (same) and at the same time exclude the other (difference).

Note.-- The same analogy is at work in the definition. Do we take e.g. R. Kühnl, *Faschismus (Versuch einer Begriffsbestimmung), in: Blätter für deutsche und internationals Politik xiii* (Fascism, Attempt to define the term), in: Sheets for German and International Politics xiii) (1968). This treatise is nothing but one long attempt to arrive at a correct definition. That is how decisive a definition can be!

The structure: **a.** given: fascism as fact and as an existing name;
            b. requested: a responsible definition - conceptual content - that corresponds to the scope (the facts).

Note -- Aristotle of Stageira (-384/-322) divides a definition into two parts (at least when it concerns general or private data)
a. the genus (genos, Lat.: genus), i.e. the universal collection;
b. the specific difference (diafora eidopoios, Lat.: differentia specifica). Both together give the species (type) as result, i.e. the subset.

Appl. model.-- The Paleopythagoreans, before Platon and Aristotle, were already engaged in defining, i.e. in enumerating the features (properties) which make up the content of a concept.
Listen to Archutas of Taras (Lat.: Archytas of Tarentum; -445/-395) when he defines windlessness: "Windlessness is a. the air mass b. at rest. Wind is the same air mass in motion (specific difference). Wind and stillness include one self-same datum, air mass, but include at least one datum which excludes it (the specific difference : resting state, movement).

Conclusion: to enumerate, of what includes and what excludes, is to define.

Note.-- Looking at a definition of Fascism. "The doctrine of the party founded by Benito Mussolini (1883/1945) in Milan in 1919".
This again includes inclusive and exclusive data:
a. doctrine (common to other systems of learning),
b. characteristic (= characteristic difference) for the party etc.
One may add: "Doctrine that made the fight against Communism its great goal".
Again: a. doctrine (inclusive aspect), b. with as intent preeminent, etc. (exclusive aspect).

Yet this last characteristic is not absolutely exclusive, for, Nazism too was a. a doctrine b. which aimed at combating all that was Communism. But in National Socialism there was something which the Fascists did not display, namely Germanizing racism.

Note -- Everyone knows that enumerating in the classification, which is primarily concerned with the scope of the concept, is decisive. But that defining is also enumerating - after all, the characteristics (Lat.: notae) of the content are enumerated - is usually much less understood. Therefore what follows.

The algorithm.-- There are themes that can only be defined by enumeration in the strong sense of the word. Thus all that is 'algorithm', i.e. all that constitutes a purposeful sequence.

An example.-- Yvonne de Blaunac, *Cuisine d'Ardeche* (Kitchen of Ardeche), *(238 recettes),* 07400 Le Teil, Ed. Simone Sudre, 1984.

Kitchen prescriptions are 'purposeful series of partial acts'. We say, 'partial acts' within the whole or dynamic system which the preparation of a kitchen phenomenon always is: - O.c., 287 (Eau-de-vie à la sauge). The French 'sauge' stands for salvia officinalis, sage.

Here, translated, is the algorithm.
a. Ingredients (infrastructure): 1 bottle containing 1 litre of eau-de-vie (Genever) at 40°; 40 leaves of fresh sage.

b. Preparation: open the bottle, insert the sage leaves -one by one-, close the bottle,-- let it brew for three weeks, putting the bottle in the sun as much as possible, filter it, refill the bottle with the filtered liquid, let it ripen.

Note.-- There is no other method of 'defining' the act other than to reflect the order - pre-sign (what goes before)/sequel (what follows) without skipping anything (complete enumeration), otherwise the definition is wrong.

You see, every description of something. - Yes, certainly, every story (worthy of the name) shows this algorithmic structure. So that real and precise descriptions and stories, as is often necessary in discourses, are actually disguised forms of defining (and thus of summing up).

By the way, all those who deal with the ordinator know that the algorithm is the order of the day there. There too, in computer science, summing up and especially summing up completely is decisive, because if you put the data into the computer in an incomplete way, you will be very disappointed as far as reliable computer operations are concerned.

Which means that summative induction is again decisive here: the totality of the data is just a necessary condition.

Sample 27.-- Treatise theory 8 (existence/ essence). (149/153).

What follows is more of a heuristic. We are going to see how a celebrated anthropologist, Margaret Mead (1901/1978), because her treatise; was 'unreal', was knocked off her pedestal.

Bibl. s.: **(1)** cultural anthropology:

P. Mercier, *Histoire de l' anthropologie*, Paris, 1971;

Sol Tex, ed., *Horizons of Anthropology*, Chicago, 1964 (twenty-something specialists);

Th. Rhys Williams, *Field Methods in the Study of Culture*, New York, 1967 ('fieldwork');

(2) M. Mead: J.D. Jennings / E.A. Hoebel, ed., *Readings in Anthropology*, New York, 1955-2 (= anthology; M. Mead.

Margaret Mead, *Anthropology and an Education for the Future* (o.c., 3/5), in which the anthropologist tries to make her "new education" a reality);

J. Erskine, *The death of a South Sea myth*, in: Snoecks (Ghent) 1984, Ghent, 1983, 133/143.

Prof. Franz Boas (1858/1942), Columbia University, sent a student woman, M. Mead to Samoa ... to write a paper. And this in a "Culturalist sense". S. Clapier Valladon, *Panorama du culturalisme*, Paris, 1976, teaches us that (ethnological, primitivological) Culturalism, a movement among others, has the following characteristics:

a. study of the personality as the center of culture;

b. analysis of culture as a whole;

c. emphasis on the multiplicity of cultures, resulting in 'cultural relativism' (no culture is the only true one);

d. methodical: 'positivism' (careful dissection of the 'facts' observed as nakedly as possible;

e. cultural-historical: 'optimism' (cultures show an upward evolution, resulting in educational conclusions).

Cultural determinism and heredity determinism.

The cultural determinist says: we are all 'determined' by our culture. The heredity determinist says: we are all 'determined' by our heredity.

Some say: our personality - in - culture is acquired; others: it is innate.

Note.-- Meanwhile, both "oppositionalisms" are overcome by the insight that both are simultaneously right in limited ways.

Note.-- Fr. Boas belonged to the cultural determinists: our personality-in-culture is acquired. Such were the premises with which the student Mead departed.

Family Sphere and Progressism.-- M. Mead's father was a professor of economics. Her grandmother was a teacher, a supporter of the "New Education" (Maria Montessori; Friedrich Fröbel), and her mother was a feminist sociologist.

Consequence: Margaret was "freely brought up" and - what was more - she was a typical Progressist: throughout her entire life she felt "a period ahead" of the rising generation.

The treatise.-- She's twenty-four. Boas sends her to the Samoa Islands to study adolescence. On 31.08.1925 she sets foot in Pago Pago, the capital of Samoa.

Her stay lasted nine months,-- mostly on Manu, Eastern Samoa. She took up residence with an American family, in an outbuilding that served as a polyclinic. E.R. Holt, a pharmacist in the U.S. Navy, was her host.

On her arrival she did not know the native language; however, she learned its elements over a period of nine weeks. In addition she stayed for ten days with a chief in Vaitogi whose daughter was a "ceremonial virgin". He knew a little English.

With her, Margaret Mead spent the nights under the same mosquito net. In Holt's clinic she met about sixty Samoan girls with whom she had long conversations about the relationship between "parents/children", "boys/girls" and about the educational system.

The thesis of the treatise.-- With his *The Spirit of Primitive Man* (1900), Boas had tried to make the following thesis - thesis, propositio - true.

It read: sexual maturation with its puberty crisis - as known in the West - is not a biological necessity (if hereditary, then inevitably a puberty crisis), but a cultural phenomenon which is thus susceptible to 'engineering' (manipulation, 'modification') (if culturally determined, then acquired and modifiable). For, in the culturalist perspective, culture is a value system that is 'relative' (relativism) (at once also education).-- Boas expected Mead to verify this claim.

Characteristic.-- A 'characteristic' is a description that shows the main points.

a. ***Fact***.- Mead determined that there was no adolescent crisis on Samoa (the existence question was answered in the negative).

b. ***Explanation***.-- The 'elements' (factors) at work in this absence of Sturm-und-Drangjahre, the puberty crisis that occurs in a Western culture with its value system, is located in the difference in upbringing.

Well, the education system, in its turn, must be situated in the Samoan culture as a totality, in which the personality is formed.-.

Samoa differs from the West especially in sexual education. Samoa has a different "culture pattern".

What Mead had noticed was that the people of Samoa had "no deep attachments to just one person". Genuine, heartfelt appreciation both for parents and for sexual partners is rare on Samoa!

In other words : the relationships, if they exist at all, are 'without engagement' and 'free love' is generally accepted. It is "a light and pleasant dance". At the same time, "non-free" love is as good as impossible to find.

In practical terms, the girls go to bed with such a large number of boys that "deep involvement" with just one boy is rare. The emphasis here, Mead believes, is on virtuosity in erotic techniques.

The second typically Western behavioral component, in Freudian language, is the urge to attack. Well, according to Mead, aggression, with rivalry and performance drive as expressions, is non-existent.

Note.-- "Samoa is a place where the stakes are never high. No one there is under any strain to get the best out of life". (S. Clapier Valladon, o.c., 185vv.).

The coming of age in Samoa, New York, 1927.
Hence the famous title of the treatise. It was followed by many other texts - books, articles - during the eventful life of Mead.

One of these is *Culture and Commitment (A Study of the Generation Gap)*, New York, 1970 (translated into French the following year: Le fossé des générations, The Generation Gap).

The term 'generation gap' has become a slogan! It dates from the days of the triumph of "the goddess of anthropology" (Cfr S. Clapier, *Panorama* 158/165 (*L' anthropologie comme science du futur*)).

Note - Apparently Boas could see his preconceived proposition 'proved' (verified).

The welcome ('reception').

The reception was overwhelming. The reasons are to be sought in well-defined cultural trends in the West (e.g. in the USA).

a. We all know Primitivism

(a.o. in the form of all kinds of Exotisms and Naturisms) that cultivates a naive veneration for everything that is 'Primitive' (or exotic or 'Naturist' or whatever as long as it is 'alternative').

J.-J Rousseau (1712/1778), the pre-eminent importer of romantic Sentimentalism through his cultural critique and his "Return to Nature".

Bernardin de Saint-Pierre (1737/1814; *Paul et Virginie* (1787)) and a number of others in that track were the trailblazers.

Note..-- The Beatniks (1955+), the Hippies and Yippies (1962+), our travel agencies all exhibit one form or another of such "escape from day-to-day, morally bound reality."

b. A Bertrand Russell (1872/1970) e.g. is also to be mentioned,

the emancipator (abductee) who, with a number of "abductees," received Mead's work with great enthusiasm - The Progressist Antitabooism, which saw in the abolition of what they called "moral and other taboos (prohibitions)" the element of "progress" par excellence, exulted: at last the facts! The relation of the sexes, among youth, -- the meaning of marriage (which one Calverton, The Bankruptcy of Marriage, tried to interpret), -- the value judgments concerning conjugal fidelity and free love -- all these seemed to find verification in Mead's treatise.

The falsification.-- The Western emancipated intelligentsia, however, had something tough to deal with.

Derek Freeman (1916/2001), New Zealand ethnologist, publishes his *Margaret Mead and Samoa (The Making and the Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth),* 1983.

The subtitle betrays the thesis - a real 'counter' thesis - : the construction and dismantling of an imaginary representation of things! For The New York Times, among others, Freeman formulated it as follows.

1. M. Mead's theses were accepted by the established intellectual-artistic vanguard; all textbooks and encyclopedias reflect this.

2. These statements are untrue : the reality on Samoa is profoundly different.

The falsification method.-- Freeman lived on Western Samoa,-- in education. Learned the language of the natives thoroughly (exam included).

He was adopted by a Samoan family. Even participated in sessions of a group of tribal chiefs (who exert such a powerful influence on traditional Samoan life).

Freeman is at the same time a supporter of an extremely detailed account of the phenomena. Which confirms the strictly scientific value of his book.

Characteristic.
Here are the essentials.
1. The facts (existence/ essence).
a. The "free love" Mead mentioned is non-existent. Thus, among other things, virginity, in the native mentality, is a high value.

b. Competition (including erotic competition) is as frequent as in a Western cultural model. Yes, the urge to attack is very strong: murder is frequent and Samoa is first in the percentage of rapes.

2. The statement.
*a. Mead's statement.-- She explained from the upbringing.--*Freeman stated as a fact that, notwithstanding American presence, the upbringing is "ancestral-authoritarian". Yes, Freeman says that this can be seen in some of its effects, such as psychological problems like neuroses (hysteria) and suicide.

Note. - One could argue: Freeman came so many years later.

Freeman: Mead neglected, for example, the police reports of her time, which she should have consulted thoroughly. Well, they contradict her statements. In other words, nothing much has changed since then. -

b. Mead's explanation of error.
a. Her "free upbringing" at home, which she went so big on, instilled in her wrong preconceptions that got in the way of a proper understanding of Samoa.

b. Even those who, after Freeman's work, try to defend Mead's book, consider this error possible. In particular: ethnologists doing fieldwork often find that, in establishing dialogues,

i. in the service of a hypothesis, **ii**. the "Archaic philanthropy" imparts answers which do not contain the objective truth of the facts, but the will to fall into the taste of the Western interlocutor.

In other words, the Samoan girls with whom Mead' spoke wanted to "appear affable".

Conclusion.-- Mead begins a perception error. Behold the stand, the problem stand now (E.R. 140), after Freeman.

Sample 28.-- Trafficking theory 9 (developmental statistics). (154/155)

'Topics', in the Antique sense, means "the doctrine concerning platitudes." Which does not prevent - metonymically - 'topical' from also meaning 'commonplace'.

We have already met a number of them: existence/ essence (whether and how something, the theme, really is), given/requested (theme/problem), whereby 'motive' or 'substance' is problem-position (status quaestionis), content/ extent (range), circumstances (why, why), where/when (space/time, existence), enumeration (definition/classification (classification)), algorithm. In other words: we already have a "small arsenal".

A. Langlois, *Le style (La chose et la manière.-- Du xvii-e au xx-e siècle*), (The style (The thing and the way -- From the 17th to the 20th century),), Bruxelles, 1925, 57, says: "The Antiques attached great importance to this heuristic part (...). They had a whole arsenal at their disposal".

Langlois lists some of them - the most obvious ones: definition/classification, similarity/difference (what we call 'analogy'), circumstances (including the antithesis pair "omen (cause)/sequence (effect)").

This is what can put us on the road to 'discoveries' when developing the text.

Restoration (update).

Let us take a more recent American book on trading: S. P. Moss, *Composition by Logic*, Belmont (Calif.), 1966. Moss recognizes as 'topics' what follows.

1. Fact statements (protocol statements, determinations of fact),-- example statements (exemplifications, example statements i.e. grasping the scope of a conceptual content).

2. What topics (what questions), definition statements (definitions),-- how topics (how questions).

2.bis Comparison topics (comparison questions), contrast topics (opposites -- counter model questions,-- which is a second form of comparison).-- Compare and contrast topics (similarity and counter model questions).--

Similarities and opposites are, in essence, only roundabout ways of describing the essence or mode of being.

3. Why topics (why/why questions).--

Conclusion: compare Langlois and other traditionalists with Moss, and one concludes that the platitudes of the ancient Greeks "still work". All the more proof for the proposition that our present-day inventiveness or 'creativity' is not absolute, but very relative, i.e. really served by ancient thought movements.

Economic model.-- Who does not know the internationally famous handbook of economic science P.A. Samuelson (Nobel Prize in economics 1970) / W. D.. Nordham, *Economics*, New York, 1985-127. We pause at p. 916 (766;899 (applications)). *What, How and For Whom*?"-- These are three basic questions about economics.

What?

"What should be produced, in terms of economic goods and services, if one puts the limited resources ('inputs') of a society first? Whereby the calculating producer thinks, at the same time as the 'what', the 'how much'.

How?

How will the producer proceed in utilizing - combining - the available goods or services, in the 'what' and the 'how much' mentioned? This is no longer purely economic but also technological.

For whom?

After the quantity of what and the how comes the destination: consumer goods and services should be distributed among the members of a society (what is called the "distribution or sharing sector").

Note: Behind this producer-schema or -general place, there is a triad, namely "I, the producer, try to sell a good or service" (I, good or service, 'man'). One could call this the selling triad: selling, good or service sold, buying.

And those who know Ch. S. Peirce's threefoldness, see behind both schemata "interpreter (interpretant), the thing deduced, interpretation." -

Conclusion. - The analysis just now has enriched us with a few platitudes, including "How much, for whom, I / product (good, service) / fellow man, -- indicating / the thing / indicated". Our arsenal enlarged!

Note.-- One finds platitudes or "topics" just about everywhere.
Thus: "The question, regarding poisons, is "what, how much and how dangerous,
Where?" (D. Martinetz/K, Lohs, *Gift (Magie and Realität/ Nutzen und Verderben),* Leipzig, 1985, 172 (a book on poisons).

Note -- Dr. Cecil Heiman, medical-anthropologist or ethnomedical engineer, starts from the predominant doctor pattern but broadens it: the analysis of the healing process - so he says - also includes the healing influence of the healing self; moreover: the person to be healed not only wants to know what he/she has, but also why/why he/she shows this 'what'. - Up to now, a few random samples concerning topics.

Sample 29. -- Treatise 10 (chreia). (156/158)
So far we have seen fragmentary platitudes at work. Are there also, from Antiquity, total platitudes? Yes, a.o. the 'chreia' (Lat.: 'chria', chrie)

Bibl. st.: H.I. Marrou, *Histoire de l' éducation dans l' antiquité*, Paris, 1948, 241;

O. Pecqueur, *Manuel pratique de la dissertation*, (Practical manual of the essay,), Namur, 1922, 12.

J. Fr. Marmontel (1723/1799), *Eléments de littérature* (1787), defines chreia, which he also calls 'definition' (the term 'definition' has a broad meaning with him: as follows.-- "The interpretation or 'definition' of either a peculiar fact or a statement."

***Note*.--** This brings us to what the ancients called 'gnomè', Lat.: sententia, opinion (saying, pronouncing). This kind of judgment usually contains the determination of some theoretical or especially practical wisdom of life.

For example, among the Sumerians (a people in Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq - Iran), who lived between -4,000 and -3,000) a saying applied (dating from +-2,000): "Marry for pleasure. After deep thought: divorce". Or still: "Thou mayest have a master. You may even have a king. The man that thou, however, really must fear, is the tax collector".

As an aside, such wisecracks are ideal subjects for a chreia.

The eightfold chreia.-- In Antique secondary education, the text size of the chreia was "a small page".

It does justice to the ambiguity of the theme and the problem definition: after all, the given and the asked are looked at from eight different sides. From a textual point of view this gives eight 'cephalaia' (Latin: capita) sections.

Here we are.
A.1. Given.-- "Isokrates of Athens once said, "The roots of education appear bitter. The fruits, however, have a pleasant taste".

A.2. Requested.-- Text development according to the schedule of the chrie. So much for the task. Now the developments.

B. Elaboration.

B.I. Characterization of Isokrates.-- Isokrates (-436/-338) was a rhetor (a teacher of rhetoric), leader of a philosophical - rhetorical school, which rivaled the Academy of Platon.

Note: The characteristic is a representation, very brief here, of the main features.

Note: In antiquity (and still today) the characteristic easily boils down to 'enkomion' (praise) or also 'psogos' (criticism, 'blame') - cfr E.RH, 89 - , which are value judgments,

B. II. The fact or saying (pronunciation).
All subsequent sections (paragraphs) of the chreia deal with this aspect.

II.a. Paraphrasis.
The 'paraphrasis' (from which we derive 'paraphrase' or description) is a shortened statement (a very short characteristic).

E.g.: **(1)** Isokrates - in a metaphor - compares education to the structure of a plant whose roots taste bitter but whose fruits turn out pleasant.

(2) By this he means that the "sensitivity training", the practice, inherent in education, is strict and causes stress,-- but with the result that one experiences afterwards in theory and especially in praxis how useful this practice really is. If you like: the substructure of educating and being educated is difficult; the superstructure is a joy.

II.b. Argumentation.
This section also accounts for a value judgment or evaluation, as it is structured in two ways.

b.1. verification.
In Greek 'kataskeuè'. The thesis, thesis, of the paraphrasis hangs in the air, - is 'unreal', as long as no proof is given.

Here is the (common) place of the examples that show, that indeed being educated over time turns out to be good and valuable.

b.2. falsification.
Greek: 'anaskeuè' (E.R. 89). The counter-model is subjected to criticism, refutation. The opinion of Isokrates, i.e., as far as it is denied, is refuted. - Here is also the place for the failed forms of education, of course.

Note.-- The chreia takes into account the multiplicity of opinions (opinion poll) in Greek democracy (pluralism).

II.c. Argument
(further aspects).

Comparison -- "Sunkrisis" (E.R. 89).-- A parallel may be introduced. E.g. the vegetable man digs in the earth but brings delicious vegetables to the market.

c.2. anecdote, story.-- Here is the (common) place for the illustration (exemplification).-- "Demosthenes of Athens (-384/-322) suffered from a weak voice (in a culture without speakers), yes, was little dramaturgically (E.R. 19vv.: hypokr. ret.) inclined. But he cherished a vision of strength "to become a great orator". He learned to deliver speeches

with pebbles in his mouth (against stuttering) and, on the banks of the sea, against the roaring waves. He became one of the most famous orators of the ancient Greeks".

c.3. authority argument (testimony).

In Late Antiquity, "the ancients" (Homer, Hesiod) were e.g. spokesmen for "high" (god-given) truths. We, at the end of the twentieth century, can actualize this by looking for a statement by an authoritative person who speaks in the same sense as Isokrates.

This is what chreia means: 'usefulness'. This scheme (set of commonplaces) remains, certainly for practice, very useful until today.

The chreia (Latinized) of Afthonios of Antiocheia (+270/...).
This Deuterosophist rhetor (E.R. 88; 94) taught as follows.

A. Introduction.-- The fact or word receives a commendation.

B. Middle.-

a. Paraphrase.-- Description, yes, rewrite.

b.1. Explanation "a causa" (from the cause; verification). **b.2**. Explanation "a contrario"(from a counter model; falsification).

c.1. Comparison. "A simili" exposes a parallel. **c.2.** Applicative model (example). "Ab exemplo" is reasoned such that the fact or statement is confirmed. **c.3**. Authority argument (testimonio). "A testimonio" is reasoned.

C. Slot.-- "A brevi epilogo", from a short epilogue is further expounded. Thus e.g. "Behold the solid thesis of Isokates concerning education and its usefulness

Decision.-- The scheme of Afthonios of Antioch is evidently very faithfully a variant of the preceding exemplar. The same or nearly the same platitudes.

The Latin mnemonic formula.
A. Introduction.-- Quis? (Who acted or spoke thus?).

B. Middle -

    a. Quid? (What? Paraphrase).

b.1. Cur? (By virtue of what, i.e. by what or why?) (Verification). b.2. Contra (Counter model) (Falsification).

c.1. Simile (Analogous case , Parallel; c..2. Paradigmata (Examples). c.3. Testes (Witnesses, arguments of authority), both 'scripta' (Sayings) and 'facta' (Facts).

C. Slot. Eg. An exhortation.

Conclusion: All those who wish to write a substantial treatise today would do well to go over this old scheme, because it is a set of viewpoints that recurs "forever and ever". Moreover, it is a very balanced scheme.

Sample 30.-- Trafficking theory 11 (eristrek). (159/160)
Bibl. st.: E.W. Beth, *De wijsbegeerte der wiskunde (Van Parmenides tot Bolzano),* (The Philosophy of Mathematics (From Parmenides to Bolzano)*,* Antwerp / Nijmegen, 1944, 78/92 (Eristics and sepsis).

The School of Megara, one of the Kleinsocratic schools, is known for its eristic method. According to Beth, o.c., 84, that method of developing texts comes down to this:
a. it is a falsification or refutation method;
b. it proceeds by means of counter-models (counter-examples). According to Beth, ibid., it is "applied with great success in modern mathematics and in modern logistics". Which proves its text-forming value. Therefore, a word about it.

Zenon of Elea (-500/...),
student of Parmenides of Elea (-640/...) and an eristic applier of Parmenides' logic, gives us a first sketch of it. Aristotle puts it as follows: basically Zenon does nothing but reason in the form of "neither you nor I give a decisive proof". Cfr Beth, o.c., 19.

It comes down to this:
a. Thou, the naysayer, gives arguments but they are not conclusive;
b. I, the speaker, also give arguments but they are not decisive either.
So both propositions (opinions) are undecidable as to absolute truth for the time being.

Consequence: only restrictive sentences objectively represent the truth. For example, "In a certain sense, you are right" or "I admit: I am only right up to a point".

When making discourses, it is very useful to realize this: how decisive is my verification/falsification? How is it decisive? (existence and essence of the decisive character). This will guard against a lot of 'dogmatism' and delusion.

Karneades of Kurene (-214/-129).
Karneades situates himself in the so-called "Third Academy (-150+), known for its Skepticism, which claims that there is no decisive evidence, only probability.

As an aside, the Skepticist fallacy is in "utterly none" (i.e. all not). The content of the proposition makes sense; but its scope (range) is exaggerated.-

Karneades was a pupil of Diogenes of Babulon (-240/-152; Stoicus) and reader of Chrusippos of Kilikie (-280/-207; Stoicus). He kept himself very aloof. He was very gifted rhetorically.-- In -156 he arrived in Rome as an envoy.

He was quickly known as a brilliant speaker. He gave a two-part speech on "justice" (meaning conscientiousness). His audience was numerous including many Roman youths.

1. The first exposition.

He argues that justice is an objective reality, expressible in words like 'justice'. Cites Platon (justice is, ultimately, an idea that shows itself in righteous acts and in our concept of 'justice'), Aristotle (justice is a concept abstracted from actual righteous acts),-- the Stoics Zenon of Kition (-336/-264; founder) and Chrusippos of Kilicia (-280/-207), who believed in a righteous nature (universe).

2. The second exposition.

He argues that "justice" is only a name, a sound, which is interpreted by individual people and groups, sometimes in a different way. Above all, he emphasizes the utilitarian interpretation of "conscience", as it is often understood by Romans: the utilitarian man seeks only, or at least primarily, his own interest.

Note. - **A**. One recognizes in this a distant after-effect of Platon's aporetic method (the reasons for, the reasons against make the conversation come to no decision).

B. One recognizes also and even especially the method of the "New Academy" - skeptical in tenor - which, after the pro (verification) and the contra (falsification), arrives at 'epoche', suspensio, suspension of judgment.

Note -- Roman group dynamics.-- The theoretical effect -- especially on a number of young Romans who perceived such Skepticism as 'new' -- was like striking lightning. Also: Cato (= Marcus Porcius Cato, nicknamed 'censor' or 'the old one'(-234/-149)), known for his distrust of 'Hellenism' (of which in his eyes the subversive speech of a Karneades was the prototype), made the Senate quickly agree to the wishes of the Athenian envoy to hasten Karneades' departure.

Conclusion. - Rome was gradually drawn into the maelstrom of Scepticism. Which provoked the reaction of the conservative Romans who saw in that type of thinking a "sedition" (subversion).

They mobilized everything that still represented the "good old Rome" with all possible means. Also with regard to the opulent life that people started to lead (think of Cato's fight against wealth).

Sample 31.-- Descriptive Theory 1 (description). (161/165)

To understand a treatise one must, among the platitudes, put the description first. Therefore a couple of samples on the subject.

Bibl. st.: C. Lefèvre, *La composition littéraire*, Bruxelles, 1963-3, 300/322 (La description);

J. Gob, *Précis de littérature française*, Bruxelles, 1947, 151/154 (La description).

More recent samples: Poétique 65 (février 1986), *Raconter / représenter / décrire*;

Ph. Hamon, *Qu' est-ce qu' une description*, in: Poétique 12;--

J.Ricardou, *L'ordre des choses ou une expérience de la description méthodique*, (The order of things or an experience of methodical description,), in: Pratiques (Metz), no. spécial, 75/84;

E. Zola, *De la description*, in: *Le roman experimental* (1880), in:. E Zola, *Oeuvres complètes, x, Cercle du livre précieux*, 1968;

C. Ginzburg, *Ekphrasis and Quotation*, in: Tijdschr.v.Filos. 50 (1988): 1 (March), 3/19;

Alain Robbe-Grillet, *Temps et description dans le récit d'aujourd'hui*, in: *Pour un nouveau roman*, (Time and description in today's narrative, in: For a New Novel), in: Idées, Paris, 45.

Behold a poor sample from a crowd.

The distant origin.

According to R. Barthes, *L 'aventure sémilologique*, 148s., the 'par.ek.basis', Lat.: digressio or excursus, digression, is the origin of the 'ekfrasis' (description). Cfr E.R. 89.

In other words: in poetic, rhetorical, scientific or philosophical works, one departs from the actual theme in order ... to elaborate on a secondary theme (e.g., to elaborate on an exemplification, a refutation of a complaint or remark, even a descriptive little treatise in its own right).

An initial description.

R. Barthes, o.c., 102, notes that 'ekfrasis' (Lat.: descriptio) is "a fragment (from an anthology)

Note: better true 'platitude' - applicable in a multitude of cases situated in a context (story e.g.)". He adds: "The description is a representation of e.g. a landscape (place) or of e.g. a character (note: portrait)".

Note -- We'll keep two details in mind: platitude and rendering.

The description as a display.

Whether it is part of a wider context or existing in itself (possibly practiced for its own sake), the description reflects the existence / essence, possibly elaborated to the circumstances specific to a theme.

G.J. Warnock, *Qualities*, in: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1967, 18, 914/916, says that the term 'poiotès', property or trait, was created by Platon and translated into Latin by M. Tullius Cicero (-106/ -43; the great Roman orator and thinker) by 'qualitas'. Cfr. Platon's Theaitetos 182a.-- 'attribute' in that very broad sense then means all that makes something distinguishable from the rest (beings - trait of existence). Translatable by terms such as characteristic, characteristic, singularity etc.m..

In this broad sense the term refers to what can be ascribed to something in a description. To describe is to "put into words the characteristics of something".

Note -- **1.** The Platonic term is broader than the present logician's: the present mathematical logic sets 'property' against e.g. 'relation'. So e.g.: "The earth is bigger than the moon" expresses, for the logician, a relation - not a 'property' -, whereas it expresses, for the Platonist, a 'property'. Thus, seen Platonically, "Liesje is the daughter of Hendrik" is the expression of a relational attribute or 'property' of Liesje (and of Hendrik).

2. The Platonic term "property" - according to Warnock - also means, among other things, a value attribute or property. "This reading is good for a young girl" thus expresses an axiological (value attribute) property proper to "this reading".

Conclusion.-- To describe relations, to render value judgments in a description of them is, Platonic, thus possible.

Profiling.
Profile' means, among other things, 'outline, outline of something (object, face), seen from the side'. In geography (the profile of a landscape as a layered reality), in psychology (the mental profile of someone depicted in a curve representing tests of intelligence) the term is common.

But look: "A waspish waist, a smile of submission, keeping meekly still! This is how Pagnol, the film maker, conjures up a generation of timid women before our eyes with his Augustine". A women's magazine will also refer to this as a 'profile'! But then there is practically no difference anymore between 'profiling' and description.

From defining to describing.
E.R. 147.-- There we described "definition" as "enumerating the properties that represent the content of an idea (concept).

But then there is no longer an essential difference between defining and describing! Defining is, the shortest possible description of the essence, the qualities that distinguish it from the rest. To describe is to give the same definition more extensively,

A definition.-- "The description the verbal circumstantial representation of a (sensory) fact" (C. Lefèvre, o.c. 300).

We intentionally put the terms "sensory" in parentheses. Why? Because, by inserting these two words, Lefèvre gives only a private, and not a universal, definition: he is talking about one type of description. After all, one can describe all kinds of things,--even non-sensory data!

Note.-- Phraseological definition.-- A.-F. Greimas, *Cours de sémantique* (1964), says that "the story is one long elaborated sentence - 'phrase' -. This can be said with equal right of the description (which is shown by the fact that it can be summarized in one sentence).

Phenomenological.-- Phenomenology, in the sense of 'intentional' phenomenology, will say that the act of description has three articulations.

a. the descriptive subject, which represents something,

b. the described object, which is displayed,

c. the description itself, i.e. the representation, constitutes a structure, i.e. the intentional structure of description as an act.

Note.-- Perspective.-- By 'perspective' one may mean "the angle of view, point of interpretation, which governs description".

Thus the Husserlian prefers to describe as an individual, introspectively attuned to what he wishes to represent. While the Marxist prefers to represent the same thing from e.g. a class struggle point of view. Whereupon Positivist, the real one, describes "as objectively and factually as possible", preferably verifiable by other "firmly" (= positive) minded fellow men, who constitute the class of scientists.

Note.-- In all these points of view there is one-another at work, but governed each time by a different point of view ('perspective' called,-- to use a term cherished by Nietzsche).

Fundamentally, any one-unique view is supported by a perspective and ... therefore to be taken restrictively.

Unity and richness.-- Case-wise, object-wise; for one-an unequivocal description is the good description. C. Ansotte, *Traité pratique de rédaction et d' élocution*, (Practical treaty of writing and elocution,), Dour, 1910, 61, sees two aspects.

a. the totality. - "Making the choice of details - 'circumstances' - subordinate to the overall impression" makes the description show unity (and respect the given and the requested).

b. The alternation of details gives the representation its richness, which demands diversity - multitude. Ansotte: preferably paint the partial impressions new, original (E.R. 136)! The subject is then powerfully exposed in its characteristics, i.e. its essential features. What is said about it, "makes it appear".

To render the totality of the given circumstance demands unity-in-the-multitude.

The description of a valuation.
Bibl. st.: J. Ruytinx, *La morale et les sciences* in: Philosophica Gandensia (Meppel), New Series 10 (1972), 1/12.

David Hume (1711/1776; top figure of the English Enlightenment) as an Empiricist enlightener stated that one cannot derive ethics (meaning: value judgments of conscience) from merely positive or 'empirical' facts.

As an aside, this separation between fact and value is resurrected in the Philosophy of Language Analysis.

More logically expressed: from presuppositions (indicative prepositions) which contain only positively determined things, normative postpositions never arise.

Note.-- **a.** If concept content correct. **b.** If concept scope or range incorrect because exaggerated.-- In other words: not always true.

Max Scheler (1874/1928; value phenomenologist) stated: "There is an original intentional feeling (of values)". There really is an 'original' - i.e. not reducible to anything else - sense of value.

Appl. model. -- Regret/ remorse/ contrition. -- Fact: I cheated on a friend. I was, out of 'shame' obliged to conceal from him a blameworthy attitude and act where he was involved (I had defaced his wife).

Appreciation. - He discovered it. I regretted it (regretted the discovery that was detrimental to me). Later on that deed seemed 'mean' to me: I felt remorse (for a conscientious person would not do such a thing). Until I decided to correct it: I came to true repentance.

Note the three types of value apprehension or, better, value perception. In regret I regret the disadvantage as a selfish being. In remorse, however, I regret as a being gifted with conscience who passively undergoes the unworthiness. In remorse I now regret as a conscientious being actively repenting.-- Regret is pre-ethical. Remorse and repentance are ethical.

Note: Sentence summary and sentence foundation.

In all three attitudes I catch the phrase "It was reprehensible". But into them add perspectives that create a variant: selfish (regret), ethically sensitive but not yet active (remorse), ethically sensitive but already enterprising (recovering remorse). Three phrases in the same sentence.

As an aside: sentence foundations are many! I can deny the remorse (consciously suppress it or repress it unconsciously). I can become enraged at this remorse which I cannot deny, and at the feeling of it and at myself as an immoral being. I can become dejected by it, let myself go. I can also accept it (and thus come to true repentance).

Well, all this can be represented in descriptive sentences. These are the basis of truly ethical conduct and its justification.

In denial, anger, dejection, regret there is a separation between fact and (ethical) value. In remorse, especially once it is 'accepted' - meaning integrated, internalized - (and repented of), there is no longer a separation between (ethical) value and fact. So Hume was partly wrong in his exaggerated Empiricism on this point.

Description is not an explanation.

To describe is to grasp the given, the theme, purely,--by eliminating everything that is not immediately given. Once again: the theme (thematology; E.R. 138) is decisive. Pure perception and nothing but that! A theory about the theme, a tradition about it,--- they do not come into play here. The I that perceives, with its reactions,-- does not come into play. If one begins Husserlian, even the existence outside my act of observation does not come into it!

Conclusion. - If you want to describe well, eliminate everything that is not strictly given. Otherwise you will lapse into non-descriptive sentences where the request was for a mere description. You see: the platitudes "given/requested" control everything.

32.-- Descriptive theory 2 (typology).

We summarize the definition of description once more: given is a given (note the repetition); asked is that given in so far as given (as given; E.RH . 142v.) show.

Note.-- One sees it: the ontology 'reality theory' overrides everything! The descriptive says of the given how real it is (whether it is real: existence) and how it is real (what kind of reality it is: essence). - We shall see that the narrative, the account and certainly the treatise exhibit precisely the same 'descriptive' basis.

Types.

First a citation.-- B. Vouilloux, *Le tableau (Description et peinture),*(The painting (Description and painting),), *in: Poétique 65 (Raconter, représenter, décrire),* 1986: février, 1/18.

The author refers to G. Genette, *Introduction,* in: P. Fontanier, *Les figures du discours,* Paris, 1977, 16, where Genette says that traditional rhetoric has six main types of description.

We rank them as follows:

a. as a pure description: painting (= tableau),-- parallel;

b. as a description of something: topography (description of landscape),-- prosopography (description of view) and ethopoeia (description of interiority), of which portrait is the aggregate (showing both view and interiority of something) (what O. Willmann calls 'characteristic').

Note -- Fontanier adds a seventh type, namely chronography (time description).

Short and to the point.

There are two ways to represent a data.

a. In brief manner. - A 'hupografè', sketch or characteristic, presents the essential main features in a -- at least -- essential way. Thus e.g. Platon, *Politeia* 504d (also 548d; Laws 737d), where he briefly 'sketches' the justice of the soul itself. As A.R. Henderickx, *The justice in Platons The State*, in: Tijdschr.v.Phil. 6 (1944): 1/2, 82, says: the sketch is more than a definition, but less than a treatise. It is a 'trace', 'profile; abridged.

b. Circumstantial. - So e.g. when L. Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, New York, 1934, or Jer. Rifkin/T. Howard, *Entropy (A New World View)*, N.Y.,1980, speak of the Middle Ages living world:

a. natural landscape (predominant feature: "forests with people") and

b. cultural landscape (wood was used as a fuel, as a tool and material,-- for everything), -everything is forest and wood,-- broadly elaborated.

Sample 33.-- Descriptive Theory 3 (models). (167/168)

We will now consider some typical models. We begin with the 'pictorial' description. First a poetic form of it.

Bertolt Brecht (1898/1956; playwright) left us the following.

"*Die Maske des Bösen*. (The Mask of Evil.), -- An meiner Wand hängt ein japanisches Holzwerk, / Maske eines bösen Demons bemalt mit Goldlack./ Mitfühlend sehe ich / die geschwollenen Stirnadern, andeutend, / wie anstrengend es ist, böse zu sein".

Approximate translation: "The mask of evil.-- On my wall hangs a Japanese wooden sculpture, / Mask of an evil demon, painted with gold lacquer. / Compassionately I see / the swollen veins of the forehead, the sign of it / how much effort it takes to be angry."

Note. - It is a descriptive poem. With a few draws "one sees the wooden mask come to mind". In French "tableau", in Dutch best "painting". -- also "painting hypotuposis." 'Hupotuposis' is sketch, characterization, profiling.

According to C. Ginzburg, *Ekphrasis and Quotation* in: T.v.Phil. 50 (1980:1 (Mar), 11, "the purpose of ekphrasis is description, 'enargeia', lat.: evidentia (also: demonstratio, inlustratio) i.e. to show as immediately present a fact,--with the effect of 'truthfulness' " .

The term 'enargeia' (enargès) -- in Homer, *Iliad* 20:131 and *Odusseia* 16:161 -- is said of the tangible presence of a deity. One might even sometimes translate the term 'enargès' by 'shining', -- so evident is what 'enargès' is.

In other words: that which is not directly perceptible is, by means of the 'painting', pushed under the eyes in such a way that it is almost as if it is directly perceptible present. That is how 'lively' the representation is!

One form of this is situating oneself in the midst of the given. Think of the student who says, long before his examination: "I can already see me succeeding". Or still: "I can already see me living it!" (says the working-class man who can handle this image well).

Famous is the painting by Matin Luther King (1929/1968; 1964 Nobel Peace Prize winner): "I have a dream" (in which he recites his dream so vividly that it gives the impression that racial equality and peace are already here).

Note.-- Nicolas Boileau-Déspreaux (Boileau for short, 1636/1711) depicts the time of the Flabby kings (the last Merovingians, up to 752) in the following verse:

"Quatre bœufs attelé, d'un pas tranquille et lent, promenaient dans Paris le monarque indolent". (Translated: "Four oxen in a span - with slow stride - led in Paris the flabby autocrat around).

Note.-- Look at the method: two partial impressions that together create a total impression! The ox is a slow animal, compared to the temper of the horse. The monk is also slow: both elements fit together! One feels the slowing down! A whole political era is characterized in this verse.

The parallel.

Cfr E.R. 89 (157).-- The 'sunkrisis' or comparison is, among the Archaic Greeks, well known. A. Rivier, *études de littérature grecque*, Geneva, Droz, 1975, 115s., 348ss., e.g. points out.

The comparison - not to be confused with 'equivalence' - is "un agent de connaissance" (a knowing factor).

Appl. model.-- We abide in the sphere of evil demons;- Euagrios of Ibora (Pontos) (345/399; Church Father - Platonicus), *Treatise on Prayer*, 50, says what follows.-

"What is the purpose of demons when they cause insatiable appetites, sex cravings, possessiveness, fits of rage, feelings of revenge and other passionate states in us? Their purpose is to burden our minds to such an extent that they are not suitable for the desired prayer. For the passions - characteristic of the spiritless part of our nature - as soon as they become dominant, do not allow our spirit to develop as it should and turn to God's Wisdom (note: Jesus as the Second Person of the Trinity).

Note -- We compare with the text of B. Brecht: the effort of the evil life catches Brecht's eye, via the Japanese work of art; with Euagrios it is the life of lust, the libertine indulgence, that catches the eye.

Both descriptions complement each other. One illuminates the other and completes the picture we can form of "all that is angry". One can also say that both texts together are partial impressions (partial perceptions) that converge to a total impression (total perception).

Do we do as the gifted do: read and reread both descriptions without nervousness, calmly, - sitting comfortably and relaxed, - attentively looking at both texts first as a whole (total impression), - losing ourselves in both texts (forgetting the world around us), - slowly walking over. The evil - all that is evil - will come to mind.

Sample 34.-- Descriptive Theory 4 (models). (169/176)

Again, we dwell on the description itself.-- - Nikolai Gogoly (1809/1852; Russian novelist) is known for a rare duality. On the one hand, one constantly suspects an ideal reality derived from his Orthodox faith and the Eastern - Greek Church Fathers. On the other hand, his depiction of people and things is one of degraded realities of all kinds. On the one hand, God's high and shining ideas; on the other hand, the laughably tragic caricatures of these high ideas. - Hence the "weeping laughter" of Gogolj, as a connoisseur, Leo Kobbilinski-Ellis, puts it, is characteristic of the "realism" of Gogolj.

Naturalism.

Idealization, such as that of Gogoly's Orthodox faith, is for the naturalist "escape from harsh reality". One of the forms of degraded literature is miserabilism (German: Elendmalerei, misery painting). One dwells so much on the sinful-failed side of life and our cultural landscape that one drowns in it.

Another form is more recent: cynical literature, which goes one step further than the naturalistic literature of the 19th century. Thinkers such as the three "critical Materialists" (as Paul Ricoeur labels them), K. Marx (economic-social degradation), Fr. Nietzsche (cultural degradation), S. Freud (depth-psychological degradation), have, with their contemporary naturalism, paved the way for the current cynicism which "degrades" (deconstructs) all higher ideas, ideals and values.

Note.-- Again:

a. as a conceptual content, naturalism, miserabilism, cynicism is a piece of reality;

b. as a scale that piece of reality is limited. Whoever would only stick to the image of man and the world of degradation, would get a very one-sided view of the total reality.

You see, the question is always: how real is degradation? How exactly is it real?

Model. Frech (Frankfurt am Main) 7, 51.-- We just read.-- "Marcia, the girl of the night.-- She has something of the cats. Dark and full of secrets... Like many cats Marcia only becomes active at night. The hours after dark are the element where she feels at home.

"Even as a teenager - she still remembers, now that she is 21 - I was someone who really dabbled in the night. -- So it's not since she's been a barmaid in a bar -- in an "Exclusive Club" in London -- that the night has been her element.

"This, to the great sorrow of my mother in particular, who was filled with worry until, as midnight passed, I drifted up again. Which made me promise to do better every time.

But the sea of light that is the metropolis attracted me again and again - "magnetically", Marcia says - and held me in its grip. Where the illuminated signs of the entertainment industry - of clubs and bars and discos - turned night into day, there, for me, was "true life". I just couldn't sit quietly at home anymore as soon as I realized that 'out there' there was laughter, drinking, living, eroticism.

Between dawn and dusk, labor, feverish pursuit, stress, pursuit of career and success, livelihood and money determine the course of time.-- But... then suddenly the offices and the business close. And the doors of the premises and amusements open.

But perhaps the main reason for my hiding at night is that I was brought up in a poor, pathetic, ugly part of London. Where - frankly - daytime life was not a pretty sight.

In addition, my parents split up after a quarrel and there was no 'harmonious family life'. -

Note.-- **1.** Platonically speaking, this description of misery is crystal clear: also in Platon's psychology the night is central. The nightdream with its unscrupulous aspect, - the crime, the tyrant's abuse of power, etc. arise in the drifting life of nightdreams where no limits are imposed by day; the nocturnal partying - as in Sicily - of the social upper class (la dolce vita).

2. The 'enargeia', evidentia, works in the text: its author situates you in the midst of the nocturnal London of the entertainment companies and this in the person of one of its members.

3. The parallel works: as the cats are nocturnal creatures, so is the 'predatory' Marcia!

4. The parallel understood as contrast is also present: the 'glitter' (the arts and crafts) of the night businesses stands in stark contrast to the dark squalor of the impoverished suburbs that Marcia has left behind her.

Fantastic -
We now turn to another sphere that is also open to description, namely fantastic literature.

Bibl. st. Fr. Rottensteiner, *The Fantasy Book (An Illustrated History from Dracula to Tolkien),* New York, 1978,--in which we draw particular attention to *The Demonic Vision of H. P. Lovecraft* (o.c., 74/77);

U.Carl, Hrsg. *Geister, Gespenster und Vampire (Die unheimlichsten Grusel- und Spukgeschichten der Weltliteratur),* (Ghosts, Ghouls, and Vampires (The Scariest Scary and Haunting Stories in World Literature)), Munich, Blanvalet, 1978 (The great horror writers). So far a small sample from a mass of texts.

As specimen we can mention e.g. Bram Stoker (1837/1912), Dracula (1897);
Guy Endore (1900/1970), *The Werewolf of Paris* 1933. These two seem to us to be the most characteristic and also well written. Another one is W. McGivern, *Night of the Juggler* (1975).

Also: Angela Carter, *In company of wolves*, Amsterdam, Contact, 1985 (with a strong Sadian slant, of course), which gives smaller-scale stories - horror stories, of course.

A particularly creepy atmosphere can be found in the myth of Cthulhu, which was used by Lovecraft as a background for the texts. For that purpose it is best to be familiar with *H.P. Lovecraft e.a., Necronomicon*, Paris, Belfond, 1979 (a particularly perplexing book containing some eighteen pages of an Arabic text from the 730s,-- with introductions and reflections).

See also Fr. Rottenheimer, *The Fantasy Book*, 80/81 (The Cthulhu Mythos). Lovecraftt's 'myth' - a real myth, by the way - deals with ferocious and unscrupulous creatures from a prehistoric age which have been driven from our earth but threaten to return time and again (a kind of eschatology or end-time doctrine).

The wonderful and the strange.
Christine Brooke-Rose, *A Rhetoric of the Unreal (Studies in Narrative and Structure, Especially of the Fantastic),* Cambridge, 1983, argues, on the subject of fantasy, with Tzvetan Todorov (E.R. 143), that the fantastic ("the unreal") exhibits two main types, namely the uncanny and the marvellous.

This, while in "science fiction" the mundane-actual merges with the fantastic.

As an aside: the book talks about e.g. *Tolkien, Lord of the Rings*,-- Vonnegut/ McElroy (science fiction stories),-- the French "Nouveau Roman"(Robbe

Grillet, N. Sarraute),-- the more recent 'Metafiction'.-- all narrative prose.

Ernst Jünger (1895/1998), a.o. *Der Arbeiter* (1931), in which the so-called magic realism is expressed, and Frederik Van Eeden (1860/1932), a.o. *De kleine Johannes* (The little John), (1885 (1), 1905/1906 (II/III)), in which the miraculous - a.o. in the children's world - is discussed. Children, after all, especially before the age of twelve, tend to live in the world of nature spirits and the like.

Model.-- Stevens W. Mosher, *Journey to the Forbidden China*, New Work, London, 1985 (o.a. 42ff.).

Note.-- Traditional rhetoric has as a commonplace "locus amoenus", pleasure house (something in the nature of 'paradeisos' (pleasure garden with plants and animal park), 'paradise', e.g. from Xenophon of Athens (-427/-355; Socratieker)).

The author arrives in southern China (Kwangsi province, west of Canton). He describes how what first appears as a romantic idyll is in fact a copy of the Maoist-Marxist system.

The settlements here were more dispersed in this highly incised landscape, and the roads rarely brought us close to them, but in one place where the road makes a sudden turn, I detected a village. Far below us, caught in the curve of a roaring stream. A small corner of the world, tucked away far from the rest.

(...). Enclosed as it was, the village seemed to be something that existed entirely on its own,--a magical, enchanted world of some twenty sturdily built, sun-dried bricks ('adoba').

We were only twenty miles from Wuchow, but we felt as if we were far away in time and space. Only the wires of the electric net, stretched along the river, testified of the century in which we live. The rest seemed like a window opening onto a distant past.

The whole thing was a feast of colors. In the pale blue of the sky a brilliant-white cumulus cloud nestled and slowly slid by. In soft, blue-green droves the mountains drifted away,-- passed the group of posters from the river, which wound sea-green around the garden slopes. Purple-stemmed sugarcane fields together with radiant--green cereal stalks formed a checkerboard in whose center was a

giant square of red and ochre yellow -- the village -- could be seen. People with nut-brown faces and dressed in black moved in it, -- slowly and with the appearance of peasant figures in ceramics.

The whole landscape was one splendor with a visual impression of deep peace. This was the right place to go through the parabola of human existence - birth, engagement, childbirth, raising children, old age, death - while living: the secure atmosphere of a small village. One came naturally under the spell of this blue-green solitude in eastern Kwangsi (...). -- So much for the idyllic part.

Now the contrivance. What appeared to be a masterpiece of form, composition and color from the vantage point from which I admired it, would undoubtedly take on a very different appearance once I entered the village. This matter-of-fact consideration brought me back to the world of sober reality, within which this village would amount to "a village like any other".

And yet, for a certain period of time, I had lived through the village as if immersed in perfectly clear tranquility,--a quality which, although I realized it was an illusion, nevertheless continued to fascinate me. An 'image' - the romantic notion of an 'idyll' - had distracted me.

Fleeing into a life of rural simplicity within a closed community while dreaming is an important part of the fantasy life of today's Western world.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who lived in a Europe of peasants (E.R. 152), ennobled "the savages" while musing on the Hobbesian-barren realities of tribal life.

(*Note*: Thomas Hobbes (1588/1679; English Enlightenment rationalist, known for his *Leviathan* (1651), a picture of the police state).

Western man, living the oppressive stove of the age of electronics, sees peasant life in a 'romantic' way -- at least from a distance, forgetting or suppressing the fact that the so-called nature man is often trapped in poverty, driven by work, undermined by illness. (...).

The appearance of seclusion of this village was a deception, a ruse of its location. Units of the Red Army had, during the last days of the civil war, crossed the region (...). Young cadres had come, in the early fifties, to help the rich

and collectivize the poor. Red Guards had, in the late sixties (***note:*** the 'cultural revolution'), come here to destroy the statues of deities and the memorial plates of the ancestors.

This hamlet was a 'production team', part of a 'production brigade', which in turn was part of a 'commune'. For here, too, the 'production' of maize and sugar cane "follows the central plan". However pristine and secluded this settlement may have seemed, it was - unmistakably - the furthest reach of the leash of power in the hands of Beijing (Bejing)."

Model.-- The bizarre.-- The term 'bizarre' - derived from the Spanish 'bizarro' (magnanimous) - is difficult to translate: **a.** whimsical-fantastic, **b.** unsavory, alienating. Preferably the two meanings in one.

The term becomes from along to more applicable to a certain literature.-- One of the works that first, in Modern or even Postmodern Europe, interpreted the bizarre is *Révéroni Saint-Cyr, Pauliska ou la Perversité moderne (Memoires d' une Polonaise)*, (Pauliska or modern perversity (Memoirs of a Polish woman)), Paris, Desjanquères, 1991. The work dates from 1798. It is the memoir of a Polish noblewoman who flees from the Russian invaders and wanders from one country to another. In the process she became the victim of "a bizarre series of vicissitudes".

a. The duality "sentimentalism/ cynicism" stands out. But a cynicism that involves madness. A madness that is attached to (what is called) "the sects of the Illuminates" and of their adherents of all kinds, who are depicted as "dangerous madmen". These fanatics of "the machine" are interconnected all over Europe, members of a secret society, universally ramified but elusive.

b. It is also noteworthy that "the naive and happy innocence" is a particular point of attraction for "the absurd systems", typical of the Illuminates. Innocent children and women are especially targeted.

c. Especially noticeable is that two traits characterize the absurd systems:

a./ an institutional analysis or social critique that "undermine in almost all peoples the foundations of morality and society" in a subversion;

b./ a group dynamic that crushes like a troll all that deviates from the ideal - the system - of the Illuminates.

d. Also central is the critique of science: Baron von Olnitz who is a convinced Materialist, style XVIII century, embodies the perverse form of scientific experimentalism: he does "human engineering" (manipulating people).

By means of all kinds of bizarre tools and techniques - including the machine that captures the life force - le fluid - of beautiful women and accumulates it, as well as of children - he wants to cause sexual enjoyment, yes, create eternal youth. All this on the background of a dark occultism.

An excerpt: the bizarre system builder von Olnitz.

O.c., 125.-- Die von Olnitz a great magnetizer, amidst all his concoctions, exhibits a firm and persistent character. He torments and tortures innocence: calculating the various degrees or transitions of one torment after another in that innocence makes him "happy.

Yet one would be wrong to call him a mean villain, he torments to study,-- to experiment to test the degree of truth of "his system."

The man possesses a fanatical fearlessness that arouses indignation. Yet this fearlessness is more that of a stray than of a depraved man.

This is so true that he deludes himself into thinking that his victims - including Pauliska - will in time be grateful to him for these torments. He also tries to instill this conviction in his victims.

Look: as someone who can control himself, in the midst of his excesses he is able to control them as he pleases and when he pleases.

It is true that the body of "his beautiful Pauliska" - his eyes devouring her feminine magic - serves to live through the endless series generated by the intoxication of his most light-hearted fits. Yet he suddenly rejects any timid beginnings of lust that would betray only himself as an individual, and expects the one he initiates to share his pleasures especially before giving himself over to them. Yes, he postpones his peak of pleasure until the moment that the victim's hour of desire arrives.

Von Olnitz is a mixture of bizarre behavior and cruelty. Yet he is cruel only because he is bizarre. And bizarre he is because the adepts of the learned society have confused his thinking (...).

There is not a single detail in all that he does, in all that he says, that does not fit in with the set of original characteristics of "homme à système" (system builder) : he would rather sacrifice the world and himself than to abandon one of his practices or one of the maxims of his imagination.

This is a description - an ethopoeia (inner representation) - which reminds one of a current type of developed people who link cynicism to bizarreness: their number is increasing. In 1798 the author of Pauliska had a kind of premonition of this.

The question arises whether ... the term "Illuminates" as it is used in the book, has a connection with the Illuminati germaniae, the Illuminates of Bavaria, founded by Adam Weishaupt (1748/1830; professor at the university of Ingolstadt).

People tell a lot about them: a.o. that they were Anarchists (predecessors of Bakunin and Kropotkin e.g.), but of typical German-Germanic allure.

It is also said that they still partly control e.g. the record companies which publish pop music. Cfr P. Mariel, dir., *Dictionnaire des sociétés secrètes en occident*, Paris, 1971, 260 (*Illuminés de Bavière*); 318 (*Les Illuminés de Bavière*);

H. Masson, *Dictionnaire initiatique*, Paris, 1970, 244 (*Illuminés de Bavière*), where it is stated that the order was founded on 01.05.1776 and suppressed by royal order in 1785.

Whether this coincides with the Illuminates as described in Pauliska is undecidable, for now. Perhaps they constitute some sort of background information.

Note.-- As noted, the work parallels the works of le marquis de Sade (1740/1814).

E. De Smet*, De Sade: dead or alive*?, in 'Streven 1991: dec., 230/238, says that de Sade himself suffered from 'algolagnia', "a neurosis which combines lust with cruelty", but that strictly speaking he was not a 'sadist' (whatever is said of him). The bizarre eccentricities of de Sade are mere 'fantasies', imagined things. Fantasms! This Libertine exhibits a typically Modern structure: he is a shameless pornographer but in a manner typical of the Enlightened intellectual (Materialist in tenor).

What we still see in our days -- more and more. With Platon we say: such a literature is expert, but does it testify to conscience?